

Bolivia's DDPC Program:

An Audit of Citizen Impact, 1999

by

Mitchell A. Seligson
Department of Political Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
SELIGSON@pitt.edu

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Contents

Chapter I. Introduction and Methodology	8
The DDPC Program	8
Methodology of This Study	13
Chapter II. Local Government (IR2 & 3)	29
Participation in Municipal Meetings	29
Gender	35
Demand-Making on Municipal Government	37
Satisfaction with Responsiveness to Demands	39
Gender and Demand-Making	39
Participation in Meetings on the Municipal Budget	40
Gender	42
Complaining to the Vigilance Committee	43
Gender and Complaints	45
Evaluation of Municipal Service	46
Treatment of Citizens by Municipal Government	47
Municipal vs. National Government	49
Community Participation	51
Gender and OTB Participation	54
Willingness to Pay More Taxes	56
Support for Single-Member District Representation	57
Community Demand-Making	58
Gender and Perceived Influence	60
Problem-Solving	61
Interpersonal Trust and the DDPC Project	62
Conclusions	64
Chapter III. SO: Increased System Support	65
Support for the Judiciary	65
The New Penal Code (CCP)	69
Support for the Congress	74
Confidence in Municipal Government	75
Overall SO Scales	76
1. Support for Institutions	76
2. Generalized System Support	78
Conclusions	81
Chapter IV. Support for and Challenges to Democracy	82
Support for Due Process: Willingness to Break Rules To Stop Crime	83
Education	83
Support for Due Process: Illegal Search and Seizures	85
Crime Victimization	87
Crime and Civil Liberties	92
Crime and Support for Civil Society Participation	95

Conclusions	98
Chapter V. The Problem of Corruption	99
Corruption	99
Perception of Corruption	100
Experience with Corruption	103
.....	107
Who Is Affected by Corruption?	107
Conclusions	113
Questionnaire Used in 1999	114

List of Figures

Figure I.1	Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Education	23
Figure I.2	Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Income	24
Figure I.3	Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Ethnicity	25
Figure I.4	Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Indigenous dress	26
Figure I.5	Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Childhood Language	27
Figure I.6	Urbanization and Sample Distributions	28
Figure II.1	Attended Municipal Meeting in Last Year	30
Figure II.2	Attendance at Municipal Meetings: National 1998 vs. DDPC 1999	33
Figure II.3	Attendance at Municipal Meetings: by Gender and Stratum	37
Figure II.4	Demand-Making on Municipality: Nation vs. DDPC 1999	38
Figure II.5	Demand-Making by Gender and Stratum	40
Figure II.6	Participating in Municipal Budget Formulation: Nation vs. DDPC Municipalities	41
Figure II.7	Participating in Budget Meetings by Gender and Stratum	43
Figure II.8	Complaints to the Vigilance Committee: National Sample vs. DDPC	44
Figure II.9	Complaints to Vigilance Committee by Gender and Stratum	45
Figure II.10	Evaluation of Service of Municipality: Nation vs. DDPC	46
Figure II.11	Satisfaction with Treatment by Local Government	48
Figure II.12	How Responsive is Local Government? Nation Sample vs. DDPC	49
Figure II.13	Who Should Get More Money and More Obligations?	50
Figure II.14	Who Has Responded Better to Solve Local Problems	51

Figure II.15	Frequency of Participation in “Juntas Vecinales” National Sample vs. DDPC	52
Figure II.16	Participation in ‘Juntas Vecinales’ Comparison of 1998/99 DDPC and Nation 1998	53
Figure II.17	Participation in OTBs National Sample, and DDPC 1998 vs 1999	54
Figure II.18	Participation in OTBs by Sample Stratum and Gender	55
Figure II.19	Participation in Community Development Associations: Comparisons of National and DDPC samples	56
Figure II.20	Who Represents you Better? National Sample vs. DDPC	58
Figure II.21	Demand-Making Comparison of National and DDPC Samples	59
Figure II.22	Perceived Influence Over Community Decisions	60
Figure II.23	Perceived Influence by Gender: National and DDPC Samples	61
Figure II.24	Participation in Community Problem-Solving: National 1998 vs. DDPC Samples	62
Figure II.25	Do People Watch Out for Themselves or Try to Help Others?	63
Figure II.26	Do People Try to Take Advantage of You? National vs. DDPC Samples	64
Figure III.1	Confidence in the Public Ministry: DDPC vs. National Samples	66
Figure III.2	Confidence in the Public Defender: DDPC vs. National Samples	67
Figure III.3	Do Courts Guarantee a Fair Trial? National and DDPC 1998/99 Samples	68
Figure III.4	Comparison of Evaluation of the Judiciary	69
Figure III.5	Percent Who Have Heard of New Criminal Code, by Gender	70

Figure III.6	Heard of New Penal Code by Education, 1999 DDPC Sample	71
Figure III.7	Urbanization and Heard of New Penal Code	72
Figure III.8	Opinion on New Penal Code	73
Figure III.9	Support for Citizen Judges by Education	74
Figure III.10	Confidence in the Legislature National and DDPC Samples	75
Figure III.11	Confidence in the Municipality: National vs. DDPC Samples	76
Figure III.12	SO for Democracy: Means for Judiciary, Legislature and Municipality	78
Figure III.13	System Support, Generalized Areas: 1998 vs. 1999 DDPC	79
Figure III.14	System Support Index, Generalized Areas: 1998 vs. 1999 DDPC Samples	81
Figure IV.1	To Fight Crime Can Rules Be Broken?	83
Figure IV.2	Support for Due Process: Willingness to Break Rules to Combat Crime	84
Figure IV.3	Approval of Breaking Rules to Stop Crime: And Relationship to System Support	85
Figure IV.4	Approval of Illegal Search of Homes	86
Figure IV.5	Approval of Illegal Searches: Relationship to System Support	87
Figure IV.6	Crime Victimization, DDPC 1998 vs. 1999	88
Figure IV.7	Crime Victimization and Confidence in the Municipality DDPC 1998 and 1999	89
Figure IV.8	Victimization and Confidence in the Police DDPC 1998 and 1999	90
Figure IV.9	How Safe Do You Feel at Night in Neighborhood? 1999 DDPC only	91

Figure IV.10	Feeling of Security and Victimization:1999 DDPC Only	92
Figure IV.11	Feelings of Illegal Entry by Police	93
Figure IV.12	Crime Victimization and Approval of Illegal Entry by Police	94
Figure IV.14	Approval of Participation in Protest Marches: 1998 National Sample vs. DDPC 1998	95
Figure IV.15	Support for Participation in Community Problem Solving Groups 1998 National vs. 1999 DDPC	97
Figure IV.16	Support for Civil Disobedience (blocking roads): 1998 National vs. 1999 DDPC	98
Figure V.1	Perceived Levels of Honesty-Dishonesty: National Sample 1998 vs. DDPC 1999	101
Figure V.2	Perception of Honesty of Mayor: 1998 National Sample, DDPC 1998 & 1999	102
Figure V.3	Perceived Honesty of the "Consejales": National 1998, DDPC 1998 & 1999	103
Figure V.4	Paid Bribe to Municipality: National 1998, DDPC 1998/1999	104
Figure V.5	Experience with Municipal Bribery and Evaluation of Treatment by Local Government	107
Figure V.6	Exposure to Municipal Corruption by Gender: National 1998 and DDPC 1999	109
Figure V.7	Exposure to Municipal Corruption and Income: National 1998 and DDPC 1999	110
Figure V.8	Demand-Making at Municipal Level and Income	111
Figure V.9	Exposure to Municipal Corruption by Level of Urbanization	112

Figure V.10

Victim of Municipal Corruption
and Complained to Vigilance Committee 113

Chapter I. Introduction and Methodology

This introductory chapter has three purposes. First, it establishes the focus of this report, which is very distinct from the 1998 study of the nation as a whole. In this report, the focus is on the Democratic Development and Citizen Participation program (hereafter known by its Spanish acronym, DDPC). Second, a series of maps helps locate in a national and departmental context precisely where the DDPC samples were drawn. Finally, it compares the national sample to the DDPC sample on key demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

The DDPC Program

The basic design and purposes of the DDPC program have already been described by the DDPC staff, and rather than attempting to paraphrase (and possibly distort) what they have said, I include here verbatim the October 1999 summary of their work.

BOLIVIA DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (DDCP) PROJECT

October, 1999

Introduction

Since December 1996, Chemonics International has been implementing the USAID-financed Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project (DDCP) to support the full implementation of the 1994 Popular Participation Law (PPL). With the passage of the PPL, Bolivia (1) created 311 municipalities in which municipal representatives are elected by popular vote, rather than appointed by the country's President; (2) effectively integrated large sectors of the population into the Bolivian state by providing legal recognition to geographically and ethnically-based local community organizations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, OTBs*), and (3) provided municipalities with the resources to effect local development by endowing the municipalities with 20% of the national budget (called co-participation funds), distributed to municipalities on a per-capita basis. Over time, the impact of these changes has been considerable: for the first time in history, the country's mostly rural, indigenous population is participating in mainstream local politics, both as elected representatives and constituents, interested in controlling resources for development. To date, no country in Latin America or the Caribbean matches the Bolivian government's level of innovation, determination, and political courage in establishing a structure for democratic local governance. As a result, the PPL creates the conditions for the full integration of civil society and municipal government, and provides local governments with the authority and resources to respond to local demand.

Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project

Contractor:	Chemonics International
Subcontractors:	Strategies for International Development; International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Contract type:	Cost Reimbursement plus Award Fee
Client:	USAID/Bolivia
Duration:	January 1996 - December 2000
Total budget:	US \$8,491,965
Employees:	24 full time staff

Structure of Municipal Government/Civil Society in Bolivia

Bolivian municipalities are headed by a Municipal Executive (*Alcalde*) who, as a candidate receiving a majority of votes cast, is directly elected to a five-year term. In case of no single mayoral candidate receiving more than 50% of the popular vote, one of the two candidates receiving the highest percentage of votes is appointed to the Office of Mayor by the Municipal Council. Amongst other responsibilities established by the PPL, the mayor is legally committed to the elaboration, in a participatory manner, of an Annual Operating Plan and Municipal Budget, as well as the regular presentation of a financial state of accounts to the Municipal Council and Vigilance Committee.

The Municipal Council, generally comprised of 5 -11 representatives proportionally elected from party lists and serving concurrent five year terms, is responsible to exercise executive oversight of the mayor and to review for approval the spending plans, programs, and development projects proposed by the Municipal Executive. One of the powers of the Municipal Council is the ability to legally remove a mayor from office by exercising the *Voto Constructivo de Censura*, requiring a two-thirds vote of the Council.

Finally, one of the most important innovations of the PPL was the establishment of the Vigilance Committee (*Comité de Vigilancia*) to represent the interests of the Territorial Base Organizations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base*), comprised of *comunidades campesinas, comunidades indigenas, pueblos indigenas, and juntas vecinales*, before the Municipal Government. The Vigilance Committee is comprised of one representative from each municipal canton or district, elected by their respective OTBs to serve concurrent two-year terms. The Vigilance Committee is responsible to channel citizen demands to municipal representatives, to exercise civic oversight of municipal governance, and to ensure that the Annual Operating Plan and Municipal Budget reflects the needs of the community, are invested in an equitable manner between urban and rural populations and that no more than 15% of expenditures are administrative, rather than programmatic, in nature. In the event that the Vigilance Committee feels that the Executive has not fulfilled its responsibilities according to the PPL, the Committee may present a request to the Bolivian Senate that the municipal bank accounts be frozen until the conflict is adjudicated by the Senate.

Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project

In order to achieve the Strategic Objectives of the project, based upon the technical assistance needs of the municipalities, DDCP has formed an integrated team of 24 professionals with demonstrated expertise in municipal accounting, budgeting, civic education, fiscal and financial programming, human resource development, meeting facilitation and municipal legislation. The team members are organized into technical groups focused on strengthening each of the individual municipal actors (Mayor, Municipal Council, Vigilance Committee, OTBs and Civil Society), to ensure the fulfillment of their respective administrative roles and responsibilities.

DDCP Strategic Objectives

- (1) Citizen demands are effectively channeled to their respective single-district representative (*uninominales*) through Civil Society Organizations,
- (2) The ability of single-district representatives (*uninominales*) to respond to constituent demands is strengthened,
- (3) Civil Society participation in local government in DDCP municipalities becomes more effective, and
- (4) DDCP municipal governments become increasingly capable of professional, effective and transparent management.

Methodology

DDCP works with 20 pilot municipalities (*municipios-escuela*), selected for their general representativeness and ethnic diversity, to strengthen the capacity of (1) community organizations to participate in the municipal governance planning process, (2) municipal government to respond to the increasing demands for participatory, responsive government, and (3) municipalities (citizens and representatives) to lobby the national Congress in support of their interests. DDCP's methodological approach begins with the provision of targeted technical assistance to each of the municipal actors (Mayor, Municipal Council, Vigilance Committee, OTBs and Civil Society) in fulfilling their legal and constitutional responsibilities. For example, the technical staff of the Mayor will receive training in integrated accounting, personnel management, purchasing, participatory planning, internal controls and municipal legislation. Other abbreviated examples: the Municipal Council, Vigilance Committees and OTBs will receive assistance in executive oversight, reading of financial reports, project planning, etc. Simultaneous with technical training, citizens and representatives are instructed in their civic responsibilities as specifically defined by the PPL, and more broadly defined by the requirements of a fully functioning democracy. With a fuller knowledge of their rights and responsibilities, citizens make greater demands for efficient, transparent, representative, and responsive government while governments achieve a better understanding of the importance of responding to these demands.

The focus of DDCP training of the actors is to prepare each for full participation in the preparation of an Annual Operating Plan and Municipal Budget. Drafting of an AOP/Municipal Budget is conducted through a series of three municipal summits, or *cumbres*, during which all municipal actors, but especially OTBs, are trained in conducting diagnostic needs assessments of their communities (*cumbre I*); OTBs then publicly present these diagnostic findings to the Vigilance Committee, which then forwards the prioritized projects to the Mayor for incorporation into the Annual Operating Plan and Budget (*cumbre II*); based upon this information, the Mayor develops the final planning and budgetary documentation to be reviewed for approval by the Municipal Council and Vigilance Committee (*cumbre III*).

To date, DDCP's 20 pilot municipalities have successfully:

1. developed, in a fully participatory manner with OTBs and Civil Society, Annual Operating Plans and Municipal Budgets, for each year in which DDCP technical assistance has been provided;
2. accessed co-participation funds by fulfilling the requirements established under the LPP for the Municipal Executive, Municipal Council, and Vigilance Committees;
3. managed over US \$300 million in resources, compared to less than US \$10 million before passage of the PPL and executed, on average, 85% of their planned budgets, demonstrating a strong project planning and implementation capacity;
4. programmed the implementation of 1,331 pre-investment and investment projects in various areas including: farming, tourism, energy, infrastructure, health, education, and institutional strengthening.

DDCP target municipalities are also required to hold quarterly "*encuentros de avance*" during which the Municipal Executive provides a quarterly financial report to the Municipal Council, Vigilance Committee, OTBs and civil society representatives and is questioned on the pace of implementation of the Annual Operating Plan and Municipal Budget, ensuring effective executive oversight. The *encuentros* ensure that each of the municipal actors is informed as to budget execution, project implementation and that the municipal executive has the opportunity to adjust, with appropriate approval, planning documentation to reflect revised needs and changed circumstances. The *encuentros* also serve as an opportunity for the Municipal Executive to initiate the participatory planning process upon which municipal development is based.

