Communism’s Shadow: 
The Effect of Communist Legacies on Post-Communist Preferences, Evaluations, and Behavior

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Chapter 1. Communism’s Shadow

1.1 Introduction

Post-communist citizens hold political, economic, and social opinions that systematically differ from those of people in the rest of the world. The primary questions we seek to answer in this book are (1) why do these attitudes diverge and (2) to what extent can this divergence be said to be a legacy of communism?

At the most basic level, there appear to be two different ways to cut into this question. The first is to posit that differences in attitudes in post-communist countries are due to the nature of the society in which these citizens live their lives (Grix 2000; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2012, 13a). After all, we already have plenty of theories to explain why democracy and markets are more popular among some people than others.\(^1\) Maybe over-educated and under-employed people everywhere are more likely to oppose market economies. It may be the case that democracy is less popular in countries with young political institutions. And perhaps citizens in countries with poorly performing economies are more likely to turn against both democracy and capitalism. If post-communist countries have a disproportionately high number of over-educated and under-employed citizens, new and not particularly well-functioning political institutions, and experience greater economic turmoil, then all of these “contextual” effects could explain why post-communist citizens hold systematically different attitudes towards democracy and the market than citizens elsewhere.

More generally, we can think about these contextual effects as falling into one of three broad (and not always mutually exclusive) categories. First, it may be that the *socio-demographic make-up* of post-communist societies accounts for aggregate level differences in

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\(^1\) On democracy, see Chu et al. 2008; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Kitschelt 1992; Duch 1993; on markets, see Earle and Gehlbach 2003; Hayo 2004; Przeworski 1991.
attitudes about politics. From this perspective, individual citizens in post-communist countries might not think about politics any differently than citizens sharing similar socio-demographic characteristics elsewhere, but it may be the case that we find different concentrations of particular types of people (e.g., more graduates of technical and vocational schools) in post-communist countries due to the effects of decades of communist policies. Second, it may that economic conditions explain the different attitudes of post-communist citizens; perhaps citizens anywhere living through the kind of economic dislocation found in post-communist countries would adapt similarly negative views about market economies. Third, it is possible that political institutions and outcomes account for attitudes citizens hold about politics, and that post-communist countries just have distinct features in this regard. All of these contextual factors could explain why we see – on average – post-communist citizens hold different attitudes about political issues than citizens in other parts of the world.

To be clear, we are using a loose definition of the idea of “context” to cover the socio-demographic make-up of a society, the economic conditions in that society, and the political institutions and outcomes of that society. The key point here is that we are trying to capture the various factors that exist outside of one’s own previous personal experience with communism that could be driving the aggregate level patterns we observe in post-communist countries in political, economic, and social attitudes. Put another way, we conceive of “contextual effects” as a set of variables that we could use to construct another region of the world that is identical in every single way to the post-communist world save for the experience of its citizens having lived through communism, and then observe whether these citizens held the same attitudes as the real
post-communist citizens we observe do.\textsuperscript{2} If this was the case, then our “contextual effects” – be they demographic, economic, or political – could be posited to explain the divergence in post-communist attitudes that we repeatedly observe.

On the other hand, it may be the case that actually living through communism led citizens to develop a peculiar set of attitudes towards politically relevant issues. We have two reasons to suspect this might be the case. First, there is a longstanding literature on “political socialization,” which argues that all political regimes – to one extent or another – seek to inculcate attitudes supportive of the regime into their citizens (Dennis 1968; Greenstein 1971; Greenberg 1973). In many cases, these efforts may be lackadaisical or passive, but in the case of Soviet Communism, there was clearly an active attempt to create “Socialist Man” (Deutscher 1967). Thus, post-communist citizens can be expected to be ideal candidates for finding a lingering effect on political attitudes of past political regimes.

Indeed, communist regimes differed from most other flavors of authoritarian regimes by being not merely interested in ruling over citizens, but rather in try to implement a particular project of shaping citizens’ attitudes. Communist citizens were not simply expected to accept the rule of the Communists, but rather expected to embrace and embody the precepts of socialism.\textsuperscript{3} Moreover, this was not just a stated goal: communist regimes took active steps to try to make sure these precepts were adopted, including in the schools, the work place, and party meetings.

\textsuperscript{2} An alternative thought experiment would involve populating post-communist countries with new, identical citizens in all respects save for the fact that they had arrived after the collapse of communism, and thus had not experienced the regime first hand.

\textsuperscript{3} Of course, this desire was stronger under certain types of communist regimes than others, a point we return to in much greater detail shortly.
What exactly were these precepts? One way to conceive of them was as a political economy worldview. In the realm of politics, the ideal political system was described as one where the proletariat (or its vanguard) ruled in the name of all of society but without bothering with bourgeois accoutrements such as multi-party competition. Economically, state planning was touted as a superior form of economic organization than markets. In addition to running the economy, the state was also to ensure the social welfare of its citizenry and to ensure broad-based equality of wealth across society. In the realm of social policy, divorce and abortion were to be legal, and women’s and minority rights encouraged. Socialist Man, therefore, ought to embody all of these preferences.

Of course, life under “real and existing” socialism was not necessarily a perfect reflection of these principles. Perhaps the greatest divide was in the political realm, where rule by the proletariat effectively became single-party rule by the Communist Party. In the economic realm, there were spheres of independent economic activity, although this certainly varied by country. In terms of social welfare, communist regimes provided healthcare, education, and housing, although in all areas certain segments of society were – to paraphrase George Orwell – “more equal” than others. Socially, access to abortion was widespread (but notable exceptions, such as Romania post-1968, existed) and while women entered the workforce in great numbers, they also remained underpaid; ethnic minorities were unevenly represented and sometimes actively suppressed; and gay-rights were completely non-existent.

Interestingly, despite the divide between the message and reality, across a wide variety of attitudes associated with the Socialist Man paradigm, we still see systematic divergence between the attitudes of citizens in post-communist countries in the 1990s and 2000s and citizens elsewhere in the world. In Table 1.1, we present a series of very simple models in support of this
claim. These models contain the relevant attitudes as the dependent variable, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent lived in a post-communist country as the primary independent variable, and control variables for the year of the survey. The data are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS, introduced in greater detail below).

-- INSERT TABLE 1.1 HERE --

As Table 1 demonstrates, we can find systematic deviations in post-communist attitudes across a wide range of attitudes associated with the “Socialist Man” paradigm, and especially among the core political and economic attitudes of this paradigm. In the top panel, we find that post-communist citizens are less likely to support democracy (Model 1), less likely to believe business should be run by private owners (Model 2), more likely to believe businesses should be run by the state (Model 3) and more likely to think government is responsible for individual level welfare (Model 4). In the lower panel, though, we find a much more mixed record for the Socialist Man emphasis on equality of citizens. On the one hand, post-communist citizens are more likely to feel that abortion is justifiable (Model 5), but are less likely to think homosexuality is justifiable (Model 6) or that ethnic diversity is desirable (Model 7). Interestingly, there is no difference in terms of disliking a neighbor of a different religion.

The attitudes related to politics and economics do indeed coincide with what we would expect from the “Socialist Man” paradigm. However, simply finding these divergences does not mean that they were caused by living through communism. To attempt to sort out this question, we develop a “Regime Exposure Socialization” (RES) model. The model is based on the idea that when regimes are actively trying to inculcate a set of political views among citizens, we should expect variation in the effectiveness of this transfer along three dimensions, much along the same way that we think about whether a person sitting outside is likely to develop sunburn.
First, there is the actual amount of time that one is exposed to the regime, which we refer to as \textit{temporal exposure}. However, all exposure is of course not equal, so we can also consider the \textit{intensity of exposure}. Finally, different individuals will react to this exposure in different ways, which we refer to as \textit{resistance to exposure}. We operationalize \textit{temporal exposure} simply as the number of years living under communist rule. However, the \textit{intensity} of this exposure, as well as variation in an individual’s \textit{resistance} to that exposure, could be affected by both regime level factors\textsuperscript{4} and/or individual level factors\textsuperscript{5}.

The theoretical framework, which we lay out in more detail below in Section 1.4, is thus intended to be general enough to be applied to the study of the effects of any type of regime that attempts to inculcate a particular view of politics among its citizens. However, in this manuscript we will develop a specific set of hypotheses – presented in Chapter 2 – to predict both micro and macro level factors that affected the \textit{intensity} and \textit{resistance} to the Socialist Man project of Soviet communist regimes (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 2).

The goal of this book, therefore, is three-fold. First, and most simply, we want to document that there is important variation between the attitudes of post-communist citizens and citizens in the rest of the world across a host of politically relevant questions.\textsuperscript{6} Second, we wish to ascertain the extent to which this variation is a result of predictable \textit{contextual effects}, including socio-demographic profiles of the population, contemporary economic conditions, and political institutions and outcome. Third, we want to know whether \textit{exposure to communism} continues to have an effect on the attitudes held by post-communist citizens, and, if so, \textit{how} these

\textsuperscript{4} E.g., in a communist context, was the individual living under a Stalinist regime (\textit{intensity})? Does the individual live in a country with a prior history of democratic rule (\textit{resistance})?

\textsuperscript{5} E.g., in a communist context, was the individual educated under communism (\textit{intensity})? Is the individual Catholic (\textit{resistance})?

\textsuperscript{6} Despite the wealth of literature on communist legacy effects, almost none of it besides our own work (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011, 2012, 2013a, b) explicitly compares attitudes in multiple post-communist countries with attitudes held by citizens in the rest of the world.
effects work. To put this in the language of our “Regime Exposure Socialization” model, we seek to determine which factors best explain variation in the intensity of and resistance to exposure to communism. We also seek to make the case generally that the Regime Exposure Socialization model is a useful framework for understanding legacy effects of different political regimes. Figure 1.1 (below) concisely summarizes our approach.

In embracing these challenges, we join a host of other scholars interested in better understanding the legacies of communism on political life in post-communist countries (Bunce 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Grzymala-Busse 2002, 2006; Kopstein 2003; Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Tucker 2006; Wittenberg 2006; Pop-Eleches 2007; Nalepa 2010). However, unlike most of these previous efforts, which involves analyses only within post-communist countries, our work is grounded in comparative analysis involving citizens who live throughout the world. Moreover, while many other studies have examined the effect of legacies on institutions, in this book we focus on the attitudes held by ordinary post-communist citizens. Finally, our goal is not so much to establish whether the past matters or not, but rather to show the way in which factors that are related to the experience of communist rule in these countries can account for attitudes held in the post-communist era and the extent to which this can be predicted by theory.

Furthermore, we believe that disentangling whether distinctive post-communist attitudes are a function of contextual effects (and if so, which ones) or living through communism (and if so, how did this matter?) is crucial for understanding the likely future trajectory of political behavior.

--- INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE ---

7 One exception to this general pattern are a number of studies comparing the attitudes of East and West German citizens; see e.g. Rohrschneider 1999, Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2007, Dalton 2009.
in post-communist countries, even if both of these types of factors are to some extent “legacies” of communism.  

In the remainder of this chapter, we proceed as follows. First, in Section 1.2, we motivate our choice to study attitudes in post-communist countries as opposed to some other set of countries. In the next two sections, we then develop more thoroughly the arguments underlying our contextual effects hypotheses (1.3) and introduce our Regime Exposure Socialization model (1.4). In Section 1.5, we explain the basic empirical strategy employed in the manuscript to test the arguments laid out in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. We then close the chapter with an expanded discussion of the contributions we hope to make in the manuscript (1.6) and lay out the plan for the remainder of the book (1.7).

1.2. Why Study Post-Communism?

Post-communism is not the only analytically useful category for understanding the countries of the former Soviet bloc. We could (and in some cases will) move down the ladder (e.g. by further subdividing ex-communist countries as a function of their pre-communist or communist developmental trajectories) or up the ladder (e.g., by analyzing transition countries as part of even broader categories such as post-totalitarian or post-authoritarian) of generality. What, then, are our reasons for studying post-communism?

Aside from the intrinsic interest of understanding the legacy of what was arguably the largest-scale social and political experiment of the 20th century, studying political behavior in the

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8 We take up the question of the extent to which our different “contextual” variables ought to be conceived of as legacies of communism in great detail below. Living through communism, almost by definition, must be considered a “legacy” of the experience of communist rule, as without communist rule no one would have lived through communism.

9 Note that Section 1.4 introduces the general form of the Regime Exposure Socialization model that could be applied to any regime type; in Chapter 2, we develop specific hypotheses appropriate for the post-communist context which we label a “Communist Regime Exposure Socialization” model.
former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia has a number of theoretical justifications and presents certain methodological advantages over studying the legacies of other types of political regimes or economic systems. These advantages include: (1) a distinctive set of shared political and economic institutions, which set ex-communist countries apart from other post-authoritarian and developing countries; (2) significant differences in pre-communist economic, political and cultural legacies, which help disentangle communist legacies from alternative explanations; (3) a fairly high degree of exogeneity in both the rise and the fall of communism for most of the Soviet bloc countries; (4) an uninterrupted exposure to communism ranging from 45 years in the case of most of Eastern Europe to 70 years for the interwar Soviet republics; (5) significant divergence in the economic and political trajectories after the fall of communism; and (6) several instances of significant within-country variation in the exposure to Communism (specifically, Germany, Ukraine and Belarus). In the remainder of this section, we address each of these in turn.

1.2.1. Institutional similarities

In addition to a shared ideology, communist regimes also shared several important institutional similarities. Determining whether these similarities were a direct result of that ideology or more a function of the powerful influence of the Soviet Union as both an institutional model and an (implicit or explicit) enforcer of communism in the region is beyond the purview of our current project, but clearly the East European and Eurasian communist countries shared several crucial economic and political institutional features that set them apart from many developmentally comparable countries. First – and perhaps most clearly – all the communist
regimes were either de jure or at least de facto one-party regimes,\(^\text{10}\) led by a Marxist-Leninist political party whose organization was closely intertwined – and often fused – with the state apparatus. A second feature, driven to a great extent by the combination of high institutionalization and ideological aspirations discussed above, was the much greater penetration of all levels of society by communist regimes compared to other authoritarian regimes. A third important feature that sets Communist countries apart from the non-communist world is the central role of the state in the economy. A fourth distinguishing train of communist regimes was their comparatively stronger emphasis on the development of industry, which in turn led to urbanization drives and a rapid expansion of primary and secondary and technical post-secondary education. A final important distinguishing feature was the fact that communist regimes – consistent with their ideology – left behind societies that were decidedly more equal in terms of the relative distribution of wealth than most other societies (Haggard and Kaufman 2008).\(^\text{11}\)

1.2.2. Pre-communist differences

Despite these marked commonalities of communist rule resulting in the previously discussed forms of institutional similarities during the communist period, of great advantage to our analytical effort is that the group of countries that we refer to as “post-communist” today entered into their periods of communist rule from remarkably different vantage points. This ranged from countries with remarkably high levels of socio-economic development, literacy, and even experiences with democracy in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, to areas in the

\(^{10}\) A few countries, such as East Germany and Poland, nominally allowed the existence of multiple parties but such parties were expected to – and almost always did – toe the official party line.

\(^{11}\) We expand upon each of these characteristics in much greater detail in Chapter 2.
Balkans and Central Asia where most of the population was illiterate and reliant on subsistence agriculture before the advent of communism. In addition, East European and Eurasian communism took route in a part of the world with a wide degree of cultural and religious variation, including Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslims.

While the particular reverberations of these pre-communist differences will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, what matters for the present discussion is that such diversity presents two distinctive analytical advantages for our efforts to assess the attitudinal and behavioral legacies of communism. First, this heterogeneity should make it easier to distinguish the legacy of communism from other competing explanations of political attitudes and behavior, such as accounts based on socio-economic development, prior institutional legacies, or cultural factors. Second, the large “within-bloc” variation along many key drivers of attitudes and behavior means that our empirical setup represents a hard test of the systemic legacy of communism. To the extent that despite their important differences ex-communist countries exhibit significant commonalities in attitudinal patterns and significant differences compared to non-communist countries, then we can be much more confident that communism played an important causal role in explaining these distinctive patterns than if such patterns were observed among countries which shared more similar developmental and political histories.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{12}\) Consider for example the legacy of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America. While these regimes shared important political features (Collier 1979), which would allow for a comparative analysis of their impact on political attitudes and behavior, such an analysis would be significantly complicated by the fact that bureaucratic authoritarianism emerged primarily among the more developed countries in the region, which featured many important similarities – e.g., prior development levels, industrialization patterns, colonial legacies, and Catholicism – while differing from most other developing countries, including other Latin American countries. Therefore, any analysis of the impact of bureaucratic authoritarianism would face much greater obstacles in disentangling the regime effect from other potential explanations.
1.2.3. Exogeneity in the rise and the fall of communism

A serious – and potentially intractable – challenge for studying the impact of political and economic regimes on subsequent attitudes and behavior is the possibility of reverse causation due to the endogeneity of political regimes. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the emergence of certain types of economic and political regimes may be the consequence of prior economic and political attitudes among a country’s citizens. For example, if citizens strongly value crucial aspects of democratic regimes, and if they are sufficiently organized and mobilized to act on these beliefs, then we would expect their countries more likely to democratize and/or less likely to revert to authoritarianism. To the extent that such values and behavioral proclivities are relatively stable over time, then any correspondence between current attitudes and recent regime characteristics may simply be the product of spurious correlation rather than evidence of regime legacies.

From this perspective, studying the effects of communism also has significant advantages because, for many of the countries of the former Soviet bloc, both the rise and the fall of communism was much more exogenous than for many other authoritarian regimes elsewhere around the world. Among the former Soviet Republics, Russia was arguably the only one where Communism arose endogenously, whereas in the other republics of the former Russian Empire it was imposed as a result of the Red victory in the Russian civil war of 1917-21.\(^\text{13}\) For the three Baltic states and Moldova, the incorporation into the Soviet Union and the imposition of communism were initially the direct result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between Nazi

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\(^{13}\) Even in Russia, much of the evidence suggests that the rise of communism was in many ways the product of a series of historical accidents rather than the inevitable conclusion of the type of historical forces, which Marx had expected would lead to the victory of Communism.
Germany and Soviet Russia, and later of the ability of Soviet troops to re-conquer these territories following the German invasion of 1941. For the East European satellite states, the rise of communism was indelibly tied to the presence of Soviet troops in most countries in the region in the aftermath of World War II, and this de facto power balance on the ground was sanctioned by the agreements of the Yalta Conference in early 1945, in which Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to Stalin’s demands for control over Eastern Europe. Therefore, except for Albania and Yugoslavia,\textsuperscript{14} and to some extent Czechoslovakia,\textsuperscript{15} the rise to power of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was also largely exogenous, in the sense that it was driven by great power politics and the presence of Soviet troops rather than the economic and political preferences of the majority of citizens from the region.

The surprising collapse of East European and Eurasian communism in 1989-91 was also more exogenous than the collapse of most other authoritarian regimes, and once again for reasons closely tied to the actual or threatened use of force by the Soviet army to uphold communist rule throughout the region. Here again, we need to distinguish between the events in the Soviet Union and those in its East European satellite states. The timing of the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was arguably to a large extent the result of Gorbachev’s abandonment in 1988 of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which signaled that the Soviet Union would no longer use force or the threat of force (as in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and (threatened) in Poland in 1981) to reverse political reforms in its East European satellites.

