The United States Congress has changed in two significant ways over the past twenty years: there has been an increase in partisan polarization and in the number of women elected to the House and Senate. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to analyzing each of these changes in isolation but have yet to explore the important connections between them. Gendered partisanship explains congresswomen’s strategic responses to increasing partisanship in Congress and the electorate. These responses that are shaped by significant gender dynamics at work in the electorate and inside Congress: gender stereotypes about congresswomen and their communal behavior, a legacy of bipartisan cooperation among former congresswomen, and institutional and party rules. I expect that gendered partisanship leads to sex differences in partisan behavior in both the House and Senate, and that women’s behavior in each chamber differs based on chamber-specific incentives: women in the House take extra steps to prove their partisan credentials, while women in the Senate are more likely to work across party lines. I test these chamber-specific predictions about sex differences using data about members’ party loyalty in voting, partisan attacks in congressional speech, and party fundraising.

The United States Congress has changed in two significant ways over the past twenty years: there has been an increase in partisan polarization and in the number of women elected to the House and Senate. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to analyzing each of these changes in isolation but have yet to explore the important connections between them. In this project, I develop and begin to test a theory of gendered partisanship in the House and the Senate.

Gendered partisanship explains congresswomen’s strategic response to increasing partisanship in Congress. These strategic responses are shaped by significant gender dynamics at work in the electorate and inside Congress: stereotypes about congresswomen and their communal behavior, a legacy of bipartisan cooperation among congresswomen, institutional and party rules, and differences in the types of districts where women run and win. I expect that gendered partisanship leads to sex differences in partisan behavior in both the House and Senate, and that the women’s behavior in each chamber differs based on chamber-specific institutional rules and incentives: women in the House take extra steps to prove their partisan credentials, while women in the Senate are more likely to work across party lines.

I analyze differences between congressmen and congresswomen, by party, in their partisan behavior and pursuit of power in the House and Senate from 1993-2008. Widespread gender stereotypes, and much of the literature on women and politics, maintain that female leaders are more cooperative and less assertive than men, leading to implicit and explicit expectations that an increase in congresswomen should be accompanied by increased cooperation and civility in Congress. However, as members of Congress are increasingly rewarded for their partisan behavior, congresswomen in the
House have incentives to take extra steps to prove their partisan credentials. Today’s Republican congresswomen must also counter the stereotype that they are more liberal than their male counterparts (as indeed was the case among Republican congresswomen during the 1990s). I therefore hypothesize that congresswomen’s behavior in the most recent House sessions is even more partisan than congressmen’s.

In the Senate, by contrast, I expect that institutional norms and rules that promote individualism lead to higher levels of partisanship among men than among women. Women in the Senate are particularly well positioned to influence the policy making process in the Senate; the need to attain sixty votes to stop a filibuster and consider most major legislation offers opportunities for centrist, cooperative senators to visibly shape legislation, and women are particularly well positioned to do so.

I test these chamber-specific predictions about sex differences using data about members' party loyalty in voting, partisan attacks in congressional speech, and party fundraising in Congress. These preliminary results offer some support for gendered partisanship at work in both the House and the Senate, providing insight into scholars’ understanding of gender dynamics in Congress and adding to the list of effects of partisan polarization and institutional rules on legislative behavior.¹

**Political and Theoretical Background**

The gender diversity of the U.S. Congress has increased considerably in the past three decades, although women remain significantly underrepresented, comprising only 17 percent of each chamber in 2009. Between 1989 and 2009, the number of women in

¹ I want to stress the preliminary nature of these results. This is a new project and I look forward to feedback to help direct it from here.
the House increased from 29 to 73 and the number of women in the Senate increased from 2 to 17.

The increase in congresswomen, however, has been considerably slower than women’s gains in other professions. Inside Congress, women remain largely outsiders in a male-dominated institution. Indeed, scholars have argued that Congress is a gendered institution (Rosenthal 2002, Duerst-Lahti 2002) and scholars and politicians alike have provided examples of gendered, and race-gendered, bias on the part of some congressmen against congresswomen (e.g., Hawkesworth 2003, Boxer 1993; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Margolies-Mezvinsky 1994). These dynamics may give congresswomen incentives to work with one another frequently, including across party lines, but they may also provide congresswomen with additional incentives to prove themselves to their male colleagues, especially their fellow partisans.

Scholarship on women in legislatures emphasizes gender—but not partisan—differences in legislative style and substance. Research suggests that congresswomen are better at building consensus than congressmen and that electing more women will change not only policies but transform the legislative process itself (e.g., Flamang 1985; Gelb and Palley 1996; Kathlene 1994). Research conducted on congresswomen’s legislative activities before Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994 found that Democratic and Republican congresswomen alike were more likely than their male counterparts to vote for and sponsor issues of importance to women such as child care, women’s health, access to abortion, domestic violence prevention, and pay equity (Burrell 1994; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dodson 1995; Dodson 2006; Gelb and Palley 1996; Norton 1999; Swers 1998; Thomas 1994).
Scholarly work on women in legislatures, however, does not generally account for the effects of institutional and partisan imperatives on congresswomen’s behavior and ambition. A notable exception is Swers (2002), who finds that Republican congresswomen respond to the Republican takeover of Congress by demonstrating increased partisanship in 1995 and 1996.

