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Partisanship in the Trump Era [1]

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DRAFT: February 7, 2018

I explore the contours of the contemporary American partisan landscape, including social and political divisions within and between the Republican and Democratic parties, (minimal) shifts in partisanship over the past two years, the relative standing of President Trump and the Republican "establishment" among rank and file party members, and prospects for partisan change in the short term (prompted by significant changes in people's views about Trump), in the medium term (prompted by attitude mismatches and cross-pressures) and in the longer term (prompted by generational replacement of the white conservatives who comprise Trump's base). In contrast to much journalistic speculation, I find that Republicans are not particularly divided by cultural conservatism (as measured by survey items focusing on respect for the American flag, the English language, and negative feelings toward Muslims, immigrants, atheists, and gays and lesbians, among others); indeed, they tend to be united and energized by these values. Democrats, by comparison, are relatively divided on cultural issues, with more than one-fourth finding themselves closer to the average Republican position than to the average position of their own party.

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1 Prepared for a symposium on "Parties and Partisanship in the Age of Trump," Bedrosian Center on Governance and the Public Enterprise, University of Southern California, February 13, 2018. Thanks to Wendy Rahn for helpful discussion and comments.

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Partisanship in the Trump Era

The stunning election and presidency of Donald Trump have raised momentous questions regarding the present and future of the American party system. Some observers have questioned how a major political party came to embrace "a blood-and-soil nationalism far removed from the United States' pluralistic and constitutional traditions" (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017, 13). Others have wondered how close that embrace really is or will become. As one observer put it, "Is Donald Trump a rogue Republican—an independent president rather than a party leader? Or is he simply remaking, in fits and starts and with the establishment kicking and screaming, the GOP in his own image? This is a central political question of Trump's presidency" (Warren 2017).

The state of the Democratic Party is equally up for debate. Trump's election, along with Republican control of both houses of Congress and a sizeable majority of state legislatures, put a significant dent in the confidence of some progressive analysts that long-term declines in ethnic homogeneity and religiosity will produce an inexorable Republican "death spiral" and corresponding Democratic electoral dominance (Holland 2017). Others continue to view demography as destiny, or something like it, but expect significant disruption along the way. Matthew Yglesias (2016) argued that insurgent primary challenger Bernie "Sanders and his youthful supporters want the Democrats to be a different kind of party: a more ideological, more left-wing one." And Sanders is certainly not going away quietly; a year after losing the 2016 Democratic nomination he told a "People's Summit" of 4,000 progressive activists that "The current model and the current strategy of the Democratic party is an absolute failure" (Gabbatt 2017).

This report provides a snapshot of the contemporary American party system focusing on similarities and differences in the attitudes and values of each party's rank

and file supporters. The primary data for my analysis come from a November 2017 survey of 2000 people who were originally interviewed in 2015 and 2016 as part of YouGov's 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project.[2] These data provide both a detailed picture of partisan attitudes ten months into Trump's presidency and an opportunity to assess the nature and extent of partisan change in the wake of Trump's remarkable campaign, election, and behavior in the White House.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, popular commentary on the political parties tends to focus on internecine conflict rather than on broadly shared values. However, the current conventional wisdom regarding the *bases* of conflict within each party seems, judging from my analysis, to be quite mistaken. Democrats are supposed to be split between "the young progressives" drawn to Sanders's democratic socialism (Yglesias 2016) and an old guard committed to the neoliberalism of the Clintons and Joe Biden. In fact, however, rank and file Democrats are relatively united in their enthusiasm for an active government, but less united on cultural issues, where a sizable minority cling to the traditional values downplayed or even rejected by most party leaders.

Conversely, on the Republican side the primary focus has been on "the president's brand of hard-edge nationalism—with its gut-level cultural appeals and hard lines on trade and immigration," as a recent *New York Times* report put it (Martin and Peters 2017). Moreover, these "profound ideological differences within the Republican coalition" are supposed to "have become much more pronounced in the Trump era" (Hohmann 2017). In fact, however, rank and file Republicans seem to be relatively united and energized by "hard-edge nationalism," but less united on the role of government, with a sizeable minority expressing rather un-Republican enthusiasm for a strong welfare state.

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[2] A more detailed description of the data appears in the Appendix.

Nor does it seem to be the case that "Mr. Trump's Republican Party is something entirely new" (Shribman 2017). Rather, as John Sides (2017) has argued, "The party coalitions were already changing" long before Trump came along; the much-noted migration of "working-class" whites to the Republican Party "mainly occurred from 2009 to 2015. It was not a consequence of the 2016 campaign." Trump's candidacy mostly served to bring to the fore "attitudes about immigration, feelings toward black people, and feelings toward Muslims" that were already widely shared among Republicans—and some Democrats.

Extending Sides' analysis, I find remarkably little change in partisanship between 2015, when Trump was first emerging as a national political figure, and late 2017. And while the few Democrats who became Republicans during this period seem to have been attracted in part by enthusiasm for Trump, there is virtually no indication that Trump's "often racially charged cultural appeals" during the campaign and in his first year as president (Finnegan 2017) have precipitated defections from the Republican Party. Thus, while I conclude with some speculation regarding prospects for partisan change in the short, medium, and long runs, there is little basis here for supposing that "Mr. Trump is remaking his party in his own image" (Shribman 2017), that Republicans are "fundamentally divided" (Todd, Murray, and Dann 2017), or even that the contemporary Republican Party is—any more than major American parties generally are—"a very uncomfortable coalition" (Litvan 2017).

The Partisan Landscape

The tabulations presented in Table 1 provide examples of significant differences in views between (average) Democrats and (average) Republicans on a variety of salient political and social issues.[3] The issues listed at the top of the table focus on

[3] Partisan attachments are inferred from responses to the familiar sequence of party identification questions developed by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954, chap. 7). Throughout

government's role in reducing income differences, providing health care and social services, and regulating the environment—the hallmarks of the modern welfare state.[4] Democrats are in every case significantly more enthusiastic than Republicans about endorsing government efforts in these areas. However, the magnitude of the partisan gulf is constrained by the fact that even a majority of Republicans endorse government efforts to regulate pollution, provide a decent standard of living for people unable to work, and ensure access to good health care, while substantial minorities favor reducing income differences and helping families pay for child care and college.

***** Table 1 *****

The bottom part of Table 1 provides examples of views that are significantly more popular among Republicans than among Democrats. These mostly touch on traditional cultural values such as respect for the flag, the English language, hard work, and "common sense."[5] However, in these cases, too, the magnitude of the partisan gulf is reduced by the fact that even most Democrats endorse many of these values. Even the more combative formulations of cultural conservatism—claims that "discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities" and that "people who disrespect the American flag don't belong in this country"—are endorsed by many (though not *most*) Democrats.

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this report I classify independents who reported leaning toward either party along with partisans, since their responses to other questions were generally similar to those of partisans. I reserve the Independent label for those who denied thinking of themselves as closer to either party.

[4] "People have different views about the federal government's responsibilities. Please indicate whether you think the government should or should not be doing each of the following things." Response options were "definitely should," "probably should," "neither; unsure," "probably should not," and "definitely should not."

[5] "Here are some ideas people have expressed about American society. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement." Response options were "strongly agree," "agree," "neither; unsure," "disagree," and "strongly disagree."

