

Patronage Appointments in the Modern Presidency: Evidence from a Survey of Federal Executives

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This paper analyzes how modern presidents make patronage decisions. It explains where less qualified but essential-to-place persons want to go and where presidents find it easiest to place them. It uses new survey data from the George W. Bush Administration to provide some of the first systematic evidence we have on where presidents place patronage appointees in the federal government. It finds that presidents are most likely to place patronage appointees in agencies that share the president's views about policy and in positions where appointees have less visible impact on agency outputs or performance. I conclude that patronage factors play an important and underappreciated role in presidential administrative strategies.

Working Paper: 01-2009

Research Concentration: Executive Politics and Regulatory Policymaking



Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions

Charges of cronyism were among the most biting criticisms of the George W. Bush Administration. * Critics charged that the president populated the government with personnel based primarily upon political connections rather than competence demonstrated through credentials or previous experience. This was epitomized in the publicity surrounding the appointments of Michael Brown (FEMA) and Julie Myers (DHS) and the replacement of several U.S. attorneys with protégés of key Republican officials.¹ The issue of patronage in the Bush Administration arguably had greater currency than previous administrations because it was publicly connected to key management failures, including, most notably, FEMA's problematic response to Hurricane Katrina (Lewis 2008; Roberts 2006; Schimmel 2006; U.S. Senate 2006). All presidents, however, face demands to repay campaign debts, assuage key constituencies, or build legislative support through the shrewd distribution of jobs. Critics charged that President Clinton's Arkansas friends got special treatment and lambasted the president for selecting politically connected campaign contributors as ambassadors.² During the George H.W. Bush Administration, the Department of Commerce earned the nickname "Bush Gardens" for its reputation as a home for patronage appointees.³ Appointees selected more for political connections or expediency than competence partially populate all modern presidential administrations (Lewis 2008; Newland 1987).

* Seminar audiences at the Clemson University Department of Economics and Vanderbilt Law School provided very helpful comments on a related paper. The errors that remain are my own.

¹ Fonda, Daren, and Rita Healy. 2005. "How Reliable is Brown's Resume?" Time Magazine, September 8, 2005 (<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1103003,00.html>, last accessed May 19, 2009); Eggen, Dan, and Spencer S. Hsu. 2005. "Immigration Nominee's Credential Questioned." *Washington Post*, September 20, 2005, A1; Eggen, Dan, and Amy Goldstein. 2007. "U.S. Attorney Was Fired to Make Room for Rove Protégé." San Francisco Chronicle, March 23, 2007, A4 (on-line edition).

² Gerth, Jeff, Stephen Labaton, and Tim Weiner. 1997. "Clinton and Friends: Strong Ties, Few Questions." *New York Times*, February 14, 1997, (<http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/14/us/clinton-and-friends-strong-ties-few-questions.html>, last accessed May 19, 2009).

³ In the Clinton Administration, eventual Commerce Department Secretary pledged to cut the number of appointees in the agency after the ranks of appointees swelled to unprecedented levels.

Given the prevalence of presidential patronage and its purported relationship to management failures, it is an important topic for academic research. Yet, one recent review of the literature summarized, “Even now...we still know very little about the functions of patronage” and called it a great irony that one of the core phenomena in the development of public administration (and, thus, political science) had attracted so little attention (Bearfield 2009). Existing work on the politics of appointments in political science generally assumes that appointed positions are used to enhance presidential control of the bureaucracy rather than satisfy patronage demands when surely appointed positions are used for both purposes (see, however, Lewis 2008).

This paper analyzes how modern presidents make patronage decisions. It explains where less qualified but essential-to-place persons want to go and where presidents find it easiest to place them. It uses new survey data from the George W. Bush Administration to provide some of the first systematic evidence we have on where presidents place patronage appointees in the federal government. It finds that presidents are most likely to place appointees selected on the basis of campaign experience and political connections in agencies that share the president’s views about policy and in positions where appointees have less visible impact on agency outputs or performance. I conclude that patronage factors play an important and underappreciated role in presidential administrative strategies.

Patronage and the Modern Presidency

In political science the term patronage generally refers to the distribution of public employment in exchange for electoral or political support (Bearfield 2009, 66; Feeney and

Kingsley 2008, 167; Weingrod 1968, 379).⁴ Despite the importance of the topic and its historical role in early writings by political scientists, there is very little systematic research on modern patronage practices, particularly at the federal level. Sorauf (1960, 28—check this) wrote almost 50 years ago that, “Very few studies exist of the actual operation of patronage systems across the country... In the absence of specific reports and data, one can only proceed uneasily on a mixture of political folklore, scattered scholarship, professional consensus, and personal judgment.” According to one recent assessment, not much has changed in the intervening 40 years (Bearfield 2009, 64).

While less work has focused on patronage specifically, a number of works have highlighted key developments in appointment politics. First, there has been an increase in the number of appointed positions. Whereas, Price (1944, 362) wrote at the end of the Roosevelt Administration that “Partisan appointments have become nearly obsolete in the United States Government”, this is no longer true. Since that time the number of appointed positions has increased substantially through law and administrative action (Lewis 2008; National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 2003). Between 1960 and 2004 the number and percentage of appointed positions more than doubled.

Second, scholars have described the many factors that influence appointment decisions, including loyalty to the president, factional representativeness, interest group connections, and socio-economic and demographic diversity (see e.g., Edwards 2001; Hecl 1977; Mackenzie 1981). This work particularly emphasizes the increased importance of presidential loyalty and ideology in personnel selection (Moe 1985; Weko 1995). Presidents have professionalized their

⁴ In political science, patronage can refer more generally to the distribution of a whole host of scarce resources in exchange for political support (Bearfield 2009, 69). Some scholars argue for a broader definition of patronage to include a whole class of patron-client interactions between persons of unequal power in a reciprocal relationship (Bearfield 2009, 68).

personnel operation, asserted control of appointed positions down to the lowest levels, and used appointed positions to influence public policy administratively (Nathan 1975). To a lesser extent this literature describes the role that interest group pressure plays in administrative politics and the ways appointed jobs can be used as a form of spoils to satisfy key interest groups or constituencies (Hecklo 1977; Newland 1987). With the weakening of the national parties, interest groups have played a larger role in electoral politics. These groups ask for and receive recognition and access in presidential administrations through visible presidential appointments.