\textsuperscript{14} In both cases the communists took over as a result of anti-fascist military campaigns with genuine popular backing and minimal Soviet military involvement in 1944-45. As a result, the Soviet Union also had less of an influence on the subsequent development of communism in these countries (in particular in Yugoslavia after 1948 and in Albania after 1956).

\textsuperscript{15} In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party won the largest vote share in the reasonably free and fair 1946 elections riding a wave of anti-Fascist sentiment, but their vote share was still only around 38% and their subsequent rise to absolute power was less the result of popular support than of the presence of Soviet troops, which allowed the Communists to marginalize their non-communist coalition partners and to suppress the resulting dissent.
Following this crucial external signal the communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact countries collapsed with remarkable speed over the course of a single year, starting with the Polish Roundtable in the early spring of 1989 and ending with the formal renunciation of power by the Bulgarian Communist Party in November 1989. While the collapse of these regimes obviously had important domestic roots, including an erosion of political legitimacy and a range of economic difficulties in the 1980s, the timing of these events cannot be explained by domestic factors. Many of these problems had existed many years before 1989 without producing regime change. Furthermore, change happened almost simultaneously in countries whose recent communist experience had been as diverse as Hungary’s relatively benign and prosperous “goulash communism” and the nightmare of Romania’s neo-Stalinist Ceausescu dictatorship. While it is true that Poland and Hungary were at the forefront of these changes, and that their earlier timing was hardly accidental, what matters most for the purposes of our analysis is that over the course of about a year most East European countries transitioned from communism to post-communism irrespective of their differences in pre-communist and communist trajectories.

In the Soviet republics, the fall of communism was intertwined with the complicated and chaotic dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus, technically, the transition to multipartyism was driven by Gorbachev’s change in March 1990 of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which effectively ended the political power monopoly of the Communist Party and paved the way for

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16 We thank Milada Vachudova for this point and for her many other useful comments on the first draft of this chapter.

17 The fall of communism in the two non-Warsaw pact communist countries of Eastern Europe was slightly different: in Albania, where communism had survived under conditions of almost complete international isolation for most of the 1980s, the transition to multipartyism did not start until December 1990. Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia the timing of the transition to multi-party competition quite similar to the rest of Eastern Europe but was driven primarily by ethnic rifts between Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian factions within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at the 14th Congress in January 1990.
competitive elections later that year. The outcomes of these elections differed quite dramatically – with anti-communist popular fronts doing much better in the Baltics, Georgia and Moldova than in the Central Asian republics – and arguably reflected different popular evaluations of the legitimacy of the communist regime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s refusal to recognize the independence declarations of the Baltic republics, and the repeated violent interventions of Soviet troops against independence movements in the Soviet republics (e.g. Azerbaijan in January 1990, Lithuania in March 1990 and January 1991 etc.) suggest that the ultimate fate of communism in the region was once again decided by events in Moscow to a greater extent than by the preferences of Soviet citizens. While it is unclear for how long the Soviet Union could have been held together by force after the fall of East European communism and the rapid rise of nationalist popular mobilization (Beissinger 2002), it seems very likely that the political trajectories of most former Soviet republics would have looked very differently in the 1990s had the August 1991 hardline coup been successful or had the power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev been won by the latter. As things turned out, the failure of the coup and Yeltsin’s assertion of Russian independence effective sealed the fate of Soviet communism and led to the emergence of fifteen newly independent countries in the fall of 1991. While the trajectories of these countries diverged quite dramatically over the following years, what matters for the current discussion is that all of them abandoned communism at roughly the same time\(^\text{18}\) and – with the partial exception of Russia – for reasons that were largely independent of the political attitudes of their citizens.

\(^{18}\)The high continuity of communist personnel and political repression in many of the former Soviet Republics (especially in Central Asia) raises important questions about the extent to which 1991 really represented genuine regime change. Nonetheless, the marginalization of the role of communist parties and communist ideology in the new regimes, combined with the albeit gradual and uneven abandonment of central planning, suggest that even the most notoriously authoritarian of the former Soviet republics (especially Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) represent new breeds of authoritarian regimes rather than continuations of Soviet communism.
1.2.4. Regime longevity

The communist regimes of Eastern Europe and Eurasia also stand out – at least in comparison to most 20th century authoritarian regimes – in their remarkable longevity, ranging from roughly 45 years in Eastern Europe to over 70 years for the pre-WWII Soviet republics. Combined with their previously discussed ambitious efforts to revolutionize the societies and individuals over which they ruled, this longevity arguably gave communist regimes a unique scope for affecting the political attitudes and behavior of East European citizens. Therefore, the communists had greater opportunities to root out or at least marginalize prior formal and informal institutions. While these efforts were only partially successful, they nevertheless had more profound consequences than similar efforts by other authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Thus, even though the Nazi and Fascist regimes arguably had similarly radical – though differently conceived – societal transformation ambitions, their execution was cut short by the defeat of the Axis countries in World War II, which capped the length of the Fascist experiment at just over two decades in the case of Italy, and at less than 15 years for all the other comparable regimes.

Regime duration matters not only for the extent of institutional transformation but also for the processes through individual citizens are politically socialized. For shorter-lived authoritarian regimes, such as interwar Fascist regimes or post-war Latin American military dictatorships, large proportions of the adult population of the country still had distinctive personal political memories of the preceding regimes by the time the authoritarian regimes collapsed. By contrast, even assuming that a ten-year old could form political memories that would survive over 70 years of turmoil and repression, in the interwar Soviet republics such
memories would have been limited to persons in their eighties and older, while in the East European satellite states the corresponding age cutoff would have been around 55-60 years. Even if we allow for inter-generational transmission of political memories (cf. Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) the much greater longevity of communist regimes effectively meant that the average resident of an interwar Soviet republic was two generations further removed from the pre-communist past than a German citizen would have been to the pre-fascist past in 1945.

In addition to allowing us to test the individual level effects of a much greater “dose” of authoritarian/totalitarian rule, the communist social experiment provides us with two additional analytical advantages. First, it provides dramatic within-country individual-level variation in the extent to which citizens were exposed to communism, ranging from people who had been born and lived for 70 years under a communist regime, to others who were born just as communism collapsed and thus had no direct personal experience with the system. Second, the coexistence among the post-communist transition countries – and sometimes even in the same country (see below) – of regions which had experienced 45 vs. 70 years of communism, means that we can systematically test the effects of authoritarian/totalitarian regime duration on a scale which would not be possible elsewhere in the world. Both of these features should be very useful in promoting a better understanding of political socialization in authoritarian regimes (and of political socialization more broadly).

1.2.5. Post-communist divergence

To the extent that political attitudes are shaped by a combination of any individual’s personal experience of the political sphere, then with the partial exception of the few months immediately following the collapse of communism, we should expect that any survey-based
evidence of post-communist exceptionalism would reflect not only the influence of communism but also that of the post-communist transition. To the extent that the nature of this transition was both highly uniform across ex-communist countries and very different from the experience of non-communist countries during the same period, this fact would raise important doubts about our ability to draw inferences about the direct individual-level effects of communism as opposed to indirect effects via economic and institutional legacies. These concerns are particularly salient given the shared – and significant – challenges facing ex-communist countries in their transition away from one-party states and command economies. Moreover, these challenges resulted in high political uncertainty, and significant economic and social costs, which were on average much more severe than those inflicted by the economic and political reform efforts undertaken during the same time period in other parts of the developing world.

While in our statistical tests we will try to address this issue in a number of ways – including through the use of survey data from the very early transition period and by controlling for indicators of well-established differences in economic and political performance – the task is simplified by the fact that following the collapse of communism the former communist countries experienced very different economic and political trajectories at both the domestic and the international level. While even a brief inventory of these differences is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is worth noting that after 1990 some countries (such as Poland) underwent rapid economic and political reforms in an effort to emulate Western markets and democratic institutions, others (such as Romania and Slovakia) underwent similar transformations but over a longer period and via lengthy detours of economic and political populism, while others still (such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) went into an entirely different economic and political direction altogether. At the same time, the socio-economic and political outputs of the last two decades
have varied widely across almost all politically salient performance indicators, ranging from economic output, monetary stability, unemployment, inequality and life expectancy to criminality, governance and state capacity (Svejnar 2000, Frye 2002, 2010). Finally, the international context of these domestic transformations has also varied dramatically, with some countries benefitting from the powerful incentives of European integration (Vachudova 2005), while others were affected by regional conflicts such as the Afghan war or the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

This significant post-communist divergence means that to the extent that substantial ex-communist attitudinal commonalities persist beyond the early transition years then such a finding would significantly strengthen our confidence in the causal impact of the communist experience on citizen politics. Moreover, this diversity provides us with greater analytical leverage for understanding how the relatively uniform experience of communism interacts with the sharply contrasting post-communist developments to produce particular attitudinal configurations.

1.2.6. Within-country variation

The dramatic reconfiguration of East European borders in the aftermath of World War II provides us with an additional analytical tool for studying the impact of communism on subsequent economic and political behavior: the existence of significant within-country variations in the length of communist exposure for several of the post-communist countries. Such sub-national variation has become an increasingly popular alternative in comparative politics for dealing with the potential shortfalls of cross-country comparisons, which may be more prone to omitted variable bias.
In the post-communist context, the most visible instance of such a “natural experiment” – though there was very little that was natural about it – was the partition and subsequent re-unification of Germany, which meant that by the 1990s East Germans differed from their West German compatriots through their experience of 45 years of communist rule but shared not only a common language, culture, and history, but also – increasingly – similar economic and institutions. Therefore, a number of studies have used comparative survey data from East and West Germany to study the impact of communism while minimizing the risk of omitted variable bias (c.f. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, Dalton 2009). Other instances of such analytically valuable border changes also occurred in several former Soviet republics, which include territories that belonged to the Soviet Union in the interwar period along with more recent territorial acquisitions during and after World War II. The most prominent such division is between Eastern and Western Ukraine, which has been shown to matter with respect to voting behavior in both initial and subsequent post-communist elections (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) but similar differences exist between Eastern and Western Belarus, between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova, and between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia.

While such sub-national comparisons are important complements to cross-national survey analyses, and will be used in several of our empirical chapters, we do not claim that the former are necessarily methodologically preferable to the latter. Even though, as mentioned, sub-national comparisons help reduce the omitted variable concerns that usually plague even many well specified cross-country statistical comparisons, they do not eliminate them entirely. To take the German example, East Germans do not differ from West Germans just in their experience of communism and in potentially observable variables such as income, but prior to the unification of Germany in 1871, most of what eventually became East Germany was part of Prussia, a state
with a very different political history and culture than many of the states which eventually became part of West Germany, such as Bavaria or Saarland. Moreover, comparisons focused on sub-national variation in a single country run into potentially serious external validity limitations: even if it turns out that East Germans prefer larger welfare states or hold different democratic values than their Western counterparts, it is unclear whether one would be justified in concluding that communism had similar effects elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, East Germans had a reputation for being much more ideologically committed to communism in the late 1980s than their East European neighbors, which suggests that they may have experienced and processed communism differently than their communist comrades elsewhere in Eastern Europe. ¹⁹

1.3 Contextual Effects on Post-Communist Attitudes

With all this shared (and divergent) history in mind, we return to our original question of trying to explain the divergence in the political attitudes of post-communist citizens and to assess the degree to which these differences are legacies of communism. As laid out above in Figure 1.1, we suggest that there are two general types of explanations for why post-communist attitudes may diverge from those held by citizens in other parts of the world: (1) the context in which post-communist citizens find themselves living and (2) the experience of actually living through communist rule. We begin with the former.

There are of course a wide variety factors that could explain opinions held by post-communist citizens on political and economic issues and why these opinions appear to diverge

¹⁹ Other examples include the trauma of living in a divided city (Berlin), the greater salience of the Western consumption model through the proximity of West Germany, the particular patterns of communist-era economic transfers (marked by significant outflows in the 1950s but balanced by significant Soviet subsidies later on), etc.
from those held by people in other parts of the world that have nothing to do with the experience of having lived through communism. Perhaps the simplest way this could occur would be if people’s preferences, evaluations, and political behavior were a function of their socio-demographic characteristics and if post-communist countries had different socio-demographic make-ups than other countries.

Consider the following highly stylized example. Imagine a world with three income categories (high, medium, and low) and three education categories (post-secondary, secondary, and less than secondary). If all political preferences were a direct function of income and education, then we would expect societies with similar distributions of education and income to have similar distributions of political preferences. Now imagine that preferences for extreme forms of redistribution were largely concentrated among those with high levels of education and low incomes. If in Country A there are very few highly educated poor people (either because there are few poor people, or few highly educated people or because income is very highly correlated with education), then that country would have a very small proportion of the population supporting extreme forms of income redistribution. In contrast, if in Country B income was unrelated to education or if both poverty and higher education were very prevalent, then we might find a much larger proportion of the population supporting extreme forms of income redistribution. This would hold despite the fact that in both countries, individual preferences were generated in exactly the same manner: as a function of income and education. Thus, despite identical processes of individual preference formation, the aggregate nature of preferences across the whole society would be different. As noted earlier, one of the effects of communism was to create societies with very different socio-demographic characteristics, so
certainly this type of theoretical approach is one that can be tested in the post-communist context.

Moving beyond socio-demographic factors, we might also expect political and economic attitudes to be a function of current economic conditions. Consider again a highly stylized world, only now it is one in which one embraces markets as long as one’s real disposable income has gone up in the past 12 months; conversely, if real disposable income has declined in the past 12 months, one is skeptical of markets. Now let us assume that outside of the post-communist countries in the 1990s, at any given time 50% of citizens had incomes that were going up, and 50% of citizens had incomes that were going down. However, let us assume – not completely unrealistically – that in post-communist countries in the 1990s, due to the economic nature of the transition from central planning to market based economies (Przeworski 1991; Svejnar 2000; Gould 2011), only 20% of the population enjoyed rising incomes and 80% saw their incomes falling in any given year. Were we then to observe preferences for market vs. state-run economies, we would conclude that citizens in post-communist countries were much more likely to be skeptical of markets (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013b). This would be the case again despite the fact that citizens in both countries were exhibiting identically determined preferences.

Similarly to the economic conditions argument, we might expect that citizens’ political view could be a function of the political and economic institutions with which they interact in the political world. Again, let us consider a highly stylized example. Imagine that support for democracy was simply a function of whether one lived under a parliamentary form of government or presidential form of government. Let us suppose that in the former case, the average citizens supports democracy “a lot” (imagine this as a 4 out of 5 on a 5 point scale), while the average citizen living in a presidential regimes only supports democracy “a little” (say
2 on a scale from 1-5). If the rest of the non-post-communist world is evenly split between presidential and parliamentary systems of government but the post-communist world is made up exclusively of countries with presidential systems of government, then the data would reveal that the average post-communist supports democracy a little (say 2 on our 1-5 scale) whereas the average citizen in the rest of the world supports democracy somewhat (say 3 on our 1-5 scale). The key point from our perspective is that this finding would have nothing to do with the fact that post-communist citizens are somewhat less trusting of political parties because of decades of single-party rule; instead, it would solely be a function of the fact that post-communist countries have more presidential systems of government.

Turning our attention back to the larger question of the legacies of communism, we are struck by the following conundrum. While all of these contemporaneous factors – be they demographic, economic, or institutional – may help to explain away differences in attitudes between citizens of post-communist countries and citizens of other countries, analytically we cannot conclusively claim that any of them either are or are not exclusively legacies of communism. The reason is that once we start carrying out surveys in the post-communist era, any contemporaneous variables that we can measure have the potential to be both a legacy of communism and a result of post-communism. Now some features – such as urbanization – are probably much more a result of communist-era than post-communist developments, although of course we cannot rule out that the economic shocks of the transition have not encouraged migration to or out of the cities. Others – such as the choice of electoral rules – are more easily justified as a result of post-communist decisions, although the SMD systems in several former

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20 It is, of course, not the case in the real world.
21 Astute readers will notice that we have not provided a list of specific variables that we will use in any of these categories. In order not to interrupt the flow of this introductory theory chapter, we have elected to hold off the discussion of individual variables until Chapter 3, where we consider data, models, and methods.
Soviet republics are clearly holdovers from the Soviet period, while the adoption of PR in much of Eastern Europe was at least in part a conscious rejection of communist political arrangements. Still others – unemployment rates, prevalence of corruption – can easily be explained as a function of both communist-era economic practices and post-communist policies. And indeed, as Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006) and Pop-Eleches (2006) have argued, some of these factors are even likely to be a function of pre-communist developments.

For these reasons, we want to go beyond simply controlling for the contemporaneous context in which citizens find themselves, and also account for contextual factors as they were at the end of the communist era and immediately before the onset of communism. Doing so has two obvious advantages. First, we are able to reduce the number of potentially unobserved factors that could be influencing our dependent variables of interest (e.g., attitudes towards democracy, the market, etc.) and thus reduce the amount of bias that could be present in our estimate of the differences in attitudes between post-communist citizens and citizens in other parts of the world.

But the second advantage is even more important from the perspective of trying to tease out the legacy effects of communism. To start with, any pre-communist era variable that we can measure can obviously not have been a legacy of communism. Thus if we can eliminate differences in opinions between post-communist citizens and people in other countries purely by controlling for pre-communist factors (e.g., such as geographic location), this would be powerful evidence against the idea that current differences in attitudes are a result of legacies of communism. Similarly, by measuring variables at the end of the communist era and before the advent of post-communism, we can at least claim these factors are not a result of post-communist developments. Thus if we find that controlling for characteristics of post-communist countries at
the end of the communist era eliminates distinctions in post-communist attitudes, it would be a strong refutation of the claim that differences in attitudes of post-communist citizens are simply a result of post-communist developments. Moreover, to the extent that we are thorough in controlling for pre-communist context, then our measure of end of the communist era context should be a reasonably good proxy for developments under communism.

None of these steps, of course, will ultimately allow us to “prove” that a contextual effect measured in the post-communist era is not itself a legacy of communism; for these types of claims we will have to rely on what we know about the variables in question and their determinants.\(^{22}\) That being said, by trying to be as thorough as possible in controlling for conditions both before the advent of communist rule and at the moment of its collapse we hope to be able to convince readers (1) that our contemporaneous measures are not simply proxies for underlying features that have distinguished political life in Eastern Europe and Eurasia for centuries; (2) that we really are controlling for many of the enduring legacies of communist rule on the societies in which citizens of post-communist find themselves living and (3) that we are not misidentifying post-communist developments as “communist legacies”. Ultimately, the goal remains the same: to see if we can explain differences in post-communist attitudes by taking account of the contextual factors that we think ought to produce those attitudes.