In January, 2007, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) became the first female Speaker of the House, presiding over a chamber that was 84 percent male. When she was sworn in, she arguably received more attention than had any other congresswoman. Her victory was heralded as an accomplishment for women and for Democrats, as her party’s victory in the 2006 midterms catapulted her from Minority Leader to House Speaker.

Presiding during an era of powerful party leaders and heightened partisan polarization, Pelosi wields more power—i.e., she has more tools and prerogatives—than her Democratic predecessors, giving her significant influence over the legislative agenda and the careers of rank-and-file members. Pelosi embodies many of the traits typical of post-reform Speakers: she is a strong partisan, demonstrated by her support for liberal Democratic policy initiatives, her fundraising prowess, her willingness to exclude the minority party from legislative decision-making, and her relentless attacks on Republicans. Pelosi’s leadership is at odds with the consensus-oriented style described by many scholars of women and politics as typical of female leaders, raising questions about the effects of changing partisan and institutional incentives on congresswomen in particular.

Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), by contrast, wields considerable power in her position as a Republican moderate. She is widely viewed as the senator most likely to
cooperate with Democrats on health care and economic policy in the 111th Congress. Since the start of the 111th Congress, and particularly during the health care reform debate, Snowe has received considerable attention from her colleagues and the media alike because of her pivotal role in determining the fate, or in shaping, major legislation. Snowe’s was one of three Republican votes on President Obama’s stimulus package, and as of mid-October 2009, she was the only Republican who had voted for a Democratic health care reform plan at any stage in the process.

Clearly, institutions shape the ability of these Pelosi and Snowe to accrue power. A female majority leader in the Senate would of course be big news, just as it was in the House, but a moderate minority party congresswoman in the House would go unnoticed during major debates. Other prominent moderate female senators in the 111th Congress include Susan Collins (R-ME), Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D-AR), Mary Landrieu (D-LA), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), while in the House there are few moderate congresswomen in 2009.

A Theory of Gendered Partisanship

Gender stereotypes suggest that female leaders exhibit communal behavior while male leaders are more likely to possess leadership traits and be assertive and agentic (e.g., Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Eagley and Karau 2002). Indeed, past scholarship on women in legislatures leads to the prediction that an increase in congresswomen should increase cooperative behavior inside the institution (e.g., Kathlene 1994, Duerst-Lahti 2002; Gelb and Palley 1996). Some of this literature focuses on consensus-building by women; other works cites congresswomen’s demonstrated record of support for women’s issues and work across party lines to put
women’s issues on the agenda in conjunction with the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues in the early 1990s (Dodson 2006; Gertzog 2004).

However, institutional forces in Congress are powerful in shaping members’ incentives and behavior. Partisanship in Congress and polarization between the two parties, has risen dramatically in recent decades (e.g., Rhode 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Theriault 2008). Members have ceded considerable power to party leaders in the contemporary House of Representatives since the 1970s (e.g., Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2002). Republican leaders’ further centralized their power with a series of reforms during their twelve years in the majority, and to the surprise of political observers, Democratic leaders kept many of the GOP innovations intact (Pearson and Schickler 2009).

The rise in leadership power has given leaders more power over the careers of their members. Leaders pick and choose between their members when it comes to allocating scarce resources such as committee assignments, legislative opportunities, and campaign funds, often rewarding party loyalty in roll call voting and fundraising for the party (Pearson 2005). Rank-and-file members also use these criteria when casting their votes for party leaders. Thus members pursuing power in committees or in the leadership have strong incentives to support the party in any way they can. Additionally, narrow margins and increased ideological polarization between the parties mean that partisan competition is fiercer than it has been in decades, leading to a breakdown in comity and “regular order” (Mann and Ornstein 2006).

As members of Congress wage partisan warfare as members of two distinct teams, and as members are rewarded for their partisan behavior—behavior that includes
voting with the party on votes that divide the parties, fundraising for the party, and attacking the other party—congresswomen have additional incentives to prove their partisan credentials than congressmen that stem from “gendered partisanship.”

*Gendered partisanship refers to congresswomen’s strategic response to increasing partisanship in Congress and the electorate.* Gendered partisanship is distinct from a general strategic response by all members of Congress because congresswomen’s response takes account of significant gender dynamics that have shaped expectations about their behavior, including specific stereotypes held by the electorate and other members of Congress about congresswomen and the legacy of bipartisan cooperation among congresswomen. This causes sex differences—in both degree and kind—in members’ strategic reactions to increasing partisan polarization in Congress.

Because institutional incentives matter, there are systematic differences in the ways that gendered partisanship shapes the behavior of congresswomen that hinge upon the interplay of increased congressional partisanship and institutional forces. In the majoritarian House, increased partisan polarization gives congresswomen incentives to work harder than congressmen to prove their partisan credentials. In the contemporary Congress, majority party leaders attain 218 votes by working with their own members rather than forming cross-party coalitions.

