

VII Study on the Democratic Values of Guatemalans

The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala: 2006

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Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance is still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

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Foreword

The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

by

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators,. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form

was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire were pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orce, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
December, 2006

INTRODUCTION

This study offers an up-to-date perspective of the opinions, attitudes, and political behavior of Guatemalans, and is part of a series of similar investigations conducted in Guatemala every two years since the beginning of the 1990s. All these studies have been supported by the Guatemala Office of the Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 2004 with the support from USAID in Washington DC the study has been conducted systematically in several Latin American countries as part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University, allowing cross-country comparisons to be made. This seventh study in Guatemala contains information obtained from a national public opinion survey conducted in June and July of 2006. As in 2004, the survey in Guatemala was developed in the framework of the LAPOP project, which covered 17 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in this round of surveys. In various chapters of this report, we present comparative data from those countries.

The central focus of this study, however, is on the national findings. The report is structured around various key topics regarding support for democracy as well as important problems of the current political context. The first chapter provides an overview of the national situation, emphasizing the significant economic and political events since the 2004 survey. The second chapter covers technical aspects of the study, including a description of the methodology used as well as a description of the sample.

Following this introduction, the subsequent chapters present survey results in greater detail, with particular emphasis on the 2006 findings. It is worth highlighting that all chapters contain longitudinal data showing the evolution of the opinions and behaviors of Guatemalans over time. Most comparisons are made with data from 2004, although periodically reference is made to data from studies conducted within the framework of this project going back to 1993.

Chapter III analyzes how Guatemalans conceive of democracy. In other words, what are the underlying views that respondents have of democracy? This is the first time that such a focus is used in this series of studies. The following chapters examine topics that were analyzed previously but that are still important. In Chapter IV, we explore the perspectives for stable democracy. In Chapter V, we analyze variables related to victimization by and the perception of corruption in Guatemala, as well as the impact that both variables might have on support for the political system in general. Chapter VI delves into the perceptions that Guatemalans have of the rule of law, emphasizing how they view the institutions of the system of justice and the magnitude of the crime problem in the country. We also examine how crime affects the perception Guatemalans have of personal safety (or insecurity) and the effect this has on their support for the political system.

The next chapter analyzes the relation between Guatemalans and local government, focusing particularly on how respondents evaluate their municipal government and the levels of public participation in local government meetings and activities. Chapter VIII focuses on the

political behavior of Guatemalans. We divide the analysis between conventional participation (voting behavior) and non-conventional participation (other political activity such as working on political campaigns and even demonstrating, for example). Chapter IX offers a perspective on what is known as “social capital,” as it exists in Guatemala, by analyzing interpersonal trust and participation in social organizations. Finally, Chapter X examines the preference levels that Guatemalans have for democratic or (semi-) authoritarian governments.

It is worth pointing out that, besides presenting descriptive data for all the above topics, we also conducted multivariable statistical analyses in order to identify the existing relations between the variables and, even more importantly, which variables or factors are related to one or another finding. The study concludes with an analysis of the general findings and the changes that have occurred over time in the political culture of Guatemalans.

Executive Summary

This series of studies of democratic culture is the most consistent effort undertaken in the country to measure Guatemalans' political values, attitudes, and beliefs. These studies have been conducted every two years since 1993. The information contained in this seventh study is based on a national survey conducted in July 2006. Besides presenting the findings of this survey, this report makes comparisons with the 2006 findings from 16 other countries in Latin America as well as with earlier studies conducted in Guatemala. This executive summary presents some of the main findings of various chapters of this study.

Different conceptions of democracy

- In this seventh study, we measured, for the first time, the prevailing conceptions that Guatemalans have of democracy. **About 56% of respondents have a normative conception of democracy**, that is, they relate it to the procedures and norms of the system. A third of the population, 32.2%, has an “empty” conception of democracy, while 7.5% has a utilitarian conception. A smaller percentage, 4.3%, has a negative conception.
- According to a multivariable analysis, the variations between the different conceptions of democracy in Guatemala are related to the following factors: the respondent's sex, age, educational level, and ethnic self-identification. **More specifically, women, people who identify themselves as indigenous, the youngest people, and those with the lowest levels of education are most inclined to have an empty conception of democracy.**
- Compared to other countries, Guatemala is located in an intermediate position. In fact, in most of the 17 countries included in the 2006 round of studies of democratic culture, around 50% of people hold a normative conception of democracy.

Support for stable democracy

- The legitimacy of the democratic political system and its institutions is one of the central elements that we tried to measure in these studies of democratic culture. We also focused on the public's acceptance of a series of basic principals inherent to democracy, such as tolerance. Politically legitimate systems tend to enjoy stable democracy when there is support for the system and when the public is reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities.
- **In Guatemala, the tendency of these two indicators, support for the system and tolerance, has been positive since 2001.** In other words, both the levels of support for the political system and the levels of tolerance in the country have risen.
- The improvement in support for the political system between 2004 and 2006 is statistically significant: support for the system rose from 49 to 52 points on a 0-to-100 point scale of measurement.
- The improvement in political tolerance from 2001 to 2004, and from 2004 to 2006, is statistically significant: on a 0-to-100 point scale, tolerance grew from 40 points in 2001 to 46 points in 2004, and to 53 points in 2006.
- The growth in both the levels of support for the system and political tolerance means that **the possibilities for stable democracy in Guatemala have also risen since 2001.** We should note, above all, the positive change in 2006 compared to the findings two years before: there

is a reduction in the percentage of Guatemalans who fall in the democracy-at-risk box (from 35.7% to 25.6%) and an increase of about six percentage points in the stable democracy box (from 21.2% to 26.8%). Despite the caution with which these findings should be read, they show a clear positive trend.

- Since 2004, **Guatemala has notably improved its ranking compared to other Latin American countries**. In 2004, it was among the countries with the lowest levels of tolerance and support for the system, and, therefore, with less chance of stable democracy. In 2006, however, it is located in an intermediate position of the 17 countries studied.
- In addition to support for the political system as whole, there are more concrete measures that allow us to analyze support for specific government institutions, which we call support for institutions of the political system. Among the public institutions included in this study, only municipalities, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the army surpass the 50-point reference line (taken as the reference point on a scale of 0-to-100). **Most institutions fall below the 40 point range**, with Congress and political parties receiving the lowest scores.

The impact of corruption

- Corruption is one of the main obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in any country. In this study, we measure the victimization of Guatemalans by corruption and the perception they have of corruption among public officials. In both cases, we also conduct a multivariable analysis to detect those factors or variables that are associated with the perception of or victimization by corruption. Finally, we present some findings about how people view certain concrete practices of corruption.
- When we add up the number of times that a person has been the victim of corruption in different government institutions, no major difference between 2004 and 2006 appears. In both years, **around 18% of the population said that they had been the victim of an act of corruption**, while 82% said they had not been.
- The factors that influence whether a Guatemalan is more likely to be a victim of corruption are living in an urban area, having a higher socioeconomic level, having a higher level of education, and being male. Other Guatemalans can still be victims of corruption, but the possibilities increase if they have such sociodemographic characteristics.
- **In terms of victimization by corruption, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position** compared to other countries. One thing is victimization by corruption, and another is the perception that people have of how corrupt public officials are. In terms of the perception of corruption among public officials, Guatemala finds itself among those countries where the perception of corruption is greatest; in Guatemala, the average perception of corruption is 81 points (on a scale of 0-to-100). This means that **a large number of Guatemalans perceive corruption among public officials to be somewhat or very widespread, which does not coincide with the data on actual levels of victimization**.
- We found that the factors associated with a greater perception of corruption among public officials are similar: **people with more education and who live in urban areas have a higher perception of corruption**. Also, as the age of respondents increases, so too does the perception of corruption. Additionally, through a statistical regression model, we determined that **people who read newspapers more frequently tend to have a higher perception of corruption among public officials**.

Perspectives on the Rule of Law

- We examined how Guatemalans view the rule of law by measuring their trust in institutions of the judicial system, their perceptions of the freedom to exercise political rights, and the impact of crime in the country.
- **Almost all the institutions of the judicial system receive a level support or trust between 40 and 49 points** (on a scale of 0-to-100). The Office of the Ombudsman is the only institution to receive 52 points, despite having suffered a slight drop in the level of support since 2004. The Public Ministry and the Constitutional Court also experienced a slight decline in the level of public support, but the difference is not statistically significant.
- **The level of public trust in the National Civil Police increased slightly**, rising from 39 points in 2004 to 43 points in 2006. Still, it has not managed to regain the level of support it achieved in 2001 when its average level of public support reached 46 points.
- **The level of public trust in the system of justice as a whole, as well as in the Supreme Court, also increased slightly** between 2004 and 2006, showing a positive trend.
- **The perception of freedom index improved in 2006 compared to 2001 and 2004**; the difference is statistically significant. This index – which measures perceptions regarding the freedom to vote, demonstrate, run for public office, and participate in community groups – has been used since 1993, giving us a longitudinal perspective of more than 10 years.
- **Guatemalans identified crime and violence as the most serious problems facing the country**, even more than economic and social problems. In 2006, close to 40% of Guatemalans considered insecurity to be the main problem.
- We used various measures in this study to assess personal safety and crime. One of them measures victimization by crime; that is, the percentage of Guatemalans who were the victim of some type of criminal act in the previous year. **The victimization by crime percentage increased from 13% in 2004 to 19% in 2006.**
- It is important to note that there are marked **differences in terms of victimization according to the respondents' area of residence**. Urban residents are much more likely to be a victim of crime than people who live in rural areas. In 2006, the percentage of victimization in urban areas was 25%, while it was only 13% in rural areas.
- **Guatemala is located in an intermediate position compared to the other countries included in this study** in terms of victimization by crime. It is worth recalling that Guatemala is one of the least urbanized countries and, therefore, the overall levels of victimization in Guatemala are lower than those of the other countries. Nonetheless, if we compare the victimization levels in the urban areas of the country, it is similar to that of the other countries in this study that have high crime rates.
- Asking people how safe or unsafe they feel in their neighborhood gave us another perspective on the impact of crime. **In 2006, the perception of insecurity (those who indicated that they feel somewhat or very unsafe) declined slightly** in Guatemala, dropping from 43% in 2004 to 37% in 2006.
- The two relevant factors that influence perceptions of insecurity are the area of residence and ethnic self-identification: **Guatemalans living in urban areas and who identify themselves as *ladino* (racially mixed) are more likely to feel insecure.**

- In 2004 and 2006, around **70% of Guatemalans considered that crime threatened the country's future**. This is a worrisome finding.
- A related topic is that of youth gangs. While most Guatemalans (57.3%) believe that gang members can be rehabilitated if they are given a chance, a third (31.4%) believe this is not possible. The rest (11.3%) did not know or did not want to respond.

Guatemalans and local government

- **The local government (of each respondent) turned out to be the institution that Guatemalans most trust.** In 2006, it earned 56 points on a scale of 0-to-100.
- There was no major variation in satisfaction with local government services between 2004 and 2006. In 2004, the average level of satisfaction was 52 points, while in 2006 it was 53.5 points, again on a scale of 0-to-100.
- A multivariable analysis allows us to determine what factors are associated with more or less satisfaction with municipal governments in Guatemala. Four predictors were found: the respondent's area of residence (rural areas show more satisfaction), socioeconomic level (the higher the socioeconomic level, the greater the satisfaction), ethnic self-identification (indigenous people are more satisfied), and city size (the impact varied).
- With regard to the management of public funds by the local government, urban and rural residents share similar opinions: **66% of rural residents expressed little or no confidence in their municipal government's management of resources; in urban areas it is 63%.**
- In terms of whether local government should be given more responsibilities and resources, the results are similar for both urban and rural areas: 36% of urban respondents said that municipalities should be given more responsibilities and resources, while 39% of rural respondents held the same view. By contrast, around **40% of people in both areas think that resources should go to the national government.**
- With regard to public participation in municipal government, **the percentage of people who attended local government meetings declined in 2006** compared to 2004, both among the indigenous population and the *ladino*. Similarly, the percentage of people who petitioned the municipal government in 2006 also declined, again both among people who identify themselves as indigenous and people who identify themselves as *ladino*.

Political participation in Guatemala

- This study measured both conventional and non-conventional political participation among Guatemalans, that is electoral participation as well as other forms of political participation.
- Registration is required to be able to vote in Guatemala. While **78.2% of *ladino* respondents were registered in 2006, only 69.2% of indigenous people** said they were.
- Regarding conventional political participation, **Guatemala has, comparatively, very low levels of voter turnout:** the penultimate place among the countries studied. Only 56.5% of respondents reported voting in the 2003 presidential election. The official report of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal stated that 58% of registered citizens voted in the 2003 election, which makes the survey data rather close to the official figure of actual voter turnout.
- In terms of the division by ethnic group, **60.4% of the *ladino* population said they voted, while only 55.8% of indigenous people** did.

- When asked why they did not go to the polls, a fifth of respondents answered that they were not old enough in 2003; another 13.1% said that they did not have a national identification card; 17.4% indicated that they had no interest in voting; and 6.2% stated that they did not like any of the candidates. This means that **a quarter (23.6%) of registered respondents lacked the motivation to vote.**
- Sex, education, and age are among the factors that are statistically associated with not turning out at the polls. **Women, people with less education, and the youngest tend to have the highest abstention rates.** It is worth noting that in all cases there is an additive relation among the explanatory variables; in other words, the variables influence abstentionism collectively.
- Other variables related to voting abstention also arose. On the one hand, people who consider the national economic situation to be good tend to abstain more. On the other hand, people who have an empty conception of democracy tend to vote less than those with a normative conception.
- The **trend of greater abstention among the female population is consistent through all categories of education** except the high school level. The abstention rate among women without any education stands out: it is much higher than in any of the other groups, reaching almost 70% in rural areas. The abstention rate among women without any education is also high in urban areas, reaching almost 64%. Among women with some primary education, the abstention rate is almost 55%. Even among women with some university education, the abstention rate is higher than among men with a university education.
- Regarding political participation, the survey also measured how Guatemalans identify themselves ideologically. **Of those who identify where they stand on an ideological scale, the majority (around 51%) place themselves toward the center.** About 22% consider themselves to be on the left or center-left, and 26% on the right or center-right, according to the scale used. It should be noted that a third of respondents (31%) did not respond to the question, indicating that many Guatemalans find it difficult to identify the differences between the political right and left.
- In terms of trust in representative institutions, we found that municipal government is the institution that generates the most trust among citizens, earning 56.5 points in 2006 (on the 0-to-100 point scale used in this study). The Supreme Electoral Tribunal gets relatively high marks compared to other institutions, but below those received by municipalities. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal also suffered a decline in the level of public trust between 2004 and 2006, falling from 50.2 to 48.7 points.
- The government, understood as the Executive Branch by Guatemalans, received 44.3 points in 2006, a decline from its 2004 result.
- In all countries, even advanced democracies, Congress and political parties are the institutions that tend to receive the lowest levels of public support, despite being essential institutions to representative democracy. In the case of Guatemala, **the levels of public trust in both institutions improved in 2006 compared to previous years.** The level of trust Congress rose from 37 to 41 points. The change was more impressive with political parties, however, which jumped from 29.7 points of trust to 40.7.
- **Neither men nor women discuss politics much in Guatemala. Among men, 78.4% do not discuss politics; among women, this percentage rises to 85%.** By contrast, only 2% of men and a similar percentage of women discuss politics on a daily basis.

- Comparatively speaking, Guatemala is a countries where **few people participate in public demonstrations**. In Guatemala, 88.2% of respondents indicated they had never participated in a demonstration; 5.6% said that they had hardly ever participated, and only 6.2% stated that they had participated several times.

Social capital in Guatemala

- In political science, a country's social capital is formed by the networks of participation in social organizations and by the interpersonal trust that exists between people.
- The **average level of interpersonal trust has improved in Guatemala**, going from 38.7 points in 2001 to 56.9 in 2004, and reaching 59.1 in 2006. This means that Guatemala has also improved its ranking compared to other Latin American countries, and now finds itself in an intermediate position.
- Among the factors associated with more interpersonal trust, we found that respondents from rural areas, men, older people, and those who profess to be Catholics, tend to trust other people more.
- In terms of attending the meetings different kinds of groups, **there is much more participation in the activities of religious organizations than in other kind of organization or group**. School-related groups have the second highest participation levels among Guatemalans. Participation in community improvement committees is also important, but below the levels of the other two groups.
- Finally, participation is less common in professional, producer, or merchant associations (including large, medium, and small business people) and in political movements and groups.

Public ambivalence: support for democratic or authoritarian governments

- We found **an increase in the percentage of Guatemalans who stated they preferred democracy, passing from 64% in 2004 to 71% in 2006**. Consequently, the other options included in the question declined (preference for authoritarian governments or indifference). In general terms, this is a positive finding.
- The **results related to satisfaction with democracy are mixed**: in 2006, the percentage of people who said they were satisfied with democracy fell considerably, dropping from 51% in 2004 to 39% in 2006. The percentage of very satisfied people also fell in the same year, declining from 7% to 1.8%. It should be remembered that the preference for democracy and satisfaction with democracy measure different levels of democratic legitimacy.
- Regarding support for authoritarian governments, the preference for a strong-hand government to resolve the country's problems as an alternative to a participatory government has been measured since 1993. **In 2006, the percentage of Guatemalans who stated that a strong-hand government is preferable rose to 53% compared to 2004**. However, the highest levels of preference for a heavy-hand, recorded in 1999, have not returned.
- There was also a **rise in the preference for a strong, non-elected leader in 2006 (23.8%) compared to 2004 (18%)**.

I. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

What follows is a brief overview of important economic and political events in Guatemala in the two years between the last study of democratic culture, in 2004, and the current 2006 study. In the political arena, the period in question was relatively stable since the administration of President Oscar Berger remained in office. It was not, therefore, a period of electoral activity or of abrupt changes on the political scene. It can be considered, though, as a period of readjustment following the 2004 election, and the years prior to it, in which the candidacy of General Efraín Ríos Montt generated heated debate. Nonetheless, there were important events in the 2004-2006 period that affected the political scene. In particular, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) concluded its mandate after 10 consecutive years in the country and withdrew. In the economic field, this was a period of recovery and expansion, and relative stability. One of the most important economic events was the free-trade treaty with the United States (DR-CAFTA) going into effect. Not everything was positive, however. Socially, there continued to be high levels of poverty and exclusion. On top of this, hurricane Stan left a wake of destruction that especially affected the most vulnerable sectors of the country.¹

Since this study focuses on Guatemalans' perceptions, we should start by examining their main concerns. Both in 2004 and 2006, the questionnaire asked respondents what they regarded to be the most serious problem facing the country. Table I.1 shows the results.² As can be seen, more than 50% of respondents in 2006 considered problems related to crime and violence to be the most serious issues facing the country. This is a high percentage. The second most mentioned problem (by 19% of respondents) was economic, or everything related to unemployment, inflation, and other similar topics. Below this, in third place, are social problems. Given its importance, poverty, which can be considered either a social or an economic problem, was assigned its own category. In any case, a fifth of respondents (20.8%) considered poverty and social problems together to be the most serious issue. The only other problem identified by more than 5% of the people surveyed had to do with bad government.

In addition to the most important problems highlighted above, between 2004 and 2006, there was a marked rise in the percentage of people concerned with crime and violence.

¹ According to *Informe Guatemala*, the ECLAC evaluation of the impact of hurricane Stan (October 2005) concluded that the most significant damage was not in the area of production, generally, but deep in the social fabric, especially among the indigenous and their precarious bases of survival (Informe Guatemala No. 34, Fundación DESC, January 2006).

² The questionnaire, which appears in the Annex at the end of the study, shows the problems included in the list in detail. In this table, the problems have been grouped to make the results clearer.

Table I.1. The Country's Most Serious Problem according to Guatemalans: 2004 vs. 2006


Problem (a)	Year	
	2004	2006
<i>Crime, violence</i>	605	733
	38.9%	51.4%
<i>Economy, unemployment</i>	610	274
	39.3%	19.2%
<i>Social problems (health, education)</i>	31	94
	2.0%	6.6%
<i>Infrastructure (lack of)</i>	5	17
	.3%	1.2%
<i>Bad government, corruption</i>	90	71
	5.8%	5.0%
<i>Human rights, internal conflict</i>	0	21
	.0%	1.5%
<i>Poverty</i>	196	202
	12.6%	14.2%
<i>Social protests</i>	3	7
	.2%	.5%
<i>Discrimination</i>	1	5
	.1%	.4%
<i>Environment</i>	12	3
	.8%	.2%
<i>Terrorism</i>	1	0
	.1%	.0%
Total	1554	1427
	100.0%	100.0%

(a) Respondents were not read possible answers
Source: LAPOP/Guatemala

A. The Economic Context

1. Economic Change from 2004 to 2006

In the period between the last survey of democratic culture, in 2004, and the June 2006 survey, the economy was characterized by some positive indicators, a sign of economic recovery and expansion.³ The rate of economic growth is among these indicators. In Figure I.1, it can be seen that the growth rate increased between 2004 and 2005, and that, so far, it is even greater in 2006, reaching 4.4%. Still, despite the highest economic growth rate in the last five years, the report *Evaluación económica de Guatemala durante el primer semestre de 2006* (ASIES-IDIES, 2006) points out that this has not generated greater development or reduced poverty, explaining that there are a series of qualitative factors that influence the former. In this, it coincides with *Informe Guatemala No. 34* (Fundación DESC, 2006), which stated, in January 2006, that the expected 4.2% growth rate of GDP for this year would be insufficient to modify social conditions. It also noted that this pace of growth does not have solid bases since it “rests on the growth of consumer spending stimulated by family remittances, money laundering (drug trafficking and tax evasion) and the expansion of consumer credit. In other words, it rests on the availability of funds in the banks that, in the case of large deposits, could leave in search of better yields at any moment” (Informe Guatemala No. 45, 2006).⁴



Source: Calculations by DICE/ASIES, 2006

Figure I.1. Growth Rate of GDP in Guatemala

Another positive sign, in the period in question, was the growth of exports by 14.7% from 2004 to 2005, rising from US\$2.9387 billion to US\$ 3.3708 billion. This, in turn, leads to a


³ We thank David Cristiani, from the Departamento de Investigaciones y Consultoría Académica of ASIES, for providing us with valuable information for this section of the study. We also thank Ligia Blanco, from the Departamento de Investigación Política of ASIES for her assistance.

⁴ The problems in the banking system in the second semester occurred after this study was conducted and, therefore, are not covered in this report.

growth in foreign exchange of 18.8% over 2004. The recovery of coffee prices was partially responsible for this increase, although all major export products experienced a similar growth.

Another important source of foreign exchange was family remittances, which continued to rise, although more moderately than in previous years (Revista Momento, 2006). *Maquilas* (export processing plants, predominantly textile manufacturing) and tourism also helped tip the balance of trade in Guatemala’s favor in the amount of US\$665.4 million. *Maquilas* contributed about the same proportion of foreign exchange in 2005 as it did in 2004, although the sector has been hit hard by China’s flooding of Guatemala’s traditional markets like the United States. In fact, during this period more than 50 *maquila* plants closed, with the loss of more than 30,000 jobs (Informe Guatemala, No. 45, 2006).

The IMAE (*Índice Mensual de Actividad Económica* or Index of Monthly Economic Activity), is an additional indicator that can help illustrate Guatemala’s economic expansion. The index is made up of 32 production variables representative of the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and public administration sectors, which together account for about 75% of the value added that the country generates. This index is used to measure the economic activity of the productive sector at any given moment. Figure I.2 shows that the pace of change of this indicator in the first semester of 2006 was higher than that observed in 2005. Still, the positive trend had been seen since the last trimester of 2005.⁵



Source: DICE/ASIES, 2006

Figure I.2. Changes in the IMAE: 2005-2006

In summary, Guatemala’s macroeconomic indicators were favorable during the period under study, and expected to remain positive through the rest of 2006. Still, as noted above, there are serious social problems, tax revenue generation is still inadequate, and DR-CAFTA has still not been accepted by all sectors of the population, some of whom oppose the trade agreement arguing that it will negatively affect the already vulnerable sectors of the country.

⁵ In both years there is a decline in the indicators during the month of April, which is due to the seasonal decline in coffee [café de oro] and sugar [cane] production.

2. Guatemalans' Perceptions of the Economy

In the previous section, we examined macroeconomic aspects using aggregated information. In this section, we present public perspectives on the national economy. The 2006 questionnaire on democratic culture included a series of questions unrelated to democracy or politics. They are used in the analysis as independent control variables to measure whether they have an effect on the other variables. Among them are four questions regarding how respondents feel about the economy. Other studies in political science have shown that individuals tend to differentiate between their view of the economic situation of the country in which they live and their perception of their personal or family economic situation. The impact of both variables on a person's political opinions also tends to be different.

The questions related to the economy included in the 2006 LAPOP questionnaire were the following:

SOCT1. *How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?*

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

SOCT2. *Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?*

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know

IDIO1. *How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?*

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

IDIO2. *Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?*

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know

Figure I.3 shows the results of the first question, which was also included in the 2004 questionnaire. As can be seen, there have not been dramatic changes of opinion in how respondents view the national economy. In 2004, the greatest number of people (around 40% of respondents) considered the national economy to be in poor shape. Only a small percentage in both years, less than 10%, thought the economic situation of the country was good or very good.




Figure I.3. Evaluation of the National Economic Situation, Guatemala, 2004-2006

In the following figure, we can see how respondents perceive their personal economic situation. The questions about this topic were not included in 2004, which means we cannot make comparisons. Figure I.4 shows that when respondents were asked whether their economic situation in 2006 is better, the same, or worse than it was 12 months prior, most Guatemalans (51.8%) said it remained the same. By contrast, only 11.5% thought it had improved, while 36.8% believed their personal economic situation had worsened over this period.




Figure I.4 Guatemalans' Perception of Their Personal Economic Situation in 2006

B. The Political Context

1. Political Change from 2004 to 2006

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the period from 2004 to 2006 was characterized by relative political stability. This was an intermediate period between a new administration taking office in January 2004 and the phase of intense political campaigning that will begin in 2007 in preparation for the presidential election at the end of the year. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal will open the campaign season in May 2007 for elections to be held the following September. A possible runoff election to determine the winning presidential candidate (if no one receives a majority of the vote in the first round) will be held in November.

Despite the relative stability, no substantial improvements in the political realm were observed during this period. According to *Informe Guatemala*, there were two critical weaknesses to President Oscar Berger's administration after two years in office: poor administrative capacity (his economic team excepted) and poor policy implementation (*Informe Guatemala*, No. 33, 2006). The weakness of the Berger administration originated in having gained power through a fragile political alliance that started to fracture shortly after it took office. This not only affected the public policies emanating from the presidency, but also weakened its capacity to negotiate with the political forces of Congress. On another front, the fight against corruption centered on officials from the previous government of the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (Guatemalan Republican Front, or FRG) and achieved some partial successes. Generally, the administration's attention to social problems, such as health care, was perceived to be inefficient. In this case, the result was a crisis in the public health care system in June 2006. But perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of the Berger administration – as well as previous administrations – was its incapacity to tackle the growing problems of crime and social violence. It was not until October 2006 (after this survey had been conducted) that it struck a direct blow to organized crime by infiltrating and destroying a mafia network that had taken control of the Pavón jail. It is possible that such government action might have increased the public's trust in the system's institutions.