Lastly, DDCP compliments its work in the area of Civic Education with Municipal Actors through the establishment of a *Comité de Orientación y Promoción Electoral (COPE)*, a mechanism founded by civil society as a commission of the Vigilance Committee for citizens to effectively exercise their democratic rights from a non-partisan perspective. Each COPE consists of representatives from various social and civic groups within a municipality such as, civic committees, farming groups, etc.. Beyond promoting electoral participation, the COPE responds to the need to strengthen ties between municipalities (representatives and citizens) and national representatives (*uninominales*).

Popular Participation Fund

An important component of the DDCP project is the Popular Participation Fund (FAP), totaling US \$2 million. The intent of the FAP is to contribute to the sustainability and replicability of the DDCP project by focusing its activities in support of non-governmental and community organizations implementing projects which contribute to the full realization of the Popular Participation Law. To date, DDCP has financed 130 projects through the FAP valued at US \$1.5 million, with 80% of the funds paid out to NGO's which receive up to \$50,000 to assist municipalities in implementing the PPL. Through these NGOs, DDCP has been able to provide technical assistance to over 150 municipalities in meeting their obligations as established under the PPL.

The DDCP has also used the FAP to enhance the role of women in the development of democracy in Bolivia through a larger role in the political process, especially at the local level. The DDCP project has financed "*Ampliación de la Participación de las Mujeres en la Planificación Participativa y Gestión Municipal (Coordinadora de la Mujer)*", in order to systematize a methodology to address gender inequality in municipal governance. At the same time, DDCP is financing "*Consolidación de la Asociación de Mujeres Concejalas de Bolivia (Coordinadora de la Mujer)*", which has brought together the elected municipal councilwomen of Bolivia to identify the institutional obstacles to the participation of women as candidates in municipal elections, as well as citizens in the municipal participatory planning process. As a result of this seminar, the women council members successfully founded a National Association of Women Council Members to represent and lobby for their interests. The Association is expected to serve as an important mechanism to address gender inequality in the municipalities and to channel targeted technical assistance to women council members.

Finally, by means of the FAP, the DDCP project has successfully assisted in the establishment and operation of 10 mancomunidades, representing more than 100 municipalities, and 7 Departmental Associations throughout Bolivia. Mancomunidades are sub-departmental municipal associations, financed by the constituent municipalities, with mandates focused on infrastructure development and productive economic objectives (i.e., road building across constituent municipalities). Although not foreseen at the drafting of the Popular Participation Law (PPL), Departmental Associations are organized with a broad mandate focused on representing constituent interests before prefectural and national governments. Like their smaller counterparts the mancomunidades, the Departmental Associations may contract with municipal experts to strengthen the administrative and managerial capacity of participating municipalities. Over the course of the last 12 months both organizations have demonstrated an ability to develop and implement productive projects. As importantly for the DDCP project, they have proven to be effective and efficient service delivery providers, able to strengthen the administrative and managerial capacity of constituent municipalities.

Replicability Strategy

The strategic intent of the DDPC project in initiating work in 20 pilot municipalities has been to gather information on the practices, procedures, systems, training methodologies and manuals necessary to provide technical assistance in municipal governance/popular participation to all of Bolivia's 314 municipalities. Over the last year, DDPC has compiled these practices into a series of replicability materials, accompanied by a defined methodology, which allows the project to provide targeted technical assistance to Bolivia's 314 municipalities thereby ensuring more efficient, transparent, responsive and participatory municipal governance in Bolivia.

While the strategy for delivering technical services is still to be defined, DDPC, in concert with the Vice-Ministry of Strategic Planning and Popular Participation, intends to work intensively with the *Servicios Departamentales* of the Prefectural Governments, with Departmental Municipal Associations, interested mancomunidades and the National Association of Women Council Members as cooperating partners in strengthening individual municipalities and municipal actors. Our cooperating partners, in concert with constituent municipalities, will select from the technical training services which DDPC offers in constructing an annual work plan for DDPC technical assistance. In this way, DDPC intends to increase civic participation in strengthened municipal governments.

DDCP Replicability Materials***Municipal Governance/Popular Participation***

- OTBs: (Constitución de la OTB; Función de Organización y Planificación; Función de Información y Difusión; Función de Seguimiento, Control y Ejercicio de los Derechos)
- Vigilance Committees: (Constitución del C.V.; Función de Organización y Planificación; Funciones de Seguimiento, Control e Información; Función de Ejercicio de Derechos)
- Municipal Executives: (Planificación Participativa; Programación de Operaciones; Presupuesto; Administración de Bienes y Servicios; Contabilidad Integrada; Administración de Personal; Manual de Descripción de Cargos; Reglamento Interno; Organización Administrativa; Manual de Organización; Reglamentos Específicos; Manual de Control Interno; Legislación Municipal)
- Municipal Council (Normas Relativas a las Atribuciones del Gobierno Municipal; Manual de Organización del Concejo Municipal; Instrumentos de Fiscalización por el Concejo Municipal)

Civic Education/Popular Participation

- Module 1: The participant will understand the necessity that the Vigilance Committee realize civic education/citizenship activities, by means of Civil Society; to promote OTBs to participate in participatory planning processes with the Municipal Government; and to promote voter registration in the Registro Cívico Electoral.
- Module 2: The participant will understand the need to create and to support the necessary and optimum conditions for a transparent transition of municipal governments, and to undertake the activities required to achieve this end.
- Module 3: The participant will be trained to undertake electoral education activities and will be familiar with the procedures and norms governing the electoral system.
- Module 4: The participant will understand the necessity of expanding the functions and responsibilities (*concertar y educar*) of the Vigilance Committee (beyond that of articulating demands and exercising oversight) and of understanding the elements of the democratic Bolivian political system.

Methodology of This Study

The data base accumulated for this project allows for an examination of the impact of the DDPC project from several different angles. To understand how this is possible, it is important for the reader to become cognizant of the three distinct data bases on which this analysis draws. First, we have a baseline data set for the nation as a whole. This

consists of a 1998 national probability sample of 2,877 Bolivian voting-age adults.¹ Second, there is the 1998 sample of six DDPC municipalities, consisting of a total of 599 interviews. Finally, there is the 1999 survey of nine DDPC municipalities, consisting of 895 interviews, including each of the DDPC municipalities plus three additional municipalities. The following table (Table I.1) shows how the entire data set is distributed.

Table I.1. Distribution of Sample by Year and Strata

Strata	Year of Interview		Total
	1998	1999	
1998 National Sample	2,877		2,877
DDPC 1998	599		599
DDPC 1999		895	895
Total	3,476	895	4,371

Note: N's reported above are weighted.

The nine DDPC municipalities were selected from among the total of twenty in which the DDPC was operating when the 1999 sample design was determined. Ideally, all twenty municipalities would have been included, but the costs of doing so were prohibitive. Instead, a sample of nine was selected from the twenty. When the 1998 national sample was being planned, however, the full list of twenty pilot municipalities had not yet been selected. The six that were eventually included in the 1998 survey were among the twelve that at that moment had active DDPC projects. By 1999, an additional group of municipalities was added, enabling the selection of an additional three DDPC municipalities. In sum, the 1999 sample included the original six municipalities included in 1998 plus an additional three added in 1999.

For analytical purposes, the nine selected municipalities have been grouped into three strata based on the number of years in which the selected municipality had been receiving DDPC assistance at the time of the 1999 study. Thus, there is one group of three municipalities with three full years of DDPC assistance (it will be recalled that the DDPC program began in 1996). Then there is a second group of three municipalities which had one year of experience in 1998 and two years of assistance by the time the 1999 interviews were conducted. Both of these sets, six in total, were interviewed in 1998 and again in

¹This is the weighted sample size. The sample was drawn so as to represent each department in the country with an equal number of interviews. But since the presentation of the data needs to represent the different population sizes of each department, weighting factors were employed. This procedure is explained in detail in the 1998 report and will not be repeated here. As reported in detail in the 1998 study, 300 respondents were interviewed in each department, and an oversample were interviewed in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. Then the entire sample was weighted to reflect the actual proportion of the population in each department. The actual sample N and weighted sample N do not differ, only the weight per respondent varies (up or down). The DDPC is always given a weight of 1, since no effort is being made to adjust it to reflect the national population parameters.

1999. There is a third group of three municipalities, interviewed for the first time in 1999, which have accumulated only one year of DDPC assistance. Table I.2 provides an overall summary of this information for the 1999 interviews.

Table I.2. Distribution of Interviews in 1999 by Municipio and Years Since Initial DDPC Support

Municipio	Number of Years Since Initial DDPC Support		
	1	2	3
Challapata, Oruro	100		
Cobija, Pando		100	
Curahuara, Oruro		100	95
Llallagua, Potosí		100	
Mizque, Cochabamba	100		
Patacamaya, La Paz		100	
Pucarani, La Paz		100	100
Punata, Cochabamba		99	100
Yocalla, Potosí	100		
Total	300	599	295

Now, keeping in mind these three data bases (national 1998, DDPC 1998, and DDPC 1999), the findings in this study will be based on three sets of comparisons. First, we are most directly interested in progress, or lack thereof, in the DDPC municipalities between 1998 and 1999. In order to carry out this comparison it is necessary to limit ourselves to the six municipalities that were included in the 1998 survey, setting aside for the moment, the three municipalities that entered the study for the first time in 1999. If we were to compare the entire 1999 municipal sample with the 1998, we would be introducing a bias in the comparisons since the 1999 results would be influenced by the data emerging from the three new municipalities, when there is no comparable group in 1998 against which to measure them. The 1998/1999 comparison group, therefore, consists of the following municipalities as shown in Table I.3. The second column shows the municipios that were not included in 1998 and are therefore excluded from the 1998-1999 comparisons. This means that the municipios of Challapata, Mizque and Yocalla are excluded from these comparisons.

Table I.3. Interviews by Municipio and Year of Interview

	Interviewed in 1999	Interviewed in 1998
Challapata	100	
Cobija	100	100
Curahuara	95	100
Llallagua	100	100
Mizque	100	
Patacamaya	100	100
Pucarani	100	100
Punata	100	99
Yocalla	100	
	895	599

The second comparison we plan to make is between the DDPC municipalities as a group and the country as a whole. This allows us to compare all of the interviews conducted in 1999 with the entire national sample of 1998. In theory, what we are seeking to compare here is the DDPC project area versus the national “base line.” But this comparison requires several qualifiers. First, in 1998 one of the DDPC municipalities (Cobija in the Department of Pando) was included in both the national sample and the DDPC special sample. Survey costs in remote Pando are very high and prompted this decision.² In the report on the 1998 national survey, the Cobija results were included in the national data in order to present a picture of the nation as a whole, and were removed from the DDPC comparison group. But in this report, the focus of which is the DDPC project, these interviews are “rescued” and transferred to the DDPC sample, removing them from the national sample. The result is that the national sample shrinks by 100 interviews, out of a total of 2,977, or 3.3%. This means that each of the figures reported for the nation as a whole in 1998 will change slightly in this analysis. The reader who compares the 1998 report with this one will note those changes. It also means that the DDPC results for 1998 that were contained in the 1998 report will also change, as now 100 interviews have been added to the municipal totals.

A second and potentially far more important factor to consider when comparing the DDPC results to the national results, is that the DDPC-selected municipalities (six in 1998 and nine in 1999) are *not* in fact a microcosm of Bolivia. The exclusion of the major population centers of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz from these selected municipalities makes the sample different in two key ways. Before mentioning those, however, it is important to note that the sample does not differ in most major characteristics. For example, there is no statistically significant difference in gender, age,

²A decision, that in retrospect, was not the wisest since each report in this series that deals with national data will have slightly different results than those that report on the municipal data in the “national” context. Materially, the differences are trivial, but they may lead to confusion on the part of some readers.

civil status, or number of offspring, variables that normally are central in defining any population. This means that the samples are highly comparable on the basis of most key indicators. Where the municipal sample differs from the national is in the area of education, income and ethnicity. This is because once the three major urban population centers of Bolivia are excluded from the national picture, levels of education and income fall, while there is a simultaneous increase in indigenous ethnicity. As a result, in any sample that excludes these major centers of urban population, we would anticipate downward shifts in education, income and non-indigenous identity.

An appreciation for the differences between the nation as a whole and the selected DDPC samples can be gained in two ways. First, the DDPC municipalities can be placed in their national context by showing how they compare to other municipalities in their own departments. That is done with a series of maps, shaded to show differences in education levels at the level of the municipality. Second, this report compares the national 1998 sample with that of the municipal samples. The results of these two demonstrations will lead us to present the comparisons of the national sample data versus the municipal data in such a way as to take into account these differences between Bolivia as a whole and the selected municipalities. This will be done both graphically and statistically.

On the pages that follow are a series of maps showing the five departments (out of nine) from which the municipal DDPC samples were drawn. Since two of these departments, La Paz and Cochabamba also contain the major urban concentrations of which was spoken above, the contrasts will become obvious to the reader. Only Santa Cruz department has an important urban center but has no selected DDPC municipalities.

The maps show several things. First, they show that within the five departments, the selected municipalities are well dispersed geographically. Second, in terms of the relative levels of development of the DDPC sampled municipalities compared to the departments in which they are located, there is significant variation. To measure development, percent literate has been selected as the key measure, based on the most recent population census. Literacy rates tend to coincide with many other indicators of development.

In the first map, La Paz Department, Patacamaya is ranked in among those municipalities in the highest levels of literacy, while Pucarani is in the second-ranked quartile. In Cochabamba, Mizque ranks within the lowest literacy quartile, but Punata is in the highest. In Oruro department, Challapata also ranks in the lowest quartile, and Curahuara de Carangas is in the second-lowest. In Potosí, Yocalla ranks in the second-lowest quartile, while Llallagua ranks in the second highest. Finally, in the Department of Pando, there is only one DDPC sampled municipality, Cobija, which ranks in the highest quartile. Overall, then, the sampled municipalities represent a wide range in levels of development (based on the literacy variable). In order to get a more precise look at how the respondents of the sampled municipalities compare with the nation as a whole, it is necessary to turn to the national sample data.

As a whole, the DDPC samples for both 1998 and 1999 exhibit significantly lower levels of education than the nation as a whole. Again, these results are not surprising given the exclusion of the major urban centers from the DDPC samples. Figure I.1 shows the significantly lower education levels for the DDPC samples, but also shows that the expanded sample of 1999, which included 9 municipios rather than the original six, comes closer to the national average.




Figure I.1
Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Education

Income also differs between the national and DDPC samples, as shown in Figure I.2. Incomes with the code of 2 range from 251 Bolivianos per month to 500 per month, while incomes with a code of 3 range from 501 to 1,000 Bolivianos per month. As can be seen, at the national level, incomes hover close to range 3, while within the DDPC samples they average closer to 2. There is virtually no difference in incomes between the 1998 sample and the 1999 sample, indicating that the increased levels of education 1999 were not paralleled with increases in income.




Figure I.2
Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Income

Ethnicity is also a major area of difference between the national and municipal samples. Figure I.3 shows that respondents in the DDPC areas are much more likely to self-identify as indigenous than are those in the nation as a whole. In contrast, those who identify as “white” in the DDPC municipios are about one-half of the proportion as in the nation as a whole.





