Latin American Public Opinion Project

Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina
The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998

by:

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Contents

List of Figures ............................ 4

Introduction and Executive Summary ............................ 10

Chapter I: Methodology and Sample Characteristics ......................... 18
  Sample Design ............................................. 18
  Sample Weights ........................................... 23
  Sample Distribution ....................................... 26
  Sample Characteristics ..................................... 28
    Comparisons with Census Data ............................ 28
    Key Demographic Characteristics ........................ 29
    Key Socio-Economic Characteristics ..................... 31
    Ethnicity ................................................. 37
    Employment ............................................. 44
  Analysis Plan ............................................. 44

Chapter II. ................................................. 46
  System Support ........................................... 46
    The Theory and the Measurement .......................... 46
    Comparisons with Other Countries ....................... 50
  Factors that Influence Political Support ..................... 52
    Demographic Factors ................................. 53
    Socio-Economic Status (Education and Income) ............ 54
    Geographic Factors ..................................... 56
    Ethnicity and Religion ................................. 60
    Ideology and Political Preference ........................ 64
    An Overall Model of System Support in Bolivia ............. 69
  Institutional Support ..................................... 70
  Conclusions ............................................. 73

Chapter III. Political Tolerance .................................. 74
  Overall and Comparative Levels of Tolerance ..................... 77
  Correlates of Tolerance ................................... 79
  System Support and Tolerance ................................ 86
  Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia ... 89
  Departmental Distribution of Support for Democracy ............ 92
  Other Measures of Political Tolerance ........................ 95
  Conclusions ............................................. 98

Chapter IV. Civil Society Participation ............................. 99
  Levels of Participation ................................... 100
  Determinants of Civil Society Participation .................... 102
Gender ................................................................. 103  
Age ............................................................... 104  
Size of Community ............................................. 106  
Geographic Location .......................................... 109  
Ethnicity ............................................................ 112  
Family Size ........................................................ 113  
Demand-Making Participation ................................ 114  
Frequency of Demand-Making .............................. 115  
Determinants of Demand-Making ......................... 118  
Civil Society Participation .................................... 118  
Gender ............................................................ 118  
Age ............................................................... 119  
Geographic Location .......................................... 120  
Ethnicity ............................................................ 121  
Family Size ........................................................ 123  
Does Civil Society Participation Lead to Action? .... 124  
Links Between Civil Society, Tolerance and System Support 136  
A Multivariate Model of Civil Society Participation ...... 139  
Conclusions ........................................................ 140  

Chapter V. Citizens and Local Government ................. 142  
Level of Participation ............................................. 144  
Gender ............................................................ 145  
Urban/Rural Differences ..................................... 146  
Departmental Differences .................................... 148  
Age and Family Size .......................................... 151  
Socio-Economic Status ........................................ 152  
Ethnicity ............................................................ 153  
A Reexamination of the DDPC Sample .................... 153  
A Multivariate Model of Participation in Municipal Meetings 155  
Municipal Participation and Democracy .................... 156  
Various Other Forms of Local Government Participation 162  
Satisfaction with Municipal Services ...................... 168  
Legitimacy of Local Government ............................ 174  
Conclusions ........................................................ 178  

Chapter VI. Administration of Justice ......................... 180  
Victimization in Bolivia ........................................ 180  
Impact of Victimization ....................................... 182  
Who Are the Victims of Crime? ............................ 184  
Views of the Justice System .................................. 187  
Reporting Crime ................................................ 187  
Satisfaction with the Authorities ............................ 194  
Factors Related to Satisfaction with the Police and Judiciary 198
Introduction and Executive Summary

Alternative Systems of Representation ........................................ 201
Discrimination ........................................................................... 204
Corruption ................................................................................ 205
Conclusions .............................................................................. 207

Chapter VII. Support for Anti-Democratic Measures ...................... 209
  Support for Coup D’Etats .......................................................... 209
    Who Supports a Coup? ............................................................. 213
      Demographic factors ............................................................ 213
      Geography .......................................................................... 215
      Income ................................................................................ 216
    Political Tolerance and System Support .................................. 217
    Ethnicity and Ideology ........................................................... 218
    Victimization ......................................................................... 220
  Overall Model of Support for a Coup ......................................... 221
  Support for Civil Disobedience .................................................. 222
    Predictors of Civil Disobedience ............................................. 223
      An Index of Civil Disobedience .............................................. 223
      Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors .......................... 224
      Geography .......................................................................... 227
    Tolerance, System Support and Approval of Civil Disobedience ... 229
    Ideology ................................................................................ 230
    Support for Coups and Approval of Civil Disobedience ............. 231
  Overall Multivariate Models ...................................................... 233
Conclusions .............................................................................. 235

Questionnaire: ........................................................................... 236
List of Figures

**Figure I.1** Map of Bolivia: Distribution of Sample by Department ........................................ 27
**Figure I.2** Income and Urban/Rural Residence .............................................................. 33
**Figure I.3** Income Urban/Rural Residence and Gender ..................................................... 34
**Figure I.4** Indicators of Wealth ......................................................................................... 35
**Figure I.5** Wealth Urban/Rural Residence and Gender ...................................................... 36
**Figure I.6** Ethnic Self-Identification .................................................................................... 38
**Figure I.7** Ethnicity, Wealth and Gender .............................................................................. 39
**Figure I.8** Ethnicity, Education and Gender ......................................................................... 40
**Figure I.9** Language(s) Spoken While Growing Up ............................................................ 42
**Figure I.10** Dress and Gender ............................................................................................. 42
**Figure I.11** Dress and Wealth .............................................................................................. 43
**Figure I.12** Dress and Education .......................................................................................... 43
**Figure II.1** System Support in Bolivia, Core Items ................................................................ 50
**Figure II.2** System Support, Core Items: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ......................... 52
**Figure II.3** Political Support/Alienation and Gender .......................................................... 53
**Figure II.4** Political Support/Alienation and Age ............................................................... 54
**Figure II.5** Political Support/Alienation and Education ...................................................... 55
**Figure II.6** Political Support/Alienation and Income .......................................................... 56
**Figure II.7** Political Support/Alienation and Urban/Rural Residence .................................... 57
**Figure II.8** Map of Bolivia: Political Support/Alienation, Variation by Department ................. 60
**Figure II.9** Political Support/Alienation and Language ....................................................... 61
**Figure II.10** Political Support/Alienation and Religion ....................................................... 63
**Figure II.11** Political Support/Alienation and Attendance At Religious Services .................. 64
**Figure II.12** Distribution of Sample by Ideology ............................................................... 65
**Figure II.13** Political Support/Alienation and Ideology ...................................................... 66
**Figure II.14** Political Support-Alienation and Evaluation Of Government Performance ............ 67
**Figure II.15** Political Support/Alienation and Presidential Vote, 1997 .................................... 68
**Figure II.16** Political Support/Alienation and Knowledge Of Single-Member District Representative .................................................. 69
**Figure II.17** Institutional Support: All Variables .................................................................... 72
**Figure III.1** Political Tolerance: Overall Levels .................................................................. 77
**Figure III.2** Political Tolerance: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ..................................... 78
**Figure III.3** Tolerance and Education: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ......................... 80
**Figure III.4** Tolerance and Ethnic Self-Identification .......................................................... 82
**Figure III.5** Map of Bolivia: Variation in Political Tolerance by Department ......................... 83
**Figure III.6** Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ............ 91
**Figure III.7** Percent of Population Supportive of Democracy by Department ....................... 93
**Figure III.8** Map of Bolivia: Percentage of Population Supportive of Democracy .................. 94
Figure III.9 Opposition to the Suppression of Democratic Liberties: and Education--Bolivia in Comparative Perspective .................................................. 97
Figure IV.1 Civil Society Participation by Group ........................................... 101
Figure IV.2 Civil Society Participation:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ......................................................... 102
Figure IV.3 Civil Society Participation and Gender ........................................ 104
Figure IV.4 Civil Society Participation and Age ............................................ 105
Figure IV.5 Civil Society Participation (total index) and Age ......................... 106
Figure IV.6 Civil Society Participation by
Size of Community .................................................................................. 107
Figure IV.7. Civil Society Participation (total index) and Size of Community ..... 108
Figure IV.8. Civil Society Participation by Size of Community: Divergent Patterns 109
Figure IV.9. Civil Society Participation by Department ................................. 111
Figure IV.10 Civil Society Participation and Indian/Western Dress .................. 113
Figure IV.11 Civil Society Participation and
Number of Children ................................................................................ 114
Figure IV.12 Demand-making: Frequency .................................................... 116
Figure IV.13 Demand-Making:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ............................................................ 117
Figure IV.14 Civil Society Participation and Demand-Making ...................... 118
Figure IV.15 Demand-making and Gender ................................................... 119
Figure IV.16 Demand-making and Age ....................................................... 120
Figure IV.17 Demand-Making and Size of Community ................................ 121
Figure IV.18 Demand-making and
Ethnic Self-Identification ........................................................................ 123
Figure IV.19 Demand-making and Children ................................................ 124
Figure IV.20 Worked to Resolve Community Problem ............................... 125
Figure IV.21 Personal Contributions to
Solving Community Problems:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ......................................................... 126
Figure IV.22 Church Participation and Voluntarism ..................................... 127
Figure IV.23 Church Group Participation and
Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......................................... 128
Figure IV.24 School Group Participation and
Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......................................... 129
Figure IV.25 Community Development Association Participation and
Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......................................... 130
Figure IV.26 Professional Association Participation and
Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......................................... 131
Figure IV.27 Union Participation and
Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......................................... 132
Figure IV.28 Cooperative Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem ................. 133
Figure IV.29 Civic Committee Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem ............. 134
Figure IV.30 Juntas Vecinales Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem .......... 135
Figure IV.31 OTB Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem ......................... 136
Figure IV.32 Community Development Association Participation, System Support and Tolerance ....... 137
Figure IV.33 Juntas Vecinales Participation, System Support and Tolerance .................................. 138
Figure IV.34 Civil Society Participation, System Support and Tolerance ........................................ 139
Figure V.1 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ....................... 145
Figure V.2 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: by Gender and Strata ......................................... 146
Figure V.3 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: Urban-Rural Differences ...................................... 147
Figure V.4 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: DDPC Sample .................................................... 148
Figure V.5 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: by Department ...................................................... 149
Figure V.6: Map of Bolivia: Attendance at Municipal Meetings by Department .............................. 150
Figure V.7 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: and Age .............................................................. 151
Figure V.8 Attendance at Municipal Meetings: and Number of Children ...................................... 152
Figure V.9 Attendance at Municipal Meetings and Ethnic Self-Identification ............................... 153
Figure V.10 Attendance at Municipal Meetings and System Support ........................................... 157
Figure V.11 Civil Society Participation and Attendance at Municipal Meetings .............................. 158
Figure V.12 Attendance at Municipal Meetings, Civil Society Participation and System Support ....... 159
Figure V.13 Civil Society Participation, Residence and Attendance at Municipal Meetings ................. 160
Figure V.14 Civil Society Participation, Gender and Attendance at Municipal Meetings .................. 161
Figure V.15 Attendance at Municipal Meetings, Civil Society and Ethnic Self-Identification .......... 162
Figure V.16 Municipal Participation: Various Forms Compared ...................................................... 163
Figure V.17 System Support and Various forms of Municipal Participation ..................................... 164
Figure V.18 Satisfaction with response from municipality among those who made a demand ........................................ 165
Figure V.19 Satisfaction with Response of Municipality and System Support .................................................. 166
Figure V.20 National Sample vs. DDPC Sample: Satisfaction with Response of Municipality ............................ 167
Figure V.21 Satisfaction with Response of Municipality and System Support: National vs. DDPC .................. 168
Figure V.22 Satisfaction with Municipal Services: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective .............................. 169
Figure V.23 Evaluation of Municipal Services and System Support: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........ 170
Figure V.24 Satisfaction with Municipal Services, System Support and Tolerance ........................................ 171
Figure V.25 Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Ethnicity ................................................................. 172
Figure V.26 Treatment by Municipality ........................................................................................................ 174
Figure V.27 Who resolves community problems best? .................................................................................... 175
Figure V.28 Who Should have more responsibility? ....................................................................................... 176
Figure V.29 Willingness to Pay More Local Taxes for Better Services .......................................................... 177
Figure V.30 Responsiveness of Municipality ................................................................................................. 178
Figure VI.1 Victimization in Bolivia: 1998 ...................................................................................................... 181
Figure VI.2 Victimization in Latin America: 1996 .......................................................................................... 182
Figure VI.3 Victimization and System Support ............................................................................................. 183
Figure VI.4 Victimization and Interpersonal Trust ......................................................................................... 184
Figure VI.5 Victimization by Gender ............................................................................................................ 185
Figure VI.6 Victimization and Age ................................................................................................................ 185
Figure VI.7 Victimization by Urban/Rural Residence .................................................................................... 186
Figure VI.8 Victimization by Department ...................................................................................................... 186
Figure VI.9 Victimization and Wealth ........................................................................................................... 187
Figure VI.10 Reporting of Crime .................................................................................................................. 188
Figure VI.11 Difficulty in Reporting Crimes to the Police or Authorities ...................................................... 189
Figure VI.12 Difficulty in Reporting Crimes to the Local Authority ............................................................. 190
Figure VI.13 Ease of Reporting a Crime and Income ...................................................................................... 191
Figure VI.14 Ease of Reporting a Crime and Age .......................................................................................... 192
Figure VI.15 Ease of Reporting a Crime to Police and System Support ......................................................... 193
Figure VI.16 Ease of Reporting a Crime to the Community Authorities and System Support .................... 194
Figure VI.17 Ease of Reporting Crimes:
by Department ........................................ 195
Figure VI.18 Treatment by the Police ........................................ 196
Figure VI.19 Treatment by Police When Dealing with a
Matter .................................................. 196
Figure VI.20 Treatment by Courts ........................................ 197
Figure VI.21 Treatment by Public Prosecutor ........................................ 198
Figure VI.22 Satisfaction with Treatment by Police and Victimization ........................................ 199
Figure VI.23 Satisfaction of Treatment by Police
and Urban/Rural Residence ........................................ 199
Figure VI.24 Satisfaction of Treatment by Police and
Income .................................................... 200
Figure VI.25 Satisfaction of Treatment by Police
and System Support ........................................ 201
Figure VI.26 Which System Represents Better? ........................................ 203
Figure VI.27 Preference for Single-Member Districts
by Department ........................................ 204
Figure VI.28 Corruption in Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........................................ 205
Figure VII.1 High Unemployment as a Justification for a Coup: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........................................ 210
Figure VII.2 Many University Student Strikes as a Justification for a Coup: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........................................ 211
Figure VII.3 Many Strikes by Unionized Workers As a Justification for a Coup: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........................................ 212
Figure VII.4 Conditions that Might Justify a Coup ........................................ 213
Figure VII.5 Support for a Coup
and Gender ........................................ 214
Figure VII.6 Support for a Coup and Age ........................................ 215
Figure VII.7 Support for a Coup
by Department ........................................ 216
Figure VII.8 Support for a Coup and Income ........................................ 217
Figure VII.9 Support for a Coup and Tolerance ........................................ 218
Figure VII.10 Ethnicity and Support for a Coup ........................................ 219
Figure VII.11 Support for a Coup and Ideology ........................................ 220
Figure VII.12 Support for a Coup and Victimization ........................................ 221
Figure VII.13 Support for Civil Disobedience:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective ........................................ 225
Figure VII.14 Approval of Civil Disobedience
and Education ........................................ 226
Figure VII.15 Approval of Civil Disobedience
and Income ........................................ 227
Figure VII.16 Approval of Civil Disobedience
and Gender ........................................ 228
Figure VII.17 Approval of Civil Disobedience and Age ..................................................... 229
Figure VII.18 Approval of Blocking Streets by Department ........................................... 230
Figure VII.19 Approval of Violent Civil Protest by Department ...................................... 231
Figure VII.20 Approval of Civil Disobedience and Tolerance ....................................... 232
Figure VII.21 Approval of Civil Disobedience and Ideology ......................................... 233
Figure VII.22 Approval of Civil Disobedience and Support for a Coup .......................... 221
Figure VII.23 Approval of Citizen Efforts to Overthrow an Elected Government and Support for a Coup ................................................................. 223
Introduction and Executive Summary

Democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of the principles underlying freedom of speech, media, and assembly; rights of political parties, rule of law, human rights, and the like. Such norms do not evolve overnight.¹

The great wave of democracy that has swept over the world in the last decade has left political scientists scrambling to explain the phenomenon. Scores of books and articles have been published, but only the barest outlines have emerged to date. While it may take several decades before we can really say with any degree of certainty why democracy “broke out” in the 1980s world-wide, a far more urgent task confronts us. We need to know, as soon as we can, what makes democracies sustainable, and what makes them sufficiently resilient to withstand the inevitable stresses and strains that confront them?

Many political scientists believe that one key factor that enable democracies to survive is having a democratic political culture. This study explores the political culture of democracy in Bolivia. It does so by allowing Bolivians, over 3,000 of them, to speak for themselves in personal interviews that were conducted in the summer of 1998. In this introduction and executive summary, some of the main findings are reported upon, the details of which are contained in the chapters that follow.

• The sample was designed to represent the entire country, and as such interviews were conducted in each of Bolivia’s nine departments, and in the three main languages used in the country (Spanish, Quechua and Aymara). The sample is representative of the urban/rural distribution of the population within each department, as well as the distribution of population by department at the level of the nation. An additional special sample was collected in six municipalities in which a USAID development program (the DDPC program) has been operating. In total, 2,977 respondents were interviewed for the national sample, and 599 were interviewed in the special municipal sample areas, with 100 of the latter overlapping with the national sample.

• The sample drawn from this study closely resembles the overall population of Bolivia, not only in terms of its geographic dispersion, but in terms of basic demographic characteristics. Precisely half of the sample was male, and half female, and their average age being 36. Three-fifths majority were married or were living in common-law unions.

Nearly half of the respondents lived in homes in which the household income was 500 Boliviano or less per month. Incomes varied by gender, with males earning more than females, and by place of residence, with urban dwellers earning more than those in rural areas.

Three-fifths of the respondents considered themselves to be ethnically “mestizo,” while ten per cent identified as Indian. The minority of “Whites” earned the greatest income, while Indians and Blacks earned the least. Only about half the population was monolingual Spanish-speaking, whereas the others spoke some combination of Spanish and Quechua and/or Aymara, and less than 10 percent were monolingual speakers of indigenous languages.

Support for the system, our measure of political legitimacy, is much lower than it is in Costa Rica, Latin America’s most stable democracy, but higher than neighboring Peru. Support for the system did not vary by gender or age, but it was significantly lower among those with university education. At the same time, system support was higher among those with higher incomes and among people who live in rural areas. Support was also higher among those with deeper religious ties and those on the political right. In the broader measure of institutional support, political parties and the police score especially low, whereas reporters and the Catholic Church score especially high.

Systems may be political stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support. But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim, indeed. The study measured political tolerance in Bolivia and found some disappointing results.

Bolivians, on average, are notably less tolerant than other Latin Americans. In each of the other countries in the study, when the overall scale of tolerance is computed, the level is at the mid-point of 50 or higher, whereas in Bolivia, the overall level is at 41.

Bolivians are especially intolerant of the right of free speech and the right to run for political office, two very basic civil liberties. These findings are confirmed with two different measures of tolerance.

In each of the other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion data base that are being analyzed in this study, higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of tolerance. In Bolivia, however, not only is tolerance lower than in other countries, it does not increase with higher education.
• The interrelationship between system support and tolerance shows that only about one-in-ten Bolivians are both supportive of their political system and express political tolerance. It is those Bolivians who we classify as supportive of stable democracy. On the other hand, nearly one half of all Bolivians hold values that place democracy at risk.

• How do the Bolivian results compare with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project database? Not well. Bolivia has the lowest proportion of its citizens who have the combination of attitudes considered to be supportive of stable democracy of the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but less than one fourth the level of support for stable democracy found in Costa Rica.

• Dictatorships have long been infamous for suppressing and/or co-opting civil society organizations. Citizens in such systems are deprived of their ability to provide collective expression of their demands. Democracy, on the other hand, cultivates civil society organizations as a key element in the articulation of citizen demands.

• How active is civil society participation in Bolivia? The data in the present study allow us to answer that question with some precision. Participation in church and school-related groups are by far the most popular in Bolivia, as is participation in community/neighborhood development groups (Juntas de mejoras, juntas vecinales). These organizations are far more popular than professional associations, civic organizations (such as women’s groups, Lions Clubs, etc.), OTBs, and labor unions.

• In marked contrast to political tolerance, civil society participation in Bolivia does well in comparative terms. Civil society participation in Bolivia is higher than the other countries in four of the seven indicators. Bolivians are more active participants in church groups, school groups, civic groups, and unions when compared to Costa Ricans, Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Paraguayans. In addition, Bolivia is far ahead of three of the other countries in community development organization participation, only lagging behind Costa Rica. Similarly, it is second to Costa Rica in professional association participation, and second to Paraguay in cooperative organization participation.

• Many studies have found that females participate less than males in civil society organizations. Bolivia is no exception to this norm. In every form of organization except civic groups, there is a significant difference. But that difference does not always advantage males over females. Bolivian women are more active in church and school related activities than Bolivian men.

• In Bolivia, most forms of civil society participation decline in the cities and increase in the countryside.
• In most forms of civil society participation, the population that self-identified as “White” is significantly lower than the other populations, especially those who self-identify as “Indian.” The only form of civil society participation in which the White population is higher than the others is in church groups, but the differences are rather small, albeit statistically significant. The indigenous population is especially active in the OTB’s as well as the Juntas Vecinales. The Bolivian data set also shows a strong association between family size and civil society participation.

• Demand-making is a vital part of civil society behavior. It is not surprising that contacting the president of the country to make a demand is the least frequent approach taken by Bolivians to help solve their local problems; only 3% have gone this route. More surprising, however, especially now that half of Bolivian legislators are elected from single-member districts, is that deputies were contacted by only 5% of the respondents. More than twice that percentage were in contact with other officials, with the highest level being contacts with national officials. Demand-making in Bolivia compares favorably with the other nations. In particular, Bolivian participation is second only to Costa Rica in contacting a deputy, or a mayor/councilman. Bolivia is actually slightly ahead of Costa Rica in contacting national-level government officials. Contacting the President in Bolivia is similar to all of the other countries, except Costa Rica, which is far higher than the others.

• Men are far more likely to make demands than women in Bolivia. The smaller the community the higher the level of demand-making, especially for all forms of demand-making beyond that of contacting the president of the country or a deputy.

• Those who self-identify as “White” systematically make fewer demands than those with other ethnic identities. It can also be seen that those who identify as Indian, are more likely to make demands than those with other identities.

• Does participation in groups lead to action? It could be that participation in committees could be purely social events, and that citizens meet to have a good time, not to stimulate change in their communities. Is talk associated with action? Most definitely. Over one-third of Bolivians have worked to resolve a community problem. The more that Bolivians involve themselves in church groups, the more they are willing to donate time, money, labor, attend meetings and try to form groups to help solve community problems. Church group participation, then, is more than a social event since it links directly to helping to build communities.

• An even sharper impact on voluntarism is found among those who attend school-related groups. Only 10-20% of those who never attend school-related group meetings actively attempt to solve community problems, whereas those who frequently attend school meetings are two times more likely to be involved in voluntarism.
A stronger impact still emerges from participation in community development associations. Only about 15% of those who never participate in community development associations have donated their labor to solve a community problem, compared to over 40% voluntarism among those who frequently attend such meetings.

The survey found that Bolivians are relatively active in civil society participation, and that such participation is connected to voluntarism in solving community problems. Are there also links to the key attitudinal variables, namely tolerance and system support? An examination of the civil society participation variables finds that every one of the nine different measures included in the study except union membership and professional associations are significantly positively associated with system support. Tolerance, on the other hand, hardly ever is significantly associated with civil society participation, and when it is, the direction is negative; more civil society participation, less tolerance.

Latin American, perhaps more than any other area of the world, has had a very strong tradition of centralization of state power. Local governments in unitary systems and state governments in Latin America’s federal systems (i.e., Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) have all been subordinated to central government to an extreme degree. Up until its recent reforms, Bolivia’s centralist tradition was perhaps even more extreme than in other Latin American countries. Bolivia is on the low-side when compared with other countries in the region. Nonetheless, the study finds that only Nicaragua has a lower level of municipal government participation. These findings suggest that even four years after the approval of the popular participation law, Bolivians are not especially active in local government.

Males participate in municipal meetings at a level over 75% higher than females.

Participation in municipal meetings in smaller areas are at rates two and one-half times greater than that of Bolivians who live in cities larger than 20,000 population in size. Bolivians in the most rural sectors of the country participate at still higher levels, fully three times the rate in the large towns and cities. Participation in municipal meetings varies a great deal by department as well. Chuquisaca has the highest level of participation, while Tarija has the lowest.

Civil society participation is especially low among Bolivians who defined themselves as “White.” Municipal attendance follows the same pattern.

Does it make a difference to Bolivian democracy if its citizens attend municipal meetings? Specifically, do system support and tolerance increase as attendance at municipal meetings increases? And does civil society participation relate to municipal meeting attendance? The study found very strong evidence that system support increases as municipal meeting attendance increases. Also, for those who are “high” on their level of civil society participation, based upon the nine-
organization series, participation in municipal meetings is 2.3 times higher than the national average. Tolerance is another matter. There is no significant association between political tolerance and attending municipal meetings. Once again, tolerance is found to be problematical in Bolivia. It is not increased by education, nor is it increased by civil society participation, and now it is found that it does not increase with attendance at municipal meetings.

- Combining civil society participation and high system support have payoffs beyond the role of either variable acting alone. Acting together, they combine to relate to especially high levels of municipal meeting attendance. Those with high system support, are more active in municipal participation for each level of civil society participation, and that among those who are the most active in civil society and who are high on system support, municipal meeting attendance is about three times the national average, reaching about 55%.

- Ethnicity and civil society participation interact to produce very high levels of municipal participation among Indians, about three times higher than the national average. Self-identified Indians participate in municipal meetings to a greater degree at all levels of civil society participation than other groups, further indicating the importance of ethnicity.