On the positive side, the Berger administration managed to reinvigorate the Peace Agreements despite the withdrawal of MINUGUA from the country. Also, despite the breakdown of talks with various groups in the first few months of 2006, and the working class (*popular*) demonstrations, the government team managed to maintain its effort to achieve consensus through dialogue. There were various tense moments between the government and these sectors, especially regarding the government's eviction of peasants who had invaded farms. In the international sphere, Guatemala also managed some achievements, such as having been chosen for a position on the new U.N. Human Rights Council.

With regard to other political actors, the atomization of political parties continued in this period, largely due to internal struggles resulting from the presidential aspirations of many of their leaders. Both the political right and left continued to be divided by their internal struggles, which did not help Guatemalans overcome their negative impression of politics. It is worth recalling that this weariness not only affects politicians but the entire democratic system. An example of the current atomization in the political realm is the excessive proliferation of parties that still prevails in the country. Table I.2 shows the existing parties in Guatemala, their membership numbers as of September 2006, and their ideological position. The wide range of presidential contenders, parties and candidates for various popularly-elected posts is not only confusing for the Guatemalan electorate, but also exacerbates the volatility of the political party system, which is one of the weakest elements of representative democracy in any country (Mainwaring, 2001).

Table I.2. Current Political Parties in Guatemala

PARTY	ACRONYM	MEMBERS <i>as of Sept. 2006</i>	IDEOLOGICAL POSITION	CURRENT REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS
Gran Alianza Nacional	GANA	21,766	Right	Yes (32)
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco	FRG	40,784	Right	Yes (28)
Partido de Avanzada Nacional	PAN	37,540	Right	Yes (14)
Partido Patriota	PP	27,692	Right	Yes (8)
Partido Unionista	PU	17,753	Right	Yes (5)
Partido Movimiento Reformador	MR	17,338	Right	Yes (4)
Partido Libertador Progresista	PLP	12,941	Right	No
Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza	UNE	29,286	Center	Yes (23)
Bienestar	BIEN	16,900	Center	Yes (1)
Centro de Acción Social	CASA	16,200	Center	No
Unión Democrática	UD	16,760	Center	Yes (1)
Partido DIA	DIA	20,481	Center	Yes (1)
Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca	DCG	72,041	Center	Yes (1)
Frente por la Democracia	FG	18,842	Center	No
Partido Socialdemócrata Guatemalteco	PSG	15,729	Center	No
Los Verdes	LV	11,661	Left	No
Alianza Nueva Nación	ANN	17,396	Left	Yes (4)
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca	URNG	17,329	Left	Yes (2)

Source: prepared by D. Azpuru based on data from ASIES and INCEP

A positive event that occurred after the completion of this survey of democratic culture was the signing of the political agreement *Acuerdo Marco Visión del País* (General Agreement Vision of the Country) on October 11, 2006. The secretary generals for 10 political parties represented in Congress (GANA, FRG, UNE, PAN, PATRIOTA, URNG, MR, DCG, DÍA, and UD) agreed to continue essential State policies in the areas of health, education, rural development, and personal safety over the next 15 years. This agreement, considered historic, constituted the culmination of an eight month effort in which representatives from these 10 organizations actively participated to formulate such public policies through consensus building (Carta Informativa Semanal No. 40, 2006). How effective and resilient this agreement will be is uncertain and will depend on the will of the parties involved.

2. Guatemalans' Perceptions of Politics

The central focus of this study is to analyze the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of Guatemalans regarding politics and related topics. This is the theme that we develop through the 10 chapters of this report. In this section, we present just an overview of the interest that Guatemalans have in “politics.” To do this, we examine the results of the following question:

POL1. *How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?*
 1) A lot 2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK

The results to this question can be seen in Figure I.5, which compares the responses given by men and women. In both cases, only a small percentage of respondents (2.9% of women and 4.9% of men) indicated that they had much interest in politics. From here on the differences are greater: men show more interest in politics. Still, even among the male population, around 80% said they had little or no interest in politics. The percentage of women with little or no interest climbs to 87%.




Figure I.5 Interest in Politics in Guatemala, 2006

C. Other Studies of Political Culture in Guatemala

During the period of authoritarian governments in Guatemala, which ended in 1986 when a freely elected civil government took power, it was practically impossible to carry out independent academic studies that involved measuring public opinion. The atmosphere of repression and censorship that existed neither provided neither safety nor academic certainty. Measuring public opinion in the country, therefore, only began with the coming of political democracy. The first study of Guatemalan democratic values was conducted by the University of Pittsburgh, the *Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales* (Association of Research and Social Studies, or ASIES), and consulting firms such as Development Associates (of the United States) starting in 1993. Since then, similar studies have been conducted every two years. In fact, Guatemala is the Latin American country in which these studies have been most frequent and consistent. The first survey was conducted in 1993; the second in 1995, and subsequently on a

regular basis (1997, 1999, 2001, and 2004) up to the survey conducted in mid 2006, which is the seventh study of democratic culture in Guatemala. In each of these years, the findings were presented to the public in various ways and were later published.

Financial support for these studies was provided by the Agency for International Development (USAID). The University of Pittsburgh, where the Latin American Public Opinion Project was initiated under the direction of Dr. Mitchell Seligson, coordinated these studies for various years. Between 1993 and 1999, these studies were jointly conducted by the University of Pittsburgh, the Guatemalan research center, ASIES, and the U.S. consulting firm, Development Associates. ASIES took charge of the 2001 study. In 2004, the study was systematized in various Latin American countries through the LAPOP project, which moved to Vanderbilt University that year. In 2004, ASIES was also the Guatemalan academic counterpart. This new study, still in the framework of the LAPOP project, was coordinated by Vanderbilt University, but there was some changes in the Guatemalan institutions. In 2006, the fieldwork was conducted by the Central American firm Borge y Asociados (instead of ASIES), and FLACSO-Guatemala (*Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales*, or Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) is in charge of diffusing and publishing this seventh study.

All the studies have maintained high academic standards, and there has been an effort to improve them year after year. Despite the changes in Guatemala, and given that these surveys are designed to examine topics in depth (rather than conjunctural topics as election surveys do), we have tried to maintain consistency in the development of certain questions, scales of measurement, and even forms of analysis and data interpretation. Still, there have been some important changes in order to try and improve the academic quality of the study, as well as to try and bring the Guatemalan study in line with other similar ones conducted in various countries of the Americas. It is worth highlighting that this series of surveys of democratic culture used questionnaires in some of the country's Mayan languages in addition to Spanish.

In addition to these studies, the Costa Rican organization PROCESOS has conducted three studies of political culture in Guatemala: two general ones and one designed for high school students. ASIES, with the support of the Soros Foundation, conducted a similar study on the democratic culture of Guatemalan young people and teachers in 2002. In the context of a project of supporting municipalities, FLASCO-Guatemala conducted a survey that included some elements of political culture.

II. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE STUDY

A. The Methodology

This study uses quantitative methodology to analyze the survey data. We use descriptive statistics, that is the frequency of responses given by respondents, but we also employ inferential statistics to identify, through multivariable analysis, the factors associated with the different variables that we try to explain. In each chapter, we use various dependent variables, which give us an overview of the topic in question. After describing them, we construct statistical regression models (linear or logistic) using various independent or explanatory variables in order to examine the relations between them. The following are among the independent variables used in different ways in the statistical models in each chapter:

- *Sociodemographic variables*: age, education, sex, place of residence (urban or rural), religion, socioeconomic level (measured by the number of goods in the home), civil state, and ethnic self-identification (a very important variable in Guatemala).
- *Contextual variables*: perception of the economic situation of the country and the personal economic situation of the respondent, victimization by crime, perception of personal safety, perception of crime as a threat to the country's future, victimization by corruption, and the perception of corruption.
- *Variables that can influence political behavior*: index of political knowledge, index of following the news in the media, index of the perception of freedom, index of participation in social organizations, index of support for the system, evaluation of the what kind of job a respondent's municipal government is doing, evaluation of the job the current president is doing (President Berger in 2006), and the degree of satisfaction with democracy.

B. The Sample of the 2006 Study

A study of democratic values, attitudes, and practices should take all citizens into account, not only those who participate or live in the largest cities. To be able to draw valid conclusions for the entire Guatemalan population, we need to take a sample of the population that has similar characteristics to the country as a whole. This sample is like a “miniature Guatemala” and includes people from all the different ethnic groups, divided by sex, age, religious beliefs, income, and other characteristics that reflect the composition of the entire population as accurately as possible. The advantage of public opinion surveys over election polls is that they tend to include more poor and rural voters, who are often underrepresented by commercial polls.

The design of the sample used in this study is representative of all adult Guatemalans in line with the composition reported in the 2002 national census. To avoid biases in choosing respondents, we used a probabilistic design; that is, we selected people through a process similar to a raffle. Since this procedure could underrepresent some regions of the country, we devised a sample for each one of them. This procedure is known as stratification, and each of the regions is called a strata. This study uses five strata: the Metropolitan Area, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest. There is also a risk that in each region, more respondents from the urban areas might be included since they concentrate more people. To avoid this, we repeated the procedure of separating each strata into an urban and rural area (in accord with the census definition), and only then did we proceed to create a sample in each of the strata. This type of design, in which the population is divided into different levels, is called a stratified design.

A sample’s accuracy is usually measured with two parameters: the reliability and the maximum error. The maximum error refers to how much the sample’s findings can vary from those that would have been obtained if everyone in the country were interviewed. Although it would be ideal if this number were zero, it is inevitable to have small differences when a group smaller than the entire population is selected. Additionally, since the respondents were randomly selected, it is possible that they might have views that differ from the rest of the population. The sample’s reliability indicates in how many cases the reported findings differ from those of the general population in a quantity lower than the maximum error. For example, when we say the study has a maximum error of 2.9% with a 95% reliability, we are stating that maximum one out of each of the 20 reported proportions has a 2.9% difference either greater or lower than that which would have been obtained if we had interviewed all adults living in Guatemala.

For the sample used in this study, which has a size of 1,498 people, we work with different precisions according to the group we are interested in analyzing. In the Annex, we show the maximum error for each of the interest groups (all with a 95% reliability). We also detail the design errors. It is worth mentioning that the 2006 sample was based on the 2004 sample, allowing comparisons to be made between them.

C. Comparing the 2004 and 2006 Samples and the Characteristics of the 2006 Sample

Table II.1 shows a detailed comparison between the samples used in 2004 and 2006. Although there have been studies of democratic culture in Guatemala since 1993, starting in 2004 the use of a scientific sample and a questionnaire with key questions was systematized here and in different countries of the continent. These key questions were also used in the 2006 questionnaire. Therefore, many of the findings that we present in this study show the changes that have occurred between 2004 and 2006.

As can be seen, the 2004 and 2006 samples are similar in various aspects, particularly in the distribution by sex and area of residence. As indicated above, both samples are representative of the national population and reflect indicators that are close to the actual composition of the country's population. It is worth adding that the *items* included in Table II.1 more than just characterize the respondents. They also serve as independent variables, which means that they are used in the statistical analyses as possible predictors or explanations of other questions. In other words, we seek to establish a relation between them and key topics, such as support for democracy.

Table II.1. Characteristics of the Respondents: Comparing the 2004 and 2006 Guatemalan Samples

VARIABLE	CATAGORIES	2004		2006	
		N	%	N	%
Sex*	Male	828	48.5	750	50.1
	Female	880	51.5	748	49.9
	TOTAL	1,708	100%	1,498	100%
Residence	Urban	790	46.3	706	47.1
	Rural	918	53.7	792	52.9
	TOTAL	1,708	100%	1,498	100%
Ethnic Self-Identification	Indigenous	768	47.8	574	39.2
	Ladino	810	50.4	872	59.6
	Garifuna	4	.2	2	.1
	Other	26	1.6	16	1.2
	TOTAL	1,608	100%	1,464	100%
Civil State	Single	447	26.6	431	29.2
	Married or living together	1,134	67.4	956	64.7
	Other	102	6	90	6.1
	TOTAL	1,683	100%	1,477	100%
Religion	Catholic	964	56.8	810	55.6
	Protestant	570	33.6	499	34.3
	Other	24	1.4	23	1.6
	None	138	8.1	124	8.5
	TOTAL	1,696	100%	1,456	100%
Education	None	271	15.9	178	11.9
	Primary (1-6)	860	50.4	679	45.3
	Middle school (7-9)	181	10.6	266	17.7
	Secondary (10-12)	279	16.2	266	17.8
	University (13 +)	117	6.9	109	7.3
	TOTAL	1,708	100%	1,498	100%
	AVERAGE EDUCATION		5.75		6.71
Age	18-25 years	442	25.9	487	32.5
	26-35 years	482	28.3	314	21.0
	36-45 years	269	15.7	299	20.0
	46-55 years	301	17.6	268	17.9
	56-65 years	122	7.1	88	5.8
	66 +	92	5.4	42	2.8
	TOTAL	1,708	100%	1,498	100%
	AVERAGE AGE		38 years		36 years
Socioeconomic Status (by number of goods in the home)	Potable Water	1,237	72.4	1,207	80.6
	Refrigerator	751	44.0	813	54.3
	Vehicle (1 o more)	346	20.2	319	21.3
	Computer	175	10.2	255	17.0

The data shown in Table II.1 covers the national sample, but it is important to emphasize the differences found among the respondents themselves, especially in 2006. The following figures show some of these differences. One of the independent variables that has an impact in Guatemala, unlike in other countries, is the respondent's area of residence. As can be seen in Figure II.1, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Honduras are the only countries in the 2006 round of LAPOP surveys in which more rural residents were interviewed than urban ones, though the

margin was small. In fact, the distribution of the population is rather similar: 53% of respondents live in rural areas while 47% live in urban areas of the country.




Figure II.1. Area of Residence in Comparative Perspective, 2006.

Using the variable of urban vs. rural residence again as one of the parameters of analysis, Figure II.2 shows the distribution of the population interviewed in Guatemala in 2006 in terms of education. It is worth noting that respondents were asked how many years of education they had, without specifying whether or not they had finished their studies. Therefore, we should assume that having a primary level or even university education does not mean that it was completed, only that respondents studied for some time at this level. With this clarification in mind, we can analyze the figure. In Table II.1, we saw that the average level of education among all respondents was 6.7 years. However, in Figure II.3, we can see that there is a clear contrast between urban and rural areas. In the former, the percentage of people with a higher level of education is evident, especially high school and even university. While in rural areas only 10.6% of the population has some degree of high school education, in urban areas this percentage rises to 25.8%. The contrast is even greater in the next category: while 11.5% of respondents from urban areas indicated that they had attended the university, in rural areas only 3.5% said that they

had attended the university. Nonetheless, the majority of the population in rural areas (53.7%) said that they had some degree of primary education.




Figure II.2. Distribution of the Guatemalan Sample, 2006: by Residence and Education

Also related to the distribution of the population, it is important to point out that the sample uses specific quotas for men and women; that is, the number of respondents of each sex was predetermined. Figure II.3 shows the distribution of education by sex for the 2006 sample. It reveals that the percentage of women without any formal education is higher than that of men. This difference disappears at the level of primary education, however, and from here on up the difference between the two sexes remains minimal, even at the university.




Figure II.3. Distribution of the Guatemalan Sample, 2006: by Education and Sex

Figure II.4 highlights another important contrast in Guatemala. Still related to the urban-rural divide, we can see that the majority of the *ladino* population lives in urban areas (53.4%) while the rest (46.6%) live in rural areas. The opposite occurs with people who identify themselves as indigenous. Here the contrast is more striking: only 37.3% of indigenous respondents live in urban areas, while 62.7% reside in rural areas.




Figure II.4. Distribution of the Guatemalan Sample, 2006: by Residence and Ethnic Identification

Age is another important factor in Guatemala. In this study, we only included people over the age of 18, the legal age to exercise the vote and other civil rights in the country. As can be seen in Figure II.5, the population pyramid in Guatemala, as in other developing countries, tends to widen at the base and narrow at the top. In Table II.1, we saw that the average age of all respondents in the 2006 survey was 36 years.




Figure II.5. Distribution of the Guatemalan Sample, 2006: by Age

Another characteristic of the 2006 sample that is worth highlighting is the difference in income levels within the population. In this study, we measured the socioeconomic level of the Guatemalans interviewed through two variables: one that asks respondents to identify the bracket in which the monthly income of their household falls; and another variable formed by an additive index composed of the number of electric appliances and goods that respondents say they have in their home (see the questionnaire in the Annex for the details). The first indicator, family income, has some limitations. For one, many Guatemalans belong to the informal sector of the economy and therefore do not have stable monthly incomes. Also, many are housewives or dependents of somebody else and, therefore, do not know the details of household income. Throughout this study, therefore, we use the index of the ownership of goods in the home as an independent variable to see whether or not it influences the results obtained in other questions.

Nonetheless, it is important to know the distribution of respondents' monthly family income. This can be seen in Figure II.6. This figure shows us that the majority of respondents, about 70%, have monthly incomes less than 2,000 quetzals, while only 4% have incomes greater than 5,000 quetzals per month.




Figure II.6. Distribution of the Guatemalan Sample, 2006: Socioeconomic Level by Income

III. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AMONG GUATEMALANS

A. Conceptual Framework

In recent years, one of the topics that scholars of public opinion have been discussing is what democracy means to different people (Mishler, 2006). Is democracy a universal concept that can “move” from country to country, independent of the culture, the historic circumstances, and the degree of political development in a particular society?

The purpose of this chapter is not to argue for an ideal conception of democracy. Rather, it is to establish the kind of conceptions of democracy that people have and how they might relate to other variables associated with democracy. This chapter, therefore, presents the results of survey measurements to determine how Guatemalans conceive of democracy. We used a complex theoretical model to measure the main conceptions of democracy that Guatemalans have. Respondents were asked to respond to the following question:

DEM13. In few words, what does democracy mean for you? [NOTICE: Do not read choices. After the first and second response, ask, “does it mean something else?”]. Accept up to three answers.

We focused the analysis on the response that respondents considered to be the most important for them, generally the first. We then classified these responses according to four categories developed by the LAPOP project.

- 1) Normative or intrinsic conceptions of democracy: consider democracy to be something associated to democratic rules and procedures, such as free elections, the power of the people, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, etc.
- 2) Instrumental or utilitarian conceptions: consider democracy to be the means to an economic or social end, such as well-being, economic progress, growth, job opportunities, free trade, etc.

- 3) Negative or pejorative conceptions: consider democracy to be a bad idea for the country, bringing such things as social disorder, corruption, the lack of justice, etc.
- 4) Empty conceptions: used to categorize those people who respond to the question by claiming that they do not know what democracy is, that it has no meaning, or that its meaning does not fit in any of the above categories.

We start from the assumption that the long term legitimacy of a political system is associated with the prevalence of normative conceptions of democracy. By contrast, in a society in which utilitarian conceptions dominate, legitimacy can erode when there is an economic or political crisis (Sarsfield, 2006).

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

The different chapters of this study have a similar structure. First, we compare the Guatemalan findings to those obtained in other countries that participated in the 2006 round of the LAPOP project. Then we analyze the national results.

Figure III.1 shows the Latin American distribution of the different conceptions of democracy. A pattern that stands out is dominance of the normative conception of democracy in all countries, especially in Chile and Costa Rica where three-quarters of the population have such a conception. This is not surprising if we consider that both countries, along with Uruguay, are generally considered to have the most advanced democracies in Latin America, according to various aggregated indicators. A second group of countries, where normative conceptions prevails among 60% to 70% of the population, is comprised of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Haiti, and Jamaica. In most countries, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, around 50% of the population has a normative conception of democracy. The empty conception of democracy is the second most important. Only in El Salvador does 40% of the population have this conception; in the other countries, the percentage is between 20% and 30%. The utilitarian conception of democracy is only significant in Panama, where around a fifth of the population holds it. In all countries, less than 6% of the population has a negative conception.




Figure III.1 Different Conceptions of Democracy in Comparative Perspective

C. Analyzing the National Findings

(1) The Findings

In the following figures, we see the distribution of the responses given by Guatemalans to the questions regarding their conception of democracy. In Figure III.2, we see that around 56% of respondents have a normative conception of democracy, that is they relate it to the procedures and norms of the system. A third of the population, 32.2%, has an empty conception of democracy, while 7.5% has a utilitarian one. A smaller percentage, 4.3%, has a negative conception.



Figure III.2 Different Conceptions of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006

(2) Explaining the Relationship between Variables: The Predictors

Now we turn to analyze what factors are related to one or another conception of democracy in Guatemala. To do this, we conducted a multivariable statistical analysis (statistical regressions), through which we tried to find the independent variables related in some way with what we are trying to explain (in this case, the different conceptions of democracy). In order to make the text flow, in this and the other chapters of this study, the results of the statistical regressions are presented in the Annex. According to the multivariable analysis, the different conceptions of democracy in Guatemala are related to the following factors: the respondent's sex, age, educational level, and ethnic self-identification. More specifically, women, people who identify themselves as indigenous, younger people and those with less education are all more inclined to have an empty conception of democracy.

Table III.1. Predictors of the Conception of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of the Conception of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Education	More education, less empty conception
	Sex	Male, less empty conception
	Ethnic self-identification	<i>Ladino</i> , less empty conception
	Age	Older, less empty conception

There are marked differences by education, as can be seen in Figure III.3. The normative conception of democracy is associated with a university and even high school education. Thus, while close to 80% of Guatemalans with some university education have a normative conception of democracy, the percentage falls as educational levels drop. The other contrast appears in the empty conception of democracy, where the opposite occurs. Close to 60% of Guatemalans interviewed without any education have an empty conception of democracy, while less than 20% of people with a high school or with some university education have this vision of democracy. Education does not appear to play an important role with regard to the other two conceptions of democracy, the utilitarian and the negative. In fact, in both categories only a small percentage of the population holds them, as can be seen in Figure III.2. It should be noted that the variations among the different conceptions of democracy by education are statistically significant.




Figure III.3 Different Conceptions of Democracy in 2006: by Education

In Guatemala, conceptions of democracy vary by the sex of respondents. In Table III.2, we can see the differences in detail. While 58.8% of men have a normative conception, only 53.1% of women do. By contrast, a larger percentage of women than men tend to have an empty conception of democracy (36.6% of women vs. 27.9% of men). The percentages in the negative and utilitarian categories do not vary much between the sexes. The differences by sex are statistically significant.

Table III.2. Differences in the Conceptions of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006: by Sex

Conception	Sex		Total
	Female	Male	
Negative	31	34	65
	4.1%	4.5%	4.3%
Empty	274	209	483
	36.6%	27.9%	32.2%
Utilitarian	46	66	112
	6.1%	8.8%	7.5%
Normative	397	441	838
	53.1%	58.8%	55.9%
	748	750	1498
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: LAPOP Guatemala, 2006

It is worth asking whether sex is a spurious variable (which explains that the causal relation between the two variables is given by a third) and it is really education that determines the conception of democracy among Guatemalans. We know that in Guatemala the educational level of women is similar to that of men, except in the category of people who do not have any formal education, in which the percentage of women is significantly higher (see Chapter II of this study). Figure III.4 shows the differences by sex and education in detail. We excluded negative and utilitarian conceptions from the figure because their percentages are quite low. Analyzing the figure, we see that, in fact, there is no difference in the percentage of men and women with a university education, 37% have a normative conception. Differences start to appear, however, at the high school level. While 40.6% of men with some high school education tend to have a normative conception, only 31.2% of the women do. There are fewer differences among people with secondary and primary education or Guatemalans with no education at all. Therefore, rather than a spurious relation, it can be said that there is an interactive relation among the variables, that is, that they only have an effect in some categories.

In contrast, differences between sexes appear in the empty conception of democracy. The percentages are similar among people with a university, high school, or secondary education, but they are different among those who only have a primary education. While 21.5% of women with a primary education have an empty conception, only 15.6% of men do. The difference among those who have an empty conception of democracy is especially high among women and men without any formal education: while 21.3% of men without any formal education have an empty conception of democracy, 36.5% of women do. The difference among those who have an empty conception of democracy is especially high among women and men without any formal education: while 21.3% of men without any formal education have an empty conception of democracy, 36.5% of women have such a conception.




Figure III.4. Different Conceptions of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006: by Education and Sex

Another predictor that is important to represent graphically is the difference between *ladino* and indigenous people in the country. Figure III.5 shows that Guatemalans who self-identify as *ladino* tend to have a more normative vision of democracy, while those who self-identify as indigenous tend to have a more empty vision of it. As can be seen in the error bars of the figure, the differences between the indigenous and *ladinos* are statistically significant in the normative and empty conceptions, but not in the other two.




Figure III.5. Different Conceptions of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006: by Ethnic Self-Identification

IV. SUPPORT FOR STABLE DEMOCRACY IN GUATEMALA

A. *The Conceptual Framework*

One of the principal weaknesses of new democracies is the low level of legitimacy of the political system, or in other words, weak social support for democracy and its institutions. The more legitimacy a democratic regime enjoys, the greater chance it has of deepening the democracy. By contrast, public support for authoritarian options can undermine efforts to consolidate democracy. Legitimacy can be defined as the attribute of a state through which it enjoys sufficient consensus, in a majority of the population, to ensure obedience without needing to rely on force. Legitimacy is the belief, in a given population, that despite the imperfections and deficiencies of the existing political institutions, they are better than other possible options and the rules that govern society require obedience (Linz and Stepan, 1978). An authoritarian regime does generally not need legitimacy since it relies on force to make citizens obedient.

Frequently, the legitimacy of elected officials (in charge of democratic institutions at a given moment) is confused with the legitimacy of democracy as a system and its institutions. To talk about legitimacy, one should refer to the permanent institutions that sustain a regime, irregardless of the authorities temporarily in charge of them. Still, we find that legitimacy is closely related to the issue of how efficacious and effective elected officials are. Thus, the ineffectiveness of rulers weakens the authority of the state and its legitimacy. As political scientist Larry Diamond claims, the legitimacy of political institutions is closely related to how well these institutions do their job, especially in resolving the issues of concern to the public (Diamond, 1999).

One of the central themes that studies of democratic culture try to measure is the legitimacy of the democratic political system and its institutions, as well as how much the public accepts a series of basic principals inherent to a democracy, such as tolerance. In this chapter, we present the results of the measurements of support for the political system and political tolerance in Guatemala. To measure support for the political system, we used a series of five *items* in which respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale from one (none) to 7 (much), how they would respond the following questions:

B1. *To what extent do you think the courts in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial?*

B2. *To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guatemala)?*

B3. *To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Guatemala?*

B4. *To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Guatemala?*

B6. *To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Guatemala?*

We measured political tolerance through a series of four *items* in which respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 (strong disapproval) to 10 (strong approval), their degree of approval to the following questions which make up the scale:

D1. *There are people who speak negatively of the Guatemalan form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**?*

D2. *How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.*

D3. *How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?*

D4. *How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?*

D5. *And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?*

?

To make the results easier to understand, they were recoded onto a 0-to-100 point scale in which 0 is the worst possible score and 100 the best possible; there is a wide variation in that scale depending of the responses given by each respondent. In both cases, support for the political system and political tolerance are combined to create an index that has a high statistical level of reliability (Alpha Cornbach).

After constructing the index of support for the political system and the index of tolerance, we divided the two variables into high and low levels. We then proceeded to explore the relation between support for the system and tolerance in order to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.⁶ Table IV.1 shows all the theoretically possible combinations between these variables.