Figure I.3
Comparison of National and DDPC Samples: Ethnicity

In addition to ethnic self identification, the interviewers noted if the respondent wore what they (the interviewers) considered to be “indigenous dress” versus “western dress.” It needs to be recognized that this determination is subjective, and for that reason ethnic self-identification is to be preferred. Nonetheless, the “dress” measure provides another way to examine differences between the national and municipal samples. Figure I.4 shows the results. The pattern here confirms what was seen above, namely, that the DDPC samples are more likely to be populated by those who have an indigenous identification than the national sample. It is of note that the 1998 DDPC sample on both the ethnic self-identification and the indigenous dress variable shows higher proportions than the 1999 DDPC sample. These results give us added confidence in the reliability of both measures of ethnicity.

**Figure I.4**

Comparison of National and DDPC Samples:
Indigenous dress

A final way to examine the ethnicity question is via language. We asked the respondents in each of the surveys which language (or languages) they spoke while growing up. We found that many Bolivians grew up multilingually, some with common combinations (such as Spanish/Quechua), but others with less common combinations involving minoritarian indigenous languages. To simplify the presentation, Figure I.5 shows the main patterns, and groups together "other combinations." Whereas 59% of the national sample were monolingually Spanish-speaking when they grew up, less than one-quarter of the DDPC sampled respondents spoke only Spanish in their childhood.




Figure I.5
 Comparison of National and DDPC Samples:
 Childhood Language

Finally, we look at urbanization. The national sample was designed to mirror the nation as a whole, whereas the DDPC sample was selected based on where the DDPC program was operating. Figure I.6 shows that the national sample is far more urban than the DDPC sample (looking only at those interviewed in both 1998 and 1999 in the DDPC areas).




Figure I.6
Urbanization and Sample Distributions

Summarizing, it has been found that the DDPC samples are quite similar to the national population, statistically indistinguishable in fact, in terms of gender, age, marital status and number of children. But, the DDPC municipios as a group are of lower socio-economic status, defined in terms of education and income, are more likely to have an indigenous ethnic identification than the national sample, and are less urban. Each of these factors will be held constant in many of the analyses that follow.

Chapter II. Local Government (IR2 & 3)

A process of decentralization is underway throughout Latin America, and the focus of much of that process is local government. USAID has established key “intermediate results” (IRs) that focus on local government as part of its performance-based democracy programs in Bolivia. This chapter examines the data from the 1998 national sample along with the 1999 special sample of DDPC municipalities. Since, as noted in Chapter 1, the 1998 special sample of DDPC municipalities differed from the 1999 special sample because in the latter an additional three municipalities were added in 1999, the comparisons here will focus primarily on the 1998 national sample and the full 1999 DDPC sample of nine municipalities.

Participation in Municipal Meetings

A quintessential definition of democracy is citizen participation in their own governance. Bolivia, far more than any other country in Latin America, has introduced institutional reforms to stimulate such participation at the level of local government. The 1994 Popular Participation Law, discussed in Chapter I, forms the basis for such participation. This chapter begins with an examination of the very basic question of participation in municipal government meetings. It does so by calculating and presenting the level of participation in the surveys being analyzed here, and then by looking at the factors that affect participation.

The basic information regarding participation in municipal meetings is contained in Figure II.1, based on question NP1 in the survey. In the 1998 study comparative data on participation in municipal governments in other Latin American countries was presented. Here the comparisons are focused on the specific issue of the impact of the DDPC on such participation. Three findings emerge from an examination of this figure. First, and most important, looking at the middle set of bars, it is found that participation increased significantly between 1998 and 1999 in the group of six DDPC municipalities that were interviewed in both years. (Once again, the reader is reminded that in 1999 three new DDPC municipalities were added to the sample, but they have no match in the 1998 sample.) Second, DDPC municipalities, whether those interviewed first in 1998 and reinterviewed in 1999 or the new ones interviewed for the first time in 1999, exhibit higher citizen participation levels than the nation as a whole. Third, in the municipalities that were added to the DDPC project last year and were interviewed for the first time in 1999, participation averages the highest of all.




Figure II.1
Attended Municipal Meeting in Last Year

These conclusions must be reviewed very carefully in light of the complex data set being analyzed. Let us take the last conclusion first. The DDPC municipalities interviewed for the first time in 1999 (that match the 1998 sample) have very high levels of participation. Is that an effect of the DDPC program, which in each of the three municipalities included in that stratum (Challapata, Mizque and Yocalla) had been exposed to the program for only one year, or is something about the baseline levels of participation in these municipalities which produced these results? Closer examination of the three municipalities in this group reveals that two of the three of them have high levels of participation (38% for Mizque and 34% for Yocalla), but one is relatively low (18% for Challapata, about that of the national average). With samples as small as these, and no baseline data *preceding* the DDPC intervention, it is not easy to determine the cause of these levels of participation. It may well be that the DDPC program has learned to become especially effective now that it has had three years of experience. It may also be that two municipalities added in the third year received the full benefit of this experience, while the third did not, for reasons that are

not apparent in the survey data itself. On the other hand, there may have been some sort of bias operating in the selection of this new group, and these municipalities were selected because of strong citizen involvement, and therefore our results are merely the result of what statisticians refer to as "selection bias." Those involved the program would need to examine the particularities of these municipios and the specific program efforts made there in order to help better explain the high levels of citizen participation uncovered by the survey.

The second finding, namely, that the DDPC municipalities scored higher than the nation as a whole is one that can be examined in more detail. First, note that the difference is largest between the 1998 national sample and the DDPC municipalities that were interviewed for the second time in 1999. What do we know about these municipalities? We know that all of them have had at least two years of exposure to the DDPC program, and three of them (Curahuara, Pucarani and Punata) have been exposed for a full three years. This means that all of the interviews conducted in these six municipalities in 1999 were taking place in municipalities which had between two and three years of DDPC exposure, and were municipalities in which we have a snapshot of one year earlier with which to compare results. But does this mean that the DDPC program itself has had the desired impact of increasing participation? If these results are examined at the level of the municipio, the picture becomes more complex. The problem with doing so, however, is that the sample sizes become very small, and differences need to be very large in order for them to be statistically significant. In any event, Table II.1 shows the results at the level of the municipality. Examine the column labeled "mean" and compare the 1998 means with the 1999 means. Let us start with Cobija, where only 10.2% of the respondents participated in 1998. In 1999, a year later and after two years of DDPC experience, the percentage had not changed. In Curahuara, a municipio with three times the level of participation than Cobija, also saw virtually no change between 1998 and 1999 after three years of DDPC exposure. Yet, the increase in Llallagua was dramatic, from levels approximating those of Cobija, to double that level in 1999 (and after two years of DDPC exposure). Was this change significant, despite the small sample size? Yes it was, as an examination of the last two columns in the table shows. There it is shown that the confidence interval (the range of possible average scores above or below which a difference is deemed to be significant at the .05 level) does not overlap the results in the column labeled "mean." The remaining three municipios each experienced an increase in participation between 1998 and 1999, but none of those differences, taken alone, is significant.

Table II.1. Percent of Respondents Attending a Municipal Meeting in the Last Year

Dependent Variable: NP1R

MUNI. Municipio	YEAR	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
COBIJA	1998	10.2	4.2	2.0	18.4
	1999	10.2	4.2	2.0	18.4
CURAHUARA	1998	30.0	4.1	21.9	38.1
	1999	29.8	4.2	21.5	38.1
LLALLAGUA	1998	9.1	4.1	1.0	17.2
	1999	20.2	4.1	12.1	28.3
PATACAMAYA	1998	18.0	4.1	9.9	26.1
	1999	29.6	4.2	21.4	37.8
PUCARANI	1998	33.3	4.1	25.2	41.5
	1999	37.1	4.2	28.9	45.3
PUNATA	1998	20.2	4.1	12.1	28.3
	1999	27.0	4.1	18.9	35.1

What are we to conclude? It seems that the DDPC program is having a positive impact, but the impact is varying from municipio-to-municipio, with no 1998-99 impact in two of the six municipalities, and positive impacts in all of the others. The small sample sizes with which we are working at the level of the municipio, however, is a limiting factor in being able to analyze these data, and it is for that reason that in the remainder of this report, all results will be presented by stratum (e.g., DDPC 1999 vs. the nation as a whole in 1998) where we have at least 300 respondents per stratum, and confidence intervals are respectably narrow. If USAID were to become interested in results at the level of the individual municipality, in order to be able to monitor performance at that level, it would be necessary to increase sample sizes in future surveys.

What of the comparison of the DDPC samples and that of the nation as a whole? In the 1998 report on the national results, a brief look was taken at that question, in which comparisons were made of the DDPC 1998 municipalities and the nation as a whole. In that comparison, controls were introduced to factor out socio-economic and demographic differences between the DDPC and the nation as a whole. That is, as already noted in Chapter I, the DDPC municipalities differ from the nation as a whole in a number of ways.

In the present report, the comparison are made between the 1998 national sample and the 1999 DDPC sample, controlling for the relevant SES and demographic differences (as already reviewed in chapter I of this study). Since the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the DDPC municipalities interviewed in 1998 almost certainly have not changed significantly by 1999, the increase in participation found there is thought to be attributed to the DDPC program itself. However, before we leap to the

conclusion that the DDPC program is responsible for differences between its pilot municipalities and the nation as a whole, it is important to first control for the factors that we already know differentiate the national and DDPC samples and then determine if the differences remain.

The overall contrast between the DDPC areas and the nation as a whole is depicted in Figure II.2. There it is shown that the DDPC municipios are significantly higher in participation than the nation as a whole. But, before we can accept the conclusion that the DDPC project is responsible for this difference from the nation as a whole (we already know from the above analysis that it seems to have been responsible for the increase *within* the DDPC areas interviewed in 1998 and again in 1999) we must control for the variables shown in Chapter I to differentiate the nation from the DDPC.




Figure II.2

Attendance at Municipal Meetings: National 1998 vs. DDPC 1999

In order to make this comparison, controlling for the variables that distinguish the DDPC sampled areas from the nation as a whole, it is necessary to resort to a rather complex multivariate analysis in two stages. First, the variables that distinguish the DDPC from the national are entered into the analysis and their impact on citizen attendance at municipal

meetings is removed. Second, comparisons are made between the DDPC and national average levels of participation in those meetings, and a test is applied for statistical significance. Technically, what is begin done is an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with covariates entered as control variables. Table II.2 shows the first step in the analysis, in which controls are introduced that have a significant impact on municipal meeting participation. It is important to note that not all variables that influence such participation are shown, just the ones that differentiate the national sample from the DDPC. For example, as will be shown later, gender has an impact on participation in such meetings, but gender does not vary between the two samples (national and DDPC). As control variables, income, education, ethnicity and degree of rurality are used.³ The column of interest is the one labeled "sig.," which shows that each of the covariates, as well as the National-DDPC (i.e., "main effects) comparison are significantly different. That is, participation levels differ between the DDPC and the nation as a whole, and so do the covariate controls. Based on these findings, it is now possible to look at the DDPC/National contrast, net of these control factors.

Table II.2. Municipal Participation: Test for Main Effects and Covariates

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	318115.449	5	63623.090	41.746	.000
Intercept	16852.785	1	16852.785	11.058	.001
Income	21380.709	1	21380.709	14.029	.000
Education	10511.237	1	10511.237	6.897	.009
Ethnicity	12898.322	1	12898.322	8.463	.004
Urbanization	225529.090	1	225529.090	147.978	.000
Stratum: national vs. DDPC	14730.173	1	14730.173	9.665	.002
Error	4590489.587	3012	1524.067		
Total	6170000.000	3018			
Corrected Total	4908605.036	3017			

R Squared = .065 (Adjusted R Squared = .063)

The impact of controlling for the higher levels of income, education, non-Indianness, and urbanization is shown in Table II.3. Compare these results with Figure II.2 above. The column labeled "mean" shows that the average level of participation increased from 17.7 to 19.1% as a result of introducing these controls, while the DDPC mean changed very little. The remaining difference, 19% vs. 24% is statistically significant ($< .01$). The confidence intervals (last two columns) shows that 95 out of 100 times, the average of the

³Ethnicity, as already noted, is measured in several ways in the questionnaire. In this analysis, ethnicity is measured by self-identification, broken down into three groups: 1) White; 2) Mestizo, Cholo and Black; and 3) Indian. Rurality is based on a four-category scheme: urban larger than 20,000; urban from 2,000-20,000; compact rural, 500-2,000; and dispersed rural, less than 500.

national sample, with these controls introduced, would not be lower than 17.4% or higher than 20.7%, whereas the DDPC samples would not be lower than 21.5% or higher than 27.4%, 95 times out of 100.

Table II.3. National vs. DDPC Participation, Net of Covariates

Comparison Groupings	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	19.080	.835	17.442	20.717
DDPC 1999 interviews	24.462	1.475	21.570	27.353
		Sig. .002		

The conclusions from this analysis are clear. First, it has been shown that in 1999 participation in the DDPC areas increased from 1998 levels in the subset of municipios that were the same ones interviewed first in 1998. Second, the entire DDPC sample of nine municipios in 1999 had significantly higher municipal meeting participation rates than the nation as a whole, net of factors that make the DDPC areas different from the nation as a whole. In other words, controlling for these factors did *not* undermine the conclusion that DDPC participation levels are higher than Bolivian levels generally.


Gender

In the 1998 study of political culture in Bolivia it was found that women participate in municipal meetings at far lower levels than men. It is of interest to determine if the DDPC program has had the effect of altering this pattern in some way, perhaps by stimulating women to participate at levels closer to those of men. Figure II.3 shows that this has not happened. For the nation as a whole, women participated at a level only 56% of that achieved by men, while for the DDPC sample, the rate is almost the same, 54%. However, it is important to note, as shown in the figure below that women in the DDPC municipal areas participate at levels higher than those of women in the nation as a whole. But, so, too, do men. This finding raises questions about the nature of the gender-specific efforts being made within the DDPC program. Are special efforts being made to target women? If not, why not, and if yes, why haven't these efforts proved fruitful. These results suggest that more thought and programmatic efforts need to be made in order to raise the level of participation of Bolivian women in local politics.

In a number of Latin American countries, Argentina, Mexico and Costa Rica being among the best known cases, quota systems have been established for females, such as a fixed minimum number of women must appear on the ballot for elections at certain levels (both Argentina and Mexico are federal systems, with individual states or provinces controlling electoral rules at the state level). In Argentina, an additional requirement is that the political parties must place the female candidates in an "electable position" on their party-list ballots. In Costa Rica this has not been a requirement, and as a result the

proportion of women elected to the national legislature has not increased. Interestingly, however, and especially relevant for Bolivia, is that at the local level in Costa Rica the proportion of successful female candidates has increased dramatically under the quota system. This suggests that a simple quota in Bolivia might work at the local level as it has in Costa Rica. One suspects that over the long term, as women gain experience in municipal politics, their proportions would increase at the national level as well. This should be especially likely to happen in Bolivia because of the single-member district system ("uninominal") now in place. Under this system, candidates run as individuals, and the voters cast their vote for a single candidate, not a list of candidates. This means that the personal reputation of female municipal elected officials could catapult them into national office.

There is a "down side" to a quota system for women, as has been noted already in Mexico and Argentina. Critics have charged that the quota system is pernicious in two ways. First, it grants women rights based on their gender alone rather than on their particular qualifications for office. The result of this could be a general lowering of the quality of the legislatures and municipal governments in these countries as an increasing number of officials are elected based on gender rather than qualifications. Second, males may be able to manipulate the system to be certain that the females selected for the ballots are appropriately "docile," unlikely to raise any issues that might be uncomfortable for men. In other words, if there is important gender-specific legislation that needs attention in Bolivia (e.g., laws protecting women against domestic violence), then it may be that males who resist such laws will select females who have no interest in attempting to pass them. Both of these concerns must be confronted before quota systems are put in place.