Finally, scholars have connected the increase in appointees, particularly less qualified appointees, to poor management performance. The increased weight placed upon loyalty and representativeness means less weight is placed on competence or substantive expertise in appointment decisions (Newland 1987). So, while there is a significant amount of work showing how appointees change agency outputs (Moe 1982; Stewart and Cromartie 1982; Wood 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994), there is an equal amount describing the effects the increased appointees of poor quality on management performance (Boylan 2004; Hecklo 1975). These developments in appointment politics, coupled with a growth in privatization, have led some scholars to argue that unchecked the United States risks a return to an earlier age of spoils and patronage (Feeney and Kingsley 2008).

While significant progress has been made explaining how presidents use political appointments to help them shape public policy administratively, less attention has been given to how appointed positions are given out to incentivize work for the president, his campaign, or party (Lewis 2009). Very little work attempts to explain *when* patronage considerations dominate personnel selection to the detriment of competence. As a result, we cannot answer simple questions such as which agencies are most likely to be populated with patronage appointees? In

the next section I explain where presidents are most likely to place patronage appointees, focusing on the incentives and skills of the pool of patronage appointees and the president's own calculus.

Explaining Presidential Patronage

Multiple factors influence presidential personnel choices in distinct cases. Some are idiosyncratic such as which applicant contacted the Presidential Personnel Office most recently or who has had a past conflict with a key committee chair. Similar institutional and political incentives influence personnel decisions across presidencies, however, and these incentives operate predictably (Moe 1985). This is particularly true in the modern period, when the president's behavior and outlook are defined and disciplined by the continuing professional institutional presidency and stable party system. Both Republicans and Democrats are expected to influence policy administratively and presidents of both parties feel pressure to help their party accomplish its electoral goals through the shrewd distribution of patronage. These concerns for control over policy and the distribution of patronage importantly shape politicization choices (Lewis 2008).

Two Parts of the Presidential Personnel Process

The job confronting presidential personnel operations is comprised of two general tasks. First, presidents need to fill key policy making positions essential to their agenda and achieving their policy and political goals. Presidents have to fill positions as prominent as the Secretary of Defense, chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, or head of the Environmental Protection Agency. Also important, but less visible, are positions such as head of the Patent and Trademark Office, chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and head of the Border Patrol

and Customs portion of the Department of Homeland Security. The problem for presidents is that, as President Kennedy reportedly said, “I thought I knew everybody and it turned out I only knew a few politicians.”⁵ Ultimately, Kennedy developed a “talent hunt” operation targeted toward finding appropriate people for key positions in government (Weko 1995; Pfiffner 1996). In the period following the Kennedy Administration the White House personnel operation has grown in size and now regularly relies on professional recruiters to help staff key positions in government. Clay Johnson, President Bush’s first personnel director, explained,

This is not a beauty contest. The goal is pick the person who has the greatest chance of accomplishing what the principal wants done...After the strongest candidate (s) has been identified, assess the political wisdom of the selection, and adjust accordingly.⁶

Johnson’s quote suggests that the ability of the appointee to implement the president’s agenda is the most important consideration for these positions. Only after this consideration is satisfied does the personnel office evaluate the political wisdom of the choice evaluated. Of course, the extent to which presidents conflate loyalty and competence and the extent to which politics intervenes in these selections varies across positions and administrations, but the larger point is that for a subset of key positions, loyalty and competence are the most important factors in personnel selection.

The second task for presidents is to find jobs for party officials, interest group representatives, and campaign workers who have priority due to past work for the campaign or political necessity. By its very nature, this part of the personnel process is driven by concerns for campaign experience or political connections rather than loyalty and competence. The pool of

⁵ Gelb, Leslie. 1976. “Carter Finding Few Outsiders.” *New York Times*, December 16, 1976, 21.

⁶ “The General Personnel Process,” received via personal communication from Clay Johnson, October 25, 2006.

potential patronage appointees is often unqualified for the positions described above. Many of the persons who have to be placed in jobs in the new administration for political reasons lack substantial qualifications or experience.⁷

Where Do Presidents Want to Put Patronage Appointees?

The question confronting presidents is where to put these “priority placements,” selected for campaign experience or connections rather than expertise or competence. To answer this question it is useful to understand where people aspiring to government jobs want to go and where presidents can easily place them.

The pool of aspiring appointees with a claim on the administration is comprised largely of young campaign workers, congressional staffers, and party officials who are frequently short on federal executive experience. They are dedicated partisans and prefer work in the administration that will advance their career within the party or the constellation of groups or businesses with close connections to the party’s core policy commitments or personalities. Since, the core constituencies of the two parties are different, however, potential Democratic and Republican patronage appointees tend to have different job aspirations. For example, one Republican presidential personnel official explained, “Most people [Republicans] do not see Labor in their long term future... You are not going to be able to make a living from that pattern of relationships.”⁸ Democratic aspirants are more likely to prefer jobs in traditionally liberal agencies such as social welfare and regulatory agencies and Republican aspirants congregate in traditionally conservative agencies such as those involved in national security and business.

⁷ Of course, many personnel who receive jobs in a presidential administration because of campaign experience or political connections turn out to be excellent leaders. Appointees selected more for campaign experience or political connections than management acumen are, however, only excellent managers by accident and can be the source of indifferent agency performance.

⁸ As quoted in Lewis (2008, 64).