Republicans and Democrats are not only divided in their views about political and social issues. Ordinary people's political orientations are often grounded in social identities and positive and negative feelings toward social groups (Converse 1964; Brady and Sniderman 1985; Achen and Bartels 2016a). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the resonance of various salient groups in contemporary partisan politics. The figure shows the average ratings (on a zero-to-ten scale) of a variety of groups and political leaders by Democratic Party identifiers and leaners (on the horizontal axis) and Republican Party identifiers and leaners (on the vertical axis).[6]

***** Figure 1 *****

Groups located above the diagonal line in the figure, including the National Rifle Association, Fox News, police officers, Christians, and wealthy people, among others, were viewed significantly more favorably by Republicans than by Democrats.[7] Below the diagonal line, Black Lives Matter, journalists, environmentalists, labor unions, and college professors, among others, were viewed more favorably by Democrats than by Republicans. Working people, nurses, farmers, and construction workers appear in the upper right corner of the figure, meaning that they were viewed very favorably by both Democrats and Republicans, while Congress was viewed equally *un*favorably by both partisan groups.

Recent analyses of the partisan landscape (Pew Research Center 2017; Ekins 2017) have divided the electorate into distinct groups defined by more-or-less similar

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[6] "Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some [social groups/people in different occupations/prominent national and international organizations/past and present political leaders]. Please indicate where you would put each one on a scale ranging from 0 (for extremely unfavorable feelings) to 10 (for extremely favorable feelings)." The order of specific groups or individuals within each battery was randomized.

[7] Not surprisingly, ratings of the parties, partisans, and prominent party leaders are even more polarized, with average ratings among Democrats and Republicans differing by as much as 6.5 points on the zero-to-ten scale in the case of Barack Obama.

political attitudes. Obviously, the nature of the typology resulting from an analysis of this sort depends on what specific issues are included and on how many groups are allowed.[8] If the defining issues are judiciously selected and the resulting groups are manageable in number and evocatively labeled, analyses of this sort can provide useful heuristic insight regarding fissures within and between the parties. On the other hand, collapsing a wide range of opinions into a manageable set of discrete groups is likely to obscure substantial intra-group heterogeneity and unlikely to facilitate systematic analysis of the electorate as a whole.

In contrast, my approach to characterizing the contemporary partisan landscape employs a dimensional analysis familiar in broad outline from decades of spatial analyses of politics (Brady 2011). Starting with a much broader selection of political attitudes—43 items and scales reflecting social views, policy preferences, and feelings about politically salient groups—I construct two summary dimensions reflecting the major bases of disagreement between and within the two major parties, *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism*.[9] Of course, just as with typological analyses, the structure of the resulting two-dimensional political space reflects the selection of specific survey items included in the analysis. I focus primarily on attitudes (like those in Table 1) and groups (in Figure 1) that tend to divide Republicans and Democrats;

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[8] The Pew Research Center (2017) typology used latent class analysis of responses to 12 questions about social and political values (plus party affiliation) to identify nine distinct groups in the electorate—four largely Republican ("Core Conservatives," "Country First Conservatives," "Market Skeptic Republicans," and "New Era Enterprisers"), four largely Democratic ("Solid Liberals," "Opportunity Democrats," "Disaffected Democrats," and "Devout and Diverse"), and one consisting of political "Bystanders." Ekins (2017) used cluster analysis of responses to 13 items and scales to identify five distinct sub-groups of Trump voters, of which four ("Staunch Conservatives," "Free Marketeers," "American Preservationists," and "Anti-Elites") accounted for 95% of his support.

[9] Together, the two summary dimensions derived from this analysis capture 78% of the observed variance in the 43 original survey items. The factor loadings are reported in Table A in the Appendix.

however, ratings of party leaders and the parties themselves are not incorporated in the summary dimensions.

The *Limited Government* dimension reflects classic economic conservatism, including opposition to government involvement in the provision of social welfare (providing access to health care, reducing income differences between rich and poor, providing a decent standard of living for people unable to work, helping families pay for child care and college, and regulating pollution and environmental hazards), antipathy toward liberal elites (including the United Nations, environmentalists, and college professors), and affinity for wealthy people and business groups.

The *Cultural Conservatism* dimension primarily taps ethnic nationalism and traditional morality, including respect for the American flag, the English language, and our national borders, antipathy toward Muslims, immigrants, atheists, and gays and lesbians, and racial resentment and concerns about discrimination against whites.

Not surprisingly, these two bundles of attitudes are positively correlated (R=.56), and some specific survey items are significantly associated with both—most notably, feelings toward the NRA and Fox News and conservative ideological self-identification. Equally unsurprisingly, despite the fact that explicitly partisan political figures and groups are excluded from the analysis, both of the resulting dimensions are also strongly correlated with a measure of (Republican) *Partisan Affect* constructed from ratings of Democrats, Republicans, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party (R=.72 for *Limited Government*; R=.67 for *Cultural Conservatism*).[10]

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[10] YouGov survey respondents rated Democrats, Republicans, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party on zero-to-ten scales running from "extremely unfavorable feelings" to "extremely favorable feelings." My summary measure of Partisan Affect is the sum of the two Republican ratings minus the sum of the two Democratic ratings rescaled to run from zero (for the strongest Democratic affect) to 100 (for the strongest Republican affect).

The distribution of citizens' attitudes on the two dimensions and the relationship between these attitudes and partisan attachments are depicted in Figure 2. Each dot in the figure represents a YouGov survey respondent, with her position on the horizontal axis reflecting her attitude toward *Limited Government* and her position on the vertical dimension reflecting her attitude toward *Cultural Conservatism*.[11] The correlation between these two sets of views is evident from the preponderance of observations in the lower left and upper right quadrants of the figure (representing liberal views on both dimensions and conservative views on both dimensions, respectively). The relationship between both sets of attitudes and partisan attachments is evident from the preponderance of Republicans (represented by red diamonds) in the upper right quadrant and Democrats (represented by blue circles) in the lower left quadrant. It is interesting to note that Independents who did not "lean" toward either party (represented by purple triangles) are widely scattered on both dimensions, not heavily concentrated near the center of the political space.[12] That fact suggests that, in the current polarized partisan environment, independence is a reflection not primarily of political moderation or cross-pressures, but of a distinctive reluctance to express even a leaning toward a political party, however congenial its values.

***** Figure 2 *****

The attitudes toward *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* depicted in Figure 2 are grounded in some of the most salient social identities in contemporary American society. The statistical analyses presented in Table 2 shed light on these

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[11] As is customary in factor analyses, the distribution of positions on each resulting dimension is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0.

[12] The distribution of Independents on the *Limited Government* dimension has a mean of .21 and a standard deviation of .85, reflecting a slight conservative tilt but nearly as much variation in views as in the electorate as a whole. The corresponding distribution on the *Cultural Conservativism* dimension has a mean of .04 and a standard deviation of .83.

connections. Liberal opposition to *Limited Government* was prevalent among African Americans, and to a lesser extent among other non-white ethnic groups, females, and urban dwellers. Conversely, church-goers, born again Christians, people with high (or undisclosed) family incomes, and those living in rural areas expressed more enthusiasm for *Limited Government*.

***** Table 2 *****

The most powerful demographic predictors of support for *Cultural Conservatism* were church attendance, (low) education, age, identification as a born again Christian, and rural residence. African Americans were much more likely to take liberal positions on the cultural dimension, while other non-whites (but, somewhat surprisingly, not Latinos), females, and urban dwellers were modestly less supportive of *Cultural Conservatism*, other things being equal.