Republican congresswomen have even stronger incentives than Democratic congresswomen to demonstrate support for their party. Research on gender stereotypes shows that congresswomen are viewed as more liberal than congressmen are, regardless of their actual voting records (McDermott 1997). Indeed, GOP Congresswomen trying to move up in their party must contend with the legacy of long-serving moderate GOP
congresswomen who often defected from their party or worked across party lines, such as former Republican Representatives Nancy Johnson (CT), Marge Roukema (NJ), Connie Morella (MD), and Sue Kelly (NY).

For Democratic women, some gender stereotypes may be helpful rather than harmful. Indeed, in Democratic congressional primaries since 1998, where Democratic voters tend to be more liberal than Democratic voters in the general election, women have won at a higher rate than men (Lawless and Pearson 2008). So while being labeled a liberal may help Democratic women win favor with party leaders, they still must contend with gender stereotypes that suggest women are less likely to possess leadership traits.

The increase in partisanship, and the concomitant partisan team mentality among members, has been dramatic in the Senate as well (see, e.g. Lee 2009). Nonetheless, women senators have fewer incentives to toe the party line than their House counterparts because of institutional differences between the two chambers. Senators are somewhat more insulated than House members from partisan pressures because of norms and institutional rules that give individual senators significant power in the legislative process, including the filibuster, holds, and a strict seniority system. Bipartisan support is often necessary to pass legislation in the Senate because it takes sixty votes to invoke cloture, putting a premium on senators’ ability to cooperate across party lines. Women senators are particularly well positioned to take advantage of gender stereotypes that position them to work across the aisle to forge compromise and consensus.

Women have a long history of significant underrepresentation in politics, which, despite recent gains, persists in Congress today. Congresswomen’s incentives to be good
partisans is thus consistent with incentives to be particularly active participants in the legislative process in general. Support for the idea that congresswomen work harder than congressmen for strategic reasons is well documented in other domains. Recent work by Anzia and Berry (2009) shows that congresswomen are better than congressmen at bringing money back to their districts and that congresswomen sponsor more bills than congressmen. Pearson and Dancey (2009) find that congresswomen deliver more one-minute speeches and speeches during legislative debate on the House floor than congressmen do.

Research on congressional elections and candidate emergence shows that new congresswomen arrive on Capitol Hill having already taken extra steps to get there. Women are more concerned with their legitimacy as candidates and likelihood of victory than men (Lawless and Fox 2005; Dodson 1998; Fowler and McClure 1989; Fulton et al. 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2002). These concerns translate into gender differences in congressional candidacies: while women running for Congress win congressional elections at the same rate as men, non-incumbent women running from 1984-2006 have have more electoral experience and raise more money than men (Pearson and McGhee 2009). In general, women candidates raise as much, or more, money than their male counterparts (Burrell 1994, 1998; Cook, Thomas and Wilcox 1994; Fox 2006). The incentives for women to prove themselves in an institution where men are the norm only increase once they arrive, and proving their partisan credentials is particularly important in today’s polarized era.
Data, Hypotheses, and Measures

I have created a new dataset of all members of the House and Senate from 1993 to 2009 that includes demographic, district, and institutional information. The data also include election outcomes, campaign spending, and the presidential vote in each member’s district. The data captures three forms of members’ partisan behavior: party voting on the House and Senate floor, leadership PAC activity on behalf of the party, and partisan speech. The data span the decades when the number of women in Congress and partisan polarization increased most rapidly, although some of the analysis focuses only on the 110th Congress (2007-2008). In this section, I present an overview of the data and outline my hypotheses.

There has been an increase in the number of women in the House and Senate from 1989 to 2009, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The biggest increase occurred in 1992, often referred to as the “Year of the Woman,” when the number of women in the House nearly doubled from 28 to 47 and the number of women in the Senate increased from 3 to 6. The increases in congresswomen have been small but steady in the election cycles that have followed. In 2009, 73 women serve in the House and 17 serve in the Senate.

[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here]

The growth in congresswomen is a disproportionately Democratic phenomenon. In the 101st Congress, the parties were near parity: the percentage of all congresswomen who were Democrats was 55%. By the 111th Congress, Democrats’ share of congresswomen grew to 77%. The analyses that follow will shed some light on the growing partisan gap. In the Senate, one woman of each party served in the 101st. In the 111th, thirteen of 17 women are Democrats.
Because women face gender stereotypes that suggest that they will be more cooperative and less aggressive than men, gendered partisanship leads to the expectation that congresswomen in the House will go to greater lengths than men to prove their partisan credentials with their voting records, fundraising for the party, and partisan speeches. By contrast, I expect that women in the Senate will be more likely to display their independence—downplaying their partisan credentials and proving their bipartisanship—taking advantage of gender stereotypes in an institution where cooperation can be yield influence. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:

H1: Congresswomen in the House vote more often with their party than congressmen, controlling for relevant factors. Women in the Senate will vote less frequently with their party than men.

H2: Women raise more money for their colleagues and party than men do in the House, but not the Senate.

H3: Women give more speeches than their colleagues. In the House, I expect that these speeches are more partisan. In the Senate, I expect that men’s speeches are more partisan than women’s.

