The Effect of Intergovernmental Organizations on Institutional Design

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I. Overview of the Puzzle and the Argument

By 1986, Mustafa Tolba was exasperated. The organization he headed, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), had spent half a decade organizing conferences on global warming. Yet organizational staff appeared to be no closer to the goal they had articulated for themselves the previous year: an international institutional response to climate change. Many of UNEP’s member states were ambivalent about the idea. And the United States and the Soviet Union – the world’s superpowers and two of the heaviest contributors to greenhouse gases – were adamantly opposed. U.S. president Ronald Reagan refused even to legitimize the issue, deriding it as “the so-called greenhouse effect.” Thinking of the manufacturing and agricultural output that would be forfeited if the USSR agreed to combat climate change, one leading Soviet scientist had condemned the idea offered by UNEP staff as “a crime against humanity.”

Suddenly, the situation changed. Within less than two years, Reagan’s delegate to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) had presented a proposal for a new institution called the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The Soviet Union and other member states swiftly had approved the plan, and within just a few months the WMO and UNEP had launched the body. During this brief window of time, several important factors remained constant: continuing Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. presidency of Ronald Reagan, and the tenure of Mustafa Tolba at the UN Environment Program. Yet the institutions addressing climate change shifted markedly during this short period: from being under the purview of domestic agencies, the issue was taken up by a new international body – an idea opposed by these same states just a few years earlier. What happened between 1986 and 1988 to prompt such a turnaround?

Intergovernmental Organizations and Institutional Design

Existing state-centric theories of international relations offer little insight. Power-based notions falter: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was created in a bipolar system in which both superpowers, and many other states as well, had been unenthusiastic about the idea of setting up an international institutional response to global warming. Interest-based views stumble: coordinated efforts to combat climate change would threaten the continued dominance of industrialized states, the industrialization of developing states, and the very livelihood of oil-producing states. Norm-based concepts waver: the possibility of global climate change has become much more accepted today, but in the mid-1980s it encountered formidable opponents and a great deal of doubt. The materialization of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is baffling if one looks to states alone for the explanation.

In a companion paper analyzing in detail the IPCC’s origins, I demonstrate that the mystery quickly dissolves once one turns attention to the proactivity of staff of the UN Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organization. Guided by Mustafa Tolba, personnel of these intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) directly lobbied the Reagan administration, prodding the U.S. Secretary of State to take the lead in setting up such an institution. Then, without waiting for a response, employees of UNEP and the WMO teamed up with a non-governmental organization to design a climate-change body of their own: the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG). The U.S., in particular, became so irritated

1 Reagan 1988, emphasis added.
2 Climatologist Mikhail Budyko, cited in Skodvin 2000, 139; Bolin 2007, 64.
with this policy-aggressive body that it agreed to negotiate with UNEP and WMO staff to design the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as a substitute. IGO staff played a central role – both in shaping how the new body would look, and also in determining whether the institutional design process would be undertaken at all. Elsewhere, I also employ detailed case studies to show that staff of the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development played similar – if perhaps less dramatic – roles in the creation of the UN Development Program and the International Energy Agency, respectively.

Such proactivity in institutional design may be a surprise to some. After all, even international relations scholars who see the personnel of intergovernmental organizations as more than mere automatons nevertheless tend to view IGOs themselves as products of state demands and state designs. This long-held position may be a reasonable generalization of institutional origins through the mid-20th century. But it overlooks the increasingly prominent role that IGO staff themselves have taken in institutional design.

Over the past several decades, the number of intergovernmental organizations created with involvement by staff of pre-existing IGOs has skyrocketed. The vast majority – around two-thirds – of today’s intergovernmental organizations were created not by states alone, but with the participation of staff from existing IGOs. In addition to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations Development Program, and the International Energy Agency, scores of other prominent intergovernmental organizations were created in this way: the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), the Global Program on Money Laundering (GPML). The list could go on, but the takeaway already is clear: our world has shifted from one in which states monopolize the creation of intergovernmental organizations, to one in which IGO staff themselves often are extensively involved. The resultant bodies, moreover, cannot be dismissed out of hand as trivial.

Received theories do not predict – let alone explain – IGO participation in institutional design, and as a result we know little about the consequences of this shift. Thus, an intriguing puzzle lies unaddressed. States are capable of carrying out institutional design on their own –

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3 An intergovernmental organization is “a formal, continuous structure established between [governmental] members from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership” (Archer 2001, 33).

4 As discussed in more detail later, “created with involvement by staff of pre-existing IGOs” encompasses the following activities: 1) IGO staff provided secretariat services and/or information to states undertaking institutional design, 2) IGO staff participated in a moderate capacity, either by initiating conferences or by directly participating in design negotiations at the invitation of states, 3) IGO staff initiated comprehensive institutional design proposals to be presented to states, or 4) IGO staff set up a new body, with limited or no input from states. Note that these activities range from quite limited involvement (providing informational services to states) to quite proactive involvement (setting up bodies with little input from states). In the theoretical framework and in the quantitative analyses, I consider both “involvement” in general (that is, whether any of the four activities pertain) and “agenda-setting” in particular (that is, which of the four activities is the highest that pertains) in the origins of a particular, observed intergovernmental organization.

5 I refer to “staff of pre-existing IGOs” in order to distinguish people employed by intergovernmental organizations from people sent by states as delegates to intergovernmental organizations, and when I use the shorthand term “IGO involvement” I mean the involvement of staff. Were I not to specify this, I would not be able to parse out the limitations of state-centric understandings of why intergovernmental organizations exist and why they look as they do. That is, an unaccounted-for possibility would remain: that intergovernmental organizations appear to be involved, but that involvement is merely an artifact of states using IGOs as forums for bringing together states’ delegates, and therefore states persist as the only relevant actors in institutional design.

6 Shanks et al. 1996, 599.
they have done so in the past and continue to do so today. The institutional design process constitutes a key occasion in which states attempt to implement mechanisms to promote the new body’s enduring responsiveness to member state interests. Given institutions’ well-known tendency toward path-dependency, the design stage takes on even greater significance. So why are IGO staff gaining ground in the institutional design arena, and what are the consequences?

**Previewing the Argument**

My answer, in a nutshell, is as follows. The arena of institutional design is an important – yet hitherto unexplored – context in which staff members of intergovernmental organizations pursue their own objectives and have a tangible impact on states. Drawing on recent scholarship, I posit that IGO employees seek material security, legitimacy, and advancement of policies they deem fitting. They face reasons to maneuver for greater insulation from state control, for such insulation can facilitate their pursuit of these objectives. Involvement in institutional design provides IGO staff with more direct – and likely lasting – means for increasing insulation from state control in new bodies within their organizational family.

I predict that intergovernmental organizations designed with IGO involvement will be more insulated from state control than if states were designing alone. The greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda to which state react, the better able are IGO staff to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control. Thus, the more extensive the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulation from state control in the resulting body.

For instance, in the creation of the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (the predecessor of the IPCC), staff of UNEP and the WMO went to great lengths to shift the status quo and set the institutional design agenda for states. Not only did they lobby the U.S. government with design demands, but they also proceeded, without states, in launching a policy-aggressive body of their own. By doing so, they placed states in a reactive position: states could choose not to cooperate with the new body, and they could even maneuver to bring about a substitute more to their liking, but they could not return to a world in which climate change was not discussed on the international stage, or one in which it was not addressed by an international institution. In the subsequent negotiations to design the IPCC as a substitute for the AGGG, staff of UNEP and the WMO did not set the agenda alone – they bargained with officials from the U.S. government. The resultant design was less insulated from state control than the AGGG had been, yet it was more insulated than what states acting alone would have designed. The case provides a stark illustration of the impact IGO staff can have in the institutional design arena. However, to show that my claims hold in a more generalizable way as well, this paper analyzes a new and original dataset that I constructed from a random sample of 180 intergovernmental organizations.

**Previewing the Implications**

Two types of objections to my claims exist, and although I ultimately dismiss both, I consider them carefully. The first is to suspect that states nevertheless account for the entire process. In terms of sheer frequency, it is impossible to deny that overt state monopolization of institutional design is the exception, *not* the rule. Yet perhaps states are only using pre-existing organizations as convenient venues for their own negotiations, thereby sideling IGO

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7 Feld et al. 1988.
employees. Or, perhaps IGO staff indeed are designing new institutions, but that is only because states demanded these new bodies and nudged closely controlled personnel of existing organizations to take on institutional design tasks on states’ behalf. If this is true, then considering IGOs to be the products of states’ demands and states’ designs remains wholly appropriate.

Elsewhere, my detailed case studies reveal proactive IGO staff who were neither sidelined nor enlisted by states in the institutional design arena – and above, I delineated how state-centric explanations based on power, interests, or norms fall short in explaining the origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Thus, the notion that states account for the entire process is challenged by case study evidence. Nevertheless I take the possibility seriously, and I explicitly allow for it in the quantitative analyses. If it were true that the involvement of IGO staff is actually quite marginalized by states, which merely utilize pre-existing organizations as convenient venues for their own negotiations, then one would expect little systematic difference in the designs of organizations that states create completely on their own and those that states create within the “handy auspices” of existent organizations. Furthermore, if it were true that states demanded these new bodies and nudged closely controlled personnel of existing organizations to take on institutional design tasks on states’ behalf, then, again, one would expect little systematic difference in the designs. Yet neither proposition holds, as shown in the quantitative analyses.

The second type of objection to my claims is to acknowledge that states do not account for the entire process, but to conjecture that this does not matter, because IGO staff are involved in institutional design only in contexts that are somehow “unimportant” to states – or at least, to the most powerful states. Perhaps participation by IGO personnel occurs only in trivial issue areas, in peripheral parts of the world, or in circumstances that attract minimal attention from states in general and/or great powers in particular. If this is true, then considering IGOs to be the products of states’ demands and states’ designs may be unsuitable for making sense of the broader universe of intergovernmental organizations, but it would remain a useful simplification for understanding those bodies that are in some sense “important.”

I take this possibility, too, into consideration. Again, case studies in the companion paper illustrate that IGO staff can play pivotal roles even in institutional design contexts dealing with sensitive issues, affecting all parts of the world, and commanding notice from powerful states. Moreover, in the quantitative analyses, I include control variables such as whether the randomly sampled organization deals with security issues, focuses on more-developed areas populated by states of relatively strong capacity, was created without the involvement of any great powers, is considered a “non-conventional” body, and so on. In addition, in the empirical section I provide a side-by-side comparison of bodies created by states alone versus those created with the involvement of staff from pre-existing organizations. One sees few statistically significant differences between the two groups. Whether “importance” is conceived of in terms of issue area, geographic focus, or involvement by great-power states, by and large it is not the case that bodies designed with participation by IGO personnel are consistently “less important” in some sense.