Two Parties Talking Past Each Other

The metaphor of a "partisan landscape" risks confusion if it is taken to imply a fixed, universally shared political geography. Donald Stokes (1963, 371-372) in his influential critique of spatial models of electoral competition noted that "the space in which political parties compete can be of highly variable structure," adding that "the skills of political leaders who must maneuver for public support in a democracy consist partly in knowing what issue dimensions are salient to the electorate or can be made salient by suitable propaganda." In the present context, the two dimensions of political attitudes I have labeled *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* seem to have similar *meanings* for most voters in both parties.[13] However, the *significance* of

[13] Separate factor analyses of the same survey items among Republicans and Democrats produce very similar structures. The separate party factor loadings on the *Cultural Conservatism* dimension correlate at .87 (and at .97 and .95 with the common dimension employed here), while the factor loadings on the *Limited Government* dimension correlate at .80

those dimensions differs between Democrats and Republicans in (at least) two ways. First, as is clear from the joint distribution of political attitudes portrayed in Figure 2, the correlation between views about *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* was a good deal stronger among Democrats (R=.43) than among Republicans (R=.20). And second, the relative *salience* of the two dimensions varied substantially, with Democrats primarily attuned to the role of government and Republicans primarily focused on cultural conservatism.

Table 3 summarizes the relationship between these two dimensions of political attitudes and overall *Partisan Affect* separately for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. In each group, unsurprisingly, people with relatively conservative attitudes tended to express more favorable views toward Republicans and the Republican Party while those with relatively liberal attitudes tended to express more favorable views toward Democrats and the Democratic Party. However, the relative importance of *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* varied significantly in the three partisan groups. Both dimensions were of roughly similar importance in accounting for *Partisan Affect* among Independents (6.38 versus 5.68); but Republican identifiers and leaners seem to have attached much more weight to *Cultural Conservatism* (13.02) than to *Limited Government* (5.27), while Democrats seem to have attached much more weight to *Limited Government* (13.07) than to *Cultural*

(and at .92 and .96 with the common dimension employed here). The latter correlations are depressed by partisan differences in the resonance of misgivings about government power (which registers as a conservative attitude among Republicans but a liberal attitude among Democrats) and by the disproportionate prominence of college professors in the political worldviews of Republicans and Wall Street bankers in the political worldviews of Democrats.

Conservatism (3.34).[14] In effect, these two partisan groups were seeing and responding to substantively different partisan divides.[15]

***** Table 3 *****

Perhaps even more surprisingly, a similar asymmetry appears in separate assessments of the two parties by the electorate as a whole. Table 4 shows that ratings of the Democratic Party (on a zero-to-ten scale) were much more strongly related to views about *Limited Government* (−1.825) than to views about *Cultural Conservatism* (−.681), while ratings of the Republican Party were almost twice as strongly related to *Cultural Conservatism* (1.398) as to *Limited Government* (.742). These differences seem to be mostly attributable to the priorities of each party's own supporters, but not wholly: Republicans and Independents rated the Democratic Party more on the basis of *Limited Government* (1.058) than *Cultural Conservatism* (.799), while Democrats and Independents rated the Republican Party more on the basis of *Cultural Conservatism* (.927) than *Limited Government* (.656). Even people who were not themselves members of a party seem to have evaluated the party primarily on the basis of the political attitudes most salient to its supporters.

***** Table 4 *****

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[14] These disparities in the relative salience of the two dimensions are even stronger when the analyses are limited to each party's strong identifiers.

[15] The intercepts in Table 3 are also worth noting. Independents with average views on both the *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* dimensions showed a near-perfect balance in partisan affect (50.55 on the 100-point scale). Republicans with similar views were somewhat more enthusiastic about the Republican Party (58.31), while ratings by Democrats with similar views were even more skewed toward the Democratic Party (37.82). These differences may reflect more or less pure partisan bias in affective ratings or the impact of specific attitudes not captured by the *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* dimensions.

Partisan Change, 2015-2017

Respondents in the 2017 YouGov survey were first interviewed in 2015, allowing for direct measurement of partisan change over this politically tumultuous two-year period.[16] Table 5 shows the distribution of partisanship in November 2017 for each partisan group in 2015. For example, the upper right cell of the table shows that 76.6% of respondents who were strong Republicans in 2015 remained strong Republicans two years later. The next two cells reading down the same column show that another 11.2% of those who were strong Republicans in 2015 were weak Republicans in 2017 and 6.9% were Republican leaners. (The remaining 5.4% left the Republican Party, becoming "pure" Independents or Democrats.)

***** Table 5 *****

The most striking fact evident from Table 5 is that, even by a generous count, partisan change was exceedingly rare: 3.9% of 2015 Democrats or Democratic "leaners" became 2017 Republicans or Republican leaners (in the nine upper-left cells of Table k), while 5.2% of 2015 Republicans or Republican leaners became 2017 Democrats or Democratic leaners (in the nine lower-right cells of the table).[17] The net effect of these shifts was to produce a tiny increase in the Democrats' partisan advantage, from 10.4% (46.6%-36.2%) in 2015 to 10.7% (45.7%-35.0%) in 2017.

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[16] Unlike the 2016 data, which were gathered in July and November-December as part of the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, the 2015 data on party identification come from a variety of unrelated YouGov surveys conducted at different points in the year. Thus, the time span between 2015 and November 2017 readings varies from a bit less than two years to almost three years.

[17] Because I classify independents who reported thinking of themselves as closer to one party or the other along with partisans, my tabulations of partisan change include not only people who changed their partisan identification but also those who switched from "leaning" Democratic to "leaning" Republican (or vice versa).

This remarkable partisan stability—stretching from the early stages of Trump's candidacy through the primary season, the general election campaign, and most of the first year of his singular presidency—is a testament to the strength of voters' partisan loyalties in the contemporary party system. Indeed, even independence seems to have become an impressively stable political orientation, with almost 80% of 2015 "pure" Independents remaining in that category two years later and fewer than 10% becoming full-fledged Republican or Democratic identifiers.

Given the remarkable infrequency of partisan change in these data, an elaborate analysis of the bases of that change would be ill-considered.[18] Nonetheless, even a cursory examination of the characteristics of these rare specimens may be suggestive.

The 21 YouGov survey respondents who defected from the Democratic Party in 2015 to the Republican Party in 2017 show every sign of having been converted primarily by personal enthusiasm for Donald Trump. In mid-2016 they were already, as a group, substantially more favorable than the public as a whole toward Trump (6.07 versus 3.35). By 2017 they were even more favorable toward Trump, though a bit less distinctively so (6.35 versus 3.82). On average, they were only slightly more conservative than the entire public on the *Limited Government* dimension (+.06), but a good deal more distinctive with respect to *Cultural Conservatism* (+.53).[19]

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[18] An additional reason for caution is that shifts in partisanship were most common among politically uninterested people, whose representation in the YouGov survey was augmented by weighting. Thus, while partisan switchers made up 3.7% of the weighted sample, they comprised only 2.2% of the unweighted sample—a total of 42 respondents.

[19] The relative causal priority of personal enthusiasm for Trump and support for *Cultural Conservatism* is, of course, ambiguous. For what it is worth, a multivariate analysis of Democrat-to-Republican switches suggests a powerful role for feelings about Trump (as measured in July 2016), with *Cultural Conservatism* and *Limited Government* attitudes having more modest (and relatively equal) effects. Feelings toward Clinton and Obama (also measured in July 2016) had little or no apparent impact.

