# THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN COSTA RICA: 2006

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







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# Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| BCCR | Banco Central de Costa Rica (Costa Rican Central Bank) |
| IDB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| CCP-UCR | Centro Centroamericano de Población (Central American Population Center) of the Universidad de Costa Rica |
| CCSS | Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (Costa Rican Social Security Administration) |
| CsPRO | Census and Survey Processing System |
| DEFT | Design effect |
| SE | Standard errors |
| GMA | Greater Metropolitan Area |
| ICE | Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (Costa Rican Electricity Institute) |
| IDESPO | Instituto de Estudios sobre Población (Population Studies Institute) of the Universidad Nacional |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| IDS | Índice de Desarrollo Social (Social Development Index) of MIDEPLAN |
| IIS-UCR | Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (Social Research Institute) of the Universidad de Costa Rica |
| INEC | Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo (National Statistics and Census Institute) |
| INS | Instituto Nacional de Seguros (National Insurance Institute) |
| Km | kilometers |
| LAPOP | Latin American Public Opinion Product |
| MIDEPLAN | Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica (Ministry of Planning and Political Economy) |
| MOPT | Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (Ministry of Public Works and Transportation) |
| NPE | Número de partidos efectivos (Effective number of political parties) |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| PRODE | Índice de Protección de Derechos (Protection of Rights Index) |
| SPSS | Statistical Package for Social Sciences |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| URS | Unrestricted random sample design |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |

# Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the "voice" of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based "over-sampling" in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the "before and after" of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance are still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

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# Prologue

## The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators,. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series

and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behaviour. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviours. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using "count variables," to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deeidentified, thus protecting the right of

anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire was pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were

assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

## Acknowledgements

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the

data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

| Country | Researchers |
|---|---|
| Summary Report | Prof. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (Project Director) |
| Mexico and Central America Group | |
| Mexico | ●Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, University of Michigan, and Senior Research Analyst at Market Strategies, Inc.<br>●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados |
| Guatemala | ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University<br>●Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala |
| El Salvador | ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador<br>●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) |
| Honduras | ●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)<br>●José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh |
| Nicaragua | ●Prof. Manuel Ortega-Hegg, Director of the Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural (CASC) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua, Nicaragua<br>●Marcelina Castillo Venerio, Centro de Análisis Socio-cultural (CASC), Universidad Centroamericana. (UCA) |
| Costa Rica | ●Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP, and Professor at the Universidad de Costa Rica.<br>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations |
| Panama | ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Professor of Political Science at Central Michigan University |
| Caribbean Group | |
| Dominican Republic | ●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee<br>●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology Science at Temple University |
| Guyana | ● Dr. Mark Bynoe, Director, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of |

| Country | Researchers |
|---|---|
| | Guyana<br>●Ms. Talia Choy, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of Guyana. |
| Haiti | ●Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University<br>● Yves François Pierre, Groupe de Recherche en Sciences Sociales (GRESS) |
| Jamaica | ● Dr. Ian Boxill, Professor of Comparative Sociology, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.<br>●Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.●Roy Russell, Lecturer in statistics, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.<br>●Arlene Bailey, Information Systems specialist, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.<br>●Dr. Lloyd Waller, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Government, UWI, Mona<br>• Dr Paul Martin, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI,<br>• Lance Gibbs and Caryl James, Lecturers/Research Assistants, Dept. of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work |
| Andean/Southern Cone Group | |
| Colombia | ●Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor at the Universidad de los Andes |
| Ecuador | ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University<br>●Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University<br>●Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt Universtity<br>●Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University<br>●Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D student, Vanderbilt University |
| Peru | ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the US, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos<br>●Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos |
| Bolivia | ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University<br>●Abby B. Córdova, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University<br>●Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University<br>●Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt Universtity<br>●Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University<br>●Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University |
| Paraguay | ●Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay |
| Chile | • Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| Brazil | ● Denise Pavia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, Brazil<br>● Simon Bohn, York University<br>● Rachael Meneguello, Brazil, Director of the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) and Professor of Political Science, University of Campinas, Brazil<br>● David Samules, University of Minnesota<br>● Luicio Renno, University of Arizona |

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
December, 2006

# Executive Summary

This study on the political culture of democracy in Costa Rica in 2006 follows up a similar study conducted two years earlier, and is part of a wider comparative research project that currently covers seventeen countries in Latin America. This larger project is not only an effort to compare the political cultures of the different countries, but also to develop a tool with which to follow their changes over time. Professor Mitchell Seligson of Vanderbilt University, and founder of the LAPOP project, oversaw the technical coordination of the project for the entire region. The Centro Centroamericano de Población of the Universidad de Costa Rica (CCP-UCR) directed the investigation in Costa Rica.

This study of Costa Rican values, attitudes, and opinions is based on the findings of a national survey of 1,500 people conducted in June 2006. The size and design of this survey is similar to the one conducted in 2004, which facilitates comparisons between them. As in the 2004 round of surveys, the basic questionnaire used in Costa Rica was the same one employed in all the countries included in the project. In addition, topics specific to the Costa Rican case were also included.

The 2006 study shows that public opinion on a number of important social and political issues in the country have changed significantly. They are, in short: a drop in the level of support for the system, the widespread decline of trust in the main public institutions and social actors, and, over the last two years, a sharp rise in the feeling of insecurity.

In terms of public support for democracy, the average score on the support-for-the-system index (designed by Seligson) dropped from 68 to 64 points on a scale of 0-to-100. This is a statistically significant drop and shows that the recovery observed between 1999 and 2004 was ephemeral. From a longer term perspective, the country's current levels are clearly lower than they were twenty years ago (80 to 85 on a scale of 0-to-100), reaffirming the declining trend noted in the 2004 study. Despite this drop, however, public support for democracy in Costa Rica is still the highest in Latin America. There is also some encouraging news. In the last two years, the average level of political tolerance rose from 58 to 62 points on a scale of 0-to-100. (Though it does need to be pointed out that, despite living in the oldest and most stable democracy in Latin America, Costa Ricans show levels of intolerance that are similar to those in the newer democracies of Mexico and Central America.) Lastly, it is noteworthy that the group of people with both high levels of support for the system and political tolerance did not shrink.

One of this study's most striking findings was the widespread decline of people's trust in public institutions. The system of justice (the judicial branch and especially the police) and those entities that provide public services (CCSS, INS, ICE), which earlier studied had shown to be held in high esteem by the public, experienced the greatest erosion. It should be recalled that, between 2004 and 2006, corruption scandals involving ex-presidents and high-ranking political leaders were uncovered in these three institutions. This 2006 study captures the impact of these events.

Finally, this study captures the marked increase in people's sense of insecurity. On average, people who feel unsafe both in their neighborhoods and in the country rose from 35 to 46 (on a scale of 0-to-100). At the same time, trust in the system of justice to punish criminals fell from 38 to 25.

An examination of authoritarian attitudes, however, shows that the simultaneous drop in support for the system and public trust between 2004 and 2006 did not lead to a rise in favorable attitudes toward a decisive leader or greater tolerance toward breaking democratic rules. Despite their disillusionment, Costa Ricans are not willing to support leaders who, in the name of development or efficiency, undermine public institutions.

This study pays special attention to three topics: corruption, electoral attitudes and behavior, and support for the free trade agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR). The topic of corruption is important because of the devastating effect that the above-mentioned corruption scandals had on the political system: a blow to the bipartisan system and, in particular, the collapse of the party that ruled for the last eight years. Our research shows an increase in the reported incidence of corruption from 14% to 19%; this is double the levels noted in Chile. Additionally, despite the strong public repudiation generated by the corruption scandals, a significant portion of the public would be willing to accept corrupt politicians if they were effective or had attractive ideas. Only 45% of the public prefers honest politicians to corrupt ones with good ideas or who are capable; the rest are either unable to choose or prefer corrupt politicians. In terms of corruption, the study confirms the 2004 finding that victims of corruption are less supportive of the system.

Our investigation of electoral attitudes and behavior is especially important given the surprisingly close results of the February 2006 presidential election, and the fact that, for the first time in 40 years, the losing party questioned the fairness of the vote. The study captures the growth of abstentionism. It confirms the finding of previous studies of the flows into and out of the electoral system (25% of voters in 2006 had abstained in 2004, but 29% of people registered to vote in 2006 abstained). It also finds falling interest to be a cause of abstentionism, especially among lower income groups. Despite the doubt and debate about how clean the elections were, and the almost month-long uncertainty about the outcome, the study shows that there were no significant repercussions on public opinion: almost half the people did not follow this debate (47%); and of those who did, two-thirds said that the irregularities – if they occurred– did not alter the outcome. In general, public trust in the TSE did not change and the degree of suspicion about the fairness of the elections was associated with how people voted (the most critical are those who did not vote or who voted for the PAC) or socioeconomic levels (people with lower incomes). The last point on this topic worth noting is that, a few months after the elections, only 36% of the people said they supported a political party, which is an indication of strong partisan disaffection.

The third topic worth highlighting, for its centrality to the current political debate in Costa Rica, is public support for CAFTA-DR. The main findings here are that the majority of people (about 50%) have ambivalent positions on this issue, and that the groups who actively support or reject the agreement are in the minority (30% and 17% respectively). There was a steep decline in the

levels of support for CAFTA-DR between 2004 and 2006; more than half of this drop can be explained by the sharp fall, over these years, in how effective people perceive the government to be fighting poverty and corruption, and protecting civil rights. This factor turned out to be an important predictor of the other key topics such as support for democracy and trust in public institutions. This suggests that there are important reciprocal effects between specific and diffuse support for democracy.

The 2006 study reexamined the topics of local government and public participation. In terms of local government, doubts about the efficiency, openness, and sensibility of local governments to people's needs increased markedly since 2004, variations between municipalities notwithstanding. The most striking finding is the decline in support for decentralization, whose index dropped from 54 to 44 between 2004 and 2006 (on a scale of 0-to-100). As opposed to other countries in Latin America where majorities support decentralization, in Costa Rica most people are skeptical about it.

In terms of public participation, this study contains a methodological innovation in its focus on modes of public participation (the different ways people effectively intervene in the social and political life of the country). The findings indicate that approximately a quarter of the population either "does nothing" or limits itself to voting every four years; about one in five participate in different areas, especially at the community level, but do not vote; and only 8% can be considered active in all the areas investigated. Level of schooling is a factor that helps distinguish between the people who least participate and the rest. This situation has not greatly changed in relation to previous years. And compared to other countries in the region, Costa Ricans are not among the most apathetic.

Lastly, in the regression analyses developed to analyze attitudes and behaviors, what stood out again was the importance of local factors in the formation of values, attitudes, and perceptions. As noted in the 2004 study, this points to a little-explored question in comparative studies of democracy: there is no "average" way that people experience democracy since both the shared community (*convivencia*) and democratic culture have textures that vary at the sub-national level. Within "climates of public opinion," it would seem that there are local ecologies that play an important role in the formation of individual attitudes.

# Chapter I. The Context

## Introduction

Costa Rica is a small country of medium economic development and high human development whose democracy is one of the oldest in Latin America and, certainly, the most stable (Peeler 1985; Booth 1989; Peeler 1991; Booth 1995; Chalker 1995; González and Céspedes 1995; Yashar 1997; Booth 1998; Lehoucq 1998; Seligson 1999; Mesa-Lago 2000; Ganuza, Barros et al. 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mahoney 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2001; Lehoucq 2005; Molina 2005). Even though the country has experienced rapid economic and social modernization, and comparatively acceptable – though volatile – levels of economic growth, its political system currently faces serious challenges (Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Programa Estado de la Nación 2006). This study of political culture was conducted, then, at an important moment in the country's recent history.

The Costa Rican democratic regime is the product of a long political transition that began at the end of the nineteenth century and included a conflictive process of political-institution development during the first half of the twentieth century (Lehoucq 1998; Molina and Lehoucq 1999; Molina 2005).[1] Although it can be debated when this transition ended, it is generally accepted that most of the institutions and freedoms associated with a democratic regime had been established by the mid-1950s (Peeler 1991; Booth 1998). In the economic sphere, the country has accumulated long-term experience with economic openness. For more than a century and a half, Costa Rica has depended on an economy in which the performance of the export sector has been decisive for the country.[2]

In the second half of the twentieth century, Costa Rica experienced a unique convergence of economic, social, and political processes.[3] As in many other underdeveloped countries, Costa Rican society experienced rapid economic and demographic growth, especially between 1950 and 1980. In contrast to the rest, it combined this growth with democratic development and important achievements in social equity. This unique convergence contributed to the social and political stability of the country, despite the turmoil experienced by other countries in the region (Programa Estado de la Nación 2002). Between 1980 and 1982, the country suffered a severe

[1] This concept of transition is taken from O´Donnell and Schmitter and refers to the transition between two political regimes with different characters (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

[2] An agro-export economy oriented toward Europe had already been established by the mid-nineteenth century. Contrary to other countries that were, during the last century and a half, relatively closed economically, like Mexico, or where the peasant economy was (and still is) the base of subsistence for most people, such as in Guatemala, in Costa Rica economic openness is nothing new. Very early in our history as an independent republic, the subsistence-based or locally-oriented peasant economy lost importance within the economic life of the country. Regarding the early development of the agro-export economy based on coffee and the transformation that it brought to the peasant economy, see: (Facio 1972; Acuña and Molina 1991). For a comparative focus on the uniqueness of Costa Rica's agro-export economy in relation to the other Central American economies, see (Paige 1997; Yashar 1997; Mahoney 2001).

[3] See sections 2 and 3 of Chapter I of the 2004 LAPOP study for a summary of these trends.

economic crisis, although in comparative terms it was less intense and of shorter duration than in most Latin American countries.

Important economic and institutional changes followed the end of this crisis. The country adopted a new style of economic development based on economic openness and the promotion of foreign investment, which generated a dynamic and diversified external sector and profound changes in the structure of the Costa Rican economy (Jiménez 1998). Parallel to this was a series of constitutional and legal changes that altered the structure of the state and how it functioned. However, the country did not return to the era of high and sustained rates of economic growth and rapid social progress that it enjoyed prior to 1980. In addition to these economic and institutional changes, there were also unique political events. In recent years, there has been a strong political dealignment (Sánchez 2003), the breakdown of the bi-party system, a decline in public trust in politics, and a fall in levels of electoral participation.

In the last two decades there has been an expansion of people's rights, and a strengthening of the constitutional, legal, and administrative mechanisms to protect and guarantee them and to oversee state action. This process has coincided with changes in the institutional design of the state and a strong deterioration in its fiscal situation, which fragmented political power and reduced the efficiency of public policies. Additionally, despite economic growth and the expansion of rights, Costa Rican society is more unequal than it was twenty years ago, it has not been possible to reduce poverty levels, and the wages of the middle and lower classes have been stagnant for the last two decades. The current political situation is made all the more complex by the significant erosion of representative democracy due to the collapse of the PLN-PUSC bipartisan system, the growth of public discontent with the way democracy is working, the irruption of distributive conflicts, and the failure of recent efforts to develop a consensus on a program of economic and political reform.

## Structural Characteristics of the Costa Rican State and Democracy

Costa Rican democracy is a stable, presidentialist system with a state in which decision-making is highly concentrated in the central government.[4] The basic organization of the state is governed by the 1949 constitution and subsequent reforms. According to the canons of a republican state under a presidentialist regime (common to most Latin American countries), the constitution defines three branches of government – the executive, legislative, and judicial –which are independent of each other but controlled by a system of checks and balances.[5] The Costa Rican

[4] This section is based on recently published or forthcoming work (Vargas Cullell 2005; Vargas Cullell 2005; Vargas Cullell 2005).

[5] Article 9 of the Constitution establishes that: the government of the Republic is of the people, and is representative, participative, alternating, and responsible. It is run by the people and three distinct and independent branches: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. (Reformed by Law No. 8364 of July 1, 2003.) None of the branches can delegate any of their vested functions. A Supreme Electoral Tribunal (*Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones*), with the rank and independence of the branches of the government, is solely and independently in charge of the organization,

democratic regime, however, is different from other democracies in the region for various reasons: (a) the important expansion of the recognition of people's rights (Table I.1) from an earlier polyarchic base; (b) a strengthening of the mechanisms to protect and enforce these rights; and (c) the ever-increasing and stronger political, legal, and administrative controls that hang over the executive branch. These trends are all characteristic of the last decades of the twentieth century. Currently, many political actors and institutions, including the public at large, have (at least some) effective capacity to veto the formulation or execution of public policies.

**Table I.1 New Rights and Obligations Passed by Congress in Costa Rica, 1989-2003 (an illustrative sample)**

| Area | Right/Obligation | Instrument | Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Political | Expansion of the right to elect local representatives | Law 7794 | 1998 |
| | | Law 8173 | 2002 |
| | Quotas for women in party lists | Law 7653 | 1996 |
| | Collective and civil rights for all indigenous persons | Law 7225 | 1991 |
| | | ILO Treaty 169 | 1992 |
| | Referendum | CP 105 | 2002 |
| Civil | Public access to constitutional justice | Laws 7128 & 7531 | 1989 |
| | Protection against excessive bureaucratic requirements (*trámites*) | Law 8220 | 2002 |
| Social | Responsible parenthood | Law 8290 | 2003 |
| Environmental | Right to a healthy environment | CP Article 50 | 1994 |
| | Ability to act on environmental issues | CP Article 50 | 1994 |
| Duties | Accountability by public officials and elected representatives | CP Article 11 | 2000 |
| | Protection for children and adolescents | 3 laws a/ | 1990-02 |
| | Protection for older adults | 2 laws a/ | 1990-02 |
| | Protection for women | 12 laws a/ | 1990-02 |
| | 6% of GDP dedicated to public education | Law 7676 | 1997 |
| | 10% of central government revenue earmarked for municipalities | CP Article 170 | 2001 |
| | Expansion of protections for freedom of the press | Inter-American Court of Human Rights | 2004 |

Source: (Programa Estado de la Nación 2002; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Saborío 2004), SINALEVI, and Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (www.tse.go.cr)

Notes: CP: Constitution (*Constitución Política*). a/ Law 7142–1990 (Social equality for women); Law 7430-1994 (Promoting breast feeding); Law 7499-1995 (Convention of Belem do Pará for the eradication of violence); Law 7735-1997 (Protection for adolescent mothers); Law 7769-1998 (Attending to women in poverty); Law 8089-2001 (Convention against all forms of discrimination against women); Law 8101-2001 (Responsible parenthood); Laws 8128 and 8129-2001 (Specialized courts for cases of domestic violence); Law 8312-2002 (reforms of various laws); Law 8315-2002 (United Nations Convention to prohibit the ill-treatment of children and adolescents).

administration, and oversight of acts related to voting, as well as the other functions vested in it by the Constitution and laws. (The final paragraph was added by Law No. 5704 of June 5, 1975.)

The constitutional design of the Costa Rican state contains various singularities, both in terms of its aims and organization. These influence the scope and forms of the state's intervention in the country's economy and politics. Among them, it is worth mentioning the following:

It mandates the state to organize production, stimulate the distribution of wealth, and protect the environment.[6] The development of Costa Rica's robust social welfare state and the state's intervention in the economy over the second half of the twentieth century was based on this strong obligation (Rosenberg 1980; Rovira 1982; Trejos 1985; González and Céspedes 1995; Booth 1998; Mesa-Lago 2000; Ganuza, Barros et al. 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004).

The constitutional powers and duties it vests in the executive branch are weak compared to the rest of Latin America (Carey 1997; Urcuyo 2003). In Costa Rica, (a) the executive branch's legislative competence is subordinated to the ordinary laws passed by the legislature; (b) executive emergency powers need to be approved by a two-thirds majority in Congress (*Asamblea Legislativa*); (c) the executive cannot veto the ordinary budget passed by Congress; and (d) the executive cannot refuse to sign laws passed by Congress.[7]

It creates a decentralized sector of autonomous institutions that are administratively independent of the executive and legislative branches.[8] The Comptroller General (*Contraloría General de la República*, or CGR) is responsible for approving their budgets.[9] The decentralized sector is in charge of, among other things, the provision of health care, electricity, telecommunications, water, financial services, and oil refining. The passage of Law 4646 of 1970 weakened the autonomy of the decentralized sector by allowing the executive to gain political control over its governing bodies.[10] Nonetheless, this control did not extend to the legal sphere or in terms of how the institutions function. To this day, the decentralized sector has maintained a good deal of administrative, and operational independence.[11] Currently, public enterprises have a dominant position in banking system, and the production of electric energy and drinking water; and they

[6] Article 50 of the constitution says: "The state will see to the greater well-being of all residents of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most appropriate distribution of wealth. Everyone has a right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, people have the right to denounce acts that infringe on this right and to sue for repairs to the damage caused. The state will determine who is responsible and the corresponding sanctions." (Constitutional Reform 7412 of June 3, 1994).

[7] See Article 121 of the Constitution.

[8] The creation of the institutionalized sector stemmed from the interest of the 1949 Constituent Assembly to take the provision of key services in the development of the country away from the executive branch and partisan politics. It was argued that this autonomy was necessary to lay the foundation for a scientifically and technically based public administration. On this point, see (Lehoucq 2005).

[9] Article 184, Clause 2 establishes as a function of the Comptroller: "Examine, approve or disapprove the budgets of the municipalities and the autonomous institutions, and oversee their execution."

[10] Law 4646 created the figure of the executive director as the top government official in a decentralized institution. The executive director is named by the president. It also created a mechanism to select the members of the executive boards, also controlled by the president, which came to be known as the 4 to 3. Through this law, the president's party was given control over the institution, while the main opposition party (assuming alternating power) received a minority representation.

[11] To coordinate public investment, the executive derives power from its political control of the top governmental bodies and the so-called "directive" mechanism, which the exception of treasury-related affairs, is actually a juridically weak mechanism to give direction to public action.

have a monopoly in the areas of insurance, oil refining, telecommunications, and alcohol production.
It establishes a robust mechanism to oversee the legality of public spending, the CGR, whose powers are among the strongest in Latin America (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004). Formally, the CGR is a part of the legislative branch, but it has complete independence. In virtue of its responsibility for approving the spending of the decentralized sector and of the municipalities, it controls just under two-thirds of total public spending. The CGR exercises ex-ante oversight over all expenditure and the state does not recognize any "debt…that it has not authorized" (Clause 1, Article 184 of the Constitution).
In 1989, Laws 7128 and 7531 created the Constitutional Court (*Sala Constitucional*) as a specialized body of the Supreme Court (*Corte Suprema de Justicia*), establishing broad, strong, and active control over the constitutionality of state action in Costa Rica (Jurado 2000; Volio 2000; Arias 2001; Domingo and Sieder 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Saborío 2004; Wilson 2004; Wilson and Rodríguez 2004). Currently, the Constitutional Court is the most powerful public entity within the Costa Rican state.

For some decades, the Costa Rican state has had a decisive position in the country's economy. In the last fifteen years, total public spending by the Costa Rican state – including the branches of government, the central government, the decentralized sector, and the municipalities – has represented close to 40% of the Gross Domestic Product, or GDP (Figure I.1).[12] Proportionally, the weight of the Costa Rican state is similar to that in some highly developed countries and is certainly greater than that found in most of Latin America. Political and institutional authorities have the capacity, in principle, to significantly influence the economic and social life of the country. However, it should be noted that the central government's tax revenue has oscillated between 12%-14% of GDP (to which another 4.5% from social security should be added). This is a relatively low proportion of total public spending; the rest is financed by the income produced from the provision of services and through public debt. This debt, even if it generates revenue for the Treasury, acts as a constraint on government action since, in recent years, the service payment on this debt has used up ever greater resources that cannot be destined to expenditure and public investment (these payments have represented up to half of the government's current revenue). As a consequence of payments on a debt greater than 55% of GDP, of chronic fiscal deficits between 2% and 4% of GDP, and in the absence of fiscal reforms that would modify the low and insufficient taxation, officials have resorted to cutting back investment in infrastructure and social spending in recent years in order to maintain macroeconomic balances (Agosín 2002).[13] This situation has impacted the quality of services that the populationreceives.

[12] Municipal taxes in relation to GDP – the weight of taxes collected by the municipalities within the national economy – is not more than 1% (Alfaro 2003; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Programa Estado de la Nación 2005).
[13] On taxes, see the chapter in this report on market institutions.

**Figure I-1 Total Public Spending, Tax Revenue, and Public Debt Service as a Percentage of GDP in Costa Rica, 1985-2004**




Source: Authors' calculations based on (Gutiérrez Saxe 2004; Trejos, J. D. 2004)
Notes: Total public spending: central government, decentralized sector, and municipalities. Tax revenue includes only taxes collected by the central government.

The majority of public spending is carried out by the decentralized sector, the approval of which is outside the direct control of the legislative and executive branches.[14] The executive certainly has influence over the volume and distribution of expenditures in the decentralized sector through executive decrees and directives from the Finance Ministry (*Ministerio de Hacienda*), guidelines from the Budget Authority (*Autoridad Presupuestaria*), and mechanisms of political influence such as naming members to the governing boards of these institutions. However, carrying out the budget of the greater part of public spending implies constant negotiations, not without friction, between the executive branch and the authorities of the corresponding institutions.

In summary, over the last twenty years, Costa Rica has experienced a democratization of its political system through the sustained widening of people's rights, the creation of effective mechanisms to guarantee them, and new measures of control over public administration. Given that democratization developed without simultaneous steps taken with regard to other institutional and fiscal variables, over time this created an increasingly difficult situation: greater democratization but less institutional capacity for state action, both in terms of institutional design, which progressively became less functional, and growing fiscal restrictions. For its part, the institutional apparatus of the state is characterized by multiple, powerful, and relatively autonomous centers of institutional power, of which the executive is just another certainly powerful but not dominant actor. It is a state with robust mechanisms of horizontal accountability

[14] The decentralized sector represents approximately 20 to 22 percent of GDP, to which is added the weak municipal tax regime, representing an additional point. The CGR is in charge of approving the expenditures of these sectors.

(O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell 2003), both constitutional as well as legal and administrative, that constantly control and delimit the competence and actions of the executive and public management more generally. Lastly, the state has a vast and strategic decentralized sector which includes the main entities that provide public services (with the exception of education and road infrastructure). The executive has formal and informal mechanisms of political control over this sector, but weak powers to direct and coordinate the policies and programs, except through Treasury-related means.[15]

## Recent Economic and Social Evolution

In the last two decades, the country embarked on a new style of development that, based on economic openness and promoting exports, has profoundly transformed its productive apparatus.[16] The traditional agro-export economy lost its former importance: coffee and bananas now represent about 10% of exports, and beef, cacao, and sugarcane are no longer exported. The service sector generates almost 60% of GDP (59.3% in 2004), while agriculture and livestock contribute only 9%. In the twenty-first century, so far, tourism has become the country's most important source of foreign exchange. Industry, which had grown under the shelter of the Central American market and predominated thirty years ago, has been displaced as the leading sector by high technology manufacturing plants producing for third markets. From 1985 to 2003, the Costa

[15] The only attempt to completely reform the public administration was through the proposed organic law of public administration in 2001. In the arguments in favor of this proposal (*exposición de motivos*), it was stated: "Costa Rican Public Administration has grown in the last fifty years without an overriding organizational blueprint. Efforts to resolve the various deficiencies in the provision of public services, or attending to necessities of indisputable general interest, have been addressed through the creation of public entities, in each case designed in response to the pressures of the moment and without considering the overall public apparatus. This public sector's growth has made the executive branch's job of coordinating it very difficult; in the face of this atomization, the general rules of planning and directing, and the regional organization of the Public Administration, have not been rethought…. One of the main deficiencies of the Costa Rican public sector is these difficulties at coordinating." The initiative proposed that there should be a unified coordination of public administration (Chapter V): "In this Chapter, the rules regarding the unified coordination of Public Administration are redefined, the creation of sectoral and subsectoral councils are regulated, the rules of planning are brought up-to-date with list of the specific principles that should guide it, responsabilities for failure to meet goals are established, the intersubjective direction is regulated so that the decentralized sector harmoniously integrated within the overall Public Administration, and precisely defines the mechanisms of evaluating performance and accountability {Saborío, 2001 #48}.

[16] In the middle of the 1970s, the Costa Rican economy was characterized by its traditional agro-export base: coffee and bananas accounted for more than 80% of exports. Import substitution industrialization and strong state intervention in the production of goods and services, such as full control of the financial system, was erected on this agro-export base. In this productive and institutional system, there interacted a small group of social and political actors with stable relations and *predec* the end of the era of political development in the country started in the middle of the 1980s. On this period, see (Rovira 1982; González and Céspedes 1995; Mesa-Lago 2000; Lehoucq 2005). There are no empirical studies on the political economy of the political parties during this period. The works that advance the most in this direction are those of Mario Alejo Sánchez and Florisabel Rodríguez. The first focuses on the geographic distribution of electoral results (Sánchez 1985). Recently, Rodríguez tried to relate the social structure with voting patterns and found that this relation, right now, has come undone (Rodríguez and Castro 2002).

Rican economy grew three fold, exports multiplied more than six times, and foreign direct investment by ten (Table I.2).

**Table I.2. Evolution of GDP, Economic Openness, Exports, and Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica, 1985-2003**

| Year | GDP (millions of constant 2000 US$) | GDP Index 1985=100 | Open-ness Coeff. | Exports (millions US$) | Export Index (1985=100) | % Non-Trad. Exports | FDI (millions US$) | FDI Index 1985=100 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1985 | 7.667,0 | 100 | | 1.081,6 | 100 | 45,6 | 64,4 | 100 |
| 1988 | 8.779,4 | 114 | | 1.448,8 | 134 | 56,1 | 123,1 | 191 |
| 1991 | 9.824.4 | 127 | 73,4 | 1.899,3 | 176 | 60,3 | 178,4 | 277 |
| 1994 | 12.063.3 | 157 | 77,3 | 2.878,2 | 266 | 67,1 | 297,6 | 462 |
| 1997 | 13.353,0 | 174 | 86,2 | 4.205,5 | 389 | 75,1 | 406,9 | 632 |
| 2000 | 15.946,3 | 208 | 94,3 | 5.849,7 | 541 | 85,0 | 408,6 | 634 |
| 2003 | 17.649,4 | 230 | 95,3 | 6.102,2 | 564 | 86,9 | 586,9 | 911 |

Notes: *Openness coefficient: %(Exports+ Imports)/GDP; Non-traditional exports: does not include coffee, bananas, beef, sugarcane, and cacao; FDI: foreign direct investment.
Sources: GDP: World Bank: Other figures: 1991-2004, *Décimo Informe Estado de la Nación*; 1985-1990: *Observatorio del Desarrollo*; foreign trade figures: COMEX based on figures from the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR).

The recent past, however, cannot match the era of rapid social and economic progress that characterized the period from 1950 to 1980. Some social indicators have certainly continued to improve: life expectancy at birth, schooling, infant mortality, and malnutrition. But in the period from 1988 to 2004, Costa Rican society became more unequal. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (National Statistics and Census Institute, or INEC), the Gini coefficient increased from 0.35 to 0.47 during these years (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo 2006). Although poverty diminished in the first half of the 1990s, the economic growth from 1995 to 2005 did not reduce it further. In recent years, the minimum wage has declined despite the fact that the Costa Rican economy has been one of the fastest growing in Latin America. From a medium-term perspective, the last twenty years have been an era of wage stagnation (Figure I.2). Finally, despite the important increase in social spending since 1991, which allowed it to recuperate the percentage it represents within GDP, today social expenditure per capita is 20% less than it was in 1980 (Figure I.3). It should be recalled that public social expenditure has a strong impact on household well-being, especially among those with low incomes.[17]

[17] Juan Diego Trejos has shown that for families in the first decil, social spending accounts for almost three times the income generated from work. See Trejos, J. D. 2005. *Inversión pública social*. San José: ponencia preparada para el undécimo Informe sobre el Estado de la nación, www.estadonacion.or.cr.

**Figure I-2 Evolution of the Minimum Wage Index (1990=100) and the Percentage of Poor Households in Costa Rica 1990-2004**




Source: (Programa Estado de la Nación 2005)

**Figure I-3 Evolution of Public Social Expenditure (ISP), ISP per capita, and ISP as a % of GDP in Costa Rica 1990-2003**




Source: (Programa Estado de la Nación 2004) based on (Trejos, J. D. 2004) with information from the STAP, the COREC II, the institutions involved, and the INEC-CCP

## Recent Political Events

Since the 2004 LAPOP study was conducted, important political events have occurred in Costa Rica that must be taken into account in the analysis of the findings from the 2006 LAPOP survey.[18] Among the most notable are: first, the revelation of corruption implicating three of the last four presidents, high-ranking officials from their administrations, and institutions that enjoyed high levels of public trust, such as the ICE, the CCSS, and the INS (Vargas Cullell and Rosero Bixby 2004); second, doubts about the fairness of the 2006 elections, unprecedented charges in the political history of the fourth quarter of the twentieth century; and third, the end of the bipartisan political era of the PLN-PUSC, which dominated Costa Rican politics in recent decades. These events contributed to the formation of a new, fluid, and unpredictable political situation and make the comparison between the LAPOP 2004 and 2006 findings of considerable interest.

The corruption scandals were the most important political event of 2004 (Programa Estado de la Nación 2005).[19] They linked the traditional party structures to irregularities in state purchases by several of the country's most important public institutions. Despite the reinforcement of anti-corruption legislation and institutions of horizontal accountability, the irregularities were discovered by external agents (the news media and citizen reports) rather than by institutional mechanisms. The facts revealed that the public institutions were colonized by a collusion of

[18] This section is based on research carried out in the preparation of the *XII Informe Estado de la Nación* (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006), particularly: (Alfaro 2006; Rodríguez, Gómez et al. 2006; Vargas Cullell 2006).

[19] An in-depth study on this topic is found in chapter 7 "Ocho preguntas y respuestas sobre la corrupción política en Costa Rica" in the *XI Informe Estado de la Nación* (Programa Estado de la Nación 2005), developed based on various investigations (Echandi 2005; Muñoz 2005; Solana 2005; Villarreal 2005).

political interests and contracting firms – which effectively privatized some of the most important public institutions. During 2005, two ex-presidents awaited trial in ordinary jails and a third had not returned to the country. The high profile of the corruption scandals negatively impacted Costa Rica's international ranking in this area, although the subsequent trials of politicians and business people allowed it to recover lost ground. The fieldwork of the 2004 LAPOP study ended before the outbreak of these scandals. This gives us a "before" and "after" picture on the topic of corruption and its effect on public support for democracy. It should be recalled that, as shown by LAPOP 2004 and other previous studies, corruption erodes the political legitimacy of a system (Seligson 2001; Seligson 2004).

The 2004 report indicated that the Costa Rican political system insures that elections are free and fair. From 1990 to 2002, there were no public charges, either legal or in the media, of fraud in national and municipal elections, or of threats to the person or property of candidates to public office.[20] The process through which Costa Ricans elected their national, legislative, and municipal authorities in 2006 can be considered clean. With the evidence that exists so far, there is no doubt that the results of the 2006 elections reflected the popular will. In contrast to previous elections, however, there were clear deficiencies in the design and management of the electoral process. Even if these deficiencies did not alter the outcome, they did demonstrate problems in the quality of the mechanisms of selecting political representation and uncover important vulnerabilities in the system that are a pressing challenge for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (*Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones*, or TSE) to resolve. There were not enough polling station workers to sufficiently guarantee transparency; there was also insufficient training to keep errors to a minimum. The TSE was slow to respond to these predictable problems and, by calling them "normal," underestimated their importance. These deficiencies in the electoral system opened the door for a political party to question, the first time since 1966, the fairness of the vote. This initiated a hitherto unknown public debate on the topic and created a precedent for future elections. There was greater public scrutiny, this time, on the conduct of the electoral organization and its possible effects. All this uncovered a series of weaknesses in the design and management of the process by electoral authorities and actors such as the political parties.

The main outcome of the Costa Rican elections was the end of the PLN-PUSC bipartisan era, which had governed the country since the 1980s and was characterized by its stability, a preponderance of "catch-all" parties, and low electoral volatility.[21] Today, this situation is a thing of the past. The Partido Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party or PLN) did win the 2006 election with 40.9% of the vote, but the Partido Acción Ciudadana (Public Action Party, or PAC), a party only created a few years ago, almost beat it with 39.8%.[22] The most notable event of 2006 was the sharp fall of support for the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (United Social Christian Party, or PUSC). The ruling party since 1998, this time it only received 3.5% of the

[20] Although there are in the internal party conventions.
[21] The first investigation that provided useful data on this catch-all character is based on information from the mid-1970s (Sánchez 1985).
[22] The 18,169 votes that separated the PLN from the PAC – equivalent to 1.1% of the total valid votes – constitutes the second smallest difference between these two political groups in Costa Rican electoral history.

total votes cast. The end of the PLN-PUSC bipartisanism meant that in the 2006 elections, for the first time since the mid-twentieth century, the political divisions and traditions that arose out of the 1948 Civil War did not influence Costa Rican voters. A second, less visible, but still important result was the weakening of the political parties´ ability to retain voter loyalty and their territorial bases. Both of these results have led to a multi-party system with fragile and generally unpredictable public support. The consequence of this situation is the emergence of divided governments (i.e., administrations without a political majority) in all the structures of government with proportional representation (national and local). On top of this, it should be added that voter turnout declined again. Even if higher levels of abstentionism characterized the 1998 and 2002 elections (around 30% compared to 20% in prior decades), in 2006 it increased five percentage points more.[23] Regions with lower levels of development and fewer opportunities for residents have lower levels of voter turnout.

In 2006, the effective number of parties hovered around three (Figure I.4). These values are among the highest in the 1953-2006 period, and show similarities with those registered by this index in the elections after the 1948 Civil War (1953-1962) and those that anteceded the crystallization of the 1983 bipartisanism (1970-1978). The periods in which the index shows a greater number of effective parties, including 2002-2006, constitute historic moments before the rise of a new system of political parties.

**Figure I-4 Effective Number of Parties According to Type of Election, 1953-2006**




Source: (Alfaro 2006)

In contrast to the period of PLN-PUSC bipartisanism, electoral support for political parties became increasingly fragile in the last three national elections (1998-2002). Two indicators of this growing fragility are the rise in electoral volatility (changing party loyalty from one election

[23] This percentage is greater than that registered in each one of the previous elections except those of 1958. Still, at that time abstentionism reflected the legacy of the 1948 Civil War rather than a voluntary act since two political parties (the Republicano Nacional and the Vanguardia Popular) were prohibited from participating.

to the next) and partisan dealignment (the loss of party loyalty among voters). Costa Rica is currently experiencing a sharp rise in volatility, especially compared to the stability of the 1980s and 1990s (Figure I.5). From an historic perspective, the "peaks" in electoral volatility during the 1953-2006 period were followed by important changes in the type and composition of the political party system (Alfaro 2006). Partisan dealignment has been visible in Costa Rica since the mid-1990s (Sánchez 2003).[24] In 1991, more than 95% of people stated that they supported either the PLN or the PUSC; at the end of 2005, less than 40% did (Figure I.6). The fragile ties between voters and parties became apparent in the difficulties that the TSE had putting together the local electoral boards (*juntas receptoras de votos*) and the need to come up with a contingency plan.

**Figure I-5 Electoral Volatility by Type of Election 1953-2006**




Note: electoral volatility is calculated through the Pedersen index which is obtained by adding the absolute net change in the percentage of votes for each party from one election to another and dividing them by two.
Source: (Alfaro 2006); updated from (Sánchez 2003)

**Figure I-6 Evolution of Party Support in Costa Rica, 1993-2005**




Note: The question asks: "What party do you support?"
Source: Calculated based on the La Nación-Unimer RI surveys (Vargas Cullell 2006).

It is worth pointing out that, in 2006, this long term trend of growing dealignment was tied to short term factors such as the corruption scandals implicating three ex-presidents and a sharp drop in the evaluation of the administration-in-power's efforts to configure the political climate in which the 2005-2006 electoral process took place. The scandals had two immediate effects on electoral preferences. On the one hand, they interrupted the trend, observed during the terms of other administrations, of the rapid decline in people who declare themselves to be "independent" as election day approaches. On the other hand, they profoundly affected the interest of people in this process.[25] Additionally, the 2005-2006 elections took place during a period of prolonged and

[24] Electoral dealignment is the progressive loss of electoral support toward the main political parties, that is, the erosion of the vote.
[25] In November 2004, seven out of ten people said that the scandals had reduced their interest in voting. Although it is clear that this situation changed in the following months, the electoral process did not manage to overturn all its

rising pessimism about the future of the country.[26] This anxiety is much more pronounced than it was a few months before the 2002 elections. Lastly, on top of the pessimism, there was a dramatic fall in 2005 of the public's job approval rating of the administration-in-office (See Chapter VIII).

## Recent Studies of Political Culture

The 2004 LAPOP study noted that there has been a considerable growth of empirical studies of Costa Rican political culture since the 1990s.[27] In the two years that have passed since that report, important works on political beliefs and attitudes have been published. In the academic realm, the study on abstentionism by researchers from the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (Social Research Institute) of the Universidad de Costa Rica (IIS-UCR) stands out (Raventós, Fournier et al. 2005). This work is the first thorough study on the magnitude, characteristics, and explanatory factors of the decline in voter turnout (with data through 2002). Also, researchers affiliated with the PROCESOS center published two new works on political attitudes in Costa Rica and Central America, following up their study on youth political culture published in 2004 (Rodríguez, Castro et al. 2003). They analyzed the paradoxes of political culture in Central American countries (Rodríguez and Madrigal 2006), and studied the volatility of the public's electoral preferences in the February 2006 national elections (Rodríguez, Gómez et al. 2006). The Instituto de Estudios de Población (Population Studies Institute, or IDESPO) of the Universidad Nacional inaugurated a new line of publications on political topics called *Umbral Político* (www.una.ac.cr/idespo/umbral.htm), complementary to their "*pulso nacional*" (national pulse) or monitoring surveys, of which they have conducted eleven since September 2004. It is also worth mentioning the studies by Vargas Cullell on the character and determinants of public support for democracy in Costa Rica, with a comparative perspective on Latin America, and on voter preferences in the recently concluded election (Vargas Cullell 2005; Vargas Cullell 2006). From outside the country, a new publication by Booth and Seligson on the ties between public participation and support for the system in Costa Rica stands out (Booth and Seligson 2005). In the realm of public opinion studies, the last two years were especially active due to the recent election. The main companies that measure public opinion, like UNIMER R.I., Demoscopía, CID-Gallup, and Borge-Asociados did surveys for the country's main news media and political parties.