\(^{22}\) To be clear, we are not making the same claim for variables measure in the pre-communist era or at the end of communism. If we could completely account for the divergent attitudes using pre-communist variables, then that would be strong evidence that these attitudes are not a legacy of communism. Likewise, if we could completely account for the divergence using variables that measure conditions at the end of Communism, then this would be strong evidence that the divergence in attitudes is a function of changes to the nature of society that occurred under Communism.
1.4. A Regime Exposure Socialization Model

Of course, it may be the case that the true source of the different political, economic, and social attitudes held by post-communist citizens comes from the actual experience of living through communism (Jowitt 1992, Kitschelt 1992, Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 1999, Gibson 2003, Tworzecki 2003). This immediately raises the question of how living through communism ought to affect one’s attitudes and views. To address this question, we draw upon the “political socialization” literature to set up what we have termed a Regime Exposure Socialization (RES) model. In this section, we outline the general contours of this model, leaving to Chapter 2 the task of a Communist Regime Exposure Socialization (CRES) model with specific hypotheses for the post-communist context.

Like many other aspects of the study of political behavior, the vast majority of the work on the study of political socialization has been conducted in American politics, and this especially true for the earliest work on the topic (Sapiro 2004). The terms has been employed to a rather wide range of topics (Dennis 1968), but the most prominent have been the way in which citizens pick up society’s “prevailing norms”, the way in which children learn about politics (Greenstein 1971, Sapiro 2004, Prior 2010), and the manner in which parental partisanship is transmitted from parents to their children (Jennings and Niemi 1968, Zuckerman 2007, Jennings et al. 2009).24 Although the last of these topics has come to predominate more recent work in the field in American politics, it is the first of these that is of most use to us in our current endeavor.

23 The term is from Greenstein 1971, but for a similar idea see Greenberg 1973, Sears 1993, and Sears and Valentino 1997.
24 Although see McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) who turn the causal arrows around, arguing that we should be looking to see if parents pick up attitudes from their children, which they study using by examining the effect of children’s civic education programs at school on the political behavior of their parents.
More specifically, there are four valuable observations from the existing literature on political socialization that we can use in attempting to craft a general model of the variation in how citizens are likely to adopt messages that are actively pushed by a regime along the lines of the “Socialist Man” experiment under communism:

(1) There is clearly existing evidence that individuals “acquire attitudes, beliefs, and values relating to the political system of which he[/she] is a member and to his[/her] own role as citizen within that political system.” (Greenberg 1973, p.3)

(2) This process can occur via multiple agents; one of the most important of which is the schools (Dennis 1968, Jenning and Niemi 1968, McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, Campbell 2006).


(4) There remains an ongoing debate about whether these socialization processes happen primarily during childhood (the “impressionable years” hypothesis) or throughout one’s life (the “life-long openness” or “constant updating” hypothesis), but there is general agreement that the early years of one’s life are important (Krosnick and Alwayn 1989, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Sears and Valentino 1997, Prior 2010, Osborne et al. 2011).

On the basis of these observations, we develop the Regime Exposure Socialization (RES) model, outlined below in Figure 1.2.

In moving away from the American context to the post-communist context, we are struck by the wide number of factors that have been proposed to us as we developed this research agenda as possible candidate to either strengthen or weaken the effect that a given year of living under communist rule might have on the political socialization of any given individual. Even in the American context there are a number of these types of factors that have been considered, but from our reading of the literature it seems that most work really only focuses on at most one or two of these factors at a time (e.g., childhood vs. adult exposure, prevalence of political discussion in one’s home), and thus the literature has not really had to develop a theoretical
framework for thinking systematically about this type of variation. In the post-communist context, however, we not only have communist regimes in different countries, we also have different varieties communism (e.g., Stalinism vs. reform communism), individuals who were educated before, during, and after communism, and a wide-range of religious traditions that had different relations with the officially atheistic communist state, to identify just a few potential sources of variation.

To avoid either (a) ignoring these many important sources of variation or (b) simply incorporating them into our analysis in a haphazard manner, we turn to the somewhat unlikely analogy of the causes of sunburn to motivate a Regime Exposure Socialization model. Surely, no one is going to develop sunburn without being exposed to the sun, and, correspondingly, we would expect the likelihood of doing so to increase the more time one spends in the sun. However, each additional hour of sun exposure is likely to have a larger effect on one’s likelihood of developing sunburn if the exposure in question is to a blazing hot sun in the middle of summer in a cloudless sky than if it occurs on a hazy day during the fall late in the afternoon.\(^{25}\) Similarly, we would expect for any given intensity of sunlight, each additional hour of exposure would have a greater effect on the likelihood of developing sunburn for an individual covered in tanning oil than an individual covered in sunscreen.\(^{26}\) Thus we have three general classes of factors that could predict the likelihood of any given individual developing sunburn: \textit{temporal exposure} to the stimuli (e.g., hour out in the sun), the \textit{intensity} or \textit{strength} of that exposure (e.g., how clear the sky is), and individual \textit{resistance} to the exposure (e.g., how much suntan lotion a person is wearing).

\(^{25}\) We might also expect sunburn to be more severe over time as the levels of ozone in the atmosphere are depleted (Abarca et al. 2002).

\(^{26}\) Or, interestingly enough, an individual drinking red wine regularly; see Matito et al. 2011 and \url{http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20086913-10391704.html}.  

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The idea behind our Regime Exposure Socialization model (RES) is simply to transfer this framework to exposure to the “message” of any given regime – like the communist regimes – that is interested in actively transmitting a set of attitudes to its citizens. So instead of hours of sunlight, the *temporal exposure* is the time spent living under that regime. For ease in interpretation and measurement, we will operationalize this concept as the number of years spent living under the regime; although one could of course you use any measurement of time. Our simplest hypotheses will therefore be that each additional year of exposure will increase the likelihood of the individual coming to hold the attitude that the regime wants held by its citizens, i.e., that the “socialization” of the population by the regime will be successful.

However, much like exposure to sunlight, we are well aware that the *intensity* of any given individual’s exposure to the regime’s socialization efforts will vary. Crucially, the RES model suggests that these factors that *intensify exposure* – we will also use the term *strengthen exposure* interchangeably – can vary at both the country level and at the individual level. So some factors will intensify exposure to everyone living in a given country in a given time, whereas other factors will affect the intensity of exposure at an individual level. In Chapter 2 we will provide specific hypotheses as to the types of factors that are germane for communist regimes, but for now consider just two examples to illustrate these different categories. So at the country level, we might expect a state dominated by true believers in a regime’s ideological vision (e.g., Stalinist communist regimes) to deliver a stronger dose of regime socialization to its citizens than a state dominated by technocrats and careerists (e.g. reformist communist regimes) (Linz and Stepan 1993). At the individual level, we might expect people who attended

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27 To be clear, this is what we mean by a “country level” factor: something that affects equally everyone living in a given country at a given time. Technically, we probably should call this a “country-year” level factor (although quite a few of these country level variables are invariant to time), but for simplicity’s sake we will simply call it a country-level factor.
secondary school under communism to have gotten a stronger version of the regime’s message than people who either attended secondary school before or after communist rule, or who dropped out of school before completing their secondary education. So in these cases, we would expect each year of *temporal exposure* to the regime to have a *larger* effect on developing the pro-regime attitude. To put this in the language of statistics, these are variables that we would expect to interact positively with years of exposure in affecting the pro-regime attitude.

At the same time, there are other factors that – much like suntan lotion – we expect could increase an individual’s *resistance* to regime socialization, regardless of the *intensity* of the exposure. Again to draw upon examples that will be explained in greater detail in the following chapter, at the country-level Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006) have argued that people who lived in countries where literacy was higher in the pre-communist were more likely to have been raised on stories of national myths, and thus more likely to be able to resist communist indoctrination because of recourse to these nationalist stories. At the individual level, we might expect that Catholics – who had access to a community that at times was hostile to the communist regime – could have had an additional buffer between themselves and the state, and therefore additional exposure to the regime’s message would have corresponding less influence on Catholics. To reiterate, the point of the model is not to argue that people from more literate pre-communist countries or Catholics were necessarily going to be more opposed to the ideals underlying the Socialist Man project (although that would not be inconsistent with the model), but only that a given additional year of exposure to communism might have less of an effect on these people than others, i.e., that their *resistance* would be higher.

To be clear, these are only a few examples of the types of individual and country-level factors that we expect could affect the *intensity* of the regime message received by citizens and
their likely resistance to that message. Most hypotheses within this framework of course need to be developed taking account of the peculiar features of actual regimes. Therefore, we devote most of Chapter 2 to building a “Communist Regime Exposure Socialization” model that specifically identifies factors that we expect to enhance the effect of exposure to communism and increase resistance to communist socialization attempts; for a concise summary of these hypotheses, see Table 2.2.

However, before concluding this section it is worth noting that there is one individual level variable that has received a great deal of attention in the literature and which is not necessarily context-dependent, and this is age of exposure. There is a school of thought that suggests children are much more likely to be susceptible to political socialization than adults, although others have suggested that this is a life-long process (Krosnick and Alwayn 1989, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Sears and Valentino 1997, Osborne et al. 2011). If we accept the premise that adults are more resistant to communist socialization, then we should expect to find that only years spent living under communism have an effect on the adaption of the attitudes associated with Socialist Man paradigm; if the lifelong socialization model holds, we should see similar effects for years spent living under a communist regime throughout one’s life. Of course, it is also possible that communist socialization – as opposed to the more commonly studied forms of political socialization in democratic regimes – has an effect on adults but not on children. This would fly in the face of a lot of what is assumed about the effect of communist schooling (Rosen 1964), but might be consistent with a view of the world where it is only as an adult that the incentives of adopting the group-think pushed by an authoritarian (or especially a totalitarian) regime become apparent.
1.5. Empirical Strategies

In this section we briefly lay out the empirical strategy we follow for answering the questions we have laid out above. This section is intended only to introduce readers to our general empirical approach; details on our models, methods, and variables are provided in Chapter 3.

1.5.1 Inter-regional comparisons

Our first task of identifying distinctive patterns of post-communist political attitudes and behavior requires comparative data from both the post-communist world and, crucially, countries from outside of the post-communist world. Only by looking at the attitude or behavior in question both outside of and inside of the set of post-communist countries can we in fact determine whether there is a post-communist “difference” to be explained. The simplest and most direct way of doing so is to measure a quantity of interest in post-communist countries, measure the same quantity of interest in other countries, and then establish whether there is a statistically and substantively significant difference across the two. So for example, if one wants to claim that there are lower levels of support for democracy in post-communist countries, then a first step would be to find a comparative survey project that measures levels of support for democracy cross-nationally – such as the World Values Survey – calculate the mean level of democratic support in post-communist countries, calculate the same values outside of the post-communist countries, and then compare the two.

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28 For the moment, we set aside the question of the appropriate reference group of “other countries”; depending on the question, it could include all other countries in the world, advanced industrialized democracies, other European countries, other new democracies, non-democracies, etc.
In practice, rather than comparing the difference of means, we will run a multiple regression model that with a post-communist dummy variable, uniquely identifying respondents in the survey who are from post-communist countries. Our simplest models will then include this dummy variable and control variables for the year of the survey to establish that post-communist citizens indeed hold different attitudes; these are the results reported in the introduction of the chapter in Table 1.1. To test our contextual effects, we will then systematically add our pre-communist, late-communism, and contemporaneous (demographic, economic, and political) variables to the model, in each case testing to see how the size and significance of the post-communist dummy-variable is affected. To the extent that such controls reduce the size of the coefficient, we can conclude the contextual variables are indeed the source of some of the post-communist exceptionalism. If it does not, we can dismiss those contextual variables. We will then repeat the process to test our RS model, adding measures of dosage strength and resistance to the models. Adding these variables and assessing their importance is a bit more complicated of a process, and will be explained in detail in Chapter 3.

1.5.2 Intra-regional comparisons

For the testing the RES model, we will also be able to leverage variation within post-communist countries. These types of analyses will be most useful when where we are interested in understanding which variables are having the biggest effect on both the dosage of the communist message as well as resistance to that message. Moreover, intra-regional comparisons will also allow us to utilize datasets that were collected only within communist countries, as well to test the effect of variables that only exist within post-communist countries.
1.5.3 Intra-country comparisons

All of the previously described analyses will involve the pooling of survey data across multiple countries. While such a research design is justified by the fact that we need to compare the attitudes and behavior of ex-communist citizens to their counterparts in non-communist countries (as well as comparing attitudes and behavior across post-communist countries), such analyses will nevertheless raise concerns about the comparability of survey questions given cross-national cultural and linguistic differences in the absence of anchoring vignettes (King et al 2003).

However, history has provided us with an interesting opportunity in this regard. The reunification of Germany in 1990 offers a methodological solution to this problem, because it allows us to compare the patterns of attitudes and behavior among East and West Germans, who share a common language and culture but of course differ in their exposure to Communism. Since the two countries have had very similar – and in many cases identical – political institutions, such a comparison has the additional advantage of reducing the potential for omitted variable bias that may affect cross-country regressions, as we do not have perfect indicators of institutional performance in different countries. While demographic and developmental differences of course persist between West and East Germany, these are arguably captured by individual characteristics, such as household income, for which we can often control in our analyses. Thus, reunified Germany offers another opportunity to explore our hypotheses, only this time in a context that does not require cross-country analysis.²⁹

²⁹ In certain limited instances, we may also be able to get similar within country leverage from analyses of Ukraine and Belarus, both of which include Western regions which were only incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II and thus their inhabitants had shorter exposures to communism than their compatriots from the East.
1.5.4. Data

As we are interested in the behavior of individual citizens, we rely on a variety of different surveys for our empirical analysis. For broad cross-national analysis going beyond the post-communist world, we rely primarily on data from the four most recent waves (1989-93, 1995-7, 1999-2002 and 2004-2009) of the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS), which yields 177 surveys from 90 countries. In addition to the individual-level survey data, we have collected data on a range of economic and political performance indicators for each of the over 177 country-years for which we had survey data. We then merge these pre-communist, end of communism, and contemporaneous indicators – discussed in greater in the empirical chapters – with the individual-level survey data to construct a multi-level data set, which allows us to test the interaction between individual and country-level factors in driving post-communist attitudes towards democracy.

While our primary comparative analyses will always commence using the WVS dataset, we also use a number of other datasets to address questions that we cannot answer solely with WVS data. Some of these datasets, such as the International Social Survey Project (ISSP) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), also include both ex-communist and non-communist countries, though their coverage is narrower than the WVS.

In other cases, however, we will draw on comparative surveys that include only data from the post-communist world. One particularly important source of data is the Post-Communist Publics (PCP) data. The PCP study consists of two waves of surveys (1990-2 and 1998-2001) and was administered in twelve ex-communist countries for the first wave and in fourteen ex-communist countries plus West Germany for the second wave. All told, therefore, this yields surveys that take place in seven different years across 14 countries. Other post-communist
datasets include the “Eurequal” data set collected by Geoff Evans and Stephen Whitefield, Richard Rose’s New Barometer Surveys, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)’s “Life in Transitions” surveys. In addition, we will on occasion supplement these data with country specific surveys that we introduce in the relevant chapters. In all of these cases, we again supplement the survey data with the aggregate level variables that we have collected.

1.5.5 Statistical Methods

The statistical tests presented in the empirical chapters of the manuscript are of course determined by the particular dependent variable in question. Generally, though, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions wherever we can in an effort to keep interpretation of our statistical results as clear as possible; when appropriate, though, we use logit or ordered logit instead. For all regressions we report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. Moreover, all the regressions use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

Of course, our data has a hierarchical structure: we use data that varies at both the country-year level and the individual level; indeed some variables vary at the country level as well. Through multiple conversations with methodological specialists and through our own exploration of the data, we are increasingly convinced that given the number of Level 2 observations (usually at least 800-1000, if not twice that amount) for each Level 1 observation,

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30 Note to readers for NYU-AD readers: we are only using the WVS survey data in the materials circulated for this talk. As noted previously, this section will eventually be moved to Chapter 3 and will be updated to describe the data we have actually used in the manuscript. For now, we are listing various sources only in order to see if you have suggestions for other datasets we might not yet be using but which we should be.
hierarchical modeling adds a large degree of complexity without changing the substantive findings in any appreciable way, especially since we cluster our standard errors at the country-year level. Thus, at this stage we are planning on presenting the main results in the text of the book without an explicit hierarchical framework while including a detailed online appendix that replicates all of the results using hierarchical models.

One quick word about the socialization analysis is in order. Readers familiar with Age-Period-Cohort (APC) analysis will notice several differences between our methods and typical APC analysis, most notably that we draw upon many fewer time repeated waves of surveys than most APC studies. We do so for two reasons. The first is a lack of data availability; were there annually repeated cross-national surveys of political attitudes and behavior in post-communist countries we would have used them in the manuscript. The second, though, is that we are able to utilize historically defined cohorts (e.g., the Stalinist era; the period of communist rule) that differ across countries. Thus we are able to control for age and period (here, survey year) while still identifying the effect for cohort (years of exposure to communism, or different types of communism). We have elsewhere explained our approach in this regard in great detail, and have been presented a series of robustness tests of our method; interested readers are invited to see Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013.31

1.6 Contribution of the Manuscript

Why have we set out to study the effect of communist era legacies on the political and economic attitudes of post-communist citizens? First, we want to understand the nature of post-

31 This section will be moved to Chapter 3. One question we have for readers is whether the robustness tests of our methods that are present in the Electoral Studies article (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013) ought to be presented in the book manuscript or if it is sufficient to simply discuss our main conclusions in the book.
communist politics better. Originally, the collapse of communism led observers to suggest that the region would be a *tabula rasa* on which new institutions could be painted and politics and economics would be accordingly reshaped. Since that time, however, study after study has demonstrated the fact that we cannot hope to understand post-communist politics without first taking account of what was left behind by communism (Jowitt 1992, Bunce 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Grzymala-Busse 2002, 2006; Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Tucker 2006; Wittenberg 2006; Pop-Eleches 2007; Nalepa 2010). However, most of this literature has focused on how the communist past has shaped either institutions (e.g. post-communist party systems) or the interests and choices of political elites. By comparison, the political attitudes and behavior of citizens, which are the main focus of the present study, have received much less attention.

To begin with, understanding the answer to this question is crucial to understanding the long-term trajectory of post-communist politics. As we noted in the introductory section of this chapter, post-communist citizens hold systematically different attitudes about politics, economics, and policy issues than citizens in other parts of the world. Our study can shed important light on the extent to which we expect these differences to disappear in the future. If, for example, these differences are largely the effect of having lived through communism – and not the context in which post-communist citizens find themselves living – then we should expect these differences to disappear gradually through generational change. Moreover, if Communist era schooling is key – as opposed to years lived under Communism generally – this too has different implications for the long-term trajectory of post-communist attitudes. If schooling is determinant, then this would imply a longer half-life for the dissolution of attitudes associated with communism, as the last generation to go to school under communism would be just as “communist” as prior generations.
If, on the other hand, these differences are due to the context in which post-communist citizens live, then we might expect these differences to be more permanent, or, conversely – if the relevant contextual effects change – likely to disappear even more quickly. Here is where the value of probing what types of contextual effects matter is especially important. If it turns out that differences are primarily due to pre-communist factors or to slow-changing institutions, then we might expect these differences to be close to permanent. Alternatively, if they are primarily due to contemporaneous economic conditions, we might expect them to subside much more quickly as economic conditions in the post-communist world converge towards what is found elsewhere.

