Another Look at Abelard’s Commentary on Romans 3:26
H. Lawrence Bond
Appalachian State University

The idea of this paper arose from a discussion during last year’s Romans Through History and Cultures session on Medieval Readings of Romans. A question was raised and largely left unanswered about Abelard’s use of exemplum in his commentary on Romans. Apparently there is still considerable curiosity about the validity of Abelard’s atonement theory. Along with that, a new generation of theologians has raised serious misgivings about the classic and objective theories that were adopted by the Church, or perhaps one should say churches, during the early, medieval, and Reformation eras. At the same time thoroughgoing re-examinations of the Pauline texts by New Testament scholars have produced invigorating fresh perspectives on Pauline theology. One might ask of Abelard’s commentary what others having been asking of Paul’s epistles: What did Abelard really say? As always, however, the temptation, as with Pauline studies, is instead to answer what one wants Abelard to have said.

Peter Abelard’s Commentaria in epistolam pauli ad romanos should lend itself to a variety of treatments if for no other reason than the diverse ways Abelard addresses and explicates the Pauline text. This, however, has not always been the case. At times it has become commonplace to consider Abelard’s commentary on Romans 3:26 as if Abelard were saying one thing and one thing only. This is one reason why his soteriological theologizing has so often been dismissed as merely exemplarist and crypto-Pelagian. This sort of analysis of Abelard’s atonement theory almost always occurs outside the immediate textual setting and with little or no reference to the exegetical style Abelard employs or the hermeneutical principles impelling it.

A series of modern scholars have attempted to correct the assessments of Abelard’s main
detractors such as Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry\(^1\) and also of his modern proponents such as Rashdall and Franks\(^2\). But perhaps of equal importance they have also shifted the attention from Abelard’s philosophical and theological methods per se to his exegetical materials and literary analysis.\(^3\)

This paper investigates particular exegetical processes at play in Abelard’s treatment of Romans 3:26 and through this means seeks to re-examine his much cited phrase *tam uerbo quam exemplo*. In so doing it intends to present a careful textual analysis. Moreover, its purpose is in no way to defend or critique Abelard but only to try within a limited range to grasp what he is saying.

Among the most controverted passages among Abelard’s works appears toward the end of his commentary on Romans 3:26.

> Nobis autem videtur, quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam, quod Filii suus nostram susceperit naturam et in ipsa nos tam verbo quam exemplo instituendo usque ad mortem perstitit, nos sibi amplius per amore adstrinxit,\(^4\) ut tanto divinae gratiae accensi beneficio nihil iam tolerare propter ipsum vera reformidet caritas.\(^5\)

> It, however, seems to us that we have been justified in Christ’s blood and reconciled with God in this: God has bound us more to God through love by this unique grace held out to us – that God’s own Son has taken on our nature and in that nature persisted unto death in instructing us through word as well as example – so that the true love of anyone kindled by so great a gift of divine grace would no longer shrink from enduring anything for the sake of God.

In addition, further controversy has arisen about the translation of a related passage several lines later in his commentary on the same chapter and verse.

> Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio, quae nos non solum a servitute peccati liberat, sed veram nobis filiorum Dei libertatem\(^6\) acquirit, ut amore eius potius quam timore

> Our redemption, therefore, is that highest love in us through Christ's Passion that not only frees us from the slavery of sin but also obtains for us the true liberty of children of God so that we do all things out of love,
cuncta impleamus, qui nobis tantam exhibuit gratiam qua maior inveniri ipso attestante non potest. Rather than fear, of him who has shown us such grace than which no greater can be found, as he himself attests.

Both statements occur in a quaestio section that Abelard inserted in his gloss on vs. 26. The two passages connect significantly. Their comprehension and translation seem to provide a key for unlocking Abelard’s atonement theory. The immediate context is, of course, Abelard’s exposition of Rom 3:26, as numbered in accord with modern versification.

In the Pauline Latin text what we enumerate as vs. 26 falls in the middle of a sentence: “. . . in sustentatione Dei, ad ostensionem justitiae ejus in hoc tempore: ut sit ipse justus, et justificans eum, qui est ex fide Jesu Christi.” The primary sentence of which vs. 26 is a component reaches back to vs. 21. At the start of this verse Paul seems to sound an eschatological note with the very first words nunc autem, in these times in contrast to what has gone before, “sine lege iustitia Dei manifestata est testificata a lege et prophetis.” In the preceding vss. 9b-18 Paul strung together a series of Old Testament verses to prove his claim that all, Jew and Gentile alike, are under the dominion of sin. In vss. 19-21, Paul proceeds with his argument that the righteousness of God, testified by the Law and the Prophets, is now manifest even apart from the Law. This leads to the lengthier passage that starts with vs. 22:

Iustitia autem Dei per fidem Iesu Christi super omnes qui credunt non enim est distinctio omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloriam Dei justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius per redemptionem quae est in Christo Iesu omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloriari Dei justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius per redemptionem quae est in Christo Iesu, quem proposuit Deus propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius, ad ostensionem justitiae suae propter remissionem praecedentium delictorum. (Rom 3:22-24)

In these times, Paul maintains, the iustitia or righteousness of God is disclosed sine lege and without regard to ethnicity for omnes qui credunt. The need for universality is obvious because
omnes . . . peccaverunt et egent gloriam Dei.