Since this report is based on a study of public opinion, we feel that we should comment on the debate that occurred at the end of the electoral campaign on the validity of political surveys and the motivations of the firms and news media. This discussion gave rise to alternative hypotheses

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effects. The scandals affected all the parties, although with different intensity and without a discernable pattern (Vargas Cullell 2006).

[26] Starting in 2004, the percentage of people, when asked about the economic perspectives of the country within a year's time, who respond "worse" has continually grown; and the difference between people who think this way in relation to those who respond "the same" or "better" is getting worse (Vargas Cullell 2006).

[27] See the brief bibliographic essay on the studies about Costa Rican political culture since the 1970s in section 5 of Chapter I. To avoid repetition, the reader interested in the topic can consult that section. This time the emphasis is on the studies conducted in the two years between the 2004 and the 2006 LAPOP studies.

to explain the surprising election results. One hypothesis claims that there was no volatility in voter preferences, as Rodríguez et al. and Vargas Cullell argue, but a covering up of the public's real choices (Rodríguez, Gómez et al. 2006; Vargas Cullell 2006). Proponents of this view point out that the competition between the two main parties was always closer than the public opinion studies suggested.[28] A second hypothesis states that during a transition process in the political party system, like the one Costa Rica is experiencing, electoral preferences are basically unpredictable.[29] The problem lies, then, in the inadequacy of the instruments used to capture voter preferences in a fluid environment in which people are quite indecisive.[30] A third hypothesis suggests that widespread mistakes were committed in the surveys and in the interpretation of their findings, preventing an understanding of what happened.[31] Finally, a fourth hypothesis – not necessarily exclusive of the others – points out that although the public opinion studies were well done, there were serious errors, or manipulation in a more extreme version, in the communication and interpretation of the findings by the news media ("media fraud").[32]

This study presents information and analysis that reaffirms, on the one hand, the importance of public opinion surveys as a valid instrument of social research; and, on the other, the worsening trends, associated with public discontent, of electoral and partisan dealignment, which impact support for the system and evaluations of how well it is working, and help us understand the volatility of voter preferences.

[28] This covering up would originate in factors such as fear, distrust, or resistance to manipulation. The main evidence against this interpretation are the fact that it can be documented that a wide segment of voters decided how they were going to vote at the end of the process and that, in general terms, abnormal levels of rejection in the polls prior to the elections were not reported.

[29] There are some authors who, on principle, are epistemologically skeptical about public opinion studies (Dryzek 1988). There is also a wide literature on how the formulation of questions or the order in which they are asked affects the results that a study produces (Bartels 2002; Linde 2003). These authors do not doubt the usefulness of public opinion studies but they do emphasize the limitations that can arise from the way such studies are developed.

[30] There is no place in the specialized literature for this thesis and the Costa Rican political situation is not so exceptional: other political systems have experienced similar political transitions and public opinion studies have been helpful tools to studies such situations. Public opinion studies have been key in the analysis of political attitudes in the context of very high uncertainty, such as the economic and political transitions in the countries of Eastern Europe, which combined a change of their economic regime (from state socialism to capitalism) and a change of political regime (from an authoritarian state to hybrid, semi-democratic, or democratic systems). On this subject, see the extensive literature of Richard Rose and William Mishler, among others, of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy of the University of Strathclyde in Scotland. Korea and Taiwan, which experienced a transition toward democracy during the 1990s, are another example of where public opinion studies have been used successfully.

[31] Certainly, a technical examination of the studies is indispensable to determine those whose quality is better and worse (something that still needs to be done). For example, the study of "exit polls" diffused by the news media when the local electoral boards were closing had important technical deficiencies that lead to an error.

[32] Until now, no evidence of fraud has been made available or proof of the effects of information from the media on electoral preferences.

# Chapter II. Data and Methods

## Introduction

This study is part of a multinational, collaborative effort based on probabilistic national samples conducted in most Latin American countries, and coordinated by Mitchell Seligson as part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of the Center for Latin American Studies at Vanderbilt University. The Centro Centroamericano de Población (Central American Population Center, or CCP) of the Universidad de Costa Rica conducted the study in Costa Rica.

The study is based on standardized procedures that were used in all participating countries, including the basic sample design, participants' informed consent, the questionnaire, the processing, and data analysis. From this base, each country made adjustments according to its own particular situation and needs, such as additions to the questionnaire and sample. Nonetheless, comparability between countries and the common methodology was maintained on essential aspects.

The study's methods, in particular the topics investigated and data collection, follow a more than two decade-old research project by Seligson on democracy in Costa Rica and Latin America (Seligson and Caspi, 1983; Seligson, 2001).

In this chapter, we provide an overview of the method used to define the sample, collect the data in the field, process and refine it, and analyze the information. Here, we emphasize aspects particular to Costa Rica since the elements common to all countries will be presented in another report. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the sample's representativeness, the characteristics of the respondents, and the precision of the findings or an estimate of sample error.

## The Sample

The LAPOP-COS06 study was carried out following the same design and sampling framework of the 2004 study. The details of the design are described in the report on the 2004 survey (Vargas et al. 2005, Appendix C). We used a probabilistic survey design to obtain a sample of 1,500 respondents. In defining the design, we sought to find a balance between various aspects, some of them at odds with each other, such as the goals of the study, clarity to facilitate the fieldwork and avoid errors on the ground, the training and quality of the fieldworkers, the available sampling framework, the budget, certain analytical requirements, the costs, and the level of precision of the findings, among others.

The target population was all Costa Rican citizens, by birth or naturalization, 18 years or older, and living in the country. We excluded from the survey non-naturalized immigrants (approximately 10% of the adult population), minors, and people living in institutional housing. We also excluded people unable to respond to the questionnaire because of physical or mental handicaps.

We used the same sampling framework employed in the 2004 survey, which was based on the census-segment maps that the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC) developed for the June 2000 Population and Housing Census (*Censo de Población y Vivienda*). The census segment is an enumeration unit of the census that contains around 60 houses (or housing units), which are clearly delineated on the maps. We reused some maps of the selected segments that were used in the 2004 survey. We also used updated maps from the INEC as much as possible.

We used the same 194 clusters selected for the 2004 survey. Below, we describe how they were selected.

We selected the clusters in a stratified, probabilistic, and multi-stage manner. The strata were the Metropolitan Area of San José, the Rest of the Central Valley, and everything Outside the Central Valley; and the urban and rural area, as defined by the census, within each canton. We defined the size of the sample in each stratum using allocation proportional to size. The canton (municipality) was the primary sampling unit (PSU) within each stratum. We selected them in a systematic manner with probability proportional to the "size" (PPS) of the canton. The size was determined by the number of Costa Ricans at least 18 years old registered in the 2000 census. Beforehand, we established a sample size of 50 respondents per canton, the minimum number necessary for certain analyses at this level of aggregation. Twenty-nine cantons were chosen in the probabilistic selection (see map 1). The probabilistic drawing determined that one of them – the canton of San José– was represented twice (100 respondents).

Within each canton, we selected census segments with PPS. The segments were stratified beforehand into urban and rural areas, with allocation proportional to the size of the stratum in the canton. The number of segments selected was determined by the number of interviews per segment, which we had established in advance: around 6 in urban areas and 12 in rural ones. These numbers were a compromise between the goal of concentrating the sample (to lower costs and facilitate the fieldwork) and that of having a dispersed sample that would diminish the homogeneity within each cluster and, consequently, the design effect.

Within each of the 194 segments, we randomly selected a cluster of dwellings, excluding those interviewed in 2004 as much as possible. In rural areas, the clusters were divided into two areas of six respondents each in order to facilitate the organization of the fieldwork. The number of dwellings in each cluster was generously adjusted up for non-coverage (no interview, rejections, nobody home, among others, in line with experience from other surveys) and non-eligibility (handicap or not having Costa Rican citizenship). In a few cases, field supervisors were authorized to increase the cluster to achieve interview quotas.

Fieldwork teams were instructed how to orderly visit the dwellings in each area surveyed until they obtained their assigned quota of:

Men from 18-29 years old;
Men 30 or more years old;
Women who neither work nor study (housewives)
Women who work or study (at least half-time)

**Map II.1 Sample Clusters, by Regions of Costa Rica**




The quotas were individually allocated for each cluster following a Monte Carlo procedure, with probabilities according to the census population in each group, within each segment.

We restricted interviews to only one person per dwelling. The interviewers received instructions of how to randomly select the person to interview when there were various eligible candidates in a dwelling.

## Data Collection Instruments

Besides the questionnaire, implemented using handheld computers or PDAs, we used segment maps, route itineraries, and informed consent forms during the fieldwork.

### *The Questionnaire*

The most important data-collection instrument was the questionnaire, which was programmed into handheld computers or PDAs (in short, "Palms" ). In the annex, we provide a paper representation of the questionnaire; we stress, however, that it is only a representation of that used in the PDAs. The majority of the questions were developed for the international LAPOP study, with adaptations to the vernacular language and situation in Costa Rica. We investigated 242 questions, or variables, 81% of which were also used in the other countries. The questions specific to Costa Rica are identified in the questionnaire by the label COS. Some of these questions were jointly developed with researchers from the other countries, but their inclusion was optional for each country. Other questions are specific to Costa Rica. The questionnaire was accompanied by a set of cards (included in the annex at the end of the questionnaire) that were used to help respondents select their responses.

The average time it took a respondent to complete the questionnaire was 37 minutes, with an inter-quartile interval of 30 to 45 minutes. These times do not include the introduction, reading the informed consent form, and selecting the respondent. The questionnaire was tested and refined in a pilot survey and in interviews with acquaintances in a controlled environment.

### *The Handheld Computer or PDA or "Palm"*

The questionnaire was programmed into handheld computers (in short, "Palms"), also known as "Personal Digital Assistans or PDAs. Each interviewer and supervisor received one of these computers ("Palm Tungsten Es" were used, with a cost of about $200 each in Costa Rica). The PDA showed the text of each question that the interviewer should read on its screen and, when needed, it also displayed instructions. The responses were usually entered into the PDA by tapping the screen, but also by entering numbers or text in "graffiti" or, if chosen, on a virtual keyboard. Through filters and by skipping ahead, based on previous questions, the PDA also controlled the flow of the interview. It also executed consistency checks that had been programmed in beforehand, and automatically generated certain variables such as the date and the exact time at different moments of the interview. The PDA did not allow data to be entered that was inconsistent or out of range; nor did it allow questions to be asked out of order. It also informed interviewers and supervisors whether or not, or what percentage, of an interview had been completed. As soon as an interview had ended, the data was ready for analysis in the computer.

The PDAs were loaded with information about the survey areas in advance, particularly all the data already known about each cluster, such as the geographic identification, the quota to complete, and the identification numbers to assign to each interview. This information was automatically provided to each interview, saving time and eliminating transcription errors.

When an interviewer indicated an area to be surveyed on the PDA, the interviews that still need to be done to fulfill the respective quota appeared on the screen, and the computer indicated the interview number to be assigned to each observation. In this way, quota errors, mistakes in assigning identification, as well as errors of duplication were eliminated.

In the central office, the supervisor for each fieldwork team loaded the survey areas to work onto their PDAs (for example, on a tour or for the week). In the field, supervisors assigned the areas to each interviewer and transmitted the information about them from PDA to PDA through an infrared wireless connection. Likewise, at the end of the day, the interviewers transmitted the completed interviews to their supervisor's PDA via infrared. The supervisors periodically downloaded the information from their PDAs to the central computer under the supervision of the field coordinator. The supervisors also kept track of completed, missing, and pending interviews on their PDA.

To avoid losses or accidents, all fieldworkers were provided with a memory card on which to permanently maintain a backup of the information in their PDA.

Battery life is one limitation in using PDAs. Interviewers were required to recharge their PDAs during the night. The model of PDAs used in the surveys allowed about five interviews per charge. In certain cases, this might be insufficient for a day's work. For this reason, battery chargers that could be used in the vehicles were provided. Interviewers also developed certain strategies, like charging their PDAs during lunch or in the homes of respondents while they conducted an interview.

### *The Segment Map*

For each survey area, the field teams received a sketch indicating the dwellings to visit and route to follow. The maps were originally created by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC) as part of the 2000 census cartography. The maps also contain useful information to locate clusters, such as geographic coordinates and reference points such as churches or roads.

### *The Route Itinerary*

This form indicated the quotas that interviewers were to complete in each cluster. It also served to record the dwellings visited, the people eligible to interview, and the identification number assigned to each interview. Additionally, it provided a way to check how much of the quota had been fulfilled. This form was also essential for follow-up visits, whether for supervision purposes or to conduct a pending interview, since it contained observations such as convenient hours.

### *Informed Consent*

As in all human-based research, it was essential to obtain people's informed consent before proceeding with an interview. To do this, the interviewer read a consent form that remained in the hands of the respondent (see annex). Consent was verbal since the interviews were anonymous. Once all the information was processed, the documents that could allow respondents to be identified were destroyed.

## The Fieldwork

Before starting the fieldwork, a pilot survey was conducted to test the questionnaire and the PDAs. Sixteen interviews were conducted, plus a considerable number of interviews to acquaintances in controlled environments.

On June 1 and 2, the fieldworkers received intensive training in interview techniques, survey procedures, the instruments, and how to use the PDAs. The fieldwork was conducted from June 3 to July 9. Three fieldwork teams participated. Each team included four interviewers (almost all women), a supervisor, and a vehicle. A fieldwork coordinator supervised the three teams.

Besides the interviews, the data-collection process included revision and field supervision activities, as well as quality control in the office, in order to correct errors made in the field. Fieldwork supervisors were responsible for verifying that the interviews were actually conducted and with the correct person. This was done in two ways. In many cases, the supervisors traveled through the segment identifying the persons to interview and leaving the interviewer doing the interview. In other cases, the supervisors revisited homes to check that the interview had been done. A list of the supervisor's duties is included in the annex.

In the office, the daily work of each team was monitored with flowcharts, such as those in Figure II.1. These charts allowed us to detect anomalies in the times and length of the interviews and in the work of each team. The number of "don't know/no response" answers recorded by each interviewer was also continually monitored in order to correct situations of possible overuse. All this was possible because the data collected in the PDAs was immediately available for analysis as fieldwork advanced.

**Figure II-1 Flowchart of Fieldwork Production in a Day**




Figure II.1 represents a good day of work: ten interviewers (two did not work that day) conducted 72 interviews (plus a supervisor conducted an emergency interview), for an average productivity of 7.2 interviews per person. On most days, the productivity was more on the order of five interviews per person.

The major problems with fieldwork were:

Four interviewers had to be replaced during the study and the new ones required individualized and emergency training.

Rain. The survey was conducted during a the rainy season in Costa Rica, which sometimes caused work to fall behind schedule.

The world cup, especially the games in which the Costa Rican team played, made it difficult to do interviews when games were scheduled.

## Data Processing

This stage, which is very important in paper-based surveys, was practically eliminated from the study thanks to the use of the PDAs. The only data processing necessary was recodifying variables and creating indices for analysis. We used the SPSS computational package to carry out these transformations and to analyze the data.

## Defining the Variables for Analysis

Prior to examining the findings, we defined a set of general variables that characterized the interviewed population. This set of variables, which is used in all the chapters of the study, and in the regressions, includes:

*Central Valley Region* or rest, dummy variable 0 and 1, where "rest of the country" is the reference group.

*Type or size of locality: Metropolitan Area of San José or capital city; Small cities* (in Costa Rica there are no intermediate cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants); and *Rural areas*. For the regression analyses, we used two dummy variables, so the reference group is the capital.

*Canton*: the 29 cantons in the sample. In the regressions, we used 28 dummies, one per canton, except San José, which was the reference group (San José had 100 interviews while the rest had 50).

*Sex*. In the regressions, the dummy variable took the value of 1 for women.

*Housewives*. Based on question Q10, which distinguishes women who work (or study) from those dedicated to domestic duties. In the regressions, the findings should be considered together with the sex variable. Men are the reference group. Women who work have a value of "0" in the sex and housewife variables.

*Living together* (or married). Dummy variable indicating that the respondent is married or living with a partner. Based on question Q11.

*Education*. In the regression analyses, we used the interval variable: number of years completed, with a range of 0 to 16, with the latter value for individuals with 4 or more completed years of university education. In Costa Rica, primary education (elementary school) lasts 6 years and secondary education (middle and high school) is completed in 5 years. However, some schools, especially technical ones, require 6 years. All people who had finished secondary education were codified as 11 years. In the presentation of some findings, we use the categories: primary or less (up to 6 completed years of education); secondary (7 to 11 years, that is at least one year of secondary); post-secondary (12 or more years, that is university studies or shorter vocational or technical degrees).

*Age* in years completed. In some regressions, we also introduced the variable "age squared" to capture curvilinear age relations.

*Wealth index*. Index of the number of selected durable goods in the home. Is calculated by the sum of questions R1 to R15. Range from 0 to 14, with an average of 7.7. To present some results, the index is categorized as: low (less than 6 on the index), medium (from 6 to 8), and high (9 and above).

*Religion*. We distinguish three groups: (1) Catholicism, (2) other religion, and (3) no religion. In the regressions, the reference group is Catholicism.

*Trust in neighbors*. Index based on question IT1 with the values: 0 = people are not at all trustworthy, 1 = people are very trustworthy, and with intermediate values of 0.33 = not very trustworthy and 0.67 = somewhat trustworthy.

*Sources of information*. We included two indices with questions A2 and A3, one for television news and another for newspapers. The indices have the values: 0 = never watch/read, 1 = watch/read every day, and with intermediate values of 0.33 = rarely watch/read and 0.67 = once or twice a week.

*Whether well-informed*. Index based on the series of questions GI1 to GI5, which ask for the names of the presidents of the U.S., Brazil, and Congress, the number of provinces in Costa Rica, and the duration of the presidential term of office. We assigned 0.2 points for each correct response, so that whoever responded correctly to all five has an index of 1 and whoever gave only incorrect responses (or said they did not know) has an index of 0.

We also defined indices to measure aspects of democratic culture. These are detailed in the corresponding chapters of this report. We should warn readers that sometimes it is necessary to use some of these indices before they have been defined in the report.

## Sample results and Its Representativeness

Since we used a probabilistic sample with a quota, we cannot have no-response indicators, unlike designs based on revisits to exhaust all assigned households. The interviewers were instructed to try to efficiently complete the quota within the group of dwellings assigned in each cluster. In this kind of design, revisits are less frequent and are conducted only if it is not possible to fulfill the quota after visiting all the dwellings assigned.

Almost 4,000 dwellings were visited. In 25% of them, no information was gathered because nobody was home, they were empty, foreigners lived in them, and other similar situations. In the approximately 3,000 dwellings contacted, there was a 3% rate of refusal to grant an interview. These rejections were concentrated in the high economic clusters, which was also where there was the greatest percentage of non-contacted dwellings.

The probabilistic sample design and the availability of a good sampling framework make us believe that the group of people interviewed is representative of the population of Costa Ricans 18 years old and up. However, because of random errors or distortions that inevitably occur in design execution, the final sample obtained could deviate in its characteristics from the population that it represents. It could even have biases that would eventually require correction. Table II.1 shows how close the sample turned out to be representative of the population. The sample is very similar to the 2000 census and the 2004 sample in characteristics such as sex, age, civil status, and economic activity. The percentage of people with secondary studies, a telephone (cellular or land line), a computer, and a car are the exceptions; these show an important and sustained growth over time that is probably not random in origin. It is likely that these differences are real, and that in the 3.5 years between the census and the 2004 survey, and the 2.5 years between that survey and the one for 2006, there has been a considerable rise in the number of owners of these three goods and in the proportion of people with secondary education.

**Table II.1 Comparison between the 2004 and 2006 Surveys and the 2000 Census**

| Characteristic | 2000 Census | 2004 Survey | 2006 Survey |
|---|---|---|---|
| (N) | (2,169,804) | (1,500) | (1,500) |
| % Men | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| Average age (years) | 39 | 40 | 41 |
| % <30 years of age | 33 | 32 | 33 |
| Civil status | | | |
| % Single | 28 | 26 | 31 |
| % married or living together | 61 | 63 | 59 |
| Education | | | |
| Average years completed | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| % secondary or greater | 45 | 53 | 56 |
| Economic activity status | | | |
| % economically active | 52 | 53 | 54 |
| Selected goods | | | |
| % with telephone | 59 | 69 | 85 |
| % with computer | 16 | 27 | 33 |
| % with car | 29 | 39 | 41 |
| Strata (%) | | | |
| San José Metropolitan Area | 27 | 30 | 30 |
| Urban Central Valley | 23 | 21 | 21 |
| Rural Central Valley | 17 | 16 | 16 |
| Urban non-Central Valley | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Rural non-Central Valley | 21 | 21 | 21 |

The last panel of the table presents the results of the sample by strata. By design, the figures are identical to those of the 2004 survey and very similar to those of the census. In general, we can see that the five strata are adequately represented in the study.

## Statistical Analysis

We used relatively simple methods of statistical analysis. To establish the association between two interval variables, we used the Pearson's correlation coefficient. This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. When there is perfect correspondence between two variables, the coefficient is equal to the unit. If variables are ordinals, we used the correlation coefficient "Tau b" whose interpretation is similar to the Pearson's.

To establish if there is a statistically significant relation between two categorical variables, we use the chi squared test.

To consolidate the information of various questions about the same topic, we constructed simple additive scales. Generally, the result is normalized in such a way that the index has values from 0 to 100. As an indicator of the consistency, or the internal reliability, of these scales, we used Cronbach´s Alpha. Coefficients of 0.70 or greater are considered reliable and consistent. We also

used factor analysis to determine the number of dimensions or implicit factors in a series of questions on the same topic.

## Multiple Regression Analysis

On repeated occasions, we ran regression models to identify net effects of the explanatory variables. In most cases, the dependent variable in these models is an index constructed from various questions, usually vaying from 0 to 100. For this type of response variable, we simply use an ordinary least squares linear regression model. The regression coefficients of these models (and their significance) allow us to concisely evaluate the factors that "explain" these indices. Although sometimes we refer to these co-factors as "determinants," in reality, it is not possible to establish causal relations with the information available. There are only "associations." In the regression models, there are also the standardized "Beta" regression coefficients. These are useful to evaluate the relative importance of the different explanatory factors in the model, as they measure the effects in standard units. As an indicator of the goodness of fit of the entire model we use the coefficient of determination or "R squared." This coefficient shows the proportion of variance explained by the entire model, compared to the explication that would be obtained with a "null" model (dependent variable simply estimated by its average).

When the dependent variable to explain is from a binary response (yes/no), we use logistic regression models. In these, the exponentiated regression coefficients are important since they indicate the odds ratio. For example, an odds ratio of 1.30 indicates that the odds of a positive response is 30% greater in the individual in question compared to a reference one. The "Pseudo R squared" of the logistic regression is similar to the R2 of the regular regression and measures the goodness of fit of the entire model.

WE distinguish in the analysis three types of models as follows:

*Basic model*. It includes as explanatory variables: individual demographic characteristics (age, age squared to include non linear effects, sex, and civil status), socioeconomic ones (years of education, wealth index, trust in neighbors, housewife as occupation, religion), geographic ones (type of locality – capital city as reference, small city and rural area – and residence in the Central Valley). In section 2.5, we explain these variables and Table II.2 shows their average values and standard deviations.

*Political model*. In addition to the basic variables, it includes indicators of political attitudes and preferences. These variables vary according to the topic analyzed, but generally include the following thirteen: (1) index of social participation; (2) index of participation by contacting authorities; (3) do not currently support any party; (4) voted in the 2006 elections; (5) voted for the PLV in 2006; (6) voted for the PAC in 2006; (7) index of perceived government efficacy; (8) victimization by corruption at least once; (9) index of tolerance of legal participation; (10) index of intolerance of illegal participation; (11) index of support for CAFTA-DR; (12) support for the system; and (13) political tolerance. The variables were excluded when they were the topic that needed to be explained.

**Table II.2 Explanatory Variables in the Basic Regression Model**

| Explanatory Variable | Average | Standard Deviation |
|---|---|---|
| Age | 40.6 | 16.7 |
| Age squared | 1922 | 1548 |
| Female | 0.49 | 0.50 |
| House wife | 0.31 | 0.46 |
| Married (or co-habitation) | 0.59 | 0.49 |
| Years of education | 8.75 | 4.45 |
| Wealth index | 7.78 | 2.18 |
| Non-Catholic religion | 0.19 | 0.39 |
| No Religion | 0.08 | 0.27 |
| Trust neighbors | 0.67 | 0.32 |
| TV news | 0.86 | 0.26 |
| Read newspapers | 0.47 | 0.38 |
| Well informed | 0.60 | 0.22 |
| Small city | 0.33 | 0.47 |
| Rural area | 0.37 | 0.48 |
| Central Valley | 0.67 | 0.47 |

*Local effects model.* In addition to the basic and political variables, it includes a group of 28 dummy variables to show that someone belongs to one of the 29 cantons included as primary sampling units in this study (each one has 50 interviews except San José which has 100).

In these analyses, we compare the value of the R2 when moving from one model to another in order to establish the degree to which the political or local condition (non-specified) variables add explanation to the basic model. For example, consider the binary response variable of the intention to outmigrate to another country in the next three years (17% affirmative responses). The logistic regression analysis to explain this variable is summarized in Table II.3.

The basic model improves the null model by 18% (pseudo R2). The model with political variables adds two percentage points to this goodness of fit; and local effects adds four points more for a final pseudo-R2 of 0.246. Some specific significant effects in the basic model are: being a woman reduces the intention to outmigrate by 35%; being a housewife reduces this intention another 41%; being married reduces it 44%; and residing in a rural area reduces it 39%. By contrast, each additional year of education increases the intention to outmigrate by 4%; not being Catholic increases it 38%; and reading newspapers daily, 80%. Additionally, the significant and positive effect of age-squared indicates a curvilinear relation: the intention to outmigrate increases in the first age groups, then stops increasing, and even decreases among older people. Wealth, social capital, watching TV news, and the area of residence do not show significant relations with the intention to outmigrate.

**Table II.3. Logistic Regressions of the Intention to Outmigrate**

| Explanatory Variable | OR | Sig. P>\|z\| |
|---|---|---|
| Age | 1.03 | 0.435 |
| Age squared | 1.00 | 0.026 |
| Female | 0.65 | 0.021 |
| House wife | 0.59 | 0.035 |
| Married (or living together) | 0.56 | 0.001 |
| Years of education | 1.04 | 0.072 |
| Wealth index | 0.94 | 0.157 |
| Non-Catholic religion | 1.38 | 0.096 |
| No Religion | 0.96 | 0.866 |
| Trust neighbors | 0.74 | 0.243 |
| TV news | 0.67 | 0.188 |
| Read newspapers | 1.80 | 0.012 |
| Well informed | 0.64 | 0.349 |
| Small city | 1.36 | 0.127 |
| Rural area | 0.68 | 0.113 |
| Central Valley | 1.26 | 0.250 |
| Pseudo R2 basic model | | 0.182 |
| Pseudo R2 political model | | 0.203 |
| Pseudo R2 local effects model | | 0.246 |

OR = odds ratio

## Accuracy of the Findings

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: nonsampling errors and sampling errors. Nonsampling errors are those occuring during the collection and processing of the data. These can be controlled by designing a good measuring instrument, adequately training interviewers, supervising the fieldwork, and with appropriate programs to capture the data. These errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. However, comparing the sample results with those of the population gives an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that reduce the representativeness of the sample. The use of PDAs probably reduced these errors through consistency checks of the responses and the control of the flow of the interview at the place and time it was conducted. Also, by eliminating the data-entry process, errors associated with this activity were eliminated. In the traditional procedures of paper-based questionnaires, errors can also occur in the process of codifying and critiquing the data, which is done in the office; these were also eliminated by using PDAs. Furthermore, computer consistency analysis can only be done several weeks after the data has been collected. It is difficult or impossible to correct errors detected in the office during the critique or by inconsistency programs given the separation in time and space between the moment of the interview on paper and the detection of these errors.

Sampling errors are random and result of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is chosen, this is only one of many possible samples of the population that could be chosen. The sampling error is the variability between all such possible samples. It could be

measured if all those samples were available, an obviously impossible situation. In practice, what is done is estimate this error over the variance obtained from the sample itself.

To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (an average, percentage, or ratio), the standard error is calculated. This is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. The standard error measures of how close the statistic is to the result that would have been obtained if the entire population had been interviewed under the same conditions. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design with which the sample was selected. The design effect, DEFT, indicates the efficiency of the design used compared to an unrestricted random sample (URS) design. A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by both designs (clustered and URS) is equal; in other words, the clustered sample is as efficient as a URS one for the same sized sample. If the value is greater than 1, the clustered sample produces an SE greater than that of the URS.

$DEFT = SE_{complex} / SE_{URS}$

Table II.4 shows the 95% confidence intervals (1.96 times the SE) and the design effects (DEFT) for five important indices and a selected percentage. The table also shows the statistical value in question (average or percentage). We estimated the SE with a Stata 9 computational package. The wealth index stands out for its high design effect, DEFT =2.01. The standard error for this variable is twice the value that it would have been obtained with a URS. We obtained similar results for other socioeconomic variables like education. These extreme values result from a high degree of socioeconomic homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, people are spatially segregated, to an important degree, according to their socioeconomic condition. This concentrations reduce the efficiency of cluster sampling for measuring these characteristics. A similar problem affected the social capital indicator (trust in neighbors), which has a DEFT = 1.6.

**Table II.4 Sampling Errors for Selected Indices. Costa Rica 2006**

CI = 95%

| Indices | Average | 95% CI | | DEFT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Household wealth | 5.78 | 5.62 | 5.94 | 2.01 |
| Trust in neighbors | 67.0 | 64.4 | 69.6 | 1.60 |
| Victim of corruption (%) | 19.3 | 17.1 | 21.5 | 1.11 |
| Support the system | 64.0 | 62.7 | 65.3 | 1.26 |
| Political tolerance | 62.2 | 60.2 | 64.2 | 1.37 |
| Efficacy of the Pacheco administration | 43.1 | 41.4 | 44.7 | 1.34 |

Confidence interval (+- 1.96 ES)

For the important indices of the survey (democratic and political attitudes and values), the design effect is between 1.1 and 1.4. It is worth mentioning that sampling error is usually between 10% and 40% higher than would have been obtained using unrestricted random sampling. For example, the important index of support for democracy has a sampling error of 0.66. This means that the 95% confidence interval (equivalent to 1.96 times the SE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT of the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained with a URS.

# Chapter III. The Meaning of Democracy

## Context

Democracy has been one of the most theoretically and politically disputed concepts in recent centuries. In fact, as some authors have noted, the literal meaning of "democracy" – from the Greek "demos" (people) and "kratos" (government) – as "government of the people" raises various questions. Who are the people? How do they govern? What issues should be included in the government of the people? How do the people ensure that the government is "their's"? (Dahl 1989; Vanhanen 1990; Dahl 1996). It is not only true that the idea of democracy has changed substantially over twenty-five centuries – Athenian democracy is very different than contemporary democracies (Dahl 1989; Dunn 1992; Skinner 1992; Held 1996) – but that, currently, democracy remains an ideal and a concept that generates sharp debate.

In this chapter, we study how Costa Ricans understand the term democracy. Our aim is to provide a framework that will allow us to understand, when we investigate public support for this political system in later chapters, the normative horizon that people have in mind when they express their preference for it. The strength of democracy's political legitimacy and other favorable attitudes toward it depend on what people believe *democracy is*. If such beliefs are based on purely utilitarian considerations, related to the benefits that a person expects to obtain from the system, support for democracy can be more contingent than when the underlying beliefs are tied to certain principles and values. If the beliefs about democracy are not founded on normative concepts, they can be fragile and ephemeral in times of economic or political crisis (Sarsfield 2006). Studying the meanings of democracy is also important from the point of view of what people believe democracy *should be*. This normative horizon provides standards through which people judge the actual democracy in which they live (Vargas Cullell 2004). If many of them understand it as more than just a political regime, and includes other aspects in their definition such as the rule of law or broad public participation in public administration, it is only natural that they insist that the democracy in which they live go beyond free elections and guaranteeing political freedoms.

The chapter has two sections, in addition to this introduction. In the second section, we examine the ideas that people have about democracy in detail. We will address this topic in two different ways or "readings": the first uses the formal democracy vs. real democracy debate as a framework to study people's conceptions of what democracy *should be*. The second reading focuses on the debate between normative and utilitarian conceptions to study the bases of people's conceptions of what *democracy is*. In the third section, we investigate the factors that help predict the bases of these conceptions.

## Ideas of Democracy

In the 2006 LAPOP study, the inquiry into the meaning of democracy follows a different strategy than that usually used in surveys of political attitudes. Generally, only one question on the topic is included since it is assumed that what people first say best characterizes their idea of

democracy. In this study, we use a different, more gradual, strategy to verify whether this assumption is correct and, at the same time, elicit richer information on the topic. First, we asked people to give up to three meanings of democracy and then we requested they chose which was the most important (Box III.1).

Box III.1 Questions Used to Study the Meanings Given to Democracy

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, que significa para Ud. la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, "¿significa algo más?"] . Aceptar hasta tres respuestas.
DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que Ud. ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior y ninguna es NS/NR. Anote el código.]88. NS 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]

Examining the simple frequencies of the responses to question DEM13d (most important meaning of democracy) indicates that the largest group is made up of people for whom the most important characteristic of democracy is political freedom (freedom in general) (Figure III.1). This supports Seligson's finding from several years ago (Seligson 1999). However, it is worth emphasizing that a significant percentage of respondents were unable to define democracy – the third most frequent response – or defined it in terms of peacefully living together. Additionally, the wide variety of ways that Costa Ricans define democracy is striking: some people allude to values like human rights and equality, while others define it in terms of positive results (economic progress) or negative ones (disorder, lack of justice). These responses suggest that it is important to take a closer look at the meanings people give democracy.

### *The Depth of the Meaning*

Since people could give up to three meanings of democracy, the first question to address is how many of them had a complex idea of it. One out of eight people were incapable of defining democracy at all (Table III.1). By contrast, a quarter of respondents were able to give three meanings. The largest group was those people only able to specify one meaning. Significant differences exist according to people's level of education: three-quarters of those who could not define democracy had only a primary level of education or less, while people with post-secondary education comprise an above-average proportion of those in the "deep meaning" category (in which three meanings were assigned). This concurs with the findings reported by Gómez and Madrigal in the case of secondary students (Gómez and Madrigal 2004).

**Figure III-1 Meaning of Democracy Chosen as the Most Important**




Note: only meanings with more than 1% are shown.

**Table III.1 Depth of the Meaning of Democracy, by Education**

| | | Primary or less | Some secondary | Post-Secondary | Total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meanings of democracy | Empty | 71.3 | 26.6 | 2.1 | 100,0 | (188) |
| | Shallow | 44.7 | 37.9 | 17.4 | 100,0 | (575) |
| | Intermediate | 40.4 | 36.7 | 22.9 | 100,0 | (354) |
| | Deep | 34.6 | 40.1 | 25.4 | 100,0 | (382) |
| Total | | 44,4 | 36.8 | 18.8 | 100.0 | (1,499) |

Chi square= 81.7; Tau_b= .181; Sig < .001

Empty: the person was incapable of defining the term democracy. Shallow: was only able to give one meaning to the term democracy. Intermediate: the person was able to give two meanings to the term democracy. Deep: the person was able to give three meanings to the term democracy.

A second, more methodological question is related to the results of applying a different strategy to investigate how people understand democracy. Two findings deserve comment: first, for 22% of the people, the most important characteristic was a different one than the one they first mentioned; second, this percentage is greater the deeper the idea of democracy that a person has. Thus, more than half of those who provided three meanings of democracy chose the second or third characteristic that they mentioned as the most important one (Table III.2). This underlines the importance of not presuming that the first definition mentioned is always the most important, and suggests the need of using more gradual procedures of inquiry when complex concepts such as democracy are investigated.

**Table III.2 Depth and Order of Importance of the Meaning of Democracy (in percentages)**

| | | Order of importance | | Total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | First response is not the most important | First response is the most important | | |
| Depth of meaning | Shallow | 0 | 100 | 100 | (494) |
| | Intermediate | 32 | 68 | 100 | (348) |
| | Deep | 44 | 56 | 100 | (382) |
| Total | | 23 | 77 | 100 | (1,224) |

Notes: See Table III.1 for a description of the categories of the depths of meaning. Order of importance: (a) First response is the most important: if the first response to dem13a coincides with the most important characteristic for the respondent to dem13d; (b) First mention is not the most important: if the first response to demo13 does not coincide with the most important characteristic for the respondent to demo13d.

### *First Reading: Meanings of Democracy and Polyarchy*

Perhaps the most heated debates on the meaning of democracy in recent decades have been between the "proceduralists" and "substantivists" on the one hand, and the communitarians and Liberals on the other.[1] This section will focus on the first of these debates (democracy as a group of political procedures versus democracy as certain equitable social and economic results) in order to determine which of these concepts predominates among Costa Ricans. To avoid confusion with the following section, we will call this the formal democracy vs. real democracy debate.

The roots of the formal vs. real democracy debate can be found in Marx's critique of bourgeois democracies, which he accused of being a formality that covered up a class dictatorship (Marx and Engels, 1976). However, it was in the twentieth century that the polemic developed, especially after Schumpeter defined democracy as a "political method" to arrive at certain collective decisions based on the free election of rulers (Schumpeter 1947). North American political science, with important internal debate, fundamentally adopted a Schumpeterian path – democracy is, above all, a political regime. Robert Dahl's formulation has been the most influential and original, distinguishing between "polyarchy" (as really existing and imperfect democracy) and "democracy" (as a vision of political equality). He thus remained in the proceduralist camp but, at the same time, kept the door open to different democratic models (Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989).

Standing up to these currents were people who included social and economic dimensions in democracy. In other words, they believed that, in a real democracy, legal and political equality

[1] In this study we will not examine the debate between the "communitarians" and liberals (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992; Mouffe 1992; Beiner 1995; Rawls 1995; Dagger 1997). In this case, the dispute does not allude to what "is or is not" a democracy, but to the best model or vision of democracy that should underlie political practices in democratic regimes and to the dangers that not promoting this vision can present for those regimes.

among citizens is insufficient and that social and economic equality is indispensable. This is where the distinction between "formal democracy" and "real democracy" originated. The latter is understood as ensuring its citizens relatively equal access to social and economic resources, whether through social policies or property redistribution, or through sustained economic growth. According to this analytical distinction, there is an opposition between procedural or polyarchic ("formal") criteria and substantive ("results") criteria in the definition of democracy. Recently, O'Donnell has proposed a different conception of democracy that, while remaining in the political sphere, goes beyond the political regime (understood as the group of rules and institutions that regulate access to power within a society). He includes the democratic rule of law as a constitutive component of democracy: thus, democracy is not possible, even defining it strictly as a political regime, without a recognition and guarantee of people's rights and subordinating political power to the law. It is, then, not only a group of rules and institutions related to the access of power but also, crucially, related to the exercise of power (O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell 2004). Remaining within the political sphere, O'Donnell distinguishes between regime democracy (polyarchy) and democracy that goes beyond the regime (democratic rule of law). The above distinctions are shown schematically in Table III.3.

**Table III.3 Analytic Distinctions in Studies of the Meanings of Democracy**

| Author | | O'Donnell's proposition | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Analytical criteria | Polyarchy | Democracy beyond the regime |
| Robert Dahl | Procedural | Free elections, political rights | Democratic rule of law |
| Various | Substantive | Social equality, economic development | (Empty group) |

Note: (Empty group): O'Donnell does not include social and economic aspects in his definition of democracy

We used the following procedure to group people's responses into the analytical categories shown in Table III.3: first, questions that asked about the meaning of democracy (13a, 13b, 13c) were recodified to group them in a few categories that were consistent with the debates about substantive and procedural democracy on the one hand, and between polyarchy and democracy beyond the regime on the other. Then, we carefully reconstructed the patterns of people's responses to determine whether they could be ascribed to one of the analytical criteria or whether various elements were mixed together (see note to Figure III.2).

Using this framework to analyze people's responses revealed the following findings: the largest group is composed of people who define democracy in terms consistent with polyarchy (40%). However, the majority of Costa Ricans do not understand democracy in purely polyarchic terms. In fact, discarding those who have an empty conception of democracy, more than half of the people include, either partially or completely, clearly non-polyarchic elements in their definition. There is, however, an important dispersion in this group. This second conclusion is, in turn, consistent with what the Citizen Audit on the Quality of Democracy (*Auditoría ciudadana sobre la calidad de la democracia*) emphasized (Programa Estado de la Nación 2001). Third, and this

seems to be a characteristic specific to Costa Rica, a significant proportion of the population defined democracy in terms of peacefully living together ("peace"), something that had already been observed by Rodríguez et al. and the above-mentioned audit (Rodríguez, Castro et al. 2003).

**Figure III-2 Grouped Meanings of Democracy in Costa Rica, 2006**




Notes: to devise the grouped meaning of democracy, we took into account all the questions that investigated the topic (dem13a, dem13b y dem13c) and analyzed them together. (a) Only polyarchy: in all responses the person gave meanings consistent with the concept of polyarchy (political freedoms and free elections). (b) Polyarchy and peace: the person mixed meanings consistent with polyarchy and democracy as a peaceful way of living (absence of war). (c) Only peace: the characteristics cited alluded exclusively to democracy as a peaceful way of living. (d) Polyarchy and well-being: the person mixed meanings consistent with polyarchy and social equality and well-being. (e) Polyarchy and rule of law: the person mixed meanings consistent with polyarchy and an understanding of democracy as how to live under the rule of law. (f) Only rule of law: democracy as how to live under the rule of law. (g) Others: all other possible combinations. (h) Empty: did not attribute any meaning to the term democracy.

The importance of studying the meaning of democracy becomes clear when it is examined in relation to an indicator usually used to measure public support for it: the preference for democracy.[2] It is assumed that people who prefer democracy as a form of government are also those who support it. However, a large number of people who could not define democracy (empty meaning) stated their preference for it (Table III.3). There are also statistically significant differences in the intensity of the preference for democracy according to how people define it: the lowest intensity is among people who not define it, and the highest is among people who conceive it in strictly polyarchic terms. These findings are consistent with those noted in a recent study about support for democracy in Costa Rica (Vargas Cullell 2005). In methodological terms, the main conclusion of this examination is that Inglehart, Rose, and Seligson's criticisms of the preference-for-democracy indicator as a summary measure of public support for democracy, given its indeterminacy, seem to be correct. People have different things in mind about what democracy means when they express their preference for it (Rose and Mishler 2000; Seligson 2000; Rose 2002; Inglehart 2003; Seligson 2005).