To date, the topic of communist-era legacies has attracted quite a bit of attention among scholars of post-communist politics. (Bernhard 1993, Rose 1993, Haerpfer and Rose 1997, Stan and Turcescu 2000, Kopstein and Reilly 2000, Barnes and Kurtz 2002, Neundorf 2012), and yet surprisingly almost none of this work has explicitly compared results in post-communist countries with results in other parts of the world. Thus we hope that our work both here and elsewhere can provide another model for how to think about the study of legacies: that there are questions that are best answered by inter-regional comparisons as well as by intra-regional comparisons. In this manuscript, we try to be very precise about the values of both approaches and the types of questions to which they ought best to be applied.

Beyond post-communist politics, however, the question of how the experience of living under one form of political regime affects attitudes held by those citizens after regime change is an important general topic. In political science, studies of the effects of the past on the present have been largely focused on the evolution of institutions (Thelen 1999; Pierson and Skocpol 2002, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002); correspondingly less attention has been
paid to the subject of how the past affects political attitudes and behavior. The general methodological approach we lay out – to assess differences between citizens in terms of attitudes, to attempt to explain away as much of these differences by contextual context, and then to attempt to directly study the effect of exposure to the old regime – holds promise for understanding the effect of other types of regime change, such as moving from colonial to post-colonial rule or from military dictatorship to democratic competition. Furthermore, the RES model is purposely designed in the manuscript from a set of general principles – that individuals are exposed to regime socialization for different periods of time (temporal exposure), and that there are factors that can intensify the effect of that exposure and other factors that may increase resistance to that exposure – so that it can be applied in contexts beyond the post-communist transitions. Indeed, nothing of the framework put forward in this chapter is peculiar to post-communism. And while we do design a particular communist RES model in the following chapter, even there some of the variables that we will posit to be important in the communist context – such as prior experience with democratic rule or religious affiliation – may have value in additional contexts as well.

It is also our hope that the individual empirical chapters – on attitudes towards democracy, the market, social welfare, and social issues – will each on their own contribute to the relevant literatures on these topics. At the very least, we hope to provide some of the most systematic evidence of the determinants of these attitudes among post-communist citizens, which can serve as a baseline for comparison for studies being carried out in other locales. But more optimistically, we hope that will raise new and interesting questions for people interested in the determinants of these different attitudes.
Moreover, the framework we have laid out in this manuscript could certainly also be applied to other aspects post-communist political behavior beyond attitude formation. While the “Socialist Man” framework that we use to motivate the current study is best applied to the attitudes we have identified in this manuscript, the general idea that we can think about context and regime exposure to explain important political differences in transitional societies could also be applied to political evaluation and participation. For example, elsewhere we have examined the effect of communist era legacies on the evaluation of political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011) and on civic participation (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013). Natural extensions of our approach here could be to examine participation in elections in post-communist countries (Pacek et al. 2009), the incumbency disadvantage in post-communist countries (Roberts 2008; Klašnja 2012), and participation in protests (Robertson 2010).

Finally, we want to highlight the fascinating and puzzling question that motivates us in writing this book. As communism collapsed in 1989, the enthusiasm for democracy in the region seemed as strong and vibrant as anywhere in human history. The fact that a few short years later a deficit in support for democracy emerged in the region is an important puzzle to be solved unto its own right. The question of whether communism was successful in creating “Socialist Man” – a possible solution to this puzzle – also strikes us as an important question to be answered before we close the books on the communist experiment in Eurasia and Eastern Europe.

1.7 Layout of the Manuscript

The remainder of the manuscript is laid out as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide some additional information about the communist ideal of “Socialist Man” and use this to build a specific Communist RES Model. Thus we propose specific variables that we expect – based on
the history of communism and how it developed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – that ought to have increased the intensity of the communist message to which citizens were exposed and the resistance that citizens might have had to that exposure.

In Chapter 3, we turn to questions of data and methodology. We have elected to devote a chapter to this topic so as not to overly interrupt the flow the empirical chapters with repeated methodological discussions that are important across multiple chapters, as well as to allow readers who are not interested in these topics to move quickly through the materials. We divide the chapter into three parts. In the first part, we introduce the different comparative-survey datasets that we will use in our analyses, as well as address any important coding decisions of these variables (e.g., the composition of our democracy index). In the second part, we introduce the specific aggregate level variables we use to measure our pre-communist, end of communism, and contemporaneous demographic, economic, and political contextual variables. We use this section to share coding decisions with the readers and to provide necessary background information in the variables. Finally, in the third section of the chapter we discuss our statistical models, touching on both what is presented in the text of the manuscript as well as robustness tests that we include in appendices.

In Chapters 4-7, we present our empirical analyses of the determinants of attitudes towards democracy (Ch.4), markets (Ch. 5), social welfare and economic equality (Ch. 6), and social issues such as abortion and minority rights (Ch. 7). [NOTE TO READERS: When these chapters are all completed, we will expand this section here with more details.]

Our primary findings from these chapters are (TO BE WRITTEN WHEN ANALYSIS COMPLETED)
In Chapter 8, we conclude the manuscript by (TO BE WRITTEN WHEN ANALYSIS COMPLETED)

Before moving on, we close with a few very quick words on terminology. One phrase that always comes into question in these types of studies is what exactly we mean by “post-communist countries”. We have not interested here in whether terms like “post-communist” or “transition” imply some unalterable path towards one political outcome or another (Gans-Morse 2004; Roberts 2004). Instead, we merely use the term descriptively, as shorthand for identifying the successor states to the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the East-Central European countries that at one time or another made up the old Communist Bloc.\(^{32}\) Similarly, throughout the manuscript we will be comparing citizens from post-communist countries with citizens from countries in the rest of world. While the technically correct way to refer to these people is as citizens of “non-post-communist countries”, that it is a bit of a mouthful. Thus instead we will use the short hand “non-communist” countries to refer to countries that are not former communist countries.\(^{33}\) Finally, our four empirical chapters cover political, economic, and social dependent variables. However, in so far as both the economic and social variables are directly related to policy choices that need to be made by governments, we will for simplicity’s sake simply refer to them in toto as “political variables”.

\(^{32}\) Essentially, this latter category is the former members of the Warsaw Pact plus Albania.

\(^{33}\) As will be explained in Chapter 3, we exclude China and Vietnam from any comparative analyses.
## Appendix 1.1. Question Wording for Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic support</td>
<td>Index based on seven survey questions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I'll describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Having a democratic political system (4 point scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (4 point scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Having the army rule (4 point scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. In democracy, the economic system runs badly (4 point agree-disagree scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (4 point agree-disagree scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling (4 point agree-disagree scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government (4 point agree-disagree scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-run business</td>
<td>There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? 'Owners should run their business'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-run business</td>
<td>There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? 'The State should be the owner'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t responsibility for</td>
<td>How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (1-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion justifiable</td>
<td>Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (1-10). Abortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality justifiable</td>
<td>Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between (1-10). Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity desirable</td>
<td>Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which of the following views do you agree? Please use this scale to indicate your position: “Ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity” vs. “Ethnic diversity enriches my life”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike neighbor of different</td>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? People of a different religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.1 Post-Communist Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Democratic support</th>
<th>(2) Owner-run business</th>
<th>(3) State-run business</th>
<th>(4) Gov’t responsibility for indiv welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>-.201** (.051)</td>
<td>-.102** (.023)</td>
<td>.037* (.015)</td>
<td>.941** (.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>253,438</td>
<td>175,242</td>
<td>175,242</td>
<td>309,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(5) Abortion justifiable</th>
<th>(6) Homosexuality justifiable</th>
<th>(7) Ethnic diversity desirable</th>
<th>(8) Dislike neighbor of different religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>.769** (.196)</td>
<td>-1.237** (.228)</td>
<td>-.864** (.186)</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>300,408</td>
<td>290,791</td>
<td>56,293</td>
<td>117,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Figure 1.1: Explanations for Post-Communist Divergence in Attitudes

Contextual Effects

Divergence in Attitudes

Exposure to Communism

Pre-communist Factor

End of Communism

Current Factors

Socio-Demographic

Economic Conditions

Political Institutions

See Figure 1.2
Figure 1.2: A Regime Exposure Socialization (RES) Model

- Temporal exposure to Communism
  - Intensity of Exposure
    - Country-Level Factors
    - Individual-Level Factors
  - Resistance to Exposure
    - Country-Level Factors
    - Individual-Level Factors
Chapter 2. A Communist Regime Exposure Socialization Model

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we laid out the basic building blocks for a Regime Exposure Socialization (RES) model. We need to find a way to measure the amount of exposure any particular individual gets to the regime, to identify factors that might lead any given exposure to have a stronger effect on some individuals than others, and then to identify factors that might lead certain individuals to have more resistance to this exposure than others.\(^1\) Measuring the amount of exposure to a given regime (be it communist or any other type of regime) seems relatively straightforward: we need some measure of time spent living under the regime, and we chose to use years. However, the particular factors that are likely to intensify the effect of a given amount of exposure to a particular type regime are in many cases going to vary across regime types; the same holds for resistance to socialization by that regime.\(^2\) Thus the purpose of the current chapter is to develop a regime socialization model that is appropriate for testing the effect of communist socialization on post-communist citizens, which we label a “Communist Regime Exposure Socialization” (CRES) model.

Such a model needs to have two components. First, we need our basic set of hypotheses concerning the attitudes that we expect to be held by someone socialized under that regime; in other words, what are the attitudes that the regime is trying to inculcate in the citizens who are being socialized? These hypotheses were already briefly presented in the introductory chapter,

\(^1\) To be clear, although we say “certain individuals” here, the factors that affect which individuals face either more intense exposure or are more resistant to that exposure could vary at either the country level (e.g., living in a country with a history of interwar democracy) or at the individual level (e.g., having received pre-communist education).

\(^2\) An exception would be something like the effect of exposure in adulthood vs. childhood, which at least has the potential to be a more universal effect, although even this might vary across different regimes that place more or less of an emphasis on using the schools as an element of transmitting its messages to its citizenry.
but will more fully justified in this chapter. Second, we need to fill out Figure 1.2 from the previous chapter with aspects of the pre-communist and communist experience that we would expect to either strengthen the effect of a given time-period of exposure to communist rule or to provide resistance against the effect of that time-period of exposure to communist socialization efforts.

Fortunately, both of these tasks point us in the same direction: we need an understanding of the peculiar features of both the pre-communist world in which communism took root, and the distinctive features of communism itself. Although we briefly touched on each of these topics in the introductory chapter of the manuscript (see Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), we use this chapter to expand upon them in greater detail. Thus, the remainder of the chapters is divided into three parts. First, we briefly consider the variation in the pre-communist conditions in the countries/territories that would eventually become the post-communist countries that are the focus of our current study. Second, we identify the most salient institutional features that characterized the experience of communist rule. Building on these insights, in the final section we then present and discuss the full CRES model, complete with our baseline hypotheses of what attitudes we expect to be affected by exposure to communism, what factors we expect to intensify the effect of that exposure, and what factors we expect to provide resistance against the effect of that exposure.

2.2. Pre-Communism

The countries of the former Soviet bloc entered their communist periods with significant variations in socio-economic development, political history, cultural and religious backgrounds. We consider each of these in turn.
Perhaps the most significant distinction across the pre-communist landscape was socio-economic development. Some of the communist countries – especially those that had previously been part of the Prussian or Habsburg empires such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany – had reached pre-communist income, education and industrialization levels that were on par with much of Western Europe and superior to Southern Europe and most of the rest of the world. (Gaidar 2012; Maddison 2009). In other areas – especially in Central Asia and parts of the Balkans – most relied on subsistence agriculture at the time when the communists took over. Moreover, literacy rates varied tremendously across the region. As Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006, p.113) document, in Central and Eastern Europe numerous countries (including Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia) had literacy rates above 90% at the onset of the Communist era. In contrast, Albania, Azerbaijan, and all five of the Central Asian Republics had literacy rates below 20%.

These countries had also travelled very different political paths on their road to communism. Most significantly, while most of the Central and East European post-communist states were independent countries at the onset of communist rule, most of the former Soviet Republics were part of the Russian empire. The only exceptions were Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were independent and Moldova, which was part of Romania in the interwar period. Moreover, prior to WWI, some of the now post-communist countries were part of the Habsburg Empire, others the Prussian Empire, and still others the Ottoman Empire. In addition, while a few East European countries – especially Czechoslovakia and to a lesser extent Poland and the Baltic republics – had experienced reasonably democratic elections and governance in the interwar period, most of the former Soviet republics and Albania had practically no usable democratic past prior to entering communism.
Culturally, the former Soviet bloc included a broad mix of ethnicities, religions and cultural traditions. This included the predominantly Muslim and partially nomadic populations of Central Asia, predominantly Eastern Orthodox countries found in both the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and the countries of East-Central Europe with their long Western Christian traditions, including both majority Protestant and Catholic countries. Indeed, a famous joke once referred to Poland, Ireland, and the Vatican as the three most Catholic countries in the world, in that order. In addition to the range of religious traditions, there was also a great deal of variation in the degree of ethnic heterogeneity across these countries, ranging the volatile ethnic mosaics of Yugoslavia to the relative ethnic homogeneity of Hungary.

While some of these differences were subsequently modified by communist developmental and redistributive efforts, by 1989 the countries of the Soviet bloc still differed along a significant range of socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions, and these differences are strongly correlated with post-communist political trajectories (c.f. Bunce 1999, Janos 2000, Horowitz 2003, Kitschelt 2003, Pop-Eleches 2007). Thus, it was arguably no coincidence that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, some of the countries with the region’s highest levels of pre-communist socio-economic development, not only experienced some of the largest anti-communist protest movements before 1989 but also subsequently emerged as the region’s liberal democratic frontrunners in the 1990s. Moreover, even in areas where communist development effectively erased pre-communist differences – especially in terms of education - post-communist political behavior seems to be shaped to a significant extent by pre-communist developmental patterns (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006).

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3 This includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova from the former Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Macedonia from East-Central Europe.
2.3 Communist Institutional Similarities

Having briefly touched on the differences in the pre-communist world, we now turn to the task of identifying factors that were similar across Communist regimes. Indeed, it is these similarities that allow us to even speak of a communist regime “type”, and, consequently, to discuss the possibility of a predicted socialization effect of exposure to communism. Obviously, the regimes self-identified as communist, which is of course one important similarity. However, in order for us to draw out our baseline hypotheses about the attitudes we expect to be held by individuals exposed to communism, we need an understanding of the basic underlying similarities of the various communist regimes. In addition, these similarities will also provide insight into the factors that we expect to either enhance the effect of exposure to communism or to provide resistance to communist socialization.

Due to the powerful influence of the Soviet Union as both an institutional model and an (implicit or explicit) enforcer of communism in the region, the East European and Eurasian communist countries shared several crucial economic and political institutional features that set them apart from many developmentally comparable countries. First – and perhaps most clearly – all the communist regimes were either de jure or at least de facto one-party regimes, led by a Marxist-Leninist political party whose organization was closely intertwined – and often fused – with the state apparatus. The prominent role of the Party in communist regimes differed from the patterns of post-war authoritarian regimes in other regions, such as military regimes in Latin America (and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa), monarchies (in the Middle East) or regimes with partially free multi-party competition (in parts of Latin America and Asia). While one-party
regimes were not limited to the Communist bloc, with a few notable exceptions the non-communist one-party regimes were much less institutionalized (and were often not much more than the personal vehicles of authoritarian leaders.) Moreover, while the role and nature of ideology varied across both time and space among the countries of the Soviet bloc, the efforts to reshape individuals and society along ideological lines (i.e., the aforementioned “Socialist Man” project), and the central role of the Party in these efforts, were much more prominent in communist regimes than in the non-communist world (democratic and authoritarian alike). Therefore, we should expect that the legacy of the once dominant communist party and ideology to affect both the institutional landscape of post-communist politics and the individual values and attitudes of individuals in ex-communist countries.

A second feature, driven to a great extent by the combination of high institutionalization and ideological aspirations discussed above, was the much greater penetration of all levels of society by communist regimes compared to other authoritarian regimes. Even beyond the infamous mass “reeducation” campaigns and purges of Stalinism, the deep penetration of society by extensive networks of secret police agents and informers led to an unprecedented degree of state control over the daily lives (and thoughts) of individuals. The effects of these surveillance and indoctrination efforts were exacerbated by the simultaneous repression and cooptation of most civil society organizations by communist regimes. Thus, churches were either subordinated to the political agenda of the regimes – and often infiltrated by secret police informers up to the

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4 Probably the most prominent exception is the KMT in Taiwan – a highly institutionalized political party that allowed very little political competition until the 1980s.

5 This is true even of many of the pseudo-Marxist regimes sponsored by the Soviet Union in parts of the developing world (e.g. Angola, Tanzania, Yemen) as part of the Cold War ideological and military rivalry with the US.

6 Of course the aggressiveness and effectiveness of such efforts varied widely across time, space and sector (Jowitt 1992) – arguably peaking during the Great Terror of the 1930s in the Soviet Union and in the first post-war decade in Eastern Europe – and while we will analyze the implications of such intra-regional variation throughout the book, for the purpose of the present discussion what matters is that (with the partial exception of the late Gorbachev years) communist regimes never abandoned this basic model of societal control.
highest levels – or severely limited in their activities and in some instances completely outlawed.7 Meanwhile other intermediary organizations – such as labor unions, youth organizations, sports clubs and cultural groups – were allowed to operate and often received generous state support but were subjected to tight ideological controls by the state and therefore did not provide opportunities for independent civic interactions. By contrast, most other authoritarian regimes were usually content to ward off political challenges, and while such concerns sometimes resulted in violent campaigns against certain parts of civil society – as in the case of unions in many Latin American military regimes – they nevertheless left more space in other parts of public life.

A third important feature that sets Communist countries apart from the non-communist world is the central role of the state in the economy. While extensive state intervention in the economy (including in some cases prominent roles for state-owned enterprises in many key sectors) also featured prominently in some West European democracies and in the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) models prevalent in many developing countries until the early 1980s, communist countries nevertheless stood out in their systematic suppression of private enterprise and in their heavy reliance on central planning, which produced a very different economic logic and a series of typically communist pathologies (Kornai 1992). Again, important variations in the scope and nature of the state’s economic control existed within the Soviet bloc,8 and in the 1980s there were significant differences in the extent to which communist governments embraced Gorbachev’s limited economic reform efforts. But despite such differences, as late as 1989 the share of the private sector in overall economic output varied

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7 Although – as we will discuss in the final section of this chapter – this varied across religious denominations and even across individual parishes (Wittenberg 2006).
8 The most prominent outlier was Yugoslavia’s “socialist self-management,” where enterprises were technically owned and controlled by workers’ councils (albeit with a great degree of interference from the Party).
surprisingly little in most of communist Eastern Europe and Eurasia, largely ranging from about 5% in most Soviet Republics, Czechoslovakia and Albania to 15% in most of the Yugoslav Republics.⁹ (EBRD 2008)

Fourth, driven by both ideological biases towards promoting the industrial proletariat and by the demands of military competition with the West, the communist economies also differed from both advanced industrialized countries and even other late developers in the nature of their economic development and modernization strategies. In particular, communist countries stood out in their emphasis on industry, and especially energy-intensive heavy industry (at the expense of both agriculture and services) and in their relative neglect of consumer goods, whose variety and quality lagged far behind the sometimes impressive achievements in producer goods and military technology. Politically, these imbalances, combined with the widespread shortages of even basic goods, inevitably invited invidious comparisons to Western Europe and helped undermine the legitimacy of communist regimes (Janos 2000).