The 21 people who defected from the Republican Party in 2015 to the Democratic Party in 2017 had even less distinctive political attitudes. Some political observers have wondered "whether the Republican Party—encumbered by Trump's often racially charged cultural appeals to blue-collar voters—has repelled well-educated whites for the long term" (Finnegan 2017). But the few Republicans who defected from the party were, on the whole, no better educated than the vast majority who stayed. Nor were they especially averse to "racially charged cultural appeals"—their average position on the *Cultural Conservativism* dimension (–.01) almost exactly matched that of the public as a whole.[20] Nor were they significantly more negative than the public as a whole toward Trump, either in 2016 (3.14 versus 3.35) or in 2017 (3.99 versus 3.82).

Thus, rather remarkably, there is *no evidence in these data that Trump has alienated traditional Republicans*—at least, not to the point of precipitating defections from the party. Indeed, there is more reason to believe that many of these Republican-to-Democrat shifts were inspired by enthusiasm for the Democratic presidential candidate. The Republican defectors, 87% of whom were women, were substantially more favorable than the public as a whole toward Hillary Clinton in July 2016 (4.64 versus 3.74) and even more so by November 2017 (6.76 versus 3.75).[21]

It's Trump's Republican Party, But Mostly by Default

One of the most extraordinary features of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign was the fact that he was publicly opposed, even after winning the nomination, by significant elements of the Republican establishment, including many

[20] On average, defectors from the Republican Party were slightly more liberal than the public as a whole on the *Limited Government* dimension (–.14).

[21] As in the case of Democrat-to-Republican shifts, multivariate analysis of these Republican-to-Democrat shifts tends to reinforce the impression that personal regard for Clinton (and perhaps also for Obama) was more important than views about Trump or *Cultural Conservatism*. (Relatively liberal attitudes regarding *Limited Government* may also have played some independent role in precipitating defections to the Democratic Party.)

prominent conservative intellectuals and four of the party's five previous presidential nominees. Even more extraordinary was the fact that Republican voters didn't seem to care—the vast majority supported him anyway.[22]

The friction between Trump and the Republican establishment continued after he entered the White House. Seven months after the inauguration, the *New York Times* reported that the "uneasy governing alliance" between the president and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell had "curdled into a feud of mutual resentment and sometimes outright hostility" (Burns and Martin 2017). Trump publicly blamed McConnell for the collapse of the effort to repeal Obamacare, tweeting "Mitch McConnell, who has screamed Repeal & Replace for 7 years, couldn't get it done." A subsequent Trump tweet blamed "Mitch M & Paul R" for the debt ceiling "mess" when they failed to heed his advice on legislative strategy (Quinn 2017).

As the latter tweet suggests, Trump's relationship with House Speaker Paul Ryan was not much better. Ryan had expressed repeated (but carefully modulated) criticism of Trump during the campaign, eventually withdrawing his support in the wake of Trump's infamous "Access Hollywood" recording. Ryan walked a similar tightrope after Trump entered the White House. "Every morning," he complained in a comic turn, "I wake up in my office and scroll Twitter to see which tweets I will have to pretend that I didn't see later" (Caldwell 2017). As veteran journalist Chris Cillizza (2017) wrote a year after the 2016 election, Ryan "spent the past two years drawing lines in the sand" regarding Trump's behavior "—and then erasing them when Trump, inevitably, overstepped."

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[22] Trump's share of the major-party vote among YouGov survey respondents who were Republican identifiers or leaners in 2015 was 91%. His share of the total vote in this group was 84%, mostly due to the 15% of 2015 Republican leaners who reported in the 2016 post-election survey having voted for minor candidates.

The futility of Ryan's repeated line-drawing, Cillizza surmised, stemmed from the fact that "there is still considerable peril in openly breaking with Trump," who "remains very, very popular with people who voted for him." However, the tabulations presented in Table 6 suggest a somewhat different reading of Republican sentiment: Trump was "very, very popular" only by comparison with McConnell, Ryan, and the rest of the Republican establishment.

***** Table 6 *****

The top panel of Table 6 summarizes Republicans' responses to a standard survey question about Trump's performance as president. Among the Republican electorate as a whole 77% approved of Trump's performance, but only 44% approved "strongly" (while 23% disapproved or were unsure). Among "strong" Republican identifiers 90% approved of Trump's performance, but only 60% approved strongly (while 10% disapproved or were unsure). For a president less than one year into his term, these approval ratings were hardly spectacular.

The middle panel of Table 6 presents a more direct reading of Republicans' feelings about Trump using a zero-to-ten scale ranging from "extremely unfavorable feelings" to "extremely favorable feelings." Among the Republican electorate as a whole, Trump's average rating on the zero-to-ten scale was 7.07—comfortably above the neutral point but again hardly overwhelming.[23] Nonetheless, Trump's ratings topped those of "Republicans" and "the Republican Party" (6.85 and 6.38, respectively), while ratings of four other prominent Republican leaders were even lower. The average rating of Paul Ryan among his own party's identifiers was only 5.02—almost exactly

[23] By comparison, Democratic identifiers' average ratings of Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, and Barack Obama ranged from 6.58 up to 8.33.

neutral—while the average rating of Mitch McConnell was a dismal 3.93.[24] Moreover, the disparity between ratings of Trump and ratings of Ryan and McConnell was even greater among the engaged subset of Republicans who voted in the most recent midterm election, and still greater among the somewhat smaller core of "strong" Republican identifiers.

The bottom panel of Table 6 reports the results of a different approach to tapping Republicans' relative confidence in their party's leaders. YouGov survey respondents were asked, "When Donald Trump disagrees with Republicans in Congress, who do you think is more likely to be right?" The Republican electorate as a whole chose Trump by a margin of 3.5 to 1, while strong identifiers chose Trump by a margin of more than 8 to 1.

Clearly, insofar as rank and file Republicans took sides in the intra-party squabble between Trump and the party establishment, they mostly sided with Trump. But that seems to be attributable less to any exceptional enthusiasm for Trump than to a conspicuous *lack* of enthusiasm for McConnell, Ryan, and other prominent party leaders.[25] If it is true that "the Republican Party no longer stands for anything other than Trump" (Reich 2018), that may be mostly by default.

Democratic Divisions—An Illusion of Ideology

While the Republican Party is learning to live with Donald Trump, the Democratic Party is wrestling with its own internal divisions. These stem not only from Hillary Clinton's surprising (to many) defeat in the 2016 general election, but also from her

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[24] The corresponding average rating of House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi by Democratic identifiers was 5.93—about a point higher than Republicans' ratings of Ryan and *two* points higher than their ratings of McConnell.

[25] Republicans were even surprisingly lukewarm toward the party itself. Their average rating of the Republican Party on the zero-to-ten scale was 6.39, half a point lower than Democrats' average rating of the Democratic Party.

surprising (to many) difficulty in fending off the insurgent challenge of Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primaries. Sanders' perceived success was interpreted by many pundits as evidence of an ideological sea change, "proving that the Democratic Party had moved decisively to the left" (Vyse 2017). While the primary season contest was still going on, Matthew Yglesias (2016) wrote that "the young progressives the party is counting on to deliver them to the promised land are, as Sanders has shown, really quite left-wing." Almost 18 months later, Thomas Edsall argued that "Many of the current conflicts [within the party] enlarge upon the ideological divisions that dominated the 2016 presidential primaries, with Hillary Clinton representing the centrist wing and Bernie Sanders the progressive wing."