**Table III.4 Preference for Democracy by Meaning of Democracy**

| | | % who prefer democracy | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grouped meaning of democracy | Empty | 76 | (174) |
| | Only polyarchy | 91 | (594) |
| | Only peace | 87 | (86) |
| | Only equality | 83 | (29) |
| | Only rule of law | 89 | (18) |
| | Polyarchy and peace | 88 | (115) |
| | Polyarchy and equality | 91 | (55) |
| | Polyarchy and rule of law | 90 | (49) |
| | Others | 88 | (352) |
| | Total | 88 | (1,472) |

Chi squared=27.7, Sig = .001

### *Second Reading: Meanings of Democracy and Rationality*

The distinction between normative and axiomatic conceptions of democracy is another way to analyze how people understand democracy.[3] In this case, we want to link these meanings to the type of rationality they express, whether it is a substantive kind of rationality (axiomatic or normative) or an instrumental one with a utilitarian character. In the former case, people define democracy according to a determined value; in the latter, people define it based on contingent results. In other words, what this distinction between substantive and instrumental rationality

[2] This indicator is developed from the following question: "With which of the following statements do you most agree?: (1) To people like us, there is no difference between a democratic and non-democratic regime; (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government might be preferable to a democratic one; (8) DK/NR."

[3] The paragraphs below adapt the text sent by the coordinating group of the LAPOP project.

tries to determine is whether the idea of democracy is based either on principles or on cost-benefit expectations (individual or social) (Bratton 2002; Sarsfield 2003; Sarsfield and Carrión 2006; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006).

According to this perspective, we can classify people into four categories. The first is comprised of responses that have a "normative or axiomatic" conception of democracy. In this conception, democracy is defined according to certain principles, values, or norms and is not based on how well it works or its results. Included in this category are responses such as "free elections," "power of the people," and "freedom." The second category is called the "instrumental or utilitarian" conception of democracy. It includes definitions predicated on expected results from the economic, social, and political performance of the system and does not allude directly to principles, values, or norms. In this category, we grouped responses like "well-being, economic progress, growth" or "more job opportunities." The third category is called the "negative" conception of democracy and it includes meanings such as "disorder, lack of justice, corruption," or "lack of freedom." Lastly, there is the "empty" conception of democracy, where we group all those people who could not define it, or did not want to (DK/NR answers).

More than three-quarters of Costa Ricans have a normative conception of democracy (77%), and only one in forty have a utilitarian conception (2.5%). The first group is, thus, thirty times greater than the second. A very small minority has a negative conception and, as was seen in the above section, a relatively significant-sized group could not define democracy. The main implication of these findings is that, in Costa Rica, democracy is generally defined in normative terms, which, in principle, are more solid and positive than instrumental ones. Given the complex situation through which the country is going, characterized by strong public discontent and partisan dealignment (see Chapters I and VIII), these findings are good news since it means that public support for democracy is rooted in values and principles.

The distribution of the different conceptions of democracy among Costa Ricans is similar to that observed in Chile, but very different from countries such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama (Figure III.4). In this latter group, wide segments of the population, including the largest, are incapable of defining democracy. Despite these contrasts, utilitarian and negative conceptions of democracy are clearly in the minority throughout all Latin America. Finally, although it is not surprising that people with the longest democratic traditions on the continent (Chileans and Costa Ricans) defined democracy in normative terms, we do not have enough observations through time to tell if there is some association between the length of a country's democratic tradition and the conceptions of democracy that its people have. All these results point to the importance of studying how people understand democracy in more detail prior to investigating their support for the system.

**Figure III-3 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Normative vs. Utilitarian Debate, Costa Rica 2006**




Notes: The difference in the percentage of people classified in the empty category in Figure III.1 is due to different ways of recodifying. They are not, however, substantially different.

**Figure III-4 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Normative vs. Utilitarian Debate in Latin America, 2006**



## Correlations of the Conceptions of Democracy

What factors allow us to predict conceptions of democracy individuals harbor? In studies on political attitudes, there is not a large bibliography on outlining theories or hypotheses on this question. In principle, though, since conceptions of democracy are a political variable, one could expect that they should be more influenced by other political attitudes than by sociodemographic variables. In this section, we will analyze whether this expectation turns out to be true. To examine this question, we use the conceptions of democracy distinguished by type of rationality (normative and instrumental) analyzed in the previous section.

To analyze the factors help predict the conceptions of democracy, we employ three multinomial logistic regression models that are based on the basic, political, and local effects models defined in section 2.8 of Chapter II. We use a multinomial logistic regression model because the dependent variable (conceptions of democracy) is nominal and not binary (it has four categories). The reference category is the "normative conception," where the vast majority of people are located.

In relation to conceptions of democracy, the basic model has a relatively low predictive capacity (Nagelkerke $r^2$ =0,155), although it is worth noting that it is higher here than in the analysis of other topics in this report. Applying the political model raised this capacity a little (Nagelkerke $r^2$=0,191), but including local differences (the "Local effects" model) substantially increased the model's goodness of fit (Nagelkerke $r^2$=0,295). This suggests that "local" ecologies play a role in the formation of meanings about democracy, a point worth exploring in greater detail in the future.[4] To simplify, the following analysis is based on the political model. It also emphasizes the contrast between people with "empty" meanings of democracy and those with a "normative" conception since these are the two most common definitions (Table III.5). As seen above, "utilitarian" and "negative" conceptions have very little importance in the Costa Rican case (together less than 8% of the total).

From the substantive point of view, two conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the model is able to capture various statistically significant predictors to distinguish people who have an empty conception of democracy from those with a normative conception. This does not happen with the other conceptions (negative and utilitarian), where significant differences are rare. On the other hand, and contrary to what might be expected, the sociodemographic and regional predictors of the conceptions of democracy had more weight than the political ones. In fact, of all the variables included, only voting in the 2006 elections, voting for the Partido Acción Ciudadana, supporting the free trade agreement with the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), and support for the system have some statistical meaning – and in all cases limited to one of the conceptions of democracy (instrumental). None of these political variables differentiate between people with an "empty" meaning of democracy (who, as already seen, tend to prefer democracy less than the rest) and those who hold a normative meaning. By contrast, people's age, schooling, how well-informed people are, professing a non-

[4] A strategy in this sense is the consideration of a multilevel model of analysis that permits controlling for the effect of the "contextual" and "personal" variables without committing an ecological fallacy.

Catholic religion, and living in rural areas or small cities are all factors that differentiate between people with empty and normative meanings. In summary, the hypothesis suggested at the start of this section on the importance of political factors has not been substantiated.

A possible explanation why political factors are not so important is that the "normative" category does not specify a particular meaning of democracy; instead, it is a heterogeneous amalgam of meanings related to a value, however unrelated or at odds they were amongst themselves. This supposition is not arbitrary: note that the political variables (partisan vote, support for the system, attitudes regarding illegal participation) are statistically significant factors that distinguish people with normative conceptions from those who define democracy instrumentally.

**Table III.5 Predictive Factors of Instrumental and Normative Conceptions of Democracy (Multinomial Logistic Regression of the "Political" Model)**

| Alternative conceptions of democracy / | Negative | | Empty | | Utilitarian | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predictors | Exp(B) | Sig. | Exp(B) | Sig. | Exp(B) | Sig. |
| Intersection | | .422 | | .000 | | .028 |
| Age | .966 | .550 | .921 | .004 | 1.039 | .528 |
| Age squared | 1.001 | .367 | 1.001 | .008 | 1.000 | .775 |
| Female | .570 | .296 | .816 | .412 | 2.195 | .116 |
| House wife | 1.408 | .568 | 1.637 | .063 | .730 | .554 |
| Married (or living together) | 1.341 | .477 | 1.085 | .679 | .654 | .309 |
| Years of schooling | 1.023 | .662 | .915 | .003 | .996 | .940 |
| Wealth index | .873 | .153 | .960 | .380 | .825 | .056 |
| Non-Catholic religion | 1.964 | .078 | .486 | .004 | .870 | .790 |
| No religion | .520 | .401 | 1.272 | .417 | .422 | .423 |
| Trust in neighbors | 3.329 | .059 | 1.106 | .726 | 1.792 | .399 |
| TV news | .384 | .146 | .727 | .357 | .890 | .898 |
| Read newspapers | 1.703 | .311 | 1.225 | .437 | 2.200 | .182 |
| Well-informed | 1.573 | .655 | .189 | .002 | 3.320 | .269 |
| Small city | 1.046 | .921 | .422 | .001 | 2.265 | .120 |
| Rural area | 1.010 | .986 | .476 | .006 | 1.507 | .531 |
| Central Valley region | .868 | .753 | .900 | .651 | .979 | .964 |
| Social participation index | .915 | .284 | 1.013 | .752 | 1.035 | .679 |
| Index of participation in protests | .954 | .922 | 1.483 | .107 | .996 | .994 |
| Index of participation by contact | .638 | .293 | .783 | .243 | .891 | .790 |
| Voted in 2006 elections | 1.398 | .522 | .742 | .256 | .175 | .112 |
| Party support (none) | 1.252 | .560 | .999 | .995 | 1.484 | .347 |
| Voted for the PLN in 2006 | .447 | .150 | .847 | .553 | 5.915 | .097 |
| Voted for the PAC in 2006 | 1.004 | .993 | .737 | .299 | 7.899 | .054 |
| Government efficacy index | .996 | .607 | 1.000 | .924 | .993 | .406 |
| Illegal participation intolerance index | 1.001 | .909 | .999 | .894 | .980 | .054 |
| Legal participation index | .993 | .410 | .994 | .145 | .994 | .520 |
| Index of support for CAFTA-DR | .994 | .249 | .997 | .206 | 1.010 | .105 |
| Victim of corruption | 1.782 | .150 | .790 | .311 | .506 | .286 |
| Support for the system index | .995 | .616 | .997 | .610 | 1.022 | .091 |

a The reference category is: Normative.

People's educational level has an important effect on two conceptions of democracy. Individuals with higher levels of education are much more likely to have a normative idea of democracy than individuals with less education, although normative conceptions prevail in both groups. Among respondents with post-secondary education, the relation is almost 10 to 1 of those with a normative conception to those with an empty one. This proportion drops to only 2.5 to 1 among people with only a primary education or less. Age is significant in the case of the "empty" conception of democracy, where people under 30 are clearly more significant.. Age, therefore, adds the experience of living in a democracy and, at least in Costa Rica, helps to form ideas about democracy based on values and principles. The relation is not lineal, however, as can be seen in Table III.5.

**Figure III-5 Conceptions of Democracy by Educational Level, 2006**




**Figure III-6 Conceptions of Democracy by Age Group, 2006**




While more informed people tend to have a normative conception of democracy, the most uninformed, by contrast, have greater difficulty defining the term (Figure III.7). Among the former, the relation of people with a normative conception to those with an empty one is 12 to 1. Among the most uninformed, it is the opposite: approximately 0.66, indicating that the empty conception of democracy prevails among them. In regional terms, residents of small cities are more likely to have normative conceptions of democracy than people in the rest of the country. Figure III.8 shows the effects of living in a small city. This finding suggests the importance of geographic variables in the analysis of this topic, as was noted in previous paragraphs.

**Figure III-7 Conceptions of Democracy by How Well-Informed, 2006**




**Figure III-8 Conceptions of Democracy by Residence in a Small City, 2006**



# Chapter IV. Support for Democracy

## Introduction

Historic experience teaches that democracies are overthrown by political forces that count on the support (or at least the passivity) of an important part, sometimes the majority, of the citizenry. They become vulnerable when, among other factors, the non-democratic political forces find fertile ground in public attitudes to grow and act (Linz 1978).[5] Therefore, the topic of public support for the system has been one of the most studied in comparative political science[6] in recent decades and has also been constantly addressed by comparative public opinion studies.[7]

In this chapter, we analyze public support for Costa Rican democracy. Our study is based on the methodology developed by Seligson, which uses trust in certain institutions and values and political tolerance to measure the degree of support for democracy. In all the issues addressed, we try to analyze the information from a comparative perspective, both in relation to other Latin

[5] These initial lines are taken, almost word-for-word from the 2004 LAPOP study (Vargas Cullell and Rosero Bixby 2004). From here on, this text will be referred to as the 2004 LAPOP study or simply the 2004 study.

[6] In contemporary political science, these studies fall into the inquiries about civic culture, whose seminal work is the classic study by Almond and Verba, and subsequently taken up from different theoretical perspectives by various authors, giving rise to intense conceptual and methodological debates (Almond and Verba 1965; Almond and Verba 1980; Pateman 1980; Eckstein 1988; Wiarda 1992). In recent years, the methodologies that stand out have been developed by Pippa Norris (Klingemman 1999; Norris 1999), Inglehart (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart 2000; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2003), Seligson (Seligson 1978; Seligson 1980; Seligson and Gómez 1987; Seligson and Gómez 1989; Seligson and Muller 1990; Seligson and Booth 1993; Seligson and Córdova 1995; Seligson 1997; Seligson 1998; Seligson 1999; Seligson 2000; Seligson and Córdova 2001; Seligson 2002; Seligson 2002; Seligson 2002; Seligson 2004), Putnam (Putnam 1993; Putnam 1997; Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002), Mishler and Rose (Mishler and Rose 1999; Rose and Mishler 2000; Mishler 2001; Mishler and Rose 2002; Rose 2002). Usually, these authors use public opinion surveys (although not exclusively) to measure the intensity of this support.

[7] The World Values Survey and the different barometers (Eurobarometro, New Democracies Barometer, Africabarometro, AsiaBarometro, and Latinobarómetro) stand out here. The questionnaire of the World Values Survey was applied in 65 countries, although not all of these have a series of public opinion surveys. There have been three rounds of surveys 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 1999-2001 (www.wvs/isr.umich/edu). The Eurobarometer, underwritten by the European Commission, has been applied since 1973 in the member states of the European Union (www.europa.eu.int/public/opinion/indez/en.htm). In the countries of the old Soviet bloc, different rounds of the New Democracies Barometer have been conducted. The Afrobarometer has three rounds of studies. The first was conducted in 1999-2000 (12 countries), the second in 2003 (16 countries), and the third in 2005 in 18 countries (www.afrobarometer.org). The AsiaBarometer, the most recent of all, has two rounds: the first in 2000, in which 9 countries were studied, and a second in 2004 (13 countries) (http://avatoli.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~asiabarometer/pages/english/index.html). The Latinobarómetro began in 1995. It initially covered 10 countries in Latin America and, starting in 1997, this was extended to 17 countries (18 in 2002). It has conducted nine rounds of surveys up to now (the last was in 2005) (www.latinobarometro.com). All these surveys generally apply questions on the preference for democracy over other systems in order to measure the topic of support for democracy. The Latin American Public Opinion Project, underwritten by USAID and located in Vanderbilt University, has conducted studies in 18 Latin American countries since the mid-1990s (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop).

American countries as well as previous studies of Costa Rica. The questions we try to answer are the following. What is the current level of support for democracy? What factors help predict greater or lesser support? Were there changes since the 2004 survey? If so, what factors help explain these changes? The answers to these questions lead, in the final section, to a brief methodological reflection on measuring diffuse support and the relation between this and other more specific evaluations by the public of how well the institutions and actors that make up the political system are performing.

The chapter is organized into seven parts, including this introduction. The second part analyzes the topics of belonging to a national political community and trust in public institutions. The third part, which is more analytical, examines the level and evolution in support for the (democratic) system and analyses the factors that might predict this level. The fourth part, which is similar in structure to the proceeding one, analyzes political tolerance. Both these measurements, support and tolerance, are included in the fifth part to examine support for stable democracy. In the sixth part, we delve into the authoritarian attitudes of the population, a theme explored in the 2004 study. This time, we found that a good portion of the people who support the system have delegative attitudes – they favor delegative leadership – (O'Donnell 1994), using the methodology developed by Gómez, Kikut, and Vargas Cullell for the UNDP (Benavides and Vargas Cullell 2003; Kikut and Vargas Cullell 2003; Kikut, Vargas Cullell et al. 2003; Vargas Cullell, Benavides et al. 2003; Vargas Cullell, Benavides et al. 2003).

## The Political Community and Trust in Institutions

As noted in the 2004 study, in Costa Rica there is almost unanimous pride in being Costa Rican.[8] The response to question B43, "how proud are you of being Costa Rican," maintained its average score of 97 out of 100 possible points.[9] Although other countries in Latin America also exhibit high levels of pride (generally above 85), Costa Rica stands out for its fervor. However, in terms of public trust, this is the only note of stability since, between 2004 and 2006, there was a notable and widespread decline of trust in social and political institutions and organizations (Table IV.1).

The majority of public institutions and organizations did continue to obtain intermediate and some high scores (above 50 points on a scale of 0-to-100), but we found an an important decline in public trust. Twenty of the twenty-two institutions or organizations experienced a drop in public trust of varied magnitudes. These declines were statistically significant in almost all cases, although the change was not always that important. The institutions that declined the least were: two of the specialized agencies that oversee the state (the Comptroller General and the Office of

[8] Pride in one's nationality and trust in public institutions and social-political organizations are measured on a scale from 1-to-7, where 1 is for a person who has no pride or trust in the item inquired about and 7 is for a person who has a lot. To facilitate the analysis, we transformed this scale onto one that goes from 0-to-100 in the following manner: 1=0; 2=16.7; 3=33.4; 4=50; 5=66.7; 6=83.4; and 7=100. The responses "don't know, no response" (DK/NR) are less than 5% of the total, except in the case of the four items that vary between 5% and 13% (the Office of the Ombudsman, National Insurance Institute, Comptroller General, and CAFTA-DR).

[9] Again, we did not find variations in national pride due to people's social, economic, and demographic characteristics, or the region in which they live. It turns out to be an almost universal attitude among the population.

the Ombudsman); political institutions (in general); and the Catholic Church.[10] Again, political parties came in last place (36 points), with no changes. This low score is consistent with what various public opinion studies have noted for Costa Rica and Latin America (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). What is new is that two more institutions entered the realm of low scores, below 50 points on a 0-to-100 point scale: Congress (49 points) and the police (42 points).

**Table IV.1 Average Trust in Values, Institutions, Organizations, and Issues, Costa Rica 2004, Scale 0-to-100**

| Items | 2004 | 2006 | Differences 2006-2004 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pride in being Costa Rican | 97 | 97 | 0 |
| Support for the political system | 75 | 72 | -3 |
| Political institutions | 75 | 75 | 0 |
| Pride in the political system | 74 | 70 | -4 |
| Office of the Ombudsman | 73 | 71 | -2 |
| Costa Rican Social Security Board (CCSS) | 72 | 62 | -10 |
| News media | 71 | 68 | -3 |
| Supreme Electoral Tribunal | 71 | 67 | -4 |
| National Insurance Institute (INS) | 71 | 63 | -8 |
| Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) | 70 | 64 | -6 |
| Catholic Church | 67 | 64 | -2 |
| Elections | 66 | 61 | -6 |
| Free trade agreement | 66 | 56 | -10 |
| Comptroller General | 64 | 63 | -1 |
| Supreme Court | 62 | 57 | -5 |
| System of justice | 61 | 53 | -9 |
| Police | 58 | 42 | -17 |
| National government | 58 | 53 | -5 |
| Courts | 57 | 51 | -6 |
| Municipalities | 57 | 49 | -8 |
| Basic civil rights | 56 | 52 | -4 |
| Congress | 53 | 49 | -4 |
| Political parties | 35 | 36 | 1 |

1/ The variables are ordered according to the score they obtained in the 2004 survey.
Note: The "N" varied between 1,311 valid responses (Comptroller General) and 1,500 valid responses (CCSS)

In the following chapters, we will analyze the changes in public trust in institutions according to their sphere of activity. For the moment, we can make the following general comment: the large group of institutions in 2004 that Costa Ricans highly trusted (close to or above 70 points) has shrunk substantially. The most notable declines were experienced by the police and key institutions of the Costa Rican social welfare state, such as the Costa Rican Social Security Board (*Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social*, or CCSS), the National Insurance Institute (*Instituto*

[10] It is important to note that the score of the Office of the Ombudsman in 2006 remains notably higher, above 70 points, than those of the Comptroller and the Catholic Church (63 and 64 points respectively).

*Nacional de Seguros*, or INS), and the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (*Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad,* or ICE), which dropped close to ten percentage points (Figures IV.1 and IV.2). Between the 2004 survey, which finished before the outbreak of the corruption scandals involving ex-presidents, and that of 2006, serious issues of corruption were revealed in these three institutions (Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Programa Estado de la Nación 2005). For their part, all the key entities of the Costa Rican system of justice (the Supreme Court, the courts, and the police) experienced significant drops (see Chapter VI). Today, the welfare institutions generally show levels of public trust similar to that which the system of justice had in 2004; the latter, in turn, dropped to even lower levels, particularly the police.

**Figure IV-1 Changes in the Average Public Trust in the ICE, la CCSS, and the INS, on a 0-to-100 point scale, 2004 and 2006**




## Support for the System

How does national pride and trust in institutions translate into support for the political system? In the political studies literature, there is a consensus on the multidimensionality of public support for the political system. Scholars agree that rather than giving an "overall grade" to the political system, people evaluate its various parts differently, that is, they hand out individual grades. For the most part, it is accepted that there are generic evaluations, which refer to support for the principles, values, and norms on which the political system is based (usually called "diffuse

support"),[11] and more specific evaluations, which refer to the performance of the institutions, administrations, and parties ("specific support"). There is an important and unresolved debate, however, about the number of dimensions that comprise public support for the political system,[12] how they are related,[13] and the best way to measure them.[14]

In this section, we analyze diffuse support for the system – the reserve of "good will" that people have toward the system, which allows them to continue supporting it even when they are critical of the job that the institutions and actors of the political system are doing.

## Support for the System in 2006

Diffuse support is supposed to be indicative of the degree to which the people recognize the system as legitimate, that is, whether they willingly accept the authority of its institutions to make collectively binding decisions for the entire population. By contrast, low support for the system indicates that there are problems of legitimacy that could eventually have consequences for political stability.[15] To study this topic, we use the index of support for the system that Professor Seligson developed and has applied in Costa Rica and other countries. In Costa Rica, there are measurements of this index dating back to 1978, which allows us to follow the evolution of public support for democracy over a relatively long period. The index is developed from interviewees' responses to five questions (Box IV.1).[16] Its findings are given on a 0-to-100 point scale in which 0 is the lowest level of support and 100 the highest. In Costa Rica, this index has been used on ten occasions (including this one) and all these statistical tests indicate that it is a reliable and valid measure.[17]

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[11] The concept of diffuse support was developed by Easton to refer to the evaluations that people make about what an object (in this case the political system) is or represents – rather than what the object does or how it functions (Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Muller, Jukam et al. 1982; Seligson 2000). This support consists in a reserve of favorable attitudes, or good will, that contribute to the members of a system accepting or tolerating results or situations that they oppose or effects they perceive as damaging.

[12] In his classic work, Easton proposed two dimensions, diffuse support and specific support. More recently, Pippa Norris suggested that there are five dimensions, that go from the most diffuse to the most specific; and Damarys Canache proposes that public evaluations refer to "objects" rather than dimensions, and distinguishes three (Canache 2002).

[13] For a discussion on this topic, see (Canache, Mondak et al. 2001; Vargas Cullell 2005).

[14] See (Seligson 2000; Rose 2002; Inglehart 2003).

[15] Under conditions of low legitimacy, people could refuse to recognize the decisions that pubic officials adopt and oppose their authority to establish and maintain public order.

[16] Some 93.8% of the people (1,433) responded to the five questions. To reduce the incidence of those with "no response," we carried out a rescue procedure of the cases where people responded to three and four questions. In these cases, we assigned to the no responses the person's average scores for the items to which they did respond. With this procedure, we elevated the number of valid cases to 99.8% (1,497).

[17] The factor analysis reflects the fact that the five questions are grouped into only one factor, with loads above .572. To measure the reliability of the scale on which the index of support for the system is based, we used the Cronbach's alpha statistical test. When the Cronbach's alpha is above .70, the measure in question is reliable. For the index of support for the system, the results are the following: 1978= 0.77; 1980=0.75; 1983=0.79; 1985=0.75; 1987=0.70; 1990=0.74; 1995=0.73; 1999=0.75; 2004=0.73. This time, the Cronbach's alpha was 0.763..

Box IV.1 Questions Used in Mitchell Seligson's Index of Support for Democracy

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a Ud. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

**B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Costa Rica garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.
**B2**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Costa Rica?
**B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político costarricense?
**B4**. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político costarricense?
**B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político costarricense?

Between 2004 and 2006, the average support for the system in Costa Rica dropped from 68 to 64 points on a scale of 0-to-100, a difference that is statistically significant at $p > 0,95$. This is the second lowest level of support observed in almost thirty years (from 1978 to 2006), and only higher than the 1999 average. Therefore, the recovery in 2002 and 2004 from the 1999 low was ephemeral. The four available surveys for recent years, a period in which the political party system deteriorated significantly and voter turnout dropped, suggest a new threshold of public support for the system that is 15 to 20 points lower than what prevailed in previous decades (short-term variations not withstanding). The cautious optimism of the 2004 report – which stated that the partial recovery in 2004, compared to 1999, was similar to that experienced in the first half of the 1980s when support for the system increased amidst difficult economic and political circumstances[18] – should be revised. Short term oscillations in the 1999-2006 period did not reverse the long term trend of declining support for the system (Seligson 2002) (Figure IV.2).[19]

Despite the decline in system support between 2004 and 2006, this support is higher in Costa Rica than in any other Latin American country (Figure IV.3). The average system support in Costa Rica is between 7 and 20 times higher than that of its Central American neighbors. (Nicaragua has the lowest support on the isthmus: 45 on a scale of 0-to-100). Two of the Andean countries, Peru and Ecuador, tend to have the lowest support for democracy in the entire Latin American region. Lastly, the countries that come closest to the Costa Rican level are Mexico

[18] As indicated in Chapter I, during this period there was a change in the party system and the level of electoral participation; despite the emergence of new parties, it did not recover. The comparison with the 1980s, however, should be made with caution since the nature of these circumstances is markedly different. In the 1980s, support for the system grew during a period of economic crisis; now, support for the system increased during a period of problems with the political system (without an economic crisis).
[19] The measurements from 1978 and 1980, the first in the series, were conducted in the San José Metropolitan Area. Comparing the averages of this era with those from 2004 and 2006 in the same areas, the situation is practically the same as that shown in Figure IV.2 (in 2004 and 2006, the average of support for the system in the Metropolitan Area was 68 and 65 respectively).

(with 60 points on the scale of 0-to-100), Colombia (58 points), and the Dominican Republic (57 points).

**Figure IV-2 Evolution of Support for the System in Costa Rica, 1978-2005, Averages on a Scale of 0-to-100**




Notes: *Sample from the San José Metropolitan Area; **National sample. In 2004 and 2006, the average support for the system in the San José Metropolitan Area was 69 and 65.
Source: Seligson, personal communication, and LAPOP 2004 and 2006

In Costa Rica, the components of the system support index that receive the highest scores are support for the political system and institutions in general, and pride in the system. The three receive very similar scores (around 75 points). By contrast, the two areas related to guaranteeing civil and political rights – trust that the courts ensure fair trials and that the political system will protect people's rights – receive the lowest scores (55 and 57 respectively). In this sense, the 2004 measure continues the pattern of the scores of the specific items of the index captured since 1978 – the novelty this time is a slight improvement in the areas that traditionally receive the worst scores (Table IV.2).

**Figure IV-3 National Averages in the Index of Support for the System in Latin America, Scale 0-to-100**




**Table IV.2 National Average of the Components Used to Calculate the Index of Support for Democracy on a Scale of 0-to-100, Costa Rica 2004 and 2006**

| Items | 2004 | 2006 | Difference 2006-2004 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fair trials | 57 | 51 | -6* |
| Political institutions | 75 | 75 | 0 |
| Basic civil rights | 56 | 52 | -4* |
| Pride in the political system | 74 | 70 | -4* |
| Support for the political system | 75 | 72 | -3* |

*Sig. Statistic: statistically significant changes to a 95% level of confidence.
In 2004, the "N" varied between 1,493 (basic civil rights) and 1,498 (political institutions); in 2006, it varied between 1,495 (pride in the political system) and 1,497 (the rest of the items).

For the analysis of the factors that predict support for the system, we employed the three linear regression models with the variants indicated in Chapter II (basic, political, and local effects).[20] In relation to system support, the predictive capacity of the basic model is very low ($r^2$=0,057);

[20] The dependent variable (Index of support for the system) almost has a normal distribution in line with the residual analysis.

with the political model the goodness of fit rises substantially ($r^2$=0,275); the local effects model only had a marginal impact (model C, $r^2$=0,292). This pattern is similar to that noted in the 2004 study, although the predictive capacity of the political model is a little lower this time.[21] From a more substantive point of view, the main conclusion noted in 2004 remains valid: the predictors of support for the system are more political than sociodemographic.[22] None of latter were statistically significant. The spatial variables (regional or local) also did not have any significant effect. It is worth highlighting the predictive effect that trust in one's neighbors has on support for the system (Sig < .001). On average, people who trust their neighbors have levels of support 11% higher than people who do not trust their neighbors (67 to 56 on a scale of 0-to-100).

The partisan dealignment and the drop in electoral participation strongly influence the average level of support for the system. This support is 7% lower among people who did not vote in the 2006 elections, and 6% lower among those who say they do not support any party (Figures IV.4 and IV.5). This is a significant finding since it suggests that there is an association between the dealignment and support for the system. The direction of causality should be investigated, but the trend of political dealignment and falling voter turnout in Costa Rica since the mid-1990s affect (and in turn could be affected by) system support.

Just as in the 2004 study, public perception of the government's efficacy at successfully confronting the challenges facing the country, such as fighting poverty and corruption and protecting democratic principles, are factors that markedly influence system support (sig < .001). People with a low opinion of this efficacy score 13 percentage points below those who have a better opinion (Figure IV.6). People's tolerance toward collective acts of legal protest produces a similar effect, although more attenuated (Figure IV.7): the more tolerant people are, the more they support the system. (This conclusion is backed by the finding that people who are most intolerant of illegal social protests support the system more).

Lastly, it is necessary to highlight various important findings precisely for their lack of explanatory power. First, electoral support for a particular party does not influence system

[21] It is probable that this decline is related to the fact that in this study we did not include factors related to social capital – except trust in one's neighbors – which are important to predict support for the system: the networks of reciprocity in a community. We did not include the questions about networks in the 2006 LAPOP questionnaire for reasons of space.

[22] To eliminate the possibility that support for democracy is affected by the behavior of the most conjunctural political factors, such as the evaluation of the job the government is doing, we conducted a covariance analysis with other items included in the questionnaire. We would expect that support for democracy – which measures diffuse support for the system – would not be "contaminated" by the more specific evaluations of what kind of job institutions and actors are doing. On the job the government is doing, we have an index of government efficacy composed of five questions: N1, N3 and N9, N10, N11 and N2, which ask: "Now, on the same scale (0-to-7), up to what point would you say that the previous administration: (N1) Fought poverty; (N3) Promoted and protected democratic principles; (N9) Fought government corruption; (N10) Protected human rights; (N11) Improved public safety; (N12) Fought unemployment." These questions form a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha > .70) and were, therefore, grouped into the respective index. The findings indicate that the average support for the system varies little when considering the index of government efficacy, but that they do affect it statistically (sig<.001). Due to this slight effect, the index of government efficacy was used as an independent variable in the B and C models.

support. This is important because it indicates that, in Costa Rica, people with low support do not tend to congregate under the wing of some party: the competition is between parties whose electoral bases show similar levels of system support. The implication is that the partisan dealignment and public discontent have not turned this competition into one between democratic and non-democratic forces. Second, .as noted in the 2004 study, people who support democratic values and institutions are not necessarily more tolerant than the rest of the population. Finally, the debate over whether or not to approve CAFTA-DR – a topic that has strongly divided Costa Rican public opinion – has not contaminated support for the system (see Chapter X for a more thorough study of this topic).

**Table IV.3 Predictors of Support for the System (Political Model)**

| Model | B | Beta | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | 22,690 | | .000 |
| Age | .044 | .036 | .798 |
| Age squared | .000 | .031 | .821 |
| Female | 1.276 | .032 | .345 |
| Housewife | -.183 | -.004 | .904 |
| Married (or living together) | .260 | .007 | .820 |
| Years of education | -.237 | -.054 | .125 |
| Wealth index | .454 | .050 | .104 |
| Non-Catholic religion | -1.238 | -.025 | .344 |
| No religion | -1.144 | -.016 | .545 |
| Trust neighbors | 6.362 | .101 | .000 |
| TV news | -.165 | -.002 | .938 |
| Read newspapers | .840 | .016 | .582 |
| Well informed | 5.900 | .063 | .048 |
| Small city | -2.081 | -.050 | .122 |
| Rural area | -.130 | -.003 | .934 |
| Central Valley region | -1.528 | -.036 | .242 |
| Index of social participation | -.124 | -.016 | .579 |
| Participation in demonstrations | -.204 | -.004 | .883 |
| Participation by contacting officials | -.166 | -.004 | .886 |
| Voted in 2006 dummy | 2.826 | .064 | .079 |
| People who do not support a party | -2.461 | -.060 | .025 |
| Voted PLN in 2006 | 2.320 | .054 | .143 |
| Voted PAC in 2006 | -2.474 | -.055 | .122 |
| Index of government efficacy | .329 | .397 | .000 |
| Index of intolerance to illegal participation | .085 | .072 | .008 |
| Index of tolerance to legal participation | .119 | .124 | .000 |
| Index of political tolerance | -.002 | -.004 | .899 |
| Index of support for free trade agreement normalized | .006 | .010 | .707 |
| Victim of corruption at least once | -4.138 | -.085 | .001 |

a Dependent variable: Index of support for the system
B: Non-standardized coefficients; Beta: Standardized coefficients.

**Figure IV-4 Average Support for the System by Voting in the 2006 Elections**




**Figure IV-5 Average Support for the System by Political Dealignment 2006**




**Figure IV-6 Average Support for the System by Perception of Government Efficacy**




**Figure IV-7 Average Support for the System by Level of Tolerance of Legal Participation**



### *Changing Support for the System, 2004-2006*

Age, the level of wealth, the perception of government efficacy, and trust in institutions key to the Costa Rican welfare state such as the ICE and CCSS[23] are predictors of support for democracy when the 2004 and 2006 measures are taken together.[24] In what follows, we will focus on political factors, which we can interpret in relation to important events that occurred during this period.

**Table IV.4 Predictors of Support for the Democratic System 2004-2006 with Political Variables (Political Model)**

| | B | Beta | Sig |
|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | 31,012 | 9,391 | .000 |
| Male | -.986 | -.803 | .422 |
| Age squared | .001 | 2.229 | .026 |
| Years of education | -.020 | -.135 | .893 |
| Religion – recodified | -.348 | -.922 | .357 |
| Income – in thousands | .005 | 1.470 | .142 |
| Wealth index | .689 | 1.680 | .093 |
| Housewife | .034 | .322 | .748 |
| Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) | .119 | 5.460 | .000 |
| Costa Rican Social Security Board (CCSS) | .090 | 4.121 | .000 |
| National Insurance Institute (INS) | .008 | .339 | .735 |
| Index of political tolerance | .014 | .741 | .459 |
| Index comparable government efficacy 2004-2006 | .189 | 8.885 | .000 |
| Trust in free trade agreement | .079 | 5.239 | .000 |
| Victim of corruption at least once | -1.024 | -.802 | .422 |
| Basic model R2 | 0.029 | | |
| Political model R2 | 0.241 | | |

a Dependent variable: Index of support for democracy

From the political point of view, special attention should be paid to the perception of government efficacy and public trust in the ICE and CCSS. All these introduce important differences in the level of system support (more than 10 percentage points of difference) (Figures IV-8 and IV-9).[25] The impact of the perception of government efficacy is an important factor again, as it was in the 2006 analysis. Since both trust and perception of government efficacy declined significantly during the period under analysis, increasing numbers of people are located in the realm of low

[23] As will be seen in the last section of this chapter, trust in the ICE, CCSS, and the INS behave differently than the items used to develop the index of support for the system.

[24] The analysis of the predictors of support for the system 2004-2006 was conducted based on the political model since it has a much higher predictive capacity than the basic model. It is important to note that these models are a bit different than those used in the 2006 LAPOP database since not all the variables were available in both years. We did not apply the local effects model since the cantons are not the same.

[25] To facilitate the interpretation, the variables of trust in the ICE and the CCSS were recodified as binaries: much trust (51 or more points on a scale of 0-to-100) and low trust (50 or less).

trust and poor perception of government efficacy, with its consequent depressive effect on support. In summary, the poor job of the Pacheco de la Espriella administration and the corruption scandals that affected the image of key state institutions explain part of the fall in support for the system that occurred between 2004 and 2006.

**Figure IV-8 Average Support for the System by Perception of Government Efficacy, 2004 and 2006 Combined**




**Figure IV-9 Average Support for the System by Level of Trust in the ICE, 2004 and 2006 Combined**




## Political Tolerance

A second step in the study of public support for democracy is to analyze political tolerance, which is understood as respect for the rights of others, even those less accepted by the public. The argument is that in increasingly diverse and plural societies – socially, economically, culturally, and politically – tolerance is the glue that bonds the society and the political community together.[26] Even though, politically speaking, people belong to a single community of citizens – everyone is politically equal – in the rest of their lives, people belong to very different, unequal, and even unconnected worlds.[27]

[26] In the specialized literature, there is controversy on the role of tolerance for democracy. Different studies have shown that in advanced democracies wide segments of the population have intolerant values and practices (Gibson 1988; Barnum and Sullivan 1989). Based on this statement, some authors maintain that what is important for a democracy is not that the "demos" is tolerant but that the elites who exercise power are: see the discussion by (Gibson and Duch 1991; Gibson 1992). In counterpoint, other authors argue that intolerance is *per se* a signal of the low quality of democracy and generates potential risks for people's rights. This latter position is the one we adopt in this report (Seligson 2000). In the Costa Rican case, previous studies also show the existence of veins of intolerance in wide segments of the population (Gómez 1998; Rodríguez, Castro et al. 1998; Gómez and Madrigal 2004).

[27] Tolerance is founded on the acceptance of pluralism as an indispensable value to guarantee respect for people's personal safety and property (Walzer 1995; Young 1995; Sartori 1997).

In a democracy, political tolerance is juridically codified in constitutional and legal norms that define the rights and freedoms of all people and guarantee their enforcement and promotion. But, the legal basis of tolerance is insufficient. The other side of the coin is people's attitudes. If the population at large is intolerant of others, unwilling to recognize or respect their rights, this generates serious risks for democratic life (*convivencia democrática*). In practice, an intolerant population can refuse to recognize constitutional and legal norms, and can foment, carry out, and cover up aggression toward particular groups in the population.

As in the 2004 study of political culture, this time we also measured political tolerance by examining people's attitudes toward the rights of persons for whom, in principle, they have less sympathy. Potentially, such persons could become easy targets for intolerance.[28] In this study, we included the four questions that were used to measure tolerance in the 2004 study as well as in different countries in order to be able draw comparisons. We also included a fifth question on the rights of homosexuals since this group has persistently been highlighted as the one that the population most rejects (Box IV.2). From the responses to questions D1-D4, we developed the tolerance index.[29] The findings are given on a 0-to-100 point scale, where 0 is the lowest level of tolerance and 100 is the highest. This is a reliable and valid measure of political tolerance.[30]

Box IV.2 Questions Used in the Tolerance Index

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Costa Rica, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?] Anotar 1-10, NS=88

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?

D5. (NO SE USA PARA EL INDICE) Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?

[28] For example: vandalism and crimes committed against members of certain groups can have certain popular acceptance. In the 2004 study, an analysis of a second kind of tolerance was included: tolerance toward the Nicaraguan population. This time, we did not address this issue.

[29] Some 97.8% of the people (1,467) responded to the four questions. To reduce the incidence of the "no response" answers, we conducted a rescue procedure of the cases where people responded to three questions. In these cases, we assigned to the no responses the person's average scores for the items to which they did response. With this procedure, we raised the number of valid cases to 99.1% (1,486).

[30] The factor analysis reflects the fact that the four questions are grouped into only one factor, with loads above .692. The Cronbach's alpha was .799, which is very satisfactory. The analysis revealed that question D5 (regarding homosexuals) could also form part of the measure of tolerance. However, to make the comparison with other studies possible, we decided to exclude it from the analysis..

Between 2004 and 2006, there was a generalized rising trend in the components of the tolerance index. Table IV.5 shows them individually. Not all the changes are statistically significant, however: while there was a clear improvement in the willingness to accept public demonstrations and televised speeches by people of the least-liked group (rising six percentage points each), the other changes were not statistically significant. In both years, however, the pattern is the same: there is greater support for the right to vote and public demonstrations than for other issues. Once again, intolerance is greatest toward homosexuals.

**Table IV.5 Changes in the Average Level of Political Tolerance in Costa Rica, Scale of 0-to-100, 2004 and 2006**

| Items | 2004 | 2006 | Difference 2006-2004 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to vote | 60 | 62 | 2 |
| To conduct peaceful demonstrations | 66 | 72 | 6* |
| To run for public office | 52 | 55 | 3 |
| To give speeches on television | 53 | 59 | 6* |
| Homosexuals running for public office | 38 | 42 | 3 |
| Index of political tolerance | 58 | 62 | 4* |

*The change is statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence.
Note: In 2004, the "N" varied between 1,416 valid responses (political tolerance index) and 1,492 valid responses (Homosexuals running for public office). In 2006, the "N" varied between 1,480 and 1,495 between the same variables.

When the items of the tolerance index are analyzed as a whole, they show an improvement in the average level of tolerance in Costa Rica. The growth is certainly modest (the average score rose from 58 to 62 on a scale of 0-to-100), but it is statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence. This is the first time in years that there has been an improvement: on average, the public is more tolerant today than they were ten years ago (Seligson and Booth 1993). From a comparative perspective, Costa Rica's tolerance-index average is not the highest in the region (unlike its system support index average score): Jamaica surpasses it by a good deal (72 instead of 62 on a scale of 0-to-100). However, the improvement since 2004 in this area enabled Costa Ricans to score higher this time than their counterparts in Central America. It is striking that a country like Chile receives a score similar to that given by citizens in political systems that do not have a long experience with democracy. As indicated in the 2004 study, the theoretical expectation that political tolerance is one of the pillars of a stable democracy is not fulfilled since in mature and stable democracies we did not find higher levels of political tolerance than new and unstable democracies (Figure IV.10).