In short, participation by IGO staff in institutional design cannot be dismissed blithely as unimportant, or as state-driven. Recognizing the role of IGO personnel in institutional design challenges much of what we think we know about intergovernmental organizations. Specifically, it calls into question conventional, state-centric views of intergovernmental organizations as products of the demands and designs of states.
To be clear: I do not deny that states remain heavily involved in the institutional design arena, and I am not claiming that states need not be considered in understanding why intergovernmental organizations exist or look as they do. In fact, state-centric views are likely to be quite appropriate for conceptualizing institutional design during the energetic, state-led organization-building of the mid-20th century. My point is that state-centric views are less fitting for understanding the institutional design arena overall, since in recent decades IGO staff have taken a prominent role as well. To make sense of the origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for instance, one must recognize the maneuvering taking place among states and IGO personnel, not just among states alone. Even constructivists – who are among the most vocal believers in the ability of IGOs to influence states as well as the wider social environment – have overlooked the institutional design arena. And even among the few scholars who have highlighted IGO involvement, no sustained attention has been given to its possible consequences.

Deepening our understanding of this arena is particularly important in light of the fact that participation by IGO personnel indeed has a tangible, general impact. Quantitative analyses of a random sample of intergovernmental organizations offer strong support for my claims: 1) intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement exhibit more insulation from state control that those created by states alone, and 2) the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulated from state control observed in the resultant body. This has significant implications for international relations scholarship and for public policy. From a practical standpoint, the phenomenon raises policy concerns about the elevated amount of resources that states would need to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. From a scholarly standpoint, the phenomenon speaks to ongoing debates concerning IGO independence and democratic deficits in the international realm, enriches our vision of state-IGO relationships in terms of principal-agent frameworks, and enhances our understanding of when and how non-state actors play key roles in institutional design.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework, discussing how IGO employees may act in institutional design and how those actions may be manifested in the bodies that they participate in creating. Section III employs large-n statistical analyses and an original dataset to demonstrate that, even after controlling for multiple other factors, bodies created with participation by staff of pre-existing IGOs are markedly more insulated from common mechanisms of state control than are bodies created by states alone. Furthermore, the greater the extent to which the employees of a pre-existing IGO set the institutional design agenda, the more insulated the new body tends to be. The impact of IGO personnel participation in institutional design holds across multiple operationalizations of insulation, is both statistically and substantively significant, and is robust to multiple alternative specifications. Section IV discusses the findings, delves into their implications for international relations scholarship, then concludes.

II. Theoretical Framework

I argue that the involvement of IGO staff in institutional design is a game-changer, producing consequences with crucial theoretical and practical implications: I predict that formal mechanisms of state control are systematically dampened in bodies created with the involvement of personnel from pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. To show why and how, in this section I begin by discussing insulation from mechanisms of state control – many of which stem

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8 See, for example, Jacobson 1986; Shanks et al. 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Pevehouse et al. 2004).
from initial institutional design processes. Next, I draw on recent work to point out that
the objectives of IGO staff likely differ from those of states, and that such differences are manifest-
ed in the institutional design process. Then, I bring these strands together, arguing that since IGO
staff are extensively involved in institutional design, and since their objectives concerning
insulation from state control differ from those of states, state-centric views are inadequate, alone,
for explaining the overall process and outcomes of institutional design in the contemporary
world.

**Insulation from Mechanisms of State Control**

One of the most basic premises of state-centric conceptualizations of intergovernmental
organizations is that, in the end, states run IGOs. But on what notions is this assertion based?
One is the conviction that intergovernmental organizations lack enforcement capabilities, and
whatever authority they do possess derives from states alone, in the form of delegated power that
states can grant or do away with at their pleasure. There is some truth to this, although it
neglects factors pointed out by international relations scholars: delegated power is not the sole
source of IGO authority, and even if it were, in practice it is rarely wholly confiscated by states.9
Another is the presumption that states are the actors designing intergovernmental organizations,
and therefore the resulting designs must reflect states’ prerogatives. This overly simplis-
tic idea, however, fits awkwardly with the fact that the majority of today’s bodies were created not by
states alone, but with participation by staff of existing IGOs.

Thus perhaps the most fundamental reason for believing that intergovernmental
organizations are run by states is that states face a variety of mechanisms by which they can
steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. Although they may be able to employ
behind-the-scenes informal channels to exert influence in IGOs, states often hedge their bets by
implementing more-formal channels.10 These channels include management of resources,
institutional oversight, and decision-making practices. With the most extreme mechanisms of
control in place, states keep IGO staff under their thumbs by yanking resources, undertaking
vigilant monitoring, vetoing organizational activities, and so on.

**Mechanisms of State Control**

Management of resources – financial or human – is a key mechanism. The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance, is funded directly and solely
by its member states. Moreover, because each state’s contribution is calculated with regard to
the size of its economy, the United States alone possesses leverage over approximately 25
percent of the budget.11 In other organizations, however, states do not monopolize financing – it

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9 See, for example, Reinalda and Verbeek 1998 (see Chapter 15 in particular); Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004;

10 For an overview of the formal and informal channels used by states and other actors to exert influence within
intergovernmental organizations, see Cox and Jacobson 1974. The four general channels emphasized by the authors
(i.e., controlling resources, blocking actions, initiating actions, and brokering deals) are similar to the management
of resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices that I discuss here. I readily acknowledge that
states may attempt to control IGOs by less formal means, and that IGO staff may seek insulation from these less-
formal mechanisms as well. Because the received literature pays little attention to the role of IGO personnel in
institutional design, however, I begin by demonstrating that their involvement is having an impact even on states’
common, formal mechanisms of control. Less-formal mechanisms remain an avenue for further research.

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761854_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. Accessed June 5, 2009.
may come from fellow IGOs, or even from non-state/non-IGO sources such as non-governmental organizations, business interests, or private individuals. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, prepares its own budget proposal, which it submits to a fellow institution, the Organization of American States (OAS) – the OAS may accept or reject the Court’s proposal, but may not amend it.\(^\text{12}\)

In addition to financial resources, an IGO’s human resources may provide inroads for state control. The President of the World Bank has always been an American citizen, nominated by the U.S. government.\(^\text{13}\) The Executive-Director of the World Food Program, in contrast, can hail from any state and is jointly appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization, after consultations with the FAO board.\(^\text{14}\) The more that an IGO’s financial and human resources are susceptible to the whims of its member states, the more easily states can mete out guidance, rewards, and sanctions to the organization’s employees.

States can exert control via institutional oversight as well. In some IGOs, member-states meet quite frequently and at a high level to oversee organizational activities. In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for example, Russia and other former Soviet republics meet four times per year at the heads-of-government level, as well as twice per year at the heads-of-state level.\(^\text{15}\) In other intergovernmental organizations, states meet less frequently – and when they do, their representatives might not be government officials at all. The statutes of the International Hydrological Program (IHP), for instance, merely requests that states choose hydrology “experts” as their representatives – at the 2008 meeting of the IHP Council, nearly half of the states were represented by individuals from universities.\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, although the IHP’s full membership mirrors that of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the IHP Council consists of only 36 member states at a time, and the representatives of those 36 states meet only once every two years.\(^\text{17}\) The more stringently and directly that states participate in institutional oversight, the more easily they can monitor and rein in the actions of IGO staff.

Decision-making practices constitute another important mechanism. Some IGOs possess only one decision-making body, which in some cases does not even consist of the entire membership. In the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), for instance, the Board of Trustees is composed of approximately 20 states, selected on a rotating basis by the UN Secretary-General in consultation with the President of the UN General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).\(^\text{18}\) To stand, therefore, secretariat activities need the acquiescence of only a handful of the member-states. In other intergovernmental organizations, decisions filter through multiple bodies, consisting of the full state membership as well as a subset of states – thus, there are more eyes on secretariat activities.

For example, quotidian decisions for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) are managed by a Council, which consists of just five member states at a time. The OPANAL General Conference, which consists of all member states, keeps tabs on Council and secretariat activities, as well as retaining responsibility for major decisions.¹⁹

Veto power, too, can be a dramatic curb on IGO activities. For example, each of the members of the Andean Community possesses the unilateral ability to block decisions and resolutions, both of which must be adopted by consensus.²⁰ In the United Nations Security Council, any one of the five permanent member states can single-handedly veto a Council resolution. In other organizations, veto power by a minority of states exists in more subtle ways: weighted voting schemes permit some states to “count” more than others, while ever-higher supermajority requirements allow blocking by an ever-smaller number of states. In contrast, organizations governed by one-country-one-vote, simple-majority practices (e.g., UNECE, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) are capable of making decisions even if a substantial number of member states dissent.

Insulation as a Product of Institutional Design

As the examples make clear, intergovernmental organizations vary markedly in their insulation from states’ management of resources, institutional oversight, or decision-making practices. Moreover, insulation from state control is a crucial organizational characteristic. The extent of an IGO’s delegated authority matters little if states can easily intervene. Insulation from state control is costly for states: it increases the amount of resources that states would need to expend to steer, monitor, or reverse IGO activities. What is more, once it exists, states face difficulty in restricting the tasks to which it can be applied. Even when states themselves implement insulation so that an IGO can better pursue a particular task, an organization that has been buffered from state intervention for one task also acquires “air cover” for pursuing other initiatives, for which states may find insulation unnecessary or even unwelcome.²¹

Across IGOs, there is wide variation in insulation from mechanisms of state control, and such variation is not wholly random. While mechanisms of state control may evolve over time – whether because of deliberate maneuverings by IGO staff or simply because states pursue control less vigorously as years pass²² – some differences likely stem from design. Indeed, as other scholars have pointed out, international institutions in general (and intergovernmental organizations in particular) “are the result of rational, purposive interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific problems.”²³ This stance is echoed in work applying

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²¹ One might suggest that states, if they deem this by-product objectionable, can simply roll back the ways in which the intergovernmental organization is shielded from their intervention. Yet not so surprisingly, exerting control generally requires mechanisms of control. Even insulation flowing directly from purposive actions by states rather than IGO staff is difficult to roll back, for if it were easily reversible it would not have provided the credibility, etc., needed for the organization’s mission in the first place.
²³ Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762. Rationality in institutional design indicates that actors craft institutions in ways anticipated to advance their own objectives (Weimer 1995; Goodin 1996; Aggarwal 1998; Nurmi 1998). That is, in the design stage, participants consider alternative forms, in terms of which forms could be expected to facilitate participants’ goals. This is not to say that actors are all-knowing, that they are certain about means-ends relationships, that all share the same objectives, that their objectives are solely long-term or solely short-term, that
principal-agent notions to the international realm. Once states (the principals) have decided to entrust tasks to IGOs (the agents), states still must address key design questions concerning the nature of the delegated authority and the nature of states’ mechanisms of control.\textsuperscript{24} The latter, in particular, are pivotal in encouraging the IGO-agent’s longer-term responsiveness to its state-principals. In short, intergovernmental organizations often are thought to exist because states demanded them and look as they do because states fashioned them that way. As one set of scholars summarizes, “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”\textsuperscript{25}

The reality, however, may be much more complex. First, state monopolization of institutional design is not the rule – it has become the exception. As discussed above, the majority of the intergovernmental organizations that exist today were created not by states alone, but with the participation of staff members of pre-existing IGOs. These hundreds of organizations operate in every corner of the globe, addressing a remarkable range of topics: from agricultural research to energy supplies, from money-laundering to environmental protection. Second, IGO employees’ objectives in general – and with respect to states’ control mechanisms in particular – do not necessarily mirror those of states themselves. The arena of institutional design is an important context in which the staff members of intergovernmental organizations do pursue their own objectives – and in ways that tangibly and systematically have an impact on states.