Paul raises certain core issues that will subsequently govern his remarks in vs. 26:

(1) justification as a gift by grace
(2) the mediation of redemption in Jesus Christ
(3) Christ offered by God through Christ’s blood as propitiatio
(4) Christ’s propitiatio made effective through faith
(5) Christ’s propitatio as manifestation of God’s righteousness
(6) God’s manifestation for the forgiveness of past sins

Propitiatio in vs. 25 is a translation of the Greek ἱλαστήριον, itself a controversial term, which can signify the place of forgiveness and atonement as well as the means. It is Paul’s next clause (vs. 26) that stimulates Abelard’s controversial questio and solutio on Christ’s atonement: “sustentatione Dei, ad ostensionem justitiae ejus in hoc tempore: ut sit ipse justus, et justificans eum, qui est ex fide Jesu Christi.” This manifesting of righteousness proceeds from God’s forbearance, and its purpose is ostendere, to show forth, God’s righteousness in the present time. The disclosure is clear: God is righteous and justifies whomever is of the faith of Jesus Christ.

QUAESTIO

Abelard begins his exegesis of vs. 26 with a gloss on the phrase: In sustentatione Dei. with which the verse begins. This lasts for a paragraph and includes successive glossae on other phrases in the verse: ad ostensionem; justitiae ejus: ut sit ipse justus; et justificans; and eum qui ex fide est Jesu Christi. These are followed by a lengthy quae est segment initiated by the query: “quae sit videlicet ista nostra redemptio per mortem Christi.” Abelard speaks of why
Christ died for our redemption as a \textit{maxima quaestio}, which he insists intrudes itself at this very point. An appositive question immediately follows. “Aut quomodo nos in eius sanguine justificari Apostolus dicat, qui maiori supplicio digni videmur, quia id commissus iniqui serui propter quod innocens Domini occisus sit?” Why is it that Paul maintains Christ’s death as the means of our justification? One would suppose that the killing of Christ would then require an additional punishment and one worse than Adam’s sin. After all, Abelard reminds the reader, we are the guilty ones. We committed the very thing for which our innocent Lord was slain.

Abelard breaks down the gross query into twenty-three questions each building on the other and none answered until the brief \textit{solutio} provided at the end of his commentary on vs. 26. There is a pattern in the succession of questions. There are two main sets: the first having to do with ransom and the second with satisfaction.

Why is it, Abelard begins, that Christ had to die in the flesh in order to redeem us? From here Abelard proceeds with 12 sub-questions about the captivity of the human race. The first set of sub-questions have to do with the issue of ransom.

\textbf{Questioning the Theory of Captivity and Ransom.}

1) First, a \textit{qua} question: “by what” necessity has God redeemed us? But this leads to an additional question and then to still another in a lengthy string of questions each deliberately connected to the other by a variety of conjoining devices.

2) There is an \textit{a quo} query: redeemed “from whom”? Who has held us captive?

3) Next \textit{qua} again: “By what justice” has God freed us from the power of whoever set the price to which God willingly submitted?
At this point Abelard presents a theory of the Devil’s rights. Some say that in the original transgression the first human being willfully subjugated himself to the Devil and as a consequence the Devil justly wielded power over human beings and would always do so unless a deliverer came. Abelard agrees with the obvious answer to the *a quo* question: God has redeemed us from the Devil.16

4) Then follows a curious *quomodo* question: However, if God freed the elect only, “how is it that either now or in the future the Devil possesses or will possess them more than now”?17

5) Next he starts the question with *numquid*, as a rhetorical interrogative expecting a negative answer: “This does not mean, does it,” that the Devil tortured the beggar resting in Abraham’s bosom, although less than the damned rich man? Then with the conjunction *aut*, he adds an emphatic alternative: “Or at the least,” did the Devil have dominion over Abraham himself and the other elect?18

6) Then *quomodo*, with an exemplary instance: “in what way” would that wicked tormenter have held power over the beggar after having been carried by angels to Abraham’s bosom?19

Abelard adds a short discursus to his own discursus. He turns to Lk 16:2-26 to explicate Abraham’s response to the rich man’s cry: Not even the Devil, he explains, could cross over and exercise power where no wicked person resides or enters.20