Results

Gendered partisanship shapes congresswomen’s incentives to toe the party line when it comes to voting on the House and Senate floor. An obvious litmus test of partisan loyalty is the rate at which members vote in favor of legislation supported by the majority party and opposed by the minority party on the floor. To pass their legislative program (and to avoid embarrassment), the majority party in the House needs 218 of 435 votes. But even in Congresses with large majority party margins, attaining 218 votes is not always easy. I capture members’ support in voting with party unity scores calculated by CQ Weekly. At the end of each year, CQ Weekly publishes members’ “party unity
scores,” the percentage of votes in which a member of Congress votes with his or her party on roll call votes where the majority of each party opposes the majority of the other, adjusted for participation so that the score is calculated from the votes they actually cast.

The bivariate results in Table 1 suggest that there are indeed sex differences within each chamber and institutional differences between the two chambers. With the exception of the 103rd Congress, the women in the Senate vote with their party less often than the men do. In 1993-1994, women senators’ average was 3 points higher than men’s, and from 1995-2008 women voted less often with their party, differences that ranged from two to five points. In every Congress, women in the House vote with their party more often than Congressmen, with differences ranging from 1 to 3 points.

Republican women lag behind Democratic women in their loyalty. But more striking is the increase in Republican congresswomen’s party loyalty. In the 102nd Congress (not shown), Republican women voted with their party 70 percent of the time, compared to a chamber average of 85 percent. In the 103rd Congress, GOP congresswomen’s average rose to 76 percent. After Republicans took control of Congress, Republican women’s average rose to 89 percent, and it has not returned to 1993-1994 levels since then, remaining at 89 percent or above in all Congresses except the 106th.

Many factors predict a member’s party loyalty in voting, perhaps most notably a member’s district concerns. And congresswomen and congressmen do not come from the same types of districts. Women are more likely to represent liberal, urban, and well-
educated districts than men (Palmer and Simon 2009). In the multivariate analyses of party unity that follow, I therefore control for a member’s district partisanship, captured by his or her party’s presidential candidate’s vote share in the district. I also control for the number of terms a member has served, along with their party. The first analysis pools the 103rd to 110th Congress and includes dummy variables for each Congress, with the 110th as the excluded category. The second analysis focuses solely on the 110th Congress. The results of the Senate analysis are in Table 2, and the House analysis is presented in Table 3.

[Table 2 and 3 about here]

The multivariate results confirm that women in the Senate are less loyal to their party than similarly situated men. From the 103rd to the 110th Congress, women in the Senate vote with their party 4.3 percent less frequently than men, statistically significant at p<.001. In the 110th Congress, being a female senator is associated with a nearly 7 point drop in party unity, statistically significant at p<.05. Not surprisingly, the more same party constituents, the higher a senator’s party unity. Given that a senator’s state partisanship is typically the top explanation for a senator’s deviation, the fact that gender performs so strongly in a model that includes it is striking.

In the House, congresswomen are significantly more loyal to their party than men are, controlling for their district, party, and length of service. The results shown in Table 3 reveal that from the 103rd to the 110th Congress, women vote with their party a higher percentage of the time than men. Perhaps most interesting are the partisan differences. In the pooled analysis, and in separate multivariate analyses I ran of each Congress (not shown), Democratic women vote with the party at a significantly higher
rate than Democratic men. In the pooled analysis, Republican women are significantly less loyal to their party than Republican men. However, by the 110th Congress, the sex difference among Republicans is no longer statistically significant. In the individual analyses of each Congress, the negative statistically significant difference disappears beginning in the 108th Congress. Through 2002, Republican congresswomen voted with their party less frequently than their male counterparts, and since 2003 there has been no difference.

An important next step is assessing the degree to which this change is a function of replacement and how much of it is a result of conversion, whereby individual congresswomen are becoming more loyal over time. The data reveal that the more recently elected Republican women are more conservative, and vote with the party more often, than the Republican women of the past. But it is also the case that majority party status, combined with partisan pressures, resulted in increasing loyalty from GOP congresswomen.

Leadership PACs

Party leaders increasingly look to their members for assistance in pursuing electoral advantage, and individual members pursue power inside the House by contributing money to their fellow partisans (Cann 2008). Party leaders provide incentives—and directives—to help overcome this collective action problem, viewing members’ campaign contributions as an expression of party loyalty above and beyond supporting the party position in roll call votes. Generally requiring more effort than voting with one’s party on the Floor, raising money for the party sets members apart from their colleagues whose party loyalty is expressed only in their voting record. As
members and leaders adopted larger roles as financiers of their colleagues’ campaigns, vulnerable members turned to congressional campaign committees, party leaders and their colleagues for increased assistance.

Members of the House and Senate and other elected officials began to form leadership PACs in the 1980s (Baker 1989), although members were already contributing to fellow partisans. Leadership PACs are distinct from other PACs because members of Congress and other elected officials—not outside groups such as unions, trade associations, or ideological interest groups—form them to contribute to up to $10,000 per cycle ($5,000 in the primary and $5,000 in the general) to their colleagues and would-be colleagues. Initially, the scope of leadership PACs was minimal, but with every new cycle more members form them. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 38 members of Congress had leadership PACs in 1994. During the 1997-1998 cycle, elected officials operated 116 leadership PACs, including 51 by House members, and just two years later, in the 106th Congress, 71 House members had a leadership PAC. By 2008, 141 members formed leadership PACs in the House.