**IGO Objectives in Institutional Design**

IGO involvement in institutional design is widespread. This would matter little, however, if the employees of intergovernmental organizations act no differently than states themselves. But as a growing body of work makes clear, the objectives of IGO staff can differ from those of member states.\textsuperscript{26} By numerous tactics, in fact, intergovernmental organizations endeavor to alter rather than adapt to the environment presented by states. So what is it that IGO staff want? How would involvement in the design of new intergovernmental organizations help to attain it? And do institutional designs actually differ as a result?

**Material Security**

Building upon recent work, I posit that IGO staff seek material security, legitimacy, and advancement of policies they deem fitting.\textsuperscript{27} To survive and operate, intergovernmental organizations need funding to pay for personnel, facilities, programs, and the like. Moreover, they cannot compromise in the face of different objectives, that the objectives actually end up being facilitated as envisioned, that unintended consequences can not emerge, or that institutions can not change later. For useful warnings regarding the ways in which the concept of institutional design – particularly the “rational” variety – can be misunderstood or misused, see Pierson 2000; Wendt 2001; Duffield 2003.

\textsuperscript{24} Hawkins et al. 2006, 11.

\textsuperscript{25} Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762. This is not to say that proponents of rational institutional design and principal-agent notions deny that the actors involved in creating new IGOs may be non-states (see, for example, Koremenos et al. 2001a, 763). Nevertheless, they join other veins of work in assuming that states are the key actors in institutional design.

\textsuperscript{26} For instance, recent work conceptualizing states as principals and IGOs as their agents highlight why this variety of tactics should be expected. Characterizing intergovernmental organizations as agents explicitly casts IGOs as strategic actors rather than mere automatons of state-principals (see, for example, Nielson and Tierney 2003; Cortell and Peterson 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Lyne et al. 2006; Milner 2006; Martin 2006; Pollack 2006; Thompson 2006).

\textsuperscript{27} Barnett and Coleman 2005, 597-598.
because these needs are ongoing, IGO staff likely pay attention to the mix of sources from which funding is drawn. This is because lack of diversification ushers in reliance on a handful of sources, whose fickleness can trigger serious disturbances in organizational activities. Indeed, from states’ perspective, such insecurity frequently constitutes an instrumental design feature and an important mechanism of state control. The United States, for instance, deliberately has withheld its promised contributions from a host of IGOs – the United Nations, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and others – and threatened to do so for many more.

This is a conscious and overt tactic to upset the activities of organizations that somehow displease the U.S., and it is most disruptive for those whose funding sources are relatively undiversified. The United States, moreover, is not the only state that employs this tactic. IGO personnel face incentives to reduce material insecurity, for it threatens their own individual futures as well as that of their organization as a whole.\(^{28}\) One important way of enhancing material security is by broadening, if possible, the pool from which funding is sought. This does not necessarily entail replacing states as funding sources – in fact, the ideal scenario, from the point of view of IGO staff, may be retaining states but also cultivating access to additional sources, with the aim of increasing both the absolute size and the variety of the potential resource pool.

**Legitimacy**

In addition to material security, IGO staff seek legitimacy.\(^{29}\) Perceptions of legitimacy are crucial, because intergovernmental organizations often must rely on moral suasion rather than brute force to elicit compliance and enforcement from states and other entities.\(^{30}\) Such perceptions stem from a variety of sources, including an IGO’s ability to act justly and honestly, to base policies on desirable norms and values, to form governance structures in accordance with the law, or to represent different societal groups in a fair way.\(^{31}\) To cultivate legitimacy, the employees of IGOs strive to distinguish themselves from their presumably self-serving member-states. They claim to pursue the collective welfare of their international membership – and frequently trumpet their ostensibly neutral and technocratic methods of doing so.\(^{32}\)

The more stringently and obviously an IGO is controlled by member states, however, the less convincing these efforts become. It is difficult to claim to work for the collective good, for example, if a minority of the membership possesses veto power over organizational activities. Like state monopolization of an organization’s access to material resources, decision-making practices also constitute a mechanism by which states exert control within an IGO but also put at risk staffs’ pursuit of particular organizational goals, such as legitimacy. Were staff to have input into institutional design, therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that decision-making structures would look somewhat different – not necessarily eradicating states’ influence, but dampening it.

\(^{28}\) Pfeffer and Salancik 2003.

\(^{29}\) Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574).


\(^{32}\) Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 23.
Advancement of Policies Deemed Fitting

IGO staff also strive to advance policies that they deem fitting. As one set of international relations scholars puts it:

They are the missionaries of our time. Armed with a notion of progress, an idea of how to create the better life, and some understanding of the conversion process, many IO staff have as their stated purpose to shape state action by establishing best practices and by articulating and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behavior… Solutions that involve regulation, arbitration, and intervention by rational-legal authorities (themselves or other organizations) appear sensible, rational, and good to IOs and so disproportionately emerge from IO activity.33

Indeed, the “zealots” and “policy-motivated agents”34 that intrigue students of American politics exist among IGO personnel as well.

Often drawn by their acclimation to certain professionalized environments and/or concern for certain issues, IGO employees self-select into particular bodies. The World Health Organization attracts physicians, while the World Bank attracts economists, for example. Individuals troubled by the plight of refugees gravitate towards the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, while those troubled by environmental degradation gravitate towards the UN Environment Program. Even in IGOs promoting international cooperation across multiple issue areas (e.g., the European Union), employees often share a commitment to addressing varied policy problems with multilateral solutions. This is not to say that IGO employees are always unified in their specific policy prescriptions – but they are united by an interest in seeing their chosen issues taken seriously on the world stage. The policy prescriptions that IGO staff deem fitting, moreover, often flow from policy proactiveness and a rational-legal worldview not necessarily shared by the world as a whole. States may – and often do – try to thwart policies advocated by IGO staff.

Institutional Design as an Arena for Instilling Insulation from State Control

Stringent mechanisms of state control can stand in the way of employees’ objectives. Indeed, that is frequently the purpose – and a fundamental basis for the state-centric view that states run IGOs. Received theory suggests scenarios in which to expect somewhat-dampened mechanisms of state control – for example, in organizations amassing technical or scientific expertise, or in organizations neglected by the most powerful states.35 By and large, however, states undertaking institutional design alone tend to have an interest in implementing mechanisms to promote the new body’s enduring responsiveness to states.

Formal mechanisms dealing with management of material resources, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices are important, common means for doing so. States use material insecurity as a form of leverage over intergovernmental organizations. They face a fundamental tension between their interest in bolstering IGO legitimacy and their inclination to exert political pressure. They do not always agree with IGO staff members’ notions of apt policies.

Thus, states’ prerogatives may conflict with IGO employees’ quest for material security,
legitimacy, and policy advancement. If states dominate IGO access to material resources, they are able to manipulate supplies and disrupt organizational activities. If states wield overt power via vetoes or decision-making bodies, they undermine the efforts of IGO personnel to free themselves from political entanglements and portray themselves as neutral technocrats working for the common good. If states hold frequent and high-level meetings to monitor organizational activities, IGO staff face impediments to addressing their chosen issues as they see fit.

**IGO Involvement in Institutional Design**

Thus, IGO staff face reasons to maneuver for greater insulation from state control, because it can facilitate their pursuit of material security, legitimacy, and policy advancement. Often, states’ mechanisms of control stem from the institutional design stage. Although well-known tendencies toward institutional stickiness make it difficult for IGO staff to alter what has been implemented in the design stage, they nevertheless try and sometimes succeed. Involvement in subsequent rounds of institutional design, however, provides IGO staff with more direct – and likely lasting – means for increasing insulation from state control in new bodies within their organizational family.

This is not to say that IGO staff seek to rid themselves of all vestiges of state control: absolute insulation may be counter-productive, because states are hesitant to join or entrust tasks to an intergovernmental organization that they cannot influence to at least some degree. But by participating in institutional design negotiations, IGO staff can push for designs that loosen mechanisms of state control, thereby providing greater breathing room for the new organization to diversify its sources of funding, legitimize itself as a neutral party buffered from political pressures, and advance policies with less interference by states. In essence, the original “body” can endeavor to create “arms” that are more insulated from state control – this is facilitated by the fact that the latter almost always retain some sort of ties to the former.

This challenges the conventional wisdom that intergovernmental organizations exist because states demanded them, and they look the way they do because states crafted them that way. It is overly simplistic to view mechanisms of state control (or insulation from such mechanisms) as fashioned solely by states, making rational design choices anticipated to advance their own objectives. Rather, staff members of existent IGOs are also important actors in institutional design negotiations, and their objectives with respect to states’ control mechanisms markedly differ from those of states. There is reason to expect IGO staff to push for – and sometimes successfully attain – greater insulation for offshoot organizations. In general, then, intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement will exhibit more insulation from state control than if states were creating alone.

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36 For example, IGO staff can lobby, co-opt competitors, or launch campaigns to bring states’ preferences closer to their own (Hurd 1999; Barnett and Coleman 2005). Executive heads can articulate ideological agendas and build coalitions (Haas 1964; Cox 1969). Employees can interpret states’ rules differently after delegation than before, adopt additional masters, find ways to report activities without revealing much real information, or encourage access by non-governmental organizations and other outside parties (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006). IGO staff can take advantage of uncertainty or disagreements among states, and they can exert internal pressure on states by aligning with domestic interest groups (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 27-28).

37 Abbott and Snidal 1998; Ikenberry 2001; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006. Decision-making rules, especially vetoes, constitute eye-catching and widely used shortcuts for thinking about the extent of state control over an IGO. Therefore such rules are included in the theoretical framework and the quantitative analyses. However, see the empirical section for a discussion concerning my reservations about considering decision-making rules to be a clear-cut mechanism of state control.
**IGO Agenda-Setting in Institutional Design**

The arena of institutional design is an important context in which the staff members of intergovernmental organizations do pursue their own objectives – and in a way that tangibly and systematically has an impact on states, by increasing the amount of resources that states must expend to intervene in organizational activities. Aware that institutional design affects outcomes and cannot necessarily be altered easily later, states wrangle over the elements of institutional design.38 Thus, while IGO staff tend to push for more-insulated designs, their ultimate success likely hinges on their centrality in the institutional design process. That is, if IGO employees play only a supporting role vis-à-vis states, states maintain agenda-setting power and will be in a stronger bargaining position to resist maneuvers for greater insulation. Yet if IGO staff play a more proactive role, they are better able to set the design agenda themselves, forcing states into a weaker and more reactive bargaining position.