But beyond its immediate impact on living standards and regime legitimacy, the particular nature of communist economic development led to modernization strategies that produced peculiarly communist demographic patterns. On the one hand, the rush to promote industrialization pushed communist regimes to promote a rapid expansion of primary and secondary and technical post-secondary education, as well as – less successfully – urbanization (Pop-Eleches 2009). On the other hand, the ideological bent and the often narrowly technical nature of communist education, combined with the strict restrictions imposed on individual entrepreneurship, arguably put many East Europeans in a difficult position in the post-communist period, where in the emerging market economies of the 1990s there was much less

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⁹ The only partial outlier was Poland, where the private sector in 1989 accounted for 30% of the economy, largely because of the partial failure of large-scale collectivization of agriculture.
demand for their particular education and job skills. Similarly, many of the “one-factory” industrial towns promoted by communist central planners were highly vulnerable once the communist system of price controls and subsidies was dismantled and indeed many of these towns suffered devastating drops in employment after the fall of communism, often leaving residents few options but to try to migrate, either internally – sometimes to the country-side in a remarkable trend of de-urbanization – or abroad. Thus, communism left behind a demographic landscape characterized by very specific opportunities and vulnerabilities, which differed from the social footprint of alternative development models, and can be expected to shape the longer-term attitudes and behavior of its subjects in the post-communist period.

Fifth, true to its ideological aspirations of promoting social and economic equality among its citizens, communist regimes left behind more equal societies and more expansive welfare states than their non-communist counterparts Thus, judging by a series of statistical measures, ranging from GINI coefficients of income inequality to access to education and healthcare, communist countries outperformed non-communist countries with similar levels of economic development. Rather than engaging in the debates over the extent to which these achievements justify the high human costs at which they were achieved, our focus here is on how they are likely to affect post-communist attitudes and behavior. A few points are worth noting: first, given that the transition to capitalism brought significant – though highly variable – increases in inequality to the former Soviet bloc countries, one would expect that in countries and time periods with rapidly increasing inequality, citizens – and particularly transition losers – would become much more receptive to the egalitarian rhetoric of communist parties (and some of their post-communist successors). Along similar lines, the legacy of generous communist-era welfare benefits created strong popular expectations about the state’s responsibilities for caring for its
citizens. The combination of economic liberalization and deep recessions in the early transition years resulted in a significant reduction of welfare benefits in many countries, and created very difficult choices for politicians caught between demands for fiscal restraint (in the context of inflationary pressures) and the difficulty of scaling back pre-existing social entitlement programs (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). This tension, which was to a great extent an institutional legacy of communism, may have played an important role in driving the chronic discontent of East European citizens with the post-communist political leaders. Finally, many welfare benefits under communism – including childcare and public housing – were channeled through state-owned enterprises. This peculiarity of the communist welfare state arguably made it more difficult to disentangle welfare state reform from other aspects of economic reforms.

Furthermore, the emphasis on egalitarianism extended – at least on a rhetorical level – beyond economic inequality to a commitment to gender and ethnic equality. While there was much more variation in the extent to which this rhetoric was matched by practice (or even the extent to which the rhetorical commitment matched other forms of rhetorical commitments) than there was in the case of single party rule, economic redistribution, and the state provision of social welfare, the advent of Communist rule brought with it an unprecedented – at least for these countries – entry of women into the workplace, access to abortion and an end to legal discrimination against ethnic minorities (Gal and Kligman 2000, Martin 2001). It is worth noting, though, that this was never really accompanied by any commensurate effort in the area of gay rights (O’Dwyer 2012), often included in scales of social progressivism in comparative studies.
2.4. The Communist Regime Socialization Model

Drawing upon the materials presented in the previous section, we arrive at the following four basic hypotheses for possible effects of communist-era socialization as a result of the “Socialist Man” project (Deutscher 1967):

\[ H1. \text{The longer the communist exposure, the less an individual will support democracy.} \]

\[ H2. \text{The longer the communist exposure, the more an individual will support state involvement in the economy.} \]

\[ H3. \text{The longer the communist exposure, the more an individual will support egalitarianism and state provision of social-welfare benefits.} \]

\[ H4. \text{The longer the communist exposure, the more an individual will support equal rights for women and ethnic minorities.} \]

These four propositions form the basis for our underlying expectations that will form the basis of our empirical analyses in Chapters 4-7. To reiterate, we will first attempt to see whether we can explain the underlying differences in post-communist attitudes on each of these dimensions without recourse to the actual experience of living through communism; these are what we have labeled as “contextual” explanations for why we witness attitude divergence among post-communist citizens. To the extent that we are unable to completely do so using our contextual variables (which include pre-communist variables, late-communist variables, and contemporaneous/post-communist variables, which are explained in greater detail in the following chapter), we will then turn to the four hypotheses laid out above. We can think of these hypotheses as the simplest version of our CRES model: the only thing we are concerned about here is actual exposure to communist rule. It is, however, still a “Communist” Regime Exposure Socialization model as opposed to the generic Regime Exposure Socialization model introduced in the previous chapter in so far as the four dependent variables – and the predicted
direction of the effect from additional years of exposure to communism – are communism-specific and generated from our understanding of the key features of Communist rule laid out in the previous section of this chapter.

However, another way of characterizing hypotheses H1-H4 is as “naïve” hypotheses, insofar as they assume that a year of exposure to communist rule is the same across all individuals at all times in all communist regimes. Put another way, these hypotheses assume away any potential factors that could either enhance the effect of exposure to communism or increase resistance to Communist socialization. Thus in the remainder of the chapter, we introduce the factors needed to flesh out a more robust and thorough CRES model, and identify both the country and individual-level variables that there are good a priori reasons to expect could either intensify the effect of any given amount of temporal exposure to Communism, or, alternatively, provide resistance against communist socialization (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1).

Before doing so, we want to comment briefly about H1-H4 in their simple form. First, we want to be very clear that in H1 we are talking about support for democracy in general as a form of government, and not the performance of democracy in one’s own country. While it is of course impossible to rule out the fact that evaluations of the latter affect attitudes regarding the former, these are distinctly different concepts that can be measured with different questions (Torcal and Montero 2006, Neundorf 2010). To be clear, it is not the case that we do not think the basic legacies framework we have advanced in this manuscript can be used to measure evaluation questions such as how an individual views the performance of democracy in her country. We have previously published work applying our general framework to the question of evaluating political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011), and intend to pursue this topic again in the future. However, the purpose of this current manuscript is to look solely at the underlying
attitudes associated with the Socialist Man paradigm, and for this reason we concentrate here on attitudes towards democracy “generally”.

Second, we realize that there is a bit of slippage between H1-H3 and H4. Politics and economics were the backbone of communism; the commitment to gender and ethnic equality figured much less in practice in the implementation of communism. However, as noted above, they were part of the rhetoric of communism, and it is precisely because they may have a “lesser” role in the on the ground implementation of communism that it is interesting to explore the effect of communist socialization in this regard alongside the other more central tenets of the communist experience. As we noted in Chapter 1, the systematic variation in social attitudes among post-communist citizens is indeed weaker than for the other attitudes we examine, so it should be interesting to see if the effect of exposure to communism is weaker in these regards as well.

With these caveats in mind, we proceed systematically through the different factors we believe could intensify the effect of exposure to communism and then those that could provide resistance against exposure to communism. Before doing so, a few additional words of explanation are in order. First, it is important to note as well that both factors work independently of one another: factors that intensify the effect of a year of exposure to communism are expected to do so independent of the level of resistance of any given individual; factors that increase resistance are expected to do so independent of the intensity of exposure.\textsuperscript{10} Thus the CRES model predicts that the cumulative effect of exposure to communism on any

\textsuperscript{10} Put another way, we are not attempting to model a triple interaction effect between temporal exposure, intensity of exposure, and resistance to exposure. Instead, we are simply going to test the model by looking at the two interactive effects (temporal exposure X intensity of exposure; temporal exposure X resistance to exposure) separately. The former approach is a potentially interesting direction for future research, but beyond the scope of what we are attempting to analyze here.
given individual will be a function of (a) years of exposure to communism (b) the *intensity* of that exposure and (c) their *resistance* to that exposure.\(^{11}\) As will be explained in much more detail in the following chapter, we will test for the empirical support for years of exposure directly, and then for *intensity* and *resistance* by interacting these factors with years of exposure and seeing if the effect is in the predicted direction.\(^{12}\) To the extent that we can find empirical support for these predictions, we will judge the CRES model to have empirical support. Finally, we need to reiterate that we expect factors that can *intensify* the effect of exposure to communism could vary at the country-level or at the individual level; the same holds for factors that affect *resistance* to communist exposure. Thus the remainder of the section is divided into four parts: country-level factors that *intensify* the effect of exposure to communism; individual-level factors that *intensify* the effect of exposure to communism; country-level factors that increase *resistance* to exposure to communism socialization, and finally individual-level factors that increase *resistance*.\(^{13}\) Taken together, they move us from the conceptual framework of a generic Regime Exposure Socialization model to a specified Communist Regime Exposure Socialization (CRES) model.

\(^{11}\) To reiterate a point made in the first chapter, *intensifying* factors and *resistance* factors are not just two halves of the same coin. Returning to the sunburn analogy, anyone can put on suntan lotion, regardless of whether they are out in a part of the world where the ozone layer provides more or less protection. Thus you could high resistance in an area where you are getting intense exposure or low resistance in an area with intense exposure; the same holds for weak exposure. Thus our intensity and resistance variables are meant to tap into distinct effects on how additional temporal exposure to communism (i.e., more years living under communism) affects one’s attitudes.

\(^{12}\) The one exception here concerns type of communist (e.g. Stalinist vs. reformist) and age of exposure. Neither of these variables can be interacted with years of exposure, as for more people the years of exposure will span multiple categories (e.g., Stalinist and neo-Stalinist; childhood and adult exposure). Thus we instead simply provide additional analysis where we decompose years of exposure unto its relevant constituent parts, i.e., we include years of childhood exposure and years of adult exposure as separate variables. See Chapter 3 for more.

\(^{13}\) As a reminder “country-level” implies that the variable is the same for all people living in a given country at a given time-period, not that the variable is by definition time-invariant. Some country-level variables do vary over time (such as whether the country is currently being ruled by a reformist communist regime or a Stalinist communist regime), whereas others (such as literacy levels in the pre-communist era) are in fact time-invariant.
2.4.1 Country-Level Intensifying Factors

We begin first with factors that we expect could intensify the effect of a given year of exposure to communism that vary at country-level. We start with regime-level factors. One of the most prominent aspects for communist diversity was the systematic variation between different “types” or “phases” of communist rule. To put this most starkly, we might expect that someone who came of political age in Moscow under Stalinism in the early 1950s to have been exposed to somewhat different propaganda and policies than someone who came of age under Gorbachev’s perestroika.

Table 2.1. Communist Experience by Year and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Transition to Communism</th>
<th>Stalinist</th>
<th>Post-Stalinist Hardline</th>
<th>Post-Totalitarian</th>
<th>Reformist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1946-1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1949-90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Baltic republics and Western Ukraine were coded as starting Communism in 1945 and exposure to regime subtypes was adjusted accordingly.

With the goal of effectively capturing these different phases, Table 2.1 breaks down the communist experience into five subcategories that represent different “types” of communist
experiences. As with any attempt at classification, we face a trade-off between level of detail, comparability, and parsimony. Thus we do not mean to claim that Stalinism in Albania in the 1980s was exactly the same thing as Stalinism in Romania in the early 1950s, but at the same time we hope that the classification scheme represents a useful first step in identifying different types of communist-era experiences.

Our five-fold classification scheme works as follows. First, we consider the initial years in which countries were in the process of installing communist systems of government. The next category is the Stalinist period, essentially the high-water mark of communist orthodoxy and repression. With the exception of Albania, the communist countries then all moved beyond Stalinism, and we break down these “post-Stalinist experiences” into three categories. “Post-Stalinist Hardline” refers to regimes that moved beyond Stalinism, but essentially still pursued hardline policies (e.g., low dissent tolerance, an active repressive state apparatus but without widespread terror, active security services, etc.). The concept of “Post-Totalitarianism” is taken from Linz and Stepan (1996), and refers to communist regimes where the communist monopoly on power was still in place, but true believers in the ideology were few and far between, with most party members now associating with the party for careerist as opposed to ideological reasons. Post-Totalitarian regimes are also known for the tacit trade-off of political power for economic security; limited pluralism was tolerated so long as the state was not directly targeted. Finally, Reformist communism refers to periods like the Prague Spring, Gorbachev’s perestroika, Poland’s various flirtations with greater political openness and independent trade unions like Solidarity (Brzezinski 1989; Ash 1990; Sakwa 1990; Williams 2010).

14 We were surprised to find that no one else had previously attempted this sort of classification, and are much in debt to the many people who offered us suggestions on the classification scheme following various presentations of our research. We in particular thank Andrew Janos, Radek Markowski, and Maria Popova who also provided us with written comments and suggestions.
1970; Janos 2000). Our expectation here is simply that the intensity of the effort on the part of the communist regimes to actively inculcate their citizens with the underlying values of the Socialist Man paradigm decreased as regime move from Stalinist to neo-Stalinist to post-totalitarian to reformist.\footnote{In some cases, it might be desirable to draw about a more nuanced argument about intensity efforts decreasing in a non-monotonic manner, e.g., we might think that as political legitimacy of communist regimes decreased there would be correspondingly more of a need to emphasize the economic benefits of communism, and thus we might actually see particular socialization efforts increasing during, for instance, post-totalitarian years. For now, we leave the discussion of such types of arguments to the actual empirical chapters in which they are approach.}

While regime type focuses on the strength of the communist regime’s message, we can also consider factors that are likely to make people be more inclined to see communist-era developments in a positive light. We expect this to increase the intensity of exposure to communism because if communism itself is seen as “good”, then the messages promoted by the communist regime are also more likely to be viewed “good”, and thus each additional year of exposure to these messages ought to have a correspondingly stronger effect on socializing the individual in question.

One such factor that could lead to communism being viewed in a better light is how much communism improved living conditions in a given country. One way to measure to get at this concept is to observe economic conditions before the imposition of communism. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, communism – and especially early communism – did result in some rather noticeable improvements in economic conditions as a by-product of the industrial developments that were a hallmark of the communist experience. Thus the worse things were before communist industrialization, the more we might expect people to “appreciate” communism. In this manner, having worse economic conditions before the onset of communism could intensify the effect of exposure to communism on communist regime socialization. However, if post-
communist citizens are more myopic, it is possible that they will view their years of interacting with communism through prism of only the most recent years of economic development. Thus another way we could attempt to separate out countries where communism may have been seen in a better economic light would be identifying countries where the economy performed better in the final decade of communist rule.

Continuing on with the theme of seeing communism in a more positive light, for some countries, communism was essentially a homegrown affair.\textsuperscript{16} To the extent that communism was not imposed by external forces on these countries, we might expect their citizens to be more receptive to communism, and thus the effect of exposure to be stronger than in other post-communist countries. In particular in Russia, communism was not only homegrown but was also associated with a period of superpower status.

The post-communist countries also differ in terms of the type of regime experienced immediately before the onset of communism. In particular, some countries communism followed homegrown interwar fascist regimes.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to wreaking havoc on large portions of their populations, these fascist regimes also led their countries to defeat in World War II. In these cases, we suspect that that communism might get an added boost from the implicit comparison to life under with fascism, and thus, all else equal, the effect of exposure to communism should be stronger in these countries.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} We include Albania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovakia, Macedonia, Russia, and Slovenia in this category.

\textsuperscript{17} We include Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, East Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania and Slovakia in this category.

\textsuperscript{18} As we will note in the following section, however, there is also an argument to be made that experience with fascism could strengthen resistance to communism.
2.4.3. Individual Level Factors Affecting Intensity of Communist Exposure

In addition to factors that vary across countries and over time, we need to consider the fact that there might also be individual-level factors that will affect the intensity of one’s exposure to communism. As with the country-level factors, we can consider both direct exposure to communist socialization efforts as well as “reference point” (i.e., how communism is viewed by individuals comparatively) types of hypotheses.

Perhaps the single most obvious direct factor is whether or not one was educated under communist rule. As we have argued previously, schools provide a very important vehicle for a society to inculcate a particular set of values in its citizens, and communist schools were especially notorious for serving as vehicles for communist party propaganda. Thus we might expect communist exposure to have a greater effect on people with secondary and post-secondary education under communism. While this is of course similar to measuring the effect of the number of years lived under communist rule as a child, it is worth noting that we are actually getting at something different here. In the current context, we are looking at whether or not having been educated under communism strengthens the effect of any given dose of exposure to communism. So one measures the effect simply of being a child in a communist country; the second looks at whether being educated under communism has a lasting effect on how one is socialized over time into holding views consistent with the Socialist Man paradigm.

Another way of thinking about individual level variation is to build off of the fact that certain individuals were simply more likely to have been exposed to communist messages/propaganda over the course of their lives. Jowitt (1992) has argued that because of their single-minded focus on rapid industrialization, communist regimes achieved much greater
penetration in urban settings. To the extent that this is correct, we would therefore expect urban residents to be more affected by communist exposure than non-urban residents.\textsuperscript{19}

A third individual-level factor that ought to predict the amount of exposure to communist ideals and propaganda is whether or not an individual is a \textit{male}. We propose two potential mechanisms for this effect. First, the armed forces – like schools – were certainly a vehicle for the transmission of communist ideals and propaganda, and the armed forces of Soviet communist countries were almost entirely made up of men. Second, we would expect the workplace – especially under communist regimes, focused as they were on the workplace as a location for political organization – to be somewhere where individuals would have greater exposure to communist ideals and propaganda, especially compared to one’s own home. And since in communist countries – despite significant progress in female workforce participation – women were much more likely than men to stay home and not enter the workforce, we have a second reason for suspecting that exposure to communism would have a greater effect on \textit{males}.

Finally, similar to the way in which we would expect people living in countries where the economy has improved more significantly under communist rule to be more likely to buy into the messages being propagated by the communist regime, we might also expect individuals who had better economic experiences under communism to be more likely to do so as well. Thus we could expect being an \textit{economic winner} (Tucker et al. 2002; Herzog and Tucker 2010) under communism to also function as an individual-level \textit{intensifier} of communist regime exposure. A similar argument could be made about being a “political winner”, although figuring out exactly what this means would be tricky. We note both of these factors here because they fit well into the theoretical framework, but in our summary of the model (see Table 2.2 below) they appear in

\textsuperscript{19} Of course, post-communist place of residence is a somewhat noisy indicator of communist-era place of residence but we may reduce this noise by restricting our analysis of this issue to the early 1990s.
brackets. This is because we lack the necessary information in surveys that are taken from the post-communist era to identify our communist era economic and political winners. We still include the discussion here in the hope that others who wish to employ this theoretical framework and have access to these types of data will find ways to include such measures in their analyses, but we want to be clear now that we will not be testing these factors in the current manuscript.