⁶ The scale ranges from 1-to-100 in such a way that 50 points is the natural division to separate the “high” and “low” categories. In reality, the scale has 101 points, since zero also counts as a valid value, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies, 50 is used because it is more intuitive.

Table IV.1. Theoretical Relation between Support for the Political System and Tolerance in Institutionally Democratic Societies

SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM	POLITICAL TOLERANCE	
	<i>HIGH</i>	<i>LOW</i>
<i>HIGH</i>	(1) Stable Democracy	(2) Authoritarian Stability
<i>LOW</i>	(3) Unstable Democracy	(4) Democracy-at-Risk

Each possible combination is located in one of the cells of the table. The ideal situation is that of the first cell (1), called the cell of stable democracy in this model. This represents those political systems in which most citizens are highly supportive of the system and are highly tolerant. These systems tend to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the reasoning that a political system needs solid support, or legitimacy, to guarantee its stability (Norris, 1999). Systems that are politically legitimate tend to enjoy stable democracy when there is support for the system and when the public is reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities. If the public does not support the political system, and are free to act, the almost inevitable result will be a change in the system with a tendency toward anarchy.

The second cell (2) is called authoritarian stability. Stable systems are not necessarily democratic, unless they guarantee the rights of minorities. In this way, if support for the system is high and tolerance is low, the society can become authoritarian. The two lower cells represent situations in which there is low support for the system. The third cell is called unstable democracy. The instability does not necessarily result in reduced rights, since this same instability might lead to a deepening of democracy, especially when people's values tend toward political tolerance. For this reason, in a situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or in a period of instability characterized by restrictions on civil rights.

The fourth cell represents the most worrisome situation. Cell (4) is called democracy-at-risk, and it represents a hypothetical situation in which a breakdown of the democratic order would be a possible result if there were low support for the system and low political tolerance in a given country. Clearly, it is not possible to predict a democratic breakdown only based on public opinion data since many other factors play a crucial role, such as the attitude of elites, the position of the military, and the support or opposition of international actors. However, it is

possible that those systems in which people neither support the basic institutions of a country nor the political rights of other citizens would be more vulnerable to a breakdown of democracy.

It is important to note a few things about this model. First, the relations described above are applicable only to democratic systems in which competitive elections are held regularly and wide public participation is permitted. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have very different implications. For example, low support for the system and higher tolerance could cause an authoritarian regime to breakdown and lead to the formation of a democratic one. Second, it is assumed that, in the long run, both the attitudes of the elite as well as the general public influence what kind of regime exists. There can be situations in which the attitudes of the public might be at odds with the type of regime for a long time, but such incongruencies could eventually lead to a breakdown of the existing regime. For example, Seligson and Booth examined the case of Nicaragua. For most of the 20th century, the reigning system was authoritarian and repression was used to maintain the regime, perhaps even despite the democratic attitudes of the population. But the existence of low support for the political system might have eventually helped to defeat the Somoza government (Seligson and Booth, 1993).

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

As in the previous chapter, we present some figures below that allow us see how Guatemala compares to the other countries included in the 2006 round of LAPOP surveys. As explained in the section above, there are three basic measurements in this chapter. The first refers to the support that the people of a particular country show the political system. The second refers to political tolerance toward other people. And the last measures the perspectives of stable democracy through a combination of the system support and tolerance indicators.

Figure IV.1 shows the comparative results of support for the political system. Guatemala is located in an intermediate position, with an average score of 52.2 on the scale of 0-to-100 used to measure support. In fact, Guatemala is located in the same range as Guyana, Bolivia, and Chile, slightly above the 50-point reference line, which determines a positive result. By contrast, the country with the highest score is Costa Rica, with 64 points, while Ecuador received the lowest. In comparative perspective, Guatemala improved notably over 2004, when it was among the three lowest-scoring countries.⁷




Figure IV.1 Support for the Political System in Comparative Perspective

⁷ It is worth recalling that in 2004 only 10 Latin American countries were included in the comparative study.

Figure IV.2 shows the comparative results of political tolerance among the same countries. Guatemala received an average score similar to that for political system support, 52.7 points on the scale of 0-to-100. This result places the country a little lower, this time in the same range as Peru, Nicaragua, and Colombia. The country with the highest score on the political tolerance scale is Jamaica, followed by Guyana. In last place is Bolivia. In terms of political tolerance, in 2006 Guatemala also notably improved its position over 2004, when it was also located among the three lowest-scoring countries.




Figure IV.2. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

As explained in the introduction to this chapter, countries with high levels of support for the system and high political tolerance have the ideal combination that can lead to democratic stability. Figure IV.3 shows the percentage of people in each country who fall into the “stable democracy” box. As can be seen, Guatemala is located in the middle, with 26.8% of the population located in this box. This result is not surprising since the country also had an intermediate position in the measurements of support for the system and political tolerance. This result also places Guatemala in a better position than other Central American countries like Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, but below El Salvador and Costa Rica. The comparison with Costa Rica, however, is not the most appropriate since this country historically has been the most democratic of the region and, as can be seen in the figure, is located not only above Guatemala but the rest of the countries as well. Again, compared to the 2004 results, Guatemala significantly improved its position within the group of Latin American countries.




Figure IV.3. Perspectives for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2006

C. Analyzing the National Findings

1. Support for the Political System as a Whole

(1) The Findings

Here we start analyzing the results from Guatemala in greater detail. To do this, we employ a longitudinal analysis, as we have data since 2001.⁸ In Figure IV.4, we see the results of each of the different *items* that make up the index of support for the system. Analyzing this figure tells us where the changes were that enabled Guatemala to improve its evaluation relative to the other Latin American countries. It can be seen that, in 2006 compared to earlier years, there was an improvement in four out of the five *items* that make up this index. The average rose for the following *items*: pride in the Guatemalan political system, respect for its political institutions, the belief that the system protects basic civil rights, and the belief that the courts guarantee fair trials. Still, only the difference in the last two years is statistically significant. By contrast, there was a statistically significant decline, compared to 2004, in the index of support for the political system




Figure IV.4. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2001-2006

⁸ The same questions were used between 1993 and 1999 to measure support for the system, but a different scale of measurement, with only three points, was used. This prevents us from using the data from these years for longitudinal comparisons.

The index of support for the political system is made up of the five variables noted above. The statistical reliability of the index (Cronbach Alpha) is quite high, above .8. Figure IV.5 shows the index over time. Although in simple numeric terms it would seem that the difference of three points between 2001 and 2004 versus 2006 was not significant, the error bars appearing in the upper part demonstrate that the difference is statistically significant. In fact, this difference signifies two important achievements: 1) that compared to other countries in Latin America, Guatemala moves from the group of countries with the worst results in this index to an intermediate position; and 2) that, for the first time since this study began, the index passes the 50-point reference line, which serves as a parameter in the studies to determine whether a result is either negative (below 50 points) or positive (50 points or greater).




Figure IV.5. Index of Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2001-2006

(2) Explaining the Relationship between Variables: The Predictors

Throughout this study, we estimate the existing variations through multivariable statistical analyses. The regression shows that there are various factors associated with lesser or greater support for the political system in Guatemala. The details of this support can be seen in Table IV.1. (The regression table appears in the Annex to this study.)

Table IV.2. Predictors of Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006
Predictors of Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006

TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Ethnic self-identification	<i>Ladino</i> , more support for the system
<i>Contextual</i>	Perception of safety	More perception of safety, more support for the system
	Perception that crime threatens the country's future	Less perception that crime threatens the future, more support for the system
	Victimization by corruption	Greater victimization, less support for the system
	Perception of corruption	Less perception, more support for the system
	Evaluation of the country's economy	Better perception, more support for the system
	Evaluation of the job the president (Berger) is doing	Better evaluation, more support for the system

Among the sociodemographic variables, only ethnic self-identification turns out to be statistically relevant. Guatemalans who identify themselves as indigenous tend to show lower support the political system. The average score of *ladino* Guatemalans was 53.4 points, while for indigenous Guatemalans it was 50.4 points. This difference, as indicated above, is statistically significant and can be clearly seen in Figure IV.6.




Figure IV.6. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006: by Ethnic Self-Identification

Most explanatory variables of support for the political system in Guatemala are of a contextual kind, that is, that they are related to the background and living conditions of the respondents. As we saw in Table IV.1, crime has an important influence on support for the political system. In this case, it is not having been the victim of a crime that matters, but how safe a person feels in the neighborhood or community where he or she lives. The perception that crime constitutes a threat to the country's future is the other way that it affects Guatemalans' support for the political system. In various studies, it has been shown that the perception of different kinds of threats - economic and physical - can affect individuals' attitudes and actions (Stenner, 2005). We measured these two independent variables in the LAPOP questionnaire through two questions, which can be found in the questionnaire located in the Annex at the end of this report, and in Chapter VI, on the rule of law.

Figure IV.7 shows how the first variable, the perception of personal safety, affects support for the political system. It can be clearly seen that respondents who stated that they feel very unsafe in their neighborhood tend to show much less support for the political system. As the perception of safety increases, so too does the level of support for the political system. In the last bar there is a slight decrease in support, but this is not statistically significant.




Figure IV.7. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006: by Perception of Personal Safety

Corruption is another contextual topics that influences support for the political system in Guatemala. This is also measured in this study through two different variables, one that measures

victimization by corruption and the other that measures the perception of corruption among public officials. The specific questions through which these *items* were measured can be found in the questionnaire and the end of this report, and in Chapter V, which addresses the topic of corruption. Both variables turn out to have a statistically significant impact on public support for the political system. For example, Figure IV.8 shows that people who have not been the victim of corruption have a much higher level of support for the political system than those who have been the victim of some kind of act of government corruption. The slope of the line in the figure underlines the force of the impact: the greater the victimization by corruption, the less the support for the system.




Figure IV.8. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006: Victimization by Corruption

The perception that respondents have of the economic situation is another contextual factor that turns out to be associated with support for the political system. As explained in Chapter II, there are differences between the impact of the evaluations that individuals make of the national economy and the evaluations they make of their own economic situation. In this case, only the perception of the national economy influences support for the political system. As can be seen in Figure IV.9, people who perceive the national economic situation to be very bad have an average level of support much lower than those who perceive it to be very good. Even among those people who have an intermediate position, there is a parallel progression: the better the evaluation of the economy, the greater the support for the political system.




Figure IV.9. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2006: by Evaluation of the Economy

2. Political Tolerance

(1) The Findings

According to the methodology used in this study, political tolerance is the other central variable in the analysis on the perspective for stable democracy. We specified the questions through which we measure political tolerance at the start of this chapter. Below, we show the findings from Guatemala in recent years. Figure IV.10 indicates that, in 2006, there was an improvement in the levels of political tolerance among Guatemalans in the *items* that make up the scale. In all cases, the differences are statistically significant, as the error bars demonstrate. The greatest increase was in accepting the right of other people to vote. It is interesting to note that the tendency in all *items* has been positive since 2001. It is worth recalling that the measurement was made on the 0-100 points scale that we use in this study, in which 50 points is the reference line to determine whether a result is positive. In this sense, two of the tolerance *items* are positive: approval of people's right to vote (55.9 point average) and approval that people participate in peaceful demonstrations (56.4 point average). While the other two *items* turned out to fall just below 50 points, both improved in 2006 compared to previous years.




Figure IV.7. Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2001-2006

As explained above, we combine the four noted *items* to create the index of political tolerance. In Figure IV.11, we can see the longitudinal results. In 2006, the results of the political tolerance index surpassed 50 points for the first time since these studies began.




Figure IV.8. Index of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2001-2006

(2) Explaining the Relationship between Variables: The Predictors

We now turn to analyze the factors or independent variables associated with greater or lesser political tolerance in Guatemala in 2006. We use the same statistical regression model. But whereas a series of predictors were identified from the multivariable analysis in the index of support for the system, in the case of tolerance we only found two contextual predictors. In Guatemala, none of the sociodemographic variables appear to be associated with more or less tolerance.

Table IV.3. Predictors of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Contextual</i>	Perception that crime threatens the country's future	Less perception that crime threatens the future, more political tolerance
	Evaluation of the country's economic situation	Better perception, more tolerance

Figure IV.12 shows the impact of the predictors in detail. The political tolerance average is higher among people who think that crime does not represent a threat to the country’s future (59.4 points). On the other side, people who consider crime to be a possible threat to the country’s future have a lower political tolerance average (51.4 points).




Figure IV.12. Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2006: by Perception that Crime Threatens the Country’s Future

We did not explore the influence that a respondent's region of residence might have through multivariable analysis. Nonetheless, Figure IV.13 shows us that the levels of tolerance do, in fact, vary between the different regions of the country. We see that the northeast registers higher tolerance than all other regions of the country. By contrast, the southwest is the only part of the country where tolerance does not surpass the 50-point reference line.




Figure IV.13. Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2006: by Region

3. The Perspectives for Stable Democracy in Guatemala

The conceptual framework, at the beginning of this chapter, explained in detail how the combination of high/low support for the system and high/low tolerance can help predict the perspectives for democratic stability in a particular country. Table IV.4, below, shows the results. In 2006, Guatemalan opinion was distributed equally among the different cells: 26.8% in the stable democracy box; 26% in the authoritarian stability cell; 21.5% in the unstable democracy box; and 25.6% in the democracy-at-risk cell. What is most important to note is the positive change in 2006 compared to 2004: there was a decline in the percentage of Guatemalans in the democracy-at-risk cell (from 35.7% to 25.6%). Despite the caution with which these results should be read, the positive trend can be clearly seen.

Table IV.2. Empirical Relation between Support for the Political System and Political Tolerance in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM	POLITICAL TOLERANCE			
	<i>HIGH</i>		<i>LOW</i>	
<i>HIGH</i>	Stable Democracy		Authoritarian Stability	
	<i>2004</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2006</i>
	21.2%	26.8%	23.8%	26.0%
<i>LOW</i>	Unstable Democracy		Democracy-at-risk	
	<i>2004</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2006</i>
	19.3%	21.5%	35.7%	25.6%

With a multivariable analysis, we tried to identify the factors that might be associated with this change. The only two factors that emerged from the analysis as predictors were the area of residence and the evaluation of the current president. As can be seen in Figure IV.14, the relation is not linear. Regarding the area of residence, people who live in rural areas are more likely to fall into the stable democracy box. This is particularly true for those who believe that the current president, Oscar Berger, is doing a good job. In similar fashion, people from urban areas who believe the president is doing a good job tend to give responses that place them in the stable democracy box, although their percentages are below those from rural areas.




Figure IV.14. Support for Stable Democracy in Guatemala, 2006: by Area of Residence and Evaluation of the President Berger

Curiously, in the above figure, we see that people who believe that President Berger is doing a good job have less chance of supporting stable democracy. Perhaps this is due to the low number of people found in this category. To better understand the results, Table IV.5 shows the distribution of how both urban and rural residents evaluate the job the president is doing. As can be seen, only a small percentage believe that the president is doing a very good job. By contrast, a relatively large percentage consider he is doing a very bad job. Therefore, the answers given by these two groups do not tend to have much influence on the final determination of support for stable democracy in Guatemala in 2006. Rather, most people are found in the middle categories, especially the “so-so” one. It is probably these categories that had more influence in the improvement of the perspectives for democratic stability in the country.

Table IV.3. Evaluation of President Berger, Guatemala, 2006

Evaluation of the Job	Residence	
	Rural	Urban
Very bad	58	42
	8.1%	6.4%
Bad	131	136
	18.2%	20.6%
So-so	407	358
	56.5%	54.3%
Good	115	106
	16.0%	16.1%
Very good	9	17
	1.3%	2.6%
Total	720	659
	100.0%	100.0%

Source: LAPOP/Guatemala, 2006

4. Support for Institutions of the Political System

In addition to the support given the political system as a whole, there are more concrete measures that allow us to analyze specific government institutions. According to Norris (1999), legitimacy can have various levels, and the institutions represent a more concrete level (less abstract, in this case, than support for the political system as a whole). We will return to this topic in Chapter X. The way to measure the legitimacy of different political institutions in Guatemala is similar to that used to measure support for the political system: respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 (none) to 7 (much), how much they trust each in a series of political institutions.

Figure IV.15 shows the 2006 results for Guatemala. As can be seen, the respondent’s municipality, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the army are the only three institutions that surpass the 50-point reference line. Most institutions are found in the 40-point range, with Congress and political parties receiving the lowest scores. In this section, we do not present

longitudinal results since various institutions included in 2006 were not considered in previous years. However, in specific sections we do present some comparative results over time. For example, the institutions of the system of justice are analyzed in Chapter VI (Rule of Law), and electoral institutions in Chapter VIII (Political Participation in Guatemala). For now, the goal is to provide an overview of the legitimacy of political institutions as a whole in 2006.




Figure IV.15. Trust in Political Institutions in Guatemala, 2006

V. THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION

A. The Conceptual Framework

In recent years, international agencies have focused their attention on fighting corruption and they have been able to establish the negative impact it has on the economic development of countries. The impact of corruption on political development has been less studied at the empirical level. Today, however, corruption is often considered to be corrosive in any political system and to lower its legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

In this chapter, we examine corruption Guatemala from various perspectives. First, we compare corruption in Guatemala to that in other countries of the region. Next, as in the other chapters, we describe the national results – through time when there is data – of victimization by corruption and the perception of corruption among public officials. In both cases, we also conduct a multivariable analysis to identify which factors or variables are associated with the perception of or victimization by corruption. Finally, we present some findings regarding the opinion that people have about certain concrete practices of corruption.

A first group of questions directly asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had been the victim of an act of corruption in certain specific institutions in the previous 12 months. The series of concrete questions are the following:

<i>Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...</i>
EXC2. <i>Has a police official ask you for bribe during the past year?</i>
EXC6. <i>During the past year did any public official ask you for a bribe?</i>
EXC11. <i>During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government?</i> If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: <i>During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?</i>
EXC13. <i>Are you currently employed?</i> If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: <i>At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an inappropriate payment during the past year?</i>
EXC14. <i>During the past year, did you have any dealings with the courts?</i> If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: <i>Did you have to pay a bribe at the courts during the last year?</i>

EXC15. Did you use the public health services during the past year? **If the answer is No → mark 9**

If it is Yes → ask the following:

In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?

EXC16. Did you have a child in school during the past year?

If the answer is No → mark 9

If it is Yes → ask the following:

Did you have to pay a bribe at school during the past year?

EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?

Based on these questions, we constructed a victimization by corruption index which counted the number of times a person was victimized by corruption in the previous year. Even if victimization by corruption is a direct measure that can have concrete influence on public support for democracy and its institutions, in previous studies of democratic culture it has been found that, independently of victimization, the perception of corruption levels in a given government can also negatively influence people's democratic values and attitudes. We measured the perception of the levels of corruption that exist among public officials through the following question:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]** (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon? (8) DK/DR

Below, we present the results for Guatemala of the two kinds of variables associated with the measurement of corruption.

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

First, we present the comparative results on the topic. Figure V.1 shows the percentage of the population that has been a victim of one or more acts of government corruption in the previous 12 months. The result is based on the questions listed in the previous section. We see that Guatemala, along with Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, is part of the group of countries with medium levels of victimization by corruption. Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, and Panama make up the group with the lowest levels of victimization (less than 15% of respondents). The group of countries with the highest levels, where more than 30% of respondents indicated that they had been the victim of corruption, includes Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Jamaica, Mexico, and, much higher, Haiti.




Figure V.1. Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2006

As noted in the conceptual framework, victimization by corruption is one thing, and another is the perception that people have of how corrupt public officials are. Both variables influence people’s political attitudes, but not always to the same degree. In terms of the second measurement, the perception of corruption among public officials, Figure V.2 shows that Guatemala is located among the countries where the perception of corruption is the highest. In these countries, more than 80% of the population believes that corruption among public officials is very or somewhat widespread. This does not coincide with the real data of victimization by corruption presented in Figure V.1. A second group, which includes most of the countries, shows that between 70% and 79% of the population perceives a high degree of corruption. A last group, in which the perception of corruption is less (between 60% and 69%) is composed of El Salvador, Chile and, curiously, Haiti and Bolivia, two of the countries that show the highest levels of victimization by corruption among respondents.




Figure V.2. Perception of Corruption Among Public Officials, Comparative Perspective 2006

C. Analyzing the National Findings

1. Victimization by Corruption

(1) The Findings

Now we analyze in more detail the situation in Guatemala in terms of victimization by corruption. The battery of questions about victimization was first used in Guatemala in 2004. For this reason, we do not have longitudinal results beyond these years. As can be seen in Figure V.3, there was a slight increase in the victimization by corruption in almost all the *items* measured, except in municipalities and the schools.




Figure V.3. Kinds of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006

When the number of times a person has been the victim of an act of corruption are added up, there is no difference between the two years. Both in 2004 and 2006, around 18% of the population stated that they had been the victim of an act of corruption, while 82% said they had not been a victim. In Figures V.4 and V.5, we see in detail the percentage of times that respondents were victims, or not, during both years.



Figure V.4. Percentage of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2004



Figure V.5. Percentage of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2006

(2) Explaining the Relationship between Variables: The Predictors

The question that arises is who are victims of corruption, or what are the factors that determine that a person is or is not a victim. The multivariable analysis allows us to identify these factors. Table V.1 shows the details.

Table V.1. Predictors of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of Victimization-by-Corruption in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Urban areas, more likely to be a victim
	Socioeconomic level	Higher socioeconomic level, more likely to be a victim
	Education	More education, more likely to be a victim
	Sex	Men, more likely to be a victim of corruption

Figure V.6 shows in greater detail how people with a higher socioeconomic level, measured in the number of goods, are more frequently victims of corruption. This is particularly the case among people who have been the victim of corruption once during the previous year.




Figure V.6. Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2006: by Socioeconomic Level

Figure V.7 shows the differences in victimization rates by sex and the respondent's area of residence (urban or rural). It can be seen that in both areas, men are more frequently victims of corruption. Independently of the respondent's sex, education also is a factor that influences the degree of victimization. In both cases, people with a high school education, and particularly people with some university-level education, are more likely to be victims. However, in urban areas, women without any education are victims more frequently than women from rural areas without any education.




Figure V.7. Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2006: by Education and Residence

1. The Perception of Corruption among Public Officials

(1) The Findings

As explained in the conceptual framework at the beginning of this chapter, the perception of corruption is a different measure than victimization by corruption, although it also influences people's political attitudes. In the case of Guatemala, Figure V.8 shows that the perception that corruption is very or somewhat widespread among public officials grew in 2006 compared to 2004. During 2004, 71.6% of respondents thought corruption was very widespread (48.7%) and somewhat widespread (22.9%). In 2006, these percentages rose to 55.3% who considered it to be very widespread and 35.3% to be somewhat widespread, for a total of 90.6% of respondents. It is worth recalling that the 2004 survey was conducted a few months after the Oscar Berger administration took office, and that this government was still in power when the 2006 survey was conducted.




Figure V.8. Perception of Corruption Among Public Officials in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006

Figure V.9 shows that the difference between the years is statistically significant. This can be seen by examining the error bars. Given the separation between the two, we can conclude that the differences between these years are statistically significant.




Figure V.9. Perception of Corruption Among Public Officials in Guatemala: 2004-2006 (Statistical Differences)

(2) Explaining the Relationship between Variables: the Predictors

Among the explanatory factors of the perception of corruption, we find two similar ones that explain victimization by corruption plus an additional one. The respondent's area of residence and the level of education are again factors that influence the perception of corruption; the additional factor is age. Table V.2 specifies the direction of the statistical relation between these variables and the perception of corruption in 2006.

Table V.2. Predictors of the Perception of Corruption Among Public Officials in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of the Perception of Corruption in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Urban areas, more inclined to perceive corruption
	Education	More education, greater perception of corruption
	Age	As age increases, greater perception of corruption

Figure V.10 shows how the perception of corruption increases among respondents with higher levels of education; this increase is especially striking in rural areas. Generally, however, urban residents perceive more corruption than rural residents in Guatemala.




Figure V.10. Perception of Corruption Among Public Officials, 2006: by Educational Level

Figure V.11 shows the difference between urban and rural areas again, but this time in terms of the age of respondents. We see that there is a marked increase in the perception of corruption among residents of both areas in people over 56 years of age. Again, we can see that although the influence of corruption is greater in urban areas, this difference disappears in the older group of people, since both have a very high perception of corruption among public officials.




Figure V.11. Perception of Corruption in Guatemala, 2006: by Age Categories

It is worth asking whether there are other non-sociodemographic factors that influence the perception of corruption. To do this, we ran a regression model that included how much attention respondents pay to the news in different kinds of media, having found that people who read newspapers more frequently tend to perceive higher levels of corruption among public officials. Figure V.12 shows this relation more clearly.




Figure V.12. Perception of Corruption in Guatemala, 2006: by Following the News in the Newspapers

Finally, as indicated in Chapter IV, corruption (both victimization by corruption and the perception of corruption) influence the level of support for the Guatemalan political system. The graph showing that relationship can be found in Chapter IV.

2. The Public and Corruption in Guatemala

In the two previous sections, we examined corruption from the perspective of what happens at the government level, where the public is unable to control or influence it. A few questions in the 2006 survey, however, tried to capture whether or not the public plays a role through its tacit acceptance of the practice of paying bribes and corruption. The following is one of the questions designed to measure this tacit acceptance:

EXC19. *¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?*

Figure V.13 shows the results. As can be seen, in both rural and urban areas, only a small percentage of Guatemalans believe that it is justifiable to pay a bribe in order to obtain better public services. Paying bribes is more accepted in urban areas, where 10.3% of the population indicated that it is sometimes justifiable. In rural areas, only 7.9% of respondents justified corruption.




Figure V.13. Justifying Bribes in Guatemala, 2006: by Residence

The following is another series of questions included in the 2006 questionnaire that also tried to capture the acceptance of corrupt acts among Guatemalans:

Please tell me if you consider the following actions as 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.

DC1. For example: A congress deputy accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars from a company. Do you think that what the deputy did is :

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished
- 2) Corrupt but justified
- 3) Not corrupt DK=8

DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays the municipal official amount and currency of country equivalent to US\$5. Do you think that what the woman did is **[Read the options]**:

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished
- 2) Corrupt but justified
- 3) Not corrupt DK=8

DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is **[Read the options]**:

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished
- 2) Corrupt but justified
- 3) Not corrupt DK=8

The results can be seen in Figure V.14. It is clear that greatest rejection was to the question regarding congressmen accepting bribes: 90.5% of respondents considered such acts to be corrupt and worthy of punishment. By contrast, only 73.5% of respondents thought the fact that a politician who helps someone find a job is a corrupt act that should be punished. A women paying additional money to try and streamline some bureaucratic procedure is accepted even more: only 57.3% of respondents considered that this is a corrupt act that should be punished.




Figure V.14. Judging Certain Acts of Corruption in Guatemala, 2006

VI. PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW

A. The Conceptual Framework

The rule of law is one of the fundamental pillars of any democracy and it is one of the most difficult aspects to consolidate in an emerging democracy like the Guatemalan. Andrade notes that the rule of law has evolved as the concept of democracy has evolved, moving from a limited meaning of the state “in which the public powers respect the judicial organization, to another more evaluative one which the general public understands as a government or regime that respects civil rights, as a regime clearly the opposite of absolutism, despotism or totalitarianism” (see Valderas, 2006). The rule of law refers to formal aspects linked to the conformation of the institutions charged with handing out justice, the procedures for the effective application of the law, as well as the relation of mutual respect between the state and its citizens.