- Among those with low system support, fewer than 30% were satisfied with the response of the municipality, whereas among those with high system support about 55% were satisfied. These findings suggest that satisfaction of citizen demands at the local level is vital to building support for the political system at the national level. Satisfaction of citizen demands depends, in part, on the availability of resources (especially budgets), but it also depends upon the good will of municipal officials. Absent budgets or absent good will, and citizen demands will be invariably frustrated. Bolivians, however, express somewhat less satisfaction than in the other countries.

- Not only is system support associated with greater satisfaction with municipal services, but so is political tolerance. Both system support and tolerance are significantly related to satisfaction, but the greater impact is noted for system support.

- Twenty three per cent of the respondents have been a victim of crime within the past year, and 21% report that a family member has been victim. These are relatively low figures compared to many other countries in Latin America.

- Does being a victim of crime in Bolivia have an impact on one’s perception of the political system? Specifically, do those who personally, or in their families, experience crime express lower support for the political system? The answer is yes. Victims express significantly less support than non-victims. And we can be certain that it is the crime that caused the lower system support rather than the other way
around, since criminals could not possibly seek out victims on the basis of their system support. These findings strongly suggest that when the political system is unable to control crime, it jeopardizes its own legitimacy.

- Among those who express the view that people in their community are very trustworthy, fewer than one quarter have been victims of a crime (personally or in the family), whereas among those who say people are not at all trustworthy, about 40% have been victims of a crime.

- Once citizens have become victims of a crime, what do they do about it? We asked those who were victims if they reported the crime, and to which authority did they report it. Only a minority of victims reported the crime, and of those, most reported it to the police.

- The major impact of perceived ease of reporting a crime is income. Reporting a crime to the police or to the community authorities is dramatically easier for those with higher incomes. Not surprisingly, Bolivians who believe it is difficult to report a crime are lower in system support than those who find it easier to report a crime. Victims of crimes (in the last 12 months) are significantly more negative on their level of satisfaction with the police than those who have not been a victim.

- Of those who have had dealings, opinions seem about evenly split between those with a positive experience versus those with a negative experience. Thus, the opinions regarding the courts are more positive than are the opinions regarding the police.

- Bolivia has recently instituted single-member district representation. Over two-fifths of the respondents had no opinion on this new system’s efficacy. Among those who did, however, they were overwhelmingly in favor of the single-member system. Less than 8% of Bolivians favored the party list formula.

- Bolivia has enjoyed constitutionally democratic rule for over a decade. Have Bolivians turned their backs on the coup d’etat as mechanism for resolving political conflict? Over one-third of Nicaraguans would support a coup under conditions of high unemployment, whereas 29% of Bolivians and a slightly lower percentage of Paraguayans and Salvadorans responded in this way. Similar percentages would support a coup under conditions of labor and student unrest.

- Support for coups is not in any way a function of education, ethnicity or urban/rural residence. Gender does have a weak relationship, however, but one that washes out in the multivariate analysis.

- Older Bolivians, those who have lived through numerous authoritarian military regimes, are less supportive of a coup than are the young. Young Bolivians are
about twice as likely to support a coup than those Bolivians who are over 65 years of age. The youth of Bolivia do not emerge as the defenders of democracy.

- Income is also related to support for coups, with wealthier Bolivians expressing more support than poorer. Only less than one-quarter of the poorest Bolivians would support a coup, whereas over one-third of those with the highest incomes would do so.

- Bolivians who are more politically tolerant are far less likely to support a coup, an indication of the importance for tolerance in helping to create an atmosphere that would resist this severely anti-democratic behavior.

- It has been noted that victimization has a negative effect on system support. It also increases the likelihood that respondents will opt for a coup. Bolivians who have been victims of a crime (or who have had family members who have been victims) are more likely to support a coup. Once again, criminals do not select victims on the basis of their attitudes, so it is clear that being a victim is what accounts for this increase in support for anti-democratic attitudes.

- There is greater support in Bolivia for each of the forms of civil disobedience measured in the questionnaire than for any other country for which we have data, and the differences are statistically significant.

- Ethnicity and urban/rural residence show no significant relationship to approval of civil disobedience in Bolivia, but the less-well educated are more likely to approve civil disobedience, in both its violent and non-violent forms. Income follows the same pattern as education. For both non-violent and violent civil disobedience, Bolivians with lower levels of education are more approving.

- One associates coups with military overthrow of civilian governments, which normally end up repressing civil liberties of citizens. Civil disobedience, in contrast, we think of as involving citizen protest against repressive acts of government. Thus, we would expect that those who support coups should not be approving of civil disobedience. In Bolivia, this is not the case. There is a positive association between the overall index of support for a coup and approval of civil disobedience. These findings are certainly troubling because they suggest an indiscriminate support for violent means to resolve political disagreements.

These results are presented in far greater detail in the pages that follow. In many ways, however, they merely scratch the surface of the rich data base that has been collected for this study. Not only do these data serve as a solid base-line for comparisons with future surveys, they also allow investigation of themes not explored here. The data base stands ready to answer many other questions relevant to democracy in Bolivia.
Chapter I: Methodology and Sample Characteristics

Sample Design

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of all citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under represented in the election. Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens, are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

Any serious study of democratic values in Bolivia confronts two problems in sample design: 1) the wide dispersal of the population; and 2) a multi-lingual population. Comparisons with other countries help put these problems in perspective. Consider Germany, the country with the largest population in Western Europe, is home to 82 million people, who occupy 357,000 square kilometers of territory. Bolivia, in contrast, with a population of only 7.4 million, occupies a massive 1.1 million square kilometers. Bolivia is the 29th largest country on the planet, but with a population about the same size of that of the Dominican Republic, a country that is only 4% of Bolivia’s size. Indeed, all of Japan, with its 125 million people, would nearly fit into Santa Cruz Department alone. In short, Bolivia has a relatively small population living on a large land mass. From the point of view of sample design, this creates complexities, which are only compounded by the fact that Bolivia’s population is very unevenly distributed. For example, La Paz has a population density of about nearly 17 persons per square kilometer, whereas the Department of Pando, with a surface area substantially larger than Costa Rica but an estimated


population in December, 1997 of 53,000, has a density of fewer than .5 residents per square kilometer.

In a multi-lingual country it is important to avoid excluding linguistic minorities. In Bolivia, many languages are spoken, but Spanish is the overwhelmingly predominant language. According to the Bolivian 1992 census bureau, 8.1% of the population over the age of 6 were monolingual Quechua speakers, and 3.2% of the population were monolingual Aymara speakers. These numbers of monolingual speakers of indigenous languages however, have been declining rapidly as a result of the widespread dissemination of the mass media. For example, the Bolivian census bureau estimates for 1997 show that only 4.4% of the population are monolingual Quechua and 2.0% are monolingual Aymara. Nonetheless, in order not to exclude the opinions of these individuals, it was necessary to prepare versions of the questionnaire in both Quechua and Aymara, and to include bi-lingual interviewers in the survey team.

In the design of the sample, the factors of population size and its distribution needed to be considered. In addition, Bolivia’s Departments, which range so greatly in population and geographic area, each have their own social and political profiles, and a study that attempts to represent the country ought to be certain to include each of its departments. In order to achieve this objective, it was decided that the sample would be designed to represent each of Bolivia’s nine departments, while still being able to speak with confidence about the country as a whole.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are nine high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the nine schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have nine tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

In Bolivia, if we want to be sure that citizens from each of the nine departments are interviewed, we must divide the sample into nine “bowls.” We call these bowls “strata.” Thus, in the Bolivia census, we have nine separate strata, one for each department. If we do not divide the country into separate strata, then it is quite likely that most of those to be

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4There were also small numbers of speakers of other indigenous Languages such as Guarani, as well as speakers of Portuguese, English and other languages. The costs involved in preparing questionnaires in each of these languages, and having a multi-lingual staff of interviewers available on the spot as such speakers were encountered, made the exclusion of such monolingual speakers necessary. According to the 1992 census, 0.1% of the population is monolingual Guarani-speaking.
The worst case emerges when opinion is divided right down the middle, and on a given question, 50% express one view and 50% express another.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10th, 11th, and 12th), then a total of 27 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Bolivia it is important to further subdivide the departments into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each department into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of departments we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cites contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each department by population size. It is common practice in Bolivia to divide the population into four clusters: 1) cities larger than 20,000; 2) cities and towns of between 2,000 and 20,000; 3) "compact rural" zones, of populations from 500 to 1,999; and, finally, 4) "dispersed rural" zones of fewer than 500 people. Our sample for each department has been stratified in this fashion.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the department and within each department, we have what is called a “multi-stage stratified sample design.” But now the question comes as to how large a sample and how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Bolivia. That is because the smallest departments would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample were very, very large. For example, Pando comprises only .6 of one percent of Bolivia’s population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only about 18 would likely to be drawn from Pando.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a sample of 300 respondents per department, which would mean that 95% of the time, our sample would be no more than ±5.8% away from the true departmental view for a given question in the survey. This level of ±5.8% is calculated using the standard formulas for sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario at the level of the department the survey would be a

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5The worst case emerges when opinion is divided right down the middle, and on a given question, 50% express one view and 50% express another.
reasonably accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 5.8% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could interview all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions the results could be as accurate as ± 3.5% at the level of the department. Since the three departments of Bolivia that form the so-called “central axis” are so important politically (i.e., La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), it was decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in those departments by interviewing an additional 100 respondents in each of them, for a total of 400 in each. In those three departments, our “confidence interval” for the sample is no more than ±5.0%, or nearly 1% more accurate than for the other departments.

The samples of 300 and 400 per department were designed to provide approximately equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we attempt to generalize beyond the level of the department to the nation as a whole, it is vital to adjust the sample size so that it accurately reflects the relative population size of each department. For example, referring again to Pando, and comparing it to La Paz, it is necessary to decrease the relative weight of Pando in the national sample and increase the relative weight of La Paz in order that we can obtain an overall picture of opinion in Bolivia. To do this the sample, once drawn, was assigned post-hoc weights so that each department correctly reflected its contribution to the national population total.

The sample design for the nine departments as a whole, with 300 interviews in six departments, and 400 interviews in three departments, called for a total sample of 3,000. A sample of this size is accurate at no worse than ±1.7%. Technically, our sampling error is ±1.7%. This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than ±1.7%. Of course, other factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of ±1.7% is very good.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the nine departments. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost, especially in a country like Bolivia where the density of population nation-wide is so low. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given

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6For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.
characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. Experience suggests that the confidence for a clustered stratified sample design of 3,000 Bolivians would increase to around ± 2.0% from the level of ± 1.7% stated above. For the purposes of this study, a level of ± 2.0% will be assumed. It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection until the household itself was reached. The individual respondent within the household was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the commonly confronted problem of having the sample incorporate too many females and too many very young or very old people. That household bias results from a higher probability of females, the very young and the very old to be at home more often than other respondents. Quotas at the level of the household is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by Encuestas & Estudios, the premier survey research firm in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. Over the past 14 years, Encuestas & Estudios has conducted over 900 surveys for more than 250 clients. It currently employs 116 people full time, and utilizes 83 part-time interviewers, of whom 40 are bilingual (Quechua or Aymara). This firm implemented the above described sample design, and was also responsible for carrying out multiple pre-tests of the survey instrument as well as the translation of the instrument into Quechua and Aymara. In addition, the firm was responsible for all data entry.

The actual number of interviews gathered by the Encuestas & Estudios firm in the national sample was 2,977, or 23 short of the goal of 3,000. This is a remarkably high level of completion of the survey, and speaks well of the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors. Those interviews were not, however, the only ones collected for this study. USAID has been assisting the Bolivian government to improve municipal governance and citizen participation at the local level, in a project called “Desarrollo Democrático y Participación Ciudadana” (hereafter DDPC), and a secondary goal of the present study was to create a baseline of data in selected municipalities in which that project has been operating. A total of 6 municipalities were selected for this baseline (see Table I.1), and 100 interviews were to be collected in each, divided evenly between urban and rural areas. Thus, the initial sample was expanded with these 600 interviews. Interview costs in remote Pando Department were so high that it proved necessary to incorporate 100 of the municipal sample interviews into the national sample. Thus, the municipal study added only 500 rather than 600 interviews to the study. Of those 500 additional interviews, 499 were completed, yielding a total number of completed questionnaires of 3,476.
The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998

Chapter I: Methodology and Sample Characteristics

When call-backs did not produce the selected respondent, then a substitute was used from the same PSU.

### Table I.1 DDPC Selected Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pando, Cobija</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro, Curahuara</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí, Llallagua</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz, Patacamaya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz, Pucarani</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba, Punata</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interviews normally took place in the respondent’s home, and were “face-to-face.” In cases where a selected respondent was not at home when the interviewer arrived, call-backs were made to the dwelling at least once. The interviews lasted for an average of 40 minutes each (median of 42 minutes), although five interviews lasted for two hours and one lasted for three. Rural and urban interviews took about the same amount of time, but travel to the rural areas to locate the respondents took much more time. In order to carry out the survey it was necessary to utilize a fleet of buses and jeeps, as well as a small airplane in the most remote areas.

### Sample Weights

As noted above, in order that the sample accurately reflect the distribution of population in Bolivia is necessary to weight the sample. To do this involves the calculation of sample weights. The calculations are shown in Table I.2 below. In the second column of the table the best estimates of departmental populations as of December, 1997 are provided by the Bolivian census bureau. The percent of the population that each department comprises is given in the third column. Foreexample, La Paz comprises 29.20% of the national population. In the fourth column, the actual sample for each department is given, excluding the DDPC additional interviews. Those interviews are excluded here because the goal is to use the weights to modify the sample totals so as to mirror the national population distribution among the nine departments. The additional DDPC interviews would skew those results since the selection was based on DDPC criteria rather than the national population distribution. In the fifth column, the percent of the total national sample that each department comprises is given. In the penultimate column the weight factor is derived, which is the result of dividing the population percentage by the sample percentage. Finally, by multiplying the sample size by the weight factor, the final column provides the weighted sample size.

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7When call-backs did not produce the selected respondent, then a substitute was used from the same PSU.
The weighted sample shows the striking impact of the variation in population size among Bolivia’s nine departments. In Pando, with less than 7% of the population, but with a sample of 300 respondents, or 10% of the sample, it is necessary to weight down the sample so that these interviews now comprise only 20 out of the 2,977. If this correction were not introduced, Pando would end up being as influential in the national totals as Potosí. On the other hand, when we wish to examine Pando alone, we have 300 interviews to examine, thus allowing us to speak of those results with a reasonable level of confidence. If we had interviewed only 21 respondents from Pando, virtually nothing could have been said about the area. It should also be kept in mind that within each department, the sample was drawn proportional to the population distribution, so that large and small population concentrations are each correctly represented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Population Estimate, December 1997&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>% of national total</th>
<th>Sample N</th>
<th>% of sample total</th>
<th>Weight factor: (population % ÷ sample %)</th>
<th>Weighted sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>2,268,824</td>
<td>29.20%</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>13.37%</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>1,651,951</td>
<td>21.26%</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>13.34%</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>1,408,071</td>
<td>18.12%</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>13.13%</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>746,618</td>
<td>9.61%</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>10.01%</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>549,835</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>10.01%</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>383,498</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>368,506</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>10.04%</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>336,633</td>
<td>4.33%</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>9.94%</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>53,124</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,769,057</td>
<td>99.97%</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Bolivia, 1998). Percent totals do not add to 100 owing to rounding errors.
Sample Distribution

It is perhaps easiest to comprehend the manner in which the sample was distributed in Bolivia by first pointing to some overall features and then looking at the distribution on a map of the country. Overall, the 3,476 interviews were conducted in 9 departments, in which a total of 67 provinces were targeted. In all of Bolivia there are 108 provinces, which means that the sample included interviews in 62% of the nation’s provinces. Within those 67 provinces, interviews were conducted in a total of 99 municipalities. In Bolivia there are a total of 311 municipalities, and thus the sample included 32% of the total. In sum, the sample includes all of Bolivia’s departments, 62% of its provinces and 32% of its municipalities. This is an unusually broad coverage for a sample survey and helps reassure us that the results accurately reflect the national picture. The interviews themselves were distributed into 145 distinct areas, what we call “primary sampling units.” In each primary sampling unit, approximately 20 interviews were carried out. This means that survey teams visited 145 neighborhoods spread out among the 67 provinces. They did so during the month of August in 1998.

The graphical display of the interviews is shown in Figure I.1. It would be impossible to display all 3,476 interview points, so one dot is used to display ten interviews. The greater density of points in departments such as Oruro and Cochabamba reflects the smaller geographic area of these departments compared to Santa Cruz and the Beni. In order to maximize the confidentiality of respondents, the location of points shown here within each department are merely illustrative, and do not reflect the actual locations of the interviews.
The actual number of interviews per department is shown in Table I.3. This table, like the map above, includes all of the interviews, unweighted.
Comparisons with Census Data

The sample drawn from this study closely resembles the overall population of Bolivia, not only in terms of its geographic dispersion, but in terms of basic demographic characteristics. Since the most recent census compiled in Bolivia was from 1992, we have to make some assumptions to project those parameters to July of 1998.

In the area of education, the 1992 census reports that 20.0% of the population of the country 15 years of age and older were illiterate. In order to match that parameter to the 1998 survey, it is necessary to consider those 21 years of age and older at the time of the interview, since those are the individuals who, in 1992 would have been 15 years of age and older. The survey did not specifically ask about literacy, which is often a subjective determination, since some individuals can read numbers but not words, or some have limited literacy. Rather, the survey asked about years of education completed. It is widely assumed that literacy comes with an education of greater than 3 years of primary school. In the 1998 sample, 16.4% of the respondents 21 years of age and older had fewer than 4 years of primary education. Thus, by the census criterion, the sample appears to somewhat overestimates the level of education found in Bolivia, at least in the primary years. This is likely to have been a function of a somewhat higher refusal rate among illiterates, who often feel uncomfortable in a survey situation. On the other hand, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported that for 1994, adult illiteracy

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8From this point on in the discussion of the data, the weighted sample, excluding the DDPC additional interviews, are used as the point of reference.
in Bolivia was 17%, or only .6% higher than the survey results.\textsuperscript{9} The World Bank reports the same figure of 17% for 1995.\textsuperscript{10} Since illiteracy has been dropping steadily in Bolivia, the lower level of illiteracy in the sample may well be a function of the rising national level of literacy. For example, the UNDP reports that in 1970, Bolivia’s illiteracy rate was 43\%,\textsuperscript{11} and it thus likely that by July of 1998 the rate would have fallen from the 1994/5 figure of 17\% to the survey figure of 16.4\%. Moreover, one must again recall the confidence interval issue. The results in the survey are taken to be within ±2\% of the national values, and thus the sample estimate comes well within the UNDP and World Bank estimates, and within 1.6\% of the census data.

Age is another parameter on which comparisons can be made with census data. In Bolivia the census data are presented in 5-year age cohorts, which means that the cohort of those who are 18 years of age is imbedded within the census group of 15-19. In order to match the census with the sample, we can exclude those younger than 20 and compare the cohorts. The census reports 19.2\% as falling between 20 and 24 years of age in its 1995 estimates.\textsuperscript{12} The survey finds 17.2\%, a result that falls within the ±2\% confidence interval of the sample. Within this same age cohort, the census reports that 49.7\% are male, compared to the survey which found 47.7\%, again a finding within the confidence interval.

In sum, the sample seems to well represent Bolivia geographically and demographically. There is every reason to believe that the findings that are drawn from the analysis of the survey would closely match those that would be obtained if we were to interview the entire adult population of Bolivia. Doing so, of course, would be impossible given the costs involved. For a tiny fraction of those costs, we have been able to obtain extensive information on the democratic values and behaviors of Bolivians.

**Key Demographic Characteristics**

In the chapters that follow a number of key demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents will be employed in the analysis. We will often wish to know how certain attitudes or behaviors vary by gender, age, and socio-economic status.


\textsuperscript{11}UNDP, *ibid.*, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{12}Anuario Estadístico, 1995, p. 45.
In order to enable the reader to obtain a global view of the characteristics of the sample as a whole, the relevant summaries are presented here.

The sample was designed to produce a 50-50 split between men and women. This was accomplished, as already noted, by utilizing quotas for gender at the level of the household. Not surprisingly, therefore, the sample that emerged was comprised of 50% male and 50% female, as is shown in Table I.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age distribution of the sample, as noted above, matched closely the national census parameters. Throughout this study, 10-year cohorts of age will be used, except for the youngest cohort, which ranges from 18 years of age through 25 years of age. The average age of the respondents for the ungrouped data is 36.3 years, as is shown in Table I.5. There was no significant difference in the average age of males versus females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sig. = NS

The grouped data of age appear in Table I.6. As can be seen, and as to be expected, a larger proportion of the sample is clustered at the younger age cohorts. This is a typical pattern found in countries with relatively high fertility rates. Nearly three quarters of the respondents were 45 years or younger, while only fewer than 5% were older than 65 years of age. For each cohort, however, there are sufficient numbers to be able to make reasonable generalizations about the respondents of that age group. This is especially true among those 55 or younger where there are over 400 persons in each cohort.
The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998  

Chapter I: Methodology and Sample Characteristics

Table I.6  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>88.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66+</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The civil status (i.e., marital status) of the respondents was also included in the questionnaire. Table I.7 shows the breakdown. Married respondents comprise more than half of the total, and if common law marriages are added to the married category, this rises to over 60%, with single respondents comprising another third. Only a very small percentage of the sample were divorced, separated or widowed.

Table I.7  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>31.5% 31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>53.4% 84.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common law</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.7% 93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4% 95.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9% 96.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0% 100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,975</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Socio-Economic Characteristics

Education has often been seen as a major factor in promoting democratic societies. Indeed, some theories argue that there is a direct connection: no education, no democracy. In Bolivia, educational levels have been rising rapidly in recent decades, as noted above. As late as 1970 about half of Bolivians were illiterate, while that number is now down to less than one-fifth. For the sample employed in this study, Table I.8 shows the overall distribution of education levels. About one-quarter of the sample has a primary education or less, while a bit less than one-quarter have some technical or university education.
Table I.8. Education Levels of the National Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Valid Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None-Primary</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/University</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,970</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.2%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,976</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income is, of course, a very important socio-economic characteristic. Surveys such as this, however, that are not focused on income itself, often have a difficult time obtaining accurate measures of income. That is because non-wage earners, especially farmers, often find it difficult to estimate their incomes. There are further problems of before-tax and after-tax income, and active versus passive income. In addition, many individuals (in Bolivia and elsewhere) prefer not to disclose their incomes to interviewers. It is for these reasons, that in addition to asking the respondents about their incomes, the survey also asked about ownership of a number of household appliances so that an index of household wealth could be established. With these caveats in mind, we can now turn to the income levels of the respondents in the survey. Table I.9 shows the breakdown of monthly household income in the sample. This data was obtained by using the standard unobtrusive method of requesting income information; a card was held up with a list of 9 income ranges. The respondent then read the number (or pointed to the number) that most closely reflected his/her income. In the case of illiterate respondents, the income ranges were read to the respondent. Not surprisingly, in a country in which over half of the population has been classified as “poor,” most of the respondents report incomes at the lower levels of the scale.\textsuperscript{13} In the survey, over 90% of the respondents reported monthly incomes of less than 2,000 Bolivianos, while over 80% reported incomes below 1,000 Bolivianos. At the conversion rate of 5.5 Bolivianos per dollar, this means that over ninety percent of the sample earned U.S. $364 or less per month, and over 80% earned U.S. $181 or less.

\textsuperscript{13}ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). Social Panorama of Latin America, 1996. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1996, p. 196-199. The 1994 urban poverty figure for Bolivia is given as 47%, while the rural level was not given in this publication but was presumably much higher.
Table I.9. Monthly Household Income in Bolivianos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None (housewife, unemployed)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;250 Bolivianos</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251- 500</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501 - 1,000</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001 - 2,000</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,001 - 5,000</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,001 - 10,000</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,001 - 20,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income levels are strongly impacted by location of residence. Those who live in larger towns and cities earn far more than those who live in rural areas, as is shown in Figure I.1. The income ranges listed in the figure correspond to the incomes in the table above. As shown in the figure, the correlation (r) between residence and income is -.33, significant at < .001. This means that as residence moves from large urban to dispersed rural, income declines sharply.

Figure I Income and Urban/Rural Residence
Income also varies by gender, and as we can see from Figure I.1, males earn significantly more than females in every residential area, from the large urban to the dispersed rural.

![Figure I Income Urban/Rural Residence and Gender](image)

We now move from salary income to household indicators of wealth (and poverty). Respondents were read a list of 13 appliances and capital goods that they might have in their homes, and were asked if the home had or did not have each item. While this measure of wealth does not directly tap the respondent's own level of income, it gives a very good idea of the relative wealth/poverty of the household of which the respondent is a part. Moreover, it avoids much of the missing data problem since on no item did non-response exceed only 1.5% of the sample and on most items it was far lower than one percent. The list of items covered those that would be found in urban areas and in electrified rural areas, as well as a limited number of items that could be found in any rural area (tractor, truck, car, motorcycle). The list of items does not, however, distinguish well among rural folk without access to electricity, since most of those would not have access to most of the items on the list. The survey did, however, contain information on land tenancy, which can be used to discriminate further among the farming population. Information on that variable will be presented below.
The wealth/poverty index basic information is presented in Figure I.1. The items chosen allow us to distinguish quite well between the homes that demonstrate numerous indicators of wealth versus those that seem far more impoverished. As can be seen in the bar chart, access to potable water in the home and electricity in the home was nearly universal. The less than 10% of the sample that had neither potable water nor electricity are either very poor or live in very remote locales. Another cluster of indicators, including television, refrigerators, sewage disposal, and a bicycle were in the homes of about half the respondents, and another group of indicators, including a telephone, a car or truck, washing machine, microwave oven and a tractor, where in the homes of about one-quarter or less of the sample.
In order to be able to use these multiple indicators of wealth as a single measure that we can use to associate with other variables in the study, we need to develop an overall index of wealth in the home.\(^\text{14}\) On the 0-100 scale, the average for the sample as a whole was 38.6. There is only one missing case.

In an effort to check on the reliability of the wealth scale just created, it was correlated with the monthly income figure described above. It was found that the two measures of wealth correlated (\(r\)) at .52 (sig. < .001), indicating that the two are very closely related but clearly not exact duplicates of each other. Since the wealth scale includes all but one case in the entire sample, while 290 respondents did not provide income information, the former will be used throughout this report for much of the analysis of the relationship between wealth and democratic values and behaviors.

