


Latin American Public Opinion Project

Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

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
# Democratic Political Culture in Hard Times: Results from the 2010 AmericasBarometer




#### **Presentation Order**

- 1. About the surveys: when, where how
- 2. Economic crisis and democracy
- 3. The vulnerabilities of democracy in the Americas

# LAPOP's Beginnings












### The Americas Barometer





### What is unique about the Americas Barometer?

Features	AmericasBarometer
Includes North America/ Caribbean (26 countries)	<b>√</b>
Interviews in indigenous languages (15 total) and widespread use of handheld computers (PDAs) allowing "code-switching" among languages	✓
Samples of 1,500 vs. typical 1,000	$\checkmark$
Full disclosure of sample designs	$\checkmark$
National stratification and sub-stratification by rural/urban residence	$\checkmark$
Functions as a consortium of academic partners	$\checkmark$
Central oversight over data collection: pre-tests in all countries; interviewer training; auditing of data sets	<b>√</b>

### What is unique about the Americas Barometer?


Features	AmericasBarometer
No cost/no registration, on-line multivariate analysis (no embargo period)	✓
No-cost, online reports for each country, in addition to a report for the entire region	✓
Confidence intervals are sample design based in all charts and regressions	<b>√</b>
Statistical analyses based on theoretical models	$\checkmark$
Entire questionnaire (in all local languages used for surveys) included as an appendix in each report	<b>√</b>
Full adherence to federal human subjects protection rules; all team leaders IRB certified	$\checkmark$

# Donors 2010



























#### The LAPOP Research Team at Vanderbilt



Partner Country Teams for 2010 Americas Barometer Startup meeting, San Salvador, El Salvador, November, 2009



## Methodology



- Face-to-face interviews by interviewers trained by LAPOP personnel
- Stratified national probability samples down to the household level (quotas within households) of 1500 voting-age respondents
- Probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling is used at every stage
- Estimated Error: < +/- 3% with 95% confidence interval</li>
- Use of PDAs (handheld computers) in most countries

# Sample Size and Confidence Intervals (National Level)



Country	Sample Size	Sampling Error		
Mexico/ Central America				
Mexico	1,562	±2.5%		
Guatemala	1,504	±2.5%		
El Salvador	1,550	±2.5%		
Honduras	1,596	±2.5%		
Nicaragua	1,540	±2.5%		
Costa Rica	1,500	±2.5%		
Panama	1,536	±2.5%		
An	dean/Southern Co	one		
Colombia	1,506	±2.5%		
Ecuador	3,000	±1.8%		
Peru	1,500	±2.5%		
Bolivia	3,018	±1.8%		
Paraguay	1,166	±2.9%		
Chile	1,965	±2.5%		
Uruguay	1,500	±2.5%		
Brazil	2,882	±1.8%		
Venezuela	1,500	±2.5%		
Argentina	1,505	±2.5%		
	Caribbean			
Belize	1,504	±2.5%		
Dominican Republic	1,500	±2.5%		
Guyana	1,540	±2.5%		
Haiti	1,752 (+4,248)	±2.4%		
Jamaica	1,499	±2.5%		
Suriname	1,500	±2.5%		
Trinidad & Tobago	1,503	±2.0%		
Unit	ted States and Car	nada		
Canada	1,500	±2.2%		
United States	1,500	±2.0%		










#### **Use of handheld computers:**

- 1. Reduces data entry errors
- 2. Allows for multiple languages
- 3. Permits embedded experiments





# National Samples Stratified by Key Regions











### **National Samples Stratified by Key Regions**









# Partners 2010



	Andean / Sou	ıthern Cone	
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia	
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR	CEDATOS GALIUP	
Peru	IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos		
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Fallador Sociales y A		
Paraguay	@IRD centro de Información y Recursos para el Desamolo		
Chile	liatituto de Ciencia Política		
Uruguay	UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO		
Brazil	Universidade de Brasilia		
Venezuela	CISOR		

# Partners 2010





# Partners 2010



	Caribbean
Dominican Republic	INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE SANTO DOMINGO
Guyana	TO THE WILL CONTRACT OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR
Haiti	GRESS  T. J. Gences South
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA

Canada and United States		
Canada	YORK UNIVERSITY TEDEFITE  TEDEFITE	
U.S.	VANDERBILT VUNIVERSITY	