The president's concern is to satisfy these patronage demands in a way that does the least damage to their public reputation or their policy agenda. Presidents ultimately prefer to place potential appointees into jobs they are best qualified to perform. To avoid bad publicity, the president's personnel staff is looking to make appointments that are publicly defensible based upon demonstrated qualifications. One personnel official explained,

The problem with presidential personnel in any administration is that you say (to a job seeker), 'What do you want to do?' and they say 'I'll go anywhere.' This is completely not helpful... Patronage becomes problematic when people have no idea what they want to do (but have to be placed).⁹

If potential appointees have skills primarily related to politics, they are most likely to be placed in staff roles, public relations positions, or legislative liaison jobs. If job seekers have resumes that list experience in business, education, or housing, personnel officials prefer to place them into jobs in the departments like Commerce, Education, or Housing and Urban Development. Job aspirants across Democratic and Republican administrations are similar in their basic profile (e.g., strong partisans, campaign work, political experience) but their resumes differ in the types of job experience they describe. Democrats are more likely to have worked for a union, housing non-profit, or environmental organization and Republicans are more likely to have worked for the Chamber of Commerce, the National Rifle Association, or a veterans organization. Presidential personnel officials use these qualifications to push patronage appointees into jobs for which they are most qualified on paper. Not only do potential patronage appointees tend to prefer jobs in agencies close to the core commitments of their party, they are also often best qualified to take these jobs.

⁹ As quoted in Lewis (2008, 63).

To avoid stalling their agenda, presidents also have strong incentives to place patronage appointees in agencies where less policy change is required--agencies that are likely to do what the president wants with or without direct presidential intervention. These agencies do not need competent appointee leadership to accomplish the goals they share with the president. The career professionals in that agency are capable and willing to do what the president wants without having to be directed attentively. This is another reason why patronage appointees, while peppered throughout the government, tend to cluster in agencies with policy views similar to those of the president. This is usually a satisfactory outcome for both the president and potential appointees since potential appointees are better qualified for and have more desire to work in agencies whose policy views are similar to those of the president.

H1: Patronage appointees are more likely to be placed in agencies whose policy views are similar to those of the president.

More generally, however, presidents prefer to put patronage appointees where they can do the least damage for performance. Presidents respond by placing patronage-type appointees in jobs where competence is less important such as lower level appointed positions, agencies whose performance is less sensitive to appointee competence such as those whose tasks are simple, or agencies where it is hard to observe a connection between performance and outcomes. Agencies with these characteristics often become patronage havens (or “turkey farms”), populated with party officials, campaign staff, and key group representatives across administrations.

H2: Patronage appointees are more likely to be placed in agencies where their appointment will have the least visible influence on agency outputs.

Of course, presidential efforts to politicize the bureaucracy hinge upon the implicit or explicit approval of Congress. What the president and his personnel officials view as patronage

can benefit members of Congress in two ways. First, these positions provide members of Congress a means of influencing policy directly, provided members have influence over who is selected. Federal patronage has historically been a means by which Congress secured control over federal administration locally. Members of Congress repeatedly refused to give up control over regional appointments such as U.S. Marshals, U.S. Attorneys, and regional USDA officials because those persons would set policy regionally in a way that was sensitive to the needs of a members' reelection coalition.¹⁰ This was particularly true in important areas like civil rights, agriculture, and the environment. One underappreciated reason Congress was antagonistic toward merit reforms was that it decreased Congress's control over agency policy. Members of Congress are more supportive of increases in the number of appointed positions when the increases allow them more direct influence over policy.

Second, appointed positions also help members to the extent that they help their party or individual election prospects. Members of Congress, particularly those from the president's party, are actively involved in recommending persons for appointed positions. To the extent they are successful, this can provide electoral benefits for the member. Appreciative constituents or groups express their gratitude through electoral support. Members also benefit when presidential patronage benefits their party more generally. The expansion of patronage by the other party's president is opposed, however, since it provides no benefit to the member and hurts performance. During the bulk of the Bush presidency, however, Congress itself was relatively conservative and sympathetic to the president's patronage efforts.

H3: There will be fewer patronage appointees when the president and Congress do not share the same political party.

¹⁰ "Postmasters to Continue as Political Appointees." (UPI) *Washington Post*, June 19, 1952, 1. This article details how "local people can hold their local representative to account" by maintaining the patronage system for regional appointments.

In total, all presidents have to satisfy patronage demands and they do so in predictable ways with an eye toward policy, performance, and congressional views. The president wants to put patronage appointees in agencies that share the president's views about policy and potential patronage appointees are a good fit for these agencies by desire and qualifications. Presidents also try to minimize the direct influence these appointees can have on performance by putting them in positions and agencies where their appointment makes little visible difference for the president's public reputation and agenda.

Data, Variables, and Methods

To evaluate these predictions, I use new unique data from a 2007-8 survey of federal administrators and program managers (Bertelli et al. 2008).¹¹ The survey includes responses from 2,225 career and appointed federal program managers and administrators across the various departments and agencies of the federal government.¹² The survey is comprised of a variety of questions about the backgrounds, political views, and work experiences of these executives.¹³ Importantly, the survey included the following question:

¹¹ A list of agencies is included in Appendix A.

¹² The survey was conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Center and was sent to 7,448 federal executives. The survey excludes executives that are not administrators or program managers. The survey's principal investigators purchased the names and contact information from Leadership Directories, Inc., the firm that publishes the *Federal Yellow Book*. The response rate from the original 7,448 names was 32%. When potential respondents who were included incorrectly are excluded (i.e., those who are not employees of the federal government or not federal executives), the response rate in the text is produced. The original list included 461 potential respondents from the National Science Foundation because the firm incorrectly labeled NSF program officers as managers or executives. The original list also included 27 names of executives working for the Delaware River Basin Commission, National Gallery of Art, Susquehanna River Basin Commission, and Japan - United States Friendship Commission. Two of these agencies are multi-state compacts and so not technically federal agencies. The National Gallery of Art is partially private and the Japan - United States Friendship Commission is a multi-lateral agency with both Japanese and U.S. citizens working together.

¹³ While survey data has the advantage of allowing researchers to measure concepts that are otherwise hard to observe, they have drawbacks as well. First, while the overall number of respondents is large, the sample of respondents could differ in important ways from the population as a whole. Of particular concern is the possibility that the sample of respondents is systematically more liberal or Democratic than the population as a whole since those opposed to the Bush Administration might be more inclined to respond to a survey about the state of public service. This concern was addressed in two ways. First, the survey's authors contracted with private firms to find

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting [strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don't know]: “*Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/connections.*” (mean 3.28; SD 0.77; Min 1; Max 4)

The question assesses the extent to which competence, as opposed to other factors influenced the selection of appointees in each agency. I specifically analyze whether the respondent strongly agrees (1; 3.35%), agrees (2; 11.34%), disagrees (3; 42.24%), or strongly disagrees (4; 43.07%) with the claim that appointees are selected more on the basis of competence as opposed to campaign experience or political connections. As is clear from the mean, the vast majority of respondents believe that campaign experience or connections are more influential than competence. There remains significant variation across agencies in average responses. Among the agencies where competence is reported to be most important is the Department of the Interior (2.88) whereas appointees in the Department of the Navy (3.68) are reported to be selected more for campaign experience and connections. Since competence and patronage factors have been set up in opposition to each other in the question, it is reasonable to interpret “disagree” and “strongly disagree” answers as support for the claim that appointees are selected at least as much for campaign experience and political connections as competence and I interpret such answers in this manner.