The wealth index has the same relationship to residential location and gender as did the income measure. These patterns are shown in Figure I.1 below.

Land rental or ownership is another way to distinguish among Bolivians socio-economically. In the weighted sample, only 5% of the respondents reported owning or

\(^{14}\)The Alpha coefficient for the items was .63. If the respondent reported on at least three of the items on the list, then that respondent’s score was based on the mean of those three items. Since missing data was very uncommon, however, and few respondents failed to answer all of the questions, this adjustment had little impact on the overall score.
renting land. Those who did report having land averaged 24 hectares, although 35% own or rent 1 hectare or less.

**Ethnicity**

The indigenous population of Bolivia is considered to be proportionally the second largest in all of Latin America, after Guatemala. For this reason alone, it is important to have some notion of the ethnicity of the respondents in the sample. Since ethnicity is a subjective criterion and the terminology used to define various groups varies from place-to-place and from time-to-time (e.g., recall the transition from the use of the term “Negro” to the term “Black” to the term “Afro-American” in the United States), we had to examine the wording of this question with special care. Based upon both pre-tests as well as the relevant social science literature on the subject, we determined that the best (but not perfect!) way to determine ethnicity in Bolivia was to ask the respondent to locate themselves in one of four categories: “Mestiza,” “Blanca,” “Indígena” or “Negra.” The questionnaire allowed for a fifth category, “Chola” as well as “other.” These are the terms that Bolivians themselves use to distinguish among ethnic groups, although we hasten to note that they are subjective terms with no precise, universal agreement as to which individual fits into which category. The category “White” presumably reflects those who believe that they are of “pure blood,” i.e., no mixture with Indian or Black blood. In reality, the reference is to cultural factors rather than blood, since it is well known that there is extensive blood type mixture throughout Bolivia. The “Mestiza” category represents such mixtures, largely between Indian and White cultures. The category “Indian” presumably represents a pure Indian culture, while “Negra” represents a pure Afro culture. Figure I.1 shows the relative distribution of the responses. As can be seen, over 60% of Bolivians consider themselves to be “Mestizos,” while nearly one-quarter consider themselves to be “White.” A surprisingly small 10% self-identify as Indian, but this, no doubt, is because of the availability of the “Mestizo” category. When a similar question was asked in Guatemala, in which the local discourse normally divides ethnicity into “Ladino” and “Indígena,” over 40% regularly select the latter.
There are strong linkages between these self-identifications and socio-economic status. The wealth index developed above shows this point clearly, as can be seen in Figure I.1. Whites live in wealthier homes than do Mestizos, who in turn live in far wealthier homes than do the Cholos, with Indians and Blacks at the bottom of the scale. These differences hold for men as well as women, except among male Mestizos and Cholos, where the relationship is slightly reversed. However, there were only eight persons who identified themselves as male “Cholos,” so the average wealth figures here are not reliable.
Ethnicity has a similar relationship to education, with the largest gap emerging between the Whites and Mestizos, on the one hand and the Cholos, Indians and Blacks on the other. The results are shown in Figure I.1
Closely related to ethnicity, but by no means synonymous with it, is language. As already noted in this chapter, Bolivia is a multi-lingual country. We asked each respondent which language(s) they spoke in their home as they were growing up. Figure I.1 shows that Spanish was the predominant language, comprising over half of the respondents, but multi-lingual households with Spanish/Quechua and Spanish/Aymara combinations were also very common. Monolingual indigenous language upbringing was not very common in the sample.
As noted, language and ethnicity are associated, but, as Table I.10 shows, there are many surprises. Most of those who grew up speaking Spanish at home identify as being Mestizo or White, but a small number identify as being Indian. Similarly, most of those who grew up speaking Aymara, identify as being Indian, but many consider themselves to be Mestizo. Surprisingly, the majority of those raised monolingually in Quechua-speaking homes, identify as being Mestizo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language spoken at home</th>
<th>Blanca</th>
<th>Mestiza</th>
<th>Chola</th>
<th>Indígena</th>
<th>Negra</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quechua</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymara</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish &amp; Quechua</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish &amp; Aymara</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I.10. Language Spoken at Home and Ethnicity
In order to avoid excluding mono-lingual speakers of indigenous languages, as already noted, versions of the questionnaire were prepared in both Quechua and Aymara. It was anticipated that the number of interviews to be conducted in those languages would be relatively small, lower than the number of persons who grew up in mono-lingual Quechua- or Aymara-speaking households. The reason for this is that as these individuals grew to adulthood, their contact with Spanish in many cases increased. A total of 23 interviews were conducted in Quechua and an additional 50 interviews conducted in Aymara for the entire sample of 3,476 respondents, or 2.1% of the entire sample (unweighted, including the DDPC sample). In the weighted national sample alone, 0.7% of the interviews were conducted in Quechua and 1.4% in Aymara.

Another way of looking at ethnicity is to take note of the type of dress worn by the respondent. This, of course, is necessarily a subjective judgement made by the interviewer, but we broadly classified dress into Indigenous and Western, and found that 11.1% of the respondents were wearing Indigenous dress at the time of the interview. In Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, Indigenous dress is far more common among females than males, presumably because of the greater regular contact Indian males have with the large Hispanic world. Figure I.1 shows that female Bolivians are almost three times more likely to have been wearing Indigenous dress at the time of the interview.

Dress is closely associated with socio-economic status. Figure I.1 shows that those wearing Western clothing at the time of the interview were far higher on our index of wealth than those wearing Indigenous dress.
In terms of education levels the differences are also sharp and statistically significant. Figure I.1 shows that those wearing Indian dress have less than have the average level of education enjoyed by those who wear Western dress.
Employment

There are many detailed studies carried out on employment and unemployment, and an investigation such as the present one, focused on democratic values, can only make a very general determination of the employment in the sample. We asked three questions regarding employment, a general one regarding the kind of work the respondent normally does, and one on whether or not the respondent had been unemployed in the year prior to the interview. If the respondent had been unemployed, we asked how for many weeks that unemployment had lasted.

The overall picture on the occupational categories of the respondents is contained in Table I.11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Large-medium business owners</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Small business owners</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Farmers who own or rent their land</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ranchers who own or rent their land</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Independent professionals</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Senior executives</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mid-level executives</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Workers</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Day-laborers</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Agricultural laborers</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sales people and artisans</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Home makers</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Students</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Retired</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Part-time workers</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Unemployed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2977</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though only seven respondents were unemployed at the time of the interview, 13.0% of the non-student/non-home maker population had been unemployed at some time during the previous year. The median number of weeks of unemployment was 12.

Analysis Plan

The survey conducted for this study includes a great many variables of interest to those who are working for a more democratic Bolivia. In the chapters that follow, each of these variables will be studied, including system support, political tolerance, civil society participation, local government participation, support/opposition to military rule, and the
administration of justice. In addition, an examination of the baseline data from the DDPC project will be undertaken, and comparisons will be made with the rest of the country.

Most contemporary quantitative social science projects aim at presenting an overall model predicting (or explaining) the dependent variable. In some ways, this study will follow that approach. Each of the above-mentioned variables (i.e., system support, tolerance, etc.) are dependent variables in this study, and the effort here will attempt to show which independent variables best explain differences in support for democratic values and behaviors. The effort will be to show which independent variables (e.g., gender, education, etc.) significantly explain the dependent variables (e.g., system support).

This study will, however, differ from the conventional social scientific analysis of data. Typically, researchers disregard any variable that plays no role in the overall explanation of the dependent variable. For example, a number of studies in Latin America have found that females are more intolerant than males. But further analysis has shown that this intolerance is largely a function of the lower overall level of education and the higher degree of church attendance of females. The overall model from typical social science investigations would ignore gender as a factor, arguing (correctly) that intolerance is a function of education and religiosity. Yet, for the policy maker, it may be very important to know that women are less tolerant than men, even if that intolerance stems from factors other than gender itself. A policy maker concerned with the problem of political intolerance could embark upon a long-term program of increasing national education levels, and expect that eventually female levels would increase to those of males. On the other hand, policy makers often do not have the luxury of waiting for such long-term policies to come to fruition, and might seek to shortcut the process in order to get more immediate results. Thus, knowledge that females in a given country are more intolerant than males, democracy-promoting programs could be aimed directly at adult females, while assisting in the long-term strategy of increasing education for young women so that they emerge as more tolerant adults.

There are other findings that have emerged in studies of democracy that policy-makers need to know about even if they cannot or do not wish to attempt influence. For example, ethnicity might play a role in support for democracy and policy makers need to know this, but they might not wish to be involved in any policies designed to affect ethnic identity.

The presentation of the data here will take note of each of the factors that are found to be important in explaining democratic values and behaviors so as to provide maximum assistance to policy makers. At the same time, it will conclude each discussion with a multivariate analysis that will simultaneously examine all of the predictors of the democratic behavior or attitude and see which ones explain it best when the others are being held constant. Such a presentation of bi-variate and multivariate results in combination will be of greatest use to policy makers.
Chapter II.
System Support

The Theory and the Measurement

Political instability has been endemic in Bolivia since Independence. Even within the highly volatile context of Latin America, Bolivia’s seemingly ceaseless set of insurrections, military coups and countless constitutional re-writes, have been extreme. Only in recent years, has this pattern begun to change markedly. From 1848 up until 1888, the country was run by a series of caudillos in which popular participation in politics was nil. Elections became more commonplace beginning in 1888 with the election of Ancieto Arce, but even in that year, only 1.6% of the population voted. But in 1896 a civil war and a coup d’état ended the elected regime of Severo Fernández Alonso, and another coup took place in 1920, and another in 1930, and yet another in 1934. An assortment of military governments ruled up until 1940 with the election of Enrique Peñaranda de Castillo with only 3.1% of the national population voting. A coup also occurred in 1943, and another in 1948, and yet another in May of 1951, followed by the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. The Revolution ushered in a new age in Bolivian politics; the election of 1956 saw 28.2% of the population voting, by far the highest level to that date. Yet, in 1964 elected government was closed down by a coup, followed by another in 1969, resulting in military rule from 1969-1978. A transition to democracy began in 1978, with a series of inconclusive elections and coups leading to the 1980 elections, which again ended with a coup, and a succession of military governments ending in an election in 1982, in which the president elected was forced out of office one year before the end of his term and new elections were called in 1985 that produced the contested victory of Víctor Paz Estensoro 1985. Since 1985, Bolivia has enjoyed a series of elected Presidents, including Jamie Paz Zamora from 1989-1993, Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, 1993-1997, and today, General (ret.) Hugo Banzer Suarez.

Imposed regimes are, by definition, illegitimate, since they gain and hold power by force. But, democratic regimes do not automatically win the support of their citizens merely by dint of their having been elected. They have to prove themselves, often repeatedly, of deserving the loyalty of the population. Citizen belief in the legitimacy of democracy develops over relatively long periods of time and depends on the ability of that system to satisfy, over the long term, the needs and demands of the populace. In Bolivia, experience with democratic rule has been recent and limited, and the process of building the legitimacy of that system has only just begun.

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The stability of a political system, and its ability to weather crises without succumbing to breakdown has been directly linked to legitimacy. Seymour Martin Lipset, one of the leading theorists in the area of democratic stability defined legitimacy as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”. Lipset hypothesized, based primarily upon his observation of the impact of the Great Depression on Europe, that systems viewed by their citizens as being legitimate would survive a crisis of effectiveness (e.g. when the economy takes a nosedive), but those that were seen as illegitimate would tend to collapse under the stress of economic crisis. Lipset refers specifically to Germany, Austria and Spain as examples of fundamentally illegitimate systems that experienced breakdowns of democracy when buffeted by a crisis of effectiveness. The United States and Great Britain, however, survived the Great Depression without political breakdown, because of the legitimacy of these systems.

Lipset recognized that once a system achieved a high degree of legitimacy there was no guarantee that it would not eventually lose it. Just as political systems can undergo a crisis of effectiveness, so too could they undergo crises of legitimacy. Indeed, Lipset (1959:78) explicitly pointed out that long-term crises of effectiveness could erode legitimacy because legitimacy itself depended upon the ability of the system to "sustain the expectations of major groups." Consequently, "a breakdown of effectiveness, repeatedly or for a long period will endanger even a legitimate’s system stability." And Juan Linz (1978:16) makes much the same point in his treatise on the causes of the breakdown of democracies: "Obviously no government is accorded legitimacy in this sense by all its

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citizens, but no government can survive without that belief on the part of a substantial number of citizens.\textsuperscript{19}

The effectiveness of the Bolivian political system in terms of delivering economic growth and increased welfare to its citizens has been limited and therefore the ability of the democratic system to engender legitimacy significantly constrained. During the period 1965-1989, annual growth averaged -.8\%, and as late as 1989 life expectancy averaged only 54 years.\textsuperscript{20} This record contrasted with an average annual growth rate of 2.0\% and a life expectancy of 65 years for the lower middle-income group of countries of which Bolivia forms a part according to the World Bank. It would not at all be surprising if Bolivian citizens had reservations about the legitimacy of governments that were in power during this period of poor economic performance. More recently, however, Bolivia’s picture has improved, achieving a growth rate of 1.8\% annual during the 1985-1995 period, while life expectancy has risen to 61 years.\textsuperscript{21} One would hope that over time, steady improvements in the economy and the welfare of its citizens would result in a slow, but steady, building of the legitimacy of the system. As these lines are being written, the entire Third World, and much of the first, faces an unprecedented economic crisis. And this crisis is occurring at a time in which never before have the economies of the world been so closely linked, and therefore the economic storms in Asia and former Soviet Union threaten to severely weaken the economies of the rest of the world, especially those in Latin America. If the economies of Latin America suffer a serious decline as a result of the Asian turmoil, will democracy survive? And in Bolivia, is there sufficient belief in the legitimacy of democracy for it weather the storm, or will Bolivians turn to authoritarian solutions to their problems?

In this chapter, belief in the legitimacy of the Bolivian system of government will be described, and demographic and socio-economic differences in beliefs will be shown. As a result of a long-term research project at the University of Pittsburgh, a scale of legitimacy called “Political Support/Alienation” (PSA) has been developed, based initially on studies in Germany, the United States, but later expanded to all of Central America, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela and, now, Bolivia.\textsuperscript{22} The scale attempts to tap the level of support

\textsuperscript{19}Linz, Juan J, and Alfred Stepan, editors. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore, MD., 1978, p. 16.


\textsuperscript{21}World Bank, 1997, p. 214.

citizens have for their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent regime itself. The core of this scale rests on five items, and each item has utilized a seven-point response format, ranging from "not at all" to "a great deal." The full Spanish text of the items are given in the questionnaire that can be found as an appendix to this study. The numbering system used in the questionnaire as well as in the data base is reproduced here to enable the interested reader to further explore the data. The questions were as follows:

B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?
B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Bolivia?
B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Bolivian political system?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Bolivia?
B6\textsuperscript{23}. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Bolivia?

In order to facilitate reading and interpretation of the items, they have been recalibrated on a 0-100 scale.\textsuperscript{24} The average scores for the national sample are shown in Figure II.1. The items have relatively similar averages, except for the item on the courts, which is low compared to the rest of the items in the series. It is also of note that none of the items have an average score in the positive end of the continuum (above 50). In light of Bolivian political and economic history, as summarized earlier in this chapter, these findings should come as no surprise.

\textsuperscript{23}There is no question ‘B5’ in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring the basic concept. In order to retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

\textsuperscript{24}This was done by subtracting a score of 1 from each item (in order to give the item a lower limit of 0), and then by dividing each item by 6, and, finally multiplying by 100.
Comparisons with Other Countries

The Bolivian results will take on greater meaning when they are placed in the comparative context of some other countries in the Latin American region. The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has been gathering data on these PSA items for a number of countries for a number of years. Recent comparable data are available for five other nations (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru). A bar graph similar to the one shown above for six countries and five variables would produce a total of 30 bars and be very difficult to read. It makes far more sense to create an overall index of system support for each of the six countries based on an average of the
five items in the scale. The comparison for the six countries is shown in Figure II.1. The results show that Costa Rica is by far the country with the highest level of system support in the series. This is not surprising given the long tradition of democratic rule in that country for most of the past century, and the widespread respect for human rights and civil liberties shown by successive governments there. Costa Rica does not, of course, have an army, and no significant political unrest has occurred since 1948. The other countries are grouped together fairly closely, although Peru is clearly at the low end of system support. This is also not surprising given that the incumbent regime itself extinguished democracy in 1992 by closing the legislature and the courts, and today the country is run with only a thin veneer of democratic procedures. Paraguay’s level of system support might seem somewhat high, given its very recent political history, but at the time of the survey a military coup had been put down in part because of strong citizen objection to it. El Salvador’s survey data was taken not long after the final signing of the Peace Accords that ended the brutal decade-long civil war in that country. It is difficult to say, of course, what impact these events have on system support at any given moment in time. Prior research has shown that even serious government failures in the short run do not noticeably weaken system support in stable democracies.

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25 This was accomplished by summing the five items (which now range from 0-100) and dividing by five. The Alpha Standardized reliability coefficient for the PSA scale in each country was as follows:
- Bolivia .77
- Costa Rica .73
- El Salvador .78
- Nicaragua .70
- Paraguay .70
- Peru .80

Reliabilities approaching .8 are considered very good in cross-national survey research of this nature.

26 These scores may differ somewhat from other published versions of the results for other countries. That is because of the manner in which non-response is treated in this report compared to some of the others. In creating an index, it is possible to lose a great many cases if there is a scattering of non-response on even as few as one item in the series. In order to maintain the maximum number of cases in the sample, the scale was created by assigning the mean score of each respondent’s answers to the PSA series when at least three of the five items questions were answered. If fewer than three items were answered, then that respondent was assigned a missing value code for the entire PSA scale.

democracies like those found in most of Latin America, these events could have a larger impact. In any event, the comparisons with other countries in Latin America show Bolivians to be exhibiting levels that are comparable to its neighbors, but notably lower than Costa Rica and higher than Peru.

Factors that Influence Political Support

This section now turns its attention to the factors related to (i.e., predictors) of political support/alienation. It first examines demographic factors, and then moves on to socio-economic and geographic factors, and finally treats the relationship of ethnicity and religion to system support. The section concludes with an overall multivariate analysis of all of the factors working together, so that we can hold constant each of them and see which ones remain influential.
Demographic Factors

While there are many areas in which there are large gender gaps in Bolivia, as will be shown in this report, system support is not one of them. As Figure II.1 shows, males and females express virtually the same level of system support.

![Figure II Political Support/Alienation and Gender](image)

Age is another variable that sometimes has an impact on political attitudes. For example, in a well known book by Ronald Inglehart, it was found that in Europe younger people tended to have “post-materialist values.” In Bolivia, however, age does not have any significant impact on system support, as is shown in Figure II.1.

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The relationship is virtually identical when individual years of school are used or the recoded, grouped years are substituted as they are in the figure.

Figure II Political Support/Alienation and Age

Socio-Economic Status (Education and Income)

Education play a role in determining levels of system support. Education was measured as years of schooling completed. This variable is significantly (< .01) related to system support, as is shown in Figure II.1, but the relationship is not linear.\(^{29}\) In order to show more clearly the impact of education, the figure focuses on the narrow range in which there is variation rather than on the entire 0-100 range of the Political Support/Alienation scale. Although there is some variation in system support among primary, junior high and

\(^{29}\)The relationship is virtually identical when individual years of school are used or the recoded, grouped years are substituted as they are in the figure.
high school educated Bolivians, the real difference emerges among college educated citizens.\textsuperscript{30} Among that group, system support declines significantly.

As noted earlier in this study, wealth was measured in two ways, by income and by material indicators of wealth (i.e., appliances in the home, etc.). Both can give us an idea of the relative wealth of the respondents, but in this case, the material indicator of wealth index showed no clear and interpretable relationship to system support, while income, on the other hand, had a clear positive relationship with it. As shown in Figure II.1, among

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure.png}
\caption{Political Support/Alienation and Education}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{30}This is established by what is known as a post-hoc test. As shown in the table below, it is the university-educated group that differs from the other three.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Subset for alpha = .05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-Primary</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.
Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 658.339.
The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used.
those with the highest incomes in the sample, system support was at its highest level.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, compared to the poorest respondents, system support is nearly 15 points higher (on the 0-100 scale) among the richest.

\textbf{Geographic Factors}

As noted in the discussion of the methodology of this study, the sample very accurately reflects the dispersion of Bolivians in both urban and rural zones. It is well known that there are many differences among rural and urban residents, highlighted by the generally lower incomes of those in rural zones. It has already been shown that higher

\textsuperscript{31}The weighted national sample (excluding the DDPC special sample) included too few cases to produce reliable means in the income category of > 20,000 Bolivianos. Therefore, this category was collapsed with the one immediately below it, (i.e., 10,001-20,000 Bolivianos). It will be used in that form throughout the analysis in this report.
income is significantly associated with higher system support. But, as is shown in Figure II.1, urban residents are less supportive of the system than are those in rural Bolivia. This may be a function of the lower levels of education in rural areas, which has been shown to relate to higher system support. In the final analysis, only the multivariate study conducted at the end of this discussion of system support will provide the full picture of these contradictory influences on system support. For the moment, it is important to note that the correlation between residence and system support is moderately strong and statistically significant. The highest support levels are found among Bolivians who live in towns in the 500-1,999 population range, although there is a slight decline among those living in the even more rural areas (the “dispersed rural” region of fewer than 500 residents). These differences are not only statistically significant, they are substantively of importance too since rural Bolivians in the 500-1,999 population category are the only ones (by residence) who are close to falling into the positive end of the Political Support/Alienation continuum (with a score of 49.9 out of 100 points).

![Political Support/Alienation and Urban/Rural Residence](image)

**Figure II** Political Support/Alienation and Urban/Rural Residence

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32The income figures by zone of residence is shown in the following summary, based upon the 1-7 income scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income in Bolivianos</th>
<th>UR</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban &gt;20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban 2,000-20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural 500-1,999</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersed rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System support varies by Department, in part as a consequence of the rural-urban distribution of the various departments, and in part because of the other socio-economic and demographic factors that vary by department (as was shown in the methodology section of this study). The overall impact of all of these factors (and others, including historical and cultural factors) is shown Table II.1 The differences among the departments are statistically significant ( < .001), but the pattern does not become clear until the data are displayed on a map of Bolivia.33

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33 The reader may wonder what effect the impact of the small sample size might be for Pando and Beni in these weighted sample results. As noted in the methodology section, the confidence interval (the range within which the correct score from the entire population of adult Bolivians is likely to lie), depends upon the sample size. It was also noted that the confidence interval for the entire sample was about ± 2%, but for the individual departments it was higher since the sample size in each one is lower. When weighted, however, the confidence intervals for the more populous departments such as La Paz, narrow considerably since their weighted sample grows in numbers, whereas the least populous departments such as Pando and Beni shrink as a result of the weighting. In order to see if the significantly higher system support in Pando and Beni are merely illusory, a function of the smaller sample size and consequently larger confidence interval, the table below presents the unweighted results. It is clear from these findings that mean scores for La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí are indeed far lower than the scores of Pando and Beni, as the confidence intervals for these groups of departments do not come close to overlapping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for Mean</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,849</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When the system support levels are displayed on a map of the country, as they are in Figure II.1, it is clear that there are three clusters of departments: 1) the cluster in the West, consisting of La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí, with low levels of system support; 2) the cluster in the East, consisting of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and Tarija, with intermediate levels of system support; and 3) remote Beni and Pando, with the highest levels of system support. It is important for policy makers to know that these regional differences exist in Bolivia since democracy programming could be targeted geographically based on these results.
The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998

Chapter II: System Support

Figure II.8. Map of Bolivia: Political Support/Alienation, Variation by Department

Darker shading = lower support

Ethnicity and Religion

It has been anticipated that in Bolivia, where ethnic identification is so sharp, that system support might vary by ethnicity. In fact, ethnicity as defined by self-identification, or ethnicity defined by dress (Indian or Western) had no significant impact on system support. There were, however, differences if ethnicity is defined in terms of language use, and the patterns are especially interesting and unexpected.

First, it is important to note that there are differences in system support based on the language in which the interview was conducted, with system support being significantly higher among those who responded in Spanish than those who responded in either Quechua or Aymara. Since, however, the sample size for those two interview languages is so small and the impact of socio-economic factors so strong, those findings are not considered meaningful.

Second, clear differences did emerge in system support as defined by the language spoken by the respondent while growing up at home. The pattern is shown in Figure II.2.
The contrast is most notable between those who grew up monolingually, speaking Quechua, Spanish, and to a lesser extent, Aymara, and those who grew up bi- or tri-lingually. Bolivians in mono-lingual households have higher system support than those who grew up speaking more than one language. Thus, it is clearly not an Indian/non-Indian division that splits public opinion on support for the basic institutions of government, but rather a split between what appears to be multi-cultural households versus mono-cultural households.

In order to make this point clearer, Table II.2 presents a statistical analysis in which a “post hoc” test is employed. This test, applied to results from an “analysis of variance” in which the means of different groups are being compared, allows the researcher to distinguish among clusters of groups. As can be seen in the table, the clear break is between Quechua and Spanish on the one hand, and the various language combinations on the other. Support levels among those growing up in mono-lingual Aymara households, while similar to the other mono-lingual groups, overlaps statistically with the Spanish & Quechua group.

How to explain these results? There is a long anthropological tradition, reflected most clearly Octavio Paz’s classical work, *The Laybarinth of Solitude*, which argues that in Latin America it is the mestizo who is the “displaced person,” the individual who is
neither part of the dominant Hispanic culture nor part of the Indigenous culture.\textsuperscript{34} In the Andean area, the classic work \textit{Deep Rivers} by José María Arguedas vividly makes this same point.\textsuperscript{35} Using the language variable analyzed above, it would appear that if we define the multi-lingual households as being “mestizo” in the sense that they are of mixed cultural backgrounds, then Octavio Paz’s thesis seems to be supported with these data. Mestizos reflect higher levels of political alienation than the monocultural Bolivians.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Language spoken while growing up & Group 1 & Group 2 \\
\hline
Spanish, Quechua & 48 & 40.5 \\
Spanish, Aymara & 379 & 40.6 \\
Spanish & 600 & 41.8 & 41.8 \\
Quechua & 81 & 43.9 & 43.9 \\
Aymara & 1569 & 45.8 & \\
Spanish, Quechua & 109 & 46.0 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Language and Political Support/Alienation Duncan Post Hoc Comparisons}
\end{table}

In the United States there is a long tradition that separates politics from religion, although the recent important impact of fundamentalist sects on the political scene in many elections is beginning to alter that view. In Latin America, in contrast, church and state have not been so separate and distinct as in the U.S. case. For that reason it is especially important to examine the impact of religion on political attitudes.