# Making Results Accessible







# Country Reports: all on-line, free

democracia en Bolivia

Cultura política de la

#### El Barómetro de las Américas

El presente estudio es parte de un programa de Investigaciones que el Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP) de la Universidad de Vanderbilt viene lievando a cabo desde hace más de dos décadas. LAPOP es un consorcio de instituciones académicas y de investigación en las Américas, con sede central en la Universidad de Vanderbilt en Estados Unidos. En el Proyecto LAPOP participan más de 30 instituciones de toda la región, cuyos esfuerzos tienen el propósito de producir estudios científicos, objetivos e independientes de opinión pública. Dichas investigaciones se enfocan principalmente en la medición de actitudes y comportamientos políticos relacionados con la democracia. El proyecto ha procibido al generose acono de la Aporcia de los Estados Unidos para al Deservolto. actitudes y comportamientos políticos relacionados con la democracia. El proyecto ha recibido el generoso apoyo de la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID), del Centro para las Américas y del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad de Vanderbilt, del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) y del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), así como de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile y del Instituto Kellogo de la Universidad de Notre Dame. LAPOP también mantiene vinculos con organizaciones como el Banco Mundial y la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), entre otras.

Las encuestas más recientes – cuyos resultados se analizan y discuten en este informefueron realizadas en el allo 2010, utilizando una muestra representativa de la población nacional en áreas rurales y urbanas. La ronda de estudios del 2010 incluyó 26 países de las Américas, lo que permite comparar los resultados de cada país con los otros países de la región.

la región.

LAPOP pone a disposición del público sin costo alguno sus bases de datos a través de nuestra página web www.lapopsurveys.org. Tanto los datos y reportes de investigación, como los artículos y libros que ha producido el Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina, son de acceso público y gratuito. Esta investigación y los datos pueden también consultarse en los sitios de otras importantes universidades de los Estados Unidos, como Duke, Harvard, Notre Dame, Princeton, la Universidad de Carolina del Norte, la Universidad de Texas y en instituciones en Latinoamérica tales como la Universidad de Costa Rica y la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Con estas iniciativas, LAPOP contido a la horacida de con la caractería de contra servicio de contra con la caractería de contra con la caractería de contra con contra con la caractería de contra cara continúa colaborando con la generación de excelencia académica y de políticas públicas en

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Calle Batalión Colorados esq. Tocopilla No. 2340,
Zona Sarco
Tel. 591 4 440 6393 – 4 440 6615
Cochabamba, Bollvía Cludadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y





Cultura política de la democracia en Bolivia, 2010

Consolidación democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles

- E. Moreno Morales, Coordinador nacional
- o Córdova Eguívar
- Vivian Schwarz Blum
- o Vargas Villazón
- Villarroel Nikitenko

Mitchell A. Seligson Coordinador científico y editor de la serie Vanderbilt University











### **Dissemination in Each Country**






#### "Policía tiene motivos para desinflar datos de delitos"




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#### The Latin American Public Opinion Project

of the Vanderbilt University

(LAPOP)



Expert mode Home

### Free on-line data analysis


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tabulation column percentage		(41)	renero	
Muy en desacuerdo	Género Hombre 746 4.19	758   4.19	Total 1,504 4.19	
(2)	3.58	3.66	3.62	
(3)	7.51	1,453   8.02	7.77	
(4)	2,326 13.07	2,553	4,879 13.59	
(5)	2,744	3,045   16.82	5,789	
(6)	3,418 19.20	3,290   18,17	6,708 18.68	
Muy de acuerdo	6,589 37.02	6,346   35.05	12,935 36.02	

# Economic Crisis and Democracy









### What economists tell us.....

On p. 3:

perity, full employment, and high standards of living. But no less important is the fact—clearly to be read from the history of the twentieth century—that the political health of a democracy is tied up in a crucial way with the successful maintenance of stable high employment and living opportunities. It is not too much to say that the widespread creation of dictatorships and the resulting World War II stemmed in no small measure from the world's failure to meet this basic economic problem adequately.