Indeed, the form of IGO involvement in institutional design varies. That is, in some situations IGO staff react to agendas set by states, while in others they set agendas to which states react. The more the situation is tilted toward the latter scenario, the better able are IGO staff to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control. An integral component of agenda-setting is the opportunity to shape another actor’s point of reference, which in turn affects how the actor evaluates its alternatives and whether those alternatives appear to be superior to the status quo.

Scholars recognize the importance of agenda-setting, and recent work calls attention to the centrality of the status quo for understanding why states join international institutions.39 My point is related, but different. The staff of existing intergovernmental organizations can shift, to varying extents, the institutional status quo for states. They can impel international discussions of issues that states did not perceive, tried to ignore, or wanted to address in a non-multilateral fashion. They can promulgate their own vision of the form an appropriate multilateral and institutional response ought to take. They can even try to make that vision a reality by designing and launching international institutions themselves. These moves shift the status quo to which states refer when deciding *whether* to create new intergovernmental organizations and choosing *how* such organizations will look. The more that IGO staff lay down the institutional design agenda for states, the more they shift the status quo to which states must react.

The extent to which IGO staff actually shift the status quo varies. If states utilize an existing intergovernmental organization merely as a forum for discussing their own ideas about the necessity and possible form of a new body, then IGO employees encounter limited opportunities for agenda-setting and, consequently, for exerting a significant impact on institutional design. Certainly, in providing secretariat services for states’ negotiations, staff can influence the nature of the information that states receive, and they may be able to suggest institutional design features more in line with their own objectives. For the most part, however, they are in a reactive position, responding to an agenda in which (at least some) states already perceive a need for a new body and have ideas of how that body should look. States themselves have introduced a world in which a particular issue is deemed discussion-worthy *and* important enough to warrant the creation of a dedicated new institution. With this as the status quo, the

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38 Koremenos et al. 2001a, 762.
39 Specifically, by setting up international institutions themselves, powerful states may be able to shift the status quo to which weaker states refer when choosing whether or not to participate in an international institution. That is, a weaker state may wish that the institution did not exist, but it cannot return to such a world. Instead, it can choose only between joining the institution or remaining outside of it (Gruber 2001).
impact of IGO staff on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be modest.

IGO staff are not always in a reactive position, however. Rather than waiting for states to perceive a particular issue as discussion-worthy, employees of an existing intergovernmental organization can make the case themselves. It is not uncommon for them to organize conferences to focus states’ attention on specific topics that they perceive as a problem in need of a multilateral solution. It may be that states were unaware of or lacked information about the problem. Or, it may be that states were cognizant of the problem but faced incentives to ignore it or address it via non-multilateral channels. Either way, it is within the power of IGO employees to usher in a world in which a particular issue sits squarely on the agenda for international discussion.

What is more, in impelling states to discuss an issue on the international stage, the staff of intergovernmental organizations frequently delineate their own notions of an appropriate multilateral and institutional solution – and as explained above, there are reasons for IGO employees to offer design proposals that are relatively insulated from state control. This places states in a more reactive position: the status quo in which the issue is not being discussed no longer exists, nor does the status quo in which there is no clear vision for the form of an appropriate institutional solution. With this as the context for institutional design negotiations, the impact of IGO staff on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be significant.

IGO employees themselves can portray a particular issue as both discussion-worthy and important enough to warrant the creation of a dedicated new institution. At times, they are even more proactive. Not only can they focus states’ attention on particular issues, or delineate their own notions of an appropriate multilateral and institutional solution – they also can attempt to set up a multilateral and institutional solution of their own, as UNEP and WMO personnel did for the issue of climate change. This constitutes an extreme form of setting the agenda and shifting the status quo for states. States’ choice, then, consists of permitting the new status quo to stand, or maneuvering to bring about an intergovernmental organization that is more to their liking. Although they might strongly wish to do so, states cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being discussed, and they cannot return to a world in which the issue is not being addressed by an international institution. When IGO staff seize the initiative to such an extent, their impact on the final form of a new body – in particular, the new body’s insulation from state control – is likely to be considerable. In sum, then, *the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulated from state control the new body will be.*

III. Quantitative Analyses

*New and Original Dataset*

I make two key claims: 1) intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement will exhibit more insulation from state control than if states were creating alone, and 2) the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulated from state control the new body will be. To systematically test these claims, I constructed a new and original dataset. The dataset covers 180 intergovernmental organizations, randomly selected from the universe of existing IGOS as determined by the Union of International Associations (UIA), the publisher of
the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (YIO). My dataset is assembled from information in the 2007-2008 online edition of the YIO, and the unit of analysis is a randomly selected IGO in the year 2008. Table 1 lists all 180 intergovernmental organizations included in the random sample.

[TABLE 1]

The YIO served as the primary data source. For each IGO, the *Yearbook* includes information on its creation year, manner of founding, headquarters location, oversight structure, decision-making structure, sources of financing, state membership, and issue area. Where YIO information was missing or unclear, I consulted supplementary data sources. Primary supplements included the individual websites of the intergovernmental organizations, the Register of United Nations Bodies, the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, and the United Nations Treaty Series.

The Dependent Variables: Insulation from Mechanisms of State Control

Rather than reducing the concept of insulation to a single proxy, I operationalize it with multiple dependent variables in order to facilitate a more comprehensive empirical evaluation of my argument. Insulation is captured according to the practices in place of as 2008, in four alternative ways: 1) as the extent to which state representatives to the IGO hail from official government positions, 2) as the elapsed time between meetings at which the states oversee IGO activities, 3) by the inability of any single state to block proposals in the IGO, and 4) as the extent to which IGO funding derives from states. The variable *Non-State Financing* gets at insulation from states’ management of resources, *Infrequent Meetings* gets at insulation from

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40 The universe from which the random sample is drawn consists of the 1,780 organizations satisfying the following two criteria. First, the organization must be intergovernmental (i.e., Type 2 equal to g). The YIO classifies an organization as intergovernmental “if it is established by signature of an agreement engendering obligations between governments, whether or not that agreement is eventually published.” Second, the organization must be international (i.e., Type 1 equal to A, B, C, D, E, or F). This encompasses “conventional” IGOs: Type A (“federations of international organizations”), Type B (“universal membership organizations”), Type C (“intercontinental membership organizations”), and Type D (“regionally oriented membership organizations”). This also encompasses “non-conventional” IGOs: Type E (“organizations emanating from persons, places, or bodies” – e.g., the United Nations Development Program) and Type F (“organizations of special forms” – e.g., the World Bank). This universe *does not* include bodies deemed by the UIA to be subsidiary or internal bodies (i.e., Type 2 equal to k) – such as the ASEAN Committee on Education. Note that the IGOs included in the International Correlates of War (ICOW) datasets are only a *subset* of the YIO universe: for example, many “emanations” are excluded from ICOW on the presumption that these IGOs are not fully independent of other IGOs. To permit later robustness checks, my dataset includes a dummy variable indicating IGOs classified as Type E-g or F-g. (Yearbook of International Organizations. “Types of International Organizations.” Available at: http://www.uia.be.node/163992).

41 To check coding replicability, I coded each of the 180s IGOs at two different points in time, in a different random order each time. For about 90 percent of the sample, this produced no differences in coding. For the less than 10 percent in which at least one difference was produced, most were due to the second-round attainment of previously unavailable information from the IGO’s website.

42 Insulation from state control is a multifaceted concept, and I try to capture several of these different facets, by operationalizing insulation in four alternative ways. If I were to try to aggregate these four operationalizations into a single proxy, at least two challenges loom: 1) it is not clear whether each should be assigned equal weight, or whether some are more “important” than others; 2) missing data would become a severe problem, since only about 50 of the 180 sampled IGOs have values for all four operationalizations of insulation. By employing multiple versions of the concept of insulation, therefore, I reduce missing data issues and allow readers to make their own assessments about whether some varieties of insulation are more important than others. The findings are similar regardless of which of the four operationalizations is considered.
states’ institutional oversight, *No Unilateral Vetoes* gets at insulation from states’ decision-making practices, and *Non-Government Representatives* gets at insulation from all three. Summary statistics—number of observations, average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum—for the dependent variables, as well as all other variables used in the analyses, are listed in Table 2.

**[TABLE 2]**

### Non-State Financing

The first operationalization, *Non-State Financing*, takes on the following values: 0 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 1 if from state and IGO sources, 2 if from state and IGO and other sources, 3 if from state and other sources, 4 if from IGO sources only, 5 if from IGO and other sources, and 6 if from other sources only. 43 “Other” refers to non-state, non-IGO sources: private individuals, non-governmental organizations, interest earnings, fees for services rendered, and so on. 44

States are presumed to exert direct control over their own contributions, indirect control over the contributions of intergovernmental organizations, and little control over contributions from other sources. Thus, a body’s insulation from state control is lowest (a value of 0) if states monopolize funding and highest (a value of 6) if non-state, non-IGO sources do. Based on 133 observations, the mean value of *Non-State Financing* is 1.47, indicating that the average observation has access to material resources from state and IGO sources, and possibly outside sources as well.

### Infrequent Meetings

The second operationalization, *Infrequent Meetings*, measures the number of months elapsing between meetings at which the full membership oversees organizational activities. 45 Some intergovernmental organizations are overseen only by a subset of the membership, and therefore the full membership never meets. In such cases, the IGO is insulated from those states not serving on the subset-body, and the variable *Infrequent Meetings* is coded as 99. Thus, *Meetings* ranges in value from 0.25 (for organizations, such as the Council of Europe, with delegates-in-residence who meet on a weekly basis) to 99 (for organizations, such as the World Food Program, which are overseen by a select group of member states but never by the full membership simultaneously). 46

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43 Coding material resources in terms of the percentage supplied by various sources is hindered by non-random missing data problems. The YIO lists financing sources for most IGOs but tends to break this down by percentages only for the largest, most prominent organizations. A similar issue with non-random missing data arises if one turns to supplementary sources, including the organizations’ own websites: it is large, prominent organizations that tend to post detailed annual reports on their websites.

44 I also ran the models with a simpler, three-category version of this dependent variable, taking on the following values: 0 if the intergovernmental organization has access to material resources from state sources only, 1 if from state sources but also IGO or other sources, and 2 if from IGO or other sources but not state sources. The main results are no different.

45 Some intergovernmental organizations are overseen only by the full membership, others are overseen only by a subset of the membership, and yet others are overseen by bodies of both types. If both types of body exist, the subset-body generally reports to the full-body. Therefore, the number of months between oversight meetings is coded according to the frequency of meetings of the full membership.