Significant but not dramatic differences emerge among Bolivians based on their religious beliefs. Figure II.2 shows that practicing Catholics express the highest levels of support, compared to non-practicing Catholics, who in turn have higher support than the

\textsuperscript{34}Octavio Paz, \textit{The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico} (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961).

Evangelical population, who in turn have higher support than those who have no religion or state that they are atheists.\textsuperscript{36}

A further indication of the importance of religion is shown in Figure II.2, which demonstrates that Bolivians who do not attend any church services (as measured by attendance during the month prior to the interview) are significantly lower in system support than those who regularly attend such services. The more services that are attended, the higher the system support, except for those who attend services very frequently, in which case the mean system support level declines slightly. It is also the case that the more 

\textsuperscript{36}The distribution in the sample of religious beliefs is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practicing Catholic</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practicing Catholic</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,954</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,978</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
frequently that Bolivians pray, the higher is their system support, but the difference is not statistically significant.

![Figure II](image)

**Figure II** Political Support/Alienation and Attendance At Religious Services

**Ideology and Political Preference**

Attention is now turned from demographic, socio-economic, ethnic and religious characteristics of Bolivians to their political belief systems. In some ways, political beliefs are as enduring as religious beliefs; in the United States, for example, individual party identification changes less often than religious preference. There is, of course, the aging process that occurs in individuals, which sometimes moves them toward a more conservative political point of view as they grow older, but since that trend tends to be common across all individuals as they age, there is an underlying constancy in ideological beliefs. How does ideology, and its expression in terms of evaluation of political leaders and party preference relate to system support in Bolivia?

System support is directly associated with political ideology in Bolivia. But ideology only seems to matter on the right, rather than on the center or left. The survey included a standard and frequently-used political ideology question in which respondents were asked to locate themselves along a 10-point continuum from left to right. As can be seen in Figure II.2, the distribution of responses is close to the normal bell-shaped curve, except
that there is a large proportion of respondents who selected the middle-point (i.e., score of 5). Left and right are about equally balanced, however. There are also a relatively large number of non-responses (16.1% of the sample), which is also to be expected from a question on ideology since many individuals, especially those with less exposure to the media, are unfamiliar with the left-right dimension.\footnote{Respondents who did not indicate their ideology on the left-right scale were less likely than those who did indicate their ideology to listen to news on the radio, watch news programs on TV, or read news in the newspaper.}

---

**Figure II** Distribution of Sample by Ideology

The examination of the relationship between political ideology and system support shows that those on the political right are far more supportive than those on the center-left end of the continuum. The results in Figure II.2 show the pattern. Thus, left and center in Bolivia have about the same (low) level of system support, while those on the right are more supportive.
Perception of the quality of the performance of government is also directly and strongly linked to system support. Figure II.2 shows that those who believe that the performance of government is “very good” are far more supportive of the overall political system than those who say that the performance of the incumbent is very poor. The difference between the two extremes is about 20 points on the 0-100 scale, revealing the strongest association yet found for the system support variable.
These results are not surprising since our theory predicts that respondent evaluation of the performance of government influences system support. These evaluations of government performance, of course, fluctuate depending on particular circumstances, often related to the state of the economy. But over time, if evaluations of the performance of elected administrations are consistently negative, system support can be expected to suffer.

For the most part, system support did not vary by party vote in the 1997 Presidential election. As shown in Figure II.2, the level of system support among the major parties was virtually identical. The only major differences were among those who voted for CONDEPA (Loza), and those who cast a null or blank ballot. Among those voters, system support was lower than for other voters. CONDEPA, long led by Carlos Palenque, who recently died, has presented itself as a new populist party whose main goal has been to challenge the domination of the traditional party machines. System support did not vary significantly between voters and non-voters (not shown in the figure).
Finally, it was found that knowledge of politics was not associated with system support except in one very important area: the single member district. The new “uninominal” system in Bolivia, about which more will be discussed later in this report, allows voters to cast a vote for an individual candidate for deputy. Although only 17.6% of the respondents in the survey were able to name their representative in the single member district, those who did were significantly higher in system support than those who could not. These results are shown in Figure II.2.
It is now appropriate to develop an overall model of system support in Bolivia. Doing so requires a multivariate analysis in which the impact of each of the variables that have been shown above to be related to system support are considered, while holding constant for all of the others in the model. In that way it is possible to see which of variables remains significantly related (i.e., are significant predictors of) system support. Since system support is measured on a scale that is continuous in nature (ranging from 0-100), OLS (i.e., Ordinary Least Squares) regression is the appropriate statistical technique. Presented below in Table II.2 is the final model, after deleting those variables initially shown to be related to system support that were entered into the model but were found to be insignificant in the presence of the other variables.

The table should be read as follows. The last column shows if the variable is significant or not. When the number in this column is .05 or lower, the variable is significant. This level of significance is based on the “t” statistic, which appears in the previous column. All of the variables in this table are significant. The “Beta” column helps us determine the relative importance of each variable in explaining system support. The “B” column is the unstandardized version of the “Beta” column, which shows us how much
of a change in the dependent variable is produced by a change of 1 unit in the independent variable. The “standard error” column is a measure of how much the B varies from sample-to-sample, or, in other terms, it is the standard deviation of the sample distribution.

The model shows that among the socio-economic and demographic factors, the older the respondent the lower the system support. It also shows that living in rural areas increases system support; indeed this is the strongest predictor in the table. Higher income and speaking only one language at home while being raised are related to higher system support. Higher education, however, is linked to a decline in system support. Thus, we now know that the lower education levels in rural areas is only partly responsible for the higher levels of system support since the urban/rural variable and education both remain significant predictors of system support. Respondents who say that religion plays an important role in their lives are more likely to express higher support for the political system, but the other measures of religion (Catholic vs. others, frequency of church attendance and prayer) disappear as significant predictors. It is also the case that knowing the name of the single-member district deputy, being on the right ideologically, and having a positive evaluation of the performance of the incumbent government are factors linked to higher system support.

### Table II.2. OLS Regression Results: Predictors of System Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>58.820</td>
<td>19.053</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 Age</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR Urban/Rural</td>
<td>3.060</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>9.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos</td>
<td>1.873</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>5.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONOLING Monolingual upbringing</td>
<td>3.959</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>5.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED Completed years of education</td>
<td>-.366</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>-3.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF6 Religion is an important aspect of my life</td>
<td>2.856</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>4.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI5 Knows name of “uninominal” deputy</td>
<td>2.110</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>2.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 Ideology (left-right)</td>
<td>.568</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>3.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1 Evaluation of government performance</td>
<td>4.317</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>8.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $r^2 = .11$; Sig. < .001.

$^f$ = recoded from original questionnaire

### Institutional Support

The focus of this investigation of political support has been on the core scale of five items. In the Bolivia survey, however, a much wider range of specific political institutions was included in the questionnaire. It is important to examine the relative degree of support.
for each of these institutions. Each of the new items was asked using the identical seven-point scale employed for the five core items. In order to recalibrate them to the same metric utilized for the core items, each was recoded in the same fashion yielding a 0-100 range for each.

The results for the 17 items included in this series are presented in Figure II.2. There are a number of points to observe in this figure. First, a large cluster of institutions score in the 40s on the scale of 0-100, indicating a support somewhat in the negative range, approximating the levels of support already seen with the system support measure. Second, two institutions fall especially low on support: political parties and the police. Parties are often rated poorly in democratic countries, but the very low rating of the police is of concern and suggests important policy implications. Third, Congress is also low on support, but not dramatically lower than the large cluster of institutions in the center of the scale. Fourth, reporters and the Catholic Church are far more highly supported than any government institution. Fifth, although the difference is not great, among government institutions, the municipality is more trusted than the others. It is interesting to note that in a number of Latin American countries, municipal presidents have been successful national presidential candidates (e.g., Ecuador, Nicaragua). Each of these findings has programmatic policy implications for those interested in strengthening democracy.
System support, as measured by the five-item Political Support/Alienation measure and these individual institutions analyzed immediately above, are closely associated with each other. Statistically they are all associated at the <.001 level or better, with an correlation (r) in the range of .3 to .5. Regression results show similar patterns to those were displayed in the analysis of the core system support items, although there is minor variation across the list of variables. Little would be gained by reporting each of those 17 equations here. Regional variation by department also produces similar patterns to what we have already seen.

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38 For example, religiosity and age are not significant predictors of support for political parties, but the other variables in the equation remain significant.
Conclusions

The ability of political leaders to generate support is critical to the long term survival of any democracy. In Bolivia, it has been found that in system support is far lower than it is in a stable democracy like that of Costa Rica, but is marginally higher than in Peru. Increasing support will not occur over night and will depend crucially on the efficacy of Bolivia’s elected leaders in the years to come. The study has shown that there is a very strong linkage between evaluation of the efficacy of the system’s performance and system support, but that this association is not linked to party or candidate preference. If current and future governments can succeed in meeting the expectations of the population, these results suggest that system support will increase and democratic political stability, so long absent in Bolivia, will be achieved.

What will make this process more difficult, however, is that at present the most highly educated Bolivians express lower support than those with the lowest levels of education, and that those in urban areas, where the most highly educated population resides, is far lower than in rural areas. Since Bolivia, like all countries in Latin America, is undergoing a rapid process of urbanization, the challenge to increase support will be a difficult one. On the other hand, system support is positively linked with active church attendance, an indication that civil society participation might be an important factor in raising such support. That is a subject to which this study will turn in Chapter IV.
Chapter III. Political Tolerance

Systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support. But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim, indeed. As Przeworski has argued, in democracies, citizens must agree to "subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process."\textsuperscript{39} For this reason it is important to measure the tolerance of Bolivian citizens and to examine the levels encountered within various demographic, geographic and political sub-sets of the population. It will also be helpful to place the Bolivian case in comparative perspective, locating it within the larger data base of which this project forms a part.

The political science literature on political tolerance is vast, and while it was initially concentrated on the United States the studies have now been broadened to include many democratizing countries around the world. Two basic approaches to the measurement of political tolerance have been used in these studies. One of these is called the "least-liked-group" approach.\textsuperscript{40} In this method, respondents are given a list of groups, normally including extremist groups of the left and right, as well as other potentially unpopular groups such as homosexuals. The respondent selects the group that he/she likes the least, and then is asked a series of questions about his/her willingness to extend a variety of political rights and civil liberties to members of that group.\textsuperscript{41} The primary limitation of this approach, however, is that in many countries significant portions of the respondents refuse


\textsuperscript{40}John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982).

to select any group. This occurs for many reasons, but the net result is that for those respondents, no tolerance information is obtained. For example, in a recent study of South Africa, only 59% of the respondents were willing to name a group. There is another important limitation to this approach and that is since each respondent can select a different group, it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across individuals. For example, in a country like Germany, where fascist parties have been outlawed since Germany redemocratized after World War II, it would be difficult to compare intolerance responses to those who selected the Nazi Party, for example, with those who selected a feminist organization. That is, we would tend to accept a high level of intolerance for the civil liberties of a banned political group, than for a reformist, completely legal social organization. A further complication with this methodology is that it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across countries since the groups that are salient in one country would likely be different in another. For example, asking about tolerating members of the Sandinista Party would make considerable sense in Nicaragua, but make no sense in Bolivia.

The other main method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance towards communism. This approach worked well, so long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lowered levels of intolerance toward communists were an indication of a general decline of intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. That is the approach taken by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:


44Even though different measures have been utilized in the study of tolerance, it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least-Liked'?", American Journal of Political Science 36 May (1992): 560-77.
The questions that follow are to learn your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Bolivia.

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the governments of Bolivia, not only the current government, but the system of Bolivian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. Thinking still of those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government be allowed to run for public office?

D4. Thinking still about those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of them appearing on television to make a speech?
In the discussion that follows, these items will be analyzed. Since the question avoided the filter of the least-liked-group, all respondents were asked each item, and most gave an answer.

**Overall and Comparative Levels of Tolerance**

The first step in this analysis is to examine each of the questions separately, and then create an overall index of political tolerance, following the same procedures utilized earlier in this study. The 1-10 scale used in the original question was converted to a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparison with the other scales used here.\(^{45}\) Figure III.1 shows that average tolerance levels for each of the four items are in the negative end of the 0-100 continuum. Greatest tolerance is shown for those who carry out peaceful public demonstrations, and a slightly lower level of tolerance is exhibited for the right to vote. Greatest intolerance is expressed for the right of free speech (to make a speech on TV) and the right to run for office.

\(^{45}\)Once again, this was accomplished by subtracting one point from each item, and dividing by nine points, and then multiplying by 100.
How high or low are these scores? We can get an idea by comparing them to the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base used earlier in this study. Figure III.2 shows that Bolivians, on average, are notably less tolerant than other Latin Americans. In each of the other countries, when the overall scale of tolerance is computed, the level is at the mid-point of 50 or higher, whereas in Bolivia, the overall level is at 41. These findings are certainly troubling, given the importance of a political culture of tolerance in helping to guard against the violation of minority rights. They suggest that in Bolivia, more than in the other countries in our data base, that majorities would be willing to allow restrictions on the rights of political minorities.

![Political Tolerance: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective](image)

Figure III Political Tolerance: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

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46 The scale was computed by summing up the four items and dividing by four. When a respondent gave an answer to two or three items, but did not answer one item, that respondent was assigned a score based on the mean of those questions to which an answer was given.
Correlates of Tolerance

In most studies of political tolerance conducted in the United States and abroad, education plays a major role. As citizens educated they learn to appreciate and respect differences in points of view. Education is a process by which empathy for others is often inculcated as one’s vistas become expanded. This process usually is most commonly found among those who have been exposed to a college-level education, but it sometimes occurs as early as high school. In each of the other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion data base that are being analyzed in this study, higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of tolerance. In Bolivia, however, not only is tolerance lower than in other countries, it does not increase with higher education, as is shown in Figure III.2. For example, in Costa Rica, respondents with primary education average 50 on the tolerance 0-100 scale, whereas those with a university education average 71. In the other countries except Bolivia the differences are not as sharp, but the pattern is the same. Those with a university education in Bolivia, however, have virtually the same tolerance levels as those with a primary education.

\[47\text{For recent evidence from Russia see Donna Bahry and Stacy Burnett Gordon Cynthia Boaz, "Tolerance, Transition, and Support for Civil Liberties in Russia," Comparative Political Studies 30, no. 4 August (1997): 484-510.}\]
Tolerance and Education:

Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

In combination, low tolerance and an absence of an impact of education on tolerance, are troubling findings. One must seriously question the political messages that are being communicated in Bolivian educational institutions. Frederick D. Weil’s extensive research on the United States and Germany has led him to conclude that in countries where the prevailing elite norms to not emphasize tolerance, increasing education can have little or no effect.\textsuperscript{48} It would appear from these data that something is going very wrong in Bolivia. The survey data cannot tell us what that is, of course, since that would require an examination of the school system itself, but the survey data strongly suggest

that the democratizing messages normally associated with education in most countries are not being transmitted, or are not being absorbed by Bolivian students. In Nicaragua, in order to better understand the education process and its relationship to democratic values, the University of Pittsburgh administered the democratic values survey to a sample of teachers, both public and private. It was found there that teachers, especially private school teachers, had levels of tolerance (and system support) higher than the mass public. One wonders what would emerge in Bolivia if a similar study were undertaken there. If it is found that Bolivian teachers are, in fact, relatively intolerant, then policy-makers might consider introducing a series of in-service training programs to help alter this view. On the other hand, if the teachers are tolerant, but the students are not, one would want to explore further what is going on in the classroom itself.

An examination of other variables that might have an association with tolerance finds that only two, ethnic self-identification and the department of residence of the respondent, have any significant and consistent relationship with it.\footnote{In some cases, there is a significant correlation, but upon examination, the relationship is non-linear and inconsistent.} Variables such as gender, urban/rural residence, age, income, ideology, religiosity, and ethnicity that are often linked to tolerance in other countries, show no such pattern in Bolivia.

Looking first at ethnic self-identification, Figure III.2 shows that one group, Blacks, stand out as the most tolerant. However, the sample size of the Black population is very small (as is the relative proportion of Blacks in Bolivia), so this finding is of limited interest to the overall study of democratic values in Bolivia. Those Bolivians who self-identify as White (i.e., “Blanco”) express significantly higher levels of tolerance than do other Bolivians. This finding is especially interesting in light of precisely the opposite results that have emerged in studies conducted in Guatemala, the only country in Latin America with a larger proportion of its population that self-identified as indigenous.\footnote{See, for example, Mitchell A. Seligson, Joel Jutkowitz, Dinhora Azpuru and Max Lucas, \textit{La Cultura Democrática de los Guatemaltecos: Resumen} (Guatemala City: ASEIS, 1995); Malcolm B. Young, Mitchell A. Seligson and Joel Jutkowitz, \textit{Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development: Second Report} (Arlington, VA: Development Associates, Inc, 1996), and Silvia Lucrecia del Cid Avalos \textit{Ethnicity, Political Culture, and the Future of Guatemalan Democracy}, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1997 (Mitchell A. Seligson, chair).} In that country indigenous populations were found, in general, to be more tolerant than the “Ladino” (i.e., mestizo and white) population.
Department of residence, as noted, also has a strong link to tolerance. In order to show these differences, the tolerance scores for each department are given, and then these scores are placed on the map of Bolivia so that regional patterns can be observed. Table III.1 shows the means; it can easily be seen that there is great variation, from a high of 53 in Tarija on the 0-100 scale, to a low of 35 in El Beni.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>36.86</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>18.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>51.27</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>20.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>17.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>40.81</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>20.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>38.43</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>19.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>39.47</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>19.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>53.19</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>14.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>35.18</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>18.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>19.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The map of Bolivia tells a clearer story. Figure III.2 shows the results. The Eastern region of Bolivia has much higher tolerance levels than the other parts of the country. This pattern is certainly curious and one that requires explanation. What factors are helping to promote greater tolerance in Santa Cruz and Tarija?
Figure III.5  Map of Bolivia: Variation in Political Tolerance by Department

Lighter shading = more tolerance
A response to that question suggests itself by thinking back about the impact of ethnic self-identification and tolerance. It was found that those who identified as “white” were more tolerant than those who identified as “indigenous” or “mestizo.” If the distribution of the indigenous population were such that it was heavily concentrated in the two departments that had high intolerance levels, then this could explain the high level of tolerance found there. In order to answer that question, Table III.2 shows the level of tolerance for the largest ethnic groups (White, Mestizo and Indian) within each department. In Santa Cruz, where tolerance is high, it is high among the white population, but it is also high among the mestizo and Indian populations. In La Paz, where tolerance is low, it is (especially) low among the white population. The overall pattern shows, therefore, that ethnicity is not primarily responsible for the departmental variation in tolerance levels. Thus, ethnicity and departmental residence are two factors that each separately play a role in determining tolerance. Note that these results, as in other tables in this report, are for the weighted sample. For that reason, very small sample sizes appear in places like Pando, whereas in fact, the full 300 interviews were conducted there.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Self-Identification</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blanca</strong></td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mestiza</strong></td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>1,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indígena</strong></td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>2,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System Support and Tolerance

The theory behind this study of system support and political tolerance is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must both believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy.

In prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh project, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability. In this study, I draw on that earlier discussion in order to remind the reader (or to present for the first time to those who have not seen those studies) what these relationships are. Table III.3 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

---


52 The scale ranges from 0-100, so the most natural cut-point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.
Table III.3
Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System support</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable Democracy</td>
<td>Authoritarian Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy at Risk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.\(^{53}\)

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchical) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.  

---

Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. First, it should be noted that system support and tolerance are positively associated with each other (r = .13, sig. < .001). This means that those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into "high" and "low." If the overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way, and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low.

The results for the Bolivia 1998 survey are shown in Table III.4. As can be seen, only about one-in-ten Bolivians are both supportive of their political system and express political tolerance. On the other hand, the largest cell by far is the democratic breakdown cell, in which nearly one half of all Bolivians fall. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Finally, between about a fifth and a quarter of Bolivians fall into the "unstable democracy" or "authoritarian stability" cells.

---

55 If the variables were left in their original 0-100 format, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making it impossible to read and interpret.

56 It is important to note that the results presented here differ from those in some earlier presentations of the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project. In many of those presentations the expanded scale of items was utilized, whereas here the focus is on the core list. In addition, in this study an algorithm is used for missing data (i.e., non-response) so as to minimize the number of missing cases in the overall scale. In the tolerance scale, when two or more of the four items are answered, the overall scale score is based on the valid responses. If fewer than two are answered, the case is scored as missing. For the system support measure, a valid score is accepted when at least three of the five questions are answered. As a result of these changes, the percentages reported in the following tables vary somewhat from some earlier reports and publications.

57 The total sample size represented in this chart = 2,791. This means that a total of 187 of the 2,977 cases had missing data on either the tolerance or the system support measure and were therefore deleted from this analysis.
In order to create this chart, a new variable, called “democ” was created in the data base. It eliminates cases in which missing data are found on either the tolerance or the system support measure. The coding was:

- if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1) democ = 100.
- if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 2) democ = 0.
- if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 2) democ = 0.
- if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 1) democ = 0.

Table III.4
Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerance</th>
<th>System support</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable Democracy 11.1%</td>
<td>Authoritarian Stability 24.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy 17.3%</td>
<td>Democracy at Risk 47.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How do the Bolivian results compare with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base? Not well, as is shown in Figure III.3. As can be seen, Bolivia is the lowest of the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but less than one fourth the level of support for stable democracy found in Costa Rica.
Figure III  Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective
In order to compare the Bolivian results to each of the cells in each of the other countries, the full data set is presented in Table III.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>High Count</th>
<th>Low Count</th>
<th>Total Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador '95</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua '95</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica '95</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay '96</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru '96</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia '98</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Slight variation in this combined table appears from the single-country data because of the calculation of missing data for the entire data set.

Departmental Distribution of Support for Democracy

It is possible to examine variation within Bolivia on the combination of high system support and high tolerance. In the analysis above it was found that for Bolivia as a whole, 11% of the population expressed high support for democracy. How does this vary by
These departmental scores were computed by assigning to each respondent in the study a value of 100 if their recoded system support and tolerance score was equal to 1 in the above analysis, and 0 if their score was equal to 0.

These clusters were determined by the Duncan post-hoc test for ANOVA results.
Figure III: Map of Bolivia: Percentage of Population Supportive of Democracy
Other Measures of Political Tolerance

In the previous chapter, the core series of political support was expanded to measure support for a number of key institutions in Bolivia. The tolerance series discussed above, which was used to compare to other countries, was also supplemented with a variety of additional measures.

In order to probe the issue of tolerance more deeply, a new series was added to the questionnaire that was derived from the recent work of Bob Altemeyer. Those items are called the RWA (“right-wing authoritarianism) series near the end of the questionnaire. Unfortunately, because the format of the Altemeyer items requires an “agree-disagree” format, the series is inherently subject to what is known as “acquiescence response set,” or “yea-saying” which is the phenomenon that occurs when individuals of low socio-economic status agree with an item irrespective of its content. Considerable research has shown that low-status Hispanic populations are like to be subject to acquiescence response set. In examining the results of the RWA items, which were written so as to alternate between the “agree” response being an authoritarian response and an anti-authoritarian response, it was found that a number of those interviewed responded “agree” to both types of questions. The response set in Bolivia was strong enough to invalidate the use of this series.

A second alternative series of tolerance items, derived from the Altemeyer work, but which was written in a “forced-choice” format was also included in the survey. These items gave each respondent two alternatives to chose from, one that reflected the authoritarian position and the other that reflect the opposite. These four items can be found in the questionnaire as the “Newtol1-4” items. The items were not susceptible to acquiescence


63 Two additional items formed this series, one dealing with homosexual rights and the other dealing with supporters of the return of military rule. In Bolivia homosexual rights are not popular with the majority of Bolivians, but since this item did not deal with a political group, per se, it was not appropriate to include in this series. The question on support for the rights of those who favor the return of military rule was, indeed, political, but the item itself is an odd one. Those who support the rights of those who wish to see the military come back to power, are those who are supporting the rights of an anti-democratic group. In Germany, for example, the Nazi Party is outlawed, and one cannot say that supporters of the rights of the Nazi Party are necessarily tolerant individuals, but may be right-wingers. In Bolivia, the same concern emerges for this item, and for that reason it was excluded from the new tolerance series.
response set because respondents could not reply “yes” to the question, but had to select from among the two alternatives. The first four of these items were summed into an authoritarianism scale, and this in turn was correlated with the tolerance measure developed above. Two findings emerged. First, the two scales were positively associated with each other (Sig. < .001), as was expected. Second, the authoritarianism scale was also unrelated to education, a finding identical to the one that emerged with the original tolerance item. In combination, these two findings help validate the tolerance scale used in this study, and also add support to the conclusion that in Bolivia education does not seem to produce greater tolerance.

There is yet a third series of items that can be used to explore further the question of tolerance in Bolivia. This series attempts to measure opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties by the state. One drawback of the items, however, is that they may capture opposition to state action of any kind, as well as state action to the suppression of liberty. The items read:

Now I am going to read you some actions that the State can take. How strongly do you approve or disapprove, using the scale of 1-10,..

C3. Of a law that would prohibit public demonstrations?

C5. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that meetings be prohibited of any group that might criticize the Bolivian political system?

C6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the Government censor publicity of its political enemies?

In this scale, the tolerant end of the continuum is the low end, that is, disapproval of state action to suppress democratic liberties (the response of 1 means strong disapproval of laws that restrict civil liberties). Recent comparable data exist for two other countries in the database, Paraguay and Costa Rica. Figure III.9 includes all three countries, and compares the level of opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties by level of education. Several conclusions emerge from this comparison. First, levels of political tolerance measured by this scale are lower in Bolivia and Paraguay than they are in Costa

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64 There are also surveys from Central America from an earlier period, but these are not analyzed here.