THE ORIGIN

WITH A N

# "In 1920, 26 out of 28 European states were parliamentary democracies"

Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: the Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy. Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 21

# "By 1938, 13 of those democracies had become dictatorships"

- **区Italy, October 1922**
- **⊠**Bulgaria, June 1923
- **⊠**Portugal, May 1926
- **区**Poland, May 1926
- **⊠**Yugoslavia, January 1929
- **区Germany**, January 1933
- **⊠**Austria, March 1933
- **区**Estonia, March 1934
- **区Latvia, May 1934**
- **⊠**Spain, July 1936
- **⊠**Romania, 1938







#### Latvia Is Shaken by Riots Over Its Weak Economy



Ilmars Znotins/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Military personnel faced off with protesters in Riga, Latvia, on Tuesday night.

By FLLEN BARRY

Breakdown is not limited to the distant past:
 Worldwide, nearly 38 percent of the 114
 democratizations 1960-2003 were reversed, at
 least for some period of time

(Converse and Kapstein, *The Fate of Young Democracies*, Cambridge University Press, 2008).








# The Theory: Country-Level

#### Economic context also matters for the stability of democracy

#### □ Economic Underdevelopment

Przeworski et al: "No democracy has ever been subverted...in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975: \$6,055. There is no doubt that democracy is stable in affluent countries" (98).









#### Two published studies using pre-crisis 2008 AmericasBarometer data:

#### Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean Latin American Politics and Society

Abby Córdova Mitchell A. Seligson

Historical evidence suggests that bad economic times often mean bad times for democracy, but prior research has given us little guidance on how this process may work. What economic conditions are most threatening, and how might they weaken consolidating democracies? This article uses the AmericasBarometer conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to answer these questions by focusing on core attitudes for the consolidation of democracy. We use survey data at the level of the individual and economic data at the country level to help detect democratic vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The study finds that conditions of low levels of economic development, low economic growth, and high levels of income inequality increase those vulnerabilities substantially, but the effects are not uniform across individuals. Some groups, especially the young and the poor, are particularly vulnerable to some antidemocratic appeals.

Tard times have often led to sharp political transformations (Goure-Pritch 1986). Dictatorships have been found to be especially brittle when confronted with severe economic downtums, occasionally opening the door to democracy, but more often than not yielding to yet another authoritarian regime (Przeworski 2009; Przeworski et al. 1996; Weede 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2007). On the other hand, the downfall of many European democracies in the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s suggests that democracies can be destabilized by severe economic crises (Bermeo 1999, 2003).

This article focuses on the possible impact of economic shocks on democratic consolidation in contemporary Latin America, a region in which nearly all countries have at least nominally democratic regimes but with widely diverse levels of polyarchy (Coppedge et al. 2008). This investigation is prompted by the worldwide financial and economic crisis that exploded in 2008 and that is still reverberating in the latin American region. From the perspective of this research, the main lesson of the 2008 meltdown is that bubbles and busts remain a permanent feature of the economic landscape. This study therefore looks at and

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#### **FEATURES**

#### PS: Political Science and Politics

#### Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America

Abby Córdova, Venderhüt University Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderhilt University

ABSTRACT While the world is focused on the economic impact of the financial and credit meltdown, what might be its impact on politics? In well-established democracies, probably not more than elections lost by incumbent parties seen as having mismanaged the economy. But what of consolidating democracies that predominate in the developing world, where some forecasts expect the crisis to hit the poor especially hard? This article uses AmericasBarometer survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean drawn on the eve of the crisis to project how it might affect democracy in the region.

n times of crists, scholars and pundits alike often seek inspiration from the classical thinkers. The worldwide credit and financial meltdown that began in 2008 has been accompanied by almost daily reference to the classics on the Great Depression, such as John Kenneth Galbraith's (1955) study of the stock market crash of 1929, or John Maynard Keynes's (1936) analysts of recessions and depressions. Surprisingly, however, political scientists seem little concerned about the political consequences of the current economic crisis. Maybe this is because so much attention on the economic crisis has focused on the advanced industrial democracies where the meltdown began, and therefore we expect no more than conventional actions from dittens; voters will puntsh incumbents with "new brooms" to sweep away the crists and in the process will "throw the bums out." The great Republican Party losses in the 2008 U.S. elections are a case in point, as are the recent elections in Iceland.

In developing countries, however, the current economic crists may have a far more profound impact. Their economies do not have the deep pockets (or hard currencies) that the governments of advanced industrial societies do, which makes it far more difficult for them to follow the Keynestan prescription that in times of economic slowdowns governments should spend their way out of them. Furthermore, in many of the developing nations, democracy itself has had only a brief history and is often still in the process of being consolidated. To gauge the possible political effects

Abby Cardova is a post-doctor of follow int he department of political actions at Venderhilt University und the Latin American Publis: Opinion Project (LA POP). She can be reached at ably hear devagreenderbile, edu.