**Figure II.3**

Attendance at Municipal Meetings: by Gender and Stratum

Demand-Making on Municipal Government

We tend to think of participation as an active process, on the assumption that citizens who attend meetings of municipal government are likely to be there in order to make demands. On the other hand, politics can be a “spectator sport” in which attendance is not linked to demand-making. Those who attend municipal meetings may be there merely to observe the process. It is important to know if increased participation in the DDPC areas also is connected to increased demand-making. The survey asked (NP2) if in the past 12 months the respondent had presented a request to a public office, functionary or councilperson of the municipality. Figure II.4 shows that the DDPC municipalities, on average, made significantly more demands than the nation as a whole.




Figure II.4
Demand-Making on Municipality: Nation vs. DDPC 1999

In order to determine if the above figures still hold after controls are applied, the same multivariate approach described in some detail above was applied. The results, presented in Table II.4 show that they do. In the column labeled “mean” we see that the national sample is still lower than the DDPC, and the confidence intervals do not overlap.

Table II.4. Demand-Making Controlled for Covariates

Comparison Groupings	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	19.080	.835	17.442	20.717
DDPC 1999	24.462	1.475	21.570	27.353

Sig. < .001

Taken in combination, these two findings seem to be very important. Bolivians in the DDPC pilot areas are more likely to attend municipal meetings *and* they are more likely to be making demands on their political system. A core goal of the DDPC was to increase citizen involvement in local government and these results suggest that it has, but not merely passive involvement, but active, demand-making involvement. This can be

considered to represent a major success of the program. Some might argue that the percentage increase is not huge, but that would be unfair since it has already been shown in the 1998 report that Bolivians were not especially low in their levels of local government participation in the Latin American context. Citizens have been responsibilities, including participation in civil society, and, of course, their roles as employees, husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, etc. There are countless demands on the time of individuals, and one cannot expect that all citizens would be regularly involved in local government meetings. Thus, there is some (unknown) upper threshold beyond which one does not anticipate participation or demand-making going.

Satisfaction with Responsiveness to Demands

Citizens can make demands, but how does government respond to them? During a number of authoritarian episodes in Bolivia, demands were often met with repression. In the democratic Bolivia today, however, leaders can be responsive to demands, or they can ignore them. In the survey data there is no objective measure of the actual responsiveness of municipal government to citizen demands, but there is a subjective measure. A question was asked of the subset of respondents who did make demands if they were content with the response given. Nation-wide, 42% were content, the others were not. When these were compared to the DDPC samples, the differences that were found were insignificant. The sample size in this comparison is problematical since the question deals only with the subset of respondents who both made a demand on local government and who did not give a "don't know" response to the question on satisfaction. This sample size limitation is unfortunate since the fairly wide variation in satisfaction detected in the 1998/99 comparison is meaningless since the differences are not statistically significant.

As a result of the limitation of sample size this study cannot determine if there are differences in levels of satisfaction between the DDPC sample of 1999 and the nation as a whole. Yet, this issue is an important one. If increased demands are met with silence, with a lack of responsiveness or even with hostility, the impact of increased participation could boomerang and produce increased frustration. Given the overall poverty of Bolivia and the still very limited resources that local governments have for satisfying citizen demands, frustration is a genuine possibility. The importance of this issue suggests that it might be wise in future DDPC studies to attempt to find the resources to increase sample sizes.

Gender and Demand-Making

Once again we examine the gender question. Figure II.5 shows that the male/female gap is present at both the national level and within the DDPC areas. Within the DDPC areas, however, the gap is wider than it is for the nation as a whole.





Figure II.5
Demand-Making by Gender and Stratum

Participation in Meetings on the Municipal Budget

The popular participation legislation in Bolivia encourages citizen participation in municipal budget-making, as was discussed in Chapter I of this report. Such participation is central to the involvement of citizens in local government because budgets are a concrete expression of priorities. If, for example citizens demand improved education facilities and government officials agree, but then turn around and strip education from the budget, citizen input will have been frustrated. For this reason it is important to know about citizen involvement in budget-making. The questionnaires used in 1998 and 1999 each asked respondents if they had participated in a meeting to discuss or plan the municipal budget. Figure II.6 shows that the entire 1999 DDPC municipios are significantly higher than the nation as a whole.

**Figure II.6**

Participating in Municipal Budget Formulation: Nation vs. DDPC Municipalities

These results are certainly encouraging, but once again they must be subjected to the scrutiny of controls. Table II.5 shows that even when controlled, significant differences persist. This finding, when combined with the prior finding of increased participation in municipal government in the DDPC areas suggests quite strongly that the DDPC program is making a difference, and making it in the crucial areas of citizen participation. Once again, the percentages themselves are small, the percentage increase between the nation and the DDPC municipalities in 1999, even after netting out the control factors, is 26%. This is a very high increase for any program over such a brief time period. Once again, we do not know what the upper threshold of participation would be. It is certainly not the case that it would be realistic to expect universal participation in budget making, even among citizens who care about these matters, since competing claims on time make such participation difficult. It may well be that the increased levels found in the DDPC areas are as high as these levels can reasonable be expected to go. Indeed, once the activities of the DDPC program terminate, one wonders how resilient these levels of participation will be. Perhaps follow-up programs will be needed to reinforce the lessons learned in the DDPC program. Future surveys will enable USAID to examine each of these possibilities.

Table II.5. Participation in Municipal Budget-Making Controlled for Covariates

Comparison Groupings	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	13.635	.744	12.176	15.093
DDPC 1999	17.098	1.307	14.535	19.661

Sig. .02

Gender

What of the gender gap in participation in budget formulation? Figure II.7 shows that it persists in the DDPC areas. More troubling is that the gender gap is relatively wider in the 1999 DDPC sample than it was in the 1998 national sample. It is difficult to attempt to explain this outcome with the survey data alone; perhaps only detailed anthropological field work can explain it. But, the heightened level of participation among males in the DDPC area may be serving to a certain extent to "crowd out" the participation of women. Perhaps, over time, female participation will increase to balance out the male levels. Even so, within the DDPC areas, female participation is higher than the nation as a whole, although the difference is insignificant.




Figure II.7
Participating in Budget Meetings by Gender and Stratum

Complaining to the Vigilance Committee

The popular participation law established the Vigilance Committee as a key institution in regulating local government. Citizens are empowered to bring complaints to their local committee, and can even halt the expenditure of municipal funds. In effect, this is a key “check-and-balance” mechanism in the law. If the DDPC program is achieving its objectives, citizens should be actively taking their concerns to this committee. Presumably, over time, if municipal government functions well, complaints will decline. Figure II.8 shows that within the DDPC areas, a larger proportion of the population brought such complaints when compared to the national population.




Figure II.8
Complaints to the Vigilance Committee: National Sample vs. DDPC

Controlling for the factors that differentiate the national sample from the DDPC areas, retains these differences shown above. Table II.6 contains the results of the covariate controls. This demonstrates that the increased level of citizen activism in the vigilance “check-and-balance” is not an artifact of differences in the two samples. In effect, after controls are applied, the DDPC municipalities experienced a 27% increase over the national levels. Once again, this is a substantial increase, suggesting a powerful impact of the DDPC program.

Table II.6. Complaints to Vigilance Committee Controlled by Covariates

Comparison Groupings	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	12.867	.731	11.433	14.301
DDPC 1999	16.403	1.288	13.877	18.928

Sig. < .05

Gender and Complaints

The now-familiar pattern of greater male participation than female, both at the national level and within the DDPC municipalities is repeated for complaints to the vigilance committee, as Figure II.9 shows. Indeed, the gap is *wider* in the DDPC areas than it is for the rest of the nation. It is not that the DDPC females participate less than the nation as a whole, but that the males in the DDPC areas are participating at levels far higher than males in the nation as a whole. Shifting these patterns will not be easy. Centuries of culture regarding the “proper place” of women in Bolivian life will need to be altered.




Figure II.9
Complaints to Vigilance Committee by Gender and Stratum

Evaluation of Municipal Service

We have seen that citizens residing in the DDPC project area are more actively engaged in local government than Bolivians generally. Expectations have been raised nationally by the Popular Participation and decentralization laws. Within the DDPC municipalities, expectations may have been raised even further, with citizens believing that the project would quickly enable the local governments to respond to a wide range of citizen demands. The great increases in resources provided by Bolivia to its local governments does not mean, however, that the resources come even close to sufficient to meeting demands. After decades of neglect, there is much to be done. Citizens have become more active in the DDPC areas than in the rest of the country as the above findings have shown, but does this mean that they are more content with their local government, or does this increased participation make them more critical? Figure II.10 suggests the latter. The survey (SGL1) asked respondents to evaluate the quality of their municipal government, on a five-point scale ranging from excellent to poor. This scale has been transformed to the more familiar 0-100 range, and as can be seen, citizens in the nation as a whole are more satisfied than are those in the DDPC municipalities.




Figure II.10

Evaluation of Service of Municipality: Nation vs. DDPC

The control variables do not change these results, as most of them have no significant impact on satisfaction with municipal services. Table II.7 show the analysis of covariance.

Table II.7. Satisfaction with Services Controlled by Covariates

Comparison groups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	47.375	.450	46.493	48.258
DDPC 1999	40.839	.792	39.285	42.392

Sig. < .001

In light of the relatively large increases in citizen participation in the DDPC areas these findings are at first disappointing. At the same time, they can be thought of as a logical outcome of increased participation. Citizens do not spend their precious time attending meetings and making complaints because they have no demands or complaints. Citizens everywhere know that "it is the noisy wheel that gets the grease." Thus, the DDPC program may, in effect, be stimulating both increased participation and decreased satisfaction. This might seem like an unhappy dilemma, but so long as the citizens complain while believing in the legitimacy of the local institution, there is everything to gain and little to lose.

Treatment of Citizens by Municipal Government

How do citizens feel that they are treated by their local government when they visit their municipality to carry out some business? When we asked this question (SGL2) we found that for the nation as a whole, 33.7% of the respondents had not conducted any business with the municipality, or had no opinion, while within the DDPC areas, only 24.4% responded that way. This means that the DDPC sample, once again, is shown to have a more active citizenry. Yet, when we compare their satisfaction with their treatment, as shown in Figure II.11, they are less satisfied.




Figure II.11
Satisfaction with Treatment by Local Government


When controls are introduced for the variables that differentiate the national from the DDPC areas, the results are shown in Table II.8. The controls do not change the results.

Table II.8. Satisfaction with Local Government and Controls by Covariates

Comparison groups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	51.423	.526	50.392	52.454
DDPC 1999	46.031	.859	44.346	47.716

Sig < .001

Another questionnaire item that evaluated satisfaction with local government (Lgl4), by asking how responsive the municipal government was to what the people want. The results (see Figure II. 12) were virtually the same as shown above, with the control variables not producing significant change (table omitted here).

**Figure II.12**

How Responsive is Local Government? Nation Sample vs. DDPC

Taken together, the results of the last three questionnaire items in the context of the higher participation found in the DDPC areas make it clear that citizens in these municipalities are participating, making demands, but are *less* satisfied with the outcomes than the significantly less participant citizens in the rest of Bolivia (taken as a whole). This suggests that the local officials in the DDPC areas have an especially acute challenge, and that is to find a way to satisfy the increasing demands of their citizens.

It is also of note that in terms of satisfaction with treatment, no variation is found by gender either at the national level or within the DDPC areas.

Municipal vs. National Government

Do the findings reported above suggest that the residents in the DDPC municipalities are ready to “throw in the towel” on local government? Not at all! In fact, as the following analysis shows, they are even more strongly committed to an increased role of local government than is the nation as a whole. These results demonstrate that the dilemma of increased participation and increased complaints ought not to be worrisome.

The survey asked the following (LGL2): In your opinion, should more obligations and money be given to the municipality, or should we let the central government assume more responsibility municipal services (such as water, trash collection, etc.)? Figure II.13 shows the results. It is found that 51% of citizens in the DDPC areas want more obligations for the local government versus only 40% for the nation as a whole.




Figure II.13
Who Should Get More Money and More Obligations?

These results do not suggest, however, that citizens in the DDPC area have given up on community power and control. We also asked (LGL1) “Who has responded better to resolving local problems in your community.” Figure II.14 shows the overwhelming preference for community resolution of local problems within the DDPC areas.




Figure II.14
Who Has Responded Better to Solve Local Problems

The strong preference within the DDPC municipalities for community problem solving should be viewed as a healthy one. Decentralization ought not to stop at the level of the municipality. Within a community, many problems can be resolved personally, face-to-face, while at the municipal level a more bureaucratized, anonymous interaction often occurs. The question asked was structured in such a way that respondents had only one choice, and thus if community problem solving was prioritized, then this took away from the percentages of the respondents who could have selected local government.

Community Participation

The strong preference for the DDPC respondents in 1999 to select the community as the best source for resolving local problems suggests that we should look further into the issue of local community problem solving. How active are the citizens of the DDPC communities in comparison to the nation as a whole? Respondents were asked about their level of attendance at meetings of “juntas vecinales” (CP13). Figure II.15 shows the results. Within the DDPC areas, participation in such local Juntas is far higher than for the nation as a whole. Controls for the variables that differentiate the nation from the DDPC do not alter these results (ANOVA table not shown).





Figure II.15
Frequency of Participation in “Juntas Vecinales”
National Sample vs. DDPC

Can we find evidence that the DDPC project is responsible for this high level of participation in Juntas Vecinales? Figure II.16 compares those DDPC municipalities that were first interviewed in 1998 with the same ones interviewed in 1999. What we find is that whereas the DDPC municipalities were slightly higher than the nation as a whole in 1998, by 1999, the same six DDPC municipalities were strongly ahead.⁴

⁴Note that in the previous chart it was shown that the overall 1999 results for the DDPC averaged lower than for the 1999 municipalities that were originally interviewed in 1998. That does not mean that the results presented here are misleading, only that the new municipalities added in 1999 to the survey were at a lower level of participation in “juntas vecinales.” Since we have no prior year baseline comparison for these new additions, we cannot say if they also increased in participation from 1998.

**Figure II.16**

Participation in 'Juntas Vecinales'

Comparison of 1998/99 DDPC and Nation 1998

The Popular Participation Law recognizes local organizations within the rubric of "Organizaciones territoriales de base," known in Bolivia as OTB's. We paralleled the analysis just undertaken of the Juntas Vecinales and found, once again, that not only were the DDPC municipalities higher than the nation as a whole, but by 1999, participation had increased in the DDPC areas still further. Figure II.17 shows the results.




Figure II.17
Participation in OTBs
National Sample, and DDPC 1998 vs 1999

Gender and OTB Participation

The apparent success of the DDPC project in stimulating participation in local juntas as well as OTBs was not paralleled by a similar narrowing of the gender gap. This is a finding that parallels what has already been seen in this analysis of participation. Figure II.18 shows the results for gender-based breakdowns of OTB participation. For each of the strata, including the new DDPC municipalities added to the sample in 1999, that gap is very wide. The new municipalities added in 1999 have about the same gap as the ones included in 1998 and reinterviewed in 1999 (middle pair of bars). This gap is so wide that the differences really ought to be explained. Female participation in the new DDPC municipalities is *lower* than the nation as a whole. The DDPC program needs to pay careful attention to these results and their implications for programming.