65 Since each country in this comparison has a slightly different system of education, the groupings here are not precise, but are necessary for comparison purposes. For example, in Bolivia, primary education runs through 5th grade, whereas in Costa Rica it runs through the 6th. These differences, however, had no impact on the overall comparisons since those were made with the unrecoded education levels, based on years of education completed.
Rica, again, keeping in mind that the low numbers on the scale indicate greater disapproval of the suppression of democratic liberties. Second, in both Paraguay and Costa Rica, there is a clear and significant relationship between education and tolerance; higher education is associated with higher tolerance. In Bolivia, in contrast, once again no relationship is found; those with a university education are just about as tolerant as those with a primary education. Third, it is of note that in both Paraguay and Costa Rica, the increase in tolerance emerges at the university level, and in Bolivia, too, there is a slight increase in tolerance at that level of education, but not enough to produce a significant relationship, even though the Bolivian sample is far larger than the other two and therefore it should be far easier for a significant relationship to emerge.

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**Figure III**  Opposition to the Suppression of Democratic Liberties: and Education--Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costa Rica</strong></td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paraguay</strong></td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bolivia</strong></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

66 The negative signs in the correlation coefficients show that higher education is associated with greater disapproval of the suppression of democratic liberties. That is, the higher levels of education are associated with a low score on the 1-10 scale, low scores being associated with opposition to the laws that would suppress civil liberties.
This analysis of alternative measures of political tolerance increase our confidence in two basic findings of this chapter. First, political tolerance in Bolivia is low, and second, it does not increase with education.

**Conclusions**

Political tolerance, a key component of political culture, is especially low in Bolivia when compared to other countries in Latin America. This, perhaps, is not surprising given the relatively low levels of education and economic development in the country, yet what has been surprising and disturbing is that tolerance does not increase with education in Bolivia. In other countries, increased education is closely linked to increased tolerance.

The model of stable democracy proposed here, one in which citizens ought to both express support for their political system and be tolerant of the rights of political minorities, has produced very disturbing results. It was found that only 11.1% of the population had this combination of attitudes, the lowest of any country in our data base. Equally as troubling is that the percent of the population with values supportive of democracy is lowest in La Paz, the nation’s political nerve center.

In combination, the findings of this chapter suggest that Bolivia’s present-day institutional democracy is not built on a solid foundation of a political culture supportive of that democracy. The 1998 survey was large enough and representative enough to be able to make that statement with a high degree of certainty. The challenge, then, is to change attitudes. In the chapters that follow, some key areas in which that might be done are explored.
Chapter IV. Civil Society Participation

The rapid and dramatic transitions to democracy that have occurred throughout the world since the 1980s have led many researchers to focus on civil society as a potentially vital element in the democracy puzzle.\(^{67}\) In Eastern Europe, the role that Solidarity played in bringing down the old authoritarian communist order has been studied in detail, and many argue that it was vital to the overthrow of the system. In Latin America, many have pointed to role of civil society in organizing the “No vote” in Chile, which resulted in the replacement of Pinochet’s dictatorship with a competitive and economically dynamic democracy. In Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and elsewhere human rights NGOs have played a key role in the democratization process.

Dictatorships have long been infamous for suppressing and/or co-opting civil society organization. Citizens in such systems are deprived of their ability to provide collective expression of their demands. Democracy, on the other hand, cultivates civil society organizations as a key element in the articulation of citizen demands.

In recent years political scientists, stimulated by Robert Putnam’s already classic work, *Making Democracy Work*, have begun to take a more systematic look at the role of civil society in democracy.\(^{68}\) Putnam argues that the key to building democracies is through the development of what he has termed “social capital.” Countries with high levels of social capital are countries in which citizens trust each other and trust their governments. This trust largely emerges from their active participation in civil society organizations. Putnam believes that the process of building social capital is a long one, but cannot prosper without an active civil society. It is for this reason that building stable democracies in former dictatorships does not occur overnight.

How active is civil society participation in Bolivia? The data in the present study allow us to answer that question with some precision. Numerous other studies of civil society merely count the number of organizations that exist in a given country or region, and presume that those counts reflect the level of activity of citizens. The democratic values survey conducted for this study allows a far more direct measure; the respondents were asked about their participation in nine distinct forms of civil society organizations. The survey makes it possible not only to examine the levels of participation, but to determine which Bolivians participate more and which less. In addition, the University of


Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project data base allows comparisons with other Latin American countries.

Levels of Participation

How active are Bolivians in various forms of civil society organizations? Figure IV.1 shows the results for the entire sample. Participation in church and school-related groups are by far the most popular in Bolivia, a finding that, as will be shown in a moment, is similar for other countries in Latin America. These findings reflect the important role of religion in Bolivia as well as the prominence of the school in the lives of its citizens, especially for those who have children in school. What might surprise some readers, however, is the relatively high level of participation in community/neighborhood development groups (Juntas de mejoras, juntas vecinales). These organizations are far more popular than professional associations, civic organizations (such as women’s groups, Lions Clubs, etc.), and labor unions. The OTB, or “Organización territorial de base,” is a new form of organization developed as part of the recently enacted citizen participation law. More will be said about participation in this form of organization in the chapter on municipal government.
Before analyzing differences in participation among Bolivians, it is important to place these findings in perspective. Figure IV.3 compares the results from Bolivia with those from other countries in the data base. The comparison excludes the “Juntas Vecinales” as well as the OTBs, since these are uniquely Bolivian organizations. These results are based on a total sample of 7,741 respondents in five Latin American countries.\(^69\) In marked contrast to the comparisons of tolerance that were seen earlier in this study, civil society participation in Bolivia does well in comparative terms. By comparing the solid black bar on the chart to the other bars it can be seen that civil society participation in Bolivia is higher than the other countries in four of the seven indicators. That is, Bolivians are more active participants in church groups, school groups, civic groups, and unions when

\(^{69}\)The data set from Peru does not contain the full list of items, so is excluded from this analysis.
compared to Costa Ricans, Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Paraguayans. In addition, Bolivia is far ahead of three of the other countries in community development organization participation, only lagging behind Costa Rica. Similarly, it is second to Costa Rica in professional association participation, and second to Paraguay in cooperative organization participation.

**Figure IV**

Civil Society Participation:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

Determinants of Civil Society Participation

How do Bolivians differ in their level of civil society participation? When this study has examined differences within the population it has created an overall index of such democratic values as tolerance and system support, and such an index will be utilized later in this study. However, in order to analyze how Bolivians differ in civil society participation, it is best that each type of organization be analyzed separately so that key differences can
be noted. That is because a dimensional analysis of the civil society participation series uncovered two dimensions in the series, one reflecting those organizations in which participation was relatively high (e.g., church groups, school groups, community development associations) and the other organizations in which participation was far lower.\textsuperscript{70} For this reason, each organization will be examined separately in this analysis. Later in this report, an overall multivariate analysis will be performed on the index.

**Gender**

Many studies have found that females participate less than males in civil society organizations. Bolivia is no exception to this norm. Figure IV.5 shows the in every form of organization except civic groups, there is a significant difference. But that difference does not always advantage males over females. Bolivian women are more active in church and school related activities than Bolivian men.

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
Organization & Component 1 & Component 2 \\
\hline
CP10R Union & .705 & .000 \\
CP9R Professional association & .681 & .121 \\
CP11R Cooperative & .647 & .052 \\
CP14R OTB's & .613 & .242 \\
CP12R Civic group & .590 & .181 \\
CP8R Community Development assn. & .393 & .700 \\
CP7R School group & .127 & .693 \\
CP6R Church group & -.100 & .573 \\
CP13R Juntas vecinales & .450 & .597 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{70}These dimensions were determined via factor analysis. The varimax rotated solution to the analysis is shown in the following table. Component (i.e., factor) \# 1 is comprised of participation in unions, professional associations, cooperatives, OTBs and civic groups. Factor \# 2 are the more popular organizations: community development associations, school groups, church groups and the juntas vecinales.
The largest male/female gaps emerge among the work-place related organizations (unions, professional associations, cooperatives), and it could be suspected that this difference is a function of the lower role of females in the Bolivian workplace. In fact, as Figure IV.6 shows, much, but not all of the difference between males and females disappears when housewives are excluded from the sample. It is disturbing, however, to see that in the newly created OTB’s, which were designed to enhance citizen participation in local government, that males are twice as active as females.

**Age**

Another common pattern is to find that participation varies with age. Typically, it is low among the young, but increases as people form and raise families. Then, in the senior
citizen years, participation again declines. This is precisely the pattern found in Bolivia, as shown in Figure IV.7. The only exceptions are that junta vecinal participation does not vary significantly with age, and that participation in church groups increases steadily with age. It is also to be noted that participation in labor unions and professional associations peak later in life than it does with the other groups.

![Civil Society Participation and Age](image)

**Figure IV** Civil Society Participation and Age

A clearer view of the relationship between civil society and age is presented by the total index, as shown in Figure IV.9
Size of Community

In Bolivia, most forms of civil society participation decline in the cities and increase in the countryside. Figure IV.11 shows the pattern, which is statistically significant for each of the organizations. Professional association participation, however, peaks before the most remote portions of the country are reached, however.
The overall pattern for the civil society combined index is shown in Figure IV.13. There it is clear that participation increases as the community becomes more rural.
For some of the organizations in Bolivia, different patterns emerge. These patterns are shown Figure IV.15. Although cooperative and junta vecinal participation increase in more rural areas, it declines again in the most remote areas, but the differences are not statistically significant. Church group attendance seems to follow no particular pattern, remaining generally very high for all areas, urban and rural.
Geographic Location

Civil society participation varies significantly by department, as is shown in Table IV.1. Participation in church groups does not vary a great deal from the overall national average (57 on the 0-100 scale), except in Tarija, where it drops to 40. Indeed, residents of Tarija have lower civil society participation than do the residents of any other department in each of the measures used in this study. In addition to the consistently low levels of participation in Tarija, residents of Santa Cruz, Pando and El Beni exhibit low community development association participation, and professional association participation. Pando is also low in professional associations, and unions. On the other hand, residents of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca are very active in civic groups.
Table IV.1. Bolivian Participation in Civil Society by Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>CP6 Church group</th>
<th>CP7 School group</th>
<th>CP8 Community development association</th>
<th>CP9 Professional association</th>
<th>CP10 Union</th>
<th>CP11 Cooperative</th>
<th>CP12 Civic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Beni</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An overall index of civil society participation can be created to show national geographic patterns by summing up each of the nine variables in this series and taking an average, based on the 0-100 scale utilized above. Most departments in Bolivia have a similar level of overall civil society participation, except for Tarija, which is extremely low compared to the others, and Cochabamba and Chuquisaca, which have a relatively high level. These results are shown in Figure IV.16, which is a map of Bolivia.

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If more than six of the nine items were missing, no score was assigned to the case, but if six or fewer items were answered, the score assigned to the case was the mean of the valid answers. The scale was reliable (Alpha = .75).
Figure IV. Civil Society Participation by Department

Darker shading = lower participation
Ethnicity

Ethnicity, defined in terms of self-identification, has a clear relationship to civil society participation, and in ways that may surprise some readers. Figure IV.17 shows that in most forms of civil society participation, the population that self-identified as “White” is significantly lower than the other populations, especially those who self-identify as “Indian.” The only form of civil society participation in which the White population is higher than the others is in church groups, but the differences are rather small, albeit statistically significant. The indigenous population is especially active in the OTB’s as well as the Juntas Vecinales. The Black population was too small to be able to draw any conclusions, so it was eliminated from this analysis.

Figure IV Civil Society Participation and Ethnic Self-Identification
The above picture of the role of ethnicity in civil society participation is reinforced by another measure of ethnicity: respondent dress. As noted earlier in this study, respondents were coded by the interviewers as either wearing Indian or Western clothing. This rough indication of ethnicity proved to associate well with the findings that the Indigenous population was more participant in many areas. Figure IV.19 shows the results, in which those wearing Indian dress (according to the interviewers), were significantly more participant than other Bolivians in all organizations except cooperatives, OTB’s, and church groups, where the differences were not significant.

![Civil Society Participation and Indian/Western Dress](image)

All sig. < .05 except cooperative, OTB’s and church

**Figure IV** Civil Society Participation and Indian/Western Dress

**Family Size**

It has already been noted in the analysis of the relationship between age and civil society participation, that the youngest adult Bolivians exhibit lower levels of civil society participation than those who are older. One reason for this, it was suggested, is that as individuals go through the life cycle, they are more likely to form and raise families. Raising children frequently creates a number of felt-needs in people, including obtaining good schools, safe streets, and access to health care, recreation facilities, church services,
etc. Parents can help to fulfill these needs by becoming active members of civil society organizations. The Bolivian data set shows a strong association between family size and civil society participation, as is shown in Figure IV.21. For each of the nine distinct forms of civil society participation included in the survey, participation increased as the number of children increased.

![Civil Society Participation and Number of Children](image)

### Figure IV Civil Society Participation and Number of Children

All differences sig. < 0.001

**Demand-Making Participation**

Citizens can actively participate in civil society without that activity spilling over into demand-making of public officials. Yet, it is only when such demands are made is there a direct linkage between civil society and the state. For that reason it is important to see how the comparatively high levels of civil society participate translate, or fail to translate, into demand-making.
The survey included six questions regarding demand-making. We asked each respondent the following:

At times people and communities have problems that they cannot resolve by themselves. Some try to resolve these problems asking for help from an official or government office. Have you sometimes asked help from:

CP1. The president of the country?
CP2. A deputy?
CP3. A mayor or town council member?
CP3A. An indigenous authority (autoridad originaria)?
CP3B. A member of the local vigilance committee?
CP4. Any national or ministerial public official?

Frequency of Demand-Making

The frequency of demand-making in Bolivia is shown in Figure IV.23. It is not surprising that contacting the president of the country to make a demand is the least frequent approach taken by Bolivians to help solve their local problems; only 3% have gone this route. More surprising, especially now that half of Bolivian legislators are elected from single-member districts, was that deputies were contacted by only 5% of the respondents. More than twice that percentage were in contact with other officials, with the highest being national officials.
How do these percentages compare to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion project database? First, however, it should be noted that in those other countries, the institution of the native authority and the vigilance committee are unique to Bolivia, and were therefore not included in the questionnaires administered in the other countries. Therefore, the comparison will be with demand-making of the President, deputy, mayor/council, and national officials.

The companions with the other countries are shown in Figure IV.25. There it can be seen that demand-making in Bolivia compares favorably with the other nations. In particular, Bolivian participation is second only to Costa Rica in contacting a deputy, or a mayor/councilman. Bolivia is actually slightly ahead of Costa Rica in contacting national-level government officials. Contacting the President in Bolivia is similar to all of the other countries, except Costa Rica, which is far higher than the others.
Demand-Making:

Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV
Determinants of Demand-Making

Civil Society Participation

There is a very close link between civil society participation and demand-making, as is shown in Figure IV.27. Fewer than five percent make demands among those whose participation in civil society organizations is very low, compared to over 25 per cent who make demands among those whose civil society participation is very high.

![Graph showing civil society participation and demand-making](image)

**Figure IV** Civil Society Participation and Demand-Making

**Gender**

Gender differences in demand-making are marked and statistically significant. The results are shown in Figure IV.29. Men are far more likely to make demands than women in Bolivia.
Age

Age has an impact on demand-making that is similar to its impact on civil society participation. As can be seen in Figure IV.31, young Bolivians are less likely to make demands than those who are somewhat older, while those who are included in the oldest age cohort participate at far lower levels than anyone else.
Size of Community

Size of community has a strong and consistent impact on demand-making, as can be seen from Figure IV.33. The smaller the community the higher the level of demand-making, especially for all forms of demand-making beyond that of contacting the president of the country or a deputy.
There is wide and statistically significant difference in the level of demand-making in Bolivia. Table IV.2 shows the results for each of the variables being examined here. For example, contacts with the president, which average only 3% nation-wide, fall as low as 1% in Santa Cruz and as high as 6% in Chuquisaca. However, since the sample size per department is relatively small, we cannot be especially confident that these differences represent real differences on this variable. More striking differences are found, however, in the other variables, where demand-making directed at deputies is reported by 15% of the respondents, while this form of civil society participation is undertaken by only 3% of those living in La Paz, Santa Cruz and Tarija. Overall, it is clear that demand-making is consistently high in Chuquisaca, and consistently low in Santa Cruz and Tarija.
Table IV.2. Percent Making Demands by Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>CP1R President</th>
<th>CP2R Deputy</th>
<th>CP3AR Native authority</th>
<th>CP3BR Vigilance committee</th>
<th>CP3R Mayor/councilmen</th>
<th>CP4R National official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pando</td>
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<td>Tarija</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Ben</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences for each variable sig. < .001

Ethnicity

Ethnicity has a clear impact on demand-making in a manner similar to civil society participation. Once again, the small sample size of the Black population requires that it be dropped from this analysis. Figure IV.35 shows that those who self-identify as “White” systematically make fewer demands than those with other ethnic identities. It can also be seen that those who identify as Indian, are more likely to make demands than those with other identities. Only contacts with national officials are not higher among the Indian population than the remainder of Bolivians. Ethnicity defined in terms of dress is significant only on contacts with the President and with the indigenous authority, so the results will not be shown here, but the overall pattern is the same; Indian ethnicity defined in terms of dress is associated with higher levels of demand-making.
The final analysis of demand-making involved examining its relationship to family size. While significant associations were uncovered, the patterns were not uniform. Demands made on national officials and mayors/councilmen declined slightly as the number of children increased. On the other hand, demands at the level of the President or of a deputy increased with the number of children. The same pattern was found for contacting the native authority. The results are shown in Figure IV.37.
Thus far this chapter has explored the levels of participation of Bolivians in various civil society organizations, and it has also explored demand-making. It has been found that Bolivian citizens are active in a broad range of civil society organizations and that demand-making, while only occurring among a minority of the population, is still fairly common. It could be argued, however, that participation in committees could be purely social events, and that citizens meet to have a good time, not to stimulate change in their communities. It could also be argued that demand-making is self-serving and is really a reflection of a population dependent on having others do things for them.

It is possible to test this suspicion by examining the linkages between “talk” and “action.” The survey not only asked about attendance in civil society organizations, but it also asked about individual work in resolving community problems. Is talk associated with
action? Most definitely. But first, we need to examine the overall levels of community problem-solving efforts.\textsuperscript{72}

Over one-third of Bolivians have worked to resolve a community problem, as is shown in Figure IV.39.

![Figure IV Worked to Resolve Community Problem](image)

How do Bolivian voluntary efforts to solve community problems compare with the other countries in the data base of the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project? The comparisons can best be made by examining the specific ways in which citizens make contributions. The surveys asked if the respondent donated material or money, donated labor, attended meetings or attempted to organize a group to solve the problem. The results are shown in Figure IV.41. As can be seen, Paraguayans and Costa Ricans are far and away the most active in voluntary efforts to solve community problems, but Bolivians exceed Nicaraguans and Salvadorans.

\textsuperscript{72}The theoretical research on which this series is based comes from Mitchell A. Seligson, "A Problem-Solving Approach to Measuring Political Efficacy," Social Science Quarterly \textit{60} March (1980): 630-42.
Now that Bolivia has been placed in comparative perspective, it is possible to return to the question of the linkage between civil society participation and voluntarism. To do this, the following set of charts examines each of the forms of civil society participation studied above, and determines its relationship to the four forms of voluntarism just described. As will be seen, the patterns for each civil society organization and its links to voluntarism in solving community problems are very similar. Since each of the national-level organizations involved in civic participation has a particular interest in the links to its own groups, one chart depicting the relationship will be shown for each type of organizations. While this introduces some redundancy in the presentation, it also helps to individualize the results. First, however, the overall relationship is shown in Figure IV.43. In this graph the relationship between overall civil society participation and the percent engaging in voluntaristic behavior is shown. The very strong relationship is evident; among
those who have very low civil society participation, only about 10% engage in voluntarism, whereas among those with high civil society participation, over 60% do.

Figure IV.45 shows the linkage to church group participation. As can be seen, each form of voluntarism in solving community problems is directly related to church group participation; the more that Bolivians involve themselves in church groups, the more they are willing to donate time, money, labor, attend meetings and try to form groups to help solve community problems. Church group participation, then, is more than a social event since it links directly to helping to build communities.
An even sharper impact on voluntarism is found among those who attend school-related groups. Figure IV.47 shows that only 10-20% of those who never attend school-related group meetings actively attempt to solve community problems, whereas those who frequently attend school meetings are two times more likely to be involved in voluntarism.
A stronger impact still emerges from participation in community development associations. Figure IV.49 shows, for example that only about 15% of those who never participate in community development associations have donated their labor to solve a community problem, compared to over 40% voluntarism among those who frequently attend such meetings.
There is also a powerful effect of participation in a professional association on voluntarism, as is shown in Figure IV.51. Once again, frequent civil society participation seems to double the level of voluntarism.
Figure IV Professional Association Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem

Union organization participation is similarly linked to voluntarism to solve community problems, as is shown in Figure IV.53.
Figure IV Union Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem

Active participation in cooperatives (e.g., savings and loan, agricultural, production, etc.), also links directly to voluntarism to solve community problems, as can be seen in Figure IV.55.
Civic committees in Bolivia have become very important in recent years, and those who participate in them are also more likely to engage in community voluntarism, as is shown in Figure IV.57.
The final two organizations are those that are related to the new decentralization program in Bolivia. One might wonder if these new organizations have the same links to voluntarism as did the more traditional organizations. Figure IV.59 shows that the pattern is very similar for the Juntas Vecinales.
Finally, the Organización territorial de base, the OTB, is one of the new organizations emerging from the decentralization program, participation in which is also linked directly to voluntarism. Figure IV.61 shows a very strong impact of OTB participation and voluntarism to solve a community problem.
The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998

Chapter IV: Civil Society Participation

Figure IV

OTB Participation and Voluntarism to Solve a Community Problem

Links Between Civil Society, Tolerance and System Support

It has been shown in the above discussion that Bolivians are relatively active in civil society participation, and that such participation is connected to voluntarism in solving community problems. Are there also links to the key attitudinal variables examined in the previous chapters, namely tolerance and system support? An examination of the civil society participation variables finds that every one of the nine different measures except union membership and professional associations are significantly (< .05) positively associated with system support. Tolerance, on the other hand, hardly ever is significantly associated with civil society participation, and when it is, the direction is negative; more civil society participation, less tolerance.

Let us look at some of the relationships. Cooperative membership is related to higher system support, but lower tolerance, as is shown in Figure IV.63.
A similar relationship is found for participation in the Juntas Vecinales, as is shown in Figure IV.65.
Overall, the relationship between a composite index of civil society and system support is positive and significant ($r = .07$, sig. .001), whereas tolerance shows no significant relationship.  

The results are shown in Figure IV.67. Higher civil society participation is directly associated with higher system support, but tolerance declines at the

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73 The overall scale of civil society participation was constructed by taking the average of the nine items, CP6 through CP14, after first recoding them to a 0-100 scheme as above. If six or more of the nine items were answered, the average of those items was used, while if fewer items were answered, the case was considered missing. The scale was reliable, with an Alpha of .75. This scale was then recoded to provide an approximately equal distribution into four categories as shown on the figure. The correlations are based on the unrecoded scale.
highest level of civil society participation, although the relationship is not statistically significant.

A Multivariate Model of Civil Society Participation

In this chapter a number of factors related to civil society participation have been explored. The chapter concludes with an overall model, in which the various predictors of civil society participation are examined all acting together. Since tolerance and system support are considered to be a function of civil society participation, they are not included here. The regression equation appears in Table IV.3, in which the dependent variable is the overall nine-item civil society participation scale. Each of the variables in the equation are significant (see last column) except wealth. But since income is also measured in the equation, once income is controlled for, wealth as measured by artifacts has no additional predictive power. The equation is telling us that there is higher civil society participation
among Bolivians who live in rural areas, who are more highly educated, who have higher incomes, who are older, who have more children, who are less likely to be White or dress in Western clothes.

Table IV.3. Predictors of Civil Society Participation Overall Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>7.561</td>
<td>2.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR Urban/rural</td>
<td>3.243</td>
<td>.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED Completed years of education</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME Monthly income</td>
<td>.572</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEALTH Wealth (home artifacts)</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 Age</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12 Number of children</td>
<td>1.551</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETID Ethnicity</td>
<td>1.397</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEST Indian dress</td>
<td>-2.943</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = .10, sig. < .001

Conclusions

Bolivians are active participants in civil society organizations. That participation could well serve as the basis to build a stronger political culture supportive of democracy. It is perhaps no coincidence that system support in Bolivia is higher in rural areas, precisely where civil society participation is highest. Although ethnicity defined in terms of self-identification does not distinguish Bolivians based on system support, it does based on civil society participation. Such participation is consistently low among the “white” population, and consistently high among the indigenous population.

Bolivians are not likely to contact their elected legislative representatives when they have demands to make, but they are far more likely to contact their municipal officials or national government officials. This is a common pattern found in other Latin American countries, and can be considered a major weakness in democracy in the region. If Bolivia is to consolidate its democracy, citizens need to hold elected officials accountable. They can do so, at a minimum, by contacting them and making demands on them. Perhaps the initiation of the single-member district system will go a long way to achieving this goal, but the system is too new to have yet had that effect.

It is also of note that Bolivian women are far less likely to make demands on the political system than are men. This suggests an important gender issue that needs to be addressed.
Civil society participation has been shown to have important links to democracy in Bolivia. On the one hand, those who participate are not only more likely to make demands, they are significantly and consistently more likely to be willing to volunteer their own time and resources to help solve local problems. Perhaps most importantly, those who are active in civil society are consistently higher in system support than those who are inactive. This suggests the democratic stability in Bolivia could be built from the bottom up. Citizens could be encouraged to participate in their local organizations, and in so doing could increase their level of confidence in the political system. Political tolerance, on the other hand, does not increase with civil society participation. This suggests problems at the grass roots that need to be addressed. In what ways are Bolivians participating in civil society that makes them no more willing to tolerate the rights of others? This is certainly an important question for further research.
Chapter V. Citizens and Local Government

Latin America, perhaps more than any other area of the world, has had a very strong tradition of centralization of state power. Local governments in unitary systems and state governments in Latin America’s federal systems (i.e., Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) have all been subordinated to central government to an extreme degree. Students of democratic theory have suggested that this centralization of state power has emerged as a major barrier to increased citizen participation and helps explain why democracy has taken so long to take hold in Latin America.

