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Does Increased Mobilization and Descriptive Representation Intensify Partisanship Over Election Campaigns? Evidence from 3 US Elections

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December 10, 2017 Version 3

Abstract

We theorize that partisanship intensifies more as elections near for *certain citizens* due to *campaign-specific factors* that buoy partisan identity salience and perceived congruence with their party: (a) citizens targeted with more mobilization activities, and (b) citizens from politically-marginalized groups that share social identity with their party's nominees. Using daily cross-sectional survey data from a nationally-representative sample collected for one year prior to the US 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, we find partisanship substantially intensifies over a campaign year (5 percentage points). The effect is larger in states receiving more mobilization activities (swing states). While black Democrats and female Republicans received increased descriptive representation from a presidential and vice-presidential nominee in 2008, respectively, only black Democrats' partisanship intensifies significantly more than comparison groups in this election. We conclude that campaigns matter because they intensify partisanship and exacerbate polarization on partisan cleavages; who becomes more polarized, however, depends on campaign-specific factors.[1]

Keywords: Partisanship; Electoral Cycle; Campaign; Identity; USA

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Political campaigning escalates as elections near, creating an environment in which opportunities for political participation and consumption of political information are more abundant. Because participation and exposure to political information mutually reinforce the intensity of partisanship, Michelitch and Utych (2018) theorize that partisan intensity waxes as elections draw near and wanes in between. In an 86-country study, they discover that partisan intensity increases from mid-point to election in a magnitude equivalent to other key drivers of partisan intensity.

In this paper, we theorize that partisanship should intensify more as an election approaches for *certain citizens* due to *campaign-specific factors* that increase partisan identity salience and perceived congruence with their party. First, we hypothesize that citizens targeted with more campaign mobilization activities should have increased exposure to information and opportunities to participate, thereby reinforcing perceived party fit and partisan identity salience. Second, we predict that for members of politically-marginalized social groups, sharing social identity with a major nominee representing one's party is associated with increased partisan intensification. Historically unrepresented citizens may equate increased descriptive representation with increased substantive and symbolic representation. Such increased representation may increase perceived party fit as well as partisan identity salience, intensifying partisanship.

We test our hypotheses using cross-sectional survey data collected each day for one year prior to the United States (US) 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections. In an important foreground result, we show that partisanship intensifies by 5 percentage points over each election year in the US. This effect size is substantial, rivaling the magnitude of gender, education, and religious affiliation.

To investigate whether partisanship intensifies more over the campaign year among those that are targeted with more campaign mobilization, we leverage the fact that parties campaign much more in swing states versus stronghold states due to the Electoral College (Shaw 2006). This electoral institution allows us to examine *within-election* variation in mobilization in which election, time, and country-specific factors are held constant. We find that partisanship intensifies significantly more in swing versus stronghold states (6.5 versus 4.8 percentage points).

To examine the effect of increased descriptive representation for politically-marginalized groups on partisan intensification, we examine whether black Democrats' and female Republicans' partisan intensification was greater leading up to the 2008 elections when Barack Obama ran as the Democrat presidential nominee and Sarah Palin ran as the Republican vice-presidential nominee. We compare black Democrats and female Republicans' partisanship intensification over the election year in 2008 versus 2000 and 2004 as well as examine the difference-in-differences (DID) between such groups' intensification versus counterparts within and across parties.[2]

We find strong support that black Democrats' intensified significantly more over the election year in 2008 (22 percentage points) versus the previous two elections (not at all). The intensification difference between black Democrats and non-black Democrats and Republicans in 2008 is significantly larger than the difference in previous elections by 16.5 and 20 percentage points respectively. However, female Republicans intensify less over the electoral cycle in 2008 than in previous years. There is no difference in their intensification versus male Republicans and Democrats and slightly less intensification versus female Democrats in 2008 versus previous years.

This study contributes to the broad study of partisanship in that it offers and substantiates novel predictions regarding heterogeneity in the electoral cycle's effect on partisan intensity for different citizen subgroups. Some groups' partisanship intensifies over the campaign season more than others and the relative ordering of groups' partisan intensity levels can even change. What factors govern partisan intensity are important to discover, given high correlations between partisan intensity and participation (e.g., Dinas (2014); Greene (2004)), perceptual biases in political information processing (e.g., Hetherington, Long and Rudolph (2016); Theodoridis (2017)) and discrimination on partisan cleavages between ordinary citizens (e.g., Iyengar and Westwood (2014); McConnell et al. (N.d.)).