Figure 1 graphs the average answers to this question provided by career professionals in each agency. Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected

home addresses and voter registration information for the survey population. They then compared party voter registration for those in the population to what respondents in the sample reported about their party ID. Second, early and late responders to the survey were compared on identifiable characteristics. In general, the respondents are very similar to non-respondents. If there is a difference between the sample and population it is that respondents are slightly more conservative and Republican than the population.

more for political experience and connections rather than competence. Agencies where campaign experience and connections are reported to be more important than competence include the defense agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the departments of Commerce and Treasury. Three of these four agencies are generally considered to be conservative by followers of administrative politics (Clinton and Lewis 2008, 6). The agencies where competence is reported to be relatively more influential include the Department of the Interior, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Two of these agencies, the departments of Labor and Housing and Urban Development, are large social welfare agencies generally considered among the most liberal in government (Clinton and Lewis 2008, 6).

[Insert Figure 1 here.]

Key Independent Variables

Perhaps the key expectation is that presidents will be more likely to place patronage appointees in agencies that share the president's policy views. Since this survey was taken during the Bush Administration, this implies that patronage appointees should be more likely to be placed in conservative agencies. To measure agency ideology I use estimates from Clinton and Lewis (2008). They fielded an expert survey to get data on agency liberalism-conservatism and used an item-response model to generate estimates in a way that accounted for rater heterogeneity. Higher values indicate more conservative agencies (mean 0.08; SD 0.96; min - 1.72; max 2.21).¹⁴ Among the most conservative agencies are the Department of Defense (2.21),

¹⁴ Measuring agency ideology is notoriously difficult. I use the Clinton-Lewis estimates here because they tap into long term characteristics of agencies across presidencies. I have also measured respondent and (average) agency ideology using estimated respondent ideal points and partisan self-identification. Ideal points were estimated via the method described by Clinton et al. (2004) for each respondent using answers to 14 survey questions about how respondents would have voted on specific votes in Congress (Bertelli et al., 2008). I have reestimated the models described later in this section with these different measures of individual and agency ideology. The results are broadly consistent with what is reported here and are included in Appendix B, models 1 and 2. The coefficients on

the Department of Commerce (1.25), and the Department of the Treasury (1.07). Among the most liberal agencies are the Peace Corps (-1.72), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (-1.69), and the Department of Labor (-1.43). If the agencies are separated into those with estimates above (conservative) and below (liberal) 0, the average value of the dependent variable (4 max) is 3.32 for conservative agencies and 3.21 for liberal agencies ($p < 0.00$). This indicates that career professionals in conservative agencies are significantly more likely to report that appointees in their agencies are selected more for political experience and connections than competence. This is true even when only self-identified Republican respondents are analyzed. This is consistent with the expectations expressed above and suggests that presidents are more likely to place patronage appointees in agencies that generally share their views about policy.

Of course, presidents look not only to the policies of agencies. They also consider the importance of the job for performance. A second expectation was that patronage appointees would be more likely to be placed in agencies where their appointment would have the least visible influence on agency outputs, including jobs in agencies with easier tasks, fewer specific expertise requirements, and less visible agencies. Measuring the complexity of agency tasks is difficult so I chose to focus on measuring programs that are difficult for generalists to manage—scientific or research and development programs. Specifically, I use data on the prevalence of research and development programs from the Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The PART was applied to 98 percent of federal programs during the Bush Administration. During this process, all federal programs were classified by function (e.g., research and development, regulation, direct federal, etc.). To get a rough measure of agency task complexity, I use the proportion of each agency's programs that were research and

the measures of agency ideology are in the expected direction and significant or close to significant in two-tailed tests in both models.

development (i.e., scientific or technical) programs (mean 0.12; SD 0.15; min 0; max 0.56).¹⁵

The agencies with the highest proportions of research and development programs were the Department of Energy (0.56) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (0.54). Among those with no research and development programs were the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Agency for International Development.¹⁶ Respondents working in agencies with higher proportions of research and development programs should be less likely to report that appointees in their agency were selected for campaign experience or political connections and more likely to report that appointees were selected on the basis of competence.

To measure the extent to which specific prior experience is required for work in the agency, I use a measure from the survey. The survey asks respondents “Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about your job and work setting: “Necessary expertise for my job can only be gained through experience working in my agency [strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree].” Answers have been recoded so that higher values indicate more agreement with this statement and averaged by agency. Higher values should arguably lead to more patronage appointees since most of what is required for agency work is learned on the job rather than a requirement in advance (mean 2.64; SD 0.17; Min 2; Max 3.2). Among the agencies with high averages are the Department of Homeland Security (3.0) and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (3.2) while those with low averages (indicating knowledge prerequisites) include the Equal Employment Opportunity

¹⁵ I have also reestimated the models described in this section using the proportion of an agency’s employees that are classified as natural or biological scientists, engineers, architects, physical scientists, mathematicians, and statisticians as a measure of agency task complexity (mean 0.18; SD 0.18; min 0; max 0.65). The coefficient on this variable was in the expected direction, substantively large, and marginally significant in one-tailed tests. These results are included in Appendix B.

¹⁶ It should be noted, however, that other agencies with tasks that we might consider quite technical including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Trade Commission had no research and development programs. This is why I also estimated other models using the proportion of an agency’s employees that are classified as natural or biological scientists, engineers, architects, physical scientists, mathematicians, and statisticians as a measure of agency task complexity as described in the previous footnote.