Up until its recent reforms, Bolivia’s centralist tradition was perhaps even more extreme than in other Latin American countries. One manifestation of the lack of local political power was that the territorial jurisdiction of municipal government did not extend beyond urban areas, thus leaving the rural population with no local government at all beyond the indigenous, non-state sanctioned systems of local rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that local participation in government does not have a strong tradition in Bolivia. According to one well-respected study,

Citizen participation in Bolivian local government is noticeably weak in comparison with the rest of Latin America.... Institutionalized mechanisms for citizen participation in local government are limited. Successive administrations have established their own ad hoc mechanisms, each of which has become identified with a political party or a faction within the party. As a result, the opportunity for constructing independent and self-sustaining citizen participation over the long term has been restricted.

In spite of, or perhaps because of this extreme centralization of political power in Bolivia, major reforms were undertaken in the 1990s. The two key reforms are the Administrative Decentralization Law (1995), which transfers a number of responsibilities from the national government to the departmental level, including the administration of all of the revenue generated within the department. The Popular Participation Law (1994) greatly expands the role of local government by dividing the entire national territory into 311

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municipalities, thereby granting local government to the formerly excluded rural areas. In addition, 20% of the national tax revenues have been transferred to the municipalities on a per capita basis. These funds can be used by municipal governments to contract for their own health care and other services. The law also provides a mechanism by which thousands of local community organizations can obtain legal status. Finally, each of the 311 municipal governments is to have its own citizen oversight committee (Comité de Vigilancia), which ultimately have the power to suspend municipal spending.

In this chapter, Bolivian attitudes toward and participation in local government will be examined, and the factors that differentiate Bolivians on these dimensions will be explored. Linkages between local participation and democratic values will also be studied. The series of questions on which this analysis is based was initially developed by the University of Pittsburgh in 1994 in the context of a study of municipal participation in Central America.\textsuperscript{77} Since then, some of the questionnaire items developed for that study have been incorporated into the Pittsburgh series of surveys in Latin America, allowing comparisons with several countries. The questionnaire items (see appendix) include the NP series (level of participation), the SGL (satisfaction with local government) series, and the LGL (legitimacy of local government) series.

One feature of this chapter that differs from the others is that in this chapter an analysis will be incorporated of the special municipal sample described in the methodology chapter of this work. It will be recalled that USAID has been attempting to support the development of democratization at the level of the municipality, and has established the Desarrollo Democrático, Participación Ciudadana (DDPC) program. Six municipalities were selected for inclusion in the current sample to provide baseline data for this program. A total of 100 respondents, 50 in urban areas and 50 in rural were interviewed in each of these municipalities. When the entire sample was designed, it was discovered that one of the selected municipalities of the DDPC program also overlapped with the national sample, and in order not to increase the costs of the study, that municipality was used for both purposes. In the prior chapters of this study, these 100 interviews were treated as part of the national sample. In order not to alter the basic parameters of data presented thus far, that procedure will be followed in this chapter as well. This means that the special DDPC sample reported on here will be restricted to the 500 remaining interviews.\textsuperscript{78} Of course, when additional studies of the DDPC municipalities are undertaken, all 600 interviews are always available for analysis so that the 1998 baseline and future studies can be fully compared.

\textsuperscript{77}Mitchell A. Seligson, \textit{Central Americans View Their Local Governments}, Report to USAID, Regional Office for Urban Development and Housing (RHUUDO) (Guatemala City, Guatemala, 1994a).

\textsuperscript{78}Actually, 499, since there was one missing case.
Level of Participation

Perhaps the most basic parameter of this examination of local government is the level of citizen participation at municipal meetings. The question asked was:

Now we are going to talk about the municipal government of this municipality. Have you had the opportunity to attend a municipal session or other meeting convoked by the mayor’s office or municipal council during the last 12 months? 1. Yes. 2. No.

It is of interest to include comparisons with countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. Figure V.1 shows that Bolivia is on the low-side when compared with other countries in the region. Only Nicaragua has a lower level of municipal government participation. These findings suggest that even four years after the approval of the popular participation law, Bolivians are not especially active in local government. It should be noted that although the law was passed in 1994, its implementation has taken place rather slowly, and still has not been fully implemented in all areas of the country. This may account for the low level participation. On the other hand, participation may have been far lower prior to 1994.

79 The responses were recoded into a 0, 100 format, so as to convert them into an overall percentage of attending vs. non-attending.

80 It would have been helpful if data were available comparing 1998 levels of participation in municipal meetings with earlier studies. Unfortunately, a question on attendance at municipal meetings was not included in the 1996 study by the National Secretariat of Popular Participation. See Gonzalo Roja Ortuste and Luis Verdesoto Custode, La Participación Popular Como Reforma de la Política: Evidencias de una Cultura Democrática Boliviana (La Paz, Bolivia: Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, Unidad de Investigación y Análisis, 1997). Another 1996 study, this one focusing directly on the USAID municipal development program areas, also failed to include a question on participation in municipal government meetings. See Desarrollo democrático participación ciudadana, Obstáculo e Impedimentos a la Participación Electoral: Un Estudio en Seis Municipios Intermedios (La Paz, 1997).
It is important to note that the DDPC project used different criteria to designate “urban” and “rural.” In that project, “urban” corresponds to the capital of the municipality (equivalent to the “county seat” in the United States), while “rural” were all other areas. In this data set, two of the urban DDPC areas (Pucarani and Curahuara de Carangas) are capitals of their municipios, but they have populations in the range of 500-2,000, which in the present study are classified as “compact rural.” Thus, if a cross-tabulation is run between the DDPC strata and the stratum variable for the present study, interviews in these areas will appear as “urban DDPC” while also appearing as “compact rural” in the democratic values national sample.

Gender

Males and females differ markedly in their levels of participation in municipal meetings, with males systematically participating more. As is shown in Figure V.1, males participate at a level over 75% higher than females in the national sample. The DDPC sample municipalities show higher levels of participation, especially in the urban areas compared to the rural, but the gender gap remains present, wide and statistically significant.81

81It is important to note that the DDPC project used different criteria to designate “urban” and “rural.” In that project, “urban” corresponds to the capital of the municipality (equivalent to the “county seat” in the United States), while “rural” were all other areas. In this data set, two of the urban DDPC areas (Pucarani and Curahuara de Carangas) are capitals of their municipios, but they have populations in the range of 500-2,000, which in the present study are classified as “compact rural.” Thus, if a cross-tabulation is run between the DDPC strata and the stratum variable for the present study, interviews in these areas will appear as “urban DDPC” while also appearing as “compact rural” in the democratic values national sample.
Urban/Rural Differences

It has already been noted in this study that rural Bolivians participate in civil society organizations at levels higher than urban Bolivians. The same pattern emerges with respect to participation in local government, as is shown in Figure V.1. The major difference, however, occurs between those who live in large towns and cities, and those who live elsewhere. Participation in urban areas of populations of 2,000-20,000, for example, participate at rates two and one-half times greater than that of Bolivians who live in cities larger than 20,000 population in size. Bolivians in the most rural sectors of the country participate at still higher levels, fully three times the rate in the large towns and cities.

The explanation for this high level of municipal meeting attendance in rural areas must be closely linked to the absence of many services that urbanites can take for granted.
For example, in most cities, water and electricity are commonly available, whereas in rural areas, citizens must petition for them, and they use local government as a vehicle to help them in their struggle. Roads are also a common demand in rural areas, whereas urbanites normally can count on serviceable roads.

![Bar chart showing Attendance at Municipal Meetings: Urban-Rural Differences](image)

The DDPC sample shows a similar pattern to that of the national sample, as is shown in Figure V.1. The only important difference is that in the DDPC sample, the dispersed rural areas exhibit somewhat lower participation than the rural area of 500-1,999 population. The overall trend of higher attendance at municipal meetings in rural areas, is, however, consistent with the national trend.
Departmental Differences

Participation in municipal meetings varies a great deal by department as well. Figure V.1 shows that Chuquisaca has the highest level of participation, while Tarija has the lowest.
The map of Bolivia in which departments are grouped by similar levels of municipal participation are shown in Figure V.1. On the map, the darker the shading, the lower the participation in municipal meetings.
Figure V.6  Map of Bolivia: Attendance at Municipal Meetings by Department

Darker shading = lower participation
Age and Family Size

Attendance at municipal meetings follows the curvilinear pattern that has already been found for civil society participation, as is shown in Figure V.2. Only about 12% of the youngest respondents in the sample have attended a municipal meeting, a percentage that nearly doubles among those in the range of 56-65 years of age, but then drops off again sharply in the 66 and over group.

As people age, the size of their families increase. It is not surprising, therefore, that municipal attendance is higher among those with more children (see Figure V.2). Again, these are people with a greater stake in local government since their needs for education, health services, etc., are greater than those with no or fewer children.
These results beg the question: is it age or a large family that increases municipal attendance? When both variables are entered into a multiple regression equation, only number of children remains statistically significant, with age washing out. But this finding only holds true when the number of children are clustered into the three groups shown in the figure. When the actual number of children is used in the regression analysis, both age and number of children remain significant. Thus, it is fair to say that both age and having children help increase the municipal attendance.

**Socio-Economic Status**

Education, income and wealth (as measured in this study) have no statistically significant impact on attendance at municipal meetings. This finding seems odd since so many studies have shown that both income and education are positively associated with participation in local government. For this reason, there is good reason to be suspicious of this finding, and to believe that the real relationship is being suppressed by other factors. The only way to tell if this is so is to move to a multivariate model in which these other factors can be controlled (i.e., held constant). That will be done in the final section of this exploration of predictors of municipal participation, and it will be shown that wealth and education do, in fact, relate positively to municipal participation.
Ethnicity

Civil society participation was especially low among Bolivians who defined themselves as “White.” Municipal attendance follows the same pattern, as is shown in Figure V.2. The indigenous population has participation levels over twice those of the White population.

A Reexamination of the DDPC Sample

It has been shown that a number of socio-economic, demographic and ethnicity variables have an impact on the level of participation in municipal meetings. Thus, it is time to reconsider the sharp differences initially shown between the DDPC sample and the national sample. To do this, the rural and urban DDPC samples are combined into one and the average level of participation in municipal meetings is compared between the national sample and the DDPC sample. This comparison is shown in Table V.1.
As can be seen, the national sample participation level is 17.7%, whereas the DDPC sample is 22.1%, a difference that is statistically significant. This picture changes dramatically, however after controlling for the variables that we already know influence municipal participation. Technically, this was done by conducting a "difference of means test" after first partialling out the impact of covariates. The result is that the strong differences between the two samples shrink. The national sample average increases to 18.4%, while the DDPC sample declines to 20.9% (compare with table above). This later figure now lies entirely within the confidence interval of the national sample, as is shown in Table V.2 below. This means that the mean percentage of attendance in the DDPC sample (if we had interviewed all adult Bolivians) could range from a low of 17.38% and a high of 24.50%.
of participation in the DDPC baseline municipalities and bring them into line with the national parameters. Once those factors are controlled for, differences (increases or even decreases in participation) can be attributed directly to the program rather than these other variables. Third, comparisons of future DDPC surveys that would examine the impact of the program only make sense if comparisons can continue to be made with future national samples. If, as is expected, DDPC areas increase their level of municipal participation, researchers would want to know if there has been a similar (or lower or even greater) increase elsewhere in Bolivia. For example, the Popular Participation law may serve to stimulate increased participation throughout Bolivia. The research question is do the DDPC areas get an extra boost as a result of the project or not?

A Multivariate Model of Participation in Municipal Meetings

It is now appropriate to examine the joint impact of each of the variables that have been explored above. Table V.3 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis. These results reconfirm most of the bi-variate findings shown above, but also now allow us to see the impact of education and wealth, when the other variables are held constant. As can be seen from the last column in the table, all of the predictors of municipal meeting attendance are statistically significant (at .01 or better), and the overall model is significant at < .001. The results are telling us that those who participate more are Bolivians who live in more rural areas, who are male, who have higher levels of education, who are wealthier,\(^{82}\) who have more children, are older and are less like to be self-identified as “White.”\(^{83}\) Some of these findings might sound contradictory. For example, we know that the indigenous population is poorer than the white population, yet Indians and richer Bolivians participate more. In fact, what the regression equation is telling us is that even when holding constant for wealth (as well as the other variables in the equation), Indians participate more than Whites. Thus, the effect of wealth does not override the impact of ethnicity.

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\(^{82}\)Income measured in monthly income was significant when wealth was excluded from the equation, but wealth turned out to be a stronger predictor, so it was included and income was dropped. As noted, both measure different aspects of a similar phenomenon.

\(^{83}\)The ethnic self-identification variable was recoded as: 1= White, 2=Mestizo, Cholo and Black, 3= Indígena.
Municipal Participation and Democracy

Does it make a difference to Bolivian democracy if its citizens attend municipal meetings? Specifically, do system support and tolerance increase as attendance at municipal meetings increases? And does civil society participation relate to municipal meeting attendance? Figure V.2 shows that there is very strong evidence that system support increases as municipal meeting attendance increases. In order to show this, system support has been divided into four groups, each one comprising approximately one-fourth of the national sample. When municipal attendance is far below the national average, system support is at its lowest level, but in contrast when municipal attendance increases to far above the national average (to about 25% of the sample), then system support is in the high range. This difference is statistically significant (< .001) as shown in the figure.

Tolerance is another matter. There is no significant association between political tolerance and attending municipal meetings. Once again, tolerance is found to be problematical in Bolivia. It is not increased by education, nor is it increased by civil society participation, and now it is found that it does not increase with attendance at municipal meetings. We will see shortly, however, that satisfaction with municipal government does, indeed, relate to political tolerance.

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84 A line chart of the unrecoded system support measure would be impossible to interpret because there are far too many categories.
It can also be shown that civil society participation has direct and strong links to municipal meeting attendance. Figure V.2 shows that for those who are “high” on their level of civil society participation, based upon the nine-organization series discussed in the chapter on civil society, participation in municipal meetings is 2.3 times higher than the national average. It is reasonable to assume that participation at the local level, in grassroots organizations, helps motivate Bolivians to take their concerns to government, as well as to solve them using their own labor and money. Thus, civil society participation provides a triple benefit for democracy; on the one hand it increases local voluntarism, and on the other it increases contact with local government. On top of this, system support is increased, although a regression analysis (not shown) reveals that the stronger impact on system support is local government attendance. Connections between these variables and
satisfaction with local government will be explored shortly. But these findings alone provide strong and persuasive evidence of the key importance of civil society and local government in strengthening democracy in Bolivia.

Combining civil society participation and high system support have payoffs beyond the role of either variable acting alone. Acting together, they combine to relate to especially high levels of municipal meeting attendance. Figure V.2 shows that those with high system support, are more active in municipal participation for each level of civil society participation, and that among those who are the most active in civil society and who are high on system support, municipal meeting attendance is about three times the national average, reaching about 55%. Compare this chart with the one immediately following and the joint impact of high civil society participation and high system support can be seen.
The impact on municipal meeting attendance of the socio-economic and demographic factors described earlier in this chapter can now be placed in the context of civil society participation. Figure V.2 shows the impact of place of residence. Participation in municipal meetings is low in urban areas, but for those who are active members of civil society, participation in municipal meetings is dramatically higher, as is shown on the right-hand side of the figure. For those with high levels of civil society participation and who live outside of the large urban areas, about half or more have attended a municipal meeting in the last year.
The gender gap, repeatedly found in this study, does not close among those who are active in civil society. Figure V.2 shows that even among Bolivians who are very active in civil society, males participate in municipal meetings at a level far higher than females. On the other hand, females who are very active in civil society do participate in municipal meetings at about twice the national average. Indeed, females who are very active in civil society attend municipal meetings at a greater rate than do males who are less active in civil society. Thus, the gender gap is reversed when we compare women active in civil society with men who are not. This once again highlights the great importance of civil society participation in overcoming barriers to deepening democracy in Bolivia.
Ethnicity and civil society participation interact to produce very high levels of municipal participation among Indians, about three times higher than the national average. See Figure V.2. Self-identified Indians participate in municipal meetings to a greater degree at all levels of civil society participation than other groups, further indicating the importance of ethnicity. Whites, on the other hand, are systematically less participant than other ethnic self-identifiers, but once Whites participate at high levels in civic society, their participation in municipal meetings is double the national average. Here again we have more evidence of the vital role of civil society participation, counteracting to a large extent the important factor of ethnicity.
Various Other Forms of Local Government Participation

Bolivians do not limit themselves to attending municipal meetings. They can participate in a number of ways, and the questionnaire asked about these. Respondents were asked:

NP2. Have you asked for help or presented a request for help to a public office, employee or representative of the Mayor’s office over the last 12 months?

NP4. Have you participated in any meeting to discuss or plan the municipal budget?
NP5. **Have you taken a complaint to the vigilance committee?**

A comparison of these three forms of participation, along with the general question on attending municipal meetings is presented in Figure V.2. As can be seen, vigilance committee participation and budget meeting participation are considerably less frequent than other forms of participation in municipal affairs.

![Municipal Participation: Various Forms Compared](image)

**Figure V** Municipal Participation: Various Forms Compared

Although the frequency of participation varies across these different forms of municipal participation, their relationship with system support is the same that has already been shown for attendance at municipal meetings. Figure V.2 shows that system support increases substantially among those whose level of municipal participation is higher than the national average.
The variables that were shown to predict participation in municipal meetings also predicts these other forms of participation, except that education does not play a role in the level of attendance at budget or vigilance committee meetings. Little would be gained by repeating the detailed analyses presented above, since the patterns are so similar. So, those will be skipped here.

The survey also measured satisfaction with the response of the municipality from among those who made a request for municipal assistance. Figure V.2 shows that the majority were disssatisfied, but 2-fifths were satisfied. Given the limited resources with which municipal governments in Bolivia have to operate, it is surprising that satisfaction is as high as it is. This is what may explain the connection to system support, and indeed there is a significant association between satisfaction with demands made and system support ($r = .17$, sig. < .001).
The close connection between system support and satisfaction with municipal response to citizen demands is shown in Figure V.2. Among those with low system support, fewer than 30% were satisfied with the response of the municipality, whereas among those with high system support about 55% were satisfied. These findings suggest that satisfaction of citizen demands at the local level is vital to building support for the political system at the national level. Satisfaction of citizen demands depends, in part, on the availability of resources (especially budgets), but it also depends upon the good will of municipal officials. Absent budgets or absent good will, and citizen demands will be invariably frustrated.
The DDPC special sample and the national sample do not differ in significant ways with regard to citizen satisfaction of requests made to municipal government. Figure V.2 shows that although the percent satisfied in the DDPC areas is higher than the national sample, the difference is not statistically significant.
When controls are introduced for variables related to municipal participation, the difference between the national sample and the DDPC sample is reduced, falling well within the confidence intervals of the two samples, as is shown in Table V.4.

Table V.4. Satisfaction Levels Controlled by Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DDPC</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval Upper Bound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>40.914</td>
<td>2.387</td>
<td>36.224</td>
<td>45.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDPC</td>
<td>47.332</td>
<td>5.547</td>
<td>36.433</td>
<td>58.230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluated at the covariates which appeared in the model: UR Urban/Rural = 2.31, ED Completed years of education = 10.39, INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos = 2.6895, Q1 Gender = 1.39, Q2 Age = 37.20, Q12 Number of children = 2.76.

Further evidence that the DDPC sample of municipalities is very similar to the national sample emerges when levels of satisfaction with municipal decisions are compared for levels of system support. Figure V.2 shows that the patterns are nearly identical with only the “low” category of system support showing much higher satisfaction in the DDPC municipalities compared to the national sample.
The initial series of items on participation in local government was followed by two questions regarding satisfaction with services. The items read:

**SGL1.** Would you say that the services that the mayor’s office is giving the people is excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor?

**SGL2.** How were you or your neighbors treated when they have gone to the municipality to carry out a transaction. Did they treat you very well, well, fair, poorly or very poorly?

Bolivia can be placed in comparative perspective by comparing the results of the first item to the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. Figure V.2 shows that Bolivians express somewhat less satisfaction than in the other countries, but the differences on the 0-100 scale are not great. The main difference emerges between Bolivia on the low end and Paraguay on the high end, with the other differences within the confidence interval. Nonetheless, the differences are statistically significant, and only goes to emphasize the point made at the beginning of this chapter, namely, that municipal

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85The item was coded as follows: Excellent = 100, Good = 75, Fair = 50, Poor = 25, Very poor = 0.
governments historically has been weak, and that the recent reforms have a long way to go before they can persuade the citizenry that things have really changed.

In each of the countries in the data base the evaluation of municipal government services is directly linked to system support at the national level. Figure V.2 shows the relationship. Bolivia follows this Latin America-wide pattern. These results are a further indication of the importance of the effectiveness of local government; those municipal governments that manage to satisfy their constituents are those that are helping to promote the legitimacy of the national system of government.
Figure V

Not only is system support associated with greater satisfaction with municipal services, but so is political tolerance. Figure V.2 shows these important findings. Both system support and tolerance are significantly related to satisfaction, but the greater impact is noted for system support. Nonetheless, given the absence of any variables which have been shown to increase the comparatively low levels of tolerance in Bolivia, it is gratifying to find that when Bolivians are satisfied with the services of their local governments they are more likely to be politically tolerant. Nonetheless, it is important to note that even those who express the highest levels of satisfaction with municipal government are still in the negative end of the 0-100 scales of system support and tolerance.
What socio-economic and demographic variables are associated with greater satisfaction with municipal services? A regression analysis found that urban/rural residence had no impact at all; even though participation is higher in rural Bolivia than it is in urban areas, satisfaction with services does not vary. Similarly, income and wealth of the respondent are unrelated to satisfaction. Gender and number of children also have no connection with satisfaction. Finally, respondent level of information about the political system (measured by the GI series in the questionnaire), are unconnected to satisfaction. It appears, then, that while a number of these variables help predict participation in local government, they do not explain satisfaction. There are, however three variables, education, age and ethnicity that are related to satisfaction.

When education is associated with satisfaction with municipal services and no other variables are controlled for, there is no significant relationship. What we do find is that satisfaction is fairly constant among all levels of education, but it drops among those with a university education. In the multivariate equation, when all other variables are held constant, education emerges as a significant predictor of satisfaction; the higher the
education the lower the satisfaction. Age is significant in the bivariate and the multivariate situations; those who are older are less satisfied with the services municipal government renders. Finally, ethnicity is associated with satisfaction, as is shown in Figure V.2. Here we see that even though the White population participates less in municipal meetings, its level of satisfaction is higher.

![Figure V: Satisfaction with Municipal Services and Ethnicity](image)

This finding regarding ethnicity suggests a troubling question; if Whites participate less in municipal meetings but are more satisfied with municipal services, then does participation lead to discontent? The answer is no. Attendance at municipal meetings has no significant association with satisfaction for the sample as a whole.

The overall model of satisfaction with municipal services is presented in Table V.4. It shows that only education, age and ethnicity are significant predictors (only those variables have a value of .05 or less in the last column).
Table V.4. Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>63.360</td>
<td>3.095</td>
<td>20.469 .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UR Urban/Rural</td>
<td>-.400</td>
<td>.366</td>
<td>-.025 -1.094 .274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED Completed years of education</td>
<td>-.409</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>-.094 -3.651 .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos</td>
<td>.467</td>
<td>.408</td>
<td>.027 1.145 .252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEALTH Wealth (as indicated by home artifacts)</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.023 -.868 .385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Gender</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>-.001 -.036 .972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 Age</td>
<td>-.184</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.129 -5.177 .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDREN Number of children</td>
<td>.780</td>
<td>.675</td>
<td>.029 1.155 .248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETID Ethnicity</td>
<td>-2.253</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>-.108 -5.335 .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj $R^2 = .02$; sig. < .001

Evaluation of the treatment by the municipality for those who have had dealings with it is shown in Figure V.2. As can be seen, nearly one-third of the respondents had no dealings with the municipality, so it gave no opinion on the subject. For this reason, we are better off using the variables already analyzed to examine the perception of the local government since the variable shown in the following figure has so much missing data.
A series of four items was asked in an attempt to measure the legitimacy of local government as an institution. Respondents were first asked:

*LGL1* In your opinion, who has responded better to help resolve the problems of this community? The central government, the Congress, or the municipality?  

Figure V.2 shows that overwhelmingly Bolivians see their local governments as the best source for solving local problems.

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Note that some of those who were interviewed said “none” and others said “all the same.” These choices were noted but not read to respondent.
The second question to measure the legitimacy of local government read as follows:

\textit{LGL2. In your opinion, should more responsibility and more money be given to the municipal government or should we let the central government assume more responsibility and more municipal services (e.g., water, waste, etc.).}

Figure V.2 shows that the municipality was favored over the central government. When added to those who qualified their support of municipal government by supporting a greater role for it only if it provided better services, nearly two-thirds of Bolivians want greater municipal control over local services.
These findings are, however, partially belied by the response to the next question. We asked the respondents:

LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes or fees to the municipality in order for it to render better municipal services, or do you think it would not be worth it?

Figure V.2 shows that most Bolivians would be unwilling to pay higher local taxes.
The final item in the series attempted to measure responsiveness of the municipality to citizen wishes. The question read:

*LGL4. Do you think that the municipality responds to the what the people want almost always, the majority of the time, once in a while, almost never or never?*

Figure V.2 shows that only a small percentage of Bolivians believe that the municipality is very responsive to its citizens. Most feel that local government is responsive from time-to-time.
Conclusions

In this chapter important linkages have been found between civil society, local government and democracy. Bolivians active in civil society are far more likely to participate in municipal government meetings. Those who attend municipal meetings, in turn, express far higher support for the political system at the national level than those who do not. Citizens who both have high levels of civil society participation and high system support, are those most likely to attend municipal government meetings. Furthermore, satisfaction with the responsiveness of municipal government is strongly linked to system support. As an added bonus, those who are satisfied with municipal services are likely to be more tolerant.

It would appear that these results suggest a true “virtuous circle” of activism in civil society, activism in local government and support for the institutions of the political system more generally. In contrast, a “vicious circle” of inactivism in civil society, local government and low system support is also present in Bolivia, and it is the predominant pattern. In quantitative terms, among Bolivian males who have high levels of civil society participation, 48% attend municipal meetings, compared to only 4% who have very low civil society participation.