In this section, we analyze various aspects related to the rule of law. First, we present, as in the other chapters, the comparative perspective of how Guatemala stands in relation to the other Latin American countries. Next, we analyze the national results. These are subdivided into various topics: the trust Guatemalans have in institutions of the judicial system, the perception of the freedom to exercise political rights, and the impact of crime in the country, seen from a variety of perspectives.

To measure trust in the institutions of the judicial system, respondents were asked, in a series of questions, how much trust they had in various institutions, using the following scale:

*Now we will use a card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Ensure that the respondent understands correctly].***

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all				A lot			Does not know

The perception of the freedom to exercise political rights was also measured through a series of four questions, which are presented below. The combination of the four questions make up the perception-of-freedom index, which we use in this study as an independent variable.

If you decided to participate in one of the activities I am going to mention, would you do it without fear, with a little bit of fear, or with a lot of fear?

DER1. *Participate in groups that seek to solve community problems?*

DER2. *Vote in a national election?*

DER3. *Participate in a peaceful demonstration ?*

DER4. *Run for public office?*

Finally, in this chapter, we address the topic of crime and its impact from a variety of perspectives. On the one hand, we describe victimization by crime, that is, the percentage of the population who has been victimized, what the principal characteristics of the victims are (the independent variables associated with victimization), and the impact of crime on Guatemalans' political attitudes. We also examine the perceptions of personal safety that Guatemalans have, their predictors, and their impact. An important topic is the perception of crime as a threat to the future of the country. Finally, we explore some additional variables related to the rule of law, such as support for due process and support for actions contrary to the rule of law, such as taking justice into one's own hands.

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.1 shows the results related to the trust that people have in the system of justice as a whole (measured on the scale indicated at the end of the previous section, that is, on a scale of 0-to-100 points). It can be seen that Guatemala is located in the upper intermediate range of countries, with an average level of trust in 2006 of 46 points. Only four countries, Guyana, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia are slightly above the 50-point reference line, while most countries are located in the 40 to 49 point range. Peru and Paraguay, and especially Ecuador, have very low averages.




Figure VI.1. Trust in the System of Justice in Comparative Perspective, 2006

Figure VI.2 shows the comparative data of victimization by crime. Here, Guatemala is located in an intermediate position, with a victimization level of 19.2%. Peru and Chile are located above all the others, with victimization levels of 26.2% and 23.1% respectively. A second group, made up by most of the countries included in the 2006 LAPOP study, has victimization levels between 15% and 20%. Guatemala is part of this group. Jamaica and Panama have relatively low levels of victimization: 10% or less. It should be remembered that in many of the countries included in this study, most of the population lives in urban areas, which generally have much higher levels of victimization by crime than rural areas. Therefore, one of the reasons why the overall victimization figure for Guatemala is low is that a large percentage of the population lives in rural areas.



Figure VI.2. Victimization by Crime in Comparative Perspective, 2006

In this comparative section, Figure VI.3 presents the differing perceptions of the degree of personal safety that people feel in the different countries. We measured this with an *item* that asked respondents to indicate, thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, how safe or unsafe they feel in their neighborhood or community. Guatemala is located in an intermediate position: 38.6% of the population said they feel very or somewhat unsafe. The country with the lowest perception of insecurity is Jamaica, while Peru is the country where the greatest insecurity is perceived.




Figure VI.3. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2006

C. Analyzing the National Findings

1. Guatemalans and the Institutions of the Judicial System

We now turn to study in more detail certain variables internal to the country, and in some cases to do a longitudinal analysis where there is data. The first figure of this section, Figure VI.4, shows the trust in some institutions of the judicial system over time. To interpret the results, we turn again to the 0-to-100 point scale used in this study and explained above. As can be seen, the Office of the Ombudsman is the institution that receives the highest level of support and the only one, in fact, in 2004 and 2006 to surpass the reference line of 50 points. Still, we should note a statistically significant reduction in the support for this institution since 2004, dropping from 57 points in 2004 to 52 points in 2006. It should be recalled that when the 2004 survey was conducted, the Ombudsman had only been in office for a few months; it was a new official, elected by Congress but with the support of various social sectors.

Support or trust in the other institutions of the judicial system are located in the 40 to 49 point range. The Public Ministry and the Constitutional Court suffered a slight decline in the levels of public support, but the differences are not statistically significant. The National Civil Police is one institutions that slightly increased its level of public support, passing from 39 points in 2004 to 43 points in 2006. Still, it has not managed to regain the level it obtained in 2001, when its average level of public support reached 46 points.




Figure VI.4. Trust in Institutions of the System of Justice in Guatemala: 2001-2006

Figure VI.5 shows in more detail the results for an *item* that asked about the trust that people have in the system of justice overall. It also shows the results of public trust in the Supreme Court. There was an improvement in public trust in both from 2004 to 2006 (these two

items were not included in 2001), but the difference is only statistically significant for the system of justice in general, not for the Supreme Court.



Figure VI.5. Trust in the System of Justice and in the Supreme Court in Guatemala 2004 vs. 2006

2. The Perception of the Freedom to Exercise Political Rights

As indicated in the conceptual section of this chapter, the free exercise of political rights is essential to democracy. In a country with a repressive past, like Guatemala, these rights were violently restricted for many years and do not automatically develop with the formal return of a democratic regime. For this reason, it has been considered important over the years to measure whether or not Guatemalans feel they have the freedom to exercise the rights recognized in the 1985 constitution.

Figure VI.6 shows the average freedom people feel they have (when they do not feel afraid) in terms of the four *items* measured since 1993 through the questions presented in the conceptual framework of this chapter. It can be seen that, in every year in which a survey was conducted, the perception of the freedom to vote in elections is the strongest, with averages since 1993 around 80 points. In fact, the variation that exists is minimal and not statistically significant.

Greater variation is observed in the second strongest freedom perceived, that of participating in groups to resolve community problems. While in the first years it remained more or less in the same range, in 2006 there was a statistically significant increase, catching up to the perception of the freedom to vote.

The advances in the other two freedoms are not so evident, but if their progression is analyzed in detail, a positive pattern can be found. The perception of the freedom to demonstrate peacefully has been increasing over the years, although it has fluctuated. The highest, statistically significant point was in 1997 and in the most recent 2006 survey. In fact, there was an important change between 2004 and 2006. Running for public office is the last freedom included in the study. A series of factors, not necessarily legal restrictions or actions by the state might, limit participation with regard to this freedom. In any case, it is important to note that the perception of the freedom to exercise this right is far below the others, although there have been positive changes over time: in 1995 it received the lowest average with 45 points, while it reached 60 points in 2004 and 63 in 2006; all of these differences are statistically significant.





Figure VI.6. Perception of the Freedom to Exercise Political Rights in Guatemala: 1993-2006

The following figure shows more clearly the trends identified in the perception of the freedom to exercise these political rights. We see two phenomena. First, year after year, the perception regarding the right to vote is the most widespread, followed by the perception of the freedom to participate in community organizations. Below these appears the freedom to participate in public demonstrations, followed by the perception of the right to run for public office. Second, we see that generally there have been improvements over time in almost all the freedoms. However, in 2001, there was a decline in all the freedoms. It is worth noting that only in the perception of the right to vote has there been a decline since 1997, but this freedom remains the one most widely perceived by Guatemalans.



Fuente: Proyecto LAPOP/Guatemala

Figure VI.7. Trends in the Perception of the Freedom to Exercise Political Rights in Guatemala: 1993-2006

By combining the four noted freedoms, we can construct an index of the public's perception of freedom. The statistical reliability of this index is quite high. Figure VI.8 shows the results of this index in urban and rural areas of Guatemala. Since the repressive policies of former authoritarian governments hit the rural populations especially hard, we might expect that the perception of freedom would be less in these areas even after 20 years of democracy. We should recall, however, that the armed conflict continued in Guatemala until 1996, especially in the rural areas, although at the end the conflict was not very intense. In any case, the figure shows that there are no significant differences in the perception-of-freedom index between rural and urban areas of Guatemala. However, when we conduct an annual comparative analysis, we find some statistically significant differences over the years. We see that, starting in 1997, there was an important jump in the perception of freedom, which coincides with the signing of the Peace Agreements in December 1996. In 2001, there was a decrease in the general perception of freedom.




Figure VI.8. Index of the Perception of Freedom in Guatemala: 1993-2006

3. The Impact of Crime in Guatemala

a) Victimization by Crime

(1) The Findings

Now we turn to another topic related to the rule of law and that, according to Table I.1 in Chapter I, is one of the problems that Guatemalans considered to be the most serious in 2004 and especially in 2006: crime and violence.

Unfortunately, we do not have many years of longitudinal information since this question was first included in the questionnaire only in 1999. Both in 1999 and 2001, respondents were asked if they or anyone in their families had been the victim of a crime. Starting in 2004, however, the format was changed to inquire only about the victimization of the respondent, that is direct victimization. Table VI.1 summarizes the results of this question in the last two studies.

Table VI.1. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

		Year	
		2004	2006
Have you been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months?	Yes	218 12.8%	283 19.2%
	No	1490 87.2%	1194 80.8%
Total		1708 100.0%	1477 100.0%

Source: LAPOP Project/Guatemala

It is also important to know the kind of crimes respondents were the victim of. These are shown in Table VI.2. Non-aggressive robbery continued to be the most frequent form of victimization, followed by aggravated robbery. However, the percentage of victims of these two types of crime declined in 2006 compared to 2004. By contrast, the percentage of people who indicated that they had been the victim of damage to their property or home burglary increased during this period.

Table VI.2. Types of Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006

What type of crime were you the victim of?	Year	
	2004	2006
Robbery without aggression of physical threat	129	150
	59.2%	54.2%
Robbery with aggression or physical threat	69	66
	31.7%	23.8%
Physical aggression without robbery	5	10
	2.3%	3.6%
Rape or sexual assault	0	1
	.0%	.4%
Kidnapping	1	3
	.5%	1.1%
Property damage	8	21
	3.7%	7.6%
Home burglary	4	22
	1.8%	7.9%
Extortion	0	4
	.0%	1.4%
Other	2	0
	.9%	.0%
Total	218	277
	100.0%	100.0%

(2) Explaining the Relation between Variables: The Predictors

Now we turn to analyze the victims: who are they, or what factors are associated with victimization by crime in Guatemala in 2006? Table VI.3 shows that the variables related to victimization by crime are related to the area of residence, educational level, age, and sex. The table also shows the direction of this relation: urban residents, people with more education, younger people, and men are more likely to have been the victim of violence in 2006.

Table VI.3. Predictors of Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Residents of urban areas, more victimization
	Education	More education, more victimization
	Age	Younger, more victimization

The following figures show the direction of the relations suggested in Table VI.3 more clearly and in greater detail. First, Figure VI.9 highlights the marked differences that exist in terms of victimization according to the area of residence. Urban residents are much more likely to be victims than rural residents. This was especially true in 2006. Guatemala is one of the least urbanized countries compared to the other countries included in this study. For this reason, the overall results of victimization in Guatemala are lower than those of the other countries. Still, if we compare the levels victimization in urban areas of the country, Guatemala is similar to other countries in this study with crime rates, such as Chile, Peru, and Mexico, all of which have predominately urban populations.




Figure VI.9. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006 (by Residence)

Continuing to use urban versus rural residence as a parameter, Figure VI.10 shows the different levels of victimization between respondents according degree of education. The pattern is clear: the greater the education, the greater the victimization. This relation starts to become clear with secondary education. Respondents with some university education are, in fact, the most affected, and people who live in rural areas are less affected.




Figure VI.10. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2006: by Residence and Education

Figure VI.11 shows the incidence of the other two independent variables that turned out to be statistically significant as factors associated with more or less victimization by crime. We see that, generally, younger respondents, particularly those between the ages of 26 and 45, are more likely to be victims. In almost all age groups, men suffer more from this phenomenon. Still, in the 26 to 35 year age group, women suffer most, since 28.3% of them were the victims of crime.




Figure VI.11. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2006: by Sex and Age

b) The Perception of Crime and the Threat it Represents

In previous chapters, we saw that not only victimization by crime itself, but the perception of insecurity and the perception that crime is a threat to the country's future are variables that lower support for the political system in Guatemala. In the previous section, we described the results of victimization by crime. In this section, we describe the results of the other two variables. The following are the questions through which we measured these two items:

AOJ11. *Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of becoming victimized by an assault or a robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK*

AOJ11A. *And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? [Read the options]*

(1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) NS/NR

(1) The Findings

Figure VI.12 shows the distribution of the responses regarding the perception of personal safety in 2004 and 2006. The trend seems to be positive since a greater number of people indicated feeling somewhat safe in their neighborhood. It is worth recalling, however, that while the government has increased security measures in some areas, people have also taken their own measures, such as placing watchtowers and fences in neighborhoods of the metropolitan area that before were completely open to pedestrian or vehicle traffic.




Figure VI.12. Perception of Personal Safety in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

The following figure shows that the differences between both years are statistically significant. We see in Figure VI.13 that the only important difference between 2004 and 2006 is among people who feel very unsafe. We derive this by analyzing the error bars, most of which overlap (indicating that the difference is not significant).




Figure VI.13. Perception of Personal Safety in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006 (Statistical Differences)

Figure VI.14 shows the results of the question of whether or not respondents consider crime to represent a threat to the country’s future: three-quarters of the population believes that it represents a serious threat. However, the percentage of people with this view declined in 2006 compared to 2004. Still, a large majority of Guatemalans feel this way. By contrast, less than 5% of respondents indicated that crime is not a threat to the country’s future.




Figure VI.14. Perception of Crime as a Threat to the Future of Guatemala, 2006

(2) Explaining the Relation between Variables: The Predictors

To indicate which factors are associated with a greater or lesser perception of personal safety, we conducted a multivariable analysis that shows that there are only two explanatory variables: area of residence and ethnic self-identification. Table VI.4 indicates the direction of the relation between the variables and Figure VI.15 shows the same thing.

Table VI.4. Predictors of the Perception of Personal Safety in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of the Perception of Personal Safety in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Rural residents, more perception of safety
	Ethnic self-identification	Indigenous, more perception of safety

The figure shows that, while the average perception of personal safety is highest among indigenous respondents living in rural areas (with 63 points on a scale of 0-to-100), it is lowest among *ladinos* living in urban areas (with 50.8 points on the same scale).




Figure VI.15. Perception of Personal Safety in Guatemala, 2006: by Ethnic Self-Identification and Residence

c) The Public and the System of Justice

A last series of figures describes other aspects related to the rule of law. Figure VI.16 shows the degree of trust that Guatemalans have in the system of justice, which was measured through the following question:

AOJ12. *If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party? [Read the options]*

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR

The results show that most respondents in 2006 have little (35.6%) or no (29.7%) trust. Both percentages add up to a total of 65.3%. By analyzing the figure, we infer that there was a decrease in trust between 2004 and 2006, especially among people who said that they had much trust that the judicial system could punish the guilty.




Figure VI.16. Trust that the System Can Mete Out Justice in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

This lack of trust can have negative influence on people’s attitudes. On the one hand, in elections people might look to candidates who offer to mount a full scale attack on crime, if necessary going beyond the limits established by the law. On the other hand, citizens might decide to take justice into their own hands, for example by lynching suspected criminals. Both phenomena have occurred in Guatemala in recent years.

Figure VI.17 shows the percentage of Guatemalans who condone authorities who sometimes act outside the law to control crime. The contrast between 2004 and 2006 is striking. While 75.9% of respondents indicated that the authorities should always respect the law in 2004,

this percentage dropped to 56.9% in 2006. As a result, the percentage of people who think that the authorities can sometimes act outside the law to capture criminals increased.




Figure VI.17. Belief in the Respect for Due Process in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006

Figure VI.18 shows the degree of approval for taking justice into one’s own hands. In this case, respondents were not asked if they had participated in such an act, but rather if they condoned people who took justice into their own hands when the state did not punish the criminals (on a scale of 1-to-10). In 2006, the average support for such action rose in both rural and urban areas, which is a troubling finding. The difference is statistically significant.




Figure VI.18. Approval of Taking Justice into One’s Own Hands in Guatemala (2004 vs. 2006): by Residence

Finally, we analyze two topics that are important in the current Guatemalan context, the rehabilitation of gang members and the exploitation of girls and women. With regard to the first, we asked respondents if they believed that gang members could rehabilitate themselves if given a chance. Figure VI.19 shows the results. Most Guatemalans (57.3%) think that they can rehabilitate themselves, while a third (31.4%) think that they cannot. The rest (11.3%) did not know or did not know how to respond to the question.




Figure VI.19. Belief that Gang Members Can Rehabilitate Themselves, Guatemala: 2006

Figure VI.20 shows the percentage of people familiar with cases of children or adolescents who, in the last year, were victims of labor exploitation (that is, they work for others who take money from them and, through threats, prevent them from abandoning the work). The figure also shows the percentage of people who know of particular cases of women, adolescents, and girls who have been the victims of sexual exploitation (forced to work as prostitutes). While 13.4% of respondents said they were familiar with cases of children who were the victims of labor exploitation, 10.7% said they knew about cases of women, adolescents, and girls who were the victims of sexual exploitation.




Figure VI.20. Knowledge of Cases of Labor Exploitation, Guatemala: 2006

VII. GUATEMALANS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A. The Conceptual Framework

This chapter focuses on a level of government that is often relegated to second place in many studies about democratization: the local level, or the municipality where a respondent lives. Nonetheless, there are many programs whose aim is to strengthen local government, emphasizing decentralization and community participation in public policies at the local level.

As in the earlier chapters, we first compare some of the results from Guatemala with those from other Latin American countries included in the 2006 study of democratic culture. Next, we analyze in greater detail the results from Guatemala, making comparisons over time when possible.

This chapter includes variables that measure the public's satisfaction with the job that their municipal government is doing and how they evaluate their treatment by the local government. A second section analyzes the trust that the public has in the municipality as an institution, as well as how it manages funds. Finally, we examine the levels of public participation in municipal meetings and the impact that people believe they have on the decisions of the municipal government.

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

Figure VII.1 shows, in comparative perspective, the average satisfaction with municipal governments in the different countries included in the 2006 round of LAPOP surveys. Again, Guatemala is located among the upper intermediate group of countries, along with El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, and Nicaragua. This can be determined by observing the error bars in the figure, which are parallel in these countries. Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are above the Guatemalan average, and below it are another group of countries in the 44 to 49 point range, including Chile, Guyana, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica, and Panama. Jamaica and Haiti have the lowest levels of satisfaction with municipal government.




Figure VII.1. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective, 2006

The following figure (VIII.2) compares the levels of participation in municipal government meetings in Latin America. In this case, Guatemala falls into the lowest group for the first time in this study; in other words, it is one of the countries with the smallest percentage of citizens who said they had participated in a meeting called by the local government. In 2006, only 7.4% of respondents in Guatemala said that had attended a meeting this kind. This contrasts with the high percentage in countries like the Dominican Republic, with 22.9%, and Honduras, with 18.5%. Participation in the intermediate group of countries ranges from 9% to 15%. Ecuador is the country in which people reported the lowest levels of participation, with 4.9%.




Figure VII.2. Attending Municipal Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2006

The last comparative figure is Figure VII.3, which presents the data on petitioning the municipal government in the last year. With respect to this question, Guatemala is found at the bottom, that is along with those countries in which a low percentage of people petition the government. In 2006, only 11.9% of the population petitioned the municipal government. Only Colombia, Haiti, Ecuador, and Panama fell below Guatemala. Above Guatemala, the percentage of people who present petitions increases, reaching higher than 20% in the cases of El Salvador, Chile, and Peru.




Figure VII.3. Petitioning the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2006

C. Analyzing the National Findings

1. Perceptions of Municipal Government

a) Satisfaction with Municipal Services

(1) The Findings

We now turn to analyze the Guatemalan results with regard to municipal government. Figure VII.4 compares the satisfaction levels with the services offered by municipal governments in 2004 and 2006 respectively. We do not see significant differences from one year to the next.

It should be recalled that we saw, in Chapter IV, that the public most trusts their municipality, among all the political institutions measured. It is worth clarifying that trust in this institution is a different measure than satisfaction with the services it offers. In this case, both variables fall in the positive range.




Figure VII.4. Satisfaction with Municipal Government Services in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

(2) Explaining the Relation between Variables: The Predictors

The multivariable analysis allows us to identify the factors associated with more or less satisfaction with municipal government in Guatemala. Table VII.1 shows that four predictors were identified: area of residence, socioeconomic level, ethnic self-identification, and the size of the city.

Table VII.1. Predictors Satisfaction with Municipal Government in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors Satisfaction with Municipal Government in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Residents of rural areas, more satisfaction
	Ethnic self-identification	Indigenous, more satisfaction
	Socioeconomic level	Higher level, more satisfaction
	Size	Varied impact

The predictors of satisfaction with the treatment received by the municipality are almost the same, but in this case it is sex, not ethnic identity, that makes a difference. This can be seen in Table VII.2.

Table VII.2. Predictors of Satisfaction with the Treatment Received by the Municipal Government, 2006

Predictors Satisfaction with the Treatment Received in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Residents of rural areas, more satisfaction
	Sex	Men, more satisfaction
	Socioeconomic level	Higher level, more satisfaction
	Size	Varied impact

Before showing the figures related to the predictors of the two dependent variables discussed, it is interesting to see the relation between the variables themselves. Figure VII.5 shows that there is a clear relation between the perception of having been well treated in the municipal government when carrying out some procedure and satisfaction with the services of local government. Although this relation might seem logical, it is possible to ask whether respondents take their personal experience into account when they evaluate local government, or whether instead, independently of their personal experience, they evaluate local government in terms of the projects or work it has undertaken in the community. It seems that there exists a high probability that satisfaction with local government is related to the treatment individuals receive.




Figure VII.5. Perception of Local Government Services in Guatemala, 2006: by Size of the Area of Residence

Figure VII.6 shows the differences in satisfaction with local government in terms of ethnic identity and area of residence (urban or rural). It can be seen that indigenous inhabitants of rural areas appear to be the most satisfied, with an average level of satisfaction of 56.4 points on a 0-to-100 point scale. By contrast, *ladino* respondents of rural areas have the lowest satisfaction average (50.5 points on the 0-to-100 point scale). The differences are statistically significant.




Figure VII.6. Satisfaction with Municipal Government Services in Guatemala, 2006: by Ethnic Self-Identification and Area of Residence

The final figure of this section shows the differences found both in how respondents feel they have been treated by the municipal government and their satisfaction with the job it has been doing. In the first place, we see that satisfaction with treatment received is greater than satisfaction with the job the local government has done. In the second place, we see that people with a lower socioeconomic level are less satisfied, both in the job the local government has done and how they have been treated by it.




Figure VII.7. Perception of Municipal Services in Guatemala, 2006: by Socioeconomic Level

b) Trust in Local Government

In Chapter IV, we analyzed public trust in various state institutions, highlighting that the municipal government is the institution that generates the greatest trust among the population (with 56 points on a scale of 0-to-100). In this section, we analyze something related but different: how much trust people have that public funds are well-managed by their municipality, and whether people consider that municipal governments should be given more responsibilities and resources or that these should be given to the national government instead.

Figure VII.8 shows the results with regard to the management of funds. In general terms, there is a good degree of agreement among rural and urban residents on this *item*: 66% of rural residents said they had little or no trust in how their municipal government managed funds. This percentage is 63% in the urban areas of the country.




Figure VII.8. Trust that Local Governments Manage Funds Well, Guatemala, 2006

The results are also similar in urban and rural areas in terms of whether or not it is the local or national government that should be given more responsibilities and resources. While 36% of urban respondents stated that municipalities should be given more responsibilities and resources, 39% of rural respondents had the same opinion. By contrast, around 40% of people from both areas thought that the resources should go to the national government.




Figure VII.9. Belief that Municipal Governments Should Assume More Responsibilities, 2006

2. Participating in Local Government

In the comparative section, we saw that participation in local government in Guatemala is relatively low compared to other countries. What is occurring inside the country? Figure VII.10 shows that the percentage of participants in municipal government meetings declined in 2006 compared to 2004, both among the indigenous and *ladino* population. Similarly, the percentage of people who petitioned the municipal government declined in 2006, again both among people who identify themselves as indigenous and among those who identify themselves as *ladino*. In both years, however, there was greater participation among the indigenous population than the *ladino*, both in terms of attending municipal meetings and in presenting petitions. Even if there are no evident reasons for the decline in municipal participation, one could imagine that the fact that 2003 was an election year might have been an influence (respondents were asked if they attended a meeting or made a petition in the previous 12 months).




Figure VII.10. Participating in Local Government in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006: by Ethnic Identity

Another way to evaluate participation in local government is to analyze if respondents asked some government official for help, especially at the local level. We see, in Figure VII.11, that 12% of Guatemalans stated that they had asked a local official for help, a percentage much

higher than the 4.2% who asked a public institution for assistance or the 3% that asked a Congressman for help.




Figure VII.11. Contact with Public Institutions in Guatemala, 2006

More directly related to the functions of local government, respondents were asked if they had conducted some business or solicited some document from the municipal government in the last year. According to Figure VII.12, 30% of respondents stated that they had conducted some bureaucratic procedure. Next, the people who indicated that they had undertaken some such task were asked if it had been resolved by the municipality. A high percentage (92%) said it had.




Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with Bureaucratic Procedures Conducted in the Municipality in Guatemala, 2006

Likewise, in terms of the perception that people have of their involvement with local government, respondents were asked how much influence they thought they had in the municipality. Figure VII.13 shows the results. It is curious to find that there is practically no difference between urban and rural residents with regard to this topic. Around half of the population, both in rural and urban areas, believe that they do not have any influence. A third of the population consider that they have a little influence. A smaller group of people, 26% in urban areas and 16.8% in rural ones, believe that they have some influence, while only 4% in rural areas and 3.4% in urban ones estimate that they have much influence on the actions of the local government.




Figure VII.13. Perception of Personal Influence on Local Government in Guatemala, 2006

The final figure of this section about local government allows us to visualize whether respondents believe that the mayor is interested in people participating in the affairs of the municipality. Once more, we do not find large differences between urban and rural residents. Around a quarter of respondents stated that the mayor is not at all interested, and another quarter that the mayor is a little interested. The highest percentage in both areas, representing almost 40% of Guatemalans, noted that the mayor is somewhat interested in people participating. By contrast, around 15% indicated that the mayor is very interested. This turns out to be more positive than was expected, since a majority of the population considers that the mayor is somewhat or very interested in people participating in municipal affairs.




Figure VII.14. Perception of the Mayor’s Interest in Public Participation in Guatemala, 2006

VIII. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GUATEMALA

A. The Conceptual Framework

Despite the wide debate among political scientists regarding what democracy is, how to measure it, and how to classify countries according to their level of democracy, all agree that there is an essential condition that determines whether or not a country is democratic: holding free elections. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset describe democracy as a system in which there are three basic conditions: competitive elections, wide participation, and civil and political rights (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989). The famous political scientist Robert Dahl pointed to free elections and inclusive citizenship among the basic elements of a political democracy (Dahl, 1999).

This chapter examines topics related to representative democracy from the perspective of public opinion and the levels of public political participation. To present the findings in a clear manner, the chapter has been divided into two large topics: conventional and non-conventional political participation. Dalton mentions that there are different kinds of conventional political action: voting, participating in political campaigns and interest groups, and other activities normally associated with politics. But he points out that, beyond the frontiers of conventional politics, there are other kinds of non-conventional participation: participating in demonstrations and protests, community-based activities, or having direct contact elected officials by requesting assistance and presenting petitions, and the like.⁹ He indicates that the latter require more personal initiative than electoral activities, which are usually managed by political parties (Dalton, 2006).