Women’s participation in leadership PAC giving has not been analyzed. The rationale for expecting sex differences is mixed. When individuals in the professions most likely to lead to elected office are surveyed, women are more likely than men in the same professional circumstances to indicate that the need to fundraise deters them from running for office (Lawless and Fox 2005). And because women are less likely to be in professional circles connected to large contributions, the idea that it is harder for women to raise money is perpetuated, even among women politicians themselves. In spite of the notion that women have a harder time raising money, or perhaps because of it, women
raise as much—or more—money than men in their own congressional campaigns (Burrell 1994, 1998; Cook, Thomas and Wilcox 1994; Fox 2006; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986).

As party money is increasingly valued and expected, congresswomen have extra incentives to raise money for the party—both to prove their partisan credentials and overcome the (erroneous) notion that women are bad at fundraising. Indeed, Speaker Nancy Pelosi proved her partisan credentials by demonstrating her fundraising prowess in her bid for the Democratic Minority Whip in 2001. Data from the Center for Responsive Politics reveal that Pelosi created “PAC to the Future” in 2000, raising $792,800 to distribute to Democratic candidates and outraising her rival Steny Hoyer (MD). In 2006, Pelosi’s PAC contributed $653,500 to 88 House candidates and $10,000 to Senate candidates.

In the analysis that follows, I test the hypothesis that women raise more money for their colleagues and party than men do in the House, but not the Senate. I analyze leadership PAC data from 2008 election cycle, obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics. The first variable indicates whether a member formed a leadership PAC, the second captures the total contributions to party candidates a member’s leadership PAC made. Forming a leadership PAC sends a signal that a member is part of the party’s electoral team, and the amount of money signals one’s level of commitment to the team.

In the House, 141 members formed a leadership PAC; 82 Republicans formed a leadership PAC, or 41 percent of the Republican Conference. Among Republicans, men are more likely to form leadership PACs. Of the 82 leadership PACs, only 7 were women’s. Fifty-nine Democrats formed a leadership PAC, 27 percent of the Democratic
Caucus. Thirteen were formed by women and 46 by men; 26.5 percent of all Democratic women and 25.4 percent of all Democratic men. Averaging the parties together, congressmen contributed $61,814 in leadership PAC dollars and congresswomen contributed $30,694. (Members who did not contribute at all are included in these averages).

When controls for exclusive committee membership, leadership position, district presidential vote, party, and terms are included in multivariate models that predicts the formation of a leadership PAC (not shown) and models that predict the amount of leadership dollars raised, sex is not a significant predictor of leadership PAC activity in the 110th Congress, as shown in Table 4.²

[Insert Table 4 here]

A higher proportion of senators than House members formed leadership PACs in the 110th Congress, 87 senators in total. Thirteen of the sixteen women senators had a leadership PAC, those that did not included Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Snowe, and Maria Cantwell (D-WA). The average leadership PAC contribution total made by the 16 women in the Senate in the 2008 election cycle was $134,700, compared to an average of $150,831 by men. The difference is not statistically significant. In a multivariate analyses set up in the same way as the House analyses, I test the expectation that women are less likely to form leadership PACs and give less than men in the Senate. As with the House analyses, the variable for sex is not statistically significant in either model. Regardless of the differing institutional incentives, and the conventional wisdom about women’s difficulty raising money, women’s leadership PAC activity mirrors men’s in both chambers.

² When models are run separately for each party the results are consistent.
Partisan Speech

Floor speeches provide members of Congress with opportunities to enhance their own party’s reputation and damage the other party’s in front of one’s colleagues and a C-SPAN audience alike. Consistently giving partisan speeches may enhance one’s reputation as a team player and damage the possibility of forging bipartisan relationships.

One-minute speeches provide members opportunities to demonstrate their commitment to their party. Unlike in the Senate, known for its rules allowing unlimited debate on any topic, opportunities for House members to speak on the floor are somewhat limited, particularly opportunities for members to speak about whatever they choose. Legislating in the House is governed by special rules that set strict time limits on debate on major legislation and, increasingly often, on the number of amendments that members may offer. Members’ opportunities to speak out about topics of their choice, e.g., offering commentary on politics, policy, or on issues of importance to their constituents, are often confined to one-minute speeches, morning hour, and special orders. At the beginning of most legislative days, any member may seek recognition to “make a speech on a subject of his or her choice not exceeding one minute in duration” (Dreier 1999). The Speaker determines how many one minutes to allow, usually informing both party’s leaders in advance.

Members frequently launch partisan attacks against the other party, or stand up to defend their own party. In recent years, party leaders have taken an active role in coordinating one minutes. The “Republican Theme Team” and the “Democratic Message Group” recruit members to deliver one minutes on an issue designated as the party’s daily message (Harris 2005; Schneider 2003). Congressional observers, and even some
members, have criticized one minutes because they start the day off with a partisan tone. A 1997 report by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Civility in the House of Representatives,” recommended that the House either eliminate one minutes or move them to the end of the day. A bipartisan group of over fifty members of Congress sent letters to the Speaker in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses to complain that one minutes had become “a series [of] soundbite assaults . . . highly conducive to the kind of attacks that used to be reserved for campaign commercials” (Schneider 2003). Reformers have not been successful in their attempts to curb one-minutes.