Mitchell A. Seltgron is Contential Professor of Political Science, professor of social opp, and director of the Latte American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which coordinates the American Barometer conscriptors. He can be reached at machallandimone undebladu.

of the current severe economic downturn, political scientists might do well to turn their attention to their own classics. No more relevant piece of that literature is the J-curve theory of University of Oregon political science professor emeritus James Davies (1962, 5): "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary." His theory presumes that during extended periods of growth, people come to expect a better future as the norm, but with the onset of a sudden downturn in the ability of the economy to satisfy those expectations, there emerges an "intolerable gap between what people want and what they get" (Davies 1962, 6), driving some individuals to participate in violent protests and even revolution. Davies supports his theory with an analysts of several rebellions and revolutions, including the French, Russian, and American Revolutions.

Predicting rebellions and revolutions remains today about as difficult as it was when Davies wrote more than 40 years ago. Davies himself takes note of mitigating factors. For example, the Great Depression in the U.S. did not produce revolution, largely because of, in his view, the strong actions taken during the Roosevelt years to mitigate its impact on people's lives. To make sounder predictions, Davies concludes that one needs to be able to assess the "state of mind" of the population by using data emerging from the (then embryonic) field of survey research. Fortunately, the recent widespread growth of surveys among the developing nations makes such an assessment possible for those countries today.

In this article, we examine the state of mind of Latin Americans on the eve of the current great economic crists in order to get a fix on what might be its ultimate impact. We do so with the

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#### The Political Culture of Democracy, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

Report on the Americas

#### E-Street


- Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
   Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series
   Vanderbilt University.
- Amy Erica Smith Research Coordinator and Editor of the Report Vanderbilt University









### Changes in Real GDP: 2008-2009



Source: World Bank 2010









### **Research Question:**

While breakdown is an extreme and unlikely outcome, will the current global economic downturn weaken citizen support for key components of democracy, thus slowing or even undermining democratic consolidation?








# Economic Experiences and Perceptions in the Americas, 2010







# Job Losses in the Americas, 2008-2010










# Percentage households with job loss (past two years)




who lost a job in the past two years

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based)

Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP

Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

# Household Income Changes, 2008-2010 in the Americas



Over the past two years, has the income of your household:

Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP


Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).








# Decrease in household income, by area of residence and level of wealth: crisis hurt the poor the most



### Is your country experiencing an economic crisis?



**Perception of Magnitude of Economic Crisis** 

Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP


Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).







Perception that the economic crisis is "very serious"




95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effects Based)

Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP


Note: Based on 25 countries (excludes Haiti).

### Who is to blame for the crisis? (among those who perceive a crisis)




### Percentage blaming "rich countries"

(among those who perceive a crisis)



### Who blames the crisis on rich countries? (among those perceiving a crisis)



#### Main findings on the crisis/democracy nexus:

In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, democratic attitudes and the legitimacy of the political system have turned out to be surprisingly resilient.







#### **Agreement with Churchill?**

 "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?"



Low Support


**High Support** 








### Support for democracy showed no significant decline from the 2008 survey





"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?"








# Support for democracy remains widespread

(No country below 60)


"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?"



## Satisfaction with democracy: 2008 vs. 2010

#### **Major increases:**

- Post-coup Honduras
- Paraguay after first opposition win
- El Salvador after FMLN victory



Satisfaction with Democracy Note: Includes all 26 countries 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP


# How Economic Experiences Affect Support for Democracy and System Support









Support for democracy heavily impacted by satisfaction with government economic performance



### Who is satisfied with democracy?








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#### **System Support Index**




- B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial?
- B2. ¿To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?







### System Support Index: Slight *Increase* 2008-2010












# System Support in the Americas 2010 (9 countries

(9 countries below 50)



### Who supports the political system?









### Government Economic Performance: A Cause for Unexpected Optimism


Counter-cyclical and pro-poor policies may have prevented not only a more serious economic crisis but also a region-wide decline in support for democracy and political legitimacy and perhaps even threats to the consolidation of the democratic regime.