For better or worse, the notion that supporters of Sanders and Clinton are separated by "ideological divisions" is starkly contradicted by the statistical analysis reported in the first column of Table 7, which shows how Democrats' relative enthusiasm for the two candidates was related to their views about *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism*. The difference in ratings between Sanders and Clinton was virtually uncorrelated with views on both dimensions. (In each case, a shift of one standard deviation translated into an expected change of just one-fifth of a point in relative feelings; the adjusted R^2 statistic is .00.) These results show that "it is quite a stretch" to view Sanders supporters "as the vanguard of a new, social-democratic-trending Democratic Party" (Achen and Bartels 2016b).

***** Table 7 *****

Relative feelings toward Sanders and former vice president Joe Biden (another potential contender for the 2020 presidential nomination) were likewise almost unrelated to views about *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* (with an adjusted R^2 statistic of .01). Moreover, the very modest correlations that do appear fly in the face of Sanders' supposed role as an icon of "the left." If anything, Democrats

who were relatively more *conservative* on both dimensions expressed slightly more favorable feelings toward Sanders relative to Biden.

The notable absence of ideological structure in Democrats' views about their party leaders is underlined by a comparison with parallel analyses among Republicans. While some observers have speculated that "anti-Trump Republicans aren't more or less conservative than the rest of the party" (Hunt 2017), that certainly isn't the case among rank and file partisans. Table 8 shows how Republicans' feelings about Trump relative to two other party leaders, former presidential candidate Mitt Romney and House Speaker Ryan, were related to attitudes about *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism*. In both comparisons, conservatives on both dimensions were much more likely than moderates to express relatively favorable views toward Trump.[26] The standing of Trump vis-à-vis the Republican establishment is grounded in meaningful disagreements about the role of government and (especially) cultural change—disagreements in which most rank and file Republicans side with Trump. But *Limited Government* was only about one-fifth as important in accounting for Democrats' relative enthusiasm for Sanders as in accounting for Republicans' relative enthusiasm for Trump; *Cultural Conservatism* was only about *one-tenth* as important on the Democratic side as on the Republican side. Among rank and file Democrats, Sanders' standing vis-à-vis the Democratic establishment in late 2017 was essentially unrelated to these salient issues and values.[27]

***** Table 8 *****

[26] Parallel analyses of Republicans' relative enthusiasm for Trump and former president George W. Bush or Senate Majority Leader McConnell produce similar results, as does an analysis of responses to the question in Table 6 regarding disagreements between Trump and Republicans in Congress.

[27] Even the most politically interested Democrats show no real evidence of ideological division in their relative enthusiasm for Sanders vis-à-vis Clinton. The apparent effect of views about *Limited Government* is larger than in Table 7, but still much smaller than in Table 8, while the apparent effect of *Cultural Conservatism* is nil (and the adjusted R^2 statistic is .00).

Does that imply that the "current conflicts" between the Sanders and Clinton "wings" of the Democratic Party are entirely a matter of personality clashes or activists wrangling about who did what to whom in the back rooms of the Democratic National Committee? No. Rank and file Democrats' feelings about Sanders relative to both Clinton and Biden seem to have been shaped, in significant part, by social identities and antipathies roughly reflected in the demographic factors listed in Table 9. For example, African Americans and Latinos were almost a full scale point more favorable toward Clinton, other things being equal—a plausible reflection of her identity as "a longtime ally of African-Americans and other minority groups" (Achen and Bartels 2016b). Education and income produced similarly large differences, with more educated and less affluent Democrats expressing relatively warmer feelings toward Clinton. On the other hand, Sanders has continued to draw "enthusiastic support from young people, a common pattern for outsider candidates," especially vis-à-vis longtime party stalwarts like Clinton and Biden.

***** Table 9 *****

The most significant division between Sanders and Clinton voters in 2016 primary exit polls was between Democrats and Independents. Sanders, a political maverick who has long resisted even calling himself a Democrat, did almost 30 points worse among Democratic identifiers than among Independents. A similar division continued to appear in relative enthusiasm for the two figures 18 months later. On average, Sanders was rated almost two points more favorably than Clinton by Democratic "leaners" in the 2017 YouGov survey, one point more favorably by "weak" Democratic identifiers, and slightly *less* favorably by "strong" Democratic identifiers. In short, outside a tiny stratum of Democratic activists, Sanders remains "a convenient vessel for antipathy to Mrs. Clinton, the Democratic establishment and some of the party's key constituencies.

But it is a mistake to assume that voters who support Mr. Sanders because he is not Mrs. Clinton necessarily favor his left-leaning policy views" (Achen and Bartels 2016b).

Prospects for Partisan Change

The American party system seems to have changed remarkably little in the first year of Donald Trump's presidency. But what about prospects for future partisan change? Here I briefly consider three possibilities—in the short run, a shift prompted by significant change in public attitudes toward President Trump himself; in the medium run, a shift prompted by cross-pressures and mismatches in the political attitudes of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents; and in the long run, secular change prompted by the gradual replacement of older, mostly white cultural conservatives with a younger, more diverse, culturally liberal generation.

Given Trump's erratic behavior in office, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that some dramatic event or series of events will drastically reshape the electorate's view of him and perhaps, by extension, of his party. However, it is hard to put much stock in that possibility given how stable voters' impressions of Trump have been so far. In the July 2016 CCAP survey and again in November 2017, respondents were asked how well a series of phrases described Trump. Table 10 shows the average responses from Republicans, Independents, and Democrats for five character traits—"intelligent," "a strong leader," "knowledgeable," "inspiring," and "moral."

***** Table 10 *****

In the electorate as a whole, Trump was viewed as somewhat less "intelligent" and "a strong leader" and slightly *more* "moral" in late 2017 than he had been in mid-2016. However, all of these shifts were modest in magnitude (less than five points on a 100-point scale). Moreover, the separate tabulations for Republicans, Independents, and Democrats presented in Table 10 suggest that much of the observed change in

impressions of Trump's character reflected confirmatory partisan bias—Trump's average rating across all five items declined by less than one point among Independents, but declined by 4.4 points among Democrats and *increased* by two points among Republicans. At the individual level, the correlations between specific trait ratings in July 2016 and November 2017 ranged from .69 to .74, and the correlation between *average* ratings in 2016 and 2017 was even higher, .79. Despite the almost daily bombshells of the Trump news cycle, ordinary citizens have so far shown surprisingly little inclination to change the views they had formed of him even before he accepted his party's presidential nomination.

In the medium run, it is possible that prospective voters will continue to sort themselves into increasingly homogenous partisan teams on the basis of the attitudes and values considered here. What might that further sorting look like?

A common trope among observers of the contemporary political scene is that the Republican Party is tearing itself apart over white nationalism. According to Dan Balz (2017), for instance, the candidacy of reactionary cultural conservative Roy Moore in a December 2017 special U.S. Senate election in Alabama "provided the capstone to a year of tumult inside the GOP … one more reminder that this is a party facing a major identity crisis and no easy answers for how to resolve it."