Figure II.18
Participation in OTBs
by Sample Stratum and Gender

The survey contained information on participation in a number of other community groups, and an analysis was made contrasting the 1998 national sample to the 1999 DDPC sample. While in each case the DDPC was significantly higher, once controls for urbanization, education, income and ethnicity were employed, these differences shrank to insignificance in all kinds of organizations except one, the “comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad,” that is, the community development association. There we can see, as shown in Figure II.19, a significant increase, which is sustained at the < .001 level even when controls are introduced. Not only are the DDPC municipalities significantly higher in community development association participation than the nation as a whole, in the subset of DDPC municipalities interviewed in 1998 and reinterviewed in 1999, significant increases occurred. Once again, one must presume that this increase ought to be attributed directly to the DDPC program. That other forms of community participation, such as school boards, professional associations, labor unions, cooperatives or civic groups did not increase, suggests even more strongly that it is the DDPC program itself that is having this influence

since it is community development associations rather than other forms of organization that are most likely to be involved with demand-making at the municipal level, as other research has shown.⁵




Figure II.19
Participation in Community Development Associations:
Comparisons of National and DDPC samples

Willingness to Pay More Taxes

Few citizens anywhere in the world are yearning to pay higher taxes. This is also the case in Bolivia. We asked our respondents (LGL4) if they would be willing to pay more

⁵See Seligson, Amber L., Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis. *Comparative Political Studies* (1999), vol. 32:342-352. This paper shows that the community development associations are the only form of civic participation linked directly to increased democracy.

taxes to the municipality so that it could provide better services. Analysis found only 16% of the DDPC areas and 19% of the rest of the country willing to do so. However, when these results were controlled by the selected covariates, no significant difference emerged, meaning that the DDPC and national samples showed no difference.

Support for Single-Member District Representation

Bolivia has undergone constitutional reform in recent years to implement a form of single-member district representation.⁶ Prior to this reform, all legislators were elected in multi-member districts from party lists. This meant that the legislators were motivated to owe their loyalty entirely to their party rather than their local “constituency.” Bolivia’s reforms followed a version of the post-World War II German system by which half of the legislators are elected from single-member districts. In Bolivia these deputies are called “uninominales.”

The survey attempted to determine how well represented Bolivians feel by their single-member (i.e., “uninominal”) deputy versus the traditional party list deputy. Figure II.20 shows the results. Several observations are necessary to clarify this figure. First, a large proportion of the respondents did not have an opinion on this subject, suggesting that the newness of the new system has left many unformed about it. This result suggests that a public awareness campaign might be in order. Second, only a very small proportion of respondents feel better represented by the party list diputado. Third, and this is a complicating factor, a new choice was added to this question in 1999 based on the experience in 1998, which was “nobody.” That is, respondents who said that they were not well represented by either one, were coded as responding “none.” While that option allowed us to more faithfully represent the views of Bolivians, it makes it difficult to compare 1998 with 1999. Fully one-quarter of all respondents in the DDPC municipalities in 1999 responded with “none.” We cannot say how they would have responded if that choice had not been available in 1998. Therefore it is not possible to conclude that the national sample respondents were more likely to have said that they were well represented by the uninominal deputy than were the party list deputy. Given the large proportion of missing data coupled with the changed response pattern, it is difficult to analyze this data further. The year 2000 sample will tell us more.

⁶For recent studies of this subject see M. Shugart and M. Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*. Forthcoming.




Figure II.20
Who Represents you Better?
National Sample vs. DDPC

Community Demand-Making

Attendance at community and municipal meetings is an important democratic achievement in its own right, but beyond such attendance is a higher level of activism involving demand-making. The survey included a block of items (CP1-CP4) to measure demand-making from the level of the President of the country down to the local government and vigilance committees. The national parameters for these variables was reviewed extensively in the 1998 study and will not be reviewed in detail here.

There is a notable difference in demand-making between the 1999 DDPC sample as a whole and the national pattern as found in the 1998 survey. Figure II.21 shows that demand made on the mayor or his/her council members and the indigenous authority are far higher in the DDPC municipalities than in the nation as a whole. These differences persist even after covariate controls are introduced (table not shown).




Figure II.21
Demand-Making Comparison of National and DDPC Samples

The survey also examined the extent to which individuals felt empowered at the local level (CP15a). Respondents were asked about the degree of influence they felt they had over community decisions. Figure II.22 shows a significant increase in perceived efficacy over local decisions when the 1998 DDPC interviews are compared to the 1999 interviews in those same communities.




Figure II.22
Perceived Influence Over Community Decisions

Gender and Perceived Influence

While the above findings are heartening, the gender gap is not. Figure II.23 shows that females in the DDPC areas feel that they have only about as much influence as females do nation-wide. Males in the DDPC areas, however, are clearly feeling themselves to be empowered. These results suggest strongly that the national patterns are being replicated within the DDPC areas, and for change to come about an “affirmative action” type effort may be needed.





Figure II.23.
Perceived Influence by Gender: DDPC Samples

Problem-Solving

Of course, participation in community development associations and “juntas vecinales” does not mean that those who did so contributed efforts to resolving community problems. To tap this dimension of activism, measuring action beyond mere talk, we asked our respondents (CP5) if they had worked to solve a community problem. Figure II.24 shows that not only are the DDPC areas significantly higher than the nation as a whole, but between 1998 and 1999 significant increases occurred in the DDPC areas.⁷ The municipalities incorporated for the first time in 1999 were higher still, perhaps reflecting the effectiveness of the program in these new areas, or perhaps reflecting a difference in the sample.

⁷The 1998 report also contained an analysis of specific actions taken (e.g., donation of material or money) to solve community problems (CP5A through CP5D). Since in the current survey these involve only the relatively small subset of those Bolivians in the DDPC areas, this analysis is not undertaken here.

**Figure II.24**

Participation in Community Problem-Solving:
National 1998 vs. DDPC Samples

Interpersonal Trust and the DDPC Project

According to social capital theory, participation in community organizations helps stimulate interpersonal trust. There is evidence in the Bolivia surveys that trust is higher in the DDPC areas than the nation as a whole, even after controls are introduced (table not shown). Figure II.25 shows that on the first of the interpersonal trust items measured here (IT2)⁸ shows that the DDPC areas are more trusting, but that trust did not increase from 1998 to 1999.

⁸IT1 is not evaluated here because unlike IT2 and IT3, a simple percentage trusting/non trusting cannot be calculated because of the way that item is scored.





Figure II.25
Do People Watch Out for Themselves or Try to Help Others?

The second trust item analyzed here (IT3) shows the same pattern, as shown in Figure II.26. There it is shown that there is no difference at all in the DDPC areas from 1998 to 1999, but the big gap is between the nation as a whole and the DDPC municipalities.

**Figure II.26**

Do People Try to Take Advantage of You? National vs. DDPC Samples

It is difficult to say if interpersonal trust has increased as a result of the DDPC project. Presumably, trust is a deeply held value, not subject to rapid change. Yet, studies in Western Europe and more recently in Mexico have shown that feelings of trust can change fairly rapidly. It is also possible that trust was higher in the DDPC areas prior to the start of the program, but we have no data to test that suspicion.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a great deal of evidence that shows that the DDPC program is having a positive effect. Citizens in the DDPC area are more participant and more demanding of their local governments. On the other hand, the gender gap is wide and not narrowing in the DDPC areas. As will be shown in other chapters of this study, these positive effects on local government participation are not universal and do not necessarily extend to other areas of political life.

Chapter III. SO: Increased System Support

Stable democracies depend upon their legitimacy. Considerable theorizing exists in political science regarding the role of demand satisfaction and government responsiveness in increasing system support *over the long term*.⁹ Far less is known about the short term and the specific steps a government can take to increase support. This chapter will examine levels of system support in the 1998 national sample and compare them to the DDPC sample, and examine change in the DDPC sample from 1998 to 1999.

Support for the Judiciary

In 1998 three questions were asked (B23A, B23B, B1) about support for the judiciary, while in 1999 an additional item was added (B23C). The first question asked about the degree of confidence for the Public Ministry or “fiscals.” Figure III.1 shows the results. As can be seen, the DDPC sample exhibits greater confidence in the Public Ministry than the nation as a whole. The 1999 DDPC sample (of the same areas interviewed in 1998) was higher than the 1998, but the difference is trivial. The DDPC program does not, however, include specific efforts in the administration of justice area. Thus, the results here might reflect an overall nation-wide increase in confidence, a finding that can be checked next year with the national survey, or may reflect a “spill-over” from other DDPC activities.

⁹For the classic view, see Lipset, Seymour Martin, *The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited*. *American Sociological Review*, (1994) 59:1-22.




Figure III.1
Confidence in the Public Ministry: DDPC vs. National Samples

It is important to qualify these results by controlling for differences between the DDPC areas and the nation as a whole. In Table III.1 this is done. It turns out, however, that system support seems not to be a function of education or ethnicity (but it is of urbanization and education), and the adjusted values are not very different from the unadjusted values.

Table III.1 Confidence in the Public Ministry with Covariate Controls

Municipality surveyed in 1998 and 1999	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
DDPC 1998 & 1999	42.673	.829	41.047	44.299
National 1998	40.172	.539	39.116	41.229

Sig. < .01

The conclusion to be drawn is that the DDPC project areas do exhibit a significant but relatively small increase in confidence in the Public Ministry.

The surveys also asked about confidence in the Public Defender (“los Defensores Públicos”). Figure III.2 shows that there is significantly more confidence in the Public Defender in the DDPC areas than there is in the nation as a whole.




Figure III.2

Confidence in the Public Defender: DDPC vs. National Samples

The impact of the control variables is shown in Table III.2. There it is seen that the controls do not alter the results, and the DDPC samples remain with significantly higher confidence in the Public Defender than the country at large.

Table III.2. Confidence with Covariate Controls

Municipality surveyed in 1998 and 1999	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 DDPC 1998 & 1999	46.201	.882	44.471	47.930
9 National 1998	43.073	.587	41.923	44.223

Sig. < .01

Item B1 asks respondents a more general question about the judiciary. It asks the extent to which the respondents are confident that Bolivian courts guarantee a fair trial. Figure III.3 displays the results. Comparison of those DDPC municipalities interviewed in 1998 and again in 1999 found no significant difference between them. It is of note that the DDPC samples for both years are higher than the nation, but not by much.




Figure III.3
Do Courts Guarantee a Fair Trial?
National and DDPC 1998/99 Samples

The last item in this series analyzed the public's view of the "defensores del pueblo," or defenders of the people. As already noted, this item was new to for the 1999 survey and therefore there is no basis for comparison. The average in the 1999 sample was 49.7, which is considerably above that of the Public Ministry or the Public Defenders. Figure III.4 shows the comparison of all three items.




Figure III.4
Comparison of Evaluation of the Judiciary

The New Penal Code (CCP)

Bolivia has instituted a new penal code, the "Código de Procedimiento Penal," and two new questionnaire items were included in the 1999 survey (AOJ8 and AOJ9). Since we do not have nation-wide data on these, the results for the DDPC areas are only a partial indication of public reaction to the new codes. We have already seen (Chapter I) that the DDPC sample differs from the nation as a whole, so the national results on this item may well differ as well.

The most basic item asks respondents if they have heard of the new code (AOJ8). For the entire 1999 DDPC sample, only 20% of the respondents had heard of the code.

Figure III.5 shows these results broken down by gender. As in prior explorations of male/females differences in Bolivia shown in this report and the 1998 study, the gender gap is wide.




Figure III.5
Percent Who Have Heard of New Criminal Code, by Gender

Not surprisingly, education plays a major role in awareness of the new penal code. Figure III.6 shows the strong connection.




Figure III.6
Heard of New Penal Code
by Education, 1999 DDPC Sample

Since the national sample has already been shown to be far more urban the DDPC sample, we can assume that in the national sample planned for 2000, knowledge will be higher. Figure III.7 shows what can be expected in the more urban areas. About one-quarter of the population in the urban DDPC have heard of the Code, compared to only about 12% in dispersed rural areas.




Figure III.7
Urbanization and Heard of New Penal Code

The 1999 survey also asked about reactions to the new penal code. Since it was anticipated that many respondents would not have heard of the new penal code, we wanted to give all respondents some information about it and then get their opinions. Question AOJ9 achieves this objective, and reads as follows:

AOJ9. ¿El nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal incorpora “jueces ciudadanos” para que junto al juez ayuden a decidir la culpabilidad y pena en los juicios. Usted diría que esto es muy bueno, algo bueno, algo malo o muy malo

Muy bueno [1] Algo bueno [1] Algo malo [3] Muy malo [4]

NS/NR [8]

In other words, we wanted to determine the reaction of respondents to the “citizen judge” component of the code. Figure III.8 shows that the response is very favorable. Only 2.2% of the DDPC respondents had no opinion, and, as can be seen, only 20% were negative about the “citizen judge” component.




Figure III.8
Opinion on New Penal Code

In order to determine which factors explain the reaction to the code, a regression was run, the results of which are shown in Table III.3. It is found that none of the socio-economic or demographic variables (rurality, ethnicity, income, gender, or age) plays a role. System support is also found irrelevant. The only significant predictor is education; the greater the education the higher the support for the citizen judge idea.

Table III.3. Predictors of Reaction to "Citizen Judge" Idea

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standard Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.058	.260		7.902	.000
UR Degree of rurality	.041	.031	.052	1.294	.196
ETIDR Ethnicity	.088	.051	.069	1.716	.087
INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos	-.013	.032	-.017	-.402	.688
EDR Education	0.073	0.033	0.102	2.218	.027
Q1 Gender	-.096	.060	-.063	-1.596	.111
Q2 Age	-.002	.002	-.030	-.733	.464
PSA5 System support	.001	.002	.029	.728	.467

a Dependent Variable: AOJ9 Diría que el nuevo código es bueno?

A visual display of the impact of education on support for the “citizen judge” concept is contained in Figure III.9.





Figure III.9
Support for Citizen Judges by Education

Support for the Congress


The surveys contain an item measuring support for the Bolivian Congress (B13). It has the same format as the judiciary items just analyzed. Surveys conducted in other Latin American countries as well as the 1998 Bolivia survey found that legislatures received low evaluations by citizens. Some have suggested that this is because citizens realize that there are many, perhaps more efficient, ways of influencing laws than going directly to elected officials. Civil society organization and pressure groups can serve this function. For whatever the reason, the results for the samples being examined here are shown in the figure. As can be seen in Figure III.10, there was virtually no difference between the national 1998 sample and the 1998 DDPC sample. However, when the subset of the 1999 DDPC sample alone is examined, we see that confidence in the legislature falls markedly. We do not know why this is the case, but we would need to take a careful look at the year 2000 data set to see what has happened nationally.

**Figure III.10**

Confidence in the Legislature National and DDPC Samples

Confidence in Municipal Government

One would have hoped that the DDPC project would have stimulated confidence in municipal government (B22), but, as shown in Figure III.11 confidence has fallen between 1998 and 1999. In 1998, the DDPC areas were virtually identical to the nation as a whole, but by 1999 those same areas (excluding the new municipalities interviewed for the first time in 1999) fell significantly. These results parallel the pattern we have already seen for the national legislature, and may be influenced by them.