7) Then with an initiating adverbial *Quod etiam ius* that signifies not simply “also” but emphatically: “And, furthermore, by what right” could the Devil have had to exercise power over humankind? How else could the Devil receive people for torture, Abelard continues, except by the Lord’s permission or consignment?21
He proceeds to use an analogy of a bond-servant and his lord in order to challenge further those positing a permission/consignment contract with the Devil to support a ransom theory of atonement. Several additional questions address the analogy:

8) The primary query is directed by the particle *numquid* and a set of verbs: *agere liceret* joined to *vellet*, and *requireret* and *reduceret* in combination. The interrogative, “This would not be the case, would it?,” is followed by a conditional clause, “If a bond-servant wanted to abandon his lord and subjugate himself to the power of another.” Then, Abelard asks: Would this servant be permitted (*agere liceret*) to live life in such a way that his lord, if he wanted (*vellet*), might not lawfully seek him out (*requireret*) and bring him back (*reduceret*)?

9) Next, a rhetorical *Quis etiam dubitet*: “Indeed, who would doubt?” accompanied by another “if . . . then” query. Suppose a bond-servant of any lord should seduce some other bond-servant into relinquishing obedience to his lord. Who would doubt that this lord would judge the seducer more guilty than the servant he had seduced?

10) Then an interrogative declaration: *quam iniustum sit* coupled with *ius illus amittere meruerit*: “How unjust it would be” and “would he not deserve to lose that right?” The answers to both reside in the question itself: How unjust it would be if the seducer deserved any privilege or authority over the one he seduced. Moreover, if he, in fact, had ever possessed any right over the other would he not now deserve to lose it? Abelard’s implicit appeal throughout is to the reader’s sense of justice and morality.

In support Abelard offers a kind of midrash on a canon from Gratian: “Privilege deserves to be lost when one abuses the power committed to him.” He provides the following application. (a) The more wicked of two bond-servants would not properly receive power over
the other; (b) instead, in the case of the analogy’s two servants, the one who was seduced should exercise a strict claim for reparation from the one who harmed him; and (c) by analogy the Devil of himself would have had no right over the first human being and could not bribe him into transgression with immortality, which although he had promised it he could not grant.  

Hence, Abelard concludes, it is proved that the Devil would gain no right at all over the one he seduced. When he renounced his obedience, the first human transgressed only against his own Lord. Therefore, it is only by the permission and consignment of the Lord that one might say that the Devil acquires some right over human beings. Moreover, this would be the kind of jurisdiction a lord’s jailer or torturer might yield to administer punishment on the lord’s behalf.

Abelard next turns to the question of God’s dominion and the liberation of human beings by whatever means. He extends the analogy’s application further. If a lord should exercise prerogative and no longer allow punishment, the jailer or torturer would retain no right whatsoever.

The underlying issue is the right of God to redeem and the absence of the right of the Devil to punish except by permission of the Lord. Abelard cites the examples of the Virgin Mary, Mary Magdalene, and the paralytic that Christ healed as examples of those whose sins were remitted apart from Christ’s Passion.

11) Therefore, he asks, via a *quid* interrogative, of what could the torturer, in this case the Devil, complain if before the crucifixion the Lord forgave a sinful human being and commanded an end to the punishment?

12) A crucial question still awaits: with no rights how then could the Devil demand and receive ransom? Abelard anticipates this by declaring that given the evidence so far the Lord
inflicted no injustice on the Devil when taking on a pure flesh and a sinless humanity on behalf of sinful human beings. Abelard casts aside the issue of deliverance by merit. Indeed, as a human the Lord himself did not by merit obtain guarantee that he should be conceived and born without sin and should persevere sinlessly. Rather Christ received this not through his merits but by the grace of the Lord sustaining him.  

13) Therefore, Abelard asks, if by this same grace Christ wished to forgive certain other human beings did he not have the capacity to free them from punishment? *Quippe*, he emphasizes, “certainly” no reason remains to punish them any longer if the Lord forgave the sins for which they were being punished. Moreover, Christ showed them such grace that he united them to himself in his person. Was he not able to grant them this lesser gift, by forgiving them their sins?  

**Questioning the Theory of Divine Satisfaction**

From the question of the validity of a ransom theory of atonement, Abelard turns to the notion of divine satisfaction as the purpose for Christ’s death.

In transition he raises a *quaet itaque* question referring to the disclosures he uncovered in interrogating the ransom theory. “Therefore, what” necessity was there for Christ’s death since it is evident that by his command alone Christ could have freed human beings from the Devil?  

What other explanation can be offered? If the Devil had no dominion of his own over human beings and could not demand ransom from God, there must be some other cause for Christ’s death.