The challenge, then, is to find out how to increase civil society participation and with it municipal government participation. This challenge is especially difficult, given that municipal meeting attendance and satisfaction with municipal services in Bolivia is relatively low compared to some other countries in Latin America, as the data base has shown. The
even greater challenge is one of gender and place of residence. Females are far less likely than males to participate in municipal meetings, and we have already seen that they are less likely to participate in many (but not all) forms of civil society associations. Urban areas are especially low on municipal meeting attendance, and among those who self-identify as “White.” Nonetheless, the recent decentralization and popular participation laws provide key instruments to enable citizens with strong incentives to participate in their local organizations and governments. Ways need to be found to capitalize on those important reforms so that democracy can be strengthened in Bolivia.
Chapter VI. Administration of Justice

Democracy has brought unprecedented freedom to Latin Americans in general, and Bolivians in particular. But with freedom, comes responsibility, and unfortunately in a number of countries some members of the society have taken advantage of their new-found freedoms to victimize others. Throughout Latin America one daily reads and hears about astronomical crime rates, and it may be a sad reality that in the minds of some Latin Americans, crime and democracy go together. Of course, there was much crime under military rule as well, but official crime, especially military crime, rarely was reported. And human rights crimes became an everyday event in some countries in the region. However, much of the crime committed during the authoritarian period went unreported, whereas democracy has been accompanied by free press, TV and radio. It is not surprising, therefore, that democracy and criminality are being associated in the minds of some citizens.

Crime, of course, is only one part of the equation. The other part is the administration of justice; how the political system handles the problem of crime. This chapter deals with both sides of the equation. It looks at the victims and it looks at how Bolivians have been treated by the criminal justice system. The focus of the chapter will be on the questionnaire series of items AOJ1 through AOJ7.

Victimization in Bolivia

What proportion of our 1998 sample of adult Bolivians have been victims of a crime? To determine this, we asked two questions. First we asked:

AOJ3. During the last 12 months, have you been a victim of robbery or crime?

We then asked:

AOJ3B. During the last 12 months, has some member of your family been a victim of robbery or crime?

The results are contained in Figure VI.1 As can be seen, 23% of the respondents have been a victim of crime within the past year, and 21% report that a family member has been victim. Since many surveys ask a combined question (respondent and family), the combined results are also presented in the figure; one-third of respondents or their family members have been victims of crime within the past year.
How does Bolivia compare with the rest of Latin America? One good approximation can be obtained by looking at the 1996 Latinobarometer data set, which covers 17 mainland Latin American countries. The question asked was: “Have you or someone in your family been assaulted, attacked, or victim of a crime in the last year?” This item, then, is similar to the combined results shown on the figure above (combining crimes against the respondent and crimes against the family of the respondent). The results are shown in Figure VI.3. It needs to be kept in mind that approximately two years separate the Latinobarometer data and the survey being analyzed here and crime rates may have increased or decreased since that time period. But, one might assume that they are relatively similar. The Latinobarometer data match closely the current survey results in Bolivia, and also show that crime in Bolivia is not nearly as great at it is in some of the countries in the region. However, given the differences in sample design, and the width of the confidence interval for each sample, Bolivia’s level of self-reported victimization is quite similar to a broad range of countries, from Peru to Argentina (see figure). Bolivia’s sample in the Latinobarometer was especially small (N = 772), and must be interpreted with caution. The confidence interval for the Bolivia sample ranges from 25% to 32%.
Impact of Victimization

Does being a victim of crime in Bolivia have an impact on one’s perception of the political system? Specifically, do those who personally, or in their families, experience crime express lower support for the political system? The answer is yes. Figure VI.5 shows that victims express significantly less support than non-victims. And we can be certain that it is the crime that caused the lower system support rather than the other way around, since criminals could not possibly seek out victims on the basis of their system support. These findings strongly suggest that when the political system is unable to control crime, it jeopardizes its own legitimacy. Furthermore, our measurement of victimization is limited to the 12 months prior to the survey. It may well be that those who were victims at an earlier point in time, or who have been victims repeatedly would show an even lower level of system support, but the survey does not give us this kind of data.
Being a crime victim also seems to affect Bolivians’ more general outlook on life. One key variable in the democracy literature is interpersonal trust. Scholars such as Robert Putnam and Ronald Inglehart have made a strong case that trust in individuals is an essential ingredient for democracies to function.\footnote{Robert D. Putnam, \textit{Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy} (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ronald Inglehart, \textit{Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies} (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).} Figure VI.7 shows that among those who express the view that people in their community are very trustworthy, fewer than one quarter have been victims of a crime (personally or in the family), whereas among those who say people are not at all trustworthy, about 40% have been victims of a crime.
Who Are the Victims of Crime?

Education and ethnicity are unrelated to victimization, but gender is. The crimes being measured focus on crimes committed outside the family. Men are more likely to be crime victims than women. Figure VI.9 shows the results.
Age also has an impact on victimization, with the young more likely to be victims than the old. Figure VI.11 shows that over 35% of the youngest Bolivians in the sample have been crime victims, whereas only one-quarter of those 65 and older have been. The sharpest fall-off is in the oldest cohort.

![Victimization and Age](image)

**Figure VI** Victimization and Age

It is not at all surprising that urbanites are more likely to be crime victims than rural residents. Figure VI.13 shows this pattern clearly.
Victimization all varies by department, as is shown in Figure VI.15. Not surprisingly, the Departments with major urban concentrations report the highest levels.
Finally, wealth is associated with victimization. Wealthier Bolivians are more likely to be victims than poorer Bolivians (see Figure VI.17).

![Victimization and Wealth](image)

**Figure VI** Victimization and Wealth

**Views of the Justice System**

**Reporting Crime**

Once citizens have become victims of a crime, what do they do about it? We asked those who were victims if they reported the crime, and to which authority did they report it. Figure VI.19 shows that only a minority of victims reported the crime, and of those, most reported it to the police.
Perhaps the low reporting of crime has to do with the perceived ease of doing so. How easy do respondents believe is it to do something about a crime? We asked the respondents the following questions:

AOJ1. Do you think that reporting a crime to the police or local authorities is easy, difficult, or very difficult?

AOJ1A. Do you think that reporting a crime to the community authority is easy, difficult or very difficult?

Figure VI.21 shows that one-quarter of the population thought that reporting a crime to the police or to the authorities was easy.
Bolivians believe that reporting a crime to the community authority was somewhat easier, as is shown in Figure VI.23.
There is a positive relationship between victimization and perceived difficulty of reporting crime, but it is a weak one. The overall pattern is that whether one is a victim or not, most Bolivians believe that it is not easy to report a crime. This varies only slightly by gender, with males finding it somewhat easier to report a crime than females. It also does not vary by ethnicity, education, or urban/rural residence.

The major factor affecting perceived ease of reporting a crime is income. Figure VI.25 shows that reporting a crime to the police or to the community authorities is dramatically easier for those with higher incomes. This is one of the strongest associations we have seen in this study, and a clear indication that being poor in Bolivia places a great barrier in the way of obtaining justice for those who have been victimized.

Ease of reporting a crime is linked to age, but only for reporting crime to communal authorities. As is shown in Figure VI.27, age has no significant connection to reporting a crime to the police.
Not surprisingly, Bolivians who believe it is difficult to report a crime are lower in system support than those who find it easier to report a crime. Figure VI.29 shows this relationship for reporting a crime to the police.
The same pattern is found for reporting a crime to the communal authorities, as is shown in Figure VI.31.)
Reporting of crime varies by department. Figure VI.33 shows that in nearly all of the departments, ease of reporting to the community authorities is greater than to the police. Residents of the departments of Potosí, Cochabamba and La Paz report lower overall ease of reporting crimes than the other departments. In Pando and El Bení, the perceived ease of reporting crimes to the community authorities was especially high.

**Satisfaction with the Authorities**

The final series of questions in the administration of justice area measured satisfaction with the treatment respondents received by the police, the courts and the public ministry. Analysis of these items needs to be somewhat different from the others since here the questions determined if the respondent had actually experienced any dealings with these agencies, and if so, what was the level of satisfaction with the treatment.
Consequently, it will first be necessary to examine the entire sample, to determine the percentage of respondents who have experienced some treatment by these judicial organs, and within that group that has, what was the level of satisfaction.

The first question asked:

*AOJ4. Of the dealings you or some member of your family has had with the Police or the PTJ, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied or unsatisfied with the results obtained?*

![Figure VI. Treatment by the Police](image)

Figure VI.35 shows the results. About two-fifths of the respondents had no dealings with the police, and of those who did they split almost evenly between some satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
The second question in the series asked:

AOJ5. How would you say that you were treated by the police or the PTJ when you have a matter to deal with them? Very well, well, poorly, or very poorly?

Figure VI.37 shows the results. Once again, about two-fifths of the respondents had no dealings with the police. Of those who had, more said that they were treated poorly than well.

![Treatment by Police: Transactions](image)

The third item in the series focused on the courts. It asked:

AOJ6. When you had a matter to deal with in the courts, in general, how were you treated? Very well, well, poorly or very poorly?

Figure VI.39 shows the results. The proportion of Bolivians who have not had any dealings with the courts is considerably higher than those who have not had dealings with the police. Nearly three-fifths of the respondents report no dealings with the courts. Of those who have had dealings, opinions seem about evenly split between those with a positive experience
versus those with a negative experience. Thus, the opinions regarding the courts are more positive than are the opinions regarding the police.

The final item in the series deals with the public ministry, the equivalent of the Attorney General’s Office in the United States. The question asked was:

**AOJ7. When you had some matter to deal with in the Attorney General’s Office or the Public Prosecutor, how were you treated? Very well, well, poorly or very poorly?**

Figure VI.41 shows the results. They are very similar to the prior question about the courts, with three-fifths having no dealings, and a nearly even split positive-negative for those who had.
These findings emerge from a regression analysis.

Factors Related to Satisfaction with the Police and Judiciary

What factors are related to these perceptions of the police and the judiciary? It needs to be kept in mind that only about half of the respondents had dealings with these institutions, and therefore the analysis that follows is based upon only those that did have dealings. Since question AOJ5 is very similar to AOJ4, but has the advantage of a four-point scale rather than a three-point scale, that item is used for the analysis. The responses were recoded into the now-familiar 0-100 scheme. Looking first at the treatment the respondents received when they had dealings with the police, we find that gender and age seem to make little difference. The differences emerge in urban/rural residence, income, system support and victimization.

We start with victimization to determine the impact of being a victim of a crime in Bolivia has upon perception of the police. As can be seen in Figure VI.43, victims of crimes

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88These findings emerge from a regression analysis.
in the last 12 months) are significantly more negative on their level of satisfaction with the police than those who have not been a victim.

![Figure VI Satisfaction with Treatment by Police and Victimization](image)

**Figure VI** Satisfaction with Treatment by Police and Victimization

Satisfaction with treatment by police is significantly lower among those living in urban areas, as is shown in Figure VI.45.

![Figure VI Satisfaction of Treatment by Police and Urban/Rural Residence](image)

**Figure VI** Satisfaction of Treatment by Police and Urban/Rural Residence
Respondents with higher incomes are also more satisfied with treatment by the police. But the difference emerges only among those with the highest incomes, as is shown in Figure VI.47.

Finally, as expected, satisfaction with treatment by the police is related to system support. Figure VI.49 shows that those who are less satisfied with the police are less supportive of the system at the national level. These findings once again emphasize the local/national linkages.
An examination of satisfaction with treatment by the courts (AOJ6) and the Public Ministry (AOJ7) found nearly identical patterns as have been shown for the police. The only notable difference is that being a victim is not related to victimization. There is no need to display those findings here since they would basically replicate the figures shown above.

Alternative Systems of Representation

As Latin America emerges from its authoritarian past into the democratic presents, experimentation is going on with the institutional structure of government. Bolivia is perhaps among the most advanced countries in Latin America, having instituted a very progressive decentralization and popular participation set of laws, as discussed elsewhere in this study. Another innovation in Bolivia, shared by Venezuela, is the institution of a version of the German system of legislative representation.

Traditionally, in Latin America, legislators have been elected by party lists rather than the U.S. system of single-member districts. This means that voters have to vote for the entire list of candidates proposed by a given party, rather than selecting their preferred individual candidate. When the ballots are counted, each election district (in the case of Bolivia, the Department), elects a number of deputies proportional to number of votes each
The presumed advantage of the single-member district system is that it can help to enhance accountability of legislators to voters. Voters can say: “I voted for you, so do what I say.” In party list systems, however, the individual legislator has not been elected by constituents, only his/her party has. Thus, single-member districts can, in theory, enhance legislative-constituency relations.

In Germany after World War II, a mixed system was put in place. The party list system was augmented by a single member district system. The idea was to retain the traditional system, with its proportional representation model, while enhancing accountability through a system of single-member districts. Venezuela was the first to adopt this system in Latin America, and has now been followed by Bolivia. Very early studies in Venezuela have shown some advantages to the new system. In Bolivia, only one election has been held using the dual system. Very little is known about its impact.

In order to study this issue using the 1998 survey, respondents were asked the following question:

VB7. In your opinion, who represents you better: 1) the multi-member district deputy from the party lists, or 2) the deputy from the single member list from your district?

The results of this question are shown in Figure VI.51. As can be seen, over two-fifths of the respondents had no opinion on this matter. Among those who did, however, they were overwhelmingly in favor of the single-member system. Less than 8% of Bolivians favor the party list formula.

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89 In reality, the system is more complex than this, since there are different voting systems for calculating how to determine proportionality. But for the sake of comparison with single-member districts, this explanation will suffice.


91 For an early study of possible formulas for implementing the system see Hugo San Martín Arzabe, Sistemas electorales: adaptación del doble voto Alemán al caso Boliviano. La Paz: Fundación Milenio, 1993.
Since few Bolivians believe that they are better represented by the party list system, it is difficult to determine what factors in the study help explain this result. When survey questions produce overwhelming support for one position over another, most statistical models cannot easily explain this outcome. A multiple regression analysis using the socio-economic, demographic factors explored in this study does not produce any significant differences. Urbanization also has little impact, and system support and tolerance show no significant relationship. Variation within department exists, but is not dramatic, ranging from a low of 79 in Tarija to a high of 93 in Beni. Figure VI.53 shows the results.
What can be concluded from this analysis is that in this, the “honey-moon” period of the new election system, single-member districts are overwhelmingly preferred among those Bolivians who have an opinion on the matter. There are no obvious fault line of disagreement on this matter. In the years to come, however, preferences may shift.

**Figure VI**

### Preference for Single-Member Districts by Department

- El Beni: 93%
- Santa Cruz: 90%
- Cochabamba: 89%
- Potosí: 89%
- Pando: 88%
- Oruro: 88%
- La Paz: 82%
- Chuquisaca: 82%
- Tarija: 79%

*Figure VI*

**Discrimination**

This chapter has focused on the legal system from the point of view of crime and victimization. But there is another form of crime, that of discrimination, that also plays a role in the daily lives of many people but often does not involve the judicial system or the police. Here we examine two forms of discrimination, ethnic and sexual.
It has been stressed in this report that Bolivia is a multi-ethnic society. Do Bolivians believe that the system treats all Bolivians equally, or is there a widespread perception of discrimination? The questionnaire examines this issue by focusing on discrimination against the Indian population. We asked if Indians are treated better, the same or worse than Whites by the police, the army, the courts and by teachers. Table VI.1 shows the results. As can be seen, it is widely perceived that Indians are treated worse than Whites in Bolivia, overwhelmingly so in the case of the police, the army and the courts. Only among teachers do most Bolivians believe that Indians are treated no better or worse than Whites. While most Bolivians believe that there is discrimination against Indians in their country, this perception is especially high among those with higher levels of education and wealth.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discrimination by:</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Police</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Courts</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also the widespread belief that there is discrimination against women. Fully 82% of the respondents said that there is discrimination against women. However, only about half of the population believes that the discrimination is serious. Moreover, only about half (51.2%) believe that women do not have an equal chance of employment. Not surprisingly, women are far more likely to perceive that there is discrimination against women than are men.

### Corruption

Corruption is increasingly seen as a significant inhibitor of economic growth. According to recent studies by the World Bank, corruption in the public sector drains away investment into unproductive activities. The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has undertaken a series of studies of public experience with and perception

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92 As determined by a regression analysis.
of corruption. A small number of items developed for those studies was included in the 1998 Bolivia survey. Figure VI.55 shows the comparative results for key items. Respondents were asked if they knew anyone who had been compelled to pay a bribe in the courts anytime in the last two years. The first set of bars on the left in the chart shows that Bolivians are less likely to have experienced this form of corruption. Respondents were also asked if they had seen, in the last two years, someone paying a bribe to a public employee for any type of favor. On this item, Bolivians were more likely than in Paraguay or Nicaragua to have experienced this form of corruption, but the differences in absolute terms are not great. The third set of bars refers to those who have actually had a public employee solicit a bribe from the respondent over the last two years. On this item, Bolivians have had greater experience with bribery than in the Paraguay and even greater than in Nicaragua. It should be added that Paraguay and Nicaragua are often singled out by organizations such as Transparency International as being particularly corrupt. Since this last item deals with actual experience, rather than indirect knowledge of corruption, it may be the most direct measure of the level of day-to-day corruption in these three countries. Yet, Bolivians are less likely to say that they believe that public corruption is very generalized in their country, as the final set of bars demonstrates. Nonetheless, in all three countries, the perception of widespread public corruption is evident, as this final set of bars demonstrates. It may be that in Bolivia, the relatively high level of direct experience with corruption has made citizens more tolerant of it, and that is what accounts for this last set of bars in the chart.

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Bolivians are fortunate that the high levels of crime experienced in countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador have not emerged in their country. Nonetheless, about one-third of Bolivians have been affected by a crime within the year preceding the survey. Those who have been victims (personal or family) of a crime are less likely to be supportive of the political system, and are far less likely to believe that people are trustworthy. Since criminals do not select their victims by their attitudes on these issues, we have to assume that being a victim translates into attitudes negative for democratic stability. Moreover, young people are more likely to be victims of a crime than the old, perhaps a factor, as will be shown in the next chapter, that influences their views on the desirability of a military coup.
It is troubling that the majority of crimes go unreported in Bolivia, according to the survey data. This is perhaps a function of the fact that most Bolivians believe that it is difficult to report crimes, suggesting that reforms may be needed in the way the police respond to citizens. The poor find it especially difficult to report a crime, reinforcing the view that there may be socio-economic discrimination on the part of the police agencies in attending to citizen demands. The price to be paid is in citizen support for the political system; those who find it difficult to report crimes are far less supportive of the political system than those who report it easy to report crimes. These findings also hold for community authorities, not only the police. Those who have been victims of crimes are less satisfied by their treatment by the police than those who have not, and satisfaction with treatment by the police also increases with income, again an indication of a socio-economic effect in police dealings with citizens. The more satisfied citizens are with their treatment by the police, the more likely they are to support the political system.

Finally, this chapter has shown that Bolivians strongly prefer the single-member district system, believe that there is considerable discrimination against women and Indians, and are more likely than some other Latin Americans to have had personal experience with corruption.
Chapter VII. Support for Anti-Democratic Measures

This study has focused on democratic values and behaviors. It would not be complete, however, unless it were to take a look at the darker side of those values and how they relate to democracy. This chapter examines the extent to which Bolivians would be willing to support anti-democratic measures. First, it looks at support for what has been the quintessential mechanism for extinguishing democracy in Bolivia (and in much of Latin America), the coup d’etat. This is followed by the willingness of the population to embark upon violent political behaviors.

Support for Coup D’Etats

Bolivia has enjoyed constitutionally democratic rule for over a decade. Have Bolivians turned their backs on the coup d’etat as mechanism for resolving political conflict? In order to determine if this is the case, the interviewers asked a module of questions (the JC items) that posed a series of hypothetical situations under which coups have occurred in the past. These items read:

Some people say that under certain circumstances a coup d’etat by the military, that is when the military takes power, could be justified. In your opinion, a coup d’etat by the military is justified or not justified....

JC1. If unemployment is very high?
JC4. If there are many university student strikes?
JC9. If there are a large number of strikes by unionized labor?
JC 10. If employers cut the salaries of their employees a lot?

The Bolivian results are most clearly understood if placed within a Latin American comparative context, made possible by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. Figure VII.1 shows that the Bolivian results are similar to those in the other countries in the data base. Over one-third of Nicaraguans would support a coup under conditions of high unemployment, whereas 29% of Bolivians and a slightly lower percentage of Paraguayans and Salvadorans responded in this way.
Bolivia scores in the same range on the second question, the one asking if university student strikes justify a coup. Figure VII.3 show the results. A slightly lower percentage of Bolivians would justify a coup under these circumstances, whereas over two-fifths of Nicaraguans would do so.
The final comparative item in this series is the one on strikes by unionized labor (the remaining item, JC10, is not found in the data base for the other countries). Figure VII.5 shows the results. In this case, nearly a majority of Nicaraguans support a coup to suppress strikes by organized labor compared to a bit more than one-quarter of Bolivians and Paraguayans and less than one-fifth of Salvadorans.
An overall view of the Bolivian data, including the final item in the series (coup justifying by employers deeply cutting wages of employees), is shown in Figure VII.7. As can be seen, their overall pattern is very similar for each question in this series; a bit more than one-quarter of the respondents justified a coup for each of the reasons given to them.
Who Supports a Coup?

Demographic factors

In order to determine what factors are relevant in determining which Bolivians are more likely to support a coup and which ones would be less likely to do so, an overall index of support for coups was constructed. The four items included in the series are the ones analyzed above (i.e., JC1, JC4, JC9 and JC10). These items formed a very reliable scale (Standardized item Alpha = .84).

Unlike many of the analyses performed in prior chapters, support for coups is not in any way a function of education, ethnicity or urban/rural residents. Gender does have a weak relationship, however, but one that washes out in the multivariate analysis. Figure VII.9 shows that males are somewhat more supportive of coups than females.
Age is also related to a coup. Many social scientists have looked at the increase in support for democracy in Europe, especially Germany and Italy, since World War II and have concluded that younger people carry with them values more supportive of democracy. But younger Europeans have grown up in a world of peace and prosperity that has coincided with reestablishment of democracy. In Bolivia, democratic rule has not been accompanied by the same forces that emerged in Europe. GNP growth in the period 1985-1995 averaged only 1.8% annually according to the World Bank (*World Development Report*, 1997).

Figure VII.11 shows clearly that older Bolivians, those who have lived through numerous authoritarian military regimes, are less supportive of a coup than are the young. Young Bolivians are about twice as likely to support a coup than those Bolivians who are over 65 years of age. The youth of Bolivia do not emerge as the defenders of democracy.
Geography

A rather dramatic difference in national levels of support for a coup emerges when departments are compared. Figure VII.13 shows that while most of the departments are clustered near that national average, the Beni is far above the average, while Pando and Tarija are far below it.
Income is also related to support for coups, with wealthier Bolivians expressing more support than poorer. Figure VII.15 shows that only less than one-quarter of the poorest Bolivians would support a coup, whereas over one-third of those with the highest incomes would do so.
Political Tolerance and System Support

Bolivians who are more politically tolerant are far less likely to support a coup, an indication of the importance for tolerance in helping to create an atmosphere that would resist this severely anti-democratic behavior. Figure VII.17 shows the results. Nearly one-third of Bolivians with low tolerance express support for a coup, compared to one-quarter who express high tolerance. System support does not show any clear relationship to support for a coup.\footnote{In a multiple regression, system support is significant, but upon examination of the form of the relationship, it is in an inexplicable “V” shape.}
Ethnicity and Ideology

Ethnicity has a relationship to support for a coup. As shown in Figure VII.19, Black Bolivians express stronger support for a coup than other groups. Yet, it must be kept in mind that the sample size of Blacks is very small. Mestizos have moderately higher support for a coup than Whites or Cholas.
Ideology has a clear link to support for a coup. One would expect that those who associate themselves with the political right would be more supportive of a coup than those on the left. As can be see in Figure VII.21, those on the far right are much more supportive of coups than any other portion of the political spectrum. Those on the center and left, however, have essentially the same (lower) level of support for a coup. Thus, ideology does not work “both ways.” While those on the right are supportive of a coup, those in the center and those on the left are both equally unsupportive.
Victimization

It has already been shown that victimization has a negative effect on system support. It also increases the likelihood that respondents will opt for a coup. Figure VII.23 shows that Bolivians who have been victims of a crime (or who have had family members who have been victims) are more likely to support a coup. Once again, criminals do not select victims on the basis of their attitudes, so it is clear that being a victim is what accounts for this increase in support for anti-democratic attitudes. Once again, we do not have data that would allow us to examine the impact of repeated or multiple victimization, and it is possible that those respondents would be even stronger supporters of a coup.
Overall Model of Support for a Coup

The multiple regression is found in Table VII.1. Looking at the last column, we see that gender is just above the level of significance, whereas age, tolerance, ideology and being a victim are significant predictors. On the other hand, the evaluation of government performance and income fell to insignificance and were excluded from the model, while, as already noted, education and urban/rural status have no significant impact on support for a coup.

Table VII.1. Multiple Regression of Support for a Coup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>41.473</td>
<td>3.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Gender</td>
<td>-2.681</td>
<td>1.574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-3.741</td>
<td>.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOL Tolerance</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 Ideology</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVICTIM Personal or Family Victim</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj. R² = .03; Sig. < .001
Support for Civil Disobedience

One can think of civil disobedience as being the “flip side” of military coups. In the case of coups, it is the state that represses the rights of citizens. In the case of civil disobedience, it is citizens who break the rules that govern democratic political behavior. When states are run by authoritarian regimes, many democratic theorists argue that civil disobedience is a citizen right, and one that often needs to be exercised to bring down repressive regimes. In democracies, however, where there presumably exist numerous peaceful channels for citizens to express their views (e.g., through elections, the media, civil society organizations, etc.), civil disobedience seems far less often justifiably. But even in democracies, civil disobedience is sometimes used to help strengthen democracy, as the case of the civil rights movement in the United States so well shows.

What do Bolivians think about civil disobedience? How much support is there for this form of behavior, and how do Bolivians differ with respect to each other and other Latin Americans? A series of four items was asked. These read:

Now let’s talk about people in general. Would you approve or disapprove of:

E15. People participating in a closure or blockage of the streets?
E14. People invading private properties?
E2. People taking over factories, offices or other buildings?
E3. People participating in a group that wishes to overthrow an elected government by violent means?