My data cast considerable doubt on that notion, at least as it applies to rank and file partisans. Indeed, they show that Republicans are generally in closer agreement about *Cultural Conservatism* than they are about *Limited Government*, while the reverse is true of Democrats.[28] Relatedly, more Republicans are cross-pressured by holding relatively liberal views about the role of government than by holding relatively

[28] The standard deviations of *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* scores among Republicans are .838 and .718, respectively. The corresponding standard deviations among Democrats are .608 for *Limited Government* and .862 for *Cultural Conservatism*. Independents are about equally heterogeneous on both dimensions, with standard deviations of .852 and .827, respectively.

liberal views about ethnic nationalism. Table 11 shows the proportions of each party's rank and file whose views on each dimension in November 2017 were closer to the other party's center of gravity than to their own. Among Republicans, 18.5% were closer to Democrats than to their fellow Republicans on the *Cultural Conservatism* dimension while 24.3% were closer to Democrats on the *Limited Government* dimension.

***** Table 11 *****

Among Democrats that pattern is reversed. Only 10.9% of Democrats were closer to the Republicans than to their fellow Democrats on the *Limited Government* dimension, but 26.3% were closer to the Republicans than to their fellow Democrats on the *Cultural Conservatism* dimension. Obviously, political views do not translate automatically into partisan attachments—if they did, all of the discrepant cells in Table 11 would be less populated than they are. However, insofar as the political attitudes considered here provide potential bases for shifts in partisan allegiance, the data indicate that the Democratic Party is distinctly more vulnerable than the Republican Party to suffering significant defections on the basis of cultural concerns.

Of course, Independents constitute another important source of potential gains for both parties. In 2017 they were about equally likely to be closer to Democrats (52%) as to Republicans (48%) on *Cultural Conservatism*, but slightly more likely to be closer to Republicans (54%) than to Democrats (46%) in their views about *Limited Government*. Overall, 31% were closer to Republicans on *both* dimensions, while 28% were closer to Democrats on both dimensions. That roughly even balance of partisan affinities suggests that they are unlikely to produce a significant change in the relative strength of the two parties, even if they do increasingly gravitate toward whichever party's views they tend to share.

In the longer run, much has been made of the prospects for Democratic gains due to the gradual replacement of older, mostly white conservatives with a younger, more diverse and politically liberal electorate (Holland 2017). But are younger voters really so much more liberal than their elders? The answer to that question turns out to hinge significantly on which dimension of political attitudes one has in mind. Figure 3 shows little evidence of generational change in attitudes toward *Limited Government*. The views of Democrats (represented by the bottom line in Figure 3) were consistently more liberal than those of Republicans in the same age cohort (represented by the top line in the figure); but within each group, generational change was quite modest.[29] Certainly there is no evidence here of broad secular change in views about the role of government, or any hint of the existence of a "really quite left-wing" cohort of "young progressives" poised to deliver the Democratic Party "to the promised land" (Yglesias 2016).

***** Figure 3 *****

The picture is rather different for *Cultural Conservatism*, as Figure 4 makes clear. Unlike *Limited Government*, *Cultural Conservatism* was significantly less popular among younger people than among older people in each partisan group. Thus, a party that clung to the *Cultural Conservatism* of today's Republican Party would, indeed, be expected to become less popular in the future, as older voters on the left end of the figure are increasingly replaced by younger voters on the right end of the figure.

***** Figure 4 *****

[29] The summary lines in the figure represent cubic trend lines. Linear regression analyses relating attitudes to birth years within each group suggest that younger Republicans were just .04 points more liberal *per decade*, on average, while younger Democrats were .04 points more *conservative* per decade.

However, the notion that the Republican Party's embrace of white grievance politics, the English language, and the American flag will increasingly "alienate the electorate of the 21st century" (Waldman 2018) overlooks the fact that parties' positions and emphases change over time. If the position of the Republican Party simply tracked the views of Republican partisans (and ignoring any additional shifts attributable to the entry into the electorate of even younger cohorts), the effect would be to produce a gradual *convergence* in views between Republicans and the electorate as a whole, since the average difference in cultural views between young Republicans and their elders is significantly greater than for Independents or Democrats.[30]

If the electorate of the future comes to look like the young voters of today, it also seems likely that the political salience of cultural tensions will fade somewhat. The statistical analyses reported in Table 12 shows that the apparent impact of *Cultural Conservatism* on *Partisan Affect* was about one-third greater among people in their sixties or older (12.48) than among people under the age of 40 (9.26). Indeed, the 60+ age group was the only one in which cultural attitudes seemed to have about as much impact as views about *Limited Government* in shaping feelings toward the Democratic and Republican parties; in both the 40-59 and under-40 age groups, views about *Limited Government* were distinctly more salient than views about *Cultural Conservatism*.

***** Table 12 *****

In any case, generational change of the sort suggested by Figure 4 and Table 12 is a very slow process. In the meantime, cultural liberalization may produce significant increases in both social dissensus and partisan polarization (Bartels 2013). Whether

[30] Overall, the linear decline in average *Cultural Conservatism* in Figure 4 is .18 points per decade among Republicans, .07 points per decade among Independents, and .11 points per decade among Democrats.

those processes are more likely to advantage the party of the “past” or the party of the “future” is by no means clear (Craig and Richeson 2014; Bartels 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

Appendix

My analysis is based primarily on data from a November 2017 survey conducted by the online survey firm YouGov. YouGov employs opt-in recruiting, using matching and weighting to produce representative samples (Rivers and Bailey 2009).[31] The 2017 survey included 2000 people who participated in a previous YouGov study, the 2016 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project. These respondents all completed a prior survey (measuring party identification and political ideology) at some point in 2015, a baseline survey in July 2016, and a post-election survey.[32]

To facilitate description and analysis, I factor analyzed 43 items from these surveys.[33] (Most of the items were asked in November 2017, with exceptions as noted.) Two factors accounted for 78% of the observed variance in the original items. These factors were subjected to oblique (promax) rotation, producing the *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism* dimensions described in the text. Complete factor loadings are reported in Table A.

***** Table A *****

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[31] 2533 responses were matched to the 2010 American Community survey with respect to gender, age, race, and education and to the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey with respect to party identification, ideology, and political interest to produce a final sample of 2000. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores constructed on the basis of age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, region, voter registration status, and ideology. The weights were then post-stratified on the basis of 2016 election turnout and presidential vote choice, then on the basis of age, gender, race, and education.

[32] The weighted survey vote shares for Trump and Clinton were 45.9% and 48.4%, respectively, closely matching their national popular vote shares, 45.9% and 48.0%.

[33] As a rough adjustment for differences among survey respondents in their use of the rating scales (Brady 1985), I have subtracted each respondents' average rating of groups and political leaders from each of her individual ratings. (Factor analyzing the unadjusted ratings produces a roughly similar structure, but with an additional non-substantive dimension reflecting respondents' general tendencies to assign high or low ratings to groups and leaders.

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Table 1: Partisan Differences in Political and Social Views

Means (and standard deviations) on zero-to-100 scales among Democrats and Republicans. Data from November 2017 YouGov survey, except where indicated.