Further, these findings build our understanding of American politics in the 2000s. First, the findings here nuance the story that partisan intensity is on a long-term rise (e.g., Lelkes (2016))

[2]Data on partisanship of sufficient variation in temporal proximity to the 2012 and 2016 elections does not exist.

by showing that partisanship intensifies over the "medium-term" during election years as electoral competition escalates. Second, scholars of American politics have an ongoing debate as to the dimensions on which electoral campaigns affect citizen behavior (e.g., Hillygus (2010)). We contribute to this debate by showing that strong partisanship rachets up as elections near, polarizing the electorate on partisan lines. Third, the 2008 election was significantly different for black Democrats but not female Republicans. Increased descriptive representation for politically-marginalized groups may only buoy partisanship toward progressive parties that overtly champion such groups, or for groups with high group-conciousness and beliefs that they are politically-marginalized. Alternatively, gaining descriptive representation in the vice-presidential position (or Sarah Palin in particular) may not suffice.

The Electoral Cycle and Partisan Intensification

In this paper, we examine fluctuations in partisan intensity, defined as the degree to which individuals have a strong partisan attachment. Michelitch and Utych (2018) find that partisan intensity fluctuates significantly over the electoral cycle worldwide, waxing around election time and waning in between, with a substantive magnitude similar to the effect of gender, age, and education. They theorize that higher levels of citizen mobilization around elections increase the relative influx of information regarding party brands and partisan conflict, as well as the net benefit of political participation in partisan activities. Exposure to such information and political participation engenders and can mutually-reinforce partisanship. Further, as group competition intensifies, individuals desire to take sides and increase identification with their ingroup, taking actions to strengthen ingroup cohesion or increase outgroup hostility (see Michelitch and Utych 2018 for full discussion).

We extend this research by theorizing that certain citizens' partisanship may intensify more than others leading up to an election due to campaign-specific factors. First, we postulate that citizens' partisanship may intensify more when parties target them with greater campaign mobilization, which should strengthen the above mechanisms. Because parties tend to spend more money and time campaigning in competitive areas (Shaw 2006), we may therefore expect to see

greater partisan intensification as an observable implication.[3]

Second, we hypothesize that when citizens from politically-marginalized groups share a social identity (e.g., race, gender) with leading election nominees in their party, their partisanship will intensify more than in elections in which they are not descriptively represented. Those citizens who share a nominee's social identity may equate the increase in descriptive representation with substantive and symbolic representation, perhaps because they assume that such nominees, if elected, would more credibly substantively represent their interests, or because they experience a symbolic status increase of their group (e.g., Mansbridge (1999)). We argue such increased representation may increase perceived party fit and partisan identity salience, intensifying partisanship. It is important to underscore the aspect of our theory that politically-marginalized groups' partisanship does not intensify writ large when they are descriptively represented by a key nominee of *any* party — the nominee must be copartisan.

Research Design

We examine our hypotheses in the United States, a difficult test case in which previous studies have demonstrated partisan intensity to be relatively stable (e.g., Clarke and Stewart (1998); Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002)). Further, while campaigning certainly ramps up towards a presidential election, the US may experience a more constant base level of mobilization given the frequency of national legislative elections (every 2 years) during the 4 year presidential election cycle. Recent work has emphasized that partisan intensity has been increasing in the long term in the US (e.g., Lelkes (2016)) and scholars have even shown recent evidence of partisan discrimination between ordinary citizens (e.g., (Iyengar and Westwood 2014)).

We leverage the National Annenberg Election Studies' daily cross-sectional nationally-representative surveys conducted for one year leading up to the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections. This dataset is the only one available, to our knowledge, that provides data on partisanship strength with sufficient

[3]Indeed, aggregate US state-level data shows certain campaign activities influence aggregate level partisanship (Holbrook and McClurg 2005). Using individual data, we test whether such partisanship levels across high and low mobilization areas are static or changing over the election year.

variation in temporal proximity to an election.[4] For the dependent variable *Strong Partisan*, we code individuals as 1 for strong Republicans or Democrats, and 0 otherwise.[5]

First, to understand whether partisanship intensifies more among citizens who are more highly targeted for partisan mobilization, we leverage the fact that the Electoral College creates swing and stronghold states in Presidential elections. Swing states receive much more mobilization from parties, interest groups, and news media than party stronghold states because they are more pivotal in election outcomes (Shaw 2006). This way of identifying mobilization targeting allows us to gain within-election variation in mobilization activities, holding election and time factors constant, versus cross-national or cross-election approaches. We code citizens as residing in swing states if the electoral margin in the state was less than six percentage points in the previous election.[6] However, it is possible that campaigning levels are so high even in core states due to the rich media environment in the US, that there may be little marginal effect of swing state residency.