46 The variable is coded this way (instead of, for example, with a count of the number of meetings occurring within a given period of time) so that it matches the other operationalizations, with higher values indicating higher insulation from state control. By maintaining this kind of consistency among the various operationalizations, assessing my
The assumption is that the more time that elapses between states’ oversight meetings, the more insulated an IGO is from state control. Thus, insulation is low if the full membership meets very frequently to monitor organizational activities, and it is high if the full membership rarely or never meets to monitor organizational activities. Based on 134 observations, the mean value of *Infrequent Meetings* is 16.75, indicating that the full membership of the average observation meets a little less frequently than once per year for oversight.

**No Unilateral Vetoes**

The third operationalization, *No Unilateral Vetoes*, is a binary variable indicating whether an organization’s decision-making rules prevent states from wielding unilateral vetoes. That is, a value of zero indicates that states make decisions according to unanimity, weighted voting, super-majority, or other rules that allow a single member to block a proposal. A value of one indicates states’ inability to unilaterally thwart a proposal within an intergovernmental organization.

States are presumed to exert more direct control over an IGO if proposals can be blocked even by a single member. Thus, an organization’s insulation from state control may be higher if states do not possess any unilateral vetoes than if they do. Based on 84 observations, the mean value of *No Unilateral Vetoes* is 0.56, indicating that a little over half of the organizations for which information is available afford no unilateral vetoes to states.

This variable must be considered with caution, for two reasons. First, there are issues with missing data. The Yearbook of International Organizations does not consistently specify voting rules. Organizations for which YIO does provide details are generally large, prominent ones. The same issue is encountered when one turns to supplementary sources.

The second issue is that, although decision-making rules constitute a widely used shortcut for thinking about the extent of state control over an IGO, it is not clear that vetoes, weighting schemes, super-majority voting, and the like *always* ensure more stringent state control. Suppose, for example, that a proposal under consideration by states would expand the tasks and resources entrusted to the staff of a particular IGO. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *reward* organizational activities. But suppose, in contrast, that a proposal under consideration by states would sanction IGO staff for doing something that displeased states. Then, the presence of a unilateral veto means that even a single state could thwart attempts to *sanction* organizational activities. Due to the prevalence of decision-making rules in discussions of state control, I include an operationalization here – but I urge caution in its use.

**Non-Government Representatives**

For the fourth operationalization, *Non-Government Representatives*, higher values indicate higher insulation from state control via the representatives states send to an IGO to make decisions on their behalf. It is coded as follows: 0 if 100% of the state representatives to the decision-making body are active government officials; 1 if 50% or more (but less than 100%) are active government officials; 2 if less than 50% (but more than 0%) are active government officials; 3 if 0% are active government officials.

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47 claims is straightforward: across the board, the coefficient on the key explanatory variables *IGO Involvement* and *IGO Agenda-Setting* should be positively related to the dependent variables.

47 Some intergovernmental organizations possess multiple decision-making bodies. Different IGOs handle multiple bodies in different ways, but perhaps the most common scenario consists of meetings of the full membership (e.g.,
The assumption is that states exert more direct control through representatives that are active government officials, but less direct control through representatives who are not (i.e., representatives from educational institutions, corporations, or other private enterprises). Thus, insulation is lowest (a value of 0) when active government officials monopolize governing bodies and highest (a value of 3) when non-government representatives do. Based on 117 observations, the mean value of Non-Government Representatives is 0.64, indicating that most but not all representatives in the average observation are active government officials.

**The Key Explanatory Variables**

I have argued that intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement will exhibit more insulation from state control than if states were creating alone. In addition, the greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, the more insulated from state control the new body likely will be. I employ two different key explanatory variables to evaluate these claims. The first is dichotomous, while the second is ordinal.

**IGO Involvement in Institutional Design**

For a given intergovernmental organization, the variable IGO Involvement equals zero if it was created by states alone. It equals one if the staff of at least one pre-existing IGO were involved in its design. “Involvement” encompasses the following activities: a) IGO staff provided secretariat services and/or information to states undertaking institutional design, b) IGO staff participated in a moderate capacity, either by initiating conferences or by directly participating in design negotiations at the invitation of states, c) IGO staff initiated comprehensive institutional design proposals to be presented to states, or d) IGO staff set up a new body, with limited or no input from states. First, all flavors of involvement are considered together – then, the alternative key explanatory variable IGO Agenda-Setting parses them out. Of the randomly sampled organizations, only about 35 percent were launched by states alone. For the vast majority, about 65 percent, the staff of a pre-existing IGO participated in the creation process. The involvement of pre-existing IGOs in institutional design is now the norm, not the exception.

Staff from a handful of intergovernmental organizations are involved particularly frequently in institutional design. As noted above, about two-thirds of the sample was created with the involvement of staff from pre-existing IGOs. Of these, more than one in three was created with participation by employees from at least one of the following five organizations: 1) Conferences of the Parties), which are supplemented by more frequent meetings of a subset of the membership (e.g., Meetings of the Executive Board). Because the representatives to smaller supervisory bodies tend to report to the larger supervisory bodies and often serve as the representatives within the larger body as well, IGOs are coded according to the latter.

48 This echoes patterns identified in previous research (Jacobson et al. 1986; Shanks et al. 1996). The Yearbook of International Organizations provides brief narratives of the manner in which organizations were created, and these narratives generally indicate whether states designed alone, or whether/how the staff of pre-existing IGOs participated in the process. For example, the entry for the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases reads: “Founded 1985, by World Meteorological Organization, International Council for Science, and United Nations Environment Programme, to ensure adequate follow-up of the recommendations of the International Conference on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variations and Associated Impacts, held in Oct 1981.” In contrast, the entry for the International Monetary Fund reads: “Founded 22 July 1944, Bretton Woods NH (USA), by representatives of 45 countries who negotiated the details of the Articles of Agreement/Charter. The charter was presented to the governments of these countries for ratification.” Information from the YIO was supplemented with additional data sources, such as the Register of United Nations Bodies.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 3) Organization of American States (OAS), 4) United Nations (UN), and 5) United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In the sample, employees of the United Nations are the most frequent participants in institutional design.

According to conventional wisdom, it does not matter that the majority of existing intergovernmental organizations were not created by states alone. States nevertheless are the actors that must be examined in order to understand the creation and structure of intergovernmental organizations. Non-state actors, such as pre-existing IGOs, can be safely ignored, because states are the only – or at least the most important – players in the institutional design process. If the conventional wisdom holds, then, with other factors held constant, *IGO Involvement* should be unrelated to a body’s insulation from mechanisms of state control. That is, the involvement of IGO staff in the institutional design process should predict no systematic differences in resulting institutional structures: states, after all, are the actors that matter for our understanding.

My argument challenges the conventional wisdom. In the institutional design process, IGO staff play frequent and even extensive roles, and their objectives concerning insulation from state control differ from the objectives of states themselves. Thus, there is reason to expect that involvement by IGO staff has an impact on institutional design outcomes such as insulation from state control. If this is true, then bodies created with participation by staff of pre-existing IGOs will display greater insulation from state control than do bodies created by states alone. That is, I expect the coefficient of the key explanatory variable *IGO Involvement* to be positively signed and statistically significant, after controlling for other factors.

Note that the coding of *IGO Involvement* does not preclude the possibility that states and IGO staff interact in the institutional design process. That is, it does not require that a given observation was created by IGO staff alone. I am not pitting state-monopolization of design against the extreme scenario of IGO-monopolization of design. This, in fact, provides a usefully tough test of the conventional wisdom: is there systematically more insulation from state control, even among cases in which the participation of IGO staff was quite constrained? The proclivity of IGO staff to push for insulation from state control likely is dampened somewhat when states also participate in the institutional design process.

The majority of today’s intergovernmental organizations were created not by states alone, but with the involvement of personnel from pre-existing IGOs. Thus, a pertinent question is not under what conditions IGO staff do participate – rather, it is under what conditions IGO staff do not participate. Do states bar them from the design of “important” bodies? Perhaps participation by IGO personnel occurs only in trivial issue areas, in peripheral parts of the world, or in circumstances that attract minimal attention from states in general and/or great powers in particular.

Yet one sees little evidence of this in a side-by-side comparison of bodies created by states alone versus those created with the involvement of staff from pre-existing organizations. Whether “importance” is conceived of in terms of issue area, geographic focus, or involvement by great-power states, few dissimilarities exist between the two groups. To see this, consider

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49 Note that most of the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a given observation may encompass both economic and social issues – the work of the Food and Agriculture Organization, for instance, touches on economic issues such as agriculture, as well as social issues such as poverty. Likewise, a given observation may focus on more than one region – the Ibero-American Social Security Organization, for example, focuses on Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking states in Europe and in the Americas.
Table 3, which uses chi-squared tests to check for differences among the 180 randomly sampled intergovernmental organizations – 65 of which were created by states alone, and 115 of which were created with the participation of staff from pre-existing IGOs.

The table displays only four statistically significant differences, two of which are closely related. At first glance, it appears that IGO staff are rarely involved in the creation of bodies dealing with political issues. This seems plausible, since political issues likely pertain to state survival more immediately than do economic or social ones, and therefore states may work energetically to prevent IGO staff from participating in the design of institutions that touch on such issues. Upon drilling down into more detailed types of political issues, however, one finds that most of the difference derives from bodies charged with promoting general cooperation. That is, omnibus organizations such as the United Nations, the League of Arab States, or the Organization of American States have been created by states alone, frequently in the first half of the 20th century. In general, these are not the types of bodies that IGO personnel participate in creating – but in recent times states themselves are rarely creating them either.

In addition to political or general cooperation issues, two other dissimilarities emerge. For one thing, a statistically greater percentage of bodies created with the involvement of IGO staff also involved China – the difference in percentages may be an artifact of small absolute numbers. Furthermore, states seem to monopolize institutional design when ten or fewer states participate in the process – in negotiations “important” enough to attract a relatively large number of states, IGO staff participate frequently, not rarely. In short, there is little basis for dismissing as “unimportant” the many bodies created with participation by the personnel of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. In general, these bodies are quite similar to bodies created by states alone.

**IGO Agenda-Setting in Institutional Design**

States do not monopolize the design of all intergovernmental organizations. In general, however, they are involved in some capacity. In some cases they rubber-stamp a design formulated almost entirely by IGO staff, but in other cases they dominate negotiations and relegate IGO staff to an auxiliary role. Put differently, in some situations IGO staff set agendas to which states react, while in others they react to agendas set by states. The more the situation is tilted toward the former scenario, I argue, the better able are IGO staff to present states with a *fait accompli* that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control.

I test this claim with a second key explanatory variable, *IGO Agenda-Setting*. This variable is ordinal, indicating the extent to which employees of an existing IGO set the agenda for institutional design. In other words, for a given intergovernmental organization, higher values of *IGO Agenda-Setting* indicate more proactive institutional-design involvement by the staff of a pre-existing IGO. Specifically, for each unit of analysis the variable takes on the following values: 0 if it was launched by states alone; 1 if it was created through inter-state negotiations for which IGO staff provided administrative services; 2 if it was designed largely by states, but with moderate input by IGO staff (e.g., staff participated in the negotiations at states’ invitation, or staff organized a conference that brought attention to the issue); 3 if it was based on

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50 The quantitative analyses the variable *Organization Age*, which indirectly controls for the year of creation. Subsequent robustness tests also incorporate *Mandate of General Cooperation* as an additional control variable.