	Democrats	***Republicans***	***Partisan difference***
Views favored by Democrats			
Government should reduce differences in income between rich and poor people	79.0 (25.0)	33.6 (34.1)	45.4
Government should help families pay for child care and college	76.5 (25.2)	39.5 (32.0)	37.0
Government should make sure that everyone has access to good health care	90.0 (19.9)	56.8 (33.3)	33.2
Government should provide a decent standard of living for people unable to work	83.4 (20.4)	57.3 (28.4)	26.1
Government should regulate pollution and environmental hazards	89.0 (18.4)	65.9 (24.6)	23.1
Views favored by Republicans			
Discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities	32.9 (33.5)	71.0 (29.7)	38.1
People who disrespect the American flag don't belong in this country	39.1 (34.4)	74.3 (29.8)	35.2
Speaking English is essential for being a true American	55.0 (33.0)	82.6 (24.2)	27.6
Government efforts to solve social problems are generally less effective than private efforts	50.6 (27.2)	71.4 (26.3)	20.8
Anyone who is willing to work hard can still achieve the American dream	59.0 (30.6)	79.4 (22.9)	20.4
Government should protect our borders to prevent illegal immigration	72.8 (24.9)	90.7 (19.4)	17.9
Government would work better if it paid less attention to experts and more attention to common sense	57.9 (29.7)	74.4 (24.5)	16.5
Conservative self-identification (2015)	34.5 (23.7)	71.6 (20.1)	37.1
Racial resentment scale (2016)	41.2 (28.9)	75.2 (23.2)	34.0
Pro-life (2016)	37.0 (23.9)	65.3 (23.0)	28.3
Authoritarianism scale (2016)	57.7 (37.2)	73.1 (31.7)	15.4

Table 2: Demographic Bases of Political Attitudes

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses).

	Limited Government	*Cultural Conservatism*
African American	−.601 (.068)	−.497 (.063)
Latino	−.135 (.064)	−.027 (.059)
Other race	−.156 (.081)	−.145 (.075)
Female	−.239 (.041)	−.132 (.038)
Age (in years)	−.0018 (.0013)	.0083 (.0012)
Church attendance	.547 (.081)	.729 (.076)
Born again Christian	.275 (.050)	.377 (.046)
Urban	−.143 (.050)	−.115 (.046)
Rural	.115 (.052)	.202 (.048)
Education	−.084 (.079)	−.758 (.074)
Income	.337 (.084)	.010 (.078)
(Income missing)	.260 (.055)	−.028 (.052)
Intercept	−.198 (.093)	−.367 (.087)
Standard error of regression	.903	.841
Adjusted R^2	.13	.23
N	2000	2000

Table 3: Bases of Partisan Affect Among Republicans, Independents, and Democrats

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Partisan affect (on zero-to-100 scale) based on ratings of Democrats, Republicans, Democratic Party, and Republican Party.

	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
Limited Government	5.27 (.56)	6.38 (.71)	**13.07** (.85)
Cultural Conservatism	**13.02** (.66)	5.68 (.74)	3.34 (.60)
Intercept	58.31 (.72)	50.55 (.56)	37.82 (.68)
Standard error of regression	12.51	10.05	13.90
Adjusted R^2	.44	.42	.32
N	738	337	900

Table 4: Bases of Affect toward Democratic and Republican Parties and Donald Trump

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Ratings of Democratic Party, Republican Party, and Donald Trump on zero-to-10 scales.

	Democratic Party	Republican Party	Donald Trump
Limited Government	**−1.825** (.070)	.742 (.070)	**1.522** (.071)
Cultural Conservatism	−.681 (.071)	**1.398** (.070)	**2.001** (.072)
Intercept	4.443 (.056)	3.887 (.056)	3.820 (.057)
Standard error of regression	2.507	2.491	2.551
Adjusted R^2	.44	.35	.58
N	2000	2000	2000

Table 5: Party Identification, 2015-2017

Column percentages reflect the 2017 distribution of party identification in each 2015 partisan group.

Party ID in 2017	*Party Identification in 2015*							
	Strong Dem	*Weak Dem*	*Lean Dem*	*Pure Indep*	*Lean Rep*	*Weak Rep*	*Strong Rep*	*2017 Total*
Strong Rep	**0.4%**	**2.3%**	**0.6%**	1.0%	6.6%	16.1%	76.6%	(14.4%)
Weak Rep	**1.5%**	**0.2%**	**0.5%**	3.3%	5.8%	68.5%	11.2%	(11.6%)
Lean Rep	**0.5%**	**2.7%**	**4.9%**	3.2%	62.6%	7.6%	6.9%	(9.3%)
Pure Indep	2.6%	8.7%	18.7%	78.4%	18.9%	2.2%	1.1%	(18.6%)
Lean Dem	3.6%	9.0%	61.3%	9.5%	**1.2%**	**0.9%**	**0%**	(9.0%)
Weak Dem	12.4%	61.7%	9.1%	3.8%	**4.9%**	**1.8%**	**0.2%**	(13.9%)
Strong Dem	79.0%	15.3%	4.9%	0.9%	**0%**	**2.8%**	**4.1%**	(23.2%)
2015 Total	(24.7%)	(14.2%)	(8.2%)	(16.5%)	(9.5%)	(12.3%)	(14.6%)	*N*=1941

Table 6: Republicans' Views of Their Party and Its Leaders

	All Republican identifiers and leaners	2014 midterm voters	Strong identifiers
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?			
Strongly approve	44.3%	56.3%	60.0%
Somewhat approve	32.3%	27.9%	29.8%
Somewhat disapprove	8.7%	6.1%	3.6%
Strongly disapprove	9.3%	7.5%	5.2%
Not sure	5.3%	2.1%	1.3%
Now we'd like to get your feelings toward some [past and present political leaders/prominent social groups/national organizations]. Please indicate where you would put each one on a scale ranging from 0 (for extremely unfavorable feelings) to 10 (for extremely favorable feelings). Average ratings:			
Donald Trump	7.07	7.61	8.24
Republicans	6.85	7.06	7.79
Republican Party	6.38	6.43	7.51
George W. Bush	5.27	5.14	5.52
Paul Ryan	5.02	5.16	5.31
Mitt Romney	4.66	4.82	4.89
Mitch McConnell	3.93	3.84	4.07
When Donald Trump disagrees with Republicans in Congress, who do you think is more likely to be right?			
Donald Trump	52.2%	65.4%	64.7%
Republicans in Congress	14.9%	9.6%	7.8%
Neither; unsure	32.2%	24.8%	27.5%
N	738	416	334

Table 7: Attitudinal Bases of Democrats' Feelings toward Party Leaders

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Differences in feelings toward leaders range from −10 to +10.

	Bernie Sanders vs. Hillary Clinton	Bernie Sanders vs. Joe Biden
Limited Government	−.189 (.203)	.149 (.174)
Cultural Conservatism	−.218 (.143)	.233 (.123)
Intercept	.401 (.163)	−.001 (.141)
Standard error of regression	3.33	2.86
Adjusted R^2	.00	.01
N	900	900

Table 8: Attitudinal Bases of Republicans' Feelings toward Party Leaders

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Differences in feelings toward leaders range from −10 to +10.

	Donald Trump vs. Mitt Romney	Donald Trump vs. Paul Ryan
Limited Government	1.036 (.160)	.884 (.152)
Cultural Conservatism	2.912 (.187)	2.015 (.177)
Intercept	−.332 (.204)	.022 (.193)
Standard error of regression	3.56	3.38
Adjusted R^2	.31	.21
N	738	738

Table 9: Demographic Bases of Democrats' Feelings toward Party Leaders

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Differences in feelings toward leaders range from −10 to +10.