### Changes in perceptions of performance predict changes in system support (2008/2010, country-level)










### Changes in perceptions of performance predict changes in system support (2008/2010, subnational level)



Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP

Note: Includes all 26 countries







### The Vulnerabilities of Democracy in the Americas

- Countries at risk: predicting instability?
- Non-economic threats and their impact on democratic support
- The armed forces, hard-line policies: a double-edged sword?







#### The Critical Combination of System Support and Political Tolerance

Tolerance System support High Low High Stable Authoritarian Stability Democracy Democracy Low Unstable at Risk Democracy







# Political Tolerance and Stable Democracy in the Americas, 2010







#### **Measuring Political Tolerance**

There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government.

How strongly do you approve or disapprove:


- D1. Of such people's right to vote?
- D2. That such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations?
- D3. Of such people being permitted to run for public office?
- D4. Of such people appearing on television to make speeches?







# Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2010 (8 countries below 50)









#### **Empirical findings, Costa Rica**

<u>.</u>					
	Tolerance				
System support	High	Low			
High	Stable Democracy 46%	Authoritarian Stability 40%			
Low	Unstable Democracy 6%	Democracy at Risk 8%			









### Democracy at Risk

Tolerance

System support	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritari an Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk



#### **Triple Dissatisfaction Index:**





Rights to participationSystem support

Trust in institutions

... and now adding

• Evaluations of Regime Economic Performance

Respondents' satisfaction with their personal and national economies

USAID





V VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

AmericasBarometer Insights: 2009 Special Report on Hondwas

Predicting Coups?
Democratic
Vulnerabilities, The
AmericasBarometer and
The 2009 Honduran Crisis

By Mitchell A. Seligs on <u>m.seligs on@vanderbilt.edu</u> Vanderbilt University and John A. Booth <u>booth@mtedu</u> University of North Texas

Dog range weather forecasting is probably little more accurate today than it was in the heyday of the Farmer's Almanac. Meteorologists today can certainly whether it will rain tomorrow, but they are far less confident about the prospects for rain next week, and have almost no ability to predict next month, let alone next year. Weather forecasters can tell very well whether the conditions are ripe for thunderstorms or tornadoes, but they cannot specify which towns or areas will get rain or suffer tornadic winds, or what hour the storms will come. Social scientists are in the same boat:

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age 1 of 6

hardly anyone predicted the fall of the Berlin wall or the breakup of the Soviet Union, and Wall Street "experts" are infamous for their ability to "predict" two out of the last five downhums. Indeed, expert predictions are more often wrong than right, as a recent comprehensive study on the subject reveals (Tetlock 2005).

While successful predictions of specific events in the distant future (e.g., rain a year from now, a riot) are most likely beyond our scientific abilities for the foreseeable future, there is some hope that political scientists may well be able to detect weaknesses, or vulnerabilities of countries to system-challenging forces. In this special Dusights paper, we look for signs of such vulnerabilities, drawing on the LAPOF AmericaSFarometer data for Honduras.

The events, which are still unfolding as this paper is being written, are punctuated by the ousting and exile of elected President Manuel Zelaya Rosales by the Honduran military. A non-binding plebiscite, or poll, had been called by Zelaya to determine popular support for a national constituent assembly to reform the constitution. Opponents suspected that the plebiscite would somehow be used to eventually override the constitutional prohibition against presidential succession, thus paving the way for an eventual reelection of Zelaya. Formal opposition to this poll was rendered by the Honduran Attorney General, the Honduran Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Honduran Supreme Court, and the National Congress, the latter having passed a law prohibiting such plebiscites within 180 days prior to national elections, which had already been scheduled for November 29, 2009. Zelaya rejected each of these barriers to the plebiscite and pushed the military to carry it out. When the military refused, Zelaya fired the head of the military, who was subsequently reinstated by the Supreme Court. The Attorney General and later the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Zelava's arrest. Soldiers detained him in the early morning hours of June 25, 2009 and unconstitutionally







<sup>\*</sup> The Insights Series is ex-edited by Professors Mitchell A. Seligeon and Elizabeth Zechmoister with administrative technical, and inclinedual support from the LAPOP group at Vandorbit. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect these of USAID. We thank Susan Beth-Seligeon for her comments on an earlier data of this paper.