An additional set of carefully related sub-questions follow.
1) *Quid*, his inquiry begins, *opus fuit*? This is at root what Abelard says he is still asking: “What was the need?” For all that has been presented in evidence the critical question remains: not simply Anselm’s *cur Deus homo* but Abelard’s more explicit *quomodo nos in eius sanguine justificari Apostolus dicat*. Abelard’s question has a particular focus. Why would the Apostle Paul say that we are justified by Christ’s death? Why should our redemption require not only the incarnation of God but such physical humiliation and not just his death but a death so bitter and ignominious that he endured the execution of the wicked?^34

2) The interrogation moves from *quid* to *quomodo*. Given such a death at the hands of human beings “how” can the Apostle maintain that we are justified or reconciled to God through Christ’s death (Rom 3:24) when God’s wrath should have been further directed at us? Surely, Abelard adds, the crucifixion of God’s Son is a more heinous crime than Adam’s eating a single apple in paradise.^35

3) This line of questioning seems to make Christ’s atonement a still greater mystery. The more human beings have multiplied their sins the more justified God’s wrath would have been. Abelard pauses here with yet another twist to his disputation. He now poses a *si . . . ut . . . quam* construction. “If” Adam’s sin was so great “that” it could be expiated only by the death of Christ, then “what” will expiate the homicide against Christ? The contrast for Abelard seems startling. If Adam’s transgression warranted punishment by crucifixion, what would suffice for the many huge crimes committed against Christ and his followers?^36

4) Abelard now directs a clear-cut attack on the satisfaction theory with another *numquid* question. “It is not the case, is it” that the death of the innocent Son would so please God the Father that God would be reconciled to us? How would this be since by sinning we committed
the very thing for which our innocent Lord was slain?\textsuperscript{37}

5) The next question \textit{nec nisi hoc} expands Abelard’s indictment of the satisfaction theory. “If this” greater sin of Christ’s crucifixion “had not” occurred could God have not pardoned the much lighter sin of the first transgression?\textsuperscript{38}

6) In other words, one might assume that the magnitude of Christ’s homicide by human hands should have made our condition far worse than beforehand. So then regarding what appears to be a contradictory situation, Abelard asks, \textit{in quo etiam}, “in what way indeed” has the Son’s death made us more righteous than before so that we should now be freed from punishment?\textsuperscript{39}

7) Even more, \textit{cui etiam}, “to whom” was the price of blood paid for our redemption? Who else but one in whose power we were? But it is not Satan. That one is God, and it is God who assigned us to the torturer.\textsuperscript{40}

8) Abelard returns to his jailor analogy. It is not the torturers but the lords who arrange or receive ransoms. This means that the price of redemption would be paid to a given lord and not his jailer. Only a lord could hold such captives and remit them to a torturer, only a lord could release them for a price, and only a lord could pay for their release. For Abelard this creates a logical and moral dilemma for proponents of the satisfaction theory. In this theory it would be God not the Devil who demands payment and satisfaction. So Abelard asks \textit{quomodo enim}, “indeed how” is it that God has released the captives by the price of Christ’s death when it was God who first set the price and exacted it in return for those held captive?\textsuperscript{41}

9) Abelard presses his moral objection further: \textit{quam vero crudele et iniquum}. “Truly how cruel and how wicked” it seems that anyone would have required the blood of an innocent
person as the price for anything or that anyone would have been pleased that an innocent person should be slain. Abelard finishes with this rhetorical point even more dramatically by adding *nedum*: how ‘even more’ cruel and wicked would it be should God have found the death of the Son so agreeable that because of it God would be reconciled to the whole world. *(2 Cor 5:19)*

Abelard then concludes the *quaestio* segment of his disputation. He declares that the composite query he has raised poses a *non mediocrem . . . quaestionem* “a not middling question” about our redemption or justification through the death of Jesus Christ.*

**SOLUTIO**

One would expect Abelard’s *solutio* to be as lengthy as his *quaestio*. In fact it is not, but it is also complex though in different ways and became more controversial. Here is where we find the *tam verbo quam exemplo* and *redemptio itaque nostra* controverted passages listed above.

Once again Abelard’s textual procedure bears investigation. This is not a brief task although the *solutio* is only 28 lines in the Buytaert edition compared with the 117 lines of the *quaestio*.

Abelard initiates his own thesis with a differentiating conjunction: *nobis autem uidetur*, “Now, for all that, it seems to us”, he announces, that Christ’s death provides the means to our justification and reconciliation to God. But how does that occur? Abelard begins to define the work of atonement through a series of appositives and subordinate clauses. This is not general grace but *singularem gratiam* with the syntax emphasizing the singularity. Abelard’s sharp critique of ransom and satisfaction theories would require him to choose his language accordingly. Otherwise, one might have expected some juridic expression such as *imputatam* as
the next distinctio applied to his use of “grace.” Instead, Abelard selects exhibitam, which on the surface might seem without force and too accommodating to human choice. For Abelard the grace he is designating is singular because it is the specific work of Christ’s incarnation and passion, and it is matchless.44

Abelard specifies its singularity as:

1) God’s own Son taking on our nature
2) His persisting to death in that nature
3) His instructing us by word as well as example

Not only is the grace singular, it is nobis exhibitam, and it is a singular work. Abelard addresses the question of how it is “set forth to us” and how it effects our atonement. He has ruled out all talk of ransom and satisfaction. Atonement must be effective on some other grounds. What are left? The appeal to further juridic and penal metaphors? Moral suasion? The choices seem few. The distinctive linguistic models and line of reasoning that Abelard adopts lead him into further controversy.