51 The quantitative analyses include a control for *Number of States Negotiating*. Subsequent robustness tests also incorporate *China Involved* as an additional control variable.
designs proposed by IGO staff and revised by states; and 4 if it was set up by IGO staff, with limited or no input from states.

If one could apply process-tracing in detailed case studies of every observation, one could tease out the precise nature of agenda-setting by IGO staff. Such an approach is not possible on a large-n scale, however. For some observations, the *Yearbook of International Organizations* and supplementary sources indicate IGO involvement in institutional design but do not provide enough detail to determine its intensity in terms of agenda-setting.

In such circumstances, to avoid overstating the extent to which IGO staff established an institutional design agenda to which states reacted, *IGO Agenda-Setting* is set equal to one. The variable receives a higher value only if the sources provide specific evidence of more intensive participation by IGO staff. Thus, *IGO Agenda-Setting* is coded conservatively. This likely understates IGO agenda-setting, thereby making it more challenging to find evidence in support of my argument. The greater the agenda-setting by IGO staff, I argue, the more insulated from state control the new body will be. Thus, I expect the coefficient of the key explanatory variable *IGO Agenda-Setting* to be positively signed and statistically significant, after controlling for other factors.  

*Control Variables*

Received theory indicates several other factors that may matter for insulation: the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved, and attributes of the group of states involved. I incorporate control variables to capture such factors.

*Passage of Time*

Personnel within IGOs possess numerous tactics for altering rather than accepting the environment presented by states. Intergovernmental organizations can lobby, co-opt competitors, or launch campaigns to bring states’ preferences closer to their own. Executive heads can articulate ideological agendas and build coalitions. In addition, IGOs can interpret states’ rules differently after delegation than before, adopt additional masters, find ways to report activities without revealing much real information, or encourage access by non-governmental organizations and other outside parties.

In general, such approaches take time – time for intergovernmental organizations to learn and execute, and time for states to grow accustomed to rather than rein in such activities. Even absent purposive action by personnel, insulation may change naturally if states pay less stringent attention to preventing insulation as years pass. To allow for the possibility that organizations become more insulated (whether purposefully or not) over time, the analysis includes the variable *Organization Age*, which indicates the number of years that have passed since an organization was created.

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52 The results of simple probit or ordered probit models, run with either *IGO Involvement* or *IGO Agenda-Setting* as the sole explanatory variable for the four operationalizations of insulation from state control, are in line my claims. For all eight models, the coefficients are positively signed – and with only exception, those coefficients are statistically significant at the five-percent level.


54 Cox 1969.

55 Hawkins and Jacoby 2006.

56 Thus, this variable also captures when the body was created, thereby allowing for the possibility that, for example, IGOs created in recent decades differ, in terms of insulation from state control, from IGOs created in the early-
**Issue Area and Nature of the Task Involved**

The issue area covered also may help to explain variation in insulation across intergovernmental organizations. Maintaining control within IGOs necessitates conscientious oversight and nimble reactions by states. But such conscientiousness and nimbleness consume states’ resources and gains from the division of labor. Because security-related issues pertain to state survival more immediately than do economic or social ones, states may be most willing to expend resources to retain control within IGOs that deal with such “high politics” issues. States may be reluctant to utilize intergovernmental organizations extensively in matters related to national security—and when they do, states may strive more forcefully against insulation, attempting to ensure that these matters are under their direct control.

Technical or scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue area may be important as well. Matters requiring extensive technical or scientific expertise often entail informational asymmetries in which the employees of an intergovernmental organization accumulate specialized knowledge. This may place IGO staff in an advantageous position vis-à-vis states (in particular, weaker ones) that lack the resources necessary for acquiring similar specialized knowledge in order to steer, monitor, or reverse organizational activities. Even for states possessing the capacity to acquire expertise on par with IGO staff, the costs involved may be prohibitive. If, in addition, uncertainty surrounds the technical or scientific issue, there is even less incentive for states to expend the resources needed to ensure state control over the IGO.

To capture these two possibilities, the analysis incorporates two binary variables. The first, National Security Issues, equals one if an intergovernmental organization deals with matters pertaining to national security, such as military training, collective defense, weaponry, and so on. This applies, for instance, to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). The coding includes IGOs—the Western European Union (WEU), for example—dealing with other issue areas in addition to ones touching upon national security. The second variable, Technical or Scientific Uncertainty, equals one if an intergovernmental organization focuses on matters requiring expertise in an area in which technical or scientific knowledge remains under development. This is the case, for instance, for the Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM), an organization seeking to develop satellite and telecommunications technology.

**Attributes of the Group of States Involved**

The attributes of the states involved also constitute an important potential explanation for insulation. In the initial bargaining context, and subsequently as well, a small group of relatively homogeneous and high-capacity states may be able to act in one accord, agreeing on and maintaining mechanisms that impede IGO insulation and enhance direct control by states. For example, intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) cater to a select assemblage of industrialized—and largely Western and capitalist—democratic countries. Such wealthy and comparatively like-minded states may find it relatively easy to install and employ strong mechanisms of state control within

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57 Lipson 1984.
intergovernmental organizations. The binary variable Developed-Areas Focus controls for this possibility.

Relatively small and homogeneous groups of high-capacity states may be well equipped to establish and maintain their control over intergovernmental organizations. Yet larger and more-heterogeneous groups, or groups involving lower-capacity states, encounter a more complex environment. When great powers participate in institutional design, they often emerge as natural leaders in the group and possess incentives and wherewithal to keep intergovernmental organizations under stringent state control. But when a group of states undertakes institutional design without the involvement of any great powers, limitations in leadership and capabilities make the maintenance of stringent state control more difficult. What is more, as the number and heterogeneity of the states involved in institutional design intensify, the negotiating environment becomes more complicated. More parties weigh in, and consensus is less likely. This can hinder states’ ability to design and preserve mechanisms of state control within intergovernmental organizations.

To account for such complexities within the group of states involved in institutional design, the analyses incorporate three additional controls. Number of States Negotiating is a continuous variable capturing the size of the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations. No Great Powers Negotiating is a binary variable equal to one if the group of states involved in institutional design negotiations did not include any states that were great powers at the time. Global Focus is a binary variable equal to one if an intergovernmental organization was set up by and serves states from all over the world, rather than focusing on a specific region.

Results

The statistical analyses employ probit models with the binary dependent variable No Unilateral Vetoes. Ordered probit models are used with the ordered dependent variables Non-State Financing, Infrequent Meetings, and Non-Government Representatives. All models are run with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The Impact of IGO Involvement

Table 4 displays the results with the (binary) key explanatory variable IGO Involvement. The results for No Unilateral Vetoes should be interpreted cautiously, as previously mentioned. However, across the four dependent variables, intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement indeed display greater insulation than do those created by states alone. Whether insulation from state control is operationalized in terms of states’ management of resources, states’ institutional oversight, or states’ decision-making practices, IGO Involvement is positively signed and statistically significant at standard levels. This holds even when alternative

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58 Koremenos et al. 2001a; Lyne et al. 2006.
59 For most intergovernmental organizations, the YIO lacks information on the number and names of states involved in the institutional design process. Therefore, I use an IGO’s initial membership as a proxy. While this omits states that participated in the negotiations but did not immediately join the organization, this captures the vast majority of the participants in the institutional design process and is a substantial improvement over the missing data from the YIO. A little less than 20 percent of the data remains missing.
60 “Great-power states” are defined according to the “International Correlates of War – Major Powers”: Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), China (1950 to present), France (1816-1940, 1945 to present), Germany (1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991 to present), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-present), Russia (1816-1917, 1922 to present), United Kingdom (1815-present), United States (1898-present). Available at: PaulHensel.org/dataintl.html.
explanations for insulation – the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved, and attributes of the group of states that participated in design – are taken into account.

[TABLE 4]

Other factors also matter. All four models suggest that insulation from state control tends to be higher for older organizations, organizations in which no great powers participated in institutional design negotiations, and organizations created by and serving states from all regions of the world. Moreover, all four models indicate that insulation from state control tends to be lower for organizations dealing with national security issues and for those that cater to developed states. Although not all of these display statistical significance at standard levels, the impacts of the variables Organization Age, National Security Issues, Developed-Area Focus, No Great Powers Negotiating, and Global Focus are consistently in the expected direction.

The results are more mixed for the remaining two variables: Technical or Scientific Uncertainty, and Number of States Negotiating. The larger the number of states involved in institutional design, the less frequently the members meet to oversee organizational activities. For organizations that focus on issues requiring expertise in an area in which technical or scientific knowledge remains under development, states are more likely to be represented by individuals who do not hold government positions.

There are marked differences in terms of insulation from state control, depending on whether or not IGO staff were involved in a body’s institutional design process, and these differences persist even after controlling for various other factors. Simulations using Clarify software, as shown in Table 5, provide a more intuitive depiction of this. The simulations were calculated with IGO Involvement alternatively set at zero or one, and all other independent variables at the mean values. All of the estimates are statistically significant at the one-percent level.

[TABLE 5]

When states design alone, the probability that financing comes solely from states is 58 percent. When IGO staff are involved, that probability drops to 23 percent. Conversely, the probability that financing comes solely from intergovernmental organizations is 3 percent if states design alone, but jumps to 17 percent if IGO staff participate as well.

Annual oversight meetings are the norm, but deviations from this norm also reveal a pattern. The probability of more-frequent semi-annual meetings is 18 percent if states monopolized the institutional design process, but 14 percent if employees of pre-existing organizations also participated. On the other hand, the probability of less-frequent bi-annual meetings is 17 percent if states monopolized the institutional design process, but 25 percent if employees of pre-existing organizations also participated.

States designing alone have a 61 percent probability of creating an IGO in which at least one state possesses a unilateral veto over organizational activities. If IGO staff also are involved, however, the probability drops dramatically, to only 30 percent.

In addition, in intergovernmental organizations crafted solely by states, there is an 80 percent probability that all state representatives to the body come from current government positions. In bodies created with the involvement of IGO employees, however, the probability is much lower: 54 percent. Furthermore, the probability that no government officials serve as states’ representatives is only 2 percent for bodies designed by states alone, but 10 percent for bodies designed with the participation of staff from other intergovernmental organizations.

The Impact of IGO Agenda-Setting

The involvement of IGO staff in the institutional design process clearly matters for the resulting body’s insulation from state control. Further statistical analyses, with the second key explanatory variable, IGO Agenda-Setting, affirm this. Table 6 displays the findings. For all four dependent variables, the greater the extent to which IGO staff set the institutional design agenda for states, the more the resulting organization tends to be insulated from state control. With other factors held constant, IGO Agenda-Setting is positively signed and statistically significant at standard levels. Again, the results for No Unilateral Vetoes should be interpreted cautiously.