### Estimating Triple Dissatisfaction (2010)

	Triply Dissatisfied	Mixed	Triply Satisfied	Dissatisfied minus Satisfied
Haiti	43.3%	55.2%	1.4%	41.9% 🛨
United States	7.9%	76.6%	15.5%	-7.5% <b>*</b>
Jamaica	7.7%	86.4%	5.9%	1.9% 🛨
Costa Rica	2.7%	68.7%	28.6%	-25.8% <b>*</b>
Uruguay	1.8%	42.9%	55.3%	-53.5%*

★ Number of dissatisfied exceeds satisfied.

★ Number of satisfied exceeds dissatisfied.









#### **Triple Dissatisfaction Index:**

#### **Net Dissatisfaction in 2008**



#### **Triple Dissatisfaction Index:**

#### **Net Dissatisfaction in 2010**




## Public Opinion in the Aftermath of Honduras' Coup of 2009








### Hondurans divided on coup, but opposed to exile of President



¿Did you favor the removal from office of President Zelaya?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



¿Did you favor sending President Zelaya into exile in Costa Rica?


Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP








### Hondurans strongly oppose a Constituent Assembly



¿Did you favor the survey President Zelaya wanted to carry out on June 28, 2009 on calling a Constituent Assembly?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



¿Did you favor the formation of a Constituent Assembly?


Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP







### Hondurans strongly oppose a reform allowing presidential re-election










#### Support for coups (2010 Americas Barometer Honduras survey): The toxic combination of wealth and low education



Based on **JC1**. Frente al desempleo muy alto; **JC10**. Frente a mucha delincuencia; **JC13**. Frente a mucha corrupción:







# Corruption, Crime, Terrorism, the Military and Natural Disasters: Threats to Democracy?








# Percent who reported having been asked to pay a bribe in the past year

- To a police officer
- To a public official
- To expedite a transaction with the municipal government
- At work
- For public health/medical service
- In the school system










### Relationship of corruption victimization to system support











## Crime victimization has increased



# Crime victimization is higher in metropolitan areas

#### (Central America)

Crime victimization in Metropolitan Guatemala City is higher than in any country in our study, and rising.










# The fear of crime is also concentrated in major cities.










#### Fear of crime increases approval of the police "crossing the line"




AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

- (1) Should always abide by the law
- (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88 )DK

In Honduras, for example, those who feel "very insecure" have over a 65% probability of approving crossing the line, compared with 37% probability among those who feel "very secure."

### Perception of insecurity undermines system support










#### San Miguelito District, Panama Concentration of Homicides and Gang Activities

Red dots= homicides

**Green dots=gangs** 

Source: Sistema Nacional de Estadísticas Criminales Integrado, Panama (Jan-Jun 2009)










#### CARSI (Central America Regional Security Initiative) Impact Evaluation in Central America

- Central America: the "most violent region in the world" (UNDP, 10/2009)
- USAID: \$56.5M for Central America (2008-1010) for community-based violence prevention programs



TO SERVIS

signs of gang activity








#### **CARSI Impact Evaluation in Central America**

Three-year "clustered randomized experiment"

 At-risk neighborhoods in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama

- Data collected before, during, & after in treatment and control groups
- Quantitative & qualitative data collection methods












#### New in 2010: Measures of Concern about Terrorism





WT1. How worried are you that there will be a violent attack by terrorists in [country] in the next 12 months?

## Fear of terrorism is negatively related to support for democracy










#### 2010 Earthquake Studies


















Research
Question: Can
Natural Disasters
Affect Support for
Democracy?

February 27, 2010:

Magnitude 8.8
Earthquake and
Tsunami

#### CHILE: Disaster damage weakens democratic attitudes, increases participation




Note: Analysis on matched dataset; Predicted Effects computed based on OLS regression results controlling for Education, Gender, Age, Vote, Region, Wealth, Marital Status, Children, Race, Rural vs. Urban, City Size; rescaled 0-100.


Maximum predicted effects of disaster damage

## Attitudes toward the Armed Forces in the Americas










# Trust in the Armed Forces











## Trust in Armed Forces is greater than trust in Police









www. LapopSurveys.org




## Corruption by Police decreases trust in people in uniform





5.6 unit "spill-over effect" of police corruption on trust in Armed Forces







www. LapopSurveys.org




### Believing Government protects human rights increases trust in Armed Forces














### Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for democracy














### Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for political system












### Trust in Armed Forces is positively related to support for military coups














#### **Support for Military Coups**

95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)


Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP

#### Support for military coups

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?

- 1. High unemployment?
- High crime levels
- Lots of corruption

#### Work in Mozambique








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