To test whether partisanship intensifies more for those from politically-marginalized social groups when their party has a same-group nominee in the race, we leverage that in the 2000 and 2004 elections, presidential and vice-presidential nominees were all from the politically-advantaged group of white men, while in 2008, the Democratic Party presidential nominee was a mixed-race man — Barack Obama — who was ascribed and self-identified as black — the first such nominee from a major party in history. Further, in 2008 the Republican Party vice-presidential nominee was a woman — Sarah Palin — for the second time in history. We thus examine whether in the 2008 elections, black Democrats' and female Republicans' partisanship intensified more than in 2004 or 2000. We then examine difference-in-differences (DID) between these groups and their non-black/black and male/female counterparts within and across parties, respectively, using

[4]These data thus allow a more targeted but narrow test of Michelitch and Utych's theory, given the large variation in temporal proximity to one country's election.

[5]We use the questions: *"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?"* followed by *"Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong [Republican / Democrat] ?"* Only 8.8 percent of our sample identifies as pure independents. However, results are robust when independents are excluded (Table 8 Appendix E).

[6]These results are robust to 10 percentage points, which biases against a finding (Table 10 Appendix E).

a few different models.[7]

We measure a respondent's position in the electoral cycle during the year leading up to the next election as the percentage of time passed, calling this variable *Proximity*. Increasing values indicate increasing temporal proximity to the next election. For example, 0 is one year ahead of the election, .5 is halfway through the year, and 1 is the day of the election. We use logistic regression and include (alongside proximity) standard individual-level covariates,[8] year fixed effects, and day-level clustered standard errors.

Results

The results in Table 1 show that the electoral cycle indeed governs the probability of being a strong partisan in the US in the pooled sample (model 1) as well as in each of the three elections (models 2-4). The predicted probability of being a strong partisan in the pooled sample is .37 one year prior to the election, and .42 directly before, for a change of 5 percentage points in the pooled data over the campaign year. By election, the initial level of strong partisanship is variable (2000: 0.29; 2004: 0.39; 2008: 0.40) yet intensification occurs by roughly similar amounts (see Appendix B Figure 3 and 4 for predicted probability graphs). This effect is similar to the global increase from electoral cycle midpoint to election (6 percentage points) in the global study as well as the substantive effect of gender, education, and religious affiliation in the present data. Yet, we hypothesize that these result could mask large heterogeneity across elections and subgroups of citizens.

[7]The 2008 campaigns could have intensified all groups' partisanship, and this later technique allows us to understand whether black Democrats' and female Republicans' partisanship intensified more than comparison groups.

[8]We include dummy variables for swing state, female, black, other race, latino (cross-cuts race), urban, rural, Protestant, Catholic Jewish, Parent, Unemployed, Retired, Student and ordinal variables for education, age, religiosity, and strength of ideology (see coding Appendix A). To allay concern that the random sample significantly changes over the course of the electoral cycle, we regress Electoral Proximity on these covariates and show that they are either not statistically-significant predictors, or if so, the substantive effect is very close to zero (Table 9 Appendix E).

Table 1: Electoral Proximity Effect on Strong Partisanship in the 2000, 2004, 2008 US Elections

	(1) Pooled	(2) 2000	(3) 2004	(4) 2008
Electoral Proximity	0.23***	0.26***	0.23***	0.21***
	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Constant	-2.73***	-2.91***	-2.37***	-2.27***
	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.063)
Observations	165106	50727	65041	49338
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes			

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Notes: Empirical Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \mathbf{S}'\phi + \varepsilon$. $\mathbf{S}'$ indicates year fixed-effects and vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level. For full estimation results, see Appendix B Table 2.

Citizens' partisanship in swing states intensified more than stronghold states in 2004 and 2008 but not 2000. Figure 2 left panel depicts the marginal effect of living in a swing state over the year leading up to the election for all 3 elections from model 1 Table 3 Appendix C (Figure 7 additionally shows by election marginal effects graphs and Figure 5 and 6 predicted probability graphs). It is clear that the gap between swing and stronghold states is not apparent until halfway through the campaign year, after which individuals in swing states become increasingly more likely to be strong partisans as the election draws near. In analyzing each election separately, we find strong partisanship in swing states increased by 5.8 and 6.6 percentage points, respectively, in 2004 and 2008, compared to increases of only 3.3 and 3.8 for stronghold states. We do not observe a significant difference between swing and stronghold states in the 2000 election — both types of states intensified by roughly 5 percentage points.