[TABLE 6]

Across all four models, several of the control variables again are consistently related to an organization’s insulation from state control: Organization Age, National Security Issues, Developed-Area Focus, No Great Powers Negotiating, and Global Focus. Insulation from state control tends to be higher for organizations created by and serving states from all regions of the world, for organizations in which no great powers participated in institutional design negotiations, and for older organizations. In contrast, insulation from state control tends to be lower for those catering to developed states or dealing with national security issues. Not all of these control variables are significant at standard levels for all versions of the dependent variables, however. As with the binary version of the key explanatory variable, Technical or Scientific Uncertainty is positively related to Non-Governmental Representatives, while Number of States Negotiating is positively related to Infrequent Meetings.

Insulation from state control intensifies with the extent to which IGO staff set an institutional design agenda for states. Again, Clarify simulations give a more concrete depiction of this relationship. The estimated probabilities, shown in Table 7, were calculated at each value of IGO Agenda-Setting, with all other variables held at their mean values. Each estimate is statistically significant at the one-percent level.

[TABLE 7]

The pattern is clear across all four operationalizations of insulation from state control. The more that the institutional design agenda is set by staff of pre-existing institutions, the more the resulting body is insulated from state control. The more that states, on the other hand, dominate the agenda, the more stringent the mechanisms of state control that are implemented in the new body.

As agenda-setting by IGO staff becomes more extreme, the probability that the body’s financing comes from intergovernmental organizations alone increases from 5 to 35 percent. The probability that state oversight meetings occur only every other year jumps from 17 to 35 percent. The probability that no states possess unilateral vetoes soars from 46 to 83 percent. The probability that no representatives hail from government posts shoots up from 4 to 26 percent.

Conversely, the less that IGO staff determine the reference point to which states react – that is, the more that states themselves dictate the institutional design agenda – the less insulated from state control the resulting body tends to be. The probability that the body’s financing comes from states alone rockets from 6 to 50 percent. The probability that states’ oversight meetings occur twice per year rises from 7 to 18 percent. The probability that at least one state possesses a unilateral veto grows from 17 to 54 percent. The probability that all state delegates are government officials swells from 33 to 74 percent.
Robustness Checks

Across the models, the coefficients on *IGO Involvement* and *IGO Agenda-Setting* are positively signed and both statistically and substantively significant. To probe the robustness of these key findings, I undertake several further checks. Specifically, I rerun the eight models, using five sets of additional control variables. Overall, the sign and statistical significance of the two key explanatory variables remain largely unchanged, as shown in Table 8.

[TABLE 8]

First, I use indicator variables to control for participation by the five IGOs whose employees are most frequently involved in institutional design. These are the Economic and Social Council, Food and Agriculture Organization, Organization of America States, United Nations, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. For the most part, these additional controls are statistically insignificant at standard levels.

Second, I include an indicator variable for the two types of intergovernmental organizations that the *Yearbook of International Organizations* classifies as “non-conventional.” “Emanations” (Type E-g) and “organizations of special forms” (Type F-g) are the most common types of organizations but are sometimes omitted from other datasets of intergovernmental organizations. The coefficient on this control variable is positive and statistically significant at standard levels in most cases.

Third, to control for regional idiosyncrasies, I include indicator variables for the major regions of the world: Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. In organizations designed by and serving states in Africa or the Middle East, states are less likely to be represented by non-government officials. In organizations designed by and serving states in Europe, states are less likely to meet infrequently to oversee organizational activities. None of the other regional controls is statistically significant.

Fourth, I add indicator variables for the involvement of specific great powers in institutional design negotiations: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The coefficients on these additional variables are almost always negative, supporting the intuition that great powers impede organizations’ insulation from state control—only a few of the controls for great powers exhibit statistical significance at standard levels, however. A notable exception to the great-power pattern is China, whose involvement predicts greater insulation from state control, although the effect is never statistically significant.

Fifth, I add an indicator variable for intergovernmental organizations charged with promoting general cooperation, spanning across issues in the political, economic, and social realms. States may be more willing to expend resources to retain control within IGOs with such omnibus responsibilities. Certainly, states seem to have created most of their organizations on their own, without participation by IGO personnel, and such general mandates may be associated with the level of insulation as well. The coefficient on this control variable is negative and statistically significant at standard levels in most cases.

As synthesized in Table 8, the introduction of these five sets of additional controls has no impact on the sign of the coefficient, and the coefficient loses its statistical significance in only

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62 “Great-power states” are defined according to the “International Correlates of War – Major Powers”: Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), China (1950 to present), France (1816-1940, 1945 to present), Germany (1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991 to present), Italy (1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945, 1991-present), Russia (1816-1917, 1922 to present), United Kingdom (1815-present), United States (1898-present). Available at: PaulHensel.org/dataintl.html.
nine of the 40 models. Moreover, this loss of statistical significance is concentrated in the models that operationalize a body’s insulation as the amount of time elapsing between states’ oversight meetings. The other operationalizations of insulation are largely unaffected.

IV. Discussion of Findings and Implications

Findings

The quantitative analyses provide firm support for my claims. Even after accounting for the passage of time, the issue area and nature of the task involved, as well as the attributes of the group of states involved, intergovernmental organizations created with IGO involvement are found to be more insulated from state control than are those created by states alone. In addition, the greater the extent to which IGO staff set an institutional design agenda to which states react, the greater the resulting body’s insulation from state control tends to be.

The effect is statistically significant in all four models. Specifically, it holds regardless of whether insulation is operationalized in terms of states’ financing, oversight frequency, decision-making rules, or representation in the body. Moreover, the findings are generally robust to numerous alternative specifications, including controls for the particular IGOs or great powers involved, whether the body is charged with promoting general cooperation, the regions of focus, and whether the body is of a non-conventional form.

Even more important, the effect of IGO participation is significant in substantive terms as well. Recall the Clarify estimations in Tables 5 and 7, which consider the key explanatory variables IGO Involvement and IGO Agenda-Setting at various values while the other independent variables are held constant at their mean values. A pattern exists. The probability that states’ representatives hail solely from non-government positions ranges from 4 percent if states design alone, up to 26 percent if IGO staff take a highly proactive role in the institutional design process. In a similar fashion, the probability that no state possesses a unilateral veto ranges from 46 percent if states design alone, up to 83 percent if IGO staff take a highly proactive role. There is a clear pattern in which common mechanisms of state control – such as veto power over organizational activities, monopolization of funding sources, frequent oversight, and using government officials as delegates – systematically encounter more obstructions in bodies created with the participation of employees of pre-existing intergovernmental organizations.

Implications

Recognizing the role and impact of IGO staff in institutional design generates hefty implications for scholarship in international relations. It weighs in, both theoretically and empirically, on persistent debates surrounding the possibility intergovernmental organizations being “independent” of states. It reveals complex interactions among states and IGOs – interactions that enrich recent endeavors to apply principal-agent notions to the international realm and speak to concerns about democratic deficits in the international realm. And it enhances our understanding of the institutional design arena, challenging conventional views that intergovernmental organizations exist because states demanded them and look as they do because states crafted them that way.

The quantitative analyses support my argument that institutional design is an arena in

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63 To conserve space, the detailed results of the 32 models are not shown here. However, the additional variables’ signs, statistical significance, and impact on the main results are discussed below.
which the employees of intergovernmental organizations not only are pursuing their own objectives, but also are having a tangible impact on states. Specifically, by promoting design suggestions and sometimes even initiating the design process themselves, IGO staff can help to bring about new institutions that states – even powerful ones – initially opposed and can less easily control. A clear pattern emerges: common mechanisms of state control systematically encounter greater obstructions in bodies that were created with IGO involvement. This provides a concrete response to the enduring debate of whether, when, and how non-state entities may be important actors in their own right on the world stage.

This is not to say that the employees of all intergovernmental organizations have instigated demand for new bodies or have sought and succeeded to insulate those bodies from state control. And again, it is essential to emphasize that states remain heavily involved in the institutional design arena, and must continue to be considered in understanding why IGOs exist and look as they do. The point, however, is that looking to states alone for explanations overlooks the fact that the institutional design arena now encompasses maneuvering and bargaining among states and IGO staff, not just among states.

In addition, the findings deepen our theoretical understanding of relationships among states and IGOs. Only recently, international relations scholars have begun to characterize relationships between states and IGOs in terms of delegation, with the former as principals and the latter authorized as their agents. This nascent but growing body of work has generated valuable insights. But it nevertheless misses a crucial point: the international realm is not so straightforward. Describing states as principals and IGOs as agents over-simplifies a much richer environment. Either directly or indirectly, intergovernmental organizations are agents of states – but they also may be agents of IGOs, and sometimes they act as principals themselves. Thus, they are in pivotal position, with the potential to push “up” against state principals as well as “down” against agents of their own.

The richness of the principal-agent context hints at implications for a different vein of theoretical work: whether or not democratic deficits exist among intergovernmental organizations. Institution design participation by IGO employees is widespread and in some cases quite intensive – but whether this participation reflects democratic principles remains an open question. By drawing attention to the role and impact of IGO staff in institutional design, I highlight additional information that scholars need to consider. Circumstances in the contemporary international system are more complex than previously recognized. For one thing, a body’s insulation from state control is not necessarily the product of states alone. Intergovernmental organizations also participate often in the design of institutions and mechanisms of control. Furthermore, delegation chains do not necessarily terminate at the link between governments and IGOs. Yes, a chain may extend from voters to elected politicians to intergovernmental organizations – but IGOs, too, are bequeathing tasks to other bodies. These two facts are relevant to theoretical discussions concerning democratic deficits in the international realm.

Received scholarship frequently portrays intergovernmental organizations as products of state demands and state designs. Yet investigating IGO-created IGOs shows that this widely held premise jibes poorly with reality. Acknowledging the prominent role that IGOs can – and do – play in institutional design calls into question much of what we think we know about

64 Tsebelis 1997; Majone 1998; Nye 2001; Moravcsik 2004.
intergovernmental organizations.⁶⁵ Do they really exist because states demanded them? Do they really look as they do because states designed them that way?

These questions are not going away. In fact, they are likely to grow ever more pertinent. While traditional state-created IGOs remain a “relatively stable core” of the universe of active intergovernmental organizations, the number of institutions launched with the aid of IGO employees has exploded in the past several decades, constituting a “rapidly enlarging periphery.”⁶⁶ If this number continues to rise, received state-centric explanations may become less and less relevant for understanding the international realm.

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⁶⁵ Students of American politics, too, have tended to overlook the possibility that bureaucrats themselves may play roles in the creation of new agencies. Thus, this may be an area for further exploration outside of international relations as well.