Commission (2.0) and the Federal Trade Commission (2.0). There is a small positive correlation (0.06) between the average response to this question and respondents' perceptions of the importance of competence relative to political factors, indicating that patronage-type appointees may be slightly more likely to be placed in these jobs.

In addition to less technical agencies, with few specific skill requirements, presidents are should place patronage appointees in less visible positions and agencies. Such positions are less central to the president's agenda and apart from public view so that if appointees fail, the consequences will be less damaging to the president. The agencies included the survey vary from the Department of Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Railroad Retirement Board. To measure agency visibility and importance I coded all minor agencies with a 1 and all other agencies with a 0 and include the coding in Appendix A.¹⁷ Twenty-two of the seventy-two agencies were coded as minor agencies.¹⁸ When minor agencies are coded and separated out, the average response for an executive in a minor agency is 3.51, compared to 3.28 in other agencies ($p < 0.06$).¹⁹ There is a

¹⁷ Statistical results are very robust to different definitions of what constitutes a minor agency. In addition to models including indicators with different cutoffs, I also estimated models using two other measures of minor agency. First, I used the number of ratings given by experts in the Clinton-Lewis (2008) expert survey as a measure of prominence, with fewer ratings indicating that experts did not know enough about the agency to give it a rating. Fewer ratings should be correlated with respondents reporting that appointees were selected more for campaign experience or political connections rather than competence. Second, I used the total number of agency programs evaluated by the Bush Administration. Fewer programs was assumed to mean less prominence and a higher probability that appointees were not selected for competence over patronage. In both cases, coefficient estimates indicate that more prominence is correlated with appointees being selected on the basis of competence rather than connections. In the first model, the coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. In the second model the coefficient, while in the expected direction is not significant ($p < 0.32$).

¹⁸ Given the smaller size of the minor agencies, however, the number of respondents from minor agencies is much smaller as a percentage of all respondents. In the sample on which models are estimated, there are about seventeen respondents from minor agencies (out of about 1,400 respondents). One difficulty is that other relevant information about these agencies such as employment or PART-score related information is not available for these agencies.

¹⁹ Another possible measure of agency importance or visibility is agency size. I chose not to use employment as the measure because there are some obvious cases where larger agencies are arguably less important than smaller ones and vice versa. For example, the Railroad Retirement Board, a relatively invisible federal agency managing retirement plans for a small sector of the economy employs close to 1,000 persons whereas the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Election Commission all employ fewer than 450. See Bogdanich, Walt. 2008. "The Disability Board that Could Not Say No," *New York Times*,

statistically discernible difference between major and minor agencies in the extent to which careerists report that their appointees are selected on the basis of competence. As expected, career executive are less likely to report that appointees in their agencies are selected on the basis of competence. This suggests that minor, less visible, agencies and commissions are attractive places for presidents to place patronage appointees.

Agency and Respondent-Specific Controls

Of course, the apparent relationship between the factors influencing appointee selection and agency preferences, task complexity, and visibility could be spurious, caused instead by the factors such as the ideology of the respondent or the size of the agency that are correlated with the key variables of interest. To account for this, I estimate models that control for a host of agency-specific and respondent-specific factors. Models include a control for the natural log of agency employment since agency size is correlated with liberalism-conservatism (mean 9.96; SD 1.94; Min 1.79; Max 13.41).²⁰ The largest agencies, the departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, are all relatively conservative. The models include The models also include an indicator for whether or not an agency is an independent commission since presidents arguably have more control over appointments in the executive branch departments (0,1; 6.8%). By history or culture some agencies may be more sensitive to patronage-type appointments even if the real extent of patronage is equivalent across agencies. In particular, respondents in agencies with strong professional identities or agencies involved in judicial or adjudicatory activities may be more sensitive to patronage-type appointments or the penetration of politics in any form. To account for this, models include the percentage of agency employees

December 14, 2008 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/us/15rail.html?hp=&pagewanted=all>, last accessed May 15, 2009). Agency employment is included as a control in the statistical models described in this section, however.

²⁰ Source: Office of Personnel Management (fedscope.opm.gov) data for September 2007.

that are professionals (mean 0.30, SD 16; min 0.04; max 0.68) and the percentage that are law judges, respectively.²¹ Higher percentages should lead to higher reported influence of patronage considerations relative to competence.²²

Apart from the true influence of campaign experience or political connections on appointee selection, a respondent's perception of the influence of patronage factors may be influenced by their own ideology or position in the bureaucracy. To account for this, models include respondent-specific controls. One possible confounding factor is respondent ideology. Civil servants are more liberal than appointees, particularly appointees in conservative agencies, and may conflate ideology and competence or lack of competence.²³ If true, this would lead me to overestimate the extent to which patronage influences the selection of appointees in conservative agencies. To account for this I include respondent ideal point estimates from Bertelli et al. (2008). These estimates were calculated using respondents' stated responses to fourteen questions about how they would have voted on actual bills considered in Congress.²⁴ Higher values indicate more conservative views and this coefficient should be negative under the belief that liberals are more likely to voice concerns about patronage.

Respondent perceptions are also influenced by their access to appointees. To account for this the models control for the frequency of contact with appointees, respondent experience in

²¹ Since the number of law judges is so small, the proportions have been multiplied by 100 so that the mean is 0.10; SD 0.35; min 0; max 1.77).

²² I have also estimated models that account for differences among agencies in what they do (i.e., block/formula grant, capital-assets acquisition, competitive grant, credit, direct federal, and regulatory programs). Using the PART data, I calculated the proportion of the agency's programs that were of each type and included these proportions as controls. The results are the same and included in Appendix B, Model 4. I have also estimate models that include controls for the proportion of agency programs that involve regulation, foreign affairs, and national security. The results confirm what is reported here and are available from the author.

²³ I have also estimated models that control for the absolute value of the difference in ideal points between the respondent and the average appointee ideal point in their agency. The results confirm the key results reported here and are available from the author. The coefficient on this variable is negative and marginally significant ($p < 0.13$), indicating that the greater the disagreement between the respondent and the average appointee in the agency, the more likely the respondent is to report that they are selected on the basis of competence.