We show marginal effects of being a black Democrat versus non-black Democrat and non-black Republican over the campaign year in Figure 2 middle panel and female Republican versus male Republican, male Democrat, and female Republican in Figure 2 right panel (as estimated from Table 4 Model 3 and Table 6 Model 3, respectively, in Appendix D). Our major finding regarding black Democrats is that their partisanship intensified more in 2008 than in previous elections (Table 4 model 1 Appendix D). There is a significant difference in their intensification in 2008

Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Voter Group Over Election Year on Strong Partisanship

Swing States v. Core States | Black Democrats v. Comparison Groups | Female Republicans v. Comparison Groups



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the election year. On the y-axis is the marginal effect of a group on the probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Left panel model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Proximity * SwingState + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \mathbf{S}'\phi + \varepsilon$. Middle and right panel model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Party + \gamma_3 2004 * Proximity + \gamma_4 2008 * Proximity + \gamma_5 2004 * Group + \gamma_6 2008 * Group + \gamma_6 Party * Proximity + \gamma_7 + Party * 2004 + \gamma_8 Party * 2008 + \gamma_9 Proximity * Party * 2008 + \gamma_{10} Proximity * 2004 * Party * Group + \gamma_{11} Proximity * 2008 * Party * Group + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \mathbf{S}'\phi + \varepsilon$. $\mathbf{S}'$ indicates year fixed-effects and vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

versus comparison groups combined and any particular comparison group, which is significantly larger than in previous elections (Table 4 model 2, Table 4 models 3, and Table 4 in Appendix D). One natural comparison group to black Democrats is non-black Democrats. Non-black and black Democrats intensify at statistically indistinguishable rates over the electoral cycle in 2000 and 2004 – the 90 percent confidence interval around black Democrat fluctuations in 2000 is (-.021, .061), compared to (.047, .091) for non-blacks. In 2004, these confidence intervals are (-.029, .049) for blacks, and (.046, .081) for non-blacks. However, when a black Democrat nominee is present in 2008, black Democrats intensify much more than non-black Democrats – a 90 percent confidence interval of (.169, .271) for blacks compared to a fluctuation of only (.033, .077) for non-blacks. Similar results hold when comparing black Democrats to non-black Republicans.[9] This evidence supports our prediction that for politically-marginalized groups, increased descriptive representation from sharing social identity with a leading nominee from one's party intensifies partisanship over the electoral cycle.

However, in contrast to our predictions, female Republicans did not intensify more in 2008.

[9]Non-black Republicans intensify at similar rates in each election – (-.003, .036) in 2000, (.033, .063) in 2004, and (.031, .070) in 2008 – and the rate is much lower than black Democrats in 2008. The sample size for black Republicans is very low and inferences cannot be made about this subgroup.

They intensify less than in previous elections (Table 6 Model 1 Appendix D). Using DID, they intensify less than all other groups combined in 2008 versus previous years (Table 6 Model 2), but upon examining comparison groups individually, we see there is no difference versus male Republican and Democrats and slightly less intensification than female Democrats (Table 6 Model 3, all models Table 7 Appendix D). The combined year marginal effects graph in Figure 2 and the by election marginal effects graphs (Figure 10) and predicted probability graphs (Figure 11) in Appendix D show that, while the marginal effect of female Republicans' partisanship is often significantly different from other groups, the marginal effect is *not changing* over the election year.

One possible reason may be that vice-presidential candidacy is not a strong enough position to signal an increase in descriptive representation. Alternatively, increased descriptive representation for politically-marginalized groups may not buoy partisanship towards conservative parties that do not overtly champion such groups in the party platform. Yet another alternative is that female group consciousness is weaker than other groups' consciousness as a political constituency, especially in parties that do not overtly champion women. In other words, female Republicans may not view themselves as politically-disadvantaged "group" that has received an increase in descriptive, and therefore substantive and symbolic representation, when a woman becomes a party nominee. Last, Sarah Palin as a particular nominee may not have been taken seriously as as a signal for increasing Republican women's perceived substantive or symbolic representation.