The results of the linear regression analysis indicate that, as with support for democracy, the political model has the best goodness of fit. The explanatory capacity of the basic model is low ($r^2$=.061), but considering political variables increases it significantly (political model, $r^2$=.162). Again, local differences barely has any impact (local effects model, $r^2$=.193).[31] It would seem

[31] This is a different pattern than that reported in the 2004 LAPOP study, where the B model did not add almost any

that, in terms of system support and political tolerance, "local ecologies" are not that important. As in 2004, people's support for the system and their evaluation on government's performance do not affect political tolerance. None of them are statistically significant (Table IV.6).

**Figure IV-10 Average National Scores on the Political Tolerance Index in Latin America (2006)**




Unlike support for the system, in the case of political tolerance there is a sociodemographic variable that is an important predictor: as in 2004, an individual's educational level helps predicting her tolerance. The more years of education, the greater the tolerance. There are 15 percentage points of difference (18 in 2004) between people with a primary education (whether finished or not) and people with superior education (Figure IV.11). People with some degree of secondary education are in an intermediate position, as in 2004. It is not unexpected that being well-informed (tau_b=0.398), a variable closely related to educational levels, is also a statistically significant predictor of tolerance. In terms of political tolerance, the educational system is a powerful vehicle of socialization. Improvements in people's level of schooling have important political implications, not only economic ones, as is usually thought. As noted in the 2004 study, since education makes people more tolerant, democratic life would benefit if people had more schooling. In contrast to the 2004 study, though, residing in certain regions is not a predictive factor of political tolerance.

explanatory power. In the 2006 study, the introduction of variables such tolerance of collective action (legal or illegal) would seem to have had the effect of improving the fit of the model.

A unique finding of this study is the importance of participating in social demonstrations. People who have at some time participated in a social protest are clearly more tolerant than those who have never done so (Figure IV.12). In more conceptual terms, this suggestion seems to support the views of scholars who see participation as a vehicle for civic socialization (Verba and Nye 1972; Verba, Nie et al. 1978; Verba, Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman, Verba et al. 1999; Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001).

**Table IV.6 Predictors of Political Tolerance (Political Model)**

| Model | B | Beta | Sig |
|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | 46,638 | | .000 |
| Age | -.156 | -.087 | .562 |
| Age squared | .002 | .113 | .441 |
| Female | -2.734 | -.048 | .195 |
| Housewife | .624 | .010 | .793 |
| Married (living together) | -.571 | -.010 | .750 |
| Years of education | .692 | .108 | .004 |
| Wealth index | -.149 | -.011 | .733 |
| Non-Catholic religion | -3.889 | -.054 | .057 |
| No religion | -.298 | -.003 | .920 |
| Trust neighbors | 1.533 | .017 | .565 |
| TV news | 1.467 | .013 | .660 |
| Read newspapers | 1.673 | .022 | .483 |
| Well-informed | 8.859 | .065 | .058 |
| Small city | 2.700 | .044 | .200 |
| Rural area | -1.279 | -.021 | .601 |
| Central Valley region | -3.396 | -.055 | .096 |
| Index of social participation | -.114 | -.010 | .744 |
| Participation in demonstrations | 5.277 | .072 | .015 |
| Participation contacting officials | -4.007 | -.063 | .027 |
| Voted in 2006 dummy | -1.533 | -.024 | .542 |
| People who do not support a political party | -2.389 | -.040 | .164 |
| Voted PLN in 2006 | .656 | .011 | .791 |
| Voted PAC in 2006 | 3.183 | .049 | .203 |
| Index of government efficacy | .025 | .020 | .507 |
| Index of intolerance to illegal participation | -.166 | -.096 | .001 |
| Index of tolerance to legal participation | .322 | .230 | .000 |
| Index of support for free trade agreement normalized | -.030 | -.036 | .217 |
| Victim of corruption at least once | 5.956 | .085 | .003 |
| Index of support for democracy | -.006 | -.004 | .899 |
| Basic model R2 | 0.061 | | |
| Political model R2 | 0.162 | | |
| Local effects model R2 | 0.193 | | |

a Dependent variable: Index of political tolerance

**Figure IV-11 Political Tolerance Average by Level of Education**




**Figure IV-12 Political Tolerance Average by Participation in Demonstrations**




## Support for a Stable Democracy

By combining the index of system support (section 3) and the index of political tolerance (section 4) we can create a more general measure of support called "support for a stable democracy" (Seligson 2000).[32] The logic behind this measure is the following: when people accept democratic authority, they recognize the fundamental institutions of a democracy; and when they also show tolerance, they are more willing to lead their lives under the "rules of the game," which are the basis of predictable and stable norms over the long term. A democracy is healthy if such tolerant democrats form the largest group, ideally the majority. By contrast, people who neither support the system nor are tolerant of the rights of others are not loyal to democracy and would be willing to have an authoritarian system, in which rights and freedoms were restricted, take its place. These people would like that the authoritarian system to also be stable – in the sense that its norms would govern social and political life for an extended period of time. A democracy would be in trouble if a large number of citizens belonged to this group, especially if they were the majority. In empirical terms, the hope is that tolerance and support for the system are positively related: the greater the tolerance, the greater the support for the institutions of the democratic regime.[33]

[32] Analyzing support for the system and tolerance together, we can identify and interrelate vital attitudes for the preservation of democracy. It should be remembered that support for the system tries to capture the degree to which people accept the authority of institutions to make decisions for the entire society; and in this case, obedience to officials named by democratic means. Thus, support for the system is a measure of political legitimacy. Second, tolerance of the rights of groups who are not well liked is a key part of democratic life, without which the enjoyment of freedoms can be seriously threatened. In other words, measuring tolerance brings us closer to the topic of political freedom.

[33] To these polarized groups – tolerant democrats who support stable democracy and the intolerant non-democrats

The situation in Costa Rica remains favorable for a stable democracy, with no major changes since 2004. The most widespread group, and almost the majority, is made up of people who have high levels of both support for the system and political tolerance ("support for a stable democracy"). People who favor a democratic breakdown – with low levels of support for the system and political tolerance – remain the smallest group (9%). The most important decline occurred in the group of people who support democratic institutions but are intolerant of the rights of others, falling six percentage points (32.8% to 26.5% of the total number of people). Such individuals support the stability that these institutions provide even at the expense of other people's rights (this is why it is called "authoritarian stability"). The decline in this group is good news, but it is practically cancelled out by the increase, between 2004 and 2006, of people who show high political tolerance but low support for the system. As in the previous study, we did not find any significant relation between tolerance and support for the system (sig.>.10).

The conclusion in the 2004 study, and which merits repeating here, is that a vein of intolerance runs through Costa Rican political culture, even among those who say they support the democratic system. Also, the decline in support for the system, noted between 2004 and 2006 (see section 3), does not mean the relative loss of weight of the people who favor a stable democracy, but rather a "hardening" of the people who already showed ambivalence in 2004 (the group favoring "unstable democracy"). All an all, Taking into account the country's complex political situation (see Chapter I), these are positive findings. It means that the country maintains a relatively robust support for a stable democracy in moments of strong public discontent and the breakdown of the bipartisan party system that governed the country in the past few decades (Chapter VIII).

**Table IV.7 Empirical Relation between Tolerance and Support for the System in Costa Rica, 2004 and 2006 (percentages)**

| | Level of support | Level of tolerance | 2004 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic breakdown | Low | Low | 7.9 | 9.1 |
| Unstable democracy | Low | High | 10.7 | 14.7 |
| Authoritarian stability | High | Low | 32.8 | 26.5 |
| Stable democracy | High | High | 48.6 | 49.7 |
| (N) | | | (1,482) | (1,462) |

For the index of support for the democratic system, we recodified the 0-to-100 point scale: (a) Low <=50; (b) High: >50. For the political tolerance index, we recodified the 0-to-100 point scale: (a) Low <=50; (b) High: >50. . r=.031, sig=.233.

A comparison of this finding with that obtained in 2004 indicates that the situation in Costa Rica is still the most positive within the region (it improved slightly in recent years (Canache, Mondak et al. 2001; Booth and Seligson 2005)). The difference between Costa Rica and all other

who support an authoritarian breakdown – two other groups are added who have contradictory attitudes.

countries is sizable, even those closest in score: support for stable democracy in Costa Rica is ten points higher than in Mexico, the Latin American country with the second best score (Figure IV.13). Chile's low score on this index is surprising, while the poor situation in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru – countries that have had considerable turmoil in recent years – was predictable.

**Figure IV-13 Support for a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective**




An additional step in the analysis is to clarify whether the group that supports stable democracy has different sociodemographic characteristics from the rest. To do this, we used the basic, political, and local effects models. In this case, we applied a logistic regression model since the dependent variable was recodified in a binary manner (support for stable democracy or no support; this latter includes the other three groups). None of the sociodemographic variables are significant.[34] The little importance of these factors was expected given the results of the system support predictors. Additionally, the influence of trust in one's neighbors on support for democracy, which was already noted, seems to have an influence here too. From a sociological

[34] The explanatory capacity of the basic model is not high (Cox-Snell's $R^2$:0.039). As in the 2004 study, the political model significantly increased this capacity, this time a bit more pronounced (Cox-Snell's $R^2$: 0.140). The local effects model marginally improved the fit (Cox-Snell's $R^2$: 0.166).

perspective, the group who supports stable democracy does not appear to be any different from the rest (Table IV.8).

Again, it is political factors that help predict support for a stable democracy (Table IV.8). On the one hand, the perception of government efficacy – in line with what was seen in the 2004 study – is an important predictor. People who better evaluate the job the administration is doing show, on average, greater support for stable democracy (there is a difference of 20 percentage points between people who evaluate the government poorly and those who evaluate it well). On the other hand, political party support is another important factor. People who still support a party, no matter which one (about a third of respondents), show substantially higher support for stable democracy. This finding reinforces the idea that the political dealignment has a negative effect on public support for democracy (Figures IV.14 and IV.15).

**Table IV.8 Predictors of Support for a Stable Democracy (Political Model)**

| | | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Step 1(a) | Age | .001 | .946 | 1.001 |
| | Age squared | .000 | .730 | 1.000 |
| | Female | .196 | .254 | 1.216 |
| | Housewife | -.193 | .319 | .825 |
| | Married (living together) | -.098 | .505 | .907 |
| | Years of education | .014 | .459 | 1.015 |
| | Wealth index | .035 | .323 | 1.036 |
| | Non-Catholic religion | -.203 | .220 | .816 |
| | No religion | -.047 | .843 | .954 |
| | Trust neighbors | .439 | .041 | 1.551 |
| | TV news | .118 | .666 | 1.126 |
| | Read newspapers | .230 | .235 | 1.259 |
| | Well informed | .937 | .013 | 2.552 |
| | Small city | -.011 | .948 | .989 |
| | Rural area | -.106 | .595 | .900 |
| | Central Valley region | .224 | .175 | 1.251 |
| | Index of social participation | -.018 | .530 | .982 |
| | Participation in demonstrations | -.033 | .851 | .968 |
| | Participation contacting officials | .450 | .002 | 1.568 |
| | Voted in 2006 dummy | -.133 | .512 | .875 |
| | People who do not support a political party | .322 | .020 | 1.380 |
| | Voted PLN in 2006 | -.072 | .721 | .931 |
| | Voted PAC in 2006 | .109 | .590 | 1.115 |
| | Index of government efficacy | .017 | .000 | 1.018 |
| | Index of intolerance to illegal participation | -.001 | .733 | .999 |
| | Index of tolerance to legal participation | .023 | .000 | 1.023 |
| | Index of support for free trade agreement normalized | -.002 | .329 | .998 |
| | Victim of corruption | .074 | .647 | 1.077 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | -4.291 | .000 | .014 |
| Basic model pseudo R2 | 0.039 | | |
| Political model pseudo R2 | 0.140 | | |
| Local effects model pseudo R2 | 0.166 | | |

a Variable(s) introduced in step 1: q1r, q2, q2c, q11r2, ocup1r2, q10r, edr, riqdx, tamanoc1, tamanoc2, regionvc, psoc, parprot, parcont, vb2r2, cosvb11r1, cosvb3PLN, cosvb3PAC, efigr, tolparin, tolparln, atlcr, vcorrup1.

**Figure IV-14 Percentage of Support for a Stable Democracy by Support for a Political Party**




**Figure IV-15 Percentage of Support for a Stable Democracy by Perception Government Efficacy**




## Authoritarian Attitudes and Support for Democracy

The 2004 study analyzed delegative (O'Donnell 1994) and openly authoritarian public attitudes.[35] The main conclusion was that a significant group of people who say they support democracy also have attitudes that are contrary to full democratic principles and norms, either because they support delegativist leadership or a non-democratic form of government. That is, the supposition that people do not mix delegative and authoritarian attitudes with adherence to democracy seemed to be incorrect. This finding supports that reported in the UNDP report on democracy in Latin America (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004) and other studies that show the important ambivalences that people have (Schedler and Sarsfield 2004; Vargas Cullell 2005).

[35] "Non-delegative attitudes" comes from the concept of delegative democracy proposed by O'Donnell. According to O'Donnell, a new type of democracy arose in Latin America in which a democratically-elected president, once in power, began acting in an authoritarian manner, although without completely violating the constitutional order. A person with a non-delegative attitude opposes this type of political development.

Up to this point, the findings reported in this chapter on the issue of support for democracy show the need for a new and more attentive look at the topic of delegative or authoritarian attitudes. In Costa Rica, almost all people say they prefer democracy over any other form of government (87.7%). However, the average system support, a more sophisticated measure without the methodological problems of the preference for democracy (Chapter III), is more than 20 percentage points lower (64.0%) (Figure IV.16).[36] In turn, support for a stable democracy (which combines system support with political tolerance) is even lower (49.7%). The fall in public support as new elements are added suggests the importance of not just relying on general indicators such as preference for democracy.

**Figure IV-16 Differences in the Percentage of People who Prefer Democracy, Support the System, and Support Stable Democracy, 2006**




Note: % of people with valid response and who chose "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government" in question DEM2. The figures of support for the system and for a stable democracy are from the previous sections.

We should note, however, that none of the measures of support for the system or a stable democracy incorporate the topic of public support for delegativist attitudes by those who exercise

[36] As noted in Chapter III, the questions about the preference for democracy have various problems. One is that democracy is a concept tinged with positive normative values, which is why people can find it difficult to reject it. Second, the question is indeterminate, in that it asks about democracy without determining how a person understands it. This point has been extensively studied by Seligson and Inglehard.

power or for clear attempts to break the constitutional order. In the literature that uses these measures as an approximation of the legitimacy of the political system, *it is assumed* that people who support democracy would not favor such measures. But this supposition does not necessarily correspond to reality, not only because of what was already indicated in the 2004 LAPOP study but also because of the findings from other Latin American countries.[37] In this study, therefore, we included a series of questions to study the topic of authoritarian or delegativist attitudes among the population (Box IV.3).

Box IV.3 Questions Used to Study Authoritarian Attitudes

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?

POP1. [Leer alternativas] 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.8. NS/NR

POP2. [Leer alternativas] 1. La Asamblea Legislativa impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando estorben la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la Asamblea Legislativa. 8. NS/NR

POP3. [Leer alternativas]1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR

POP4. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario], 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro. 8. NS/NR

POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.8. NS/NR

[Déjele la tarjeta "B" al entrevistado]
Ahora, siempre usando la tarjeta B, por favor dígame ¿Hasta qué punto estaría usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que, a como está hoy la situación del país, el Presidente [Leer las respuestas] Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe

DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

COSDE01. Ponga orden en el país por las buenas o por las malas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?

COSDE12. Incumpla algunas decisiones de la Sala IV. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?

COSDE03. Pase por encima de las leyes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa Ud? [Leer](1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR

[37] The clearest example of this is Venezuela. Both Canache and the UNDP report provide evidence of high levels of support for democracy (Canache 2002; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). However, President Chávez is a typical delegative leader (as Fujimori or Menem were before, although with different ideological orientations) and the Venezuelan regime has been developing in a regressive sense (Cannon 2004).

In Costa Rica, a solid majority opposes efforts to restrict political freedoms and undermine the welfare state (Table IV.9). More than 90% reject the breakdown of electoral democracy by a decisive leader (a finding almost identical to that reported in the 2004 LAPOP study). And more than 70% oppose a president who would ignore Congress, the opposition parties or the judges, or does what the "people want" by skirting the law. Another majority, smaller but still significant, oppose efforts to ignore the decisions of the Constitutional Court or the idea that a democracy without political parties is possible (despite the low public esteem parties have). The situation is inverted in only two, decidedly ambiguous, topics: the imposition of public order "by any means possible" and that the president has sufficient power to be able to act. Even though both extremes have been used to justify authoritarian regimes in other Latin American countries, the need for public order or for a president with the power to act are not incompatible with a democratic regime.

**Table IV.9 Authoritarian Attitudes among Costa Ricans, 2006**

| Items | % authoritarian |
|---|---|
| President establishes order by any means possible* | 53 |
| President does not abide by decisions of the Constitutional Court* | 38 |
| Democracy without parties | 34 |
| President restricts voice and vote of opposition parties | 33 |
| President ignores Congress | 29 |
| President does what the people want | 28 |
| President has sufficient power to act | 27 |
| President ignores judges | 15 |
| President acts above the law* | 12 |
| Decisive leader | 5 |

The "N" varied between 1,438 (president limits voice and vote of opposition parties) and 1,492 (president acts above the law).

*We classified responses that scored 33.4 points or less, on a scale of 0-to-100, as authoritarian. The original scale of the questions went from 1-to-7; it was reconverted to a 0-to-100 point scale in the same way as the questions about trust in institutions (see that section for an explanation). Source: questions POP1-5, DEM23, COSDE01, COSDE12, COSDE03, AUT1.

A second step in the study of authoritarianism is to determine whether the questions indicated above are reliable measures of authoritarian and delegative attitudes that can be summarized in synthetic indices. If they were, these items would provide information that would allow us to arrange people along a continuum from a greater propensity toward authoritarianism or delegativism to greater opposition to both. The main conclusion, however, is that the majority of them are not (Table IV.10): note the very low Cronbach´s alphas. Three of them, though, – opposition to imposing order by any means possible, to a president who acts above the law, and to one who does not follow the decisions of the Constitutional Court (*Sala IV*) – almost have a satisfactory reliability (Cronbach´s alpha close to .70). It is worth pointing out that these questions are based on the scale of non-delegative attitudes used in the 2004 LAPOP study (with

some modifications), so it is to be expected that the findings are similar.[38] Based on these results, we developed an index of delegative attitudes whose components are the three questions mentioned above (Factor 2). In 2006, the average on the non-delegative -attitude index was 65 on a 0-to-100 point scale, where 100 means full rejection of delegativism. This indicates that attitudes opposed to delegativism are more prevalent, but that this opposition is far from universal. Remember the clear difference in the average of each of component of the index (Table IV.9).

**Table IV.10 Matrix of Rotated Components a/ of the Questions about Authoritarian and Delegative Attitudes and the Reliability of the Resulting Scales**

| Attitudes | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| President limits voice and vote of opposition parties | 0.062 | 0.496 | -0.169 |
| President ignores Congress | 0.061 | 0.613 | 0.337 |
| President ignores judges | 0.013 | 0.688 | -0.036 |
| President has sufficient power to act | 0.084 | 0.162 | 0.777 |
| President does what the people want although the laws are an impediment | 0.087 | 0.479 | 0.131 |
| Opposed to democracy without political parties | 0.216 | 0.265 | -0.522 |
| President establishes order in the country | 0.700 | 0.094 | -0.046 |
| President acts above the laws | 0.778 | 0.061 | -0.021 |
| President does not comply with some of the decisions of the Constitutional Court | 0.846 | 0.073 | -0.018 |
| Decisive leader | 0.071 | 0.398 | -0.226 |
| % Variance explained | 18.9% | 16.0% | 10.9% |
| Cronbach´s alpha | 0.671 | 0.428 | 0.003 |

Extraction method: Analysis of main components.
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a/ The rotation converged on four iterations.

The combination of the system support index (section 3) and the index of non-delegative attitudes offers a new perspective on the analysis of public support for democracy. The methodology is analogous to that employed by Seligson to estimate the support for a stable democracy (section 5). There is an important difference, however. While including political tolerance to examine support for democracy is based on the assumption that less tolerant people can be a potential threat to the system – a supposition that is not necessarily true – considering pro-delegative attitudes explicitly addresses the support for political acts that are contrary to democratic norms (the "core" of delegativism). Thus, people who do not support the democratic system and also favor delegativism certainly constitute a risk for democracy since they not only hold the system in low esteem but they are also willing to support actions that undermine it. By contrast, people who support the democratic system and reject delegativism could be considered solid democrats or the "core" public support for democracy. The best situation for democracy is

[38] This time, the scale of non-delegative attitudes was composed of five items. For reasons of space, in this study we included two of them (public order and acting outside the law) and added, for experimental reasons, the question on the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the delegative scales of 2004 and 2006 are not comparable.

when the majority of people are part of this core and their numbers are several times greater than the authoritarian core. The worst situation would be the opposite.

A first important finding is that, in 2006, the "core" support for democracy was the largest group in Costa Rica (39.7%); and it was almost ten times larger than the delegativist "core" (only 4.3%). Although the democrats are far from being a majority, this is a positive finding since they do have a comfortable lead. A second important finding is that the majority of people show significant levels of ambiguity or contradictions in their support (or rejection) of the system. Special attention should be paid to these groups: if support for the system (Seligson's methodology) is affected by political dealignment and the perception of governmental efficacy, they might start to gravitate toward more hostile positions to democracy if both the dealignment and discontent with the administration's performance persist or get worse. The most important people within these groups are those who have, in principle, a high level of support for the system but intermediate levels of delegative attitudes. One could imagine that although this group wants, above all, the political system to work efficaciously, this does not lead them to antagonize the system for the time being.

**Table IV.12 Level of Support for the System and Level of Delegative Attitudes, Costa Rica 2006 (% of the total)**

| | | Level of delegative attitudes | | | % of the total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | High | Intermediate | Low | | |
| Level of support for the system | Low | 4 | 9 | 11 | 24 | (310) |
| | High | 9 | 27 | 40 | 76 | (971) |
| Total | | 13 | 36 | 51 | 100 | (1.281) |

Chi-squared: 8.71 Sig < .05; Kendall's Tau-b =.06 Sig < .05

## The Relation between Diffuse and Specific Support for Democracy

One of the most debated issues in studies of public support for democracy is the interrelation between the dimensions related to diffuse support – the "reserve of good will toward the system" – and those dimensions related to specific support – evaluations of how well the system performs or delivers. In Easton's original proposal, there was not only a sharp separation between diffuse and specific support, but reciprocal influences were not very important (Easton 1965; Easton 1975). In other words, people who believed in democracy would continue to support it even if the institutions worked poorly. The opposite was also true: people who did not believe in democracy would continue to be hostile to it even if the system worked well. Recently, Damarys Canache has shown that this idea does not match reality (Canache 2002). Canache showed that there is certain seepage between the different dimensions of support for democracy, on the one hand, and that there is not only one chain of causality, on the other (for example, a fall in specific support could provoke, after some time, a fall in diffuse support). In other words, there are reciprocal influences.

The findings summarized in this chapter owe a debt to Canache's thesis since the public's evaluation of government efficacy (a measurement of how well the system is functioning) was a predictor both of the level of support for the system and of support for a stable democracy. But the opposite is also true: support for the system influences the level of perceived government efficacy. This reciprocal influence is reflected in the moderate correlation coefficient that exists in Costa Rica between both topics, controlling for the level of people's political tolerance (Spearman´s R= 0.42).

A different way to examine the interrelations between diffuse and specific support for democracy is to answer the following question. How unique is the measure of support for the system (a measure of diffuse support) in the context of public evaluations of how well other institutions work (measures of specific support)? In principle, one would expect that system support should remain independent as a distinct and separate factor from any other item of specific performance; and that it would also behave differently than the other variables that inquire about how well institutions work. Neither expectation turns out to be true (Table IV.14). On the one hand, the components that supposedly measure diffuse support form part of a larger macro factor, which includes evaluations of concrete institutions of the political system (the government, Congress, political parties) and the system of justice; it is alsto the most important factpr since it explains the largest part of the variation. This macro factor forms a reliable scale (Cronbach´s alpha of .899): it consists of a general evaluation of the political system that indiscriminately mixes issues related to diffuse support with those of specific support. A second factor combines institutions key to the social welfare state (ICE, INS, and CCSS); it is also another (almost) reliable scale (Cronbach´s alpha of .694). A third factor combines institutions that oversee the state (horizontal accountability) and a fourth includes various components of the index of support for democracy; both scales are reliable.

The point of this exercise is not to construct new indices but rather to raise an important theoretical issue and another regarding the topic of measuring. In terms of the first, the main conclusion of the preceding analysis is that, at least in Costa Rica, public evaluation of democracy stems from a combination of general and specific evaluations of support for the principles of the system as well as from judgments on how well its institutions are working.[39] That is, in practice people do not distinguish between diffuse and specific support, the distinction so analytically cherished by political scientists. In terms of measuring, if similar findings were obtained in other countries, it would seem necessary to question the basis on which the index of support for the system is measured. As we have seen, despite withering away as an independent factor, the components of this index group themselves with other institutions of the political system. This important finding seems to reinforce the thesis that it is a measure of support for the *polity*, but rejects the interpretation that it is a measure of diffuse support.

[39] In the statistical analyses conducted for the 2004 study, a similar result was found to this one. This finding was noted in Chapter III and especially Chapter V, although a conceptual reflection was not developed on this point.

**Table IV.14 Matrix of Rotated Components a/ of the Questions about Public Trust in Institutions and Organizations, and the Reliability of the Resulting Scales**

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Courts | 0.526 | 0.116 | 0.010 | 0.248 |
| Political institutions | 0.153 | 0.135 | 0.129 | 0.644 |
| Basic civil rights | 0.481 | 0.180 | -0.003 | 0.452 |
| Pride in the political system | 0.309 | 0.082 | 0.153 | 0.729 |
| Support for the political system | 0.301 | 0.050 | 0.209 | 0.729 |
| System of justice | 0.587 | 0.205 | 0.115 | 0.347 |
| Supreme Electoral Tribute | 0.686 | 0.012 | 0.191 | 0.190 |
| Congress | 0.664 | 0.180 | 0.187 | 0.103 |
| National government | 0.647 | 0.134 | 0.223 | 0.205 |
| Office of the General Prosecutor | 0.684 | 0.097 | 0.291 | 0.163 |
| Police | 0.575 | 0.289 | 0.010 | 0.099 |
| Catholic Church | 0.004 | 0.400 | 0.175 | 0.290 |
| Political parties | 0.546 | 0.295 | 0.144 | 0.145 |
| Supreme Court | 0.600 | 0.194 | 0.408 | 0.216 |
| Municipality | 0.419 | 0.352 | 0.179 | 0.163 |
| Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) | 0.179 | 0.722 | 0.144 | 0.164 |
| Costa Rican Social Security Board (CCSS) | 0.265 | 0.756 | 0.061 | 0.065 |
| National Insurance Institute (INS) | 0.152 | 0.771 | 0.167 | -0.020 |
| Office of the Ombudsman | 0.232 | 0.225 | 0.660 | 0.157 |
| Comptroller General | 0.406 | 0.158 | 0.654 | 0.149 |
| News media | 0.049 | 0.169 | 0.705 | 0.125 |
| Constitutional Court | 0.497 | 0.042 | 0.619 | 0.135 |
| Elections | 0.638 | 0.026 | 0.315 | 0.107 |
| % Variance explained | 21.860 | 10.707 | 10.644 | 9.957 |
| Cronbach´s alpha | 0.899 | 0.694 | 0.800 | 0.770 |
| | . | 0.739* | . | . |

Extraction method: Analysis of the main components.
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a/ The rotation converged on 7 iterations.
*Cronbach´s alpha with the Catholic Church eliminated from the scale.
The components of the index of support for the system are the first five items, which are separated from the others by the dotted line.

# Chapter V. Corruption in Public Affairs

## Context

Over the last two years, Costa Rican society has been shaken by corruption scandals (see Chapter I). For long months, it experienced an unprecedented event: two enjailed ex-presidents awaiting trial and another, forced to resign from a high-level international position, refused to return to the country. Additionally, a group of high-level public and ex-public officials were also in jail and/or awaiting trial. Analyzing the issue of corruption, therefore, has special relevance for this study. Fortunately, the fieldwork of the 2004 LAPOP study finished before the news of these scandals broke. This allows us, by placing the 2004 study along side this one, to have "before" and "after" snapshots from which to analyze the issue of corruption and its effect on public support for democracy. It should be recalled that, according to previous studies, corruption erodes the political legitimacy of a system (Seligson 2001; O'Donnell 2004; Seligson 2004).[1]

Article 11 of the Costa Rican Constitution establishes that public officials – and by extension elected representatives – are "only vested with authority." This means that their authority is not innate but is derived from the sovereignty of the people: those who wield power are subject to the law.[2] Thus, from a democratic perspective, corruption in the exercise of public duties transgresses democratic legality.[3] It is an illegal or immoral use of authority when a public official or elected representative assumes powers he or she should not have. Thus, the aims or ends that the transgressor uses to justify acting outside the law are irrelevant.[4] In summary, corruption is antithetical to democracy because it violates one of latter's basic premises: power, in a democracy, is subject to the law. For this reason, the mechanisms of "horizontal accountability" to prevent and sanction the unlawful use of authority are structural components

[1] If people see that public officials break the law with impunity, and use public resources for their own benefit (or for people close to them), their trust in these officials and in the institutions that allow such abuses can be seriously affected. This unfortunate situation can worsen if people feel the effects of being the victim of frequent and repeated acts of corruption.

[2] Since they are vested with authority, public officials and representatives cannot go beyond constitutional and legal norms in the exercise of their duties. These norms establish the aims, procedures, and spheres for the use of the resources that have been entrusted to the representatives and public officials. They stipulate that it is illegal to misappropriate funds, use them for purposes not stipulated by law, and the use of procedures that have not been expressly authorized by law or administratively. It is this way because, in terms of public law, officials cannot do what the law does not explicitly allow. This principle is the opposite of what occurs in private law: here, people can do anything that the law does not expressly prohibit..

[3] We understand corruption to be the use of the authority or public resources for private, personal, or third-party ends through practices that are sanctioned by national laws or international treaties that the country has signed and ratified. However, there are multiple and alternative manners of defining corruption (Genaux 2004).For this study, understand corruption to be the use of the authority or public resources for private, personal, or third-party ends through practices that are sanctioned by national laws of international treaties that the country has signed and ratified (Goudie and Stasavage 1998; Henning 2001; Jain 2001; Kurer 2005).

[4] An excuse frequently used in various countries of the region (including Costa Rica) for the non-authorized use of public funds is that of "necessity." It is said that since the existing legal and administrative framework is full of snags, and the need to attend people's pressing demands, transgressing the norms is a minor evil (and even necessary) in order to achieve a greater good (social well-being).

of a democratic rule of law (O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell 2004; O'Donnell 2004).

Corruption as the illegitimate use of power is only, however, one part of a complex relation it has with democracy. In cases of government corruption there is not only the corruptee, who takes advantage of his or her power, but also the corruptor, who uses illegal or immoral means to obtain benefits. In a democracy, the corruptors are private citizens.[5] Although increasing attention has been paid to the corruptor in analyses of corruption in the fields of law[6] and economics[7], the same has not happened in political science.[8] Emphasizing the corruptor entails (re)introducing citizens into the analysis, not only as innocent victims but also as corrupting agents or, at least, as actors who tolerate such acts. This not only means accepting that, in practice, the public's behavior and attitude can variously undermine democratic norms, but also that, from a normative point of view, people living in a democracy are not necessarily virtuous citizens.

## Perceptions of the Prevalence of Corruption

The perception of widespread corruption among public officials runs deep in Costa Rica and, contrary to what was expected given the corruption scandals of 2004, it did not vary significantly between 2004 and 2006.[9] In 2004, 75% of the people thought that corruption was very or somewhat widespread; currently it is 97%.[10] We confirm the analysis made in the previous study

[5] For this analysis, it is not important if the citizen corruptor is or is not a co-national of the corrupt official. What interests us is that, rather than be a person who occupies a public post, it is a private person who possesses a group of rights bestowed on him or her by the legitimate authority and backed by the institutions of the rule of law.

[6] In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Federal Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), modified in 1998 and complemented in 2002, stemming from the scandals involving large private corporations, by the Sorbonne-Oxley Act (SOA), with specific regulations for the private sector. The FCPA and its reforms place special emphasis on the corruptor – private company or public institution – in transactions with other governments. The U.S. legislation has a strong impact on the development of the OECD and OEA conventions in terms of anti-corruption measures. There are multiple studies on the legal, political, and economic implications of these legal norms (Earle 1996; Zucker 1996; Martz 1997; Bassett 1998; Buchheit and Resiner 1998; Low, Bjorklund et al. 1998; Corr and Lawler 1999; Harms 2000; Kim 2000; Shaw 2000; Tronnes 2000; Henning 2001; Heifetz 2002; Cunningham 2003; Herzfeld and Weiss 2003; Markovskaya, Pridemore et al. 2003; Perkel 2003; Beale and Safwat 2004; Damania, Fredriksson et al. 2004; Maor 2004; Serafini 2004; Tarullo 2004; Lacey, George et al. 2005; Webb 2005).

[7] One of the most important debates in economics has been the effect of corruption on the development of countries. Most scholars believe that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth, productivity, the degree of poverty, and the consolidation of institutions (Alam 1990; Mauro 1995; Mauro 1997; Gupta, Davoodi et al. 1998; Mauro 1998; Husted 1999; Al-Marhubi 2000; Gupta, Davoodi et al. 2000; Kaufmann and Wei 2000; Del Monte and Papagni 2001; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Chakraborty and Lahiri 2003; Ciocchini, Durbin et al. 2003; Lambsdorff 2003; Lambsdorff 2003; Mauro 2004). However, the discussion is far from settled. See (Meon and Sekkat 2005).

[8] These have focused more on the issue of the systematic effects of the illegitimate use of power: thus, in investigations on democracy, there are many studies that include public perceptions on the level of corruption, but usually they sidestep the uncomfortable topic of people's acquiescence to corruption.

[9] The question used in this analysis is the following: EXC 7 "In your experience, corruption among public officials is….(1) Very widespread (2) Somewhat widespread (3) Little widespread (4) Not widespread."

[10] To a 95% level of confidence, this difference does not turn out to be statistically significant by only a very small amount..

that this perception does not vary much regionally and that it tends to be greater among people with higher levels of education – this level of association is even very similar to that reported two years ago (in 2006, Spearman´s R= -.078; in 2004, Spearman= -.091 sig < .001). At all educational levels, however, more than 95% of respondents thought that corruption is somewhat or very widespread.

Measurements of the perception of corruption conducted in Costa Rica and Latin America show how people from this region believe that corruption is very common in public management.[11] Although there are important differences between those countries where more corruption is perceived (Ecuador and Jamaica) and those where this perception is not so high (Chile and Bolivia), in all cases the average scores are clearly above 50 on a 0-to-100 point scale (Figure V.1).[12] It is worth noting that these variations are different than those found in other measures of the perception of corruption, such as Transparency International's (TI). According to TI, Bolivia is one of the most corrupt countries in Latin America and Chile is the least. But in the LAPOP study, both obtain the same average score. Viewed in comparative perspective, the perception of corruption in Costa Rica occupies an intermediate position within Latin America. It is not very different from countries that, in other measures, are categorized as societies in which there is a lot more corruption in public affairs.

## Acquiescence to Corruption

The pervasive perception that corruption is widespread among public officials and politicians does not mean that people are bothered by it. Some people might accept public corruption as inevitable, or even explicitly justify it as an acceptable way (though illegal) to achieve individual or collective goals. In other words, one question is how widespread people believe corruption to be in politics and public affairs, and another is their relation to this perceived state of affairs. To clarify this latter issue, we must examine people's level of tolerance toward corruption. As in the 2004 study, we investigated the topic of people's tolerance or acquiescence to corruption in public administration. This time, we complemented this analysis with an inquiry into what we call "the dilemma of the corrupt politician," the topic we address in the second part of this section.

[11] In various years, the Latinobarómetro survey has included the question on the perception of the degree of corruption among public officials (on a scale of 0-to-100). The national averages are above 80 in the countries it covers with the exception of Chile. See www.latinobarómetro.com.

[12] As indicated in the 2004 study, the few differences in the intensity of the perception of how widespread corruption is among public officials in most countries and, in addition, the difficulty of interpreting these differences when they exist, makes this perception a poor tool to analyze the topic of corruption. It is difficult to understand the reasons why countries with very different levels of institutional development, such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, have similar levels of perception regarding corruption among public officials; or the reasons why the perceptions are similar when there are important differences in the level of victimization by corruption both among various countries and, like in Costa Rica, between the level registered in 2004 and 2006.

**Figure V-1 Perception of the Pervasiveness of Corruption Among Public Officials in Comparative Perspective, Scale from 0-to-100, 2006**




## *Tolerance towards Corruption in Public Administration*

To be able to make comparisons with the other countries included in the 2006 round of LAPOP studies, we did not ask the same questions used in 2004 to investigate tolerance to corruption in public administration (Box V.1). Even if this obviously limits analyses over time, it has some advantages: first, it allows for comparisons between countries, and second, it allows us to evaluate whether we get similar results with different questions (Box IV.1).[13]

[13] The main difference between the questions used in the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies, apart from the situations asked about, is that two years ago in each case not only were people asked about their attitude toward the corrupt person who accepted the bribe, but also about the corruptor (who pays the bribe) – the dilemma proposed by Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz in her sonnet: "who sins more: he who pays to sin or he who sins for the payment?" With this strategy, we confirmed that people are generally more tolerant of the corruptor than the corrupted, especially in situations of daily life. In the 2004 study, the questions used to measure tolerance of corruption moved in the same dimension and were a reliable and valid measure (Cronbach's alpha = .78). As will be seen later on, this is not the case in this study.

Box VI.1 Questions Used for Tolerance to Corruption

Me gustaría que me indique si Ud. considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigada; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.

**DC1**. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera Ud. que lo que hizo el diputado es[Leer alternativas]1) corrupto y debe ser castigado2) corrupto pero justificado3) no corrupto NS=8 DC1
**DC10.** Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una constancia de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 2500 colones de más al empleado público. Cree Ud. que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas]:1) corrupto y ella debe ser castigada2) corrupto pero se justifica3) no corrupto8) NS DC10
**DC13**. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Ud. Cree que el político es [Leer alternativas]:1) corrupto y debe ser castigado2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8 DC13
**EXC18.** ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida? 0. No. 1 Sí 8. NS/NR
**EXC19**. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?

With a distinct battery of questions to those used in the 2004 study, we got similar results. First, both in 2004 and 2006, most people are opposed to corruption in public administration (Table V.1). Second, in both years, however, the intensity of such opposition varied according to the situations being investigated. There is more tolerance when an act of corruption is closer to people's daily lives: almost half of the population condoned a mother who had to pay a bribe to get a certificate for her child (Table V.1). This tolerance declines sharply when the act in question has more tangible public importance: there is almost universal condemnation of a congressperson who accepts a bribe. There is a greater threshold of tolerance for minor acts of corruption than for serious ones that can cause damage to the greater community.

The five questions about tolerance of corruption can be grouped into a simple additive index in which 0 indicates complete intolerance (in all cases the respondent says that the actors are corrupt or the bribe is unjustifiable) and 5 indicates complete tolerance (in all cases the respondent says that the actors are not corrupt or are justified).[14] The main finding is that only a minority group of people inflexibly condemn concrete acts of corruption in public administration: a little more than one in four (27%). The rest express at least some degree of acquiescence to corruption depending on the concrete situation.

[14] According to the factor analysis and the reliability of the resulting scales, the five questions are loaded onto two different factors: on the one hand, questions dc1, dc10, and dc13 have insufficient reliability (Cronbach's alpha= .418) and questions exc18 and exc19, have a satisfactory reliability (Cronbach's alpha= .750). However, in this latter case, we decided to not group the questions on a scale because such a scale would have few components. Additionally, our interest was using the information from all the questions that inquire about tolerance of corruption to determine whether, confronted with different situations, people would reaction differently. For all these reasons, we decided to use a simple additive index.

**Table V.1 Attitudes when Faced with Situations of Corruption**

| Topics investigated and responses | Against | For | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Congress person accepts a bribe | | | 1,500 |
| Corrupt and should be punished | 95 | | |
| Not corrupt (is justified/ DK-NR) | | 5 | |
| Mother pays bribe | | | 1,500 |
| Corrupt and should be punished | 47 | | |
| Not corrupt (is justified/ DK-NR) | | 53 | |
| Politician uses influence to get brother-in-law a job | | | 1,500 |
| Corrupt and should be punished | 95 | | |
| Not corrupt (is justified/ DK-NR) | | 5 | |
| Paying bribes is justified | | | 1,500 |
| No | 74 | | |
| Yes and DK/NR | | 26 | |
| Pay bribes to receive good public services | | | 1,500 |
| No | 71 | | |
| Yes and DK/NR | | 29 | |

Note: The DK/NRs were added to the people who justified an act of corruption because, when faced with a precise question, they did not rule out the possibility of paying bribes. In any case, this was a small group (n< 10).

As in the 2004 study, we did not find any good explanations for the acquiescent attitudes toward corruption.[15] Again, people's age and civil status have an influence, but not necessarily in the same way seen two years ago; and in any case, their effect is very slight. The main finding is still negative: democrats and non-democrats, tolerant and intolerant politicians show similar levels of acquiescence to corruption. The perception of government efficacy is a significant factor (Sig < .05): people who more critically judge government's performance are also more tolerant of corruption (Figure V.2). Although this effect is not very large, it suggests that improving how public institutions operate can have positive effects on public (in)tolerance of corruption.

[15] In 2004, the B political model had a low explanatory capacity for the index of tolerance of corruption (r2=0.05). When cantons were introduced as dummy variables, this capacity almost doubled (r2=.0903). In 2006, introducing tolerance of corruption as a binary variable (none/some tolerance), the logistic regression models gave a similar result (Basic model: Cox and Snell's r2= .064; Political model, Cox and Snell's r2= .068). The introduction of a large quantity of political variables barely altered the explanatory capacity. However, the local effects model raised the model's fit almost 40% (Cox and Snell's r2= .103) which, although still low, again suggests the importance of ecologies in the formation of perceptions..