Abelard’s syntax is clarifying. Latin syntax can be emphatic because the language is highly inflected. A sentence’s word order might have to be switched to render the Latin text into meaningful English. In replicating the pattern of emphasis of the Latin a parallel English translation would look like that below. The words and phrases emphasized in the Latin appear in bold print in order to recapture how the Latin reader would have received Abelard’s involved statement.

Nobis autem videtur, quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam
To us, nevertheless, it seems that in this have we been justified in the blood of Christ and with God reconciled, that by this unique grace held out to us,
nobis exhibitam,
quod Filius suus
nostram susceperit naturam
et in ipsa
nos tam verbo quam exemplo
instituendo usque ad mortem persttitit,

nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit,

ut tanto divinae gratiae accensi beneficio

nihil iam tolerare propter ipsum
vera reformidet caritas.45

What would be clear to the Latin reader can elude us because the word order does not follow English syntax. The structure indicates that in the Latin there is no special emphasis on the phrase tam verbo quam exemplo. The syntax indicates its role in Abelard’s claim. The phrase is not part of the main or matrix clause; it is adverbial to the participle instituendo, which in turn is adverbial to the main verb of a clause that modifies still another clause modifying the matrix clause. The set of relationships in the passage is revealing.

Nobis autem videtur,

• quod
  in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati,
  • quod
    per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam,
    • quod
      (1) Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam et
      (2) in ipsa
        nos
tam verbo quam exemplo
      instituendo
      usque ad mortem persttitit,
      nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit,
    ut tanto divinae gratiae accensi beneficio
  nihil iam tolerare propter ipsum
  vera reformidet caritas
Notice that the core of the statement is more obvious now. Our justification and reconciliation consist in this: God has bound us more to God through love by the unique grace held out to us through Christ’s Passion. Abelard’s crucial claim here itself bears analysis through an exegesis.

PER HANC SINGULAREM GRATIAM.

After rejecting ransom and satisfaction theories, Abelard begins to explain his own view of how Christ’s Passion effects atonement. At the start he emphasizes the singular grace by which God joins us with God more through love and thereby effects our atonement. The often cited translation of G. E. Moffatt and Richard Weingart’s monograph both cast singularem gratiam as eventful and translate it as “this unique act of grace.” Peppermüller prefers only the substantive Gnade and relies on Abelard’s modifying phrase and subordinating conjunction to delimit the term: durch diese einzigatige uns erwiesene Gnade “through this singular grace proved to us.”

NOBIS EXHIBITAM

Here the debate concerns both words. (1) EXHIBITAM. G. E. Moffat translates this as a past participle “manifested” and Weingart as an adjective “manifest” while Peppermüller employs the participle erwiesen, “proved.” The term exhibitam in Latin can suggest more than “manifested” or its English cognate “exhibited.” From exhibere , the combining of ex and habere , literally “to hold out or forth,” the passive participle exhibitam can signify not merely having been displayed but also (a) having been held out in order to demonstrate or prove; (b) having been offered, granted, or provided to someone; (c) having been presented or represented; or (d) having been present. This is a richer term than merely “having been shown.” (2) NOBIS.

**QUOD FILIUS SUUS NOSTRAM SUSCEPERIT NATURAM**

This for Abelard is central to what God has held out to us: God’s own Son having taken on our own nature. The loving death even of the best of us renders only so much love and gratitude but neither justification nor reconciliation. However, for death to work atonement it has to be the death of God in flesh not the death of a human being as a propitiation to God. Christ’s Passion works because it is not our passion but God’s. As Abelard presents it, atonement affects us not God.

**IN IPSA NOS TAM VERBO QUAM EXEMPLO INSTITUENDO.**

*In ipsa* means in the human nature Christ has assumed. *Instituendo* is an interesting word although in itself it would seem to pose little problem, but the word certainly can communicate more than a one-dimensional instruction. From *in-statuere*, the gerund *instituendo*, used as an ablative of agent, can signify more than a synonym such as the less enfolded *docendo* and communicates the sense of setting or standing up, planting or fixing, imposing, constructing, and and figuratively that of instituting or establishing, ordaining, undertaking, procuring, governing, and only subsequently training up or teaching. The context makes quite clear that the purpose of the *instituere* is to effect life-change by a reconstruction of the human interior.