While rich in providing daily nationally-representative samples in election years, these data are only available for three elections in one country. Future research should consider the robustness of the claims on the heterogeneous nature of partisan intensification over the electoral cycle to other country and election cases, given data availability. The results lead to theory-broadening questions regarding the importance of the office for which politically-marginalized groups gain descriptive representation, the degree to which the politically-marginalized group must be self-conscious, and whether the party must ideologically champion the politically-marginalized group. Thinking further about scope conditions, such effects may be much weaker in party-centric parliamentary systems that mobilize less on individual characteristics of party leadership, much stronger

where shared identity with a nominee signals a higher degree of government service delivery as in patronage democracies, or much more where it is more difficult to distinguish and clarify party brands where party systems are volatile.

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A Coding of Variables

1. Dependent Variable, Strong Partisan

   2 prong Party ID question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent or something else?

   Do you consider yourself a strong or not a very strong (Republican — Democrat — independent)?

   1 = Strong Republican, Strong Democrat 0 = Not very strong Republican, Not very strong Democrat, Independent, Something Else

2. Key Causal Variable of Interest — Electoral Proximity

   Percentage of time passed over the year preceding an election coded 0 — 1. 1 indicates the Election Day of interview year, while 0 indicates one year away from the election.

3. Key Moderator — Swing States Coding of swing states during 2000 campaign year: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia

   Coding of swing states during 2004 campaign year: Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin

   Coding of swing states during 2008 campaign year: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin

4. Individual Covariates

   - Female (survey gender quota 50/50) 0 — male 1 — female
   - Race variables - What is your race? are you white, black or African-American, Asian, American Indian, or some other race? 1 White 2 Black 3 Asian 4 American Indian 5 Other

     Black — 1 = "Black" to above, 0 otherwise Other Race — 1 = "Asian," "American Indian," or "Other" to above, 0 otherwise
   - Strength of Ideology - Generally speaking, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?

     0 — Moderate .5 — Liberal, Conservative 1 — Very liberal, Very conservative
   - Age - What is your age? Age in years
   - Education - What is the last grade or class you completed in school? (recoded 0-1) 1 Grade 8 or lower 2 Some high school, no diploma 3 High school diploma or equivalent 4 Technical or vocational school after high school 5 Some college, no degree 6 Associate's or two-year college degree 7 Four-year college degree 8 Graduate or professional school, no degree 9 Graduate or professional degree
   - Employment Variables - Are you working full time or part time? 1 Working full time 2 Part time 3 Temporarily laid off or unemployed 4 Retired 5 Permanently disabled 6 Homemaker 7 Student 8 Other

     Retired — 1 = "Retired" to above, 0 otherwise Unemployed — 1 = "Temporarily laid off or unemployed" to above, 0 otherwise Student — 1 = "Student" to above, 0 otherwise
   - Hispanic - Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent? 1 — Yes 0 — No

- Religion variables ? If attend religious services: Do you mostly attend a place of worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, an Orthodox Church, Muslim, or some other religion? If do not attend religious services: Regardless of whether you now attend any religious services do you ever think of yourself as part of a particular church or denomination? IF YES — Do you consider yourself as Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, an Orthodox Church, Muslim, or some other religion?

  1 Yes, Protestant (including Baptist, Christian, Episcopal, Jehovah's Witness, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and nondenominational Christian) 2 Catholic 3 Jewish 4 Mormon 5 Orthodox (including Greek, Russian, and Eastern) 6 Muslim 7 Other* 8 No denomination 9 Atheist or agnostic

  Protestant 1 = 1 to above, 0 otherwise Catholic 1 = 2 to above, 0 otherwise Jewish 1 = 3 to above, 0 otherwise Other Religion 1 = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 to above, 0 otherwise

- Children - How many children under age 18 now live in your house or apartment? 0 if 0, 1 otherwise

- Urbanity - an estimate of the urbanity of the respondent's place of residence, derived from the respondent's phone number. 1 Urban 2 Suburban 3 Rural

B Foreground Results: Electoral Cycle Effect on Citizen Partisanship

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Strong Partisanship Over Election Year



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the midpoint of the electoral cycle (1 year away) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Empirical Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \mathbf{S}'\phi + \varepsilon$. $\mathbf{S}'$ indicates year fixed-effects and vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Strong Partisanship Over Election Year By Election

2000 2004 2008



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Table 2: Electoral Year Effect on Strong Partisanship (Table 1 - Showing Covariates)