**Figure V-2 Average Tolerance of Corruption by Perception Government Efficacy, 2006**




## *The Dilemma of the Corrupt Politician*

The moral condemnation of a corrupt politician does not carry much cost: anybody can do it, especially in a context, like the Costa Rican since the 1990s, in which most people reject corruption (Garita and Poltronieri 1997). The 2004 study found that most people did not agree with the following statement: "It would not matter to me that a president takes advantage of his or her position so long as he or she resolves the country's problems." This rejection was widespread with few variations according to system support, political tolerance, or tolerance of corruption in public administration. In principle, an overall atmosphere rejecting corrupt politicians is better to one in which they count on the moral complicity of the people.

However, what happens when there is a cost to rejecting corruption? In other words, when the rejection of corrupt situations or politicians implies paying a tangible price in some other area that people might consider to be important for the progress of the country or for their own personal interests. How people resolve this dilemma is important since it allows us to identify the "core" people who are intolerant of corruption, and whether part of the population would be willing to "look the other way" in order to obtain benefits. Backed up against the wall, what do people choose? We call this the "dilemma of the corrupt politician." To investigate it, we included three questions in this study that give respondents alternatives that they had to resolve.

Considering the dilemma of the corrupt politician is especially important in this 2006 study given the traumatic corruption revealed in recent years. After this experience, how firm are the adamant rejections of corruption in politics? The importance of studying this topic is obvious since, when people were asked if the construction of a hospital should be stopped because of evidence of

corruption, the public split equally between those who said that it should be stopped (49%) and those who said it should not (51%).

Box VI.2 Questions Used to Study the Dilemma of the Corrupt Politician

Uno siempre quiere lo mejor para el país, pero a veces hay que escoger… ¿De las siguientes opciones, cuál cree es la mejor para el país?

COSC7. Un presidente honesto pero incapaz o un presidente capaz pero deshonesto 1. honesto – incapaz 2. deshonesto – capaz 8. NS/NR

COSC8. Un presidente deshonesto pero con buenas ideas, o un presidente honesto pero con malas ideas 1. deshonesto – buenas ideas 2. honesto – malas ideas 8. NS/NR

COSC9. Parar la construcción de un nuevo hospital porque se pagaron comisiones por debajo o no pararla. 1. Parar la construcción 2. No pararla 8. NS/NR

The main findings can be summarized in the following manner. In first place, less than half of the people (45%) chose honesty as the main virtue of a politician (in this case a president) compared to his or her capacity or ideas. This is the largest group, but did not include a majority of the population (Table V.2). In second place, a rather large group of people did not want to choose or had difficulty doing so. One in four people did not know how to or did not respond to one of the two questions. In this case, the DK/NR are not only much higher than in the rest of the questionnaire (where this category is usually around 5% or less) but they might also indicate the complexity of choosing between topics or values that are important to people. Finally, there is a small but still important group of people who openly prefer dishonest politicians if they are capable and their ideas are "good" (15%). In summary, backed up against the wall, the majority of Costa Ricans either did not chose honesty in politicians as their main virtue or have serious difficulties answering the questions.

In light of these discouraging findings, we conducted an initial exploration to examine if the "core" people intolerant of corruption in politics constitute a particular group of people. To do this, we created a binary "dilemma" variable (0= chose capacity or good ideas as the most important and 1= chose honesty instead of capacity and good ideas); we excluded people who answered DK/NR in any of the two questions. Subsequently, we ran a binary logistic regression model (with the basic, political, and local effects variants). The models have a high predictive capacity – again, the one with the best fit is the local effects model, which includes the political variables and the cantons with dummy variables (Cox and Snell r2 = .150 in comparison with Cox and Snell r2 = .112 in the political model).

**Table V.2 The Dilemma of the Corrupt Politician: Choosing between Capacity, Good Ideas, and Corruption in Politicians**

| | | Dilemma of good ideas-corruption | | | % total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Prefer dishonest with good ideas | Do not choose | Prefer honest with bad ideas | | |
| Dilemma of capacity and corruption | Prefer dishonest and capable | 15 | 1 | 2 | 18 | (278) |
| | Do not choose | 1 | 18 | 1 | 20 | (302) |
| | Prefer honest and incapable | 12 | 4 | 45 | 61 | (920) |
| % total | | 28 | 23 | 49 | 100 | (1,500) |

The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Generally, older people (although the relation is not linear), individuals whose religion is not Catholicism, or who do not have a religion tend to resolve the dilemma of the corrupt politician in favor of honesty (Sig <.05), although the differences are not large. The exception are housewives who clearly chose this option compared to the rest of the population (Sig <.05). The political variables related to system support, or public participation do not have effects or these are very slight. As expected, tolerance of government corruption (see above section) is related to the way in which people resolve the dilemma of the corrupt politician: people without any tolerance to corruption are more inclined to favor honesty as the virtue in politicians (Figure V.3). The difference is important: an average of 10 points on a scale of 0-to-100 (68 compared to 58).

The main conclusion of this analysis is that, despite the strong public repudiation generated by the corruption scandals in Costa Rica during 2004 (see Chapters I and VIII), an important part of the population would be willing to tolerate corrupt politicians if they were effective or had attractive ideas. If this conclusion is true, it would seem that the magnitude of this repudiation was not only provoked by the corruption scandals but also by other factors (for example, having occurred in an era of strong public discontent with the efficacy of the political system).

**FigureV-3 Percentage Who Choose the Honest Politician in the Dilemma of the Corrupt Politician by Level of Tolerance of Corruption in Public Administration (Binary Variable 0-1)***




* We excluded from consideration people who responded DK/NR to any of the questions EXC2 and EXC6.
Note: To better illustrate, we show the results on a scale of 0-to-100 (in percentages).

## The Incidence of Corruption

Do the majority of Costa Ricans live trapped in a world where they are victims of everyday acts of corruption? To study this question, we asked a series of questions to query if, in the previous year, individuals had personally been the victim of concrete acts of corruption in a series of areas of social life (Box V.2). Based on these questions, we developed an index that added up the experiences (the number of times that a person reported having been confronted with corruption).[16]

[16] Given the certain acquiescence to corrupt acts in public offices and politics, we decided to modify the title to this section. Before it was called "victimization by corruption," which supposes that people are victims of an undesired act. Even if this might be true in most cases, it is evident that segments of the population were not innocent victims (they might well have been corruptors) and do not necessarily see this situation negatively. For these reasons, and to adopt a more generic title that includes both victims and people who are not, we opted for the more neutral title, "The incidence of corruption."

Most people (81 out of 100) who responded to the questions stated that they did not have any concrete experiences with corruption in the previous year; and only a few people (6 out of 100) were victims more than once. However, when we compare this situation to the findings from the 2004 study, there was an important and statistically significant increase (to a 95% level of confidence) in the incidence of corruption in the provision of public services (Figure VI.3 in that report). While 14% of respondents had experienced this type of corruption two years ago, this time the reported level is 19%. Not only is this level visibly higher, it also erased the comparative lead over other countries that Costa Rica had in 2004, in terms of a lower incidence of corruption in the provision of public services (Figure VI.4 in that report).

Box V.2 Questions Used to Study the Incidence of Corruption

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...
**EXC2.** ¿Algún policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno), en el último año?
**EXC6**. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?
**EXC11** Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de la exigida por ley? (SONDEE: hizo trámites?)
**EXC13** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año? (SONDEE: Trabajó ud?)
**EXC14**. ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año? (SONDEE: usó juzgados?)
**EXC15.** Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida? (SONDEE: usó servicios médicos)
**EXC16.** En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida? (SONDEE: tiene hijos en escuela/colegio?)
**EXC17**.¿Alguien le pidió una mordida para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?

Question EXC17 was not part of the 2004 LAPOP study. It is worth pointing out that paying a bribe to prevent one´s electricty from being cut is almost non-existent in Costa Rica.

In 2006, Costa Rica ceased to be, by Latin American standards, a country characterized by a low incidence of corruption. Even if it is clearly below countries such as Mexico and Bolivia (where more than 30% of the people were victims of corruption in the previous year), its level is three times that reported in Colombia and Chile. It is important to note, lastly, that the incidence of corruption does not necessarily correspond with the perception of corruption among public officials (Figure V.1): countries like Bolivia and Mexico, where the perception of corruption is lower than in others, nonetheless have the highest incidence of corruption; in other cases, such as Chile, there seems to be greater correspondence.

**Figure V-4 Changes in the Level of Reported Incidents of Corruption in the Provision of Public Services in Costa Rica, 2004 and 2006**




**Figure V-5 Average Percentage of People Who Were Victims of Corruption at Least Once, Latin America, 2006**




As in the previous study, this one shows that in Costa Rica the victims of concrete acts of corruption do not generally have a starkly different sociodemographic profile from that of the rest of the population, except in terms of their educational level, wealth, and rural residence. We reach this conclusion by analyzing the findings of a logistic regression model (the dependent variable is dichotomous: victim or not-victim).[17] People with higher levels of education and wealth are more likely to experience corruption in the provision of public services (sig<.1): on average, 25% of people with post-secondary education reported an experience of this type compared to 15% of those with only a primary education or less. The most important political variables predicting corruption victimization are system support and political tolerance. They introduce similar differences to those noted for educational levels (Sig <.05), although in the opposite direction: while people with more support for the system have lower levels of victimization (see the following section), more politically tolerant individuals are more likely to experience corruption. Even if there is a statistically significant effect of tolerance on acts of corruption in public administration in this study, in contrast to that from 2004, it is negligible. Generally, the conclusion of the previous study is sustained: both "victims" and "non-victims" of corruption have a similar level of intolerance of corruption. Lastly, rural residents are less exposed to corruption.

[17] The basic model has a low predictive value (Cox and Snell's R2= 0.071) and, opposed to most other times, the introduction of political variables does not produce better effects (Cox and Snell's R2= 0.103).

## Corruption and Support for Democracy

Again, this study confirms the finding of other investigations in Vanderbilt University's LAPOP project: people who experience government corruption show less support for the system. In 2006, these people scored an average of 60 on a 100-point scale on Seligson's system support index, below the national average (64) and people who did not have this experience (65 on average). It reaffirms, then, the pattern noted in the 2004 LAPOP study (Figure IV.5 in that report): in terms of support for democracy, the difference between experiencing and not experiencing acts of corruption in the provision of public services is five percentage points. Being a victim of corruption is associated with less system support, although this effect is not dramatic. (It is important to underline the possibility that there are reciprocal effects between diffuse support and the experience of corruption).

This study confirms that this finding is robust: in all the countries included in the 2006 study, victims of corruption show less support for the democratic system than non-victims. The differences are statistically significant (sig <.001), and in countries like Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, they are pronounced (Figure V.7).

**Figure V-6 Average Support for the System by Experience with Corruption in Public Administration, Costa Rica (2006)**


**Figure V-7 Differences in National Averages in Support for the System by Experience with Corruption, by Country (2004 and 2006)**



# Chapter VI. Protecting Civil Rights and Public Safety

## Introduction

Protecting people's civil rights is a pillar of democracy.[1] Without this protection, one of the premises of a democratic system is affected: people's political and civic equality – an equality recognized and guaranteed by the Costa Rican Constitution.[2] The absence of protection for civil rights creates uncertainty and, therefore, insecurity: without protection people are vulnerable to threats (real and potential) from other people, organizations, or institutions, and they will fear for their personal safety, property, and dignity.[3]

The protection of these rights requires a group of institutions with the legal competence, and the financial, technical, and administrative capacity to reasonably fulfill this function. In Costa Rica, there has been vigorous institutional development in this area in recent decades, focused on strengthening the judicial system and institutions such as the Office of the Ombudsman. This institutional development has substantially widened people's access to the protection of their rights (see Chapter I). From an international perspective, Costa Rica has been continually recognized as a leader in promoting and protecting human rights.

In the last two years, public trust in the institutions of the rule of law has been put to important tests. On the one hand, the judicial system became an object of public scrutiny as it tried the ex-presidents and high-level (ex-) public officials involved in the corruption scandals that shook the country (Chapter V). On the other hand, a UNDP study on the topic of public safety documented the widespread and growing perception of public insecurity and the high profile of crime in the news media (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006).[4] This has generated public demands on the system of justice, and on the police more generally, for more effective protection of public safety.

One might expect that a society that recognizes, promotes, and guarantees people's rights would be one in which its residents live in safety, with few threats to their person or property. Even if

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[1] This first paragraph is taken word-for-word from the 2004 LAPOP study.

[2] In recent years, a debate has developed in comparative studies of democracy regarding the relation between democracy and the democratic rule of law. In procedural theories of democracy, the existence of the rule of law is assumed, implicitly or explicitly, as a necessary condition – although external to the regime (Dahl 1971; Dahl 1989; Dahl 1999). More recently, O'Donnell has proposed a wider concept of democracy – democracy beyond the regime – according to which the democratic rule of law is a constitutive dimension of democracy. He argues that the recognition of people's political equality is implied by a group of institutions capable of recognizing and guaranteeing these rights (O'Donnell, Guillermo 1997; O'Donnell 1998; O´Donnell 2003). Other authors have proposed that the consolidation of a rule of law is crucial for a democracy, a point barely treated in procedural theories of democracy (Becker 1999).

[3] This situation undermines their freedom, since it limits the range of life options that they can desire. Additionally, it makes individual freedom depend on the economic and political resources that each person can mobilize to protect their rights.

[4] This report is the most extensive investigation on the topic of public safety that has been conducted to date in Costa Rica.

Costa Rica unquestionably has lower crime rates than nearby countries, crime statistics for the last 20 years show a gradual but sustained growth in crime, especially violent ones (Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006). This growth has contributed to the sharp increase in the feeling of insecurity. (Garita and Poltronieri 1997; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Vargas Cullell and Rosero Bixby 2004; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006).

Taking into account the findings of the 2004 LAPOP study, this chapter addresses the following questions. Have there been any changes in the public's trust in the institutions responsible for protecting people's rights? Is the perception of insecurity greater now than it was two years ago? Are changing crime rates responsible for the changing perceptions of public safety? Does insecurity feed public demands to act outside the law in order to "control crime?"

## Protecting Rights

The 2004 LAPOP study indicated that Costa Ricans generally tend to trust the institutions that form the pillars of the system that protects their rights. In 2004, all these institutions received average scores above 50 on a scale of 0-to-100. The approximately 10 to 15 point difference between trust in the Office of the Ombudsman and the institutions of the judicial system (the Supreme Court, courts, and police) was also notable. In 2006, this difference widened substantially: the Ombudsman now surpasses the others by 15 to 25 points (Table VI.1).

The growing gap between the Ombudsman and the judicial system is due to a sharp drop of public trust in the judicial system between 2004 and 2006 (Figure VI.1). While the former did not experience statistically significant variations over these two years, all the judicial institutions underwent significant drops (to a 95% level of confidence). Most of them declined between some 5 to 8 points, with the exception of the police, which dropped 16 percentage points. There was a sharp drop in average of the index of trust in the protection of rights (which we developed from the scores of all the above-mentioned institutions): eight percentage points in only two years (falling from 62 to 54 points on a scale of 0-to-100).

Although public trust on the institutions responsible for protecting civil rights is not particularly high compared to other public institutions (see Chapter IV), it is high when compared to similar institutions in other countries of the region (Figure VI.2). However, it should be recognized that public trust in these institutionsis rather low in most Latin American countries (average scores less than 50 on a scale of 0-to-100). Only Costa Rica, Colombia, and El Salvador have positive scores; most countries are in the 44 to 49 point range. On the low end are Bolivia and Peru where there is very little trust in the institutional protection of rights. The main new finding on this topic is that, over the last two years, Costa Rica lost most of the advantage it enjoyed through 2004 over the rest of Latin America: at that time its average level of trust was 62 points (on a scale of 0-to-100), almost seven points higher than the country with the second highest level of trust.

**Table VI.1 Average Public Trust in Institutions that Comprise the System that Protects Rights (Scale 0-to-100), 2006**

| | 2004 | 2006 | Difference 2004-2006 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Courts | 57 | 51 | -6 |
| System of Justice | 62 | 53 | -9 |
| Office of the Ombudsman | 73 | 70 | -3 |
| Police | 59 | 42 | -17 |
| Supreme Court | 62 | 57 | -5 |
| Constitutional Court | ND | 57 | -- |
| Normalized index of trust in the protection of rights | 62 | 54 | -8 |

## The Perception of Public Safety

Since the early-1990s, measurements of the perception of public safety have been conducted in Costa Rica (Garita and Poltronieri 1997). Already at that time, these studies found a feeling of high public insecurity, despite the relatively high level of trust in the institutions that protect rights . The 2004 LAPOP study confirmed this feeling of insecurity and added some important findings: although almost everyone thought that crime was a threat to the country, most assured that they lived in safe neighborhoods. Nonetheless, the general perception of insecurity motivated people to invest strongly in measures to protect their homes, the type of investment varying according to the economic possibilities of the household and changes in behavior. The recent UNDP study added new and more extensive information on the degree and characteristics of public insecurity (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006). In this report, we included the battery of questions used in the 2004 LAPOP study on public safety (Box VI.1) in order to analyze the changes over the last two years. We also added two new questions.

**Figure VI-1 Index of Trust in the Protection of Rights on a Scale of 0-to-100, in Comparative Perspective, 2006**




Box VI.1. Questions Used to Study the Perception of Public Safety

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde Ud. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente Ud. muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

AOJ12. Si Ud. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?. [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR

AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año?(1) Si (2) No 8 (NS)

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS

The only changes from the 2004 LAPOP study were the following: question AOJ16A was included and question CRAOJ20, on dangerous areas in neighborhoods, was excluded.

Between 2004 and 2006, there was a sharp increase in the feeling of public insecurity in Costa Rica (Table VI.2). The percentage of people who feel that crime threatens the country and, at the same time, perceive their neighborhoods to be unsafe, increased a little more than ten points to encompass almost half the population. These people constitute a group who feel that the insecurity has encroached into their immediate surroundings. Correlatively, the group of people who have a general perception of insecurity (the country is threatened but not their own neighborhoods) declined; two years ago, this was the largest group. In 2004, there was almost 24 percentage points of difference between these groups (59% to 36%), but today they are practically the same size (49% to 45%).

**Table VI.2 Perception of Public Safety in Costa Rica, 2004 and 2006**

| | | Year | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2004 | 2006 |
| Perception of public safety | Neighborhood safe; country safe | 3 | 2 |
| | Neighborhood safe, country unsafe | 59 | 49 |
| | Neighborhood unsafe; country safe | 3 | 2 |
| | Neighborhood unsafe; country unsafe | 36 | 46 |
| | Total | 100 | 100 |
| (N) | | (1,461) | (1,495) |

Chi squared= 32.9, Tau-b= 0.1; Sig <.001
The percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 because of rounding.

The increase, between 2004 and 2006, of those who feel extremely insecure (both the country and their neighborhoods are threatened) is statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence. It is also positively associated with another growing indicator of insecurity: the growing percentage of people who state that their neighborhood is affected by gangs, which rose from 31% to 36% (Figure VI.3). It is also not surprising that the sharp decline we found in public trust that the judicial system punishes criminals – a drop of 13 percentage points from a level that, in 2004, was already low (Figure VI.3).

In terms of the perception of insecurity, Costa Rica is not very different from the rest of the region. On the one hand, in each country there is a gap between the perception of insecurity at the local and national levels (Figure (VI.4). This finding confirms what the 2004 LAPOP study noted. In all countries included in the study, except Mexico, wide majorities (over 85 out of 100) believe that crime is a threat to the country's well-being; but, at the same time, only a minority of people say they live in very or somewhat unsafe neighborhoods (generally below 45 out of 100). Also, despite the fact that the differences in the perceptions of local and national insecurity are statistically significant between the countries (Sig < .001), these differences do not appear to reflect the contrasting levels of violent crime that does occur. Thus, countries such as Costa Rica or Chile, whose indices of violent crime are far below those of Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador, have similar perceptions of insecurity to these latter countries. And the variation in the perceptions of (in)security, especially in people's immediate surroundings (the neighborhood), do not clearly coincide with the actual levels of crime in the countries according to the available statistics.

**Figure VI-2 Changes in the Perception of Public Insecurity (Scale 0-to-100) between 2004 and 2006**




**Figure VI-3 Changes in Trust in the Judicial System to Punish Criminals (Scale 0-to-1) between 2004 and 2006**




**Figure VI-4 Average Perception of Insecurity in the Neighborhood and the Threat of Crime to the Well-being of the Country, in Comparative Perspective, Scale of 0-to-100 (2006)**




Having determined the rise in public insecurity, it is worth examining the factors that are associated with the perception of high insecurity. To do this, we recodified the perception of

public safety variable as a dummy or binary (1=unsafe neighborhood/unsafe country) and we applied a logistic regression model with the variants used in previous chapters. The local effects model has the best goodness of fit (Cox and Snell pseudo R = 0.136, compared to 0.097 and 0.059 for the political and basic models respectively). Again, this suggests the significance of local ecologies, both on this topic as well as previous ones. However, we should note that the explanatory power of the model is low, which means that we do not have a robust explanation for perceptions of public insecurity.

**Table VI.3 Logistic Regression Model with the Perception of Public Insecurity (Neighborhood Unsafe; Country Unsafe) as the Dependent Variable**

| | | B | Sig. | Exp (B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Step 1(a) | Age | .000 | .981 | 1.000 |
| | Age squared | .000 | .840 | 1.000 |
| | Female | -.382 | .014 | .683 |
| | Housewife | .110 | .516 | 1.116 |
| | Married (or living together) | -.182 | .145 | .834 |
| | Years of Education | -.007 | .696 | .993 |
| | Wealth index | .072 | .029 | 1.074 |
| | Non-Catholic religion | .014 | .926 | 1.014 |
| | No religion | .178 | .407 | 1.195 |
| | Trust in neighbors | -1.106 | .000 | .331 |
| | TV news | .731 | .003 | 2.078 |
| | Read newspapers | -.141 | .417 | .868 |
| | Well-informed | .176 | .589 | 1.193 |
| | Small city | .424 | .006 | 1.527 |
| | Rural area | .269 | .126 | 1.309 |
| | Central Valley region | .089 | .532 | 1.093 |
| | Crime victim | -.810 | .000 | .445 |
| | Victim of corruption | -.057 | .695 | .944 |
| | Perception of household economic situation | -.097 | .054 | .908 |
| | Perception of national economic situation | -.039 | .520 | .962 |
| | Index of political tolerance | .000 | .920 | 1.000 |
| | Index of support for the system | -.011 | .001 | .989 |
| | Index of government efficacy | -.003 | .220 | .997 |
| | Constant | .335 | .609 | 1.397 |
| | Basic model pseudo R2 | 0.059 | | |
| | Political model pseudo R2 | 0.097 | | |
| | Local effects model pseudo R2 | 0.136 | | |

a Variable(s) introduced in step 1: q2, q2c, q1r, ocup1r2, q11r2, edr, riqdx, q3r1, q3r2, it1r, a2r, a3r, informado, tamanoc1, tamanoc2, regionvc, vic2r, vcorrup1, sitecho, sitecpa, tolerpr, ademr, efigr.

Men and wealthier people tend to feel more insecure than the rest, but the effect of these characteristics is very slight (Sig < .05). By contrast, we can state that the feeling of insecurity is

a much more prevalent perception in the capital than elsewhere (Figure VI.5). As expected, being the victim of a crime strongly affects perceptions of public safety: victims have a level of insecurity almost 20 points higher than non-victims (Figure VI.6). Insecurity is slightly associated with evaluations of one's household economic situation: the worse the situation is, the more a person feels unsafe. Trust in neighbors is strongly associated with the perception of insecurity: the average level of insecurity of people who do not trust their neighbors is almost double that of people who do (65% to 36%, Sig < .01). Lastly, watching TV news is also related to the perception of insecurity (Sig < .01), but its effect is slight.

**Figure VI-5 Perception of Public Insecurity (Country Unsafe; Neighborhood Unsafe) by Region, 2006**




**Figure VI-6 Perception of Public Insecurity (Country Unsafe; Neighborhood Unsafe) by Victimization by Crime, 2006**




A finding worth highlighting is the importance of system support in predicting perceptions of insecurity (Sig .001). People who show low support for the system tend to feel more insecure than others. (However, it should be noted that the level of insecurity is completely independent of the perceived efficiency of the judicial system to punish criminals (Sig > .1).) One implication of this finding is that political speech in favor of public safety would appeal especially to people who support democracy the least. In itself, this is not a problem, but it could become one if the person giving the speech was a leader or party who was "disloyal or semi-loyal" to the system (using Linz's expression).

**Figure VI-7 Perception of Public Insecurity (Country Unsafe; Neighborhood Unsafe) by Level of Support for the System, 2006**




## Victimization by Crime

The observation in the 2004 LAPOP study that the perception of public insecurity in Costa Rica is greater than the rate of victimization (people who have actually been victims of a crime) still remains true. This is a frequent finding in the various public opinion studies conducted in the country and in Latin America (www.latinobarometro.com) and the studies conducted within the framework of Vanderbilt University's public opinion project. The recent UNDP study on public safety confirms it as well (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006). From a medium-term perspective, however, we need to recognize that the high perception of insecurity is related to a significant trend of rising violent crime rates in recent decades (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2006; Programa Estado de la Nación 2006).

The current measurement show that the levels of victimization have not changed over the last two years (Table VI.4). The small variations that appear are not statistically significant (Sig Chi squared > .1). In both years, around 85% of the people had not been the victim of a crime in the previous 12 months. If we analyze violent crime, the proportion is much lower, below 5%. This coincides with the evolution of crime in recent years which, according to judicial statistics, has not changed much.

**Table VI.4 Levels of Victimization by Crime in Costa Rica, 2004 and 2006 (percentages)**

| | | Year | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2004 | 2006 |
| Type of crime | Not a victim | 85 | 84 |
| | Non-violent | 11 | 12 |
| | Violent | 4 | 5 |
| | Total | 100 | 100 |
| | (N) | (1,492) | (1,500) |

Chi squared= 2.8, No Sig (.290)

As in the 2004 LAPOP study, we also found that Costa Rica and Panama are the Central American countries with the lowest incidence of violent crime. Although the differences are statistically significant, this time they are small, however (Figure VI.8). Including new countries in the 2006 study does not substantially modify Costa Rica's position: it still has one of the lowest rates of violent crime. But this level is very similar to those of the majority of other countries, except Peru and Mexico where there is more violent crime.

**Figure VI-8 Average Percentages of People Who Were Victims of a Crime by Country, Violent and Non-Violent, 2006**




As in the 2004 LAPOP study, we ran a logistic regression model with the question about victimization (VIC1) as the dependent variable (binary: was a victim – was not a victim) in order to examine the characteristics of people directly affected by crime. We only used the basic model since we were not interested in political variables for this analysis. The results were basically the same as those obtained in the previous study: the level of education was the strongest predictor

(Sig: .01). Generally, the greater the education, the greater the rate of victimization, to the point that people with post-secondary education and high income levels reported having been crime victims three times more than those with a primary education or less and those with low income levels (an incidence close to 30% compared to a one near 10%). This time, however, the difference between the capital and the rest of the country stood out clearly: there is a greater chance of being the victim of a crime in San José (Figure VI.9).

**Figure VI-9 Victimization by Crime by Size of City, 2006**




In summary, there has not been much variation in the objective trends of public (in)security over the last two years. Victimization rates are basically the same, as are the sociodemographic characteristics of victims. However, there was a marked increase in the perception of insecurity over the last two years, especially among people who live in the capital.

## Support for Acting Outside the Law to Fight Crime

It is not surprising that, in the face of the growing perception of insecurity, there has been a substantial increase in public demands for authorities to take stronger action against criminals. The question is whether this demand means that people will be more tolerant of authorities acting outside the law in order to punish criminals. This is an important question given ties between the police (and para-militaries) and the extra-judicial assassination of presumed criminals, or of social undesirables more generally, in various Latin American countries (Brinks 2004). To investigate this, we used a question in both the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies, allowing us to do

a comparative analysis. The question asks, "To capture criminals, do you believe that: authorities should always respect the law or are there occasions when they can act outside of it? (1) They should always respect the law; (2) There are occasions when they can act outside of it; (8)DK."[5] Unfortunately, the main finding on this topic is negative: there is greater demand today than there was two years ago for authorities to act outside the law in order to punish the guilty; the decline is statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence (Figure VI.10). Still, the fall of support for remaining inside the bounds of the law is moderate and the score of 48 in 2006 indicates the public is evenly divided on the topic.

**Figure VI-10 Support for Abiding by the Law to Combat Crime on a Scale of 0-to-100, 2004 and 2006**




Contrary to what might be expected, the increase in the perception of public insecurity is not strongly associated with public demand for acting outside the law (Table VI.5) nor with the index of trust in the protection of rights. While the correlations are statistically significant (Sig < .01) in both cases, and move in the expected direction, they are very weak (Tau-B < .10). This means that even though in general these variables go along (more insecurity, less trust in the protection of rights and greater demand for extralegal action), we do not find this behavior at the level of the individuals. For now, the presumption that insecurity immediately generates less attachment to the rule of law does not appear to hold in the Costa Rican case, and we do not know which other variables may help explain this outcome..[6]

[5] The question was recodified on a scale of 0-to-1, where 1 is "they should always respect the law" and 0 "sometimes they can act outside it."

[6] The basic and political logistic regression models, with following the law as the dependent variable, had a very low predictive capacity (Pseudo Cox and Snell's r < .03).

**Table VI.5 Correlations between the Level of Trust in the Protection of Rights, the Perception of Public Insecurity, and Support for Abiding by the Law to Combat Crime, 2004 and 2006**

| | | Level of trust in the protection of rights | Perception of public insecurity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kendall´s Tau_b | Perception of public insecurity | -.099(**) | |
| | Officials respect for the law | .076(**) | -.035 (*) |

* The correlation is significant to a level of 0.1 (bilateral).
** The correlation is significant to a level of 0.01 (bilateral).

# Chapter VII. Local Government

## Context

The Costa Rican political system is highly centralized. Municipalities lost functions to the central government very early in the history of the republic.[1] The creation of a sector of decentralized institutions in the 1949 Constitution – autonomous entities belonging to the central government that are charged with providing government services – and subsequent laws that helped found new institutions or established public control over existing private companies in areas such as the provision of potable water (the Costa Rican Electricity Institute in 1951, or the National Aqueduct and Sewer Service [*Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados*, or SNAA], in 1961) reduced the role of municipalities in the provision of goods and services even more. Today, central government institutions provide these services to most of the population.

In recent years, certain measures have been adopted that shift more power and authority to the municipalities. In the mid-1990s, property tax collection was handed over to them. In 2001, approved reforms to Article 171 of the Constitution established that 10% of the central government's budget would be earmarked for the municipalities; also, that a fourth of the road-maintenance tax should go to local governments. In addition to decentralization, there has also been an effort to develop local democratic institutions. The approval of a new Municipal Code in 1998 created new mechanisms of direct democracy and strengthened existing ones (the recall of officials, plebiscites, open town hall meetings). The Code also created the position of municipal mayor to be chosen through non-concurrent, direct elections. Costa Rica was the last country in Central America to adopt this mechanism. The first election was carried out in December 2002.[2] In practice, the advance of decentralization is notably less than might be surmised from the above-mentioned normative and institutional reforms. First, the transfer of 10% of the central government's budget depends on a law defining municipal competences that, five years after the constitutional reform, Congress has still not enacted due to the objections of treasury officials. Second, the economic base of local governments remains extremely weak. In the 1995-2005 period, municipal taxes did not exceed 0.7% of GDP (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006).[3] Third, the central government does not carry out the transfers provided for by law. In the 2002-2005 period, municipalities received less than half of the road infrastructure resources to which

[1] In the first two decades after Independence from Spain, there were two conflicts, with changing alliances, between the four urban municipal seats (1823 and 1838). The city of San José triumphed in these conflicts, removing Cartago's status as a 'city,' and became (through this day) the seat of the national government. Even then, in the first decades after Independence in 1821, the municipalities took back functions such as the provision of health services, education, and various social works to attend to the poor. These functions were gradually assumed by the institutions of the central state. With the educational reforms starting in 1880, the municipalities ceded control over a key sphere of social life. During the twentieth century, municipal functions were gradually reduced to the provision of some local services that the central institutions, for various reasons, did not provide, such as garbage collection, public lighting, and rural roads.

[2] Until 1998, the Costa Rican municipal regime could be characterized as a parliamentary regime. The legislative body of the corporation – the Municipal Council – was elected by the people and had, among its powers, the naming and removal of the municipal executive.

[3] The percentage of local government tax revenue within the gross domestic product.

they were legally entitled (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006). Finally, the abstention rate was very high in the first direct election of mayors: nationally, an average of 70% of voters did not cast a ballot.[4] In summary, the Costa Rican political system shows a timid and gradual process of decentralizing responsibilities and of democratizing local governments.[5]

The 2004 LAPOP study included a broad examination of public attitudes toward and participation in local governments. Its main conclusions were that people clearly distinguish the specific character of local problems from national ones; and that they were critical of municipalities in terms of the quality of their services, their openness to participation, and their efforts at accountability. It also highlighted the division in the country regarding the decentralization of responsibilities to municipalities. Finally, it noted that people neither petitioned nor participated in local governments very much. In this study, we investigated this issue in a more limited manner since, between 2004 and 2006, there were no important changes either in the available indicators of the (poor) job local governments generally do, or in terms of further decentralization of the state, that required special attention (Programa Estado de la Nación 2005; Programa Estado de la Nación 2006). Therefore, we continued to monitor how people evaluate local government performance and their levels of participation in local affairs. The core of this chapter is our investigation on support for decentralizing the state, where there were important changes to report.

## Municipal Government Performance

One of the arguments wielded in favor of decentralization is that local governments are "closer" to the people. The supposition is that municipalities are more sensitive to local problems and, consequently, have incentives to respond more effectively to public demands. However, one thing is the expectation that local governments do a better job than central government institutions, and another thing is whether or not they really do a better job.

This question is especially important in a country as centralized as Costa Rica where the transfer of competences to the municipal level (already constitutionally approved) is still pending. Public support for the transfer of competences to local governments – a new turn in the institutional history of the country –not only depends on the public's expectation that municipalities will be more attentive to their concerns, but also how well they can do their job. If people think they are doing a poor job, this will be fertile ground for growing public resistance to the further decentralization of responsibilities still in the hands of other entities. We can study the changes in people's perceptions of how their local governments are performing because the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies included three comparable questions (Box VII.1).

[4] By contrast, abstentionism in presidential and legislative elections in the first electoral round of February 2002 was 30.7%.

[5] In other dimensions, there were important changes in the municipalities: a notable fragmentation of the local party system and a strong increase in the number of women in the municipal councils, to the point that they represent more than 40% of the council persons elected in 2002 (Programa Estado de la Nación 2002).

Box VII.1 Questions Used to Study People's Perception of Municipal Performance[6]

**NP1B.** ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS
**SGL1**. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) No sabe
Additionally, we used question B32 on public trust in the municipality as an indicator of how people perceived the performance of the municipality.

Between 2004 and 2006, there was a sharp and generalized fall in the perception of municipal government performance (Figure VII.1). Public trust in these corporations fell nine percentage points in only two years, dropping into the realm of low trust (less than 50 on a scale of 0-to-100). At the same time, the perception of the quality of municipal services fell from 53 to 45 points, also placing it in the realm of low scores; and the perception of authorities' responsiveness to people's petitions also declined from its already low 2004 levels. From a comparative perspective, the public's perception of the poor quality of municipal services in Costa Rica placed the country within the worst-scoring group of Latin American countries on this topic; it only surpassed Panama and Jamaica in dissatisfaction (Figure VII.2). In general terms, it is far behind the Dominican Republic and Ecuador.

**Figure VII-1 Changes in Public Trust and the Perception of Municipal Performance in Costa Rica, 2004 and 2006**




**Figure VII-2 Perception of the Quality of Municipal Services in Latin America, 2006**




[6] In 2006, we included question SGL2, which asks: "How do you feel you or your neighbors have been treated by the municipality when taking care of different kinds of affairs? Have you been treated very well, well, neither good nor bad, badly, or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither good nor bad (so-so) (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Don't know." We did not analyze in this section since the emphasis is in the comparative analysis – measuring change – and this question was not asked in the 2004 study. It is worth emphasizing that, in the 2006 study, the level of association between SGL1 and SGL2 is moderate and in the expected direction (Tau-b= .471, Sig < .001).

## Transferring Competences to Municipalities

The 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies investigated people's support for decentralization. We asked: "LGL2. In your opinion, should municipalities be given more responsibilities and resources or should the national government take over more municipal responsibilities and services?" One of the findings of the 2004 study was that, in Costa Rica, the population was evenly divided on the topic of decentralizing competences to municipalities (50.7% in favor and 49.3% against). Given the sharp drops of public trust in national institutions and in the evaluation of government efficiency, it is worth asking whether people have re-evaluated their position on this issue. If the central government and its institutions did not function well, a possible reaction would be to call for the transfer of competences to municipalities (responsibilities and resources) so they could resolve what the national government could not or did not want to. The available information shows that between 2004 and 2005 there was, effectively, a significant change in public opinion with regard to decentralization, but it was in the opposite direction than expected: support for the transfer of more responsibilities and resources to the municipalities is significantly less today than it was two years ago – ten percentage points less on a scale of 0-to-100 (Figure VII.2).

**Figure VII-3 Changes in Support for Decentralizing Competences to Municipalities**




Note: We recodified the question SGL2 in the following way: 3 'More responsibilities and resources to the municipality' 2 'More responsibilities and resources if the municipality improves' 1 'Keep things as they are' 0 'National government assumes more responsibilities and resources.' Then we normalized this scale to one with 0-to-100 points.

What are the predictors of support for decentralization? We ran a logistic regression model with the support-for-decentralization variable as a binary (1= support; 0= no support), and using the basic and political models, discussed in earlier chapters, for the analysis. In this case, we tried two variants of the political model: one that only considered national level political variables and

another that also included variables related to municipal performance and public participation in local affairs. We conducted the analysis for all available observations between 2004 and 2006. The predictive capacity of the three models is low (Basic model: Cox and Snell R2= 0.033; Political model: Cox and Snell R2= 0.051; Modified political model: Cox and Snell R2= 0.084). In this chapter, we focus on the results of the modified political model because it was the one that fits better (Table VII.1).

**Table VII.1 Predictors of Support for Decentralization (Modified Political Model with Local Variables), 2004-2006 Combined**

| | | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Step 1(a) | Sex | -.314 | .000 | .731 |
| | Age | .037 | .006 | 1.037 |
| | Age squared | .000 | .031 | 1.000 |
| | Schooling (in years) | .065 | .000 | 1.067 |
| | Wealth | .023 | .394 | 1.023 |
| | Index of political tolerance | .004 | .014 | 1.004 |
| | Index of support for the system | .005 | .078 | 1.005 |
| | Index of government efficacy | .008 | .460 | 1.008 |
| | Municipal responsiveness | .006 | .000 | 1.006 |
| | Trust in municipality | .008 | .000 | 1.008 |
| | Quality of municipal services | .005 | .025 | 1.005 |
| | Petitioning the municipality | .093 | .392 | 1.097 |
| | Constant | -2.715 | .000 | .066 |
| | Basic model R2 | 0.033 | | |
| | Political model R2 | 0.051 | | |
| | Local effects model R2 | 0.084 | | |

a Variable(s) introduced in the step 1: q1, q2c, ed, tolerpr46, ademr46, efigob46, np1brn46, b32r46n, sgl1rn46, np2r46.

Men and people with higher levels of education tend to support the process of decentralization more. There is a 20 percentage point difference (63 to 43 on a scale of 0-to-100) in support for decentralization between people with post-secondary education and those with a primary education (Figure VII.3). The level of trust in the municipality introduces important differences in support for decentralization – 17 percentage points between people with low and high levels of trust (Figure VII.4). This helps explain the decline of support for decentralization: the sharp drop of trust in municipalities between 2004 and 2006 pushed down the levels of support for decentralization. It is important to note that, contrary to what was expected, neither the evaluation of the quality of municipal services nor support for the system were predictors of decentralization.

The factor that most works against decentralization is the perception of how responsive municipal officials are to people's petitions (Figure VII.5). People who consider that municipal officials pay attention to what people request are almost twice as likely to support giving

municipalities more responsibilities and resources than people who do not believe that officials are very responsive. This finding suggests that local governments will be able to garner more support for decentralization the more receptive they are to people's demands. In the meantime, most people remain skeptical about decentralization. The finding also indicates that, since there are important differences in the performance of local governments (Programa Estado de la Nación 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2002), decentralization will have a greater chance of success, from the point of view of public opinion, where there is greater openness to public demands. In this sense, it would seem that the decentralization of competences to municipalities will require a gradual and certified process (that is, when local governments fulfill certain parameters of good performance) – that is if they want public approval. The above findings explain the following result: in 2006, 70% of people answered that it was not worth paying municipalities more taxes in order to improve the services they provide.

**Figure VII-4 Support for Decentralization by Level of Education on a Scale of 0-to-100, 2004-2006 Combined**




**Figure VII-5 Support for Decentralization by Trust in Municipalities on a Scale of 0-to-100, 2004-2006 Combined**




## Public Participation in Municipal Affairs

The counterpart of the public evaluation of various aspects of municipal administration (efficacy and quality of services) is the degree to which people participate in this administration. It could be that Costa Rican public critics do not participate in local government – that they are inactive critics. Participation in local affairs can be studied in two different areas: involvement in activities organized by the municipality (NP1) and petitioning municipal officials (NP2) (Box VII.3). In both cases, although in different ways, people appeal to municipal officials and authorities as right-holders.

Box VII.3 Questions Used to Measure Participation in Municipal Affairs in 2004 and 2006

**NP1**. ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunion convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses?
(1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda
**NP2.** ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?
(1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda

Between 2004 and 2006, there were no changes in the low levels of participation in municipal affairs and petitioning local authorities. Approximately 1 out of every 12 people (8%) attended meetings organized by the municipality and close to 1 out of every 5 petitioned local officials (19%). In both years, attendance at municipal meetings and petitioning local authorities are associated (Spearman´s r=.222 and .246 respectively; both sig<.001). People who attend municipal meetings also more likely to petition local officials.

**Figure VII-6 Attending Municipal Meetings and Petitioning Local Authorities, 2004 and 2006 (% of the total)**




As noted in the 2004 study, compared to other Latin American countries, Costa Rica has one of the lowest levels of participation in municipal affairs. The level of participation in the country is approximately half that reported in the Dominican Republic. In terms of petitioning, however Costa Ricans appear more active and stand out for the degree to which they interact with their local governments (Figure VII.7).