2.4.3 Country-Level Resistance Factors

We now turn to the types of factors that we would expect to generate resistance to communist regime socialization efforts. Recall that these are factors that we expect to decrease the marginal impact of an extra year of exposure to communism, regardless of the intensity of that exposure. We begin with factors that vary at the country-level, and consider three such factors.

First, Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006) point to the importance of higher literacy rates before the onset of communism as an important factor that mediated citizens’ experiences with communism. Their argument is that the higher literacy before communism, the more likely it will be that that citizens were familiar with national myths. These “national identities” can therefore serve as an alternative reference point to the “Socialist Man” identity.\(^\text{20}\) From this vantage point, we would predict that higher literacy rates would therefore signify a larger percentage of the country with access to these types of national myths, and correspondingly overall higher levels of resistance to communist socialization.

\(^\text{20}\) Russia is of course in its own category in this regard.
A second set of country-level characteristics that could shape the way in which communism is viewed in a country concern the pre-communist political trajectories of different countries and regions. Thus, in some countries, communism followed a period of *interwar democracy*. In these countries, we suspect communism may look somewhat worse in comparison to the previous regime (i.e., citizens were not just moving from one form of non-democratic regime to another) than in other countries that had not previously experienced communism. Therefore, in the countries that had enjoyed a period of interwar democracy, we would expect the effects of exposure to communism to be reduced.

We can also draw upon interwar experiences with different forms of political rule in another way, namely by leveraging the fact that some countries experienced fascist rule while others did not. In the previous section, we suggested reasons why interwar experiences with fascism might strengthen the effect of exposure to communism. Unfortunately, this is also one of those cases where it is not impossible to imagine the opposite effect: that fascism may have left behind an enduring legacy of anti-communism imprinted on its own citizens. If this was the case, then we would expect interwar fascism to increase住了 resistance to communist regime socialization.

Finally, there was rather significant variation across countries in the degree to which repression continued to be a function of communist rule (Linz and Stepan 1993). Here, the expectation might be that in countries in which the communist regime maintained a more antagonistic relationship with the larger population to the bitter end, citizens might be that more

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21 We measure the quality of interwar democracy by using the average Polity score in a country from 1920-1939.  
22 We could also drill down deeper into individual level variation (as we will do for communist era legacies in the next section) and look at the effect, for example, of being Jewish in a fascist state and how that affected the relative influence of additional communist exposure. But for now, we simply note these ideas as interesting subjects for potential future research.
resistant to incorporating any of the regime’s precepts in their own world views once communism collapsed. In this way, late communist repression could also decrease the effect of exposure to communism on attitude formation. We already somewhat tap into this with our characterization of different regime types (discussed Section 2.4.1), but taking stock of how closed the regime remained at the very end of the communist era gives us a chance to explore this particular aspect of communist rule more directly.

2.4.5. Individual-Level Factors Affecting Resistance to Communist Exposure

Finally, we turn to individual level factors that could strengthen resistance to communist socialization. Before doing so, it is important to mention one important caveat, which is that there could likely be a number of interesting personality traits that we could consider here but which we cannot analyze because the cross-national surveys we utilize do not measure these traits. Thus for now we simply note that personality would be a perfectly reasonable category to include among individual-level dose resistance factors, but one which we will not pursue in the current manuscript.  

The first individual level factor we need to consider is the age at which one receives exposure to communism. As was discussed in Chapter 1, there is a line of argument in the political socialization literature proposing that people are more open to socialization as children than later in life (Krosnick and Alwayn 1989, Visser and Krosnick 1998, Sears and Valentino

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23 For recent work in political science applying personality traits to political behavior, see for example: Mondak and Halperin, 2008; Mondak, 2010; Mondak et al., 2010; Mondak et al., 2011; Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011a.
Within our CRES framework, then, this suggests we might find more resistance to Communist regime socialization effort among adults then among children.\textsuperscript{24}

Continuing with the importance of childhood importance, we can use the logic of the Darden and Grzymała-Busse (2006) argument presented in the previous section to motivate an individual-level resistance hypothesis as well. Namely, if the education needed to acquire literacy before the onset of communism also transmits nationalist myths, then we might expect people who were educated before the onset of communism to have more resistance to communist socialization efforts. Further justifying this expectation, we might expect schools to be one of the best places for the communist regime to break down whatever inherent resistance individuals might have to communist socialization. This would then predict that post-communist citizens who were not educated under communism would have higher levels of resistance than those who were. Note, however, that – unlike with the nationalist myth argument – we are now tapping into three types of people here: people who were educated before communist rule, people who lived in communist countries but did not attend school, and people who were educated after the onset of communism.

Each of these three categories warrants a little more explanation. The people taking surveys in the 1990s and 2000s that were educated before communism are primarily going to come from East-Central Europe as opposed to the former Soviet Union, just by dint of demography. Second, when we look at people who did or did not attend school generally, there is obviously going to be more variation across this category if one looks at secondary and post-secondary education – which is the approach we utilize – where there is greater variation in school attendance than elementary school education. Finally, the number of people who

\textsuperscript{24} It is worth noting that this argument has nothing to do with communism in particular, and therefore could be applied to regime exposure socialization models anywhere.
received any level of education after the collapse of communism is going to increase as more time passes; thus we should have more of these people in surveys conducted in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Taken together though, we can draw upon a number of different distinctions when classify people in terms of whether or not they received secondary and post-secondary education under communist rule.

Third, to return to a theme from the beginning of this chapter, it is possible that followers of particular religious denominations would be more likely to resist communist imprinting. This could be because the actual doctrinaire teachings of the religion were more hostile to communism or, as Wittenberg (2006) has demonstrated, because religious institutions actually provided a bulwark against communist attempts at indoctrination. To explore this possibility, we subdivide post-communist citizens into five groups based on their self-identified religious denomination in the surveys: Protestants, Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, and other (almost entirely atheists). While the very fact that they self-identify with a certain religious denomination may reflect a greater willingness/ability to resist communist indoctrination, we expect to see differences across religious denominations. In particular, we expect that Catholics and to a lesser extent Protestants would be more resistant to communist teachings than Eastern Orthodox and Muslims due to the fact that Catholic and to some extent Protestant churches were on balance less accommodating to communist regimes than their Orthodox and Muslim counterparts.

2.5. Conclusions

Tying all of the preceding materials together, Table 2.2 concisely presents the various factors that we propose could either strengthen or weaken the effects of exposure to communism:
Table 2.2: A Communist Regime Exposure Socialization Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensifiers of Exposure</th>
<th>Country Level</th>
<th>Individual Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of Communism (Stalinism, Neo-Stalinism, Reform Communism)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Economic/Political Winners]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Economic Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communist education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Fascism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-Grown Communism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resistance to Exposure</th>
<th>Country Level</th>
<th>Individual Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-communist literacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Personality Traits]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwar Democracy/Fascism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Communist Repression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-communist Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three points are worth noting.

First, this is clearly not the only Communist Regime Exposure Socialization model that one could write down. Despite the fact that we have even tried to consider factors that we can not currently test (e.g., personality traits), we are sure that reasonable people could identify additional factors that might mitigate the effect of temporal exposure to communism. That being said, as with all modeling exercises there are trade-offs between parsimony and thoroughness and, as will become apparent in Chapter 4-7, testing even the effects of this many different variables is a time-consuming exercise. Overall, we believe the model laid out in Figure 2.2 does a good job of moving beyond the original naïve assumption – that any year of communist exposure in any country at any time is equivalent to any other year of communist exposure in any country at any time – to explore a wide range of factors that might intensify the effect of or provoke resistance to exposure to communism. This list of factors was developed as a result of presenting earlier versions of our research to a large number of patient audiences, and the final compilation of factors listed above represents many suggestions for many people.
Second, even to the extent the readers may disagree with any particular factors either included or excluded from Table 2.2, the approach of thinking about regime exposure generally — and communist regime exposure specifically — as a function of temporal exposure, factors that intensify this exposure, and factors that provide resistance to that exposure, is one that be replicated elsewhere without necessary duplicating all of the specific categories we employ in this manuscript. Indeed, the very way we have introduced our RES approach — generally in Chapter 1, and then applied to communism here in Chapter 2 — is a reflection of the fact that we think the variables that will populate Table 2.2 ought to vary across different regime types. While we obviously think the variables we have presented here are the most appropriate in the communist context — otherwise the table would have different variables in it! — we would not be surprised to find scholars who think other factors are more important than the ones we have identified. And while we have included a few factors here that we do not measure in the empirical sections of this manuscript, it is undoubtedly the case that we have heavily slanted our presentation of factors towards those we can measure and analyze in the coming chapters.

Finally, it is important to note that Table 2.2 is not a statistical model, but a rather a concise statement of a set of hypotheses generated by a unified theoretical framework. Some of these factors undoubtedly co-vary (e.g. pre-communist literacy and interwar democracy), and tap into similar dimensions (e.g., East-Central Europe vs. former Soviet Union). For now, this is fine, as we are just trying to create a thorough inventory of the specific hypotheses we will test to assess the usefulness of the CRES model. Correlation across independent variables in actual statistical models of course presents some challenges for how we interpret the results of our analyses, and it is to this and the many other methodological challenges of testing both our
contextual effects and communist regime socialization explanations for the divergence in post-communist political attitudes to which we turn in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 – Democratic attitudes

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter we present our first empirical test of the theoretical framework developed in the preceding chapters to explain divergence in the attitudes of post-communist citizens as being a function of either contextual effects and/or living through communism by turning to the fundamental question of attitudes towards democracy. Along with the attitudes towards markets, which will be analyzed in the next chapter, the extent to which citizens of post-communist countries support democracy has been one of the most important questions of the transition. Moreover, without getting into the debate about the primacy of economics vs. politics, the transition towards democracy – or at least away from communist one-party rule – was for most East Europeans the most visible aspect of the early post-communist period. Within a few months of the dramatic collapse of their communist regimes, the citizens of most East European countries – as well as a number of the republics of the former Soviet Union – had the chance to experience their first genuinely contested multi-party elections in over four decades. But beneath the widespread excitement generated by this historical event, many domestic and international observers worried about the extent to which post-communist elites and citizens would be able to discard decades of communist rule and turn – almost overnight – into Western liberal democrats.

There is a long-standing debate in political science about the drivers of popular support for democracy, and more specifically about the relative importance of economic considerations, political performance and cultural factors. Thus, whereas several authors have traced patterns democratic support to individual and societal variations in economic conditions (Przeworski 1991, Kitschelt 1992, Dalton 1994), others have instead emphasized the importance of political performance and especially citizens’ evaluation of the functioning of basic democratic
institutions (Evans and Whitefield 1995, Rose et al 1998, Chu et al 2009). Finally, a third strand of the literature focuses on the role of political culture in shaping democratic regime support (Almond and Verba 1965, Inglehart 1990.)

Our analysis in this chapter speaks directly to these debates, in the sense that we will test the explanatory power of hypotheses derived from all three of these scholarly traditions. However, we intend to do so from the very specific perspective of our broader concern for the specific mechanisms through which communist legacies affect post-communist political attitudes. Thus, we cover both economic conditions and political institutions when assessing the affecting of controlling for contemporaneous contextual variables. Moreover, we neatly pick up the “cultural” strand of this literature in our CRES model, albeit here in the sense of exposure to Soviet culture. That being said, our pre-communist contextual variables can also be interpreted as picking up underlying cultural elements from the region that predate the communist era.

Somewhat surprisingly, even though much of the literature cited above related to the determinants of support for democracy is based on analyses of surveys from the former communist countries, there has been very little explicit discussion about the extent to which communist legacies can help explain the patterns of democratic support in the region. In part, this may be due to the fact that most of the contributions to this debate only used surveys from a single country or region, and that one of the few explicitly cross-regional analyses (Chu et al 2009) does not include data from the ex-communist countries. One exception in this respect is previous work by one of us (Pop-Eleches 2008), which identifies a significant post-communist deficit in democratic values but explains it largely in terms of the peculiar version of communist
modernization efforts. Meanwhile, Neundorf (2009) analyzes the impact of communist socialization but her focus is on satisfaction with democracy rather than democratic support.¹

To begin to understand the impact of communism on subsequent democratic attitudes we need to start from the authoritarian and often totalitarian nature of communist regimes over the course of their four to seven decades in power. Unlike many other authoritarian regimes, communist regimes went beyond the traditional repression of political opponents and launched – despite some important variations across both time and space – massive efforts to penetrate deep into civil society and into the private lives of individuals. This deeper penetration, combined with their longer duration – at least compared to most Fascist regimes in Europe or military dictatorships in Latin America or Africa – suggests that we should expect the anti-democratic character of these regimes to be reflected more powerfully in the democratic preferences of post-communist citizens.

However, it is important to note that communism differed from most other authoritarian regimes in that it actually claimed to be democratic. These pretensions went beyond the use of “democracy” in a variety of official names (including the “German Democratic Republic”), to include regular elections, which in some countries (e.g. Poland and East Germany) even gave voters a choice between multiple parties, even if the outcome of the

¹ While democratic satisfaction is interesting in its own right, it is conceptually separate: thus, it is possible to hold liberal democratic values while being dissatisfied with democratic developments in one’s own country and conversely to be satisfied with the state of democracy without embracing democratic values fully. Empirically, factor analysis confirms that democratic satisfaction has much higher uniqueness and a lower factor loading on the main factor than the democratic support indicators, which suggests that there is no compelling statistical reason for lumping the two types of indicators together.¹
elections was never really in question. Perhaps more importantly for the present discussion, was
the fact that communist regimes referred to themselves as “people’s democracies,” whose
democratic nature supposedly derived from the fact that their leaders governed in accordance
with the interests of the majority of the people. However, by the 1980s most of these democratic
claims sounded increasingly hollow, and much of the negotiations between communist regimes
and their opponents in the late 1980s and early 1990s revolved around the extent to which the
former were willing to accede to political liberalization and eventually full-blown
democratization.

Thus, despite these pretenses to the contrary, there is little doubt that by the late 1980s
communist regimes were seen not only by their opponents but also by most citizens and even by
most regime insiders (Kotkin 2010) as essentially authoritarian in nature. Therefore, the most
straightforward expectation from a regime exposure socialization perspective would be that
citizens of former communist countries would exhibit weaker support for democratic values in
the wake of the collapse of communism. Of course, it is also conceivable that post-communist
citizens, driven by their rejection of the deeply compromised communist regimes, would over-
compensate and thus embrace democratic values with greater fervor than their non-communist
counterparts. If this resistance mechanism would predominate— and much of the democratic
optimism of the early 1990s was implicitly or explicitly built on this expectation – then we
should have expected a democratic surplus among citizens of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. However, given that we have already demonstrated in Table 1.1 of Chapter 1 that
there is a post-communist democratic deficit, it appears that on balance regime exposure

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2 While some of the early communist redistributive efforts and developmental achievements had given a certain
validation that communist regimes represented rule for the people (if not necessarily by the people), by the 1980s the
increasingly visible life style differences between communist elites and average citizens had largely delegitimized
these claims.
socialization has outweighed resistance, and thus our task in this chapter is to explain the mechanisms underlying this weaker democratic support among post-communist citizens.

The chapter is organized as follows: first, we demonstrate that a democratic deficit exists among post-communist citizens and that this deficit holds across a broad cross-national sample of countries even if we account for pre-communist developmental differences. Next we examine to what extent these differences in democratic support can be explained by different facets of the economic and political context experienced by post-communist citizens and we find that while both late-communist and post-communist context shapes democratic attitudes, it does not account for the democratic deficit. Instead we show that individual exposure to communism – and especially Stalinism and Post-Totalitarianism – has an important and lasting impact on democratic support. In the final section we investigate a number of extensions of our analysis, including the question of whether post-communist citizens understand democracy differently, and whether these different democratic conceptions help explain the differences in democratic support.

4.2 The post-communist democratic deficit and the role of contextual factors

To establish whether there is a systematic difference between ex-communist citizens and their counterparts in countries that never experience communism, we rely on data from the three most recent waves (1994-8, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009) of the World Values Survey, which yielded 177 surveys from 90 countries (including 53 surveys from 24 post-communist countries.) To assess democratic support, we created a standardized democracy index based on seven WVS
survey questions, which asked respondents to evaluate different statements about democracy and alternative ways of ruling the country (see appendix for question wording).³

For the statistical tests presented in this chapter we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and we report robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level to account for the fact that the macro-variables, such as economic performance and political institutions differ across country-years but are constant for all respondents in a given survey. As described in Chapter 3, we rerun the key versions of the models using an alternative hierarchical model and include these results in the online appendix that accompanies the manuscript.⁴ Moreover, all the regressions use equilibrated survey weights, which combine any within-country survey weights with a cross-country component that adjusts for sample size differences across countries.

Table 4.1

The results in Table 4.1 indicate that citizens of the former communist countries were on average less supportive of democratic forms of government than their non-communist counterparts. In the most basic specification in model 1, which replicates model 1 in Table 1.1 and only includes the post-communism dummy variable and a set of survey year dummies to capture temporal effects, we identify a statistically significant negative effect of post-communist citizenship on democratic values, and this effect is moderately large in substantive terms (28% of a standard deviation of the democracy support index.) Model 2, which controls for a range of

³ Cronbach’s alpha for the index was .72 for the WVS index, which is quite reasonable for this type of survey questions. Moreover, factor analysis confirmed that all the questions loaded on a single main factor, and we were not able to improve the alpha statistic by dropping any variables from the index. In the final section of the chapter, we present robustness tests using only those components of the index that do not contain the word “democracy”; see Section 4.4. For question wording see the appendix to Chapter 1.

⁴ NOTE TO READERS: Chapter 3 of the manuscript will be used to introduce readers to our statistical methods and plan for testing the robustness of our results. At this time, we are not including the results from the hierarchical models, but we will include them when we submit the manuscript for review. From our initial examination of the results of these analyses, the results in Table 4.1 appear quite robust to this form of respecification: the coefficients are all in the same (negative) direction and are all of roughly the same size and statistical significance, although on balance the standard errors are a little bigger in the hierarchical models. But there is nothing here that makes us suggest we are capturing a fundamentally different story by using OLS with survey-year clustered standard errors.
geographic and historical factors that set East European and Eurasian countries apart from the rest of the world, reveals a post-communist democratic support deficit that was almost twice as large as in the baseline model. In other words, far from explaining away the post-communist democratic deficit, once we account for deeper structural and historical differences, the anti-democratic attitudinal legacy of communism is even greater than what a simple bivariate comparison suggests.

Once we control for the developmental legacy of communism in model 3 – by including the variables measuring conditions at the end of the communist period (see Chapter 3 for details) – the magnitude of the democratic deficit declines by almost 30% compared to model 2, though it is still larger than in model 1. This drop suggests that at least a part of the difference in democratic attitudes is due to the socio-economic macro-conditions left behind by communism, but we are still left with a substantively large and statistically significant deficit that neither pre-communist nor late-communist developmental differences can properly explain.