	(1) Pooled	(2) 2000	(3) 2004	(4) 2008
Electoral Proximity	0.23***	0.26***	0.23***	0.21***
	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Swing State (Prior Election)	0.04***	0.04**	0.02	0.08***
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Strength of Ideology	1.33***	1.24***	1.38***	1.35***
	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female	0.27***	0.22***	0.21***	0.38***
	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Age	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.20***	0.38***	0.14***	0.10***
	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Unemployed	-0.11***	-0.04	-0.10*	-0.16**
	(0.036)	(0.085)	(0.052)	(0.062)
Retired	0.03*	0.02	0.09***	0.01
	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Student	0.08*	0.07	0.11	0.04
	(0.046)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.100)
Hispanic	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.044)
Black	0.81***	0.83***	0.65***	1.03***
	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Other Race	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.17***	-0.14***
	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Protestant	0.36***	0.36***	0.45***	0.32***
	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Catholic	0.26***	0.30***	0.31***	0.21***
	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Jewish	0.54***	0.55***	0.53***	0.59***
	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Other Religion	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.22***
	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.058)
Parent	0.08***	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Urban	0.07***	0.03	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Rural	-0.07***	-0.12***	-0.06***	-0.05**
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.024)
2004	0.38***			
	(0.015)			
2008	0.27***			
	(0.016)			
Constant	-2.73***	-2.91***	-2.37***	-2.27***
	(0.035)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.063)
Observations	165106	50727	65041	49338

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

C Swing versus Stronghold States

Table 3: Electoral Proximity Effect on Strong Partisanship in Swing versus Stronghold State

	(1) Pooled	(2) 2000	(3) 2004	(4) 2008
Electoral Proximity	0.19***	0.30***	0.15***	0.17***
	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Swing State (Prior Election)	-0.03	0.11*	-0.11***	0.01
	(0.027)	(0.063)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Swing State (Prior Election) x Electoral Proximity	0.11***	-0.10	0.21***	0.13*
	(0.039)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.071)
2004	0.38***			
	(0.015)			
2008	0.27***			
	(0.016)			
Constant	-2.71***	-2.93***	-2.33***	-2.25***
	(0.037)	(0.071)	(0.054)	(0.064)
Observations	165106	50727	65041	49338
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of Strong Partisanship by Swing and Core States



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the midpoint of the electoral cycle (1 year away) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Proximity * SwingState + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Strong Partisanship by Swing and Core States by Election



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the midpoint of the electoral cycle (1 year away) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Proximity * SwingState + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Swing State on Strong Partisanship by Election



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the midpoint of the electoral cycle (1 year away) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the marginal effect of swing state. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Proximity * SwingState + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

D Politically-Marginalized Groups Gaining Descriptive Representation

Table 4: Electoral Proximity Effect on Strong Partisanship for Black Democrats versus Comparison Groups

	(1) Black Democrats	(2) Full Sample	(3) Full Sample
Electoral Proximity	0.17	0.27***	0.38***
	(0.144)	(0.048)	(0.053)
2004	0.32**	0.42***	0.61***
	(0.132)	(0.039)	(0.042)
2008	0.22	0.32***	0.33***
	(0.140)	(0.042)	(0.052)
2004 x Proximity	-0.05	-0.04	-0.18***
	(0.184)	(0.056)	(0.055)
2008 x Proximity	0.69***	-0.12*	-0.30***
	(0.204)	(0.061)	(0.074)
Black Democrat		1.13***	
		(0.113)	
Proximity x Black Democrat		-0.10	
		(0.150)	
2004 x Black Democrat		-0.08	
		(0.135)	
2008 x Black Democrat		-0.13	
		(0.142)	
Proximity x 2004 x Black Democrat		-0.07	
		(0.189)	
Proximity x 2008 x Black Democrat		0.76***	
		(0.209)	
Black			1.51***
			(0.089)
Democrat			0.29***
			(0.039)
Black x Proximity			-1.18***
			(0.115)
Democrat x Proximity			0.01
			(0.046)
2004 x Black			-1.04***
			(0.083)
2008 x Black			-0.92***
			(0.119)
Proximity x Black x 2008			-0.84***
			(0.282)
2004 x Democrat			-0.19***
			(0.028)
2008 x Democrat			0.14**
			(0.060)
Proximity x Democrat x 2008			0.15*
			(0.087)
Proximity x 2004 x Black x Democrat			1.70***
			(0.122)
Proximity x 2008 x Black x Democrat			2.85***
			(0.238)
Constant	-1.86***	-2.79***	-3.02***
	(0.163)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Observations	11800	165106	165106

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Table 5: Pairwise Comparison of Black Democrats' Strong Partisanship versus Comparison Groups