In the first section of this chapter, as in the previous ones, we examine how Guatemala compares to the other countries of the hemisphere. Next, we analyze the data from Guatemala itself, dividing the analysis, as mentioned above, into conventional and non-conventional political action. With regard to conventional political participation, it is worth noting that besides analyzing the political behavior of Guatemalans, we also examine their views of the political parties and other representative institutions.

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

Figure VIII.1 shows the voter turnout reported by respondents, that is, whether or not they participated in the last presidential election held in their country. Guatemala, in this regard, appears at the lower end of the list, in penultimate place. Only 56.5% of respondents reported having voted in the 2003 presidential election. At the top of the list are Peru and Bolivia, which

⁹ Dalton classifies participation in non-conventional political actions on a scale that goes from non-orthodox actions (like signing petitions or participating in legal demonstrations), through what he calls direct actions (like participating in boycotts or illegal strikes), illegal actions (like participating in the occupation of buildings and private properties and in illegal demonstrations) up to actions, at the end of the scale, that involve violence (such as participating in sabotage, guerrilla organizations, kidnapping, etc.) (Dalton, 2006, p.65).

reported participation levels around 90%. A second group of countries, composed of Ecuador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have participation rates in the range of 80-89%. Most countries report rates from 70% to 79%, while El Salvador, Paraguay Nicaragua, and Colombia fall into the 60% range. Guatemala is the only country in the 50% range, and Jamaica is last with a rate of 48%. These findings are not new; it has been noted for some time that one of the major weaknesses of representative democracy in Guatemala is low voter turnout. (See, for example, the report *Democracy in Latin America* from the United Nations Development Programme.) Still, it is worth noting that the analysis should go deeper since varying electoral laws can also influence these results. One example of this is voter registration, which is not automatic in Guatemala the way it is in a number of other countries. Another factor is mandatory voting. It is important to note that the countries that, according to the UNDP report, do not have mandatory voting (Colombia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala) are the countries that appear in the lower range of voter turnout in the 2006 LAPOP survey, as can be clearly seen in Figure VIII.1.¹⁰




Figure VIII.1. Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 2006

On the other side of the coin is non-conventional political participation, which is explained above. Figure VIII.2 shows the percentage of people who reported having participated in a public protest in the surveyed countries. In this aspect, Guatemala also falls onto the lower end of the list. Bolivia was the country with the highest percentage of respondents who indicated having participated in public protests on various occasions. This is not surprising given the

¹⁰ It is worth noting that there is an error in the UNDP report in this regard. The report states that voting is mandatory in Guatemala when in actuality it is not, according to the 1985 constitution, which is still in force.

number of protests that have occurred in the country in recent years. Peru also fell into the 20% range of participation in protests. A second group, the largest, is made up by those countries in which 10% to 15% of the population had participated in protests (Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Honduras). Lastly, the third group, with less than 10% participation in protests, is, besides Guatemala, composed of other Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, and Mexico and Jamaica.




Figure VIII.2. Participation in Protests in Comparative Perspective, 2006

C. Analyzing the National Results

1. Conventional Political Participation: Voting

a) Levels of Participation

(1) The Findings

Figure VIII.3 shows the descriptive results of three different questions related to the political behavior of Guatemalans: if respondents are registered to vote, if they voted in the last election, and if they support some political party. One of the frequent criticisms made of the Guatemalan political system is that it is dominated by the country's *ladino* population (Boneo, Torres-Rivas, 2001). To examine this suggestion, the findings of Figure VIII.4 have been divided into two panels: one containing the results of those Guatemalans interviewed who self-identify as indigenous and the other containing the results of the *ladino* population.

As can be seen in the lower panel of the figure, the percentage of the *ladino* population who participates is, in fact, higher than the percentage of the indigenous population who does. While 78.2% of *ladinos* are registered, only 69.2% of indigenous people are. The second question was only directed to respondents who said they were registered. This group was asked whether or not they voted in the last presidential election. It should be recalled that, as we saw in Figure VIII.1, only 56.5% of those registered said they had voted. The official report from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal noted that 58% of registered citizens voted in the 2003 election. The survey data, therefore, is rather close to the official data of actual voter turnout. In terms of the division by ethnic group, 60.4% of the *ladino* population said they had voted while only 55.8% of indigenous people said they had.

With regard to the last topic of Figure VIII.3, the difference between ethnic groups disappears. In terms of support for a political party, the results are almost identical: only 15% of respondents, *ladino* or indigenous, said they support a political party. This is a low percentage of the population and shows the lack of identification with a political group, which is a necessary factor for greater democratic stability.




Figure VIII.3. Aspects of Voter Turnout in Guatemala, 2006

Table VIII.1 shows another aspect of electoral behavior, specifically what reason most influenced respondents' choice of who to vote for (of those who reported voting). We see that 61.1% of respondents said they had voted for the candidate's platform; 20.7% indicated that they voted for the qualities of a candidate; and only 18.2% said they voted for the candidate's political party.

Table VIII.1. Reasons for Voting for a Candidate

What Was the Most Important Reason that Determined Your Vote?	Frequency	Percentage	Valid Percentage
The qualities of the candidate	156	10.4	20.7
The political party of the candidate	137	9.1	18.2
The platform of the candidate	461	30.8	61.1
Total	754	50.3	100.0
No answer	90	6.0	

Did not vote	654	43.7
Total	744	49.7
	1498	100.0

Source: LAPOP Project/Guatemala, 2006

Figure VIII.4 shows the percentages for valid responses to this question. If respondents answered honestly, the findings of this figure are mixed. On the one hand, it would seem that Guatemalans voted rationally, since they focused their attention on the platforms of candidates rather than their personal qualities. On the other hand, however, only 18.2% had voted for the political party of a candidate, which is another sign of the weakness of political parties as channels of political intermediation in Guatemala.




Figure VIII.4. Most Important Reason for Deciding Who to Vote for in the Last Election

We now turn to analyze something important, given the high percentage of Guatemalans who reported they did not go to the polls: the reasons why they did not vote. Figure VIII.5 shows the reasons respondents gave. There is no predominant reason. A fifth of respondents indicated that they were not old enough to vote in 2003, and another 13.1% stated that they did not have a national identification card; both of these are valid reasons that do not call for further interpretation. It is the other responses that need to be analyzed in this case: 17.4% indicated that they did not vote because they had no interest in doing so, and 6.2% said that they did not like any candidate. This means that a quarter (23.6%) of respondents did not feel motivated to participate.




Figure VIII.5. Reasons for Abstentionism at the Polls during the Last Election in Guatemala, 2006

(2) Explaining the relation between variables: The Predictors

The analysis now moves to the factors or predictors that are statistically associated with not turning out to vote. As indicated in Table VIII.2, education, age, and sex are the explanatory variables for not voting in the 2003 election in Guatemala. The perception of the national economic situation is also a factor that turned out to be associated with abstention in the regression. Also, those who have an empty conception of democracy tend to vote less compared to those who have a normative conception. This last factor might be associated with the education variable, and more specifically, the lack of civic education.

Table VIII.2. Electoral Abstention Predictors in Guatemala, 2006

Electoral Abstention Predictors in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Age	Lower age, more abstention
	Sex	Women abstain more
	Education	Less education, more abstention
<i>Contextual</i>	Perception of the national economy	Positive perception, more abstention
<i>Others</i>	Conception of democracy	Empty conception of democracy, más abstention

Regarding the sociodemographic factors that influence electoral abstention in Guatemala, these results are not surprising since even in advanced democracies youth and low educational levels are factors that determine the failure to show up at the polls (Dalton, 2006). However, women turnout to vote almost as much as men in countries like the United States (Babour and Wright, 2006:594). In the case of Guatemala, the following figures show the influence of the different factors in electoral abstention. It should be noted that in all cases there is an additive relation between the explanatory variables; in other words, the variables influence abstention rates collectively. In the following figures, we present the data in panels that separately represent urban and rural areas; although residence does not turnout to be an explanatory variable in the regression, it is important to keep this difference in mind for the programs that are carried out to promote voting.

Figure VIII.6 shows the differences by sex and education, separating urban and rural areas. What stands out is that the abstention rate among women without any education is much higher than in any other group, almost reaching 70% of the population in rural areas. In urban areas, however, the abstention rate of women without any education is also high, almost reaching 64%. Among women with some primary education, the percentage of abstention is almost 55%, and is similar in urban and rural areas. In these two categories of education, the differences with men are important. Even compared to men without any education, women generally show very high percentages of abstention. The tendency of the female population to abstain is maintained

throughout all categories, except among those with a high school education. Even among women with some university education, the abstention rate is higher than among men with a university education.




Figure VIII.6. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala: by Sex and Education

Figure VIII.7 shows another perspective: the difference in voter turnout (or abstention) according to sex and age. Again, it separates rural and urban areas. We see again that women abstain from voting at much higher levels. This is particularly evident among younger women (18 to 25 years old), among whom the abstention rate in rural areas is 69%. It is also high in urban areas where it reaches 65%. We see that the difference between men and women in this first category is not so dramatic, since young men, especially in rural areas, also have high abstention rates, almost reaching 62%. We also see that there is high abstention among older women in rural areas (above 56 years old), among whom the abstention rate almost reaches 70%.




Figure VIII.7. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala: by Sex and Age

In Figure VIII.8, we see another perspective, this time using the variable of ethnic self-identification. Although this variable did not turn out to be statistically significant in the regression, it is important in terms of civic education and programs to promote voting which can be conducted in the country on the eve of the 2007 election. It can be seen that in both urban and rural areas, female abstention is higher, as seen in the above figures. Here, however, we see that the abstention rate is similar among men who identify themselves as indigenous as among those who identify themselves as *ladino*; this holds true in both urban and rural areas. Still, among women there is a difference in terms of ethnic self-identification: in both urban and rural areas, women who identify themselves as indigenous abstain more. The low turnout at the polls is particularly high among rural indigenous women, where the abstention rate is greater than 60%.




Figure VIII.8. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala: by Residence and Ethnic Self-Identification

Figure VIII.9 shows interesting results. This figure tries to represent the most significant variables related to electoral abstention in Guatemala, that is, age, sex, and education. There are various important elements to highlight. On the one hand, it is clear that age is a factor related to abstention: in all age categories, younger Guatemalans, both men and women, vote less. This turns up even among the population with some university education, especially in the case of women. Another important finding shown in Figure VIII.9 is that less educated Guatemalans vote less. It is curious to see that young men without any education turn out to vote even less than women. However, this relation is inverted in the subsequent educational categories: generally, women have higher abstention levels in all age and education categories. In summary, what the figure reveals is that the highest abstention rates are among women without any education or with only some primary education, in almost all age categories.




Figure VIII.9. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala: by Sex, Age, and Education

In the following two figures, we see the other two factors, beyond the sociodemographic variables already discussed, that influence electoral abstention in Guatemala. Figure VIII.10 shows that Guatemalans with an empty conception of democracy have much higher abstention

levels. In Chapter III of this report, we described what the different conceptions of democracy mean. In practical terms, it should be noted that the lack of civic education, and more specifically of democratic education, is a factor related to voter abstention: voting is not important to Guatemalans for whom democracy does not have a clear meaning. By contrast, people who have a normative conception of democracy (even if it is a conception limited to formal aspects), or a utilitarian conception, have higher rates of voter turnout. The differences are statistically significant (this can be seen in the confidence intervals).




Figure VIII.10. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala and Conceptions of Democracy

Finally, Figure VIII.11 shows that people who have a positive perception of the economic situation of the country tend to vote less than those who have a more negative perception.





Figure VIII.11. Electoral Abstention in Guatemala and Perceptions of the Country's Economic Situation

We now turn to examine how much Guatemalans accept conventional political participation. We do this through two questions in which respondents were asked to identify their level of approval of certain actions considered to be conventional and non-conventional political participation. The questions, which we have been asking since 2001 and therefore can be analyzed longitudinally, were the following:

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions..



- E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations.*
- E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems.*
- E11. Of people working on electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.*
- E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads.*
- E14. Of people seizing private property or land.*
- E2. Of people seizing factories, offices and other buildings.*
- E3. Of people participating in a group wanting to carry out a violent overthrow of an elected government.*
- E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals.*

Figure III.12 shows the results regarding the approval certain kinds of conventional political participation. The figure showing the approval levels for non-conventional political participation is included later on. It can be seen that there is rather high approval for these types of actions, particularly in terms of participating in organizations that try to resolve community problems. In 2006, the level of approval for this form of participation was 71 points out of 100. The approval of participating in political campaigns is the lowest, only reaching an average of 59.2 points out of 100 in 2006. Both cases, however, are above the 50-point reference line. Also, we see in both cases that there has been an important rise in the acceptance levels of these actions in 2006 compared to five years before, when these questions were asked in 2001.




Figure VIII.12. Approval of Conventional Political Participation in Guatemala, 2001-2006

Before moving to the next section of this chapter, it is important to know the ideological position of Guatemalans. Figure VIII.13 shows the responses to a question that asked respondents to characterize themselves ideologically. The figure shows that the bulk of Guatemalans (around 51%) locate themselves toward the center. Approximately 22% consider themselves to be on the left or center-left, and 26% on the right or center-right, (according to the scale used). It should be noted that one-third of respondents (31%) did not respond to the question, indicating that many Guatemalans find it difficult to identify the differences between the political right and left.



Figure VIII.13. Ideological Position of Guatemalans, 2006

Figure VIII.14 shows ideological positions according to ethnic self-identification. It can be seen that the results are very similar among both ethnic groups. Even the number of "no response" is similar, reaching around 30% of respondents in both groups.




Figure VIII.14. Ideological Position of Guatemalans by Ethnic Self-Identification, 2006

b) Trust in Representative Institutions

Electoral representation necessarily passes through the fundamental political institutions in any democracy, especially political parties and Congress. Figure VIII.15 compares, over time, public trust in these and other institutions directly tied to representing the people. We see that local government, or the municipality, is the institution that generates the most public trust, earning 56.5 points in 2006 (on the 0-to-100 point scale used in this study). This level of trust, in fact, has increased since 2001. And the municipality is the only electoral institution that surpasses the 50-point reference line which is used in this study as a parameter to determine positive results.

The next institution is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the results for which are relatively high *vis-à-vis* the other institutions, but below those of the municipalities. In fact, public trust in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal fell between 2004 and 2006, dropping from 50.2 to 48.7 points. The government, understood as the Executive Branch by Guatemalans, obtained 44.3 points in 2006, a reduction from its 2004 results.

Finally, we arrive at Congress and the political parties, institutions that in all countries, even advanced democracies, tend to receive the lowest levels of public support despite being the essential institutions to representative democracy. In the case of Guatemala, the levels of public trust in both institutions rose in 2006 compared to previous years. The levels of trust in Congress went from 37 to 41 points. However, the most dramatic change involved the political parties, which jumped from 29.7 points of trust to 40.7. These results occurred despite the fact that, as mentioned at the beginning of this study, the political party system in Guatemala remains atomized and fractured into many parties. Likely, the public thinks that positive results will come of the efforts at inter-party dialogue and consensus that have occurred since 2004.




Figure VIII.15. Trust in Representative Institutions in Guatemala: 2001-2006

The fact that trust in political parties has increased does not, unfortunately, mean that people necessarily view them as the most suitable vehicles for representation. In various Latin American countries (for example, Peru in the 1980s and Venezuela more recently), political-boss style (*caudillista*) leaders have used discredited political parties as a pretext in efforts to govern

without political intermediaries and without opposition. With their populist rhetoric, many have proposed that democracy can exist without political parties. How receptive would such ideas be in Guatemala? A partial response can be found by analyzing the results of Figure VIII.16. We see that particularly among people without any education there is a relatively high level of support for the idea that democracy can exist without parties (62.1 points out of 100). Support for this idea drops as educational levels rise, but even among respondents with some university education, the average support for the idea of democracy without political parties is relatively high, with 50.6 points on a 0-to-100 point scale.




Figure VIII.16. Belief in Democracy without Political Parties, 2006: by Education

Another important aspect to evaluate, especially in countries with strong Executive Branches as is common in Latin America, is the institution of the presidency. Measuring how people evaluate the job the current president is doing can give shed some light on the topic. We also have data since 1993 for this variable. It should be noted that all Guatemalan presidents from this date have been freely elected civilians. The data shows how respondents evaluated the sitting president at the moment each survey was conducted. For example, the score that former

President Jorge Serrano received corresponds to the evaluation that Guatemalans gave his administration in May 1993.

Figure VIII.17 shows that Ramiro de León Carpio is the best evaluated president of the last 13 years, with a rating of 63 points on of 0-to100 point scale. By contrast, Alfonso Portillo is the worst rated president, only scoring 36.3 points. The other presidents have intermediate scores. Ex-President Álvaro Arzú, who was evaluated twice by this survey during his term in office, scored over 50 points in both cases. While the current president, Oscar Berger, obtained a rating higher than 50 points in April 2004, when the sixth study of democratic culture was conducted, this rating decreased in the study conducted in June 2006.




Figure VIII.17. Evaluating the Job of Sitting Presidents in Guatemala: 1993-2006

2. Non-Conventional Political Participation: Other Forms of Political Participation

The last section of this chapter focuses on what is also considered political participation but is, as explained at the start of this chapter, non-conventional. One of these non-conventional actions, especially in non-electoral periods, is just discussing politics with other people. When asked how often they talk politics, as can be seen in Figure VIII.18, the vast majority of

Guatemalans answer rarely or never. The figure shows the differences between men and women. It should be recalled, as we showed earlier in this chapter, that women turn out to vote much less than men, and so it should be expected that they also discuss politics less than men. The figure shows that the proportions are similar, however. Neither men nor women discuss politics a great deal in Guatemala. Among men, 78.4% do not discuss politics, and among women this figure rises to 85%. By contrast, only 2% of men and a similar percentage of women discuss politics daily.




Figure VIII.18. Frequency of Discussing Politics in Guatemala, 2006: by Sex

As explained above, participation in public demonstrations is a non-conventional form of political participation. Figure VIII.19 shows that in Guatemala 88.2% of respondents stated that they have never participated in a demonstration; 5.6% said they had hardly ever participated, and only 6.2% indicated that they have participated a few times. This shows that social mobilization in Guatemala is still weak, especially compared to other countries in Latin America.




Figure VIII.19. Participation in Demonstrations in Guatemala, 2006

Regarding non-conventional political participation, it is important not only to have an idea of the frequency with which people participate, but also how well others accept participation in these kinds of actions. Figure VIII.20 shows the degree to which people are willing to accept limiting the freedom demonstrate, as well as also other freedoms common to a democracy, such as the right to congregate and freedom of speech. As can be seen, the greatest approval is for limiting public demonstrations, although the average is only 33 points out of 100. Also, around a third of the population would approve limiting the freedom to congregate. In terms of censorship,

the percentages are also relatively low. Only around a quarter of the population would approve of censoring the mass media.




Figure VIII.20. Approval of Limiting Certain Political Rights in Guatemala, 2006

To conclude, in this chapter we presented the level of approval that exists toward other people's participation in actions that in recent years have become relatively common in Guatemala despite being illegal. The questions on which this figure is based are found earlier in the chapter. Figure VIII.21 shows that the approval of illegal, non-conventional actions is relatively low. Only a fifth of the population in 2006 would approve of actions such as blocking roads, invading properties, and toppling an elected government. Clearly, the illegality and violence that each of these actions implies is different, and participation in a coup d'état would be an extreme act against the democratic system, while the other two are actions whose objective is more specific and generally limited. In any case, the support for these actions has maintained more or less the same levels since 2001, with the exception of approving the invasion private properties, which increased from an average of 14.1 points in 2004 to 21 points in 2006.




Figure VIII.21. Approval of Illegal Forms of Protest in Guatemala: 2001-2006

IX. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN GUATEMALA

A. The Significance of Social Capital

In recent years, academics, international organizations, and even many governments have paid increasing attention to what has come to be called social capital. Social capital is made up of the networks of existing social organizations of all kinds, not only ones of a political nature. It can be defined as the sum of all social networks, the norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and interpersonal trust that exist among members of a society.¹¹

In this chapter, we explore some aspects related to social capital in Guatemala. As in earlier chapters, we first present the comparative perspective and later analyze the national results. In a first section, we examine the levels of interpersonal trust that exist between Guatemalans, and in a second section, we analyze the levels of social participation.

The questions used to capture these aspects are described below. Even if it is common today to try and measure the trust that people have in political institutions, less attention is paid to the trust they have toward other members of the society, or interpersonal trust. Political scientist Robert Putnam showed, in a study conducted in Italy, that communities where there is a greater feeling of mutual trust tend to be more democratic (Putnam, 1993). In this sense, the item that measures interpersonal trust in the questionnaire is the following:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy ..?
 (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK

Additionally, Putnam also showed that the network of social organizations is fundamental to the development of democracy. In a famous article, he even argued that in the United States people are participating in social organizations less frequently and that this is affecting the country's democracy (Putnam, 1995). In this case, the questions that measure social participation asked respondents to indicate how often they attend meetings in a series of social organizations or groups. With these results, we constructed an index of social participation. There were also other questions related to the mutual attendance that we explore in this chapter. The questions used are shown below.

¹¹ This concept is taken from Robert Putnam and Lewis Feldstein, *Better Together: Restoring the American Community* (New York, Simon and Schuster).

Now I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the respondent]**

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...
CP7. Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them....
CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? You attend them...
CP10. Meetings of a labor union? You attend them...
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political movement? You attend them...

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

Figure IX.1 compares the averages of the interpersonal trust from those countries in the western hemisphere where the survey was conducted. Guatemala is located in the middle of the list, with 59.1 points on a scale of 0-to-100. The two countries where people show the most interpersonal trust are Costa Rica and Honduras, which both have 67 point averages. Paraguay, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua are within the 60% range. Guatemala is in the group that obtained 50 to 59 points, which also includes Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, and Ecuador. Panama, Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru are located at the bottom of the list, with averages in the 40 point range.



Figure IX.1. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2006

Figure IX.2 compares the result to a question about how many respondents participated in solving some community problem. As can be seen, Guatemala falls in the 30-39% range. The countries in which a larger percentage of the population has contributed to solving some community problem are, in the following order, Paraguay, Honduras, Peru and the Dominican Republic. And the countries where the lowest percentage of the population has contributed are Bolivia, Panama, and Nicaragua, in that order.




Figure IX.2. Participation in Resolving Community Problems in Comparative Perspective, 2006

C. Analyzing the National Findings

1. Interpersonal Trust

(1) The Findings

We now proceed to describe and analyze the Guatemalan results. Figure IX.3 is positive. It shows that, between 2001 and 2006, the average of interpersonal trust improved a great deal in the country, rising from 38.7 points in 2001 to 56.9 in 2004, and reaching 59.1 in 2006. Even if we tried, through a multivariable analysis, to identify some factors that might have contributed to this positive change, there are other immeasurable or intangible elements that might have had an influence as well. Since the signing of the Peace Agreements, Guatemala has become a country in which dialogue in various forums and meetings is relatively common. This might have contributed to the positive tendency in interpersonal trust. Additionally, the end of the armed conflict might have decreased the polarization and mistrust that have traditionally existed in the country.




Figure IX.3. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala: 2001-2006

(1) Explaining the Relation between Variables: the Predictors

There is a series of independent variables that are tangible and can be statistically crossed to try and explain which Guatemalans show more or less interpersonal trust. Table IX.1 lists these factors. Briefly, respondents from rural areas, men in general, older people, and those indicating they are Catholic tend to have more trust in other people.

Table IX.1. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2006
Predictors of Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2006

TYPE OF VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Rural residents, greater interpersonal trust
	Sex	Men, greater trust
	Age	Older people, greater trust
	Religion	Catholic, greater trust

The detail of the direction and strength of these predictors can be seen in the following three figures. Figure IX.4 shows the difference by educational level (although this variable did not turn out to be a significant predictor) and by professed religion. We see that in almost all educational levels, people who said they were Catholic showed a higher average of interpersonal trust than people who indicated that they are Protestant or Evangelical. Only at the university level does the opposite occur. The highest average of trust in other people occurs in the following order: Catholic Guatemalans without any formal education (65.6 points out of 100), followed by Catholics with some primary education (63.5 points), and then by Evangelicals with some university education (62.9 points).




Figure IX.4. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2006: by Religion and Education

A second figure in this section shows the levels of interpersonal trust by religion and area of residence (urban or rural). Figure IX.5 shows that rural Catholic respondents have more interpersonal trust than any of the other two groups, with 65.1 points out of 100. This difference is statistically significant. By contrast, the error bars seem to show that there are no significant differences among the other three groups.




Figure IX.5. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2006: by Area of Residence and Religion

Finally, Figure IX.6 shows the role that age and sex play, two variables that in the multivariable regression turned out to be statistically significant as explanations of interpersonal trust in Guatemala. The difference between men and women is clear, especially in people Older than 56. Among all age groups, it is older men who show the greatest trust in other people. The opposite occurs with women, who at this same age start to show a decline in their levels of interpersonal trust.

It is interesting to note that among young people there is no major difference between male and female Guatemalans. Both show low levels of interpersonal trust, which increases as they get older. In the case of the women, there are ups and downs, and the only age group that surpasses men in terms of interpersonal trust is that of women from 36 to 45 year old.




Figure IX.6. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2006: by Sex and Age

2. Participation in Social Organizations

(1) The Findings

Now we turn to another pillar of social capital, participation in organizations. Figure IX.7 shows the levels of participation in various kinds of groups between 2004 and 2006. It can be seen that in both years participation in the activities of some kind of religious organization is far greater than participation in other organizations or groups. This participation even increased slightly in 2006, rising from 65.1 points on average to 69.8 points out of 100.

School-related groups are the second type in which Guatemalans participate. Although there was a slight decline in 2006, compared to 2004, still a quarter of the population indicated that they participated in associations or groups tied to schools. Participation in community improvement committees is also important, but below the levels of the other two groups. In these types of groups, the average was 23 in 2004 and 15 in 2006. Turning to participation in professional, producer, or merchant associations (which includes small, medium and large business people), the averages are similar between rural and urban areas. Finally, people who indicated that they participated in political movements or groups appear at the end of the figure. It is worth recalling that in Guatemala there is a the legal figure of civic electoral committees which permit participation in local elections. However, these committees disappear as juridical figures once the elections are over. In any case, the average participation in these organizations or in political parties was only 2.3% in 2006, while in 2005 it was 7.3%. This is largely due to the fact that there were presidential elections in Guatemala in 2003, shortly before this study was conducted in the first months of 2004.




Figure IX.7. Participation in Social Organizations in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006.

The figure that follows (IX.8) shows the degree to which respondents contributed to the resolution of some community problem. The results presented here compare 2004 and 2006. As

can be observed, there is not much variation. In both years, around 30% to 33% of the population participated in solving some common problem.




Figure IX.8. Participation in the Resolution of Some Community Problem, 2004 vs. 2006

(2) Explaining the Relation between Variables: The Predictors

Three explanatory variables emerge from the analysis of why Guatemalans participate in these kinds of organizations. These variables are the area of residence, the socioeconomic level, and age.