The 2004 LAPOP study applied logistic regression models to study the characteristics of the people who attend municipal meetings and petition local authorities. In both cases it was found that age and educational levels were important predictors. Attendance at municipal meetings

increased slightly the older a person was. Level of education was the variable with the strongest influence. People with post-secondary education (completed or uncompleted superior education) showed attendance levels three times that of people with a primary education or less. The greater the education, the greater the participation. Neither local nor regional differences were found in this pattern.[7] Because there were no important changes in public participation in local governments between 2004 and 2006, there is no reason to believe that these patterns have changed. For this reason, they were not included in this analysis.

**Figure VII-7 Average Percentage of People who Attend Meetings and Petition Municipalities in Latin America, 2006**




[7] In the case of petitioning municipal officials, women and married people were also statistically significant predictors (Sig < .10).

# Chapter VIII. Voting Behavior

## Introduction

This chapter studies a burning issue in Costa Rica: citizens' behavior in the 2006 elections. For many reasons, these elections were a watershed in the recent political history (see Chapter I). In the first place, the bipartisan system based on the PLN and PUSC, which ruled Costa Rican society since the 1980s, collapsed. In second place, this was the first election in almost 60 years in which the political traditions that arose out of the 1948 Civil War did not divide the country. Third, also for the first time in many decades, the losing party questioned the fairness and results of the election. Fourth, the high electoral volatility in the 2002-2006 period is an indication of the weakness of the (old and new) parties in the exercise of political representation (see Chapter I). Finally, voter turnout declined again from its already low 1998 and 2002 levels. For these reasons, this chapter addresses the topic of elections in more detail than the 2004 LAPOP study. Due to the interest in characterizing the shape of the current political situation in Costa Rica, we do not develop a comparative analysis to the same degree as in the other chapters.

The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first, we briefly analyze the political climate that surrounded an electoral process characterized by widespread public discontent. This helps us understand the electoral and partisan dealignment. In the second section, we study electoral participation: whether or not there were restrictions on the right to vote freely, and the solidity and distribution of electoral preferences. Due to the increase in abstentionism, we pay special attention to the reasons why people do not vote and to the social and political characteristics of the abstentionists. In the third section, we examine the impact of reports of electoral irregularities on the public. In particular, we are interested in seeing whether these reports affected the legitimacy of the political system and trust in institutions. Finally, in the last section, we comment on the political dealignment as a challenge for governability.

## The Political Climate

The electoral process of 2006 developed in the context of increasing public criticism about the country's economic and political performance. Between 2004 and 2006, people's evaluations of government efficiency, the economic situation, and satisfaction with democracy all fell sharply (Figure VIII.1). Appraisals of government performance dropped the most, 11 percentage points (from 56 to 43 on a scale of 0-to-100). People became even more negative in their judgments of the country's economic situation. Already in 2004, the appraisals were mostly negative, but in 2006 they were even worse (dropping seven points to an average score of 33 on a scale of 0-to-100, equivalent to a "bad situation"). Finally, satisfaction with democracy also fell, although not as sharply. All these changes are statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence. These negative evaluations increased the political difficulties of the PUSC – the governing party since 1998 – to present voters with a credible electoral offer. But they also seem, as will be seen in the final section, to have affected political party system as a whole.

Box VIII.1 Questions Used to Analyze the Performance of the System

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía…. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe

N1. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno pasado combatió la pobreza.

N3. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno anterior promovió y protegió los principios democráticos.

N9. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno anterior combatió la corrupción en el gobierno.

PN4. En general, ¿ud. diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Costa Rica?
(1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

All questions were recodified on a scale of 0-to-100 to faciliate their interpretation and comparison between different categories of answers. Questions N1, N3, and N9 were used to develop the index of the perception of government efficiency. They form a reliable measure (Cronbach´s alpha >.70). It is important to note that these are the questions common to both the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies; this comparable index, then, does not consist of all the items included in the 2006 LAPOP analysis.

The question on satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of diffuse support for the political system has been widely criticized in the literature due to its indeterminacy. The concept of democracy that it measures is not clear, on the one hand, nor is the fact that people respond referring to the political system in particular, on the other. We share this critique. In this study, we use it as a generic measure that evaluates a diffuse question that could be called "the state of things" – in which various issues could be included. It is worth noting that the correlation between the index of government efficiency, the evaluation of the country's economic situation, and satisfaction with democracy have a positive association; they move in the same direction, though weakly (Pearson´s R oscillates between .200 and .300; Sig > .001).

There is very deep and widespread public malaise with politics. The great majority of people say they are disillusioned, indifferent, or annoyed by politics (82%). Only the remaining 18% say they are interested in or excited by politics, and the majority of them say they these feelings are stronger now than they were before (Table VIII.1). This finding is consistent with what the UNIMER R.I. survey for the newspaper *La Nación*, based on the same questions, reported in November 2005 (UNIMER RI 2005).

**Figure VIII-1 Changes in the Perception of the Country's Current Economic Situation and Satisfaction with Democracy between 2004 and 2006**




## Table VIII.1 Type and Intensity of People's Feelings toward Politics, 2006

| Feelings toward politics recodified | Intensity of feelings toward politics recodified | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Less | Equal | More | |
| Annoyed, angry | 4 | 3 | 8 | 15 |
| Uninterested, disillusioned | 8 | 6 | 14 | 28 |
| Indifferent | 9 | 19 | 12 | 40 |
| Interested, excited | 5 | 5 | 9 | 18 |
| Total | 27 | 32 | 41 | 100 |

N = 1463. Chi-squared=119.1 Sig < .001, Tau-b= -.046 Sig < .001. Because of rounding, the totals do not necessarily add up.

We developed an index of feelings toward politics based on the type and intensity of political attitudes.[8] As expected, the index has a statistically significant positive association (Sig. < .05) with various evaluative measures of economic and political system's performance, such as the country's economic situation, satisfaction with democracy, perceived government efficacy, and people's perception of their household economic situation (Table VIII.2). People excited about politics tend to evaluate things better, and those most disillusioned or upset evaluate them the worst. However, bivariate correlations show that this association is very weak.[9] The lack of interest in politics, although it certainly affects (and is affected by) the evaluations of the performance of the system, is not easily modified by them: generally, it can be inferred that public discontent with politics is widespread independently of the level of satisfaction that people have with the economic and political situation.

**Table VIII.2 Bivariate Correlations between the Index of Feelings toward Politics and Various Measurements of the Performance of the Economic and Political System**

| | Correlation | Sig |
|---|---|---|
| Perception of the country's situation | .091 | .001 |
| Perception of the household's situation | .059 | .024 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | .199 | .000 |
| Index of government efficiency | 0.179 | .000 |
| (N) | (1,463) | |

In summary, the political climate surrounding the 2006 elections was characterized by the simultaneous drop in all the evaluative measures on the system's economic and political performance, along with widespread public disinterest and indifference with politics.

## Electoral Participation

Political freedoms are an indispensable but insufficient condition for democracy: they do not guarantee that people want to participate in choosing their leaders and, ultimately, that they do vote. Without public participation, electoral democracy is not viable. It is the people, as the source of sovereign power, who elect their own leaders. If they decide to abstain from voting in large numbers, the legitimacy and the validity of the democratic regime can be called into question given that elections are the mechanism through which the regime reproduces itself

[8] Question cosdd1 "feeling toward politics" was recodified on a scale from -6 to 3 with the following values: -6: bothered; -3: disillusioned; 0: indifferent; 3: excited. In turn, question cosdd3 was recodified on a scale from -1 to 1, with the following values: -1: less; 0: equal; 1: more. Once recodified, we developed an index of feelings toward politics, whose formula is simply: cosdd1r + cosdd3r. It varied on an 11-point scale (-7 to 4, where -7 is a person bothered, and experiences this feeling more intensely than one year ago, and 4 is an excited person who feels this way more than some time before).

[9] To eliminate the possibility that these associations were really spurious results from the reciprocal influences of all the variables, we ran partial correlations, using each one of the factors considered successively as the control variable. The results do not vary substantively: all the associations are robust from the statistical point of view, but very weak.

(Benavides and Vargas Cullell 2003).[10] Studying electoral participation is particularly important this time around because of the increase in abstentionism and the unprecedented criticisms on the transparency and fairness of the 2006 elections.

### *The Right to Vote Freely*

Voting freely to choose leaders is the basis of democracy. By free, we mean that the vote originates entirely in the exercise by the individual of her moral autonomy (Dahl 1989). Individuals vote only taking into account their beliefs about what best suits them, and this decision does not have any consequences for their safety, their property, or the lives of people close to them. In sum, there are no pressures or threats that limit the effective range of options that voters face when they cast their ballot.

In Costa Rica, from 1990 to 2002– a period in which four national elections were held – there were no denunciations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) about threats to the safety of voters and their property or threats to candidates for public office. There were also no such reports in the media (Programa Estado de la Nación 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2002). We would expect, then, that few people in Costa Rica feel any breach in their right to vote or run for office. However, in view of the denunciations of electoral irregularities, we decided to include, in the 2006 study, a broader battery of questions regarding the anomalies people experienced when they exercised their right to vote.

Box VIII.2 Questions Used to Investigate Incidents of Electoral Irregularities

COSEL6. ¿Presenció usted en el centro donde votó alguna anomalía o algo raro en el proceso de votación? 1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR

COSEL1. En estas elecciones, ¿le ofrecieron un beneficio o un trabajo si votaba por un partido?1. Sí 2. No [Pase a COSEL3] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSEL3]

COSEL2. ¿Qué le ofrecieron? 1. Empleo o un negocio 2. Bonos, becas, ayudas (como alimentos o materiales)3. Dinero 4. Otro 8. NS/NR

COSEL3. Siempre hablando de estas elecciones ¿Alguien lo amenazó o presionó para que votara de determinada manera? 1. Sí 2. No [Pase a COSEL8] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSEL8 ]

COSEL4. ¿Cómo lo amenazaron o presionaron? [No leer]1. Con quitarle su empleo (a Usted o su familia) 2. Con retirarle alguna ayuda o beneficio social (a Usted o su familia)3. Con agredirlo (a Usted o su familia) 4. Otro 8. NS/NR

The evidence reaffirms that people vote freely in Costa Rica. Their decision on whether or not to exercise their right to vote, as well as who they chose to vote for, are neither coerced by threats

[10] By contrast, that electoral democracy requires high levels of participation to function is not necessarily true. To date, there is no theory able to explain what the ideal and optimum level of public participation is (Ibid, loc. Cit).

or pressure nor "incentivized" by clientelistic offers. In fact, less than 1% of respondents reported having received a threat to get them to vote in a certain way (such as threats to their job or withdrawing social aid). Only one person declared having been physically threatened. This very low incidence is within the survey's margin of error. Only one-in-twenty people stated that they had received clientelistic offers (5.3%) – promises of social aid, money, or jobs. This reaffirms the very low levels of voter coercion found in the 2004 study, regarding the 2002 elections, where less than 2% of respondents said they had received threats or "incentives" to influence how they voted. Whatever the electoral irregularities, they do not appear to have been associated with coercion in the exercise of the right to vote freely.

Also, only close to 6% of the people who voted said they had witnessed an anomaly or "something strange." This low level of incidence is close to the survey's margin of error. We can conclude, therefore, that the incidence of anomalies seen was very low (however a person defines "something strange") – statistically close to zero.

### *The Political Record of the 2006 Electorate*

One of the most interesting contributions of the study by the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of the Universidad de Costa Rica (IIS-UCR), published in 2005, was to identify the importance that people's voting records have on the decision to vote (Raventós, Fournier et al. 2005). This study shows that people's decisions of whether or not to participate in an election changes over time. In particular, it helps discredit the idea that abstentionists are a solid group – people that, once they stop voting, drop out permanently from the system – and shows, by contrast, that the composition of this group changes significantly over time. It should also not be assumed that people who vote in a given election have an unblemished record of participating in previous ones.

The results of the 2006 LAPOP study confirm these findings. Almost half the people who did not vote during the 1994-2002 period did vote in 2006; and almost one out of seven people who had always voted did not vote on this occasion (Table VIII.1). Likewise, an important percentage of people who had stopped voting during 1994-2004, or who, being new voters in 2002 did not vote that year, went to the polls in 2006. In summary, there is a good deal of movement within the electorate. Still, these are not random changes. There is a moderate level of association between a trajectory of previous participation and the decision to vote in 2006 (Crammer´s V = .322, Sig<.001): people who had a history of abstaining in previous years tended to abstain in greater proportion in 2006 than those who always turn up at the polls.

**Table VIII.3 Voted in the 2006 Elections by Trajectory of Electoral Participation from 1994 to 2002 (people older than 22 years)***

| | Voted | Did not vote | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Never voted 1994-2002 | 42 | 58 | (202) |
| Always voted 1994-2002 | 84 | 16 | (684) |
| Inconsistent 1994-2002 | 67 | 33 | (67) |
| Stopped voting 1994-2002 | 68 | 32 | (174) |
| Reactivated vote in 2002 | 68 | 32 | (138) |
| New in 2002 did not vote | 75 | 25 | (4) |
| Total | 73 | 27 | |
| (N) | (922) | (347) | (1,269) |

Chi squared= 147.7, Crammer´s V= .340, Sig < .001
* These people were eligible to vote in 2002.

One of the interesting findings of this study is that, in the 2006 elections, an important percentage of the electorate who did not participated in previous elections chose to participate this time. In total, a quarter of the electorate acted this way. However, an even larger percentage "withdrew" (did not vote) in 2006 (29.2%). The difference between these two groups (3.4%) is the increase in abstentionism that this study registers. The increase shows that the 2006 LAPOP survey captured the drop in voter turnout between 2002 and 2006, and did so in a proportion similar to what happened (a little under five percentage points), although the overall estimate of 29% abstention is somewhat below the real figure (Figure VIII.2).

**Figure VIII-2 Balance between People Entering and Leaving the Electoral System, 2006**




People's voting records are also important in determining the solidity of electoral support of the parties. A party whose electoral base is composed mainly of committed individuals stands on firmer ground than another whose base is a fortuitous conjunction of people who came together for circumstantial reasons. A party in this latter situation is more exposed, in the short term, to the effects of volatility and dealignment. To examine this issue, we conducted an analysis of the political trajectory of respondents in relation to their electoral choice in 2006. The main findings are the following. First, the heterogeneity of abstentionists is confirmed. Almost 30% of those who "never voted" in the 1994-2002 period did vote in 2006 (Table VIII.4). Second, both the PLN and the PAC were relatively successful in capturing their traditional supporters. Third, the blow to the PUSC, the ruling and the largest political party in Costa Rica in the 1990-2002 period, was evident. Only 13% of "traditional PUSC" voters voted for this party – classified together with other minority parties in the "Others" category due to their poor electoral results. By far, the PAC was the net winner of the diaspora out of the PUSC, which partly explains its electoral success in 2006.

### *A Deeper Examination of Abstentionists*

Voting is a civic duty in Costa Rica but, unlike in other Latin American democracies, abstaining does not carry any specific sanctions. In the first round of the 2006 presidential election, 64.9% of the people voted. This voter turnout was five percentage points less than in 1998 and 2002 (approximately 70%), and clearly below the average for the nine elections held from 1964 to

1994 (approximately 80%). It only compares with the turnout in the first presidential election after the 1948 Civil War.[11] As stated in the 2004 study, this new decline in participation is, from a comparative perspective, part of a regional trend of declining levels of registered electoral participation in Latin America during the 1985-2006 period. The level of voter turnout in Costa Rican no longer stands out from the rest of the region, as it did in the past (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004).

**Table VIII.4 Electoral Preferences in 2006 by Trajectory of Party Loyalty, 1994-2002 (in percentages, people older than 22 years)**

| Electoral preference 1994-2002 | Electoral preference in 2006 | | | | | Total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Did not vote, blank or null vote | PLN | PAC | ML | Other | | |
| Never vote | 71 | 19 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 100 | (202) |
| New 2002 did not vote | 50 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 25 | 100 | (4) |
| PLN voter | 14 | 74 | 8 | 1 | 3 | 100 | (211) |
| PUSC voter | 28 | 16 | 38 | 6 | 13 | 100 | (306) |
| PAC 2002 | 14 | 19 | 60 | 5 | 3 | 100 | (149) |
| Between traditional parties | 25 | 49 | 19 | 4 | 4 | 100 | (138) |
| Lost party support | 41 | 31 | 20 | 6 | 4 | 100 | (107) |
| Other | 34 | 21 | 23 | 7 | 15 | 100 | (152) |
| Total | 33 | 32 | 25 | 4 | 7 | 100 | (1,269) |
| (N) | (415) | (403) | (318) | (48) | (85) | | |

Note: because of rounding, the percentages do not add up to 100.

Did the reasons for not voting change in 2006? To study this, question vb4 was included in the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP studies (Box VIII.3), allowing us to do a comparative analysis. Compared to the previous elections, the percentage of people who stated that they did not vote for reasons beyond their control ("was sick," "had to work") declined notably. In contrast, the percentage of those who did not vote out of lack of interest increased (Table VIII.4). These changes are statistically significant (Sig < .001) and similar in size. The percentage of people who stopped voting out of protest ("did not like any candidate," "do not believe in the system") declined. Lack of interest, therefore, was the dominant reason for abstaining in 2006.

[11] In the 1953 election, however, the political forces defeated in 1948 were prohibited.

Box VIII.3 Questions and Recodification Used to Analyze Abstentionism

VB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en esas elecciones? [anotar una sola respuesta Y PASAR A CRVB5]
(01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato/partido (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07)No se encontró en el padrón electoral (10) No tener edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar (88) NS/NR 99. No aplica

Together with other infrequent responses, we classified the above possible responses into four groups:
1. Beyond their control: (02) Sick (10) Not old enough (11) Had to work
2. Lack of interest: (01) Without transportation (03) Lack of interest (06) Without national ID card (07) Could not find voter registration (11) Arrived late to vote/was closed[12]
3. Protest: (04) Did not like any candidate/party (05) Do not believe in the system

**Table VIII.5 Vote and Reasons for Abstention in 2002 and 2006**

| | | Year | | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 2002 a/ | 2006 | |
| vb4r | Did not vote for reasons beyond control | 26 | 16 | (168) |
| | Did not vote out of lack of interest | 37 | 45 | (337) |
| | Did not vote out of protest | 30 | 25 | (225) |
| | Did not vote for other reasons | 7 | 15 | (93) |
| | Total abstentionists | 100 | 100 | (823) |
| | (N) | (385) | (438) | |
| | Voted | 74 | 71 | |
| | (N) | 1,115 | 1,062 | |

a/ According to the 2004 LAPOP study's estimate Chi squared= 30.7; Sig < .001; Crammer´s V= 0.10, Sig. < .001. Because of rounding, the percentages do not add up to 100.

In 2002, abstentionists were characterized as mostly men, young, single, people with lower educational levels, people who supported democracy less, and people who did not believe that voting mattered much. In 2006, some of these characteristics continued to hold true (lower educational levels and less support for the system) but in terms of sex and age, abstentionism stopped being more prevalent among men and young people and became more evenly distributed throughout the entire population. The analysis generally allows us to identify three predictors of

[12] In Costa Rica, more than 99% of people have a national identification card, the only requirement to be able to vote. Finding people in the voter registries is simple since people get immediate responses via telephone and the internet. Polling stations are accessible throughout the country – they are close to where people live and are open 12 hours.

abstentionism – social, geographical,[13] and political – although we must say that we did not come up with a good explanation for this phenomena.[14]

In the 2006 elections, abstentionism had a socioeconomic profile: individuals with low levels of education and wealth abstained in much greater proportion than individuals with higher levels. In fact, abstentionism among people with only primary schooling was 20 percentage points higher than among people with post-secondary education; however, there is no statistically significant difference between primary and secondary education (Figure VIII.3). People with low levels of wealth abstained, on average, 26 percentage points more than people with high levels (Figure VIII.4). In summary, a high level of education and wealth reduces abstention rates by half.

**Figure VIII-3 Average Abstentionism by Level of Schooling, 2006**




**Figure VIII-4 Average Abstentionism by Level of Wealth, 2006**




In political terms, abstentionists are people who tend to participate less in other areas of social and political life. Among people who are active in their communities, abstentionism is 10 points lower; a similar situation occurs among people who participate by contacting authorities to resolve community problems (Sig < .05). As in the 2004 LAPOP study, system support is lower among abstentionists than among voters (Figure VIII.5). We also add that, as expected, abstentionism is greater among individuals who do not support any political party. This point is

[13] Geographically, the survey is adjusted to electoral results (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006). Abstentionism was highest outside the Central Valley and in rural areas. These were the trends that this study captured. The differences between abstentionism in the capital city and rural zones, and between the Central Valley and the rest of the country, are statistically significant (Sig < .05) to a 95% level of confidence.

[14] The dependent variable in the logistic regression analysis was question vbr2 on the vote in 2006 (1= did not vote; 0= voted). Model A, which includes only sociodemographic variables, had low predictive power (Cox and Snell´s pseudo R= 0,07). This time, model B did not notably increase this power (Cox and Snell´s pseudo R= 0.11). In the following paragraphs, we use the B model in the analysis.

important because, if the trend of partisan dealignment continues, abstentionism is likely to increase. In summary, despite the heterogeneity and fluidity of abstentionism, with regard to motives and political trajectories, abstentionists in 2006 are even more removed from the political system than the rest of the population.

We should not assume, however, that abstentionists, as a group, are more more disgruntled individuals than the rest of the population. The logistic regression analysis we conducted shows that, in terms of disinterest, annoyance, and indifference with politics, abstentionists are similar to people who vote. Malaise with politics is widespread among the majority of Costa Ricans: people who vote are similarly as disillusioned and indifferent as the abstentionists.

**Figure VIII-5 Average Abstentionsism by Level of Support for the System, 2006**




**Figure VIII-6 Average Abstentionism by Political Party Support, 2006**




## *Electoral Participation Beyond the Vote*

As indicated in the 2004 LAPOP study, there is a world of activities beyond voting through which individuals can participate in an electoral process. Our interest in examining this point is to determine whether there is evidence of a further weakening of the active voter base on which the parties depend, even beyond the already low 2004 levels. This is important not only as an indication of eventual party weakening but also because the election day depends, up to a large degree, on the overseers and members of the local electoral boards that parties provide. These people are key to make sure that the electoral boards operate and that the ballots are counted fairly. In 2006, the inability of the parties to name overseers and electoral board members was one of the most serious problems faced by the TSE. Thus, we would like to examine whether electoral participation beyond the vote declined compared to two years ago.

To do so, we included two questions from the 2004 LAPOP survey aimed at capturing other (non-voting) electoral activities in which people participate; this gives us a reference point for comparison (Box VIII.3). Based on this information, we reconstructed the modes of electoral participation. These modes are the different ways individuals intervene in the electoral process. A

mode describes a profile of activities of a person engages with during an electoral process. Our reconstruction examines the things that people do in the electoral sphere (Benavides and Vargas Cullell 2003).

Box VIII.3 Questions Used to Study Participation Beyond the Vote

PP1. Ahora para cambiar el tema…Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [lea las alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR

Between the 2002 and 2004 elections, there were no major changes in the modes or ways that people participate (or not) in the electoral process. There were small variations that, seen individually, are not important; however, they generally all move in the same direction, toward less participation:

People who do not vote, who do not try to persuade others how to vote, and who do not work for a candidate or party (the inactive), were close to a quarter of all citizens in 2006 (24.6%), while four years earlier they represented a little more than a fifth of the citizenry.
People who vote but do not try to persuade others how to vote or work for a candidate or party continue to be the largest group of people, approximately half of the electorate.
People who vote, try to persuade others how to vote, and work for a candidate or party (the activists), or who vote and work for a candidate, make up a small group. In 2006, they were 10% of the electorate while four years before they were 13.9%.[15]

[15] In the 2004 study, it was found that, in terms of personal characteristics, there are not many differences between people with different modes of electoral participation. The most notable differences are in political attitudes: the activists show, on average, greater support for democracy, are politically more tolerant, and are more active in their communities.

**Table VIII.6 Forms of Electoral Participation, 2004 and 2006**

| | 2002* | 2006 |
|---|---|---|
| Did not vote, persuade, or work | 21 | 25 |
| Only persuade | 2 | 3 |
| Only work | 2 | 1 |
| Only vote | 51 | 50 |
| Work and persuade, did not vote | 1 | 0 |
| Vote and persuade | 9 | 11 |
| Vote and work | 8 | 6 |
| Vote, work, and persuade | 6 | 4 |
| | 100 | 100 |
| (N) | (1,492) | (1,497) |

*2002 (measurement from the 2004 LAPOP study). Chi squared= 27.7; Sig <.001
The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

The modes of electoral participation vary considerably among Latin American countries. From a comparative perspective, the percentage of people who do not participate in elections in Costa Rica (25% "do not vote, persuade, or work) is far from being the highest: in countries like Guatemala, Jamaica, Colombia, and El Salvador it exceeds 30%. Costa Rica also does not have the smallest core of electoral activists (21% of people who vote and at least do something else); instead, this group tends to be relatively large compared to most of the other countries (Table VIII.7). Generally, activists are a minority of the population throughout the region. Nonetheless, it is certain that one of the traditional strengths of Costa Rican democracy – high electoral participation throughout the second half of the twentieth century – appears to have withered away.

**Table VIII.7 Modes of Electoral Participation in Latin America (in percentages)**

| | | Forms of electoral participation | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Do not vote, persuade, or work | Only vote | Vote and something else | Others | |
| Country | Mexico | 24 | 58 | 13 | 4 | 100 |
| | Guatemala | 41 | 47 | 10 | 2 | 100 |
| | El Salvador | 28 | 53 | 15 | 4 | 100 |
| | Honduras | 14 | 57 | 26 | 3 | 100 |
| | Nicaragua | 32 | 46 | 15 | 7 | 100 |
| | Costa Rica | 25 | 50 | 21 | 4 | 100 |
| | Panama | 13 | 51 | 28 | 8 | 100 |
| | Colombia | 35 | 45 | 15 | 5 | 100 |
| | Ecuador | 14 | 67 | 16 | 2 | 100 |
| | Peru | 7 | 70 | 22 | 1 | 100 |
| | Chile | 26 | 57 | 14 | 3 | 100 |
| | Dominican Republic | 14 | 40 | 40 | 6 | 100 |
| | Jamaica | 45 | 33 | 15 | 6 | 100 |
| Total | | 24 | 52 | 19 | 4 | 100 |

N= 18,738, Chi squared: 2540, Sig < .001.
The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

## Reports of Electoral Irregularities

For the first time in 40 years in Costa Rica, the losing party questioned the results of the presidential election.[16] For the most part, the people who made the denouncements argued that irregularities prevented the Partido Liberación Nacional from being proclaimed the winner; given how close the vote was, it was argued that if the charges were true this could change the outcome of the election. The news media and electoral authorities, representatives of the political parties, and analysts debated the merits of the accusations. As in other elections, but under very different political circumstances, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) conducted a vote-by-vote recount, this time under the close scrutiny of party representatives. It was not until one month after the election that the TSE officially declared who would be the new president.[17] There was tension between the parties in the days immediately following the election, although it needs to be said that there were no episodes of violence or social mobilization unfolded; the citizenry remained calm. Beyond the outlined events, it is clear that electoral democracy – unquestioned in Costa Rican politics in recent history – has been the object of criticism and doubt. A losing party that doubts the fairness and transparency of the election opens the door for other groups to raise similar accusations in the future.

### *The Impact on Public Opinion*

This section examines the following questions. How did the charges of electoral irregularities impact the public? Did they affect public trust in the TSE? What are the social and political profiles of the individuals who questioned the elections? To answer these questions, we included six questions that asked people how much they knew about the charges, whether or not they believed them, and their effects on the fairness and outcome of the 2006 presidential election (Box VIII.4).

[16] While the PAC presented more than 600 reports of irregularities in the presidential elections, it did not present any in the legislative and municipal elections that were held at the same time.

[17] It is interesting to observe that the pattern started in Honduras and repeated in Mexico was repeated: the losing candidate refused to recognize the initial results. Contrary to these cases, especially the Mexican, the questioning did not lead to incidents or social and political mobilizations.

Box VIII.4 Questions Used to Study the Impact of the Charges of Electoral Irregularities on Public Opinion

COSEL8. ¿Está Usted enterado de las denuncias sobre irregularidades electorales formuladas por algunos partidos políticos? 1. Sí 2. No [Pase a COSEL13] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSEL13]

COSEL9. ¿Considera que la mayoría de estas denuncias eran ciertas? 1. Sí 2. No 3. Algunas sí, otras no 8. NS

COSEL10. ¿Cree ud que hoy tendríamos otro presidente si no hubiesen ocurrido las anomalías denunciadas?1. Otro presidente 2. el mismo presidente

COSEL11. Tomando en cuenta lo que hemos hablado ¿piensa usted que las elecciones recién pasadas realmente reflejaron la voluntad popular? 1. Sí 2. No 3. Más o menos 8. NS / NR

COSEL12. En comparación con elecciones anteriores, ¿considera usted que las elecciones recién pasadas fueron más limpias o menos limpias? 1. Más limpias 2. Menos limpias 3. Igual 8. NS / NR

COSEL13. En su opinión, ¿actuó el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de manera imparcial en las elecciones pasadas? 1. Sí 2. No 3. Más o menos 8. NS / NR

The first point to examine is whether the slight decline of public trust in the TSE between 2004 and 2006 (as seen in Chapter IV) is associated with people's perception on how impartially this body acted in the 2006 election. People who believe that the TSE acted impartially – the majority of people (52%) – trust this entity more than people who believe it did not (27%). There is an average difference of 12 percentage points between these groups (74 to 62 on a scale of 0-to-100) (Figure VIII.7).[18]

What were the repercussions of the charges of electoral irregularities on public opinion? A first surprising result, given the wide coverage this issue had in the media, is that almost half the people was not following up the issue (47%). Although this does not mean that they had not heard about them, it does indicate that they did not pay them much heed (Table VIII.8). The charges, in principle, had limited repercussions on public opinion.

[18] Contrary to what might be expected, the perception of impartiality was not very affected by the truthfulness that people attributed to the charges of electoral irregularities. Although the association between the perception of impartiality and truthfulness attributed is positive (Sig <.001), the magnitude of this association is relatively weak (Tau-b= 0.193). It seems that, when judging the performance of the TSE, people have other factors in mind – and not necessarily the charges of electoral irregularities.

**Figure VIII-7 Average Trust in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal by the Perception of its Impartiality in the 2006 elections**




Second, knowledge about the charges influenced the perceptions of the TSE's impartiality (Chi square = 38.3; Kendall´s Tau-b: 0.148; Sig < .001). The influence, however, is in the opposite direction than expected: 6 out of 10 people who thought that the TSE acted impartially knew about the irregularities, while only a little more than 4 out of 10 who believed that the TSE was not impartial knew about them. In other words, the less people knew about the charges the greater their suspicion of the TSE; likewise, the greater their knowledge of the charges, the lower their suspicion. The conclusion we draw from this is that the greatest impact of these charges on public opinion was among less informed people.

Even though the impact of the charges of electoral irregularities was less than expected, many people could have believed them and, in consequence, could conclude that the 2006 elections were neither transparent nor clean. To figure out how widespread this perception is, we recodified the variables COSEL9-12 (Box VIII.1) on a scale of 0-to-100 where 0 indicates that nobody believes the charges and that everyone thinks that the elections were clean and reflected the popular will, and 100 indicates that everyone believes the charges were true and that the elections were neither clean nor reflected the popular will. The assertion that electoral irregularities were true and that elections were not fair received, on average, intermediate scores (around 50)), while the majority of people clearly believed that the elections reflected the popular will and the electoral irregularities, even if they occurred, did not alter the results (Figure VIII.16). Even in these cases, however, approximately one third of citizens were critical of how the elections were run.

**Table VIII.8 Opinions of the Irregularities in the 2006 Elections in Costa Rica**

| Topics investigated and responses | % | (N) |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge of electoral charges | | (1,490) |
| No | 47 | |
| Yes | 52 | |
| Truthfulness of the charges* | | (778) |
| True | 33 | |
| Some / DK-NR | 15 | |
| Not true | 29 | |
| Effect of anomalies on the outcome* | | (778) |
| Another president would have been elected | 37 | |
| The same president would have been elected | 63 | |
| Elections reflected the popular will* | | (778) |
| No | 29 | |
| More or less | 19 | |
| Yes | 52 | |
| Fairness of the elections* | | (778) |
| Less clean than previous ones | 31 | |
| The same | 46 | |
| Cleaner than previous ones | 23 | |
| Behavior of the TSE | | (1,390) |
| Was not impartial | 27 | |
| More or less | 21 | |
| Was impartial | 52 | |

*Only asked of people who were aware of the charges.
Source: Questions COSEL 8-13.

**Table VIII.9 Perception of the Impartiality of the TSE by Degree of Knowledge of the Charges of Electoral Irregularities in 2006 (percentages of the total)**

| | | Knowledge of charges | | Total | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes | No | | |
| Impartiality of the TSE | Yes | 35 | 22 | 56 | (777) |
| | More or less | 7 | 8 | 15 | (206) |
| | No | 13 | 16 | 29 | (400) |
| Total | | 54 | 46 | 100 | (1,383) |
| (N) | | (752) | (631) | | |

Note: Chi squared= 38.32, Sig < .001; Kendall´s Tau-b = 0.148, Sig < .001. Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

**Figure VIII-8 Degree of Truth in the Charges of Electoral Irregularities and Effects on the Fairness and Outcome of the Elections, Averages on a Scale of 0-to-100**




a/ These questions were only asked people who were aware of the charges: N=752.
b/ The variables were recodified to indicate how much people who were aware of the charges of irregularities thought that they were true, on a scale of 0-to-100. The value of 0 indicates that they did not believe the charge or their effect on the fairness or outcome of the election; the value of 50 indicates that they gave some credence to them ("some yes, others no"); and the value of 100 indicates that people completely believed the charges and their effect on the fairness and outcome of the elections.

## *Who questioned the elections?*

Who questioned the fairness and outcome of the 2006 elections? To analyze this question, we conducted statistical tests to determine whether the attitudes about the electoral irregularities were a reliable and valid measure to ascertain the level of criticism about what happened in the 2006 elections. The results indicate that, effectively, these questions measure the same dimension. Therefore, we constructed an index of electoral irregularities (scale of 0-to-100).[19] Then we applied a linear regression model with the three variations used in the other chapters (basic, political, and local effects models) (Table VIII.8).[20]

[19] The factor analysis reflects the fact that the four questions are grouped into a single factor, with loads above .572, which explains 52% of the variance. To measure the reliability of the scale on which the index of support for the system is based, we used the Cronbach's alpha statistical test. When the Cronbach's alpha is above .70, the measure in question is reliable. On this occasion, the Cronbach's alpha was 0.663, a level slightly below a satisfactory inquiry; the level obtained, however, is very close to that required.
[20] The dependent variable (index of electoral irregularities) has a normal distribution in line with the residual analysis.

As in almost all the topics investigated in this study, the basic model has the least predictive capacity ($r^2$=0.033); the political model has a substantially better fit ($r^2$=0.277); and the local effects model has a small additional impact ($r^2$=0.317). The main conclusion is that the people who most question Costa Rican electoral democracy do not, for the most part, form a particular sociodemographic group; instead, they are distinguished by political factors. Not all political factors are important, however. In contrast to other occasions, the perception of government efficacy, political party support, social and political participation (except the vote), and political tolerance do not influence the levels of doubt about the elections. We need turn our attention to electoral participation (whether or not a person voted, or voted for a particular party), support for democracy, and the level of support for CAFTA-DR.

The people most critical of the fairness and outcome of the 2006 elections have lower levels of education (Sig < .1). The charges of electoral irregularities resonated much less among people with post-secondary education than among those with only some degree of primary education. Electoral participation has the opposite effect: people who voted are more willing to perceive the elections as clean and transparent than those who did not vote (10 percentage points less on a scale of 0-to-100). In other words, it would seem that the greatest effect of the charges occurred among "outsiders": the less educated and abstentionists.

The party a person voted for is also an important factor to predict doubts about the elections. As expected, voters who cast their ballots for the PLN are much less critical of the elections than the rest (21 percentage points less). By contrast, voters for the PAC – the party who made the charges – clearly tend to be the most critical of the transparency and fairness of the outcome of the 2006 elections. In the end, however, the PAC vote has a substantially lower effect than the PLN vote (11 points), which means that criticism of the elections among PAC voters is less intense than the defense of the elections among PLN voters (Figures VIII.11 and VIII.12).

Support for the system is a predictor of the level of suspicion about the 2006 elections: people with a high level of support are less critical than people with a low level (11 percentage points of difference on a scale of 0-to-100). This predictable finding is in line with empirical studies of political legitimacy: people with a "reserve of good will" toward the system are willing to support it and tolerate suboptimal performance, such as the TSE's management of the 2006 election. Finally, the level of support for CAFTA-DR is a very important predictor of questioning the 2006 elections. (Support for CAFTA-DR and support for the system are not themselves related, however, as we will see in Chapter X.) In fact, among people who strongly support CAFTA-DR, the level of questioning is 25 percentage points higher than people with little support for it. This finding was also predictable: on the one hand, support for CAFTA-DR is substantially lower among PAC voters than among PLN ones; and on the other hand, during 2005, various figures tied questioning the legitimacy of the electoral process to support for CAFTA –DR.[21]

[21] During 2005, civil society organizations actively interrupted the political debate by tying the ratification of CAFTA-DR to the presidential candidacy of Oscar Arias Sánchez for the PLN. In general terms, the social and

**Table VIII.10 Predictors of the Level of Electoral Questioning ( Political Model)**

| | B | Beta | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|
| (Constant) | 101.731 | | .000 |
| Age | -.333 | -.175 | .361 |
| Age squared | .005 | .224 | .233 |
| Female | 1.574 | .026 | .563 |
| Housewife | 2.025 | .029 | .533 |
| Married (living together) | 1.006 | .016 | .684 |
| Years of education | -.451 | -.069 | .144 |
| Wealth index | .285 | .020 | .630 |
| Non-Catholic religion | 1.738 | .023 | .527 |
| No religion | 1.860 | .017 | .639 |
| Trust neighbors | -3.268 | -.033 | .377 |
| TV news | 4.399 | .032 | .376 |
| Read newspapers | 1.530 | .019 | .639 |
| Well-informed | -8.158 | -.057 | .189 |
| Small city | 1.762 | .028 | .511 |
| Rural area | 1.267 | .019 | .701 |
| Central Valley region | -.278 | -.004 | .923 |
| Index of social participation | .512 | .043 | .270 |
| Participation in demonstrations | -3.653 | -.052 | .175 |
| Participation by contacting officials | 1.924 | .030 | .415 |
| Voted in 2006 dummy | -6.028 | -.086 | .081 |
| People who do not support a political party | 2.927 | .048 | .200 |
| Voted PLN in 2006 | -13.335 | -.200 | .000 |
| Voted PAC in 2006 | 7.032 | .109 | .032 |
| Index of government efficacy | -.042 | -.032 | .414 |
| Index of intolerance to illegal participation | -.177 | -.095 | .013 |
| Index of tolerance to legal participation | .000 | .000 | .999 |
| Index of political tolerance | -.028 | -.027 | .492 |
| Index of support for CAFTA-DR normalized | -.229 | -.252 | .000 |
| Victim of corruption at least once | -.694 | -.010 | .789 |
| Index of support for democracy | -.205 | -.133 | .001 |
| Basic model R2 | 0.033 | | |
| Political model R2 | 0.277 | | |
| Local effects model R2 | 0.317 | | |

a Dependent variable: Clean election index.

producer organizations opposed to the free trade agreement openly opposed the candidacy of Arias, while the majority of business leaders decidedly backed the ratification of the agreement and, in different ways, the PLN candidate. In this polarized atmosphere within civil society, an event unprecedented in recent decades occurred: the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the in-coming administration by a sector of trade unions and social and producer organizations opposed to the free trade agreement if Arias Sánchez won the election; they argued that the Constitutional Court's ruling, which annulled the prohibition of presidential reelection, was spurious (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006).

**Figure VIII-9 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Level of Schooling on a Scale of 0-to-100**




**Figure VIII-10 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Electoral Participation on a Scale of 0-to-100**




**Figure VIII-11 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Whether or Not Voted for the PLN on a Scale of 0-to-100**




**Figure VIII-12 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Whether or Not Voted for the PAC on a Scale of 0-to-100**



**Figure VIII-13 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Support for the System on a Scale of 0-to-100**




**Figure VIII-14 Average Level of Questioning the 2006 Elections by Support for CAFTA-DR on a Scale of 0-to-100**




## Party Dealignment as a Challenge to Governability

The analysis conducted in this chapter confirms that, in the context of strong public discontent with politics, there is an important process of electoral and partisan dealignment. The question is, how serious is this dealignment? To investigate this issue, we included two questions in the 2006 LAPOP questionnaire: the first asks whether people currently support a political party (VB10); the second, which was only directed at people who supported a party, asked them which party they preferred (COSVB11).

Four months after the elections, almost two-thirds of the people said that they did not support a political party (64.5%). Half of voters for the PLN – the victor – had already deserted camp. But the situation is even worse in the case of the PAC (63%) and especially the ML, of which practically all the people who voted for it (81.3%) said they do not support a party anymore. Although it is normal for partisan support to fall off after an election, the magnitude of this drop is quite surprising (Table VIII.11). In fact, these findings differ markedly from others obtained in a recent public opinion study (the UNIMER RI survey of September 2006 for the newspaper *La Nación*). In this latter study, people unaffiliated with a party are the largest group, confirming the diagnosis about partisan dealignment; but they represent less than 40% of the population, a substantially smaller dealignment than that captured by the 2006 LAPOP study. What might

account for this discrepancy? We do not have a good explanation. It is likely, though, that different ways of asking about the issue has some effect.[22]

**Table VIII.11 Party Dealignment after the 2006 Election (in percentages)**

| Voted in 2006 elections | Party support | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Support a party | Do not support a party | | |
| Did not vote | 24 | 76 | 100 | (506) |
| PLN | 51 | 49 | 100 | (456) |
| PAC | 36 | 64 | 100 | (367) |
| ML | 19 | 81 | 100 | (64) |
| Others /null or blank vote | 29 | 71 | 100 | (107) |
| | 36 | 64 | 100 | (1.500) |
| (N) | (533) | (967) | | |

Chi squared= 83.7, Sig < .001;Crammer´s V= 0.237

The main conclusion is that party loyalties have deteriorated considerably in Costa Rica, which seems to confirm the diagnosis of high political volatility that we made in Chapter I. Today, support for political parties – and by extension, the government – is something simultaneously seen and not seen: it can disappear or reappear abruptly at any moment and without apparent cause. In the months from February to June-July (the period of fieldwork) there were no particular events that could explain people's flight. From the perspective of the political parties, the other implication of this finding is that the party system in Costa Rica, lacking solid roots in the society, is weak, broken, and volatile.