Previous studies of one-minute speeches find that members who are disadvantaged in the institution, such as junior members, minority party members, “backbenchers,” and non-committee chairs, are most likely to take advantage of unconstrained time (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001; Rocca 2007). In the 103rd and 109th Congress, congresswomen gave significantly more one-minute speeches than congressmen (Pearson and Dancey 2009).

I collected data on all one-minute speeches in the 110th Congress for this analysis. This amounted to some 3,698 speeches. The Congressional Record is available online, but it must be downloaded into text files and separated by category and by member to determine how many speeches members gave and to run the content analysis programs for each member’s speeches. For this analysis, I created a separate document for each member, which contained all of their one-minute speeches. To analyze the content of members’ speeches, I used a content analysis program, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC, developed by James Pennebaker and colleagues (Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth 2003). LIWC is a word-based count system that assumes that people attempt
to express particular concepts by the use of specific words that constitute the concept (Pennebaker and King 1999). LIWC, like other computer-aided content analysis programs that aim to quantify linguistic themes in human language, works through a set of specific “dictionaries” that are applied to a given text (Ropping 2000).

In the analyses of congressional speeches, I created dictionary categories that enabled LIWC to capture mentions of the word (or forms of) Democrat and Republican. If a member mentioned either party, a research assistant read the content of the speech and coded it as negative in tone, positive in tone, or neutral in tone. I then generated separate counts for each member of the number of speeches in which a member is negative about the other party and positive about one’s own party.

In the 110th Congress, members gave anywhere from 0 (114 members) to 211 one minutes. Congresswomen were more likely to give one-minute speeches: congressmen gave 7.99 speeches and congresswomen gave 10.57 speeches. In this analysis, however, I am interested in only the number of partisan one-minute speeches members give, not the overall number of speeches. At the bivariate level, there is no real sex difference among Democrats. Congressmen averaged 1.8 and congresswomen averaged 1.5 speeches in support of the party and .79 and .65 speeches attacking Republicans, respectively. There were striking sex differences among Republicans, however, in partisan speechmaking. Republican congresswomen gave, on average, 4.2 speeches attacking Democrats and 1.95 speeches praising Republicans, while Republican congressmen gave only 1.2 speeches attacking Democrats and .63 speeches in support of their party. Representative Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) led the House in the number of partisan one-minutes.
I analyze partisan speechmaking using multivariate regression analysis. Although speeches attacking the other party and defending one’s own party are both types of partisan speechmaking to advance one’s own “team,” they differ in tone and content. Attacking the other party generates more conflict, and it violates gender stereotypes to a greater extent than supporting one’s own party. I therefore use two dependent variables, the number of speeches attacking the other party a member gives and the number of speeches defending one’s own party, and analyze each party separately. In addition to testing for sex differences, I include controls for seniority, district presidential vote for the party, and the member’s own vote share in the last election. Members who represent districts with a sizable share of constituents who identify with the other party and members who are electorally vulnerable should be less likely to attack the opposing party for risk of offending their other-party constituents. These members may be just as likely to defend their own party, so I do not necessarily expect that these variables will depress partisan speechmaking in the models predicting positive in-party speechmaking.

The results in Table 5 reveal that Republican congresswomen are leading the charge attacking Democrats and defending Republicans. Republican congresswomen are significantly more likely to do both, but it is worth noting that GOP congresswomen are particularly likely to attack Democrats in their one-minute speeches. Junior members deliver more partisan speeches, but the electoral and district variables have no significant effect on the delivery of partisan one-minutes.

There is no difference, on the other hand, in the proclivity of Democratic congresswomen and congressmen to give partisan one-minute speeches. Among
Democrats, seniority is the only statistically significant predictor, and the coefficient is negative.

I expected that congresswomen’s strategic incentives to prove their partisan credentials—particularly when it comes to partisan attacks—would result in more partisan speeches. The results clearly confirm my hypothesis when it comes to Republican women, but not Democratic women. Republican women arguably have even more to prove than Democratic women. Democratic women have long been a loyal part of the Democratic Caucus, whereas Republican women have been, up until recently, more liberal than their male counterparts (Frederick 2009), and must visibly counter the gender stereotypes that women are more liberal, and less assertive, than men. Attacking Democrats on the House floor is arguably one of the most visible ways to do so.

I predict that gendered partisanship, coupled with significant institutional differences, leads to the opposite results in the Senate. There are limits to the comparisons one can make between the two chambers when it comes to congressional speech. Senators have many more opportunities to speak than House members do. Senate debate is not constrained in the way that it is in the House, and the size of the House limits the time any one member can speak. Nonetheless, a comparison of non-legislative speech in both chambers would allow me to test my hypotheses about differences in partisan speech. In the Senate, I turn to speeches delivered during the Senate’s Morning Hour. A “rough parallel” to one-minute speeches, morning hour speeches provide senators with opportunities to speak about any topic, including to defend one’s party or to attack the other.