Table IX.2. Predictors of Participation in Social Organizations in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of Social Participation in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Sociodemographic</i>	Residence	Urban residents, more participation
	Socioeconomic level	Higher level, more participation
	Age	Less age, more participation

If we wanted to verify some of these results graphically, Figure IX.9 allows us to draw some conclusions regarding the topic. As a dependent variable in this case, we use the index of participation in organizations of various kinds, which was explained in the introduction to this chapter. It can be seen that young people, both in rural and urban areas, have the lowest levels of trust in other people. There is a notable increase in trust in the 25-36 age group in both rural and urban areas, then it starts to fall off. The level of trust in urban and rural areas only separates in people 60 or more years old. In this age group, urban residents tend to have more interpersonal trust.




Figure IX.9. Index of Participation in Social Organizations in Guatemala, 2006: by Age and Residence

X. PUBLIC AMBIVALENCE: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC MEASURES

A. The Significance of the Topic

The last chapter of this study examines the public's preference for democracy or alternatively for authoritarian or semi-authoritarian forms of government. The fact that electoral democracy exists in various countries does not mean that it has developed to the same extent in all of them (Ottoway, 2003). If democracy is understood as something gradual, then the countries of Latin America, even 20 years after their political opening, still find themselves in a process of democratization. The idea of democracy as something progressive is not widely accepted by the public in young democracies, who frequently demand respect for the political rights inherent in one, but also expect that it will provide security and improve socioeconomic conditions.

When the public's expectations regarding democracy become unrealistic, particularly when different kinds of crises arise, it is the legitimacy of the democracy that is at stake. It should be recalled that, as discussed in Chapter IV of this study, legitimacy or social support for democracy has different levels that extend from supporting the borders of the nation-state to supporting government officials. Table X.1 shows the different levels of legitimacy proposed by Norris. In this chapter, we examine, in general terms, the first, second, and third levels of democratic legitimacy. In Chapter IV, we thoroughly analyzed aspects related to the fourth level, and in Chapter VIII we examined the support for certain political actors, political parties, and, in particular, the sitting president.

Table X.1. Levels of Social Legitimacy of a Democratic Regime

	<i>LEVELS OF SOCIAL SUPPORT</i>	<i>OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT (How it is measured)</i>
DIFFUSE SUPPORT	<i>--Support for community policies</i>	Pride in being a citizen of a particular country
	<i>-- Support for the principals of a regime</i>	Understand democracy as a value, believe in due process, respect for democratic rules, reject authoritarian options, tolerance
SPECIFIC SUPPORT	<i>--Support for the job a regime is doing</i>	Satisfaction with how democracy is working
	<i>--Support for the system and institutions of a regime</i>	Trust in institutions and support for the political system
	<i>--Support political actors or the authorities</i>	Trust political actors, evaluation of the actions of authorities in office.

Source: prepared by D. Azpuru, based on Norris

Additionally, we briefly examine the other side of the coin, the public's support or preference for options or measures that are not necessarily democratic. What options do people chose when, according to them, democracy is not operating as it should. The alternatives should be democratic, but this is not always the case. Here, we explore the level of support for some of these other options.

As in the previous chapters, we first present a comparative perspective, and then enter into the analysis of the national results.

B. Guatemalans in Comparative Perspective

First, we analyze the support for the political community, that is, the nation-state included within the national borders. The question was measured on a scale of 1 (none) to 7 (much). For ease of comprehension, we later converted the 1-to-7 point scale to a 0-to-100 point scale. Respondents were asked the following question:

B43. How proud are you to be Guatemalan?

The results for the Latin American region can be seen in Figure X.1 It shows that Guatemala, although it has a relatively high average on the 0-to-100 point scale used in this study, is almost at the bottom of the list, only above Panama and Haiti. Other countries located in the 80-89 point range are Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. The rest of the countries are in the 90-99 point range, with the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica receiving the highest scores.




Figure X.1. Support for the Political Community in Comparative Perspective, 2006

The second level of legitimacy of a democratic regime is the support for the principals of the regime, that is support for democratic ideas. In this study, we used two questions to measure this level:

DEM2. With which of the following statements are you in most agreement:

- (1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government
- (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.
- (8) DK/DR

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements??

The comparative responses to the first question can be seen in Figure X.2, which shows the levels of preference for democracy in the countries included in the 2006 survey. Given the kind of figure, the countries do not appear in the order of preference for the democratic option. In all countries, though, the majority of the population clearly prefers democracy. The percentages vary from a low of 52% in Paraguay to a high of 88% in Costa Rica. Guatemala appears in an intermediate position with 71%. It is also important to observe the percentage of people who stated that they would prefer an authoritarian government. In the case of Guatemala, 16% of respondents fell into this category.




Figure X.2. Preference for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2006

The following figure (X.3) shows the support for the idea that, despite its problems, democracy is always the best of government. We see that Guatemala is located in the upper part of the intermediate category, that is, among the countries that received averages of 60 to 69 points in this question. The Dominican Republic and Costa Rica are on top again, along with Colombia, Jamaica, Haiti, and Chile, all in the 70-79 point range. The lowest group is made up of Peru and Panama, in the 50-59 point range.




Figure X.3. Belief that Democracy is Always the Best Possible System of Government in Comparative Perspective

As explained at the start of this chapter, there is a third level of legitimacy of democracy which can be measured through the following question:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in Guatemala?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR

The answers from across the hemisphere can be seen in Figure X.4. In this level of legitimacy, Guatemala appears toward the bottom of the list, given that only 40.6% of respondents stated that they felt satisfied or very satisfied with how democracy is working in their country. At the head of the list is, again, the Dominican Republic, with 61.7%, followed by Bolivia. Various countries fall into the 50-59% range: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Honduras, and Mexico. In the 40-49% range are El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua, and, at the bottom of this group, Guatemala. In Peru, 36.8% of respondents stated they were satisfied or very satisfied, while in Ecuador, only 25% said they were.




Figure X.4. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective

C. Analyzing the National Results

1. Levels of Legitimacy for Democracy

(1) The Findings

We now examine the results from Guatemala in greater detail. Figure X.5 shows the results regarding the preference for democracy from 1999 to 2006. During this last year there was an increase in the percentage of Guatemalans who indicated they preferred democracy, rising from 64% in 2004 to 71% in 2006. Consequently, the other options fell. This is generally a positive finding.




Figure X.5. Preference for Democracy in Guatemala: 1999-2006

Also with regard to the second level of democracy, explained in Table X.1 of this chapter, Figure X.6 shows the changes between 2004 and 2006 in these two questions. The first two bars refer to whether respondents believe that democracy is always best. As can be seen, there was also a rise in this variable in Guatemala during 2006, growing from 57.9 to an average of 71.1 points on a scale of 0-to-100. The difference is statistically significant.

Another related question asked respondents to indicate how democratic they consider Guatemala to be. In the last two bars, we see that this perception declined in 2006, falling from 54.6 points in 2004 to 49.5 points.

The results of Figure X.6 appear mixed: one positive finding and another negative. However, it is important to compare both results. Even if Guatemalans consider that Guatemala was more democratic in 2004 than in 2006, the belief that democracy is always the best form of government rose during the latter year, which is very positive.




Figure X.6. Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

Finally, in this descriptive part regarding the legitimacy of democracy, Figure X.7 shows the results of the question related to democratic satisfaction. The results are also mixed. In 2006, the percentage of the people who said they were satisfied with democracy fell considerably,

dropping from 51% in 2004 to 39% in 2006. The percentage of people who are very satisfied also fell, going from 7% to 1.8% in the same year. As a consequence, the percentage of unsatisfied people increased, rising to 2001 levels. The only relatively positive result is that only 10.1% of respondents indicated that they were very unsatisfied with democracy, in contrast to the 27.3% who said they were very unsatisfied in 2001.




Figure X.7. Satisfaction with how Democracy is Working in Guatemala: 2001-2006

Again, it is worth highlighting that in this section we found mixed results: improvement in some indicators and decline in others. But, in general terms, despite the fact that in 2006 Guatemalans are less satisfied with the performance of their democracy than in 2004, they seem more willing to prefer democracy and believe that is the best possible form of government. In the end, satisfaction can vary, but the most solid and important indicators are the two *items* previously shown. Therefore, the balance is generally positive with regard to the legitimacy of democracy in Guatemala.

(2) Explaining the Relation between Variables: the Predictors

In Table X.2, we present the predictors of the variables of democratic legitimacy discussed above. It is curious to see that sociodemographic factors are not important in any of the models. In all cases, it is the contextual variables that have an impact on social support for the different levels of democratic legitimacy.

Table X.2. Predictors of Democratic Legitimacy in Guatemala, 2006

Predictors of the Levels of Legitimacy for Democracy in Guatemala, 2006		
TYPE OF VARIABLES	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DIRECTION OF THE STATISTICAL RELATION
<i>Dependent Variable: Preference for Democracy</i>		
<i>Contextual</i>	Perception of safety	Greater perception of safety, greater preference for democracy
	Perception of corruption among public officials	Lower perception of corruption, greater preference for democracy
	Evaluation of the job of the president (Berger)	Better evaluation of the president, greater preference for democracy
<i>Dependent Variable: Belief that democracy is always best</i>		
<i>Contextual</i>	Victimization by crime	Victims, less belief in democracy
	Perception of corruption among public officials	People who perceive more corruption have less belief in democracy
	Perception of one's own economic situation	People who perceive their economic situation is worse have less belief that democracy is always best
<i>Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with democracy</i>		
<i>Contextual</i>	Victimization by crime	Victims, less satisfied with democracy
	Perception of personal safety	People who perceive more safety, more satisfied with democracy
	Perception that crime threatens the country's future	People who perceive crime to be a threat, less satisfied with democracy
	Victimization by corruption	Victims, less satisfied with democracy
	Perception of one's own economic situation	People who perceive their economic situation is worse are less satisfied with democracy
	Evaluation of the local government	Better evaluation of local government, more satisfied with democracy
	Evaluation of the job President Berger is doing	Better evaluation, more satisfied with democracy

In the following figures, we see in greater detail the influence of these predictors. Figure X.8 shows that the belief that democracy is always the best form of government for Guatemala is influenced by the perception that people have of the country's economic situation and their own economic situation. That is, the better the national and one's personal economic situation, the greater the tendency to believe that democracy is always the best form of government.




Figure X.8. Belief that Democracy is Always the Best Possible Form of Government, and the Perception of the Country's and One's Own Personal Economic Situation

Figure X.9 shows the changes with regard to satisfaction with democracy in terms of respondents' evaluations both of the job that their municipality is doing as well as the job that President Berger has been doing. The direction is clear: a better evaluation of the job of both offices means greater satisfaction with democracy.




Figure X.1. Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy in Guatemala, 2006: by Evaluation of Municipal Services and the Job of President Berger

2. Support for Authoritarian Measures or Governments

The final part of this chapter and study shows some figures related with the other side of the coin. It has been said that Latin Americans are ambivalent about democracy and that even if they support the generic idea of democracy, people are willing to support measures or governments that are not entirely democratic (UNDP, 2004). Figure X.10 shows one of these variables. Respondents were asked the following question:

DEM11. Do you think that we need a strong-hand government to resolve this country's problems or that problems can be resolved with everybody's participation? (1) Strong-hand (mano dura) (2) Participation (8) DA/DK

The figure is interesting because it is one of the few variables that has been measured in the same format since 1993. The results are mixed. In 2006, the percentage of Guatemalan who said that they prefer a strong-hand government to resolve the country's problems, instead of everyone participating, increased. The lowest percentage of preference for this option occurred in 2004, shortly after a supposedly strong-hand government (the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco*, or FRG) ended its term in office without improving problems such as personal safety. The high percentage (62%) who opted for a strong-hand government in 1999 is related, in large part, to the arrival of the FRG to power, since many people chose this party precisely because it offered to crack down on crime by using a strong-hand. In 2006, the preference for this type of government again appears to be on the rise, but it has still not reached "normal" levels for Guatemalans, that is the 53% preference for a strong-hand government obtained in four of the surveys.




Figure X.10. Preference for a Strong-hand Government in Guatemala 1993-2006

Another perspective on the preference for not entirely democratic options is provided by a series of questions designed to measure populism. Populism is understood as the supremacy of a president over the other branches of government, in the traditional style of Latin American political bosses (*caudillos*) and of some current presidents in the region. We asked the following questions:

I am going to read out several pairs of statements. Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you tell me with which of the following two statements you agree with the most?

POP1. [Read the options]

1. *It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties [or, on the contrary]*
 2. *Even if they slow the progress of this country, our presidents should not limit the voice and vote of opposition parties.*
8. DK/DR

POP2. [Read the options]

1. *The Congress hinders the work of our presidents and should be ignored [or, on the contrary]*
 2. *Even when it hinders the work of the presidents they should not bypass the Congress.*
8. DK/DR

POP3. [Read the options]

1. *Judges frequently hinder the work of our presidents, and they should be ignored. [or, on the contrary]*
 2. *Even when judges sometimes hinder the work of our president, their decisions should always be obeyed.*
8. DK/DR

POP4. [Read the options]

1. *Our presidents should have the necessary power so that they can act in the national interest. [or, on the contrary]*
 2. *The power of our president should be limited so that they do not endanger our liberties*
8. DK/DR

POP5. [Read the options]

1. *Our president should do what the people want even when laws prevent them from doing so. [or, on the contrary]*
 2. *Our president should obey the laws even when the people don't want them to.*
8. DK/DR

s.

The responses can be seen in Figure X.11, which shows variation between the different questions. There is a high level of support for the first, related to the power a president should have to work for the national interest. But support declines for the options that limit the other branches of government. Nonetheless, they remain relatively high since at least a third of Guatemalans seem to support the idea that the president should put limits on Congress, judges, and even ignore laws that prevent him from acting.




Figure X.11. Support for a Populist Government in Guatemala, 2006

Related in some way to the above question, another item of the questionnaire asked respondents to choose between the following two options:

Some people say that we need a strong leader who is not elected through popular vote. Others say that even if things don't work well, electoral democracy, this is the people's vote, is always best. What do you think?

With regard to this question, the percentage of people who indicated that a non-elected leader is preferable increased from 18% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2006. The responses to this question can be seen in Figure X.12. We see that the increase is especially notable among people with a basic education. There were no major changes in the other educational categories.




Figure X.12. Preference for a Non-Elected, Strong Leader in Guatemala, 2004 vs. 2006

The last figure tries to capture the support for extreme, non-democratic measures, like a coup d'état. We asked the following questions:

Now let's change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over through a coup d'état would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.

JC4. When there are a lot of social protests.

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.

JC12. When there is high inflation, with excessive prices increases.

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.

The last figure, Figure X.13, compares the responses from 2004 and 2006. We see that the most important reason that would justify a coup, according to respondents, is the high crime rate in the country. Although the percentage of Guatemalans who responded positively to this option rose in 2006, it was also the most important reason given in 2004. On the positive side, there was, in fact, a decline in the percentage of people who supported a possible coup for all the other reasons, which is a positive finding. Nonetheless, a third of Guatemalans still would be willing to support a coup d'état in the country.




Figure X.13. Reasons that Would Justify a Coup d'État in Guatemala: 2004 vs. 2006

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XII. ANNEXES

A. Description of the Methodology Used to Design the Sample for Guatemala¹²

1. Diseño de la muestra

a) Universo

El universo de una muestra es la población o las unidades geográficas para las cuales se puede hacer inferencias a partir de los datos obtenidos. Para este estudio, el universo incluye a todos los ciudadanos (personas de 18 años y más) en áreas urbanas y rurales en los 331 municipios existentes al momento del censo 2002, en la República de Guatemala. Las poblaciones del recientemente creado municipio de Unión Cantinil, Huehuetenango tienen posibilidad de aparecer, en cuanto todas sus poblaciones ya existían y se encontraban en el municipio de Chiantla. Sin embargo, de haber sido escogida su cabecera, ésta se hubiera contado como área rural y no como área urbana para propósitos de clasificación.

Para salvar las barreras lingüísticas, los cuestionarios se tradujeron al Q'eqchi' y al K'iche' por ser los idiomas mayas en los que se realizaron el mayor número de entrevistas en las aplicaciones anteriores.

b) Regiones y otros dominios de estudio

Un dominio de estudios es una región o grupo específico para el cual se desea obtener estimaciones. Para este estudio, se definen cinco regiones que pueden ser utilizadas como dominios de estudios :

1. **Metropolitana:** Incluye a todos los municipios del departamento de Guatemala.
2. **Suroccidente:** Incluye todos los municipios de Escuintla, Suchitepéquez y Retalhuleu, así como algunos municipios seleccionados en San Marcos y Quetzaltenango.¹³
3. **Noroccidente:** Incluye la totalidad de los municipios de Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Sololá, Totonicapán, Huehuetenango, así como el resto de los municipios de San Marcos y Quetzaltenango.
4. **Nororiente:** Incluye a la totalidad de los municipios de Petén, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, El Progreso, Izabal, y Zacapa.
5. **Suroriente:** Incluye los municipios de Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa, y Chiquimula.

¹² Esta parte del informe, Descripción de la Muestra, fue redactada por Juan Pablo Pira. Esta muestra, originalmente preparada por ASIES y en esta ocasión trabajada por Borge y Asociados, forma parte de una colección de estudios similares realizados en 17 países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe.

¹³ Los municipios de Quetzaltenango incluidos en esta región son: Colomba, El Palmar, Coatepeque, Flores Costa Cuca, y Génova. Los municipios del departamento de San Marcos que se incluyen en esta región son El Quetzal, El Rodeo, El Tumbador, La Reforma, San Pablo, Malacatán, Catarina, Nuevo Progreso, Pajapita, Ayutla y Ocós.

c) Unidades de medida

Las unidades de medida son las personas u objetos a los que se refiere la información. Las unidades de medida para este estudio son las poblaciones que residen en viviendas reportadas en los mapas del Censo Nacional 2002. Se excluye a las personas que residan en hospitales, cuarteles, asilos, internados y otras instituciones similares.

d) Unidades de observación, informantes y unidades finales de muestreo.

Este estudio reporta variables que se refieren al informante, el hogar y a la vivienda. Por esta razón, es conveniente utilizar la vivienda como unidad final de muestreo por ser más o menos permanente en el tiempo.

2. Método de muestreo

Atendiendo a los requerimientos contractuales, se diseñó una muestra compleja. El muestreo complejo incluye características tanto de muestras estratificadas, como de muestras por conglomerados. Los siguientes requisitos fueron observados en la construcción de la muestra:

- El 100% de los ciudadanos guatemaltecos debe ser representado. En este caso, sólo se exceptúa a aquellos que residan en viviendas no reportadas en la cartografía 2002.
- Se define un mínimo de cinco y un máximo de ocho estratos de análisis. En este estudio, se trabajó con los cinco estratos mencionados anteriormente.
- Cada estrato puede ser usado como un dominio de estudio.
- Tanto el área urbana como el área rural deben poder usarse como dominios de estudio.
- La muestra debe ser autoponderada, tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel de estrato. Este requerimiento existe para evitar el uso de pesos en el análisis de la información.

Atendiendo a estos requerimientos, se propusieron los siguientes objetivos:

- Obtener una muestra representativa que permita analizar la información para los siguientes dominios de estudio:
 1. Guatemala como país
 2. Estratos de primera etapa (dominios de estudio)
 - a. Metropolitana
 - b. Nororiental
 - c. Noroccidental
 - d. Suroccidental
 - e. Sureste
 3. Otros dominios de estudio
 - a. Urbano
 - b. Rural

- Obtener errores de muestreo para algunos indicadores a todos los niveles.
- Distribuir las entrevistas en una forma consistente con el presupuesto, el tamaño de la muestra requerido y un margen de error adecuado para los resultados del estudio.
- Utilizar el marco muestral más reciente disponible para cada lugar poblado.

Bajo las condiciones y objetivos mencionados anteriormente, se procedió a construir la muestra compleja. Se utilizó escogencia aleatoria en todas las etapas, salvo en la última, en la que se establecieron cuotas por edad y sexo. En 2004, las cuotas eran calculadas para cada sector censal a manera que respondieran a las cuotas en la información censal. Durante la aplicación en 2006, se utilizó la misma cuota en todos los sectores.

Obtener una representación adecuada de Guatemala resultó siendo una tarea bastante retadora. Además de las consideraciones usuales de las cuotas urbanas y rurales, se prestó especial atención a las características propias de cada municipio en particular, esto representó algunas complicaciones para cumplir con el requisito de que la muestra fuera autoponderada a nivel de región. Por esta razón, aunque desde un punto de vista de traslados y logística hubiera sido más conveniente estudiar áreas urbanas y rurales del mismo municipio, se tiene en varios casos sólo áreas rurales o bien, sólo áreas rurales de algunos municipios.

La división municipal de Guatemala presenta grandes variaciones en área y población de los municipios. Adicionalmente, la definición de área urbana y rural que se utilizaba hasta antes del censo 2002, correspondía no a actividades económicas, concentración de la población o servicios disponibles, sino a la clasificación de lugar poblado. Esta definición se conservó para garantizar la comparación entre las muestras de los estudios de 1993 a 2001. Por esta razón, se estimó conveniente dividir cada estrato en sus áreas urbana y rural y luego escoger de este grupo los municipios con probabilidad proporcional a la población de cada tipo. De esta manera, un municipio dado tenía distintas posibilidades de selección para sus áreas urbanas y rurales.

Originalmente, se había sugerido que se escogieran municipalidades en una primera etapa y una vez seleccionadas, se escogieran comunidades u otras unidades censales dentro de los municipios seleccionados. Sin embargo, este procedimiento hubiera resultado problemático si hubiera sido seleccionado un municipio sin área rural –como lo son varios de Sacatepéquez, Sololá y la misma Ciudad de Guatemala– o uno con un área urbana muy pequeña en comparación a su población rural, como ocurre en algunos municipios de Quiché y San Marcos. Eliminar la elección del municipio redujo a uno el número de etapas de selección y facilitó cumplir con el requisito de autoponderación. Por varias razones, mayormente históricas, existen algunos municipios que muestran características muy distintas a las de sus vecinos. Dos casos típicos son Zaragoza, en Chimaltenango y Pachalum, en Quiché, municipios que tienen poblaciones mayormente ladinas y se encuentran rodeados de otros con poblaciones mayormente indígenas. El caso opuesto ocurre el Chiquimula, en las municipalidades de Camotán, Jocotán y Olotá, ya que estas presentan alguna población indígena aunque sus vecinos son casi exclusivamente ladinos. Si se procediera a escoger municipalidades y luego poblaciones, y si el azar favoreciera a uno de estos municipios, las proporciones ladino/indígena se verían afectadas.

Para evitar estos problemas, se construyó una regionalización de Guatemala basada en características similares más que en proximidad geográfica. Esta división se logró por medio de

un procedimiento de análisis de conglomerados¹⁴ al que se le incluyó un número elevado de variables a nivel municipal. En particular, considerando la temática del estudio, se prefirió variables relacionadas a educación, participación en las elecciones, pobreza, sexo y ruralidad.¹⁵

Se ensayaron divisiones desde uno hasta diez grupos y se prefirió una de seis grupos, pues a partir de este punto se obtenían demasiados grupos de sólo un municipio. Tres municipios no pudieron ser clasificados pues presentaban un número elevado de valores perdidos para las variables que se utilizaron: Santa Lucía Milpas Altas, en Sacatepéquez, San Bartolo, en Totonicapán y Quesada, en Jutiapa. Los primeros dos municipios fueron asignados al Grupo Especial 1 y Quesada al Especial 2.

Si se consideran todas las divisiones posibles de los seis grupos homogéneos y dos especiales, los cinco dominios de estudio y las dos áreas, se obtiene un total de ochenta posibles divisiones. Sin embargo, sólo treinta y cuatro son no-vacías. El número de entrevistas en cada división se obtuvo asignando en forma proporcional a la población. La escogencia se realizó entonces en dos etapas: en la primera se escogieron las comunidades de la división con probabilidad proporcional al número de sectores censales. Por contarse con un número de viviendas similar en cada sector censal, la escogencia anteriormente mencionada es similar a escoger con probabilidad proporcional a la población. En la siguiente etapa, se eligieron sectores censales dentro de cada comunidad. Por tener todos los sectores censales un número similar de viviendas, esta segunda etapa es similar a una escogencia con probabilidad igual. Por el tamaño de la muestra, en la mayoría de casos se escogió un sector o dos por municipio, a excepción del caso de la ciudad de Guatemala.

A cada sector censal rural se le asignaron doce entrevistas y a cada sector censal urbano se le asignaron ocho. La muestra resultante se revisó para determinar si se había cumplido con los requisitos. En resumen: la muestra resultante se compone de tres etapas, con treinta y cuatro estratos de selección. La primera etapa consistía en escoger las comunidades con probabilidad proporcional al número de sectores censales. La probabilidad de escoger una comunidad C_i es entonces proporcional al número de sectores censales N_{C_i} que se encuentren en la comunidad como se muestra en la siguiente ecuación:

(1) Ecuación 1: Probabilidad de escoger una comunidad

$$P(C_i) = \frac{N_{C_i}}{\sum_j N_{C_j}}$$

¹⁴ Las variables fueron normalizadas y se utilizó una norma euclidiana para medir la distancia entre los conglomerados.

¹⁵ Las variables utilizadas fueron las siguientes: población total 2002, viviendas 2002, porcentaje de autoidentificación como indígena, porcentaje de población rural, porcentaje de población masculina, alfabetismo de hombres y mujeres de más de 15 años, indicadores de eficiencia educativa, ingresos ordinarios de las municipalidades, porcentaje de población por debajo de la línea de la pobreza, índice de vulnerabilidad, prevalencia de desnutrición crónica, índice de desarrollo humano y porcentaje de ciudadanos que aparecen en el padrón.

En la segunda etapa, el sector censal se escogía con una probabilidad proporcional a la población en el sector. En este caso, la población es el número de viviendas. Usualmente este valor es similar para todos los sectores.

Ecuación 2: Probabilidad de escoger un sector k en una comunidad i

$$P(S_{ki}) = \frac{Pob_{Ski}}{\sum_j Pob_{Sji}} = \frac{Pob_{Ski}}{Pob_{Ci}}$$

Dentro de cada sector, las viviendas se escogían con probabilidad igual. Por ejemplo, para un sector rural, la probabilidad de escogencia de una vivienda sería:

Ecuación 3: Probabilidad de escoger una vivienda en el sector S_{ki}

$$P(Viv_{ikl}) = \frac{12}{Pob_{Ski}}$$

La probabilidad de escogencia de una vivienda en un estrato selección (cada una de las treinta y cuatro divisiones mencionadas anteriormente) sería el producto de las tres probabilidades mencionadas. Por ser proporcionales todas las asignaciones y contarse con sectores censales de tamaños similares, las probabilidades de selección para cada vivienda a nivel nacional son similares.