[22] The 2006 LAPOP questionnaire has two differences from that of UNIMER RI: on the one had, the location of the questions is different (LAPOP 2006 asked about the topic before asking people to say who they voted for); and, on the other hand, LAPOP 2006 used a gradual strategy while UNIMER RI did not (first people were asked if they supported a party and then only those who said they did were asked which one they supported). Perhaps this managed to identify a "core" of stronger partisan supporters than did UNIMER RI.

# Chapter IX. Public Participation

## Introduction

Public participation is a broader concept than electoral participation. The public, besides showing up at the polling stations, participates in decisions by getting involved in organizations and contributing with resources or time to help solve community problems. A democracy in which the public actively participates in various spheres of political and social life would seem to be more robust than one in which participation is limited to voting. One could also imagine a stable and orderly democracy in which elected representatives and institutions behave according to the voter expectations and in which participation is rare – although this situation could result in an apathetic society. In any case, all democracies need some degree of public participation, not only because this is part of their essence – the election of rulers by the ruled – but to have some degree of control over public administration. (Verba and Nye 1972; Verba, Nie et al. 1978; Conway 1985; Conge 1988; Crotty 1991; Putnam 1993; Verba, Brady et al. 1995; Putnam 1997; Schlozman, Verba et al. 1999; Putnam 2000; Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001).

In the 2004 LAPOP study, the issue of public participation was studied at some length through the concept of social capital (Putnam 1993; Coleman 2000; Putnam 2002).[1] Analyzing people's participation in different spheres of social life was part of a wider inquiry into neighborhood networks of reciprocity and interpersonal trust. This study conducts a more limited examination of participation. We attempt to reconstruct the modalities through which people intervene in the social and political life of the country. The aim, which is more descriptive, is to better understand the complexity of these interventions. Therefore, we are interested in examining how people exercise their political rights, choosing and articulating the arenas where they try to influence how public affairs are managed. The main reason for shifting the inquiry is that we have no reason to suspect that there have been important changes in terms of social capital since the 2004 investigation.

The basic questions that orient this chapter are the following. How widespread are the "core" people who do not participate in the social and political life of the country? How widespread are the "core" people who simultaneously intervene in various spheres? Given that the previous chapter showed broad public disinterest and declining participation in the electoral realm, we want to clarify whether these are part of a more general phenomena of Costa Ricans withdrawing from the public sphere.

A priori, any outcome is possible. On the one hand, it could well be that public disinterest has effectively pushed down participation levels on issues of public concern. On the other hand, it is also possible that low electoral participation supposes greater activity in other spheres since the

[1] There are multiple definitions of social capital. For a discussion about these, see (Vargas Cullell 2005). In this study, we use that of Putnam, which originally defined social capital as the networks of reciprocal trust and cooperation between people to resolve problems of collective action (Putnam 1993).

loss of faith in electoral politics has pushed people to act in their communities or form their own groups in order to influence the management of affairs important to the public. This issue is also important since, as seen in Chapter IV, public participation is a predictor of support for democracy in certain spheres (more participation, more support). In this sense, widespread apathy, in terms of participation, would be bad news for democracy. This chapter attempts to respond to these questions.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, we present the levels of public participation in each of the spheres of social and political life that we investigated. In the second, we combine this information in order to reconstruct the modes of public participation. In the third and final section, we analyze the correlations of the modes of social participation in order to identify the predictive factors.

## Levels of Public Participation

In the 2004 study, it was determined that, excluding religious services, the most frequent kind of participation was attending parent-teacher association and community improvement committee meetings: between 15% and 30% of people stated they participate in one of these organizations at least once or twice a month. When asked about what kind of community action people carry out, approximately one in three said they contributed to solving some community problem, and approximately one in five mentioned that they had donated money, work, or had attended meetings. The main predictive factors of social participation were age (with a curvilinear effect), educational level, and religiosity – the latter two with a positive effect (Vargas Cullell and Rosero Bixby 2004).

With these findings as a starting point, this study analyzes this topic from a slightly different perspective. As noted in the introduction, we are interested in reconstructing the ways in which people participate in the social and political life of the country. Since people can participate in many different and complex ways, we developed a methodology to classify and group people's responses to a great number of questions in order to reconstruct the ways in which they participate in public issues.

### *Methodology*

The starting point for our analysis of public participation is recognizing that such participation is part of how democracy works. Therefore, our first step was to match the dimensions or spheres of public participation with the dimensions of a concept of democracy. The concept of democracy that we use in this analysis was inspired by O'Donnell (O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell, G. 1997; O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell 2004; O'Donnell 2004) and further developed by Vargas Cullell (Vargas Cullell 2004). In Costa Rica, this concept has been developed by the Citizen Audit on the Quality of Democracy (*Auditoría Ciudadana sobre la Calidad de la Democracia*) and by successive editions of the *Informe sobre el Estado de la Nación* (Report on the State of the Nation) (Programa Estado de la Nación 2001; Programa Estado de la Nación 2002; Programa Estado de la Nación 2003; Programa Estado de la Nación 2003; Programa Estado de la Nación 2004; Programa Estado de la Nación 2005; Programa Estado de la Nación

2006). In Latin America, it was developed by the UNDP report on democracy (Benavides and Vargas Cullell 2003; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004).

We postulate that democracy has three main dimensions or spheres, with a dimension of public participation that corresponds to each one. First, *democracy as a political regime*: this includes the norms, institutions, and acts related to the access of power; from the point of view of public participation, it corresponds to the actions directed at influencing the selection of rulers, or participation through the *exercise of the vote and electoral activism*. Second, *democracy as a form of government*: this includes the norms, institutions, and acts related to the exercise of power; from the point of view of public participation, it corresponds to the collective actions directed at influencing the decisions adopted by public officials, or *participation by contacting authorities and social protests*. Third, *democracy as public life*: this includes the horizontal relations between people; from the point of view of public participation, it corresponds to the collective action directed at promoting the inclusion of other citizens to strengthen the capacity of the collective to improve its surroundings without trying to influence public officials and public policy, or *social participation*. In summary, the analysis started by making a distinction between three dimensions of democracy to which we articulated five spheres or dimensions of democracy, as indicated in Table IX.1 (Benavides and Vargas Cullell 2003).

**Table IX.1. Dimensions of Democracy and Public Participation: Analytical Scheme**

| Dimension of democracy | Sphere | Dimension of participation |
|---|---|---|
| Democracy as a political regime | Access to power | Voting<br>Electoral activism |
| Democracy as a form of government | Exercise of power | Contacting authorities<br>Protests |
| Democracy as a living in public community | Horizontal relations between people | Social participation |

The LAPOP study contains a broad battery of questions to investigate the topic of public participation (Table IX.2). The questions related to each dimension were grouped in additive indices, which we called: the index of social participation, of contacting authorities, and of protest and electoral activism. The scores were added up and then normalized on a scale of 0-to-100 to facilitate their comparison. A score of 100 indicates that a person stated that he or she had participated in all the activities asked about. That is, that he or she is a very active citizen. A score of 0 indicates that the person said that he or she did not participate in any of the aspects investigated.

Finally, the variables that measure practices of public participation in each one of the spheres were recodified again, as indicated in Table IX.3, in order to simplify the analysis. Here, we distinguish four spheres: voting, electoral activism beyond the vote, participation by contacting officials, and the experience of participating in demonstrations. We then recodified the questions as binary variables to distinguish, in each case, whether there was (or was not) activity in the respective sphere. From the methodological point of view, the modes of participation are specific combinations of the values 0 and 1.

**Table XI. 2 Questions Used to Study Public Participation and the Conceptual Dimension in which They Were Grouped**

| | Question | Procedure |
|---|---|---|
| Social action | | |
| | CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí *[siga]* (2) No *[Pase a CP6]* (8) NS/NR *[Pase a CP6]* | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP5A. ¿Ha donado Ud. dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio? | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido Ud. con su propio trabajo o mano de obra? | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo Ud. a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora? | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar Ud. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora? | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si Ud. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado] | |
| | CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste… | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…. | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste… | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste… | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP10. ¿De un sindicato? | Recodif. 0-1. Solo 2006 |
| Contacting officials | | |
| | ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ? | |
| | CP2. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde o regidores)? | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del gobierno | Recodif. 0-1 |
| Participating in demonstrations | | |
| | PROT1. Alguna vez, ¿ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó "nunca" o "NS", marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5] | Recodif. 0-2. |
| | PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? | Recodif. 0-2. Solo 2006 |
| Electoral participation beyond the vote | | |
| | PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? *[Lea las alternativas]* (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR | Recodif. 0-1 |
| | PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó Ud. para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR | Recodif. 0-1 |

**Table IX.3 Recodification of the Public Participation Variables**

| Dimension of participation | Question | Recodification |
|---|---|---|
| Voting | VB2 | 0=Do not vote;<br>1=Vote; |
| Electoral activism | PP1-PP2 | 0=Never or rarely persuade others or work for a candidate; 1=Frequently do one of the two things |
| Social participation | CP5 CP5A CP5B CP5C CP5D CP7 CP8 CP9 CP10 | 0=Do not collaborate in the community<br>1= Collaborate in it at least once a month |
| Participate by contacting officials | CP2-CP4-CP4A | 0=Do not contact officials<br>1= Contact with at least one official |
| Participate in social protests | PROT1-PROT2 | 0=Do not participate in protests<br>1= Have participated at least once |

### *Findings*

Voting is the most widespread form of electoral participation in Costa Rica (voted in 2006). Following this is electoral participation beyond the vote: trying to persuade others how to vote or working for a candidate, which one out of four people do. Participating in the community and contacting officials are much less common (Table IX.4). Participating in social protests is the least frequent of all (only 10% of the people had participated this way).

**Table IX.4 Average Participation in Different Spheres on a Scale of 0-to-100, Costa Rica 2006**

| | Average |
|---|---|
| Voting | 70.8 |
| Electoral participation beyond the vote | 25.3 |
| Social participation (index scale 0-to-100) | 16.1 |
| Participate by contracting officials (index scale 0-to-100) | 13.2 |
| Participate in demonstrations (index scale 0-to-100) | 9.8 |

Valid N according to the list: 1,497
Note: in the case of social participation, no case achieved a score of 100 points.

An important question to figure out is whether the drop in electoral participation by voting in 2006 reflected a more general trend of falling public participation in the social and political life of the country. With the available information, the answer is negative: in both years, there is no considerable fall in the levels of public participation, with the exception of a slight decrease of participation by contacting officials, which declined from 17 to 13 points on a scale of 0-to-100 (Figure IX.1). The differences are not statistically representative in the case of participation beyond the vote and social participation. By contrast, there was a slight increase of participation in social protests, but for the most part, the low levels of public participation reported in the previous study continue. In summary, the climate of greater public distrust did not affect participation.

**Figure IX-1 Changes in the Levels of Public Participation between 2004 and 2006 on a Scale of 0-to-100**




Note: The results of the index of participating in protests and that of social participation are different than that reported in 2006 since it was not possible to use all the questions that were included in the 2006 LAPOP questionnaire in the comparative analysis.

## Modes of Public Participation

The modes of public participation are the kinds of interventions that people carry out in their social and political lives. A mode describes a characteristic profile of a person's activities. We reconstructed them by examining the things that people do in the different dimensions of public participation. The expression "mode of participation" is from Verba et al. (1995).

### *Methodology*

When the modes of participation are analyzed, the different social and political spheres in which a person intervenes are not seen individually, as presented in the previous section, but instead are seen together. Therefore, we analyze what people do, and usually they intervene in more than one way in the lives of their communities or country.

Our reconstruction of the modes of participation was based on a study of all the possible combinations between the five dimensions of participation discussed in the previous section. This analysis allowed us to then simplify the categories until we could distinguish four modes of participation:

People who do not do anything/or only vote;
People who participate in the social or political life but do not vote;
People who vote and conduct an additional activity in another sphere of public participation;
People who vote and conduct at least two additional activities – they are the most active.

The modes of participation are a nominal classification: the categories cannot be arranged in a hierarchy. The order in which we present them expresses the flexible application of certain criteria.[2]

### *Findings*

In Costa Rica, one out of ten people "do nothing," that is they do not exercise their right to participate in the social and economic life of the country. To this, we should add those (13%) for whom whose participation is limited to voting every four years, an act that requires minimum time and effort (Table IX.5). Almost a quarter of the population, then, is comprised of inactive people. This level is very similar to that reported for Costa Rica by the UNDP report on democracy in Latin America (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). Almost a fifth of the population intervenes in their communities or country – contacting authorities, protesting, participating in neighborhood community organizations, or even carrying out some kind of electoral activism – but without exercising their vote. Another group, close to half of the population, combines voting with at least one additional intervention (see the category "Participation with exercising the vote" in Table IX.6). Finally, the activists – people who intervene in all the spheres of public participation noted in this study – constitute a small group (7%).

Compared to other countries in the region, Costa Ricans are not particularly active, but neither are they the most inactive. The percentage of people who do nothing or only vote (a little less than 25% of the total) is in an intermediate position in Latin America; this group is largest in Guatemala and Nicaragua, where it includes more than 30% of the population (Table IX.6). Costa Rica is far behind Peru and the Dominican Republic, countries in which the population participates much more in social and economic life. In these two countries, approximately 45% of the population votes and carries out at least two more interventions (contacting authorities, protesting, collaborating in the community), compared to 34% in Costa Rica. In general, the level and type of public participation found in Costa Rica in 2006 is different than that reported by the UNDP, which was based on Latinobarómetro 2002. But it should be pointed out that this difference might be influenced by the decline in electoral participation in Costa Rica since this latter measure (Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004).

[2] Generally, the order of the presentation starts with the categories in which there is less personal cost (investment of time, money), commitment, and leadership, and concludes with the categories that imply greater personal cost, commitment, and leadership. At the end, we add a category that responds to other criteria.

**Table IX.5 Modes of Public Participation in Costa Rica, 2006**

| | | Percentage | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valid responses | Does nothing | 10.0 | |
| | Only votes | 13.4 | |
| | Participates without exercising the vote | 19.2 | |
| | Only social action | | 6.9 |
| | Only representation or only electoral activism | | 4.9 |
| | Social action and representation | | 5.0 |
| | Social action and electoral activism without voting | | 2.4 |
| | Participation with exercising the vote | 49.1 | |
| | Vote and social action | | 17.7 |
| | . Vote and representation | | 5.7 |
| | . Vote. social action. and representation | | 13.2 |
| | . Vote. social action. and electoral activism | | 6.1 |
| | Vote. representation. and electoral activism | | 6.4 |
| | Participate in all spheres | 8.3 | |
| | . Vote. social action. representation. and electoral activism | | 8.3 |
| | Total | 100.0 | |
| (N) | | (1,500) | |

Note: to simplify the presentation, participation by contacting officials and participating in protests were grouped together in the "representation" category.

**Table IX.6: Modes of Public Participation in Latin America (%), 2006**

| | | Recodified forms of participation | | | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Does nothing/only votes | Participates without voting | Voting and one additional intervention | Voting and at least two additional interventions | |
| Country | Mexico | 24 | 18 | 29 | 29 | 100 |
| | Guatemala | 34 | 24 | 23 | 19 | 100 |
| | El Salvador | 23 | 22 | 28 | 27 | 100 |
| | Honduras | 19 | 17 | 28 | 37 | 100 |
| | Nicaragua | 33 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 100 |
| | Costa Rica | 23 | 19 | 23 | 34 | 100 |
| | Panama | 29 | 13 | 22 | 36 | 100 |
| | Peru | 15 | 6 | 34 | 45 | 100 |
| | Chile | 22 | 21 | 29 | 29 | 100 |
| | Dominican R. | 15 | 22 | 20 | 43 | 100 |
| | Jamaica | 18 | 40 | 17 | 25 | 100 |

Note: The bases are weighted.

## Correlations of the Modes of Public Participation

In the 2004 LAPOP study, it was found that education and age were predictive factors of participation in the community sphere. This time, we inquired whether, with a different and broader methodology to measure participation, these findings would remain the same. To answer this question, we used a multinomial logistic regression model with "forms of participation" as the dependent variable and using the basic, political, and local effects variations applied in earlier chapters.[3] The basic model had a low predictive capacity, although better than that usually seen so far in this study (Nagelkerke R=0,163). This capacity increased when the political variables of the political model were considered (Nagelkerke R=0,223). Considering local differences – the cantons – improved the model's fit, significantly increasing its predictive capacity (Nagelkerke R=0,277); this is a rather high level compared to the results from earlier chapters (Table IX.7). Once again, this suggests the importance of analyzing local ecologies more thoroughly in the formation of public attitudes.

The statistically important (Sig < .1) sociodemographic variables that distinguish between at least one mode of public participation by the people who "do everything" (the most active, which are the reference category), are the following: age (squared), civil status (married or living together=1), occupation (housewife=1), and education (in years). Of these, only education is a predictive factor for all modes of participation. The important geographic variables are urban or rural residence and GMA/not GMA (Greater Metropolitan Area). This finding, together with the predictive capacity added by Model C, points to the weight of geography in the study of public participation, although subsequent analysis indicates that this effect is relatively small. Finally, the significant political variables are party support (1=no support), support for the system, tolerance toward legal participation, support for CAFTA-DR, and experience with corruption in the provision of public services. Generally, people who are not married or living together and housewives tend to be more inactive than the others ("do nothing or only vote"); residents of rural areas or outside the GMA are more active. People who support the system more, are more opposed CAFTA-DR, or who have been the victim of an act of corruption are the most active.

[3] The multinomial logistic regression is used when there is a nominal variable that is not exactly binary as is the case in the modes of public participation. Within this, the reference category is that of the most active people, who do "everything" in all areas that were investigated in this study.

**Table IX.7 Correlations of the Modes of Public Participation (Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Political Model)**

| Modes of participation recodified | Do nothing/Only vote | | | Participate without voting | | | Vote and anther intervention | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Predictors | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) | B | Sig. | Exp(B) |
| Intersection | 5.159 | .000 | | 3.563 | .000 | | 1.272 | .167 | |
| Age | -.178 | .000 | .837 | -.035 | .274 | .965 | -.044 | .133 | .957 |
| Age squared | .002 | .000 | 1.002 | .000 | .352 | 1.000 | .000 | .177 | 1.000 |
| Female | .041 | .853 | 1.042 | -.147 | .549 | .863 | -.146 | .509 | .864 |
| Housewife | -.425 | .100 | .654 | -.103 | .705 | .902 | .234 | .335 | 1.264 |
| Married (or living together) | -.055 | .776 | .947 | -.152 | .447 | .859 | .273 | .141 | 1.314 |
| Years of Education | -.059 | .025 | .942 | -.063 | .025 | .939 | -.034 | .151 | .966 |
| Wealth index | -.017 | .729 | .984 | -.031 | .543 | .970 | .067 | .158 | 1.069 |
| Non-Catholic religion | .042 | .851 | 1.043 | .309 | .172 | 1.362 | .043 | .838 | 1.044 |
| No religion | .248 | .440 | 1.281 | .611 | .053 | 1.842 | .027 | .936 | 1.027 |
| Trust neighbors | -.849 | .003 | .428 | -.474 | .116 | .623 | -.544 | .051 | .581 |
| TV news | -.716 | .048 | .489 | .207 | .614 | 1.230 | -.693 | .051 | .500 |
| Read newspapers | -.621 | .016 | .537 | -.678 | .013 | .507 | -.365 | .144 | .694 |
| Well-informed | -.888 | .082 | .412 | -2.170 | .000 | .114 | -1.163 | .015 | .312 |
| Small city | .371 | .103 | 1.449 | -.010 | .969 | .990 | .095 | .650 | 1.100 |
| Rural area | .069 | .795 | 1.071 | -.340 | .235 | .712 | .006 | .981 | 1.006 |
| Central Valley region | .209 | .334 | 1.233 | -.139 | .549 | .870 | .554 | .011 | 1.739 |
| Index of government efficacy | .003 | .383 | 1.004 | .003 | .543 | 1.003 | .000 | .963 | 1.000 |
| Index of intolerance of illegal participation | .011 | .046 | 1.011 | .000 | .952 | 1.000 | .008 | .122 | 1.008 |
| Index of tolerance of legal participation | -.012 | .004 | .988 | -.001 | .823 | .999 | -.004 | .388 | .996 |
| Index of support for CAFTA-DR | .008 | .003 | 1.008 | -.001 | .819 | .999 | -.001 | .625 | .999 |
| Incidence of corruption | -.376 | .087 | .687 | -.062 | .779 | .940 | -.426 | .039 | .653 |
| Index of support for the system | .000 | .972 | 1.000 | -.011 | .031 | .989 | .003 | .579 | 1.003 |
| Household economic situation | .033 | .669 | 1.033 | .035 | .659 | 1.035 | .004 | .956 | 1.004 |
| National economic situation | -.074 | .413 | .929 | -.116 | .244 | .891 | .086 | .305 | 1.090 |

a The reference category is: Voted and at least two other interventions.

Educational levels are an important predictor of the mode in which people participate in the social and political life of a country. Generally, people with post-secondary education are a good deal more active than people with lower levels of education. If we compare people with post-secondary education who "vote and carry out at least two additional interventions" with similarly educated people who "do nothing or only vote," the ratio between them is 2.8 to 1. By contrast, if we do the same comparison between people with primary or less education, the ratio is almost equal to 1 (Figure IX.2). We should also note that this pattern is repeated when the most active people are compared to those who "participate without voting:" here too, people a with primary education are most prevalent compared to those who have post-secondary education.

Additionally, the variables related to trust in one's neighbors and being well-informed are important predictors of the mode of public participation. Trust, the level of political information that people have, and watching TV news are positively related with greater public activism. When we compare the modes of participation "vote and carry out at least two additional interventions" and "do nothing or only vote," people who trust their neighbors more have a ratio of 1.9 to 1; the situation is the opposite when we analyze people who tend not to trust their neighbors: less trustful people prevail among the more inactive (Figure IX.3).[1]

These findings – that education and variables related to interpersonal trust and knowledge are important predictors – are consistent with the findings from the 2004 LAPOP study even though we used a different methodology.[2] They are also consistent with what Verba and colleagues have pointed out in their studies of participation: that by participating, people "invest" in the system and, therefore, tend to support it more (Verba, Brady et al. 1995; Schlozman, Verba et al. 1999; Burns, Schlozman et al. 2001).

[1] It is worth noting that a similar trend, but more marked, can be found when victimization by corruption is studied: the victims tend to participate more than the rest.

[2] These results were also obtained when we conducted the analysis combining the 2004 and 2006 data with a slightly different variable "modes of public participation" in which only the questions included in both LAPOP studies were used. The level of education was a significant factor to predict the modes of public participation that people have.

**Figure IX-2 Forms of Participation by Level of Education, 2006**




**Figure IX-3 Forms of Participation by Trust in Neighbors, 2006**




Note: we use the modes-of-participation variable defined for the 2006 LAPOP study (it includes two questions that were not used in the 2004 study). In the case of trust in neighbors, 1= much trust; 0= no trust.

# Chapter X. The Free Trade Agreement with the U.S

## Introduction

The Costa Rican government's signing and ratification of the free trade agreement between Central America, the Dominican Republic, and the United States (CAFTA-DR) has been one of the most polemical and divisive issues in Costa Rican politics in recent years (Alonso 2004; Martínez and Castro 2004; Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 2004; Mora 2004; Sanabria 2004; Trejos 2004; Comisión de Notables 2005). The conflicts were unleashed during the negotiations of the agreement, between 2003 and 2004, and intensified once the executive branch concluded the negotiation. While the legislatures of the Dominican Republic, all other Central American countries, and the United States have already ratified CAFTA-DR, Costa Rica is the only country that had still not ratified it, at the time this report was written.

The conflicts over the eventual ratification of CAFTA-DR have appeared in multiple arenas. Within the Pacheco (2002-2006) administration, which originally promoted the trade agreement, sharp internal tensions arose that divided the cabinet at the end of 2004. Within the state, institutional divisions have appeared: while the Ministry of International Commerce (*Ministerio de Comercio Exterior*) is the main promoter of CAFTA-DR, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a public report opposing it, and officials from various public universities have spoken out against the agreement. During 2005, there were public marches in favor and against CAFTA-DR: trade unions, universities, and some producer associations mobilized demonstrations of people opposed to it; entrepreneurial chambers and related groups mobilized supporters of the agreement (Programa Estado de la Nación 2006). The debate over CAFTA-DR also burst onto the stage of electoral politics as a topic the main political parties had to address: the PLN and the ML declared their support for the agreement, while the PAC argued that it should be renegotiated to obtain better terms.

Radicals on both sides have either characterized CAFTA-DR as indispensable for the development of the country and whose rejection will have very negative effects, or as a fundamental threat to the country's sovereignty and social welfare state (*estado de derecho social*) (for a characterization of the positions, see Alonso 2004). These extreme positions, however, are only some of those that have been put forward: apart from the proposal to re-negotiate, other sectors have suggested different kinds of conditional support for CAFTA-DR (Comisión de Notables 2005).

This chapter has two aims in addressing such a polemical issue as CAFTA-DR. First, we propose to sound out public attitudes to determine the real climate of public opinion and identify the factors that explain why people support or reject the free trade agreement. We conduct this query both for the current situation as well as to determine the main changes since 2004. Second, in view of the conflicts unleashed by CAFTA-DR, we inquire into some of the political risks for the governability of the country by examining the connections between diffuse and specific support for the political system and attitudes of support or rejection of CAFTA-DR.

## Attitudes about CAFTA-DR

We included a battery of questions in this study to explore public support for CAFTA-DR in some depth (Box X.1). Our preference for various questions and not just a synthetic measure was based on the hypothesis that wide segments of the public might have intermediate, ambivalent, or contradictory attitudes ("grey areas") in their support or rejection of the free trade agreement. And if true, that it would be important to determine the nature of these grey areas since information about them could influence the type of political discussion on the topic. It was also important to examine how the public accepted the political theses proposed during the 2005-2006 election campaign. In turn, this could influence the balance of power between those who oppose and promote CAFTA-DR.

Box 10.1 Question Used on the Topic of Attitudes toward the Free Trade Agreement in 2006

COSTLC1. Hablando sobre el TLC con Estados Unidos, cree ud que debemos rechazarlo, aprobarlo o renegociarlo?
1. Rechazar el TLC 2. Aprobar el TLC 3. Renegociar el TLC 4. Otros
8. NS / NR [Pase a próxima sección ED]

COSTLC2. Su opinión sobre el TLC, ¿es la misma que tenía hace un año o cambió durante la campaña electoral? [Lea las respuestas de 1 a 3]
1. Es la misma que hace un año 2. Cambió durante la campaña electoral
3. Cambió después de la campaña electoral 4. [No leer] Otros 8. NS / NR

COSTLC3. ¿Cuál de las siguientes acciones debe adoptar el gobierno? [Lea las respuestas de 1 a 3]
1. Tratar de que la nueva Asamblea Legislativa apruebe el TLC lo antes posible [Pase COSTLC5]
2. Convocar primero a una consulta popular para que ahí se decida la suerte del TLC
3. Retirar el TLC de la Asamblea Legislativa y desecharlo 4. [No leer] Otros 8. NS/NR

COSTLC4. Si la Asamblea Legislativa aprueba el TLC y la gente sale a las calles para rechazarlo, como ocurrió con el Combo del ICE, estaría Usted... [Lea las respuestas 1-5]
1. Muy de acuerdo con las protestas 2. De acuerdo 3. En desacuerdo
4. Muy en desacuerdo 5. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo [No leer respuestas 6 y 7]
6. Depende 7. Otros 8. NS/NR

COSTLC5. Después de todo lo que hemos hablado y en resumen ¿Comparando los beneficios y los perjuicios del TLC, diría Ud que el TLC: [Lea las respuestas 1 y 2]
1. Traerá más beneficios 2. Traerá más perjuicios 4. [NO LEER] Otros 8. NS / NR

COSB48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?. Respuestas en escala 1 a 7, 1=Nada, 7=mucho

CAFTA-DR causes less polarized reactions among the public than might be expected given the polarized debate that supporters and critics of the agreement have sustained for several years (Table X.1). For starters, around 20% of the population does not have an opinion about the free trade agreement or does not respond. The analysis that follows was conducted with the 80% of respondents who did have an opinion (about 1,200 interviews).

**Table X.1 Attitudes toward CAFTA-DR**

| Topics investigated and responses | Oppose agreement | Neutral | Favor agreement | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Position toward agreement | | | | 1,189 |
| Reject it | 21 | | | |
| Renegotiate it | | 50 | | |
| Approve it | | | 29 | |
| Changed opinion regarding agreement | | | | 1,207 |
| Same opinion as a year ago | | 83 | | |
| Changed with electoral campaign | | 15 | | |
| Other | | 2 | | |
| Government action toward agreement | | | | 1,152 |
| Withdraw it from Congress | 19 | | | |
| Referendum | | 54 | | |
| Congress should approve quickly | | | 27 | |
| Demonstrations against agreement | | | | 1,210 |
| Agree with or agree with a great deal | 42 | | | |
| Depends, etc. | | 7 | | |
| Disagree with or disagree with a great deal | | | 50 | |
| Cost-Benefit of agreement | | | | 1,155 |
| More damage | 35 | | | |
| Others | | 15 | | |
| More benefits | | | 50 | |
| Agreement will improve economy (scale 1-7) | | | | 1,332 |
| Scale 1 (none) to 2 | 23 | | | |
| Scale 3 to 5 | | 42 | | |
| Scale 6 to 7 (much) | | | 35 | |

Note: People who support the quick approval of CAFTA-DR in Congress (COSTLC3) were codified in COSTLC4 as opposed to demonstrations.

The largest group has intermediate attitudes regarding CAFTA-DR (50% favor renegotiating it and 51% favor a referendum). The smallest group is composed of people who oppose CAFTA-DR (around 20% in the questions about their position and government action), although those who fully support it are also a minority (around 30%). The positions in favor or against CAFTA-DR increase when we ask about support for possible demonstrations and the benefits or costs of the agreement. On both issues, the intermediate positions do not predominate; more people disapprove of demonstrations (50%) and believe that the free trade agreement will cause harm (50%), but the groups with the opposite position in both cases are also large (42% and 35% respectively). Additionally, most people state that they had not modified their position within the last year, which seems to indicate that the propaganda campaigns in favor or against the agreement were not very effective. In summary, relatively favorable attitudes toward CAFTA-DR, such as the perception that it will bring more benefits than costs, combine with cautious attitudes of the best course of action to follow (re-negotiate and hold a referendum), while the positions decidedly in favor or against the treaty are in the minority.

Various of the questions about CAFTA-DR refer to similar issues. Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether they comprise a single scale.[1] The resulting Cronbach´s alpha coefficient was 0.86, a value that suggests that the four questions do form a scale with a high degree of internal consistency. The scale derived from the four questions, with values between 0 and 100, correlates around 0.80 for each one of them.[2] In it, respondents are distributed in a relatively uniform manner along the values of the scale from 0 to 80, with a higher concentration after 80 (i.e., for values decidedly in favor of CAFTA-DR) (Figure X.1). If we take the 20 lowest points on the scale as an indicator of a clear rejection of CAFTA-DR, and the 20 highest points as clear support for it, this gives us the percentage of the population with a radical or extreme position: 17% and 30% respectively. The remaining group, which represents 53% of respondents, has intermediate or relatively neutral positions regarding CAFTA-DR.

**Figure X-1 Distribution of Support for CAFTA-DR**




Note: 367 (24%) lost observations because respondents did not know or did not respond.

[1] We excluded question COSTLC2 from the analysis since it clearly refers to another topic.

[2] Some 72.3% of the people (1,085) responded to questions COSTLC1, COSTLC3, COSTLC4 and COSTLC5 (we excluded question COSTLC2 from the scale since, as stated above, it asks about a different topic – changes in the preference for the agreement). To reduce the incidence of the "no response" answers, we conducted a rescue procedure of the cases where people responded to three questions. In these cases, we assigned to the no responses the person's average rating in the other three items to which they did respond. With this procedure, we raised the number of valid cases to 79.2% (1,185).

What factors help predict support for CAFTA-DR? After a preliminary analysis, we determined that some effects are not necessarily linear for the entire range of the scale: some have an effect on the adamant opponents of the agreement, while others have an effect on the other extreme, among its supporters. In view of this, we decided to run two logistic models: one for the probability of rejection and the other for the probability of support (this is equivalent to adjusting a multinomial model of three categories of support for CAFTA-DR). As in earlier chapters, we used three models: the basic, political, and local effects models. Table X.2 shows the exponentiated regression coefficients, the OR, for the models with political variables. In the lower part, we show the goodness of fit (pseudo R2) of the three models

**Table X.2 Regression Model of Public Support for CAFTA-DR**

| Explanatory variables | Support CAFTA-DR | | Reject CAFTA-DR | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OR | P>\|z\| | OR | P>\|z\| |
| Age | 1.00 | 0.993 | 0.99 | 0.683 |
| Age squared | 1.00 | 0.939 | 1.00 | 0.699 |
| Female | 0.97 | 0.846 | 1.14 | 0.562 |
| Housewife | 0.91 | 0.630 | 1.14 | 0.578 |
| Married (or living together) | 0.91 | 0.533 | 1.10 | 0.615 |
| Years of education | 0.96 | 0.051 | 0.96 | 0.109 |
| Wealth index | 1.01 | 0.830 | 0.97 | 0.419 |
| Non-Catholic religion | 1.16 | 0.388 | 1.63 | 0.013 |
| No religion | 1.15 | 0.569 | 1.31 | 0.343 |
| Trust in neighbors | 1.10 | 0.670 | 1.17 | 0.574 |
| TV news | 0.84 | 0.533 | 0.82 | 0.535 |
| Read newspapers | 1.99 | 0.001 | 0.63 | 0.058 |
| Well-informed | 1.96 | 0.091 | 0.56 | 0.237 |
| Small city | 1.09 | 0.644 | 1.12 | 0.622 |
| Rural area | 1.01 | 0.943 | 1.07 | 0.792 |
| Central Valley region | 0.85 | 0.333 | 0.92 | 0.668 |
| Government efficacy (0-1) | 1.93 | 0.039 | 0.36 | 0.007 |
| Support for democracy (0-1) | 0.86 | 0.706 | 1.10 | 0.840 |
| Intolerance of illegal participation (0-1) | 4.12 | 0.004 | 0.25 | 0.002 |
| Tolerance of legal participation (0-1) | 0.71 | 0.315 | 1.18 | 0.698 |
| Political tolerance (0-1)) | 0.65 | 0.080 | 1.23 | 0.504 |
| Voted in 2006 (1=yes) | 1.09 | 0.672 | 1.39 | 0.194 |
| Voted PLN in 2006 | 1.13 | 0.576 | 0.72 | 0.227 |
| Voted PAC in 2006 | 0.52 | 0.004 | 1.04 | 0.890 |
| Do not support a party (1=no support) | 1.37 | 0.285 | 0.52 | 0.030 |
| Current PLN supporter | 2.14 | 0.024 | 0.38 | 0.010 |
| Current PAC supporter | 0.96 | 0.908 | 0.83 | 0.630 |
| Basic model pseudo R2 | | 0.017 | | 0.033 |
| Political model pseudo R2 | | 0.065 | | 0.070 |
| Local effects model pseudo R2 | | 0.098 | | 0.110 |

N = 1,168 observations. The statistically significant factors are in bold.

In the three models, the basic sociodemographic factors explain only 2% or 3% of the variance of support for or rejection of the agreement. The political variables increase the explanation four percentage points, and local effects raise it three or four additional points. The most important effects are, then, political attitudes and local effects, which suggest that the position people have toward the agreement are mainly governed by ideology as well as local "ecologies," which need to be studied in greater detail. However, the low explanatory power of the three models should be recognized.

Among the sociodemographic characteristics, education stands out, reducing both the probability of support and rejection (an extra year of education decreases such probabilities by 4%); that is, it pushes people toward the center. Reading newspapers daily and being fairly well-informed doubles the odds of supporting the agreement. In the same way, readings newspapers reduces the odds of being against it by 37%. The only sociodemographic characteristic with a significant effect is professing to have a non-Catholic religion, which increases the odds of opposing the agreement by 63%.

As already indicated, it is necessary to pay more attention to political variables than sociodemographic ones to explain positions toward the agreement. In these, what stands out is the perception of government efficacy, intolerance toward illegal protests, and certain election-related political variables such as having voted in the 2006 elections and current party support (except for the PAC). The odds of supporting the treaty almost double among people who think the government is very efficacious (the maximum level); likewise, the probability of rejecting it falls 64% among these same people. A similar "maximum" effect occurs among people very concerned with order, that is people who have the highest levels of intolerance toward illegal demonstrations. The probability that they support the agreement is four times greater, and that they reject it, four times less. Current supporters of the PLN are more than twice as likely to support the agreement and have 62% less chance of rejecting it. People who voted for the PAC in 2006 and those who have greater political tolerance in general are less likely to support the agreement, but this does not necessarily raise the probability that they reject it. Finally, people who do not currently support any political party are less likely to reject the agreement, without supporting it significantly more.

It is very important to emphasize that diffuse support for democracy neither shows a significant association with support for CAFTA-DR nor with the rejection of it. The political implication of this finding needs to be highlighted. It suggests that despite the importance of the debate about CAFTA-DR and the current divisions it has generated inside Costa Rican politics, the eventual ratification (or rejection) of the agreement by Congress is not linked to individual variations in support for the political system. In other words, "democratic forces" are not confronting "anti-democratic" ones (however they are defined) in an epic battle over the free trade agreement. This does not mean that the general trends in the society do not influence the evolution of support for CAFTA-DR over time. As will be seen below, these trends have an important impact when we compare the situation in 2006 to that in 2004.

Finally, the local effects model shows that the community has some importance in predicting support for CAFTA-DR, since these effects elevate the predictive capacity of the model, measured by R-squared, close to 50%. On average, people who read newspapers daily tend to

support CAFTA-DR substantially more than people who never or rarely read them. The difference on the scale of support for the agreement is 63 to 50 points (Figure X.2). As mentioned above, age, sex, occupation, civil status, economic condition, and regional variables do not introduce differences in the support for CAFTA-DR, which indicates, from the sociodemographic and regional point of view, that this support is rather widely distributed within Costa Rican society without any apparent pattern. From a political point of view, people with greater intolerance of road blockages, taking over buildings, and other illegal acts of social protest show greater support for the agreement (Figure X.3). The differences are notable (more than 10 points) although the relation with support is not linear.

**Figure X-2 Average Support for CAFTA-DR by Reading Newspapers**




**Figure X-3 Average Support for CAFTA-DR by Intolerance of Illegal Participation**




What most influences support for CAFTA-DR is the area of political and electoral participation. This is expected since it was one of the most debated issues of the 2006 electoral process. The two parties with the highest numbers vote, the PLN and the PAC, squared off with opposing positions on the topic: the former supported CAFTA-DR and the latter favored re-negotiating it. Of PLN voters, 40% support the treaty and 13% oppose it. This compares to 18% support and 20% opposition among PAC voters. Although the difference between these two groups is clear, people's positions within them are far from monolithic: neither all PLN voters favor the treaty nor do all PAC voters oppose it. People who voted for other parties, and those who abstained or cast blank or null ballots, are in an intermediate position. This last result is of great interest considering that various groups have claimed to represent the abstentionists on this issue. Abstentionists appear to be more like PAC voters in their degree of opposition to the agreement (18%), but are closer to the PLN is their level of support (30%) and, above all, in the percentage of ambivalent people. What is striking is that PAC voters have the greatest degree of ambivalence toward the agreement at 62%. These findings, although congruent with what was seen in the election campaign, suggest that the measure of support for or opposition to CAFTA-DR does not correspond solely to voting behavior.

**Figure X-4 Degree of Support for CAFTA-RD by Presidential Vote in 2006**




## Changing Support for CAFTA-DR between 2004 and 2006

An important question to explore is the change in public support for CAFTA-DR between 2004 and 2006. If support increased during these years, both the executive branch and other promoters of CAFTA-DR would be in a better position to deal with the difficult task of congressional ratification should the administration find itself without a majority in this body. By contrast, if support declined, those opposed to the agreementwould be in a better position to rally people to derail the ratification either through congressional opposition or collective demonstrations of protest.

The 2004 LAPOP study did not include a battery of questions to inquire in any depth about people's attitudes toward CAFTA-DR – an important topic since, as suggested, large segments of the population have intermediate, ambiguous, or contradictory positions. Despite this limitation, we can address changes in support for CAFTA, though in a limited way, since both the 2004 and 2006 studies included a question (COSB48) that asks: "How much do you believe that the free trade agreement will help improve the economy?" (The responses were recorded on a scale from 1= none to 7= much). Certainly, the phrasing of the question is different from the series of questions COSTLC1-COSTLC4, but it does bear some resemblance to question COSTLC5 on the benefits or costs of the free trade agreement.

One way to determine if question COSB48 is a valid measure of public support for CAFTA-DR is to examine the manner in which it behaves in relation to the index of support for CAFTA-DR that we analyzed in the previous section. If there is a strong and direct association between both measures, we could use question COSB48 as a synthetic and approximate measure of support for the agreement. The Pearson's correlation coefficient between the index and question COSB48 turned out to be 0.66, which is direct and robust, as expected, but without perfect colinearity. This allows us to confidently use question COSB48 to measure the changes in support for CAFTA-DR between 2004 and 2006.

Between April 2004 and June 2006, there was a sharp decline in public support for CAFTA-DR (Figure X.5). The average belief that the free trade agreement would benefit the economy declined 10 points, dropping from a comfortable score of 66, on a scale of 0-to-100, to an intermediate score of 56. This decline is statistically significant to a 95% level of confidence. Thus, in the field of public opinion, at least, the defenders of CAFTA-DR have lost important ground although on average they still have some advantage.