**Figure III.11**

Confidence in the Municipality: National vs. DDPC Samples

Overall SO Scales

1. Support for Institutions

It is possible to form an overall scale of the above items to measure the SO. First, it is necessary to exclude B23C, the Defender of the People, since this item was not asked in 1998. But, once that is done, many techniques can be used since some might prefer to weight one item more heavily than another. However, a factor analysis on the items, which is a technique that can be used to demonstrate if the items in a putative scale form a single dimension or multiple dimensions, reveals a single dimension in these five items (B13, B22, B1, B23A and B23B). The factor analysis is shown in Table III.4 below. As can be seen, only one dimension, called "component" in the table, has an "eigenvalue" greater than 1. This means that the remaining dimensions, or factors have variables that explain less than their own contribution to the solution. As a result, we can be confident that a single scale will work.

Table III.4. Factor Analysis of System Support Items

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.598	51.956	51.956	2.598	51.956	51.956
2	.824	16.488	68.445			
3	.681	13.626	82.071			
4	.551	11.017	93.088			
5	.346	6.912	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. No rotation performed because solution formed a single factor.

The method for computing the overall scale can also vary. One way is to simply add up all of the items and take an average. The problem with that approach is that when any given respondent answers with "don't know" to any item, all of that respondent's answers are dropped from the overall scale. This has the effect of throwing away a lot of valid data. A better approach, one which assigns a respondent a score based on average of the non-missing data s/he provides, is used here. If a given respondent answered three or more of the items in this five-item series, that respondent received the average of those items. If fewer than three items are answered, the respondent was given a missing value code.

A second complication is that the overall scale is meant to represent the legislature, the municipality and the judiciary. In the scale we have one item measuring the legislature (B13), one the municipality (B22) but three representing the judiciary (B1, B23A, and B23B). If we average these, the judiciary will count for more, since it has more items in the scale. So, the way around this is to first compute an index for the judiciary, which we call here "JUD." This is created by counting all cases which have at least two of the three responses as valid (that is, using the average system described above). Then the overall scale is then computed, in which three items are used, the JUD index and B13R and B22R. Again, if two of the three are valid, the average of those two are taken. If fewer than two are valid, the case is dropped from the scale.¹⁰

¹⁰Note. In March of 1999, USAID requested that a scale such as this be created. In creating the scale from the 1999 data, the procedures stated above were employed. However, owing to the error of basing the results on the entire 1998 sample, and failing to exclude the DDPC sample from the national weighted sample, a mean of 41.1 was reported for the judiciary, when in fact the correct number is, as reported her. 39.9). This has an impact on the overall SO result as shown below.

The results for the overall scale are shown in Figure III.12.¹¹




Figure III.12
SO for Democracy:
Means for Judiciary, Legislature and Municipality

2. Generalized System Support

In the 1998 study an overall scale of system support was generated based on a series of items measuring system support at a more general level than the measure based on specific institutions. These are items B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6 in the questionnaire. These items, each of which was initially scored on a 1-7 scale, are as follows:

B1. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?

B2. Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?

¹¹Note that the overall results for 1998 as reported to USAID was 40.8, compared to these results of 40.4. The difference, as noted in the prior footnote, emerges from the erroneous inclusion of the DDPC data in the national sample of 1998

B3. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?

B4. Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?

B6. Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?

Comparisons of the DDPC municipalities interviewed in both 1998 and 1999 are shown in Figure III.13. As can be seen, four of the five measures declined significantly. Only the item on the judiciary, measuring belief in the ability to get a fair trial, did not decline significantly. These patterns are consistent with the specific institutions measured above, in which declines were found between 1998 and 1999 in the DDPC areas sampled for the first time in 1998.




Figure III.13

System Support, Generalized Areas: 1998 vs. 1999 DDPC

In order to create an index of the items, we first checked to make sure that the five items formed a single dimension. Once again, factor analysis was employed. Table III.5 contains the results. As can be seen, only one factor emerges, so we know we have a unidimensional index.

Table III.5. Factor Analysis of Generalized System Support Items

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %			
1	2.424	48.485	48.485	2.424	48.485	48.485
2	.962	19.240	67.725			
3	.664	13.270	80.995			
4	.568	11.353	92.348			
5	.383	7.652	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The overall index for generalized system support was created by taking an average of the rescaled items (now scored 0-100 as in 1998). If three or more of the responses for any given individual were valid for these five items, the average of that score was computed. If fewer than three valid responses were received, the case was excluded from the overall index. A total of 80 individuals, or 6.7% of the 1998/99 sample were excluded by this mechanism.

Figure III.14 shows the comparison of the DDPC sample for 1998 with the identical municipalities for 1999. As can be seen, the overall index declines significantly between 1998 and 1999.




Figure III.14
System Support Index, Generalized Areas:
1998 vs. 1999 DDPC Samples

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that system support has undergone some declines since 1998. The comparison is based upon the 1998 DDPC municipalities that were reinterviewed in 1999 rather than on a comparison of data for the nation as a whole. Two possibilities emerged to explain this decline. The first is that in the nation as a whole, there has been a decline in support, and these declines are also found in the DDPC areas. The second is that the nation has not changed, but something is going on inside of the DDPC sample areas that is causing this decline. Without national level data, we cannot tell which explanation is the correct one. In the year 2000, however, new national level data will be available and it will then be possible to examine this question. The value of collecting national data now becomes apparent since without it, we cannot know exactly what is going on in the project areas.

Chapter IV. Support for and Challenges to Democracy

In the 1999 survey a significant focus was retained on support for the rule of law. Indeed, the series in this area was enhanced with new items, two of which (AOJ9 and APJ10) were analyzed in a prior section of the present study. In this chapter, we take a look at the additional items, AOJ11-14, and examine their links to some of the other variables in the study.

We should begin by noting that since the items analyzed here are new, the only data we have on them come from the 1999 DDPC sample. We already know that this sample is different from the nation as a whole, but we also know that the differences in attitudes are not dramatic.

The first three items in the series (APJ10, AOJ11 and AOJ12) were designed to measure attitudes toward issues having judicial relevance. Specifically, they deal with the trade-offs with which citizens are confronted when they attempt to balance the right of the accused versus the right of citizens to live without fear of crime. These are not new issues, and they do not merely affect Bolivia. But they do deal directly with a key set of civil liberties and due process protections that lie at the core of any democratic regime.

The text of the items is as follows:

AOJ10. ¿Con cuáles de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo? Para poder luchar contra la delincuencia, las autoridades: 1) Nunca deberían romper las reglas, o 2) Algunas veces tienen que romper las reglas.

AOJ11. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: 1. Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva, o 2. La policía puede entrar a su casa sin necesidad de una orden judicial.

AOJ12. ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? 1. Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunas libertades, o 2. Respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden.

The analysis of these variables did not produce linkages to municipal participation or satisfaction. We cannot say from this analysis that strong municipal government has any clear or direct linkages to citizen support of due process.

Support for Due Process: Willingness to Break Rules To Stop Crime

The first item asks about willingness to allow the police to uphold or break the rules to fight crime. We see that Bolivians are evenly divided on this issue, as is shown in Figure IV.1. A very slim minority say that the rules should never be broken.




Figure IV.1
To Fight Crime Can Rules Be Broken?

Education

Normally we would expect to find education being strongly associated with support for due process; the higher the education the greater the support for due process. At least that is the pattern we have found in many other countries around the world. But, recalling the Bolivia 1998 study, we found that tolerance for minority rights did not increase with higher education in that country. Figure IV.2 shows the Bolivian patterns still continues to be different from other countries. We do find that support for due process in terms of unwillingness to allow the police to bend the rules to fight crime is higher among those with junior high school education than it is with primary education, but among university educated Bolivians in the DDPC areas, support for due process declines. We checked to see if gender had any impact on this variable, but it did not; males and females have the same average level of support for due process.




Figure IV.2

System support is found to be significantly linked to opposition to violation of due process. The overall index of generalized system support can be used to demonstrate this. Figure IV.3 shows the results.




Figure IV.3
Approval of Breaking Rules to Stop Crime:
And Relationship to System Support

Support for Due Process: Illegal Search and Seizures

Our next question in this new series was more specific in terms of due process. It asked directly about illegal search and seizures of homes of suspected criminals. Figure IV.4 shows a much stronger resistance to this violation of due process. It is possible that Bolivians feel that “one’s home is one’s castle” and should not be violated, or it may be that there is genuine resistance to this sort of violation of due process. Yet, the pattern with education that was seen above is similar, but not nearly as strong. Once again university educated Bolivians in the DDPC municipalities express *lower* support for due process, but the difference (no figure shown) is not especially great compared to those of other levels of education.




Figure IV.4
Approval of Illegal Search of Homes

Further exploration of the data revealed that system support is significantly higher among those who resist illegal searches of homes than it is among those who would allow such entry. This was found to be the case for the generalized system support, as well as for most of the specific institutions reviewed earlier in this report. To simplify the presentation, the index of generalized system support is used in Figure IV.5 to show the linkages. This finding, coupled with the prior analysis of system support and willingness to uphold due process, suggests that those who support the system also support a key democratic liberty.




Figure IV.5
Approval of Illegal Searches:
Relationship to System Support

Crime Victimization

The problem of crime was examined in some detail in the 1998 report. Here our focus is on two questions. First, did crime increase or decrease in the DDPC areas that were interviewed in both 1998 and 1999? Second, does victimization have an impact on attitudes toward local government.

It is easy to answer the first question. Figure IV.6 shows that there was no significant difference between the two years. In both, about one-fifth of the respondents reported having been victimized by crime.




Figure IV.6
Crime Victimization, DDPC 1998 vs. 1999

Analysis of the data reveals that those who have been crime victims within the two years prior to the survey were significantly less supportive of their municipal government than those who had not been victimized. Figure IV.7 shows that this is true for both the 1998 DDPC survey as well as the 1999 survey. Since criminals could not possibly pick their victims based on their degree of confidence in their municipal government, we know that being a victim causes the decline in support.




Figure IV.7
Crime Victimization and Confidence in the Municipality
DDPC 1998 and 1999

One might think that the police would be blamed for not preventing crime, but in the DDPC municipalities, it is local government (as shown above) and not the police who take the blame. Figure IV.8 shows that the differences in confidence in the police among victims vs. non-victims in both 1998 and 1999 are insignificant. This suggests a well-known phenomenon that citizens tend to blame those who are closest to them for their woes. The police are viewed as being run and organized at the national level, while crime happens very locally. Thus, the victims appear to be holding local officials accountable for the conditions that allow crimes to occur. Further investigation reveals that the other questions measuring support for the judiciary do not show a pattern of reduced support among victims of crime.




Figure IV.8
Victimization and Confidence in the Police
DDPC 1998 and 1999

In 1999 we added an item to measure the sense of personal insecurity felt by Bolivians. The question asked was:

AOJ13. ¿Qué tan seguro se siente usted de caminar solo por la noche en su vecindario? Usted se siente, muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?

The distribution of responses is shown in Figure IV.9. As can be seen, about two-thirds of the DDPC respondents in 1999 felt very or somewhat secure.




Figure IV.9
How Safe Do You Feel at Night in Neighborhood?
1999 DDPC only

Being a victim significantly decreases ones feeling of security. Figure IV.10 shows that those who had been victimized by crime felt much less secure walking through their neighborhoods at night.




Figure IV.10
Feeling of Security and Victimization: 1999 DDPC Only

Crime and Civil Liberties

Victims of crime have been shown to have different characteristics than non-victims. Does this difference translate into anti-democratic values, and therefore are high levels of crime a threat to democracy? First, we examine fear, since we have already shown that fear is greater in victims than non-victims. Figure IV.11 shows the results. As can be seen, there is a strong relationship, with nearly 80% of those who feel very secure opposed to violations of civil liberties.




Figure IV.11
Feelings of Illegal Entry by Police

Being a victim of a crime also increases willingness to allow the police to violate due process protections. Figure IV.12 shows the results. Thus, it is clear that fear of being a victim or actually becoming a victim both decrease support for basic liberties.




Figure IV.12
Crime Victimization and Approval of Illegal Entry by Police

It may be that crime victimization produces fear, and fear decreases support for due process rights. We can test this thesis via a multiple regression analysis. In Table IV.1, it is shown that fear of crime is more important than actual victimization. In fact, once the impact of fear of crime is taken into account, being a crime victim adds no significant explanatory power to the equation.¹²

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	63.019	3.419		18.433	.000
AOJ13R Fear of Crime	0.16	.047	.120	3.433	.001
AOJ3R Crime Victim	-6.782E-02	.037	-.063	-1.813	.070

¹²It may be that a structural equation model would produce a different result. That is, it may be that crime victims have more fear, and those with more fear, in turn, are less supportive of civil liberties. It is hoped that for the next report, with the large sample size of the national sample, such an approach will be possible.

Crime and Support for Civil Society Participation

The survey contained a series of items measuring support for the right to participate politically. One of the most basic questions is support for citizens to participate in protest marches (question E5). We first compare support for this democratic value by comparing the national sample to the DDPC 1999 survey. Figure IV.13 shows that the DDPC municipalities were significantly more supportive of this liberty than the nation as a whole, although the overall national average on a 1-10 scale was in the positive end of the continuum (6.0).




Figure IV.14
Approval of Participation in Protest Marches:
1998 National Sample vs. DDPC 1998

Keep in mind that these results might be misleading, since we have not controlled them for covariates. Table IV.2 does that and finds that the results remain unchanged, with the DDPC municipalities more supportive than nation.

Table IV.2 Support for Protest Marches and Controls for Covariates

Comparison groups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	5.996	.051	5.895	6.097
DDPC 1999	6.444	.091	6.265	6.622

Differences sig. < .001

An examination of the impact of crime on this support shows that it has none, indicating that support for this important civil liberty is not affected by crime. Further analysis of the remaining questions in this series (series E as well as series C) found that crime victimization did not diminish support for political participation or tolerance for civil liberties.¹³ In addition, an examination of the impact of fear of crime on these variables showed no overall pattern. But, we did find that other key areas of civil liberties were more highly supported in the DDPC municipios than in the nation as a whole. Consider item E8, which measures support for participation in community problem-solving groups. Figure IV.15 shows the higher levels within the DDPC municipios. Covariate analysis (not shown) leaves these results intact.

¹³One exception was for E8, in which crime victims were less willing to support community problem solving groups. I have no ready explanation for this apparently anomalous finding.




Figure IV.15
 Support for Participation in
 Community Problem Solving Groups
 1998 National vs. 1999 DDPC

But these are conventional forms of participation, what about protest behavior? Once again, the DDPC municipios score higher. Figure IV.16 shows that support for civil disobedience in the form of blocking roads (E15) is higher among the DDPC municipio residents than it is among the general public. Covariate analysis does reduce this relationship somewhat, but they still remain significant. Table IV.4 shows the covariate results.

Table IV.4 Support for Civil Disobedience and Covariates

Comparison groups	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1998 National Sample	4.005	.052	3.904	4.107
DDPC 1999	4.292	.092	4.112	4.472

Sig. < .05




Figure IV.16

Support for Civil Disobedience (blocking roads):
1998 National vs. 1999 DDPC

Conclusions

Crime and fear of crime seem to be important factors determining Bolivian attitudes toward due process guarantees. With one-in-five Bolivians reporting having been crime victim, the impact on support for such guarantees is not trivial. Also, within the DDPC samples, some forms of support for civil liberties increased between 1998 and 1999.