En las viviendas donde se encontró más de un adulto que cumpliera la cuota, se contó con una cuarta etapa de selección que se realizó con la ayuda de una tabla números aleatorios. Estas tablas son conocidas como tablas de Kish.

b) Marco muestral

El Marco muestral utilizado lo constituyeron los listados de comunidades, sectores censales y mapas producidos por el INE (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*), para el Censo 2002.

c) Tamaño de muestra

Para cumplir con los requerimientos contractuales, se estableció un tamaño de muestra de 1500 entrevistas efectivas. Las estimaciones del margen de error en cada dominio de estudio se presentan en la sección 1.9.

d) Efectos de diseño y error de muestreo

El error de muestreo y el efecto de diseño se estiman utilizando el tamaño de la muestra y los efectos de diseño obtenidos en estudios similares. Los efectos de diseño, que se definen como el cociente de la varianza obtenida con la muestra compleja entre la varianza obtenida con una muestra aleatoria irrestricta de igual tamaño como indica la siguiente ecuación:

Ecuación 4: Definición de efectos de diseño

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

Donde $V_{sa}(\theta)$ es la varianza del indicador θ obtenida usando una muestra aleatoria irrestricta y $V_{comp}(\theta)$ es la varianza para el mismo indicador utilizando una muestra compleja. Cabe resaltar que estos efectos son distintos para cada variable.

Para estimar los valores de los efectos de diseño, se utilizó un procedimiento iterativo del tipo *Jackknife 1* que se encuentra disponible en el software *WesVar Versión 2*. En la siguiente tabla, se presentan los efectos de diseño para varias variables, de preferencia las que se miden en escalas 1-10 y 1-7. El efecto de diseño que se presenta DEFF es sobre la varianza.

Tabla 1. Efectos de diseño para variables seleccionadas en el estudio 2006

Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)
e2	1.706	B1	1.461	D1	2.301
e3	1.725	B2	1.35	D2	2.112
E5	1.735	B3	1.647	D3	2.13
E8	1.901	B4	1.694	D4	1.973
EDUC	1.939	B6	1.427	D5	2.608

Para el estudio CAMS 2004 se había estimado preliminarmente un efecto de diseño promedio de (DEFT) 1.348, usando un promedio sobre las principales variables en escala de 1 a 7 y de 1 a 10 y la aproximación por series de Taylor, que provee el programa *Epi Info* versión 6. Para la aplicación 2006, se obtiene un efecto de diseño promedio para estas variables, usando la técnica *Jackknife 1* y el programa *WesVar* versión 3.2. El promedio de DEFF es 1.847 por lo que DEFT, su raíz cuadrada, se estima en 1.359 que difiere poco del valor obtenido en 2004.

Es importante tomar en cuenta que se consideró una ligera sobremuestra para cada región, basada en la tasa de rechazo observada en la aplicación 2004. Puesto que las tasas bajaron sustancialmente de la aplicación 2004 a la actual, algunos puntos muestrales fueron eliminados con la ayuda de una tabla de números aleatorios. En la sección 1.11 donde se detalla la muestra, se presentan los lugares eliminados en tipo **negrilla**. La estimación de tasa de rechazo fue muy consistente con el resultado obtenido, con la excepción de la región Nororiente que en la aplicación anterior no presentó una tasa tan elevada como para prever este problema.

Tabla 2. Entrevistas y tasas de rechazo por región

Región	Entrevistas requeridas	Tasa de rechazo estimada	Número de boletas asignadas (incluido rechazo)	Número efectivo de encuestas	Tasa de rechazo (real)
Guatemala	340	12%	384	343	12%
Noroccidente	499	15%	576	508	13%
Nororiente	269	12%	300	239	25%
Suroriente	165	14%	188	174	8%
Suroccidente	227	14%	260	234	11%
TOTAL	1500	14%	1708	1498	14%

e) Errores de muestreo por dominio de estudio

Tabla 3. Tamaños esperados de muestra y errores de muestreo

	Boletas	Margen de error (95% confianza)	
		Muestra aleatoria irrestricta	Margen de error en muestra compleja. (Se usa el efecto de diseño promedio de 1.348)
Metropolitana	340	5.4%	6.3%
Noroccidente	499	4.5%	5.2%
Nororiente	269	6.1%	7.1%
Suroriente	165	7.8%	9.0%
Suroccidente	227	6.6%	7.7%
Urbana	696	3.8%	4.4%
Rural	804	3.5%	4.1%
TOTAL	1500	2.6%	3.0%

Luego del operativo de campo, la tabla anterior se actualizó con el valor que se obtuvo al promediar los efectos de diseño las variables descritas en la tabla 1.

Tabla 4. Tamaños reales y efectos de diseño (95% confiabilidad)

		Margen de error (95% confianza)	
	Entrevistas	Muestra simple aleatoria	Muestra compleja
Metropolitana	343	5.2%	7.1%
Noroccidente	508	4.3%	5.8%
Nororiente	324	5.4%	7.3%
Suroriente	168	7.5%	10.2%
Suroccidente	234	6.3%	8.6%
Urbana	706	3.6%	4.9%
Rural	792	3.4%	4.6%
TOTAL	1498	2.6%	3.5%

f) Comparación entre la muestra y la población

En estas comparaciones se percibe un ajuste más preciso a las proporciones censales. En gran parte, este avance se debe a una mejor estimación de los porcentajes de no respuesta.

(i) Por región

	Población Censo 2002	Porcentaje	Entrevistas	Porcentaje
Metropolitana	2 541 581	22.6%	343	22.9%
Noroccidente	3 742 407	33.3%	508	33.4%
Nororiente	2 012 859	17.9%	324	21.6%
Suroriente	1 235 866	11.0%	168	11.2%
Suroccidente	1 704 486	15.2%	234	15.6%
TOTAL	11 237 199		1 498	

(ii) Por áreas urbana y rural

	Población Urbana	Población Rural	Porcentaje de población urbana	Entrevistas Urbanas	Entrevistas rurales Rural	Porcentaje de entrevistas urbanas (real)
Metropolitana	2186669	354912	86.0%	295	48	86.0%
Noroccidente	1424190	2318217	38.1%	184	324	36.2%
Nororiente	590006	1422853	29.3%	71	168	29.7%
Suroriente	366029	869837	29.6%	68	106	39.1%
Suroccidente	667120	1037366	39.1%	88	146	37.6%
TOTAL			46.1%	706	792	46.3%

g) Listado de puntos muestrales

NOTA: Para la aplicación 2006, todos los puntos muestrales urbanos tuvieron 8 boletas y todos los puntos muestrales rurales 12 boletas. Se presenta en última columna, la distribución 2004 que muestra algunos sectores de 7, 10 u 11 boletas.

Región 1	Guatemala				
	Departamento	Municipio	Comunidad	Área	Entrevistas 2004
1	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 1 No colonias	Urbana	8
2	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia 10 de Mayo Zona 1	Urbana	8
3	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 2 No colonias	Urbana	8
4	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 3 No colonias	Urbana	8
5	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 5 No colonias	Urbana	8
6	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Arrivillaga Zona 5	Urbana	8
7	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 6 No colonias	Urbana	8
8	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia El Martinico I Zona 6	Urbana	8
9	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Los Ángeles Zona 6	Urbana	8
10	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Castillo Lara Zona 7	Urbana	8
11	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia 4 de Febrero Zona 7	Urbana	8
12	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Kaminal Juyú I Zona 7	Urbana	8
13	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 10 No colonias	Urbana	8
14	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Concepción Zona 10	Urbana	8
15	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Valle de Almería Zona 11	Urbana	8
16	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Miraflores Zona 11	Urbana	8
17	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 13 No colonias	Urbana	8
18	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Vista Hermosa 1 Zona 15	Urbana	8
19	Guatemala	Guatemala	Aldea Lavarreda Zona 18	Urbana	8
20	Guatemala	Guatemala	Finca La Pascua Zona 18	Urbana	8
21	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia La Florida Zona 19	Urbana	8

22	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Venezuela Zona 21	Urbana	8
23	Guatemala	Chinautla	Caserío San Antonio Las Flores	Rural	11
24	Guatemala	Chinautla	Colonia Santa Isabel 1 y 2	Urbana	8
25	Guatemala	Mixco	Aldea El Rodeo	Rural	11
26	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Colinas de Minerva	Urbana	8
27	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia La Brigada	Urbana	8
28	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Montserrat 2	Urbana	8
29	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Lomas del Rodeo	Urbana	8
30	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Pérez Guisasola	Urbana	8
31	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia San Francisco 1	Urbana	8
32	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Río Escondido	Urbana	8
33	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Molino de Las Flores 1	Urbana	8
34	Guatemala	Mixco	Mixco	Urbana	8
35	Guatemala	Palencia	Caserío El Bejucal	Rural	11
36	Guatemala	Petapa	Colonia Villa Hermosa 1 y 2	Urbana	8
37	Guatemala	San José Pinula	Lotificación Santa Sofía	Urbana	8
38	Guatemala	San José Pinula	Colonia Santa Elena	Urbana	8
39	Guatemala	San José Pinula	San José Pinula	Urbana	8
40	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez	Caserío San Juaneritos	Rural	10
41	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez	Ciudad Quetzal	Urbana	8
42	Guatemala	San Pedro Ayampuc	Colonia Villas de San Pedro	Urbana	8
43	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Aldea El Carmen	Rural	11
44	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Colonia Loma Real	Urbana	8
45	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Santa Catarina Pinula	Urbana	8
46	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Aldea Bárcenas	Rural	11
47	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Asentamiento Tres Banderas	Urbana	8
48	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Castañás	Urbana	8
49	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Renacimiento	Urbana	8
50	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Santa Teresita	Urbana	8
51	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Prados de Monte María	Urbana	8
	<i>Total para la región 2004</i>				425
Región 2		Suroccidente			
52	Escuintla	Escuintla	Colonia Magnolias	Urbana	7
53	Escuintla	Escuintla	Caserío Los Portales	Rural	12
54	Escuintla	Escuintla	Colonia Independencia	Urbana	7
55	Escuintla	Escuintla	Escuintla	Urbana	8
56	Escuintla	La Democracia	La Democracia	Urbana	7
57	Escuintla	La Gomera	Lotificación San Rafael	Urbana	8
58	Escuintla	La Gomera	Parcelamiento Los Chatos	Rural	11
59	Escuintla	Masagua	Aldea Obero	Rural	12
60	Escuintla	Masagua	Caserío Málaga	Rural	11
61	Escuintla	Nueva Concepción	Trocha 5	Rural	12
62	Escuintla	San José	Puerto San José	Urbana	7
63	Escuintla	Siquinalá	Finca San Vicente	Rural	12
64	Escuintla	Tiquisate	Tiquisate	Urbana	7
65	Quetzaltenango	Coatepeque	Coatepeque	Urbana	8
66	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar	El Palmar	Urbana	7
67	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar	El Rosario Palajunoj	Rural	12

68	Retalhuleu	Champerico	Caserío Santa Ana La Selva	Rural	11
69	Retalhuleu	El Asintal	Lotificación San Rafael	Urbana	8
70	San Marcos	El Tumbador	Aldea Las Cruces	Rural	11
71	San Marcos	Ocós	Caserío Villa Angela	Rural	12
72	Suchitepéquez	Chicacao	Finca Washington	Rural	11
73	Suchitepéquez	Mazatenango	Mazatenango	Urbana	8
74	Suchitepéquez	Patulul	Colonia Santa Luisa	Urbana	7
75	Suchitepéquez	Río Bravo	Comunidad Agraria Campesina	Rural	12
76	Suchitepéquez	Samayac	Samayac	Urbana	7
77	Suchitepéquez	San Francisco Zapotitlán	Finca Las Margaritas	Rural	12
78	Suchitepéquez	Santa Bárbara	Santa Bárbara	Urbana	7
79	Suchitepéquez	Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez	Parcelamiento El Japón Nacional	Rural	11
80	Suchitepéquez	Santo Tomás La Unión	Santo Tomás La Unión	Urbana	7
	<i>Total para la región 2004</i>				272
Región 3		Noroccidente			
81	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Aldea Buena Vista	Rural	12
82	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Urbana	8
83	Chimaltenango	Patzún	Aldea Cojobal	Rural	12
84	Chimaltenango	Patzún	Patzún	Urbana	8
85	Chimaltenango	San Martín Jilotepeque	Caserío El Sargento	Rural	12
86	Chimaltenango	San Martín Jilotepeque	San Martín Jilotepeque	Urbana	8
87	Chimaltenango	Tecpán Guatemala	Caserío Xetonox	Rural	12
88	Chimaltenango	Tecpán Guatemala	Tecpán Guatemala	Urbana	8
89	Huehuetenango	Aguacatán	Aguacatán	Urbana	8
90	Huehuetenango	Aguacatán	Aldea El Pericón	Rural	12
91	Huehuetenango	Cuilco	Aldea El Rodeo	Rural	12
92	Huehuetenango	Jacaltenango	Aldea Jajliná	Rural	12
93	Huehuetenango	Jacaltenango	Jacaltenango	Urbana	8
94	Huehuetenango	La Libertad	Aldea El Trapichillo	Rural	12
95	Huehuetenango	Nentón	Nentón	Urbana	8
96	Huehuetenango	San Juan Atitán	Aldea Camul	Rural	12
97	Huehuetenango	Todos Santos Cuchumatán	Todos Santos Cuchumatán	Urbana	8
98	Quetzaltenango	Cabricán	Caserío Grandeza	Rural	12
99	Quetzaltenango	Flores Costa Cuca	Aldea Gálvez	Rural	12
100	Quetzaltenango	Huitán	Aldea Paxoj	Rural	12
101	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango	Zona 2	Urbana	8
102	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango	Zona 4	Urbana	8
103	Quetzaltenango	San Martín Sacatepéquez	San Martín Sacatepéquez	Urbana	8
104	Quiché	Chajul	Chajul	Urbana	8
105	Quiché	Chichicastenango	Caserío Chuabaj	Rural	12
106	Quiché	Chichicastenango	Chichicastenango	Urbana	8
107	Quiché	Cunén	Finca El Rancho	Rural	12
108	Quiché	Ixcán	Cooperativa La Resurrección	Rural	12
109	Quiché	Ixcán	Playa Grande	Urbana	8
110	Quiché	Ixcán	Victoria 20 de Enero	Rural	12
111	Quiché	San Juan Cotzal	Finca San Francisco	Rural	12
112	Quiché	Uspantán	Caserío Sicaché	Rural	12
113	Quiché	Uspantán	Uspantán	Urbana	8

114	Sacatepéquez	Alotenango	Alotenango	Urbana	8
115	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala	Aldea San Juan del Obispo	Rural	12
116	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala	Antigua Guatemala	Urbana	8
117	Sacatepéquez	Jocotenango	Colonia Los Llanos	Urbana	8
118	Sacatepéquez	San Lucas	San Lucas	Urbana	8
119	Sacatepéquez	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Urbana	8
120	Sacatepéquez	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Santo Tomás Milpas Altas	Rural	12
121	San Marcos	Comitancillo	Aldea Chicalaj	Rural	11
122	San Marcos	Comitancillo	Comitancillo	Urbana	8
123	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Aldea Talhuito	Rural	12
124	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Aldea Tuichuná	Rural	12
125	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Concepción Tutuapa	Urbana	8
126	San Marcos	San Cristóbal Cucho	Aldea Barranca Grande El Calvario	Rural	12
127	San Marcos	San Marcos	San Marcos	Urbana	8
128	San Marcos	San Miguel Ixtahuacán	Aldea Sicabé Buena Vista	Rural	12
129	San Marcos	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	Aldea San Andrés Chapil	Rural	12
130	San Marcos	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	Urbana	8
131	San Marcos	Tajumulco	Caserío Piedra Redonda	Rural	12
132	San Marcos	Tajumulco	Tajumulco	Urbana	7
133	Sololá	Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán	Caserío Chui Santo Tomás	Rural	11
134	Sololá	Santa Clara La Laguna	Santa Clara La Laguna	Urbana	8
135	Sololá	Santa Lucía Utatlán	Caserío Chuitzam	Rural	12
136	Sololá	Santiago Atitlán	Santiago Atitlán	Urbana	8
137	Sololá	Sololá	Santa María El Tablón	Rural	8
138	Sololá	Sololá	Sololá	Urbana	8
139	Totonicapán	Momostenango	Caserío Chonimatux	Rural	12
140	Totonicapán	San Bartolo	San Bartolo	Urbana	8
141	Totonicapán	San Francisco El Alto	Aldea San Antonio Sija	Rural	11
142	Totonicapán	San Francisco El Alto	San Francisco El Alto	Urbana	8
143	Totonicapán	Totonicapán	Totonicapán	Urbana	8
	<i>Total para la región 2004</i>				624
Región 4		Suroriente			
144	Chiquimula	Chiquimula	Chiquimula	Urbana	7
145	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Aldea Las Flores	Rural	11
146	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Caserío Barbasco	Rural	11
147	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Jocotán	Urbana	7
148	Jalapa	Jalapa	Aldea Taco Arriba	Rural	11
149	Jalapa	Jalapa	Caserío El Poxte	Rural	11
150	Jalapa	Monjas	Caserío Las Vegas	Rural	11
151	Jalapa	San Carlos Alzatate	San Carlos Alzatate	Urbana	7
152	Jalapa	San Pedro Pinula	Aldea Aguamecate	Rural	11
153	Jutiapa	Jalpatagua	Aldea Aceituno	Rural	11
154	Jutiapa	Jalpatagua	Jalpatagua	Urbana	7
155	Jutiapa	Jutiapa	Jutiapa	Urbana	7
156	Jutiapa	Santa Catarina Mita	Aldea El Quebracho	Rural	11
157	Jutiapa	Santa Catarina Mita	Santa Catarina Mita	Urbana	8
158	Jutiapa	Yupiltepeque	Caserío Monzones	Rural	12
159	Santa Rosa	Cuilapa	Aldea San Juan de Arana	Rural	12

160	Santa Rosa	Cuilapa	Cuilapa	Urbana	8
161	Santa Rosa	Oratorio	Aldea Las Cabezas	Rural	12
162	Santa Rosa	San Juan Tecuaco	Aldea El Tanque	Rural	12
163	Santa Rosa	San Juan Tecuaco	San Juan Tecuaco	Urbana	8
	<i>Total para la región 2004</i>				195
Región 5		Nororienté			
164	Alta Verapaz	Cahabón	Caserío Pinares	Rural	12
165	Alta Verapaz	Cobán	Cobán	Urbana	8
166	Alta Verapaz	Panzós	Finca La Amistad	Rural	12
167	Alta Verapaz	Panzós	Panzós	Urbana	8
168	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	Aldea Chitap	Rural	12
169	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	Aldea Chiyux	Rural	12
170	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	San Pedro Carchá	Urbana	8
171	Alta Verapaz	Senahú	Finca El Volcán	Rural	12
172	Alta Verapaz	Viejo Chahal	Viejo Chahal	Urbana	8
173	Baja Verapaz	Granados	Aldea Llano Grande	Rural	12
174	Baja Verapaz	Salamá	Aldea Ixcayán	Rural	12
175	Baja Verapaz	Salamá	Salamá	Urbana	8
176	Baja Verapaz	San Miguel Chicaj	Aldea Chixolop	Rural	12
177	Baja Verapaz	San Miguel Chicaj	Aldea San Gabriel	Rural	12
178	El Progreso	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	Aldea Estancia de La Virgen	Rural	12
179	El Progreso	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	Urbana	8
180	El Progreso	Sanarate	Aldea Agua Dulce	Rural	12
181	El Progreso	Sanarate	Aldea Montepeque	Rural	12
182	El Progreso	Sansare	Aldea Buena Vista	Rural	12
183	Izabal	Los Amates	Finca El Pilar	Rural	12
184	Izabal	Morales	Caserío El Mitchal	Rural	12
185	Izabal	Morales	Finca Arapahoe Nuevo	Rural	12
186	Izabal	Puerto Barrios	Aldea Milla 5	Rural	12
187	Izabal	Puerto Barrios	Puerto Barrios	Urbana	7
188	Petén	La Libertad	Caserío San José La Bendición	Rural	11
189	Petén	Melchor de Mencos	Caserío Puerta del Cielo	Rural	11
190	Petén	Melchor de Mencos	Melchor de Mencos	Urbana	7
191	Petén	San Benito	San Benito	Urbana	7
192	Zacapa	Cabañas	Aldea Santo Tomás	Rural	11
193	Zacapa	San Diego	Aldea El Triunfo	Rural	11
194	Zacapa	Zacapa	Zacapa	Urbana	7
	<i>Total para la región 2004</i>				324

B. Design Effects: Comparative Precision of the Findings

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling errors and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the gathering and processing of the information. These errors can be controlled by constructing a good measurement instrument, good interviewer training, good field supervision, and with good programs to input data such errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the comparison of the result of the sample with the population gives an idea if those errors have generated biases that might make the sample unrepresentative of the population. The use of hand-held computers that have been employed in the AmericasBarometer 2006 in some of the countries studied likely reduces these errors by allowing for consistency checks during the actual process of interviewing. In addition, eliminating the process of data entry eliminates errors at this stage as well. With the traditional process of paper questionnaires, it is necessary to code the questionnaires in the office and to clean the data, which is also a process that can generate error. With paper questionnaires, this process goes on only weeks after the data have been collected. Correcting the errors detected in the office during the cleaning process, or by programs that detect errors, still leaves many of those errors uncorrected or uncorrectable.

On the other hand, sampling errors are a produce of chance and result from the basic fact of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, it must be realized that this is only one of the many possible samples that could be drawn. The variability that exists between all of these possible sampling errors could be known only if all possible samples were drawn, which is obviously impossible for practical and cost reasons. In practice, what one does is to estimate the error based on the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sampling error of a statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar circumstances. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design of the sample. The Design Effect, DEFT, indicates the efficient of the design employed in relation to a design of simple random sampling (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by the both designs (complex and SRS) is the same; that is to say, the complex sample is as efficient as the SRS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample produces an error larger than that obtained by SRS.

$$DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$$

In the table below are presented the confidence intervals (95%, that is 1.96 of the EE), and the design effects (DEFT). The table shows also the statistical value of the question (mean or percentage). The EE are estimated by STATA 9. The extreme values originate in a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socio-economic situation, and this reduces the efficiency of the cluster sampling.

It is worth noting that the sampling error is usually 10% to 40% larger than what would have been observed by SRS. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important system support index, (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. That means that confidence interval at 95% (given by the 1.96 of the EE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT from the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained by SRS.

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Error	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			itlr			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican Rep.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican Rep.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53

C. Regressions Used in Different Chapters

CAPÍTULO III:

CONCEPCIONES DE DEMOCRACIA

Concepciones alternativas de la democracia(a)		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
0 Negativo	Intercept	-2.937	.954	9.474	1	.002	
	Sexo	.039	.264	.022	1	.883	1.040
	Edad	-.006	.010	.405	1	.524	.994
	Educacion	-.065	.039	2.726	1	.099	.937
	Nivel socioeconómico	.115	.085	1.815	1	.178	1.121
	Residencia urbana	.484	1.058	.209	1	.647	1.623
	identidad étnica	.527	.287	3.368	1	.066	1.693
	Tamaño	-.088	.332	.070	1	.791	.916
1 Vacía	Intercept	-.167	.446	.140	1	.708	
	Sexo	.355	.126	7.981	1	.005	1.427
	Edad	-.017	.005	11.482	1	.001	.983
	Educación	-.145	.020	52.849	1	.000	.865
	riqueza	-.016	.042	.144	1	.704	.984
	Nivel socioeconomico	.138	.476	.084	1	.771	1.148
	identidad étnica	.755	.133	32.449	1	.000	2.128
	Tamaño	.010	.153	.005	1	.946	1.010
2 Utilitaria	Intercept	-1.244	.698	3.181	1	.075	
	Sexo	-.161	.209	.590	1	.442	.852
	Edad	-.002	.008	.080	1	.778	.998
	Educación	-.053	.031	2.868	1	.090	.949
	Nivel socioeconómico	.011	.068	.027	1	.869	1.011
	Residencia	-.745	.667	1.246	1	.264	.475
	identidad étnica	.216	.226	.916	1	.338	1.242
	Tamaño	.261	.215	1.470	1	.225	1.299

Categoría de referencia: Normativa.

CAPÍTULO IV

APOYO AL SISTEMA

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	55.832	6.347		8.796	.000
	Residencia urbana	.124	1.355	.003	.092	.927
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.010	.405	.001	.026	.980
	¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.021	.192	-.005	-.108	.914
	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.056	.048	-.038	-1.167	.244
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena	-2.752	1.381	-.066	-1.992	.047
	Sexo masculino	-1.169	1.255	-.029	-.932	.352
	Entrevistados que han sido víctimas de un acto de delincuencia	.012	.016	.024	.725	.468
	Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive	.061	.023	.088	2.688	.007
	¿El nivel de delincuencia representa amenaza para el país?	-.059	.028	-.066	-2.104	.036
	Índice total de victimización de la corrupción	-2.557	.867	-.097	-2.949	.003
	Percepción de corrupción	-2.124	.895	-.074	-2.375	.018
	¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país...?	.090	.035	.095	2.544	.011
	¿Cómo calificaría SU situación económica?	.000	.040	.000	.011	.991
	Satisfacción con los servicios del gobierno local	.030	.034	.029	.875	.382
	Evaluación del trabajo del Presidente (Oscar Berger)	.167	.035	.171	4.770	.000
	Índice de atención política	.001	.011	.007	.109	.913
	Índice de conocimiento político	-.218	.162	-.085	-1.341	.180

Variable dependiente: Apoyo al sistema

TOLERANCIA POLITICA:

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	65.930	7.704		8.557	.000
	Residencia urbana	-2.677	1.671	-.057	-1.602	.110
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.361	.498	.031	.725	.469
	¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.113	.236	-.021	-.481	.630
	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.026	.059	-.015	-.442	.659
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena	3.126	1.697	.064	1.842	.066
	Sexo masculino	1.407	1.541	.030	.913	.361
	Entrevistados que han sido víctimas de un acto de delincuencia	-.027	.020	-.048	-1.404	.161
	Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive	.002	.028	.003	.085	.932
	¿El nivel de delincuencia representa amenaza para el país?	-.095	.035	-.089	-2.731	.006
	Índice total de victimización por corrupción	1.837	1.065	.060	1.725	.085
	Percepción de corrupción	.259	1.101	.008	.235	.814
	¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país...?	-.110	.044	-.098	-2.515	.012
	¿Cómo calificaría SU situación económica...?	-.015	.049	-.012	-.300	.764
	Satisfacción con los servicios del gobierno local	-.017	.043	-.014	-.402	.688
	Evaluación del trabajo del Presidente (Oscar Berger)	.042	.043	.037	.980	.327
	Índice de atención política	.001	.013	.006	.093	.926
Índice de conocimiento político	-.259	.199	-.085	-1.305	.192	

Variable dependiente: Tolerancia política

APOYO A UNA DEMOCRACIA ESTABLE:

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Paso1 (a)	Residencia	-.393	.170	5.346	1	.021	.675
	Nivel socioeconómico	.082	.050	2.667	1	.102	1.086
	Educación	-.020	.024	.720	1	.396	.980
	Edad	.000	.006	.000	1	.985	1.000
	Identidad étnica	.061	.174	.123	1	.726	1.063
	Sexo	-.129	.157	.680	1	.409	.879
	Victima delincuencia	.000	.002	.005	1	.946	1.000
	Percepción seguridad	.005	.003	2.867	1	.090	1.005
	Crimen amenaza al futuro	-.005	.003	1.996	1	.158	.995
	Indice corrupción	-.006	.111	.003	1	.958	.994
	Percepción corrupción	-.153	.108	1.986	1	.159	.858
	Situación de ingresos familiares	-.006	.004	1.558	1	.212	.994
	Situación de la economía	-.002	.005	.232	1	.630	.998
	Participación en gobierno local	-.007	.004	2.821	1	.093	.993
	Evaluación del presidente	.015	.004	11.047	1	.001	1.015
	Indice atención política	.002	.001	2.214	1	.137	1.002
	Indice de corrupción	-.007	.021	.116	1	.733	.993
Constante	-.722	.790	.836	1	.361	.486	

Variable dependiente: porcentaje de población en casilla democracia estable

CAPÍTULO V

VICTIMIZACIÓN POR CORRUPCIÓN

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	-.268	.086		-3.126	.002
	Residencia urbana dummy	.079	.042	.055	1.893	.059
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.039	.012	.107	3.134	.002
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	.079	.042	.053	1.872	.061
	Sexo masculino dummy	.170	.038	.118	4.432	.000
	Apoyo al sistema	.152	.038	.105	3.954	.000
	Educación	.042	.022	.065	1.927	.054
	Edad	-.006	.015	-.011	-.416	.677

Variable dependiente: Número total de maneras que han sido víctimas de corrupción en el último año

PERCEPCIÓN DE LA CORRUPCIÓN

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	65.297	3.069		21.279	.000
	Residencia urbana dummy	4.431	1.489	.093	2.975	.003
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.065	.441	.005	.148	.882
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	1.368	1.511	.028	.905	.366
	Sexo masculino dummy	-1.730	1.371	-.036	-1.262	.207
	Apoyo al sistema	4.363	1.369	.091	3.186	.001
	Educación	1.675	.781	.077	2.144	.032
	Edad	1.808	.524	.103	3.453	.001

Variable dependiente: ¿Qué tan extendida está la corrupción entre los funcionarios de gobierno?