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3 The words of Richard Beth, Congressional Research Service expert. I look forward to feedback on the best way to compare non-legislative partisan speech.
At this point, the results for the 110th Congress are only suggestive and bivariate (and therefore not presented here) because the analysis only includes speeches delivered in 2007. Preliminary analysis of morning hour speeches given in 2007 suggests that women are less likely than men to give speeches and less likely to make partisan attacks than men, and that both men and women in the Senate are more likely to focus on their constituents and particular legislation than partisan attacks, distinguishing them from their House counterparts.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Gendered partisanship refers to congresswomen’s strategic response to increasing partisanship in Congress and the electorate. In the House, congresswomen respond with partisan behavior that often systematically exceeds that of their male colleagues. In the Senate, women often respond strategically by behaving in less partisan ways than their male counterparts, positioning them to capitalize on opportunities to shape legislative compromises, sometimes across party lines.

Partisanship, and the partisan polarization that divides the parties, has risen in both chambers. Yet the effects on congresswomen’s incentives have been distinct. Female politicians are stuck with many gender stereotypes, including the stereotype that they are less assertive and more likely to seek compromise than men. Compromise, particularly bipartisan compromise, is valued very differently, and has different career implications for members, across the two chambers.

Moderate senators of both parties have many opportunities to influence policy as majority party leaders work to attain a filibuster-proof majority on major legislation.
Beyond these opportunities, Senate party leaders have fewer opportunities to reward or punish their members for their party loyalty.

By contrast, moderate members of the House see fewer opportunities to shape legislation, particularly minority party moderates. Majority party leaders are much more likely to compromise with factions within one’s own party than with minority party members. But even majority party moderates have incentives to toe the party line, as party leaders use loyalty as a criterion when determining committee assignments and legislative opportunities (Pearson 2005). When Republicans controlled Congress, Republican moderates in the “Tuesday Group” actually kept their roster secret because it is seen as something potentially damaging to their careers.

This preliminary exploration of gendered partisanship shows that, as hypothesized, partisanship in the House has had different effects on men and women within each chamber, and across chambers. Analyses that control for district partisanship reveal that congresswomen vote with the party more often than congressmen, contribute as much money as their male colleagues with their leadership PACs, and, among Republicans, give more partisan speeches on the House floor. In the Senate, by contrast, women vote less frequently with their party and, at least in the short time frame under consideration, give fewer partisan speeches than men.

Fully assessing the theoretical roots and implications of gendered partisanship requires further investigation. First, all of the analysis must encompass the past two decades to track the effects of the most dramatic increases in polarization and women’s representation. As polarization increases, I expect that the gender differences in partisanship will increase as well. The over time party unity analysis suggests that this is
the case; before the 108th Congress, Republican women in the House were less likely to vote with their party than their male counterparts, a difference that has since disappeared. The analysis of the 110th Congress reveals that women and men form leadership PACs at the same rate and contribute the same amount to same-party candidates. Assessing whether women used to contribute less than men would provide the context necessary to assess these statistically insignificant results and the full effects of increasing partisanship.

The three measures of partisanship explicated in this paper—party unity in roll call votes, leadership PAC contributions, and partisan speeches—are only some of the ways that members of Congress can demonstrate their partisan credentials. Another possibility is to track partisan media appearances, such as the regular back-and-forth cable news debates that occurred during the Fall of 2008 between Congresswomen Michele Bachmann (R-MN) and Debbie Wasserman Schulz (D-FL).

Gendered partisanship may affect membership in congressional caucuses that have a specific effect on party leaders’ ability to set the agenda. Within the House Democratic Caucus, the Blue Dog Democrats sometimes cause problems for majority Democratic party leaders’ agenda in their attempts to move policy to the right of the Democratic median. An analysis of Blue Dog membership that accounts for constituency will shed further light on sex differences in party loyalty in the House. At the beginning of the 104th Congress, nearly thirty moderate and conservative Democrats formed the Blue Dog Coalition, usually referred to simply as the Blue Dogs. The Blue Dogs advocate fiscal restraint, focusing on their annual plan to balance the budget. When they formed, observers noted that their ideological centrism and willingness to break with
their party compelled both Republican and Democratic leaders take their views seriously (Rubin 1997). While their influence is nowhere near that of Senate moderates, it is worth noting that they are the closest group to Senate moderates in a Democratic-controlled Congress. Speaker Pelosi has had to make several concessions to Blue Dog Democrats on issues including “pay-as-you-go” budgeting, appropriations bills, and, most recently, health care reform.

In the 110th Congress, there were 47 Blue Dog Democrats, 6 of whom were congresswomen. Twenty-three percent of Democratic congressmen joined the Blue Dogs compared to 12 percent of Democratic congresswomen, which is a significant difference, but it is, of course, possible that constituency interests account for these differences.