²⁴ Estimates were generated from a two-parameter item response model of votes as described in Clinton et al. 2004.

the agency, and whether respondents work in Washington, D.C. or a regional office. Some respondents have much more direct contact with appointees than others and this should give them better information about appointees than other respondents. To control for this, I include an ordinal variable indicating a respondent's self-reported frequency of contact with agency appointees (Never (1)-5.0%; Rarely (2)-16.1%; Monthly (3)-16.3%; Weekly (4)-19.4%; Daily (5)-43.3%; mean 3.77; SD 1.31). The majority of career executives have contact with their agency's appointees daily or weekly. The survey also asks respondents how many years they have worked in their current position (mean 7.1; SD 6.27; min 0; max 45) and whether they work in Washington, DC or a regional office (0,1; 22.22%). Respondents with more experience and contact should also be able to give a better evaluation of the factors influencing appointment.

Methods

Data are organized by respondent. Since the dependent variable is ordered and categorical and the distances between categories may not be equal, I estimate a series of ordered probit models of whether the respondent indicated strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree to the question about competence in appointee selection. I report robust standard errors clustered by agency since the observations are not independent because groups of respondents work in the same agencies.²⁵

²⁵ I have also estimated models where the agency is the unit of analysis rather than the individual survey respondent. The results are generally consistent with what is reported in the main text although the standard errors are larger. The coefficient on agency ideology is substantively important in the expected direction and significant at the 0.05 level in two-tailed tests. The coefficient on the proportion of R&D programs is substantively large in the expected direction but the standard errors are larger so that they are not significant. The coefficient on minor agencies is significant and in the expected direction in two-tailed tests. The full results are included in Appendix C.

Results

The models fit the data well and largely confirm the expectations set out above. It is easy to reject the null of no improvement over a cut-point only model ($p < 0.00$). More generally, agency ideology plays an important role in explaining the distribution of patronage appointees across the federal government. According to the model estimates of survey responses in Table 1, respondents in conservative agencies are more likely to report that their appointees were selected for campaign experience or political connections even when controlling for a host of other factors including the respondents' own ideology. The model results also provide evidence that agencies with more technical tasks are less likely to have appointees selected for political experience. Respondents in minor agencies, however, are significantly more likely to report that appointees working in those agencies were selected for campaign experience or political connections.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

Before delving into the results with regard to the hypotheses presented above, there are several notable findings among the agency-specific and respondent-specific controls in the models. Some of the cultural differences across agencies modestly influence perceptions of political intervention into the agency. The coefficients on the percentage of employees that are professionals and the percentage of employees that are law judges are both positive and significant in the latter ($p < 0.05$). These estimates indicate that agencies with higher percentages of professionals or law judges are more likely to report that their appointees were selected for campaign experience or political connections. Substantively, increasing the percentage of professionals and law judges from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases the probability that a respondent strongly disagrees that their

appointees were selected for competence by about 4 percentage points, a noticeable but not overwhelming effect.²⁶

Among the respondent characteristics, the respondent's location and experience in the bureaucracy have a statistically distinguishable influence on the respondent's perceptions of why appointees were selected. The closer respondents are to key agency appointees either through direct contact or location, the more likely they are to believe that these appointees have been selected on the basis of competence. Similarly, the longer an executive has worked in their job, the more likely they are to believe that appointees in their agency have been selected on the basis of competence. Substantively, a respondent who has daily contact with an appointee is 7 percentage points less likely to "strongly disagree" with the claim that appointees are selected on the basis of competence than a respondent who meets with their appointee monthly. The difference between executives working in Washington as opposed to a regional office is 11 percentage points. Compared to a new executive, an executive who has worked in their job as program manager or administrator for 12 years is 2 percentage points more to agree that their agency's appointees were selected on the basis of competence. In the models in Table 1 the respondent's own ideology was not significantly related to their views about the competence of appointees. Substantively, the coefficients suggest that conservative respondents are more likely to believe appointees were selected on the basis of connections rather than competence but the effects are modest. Increasing respondent conservatism from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases the percentage of respondents answering in the highest category by a modest 1.2 percentage points.

²⁶ Substantive effects were calculated with the mfx command in STATA and simulations assuming a respondent who is a 7 year veteran of her position, working in the Washington office of a non-minor agency that is not a commission and who has contact with their appointee boss once a month. All other values set at their means unless otherwise specified.

Patronage and Agency Ideology

The most robust finding across the estimated models is the relationship between agency ideology and respondent perceptions that appointees were selected for campaign experience or political connections. The coefficients are consistently significant at the 0.05 level in two-tailed tests and the substantive effect is notable. Respondents in conservative agencies are significantly more likely to report that appointees in their agencies were selected on the basis of political factors, as expected. Increasing agency ideology from one standard deviation below the mean (liberal) to one standard deviation above the mean (conservative) increases the likelihood that a respondent believes their appointee was selected for political reasons by 8-9 percentage points. The influence of agency ideology on the influence of competence versus campaign experience or connections across the range of agency ideologies is included in Figure 2. The figure graphs the influence of ideology on the probability a respondent will strongly disagree with the claim that their appointees are selected on the basis of competence.²⁷ The clear downward trend provides important evidence that presidents are more likely to place patronage appointees into agencies that share their own views. Presidents do not need these appointees to get control of agencies to change them and Republican appointees are more likely to want to work in conservative agencies because of experience and career aspirations.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

To put the influence of ideology in more concrete terms, changing the ideological profile of the Department of Labor to the ideological profile of the Department of Commerce in the Bush Administration would have led respondents to be 14 percentage points more likely to respond that they “strongly disagree” with the claim that appointees in their agency were selected

²⁷ I have also estimated models with squared terms to see if the effect is linear. I could not reject the null that the squared term did not improve the fit of the model. These results are available upon request from the author.

on the basis of competence. Similarly, if the Peace Corps had the same ideological profile as the Department of Defense, respondents in the Peace Corps would be 22 percentage points more likely to strongly object to the claim that their appointees were selected on the basis of competence.