These items were asked on a 1-10 scale, and we can use that scale in its unrecoded form to compare Bolivia to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. Figure VII.25 shows that there is greater support in Bolivia for each of the forms of civil disobedience measured in the questionnaire than for any other country, and the differences are statistically significant. Clearly, the most acceptable form of civil disobedience is blocking streets, but even this form of behavior has an average approval rating that is in the negative (i.e., disapproval) range of the scale in each of the countries. In the other three measures, the approval for civil disobedience register lower approval, but it is notable that Bolivian support for participating in a group that seeks to overthrow an elected regime is surprisingly high.
Predictors of Civil Disobedience

An Index of Civil Disobedience

In order to simplify the analysis of the factors that predict support for civil disobedience, it would be helpful to create a single index. Inspection of the dimensionality of the data using factor analysis revealed a single factor, and each of the four items are positively correlated with each other. Nonetheless, a reliability analysis revealed a subtle yet important difference between the first item and the remaining three. The first item (E15) deals with support for blocking streets, while the others involve explicitly violent actions (invading private property, taking over factories and buildings and a violent overthrow of an elected government). Bolivians apparently demarcate the first form of behavior, that could
involve a peaceful protest march, in the course of which streets could be blocked, and the other three forms of behavior.

The reliability analysis appears in Table VII.2. As can be seen, when item E15 is excluded, the reliability increases (last column), whereas when any of the other items is excluded, the reliability decreases. Analysis of the data shows clearly that approval of blocking of streets is different from approval of the more violent forms of civil disobedience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scale Mean</th>
<th>Scale Variance</th>
<th>Item-Deleted Correlation</th>
<th>Item-Deleted Squared Correlation</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E15</td>
<td>7.6863</td>
<td>24.6217</td>
<td>.4367</td>
<td>.1949</td>
<td>.8464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E14</td>
<td>9.1121</td>
<td>24.0741</td>
<td>.7256</td>
<td>.6403</td>
<td>.6921</td>
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<tr>
<td>E3</td>
<td>8.9602</td>
<td>24.3366</td>
<td>.6075</td>
<td>.4034</td>
<td>.7441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors

Ethnicity and urban/rural residence show no significant relationship to approval of civil disobedience in Bolivia, but the less-well educated are more likely to approve civil disobedience, in both its violent and non-violent forms. Figure VII.27 shows the results. The patterns are not particularly strong, but university educated Bolivians are the least supportive of civil disobedience.
Income follows the same pattern as education. For both non-violent and violent civil disobedience, Bolivians with lower levels of income are more approving. Figure VII.29 shows the results. The pattern is clearer, however, with the "block streets" variable than it is with the violence index.
Gender has little relationship to approval of civil disobedience as is shown in Figure VII.31. Only for the variable measuring approval of blocking streets do we find that males have more support than females, but the difference in absolute terms is very small and statistically insignificant.
Age is related to support for blocking streets, with younger Bolivians being more supportive than older. Support for violent civil disobedience, however, while exhibiting a similar pattern, is not significantly related to age. Figure VII.33 shows the results.

![Figure VII Approval of Civil Disobedience and Age](image)

**Figure VII** Approval of Civil Disobedience and Age

**Geography**

There is considerable diversity of opinion among the departments of Bolivia on support for civil disobedience. As is shown in Figure VII.35, residents of La Paz exhibit the lowest support for blocking streets, while those in El Beni are the highest.
As can be see in Figure VII.37, when it comes to support for violent political protest, La Paz is also low, along with Oruro and Potosí, while Tarija is especially high.
Tolerance, System Support and Approval of Civil Disobedience

The analysis of the relationship between system support and approval of civil disobedience is complex, and only emerges clearly in the multivariate analysis that will be shown below. Tolerance, however, has the same, positive relationship to civil disobedience for both violent and non-violent forms. This is to be expected, given that the tolerance items measure tolerance for the exercise of civil rights. It does not mean, however, that those who are tolerant would necessarily participate in these activities, only that they would approve of others doing so. Once again, this highlights the importance of the multivariate analysis.
The relationship between tolerance and approval of civil disobedience is shown in Figure VII.40. Both violent and non-violent means are more strongly approved by those who are more tolerant. As shown in the figure, among those who score highest in tolerance, approval of blocking streets almost reaches the positive end of the 0-100 continuum. It is also to be noted that approval of blocking streets is much greater than approval of violent forms of protest.

The graph titled "Approval of Civil Disobedience and Tolerance" shows a positive correlation between tolerance and approval of non-violent forms of protest. Approval of violent forms of protest, indicated by the dashed line, remains relatively low across all levels of tolerance.

Ideology

Ideology (defined by a 10-point left-right scale), has no relationship to approval of violent forms of civil disobedience, as is shown in Figure VII.41. Approval of blocking of streets, however, is more strongly approved by the left than the center or right, except the extreme right also expresses higher approval. This suggests a frequent finding in the political science literature that extreme ideological positions often exhibit similar attitudes and behaviors.
Support for Coups and Approval of Civil Disobedience

It is now possible to examine the relationship between support for coups, studied earlier in this chapter and support for civil disobedience. As noted at the outset, these appear to be diametrically opposed forms of behavior. One associates coups with military overthrow of civilian governments, which normally end up repressing civil liberties of citizens. Civil disobedience, in contrast, we think of as involving citizen protest against repressive acts of government. Thus, we would expect that those who support coups should not be approving of civil disobedience. In Bolivia, as we shall see in a moment, this is not the case. Figure VII.43 shows a positive association between the overall index of support for a coup and our two measures of approval of civil disobedience. These findings are certainly troubling because they suggest indiscriminate support for violent means to resolve political disagreements.
More direct and dramatic evidence of this troubling pattern is found when item E3, approval of citizens participating in a group that wishes to overthrow an elected government by violent means, is examined alone, rather than as part of the violence index. Figure VII.45 shows the strong relationship between our respondents’ approval of citizen overthrows of an elected government and military coups.
Overall Multivariate Models

The multivariate models of the factors predicting approval of civil disobedience are similar in most respects. Table VII.3 shows the pattern for blocking streets. As can be seen, more support for blocking streets is expressed by Bolivians who are younger, have lower incomes, are male, are on the left ideologically, have higher levels of political tolerance, and are more supportive of military coups. System support plays no role. The strongest predictors are tolerance and support for coups.
Predictors of approval of violent civil disobedience is shown in Table VII.4. The pattern is the same except for the emergence of political support/alienation as a significant predictor. In this model, those who approve of violent civil disobedience are younger, less well educated, poorer, male, on the political left, more tolerant, more supportive of coups, and are less supportive of the political system. This finding fills in an important piece of the puzzle. It suggests again the importance of system support for political stability. Bolivians with low system support are more likely to approve of violent civil disobedience, whereas as we saw in the table above, non-violent civil disobedience is not related significantly to system support.

Ad. R^2 = .10
Conclusions

A little over one-quarter of the population of Bolivia would approve a coup d'état under conditions of high unemployment, student strikes, worker strikes and reduction in employee wages. This is a proportion lower than in Nicaragua, but higher than in Paraguay and El Salvador. These results are not surprising, given Bolivia’s long history of military regimes and limited experience with democracy.

Coups are most strongly supported among the young and among the wealthiest citizens. This suggests that the hope that the young (or the wealth) will emerge as defenders of the democratic creed is misplaced, at least in Bolivia. Since the young are also more likely to be victims of crime than the old, and crime victims more strongly support coups than those who have not been victims, it is important to consider the important effects that crime might have for democratic stability. Citizens who are more tolerant, however, are far more likely to oppose a coup, so finding ways to increase political tolerance could help increase opposition to coups. Yet, the investigation conducted in this study found that in Bolivia, tolerance does not increase with education or civil society participation. Only those who were more satisfied with municipal services were found to be more tolerant.

Bolivians were also found to be more supportive of civil disobedience than those of other countries in Latin America. Not surprisingly, the more tolerant citizens were more supportive of civil disobedience. But, what was most disturbing is that citizens who support civil disobedience are also more likely to support a coup, suggesting an indiscriminate support for violent forms of political behavior, either by the state or by its citizens. But, it was encouraging to find that those who express higher system support (in the multivariate model) are far more likely to oppose violent acts of civil disobedience. This finding once again suggests the importance of system support for democratic stability.
Questionnaire:
Spanish Version
Buenos días/tardes. Mi nombre es: _____________________ Soy encuestador (a) de la empresa Encuestas y Estudios y de la Universidad de Pittsburgh de los Estados Unidos. Estamos realizando un estudio para conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre diferentes aspectos de la situación nacional. Ud. ha sido seleccionado (a) por sorteo para hacerle una entrevista y quisiéramos pedirle que colabore con nosotros, dedicándonos unos minutos de su tiempo. Le reitero que todas sus respuestas serán confidenciales.

Para empezar, acostumbra escuchar algún programa de noticias.. (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

A1. Por radio
   Si [1]  No [0]  NR [8]

A2. Por la televisión
   Si [1]  No [0]  NR [8]

A3. Lee noticias en el periódico
   Si [1]  No [0]  NR [8]

A4. En su opinión, cuál es el problema más grave que enfrenta el país? (Una sola respuesta, si menciona más de uno pregunte por el más importante)


A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverlos solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiendo ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda o cooperación... (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

CP1. Al Presidente de la República

CP2. A Algun diputado

CP3. Al Alcalde o concejal

CP3A. A la autoridad originaria o autoridad de la comunidad indígena

CP3B. Al comité de vigilancia de la municipalidad

CP4. A alguna oficina del gobierno nacional, ministerio, prefectura o, policía

Ahora le voy a leer algunas preguntas sobre esta comunidad y los problemas que tiene.

CP15A. ¿Cuánta influencia cree que Ud. tiene sobre las decisiones que toman los grupos de esta comunidad? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha, poca o ninguna influencia?


CP5. ¿Alguna vez ha trabajado o tratado de resolver algún problema de la comunidad o de los vecinos de aquí?


CP5A. Si responde si => Ha donado materiales o dinero para ayudar en algún problema o alguna mejora?
Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, digame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones frecuentemente, asiste de vez en cuando, asiste casi nunca o nunca asiste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asiste Ud a..................</th>
<th>Frecuentemente</th>
<th>De vez en cuando</th>
<th>Casi nunca</th>
<th>Nunca</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CP6. Algun comité o sociedad de la iglesia o templo?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP7. Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP8. Comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP9. Una asociación de profesionales, negociantes, campesinos o productores?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP10. Sindicato Obrero?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP11. Cooperativa?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP12. Alguna asociación o comité cívico (grupos de mujeres, etc)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP13. Juntas vecinales?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB’s)?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

L1. En esta tabla (entregue tabla # 1) hay una escala que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 es de extrema izquierda y 10 de extrema derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, se dice que una persona es de izquierda o que es de derecha. Mejor todavía, Ud. mismo cuando califica a una persona dice ese es de izquierda y ese es de derecha ¿En esta escala, políticamente Ud. dónde se ubicaría?

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha
NS [88]

LS3. Ahora, algunas opiniones: Hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? Diría Ud. que se encuentra 1) muy satisfecho, 2) algo satisfecho, 3) algo insatisfecho o 4) muy insatisfecho?

NS [8]

IT1. Hablando en general de la gente de este lugar, diría Ud. que la gente en general es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?

NS/NR [8]

IT2. ¿ Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo por sí misma o cree que la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?

NS/NR [8]

IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente trataría de aprovecharse de Ud. si se les presentara la oportunidad, o cree que no se aprovecharían?
Si se aprovecharían [1] No se aprovecharían [2]
NS/NR [8]

CC12. En general, ¿Cómo le han tratado cuando ha tenido que ir a una oficina del gobierno?

VB1. Ahora, vamos a hablar de las elecciones. ¿Estaba Ud. inscrito para votar en las elecciones pasadas?
Si [1] No [2] => pase a VB4

VB2. Si estaba inscrito = >Votó Ud. en las elecciones pasadas (de junio de 1997)
NDR [9]

VB2A. Si votó en las elecciones de 1997= > Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente? (No lea las alternativas)
Otro____________ NS / No recuerda, No responde [8] NDR [9]

VB2 ADIP. Si votó en las elecciones de 1997= > Por qué partido votó para diputado uninominal ? (No lea las alternativas)

VB2 B. Si no votó => Por qué no votó (No lea las alternativas, acepte una sola respuesta, la más importante).
Estaba fuera del país [15] Otro (especifique)________________ NS [88] NDR [99]

VB4. Para todos => Por qué motivo piensa Ud. que algunas personas no pudieron votar en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de Junio de 1997? (No lea las alternativas, acepte una sola respuesta, la más importante).
Estaba fuera del país [15] Otro (especifique)________________ NS [88]

VB6. ¿Es Ud. miembro de algún partido político?

VB7. En su opinión, quién le representa mejor 1) el diputado plurinominal de la lista de partidos, o 2) el diputado uninominal de su distrito?

PP55. Hay personas que trabajan por alguno de los partidos o candidatos durante las campañas electorales. Ha trabajado Ud. para algún partido o candidato en estas elecciones o en las pasadas?
NP1. Ahora vamos a hablar de la alcaldía de este municipio. Ha tenido Ud. la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o consejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?


NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una solicitud a alguna oficina pública, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?


NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ¿Quedó contento con la respuesta que le dieron?


NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto de la municipalidad?


NP5. ¿Ha llevado alguna queja al comité de vigilancia municipal?


SGL1.Diría Ud. que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?


SGL2. ¿Cómo le han tratado a Ud. o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites?. Le trataron muy bien, bien, regular, malo o pésimo?


LGL1. En su opinión, ¿Quién ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad?. ¿El Gobierno Central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la comunidad?


LGL2. En su opinión, se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la Alcaldía o debemos dejar que el Gobierno Central asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (agua, basura, etc.)


LGL3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos o tasas a la municipalidad para que ésta pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena más?


LGL4. ¿Cree Ud. que la municipalidad responde a lo que quiere el pueblo casi siempre, la mayoría de las veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca?
Algunas personas dicen que se justificaría, bajo ciertas circunstancias, un Golpe de Estado por los militares, es decir cuando los militares toman el poder. En su opinión, un golpe de estado por los militares se justifica o no se justifica... (lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).


JC15. Algunas personas prefieren vivir bajo una democracia porque protege los derechos humanos e individuales, a pesar de que a veces pueda ser ineficiente y desordenada. Otros prefieren vivir bajo una dictadura por su orden y eficiencia. Qué prefieres más Ud. una democracia o una dictadura?


BC15. ¿Podrian ocurrir motivos por los cuales justificaría Ud. un golpe de estado que interrumpe el proceso democrático Boliviano?


BC16. Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cual se justifique la violencia cometida por militantes políticos?


Ahora (entregue tarjeta # 2) vamos a usar esta tarjeta.... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto:“hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?”, si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el númer0 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. “hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?” léame el número por favor.

(ASEGURE SE QUÉ ENTIENDA) Usando esta tarjeta ..................

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B1. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B2. Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B3. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B4. Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
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<tr>
<th>B6. Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B30. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B11. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B12. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ejército?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<th>B13. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<tr>
<td>B14. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Central?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B15. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B18. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B20. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B21. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B22. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>B22B. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>B22C. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el comité de vigilancia municipal?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B22D. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base OTBs</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B23. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23A. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23B. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la defensoría pública?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B24. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que las elecciones fueron libres, o sea que la gente pudo votar por el candidato que prefería?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B25. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que las elecciones fueron limpias, o sea sin fraude?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B26. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que el Gobierno Central responde a las necesidades de la gente?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ahora vamos a cambiar de tarjeta. (Entregue tarjeta # 3). Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 1 a 10 grados, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desaprueba mucho y el 10 indicando que aprueba mucho. Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Bolivia. (Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desaprueba</th>
<th>Escalera</th>
<th>Aproba</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de los gobiernos bolivianos, no solo del Gobierno actual, sino del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas?. Por favor léame el número SONDEE: Hasta qué punto?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las personas que sólo hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano les permitan postularse para cargos públicos</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para hacer un discurso?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Desapueba</td>
<td>Escala</td>
<td>Aprueba</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver problemas de las comunidades?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de las calles?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas u otros edificios?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ahora vamos ha hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaba ... (encuestador: pregunta inciso por inciso).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Desapueba</th>
<th>Escala</th>
<th>Aprueba</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C3. ¿Una ley que prohibiera las manifestaciones públicas?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5. ¿ Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que se prohibiera reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el Gobierno censure la propaganda de sus enemigos políticos?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Ud. más de acuerdo?

NEWTOL1. El Estado debería permitir: 1) una libertad de opinión ó 2) el Estado debería tener el derecho de silenciar a aquellos que se oponen a los deseos de la gente.


NEWTOL2. El Estado debería tener el derecho 1) de detener a sus oponentes políticos sin necesidad de un juicio si la situación así lo requiere o 2) nadie debería ser detenido sin juicio previo.


NEWTOL3. El Estado debería: 1) garantizar a todos el derecho a la protesta y manifestación pacífica ó 2) el Estado debería tener derecho a suprimir las protestas de sus oponentes políticos.


NEWTOL4. El Estado debería 1) tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de opiniones falsas que puedan dañar a nuestra nación ó 2) el Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello.

NEWTOL 5. 1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran ó 2) los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestros niños y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno.


NEWTOL 6. Los ciudadanos que apoyan el retorno de los militares al gobierno en Bolivia deberían 1) tener el mismo derecho a organizarse que cualquier otro ó 2) los grupos que apoyan un gobierno militar deberían ser prohibidos de organizarse.


AOJ1. ¿Cree Ud. que avistar o denunciar un delito a la policía o autoridad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?


AOJ1A. ¿Cree Ud. que avistar o denunciar un delito a la autoridad de la comunidad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?


AOJ2. A personas como Ud. cuando tiene que resolver algún caso en los juzgados o tribunales, las tratan siempre con justicia, a veces las tratan con justicia o no la tratan con justicia?


AOJ3. Durante los últimos 12 meses ha sido Ud. víctima de robos o agresiones?

Si [1] No [2] => pase a AOJ3B

AOJ3A. Si ha sido víctima => Ha denunciado o dio aviso a la policía o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad este robo o agresión?


AOJ3B. Durante los últimos 12 meses algún miembro de su familia ha sido víctima de robos o agresiones?


AOJ4. De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia ha hecho en la Policía o PTJ, se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho o insatisfecho de los resultados obtenidos?


AOJ5. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía o PTJ cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?


AOJ6. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?

AOJ7. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas del Ministerio Público o fiscales, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERIENCIAS PERSONALES</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Sí</th>
<th>NS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXC 1. Ha sido acusado durante los últimos dos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC2. Algun agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno)?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un policía en los dos últimos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en los dos últimos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en los últimos dos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC12. Para tramitar algún préstamo u otra transacción en un banco. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo correcto en los dos últimos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC13. En su trabajo, le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en los últimos dos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXC14. ¿Conoce a alguien que ha tenido que pagar una coima en la Corte en los últimos dos años?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está muy generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?


Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los representantes en estas instituciones son honrados o corruptos. En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 quiere decir muy corruptos y 10 quiere decir muy honrados, podría decirme hasta qué punto cree Ud. que son honrados o corruptos .... (lea inciso por inciso y espere la respuesta)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUCIONES</th>
<th>GRADO DE CORRUPCIÓN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muy Corruptos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC1. Los diputados</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC2. Los ministros</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC3. Los alcaldes</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC4. Los concejales</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC5. Los policías</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC7. Los maestros</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC8. Los catedráticos de las universidades</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC9. Los sacerdotes, cleros y pastores</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
¿Cree Ud. que las personas o instituciones que voy a mencionar tratan a los indígenas mejor, igual o peor que a los blancos?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAS O INSTITUCIONES</th>
<th>Mejor</th>
<th>Igual</th>
<th>Peor</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IND1. La policía</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND2. El Ejército</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND3. Los Tribunales de Justicia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND4. Los maestros de las escuelas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACR1. Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor digame cuál de las tres describe mejor su opinión:

[8]

1.- La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios

2.- Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas

3.- Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios

Respuesta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GI1. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos</th>
<th>Respuesta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GI2. Recuerda cómo se llama el jefe de gobierno de Rusia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI3. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de Argentina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI4. Recuerda cuántos diputados hay en el Congreso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI5. Recuerda cómo se llama el diputado uninominal de este distrito electoral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KK1. Alguna gente dice que a los funcionarios públicos les importa mucho lo que piensan las personas como Ud. ¿Está Ud. de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esa opinión?


URG21B7. ¿Ud. piensa que vale la pena votar o que no vale la pena, porque al final de cuentas siempre es lo mismo?


KK5. Algunos dicen que es peligroso llegar a un arreglo con los adversarios políticos, mientras otros dicen que esto es bueno. ¿Qué piensa Ud.?


KK6. Algunos dicen que es más importante vivir en una sociedad ordenada que tener mucha libertad. En su opinión, ¿Qué es más importante, el orden o la libertad?


DM1. ¿Considera Ud. que en Bolivia hay discriminación contra las mujeres?

**DM2. Si hay discriminación =>** Considera que la discriminación contra las mujeres es muy grave, grave, mas o menos grave o no muy grave?


**DM3. ¿Tienen las mujeres igualdad de oportunidades para conseguir empleo?**

Si tienen [1]  No tienen [2]  

**DM4. Según su experiencia el problema más común de las mujeres en el trabajo es... (lea las opciones, anote una sola respuesta.)**

No les dan empleo si dicen que están embarazadas [1] Las enamoran los jefes (patrones) o compañeros [2]  
Es mal visto por pedir permiso para atender a sus hijos [3]  Les pagan menos que a los hombres [4]  

**CHAUV1. En su opinión puede un ciudadano ser considerado un buen Boliviano si critica a su gobierno en un periodo de crisis?**

Si [1]  No [2]  

**CHAUV5. Si el presidente de otro país insulta públicamente al nuestro, deberíamos tomar medidas radicales o agresivas para acallarlo, sí o no?**

Si [1]  No [2]  

¿Estaría Ud. de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?

| RWA1. Un grupo que tolera bastantes diferencias de opinión entre sus propios miembros no puede durar mucho tiempo. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA2. En este mundo complicado, la única gente en la que podemos confiar son nuestros gobernantes. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA3. Mis propios puntos de vista son generalmente tan válidos como aquellos de nuestros gobernantes nacionales. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA4. Los jóvenes de ahora deben ser controlados en lo que dicen hasta que tengan la edad necesaria para saber lo que hablan. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA5. Es importante que un padre establezca su autoridad en la casa, incluso si ello significa pegar a los niños de vez en cuando. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA6. La mejor manera que una organización crezca es si los dirigentes escuchan los puntos de vista de sus miembros. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA7. La gente debería tener la oportunidad de escuchar todas las posiciones en un debate, incluso si alguna gente expresa puntos de vista radicales. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA8. Los profesores en nuestras escuelas deberían enfatizar la disciplina primero, incluso si ello significa dedicar menos tiempo a la enseñanza de las matemáticas o la historia. | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| RWA9. Los estudiantes universitarios deberían tener el derecho de protestar y manifestarse, incluso si ello significa bloquear el tráfico y | 1 | 2 | 8 |
causar congestiones.

| **RWA10. Los hijos siempre deben obedecer a sus padres.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **RWA11. En todas las cosas, siempre hay una sola verdad.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **RWA12. Para la mujer lo primero es la casa.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **RWA13. Bolivia sólo puede ser manejada con mano dura.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **RWA14. Los trabajadores siempre deben obedecer las órdenes de sus capataces o supervisores, incluso si ello significa causar daño a la fábrica o a la empresa.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **RWA15. Una buena manera de incrementar la producción en una fábrica es integrar a los trabajadores en las decisiones de los administradores. Incluso si ello significa disminuir temporalmente el ritmo de trabajo.** | 1 | 2 | 8 |

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?


NS/NR [8]

Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido a la iglesia (culto o templo) durante el mes pasado? ________ veces (88= NS/NR)

Q5. ¿Qué tan frecuentemente reza Ud? Diariamente, una vez a la semana, de vez en cuando o casi nunca


NS/NR [8]

RF6. La religión es un aspecto importante de su vida. Está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en contra o muy en contra


NS/NR [8]

Ahora para terminar, algunas preguntas que nos sirven sólo para fines estadísticos. En su casa Ud. tiene...

| **R1. Televisor a color** | No | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
| **R2. Televisor en Blanco y Negro** | No | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 |
R14. Alcantarillado  0 1 8

R12. Anote si es posible, sin preguntar. Piso de la habitación


OCUP1. ¿En qué trabaja Ud. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.- Auto Empleados</th>
<th>2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:</th>
<th>3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas</td>
<td>Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios</td>
<td>Anas de Casa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas</td>
<td>Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios</td>
<td>Estudiantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra</td>
<td>Personal o empleados de Planta</td>
<td>Jubilados y Rentistas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ganaderos dueños de su ganado</td>
<td>Obreros</td>
<td>Trabajadores ocasionales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profesionales independientes</td>
<td>Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comerciantes y arcesanos empleados</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OCUP2. Sólo para agricultores dueños de tierra o inquilinos => Cuántas hectáreas de tierra es dueño o se alquila? _________ (Use decimales si es necesario).

DESOC1. Para todos => ¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?


DESOC2. Si responde Si => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? ______ semanas NDR [9]

ED. Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó (encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado/a))
- Ninguna : 0
- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12
- Técnica o Universidad: 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? ________ años

Q10. En cuál de los siguientes rangos (muestre la tarjeta de ingresos) ubicaría el INGRESO TOTAL MENSUAL de todas las personas de su hogar?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NS/NR [88]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q11. Cuál es su estado civil (No lea las alternativas)


Q12. Cuántos hijos tiene Ud. _____ hijos  No tiene hijos [0]
ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, mestiza, indígena o negra?


LENG1. ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa)


GRACIAS, HEMOS TERMINADO


Hora terminada _____:____ tiempo de duración de la entrevista _____ minutos

Nombre del Entrevistado _________________________

YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLENADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA

________ ________ (firma del encuestador)

Firma y código Supervisor ____________ Cod. ______

Firma y código Validador ____________ Cod. ______
TARJETA # 1

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Derecha

TARJETA # 2

Nada 1

Mucho 7
**TABLA DE INGRESOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Número</th>
<th>Descripción</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Nada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Menos de 250 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>De 251 a 500 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>De 501 a 1000 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>De 1001 a 2000 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>De 2001 a 5000 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>De 5000 a 10.000 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>más de 20.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>