	(1) Black Democrats and non-Black Democrats	(2) Black Democrats and Non-Black Republicans
Electoral Proximity	0.28***	0.31***
	(0.068)	(0.064)
2004	0.31***	0.47***
	(0.058)	(0.053)
2008	0.39***	0.24***
	(0.060)	(0.059)
2004 × Electoral Proximity	-0.01	-0.08
	(0.080)	(0.075)
2008 × Electoral Proximity	-0.01	-0.27***
	(0.085)	(0.083)
Black Democrat	1.08***	0.95***
	(0.117)	(0.120)
Black Democrat × Electoral Proximity	-0.10	-0.14
	(0.156)	(0.157)
2004 × Black Democrat	0.02	-0.12
	(0.140)	(0.143)
2008 × Black Democrat	-0.21	-0.04
	(0.144)	(0.153)
2004 × Black Democrat × Electoral Proximity	-0.09	-0.03
	(0.196)	(0.199)
2008 × Black Democrat × Electoral Proximity	0.62***	0.94***
	(0.212)	(0.221)
Constant	-2.64***	-2.51***
	(0.066)	(0.066)
Observations	79120	83340
Covariates	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Black Democrat on Strong Partisanship by Election



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the election year. On the y-axis is the marginal effect of a group on the probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Party + \gamma_3 2004 * Proximity + \gamma_4 2008 * Proximity + \gamma_5 2004 * Group + \gamma_6 2008 * Group + \gamma_6 Party * Proximity + \gamma_7 + Party * 2004 + \gamma_8 Party * 2008 + \gamma_9 Proximity * Party * 2008 + \gamma_{10} Proximity * 2004 * Party * Group + \gamma_{11} Proximity * 2008 * Party * Group + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Strong Partisanship by Election and Race/Party



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the election year. On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Party + \gamma_3 2004 * Proximity + \gamma_4 2008 * Proximity + \gamma_5 2004 * Group + \gamma_6 2008 * Group + \gamma_6 Party * Proximity + \gamma_7 + Party * 2004 + \gamma_8 Party * 2008 + \gamma_9 Proximity * Party * 2008 + \gamma_{10} Proximity * 2004 * Party * Group + \gamma_{11} Proximity * 2008 * Party * Group + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Table 6: Electoral Proximity Effect on Strong Partisanship for Female Republicans versus Comparison Groups

	(1) Female Republicans	(2) Full Sample	(3) Full Sample
Electoral Proximity	0.38***	0.23***	0.21***
	(0.092)	(0.049)	(0.077)
2004	0.53***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.078)	(0.042)	(0.066)
2008	0.27***	0.32***	0.31***
	(0.084)	(0.044)	(0.068)
Electoral Proximity × 2004	-0.12	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.107)	(0.059)	(0.096)
Electoral Proximity × 2008	-0.23**	-0.02	0.01
	(0.115)	(0.064)	(0.100)
Female Republican		0.16**	
		(0.071)	
Female Republican × Electoral Proximity		0.16*	
		(0.093)	
Female Republican × 2004		0.19**	
		(0.082)	
Female Republican × 2008		0.01	
		(0.086)	
Proximity x 2004 x Female Republican		-0.12	
		(0.112)	
Female Republican × 2008 × Electoral Proximity		-0.20*	
		(0.120)	
Female			0.21***
			(0.064)
Republican			0.27***
			(0.061)
Female × Electoral Proximity			0.06
			(0.084)
Republican × Electoral Proximity			0.06
			(0.081)
Female × 2004			0.00
			(0.072)
Female × 2008			0.11
			(0.076)
Female × 2004 × Electoral Proximity			0.09
			(0.104)
Republican × 2004			0.11
			(0.071)
Republican × 2008			-0.14*
			(0.075)
Female × 2008 × Electoral Proximity			0.10
			(0.113)
Republican × 2004 × Electoral Proximity			0.03
			(0.104)
Republican × 2008 × Electoral Proximity			-0.23**
			(0.112)
Republican × Female × 2004 × Electoral Proximity			-0.15***
			(0.055)
Republican × Female × 2008 × Electoral Proximity			-0.13**
			(0.064)
Constant	-2.34***	-2.66***	-2.83***
	(0.098)	(0.048)	(0.065)
Observations	36989	165106	165106
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 7: Pairwise Comparison of Female Republicans' Strong Partisanship versus Comparison Groups