Chapter V. The Problem of Corruption

Corruption

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new or restored democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries.¹⁴ There is a growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption for economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance. In the 1996 annual meeting of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, pledged the resources of the Bank to fight the "cancer of corruption." In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted "Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries."¹⁵

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

Research reported by the World Bank has shown that cross-nationally, corruption slows growth and reduces investment.¹⁶ The Bank also suggest, but does not directly test, the thesis that "Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital.... Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy...."¹⁷ In this study, we want to first to test this hypothesis, and then to assess if efforts to fight corruption via the efforts described above can make a difference.

¹⁴For an extended discussion of this topic see the papers on corruption control in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999.

¹⁵A review of these and other efforts is found in USAID. 1999. *Democracy Dialogue*, June, Washington, DC.

¹⁶World Bank. 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102-104.

¹⁷Word Bank, *op. cit.*, 102.

In Nicaragua in my recent research I have found strong evidence supporting the World Bank's hypothesis of a link between both the perception of and experience with corruption and the legitimacy of the political system.¹⁸ Bolivia has been viewed internationally as having a serious problem with corruption. According to the most recent survey available by Transparency International, Bolivia ranks 69th out of 85 countries for which they have accumulated data.¹⁹ While studies such as these only measure perception of foreign business representatives and not reality, such a low international ranking suggests that it is worth taking a look at the experience and perception of corruption that Bolivians themselves have. Furthermore, the Transparency study tends to focus on corruption that affects the business world rather than that which affects the average citizen. Since USAID Bolivia's democracy program is focused directly on the average citizen, the Transparency reports are not especially helpful.

In the 1998 report on the democratic values survey only a small section was include dealing with corruption (see chapter VI of the 1998 study). The present report expands on that treatment focused at the municipal level, and presents some rather disturbing evidence that needs to be considered by those involved in the DDPC program.

Perception of Corruption

Since the findings to be developed below are disturbing, it is first necessary to establish a baseline of information. As will be shown, respondents in the DDPC municipios have a more negative view of the level of corruption in their local government than the nation as a whole. The question that immediately comes to mind is whether this difference is spurious, related more to an overall negativism on the part of DDPC residents than anything in the management of local government that would cause them to believe this way. To test for this possibility, I will examine perceptions of groups unrelated to local government and compare national averages to the DDPC averages.

The series of questions to be analyzed here are PC1-PC14. The question read to the respondents was:

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los representantes en estas instituciones son honrados o corruptos. En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 quiere decir muy corruptos y 10 quiere decir muy honrados, podría decirme hasta qué punto cree Ud. que son honrados o corruptos ...

¹⁸Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*, A Report to USAID, Nicaragua (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1997) and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study* (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1999). This discussion draws on that research and the joint efforts of Sergio Diaz-Briquets and myself.

¹⁹See www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html.

Then a list of institutions was read and responses noted. As the initial scale was in a 1-10 format, this scale is retained here. Consider Figure V.1, which compares the 1998 national sample with the entire 1999 sample of targeted municipalities. As can be seen, university professors and union leaders are viewed as significantly more positively by respondents in the DDPC areas than in the nation as a whole, and the clergy, teachers and judges are viewed about the same by both groups, with no significant difference between them. These findings suggest that the DDPC residents are not especially prone to view public or private sector individuals as inherently more corrupt than the national population. Indeed, when it comes to university professors and union leaders, they see them as *less* corrupt than the national population does.




Figure V.1
 Perceived Levels of Honesty-Dishonesty:
 National Sample 1998 vs. DDPC 1999

With this background established, we now turn to the perception of local officials, specifically mayors and council persons. Figure V.2 shows a comparison of the 1998 national sample with the 1998 and 1999 DDPC samples. There it is seen that while the 1998 DDPC respondents on average viewed their mayors as less honest than did the nation as a whole, by 1999, in the same DDPC areas interviewed as in 1998, perception of honesty had fallen further.




Figure V.2

Perception of Honesty of Mayor:
1998 National Sample, DDPC 1998 & 1999

A similar pattern emerges when we look at the evaluation of the “concejales,” which is shown in Figure V.3. In 1998, the national and DDPC samples did not diverge, but by 1999, the same DDPC municipios interviewed in 1998 had seen a decline in perception of the honesty of their elected municipal councils.




Figure V.3
Perceived Honesty of the "Consejales":
National 1998, DDPC 1998 & 1999

Experience with Corruption

If the municipal government is perceived as being less honest in 1999 than it was in 1998 in the DDPC project areas, is this a function of actual experiences with corruption or some other factor? The questionnaire asked respondents the following question:

EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

This seems like a very straightforward way to measure respondent experience with corruption in dealing with municipal government. In light of the findings reported earlier in this chapter, Figure V.4 contains some surprising results. There is shown that actual experience with bribery in the DDPC municipalities is *lower* than it is for the nation as a

whole. Given the results we presented earlier, one would have expected that actual bribery would have been more common in the DDPC areas than in the nation as a whole.




Figure V.4
Paid Bribe to Municipality:
National 1998, DDPC 1998/1999

Before we draw any firm conclusions about these apparently contradictory results, it is necessary to use covariate analysis to control for the impact of factors we know to differentiate the DDPC municipalities from the nation. But first it is important to point out that bribery clearly did not increase from 1998 to 1999 within the DDPC municipalities that were interviewed in both years, as the above figure makes clear. Table V.1 shows that once the covariate controls are applied, the DDPC and national samples are no different in their experiences with corruption.

Table V.1. Experience with Municipal Corruption Controlled by Covariates

	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Municipality surveyed in 1998 and 1999				
DDPC 1998 & 1999	22.401	1.359	19.736	25.066
National 1998	23.144	.907	21.366	24.923

Sig. = NS

What conclusion can we draw from these findings? First, corruption in the DDPC areas is no worse (and no better!) than it is nation-wide. Second, corruption in the municipality has not changed in the DDPC municipalities between 1998 and 1999. Third, by any standard, corruption seems high both nationally and within the DDPC areas in an absolute sense since one-in-five respondents report having to pay an extra fee in order to carry out a transaction. Since the question refers only to those who have had to carry out transactions, for all we know, the proportion would rise if a larger proportion of the sample had carried out a transaction.

The fourth, and most puzzling finding, is perception and reality do not seem to match. Why is corruption perceived as worse in the DDPC areas, but the perception of the honesty of municipal officials is lower in the DDPC project and declined from 1998 to 1999? There are two possibilities. First, there is a gap between the elected officials (the mayor and the council) and the municipal employees. Recall that our question regarding honesty focused on the elected officials, not employees who carry out the day-to-day transactions. In future studies, we might wish to include questions that would tap into this problem. Second, it may be that the DDPC program itself is shining a light on elected officials, holding them to a higher standard that to which they are held in the rest of Bolivia. Because of that, the DDPC respondents are more critical of the behavior of their public officials than they would have been without the DDPC program. This possibility reminds us of the classic "Hawthorn Experiments" in which workers in a factory were divided into two groups, and one work group was given a greater amount of light to work under. It had been expected that those with the greater amount of light would perform the better, but in fact all workers improved their performance. The researchers discovered that it was the greater attention paid to the workers as a result of the experiment that drove them all to higher levels of productivity. The "Hawthorne Effect" may be producing the results reported on here.

But, before we conclude that experience with corruption has no real effect on citizen attitudes toward municipal government, we should examine and consider the link between the attitudes examined in Chapter 2 of this report and the experience with corruption information presented here. A regression analysis finds that in both the national sample and in the DDPC sample (interviewed in both 1998 and 1999), experience with corruption in the municipality significantly affects perception of treatment by the municipality. The regression shown in Table V.2 controlled for each of the covariates used throughout this

report, and it shows that experience with corruption affects negatively perception of treatment by municipal government.²⁰

Table V.2. Impact of Experience with Municipal Corruption

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
DDPC 1998 & 1999	(Constant)	36.4	8.6		4.3	0.0	
	SGL2R Treatment by municipality	-0.2	0.1	-0.1	-2.7	0.0	
	UR Degree of rurality	-5.3	1.6	-0.1	-3.4	0.0	
	ED Education	0.8	0.3	0.1	2.5	0.0	
	INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos	-3.2	1.4	-0.1	-2.2	0.0	
	ETIDR Ethnicity	3.0	2.3	0.0	1.3	0.2	
National 1998	(Constant)	28.6	5.3		5.4	0.0	
	SGL2R Treatment by municipality	-0.3	0.1	-0.1	-5.3	0.0	
	UR Degree of rurality	-4.1	0.8	-0.1	-4.8	0.0	
	ED Education	0.8	0.2	0.1	3.3	0.0	
	INCOME Monthly income in Bolivianos	-0.3	0.9	0.0	-0.3	0.8	
	ETIDR	5.0	1.7	0.1	2.9	0.0	

a Dependent Variable: EXC11R, R² .04 for DDPC, .05 for national

These results can be seen graphically in Figure V.5. The greater the exposure to bribery, the lower the evaluation of treatment by municipal government. Thus, while experience with corruption has a puzzling relationship to perception of honesty of municipal officials, it has a clear relationship to the direct evaluation of treatment by municipal government; those who have been subjected to corrupt municipal practices have a lower evaluation of the treatment they receive from that government.

²⁰I have reversed the direction of causality in the regression equation in order to simplify the presentation.




Figure V.5
Experience with Municipal Bribery
and Evaluation of Treatment by Local Government

Who Is Affected by Corruption?

The section of the questionnaire labeled EXC has a number of items that measure experience with corruption. Some of those items deal with respondent-experienced corruption, while others deal with vicarious experience. In order to determine who is victimized by corruption (rather than who has seen others being victimized by it), it is necessary to limit the analysis to the direct, personal experience with corruption included in items EXC1, EXC6, and EXC11. These items are:

EXC1. Ha sido acusado durante los últimos dos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?

EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en los últimos dos años?

EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

As can be seen, item EXC6, which focuses on public employees, actually overlaps the other two because the police and municipal employees are both public employees. In fact, the three items are positively associated, with a very strong correlation between public employees (EXC6) and municipal corruption (EXC11). In order to retain the focus of this study on municipal corruption, therefore, only that variable will be used in this analysis. Furthermore, the comparison here will use the entire 1999 DDPC sample (because of its larger sample size than the 1998/99 comparison) and the 1998 national sample as national baseline with which to draw comparisons.

In searching for systematic differences in exposure to corruption at the municipal level, it was found that ethnicity had no clear pattern. Gender, however, did emerge as a significant factor in exposure to municipal corruption at both the national and DDPC level.²¹ Figure V.6 shows the overall results for these three items. In both samples, males were more likely to be victims of municipal corruption than females. It is probable that this is largely a function of the greater frequency with which males transact business with municipal government as compared to females, a pattern that was shown earlier in this research.

²¹Note that this pattern did not emerge in the smaller DDPC 1998/99 comparison.





Figure V.6
Exposure to Municipal Corruption by Gender:
National 1998 and DDP 1999

Bolivians with higher incomes are far more likely to be victims of bribes at the municipality than poorer Bolivians. Figure V.7 shows that above a monthly income of 1,000 Bolivianos in the DDP areas and 5,000 Bolivianos in the country as a whole, victimization by corrupt municipal employees increases dramatically.

**Figure V.7**

Exposure to Municipal Corruption and Income:
National 1998 and DDPC 1999

No doubt, this finding is a function of two factors. First, those with higher incomes are more likely to be making a request from the municipal government, and second, those with more income are likely to be perceived as better targets for bribes than those who are very poor. The first explanation is clearly demonstrated in Figure V.8, which shows the connection between income and making demands and requests to local government. It is not possible, of course, to show with the survey data that wealthier individuals are perceived as being "fatter" targets for eliciting bribes, but we can feel confident in knowing that wealthier Bolivians are, in fact, more likely to confront this dark side of local government in Bolivia.




Figure V.8
Demand-Making at Municipal Level and Income

Urbanization has an impact on exposure to corruption. As shown in Figure V.9, within both the DDPC and national samples, residents of smaller towns and villages are less exposed to municipal corruption.




Figure V.9
Exposure to Municipal Corruption
by Level of Urbanization

Bolivians who are victimized by corruption at the municipal level are far more likely to be making a formal complaint to the Vigilance Committee, even though the survey data does not tell us if the complaint made dealt with the incidence of corruption. Figure V.10 shows the significant difference in complaints at both the national and DDPC levels.




Figure V.10
Victim of Municipal Corruption
and Complained to Vigilance Committee

Conclusions

Corruption is a serious problem world-wide, and Bolivia is no exception. One-in-five of our respondents have experience corruption in the last year. Moreover, corruption has a direct impact on the way in which Bolivians feel that they are treated by their local governments. And those who have experienced corruption are more likely to be bringing a complain to the vigilance committees. The DDPC program should consider these findings and their implications for the long-term success of their program.

Questionnaire Used in 1999

- CP1. **Al Presidente de la República** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]
- CP2. **A Algún diputado** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]
- CP3. **Al Alcalde o concejal** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]
- CP3A. **A la autoridad originaria o autoridad de la comunidad indígena** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]
- CP3B. **Al comité de vigilancia de la municipalidad** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]
- CP4. **A alguna oficina del gobierno nacional, ministerio, prefectura o, policía** Si [1] No [2]
NS/NR [8]

Ahora le voy a leer algunas preguntas sobre esta comunidad y los problemas que tiene.

CP15A. **¿Cuánta influencia cree que Ud. tiene sobre las decisiones que toman los grupos de esta comunidad? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha, poca o ninguna influencia?**
Mucha [1] Poca [2] Ninguna [3]

CP5. **¿Alguna vez ha trabajado o tratado de resolver algún problema de la comunidad o de los vecinos de aquí?**

Si [1] No [2] => CP6

CP5A. **Si responde si => Ha donado materiales o dinero para ayudar en algún problema o alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5B. **Si responde si => Ha dado su propio trabajo o mano de obra?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5C. **Si responde si => Ha asistido a reuniones sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5D. **Si responde si => Ha tratado de organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema local o para lograr alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones frecuentemente, asiste de vez en cuando, asiste casi nunca o nunca asiste.

Asiste Ud a.....	Frecuente mente	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR
CP6. Algún comité o sociedad de la iglesia o templo?	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela?	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. Comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. Una asociación de profesionales, negociantes,	1	2	3	4	8

campesinos o productores?					
CP10. Sindicato Obrero?	1	2	3	4	8
CP11. Cooperativa?	1	2	3	4	8
CP12. Alguna asociación o comité cívico (grupos de mujeres, etc)	1	2	3	4	8
CP13. Juntas vecinales?	1	2	3	4	8
CP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)?	1	2	3	4	8

L1. En esta tabla (entregue tabla # 1) hay una escala que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 es de extrema izquierda y 10 de extrema derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, se dice que una persona es de izquierda o que es de derecha. Mejor todavía, Ud. mismo cuando califica a una persona dice ese es de izquierda y ese es de derecha ¿En esta escala, políticamente Ud. dónde se ubicaría.?

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha
NS [88]

LS3. Ahora, algunas opiniones: Hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? Diría Ud. que se encuentra 1) muy satisfecho, 2) algo satisfecho, 3) algo insatisfecho o 4) muy insatisfecho?

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Algo insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4]
NS [8]

IT1. Hablando en general de la gente de este lugar, diría Ud. que la gente en general es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?

Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]
NS/NR [8]

IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo por sí misma o cree que la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?