Patronage Appointments and Connection to Performance

Do presidents place patronage appointees into jobs where there is a less visible connection to performance? As expected, the answer appears to generally be yes, although the results are less robust. The coefficient estimates on the variable accounting for task complexity—the proportion of agency programs that are research and development programs—is significant in both models and negative. Respondents in agencies with a higher proportion of research and development programs are more likely to report that their agency’s appointees are selected on the basis of competence. For example, if the Department of Housing and Urban Development had the same proportion of research and development programs as NASA, this would decrease the likelihood that a respondent strongly believes patronage is a key factor by 10 percentage points. This is true even when controlling for a host of other agency-specific and respondent-specific factors. More generally, Figure 3 graphs the influence of agency research and development activities on respondent views about appointee selection. The downward slope across the range of values supports the general claim that agencies that perform tasks that are hard for generalists to manage are less likely to be populated with appointees selected on the basis of campaign experience or political connections.

[Insert Figure 3 here.]

While the influence of agency tasks on patronage is relatively consistent across models, the coefficient on the necessity of prior experience is never statistically significant. The coefficient is consistently positive, indicating that patronage considerations are more likely to come into play in agencies where work skills have to be learned on the job, rather than prior to employment. Substantively, the coefficient estimates suggest that increasing this variable from its minimum (more expertise required) to its maximum (skills learned on job) increases the probability that a respondent “strongly disagrees” with the claim that appointees are selected on the basis of competence by 8 percentage points.

Another of the most robust findings is the coefficient on minor agencies. Respondents in minor agencies are significantly more likely to report that appointees are selected on the basis of campaign experience or political connections. A career executive working in a minor agency such as the Appalachian Regional Commission or the National Mediation Board is thirty-nine percentage points more likely than a career professional in an agency such as the Federal Election Commission or the Office of Personnel Management to “strongly disagree” with the claim that appointees in their agency were selected on the basis of competence.

Together, the cumulative evidence suggests that presidents are more likely to place patronage appointees in agencies where their performance has less influence on outcomes relevant to the president. Appointees working in agencies with more complex tasks and larger, more visible agencies are less likely to be selected primarily on the basis of campaign or political experience.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, the results from the 2007-8 survey of federal executives are broadly consistent with expectations. Program managers and administrators in conservative agencies are more likely to report that appointees in their agencies are selected for campaign experience and political connections. Executives in agencies with higher technical tasks, more skill requirements, and more visibility are more likely to report that competence was an important factor in the selection of appointees. These findings are broadly consistent both with the interests of presidents in satisfying patronage demands and the interests of prospective job seekers.

The question that remains is whether federal program managers and administrators at the top levels of government have reported something real in this survey. In other words, is it true that some appointees were selected more for competence and others more for patronage in the way the paper describes? One concern is that survey respondents exaggerate or otherwise unreliably report the importance of patronage in their agencies. This should not be a problem if the data analysis was conducted carefully. At the most basic level, an overall exaggeration in the influence of patronage on appointee selection will not interfere with relative comparisons across agencies. If some agencies' respondents exaggerate and others' do not, this is also should not be a problem provided the location of the exaggeration is uncorrelated with the key variables of interest. If the exaggeration is correlated with a feature of an agency or respondent such as the agency or respondent's ideology, this can be controlled for in statistical models.

More generally, however, is the evidence reported here about the differential influence of patronage factors across agency ideology and work environments reflective of reality? Are career executives getting it right? One factor that should give us some confidence is that the results are broadly consistent with other recent work on appointment politics. Lewis (2008) found that the

number of schedule C appointees increased more in conservative agencies under Republicans and liberal agencies under Democrats. If these patronage-type appointees are being added systematically, they could be just the type of appointees survey respondents are referring to when answering the survey. Moreover, the reports of higher degrees of patronage in minor agencies and agencies where patronage appointees can do less damage is consistent with the conventional wisdom about appointment politics (Lewis 2008, 28). This analysis, however, provides the first quantitative evidence that presidents and their staffs make decisions with these considerations in mind.

Of course, if patronage appointees are placed into positions where they can do the least amount of damage, this arguably makes understanding patronage less important. To draw this conclusion, however, would be a mistake. At a minimum, patronage politics is important to understand since presidential choices can have large consequences for the presidency and the nation and patronage plays a role even in more prominent positions. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency historically was populated with patronage appointees because it was obscure and appeared to function despite the fact that the agency's appointees had no specific skills or expertise. Understanding how agencies like FEMA get staffed helps us not only understand presidential politics but also agency performance more generally. The shrewd distribution of these jobs is an important political resource for presidents that must be understood to understand the presidency more generally.

An ultimate goal of administrative presidency research is to understand not only the multiple factors that influence personnel decisions but *when* and *how* the different factors operate in different circumstances. This research helps us understand when patronage factors are likely to be influential and how they dictate where persons will be appointed. Most of the 3,500

presidential appointments available to a new president are lower level appointments or appointments to minor boards and commissions. These selections are obscure even to the most astute political observers. We cannot understand presidential administrative strategies or the politics of these different agencies and the policies they created without understanding how these positions get filled and the important role that patronage plays.


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Figure 1. Agency Appointees Selected for Campaign Experience or Connections



Note: Question wording is "Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting: Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/connections" (4) Strongly disagree, (3) disagree, (2) agree, (1) strongly agree. Higher values indicate that appointees are more likely to be selected for campaign experience or connections than competence. Reported values are average responses by agency.

Figure 2. Influence of Agency Liberalism-Conservatism on Probability an Individual Strongly Disagrees that their Agency's Appointees Selected on the Basis of Competence




Figure 3. Influence of Agency Tasks on Probability an Individual Strongly Disagrees that their Agency's Appointees Selected on the Basis of Competence




Table 1. ML Estimates of Ordered Probit Models of Respondent Perceptions of Whether Appointees are Selected for Competence or Campaign Experience or Political Connections

Variable	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
<i>Key Variables</i>				
Agency liberalism-conservatism	0.14	0.04**	0.14	0.03**
% R&D programs	-0.42	0.16**	-0.47	0.20**
Site-specific expertise	0.14	0.32	0.17	0.31
Minor agency (0,1)	1.15	0.20**	1.10	0.27**
<i>Agency-specific controls</i>				
Ln(2007 employment)			0.00	0.03
Commission (0,1)			0.08	0.22
% Professional employees			0.35	0.30
% Law judges			0.12	0.06**
<i>Respondent-specific controls</i>				
Resp. Liberalism-conservatism			0.05	0.04
Frequency of Contact with Appointees			-0.09	0.03**
Years Worked in Agency			-0.01	0.00**
Work in Regional Office (0,1)			-0.28	0.06**
<i>Cut Points</i>				
1	-1.51	0.90	-1.81	0.82
2	-0.73	0.86	-1.00	0.78
3	0.50	0.83	0.25	0.76
<hr/>				
N	1362		1314	
Number of agencies	39		39	
X ² (4, 12)	66.13		206.82	

Note: Dependent variable is ordered and categorical based upon individual survey response. Question wording: "Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting [strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don't know]: "Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/ connections." Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected more for political experience and connections rather than competence *significant at the 0.10 level in two-tailed tests; **significant at the 0.05 level in one-tailed tests. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on agency.