In the next four models, we introduce variables that measure the post-communist demographic, economic and political context to try to distinguish more clearly how much of the post-communist attitudinal patterns are due to contextual differences rather than the experience of living through communism. We begin by adding each of these blocks of variables separately, so the relevant comparison for models 4-6 is model 3. Adding demographics and religiosity in model 4 leads to a further reduction in the size of the deficit and a noticeable improvement in model fit, but given that our variables capture individual-level demographic conditions at the time of the survey, it is unclear how much of this effect is due to the demographic footprint of communism and how much to the traumatic social transformations of the post-communist

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5 Note to readers: we will also introduce all of the contextual variables (pre-communist, end of communism, and co-temporaneous) in Chapter 3.
transition. More importantly for our discussion, the substantive difference compared to model 3 was fairly small (about 15%) and the post-communist democratic support deficit continues to be large and statistically significant.

In model 5 we included a series of post-communist economic performance indicators to test whether the post-communist democracy deficit could be the result of the traumatic economic transitions that post-communist countries were undergoing at the time of the surveys. We find modest support for this “Weimar hypothesis”: thus, controlling for economic conditions explains less than 10% of the democratic support gap in model 3 and the difference in the post-communism coefficient between models 3&5 is not statistically significant and the improvement in the model fit was fairly modest. So somewhat surprisingly, once we control for conditions at the end of communism the economic conditions during the post-communist transition do not seem to explain much of the democratic deficit at all.

In model 6 we control for political institutions and outcomes, and while we do find that doing so improves the explanatory power compared to model 3, the net effect of these controls is to widen the post-communist democratic deficit by over 20% compared to model 6.

In model 7 we include the full set of pre-communist, communist, and post-communist controls to establish the overall effect of contextual differences on our assessment of the nature and extent of post-communist exceptionalism in democratic attitudes. The highly statistically significant effect of the post-communism dummy in model 7 indicates that even controlling for a broad range of short and long-term developmental and institutional differences, citizens of ex-communist countries differ systematically from their non-communist counterparts when it comes to supporting democratic politics. Moreover, the negative coefficient in model 7 is roughly 10% larger than in model 3 and 40% larger than in model 1, which suggests that neither post-
communist developments nor longer-term historical legacies are the main reason for this
democratic deficit.

Finally, in model 8 we restricted our focus to a within-country analysis of Germany to
isolate the effects of the 45 years of communist rule in the areas that belonged to the former East
Germany (GDR). Testing the model on a single country allows us to control for a host of
cultural and institutional similarities that may not have been captured even by the extensive sets
of controls we used in the cross-national regressions above. Model 8 confirms not only the
existence of a democratic deficit but the effect is also quite similar in magnitude to the effects in
models 4&7, thereby strengthening our confidence in the robustness of our cross-national
findings.

Overall, the democratic support patterns in the regressions in Table 4.1 confirm that
differences in pre-communist, late-communist and post-communist context help explain the
cross-national variation in support for democracy: not only do a number of individual factors
emerge as substantively and statistically significant predictors of democratic support (see Table
4.1a in the electronic appendix) but the overall explanatory power of the model increases almost
six-fold between model 1 and model 7. However, what matters more from the perspective of our
theoretical concerns is the fact that once we consider this broad range of contextual differences
jointly, they do not help us explain why citizens of ex-communist countries are less enthusiastic
in supporting democratic values than their non-communist counterparts. Indeed, the magnitude
of the democratic difference is slightly larger in the fully “contextualized” model 7 than in the
simple bivariate model 1. Combined with the very similar within-Germany patterns in model 8,
these findings certainly justify a closer look at the role of communist socialization on individual-
level attitudes towards democracy.
4.3 The post-communist democratic deficit and the role of communist socialization

Our next step, therefore, is to test the extent to which our Communist Regime Exposure Socialization (CRES) model – which also offers an explanation for why post-communist citizens would hold anti-democratic attitudes – is supported by the empirical data. We begin in Table 4.2 (below) with model 1, which contains the full set of contextual controls in model 7 of Table 4.1, but with an added simple measure of temporal exposure to communism that captures the number of years past the age of six that a respondent has spent under communism. Note also that since we keep the post-communism dummy and the age variable in the model specification, the exposure variable represents a fairly conservative estimate of the role of communist socialization effects, net of the effects of living in a post-communist country and of the fact that respondents with longer communist exposures tend to be older.

Table 4.2 here

The results in model 1, which are confirmed by the fixed-effects specification in model 2, indicate that in line with temporal exposure hypothesis, an additional year lived under a communist regime reduces a respondent’s support for democracy in the post-communist period. The result is highly significant (at .001) and it is quite large in substantive terms: thus, the difference between a respondent with the full dose of East European communism and one who was six or younger when communism fell (and therefore should be minimally affected by personal exposure) accounts for .2 points on the democracy index in model 1 and for .24 in model 2, which is very close to the size of the communist democratic deficit we estimated in

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6 In line with the convention in age-period-cohort (APC) models, our regressions include age and survey year dummies in addition to exposure indicators to disentangle the different dimensions of temporal variation (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013).

7 We can not include the post-communist dummy variable in the fixed effects models because it is a linear combination of the country dummy variables.
Perhaps even more tellingly, the inclusion of the exposure variable reduces the size of the post-communist coefficient by half compared to model 7 and renders it statistically insignificant.

While the results so far confirm the importance of individual communist socialization, the CRES model leads us to expect that the effectiveness of socialization will vary with both the intensity of the exposure and the degree of resistance that individuals have to that exposure. As a first step in testing these hypotheses, in models 3&4 we investigate the first possible dimension along which communist exposure could be expected to yield heterogeneous democratic attitudes: the nature of communist regimes that existed in the country and time period where a given respondent received her communist exposure.

The results in models 3 and 4 are quite similar and support of our expectation that exposure to the most coercive and ideologically committed of communist sub-regimes – Stalinism – should be particularly effective in shaping political preferences. Thus, the effects of Stalinism were highly significant and almost twice as large the average effects of communist exposure in models 1&2. By contrast, the effects of reform communism, the most ideologically flexible subtype of communist regimes, actually pointed in the “wrong” direction, which suggests that living through these periods could have even made respondents more accepting of democratic values (though the effects were statistically insignificant). Also in line with expectations, the effects of neo-Stalinist hardline regimes were negative and statistically significant, though their magnitude was noticeably smaller than for Stalinism, which confirms the more modest persuasive powers of ideological orthodoxy after the heyday of Stalinism was over. The only (partial) surprise is the large negative impact of post-totalitarian exposure, whose

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8 The predicted effects are obviously larger among residents of interwar Soviet republics, who could have up to 25 years of additional exposure.
magnitude is slightly larger than that of Stalinism, and is twice as large as for neo-Stalinist hardline regimes.

Overall, the patterns revealed in models 3&4 confirm that the dosage of communist socialization varied considerably across different communist regime subtypes and that in general regimes with greater commitments to ideological orthodoxy had a stronger impact on the democratic preferences of their citizens well into the post-communist period. However, the relative weakness of neo-Stalinist hardline regimes, compared to the relative effectiveness of the less zealous post-totalitarian regimes, suggests that, at least when it comes to shaping support for democracy, the intensity of exposure is not simply a function of either ideological inflexibility or sheer willingness to repress but also other regime characteristics (such as legitimacy), which we cannot capture with our current classification.

As a next step, we test the hypothesis that adults have more resistance to regime communist regime socialization than children. We do so by splitting our temporal exposure variable into two separate variables for years of exposure to communism as a child (early communist exposure) and years of exposure to communism as an adult (late communist exposure). Quite surprisingly, we find the exact opposite from what the socialization literature led us to expect! Judging by the effects in models 5&6 the anti-democratic impact on communist exposure was much stronger for adult exposure than for early exposure. Thus, according to both models, the effects of adult exposure were negative and highly significant (at p<.01) and while early exposure had a statistically inconclusive effect and pointed in the wrong direction in model 5. Overall, these findings suggest that regime preferences get solidified later in a person’s life – a pattern that is at odds with predictions suggesting that adults should be more resistant to socialization than children. The findings are more compatible with previous hypotheses
suggesting that socialization would be more of a life-long process, but even these theories never predicted an effect only in the adult year and not in the years of childhood.

What could explain this surprising finding? Perhaps it is the case that in regimes that place a great deal of attention on inculcating a particular world view among their citizens, childhood – despite the indoctrination potential schooling – is a period of times when politics is simply less relevant in one’s life. Adults living under communism, however, were more likely to be more deeply incorporated into communist political structures and power relations. This more constant contact at a time in one’s life when people realized the cost and benefits of toeing (or not) the party line may have led to a more intense socialization experience. While these remain speculative points, this is a certainly a finding that it will be important to see if it is replicated in our analyses of the other political and economic attitudes in subsequent chapters.

Having analyzed the effect of our two “sub-type” exposure variables, we now turn to the remaining variables that according to the CRES model are predicted to either increase the intensity of or resistance to communist exposure. (NOTE TO READERS: In Chapter 3, we will have explained that since years of exposure to regime type and age of exposure are both variables that sum to total exposure for every individual, we can analyze them by substituting in the “decomposed” versions of these variables as we do in Table 4.2. The remaining variables are not counts of sub-types of years of exposure, so we analyze these variable using interaction effects).

For the sake of clarity in the presentation of results, rather than first discussing either intensity or resistance variables, we instead first examine country-level factors that affect both intensity and resistance (Table 4.3) before turning to the individual-level factors that do so (Table 4.4). Our primary focus is less on these factors than on the extent to which they mediate
the effects of an additional year of communist exposure. Also it is important to note that we now restrict ourselves to only survey respondents from post-communist countries. The reasons for this analytical choice, which will be replicated in subsequent chapters, were partly driven by practical constraints but also reflect theoretical concerns about the comparability of certain measures between communist and non-communist countries. However, this change in samples raises some methodological difficulties due to the fact that in a post-communist sample age and communist socialization are much more highly correlated than in the global sample, thereby leading to much more unstable statistical results and reducing the comparability to the analyses in the first three tables. Therefore, we have run a set of constrained linear regressions, in which we constrain the age coefficient across all the models to the estimate obtained from running a baseline exposure model (model 1 of Table 4.2).

As discussed in Chapter 3, the models specifications for the next two models also differ in that we no longer include the full set of country-level controls from the earlier statistical tests. We do so in part to avoid running into degrees-of-freedom problems at the country-year level for our smaller set of post-communist surveys but also because we want to be able to interpret the effects of highly correlated mediating factors – such as interwar literacy and economic development – which is more problematic when all variable are included simultaneously in the same regression. While this choice leads to statistical models that are under-specified compared to the first set of regressions, this does not affect the estimates for the main coefficients we care about: individual communist exposure and the interaction terms between exposure and individual or country-level mediating variables.

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9 We were missing comparable institutional indicators for a several of the non-communist countries in the WVS sample.

10 For example, our indicator for late-communist liberalization (the Polity regime score in 1989) would simply capture levels of democracy in non-communist countries.

11 In this and subsequent analyses these tests were performed using the cnsreg command in Stata 12.0.
4.3.1 Country-level moderators of exposure intensity and resistance

Table 4.3 here

Figures 4.1-4.4 here

As a first step in model 1 we included an interaction between communist exposure and the 5-point scale of literacy levels in the early 1920s, which we expect to increase resistance to communist exposure. The positive and statistically significant interaction effect indicates that longer communist exposure had a much stronger anti-democratic effect – indeed was about 50% larger -- in countries with very low pre-communist literacy rates than in countries with very high literacy levels (such as Czechoslovakia) and the conditional exposure effects were negative and statistically significant across the board. Conversely, the positive effects of higher pre-communist literacy levels were almost twice as large among respondents with extensive personal exposure to communist regimes, and the effects were only significant for individuals with two decades or more of personal exposure. While we have to be careful about inferring individual-level mechanisms from aggregate-level data, this finding is consistent with Darden and Grzymala-Busse’s (2006) argument about the greater obstacles to communist indoctrination for citizens who had previously been exposed to different political narratives through pre-communist education systems.

Model 2 reveals that pre-communist socio-economic development mattered even beyond the role of education: thus, the positive interaction effect between pre-communist GDP per capita and communist exposure suggests that the anti-democratic impact of longer personal exposure to communist regimes was twice as large in the countries that had been very poor prior to the arrival of communism. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, 45 additional years of exposure in a highly economically developed country decreased support on the democratic index scale by .14, while
the same temporal exposure in a poor country decreased it by .28. Given that the magnitude of these results was even greater than in model 1, this greater resistance to communist indoctrination of societies that were highly economically developed may reflect not only the importance of pre-communist political socialization as an ideological antidote to communism but also the fact that the appeals of the developmental and political project of communism were stronger in less developed societies, and therefore citizens were more likely to embrace its anti-democratic values. Or to put in the language of the CRES model, socialization was appears to have been *intensified* where communism offered more dramatic economic progress.

In model 3 we turn to the mediating influence of pre-communist exposure to democracy, which we hypothesized would provide *resistance* to communist exposure. Prior experience with democracy varied from fairly robust in several countries in the region, (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and the Baltic states) to non-existent in the interwar Soviet republics and several Balkan countries. While the communists tried and largely (but not fully) succeeded in destroying the institutional vestiges of pre-communist democracies, we would nevertheless expect the availability of prior democratic memories (or myths) to shape both the resistance to communist political narratives and the post-communist embrace of democratic values.

The statistically significant and substantively large\(^{12}\) positive interaction effect between communist exposure and pre-communist regime in model 3 confirms these expectations: as illustrated in Figure 4.3, even though communist exposure had a significant negative impact on democratic values irrespective pre-communist regime trajectories, in interwar democracies the magnitude of this effect was only about half the size compared to countries that were

\(^{12}\) It is important to note that coefficients are not standardized across models. So while literacy is coded on a 1-5 scale (mean 3.4; SD 1.2), interwar regime type is coded on the polity scale of -10 to 10 (mean -3.6, SD 4.6). Thus a .0002 coefficient for regime can have a substantively larger effect than a .0005 coefficient for literacy. More generally, the substantive significance of interactive effects are best explored graphically (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).
consistently non-democratic even before the arrival of communism. Not surprisingly, the
democratic boost from living in a country that had experienced democracy before the 1990s was
much larger (and only achieved statistical significance) among respondents with extensive
personal communist exposure, whereas for those with short/no exposure the effects were only
half as large and statistically insignificant. In other words, our findings suggest that interwar
democracy mattered for post-communist democratic values not because it gave all citizens a
uniform democratic boost but because it reduced the extent to which citizens with long personal
exposures to communism were susceptible to adopting its non-democratic values, i.e., increased
resistance.

In model 4 we test whether the ability of communist regimes to inculcate non-democratic
political preferences is shaped by the extent of these regimes’ initial legitimacy derived from the
credibility of their claims of authentic domestic roots and support. Thus, we would expect
homegrown Russian, Albanian, and Yugoslav communism to have been (at least initially) more
effective in shaping the political values of its citizens, and therefore to intensify the effect of
communist exposure. However, the negligible size of the interaction effect in model 4 does not
confirm this expectation, suggesting that the initial differences in legitimacy did not translate into
noticeably greater receptiveness towards communist socialization.

In the next two models we analyze how the communist economic performance mediated
the effect of communist exposure on democratic values. As discussed in chapter 3, while all
communist regimes had healthy initial growth followed by a slowdown after the mid-1970s,
there were significant differences in economic trajectories throughout the communist period and
particularly in the 1980s.
In model 5 we focus on the effects of the divergence between countries that weathered the economic crisis of the 1980s relatively well (e.g. East Germany and the Soviet Union) vs. those that suffered crippling recessions (e.g. Poland, Yugoslavia and especially Romania). To reiterate, our expectation is that communist economic success should intensify the effect of communist exposure, and thus we would expect to find a negative coefficient for the interactive effect. The negative and marginally significant interaction effect between average economic growth in the 1980s and total communist exposure confirms that communist economic performance affected the extent to which individuals who lived under communism embraced its political values: thus, in line with our theoretical arguments in the previous chapter, the anti-democratic effects of communist exposure were stronger in countries that performed better in the last communist decade. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the magnitude of this effect was quite large: whereas in countries with relatively healthy late-communist economic growth the effects of cumulative communist exposure were substantively large and highly significant, in countries with the weakest growth, socialization effects were only about half as large, though they were still statistically significant.

Finally, in model 6 we focus on a longer-term indicator of communist economic performance: the ratio between GDP/capita in 1989 and the income levels before communist regimes took over (adjusted for the different timing in the arrival of communism).13 While it is unclear how far back economic memory extends, such a measure has the advantage of capturing the overall economic performance of communist regimes and thus may be a more accurate indicator on the economic legitimacy of communism, especially in the eyes of respondents with longer personal exposures to communism. Even though the two measures of economic growth

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13 In the current version, we are using data for 1914 for the interwar Soviet republics and data for 1939 for the post-WWII communist regimes, though we are working on getting data for 1917 and 1945 respectively to capture income levels more closely to the start of communist rule.
are only weakly correlated (at .13), the results in model 6 reveal a similar, though substantively and statistically weaker, pattern to model 5: the anti-democratic effects of communist exposure are roughly 20% larger for countries which made greater economic progress during the communist period than for those with comparatively weaker performance.

Overall, the results in Table 4.3 confirm that the extent to which East European and Eurasian societies were affected by communist indoctrination efforts was shaped in predictable ways at the country-level by both pre-communist economic and political trajectories and by differences in communist economic performance. As expected, citizens of countries that entered communism with considerable democratic experience and with higher levels of socio-economic economic development seem to have been less affected by additional years of communist exposure than citizens from countries where we would expect lower resistance and more intense communist exposure.

4.3.2. Individual-level moderators of exposure intensity and resistance

Since the CRES model predicts that the effects of communist exposure are likely to be modified not just by the macro-environment characteristics but also by the particular individual circumstances of a respondent, in Table 4.4 we analyze the interactions between communist exposure and the individual-level characteristics identified in Chapter 2. Since some of the mediating variables (such as the pre-communist vs. communist education categories) are essentially nonsensical for non-communist countries, we again restrict the analysis in this model to citizens of post-communist countries. We therefore also use the same constrained linear regression approach we employed for the tests in Table 4.3.
As a first step in model 1 we interact communist exposure with different types of self-declared religious denomination, with the expectation that Catholicism and Protestantism will increase resistance communist exposure. Judging by the size and signs of these interaction effects, which are illustrated in Figure 4.5, greater communist exposure had a weaker anti-democratic impact among Catholics than among Protestant, Muslim and particularly Eastern Orthodox respondents. While the exposure effects were negative and at least marginally significant for all four denominations, suggesting that none of the region’s main religions provided a completely effective antidote to communist socialization, the magnitude of the exposure effect was almost twice as large for Eastern Orthodox, Muslim and Protestant respondents as for Catholics, and the difference was statistically significant at .05. These differences do not necessarily reflect the differences in democratic sensibilities of different religions\textsuperscript{14} but rather the more independent political stance of the Catholic church vis-à-vis the communist regimes compared to their Orthodox, Protestant, and Muslim counterparts.