**Figure X-5 Change in the Average Confidence in CAFTA-DR as a Means of Development 2004 and 2006**




The fall of support for CAFTA-DR seems to have occurred in almost all groups no matter the criteria: sex, age, level of education, region of residence (Table X.3). Also, surprisingly, people who said that they had not changed their opinion had an index of support 10 points less than they did in 2004, and similar to the index of people who did change their opinion. This finding suggests that the responses to the question of whether a person changed his or her opinion do not reflect the reality of the changes that occurred. If they reflected those changes, the index should show a similar average to that of 2004 for people who said they did not change their opinion, and one substantially less for people who said they did change their opinion.

**Table X.3 Changes in Confidence about CAFTA-DR between 2004 and 2006 by Some Characteristics of the Population**

| | Average | | Difference | (N observations) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Groups | 2004 | 2006 | | 2004 | 2006 |
| Total | 66 | 56 | -10 | (1,364) | (1,332) |
| Women | 65 | 55 | -10 | (676) | (667) |
| Men | 66 | 57 | -9 | (688) | (665) |
| Under 30 years | 67 | 56 | -11 | (451) | (459) |
| 30 or more years | 65 | 56 | -9 | (913) | (873) |
| Primary or less | 64 | 55 | -9 | (610) | (546) |
| Some degree of secondary | 67 | 56 | -11 | (527) | (514) |
| Post-secondary | 66 | 56 | -10 | (227) | (272) |
| Central Valley | 66 | 57 | -10 | (987) | (970) |
| Outside the Central Valley | 63 | 54 | -10 | (377) | (362) |
| Urban | 66 | 57 | -10 | (862) | (863) |
| Rural | 64 | 55 | -9 | (502) | (469) |
| Do not read newspapers daily | 64 | 54 | -10 | (1,024) | (991) |
| Read newspapers daily | 69 | 62 | -7 | (339) | (341) |
| Not Catholic | 66 | 53 | -13 | (350) | (362) |
| Catholic | 65 | 57 | -8 | (1,014) | (970) |
| Low government efficacy | 53 | 51 | -2 | (541) | (789) |
| High government efficacy | 74 | 63 | -11 | (779) | (513) |
| Did not change opinion | 66 | 56 | -10 | (1,314) | (1,135) |
| Did change opinion | . | 55 | … | … | (197) |

Table X.3 also shows the changes that occurred according to three variables that, in line with the regression analysis of the previous section, have a significant effect on approval or rejection of the agreement. We can see that these three variables identify groups in which support for the agreement fell in a different way in each. Support for CAFTA-DR fell less (-7 points) among people who read newspapers daily compared those who do not; this also, in 2006, widens the gap between them and people who do not get their information from the written press (62 vs. 54). Additionally, a gap that did not exist in 2004 has begun to form in terms of support for the agreement by people's religion: support fell more among people who call themselves non-

Catholics than among Catholics (-13 compared to -8). However, the largest difference in the fall of support for the agreement was in the groups defined by the index of government efficacy.[3] There was almost no change (-2 points) among people who consider that the government is doing a poor job since their support for the agreement in 2004 was already relatively low (53 compared to 74).

To understand and explain the fall in support for CAFTA-DR, it is worth first exploring if it is concentrated in certain groups. Secondly, we should explore whether the composition of people in groups with differing support for the agreement has changed and how much this explains the observed fall between 2004 and 2006. For this to happen, the variable in question has to be significantly associated with support for or rejection of the agreement, the issue we studied in the logistic regressions of the previous section. The composition of the population according to these variables also has to have changed significantly. The only variable that contains these two conditions is the index of government efficacy. We know that people who do not favorably rate the job the government is doing tend to support the agreement less, and we also know that this index fell substantially between 2004 and 2006 (Table X.3).

To quantify these effects, we adjusted the multiple regression models to the comparative variable of support for the agreement. In a first model, the only explanatory variable is the dummy one of whether or not the opinion belongs to the 2006 survey (the LAPOP-2006 variable in Table X.4). The estimated regression coefficient for this variable is -9.55, a value that exactly measures the change that occurred on the scale of support for the agreement between 2004 and 2006. In the subsequent models, we pay attention to the changes in this coefficient produced by considering other variables. Table X.4 shows two additional models. For the model in which the only additional variable is the index of government efficacy, the LAPOP-2006 coefficient falls -5.05 points. This means that declining credibility of government efficacy explains 47% of the 9.55-point fall in support for CAFTA-DR. No other variable investigated in the two surveys provided any additional explanation for the fall. This is what the regression model of the last column in Table X.4 shows. Here, we combined the three variables that were previously identified as associated with support for the agreement (reading newspapers, being Catholic, and the index of political tolerance) with the index of support for democracy.[4] For all practical purposes, the combination of these variables does not alter the LAPOP-2006 coefficient; that is, it does not add any additional explanation of the causes of the fall. One could continue adding additional

[3] As it involves a comparison between 2004 and 2006, we constructed the index of government efficacy based on the three questions included in both studies (N1, N3, and N9). See Chapter IV.

[4] Diffuse support for democracy emerged in this model as a significant predictor of support for CAFTA-DR. An increase of one point in diffuse support for democracy produced a 0.19-point increase in support for the agreement. This result contrasts with the non-significant effect obtained in the analysis of support for the agreement in 2006. The explanation of this apparent contradiction stems from the change in the dependent variable. For unknown reasons, the index of support for the agreement, constructed with four questions, did not show any association with the index of support for democracy, while it did with the responses to the question of whether the agreement would help improve the economy. Something similar occurred with the "well-informed" variable (not shown in the tables). It would seem that people with greater support for democracy and who are better-informed perceive the agreement to be economically beneficial, but this does not translate into more general support possibly because of other non-economic considerations.

variables and the coefficient would remain around -5.1. This value is the residual fall in support for the agreement that could not be explained with the variables investigated in the survey, which represents a little more than half of the observed fall.

**Table X.4 Multiple Regression for Confidence in CAFTA-DR as a Means of Development 2004-2006**

| Explanatory variables | Base | Government efficacy | Other variables |
|---|---|---|---|
| LAPOP-2006 | -9.55 | -5.05 | -5.10 |
| Index of government efficacy | | 0.36 | 0.29 |
| Read newspapers | | | 6.12 |
| Catholic religion | | | 0.94 |
| Index of political tolerance | | | -0.05 |
| Index of support for democracy | | | 0.19 |
| Constant | 65.58 | 45.43 | 36.08 |
| R-squared | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.12 |
| Explication | 100% | 47% | -1% |

Note: All the effects are significant to $p<0.05$, except that of religion.

In conclusion, the important changes in the perception of the government's performance between 2004 and 2006 impacted the level of support for CAFTA-DR, reducing the index by five points. The index also fell five additional points for causes that this study does not explain. We know, though, that this residual fall is concentrated largely among people with a high opinion of how the government has performed, as well as among people who read newspapers rarely or not at all, and among people who stated that they are not Catholic.

The main conclusion of this comparative analysis is the following: subsequent falls in the perception of the government's efficacy will negatively impact public support for the free trade agreement. The implication of this is that a good deal of the support for CAFTA-DR, in the critical moments of congressional approval in up-coming months, depends largely on the capacity of the government to show results in other areas of public policy. Additionally, given that most people have cautious attitudes favoring "renegotiation" or a "referendum," as seen in the second section of this chapter, a key point will be how the actors in the struggle appropriate and manage to redefine what is understood by renegotiating CAFTA-DR – whether this renegotiation refers to initiating a new round with the other signatory countries or if it refers to a domestic political agreement.

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# Annexes

Consentimiento informado

Cuestionario (representación en papel del cuestionario en *PDA*)

Centro Centroamericano de Población

Junio/Julio, 2006

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo del Centro Centroamericano de Población de la UCR para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Costa Rica.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse al **Centro Centroamericano de Población** de la **UCR**, al **207-5693** con el Dr. Luis Rosero o con Lic. Róger Bonilla.

¿Desea Participar?

Versión # 23bR (PDA) IRB Approval: **060187**

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: COSTA RICA, 2006



**Entrevistador: Lea y entregue la nota de consentimiento informado**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **País:** 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua **6. Costa Rica** 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24.Guyana 25. Trinidad | PAIS | 6 |
| Area de enumeración | ARENUM | |
| **IDNUM.** Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]_____ ESTRATOPRI: 1. AMSJ 2. Urbano - Bajura 3. Urbano – Central 4. Rural – Bajura | IDNUM<br>ESTRATOPRI | 60___ |
| **UPM**._____ | UPM | |
| **COSProvincia**_____ | COSPROV | |
| COSCANTON: _____ | COSCANTON | |
| **COSDISTRIO.** Distrito del cantón_____ | COSDISTRITO | |
| **SEGMENTO CENSAL**_____ | COSSEGMENTO | |
| **Sector**_____ | COSSEC | |
| **CLUSTER.** (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] | CLUSTER | |
| **UR** 1. Urbano 2. Rural | UR | |
| **Tamaño del lugar: 1. San José (área metropolitana, estrato 1) 4. Ciudad pequeña (estratos 2 y 3) 5. Área rural (estratos 4 y 5)** | TAMANO | |
| Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español | COSIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ] | 1 |
| Hora de inicio: _____:_____ *[por programa]* | HORA1 | |
| Fecha de la entrevista dia: ____ mes:_____ año: 2006 *[por programa]* | FECHA | |
| **Entrevistador** (LISTA DE ENTREVISTADORES CON CODIGOS) | ENTREV | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Q1**. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer | Q1 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **A4 [COA4]**. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [**NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]** | A4 | ☐<br>☐ |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agua, falta de | 19 | Inflación, altos precios | 02 |
| Caminos/vías en mal estado | 18 | Los políticos | 59 |
| Conflicto armado | 30 | Mal gobierno | 15 |
| Corrupción | 13 | Medio ambiente | 10 |
| Crédito, falta de | 09 | Migración | 16 |
| Delincuencia, crimen, violencia | 05 | Narcotráfico | 12 |
| Derechos humanos, violaciones de | 56 | Pandillas | 14 |
| Desempleo/falta de empleo | 03 | Pobreza | 04 |
| Desigualdad | 58 | Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) | 06 |
| Desnutrición | 23 | Salud, falta de servicio | 22 |
| Desplazamiento forzado | 32 | Secuestro | 31 |
| Deuda Externa | 26 | Seguridad (falta de) | 27 |
| Discriminación | 25 | Terrorismo | 33 |
| Drogadicción | 11 | Tierra para cultivar, falta de | 07 |
| Economía, problemas con, crisis de | 01 | Transporte, problemas con el | 60 |
| Educación, falta de, mala calidad | 21 | Violencia | 57 |
| Electricidad, falta de | 24 | Vivienda | 55 |
| Explosión demoFigure | 20 | Otro | 70 |
| Guerra contra terrorismo | 17 | NS/NR | 88 |

| DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para Ud. la democracia? [OJO: *No leer alternativas*. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, "¿significa algo más?"] . Aceptar hasta tres respuestas. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | $1^0$ Respuesta DEM13A | Sondee: ¿significa algo más? $2^0$ Respuesta DEM13B | Sondee: ¿significa algo más? $3^0$ Respuesta DEM13C |
| No tiene ningún significado | 0 | | |
| Libertad: | | | |
| Libertad (sin decir que tipo) | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Libertad económica | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Libertad de movimiento | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Libertad, falta de | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Ser independientes | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Economía: | | | |
| Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Capitalismo | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Libre comercio, libre negocio | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Trabajo, más oportunidad de | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Trabajo, falta de | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Sufragio: | | | |
| Derecho de escoger lideres | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| Elecciones, voto | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| Elecciones libres | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Elecciones fraudulentas | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Igualdad: | | | |
| Igualdad (sin especificar) | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Igualdad económica, de clases | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Igualdad de género | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| Igualdad frente a la leyes | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Igualdad de razas o étnica | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad | 22 | 22 | 22 |
| Participación: | | | |
| Limitaciones de participación | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Participación (sin decir que tipo) | 24 | 24 | 24 |
| Participación de las minorías | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Poder del pueblo | 26 | 26 | 26 |
| Estado de derecho: | | | |
| Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| Justicia | 29 | 29 | 29 |
| Obedecer la ley , menos corrupción | 30 | 30 | 30 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gobierno no militar | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| Vivir en paz, sin guerra | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Guerra, invasiones | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Otra respuesta | 80 | 80 | 80 |
| NS/NR | 88 | 88 | 88 |
| **Código** (si da únicamente una respuesta, o NS/NR se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas y la segunda es NS/NR, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1] | DEM13A ☐☐ | DEM13B ☐☐ | DEM13C ☐☐ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **DEM13D.** ¿De estos significados de democracia que Ud. ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio 2 o 3 respuestas y ninguna es NS/NR. Anote el código.] 88. NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta] | DEM13D | ☐☐ |

Ahora, cambiando el tema….. …..[ Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir "todos los días", "una o dos veces por semana", "rara vez", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado]

| Con qué frecuencia … (LEER) | Todos los días | Una o dos veces por semana | Rara vez | Nunca | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A1.** Escucha noticias por la radio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | A1 | |
| **A2.** Mira noticias en la TV. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | A2 | |
| **A3.** Lee noticias en los periódicos | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | A3 | |
| **A4i.** Lee noticias vía Internet | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | A4I | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **SOCT1**. Ahora, hablando de la economía…. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR | SOCT1 | |
| **SOCT2.** ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR | SOCT2 | |
| **IDIO1.** ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR | IDIO1 | |
| **IDIO2.** ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR | IDIO2 | |

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ? | Sí | No | NS/NR | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP2**. A algún diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa? | 1 | 2 | 8 | CP2 | |
| **CP4A**. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde o regidores)? | 1 | 2 | 8 | CP4A | |
| **CP4**. A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del gobierno? | 1 | 2 | 8 | CP4 | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **PROT1.** Alguna vez, ¿ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? **[Si "nunca" o "NS/NR", marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]** | (1) algunas veces | (2) casi nunca | (3) Nunca | (8) NS/NR | | PROT1 | |
| **PROT2.** ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? | (1) algunas veces | (2) casi nunca | (3) nunca | (8) NS/NR | (9) Inap | PROT2 | |

| Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta... | Sí | No | NS/NR | INAP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP5.** ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí ***[siga]*** (2) No ***[Pase a CP6]*** (8) NS/NR ***[Pase a CP6]*** | 1 | 2 | 8 | | CP5 | |
| **CP5A.** ¿Ha donado Ud. dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | CP5A | |
| **CP5B.** ¿Ha contribuido Ud. con su propio trabajo o mano de obra? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | CP5B | |
| **CP5C.** ¿Ha estado asistiendo Ud. a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | CP5C | |
| **CP5D.** ¿Ha tratado de ayudar Ud. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora? | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | CP5D | |

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si Ud. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año", o "nunca" para ayudar el entrevistado]**

| | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca | NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP6**. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP6 | |
| **CP7**. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP7 | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CP8**. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP8 | |
| **CP9**. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP9 | |
| **CP10.** ¿De un sindicato? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP10 | |
| **CP13**. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste… | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 8 | CP13 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **LS3**. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría Ud. que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo **in**satisfecho (4) Muy **in**satisfecho (8) NS/NR | LS3 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **IT1**. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? **(Leer alternativas)**<br>(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR | IT1 | |

ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

**L1**. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Izquierda | | | | | Derecha | | | | | L1 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | (NS/NR=88) | |

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipalidad...

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **NP1**. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR | NP1 | |
| **NP1B.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR | NP1B | |
| **NP2** . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o regidor de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?<br>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR | NP2 | |
| **SGL1**. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son ...? **[Leer alternativas]**<br>(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR | SGL1 | |

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|---|---|---|
| **SGL2**. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?<br>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR | SGL2 | |
| **LGL2**. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?<br>(1) Más al municipio<br>(2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios<br>(3) No cambiar nada **[NO LEER]**<br>(4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios **[NO LEER]**<br>(8) NS/NR | LGL2 | |
| **LGL3**. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad?<br>(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR | LGL3 | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **JC15. ¿**Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Legislativa o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso? | (1) Si | (2) No | (8)NS/NR | JC15 | |
| **JC16. ¿**Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Sala Cuarta o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso? | (1) Si | (2) No | (8)NS/NR | JC16 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?<br>POP1. [Leer alternativas]<br>1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario],<br>2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.<br>8. NS/NR | POP1 | |
| POP2. [Leer alternativas]<br>1. La Asamblea Legislativa impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario],<br>Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la Asamblea Legislativa.<br>8. NS/NR | POP2 | |
| POP3. [Leer alternativas]<br>1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario],<br>2. Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR | POP3 | |

| | |
|---|---|
| POP4. [Leer alternativas]<br>1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],<br>2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.<br>8. NS/NR | POP4 |
| POP5. [Leer alternativas]<br>1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario],<br>2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.<br>8. NS/NR | POP5 |

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|---|---|
| **VIC1**. ¿Ha sido Ud. víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?<br>(1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS/NR *[pasar a AOJ8]* | VIC1 |
| **VIC2**. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? ***[Leer las alternativas]***<br>(1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física<br>(2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física<br>(3) Agresión física sin robo<br>(4) Violación o asalto sexual<br>(5) Secuestro<br>(6) Daño a la propiedad<br>(7) Robo de la casa<br>(88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no víctima) | VIC2 |
| **AOJ8**. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?<br>(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR | AOJ8 |
| **AOJ11**. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde Ud. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente Ud. muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?<br>(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR | AOJ11 |
| **AOJ11A.** Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? **[Leer alternativas]**<br>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR | AOJ11A |
| **AOJ12**. Si Ud. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?. **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR | AOJ12 |
| **AOJ16A.** En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año?<br>(1) Sí (2) No 8 NS/NR | AOJ16A |
| **AOJ17.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?<br>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR | AOJ17 |

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a Ud. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a Ud. ver televisión? Léame el número. ***[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]***.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nada | | | | Mucho | | | NS/NR |

| Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|
| **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Costa Rica garantizan un juicio justo? **(Sondee:** Si Ud. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio ) | | B1 |
| **B2**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene Ud. respeto por las instituciones políticas del Costa Rica? | | B2 |
| **B3**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político costarricense? | | B3 |
| **B4**. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente Ud. orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político costarricense? | | B4 |
| **B6**. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa Ud. que se debe apoyar el sistema político costarricense? | | B6 |
| **B10A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? (Por favor mire la tarjeta) | | B10A |
| **B11**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones? | | B11 |
| **B13**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Asamblea Legislativa? | | B13 |
| **B14**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en el Gobierno? | | B14 |
| **B15**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Fiscalía General de la República? | | B15 |
| **B18**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Policía? | | B18 |
| **B20**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Iglesia Católica? | | B20 |
| **B21**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en los partidos políticos? | | B21 |
| **B31**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia? | | B31 |
| **B32**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad? | | B32 |
| **COSB1**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el ICE, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad? | | COSB1 |
| **COSB2**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social? | | COSB2 |
| **COSB3**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el INS, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros? | | COSB3 |
| **B43**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser costarricense? | | B43 |

| Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **B17**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Defensoría de los Habitantes? | | B17 | |
| **B19**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República? | | B19 | |
| **B37**. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación? | | B37 | |
| **B50.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Sala Cuarta? | | B50 | |
| **B47.** ¿Hasta que punto tiene Ud. confianza en las elecciones? | | B47 | |
| **COSB48.** ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía? | | COSB48 | |

Ahora, usando **la tarjeta "A"**, por favor conteste estas preguntas

| Ahora, en esta misma escala, (***seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos***)<br>**NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO** | Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **N1.** Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno pasado combatió la pobreza. | | N1 | |
| **N3.** Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno anterior promovió y protegió los principios democráticos. | | N3 | |
| **N9**. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno anterior combatió la corrupción en el gobierno. | | N9 | |
| **N10.** Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno anterior protegió los derechos humanos. | | N10 | |
| **N11.** Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno anterior mejoró la seguridad ciudadana. | | N11 | |
| **N12.** Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno anterior combatió el desempleo. | | N12 | |

[RECOJA TARJETA A]

| **COSDD1**. La política provoca distintas reacciones en la gente. ¿Cuál de estos sentimientos expresa mejor su estado de ánimo actual en relación con la política...<br>1. Interés, ilusión 2. Indiferencia, me da igual<br>3. Desinterés, desilusión 4. Molestia, enojo<br>[NO LEER]<br>5. Otro [pasar a M1]<br>8. NS/NR [pasar a M1] | | COSDD1 | |
|---|---|---|---|

| **COSDD3.** Y, dígame, en relación con unos años atrás, ¿Tiene usted más [SEGÚN RESPUESTA COSDD1] o menos [SEGÚN RESPUESTA COSDD1]?<br>1. Más 2. Menos 3. ***[NO LEER]*** Igual 8. NS/NR | COSDD3 | |
|---|---|---|

| **M1**. Y hablando en general del gobierno pasado, diría Ud. que el trabajo que realizó el Presidente Pacheco fue: ***[Leer respuestas]***<br>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) | M1 | |
|---|---|---|

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (8) NS/NR | | |

**[Entregue tarjeta B]**: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Muy en desacuerdo | | | | | | Muy de acuerdo | NS/NR |

| Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **ING4**. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | | ING4 | |
| **PN2.** A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los costarricenses tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | | PN2 | |
| **DEM23.** Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | | DEM23 | |
| **COSVA1**. Debe autorizarse la búsqueda de petróleo en Costa Rica aunque haya riesgos ambientales. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo? | | COSVA1 | |
| **COSVA2**. Es necesario que las empresas privadas se hagan cargo de los servicios de la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo? | | COSVA2 | |

[Déjele la tarjeta "B" al entrevistado]
Ahora, siempre usando la tarjeta B, por favor dígame ¿Hasta qué punto estaría usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que, a como está hoy la situación del país, el Presidente ***[Leer las respuestas]***

| Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **COSDE01**. Ponga orden en el país por las buenas o por las malas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? | | COSDE01 | |
| **COSDE12**. Incumpla algunas decisiones de la Sala IV. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? | | COSDE12 | |
| **COSDE03**. Pase por encima de las leyes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? | | COSDE03 | |

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **PN4.** En general, ¿ud. diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Costa Rica?<br>(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) | PN4 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| NS/NR | | |
| **PN5.** En su opinión, ¿Costa Rica es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?<br>(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático<br>(4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR | PN5 | |

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**
Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que Ud. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza Ud. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desaprueba firmemente | | | | | | | | | Aprueba firmemente | NS/NR |

| | 1-10, 88 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **E5**. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. | | E5 | |
| **E8**. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. | | E8 | |
| **E11**. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. | | E11 | |
| **E15**. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. | | E15 | |
| **E14**. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. | | E14 | |
| **E2**. Que las personas se tomen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. | | E2 | |
| **E3**. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. | | E3 | |
| **E16.** Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales | | E16 | |

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente**.**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desaprueba firmemente | | | | | | | | | Aprueba firmemente | NS/NR |

| | 1-10, 88 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **D32**. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas? | | D32 | |
| **D33**. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier | | D33 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| grupo que critique el sistema político Costa Rica? | | | |
| **D34**. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión? | | D34 | |
| **D36.** ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas? | | D36 | |
| **D37**. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican? | | D37 | |

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Costa Rica. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desaprueba firmemente | | | | | | | Aprueba firmemente | | | NS/NR |

| | 1-10, 88 | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **D1**. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Costa Rica, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: ***[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]*** | | D1 | |
| **D2**. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. | | D2 | |
| **D3**. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**? | | D3 | |
| **D4**. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**? | | D4 | |
| **D5.** Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**? | | D5 | |

Recoger tarjeta C

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **DEM2**. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:<br>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático<br>(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.<br>(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático<br>(8) NS/NR | DEM2 | |
| **AUT1**. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa Ud? **[Leer]**<br>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido<br>(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor<br>(8) NS/NR | AUT1 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **PP1**. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? ***[Lea las alternativas]***<br>Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR | PP1 | |
| **PP2**. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó Ud. para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?<br>(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR | PP2 | |

Me gustaría que me indique si Ud. considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigada; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **DC1**. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera Ud. que lo que hizo el diputado es**[Leer alternativas]**<br>1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado<br>2) Corrupto pero justificado<br>3) No corrupto NS/NR=8 | DC1 | |
| **DC10**. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una constancia de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 2500 colones de más al empleado público. Cree Ud. que lo que hizo la señora es **[Leer alternativas]:**<br>1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada<br>2) Corrupto pero se justifica<br>3) No corrupto<br>8) NS/NR | DC10 | |
| **DC13**. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es **[Leer alternativas]**:<br>1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado<br>2) Corrupto pero justificado<br>3) No corrupto NS/NR=8 | DC13 | |

| | No | Sí | NS/NR | INAP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida... | | | | | | |
| **EXC2**. ¿Algún policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno), en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | EXC2 | |
| **EXC6**. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | EXC6 | |
| **EXC11**. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año?<br>No → Marcar 9<br>Sí → Preguntar: | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9<br>No tramite | EXC11 | |

| | No | Sí | NS/NR | INAP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? | | | | | | |
| **EXC13**. ¿Usted trabaja?<br>No → Marcar 9<br>Sí → Preguntar:<br>En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9<br>No trabaja | EXC13 | |
| **EXC14**. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?<br>No → Marcar 9<br>Sí → Preguntar:<br>¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9<br>No juzgados | EXC14 | |
| **EXC15**. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?<br>No → Marcar 9<br>Sí → Preguntar:<br>Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida ? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9<br>No servicios medicos | EXC15 | |
| **EXC16**. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año**?**<br>No → Marcar 9<br>Sí → Preguntar:<br>En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida? | 0 | 1 | 8 | 9<br>No hijos en escuela/colegio | EXC16 | |
| **EXC17.**¿Alguien le pidió una mordida para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | EXC17 | |
| **EXC18.** ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | EXC18 | |
| **EXC19.** ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable? | 0 | 1 | 8 | | EXC19 | |

Uno siempre quiere lo mejor para el país, pero a veces hay que escoger… ¿De las siguientes opciones, cuál cree es la mejor para el país?

| | | |
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| **COSC7**. Un presidente honesto pero <u>incapaz</u> o un presidente capaz pero deshonesto<br>1. honesto - incapaz<br>2. deshonesto – capaz 8. NS/NR | COSC7 | |
| **COSC8**. Un presidente deshonesto pero con buenas ideas, o un presidente honesto pero con malas ideas<br>1. deshonesto – buenas ideas<br>2. honesto – malas ideas 8. NS/NR | COSC8 | |
| **COSC9**. Parar la construcción de un nuevo hospital porque se pagaron comisiones por debajo o no pararla.<br>1. Parar la construcción<br>2. No pararla 8. NS/NR | COSC9 | |

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| **EXC7**. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? **[LEER]**<br>(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada<br>(8) NS/NR | | EXC7 | |

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| Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente…<br>**GI1.** ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? ***[NO LEER: George Bush]***<br>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde | GI1 | |
| **GI2**. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica? ***[NO LEER: Francisco A. Pacheco]***<br>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde | GI2 | |
| **GI3**. ¿Cuántas provincias tiene Costa Rica? ***[NO LEER: 7]***<br>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde | GI3 | |
| **GI4**. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Costa Rica? ***[NO LEER: 4 años]***<br>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde | GI4 | |
| **GI5**. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [**NO LEER**: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"]<br>(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde | GI5 | |

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| **VB1**. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Tiene Ud. cédula de identidad?<br>(1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR | VB1 | |
| **VB2**. ¿Votó Ud. en las últimas elecciones presidenciales?<br>(1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB6] | VB2 | |
| **COSVB3**.¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones?<br>0 Nulo/ En Blanco PASE VB8 1 Toledo (PUSC) pase VB8<br>2. Arias (PLN) PASE VB8 3. Otton Solís (PAC) PASE VB8<br>4. Otto Guevara (ML) PASE VB8 77. Otro PASE VB8<br>88. NS/NR PASE a VB8 99. Inap (No votó) | COSVB3 | |

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| [SI VOTO, PASAR A VB8]<br>***VB4. [Si no votó]*** ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] [***NO LEER***]<br>1 Falta de transporte pase COSVB8<br>2 Enfermedad pase COSVB8<br>3 Falta de interés pase COSVB8<br>4 No le gustó ningún candidato pase COSVB8<br>5 No cree en el sistema pase COSVB8<br>6 Falta de cédula de identidad pase COSVB8<br>7 No se encontró en padrón electoral pase COSVB8<br>10 No tener edad necesaria pase COSVB8<br>11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado pase COSVB8<br>12 Tener que trabajar/No tenia tiempo pase COSVB8<br>13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad pase COSVB8<br>14. Otra razón pase COSVB8<br>(88) NS/NR pase COSVB8 (99) Inap (No votó) | VB4 | |
| [SI NO VOTO, PASAR A COSVB8]<br>**VB8. [Para los que votaron]** Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón más importante de su voto? ***[Leer todos]***<br>Las cualidades del candidato<br>El partido político del candidato<br>El plan de gobierno del candidato<br>Otro<br>(8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó) | VB8 | |

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| **COSEL6**. ¿Presenció usted en el centro donde votó alguna anomalía o algo raro en el proceso de votación?<br>1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR | COSEL6 | |
| **VB6**. ¿Votó Ud. para diputado en las últimas elecciones?<br>1. Sí 2. No. [ Pase a COSVB8] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSVB8]? | VB6 | |
| **COSVB7.** ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones?<br>0. Voto Nulo/ Blanco 9. Inap (No votó) 1 Unidad (PUSC)<br>2. Liberación Nacional (PLN) 3. PAC<br>4. Movimiento Libertario 77. Otro 88. NS/NR | COSVB7 | |
| **COSVB8**. Y ¿por quién votó para presidente en la primera vuelta de las elecciones del 2002?<br>0 Nulo/ En Blanco 1 Abel Pacheco (PUSC)<br>2. Rolando Araya (PLN) 3. Otton Solís (PAC)<br>77. Otro 88. NS/NR<br>98. Menor de edad ***[PASE A VB10]*** 99. Inap (No votó) | COSVB8 | |
| **COSVB9**. ¿Y en 1998 por quién votó para Presidente?<br>0 Nulo/ En Blanco 1 Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (PUSC)<br>2. José Miguel Corrales (PLN) 77. Otro 88. NS/NR<br>98. Menor de edad ***[PASE A VB10]*** 99. Inap (No votó) | COSVB9 | |

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| **COSVB10**. ¿Y en 1994 por quién votó para Presidente?<br>0 Nulo/ En Blanco 1 Miguel Ángel Rodríguez (PUSC)<br>2. José María Figueres (PLN) 77. Otro 88. NS/NR<br>98. Menor de edad ***[PASE A VB10]*** 99. Inap (No votó) | COSVB10 |

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| **VB10. ¿**En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?<br>(1) Sí *[Siga]* (2) No *[Pase a* POL1*]* (8) NS/NR *[Pase a POL1]* | VB10 |
| **COSVB11. ¿**Con cuál partido político simpatiza Ud.? ***[NO LEER LISTA]***.<br>1 Unidad (PUSC) 2. Liberación Nacional (PLN)<br>3. PAC 4. Movimiento Libertario<br>77. Otro 88. NS/NR PASE A POL1 | COSV B11 |
| **COSVB12**. ¿Cuál de las siguientes situaciones representa mejor su relación con este Partido…? **[LEA PAUSADO]**<br>1. Soy dirigente<br>2. Soy seguidor leal y colaboro activamente con él<br>3. Soy seguidor leal, me limito a votar<br>4. Me agrada el partido pero podría votar por otro.<br>5. Otro [NO LEER] 8. NS/ NR | COSV B12 |
| **POL1.** ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?<br>1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR | POL1 |
| **POL2**. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? ***[Leer respuestas]***<br>1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez<br>5) Nunca 8) N/S | POL2 |

Cambiando de tema, ahora vamos a hablar de las últimas elecciones

| | |
|---|---|
| **COSEL1**. En estas elecciones, ¿le ofrecieron un beneficio o un trabajo si votaba por un partido?<br>1. Sí 2. No ***[Pase a* COSEL3*]*** 8. NS/NR ***[Pase a* COSEL3*]*** | COSEL1 |
| **COSEL2**. ¿Qué le ofrecieron?<br>1. Empleo o un negocio<br>2. Bonos, becas, ayudas (como alimentos o materiales)<br>3. Dinero<br>4. Otro 8. NS/NR | COSEL2 |
| **COSEL3**. Siempre hablando de estas elecciones ¿Alguien lo amenazó o presionó para que votara de determinada manera?<br>1. Sí 2. No [Pase a COSEL8] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSEL8 ] | COSEL3 |
| **COSEL4**. ¿Cómo lo amenazaron o presionaron? ***[No leer]***<br>1. Con quitarle su empleo (a Usted o su familia)<br>2. Con retirarle alguna ayuda o beneficio social (a Usted o su familia)<br>3. Con agredirlo (a Usted o su familia)<br>4. Otro 8. NS/NR | COSEL4 |

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| **COSEL8**. ¿Está Usted enterado de las denuncias sobre irregularidades electorales formuladas por algunos partidos políticos?<br>1. Sí 2. No [Pase a COSEL13] 8. NS/NR [Pase a COSEL13] | COSEL8 | |
| **COSEL9**. ¿Considera que la mayoría de estas denuncias eran ciertas?<br>1. Sí 2. No 3. Algunas sí, otras no 8. NS / NR | COSEL9 | |
| **COSEL10**. ¿Cree ud que hoy tendríamos otro presidente si no hubiesen ocurrido las anomalías denunciadas?<br>1. Otro presidente 2. el mismo presidente | COSEL10 | |
| **COSEL11**. Tomando en cuenta lo que hemos hablado ¿piensa usted que las elecciones recién pasadas realmente reflejaron la voluntad popular?<br>1. Sí 2. No 3. Más o menos 8. NS / NR | COSEL11 | |
| **COSEL12**. En comparación con elecciones anteriores, ¿considera usted que las elecciones recién pasadas fueron más limpias o menos limpias?<br>1. Más limpias 2. Menos limpias 3. Igual 8. NS / NR | COSEL12 | |
| **COSEL13**. En su opinión, ¿actuó el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de manera imparcial en las elecciones pasadas?<br>1. Sí 2. No 3. Más o menos 8. NS / NR | COSEL13 | |

USAR TARJETA "B" OTRA VEZ.

| Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde **1 muy en desacuerdo** y **7 significa muy de acuerdo**, ¿hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones? | Escala<br>Muy en de desacuerdo<br>1 2 3 4 5 6 7<br>Muy de acuerdo | NS/ NR | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AA1**. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica? | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | AA1 | |
| **AA2**. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | AA2 | |
| **AA3**. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo? | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | AA3 | |
| **AA4**. Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo? | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 | 8 | AA4 | |

RECOGER TARJETA "B"

| Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares: | | |
|---|---|---|
| **DIS2**. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)<br>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR | DIS2 | |
| **DIS3**. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio<br>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) inap (No buscó trabajo) | DIS3 | |
| **DIS4**. En reuniones o eventos sociales<br>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR | DIS4 | |
| **DIS5**. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)<br>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR | DIS5 | |

Cambiando de tema

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **COSTLC1**. Hablando sobre el TLC con Estados Unidos, cree ud que debemos rechazarlo, aprobarlo o renegociarlo?<br>(1) Rechazar el TLC (2) Aprobar el TLC (3) Renegociar el TLC (4) Otros<br>(8) NS / NR [Pase a próxima sección ED] | COSTLC1 | |
| **COSTLC2**. Su opinión sobre el TLC, ¿es la misma que tenía hace un año o cambió durante la campaña electoral? ***[Lea las respuestas de 1 a 3]***<br>(1) Es la misma que hace un año (2) Cambió durante la campaña electoral<br>(3) Cambió después de la campaña electoral ( 4) ***[No leer]*** Otros (8) NS / NR | COSTLC2 | |

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| **COSTLC3**. ¿Cuál de las siguientes acciones debe adoptar el gobierno?<br>[Lea las respuestas de 1 a 3]<br>1. Tratar de que la nueva Asamblea Legislativa apruebe el TLC lo antes posible ***[Pase a COSTLC5]***<br>2. Convocar primero a una consulta popular para que ahí se decida la suerte del TLC<br>3. Retirar el TLC de la Asamblea Legislativa y desecharlo<br>4. [No leer] Otros<br>8. NS / NR | COSTLC3 | |
| **COSTLC4**. Si la Asamblea Legislativa aprueba el TLC y la gente sale a las calles para rechazarlo, como ocurrió con el Combo del ICE, estaría Usted... ***[Lea las respuestas 1-5]***<br>1. Muy de acuerdo con las protestas 2. De acuerdo 3. En desacuerdo 4. Muy en desacuerdo<br>5. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo ***[No leer respuestas 6 y 7]***<br>6. Depende<br>7. Otros 8. NS/NR | COSTLC4 | |
| **COSTLC5**. Después de todo lo que hemos hablado y en resumen ¿Comparando los beneficios y los perjuicios del TLC, diría Ud que el TLC: ***[Lea las respuestas 1 y 2]***<br>1. Traerá más beneficios<br>2. Traerá más perjuicios<br>4. ***[NO LEER]*** Otros 8. NS / NR | COSTLC5 | |

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED**. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total ***[Usar tabla abajo para código]***

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ninguno | 0 | | | | | | ED | |
| Primaria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | |
| Secundaria | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | | |
| Universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | | |
| NS/NR | 88 | | | | | | | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Q2**. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR) | Q2 | ☐☐ |
| **Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? **[no leer alternativas]**<br>(1) Católica<br>(2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)<br>(3) Otra no cristiana<br>(5) Evangélica<br>(4) Ninguna<br>(8) NS/NR | Q3 | |

[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Q10**. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?<br>(00) Ningún ingreso, sin ingresos<br>(01) Menos 10.000 colones<br>(02) De 10.000 - 99.000 colones<br>(03) De 100.000 – 134.000<br>(04) De 135.000 – 174.000<br>(05) De 175.000 – 219.000<br>(06) De 220.000 – 269.000<br>(07) De 270.000 – 349.000<br>(08) De 350.000 – 449.000<br>(09) De 450.000 – 699.000<br>(10) 700.000 o más (88) NS/NR | Q10 | |
| **Q10A. ¿**Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?<br>No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap<br>Sí → preguntar:<br>¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda] | Q10A | |
| **Q10B.** ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?<br>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada<br>(8) NS/NR (9) INAP | Q10B | |
| **Q10C.** ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? **[Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde]**<br>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente<br>(2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países<br>(3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)<br>(4) No (8) NS/NR | Q10C | |
| **Q14.** ¿Tiene Ud. intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?<br>1) Sí 2) No (8) NS/NR | Q14 | |

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| **Q10D.** El salario o sueldo que Ud. recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]<br>(1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar<br>(2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades<br>(3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades<br>(4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades<br>(8) **[No leer]** NS/NR | | |
| **Q11**. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? ***[no leer alternativas]***<br>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR | Q11 | |
| **Q12**. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS/NR……88. | Q12 | \|___\|__ |

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| | | |
| **COSETID.** ¿Usted considera que es una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, Afro-costarricense, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Afro-costarricense (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR | COSETID | |
| **COSETIDA.** Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR | COSETIDA | |
| **COSLENG1.** ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa]** (1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena (4) Inglés-creole (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR | COSLENG 1 | |

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: ***[leer todos]***

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **R1**. Televisor | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R1 | |
| **R3**. Refrigeradora (nevera] | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R3 | |
| **R4.** Teléfono convencional (no celular) | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R4 | |
| **R4A**. Teléfono celular | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R4A | |
| **R5**. Vehículo | (0) No | (1) Uno (2) Dos | (3) Tres o más | R5 | |
| **R6**. Lavadora de ropa | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R6 | |
| **R7**. Microondas | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R7 | |
| **R8**. Motocicleta | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R8 | |
| **R12**. Agua potable dentro de la casa | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R12 | |
| **R14**. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R14 | |
| **R15.** Computadora | (0) No | | (1) Sí | R15 | |

| | | |
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| OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar "No" en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)] *[No leer alternativas]*<br>1. Profesional, directivo<br>2. Técnico<br>3. Oficinista<br>4. Comerciante<br>5. Campesino o agricultor<br>6. Peón agrícola<br>7. Artesano<br>8. Servicio doméstico<br>9. Otros servicios<br>10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria)<br>11. Obrero no especializados<br>12. Estudiante ***[Pase a MIG1]***<br>13. Ama de casa***[Pase a MIG1]***<br>14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista***[Pase a MIG1]*** 88. NS/NR | OCUP1 | ☐☐ |

| | | |
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| **OCUP4.** ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?<br>1. Sí [Siga]<br>2. No [Pasar a DESOC2]<br>8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1]<br>9. INAP | OCUP4 | |
| **OCUP1A** En esta ocupación Usted es: ***[Leer alternativas]***<br>1. Asalariado del gobierno o autónoma?<br>2. Asalariado en el sector privado?<br>3. Patrono o socio de empresa?<br>4. Trabajador por cuenta propia?<br>5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago 8. NS/NR 9. INAP | OCUP1A | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **OCUP1B1.** ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde trabaja? **[Leer alternativas]**<br>(1) Menos de 5 empleados<br>(2) De 5 a 9 empleados<br>(3) De 10 a 19 empleados<br>(4) De 20 a 100 empleados<br>(5) Más de 100 empleados<br>(8) NS/NR<br>(9) INAP | OCUP1B1 | ☐☐☐☐ |
| **OCUP1C.** ¿Tiene Ud. seguro social?<br>Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR 9. INAP | OCUP1C | |
| **DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4]** => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas<br>(88) NS/NR | DESOC2 | ☐☐ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **MIG1.** Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió Ud princiPDAente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:<br>1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR | MIG1 | |
| **MIG2.** Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía Ud.? **[Leer alternativas]**<br>1. En este mismo cantón **[Pase a HORA2]**<br>2. En otro cantón en el país [Siga]<br>3. En otro país [**PASE A HORA2**]<br>8. NS/NR [**Pase A HORA2**] | MIG2 | |
| **MIG3**. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: **[Leer alternativas]**<br>1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este<br>(2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este<br>(3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR | MIG3 | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| HORA 2 | Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración. | ___ ___ \| ___ ___<br>Hora |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | REGISTRAR HORA DE FIN DE ENTREVISTA ***[por programa]*** | Minutos |
| TI | Duración de la entrevista ***[por programa]*** | MINUTOS ___ ___ ___ |

Tarjeta # 1



Tarjeta A



Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta E

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos 10.000 colones
(02) De 10.000 - 99 mil colones
(03) De 100.000 – 134 999
(04) De 135.000 – 174 999
(05) De 175.000 – 219 999
(06) De 220.000 – 269 999
(07) De 270.000 – 349 999
(08) De 350.000 – 449 999
(09) De 450.000 – 699 999
(10) 700.000 o más