CAPÍTULO VI

PERCEPCIÓN DE SEGURIDAD

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	57.913	3.107		18.640	.000
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.345	.228	-.053	-1.517	.130
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.050	.058	.024	.848	.397
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	3.509	1.691	.059	2.075	.038
	Sexo masculino dummy	2.240	1.542	.039	1.453	.146
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	-.021	.506	-.001	-.042	.967
	Residencia urbana dummy	-6.965	1.699	-.120	-4.101	.000

Variable dependiente: Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive

VICTIMIZACIÓN POR DELINCUENCIA

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1(a)	Residencia	.469	.154	9.239	1	.002	1.599
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes	.067	.045	2.195	1	.138	1.069
	Educación	.063	.020	9.943	1	.002	1.065
	Edad	-.012	.006	4.749	1	.029	.988
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	-.158	.159	.985	1	.321	.854
	Sexo masculino dummy	.329	.140	5.512	1	.019	1.390
	Constante	-2.080	.286	52.791	1	.000	.125

Variable dependiente: ¿Fue víctima de un acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

CAPÍTULO VII

SATISFACCIÓN CON SERVICIOS DEL GOBIERNO LOCAL

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	74.255	7.173		10.352	.000
	Residencia urbana dummy	-14.905	4.247	-.387	-3.509	.000
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.037	.040	-.027	-.915	.361
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	3.992	1.177	.101	3.391	.001
	Sexo masculino dummy	-1.707	1.063	-.044	-1.606	.109
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.028	.155	-.006	-.178	.859
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	1.120	.349	.118	3.214	.001
	Tamaño del lugar	-4.641	1.341	-.388	-3.462	.001

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con los servicios del gobierno local

EVALUACIÓN DEL TRATO RECIBIDO DE PARTE DEL GOBIERNO LOCAL

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	72.644	7.824		9.284	.000
	Residencia urbana	-10.704	4.656	-.267	-2.299	.022
	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.015	.044	.010	.347	.729
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena	1.984	1.255	.048	1.581	.114
	Sexo masculino	-2.605	1.136	-.065	-2.293	.022
	¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.075	.167	-.017	-.448	.654
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.956	.374	.096	2.555	.011
	Tamaño del lugar	-3.781	1.466	-.305	-2.580	.010

Variable dependiente: percepción de trato recibido de parte de la municipalidad

CAPÍTULO VIII

ABSTENCIÓN ELECTORAL

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Paso1 (a)	Residencia	.043	.150	.082	1	.775	1.044
	Nivel socioeconómico	-.073	.045	2.652	1	.103	.929
	Educación	-.061	.022	7.742	1	.005	.941
	Edad	-.046	.006	61.308	1	.000	.955
	Etnicidad	-.199	.152	1.716	1	.190	.819
	Sexo	-.622	.139	20.157	1	.000	.537
	Víctima de delincuencia	.002	.002	1.183	1	.277	1.002
	Víctima corrupción	-.066	.100	.439	1	.508	.936
	Percepción economía nacional	.010	.004	6.916	1	.009	1.010
	Percepción economía personal	.007	.004	2.297	1	.130	1.007
	Evaluación gobierno local	.004	.004	1.029	1	.310	1.004
	Evaluación del Presidente	-.004	.004	1.158	1	.282	.996
	Confianza interpersonal	-.003	.003	1.867	1	.172	.997
	Concepción de la democracia	-.195	.071	7.495	1	.006	.823
	Índice atención política	.000	.001	.132	1	.716	1.000
	Índice conocimiento político	.023	.018	1.665	1	.197	1.024
	Creencia democracia siempre mejor	-.005	.003	2.778	1	.096	.995
Constante	2.046	.644	10.098	1	.001	7.738	

Variable dependiente: no asistió a votar (únicamente personas empadronadas)

CAPÍTULO IX

CONFIANZA INTERPERSONAL

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	57.589	3.422		16.831	.000
	Residencia urbana dummy	-6.060	1.745	-.108	-3.473	.001
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.281	.516	.020	.544	.586
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.442	.235	-.070	-1.881	.060
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.158	.068	.079	2.318	.021
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	.828	1.733	.015	.478	.633
	Sexo masculino dummy	3.077	1.580	.055	1.948	.052
	Índice de participación en organizaciones (promedio)	-.033	.059	-.016	-.564	.573
	¿Tiene hijos? dummy	-3.796	2.191	-.060	-1.732	.083
	Religión católica dummy	4.067	1.628	.071	2.498	.013

Variable dependiente: ¿La gente de la comunidad es confiable?

ÍNDICE DE PARTICIPACIÓN SOCIAL

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	14.502	1.580		9.176	.000
	Residencia urbana dummy	-1.853	.834	-.067	-2.221	.027
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.592	.247	.087	2.393	.017
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	.202	.112	.066	1.799	.072
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-.069	.033	-.070	-2.107	.035
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	-.198	.827	-.007	-.240	.811
	Sexo masculino dummy	.337	.756	.012	.446	.656
	¿Tiene hijos? dummy	8.522	1.020	.274	8.357	.000
	Religión católica dummy	-.392	.780	-.014	-.503	.615

Variable dependiente: Índice de participación en organizaciones (promedio)

CAPÍTULO X

PREFERENCIA POR LA DEMOCRACIA

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	44.994	13.475		3.339	.001
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.274	.399	-.031	-.685	.493
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.496	.847	.026	.586	.558
	Residencia urbana dummy	-1.828	2.867	-.024	-.638	.524
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.033	.118	.011	.277	.782
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	4.683	2.917	.057	1.605	.109
	Sexo masculino dummy	.221	2.665	.003	.083	.934
	vic1r Entrevistados que han sido víctimas de un acto de delincuencia	-.094	.034	-.099	-2.788	.005
	aoj1Irec Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive	-.118	.049	-.085	-2.410	.016
	aoj1Iarec El nivel de delincuencia representa amenaza para el país	.062	.058	.036	1.065	.287
	exc7tot Índice total de victimización por corrupción.	-1.499	1.828	-.029	-.820	.412
	exc7rec Percepción de corrupción	6.049	1.933	.107	3.130	.002
	soct1rec ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país...?	-.103	.075	-.054	-1.364	.173
	idio1rec ¿Cómo calificaría SU situación económica...?	.150	.083	.072	1.809	.071
	sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios del Gobierno local	.083	.073	.041	1.131	.258
	m1rec Evaluación del trabajo del Presidente (Oscar Berger)	.152	.074	.078	2.036	.042
	Índice de atención política	.009	.023	.027	.396	.692
	Índice de conocimiento político	-.323	.342	-.064	-.944	.346
	¿Tiene hijos? dummy	.751	3.499	.009	.215	.830

Variable dependiente: Preferencia por la democracia

CREENCIA QUE DEMOCRACIA ES SIEMPRE LO MEJOR

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	45.672	8.382		5.449	.000
	Residencia urbana dummy	-3.217	1.810	-.063	-1.777	.076
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	.778	.538	.061	1.445	.149
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.398	.253	-.068	-1.570	.117
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.032	.064	.017	.502	.615
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	1.169	1.839	.022	.636	.525
	Sexo masculino dummy	.084	1.676	.002	.050	.960
	vic1r Entrevistados que han sido víctimas de un acto de delincuencia	-.062	.021	-.102	-2.950	.003
	aoj1lrec Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive	.026	.030	.029	.846	.398
	aoj1lrec ¿El nivel de delincuencia representa amenaza para el país?	-.037	.037	-.032	-.993	.321
	exc7tot Índice total de victimización por corrupción	-.514	1.150	-.015	-.447	.655
	exc7rec Percepción de corrupción	3.769	1.213	.102	3.108	.002
	soct1rec ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país...?	-.021	.047	-.017	-.450	.653
	idio1rec ¿Cómo calificaría SU situación económica...?	.108	.053	.078	2.035	.042
	sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios del Gobierno local	.051	.046	.039	1.119	.263
	m1rec Evaluación del trabajo del Presidente (Oscar Berger)	.085	.046	.069	1.851	.065
	Índice de atención política	.017	.014	.079	1.201	.230
	Índice de conocimiento político	.120	.215	.036	.558	.577

Variable dependiente: Democracia siempre mejor

SATISFACCIÓN CON LA DEMOCRACIA

Modelo		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	9.833	6.423		1.531	.126
	Residencia urbana dummy	.559	1.398	.013	.400	.689
	Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes de capital	-.753	.412	-.069	-1.829	.068
	Educación ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.235	.196	-.046	-1.201	.230
	Edad ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.021	.049	.013	.433	.665
	Auto-identificación étnica indígena dummy	.119	1.424	.003	.083	.934
	Sexo masculino dummy	.777	1.294	.017	.601	.548
	vic1r Entrevistados que han sido víctimas de un acto de delincuencia	-.034	.016	-.064	-2.109	.035
	aoj11rec Percepción de seguridad en el barrio donde vive	.078	.023	.100	3.340	.001
	aoj1larec ¿El nivel de delincuencia representa amenaza para el país?	-.085	.028	-.087	-3.014	.003
	exctot Índice total de victimización de la corrupción	-1.815	.878	-.063	-2.067	.039
	exc7rec Percepción de corrupción	.516	.927	.016	.556	.578
	soct1rec ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país...?	.069	.036	.064	1.911	.056
	idio1rec ¿Cómo calificaría SU situación económica...?	.131	.041	.108	3.230	.001
	sgl1r Satisfacción con los servicios del Gobierno local	.118	.036	.100	3.287	.001
	m1rec Evaluación del trabajo del Presidente (Oscar Berger)	.355	.036	.321	9.881	.000
	Índice de atención política	.018	.011	.094	1.630	.104
	Índice de conocimiento político	.270	.165	.093	1.643	.101

Variable dependiente: Satisfacción con la democracia

D. Questionnaire Used in the 2006 Study

Versión # 23C IRB Approval: 060187



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VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Guatemala, 2006

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAÍS	2
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] __ __ __ __	IDNUM	
ESTRATOPRI: 1. Zona metropolitana 2. Suroccidente 3. Noroccidente 4. Suroriente 5. Nororiente 11. Villa Nueva (OS) 12. Chimaltenango (OS) 13. Sololá (OS) 14. Quetzaltenango (OS) 15. Santa Cruz del Quiché 16. Nebaj (OS) 17. San Juan Cotzal (OS) 18. Pachalum (OS) 19. Rabinal (OS) 20. Cobán (OS)	ESTRATOPRI	02 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM. _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Departamento: _____ (01) Guatemala (08) Totonicapán (15) Baja Verapaz (02) El Progreso (09) Quetzaltenango (16) Alta Verapaz (03) Sacatepéquez (10) Suchitepéquez (17) Petén (04) Chimaltenango (11) Retalhuleu (18) Izabal (05) Escuintla (12) San Marcos (19) Zacapa (06) Santa Rosa (13) Huehuetenango (20) Chiquimula (07) Sololá (14) Quiché (21) Jalapa (22) Jutiapa	GUADEPT	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MUNICIPIO _____	GUAMUNICPIO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LUGAR POBLADO _____	GUALUGAR P	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	SEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector _____	SEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Idioma del cuestionario: ((1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Achí (7) Ixil	GUIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMAÑO	
Hora de inicio: _____:_____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2006	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. Sexo (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer **Q1**

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]		A4	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	No sabe	88

DEM13. En pocas palabras, ¿qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.

	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?		Sondee: ¿significa algo más?
	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir qué tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de sexo	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir qué tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de Derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80
NS/NR	88	88	88
Código (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

DEM13D. De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión ¿cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.] 88. NS 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]	DEM13D	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Ahora, cambiando el tema.....[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4I
SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica <u>del país</u> ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe						SOCT1
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual <u>del país</u> es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe						SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general <u>su situación</u> económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe						IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que <u>su situación</u> económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe						IDIO2

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS		PROT1
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	(9) Inap	PROT2

<i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido con la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6

CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra...? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	LS3
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1
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ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala del 1 al 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda							Derecha			(NS=88)

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1
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<p>NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS</p>	<p>NP1B</p>	
<p>NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<p>NP2</p>	
<p>SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) No sabe</p>	<p>SGL1</p>	
<p>SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe</p>	<p>SGL2</p>	
<p>LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	<p>LGL2</p>	
<p>LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>	<p>LGL3</p>	
<p>MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? [Leer alternativas] (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI6</p>	
<p>MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante el último año? (1) Sí [siga] (0) No [pase a MUNI11] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11]</p>	<p>MUNI8</p>	
<p>MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.</p>	<p>MUNI9</p>	
<p>MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p>MUNI10</p>	

<p>MUNI11. ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI11</p>
<p>MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? [Leer alternativas] (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>MUNI15</p>

<p>Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias? [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]</p>					
<p>JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder</p>	<p>(8) NS</p>	<p>JC1</p>	
<p>JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS</p>	<p>JC4</p>	
<p>JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS</p>	<p>JC10</p>	
<p>JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS</p>	<p>JC12</p>	
<p>JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.</p>	<p>(1) Se justificaría</p>	<p>(2) No se justificaría</p>	<p>(8) NS</p>	<p>JC13</p>	
<p>JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el Presidente cierre el Congreso o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	<p>(1) Si</p>	<p>(2) No</p>	<p>(8)NS</p>	<p>JC15</p>	
<p>JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el Presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?</p>	<p>(1) Si</p>	<p>(2) No</p>	<p>(8)NS</p>	<p>JC16</p>	

<p>Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?</p> <p>POP1. [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP1</p>
<p>POP2. [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros Presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando estorben la labor del presidente, nuestros Presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso. <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP2</p>
<p>POP3. [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros Presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros Presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP3</p>
<p>POP4. [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nuestros Presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario], 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros Presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro. <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP4</p>
<p>POP5. [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nuestros Presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere, aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros Presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP5</p>

<p>VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>
<p>VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (88) NS (99) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p>VIC2</p>
<p>AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar AOJ8] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar AOJ8] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar AOJ8]</p>	<p>AOJ1</p>
<p>AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [no leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) INAP [No víctima]</p>	<p>AOJ1B</p>
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS</p>	<p>AOJ11</p>
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ12</p>
<p>AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? (1) Si (2) No 8 (NS)</p>	<p>AOJ16A</p>

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	AOJ17	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? (1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS	AOJ18	
GUA AOJ22. ¿Cree usted que los pandilleros o mareros pueden rehabilitarse si se les brinda una oportunidad? 1. si pueden rehabilitarse 2.No pueden rehabilitarse 8. NS	GUA AOJ22	
GUAEXPLOIT1. ¿Sabe usted de algún caso particular, incluyendo niños/as y adolescentes, que en el último año han sido víctimas de explotación laboral, es decir, que aceptaron trabajos en que otros les quitan el dinero que ganan, y no pueden abandonar su trabajo porque están amenazados? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	GUAEXPLOIT1	
GUAEXPLOIT2. ¿Sabe usted de algún caso particular de mujeres, adolescentes o niñas que en el último año han sido víctimas de explotación sexual, es decir, les obligaron a trabajar como prostitutas? 1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	GUAEXPLOIT2	

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho?
(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4
GUA ST5. Office of the Ombudsman	1	2	3	4	9	8	GUA ST5

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada				Mucho			No sabe

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)		B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?		B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político Guatemala?		B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político guatemalteco?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la el Ministerio Público?		B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Policía Nacional?		B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser guatemalteco?		B43

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe		
B45. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Office of the Ombudsman?		B45
B24. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los tribunales de justicia?		B24
B39. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las cámaras de empresarios privados?		B39
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?		B40
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria (SAT) Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?		B42
B51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las ONG's organizaciones no gubernamentales que trabajan en la comunidad?		B51
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte de Constitucionalidad?		B50
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47

Ahora, usando **la tarjeta "A"**, por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS
N1. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.	N1
N3. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	N3
N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	N9
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	N10
N11. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	N11
N12. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.	N12

[Recoja tarjeta A]

<p>M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Oscar Berger es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR</p>	M1
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[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		No sabe

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe		
<p>ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	ING4	
<p>PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los guatemaltecos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	PN2	
<p>DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	DEM23	

RECOGER TARJETA B

<p>PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR</p>	PN4
<p>PN5. En su opinión, ¿Guatemala es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS/NR</p>	PN5

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.	E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.	E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano, cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales.	E16

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político guatemalteco?	D33
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	D34

D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?	D36
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	D37

Las preguntas que siguen, son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor, léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D5

RECOGER TARJETA "C"

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS	DEM2
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde	DEM11

<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer]</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Lea las alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP1</p>
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales?</p> <p>(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>
<p>Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.</p>	
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas]::</p> <p>1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8</p>	<p>DC1</p>
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga cuarenta quetzales de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas]::</p> <p>1) corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) corrupto pero se justifica 3) no corrupto 8)NS</p>	<p>DC10</p>
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es [Leer alternativas]::</p> <p>1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8</p>	<p>DC13</p>

	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida durante el último año?	0	1	8		EXC2	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida durante el último año?	0	1	8		EXC6	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad durante el último año No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima, mordida) durante el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar mordida en los juzgados durante el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC14	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos durante el último año? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	0	1	8	9	EXC15	
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Si → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	0	1	8	9	EXC16	
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas, a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?	0	1	8		EXC18	

	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC19
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					EXC7
Ahora queremos saber cuanta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...					
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI1
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Guatemala? [NO LEER: insertar nombre] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI2
GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Guatemala? [NO LEER: insertar número] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI3
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? [NO LEER: insertar número de años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI4
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					GI5
Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4
VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa... ¿Está empadronando para votar? 1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS					VB1
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (8) NS [Pasar a VB10]					

<p>GUAVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO - F R G (Rios Montt)</p> <p>2. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA –URNG (Asturias)</p> <p>3. DIA (Suger)</p> <p>4. GANA: PATRIOTA, MOVIMIENTO REFORMADOR, PARTIDO SOLIDARIDAD NACIONAL (PP-MR-PSN) (Berger)</p> <p>5. PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - P A N (López Rodas)</p> <p>6. PARTIDO UNIONISTA - P U (Fritz García-Gallont)</p> <p>7. UNIDAD NACIONAL DE LA ESPERANZA – UNE (Colom)</p> <p>8. DEMOCRACIA SOCIAL PARTICIPATIVA – DSP (Lee)</p> <p>9. DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA - D C G (Arbenz)</p> <p>10. MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL Y POLITICO CAMBIO NACIONAL – MSPCN (Conde Orellana)</p> <p>11. UNION NACIONAL - U N (Arredondo)</p>	<p>GUAVB3</p>
<p>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>1 Falta de transporte</p> <p>2 Enfermedad</p> <p>3 Falta de interés</p> <p>4 No le gustó ningún candidato</p> <p>5 No cree en el sistema</p> <p>6 Falta de cédula de identidad</p> <p>7 No se encontró en padrón electoral</p> <p>10 No tener edad necesaria</p> <p>11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado</p> <p>12 Tener que trabajar</p> <p>13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad</p> <p>14. Otra razón</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) Inap (Votó)</p> <p>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</p>	<p>VB4</p>
<p>VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos] [Solo aceptar una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Las cualidades del candidato</p> <p>(2) El partido político del candidato</p> <p>(3) El plan de gobierno del candidato</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p>VB8.</p>
<p>VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>1. Sí [Siga] 2. No. [pasa a VB10] 8. NS [pasa a VB10]</p>	<p>VB6</p>

<p>GUAVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO - F R G</p> <p>2. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA –URNG</p> <p>3. DIA</p> <p>4. GANA: PATRIOTA, MOVIMIENTO REFORMADOR, PARTIDO SOLIDARIDAD NACIONAL (PP-MR-PSN)</p> <p>5. PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - P A N</p> <p>6. PARTIDO UNIONISTA - P U</p> <p>7. UNIDAD NACIONAL DE LA ESPERANZA – UNE</p> <p>8. DEMOCRACIA SOCIAL PARTICIPATIVA – DSP</p> <p>9. DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA - D C G</p> <p>10. MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL Y POLÍTICO CAMBIO NACIONAL – MSPCN</p> <p>11. UNION NACIONAL - U NUNION DEMOCRATICA – UD</p> <p>12. ALIANZA NUEVA NACION – ANN</p> <p>TRANSPARENCIA</p> <p>Otro _____</p> <p>88. No sabe 99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>GUAVB7</p>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>
<p>GUAVB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>1. Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)</p> <p>2. Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)</p> <p>3. Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)</p> <p>4. Partido Unión Democrática (UD)</p> <p>5. Partido Liberador Progresista (PLP)</p> <p>6. Partido Los Verdes (PLV)</p> <p>7. Movimiento Reformador (MR) --anteriormente PLG--</p> <p>8. Partido DIA</p> <p>9. Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)</p> <p>10. Partido Patriota (PP)</p> <p>11. Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)</p> <p>12. Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA) –(Antes PSN) -</p> <p>13. Partido Unionista</p> <p>14. Unidad Nacional Auténtica UNA</p> <p>15. Bienestar Nacional (BIEN)</p> <p>16. Alianza Nueva Nación ANN</p> <p>17. Frente Por la Democracia -- Anteriormente Transparencia--</p> <p>18. Centro de Acción Social CASA</p> <p>19. Partido Social Demócrata Guatemalteco.</p> <p>20. Unión del Cambio Nacional (UNE)</p> <p>21. Encuentro por Guatemala</p> <p>88. No sabe</p> <p>99. INAP</p>	<p>GUAVB11</p>

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) N/S	POL1
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer alternativas) 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) N/S	POL2

USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa nada de acuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo , ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala					NS/ NR	
	Muy en Muy de desacuerdo acuerdo						
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA1
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA2
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA3
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, ¿se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas?	1 6	2 7	3	4	5	8	AA4

RECOGER TARJETA “B”

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS2
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (No buscó trabajo)	DIS3
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS4
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS5

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

Ninguna	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9				
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado (secundaria)	10	11	12				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
No sabe/no responde	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años

Q2

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[no leer alternativas]**

- (1) Católica
- (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)
- (3) Otra no cristiana
- (5) Evangélica
- (4) Ninguna
- (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar

Q3

GUAQ4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido usted a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca

GUAQ4

[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

- 1. de 0 a 1000
- 2. de 1001 a 1500
- 3. de 1501 a 2000
- 4. de 2001 a 2500
- 5. de 2501 a 3300
- 6. de 3301 a 4000
- 7. de 4001 a 5000
- 8. de 5001 a 6600
- 9. de 6601 a 9500
- 10. más de 9500

RECOGER TARJETA E

Q10

<p>Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap Sí → preguntar: ¿Cuanto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, <u>escribir cantidad y especificar moneda</u>]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>	
<p>Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa, de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p>Q10B</p>	
<p>Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10C</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted percibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. [No leer] NS/NR</p>		
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q11</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS.....88.</p>	<p>Q12</p>	<p> _ _ _ </p>
<p>GUAETID. ¿Usted se considera...? (1) Indígena (2) Ladino (3) Garífuna (4) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>GUAETID</p>	
<p>GUAETID1. Considera que su madre es o era una persona ladina, indígena o garífuna (1) Indígena (2) Ladina (3) Garífuna 8 NS (NS/NR)</p>	<p>GUAETID1</p>	

<p>GUAETID2: ¿A qué grupo étnico (pueblo) pertenece?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Achi 2. Akateko 3. Awakateko 4. Ch'orti' 5. Chuj 6. Itza' 7. Ixil 8. Jakalteko (Popti') 9. Kaqchikel 10. K'iche' 11. Mam 12. Mopan 13. Poqomam 14. Poqomchi' 15. Q'anjob'al 16. Q'eqchi' 17. Sakapulteko 18. Sipakapense 19. Tektiteko 20. Tz'utujil 21. Uspanteko 22. Xinka 23. Garífuna 24. Ladino 26. Ninguno 27. Otro 	<p>GUAETID2</p>	
<p>GUAETID4. [Entregar Tarjeta B] En una escala de 1 a 7, en la cual 1 es poco y 7 es mucho ¿En qué medida se siente usted guatemalteco?</p> <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) NS</p> <p>Poco Mucho</p>	<p>GUAETID4</p>	
<p>GUAETID3. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Maya?</p> <p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8)NS</p> <p>Poco Mucho</p> <p>[Retirar Tarjeta B]</p>	<p>GUAETID3</p>	
<p>GUALENG1. ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (<i>acepte más de una alternativa</i>).</p> <p>(1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi'</p> <p>(6) Otro (nacional o extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>GUALENG1</p>	

<p>[GUALENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? ¿Cuál? (Acepte una alternativa) (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Otro (nacional o extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>GUALENG1A</p>
<p>GUALENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: <i>(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)</i> (1) Sólo Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Español e idioma extranjero (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>GUALENG4</p>

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **(leer todos)**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado, preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar “No” en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista 4. Comerciante 5. Campesino o agricultor 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano 8. Servicio doméstico 9. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializado (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializado 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa[Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista[Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR 	<p>OCUP1</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 	<p>OCUP4</p>	
<p>OCUP1A En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ¿Asalariado del gobierno? 2. ¿Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. ¿Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. ¿Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. ¿Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	<p>OCUP1A</p>	
<p>OCUP1B1. En total, ¿cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 	<p>OCUP1B1</p>	
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	<p>OCUP1C</p>	

DESOC2. [SÓLO SI RESPONDIÓ NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS (99) Inap	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? ¿en el campo? ¿en un pueblo? ¿O en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1	
MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2	
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta # 1




Tarjeta "A"



Tarjeta "B"



Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta E

- 1. de 0 a 1000**
- 2. de 1001 a 1500**
- 3. de 1501 a 2000**
- 4. de 2001 a 2500**
- 5. de 2501 a 3300**
- 6. de 3301 a 4000**
- 7. de 4001 a 5000**
- 8. de 5001 a 6600**
- 9. de 6601 a 9500**
- 10. más de 9500**