	Bernie Sanders vs. Hillary Clinton	Bernie Sanders vs. Joe Biden
African American	−.840 (.306)	−.396 (.260)
Latino	−.942 (.322)	−.278 (.274)
Other race	.525 (.452)	.689 (.384)
Female	−.088 (.223)	.314 (.189)
Age (in years)	−.0304 (.0069)	−.0427 (.0058)
Church attendance	−.438 (.437)	−.016 (.372)
Born again Christian	−.737 (.290)	−.218 (.246)
Urban	−.151 (.247)	.383 (.210)
Rural	.147 (.309)	.905 (.263)
Education	−.755 (.427)	−1.346 (.363)
Income	.838 (.439)	.404 (.373)
(Income missing)	−.467 (.319)	−.738 (.271)
Intercept	2.869 (.511)	2.055 (.434)
Standard error of regression	3.236	2.752
Adjusted R^2	.06	.08
N	900	900

Table 10: Impressions of Donald Trump in 2016 and 2017

Means (and standard deviations) on zero-to-100 scales among Republicans (*N*=738), Independents (*N*=337), and Democrats (*N*=900).

	July 2016	November 2017	*Difference*
REPUBLICANS			
Intelligent	72.5 (30.8)	72.7 (28.0)	+0.2 (26.0)
Strong Leader	74.1 (31.3)	73.3 (31.0)	−0.9 (27.8)
Knowledgeable	66.2 (31.6)	68.4 (29.2)	+2.3 (25.9)
Inspiring	66.1 (33.9)	65.6 (31.9)	−0.5 (27.2)
Moral	54.1 (33.6)	62.8 (30.3)	+8.7 (26.6)
(Average)	*66.6 (28.7)*	*68.6 (27.2)*	*+2.0 (20.8)*
INDEPENDENTS			
Intelligent	50.4 (38.5)	46.7 (38.7)	−3.7 (33.7)
Strong Leader	48.5 (40.7)	45.7 (38.6)	−2.8 (36.7)
Knowledgeable	45.2 (37.5)	43.5 (36.3)	−1.7 (31.8)
Inspiring	37.6 (37.5)	38.7 (37.7)	+1.0 (29.8)
Moral	33.1 (33.8)	37.1 (34.3)	+4.0 (29.8)
(Average)	*43.0 (34.9)*	*42.4 (35.1)*	*−0.6 (28.0)*
DEMOCRATS			
Intelligent	28.5 (34.6)	20.2 (29.5)	−8.4 (31.3)
Strong Leader	22.0 (31.3)	16.2 (28.0)	−5.7 (28.0)
Knowledgeable	20.3 (30.3)	16.2 (27.8)	−4.1 (28.1)
Inspiring	16.0 (28.4)	12.7 (24.8)	−3.3 (26.6)
Moral	13.7 (25.9)	13.1 (24.7)	−0.6 (24.1)
(Average)	*20.1 (26.4)*	*15.7 (24.8)*	*−4.4 (22.5)*

Table 11: Bases of Vulnerability to Partisan Conversion

REPUBLICANS			
Cultural Conservatism	*Limited Government*		
	Closer to average Democrat	Closer to average Republican	Total
Closer to average Republican	20.0%	61.6%	81.5%
Closer to average Democrat	4.3%	14.2%	**18.5%**
Total	**24.3%**	75.7%	*N*=738
INDEPENDENTS			
Cultural Conservatism	*Limited Government*		
	Closer to average Democrat	Closer to average Republican	Total
Closer to average Republican	17.3%	30.8%	48.1%
Closer to average Democrat	28.1%	23.7%	51.9%
Total	45.5%	54.5%	*N*=337
DEMOCRATS			
Cultural Conservatism	*Limited Government*		
	Closer to average Democrat	Closer to average Republican	Total
Closer to average Republican	22.5%	3.7%	**26.3%**
Closer to average Democrat	66.6%	7.1%	73.7%
Total	89.1%	**10.9%**	*N*=900

Table 12: Bases of Partisan Affect, by Age Cohort

Ordinary least squares regression parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses). Partisan affect (on zero-to-100 scale) based on ratings of Democrats, Republicans, Democratic Party, and Republican Party.

	Age < 40	Age 40-59	Age 60+
Limited Government	11.97 (.89)	13.47 (.72)	12.43 (.67)
Cultural Conservatism	9.26 (.89)	10.15 (.78)	12.48 (.68)
Intercept	49.12 (.69)	46.41 (.60)	45.84 (.56)
Standard error of regression	14.28	15.58	15.85
Adjusted R^2	.56	.61	.69
N	473	679	848

Table A: Factor Loadings

	Limited Government	***Cultural Conservatism***
Government should make sure that everyone has access to good health care	**−.8593**	.0954
Feelings toward the NRA	.4377	.4616
Feelings toward Fox News	.3641	.4778
Government should reduce differences in income between rich and poor people	**−.8127**	−.0180
Government should provide a decent standard of living for people unable to work	**−.7602**	.0665
Feelings toward environmentalists	**−.5139**	−.2969
Racial resentment scale (2016)	.2975	**.5129**
Government should help families pay for child care and college	**−.7416**	−.0497
Feelings toward Black Lives Matter	−.3617	−.4258
Conservative self-identification (2015)	.4583	.3082
Government should provide assistance to people affected by natural disasters	**−.5721**	.1911
Discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against blacks and other minorities	.2139	**.5489**
Feelings toward journalists	−.3838	−.3771
People who disrespect the American flag don't belong in this country	.0099	**.7453**
The interests of ethnic and racial minority groups often conflict with those of the white majority	−.2754	.4483
Feelings toward the United Nations	**−.5677**	−.1418
Feelings toward college professors	**−.5093**	−.1938
Speaking English is essential for being a true American	.0580	**.6431**
Feelings toward immigrants	.1345	**−.5618**
Feelings toward Muslims	.0599	**−.6291**
Government should regulate pollution and environmental hazards	**−.6180**	−.0626
Feelings toward the military	.1830	.4916
Feelings toward Christians	.2002	.4581
Feelings toward atheists	.1007	**−.5507**
Feelings toward police officers	.2840	.3607
The interests of business groups often conflict with those of workers and consumers	**−.5090**	.1240

Feelings toward labor unions	−.4418	−.1765
Feelings toward gays and lesbians	.0615	**−.5461**
Government efforts to solve social problems are generally less effective than private efforts	.3193	.2840
Government should protect our borders to prevent illegal immigration	−.0445	**.5560**
Feelings toward businesspeople	.3856	.2096
Pro-life (2016)	.3047	.2777
Anyone who is willing to work hard can still achieve the American dream	.1874	.3861
Feelings toward wealthy people	**.5282**	.0396
Authoritarianism scale (2016)	−.0744	.4881
We have to teach children that all men are created equal, but we know that some are really better than others	−.1832	.3743
Feelings toward white people	.2085	.3155
Government would work better if it paid less attention to experts and more attention to common sense	.0292	.4871
Feelings toward Walmart	.0555	.4535
Feelings toward Wall Street bankers	.4571	.0224
Feelings toward people on food stamps	−.1202	−.3524
The government in Washington has gotten too powerful for the good of the people	.0414	.3556
It is more important for politicians to stick to their principles than to compromise in order to get things done	.3134	.0108

Figure 1: Republicans' and Democrats' Ratings of Political Leaders and Groups



Figure 2: Attitudes of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents toward *Limited Government* and *Cultural Conservatism*



Figure 3: Views about *Limited Government* by Birth Year and Party



Figure 4: Views about *Cultural Conservatism* by Birth Year and Party