The phrase *TAM VERBO QUAM EXEMPLO* has received the most attention by scholars trying to decipher Abelard’s own theory of atonement. The crucial dispute is over Abelard’s use of *exemplo*. The charges of Pelagianism and exemplarism against Abelard emanate also from this passage as well as others. The *Capitula haeresum Petri Abaelardi*, an anonymous catalogue of
fourteen alleged heresies, possibly drawn up by Thomas of Morigny, lists this passage under the rubric: *Quod Christus non assumpsit carnem, ut nos a iugo diaboli liberaret.*

One wonders what Abelard means here by *exemplum*. He does not precisely say. The context, however, reveals much about what he is not saying and what he may be intending to say. It is important to observe that it is within a deliberate exegetical environment that Abelard presents his idea of atonement and that he also seems to be in process of developing it out of his own exegesis. Abelard apparently lectured on Romans and at least one *reportio* has been discovered. However, in his Romans commentary Abelard is, for the most part, exegeting and only on occasion holding disputations. In this text it is as much or more a matter of Abelard’s reading Paul as it is of his arguing a set of theses. The Romans commentary is not merely a vehicle for Abelard’s theologizing. It is Abelard dialoguing with the text as well as explicating it.

The theological understandings Abelard is urging are intended as curative more than simply as propositional. Just as “a new perspective” on Paul has developed among contemporary biblical scholars a “new perspective” on Abelard also deserves developing. For Paul’s letter to the Romans is no more a theological treatise than Abelard’s exegesis.

On the surface Abelard’s use of *exemplum* suggests a model or pattern. Even so the text makes clear that it is no mere model. To categorize Abelard’s position here primarily as an exemplary moral theory is to evade the immediate context of this particular *solutio*. If, however, it designates a model, this *exemplum* of Christ’s earthly life communicates both an instance and a pattern, but Abelard intends that they be understood as a matchless redemptive instance of divine love and an efficacious pattern or model to experience in one’s heart as well as to emulate in
one’s life. One might say that for Abelard, in this context, *exemplum*, more than just model, means sign. It is a sign that once penetrating the human soul recreates and transforms. The Christ-*exemplum* functions, one might say, sacramentally. The *exemplum* of Christ’s life including his Passion is seen by Abelard to signal the redemptive love of God and to convey genuine love and reconciliation. Moreover, it is a participatory sign received affectively, existentially, and not just cognitively.

If humans had the ability and the inclination on their own to reconcile with God, why was Christ’s death mandated? For Abelard God may have chosen some other manner of justification and reconciliation but whatever method God might have used, atonement worked by God was necessitated by God and the human condition, by God’s loving response to the terminal brokenness of the human soul.

Abelard acknowledges that God offered atonement to others before Christ’s Passion and that by faith it was received by Abraham, Mary, and others. Are human beings simply lacking a strong moral example? Do they need only a new and dramatic stimulus to faith, in this case, from an inspiring life and death? Charges of exemplarism against Abelard claim that this is essentially Abelard’s position. However, if there were any validity in this claim, in Abelard’s case it would have to acknowledge also that the *exemplum* he describes is comprised of the life and death, not of just any good person, but of God in flesh. This would make it the Example of examples and more than merely inspiring.

*Usque ad mortem perstitit.* Not simply Christ’s dying is exemplary but the reason and way Christ took on death. It manifests God’s love as the ultimate instance, but it is critical also in opening the human heart in a way human beings cannot manage for themselves. Christ’s
death may be exemplary and efficacious, but why did Christ have to die? This takes us back to Abelard’s original question. Not only *cur Deus homo* but why the death of the innocent? At one level Abelard has already answered this in his initial statement: to work justification and reconciliation. *Nobis autem videtur, quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati.* But how so?

*NOS SIBI AMPLIUS PER AMOREM ADSTRINXIT.* The answer follows immediately in Abelard’s statement, which reads like a proclamation as well as an exposition. In Latin syntax he is saying “that *we* to God may be more fully bound by love.” Abelard reveals his grasp of the purpose of Christ’s death in his explanation of the manner and the effect in which atonement occurs. The reason for the Passion is to justify and to reconcile, and this can take place through love in God’s joining us to God. Could this not have occurred in some other way than Christ’s death? We do not know. We only know that this is the redemptive way God has chosen for us in this new season of grace. It is clear to Abelard how atonement does not occur – either because or when God has paid ransom to the Devil or finds divine justice to be satisfied through the death of the innocent.