Appendix A. List of Agencies

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Minor (Yes, No)</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Minor (Yes, No)</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Minor (Yes, No)</u>
ACHP	1	FASAB	1	NMB	1
ADF	1	FCC	0	NRC	0
AMTRAK	0	FDIC	0	NREC	1
ARC	1	FEC	0	OPM	0
ARMY	0	FED	0	OSHRC	1
BBG	0	FHFB	0	OTH	0
CCJJD	1	FMC	1	PCOR	0
CFTC	0	FMSHRC	1	RRB	1
CNCS	0	FRTIB	1	SBA	0
COM	0	FTC	0	SEC	0
CPSC	0	GSA	0	SMTH	0
CSHIB	1	HHS	0	SSA	0
DHS	0	HSTS	1	STAT	0
DNFSB	1	HUD	0	USAF	0
DOD	0	IMLS	1	USAID	0
DOE	0	INT	0	USARC	1
DOED	0	JMMFF	1	USCFA	1
DOJ	0	MKSF	1	USDA	0
DOL	0	MMC	1	USITC	0
DOT	0	MSPB	0	USPS	0
DTRS	0	NARA	0		
DVA	0	NASA	0		
EEOC	0	NAVY	0		
EOP	0	NCPC	1		
EPA	0	NFAH	0		
EXIM	0	NLRB	0		

Appendix B. ML Estimates of Ordered Probit Models of Respondent Perceptions of Whether Appointees are Selected for Competence or Campaign Experience or Political Connections—Alternate Specifications

Variable	1		2		3		4	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
<i>Key Variables</i>								
Agency liberalism-conservatism	0.56	0.18**	-0.51	0.31	0.13	0.03**	0.13	0.04**
Scientific or Technical Tasks	-0.77	0.28**	-0.68	0.33**	-0.30	0.23	-0.80	0.23**
Site-specific expertise	-0.05	0.23	0.16	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.08	0.35
Minor agency (0,1)	1.36	0.23**	1.33	0.29**	0.62	0.19**	1.20	0.37**
<i>Agency-specific controls</i>								
Ln(2007 employment)	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03
Commission (0,1)	0.03	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.29	0.18	0.08	0.29
% Professional employees	0.60	0.35*	0.42	0.38	0.18	0.27	0.22	0.30
% Law judges	0.12	0.06**	0.09	0.07	-0.00	0.05	0.15	0.09*
<i>Respondent-specific controls</i>								
Resp. Liberalism-conservatism	0.03	0.04	-0.18	0.07**	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Frequency of Contact with Appointees	-0.10	0.03**	-0.10	0.03**	-0.10	0.03**	-0.09	0.03**
Years Worked in Agency	-0.01	0.00**	-0.01	0.00**	-0.01	0.00**	-0.01	0.00**
Work in Regional Office (0,1)	-0.31	0.06**	-0.30	0.06**	-0.30	0.06**	-0.26	0.06**
<i>Cut Points</i>								
1	-2.26	0.62	-2.00	0.94	-1.46	0.64	-2.33	0.98
2	-1.45	0.59	-1.20	0.90	-0.66	0.61	-1.53	0.93
3	-0.20	0.57	0.06	0.89	0.62	0.59	-0.27	0.91
N	1324		1333		1444		1314	
Number of agencies	40		40		51		39	
X ² (4, 12)	236.15		236.15		134.20		290.79	

Note: Dependent variable is ordered and categorical based upon individual survey response. Question wording: “Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting [strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don’t know]: “*Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/ connections.*” Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected more for political experience and connections rather than competence. **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.10 level in two-tailed tests. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on agency. Models 1 and 2 include alternate measures of agency ideology (i.e., estimated ideal points, partisanship). Model 3 includes the % of agency employees that are natural or biological scientists, engineers, architects, physical scientists, mathematicians, and statisticians as a measure of agency task complexity (source: OPM Fedscope Website). Model 4 controls for the percentage of an agency’s total programs comprised of the following types: block/formula grant, capital and assets acquisition, competitive grant, credit, direct federal, regulation.

Appendix C. OLS Estimates of Regression Models of Respondent Perceptions of Whether Appointees are Selected for Competence or Campaign Experience or Political Connections—Agencies as Unit of Analysis

Variable	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
<i>Key Variables</i>				
Agency liberalism-conservatism	0.16	0.06**	0.19	0.06**
% R&D programs	-0.39	0.41	-0.58	0.50
Site-specific expertise	0.06	0.19	0.16	0.21
Minor agency (0,1)	0.69	0.24**	0.66	0.28**
<i>Agency-specific controls and Constant</i>				
Ln(2007 employment)			-0.04	0.04
Commission (0,1)			-0.13	0.16
% Professional employees			0.49	0.34
% Law judges			0.17	0.19
Constant	3.15	0.48**	3.16	0.55**
<hr/>				
N	39		39	
F (4,8 df)	3.89		2.37	

Note: Dependent variable is average of individual survey response by agency. Question wording: “Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements about your work and job setting [strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don’t know]: “*Political appointees in my agency tend to be selected more for competence and experience than campaign or political experience/ connections.*” Answers are recoded so that higher values indicate that appointees were selected more for political experience and connections rather than competence. **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.10 level in two-tailed tests. Graphs of residuals and leverage vs. residual squared plots reveal no violation of regression assumptions.