On the Republican side, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Republican moderate Tuesday Group had several congresswomen during the mid-to-late 1990s (e.g., Connie Morella (R-MD), Nancy Johnson (R-CT), Sue Kelly (R-NY), Marge Roukema (R-NJ), and Tillie Fowler (R-FL). In the contemporary Congress, it seems that congresswomen are more likely to join the conservative Republican Study Group, whose members include Michele Bachmann (R-MN), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Mary Fallin (R-OK), Virginia Foxx (R-NC), Cathy McMorris-Rodgers (R-WA), Sue Myrick (R-NC), and Cynthia Lummis (R-WY).

Congresswomen’s general lack of visibility in moderating the House agenda through caucus membership is in sharp contrast to the efforts by the “Gang of 14” in the Senate in the 109th Congress. Senators Olympia Snowe (R-ME), Susan Collins (R-ME), and Mary Landrieu (D-LA) were among the visible, bipartisan group of senators who
tried to work out a deal to prevent a Senate rules change to eliminate the use of the filibuster to prevent judicial confirmation votes.

Gendered partisanship has implications for the ability for congresswomen to work with one another across party lines. As members’ partisan identity becomes more important, it is likely that women on both sides of the aisle think of themselves as members of a party first and give less priority to their identity with, and membership in, the Women’s Caucus. Indeed, after one Republican member of the Women’s Caucus campaigned for a Democratic member’s opponent in the 1994 elections, the Democrat dropped out. An over-time analysis of the agenda, activities, and success of the Women’s Caucus as polarization has increased would shed additional light on the effects of gendered partisanship.

The increase in congresswomen has coincided with the increase in partisan polarization in Congress. There is no evidence to suggest that more women are running for Congress because the Congress is more polarized. The increase in women’s candidacies has been slow, and if anything, bitter partisan battles and incentives to engage in partisan behavior may deter some women from running, particularly Republican women. But those women who do run for, and win House seats, engage in partisan battles as fiercely as—and often more so--than their male counterparts, exacerbating rather than ameliorating the breakdown in bipartisan cooperation and comity in the House. In the Senate, chamber-specific incentives enhance women’s potential to bring some degree of bipartisan cooperation.
References


Table 1. Party Unity in the Senate and House from 1993-2008, by Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Men %</th>
<th>Women %</th>
<th>Dem Women %</th>
<th>Rep Men %</th>
<th>Rep Women %</th>
<th>Men %</th>
<th>Women %</th>
<th>Dem Women %</th>
<th>Rep Men %</th>
<th>Rep Women %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
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Cell entries are CQ Weekly party unity averages.

Table 2. Party Unity in the Senate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>110th Congress</th>
<th>103rd – 110th Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>-6.80* (2.7)</td>
<td>-4.30*** (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party’s Pres. Vote</td>
<td>.89*** (.14)</td>
<td>.81*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>-2.147* (.916)</td>
<td>-1.06 (1.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>12.38*** (2.35)</td>
<td>5.61*** (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>38.74*** (4.42)</td>
<td>43.50*** (2.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Year Dummies)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R Squared</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>9.71</td>
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Table entries are OLS coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is CQ Weekly party unity. *p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Table 3. Party Unity in the House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>103rd – 110th Congress</td>
<td>110th Congress</td>
<td>103rd – 110th Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>1.27** (0.43)</td>
<td>1.058* (0.98)</td>
<td>3.42*** (0.585)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party's Pres. Vote</td>
<td>0.42*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.235*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.47*** (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.165** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-4.93*** (0.30)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>70.65***</td>
<td>80.31</td>
<td>66.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Year Dummies)</td>
<td>(Year Dummies)</td>
<td>(Year Dummies)</td>
<td>(Year Dummies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>228</td>
<td>1701</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj. R Squared</td>
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<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.391</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>4.276</td>
<td>8.922</td>
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</table>

Table entries are OLS coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is CQ Weekly party unity. *p < 0.10 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 4. Leadership PAC Contributions in the 110th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Senate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>-12332</td>
<td>-18440</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21824)</td>
<td>(32900)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party's Pres. Vote</td>
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<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(754)</td>
<td>(1612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
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<td>-3002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1927)</td>
<td>(12113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Committee</td>
<td>29634#</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16371)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-62784***</td>
<td>-10747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16021)</td>
<td>(27491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>138858#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N     | 429           | 100           |
Adj. R Squared | .072          | -.036         |
SEE    | 162091.15     | 117706.53     |

Table entries are OLS coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total leadership PAC contributions to same-party candidates.  \^p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Table 5. Partisan Speechmaking in the House, 110th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attacking</td>
<td>Defending</td>
<td>Attacking</td>
<td>Defending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.31 (.34)</td>
<td>.79 (.68)</td>
<td>2.75** (.93)</td>
<td>1.15* (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>-.08** (.03)</td>
<td>-.24*** (.06)</td>
<td>-.24** (.08)</td>
<td>-.11* (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party's Pres. Vote</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>.04 (.05)</td>
<td>.04 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of Victory</td>
<td>-.03 (.02)</td>
<td>-.002 (.004)</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
<td>.00 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>2.30*</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R Squared</td>
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<td>.069</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries are OLS coefficients with estimated standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of partisan one-minute speeches delivered by a MC. *p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001.
Figure 1. Women in the House of Representatives, 1989-2009

Figure 2. Women in the Senate, 1989-2009