Table 4.4 here
Figures 4.5-4.8 here

In model 2 of Table 4.4 we focus on the effects of education, which should by all accounts should play a crucial role in the political socialization process. First, we analyze the effects of pre-communist education, which, according to the CRES model developed in Chapter 2, should help individuals resist communist indoctrination and should therefore weaken the anti-democratic impact of communist exposure. This expectation is confirmed by the substantively large positive interaction effect between communist exposure and pre-communist education. As a result, as illustrated in Figure 4.6, whereas among respondents without a pre-communist

\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Muslims in post-communist countries actually appear to be significantly more favorable to democratic systems than their Catholic counterparts among respondents with short communist track records.
education greater communist exposure was associated with a substantively large and statistically significant decline in democratic values, for respondents who were exposed to pre-communist education, the effect disappears completely. However, the results need to be taken with a grain of salt because of the limited communist exposure range among respondents who had received pre-communist education.¹⁵

By contrast, the CRES model predicts that communist education should play a very different role, since we expect that education under communism should intensify the effect of communist socialization and therefore amplify its negative effects on democratic attitudes.¹⁶ The results, partially confirm this hypothesis: in line with our predictions Figure 4.8 shows that the effects of communist exposure were stronger for respondents educated under communism. However, the magnitude of the effect is modest and fails to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, we do not find much variation between different types of education, and the effects for higher education under communism are actually slightly weaker than for primary and secondary education, which suggests that the greater intensity of communist indoctrination in universities may have been counteracted by greater access to alternative sources of information, which in turn could have triggered resistance.¹⁷

In model 3 we test whether Jowitt’s (1992) argument about the greater political penetration of communist regimes in urban settings is confirmed in terms of the relative impact of communist exposure on democratic values. As illustrated in Figure 4.7, the moderately large

---

¹⁵ By definition, any respondent old enough to be educated before the arrival of communism was exposed to the full dose of communism, so the differences in exposure simply reflect the (relatively minor) differences in the lifespans of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

¹⁶ As described in Chapter 3, we coded respondents based on the timing and the highest level of education they achieved in order to establish whether or not they received their degrees during the communist period. To the extent that intensity of communist exposure increases with additional schooling, we should expect successively larger negative interaction effects for higher levels of education.

¹⁷ Note that the three education categories are exclusive rather than cumulative, since they are based on the highest level of education achieved. In future versions of this analysis we may switch to the more intuitive coding that would allow for such cumulative interpretations.
and statistically significant negative interaction effect between urban residence and communist exposure in model 3 suggests that the urban residents indeed exhibited roughly 30% higher communist socialization effects for the same degree of temporal exposure. While we need to confirm in future chapters whether this trend holds across a broader range of political attitudes, these findings confirm Jowitt’s theory, which is remarkable given that urban residents had greater access to alternative sources of information, and therefore, like respondents with a higher education, may have been better equipped to resist communist indoctrination efforts.

Finally, due to the greater exposure of men to communist socialization in both the workplace and the army, the CRES model predicts that being male should intensify communist exposure. The negative and statistically significant interaction term in model 4 and the patterns in Figure 4.8, contradict this hypothesis: while the conditional effects of communist socialization were negative and statistically significant for both men and women, the anti-democratic effects of exposure were about 15% weaker among men (though the difference fell short of achieving statistical significance). As a result the democratic gap between men and women was larger among respondents with extensive communist exposures, but not in the direction hypothesized by the CRES model.

4.4 Extension: Democratic conceptions

As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are good reasons to expect that the peculiar nature of communist “popular democracies” would shape not only citizen support for democratic politics but also their very understanding of democracy. Thus, Rohrschneider (1999), using public opinion surveys from the early to mid-1990s, shows that even though both East and West German citizens regarded liberal democratic rights as key
components of democracy, the former showed considerably higher concern for social egalitarianism in their understanding of democracy. Given that there are good reasons to expect democratic conception differences to be even greater in ex-communist with weaker pre-communist democratic traditions than East Germany, this raises questions about the validity of cross-national comparisons of democratic support measures. In other words, what does it mean to say that post-communist citizens are less supportive of democracy if their understanding of democracy is different than that of their non-communist counterparts?18

To address these concerns we use a series of questions from the fifth wave (2005-2009) of the World Values Survey, in which respondents were asked for a series of items to rate on a 10-point scale how essential each item was as a characteristic of democracy (see Table A4.5 in the appendix for full question wording). As a first step we ran a series of weighted and county-year clustered OLS regressions where we simply regressed each item on the post-communism dummy variable. As in the case of the democratic support regressions, we then supplemented these simple bivariate models with a set of more fully specified models, which control for many of the pre-communist, communist and post-communist contextual variables we used in the previous sections.19

Table 4.5 here

The results in both sets of regressions confirm that post-communist conceptions of democracy differed in some significant ways from those of non-communist respondents, and the results are broadly in line with theoretical expectations: thus, post-communist respondents were significantly more likely to consider state aid for the unemployed and a prospering economy as

---

18 We address a similar question with regard to left-right self-placement elsewhere (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2010).
19 Given that the democratic characteristics questions were only asked in a single survey wave, we had to slightly reduce the number of country-level controls in order to avoid the multicollinearity problems that arise with over-fitted models.
an essential component of democracy (and in both cases the effect was fairly large - 0.8 points on a 10-point scale). On the other hand, however, the social-democratic conception suggested by such concerns does not extend to equating democracy with taxation of the rich to help the poor, which actually pointed in the opposite direction. Moreover, ex-communist citizens were also more concerned about a number of liberal aspects of democracy, such as equal rights for women and civil liberties protections, while opposing religious authorities’ involvement in interpreting laws. While some of these aspects, such as social security, gender equality and secularism, are in line with communist-era principles, the emphasis on civil liberties, and the endorsement of popular referenda are arguably more reflective of reactions against the abuses and the paternalism of communist regimes. Finally, it is worth mentioning that for two of the most basic aspects of democratic rule – the importance of choosing leaders through free elections and the intervention of the army against incompetent governments – post-communist citizens were statistically indistinguishable from the non-communist counterparts. So overall, the concern that perhaps post-communist citizens see democracy solely as a set of economic as opposed to political principles is not substantiated by these data.

That observation notwithstanding, it is still worth examining whether and how democratic conception differences affect democratic support patterns and – crucially from our perspective – whether these differences can help explain the post-communist democratic deficit. For example, if citizens who see a prospering economy as a key component of democracy tend to be less supportive of democracy, and given that we know that ex-communist citizens were more likely to see economic prosperity as a crucial element of democracy, then it is conceivable that the democratic deficit would disappear once we account for such different democratic
conceptions. To test whether this is the case, in Table 4.6 we first re-estimate our full model (model 7) from Table 4.1 using only data from the surveys for which the democratic conceptions questions were asked (using a similar set of individual and country-level controls as in the regressions in Table 4.1). With this as an appropriate base-model, in model 2 we added the ten democratic conception indicators discussed in Table 4.5 above.

Table 4.6 here

The results of the baseline regression in model confirm that the post-communist democratic deficit for the 2005-2009 survey wave (in which the democratic conception questions were asked) is similar to the deficit we found using the full sample in model 7 of Table 4.1, which suggests that the post-communist democratic support deficit is not declining over the course of the post-communist transition. Turning to the results in model 2, we find that democratic conceptions matter for explaining democratic support patterns: not only are several of the individual democratic conception variables individually significant predictors of democratic support (and their signs are in the expected direction) but adding them to the model specification leads to a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the model (the r-squared statistic jumps from .16 in model 1 to .30 in model 2). However, the most important finding for our purposes is that accounting for differences in democratic conceptions does not seem to account for the post-communist democratic support deficit: thus, in model 2, the size of the post-communism coefficient is virtually unchanged compared to the baseline results and continues to be negative, substantively large and highly statistically significant. In other words, even though post-communist citizens differ somewhat in what they view as essential elements of democracy,

---

20 Of course, if we were to find that this is the case, then that would not necessarily refute the importance of communist legacies but would suggest a particular cognitive mechanism for why ex-communist citizens profess weaker democratic support.

21 As in Table 4.5 we used a slightly reduced set of country-level controls in order to avoid the multicollinearity problems.
these differences cannot account for their lower overall support for democracy in the post-communist period.

As a final step to test whether simply the word “democracy” is contaminating our analysis, we modify our democratic support index in such a way as to exclude all questions in which the word democracy appears. To do so, we construct an alternative three-item index, which includes two of the questions from the original index – asking about the desirability of army rule and rule by a strong leader – as well as an additional question about having experts rather than the government ruling the country.\textsuperscript{22} Doing so has the advantage of eliminating the potential validity concerns related to the different democratic conceptions discussed above even beyond the solutions proposed in Table 4.6. Moreover, given the heavy normative emphasis on democracy in the post-Cold War era, one may worry about whether answers to direct questions about democracy would elicit truthful responses. On the other hand, however, the resulting three-item index has a considerably lower reliability than our original index, even though the two indexes are correlated at .66.

Table 4.7 here

In Table 4.7 we start with the baseline specification from models 7&8 in Table 4.1 and then re-run the models using the alternative 3-item democracy index discussed above.\textsuperscript{23} The results confirm that our findings about the existence of a substantively large and statistically significant democratic support deficit are not simply driven by biases inherent in question wording: thus, model 2, which uses the 3-point democracy index reveals a post-communist

\textsuperscript{22} This question was not included in the original democracy index because it lowered the reliability of the index and because it is less obviously an anti-democratic alternative than army rule or a strong leader. We included it here out of interest in not relying solely on two variables in the index, but also because adding it to the index in the case actually increases the alpha of the scale across the full dataset.

\textsuperscript{23} The coefficients differ slightly from those in Table 4.1 because the sample was restricted to observations for which data was available for both the 7-point and the 3-point democracy indexes.
democratic deficit that is highly significant and of slightly larger magnitude as the one in the baseline model 1, which uses the 7-point democracy index. The similarity also holds when we restrict the analysis to within-country variation between East and West Germans in models 3&4. Therefore, we can be quite confident that despite different conceptions and possible normative biases in cross-national responses to survey questions about support for democracy, the patterns discussed in the rest of this chapter are not simply the artifact of cross-national survey validity limitations.

4.5. Conclusions

In this chapter we have analyzed the mechanisms underlying the large and temporally resilient democratic values deficit among residents of post-communist countries. While we have shown that a number of pre-communist, communist and post-communist contextual factors affect democratic support patterns, these contextual differences alone cannot account for the significant democratic deficit of post-communist citizens. By contrast, we found very strong support for the personal exposure mechanism: not only do we show that the extent of the democratic deficit increases substantially with the length of time a given individual has lived under a communist regime, but accounting for such differences explains roughly two thirds of the aggregate difference in democratic attitudes between post-communist and non-communist countries.

In addition to establishing the importance of the personal exposure mechanism, our analysis in this chapter has illustrated the importance of digging deeper beneath the seeming uniformity of communist regimes in the ways suggested by our CRES model in order to get a more nuanced understanding of the individual and country-level contexts that mediate the effects

\[24\text{ While the two coefficients are not strictly comparable, the two variables nevertheless had very similar means and standard deviations.}\]
of communist socialization. In line with our CRES model, we found that the nature of the communist regime subtype to which different individual were exposed affected the patterns of democratic support: thus, the greater exposure to ideological indoctrination in Stalinist regimes translated into stronger anti-democratic effects, especially when compared to more flexible and less repressive reform communist regimes. Similarly, communist economic success – both overall and in the last decade of the communist experience – also intensified the effect of exposure to communism. In contrast, home grown communism, which we hypothesized could intensify the effect of communist exposure, did not actually do so. Our aggregate level resistance hypotheses also enjoyed strong empirical support: citizens of countries with robust interwar democracies and high levels of pre-communist literacy and economic development were much more resistant to adopting anti-democratic values in response to communist socialization efforts. Indeed, of all the aggregate level variables from the CRES model that we tested in regard to support for democracy, only homegrown communism failed to deliver the predicted (intensifying) expected effect.

At the individual level we found that pre-communist education and adherence to Catholicism provided – as predicted - resistance against communist socialization efforts. Meanwhile, communist education had the predicted effect of intensifying the anti-democratic impact of communist exposure, though the effects were not particularly strong, and (contrary to our expectations) were more pronounced for secondary than for post-secondary education. The predictions of the CRES model were also confirmed with respect to urban residence, which intensified the attitudinal effects of communist exposure. We also found a quite surprising result with regard to the age of communist exposure. Far from finding more resistance to socialization
among adults in contrast to more malleable children, we actually found no effect for additional years of childhood exposure while finding an effect for adult exposure.

In the final section we address a number of potential concerns about the cross-national comparability of survey questions tapping into democratic support. We show that while post-communist citizens indeed have somewhat different conceptions of democracy – placing a heavier weight on economic aspects but also on gender equality, popular participation and civil liberties – these differences in conceptions cannot account for the democratic deficit discussed in this chapter. Nor do our findings seem to be sensitive to alternative constructions of the dependent variable, which exclude survey questions that explicitly mention democracy and may therefore be sensitive to normative biases.

Taken together, the findings in this chapter offer surprisingly little support for the contextual effects explanation for the post-communist democratic deficit. Even when we saturate our models with variables to control for pre-communist differences, conditions at the end of communism, and demographic, economic, and political differences between post-communist and non-communist countries at the time our surveys were conducted, we continue to find persistent and large differences in support for democracy among post-communist citizens. However, when we examine the effect of exposure to communism on attitudes towards democracy, we find results that are consistent with the predictions of our CRES model. At the most basic level, even after controlling for age and a host of other country-level and individual-level variables, we find that more years of exposure to communism leads to less support for democracy. Furthermore, we find strong empirical for many of the factors – at both the country-level and the individual-level – that our CRES model predicts should either strengthen or weaken the effect communist exposure on a given individual. In short, socialization seems to matter, but it does so in a
nuanced way that is predictable based on the peculiar patterns of communist economic and political development.

With these results in hand, we can proceed to examine the extent to which these results will hold when we move beyond the political sphere of democracy to questions of economic and social preferences as well. We turn to the first of these questions – attitudes towards the market – in the following chapter.
### Appendix

Table 4.1: Democratic support and contextual explanations

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Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Table 4.2: Communist socialization and democratic support

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Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Table 4.3: Country-level mediators

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<td>-.0011#</td>
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<td>Communist cumulative growth*</td>
<td>-.0003</td>
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<td>-.0315</td>
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<td>-.0315</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0383)</td>
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<td>64,763</td>
<td>64,763</td>
<td>64,763</td>
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Table 4.4: Individual-level mediators

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<td>-0.0047</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
<td>(.0010)</td>
<td>(.0032)</td>
<td>(.0032)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.0022*</td>
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<td>(.0011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant resp.* Total comm exposure</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0014)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox resp.* Total comm exposure</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim resp.* Total comm exposure</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0012)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0499)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.0465)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.0393)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslim resp.</td>
<td>.1273*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0619)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-comm educ* Total comm exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0059</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm primary educ* Total comm exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm secondary educ* Total comm exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm higher educ* Total comm exposure</td>
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<td>-0.0004</td>
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<td>Pre-comm educ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.4799)</td>
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<td>Comm primary educ</td>
<td>.0745</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0225)</td>
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<td>Comm higher educ</td>
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<td>(.0318)</td>
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<td>Urban resident* Total comm exposure</td>
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<td>-0.017*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.0008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban resident</td>
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<td>.0633*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0292)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male* Total comm exposure</td>
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<td>.0010*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0005)</td>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>.0363**</td>
<td>.0367**</td>
<td>.0377**</td>
<td>.0109</td>
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<td>(.0078)</td>
<td>(.0072)</td>
<td>(.0072)</td>
<td>(.0154)</td>
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<td>64,763</td>
<td>64,763</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Table 4.5: Drivers of democratic conceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Gov’t tax rich and subsidize poor</th>
<th>(2) Religious authorities interpret laws</th>
<th>(3) Choose leaders in free elections</th>
<th>(4) People receive unempl aid</th>
<th>(5) Army takes over when gov’t is incompetent</th>
<th>(6) Civil rights protect people’s liberty</th>
<th>(7) Economy is prospering</th>
<th>(8) Criminals severely punished</th>
<th>(9) People can change the laws in referendums</th>
<th>(10) Women same rights as men</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results without additional controls</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>-.257 (.346)</td>
<td>-.400 (.387)</td>
<td>.320# (.165)</td>
<td>.862** (.238)</td>
<td>-.201 (.334)</td>
<td>.704** (.246)</td>
<td>.863** (.293)</td>
<td>.555# (.309)</td>
<td>.479* (.204)</td>
<td>.484** (.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>58,201</td>
<td>56,748</td>
<td>59,154</td>
<td>58,691</td>
<td>56,903</td>
<td>57,511</td>
<td>58,223</td>
<td>58,631</td>
<td>57,405</td>
<td>59,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<td>Results with individual and country-level controls</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist</td>
<td>-.746# (.426)</td>
<td>-1.201** (.395)</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.767# (.398)</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.387</td>
<td>.900** (.272)</td>
<td>1.261** (.277)</td>
<td>1.009** (.322)</td>
<td>.707** (.234)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>58,201</td>
<td>56,748</td>
<td>59,154</td>
<td>58,691</td>
<td>56,903</td>
<td>57,511</td>
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<td>58,631</td>
<td>57,405</td>
<td>59,147</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.227</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.105</td>
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</table>
Table 4.6: Democratic conceptions and democratic support

| Democracy = governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. | (1)  
|------------------------------------------------------------|------
| Post-communist                                             | -.219*  
|                                                           | (.126)  
| Democracy = religious authorities interpret the laws.      | -.021**  
|                                                           | (.003)  
| Democracy = people choose their leaders in free elections. | .044**  
|                                                           | (.005)  
| Democracy = people receive state aid for unemployment.    | -.002  
|                                                           | (.003)  
| Democracy = the army takes over when government is         | -.053**  
| incompetent.                                               | (.003)  
| Democracy = civil rights protect people’s liberty against  | .026**  
| oppression.                                                | (.005)  
| Democracy = the economy is prospering.                    | .010*  
|                                                           | (.004)  
| Democracy = criminals are severely punished.               | -.008*  
|                                                           | (.004)  
| Democracy = people can change the laws in referendums.     | .022**  
|                                                           | (.003)  
| Democracy = women have the same rights as men.             | .016**  
|                                                           | (.004)  

| Pre-communist controls | Yes  
| Late-communist controls | Yes  
| Post-communist demographics | Yes  
| Post-communist economic outcomes | Yes  
| Post-communist political institutions | Yes  
| Observations | 51,429  
| R-squared | .161  

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Table 4.7: Robustness test using an alternative democracy index

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<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
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<td>7-item democracy index</td>
<td>3-item regime index</td>
<td>7-item democracy index</td>
<td>3-item regime index</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.372** (.140)</td>
<td>-.213** (.030)</td>
<td>-.175** (.018)</td>
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<td>Pre-communist controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late-communist controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist demographics</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist religiosity</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-communist economic outcomes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Post-communist political institutions</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>.068</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1
Works Cited / Partial Bibliography


Matito, Cecilia, Neus Agell, Susana Sanchez-Tena, Josep L. Torres, and Marta Cascante. 2011 “Protective Effect of Structurally Diverse Grape Procyanidin Fractions against UV-Induced Cell Damage and Death” *Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry* 59 (9), 4489-4495