⁶⁶ Shanks et al. 1996, 600.
### APPENDIX

**Table 1: Randomly Selected Intergovernmental Organizations in the Dataset**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name (Abbreviation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of the Mediterranean (MAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank (ADB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Economic Community (AEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Information Society Initiative (AISI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Telecommunications Union (ATU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Command Transformation (ACT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amazonian Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Investment Company (TAIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Central Bank Governors Forum (ACBGF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific Commission on Agricultural Statistics (APCAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Agricultural Research Institutions in the Near East and North Africa (AARINENA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berne Club</td>
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<tr>
<td>BioNET INTERNATIONAL Consultative Group (BICG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Sea Action Plan (BSAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Board of Governors of the European Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest Union for the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (Budapest Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community (CARICOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean Festival of Creative Arts (CARIFESTA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean Information System for the Agricultural Sciences (CAGRIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caspian Environment Programme (CEP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central American Council on Housing and Human Settlements (CCVAH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization (CST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission for Inland Fisheries of Latin America (COPESCAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for the Scientific and Technological Development of Central America and Panama (CTCAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commonwealth Youth Programme (CYP)
Conference des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays d'expression francaise (CONFEJES)
Conference of the European Regional Legislative Parliaments (CALRE)
Conferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas de Centroamerica (CFAC)
Consultative Committee on Industrial Change (CCMI)
Cospas-Sarsat
Council of Arab Ministers for Social Affairs
Council of Arab Ministers for Youth and Sports
Council of Europe (CE)
Council of Legal Education (CLE)
Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP)
Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA Court of Justice)
ECA Subregional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA Kigali)
Environmental Crime Prevention Programme (ECPP)
Euro-Mediterranean Legal Metrology Forum (EMLMF)
European Commission
European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET)
European Forestry Commission (EFC)
European Health Committee (CDSP)
European Network on Teacher Education Policies (ENTEP)
European Nuclear Energy Tribunal (ENET)
European Sub-Regional Aviation Security Training Centre (AVSEC)
European Youth Foundation (EYF)
FAO/WHO Coordinating Committee for the Near East (CCNE)
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Galileo Satellite Navigation Project
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)
Group of Eight (G8)
Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
Ibero-American Social Security Organization (OISS)
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE)
Inter-American Center for Crafts and Popular Arts
Inter-American Center for Development and Environmental and Territorial Research (CIDIAT)
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
Inter-American Committee on Social Development (CIDES)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH)
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
Intergovernmental Committee for the Application of the International Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab and European States bordering on the Mediterranean
Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG IOTWS)
Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region (INFOFISH)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRDB)
International Centre for Promotion of Enterprises (ICPE)
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR)
International Commission of the Scheldt River (ICS)
International Commissions for the Protection of the Moselle and Saar (ICPMS)
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
International E-Road Network
International Energy Agency (IEA)
International Hydrological Programme (IHP)
International Seabed Authority (ISBA)
International Tropical Fruits Network (TFNet)
Internet Governance Forum (IGF)
Joint Force Command South (JFC Naples)
Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Health of Seafarers
League of Arab States (LAS)
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation Scheme (MGC)
Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE)
Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN)
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Command (NAEW&C FC)
Near East Forestry Commission (NEFC)
Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific (NACA)
Niger Basin Authority (ABN)
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
Nordic Committee for Nuclear Safety Research (NKS)
Nordic Contact Agency for Agricultural and Forestry Affairs (NKJS)
Nordic Council (NC)
Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)
Nordic Film and Television Fund (NFTF)
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO)
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)
Parliamentary Commission of the Central European Initiative
Permanent Committee on Cadastre in the European Union (PCC)
Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education (IMHE)
Regional African Satellite Communications Organization (RASCOM)
Regional Centre on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development for the Near East (CARDNE)
Regional Centre on Urban Water Management, Teheran (RCUWM)
Regional Information System (SIRI)
Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Information and Training Centre - Wider Caribbean (REMPEITC-Carib)
Regional Maritime Academy, Accra (RMA)
Regional Network for the Chemistry of Natural Products in Southeast Asia
SAARC Network of Researchers on Global Financial and Economic Issues
SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF)
SECI Regional Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime (SECI Center Bucharest)
Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (UNEP/CMS)
Sistema Regional de Informacion sobre Formacion Profesional (SIRFO)
Six Countries Programme (6CP)
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
South Centre
South-South Cooperation WIDE (SSC WIDE)
Southern Africa Postal Operators Association (SAPOA)
Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC)
Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)
Standing Committee on Commonwealth Forestry
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
Trade and Investment Council
Trans-European North-South Motorway Project (TEM)
Transit Transport Coordination Authority of the Northern Corridor (TTCA)
UNESCO Regional Office for Education in the Arab States (UNEDBAS)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL)
United Nations Committee on Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies
United Nations Development Group (UNDG)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MUNOC)
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
United Nations Programme on Space Applications (PSA)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Special Committee of Twenty Four)
United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)
United Nations Statistical Commission
UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (IUNRWA/UNESCO IE)
Venice European Centre for the Trades and Professions of the Conservation of Architectural Heritage
Visegrad Group
West-Nordic Foundation (Vestnordenfonden)
Western European Union (WEU)
World Food Programme (WPF)
World Health Organization (WHO)
YOUTH Community Action Programme
ZEP-RE - PTA Reinsurance Company
Table 2: Summary Statistics for all Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>OBS</th>
<th>AVE</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MIN</th>
<th>MAX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Financing</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent Meetings</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>16.75</td>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Unilateral Vetoes</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Government Representatives</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Explanatory Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Involvement</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Agenda-Setting</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>0.94</td>
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<td><strong>Other Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Organization Age</td>
<td>175</td>
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<td>20.03</td>
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<td>National Security Focus</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical or Scientific Uncertainty</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed-Area Focus</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Number of States Negotiating</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>17.78</td>
<td>24.21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Great Powers Negotiating</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Focus</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC Involved</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO Involved</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS Involved</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Involved</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO Involved</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Conventional Body</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on Africa</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Americas</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>0.36</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Europe</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Middle East</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Involved</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France Involved</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Involved</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Involved</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Involved</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate of General Cooperation</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OBS = number of observations, AVE = mean value, SD = standard deviation, MIN = minimum value, MAX = maximum value
Table 3: “Importance” of IGOs Created by States Alone versus IGOs Created with IGO Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE AREA</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created by States Alone (n₁ = 65)</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created with the Involvement of IGO Staff (n₂ = 115)</th>
<th>P-value and Significance of Chi-Squared Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encompasses social issues</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompasses economic issues</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encompasses political issues</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/terrorism/border security</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance/administration</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law/arbitration</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security/defense/military</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy #</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer space/aerospace #</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General cooperation Δ</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOCUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created by States Alone (n₁ = 65)</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created with the Involvement of IGO Staff (n₂ = 115)</th>
<th>P-value and Significance of Chi-Squared Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global focus</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Africa</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Americas</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Europe</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Middle East</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on More-Developed Areas</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Less-Developed Areas</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STATES INVOLVED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Involved</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created by States Alone (n₁ = 65)</th>
<th>Percentage of IGOs Created with the Involvement of IGO Staff (n₂ = 115)</th>
<th>P-value and Significance of Chi-Squared Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 or fewer states involved</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No great powers involved</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States involved</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom involved</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France involved</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia involved</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC) involved</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
# also encompasses economic issues
Δ encompasses political, economic, and social issues simultaneously
Table 4: The Impact of IGO Involvement on Insulation from State Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-State Financing</th>
<th>Infrequent Meetings</th>
<th>No Unilateral Vetoes</th>
<th>Non-Government Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IGO Involvement</strong></td>
<td>0.983***</td>
<td>0.338*</td>
<td>0.820**</td>
<td>0.748**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization Age</strong></td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Security Issues</strong></td>
<td>-1.047**</td>
<td>-0.888</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.420)</td>
<td>(0.596)</td>
<td>(0.602)</td>
<td>(0.595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical or Scientific Uncertainty</strong></td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.738*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.644)</td>
<td>(0.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developed-Area Focus</strong></td>
<td>-0.501</td>
<td>-0.534</td>
<td>-1.247**</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.607)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of States Negotiating</strong></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Great Powers Negotiating</strong></td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Focus</strong></td>
<td>0.602*</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.929**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: IGO Involvement and Probabilities of Insulation from State Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability that:</th>
<th>If states designed alone</th>
<th>If IGO staff participated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing comes from states alone</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing comes from IGOs alone</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States meet twice per year for oversight</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States meet every two years for oversight</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one state possesses a unilateral veto</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No states possess a unilateral veto</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All state representatives are government officials</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No state representatives are government officials</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: The Impact of IGO Agenda-Setting on Insulation from State Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-State Financing</th>
<th>Infrequent Meetings</th>
<th>No Unilateral Vetoes</th>
<th>Non-Government Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IGO Agenda-Setting</strong></td>
<td>0.425*** (0.082)</td>
<td>0.257** (0.123)</td>
<td>0.294* (0.173)</td>
<td>0.279* (0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization Age</strong></td>
<td>0.008 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Security Issues</strong></td>
<td>-1.048** (0.422)</td>
<td>-0.888 (0.596)</td>
<td>-0.050 (0.596)</td>
<td>-0.780 (0.567)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical or Scientific Uncertainty</strong></td>
<td>0.653 (0.481)</td>
<td>-0.291 (0.211)</td>
<td>0.320 (0.599)</td>
<td>0.790** (0.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developed-Area Focus</strong></td>
<td>-0.501 (0.444)</td>
<td>-0.448 (0.516)</td>
<td>-1.039* (0.624)</td>
<td>-0.215 (0.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of States Negotiating</strong></td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.023*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Great Powers Negotiating</strong></td>
<td>0.264 (0.242)</td>
<td>0.200 (0.236)</td>
<td>0.122 (0.333)</td>
<td>0.052 (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Focus</strong></td>
<td>0.473* (0.343)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.334)</td>
<td>0.677 (0.468)</td>
<td>0.888* (0.455)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 111 119 77 105

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7: *IGO Agenda-Setting* and Probabilities of Insulation from State Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability that:</th>
<th>IGO Agenda-Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing comes from states alone</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing comes from IGOs alone</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States meet twice per year for oversight</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States meet every two years for oversight</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one state possesses a unilateral veto</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No states possess a unilateral veto</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All state delegates are government officials</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No state delegates are government officials</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37
Table 8: Robustness of Sign and Significance of the Key Explanatory Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-State Financing</th>
<th>Infrequent Meetings</th>
<th>No Unilateral Vetoes</th>
<th>Non-Government Representatives</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IGO Involvement</strong></td>
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<td>Added controls for specific IGOs involved</td>
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<td>Added control for non-conventional IGOs</td>
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<td>Added controls for specific region involved</td>
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<td>Added controls for specific powers involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Added control for mandate of general cooperation</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⊕ indicates that coefficient on key explanatory variable is positive and statistically significant at standard levels; + indicates that coefficient is positive but not significant
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Milner, Helen. 2006. Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems,


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http://esa.un.org/esaWeb/referenceService/registry/pgSelectBodiesByName.html