A critical question may be that of sequence. The effect of Christ’s death on the human soul is in fact a liberation and a fulfillment of God’s law. There is victory over Satan, and there is a transformation and freedom of the soul. But in what sequence do such things take place? If in Abelard’s view the defeat of a Satanic domination over the soul or the appeasement of God precede justification and reconciliation, Abelard would then be embracing some kind of ransom or satisfaction theory. This is not the sequence according to Abelard. Nevertheless, for him atonement once effected accomplishes such things, one might even say “objective” things such as
claimed by proponents of various “objective” theories. Abelard gives first place to the immediate effect of Christ’s love on the human soul. Other benefits follow. It may prove surprising to some that Abelard’s discussion of the effects of Christ’s Passion include the traditional language of propitiation, purchase, conquest, liberation, and even satisfaction though not necessarily with the same signification applied to these terms by others.

Abelard does not ascribe a solitary causal power to the manifestation of the Christ-exemplum. Once again it should be remembered that in his commentary on Romans 3:26 Abelard is primarily exegeting and developing neither a doctrinal system nor a complete explication of Atonement. He is certainly claiming that the manifestation of God’s love in Christ is the central event in God’s gift of atonement and its effect on the human soul is its redeeming consequence. The saving effect of Christ’s work, according to Abelard, is not forensic satisfaction, propitiation, or ransom as if first God must be satisfied or appeased or the Devil paid off prior to redemption of the human soul.

Although Abelard speaks of justification and then reconciliation: iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati, he does not explain whether or not justification and reconciliation are conjoined or whether the latter proceeds from the former. In his wording he finds no reason to distinguish between justification through the Cross and reconciliation with God. Both, he maintains, consist of God’s binding (adstringere) us to God more fully (amplius) through love. For Abelard God’s joining us with God, not the exemplum, is the atoning work. This is that in which the justification and reconciliation have taken place.

What then about the singularis gratia exhibita? And what too of the relative clause that defines this phrase? Abelard’s syntax reveals the role of exemplum in his statement and its place
in the sequence of Abelard’s explanation.

The matrix clause *Nobis autem videtur quod* initiates a set of subordinate clauses.

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Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc. . .
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The construction *quod in hoc*, used here in combination with the relative pronoun *nobis*, introduces a lengthy explanatory clause that defines the *hoc* in which atonement takes place. “We perceive that (*quod*) we are justified and reconciled *in hoc.*” The clause after *videtur* functions as an object sentence, since here the passive of *videre* has active force.

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Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati quod . . .
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*Hoc* refers to a second *quod* that initiates the explanatory clause qualifying it. The claim that follows is the core of Abelard’s observation. “We perceive that we have been justified and reconciled in *hoc . . . quod.*”

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Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati quod . . . nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit.
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Atonement inheres in God’s binding us to God *amplius per amorem*. This is the crucial statement. The redemptive means is stressed earlier with the adverbial phrase “by this singular grace shown to us,” which in a subsequent subordinate clause Abelard defines as Christ’s incarnation and death.

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Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam . . . nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit.
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While in human flesh he died as he persisted in “instituting” us “by word as well as example.”

This is the specific context for Abelard’s disputed phrase.

Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam – quod Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam et in ipsa nos tam verbo quam exemplo insitutendo usque ad mortem perstitit – nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit.

The atonement, i.e. justification and reconciliation, is God’s binding us through love. The means are the enfleshment and death of God in Christ. Human death occurs in Christ’s ministry of “instituting” us by both his word and his example. Does this claim amount only or merely to an exemplary moral theory of atonement? Regardless, it certainly means that the primary effect of atonement is humanward and not priorily transaction, purchase, or propitiation in the direction of God or Satan. The benefits of atonement may include some version of these things, but they are not the process or the primary effect.

Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et Deo reconciliati quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam – quod Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam et in ipsa nos tam verbo quam exemplo insitutendo usque ad mortem perstitit – nos sibi amplius per amorem adstrinxit, ut tanto divinae gratiae accensi beneficio nihil iam tolerare. propter ipsum vera reformidet caritas.

Ut initiates a result clause that employs the subjunctive reformidet whose subject is caritas.

Clearly reformidet is not subordinate to accensi. The consequence is not the kindling of true love but reformidare nihil, the freedom of true love, from fear of undergoing anything on God’s behalf. Reformidet is not subordinate to accensi; rather, as the perfect passive participle of accendere it modifies vera caritas. True love belonging to one who is fired accensi (from ad+candere, to gleam and glow) by so great a gift of grace now dreads to face nothing for the sake of God. The result is the liberation of an authentic love, but the means is love’s arousal by so great a gift of grace through Christ. From this reading it is surely much too simplified and
misleading to label Abelard’s solutio plainly exemplarist or Pelagian. This is confirmed by such other places in Abelard’s commentary as his remarks on 7:25: Gratia Dei, id est non lex, non propriae uires, non quaelibet merita, sed quaelibet merita, se diuina beneficia gratis nobis per IESVM, id est salutarem mundi, collata. The Law does not deliver us from this mortal body, nor do our powers or merits but only the divine grace bestowed on us through Jesus.\textsuperscript{55}