Preocupada por sí misma [1] Ayuda al prójimo [2]
NS/NR [8]

IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente trataría de aprovecharse de Ud. si se les presentara la oportunidad, o cree que no se aprovecharían?

Si se aprovecharían [1] No se aprovecharían [2]
NS/NR [8]

VB1. Ahora, vamos a hablar de las elecciones. ¿Estaba Ud. inscrito para votar en las elecciones presidenciales de 1997?

Si [1] No [2] => pase a VB4

VB2. Si estaba inscrito => Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 1997?

Si [1] No [2] => pase a VB7

NDR [9]

VB2ADIP. Si votó en las elecciones de 1997=> **Por qué partido votó para diputado uninominal ?** (No lea las alternativas)

AND [1] MNR [2] MIR [3] Condepa [4] UCS [5] Voto nulo, blanco [7] Otro _____ NS / No recuerda/NR [8] NDR [9]

VB7. En su opinión, quién le representa mejor 1) el diputado plurinominal de la lista de partidos, o 2) el diputado uninominal de su distrito?

Partido [1] Uninominal [2] No sabe cual es cual [3] Ninguno[4] NS [8]

VB8. ¿Piensa votar en las próximas elecciones municipales?

Si [1] No [2] NS [8]

NP1. Ahora vamos a hablar de la alcaldía de este municipio. Ha tenido Ud. la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una solicitud a alguna oficina pública, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?

Si [1] No [2] => Pase a NP4 NS/NR [8]

NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ¿Quedó contento con la respuesta que le dieron?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] NDR [9]

NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto de la municipalidad?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

NP5. ¿Ha llevado alguna queja al comité de vigilancia municipal?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

SGL1. Diría Ud. que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?

Excelentes [1] Buenos [2] Regulares [3] Malos [4] Pésimos [5] NS [8]

SGL2. ¿Cómo le han tratado a Ud. o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites?. Le trataron muy bien, bien, regular, mal o pésimo?

Muy bueno [1] Bueno [2] Regular [3] Malo [4] Pésimo [5] Nunca hizo trámites [90]
NS [8]

LGL1. En su opinión, ¿Quién ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad?. ¿El Gobierno Central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la comunidad?

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La comunidad [4] Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6]
NS/NR [8]

LGL2. En su opinión, se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la Alcaldía o debemos dejar que el Gobierno Central asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (como el agua, recojo de basura, etc.)

Más a la alcaldía [1] Más al gobierno [2] No cambiar nada [3] Más a la alcaldía si da mejores servicios [4] NS/NR [8]

LGL3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que ésta pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?

Más impuestos/tasas [1] No vale la pena pagar más [2]
NS [8]

LGL4. ¿Cree Ud. que la municipalidad responde a lo que quiere el pueblo casi siempre, la mayoría de las veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca?

casi siempre [1] la mayoría de las veces [2] de vez en cuando [3] casi nunca [4] nunca [5]
NS [8]

Algunas personas dicen que se justificaría, bajo ciertas circunstancias, un Golpe de Estado por los militares, es decir cuando los militares toman el poder. En su opinión, un golpe de Estado por los militares se justifica o no se justifica... (lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).

JC1. Si el desempleo es muy alto? Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]

JC4. Si hay muchas huelgas estudiantiles en las universidades? Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]

JC9. Si hay un gran número de huelgas por trabajadores sindicalizados? Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]

JC10. Si los patronos acortan mucho los sueldos de sus empleados? Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]

JC15. Algunas personas prefieren vivir bajo una democracia porque protege los derechos humanos e individuales, a pesar de que a veces pueda ser ineficiente y desordenada. Otros prefieren vivir bajo una dictadura por su orden y eficiencia. Qué prefiere más Ud. una democracia o una dictadura?

Una democracia [1] Una dictadura [2] NS/NR [8]

BC15. ¿Podrían ocurrir motivos por los cuales justificaría Ud. un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso democrático Boliviano?

Si [1] No [2]
NS[8]

BC16. Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cuál se justifica la violencia cometida por los militantes políticos?

Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS [8]

Ahora (entregue tarjeta # 2) vamos a usar esta tarjeta.... Esta tarjeta contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le

pregunto: "hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?", si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. "hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?" léame el número por favor. (ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA) Usando esta tarjeta

	Escalera							NS/NR
	Nada						Mucho	
B1. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B2. Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B3. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B4. Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B6. Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B30. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B11. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B13. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B18. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B20. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B21. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B21A. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22B. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22C. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el comité de vigilancia municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22D. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base OTBs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23A. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23B. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Defensores Públicos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23C. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Defensor del Pueblo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B31. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Ahora vamos a cambiar de tarjeta. (entregue tarjeta # 3). Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera de 1 a 10 gradas, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desapruueba mucho y el 10 indicando que aprueba mucho. Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Bolivia. (Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala).

	Escalera										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de los gobiernos bolivianos, no sólo del Gobierno actual, sino del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas?. Por favor respóndame con un número SONDEE: Hasta qué punto?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D3. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las personas que sólo hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano les permitan postularse para cargos públicos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para hacer un discurso?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

Dejemos de lado a las personas que hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Hablemos ahora de todas las personas en general. Hasta qué punto Ud. aprueba o desaprueba ... (encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso).

	Escala										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver problemas de las comunidades?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de las calles?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas u otros edificios?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría ... (encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso).

	Escala										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
C3. ¿Una ley que prohibiera las manifestaciones públicas?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
C5. ¿ Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que se prohibiera reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
C6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el Gobierno censure la propaganda de sus enemigos políticos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Ud. más de acuerdo?

NEWTOL4. El Estado debería 1) tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de opiniones falsas que puedan dañar a nuestra nación o 2) el Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello.

Prohibir la expresión [1] No prohibir la expresión [2] NS [8]

NEWTOL5. 1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran o 2) los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestros niños y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno.

Tienen derecho [1] Deben ser controlados [2] NS [8]

NEWTOL6. Los ciudadanos que apoyan el retorno de los militares al gobierno en Bolivia deberían 1) tener el mismo derecho a organizarse que cualquier otro o 2) los grupos que apoyan un gobierno militar deberían ser prohibidos de organizarse.

Mismo derecho [1] Prohibidos de organizarse [2] NS [8]

AOJ1. ¿Cree Ud. que avisar o denunciar un delito a la policía o autoridad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?

Fácil [1] difícil [2] muy difícil [3] NS/NR [8]

AOJ1A. ¿Cree Ud. que avisar o denunciar un delito a la autoridad de la comunidad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?

Fácil [1] difícil [2] muy difícil [3] NS/NR [8]

AOJ2. A personas como Ud. cuando tiene que resolver algún caso en los juzgados o tribunales, las tratan siempre con justicia, a veces las tratan con justicia o no la tratan con justicia?

Las tratan con justicia [1] A veces las tratan con justicia [2] No las tratan con justicia [3] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3. Durante los últimos 12 meses ha sido Ud. víctima de robos o agresiones?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3B. Durante los últimos 12 meses algún miembro de su familia ha sido víctima de robos o agresiones?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3A. Si ha sido víctima el o su familia => Ha denunciado o dio aviso a la policía o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad este robo o agresión

Policía [1] Autoridad de la comunidad [2] No lo denunció [3] NS/NR [8] NDR [9]

AOJ4. De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia ha hecho en la Policía o PTJ, se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho o insatisfecho de los resultados obtenidos?

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Insatisfecho [3] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS/NR [8]

AOJ5. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía o PTJ cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS/NR [8]

AOJ6. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS/NR [8]

AOJ7. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas del Ministerio Público o fiscales, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS/NR [8]

AOJ8. ¿Ha oído hablar sobre el nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal?

Sí [1] No [2]
NS[8]

AOJ9. ¿El nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal incorpora “jueces ciudadanos” para que junto al juez ayuden a decidir la culpabilidad y pena en los juicios. Usted diría que esto es muy bueno, algo bueno, algo malo o muy malo

Muy bueno [1] Algo bueno [2] Algo malo [3] Muy malo [4] NS/NR [8]

AOJ10. ¿Con cuáles de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo? Para poder luchar contra la delincuencia, las autoridades: 1) Nunca deberían romper las reglas, o 2) Algunas veces tienen que romper las reglas

nunca romper reglas [1] algunas veces romper las reglas [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ11. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: 1. Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva, o 2. La policía puede entrar a su casa sin necesidad de una orden judicial

se debería esperar [1] la policía puede entrar [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ12. ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? 1. Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunas libertades, o 2. Respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden

vivir en sociedad ordenada [1] respetar derechos y libertades [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ13. ¿Qué tan seguro se siente usted de caminar solo por la noche en su vecindario? Usted se siente, muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro

muy seguro [1] más o menos seguro [2] algo inseguro [3] muy inseguro [4] no sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ14. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?

- [1] La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno
- [2] En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario es preferible a uno democrático
- [3] Me da lo mismo un régimen democrático que un régimen no democrático

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...

Ahora para hablar de otra cosa...	No	Si	NS
EXC1. Ha sido acusado durante los últimos dos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?	0	1	8
EXC2. Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno)?	0	1	8
EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un policía en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en los últimos dos años?	0	1	8
EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8
EXC13. En su trabajo, le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en los últimos dos años?	0	1	8
EXC14. ¿Conoce a alguien que ha tenido que pagar una coima en la Corte en los últimos dos años?	0	1	8

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta muy generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?

Muy generalizada [1] Generalizada [2] Poco generalizada [3] Nada generalizada [4] NS/NR [8]

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los representantes en estas instituciones son honrados o corruptos. En una escala del 1 al 10 donde 1 quiere decir muy corruptos y 10 quiere decir muy honrados, podría decirme hasta qué punto cree Ud. que son honrados o corruptos (lea inciso por inciso y espere la respuesta)

INSTITUCIONES	GRADO DE CORRUPCIÓN										NS
	Muy Corruptos					Muy Honrados					
PC1. Los diputados	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
PC2. Los ministros	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
PC3. Los alcaldes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

PC5. Los policías	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC7. Los maestros	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC8. Los catedráticos de las universidades	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC9. Los sacerdotes, cleros y pastores	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC10. Los líderes sindicales	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC12. Los jueces	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC13. Los militares	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
PC14. Los líderes de los partidos políticos	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

ACR1. Voy a leerle tres frases. Por favor dígame cuál de estas tres describe mejor su opinión:

- [1] La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios
- [2] Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas
- [3] Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios

	Respuesta
G11. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos	
G12. Recuerda cómo se llama el jefe de gobierno de Brasil	
G13. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de Argentina	
G14. Recuerda cuántos diputados hay en el Congreso	
G15. Recuerda cómo se llama el diputado uninominal de este distrito electoral	

DM1. ¿Considera Ud. que en Bolivia hay discriminación contra las mujeres?

Si [1] No [2] => *pase a DM3* NS/NR
[8]

DM2. Si hay discriminación => Considera que la discriminación contra las mujeres es muy grave, grave, más o menos grave o no muy grave?

Muy grave [1] Grave [2] Más o menos grave [3] No muy grave [4] NS/NR
[8] NDR [9]

DM3. ¿Tienen las mujeres igualdad de oportunidades para conseguir empleo?

Si tienen [1] No tienen [2] NS/NR
[8]

DM4. Según su experiencia el problema más común de las mujeres en el trabajo es... (lea las opciones, anote una sola respuesta,)

No les dan empleo si dicen que están embarazadas [1] Las enamoran los jefes (patrones) o compañeros [2]
Es mal vista por pedir permiso para atender a sus hijos [3] Les pagan menos que a los hombres [4]

Les cuesta mucho ascender a un mejor puesto [5]
[8]

No tiene ningún problema [6]

NS/NR

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?

Católico (participante) [1] Católico (no participante) [2] Evangélica [3] Ninguna [6] Otro _____
NS/NR [8]

Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido a la iglesia (culto o templo) durante el mes pasado? _____ veces (88=
NS/NR)

Ahora para terminar, algunas preguntas que nos sirven sólo para fines estadísticos. En su casa Ud. tiene...

	No	Uno	Dos o +	NS/NR
R1. Televisor a color	0	1	2	8
R2. Televisor en Blanco y Negro	0	1	2	8
	No	Si	NS NR	
R3. Heladera/refrigerador	0	1	8	
R4. Teléfono	0	1	8	
R5. Automóvil o camión	0	1	8	
R6. Lavaropa	0	1	8	
R7. Microondas	0	1	8	
R8. Motocicleta	0	1	8	
R9. Tractor	0	1	8	
R10. Energía eléctrica	0	1	8	
R11. Agua potable	0	1	8	
R13. Bicicleta	0	1	8	
R14. Alcantarillado	0	1	8	

R12. Anote si es posible, sin preguntar. Piso de las habitaciones de la casa

Tierra [1] Madera [2] Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, baldosa [4] cerámica o mosaico [5] no se pudo ver [90]

OCUP1. ¿En qué trabaja Ud?. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	6	Amas de Casa	12
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	7	Estudiantes	13
Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de Planta	8	Jubilados y Rentistas	14
ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros	9	Trabajadores ocasionales	15

profesionales independientes	5	Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	10		
		Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	11		

OCUP2. Sólo para agricultores dueños de tierra o inquilinos => **Cuántas hectáreas de tierra es dueño o se alquila?** _____. ____ (Use decimales si es necesario).

DESOC1. Para todos => **¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?**

Si [1] No [2] => Pase a ED Estudiante, Ama de casa,
Jubilado [9]

DESOC2. Si responde Si => **¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?** _____
semanas NDR [9]

ED. Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó (encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a))

- Ninguna : 0
- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5
- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12
- Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años

Q10. En cuál de los siguientes rangos (muestre la tarjeta de ingresos) ubicaría el **INGRESO TOTAL MENSUAL** de todas las personas de su hogar?

- Nada [0] Menos de 250 Bs. [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4]
De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5000 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] más de 20.001 [8]
NS/NR [88]

Q11. Cuál es su estado civil (No lea las alternativas)

Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre, concubinato [3] Divorciado [4] Separado [5] Viudo [6] NS/NR [8]

Q12. Cuántos hijos tiene Ud. ____ hijos No tiene hijos [0]

ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, mestiza, indígena o negra?

Blanca [1] Chola [2] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Otra _____ NS/NR [8]

LENG1. Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa)

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymará [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____ Otro extranjero [5] _____
NS/NR [8]

GRACIAS, HEMOS TERMINADO

LCUEST. Idioma de la entrevista: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymar  [3]

VEST. El entrevistado vest : Traje ind gena/nativo [1] Traje moderno/occidental [2]

Hora terminada ____:____ tiempo de duraci n de la entrevista ____ minutos

Nombre del Entrevistado _____

YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA

(firma del encuestador)

Firma y c digo Supervisor _____ Cod. _____

Firma y c digo Validador _____ Cod. _____

TARJETA #1

Izquierda **1** **2** **3** **4** **5** **6** **7** **8** **9** **10**
Derecha

TARJETA #2

							7	<i>Mucho</i>
						6		
					5			
				4				
			3					
		2						
<i>Nada</i>	1							

--

TARJETA # 3

										10	<i>Aprueba</i>
									9		
								8			
							7				
						6					
					5						
				4							
			3								
		2									
<i>Desaprueba</i>	1										

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TABLA DE INGRESOS

0. Nada

1. Menos de 250 Bs.

2. De 251 a 500 Bs.

3. De 501 a 1000 Bs.

4. De 1001 a 2000 Bs.

5. De 2001 a 5000 Bs.

6. De 5000 a 10.000 Bs.

7. De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs.

8. más de 20.001