	(1) Female Republicans and Male Republicans	(2) Female Republicans and Female Democrats	(3) Female Republicans and Male Democrats
Electoral Proximity	0.22***	0.25***	0.29***
	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.098)
2004	0.39***	0.26***	0.38***
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.085)
2008	0.15*	0.34***	0.36***
	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.088)
2004 × Electoral Proximity	-0.02	0.03	-0.08
	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.120)
2008 × Electoral Proximity	-0.31***	0.11	0.03
	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.128)
Female Republican	0.03	-0.13	0.13
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.094)
Female Republican × Electoral Proximity	0.16	0.15	0.09
	(0.117)	(0.107)	(0.127)
2004 × Female Republican	0.14	0.29***	0.16
	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.109)
2008 × Female Republican	0.17	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.114)
2004 × Female Republican × Electoral Proximity	-0.10	-0.17	-0.05
	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.154)
2008 × Female Republican × Electoral Proximity	0.08	-0.33**	-0.25
	(0.153)	(0.141)	(0.168)
Constant	-2.36***	-2.30***	-2.63***
	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.088)
Observations	72784	85338	67760
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Figure 10: Marginal Effect of Female Republican on Strong Partisanship by Election



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the election year. On the y-axis is the marginal effect of a group on the probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Party + \gamma_3 2004 * Proximity + \gamma_4 2008 * Proximity + \gamma_5 2004 * Group + \gamma_6 2008 * Group + \gamma_6 Party * Proximity + \gamma_7 + Party * 2004 + \gamma_8 Party * 2008 + \gamma_9 Proximity * Party * 2008 + \gamma_{10} Proximity * 2004 * Party * Group + \gamma_{11} Proximity * 2008 * Party * Group + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

Figure 11: Predicted Probability of Strong Partisanship by Election and Gender/Party



Notes: On the x-axis is the percentage through the election year. On the y-axis is the predicted probability of identifying as a strong partisan. Model: $PartisanIntensity = \gamma_1 Proximity + \gamma_2 Party + \gamma_3 2004 * Proximity + \gamma_4 2008 * Proximity + \gamma_5 2004 * Group + \gamma_6 2008 * Group + \gamma_6 Party * Proximity + \gamma_7 + Party * 2004 + \gamma_8 Party * 2008 + \gamma_9 Proximity * Party * 2008 + \gamma_{10} Proximity * 2004 * Party * Group + \gamma_{11} Proximity * 2008 * Party * Group + \mathbf{X}'\beta + \varepsilon$. Vector $\mathbf{X}$ contains standard individual-level covariates and swing state dummy. Standard errors clustered at the day level.

E Robustness Checks

Table 8: Table 1 Dropping Independents

	(1) Pooled	(2) 2000	(3) 2004	(4) 2008
Electoral Proximity	0.24***	0.28***	0.24***	0.22***
	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.037)
2004	0.36***			
	(0.015)			
2008	0.26***			
	(0.016)			
Constant	-2.53***	-2.67***	-2.10***	-2.25***
	(0.037)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.068)
Observations	151904	45909	60513	45482
Controls	Yes	YEs	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Table 9: Regressing Electoral Proximity on Covariates with Ordinary Least Squares

	(1) Electoral Proximity	(2) Electoral Proximity	(3) Electoral Proximity	(4) Electoral Proximity
Strength of Ideology	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Female	0.00**	0.00*	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	0.00*	0.01***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Unemployed	-0.02***	-0.00	-0.01*	0.04***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Retired	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Student	-0.01***	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.00
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Hispanic	0.01**	0.00	0.02***	-0.00
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Black	-0.00	-0.01**	0.01**	-0.00
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Other Race	-0.00	0.01*	-0.01**	0.00
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Protestant	0.02***	0.00	-0.00	0.01**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Catholic	0.02***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Jewish	0.02***	0.01	-0.01	-0.02**
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Other Religion	0.03***	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parent	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Urban	-0.00**	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural	0.01***	-0.00	0.01***	0.00
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.62***	0.70***	0.53***	0.52***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	175427	53969	68835	52623

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$

Table 10: Robustness Check on Table 3 Swing State Vote Margin: 10pp

	(1) Pooled	(2) 2000	(3) 2004	(4) 2008
Electoral Proximity	0.16***	0.32***	0.13***	0.12**
	(0.027)	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.049)
Swing State 10pp	-0.04*	0.15***	-0.12***	-0.03
	(0.025)	(0.057)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Swing State 10pp × Electoral Proximity	0.13***	-0.11	0.21***	0.16**
	(0.037)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.064)
2004	0.38***			
	(0.015)			
2008	0.27***			
	(0.016)			
Constant	-2.70***	-2.98***	-2.32***	-2.24***
	(0.037)	(0.076)	(0.054)	(0.065)
Observations	165106	50727	65041	49338
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

$*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01$