The following sentence serves as a bridge to the next controverted passage.

\begin{quote}
Quod quidem beneficium antiquos etiam patres, hoc per fidem exspectantes, in summum amorem Dei tamquam homines temporis gratiae non dubitamus accendisse, cum scriptum sit : “Et qui praebant et qui sequebantur clamabant dicentes : Hosanna filio Dauid,” etc.\textsuperscript{56} Iustior quoque, id est amplius Deum diligens, quisque fit post passionem Christi quam ante, quia amplius in amorem accendit completum beneficium quam speratum.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

In it Abelard explains the effect of the Atonement, on those of the Old Covenant, who had believed God even before Christ’s Passion. He speaks of them as the per fidem exspectantes, those by faith anticipating God’s supreme gift of grace in Christ. Undoubtedly, Abelard declares, though living in the season of the Law they too were inflamed to a very great love of God just as those who will follow in the time of grace. Their voices joined preveniently with those shouting “Hosanna to the Son of David.” But after Christ’s Passion each believer become iustior, that is, as the term has now come to signify, amplius Deum diligens, one who loves God more fully. Abelard’s explanation is direct and simple: amplius in amorem accendit completum beneficium quam speratum. A gift fulfilled inflames a fuller love than one hoped for.

Abelard also appears to be equating love and righteousness. There could be no iustificatio without love for true love is its substance. For Abelard the model for understanding iustificatio is transformed by the Cross. Abelard’s model is purposely not forensic. The reason
is his root claim that atonement amounts to God’s uniting us to God more fully through love by the grace of the Christ-event inflaming us with *summa dilectio*. What is that love? Is it simply a degree of love, love brought to its pinnacle? Is it a greater amount of love or a new kind of love unlike any other? What is the relationship between this love and God’s binding us? Can this love be reduced to only a subjective experience?

In the passage that follows Abelard restates his claim and substantiates it with textual references. His expansive first sentence summarizes his interpretation of Paul’s view of redemption in v. 26 of ch. 3. The main controversy has to do with the translation of the initial main clause: *Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio.*

Abelard begins with a summation. *Itaque*, so now, in accord with all that has been stated, we may say that redemption consists of *dilectio*. One might have expected, instead, such words as *liberatio*, *salvatio*, *propitiatio*, *satisfactio*, or *justificatio*, words that seem less subjective and more “objective” or “dramatic.” After all the stem is from *redemptare* or *redimere*, which in strictly secular affairs designate buying back or ransoming a captive. For Abelard it means love, but a certain kind of love that effects phenomena in the heart, mind, and soul that are objective, dramatic, and subjective.

It is love at its highest, greatest and profoundest, and it is love in its finality. How is it available to us and what is its motion? To what extent are human beings capable of yielding such love?

This profoundest love occurs *per passionem Christi*. It harks back to Abelard’s earlier statement:
Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam et in ipsa . . . usque ad mortem persttit. But there is no
talk here of nos tam verbo quam exemplo instutendo.\textsuperscript{59}

**Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in nobis per passionem Christi dilectio**

We obtain the full matrix clause with the addition of in nobis. This is the source of controversy.

Bernard of Clairvaux had listed Abelard’s statement in the *Epistula de erroribus Petri Abaelardi*
after having interpreted it as another piece of evidence in charges of exemplarism and
Pelagianism.\textsuperscript{60}

Regarding this particular text a question has centered around the claim that the highest
love that is our redemption is in nobis. Rashdall translates it as “that supreme love shown to us
by His passion”\textsuperscript{61} and Franks as “that supreme love manifested in our case by the passion of
Christ.”\textsuperscript{62} Robert O. P. Taylor insists on comprehending *illa summa in nobis. . . dilectio* as being
in us through Christ’s passion and not merely displayed.\textsuperscript{63} In his groundbreaking study Richard
Weingart concurs and is among the first to investigate the role of love in Abelard’s atonement
extensively.\textsuperscript{64} Philip L. Quinn favors Taylor and vigorously pursues the questions of Pelagianism
and Exemplarism in Abelard’s exegesis of Romans 3:26.\textsuperscript{65} More recently Thomas Williams has
extended the discussion by investigating Abelard’s Romans commentary in its entirety.\textsuperscript{66} John
Marenbon prefers to emend the clause as “Our redemption <is brought about> by the very great
love <instilled> through the Passion of Christ” as if *illa summa . . . dilectio*, which is clearly the
predicate in the nominative case, were an ablative of means.\textsuperscript{67} For Rashdall and Franks the text’s
redemptive love is that love revealed to us in Christ’s Passion. Consequently, atonement would
be love as exemplified to us and only by its inspiration capable of rousing us to return the love
and emulate it. But Abelard says here, without adding the word *exhibitam*, that redemption is
“that highest love in us by means of Christ’s Passion.” For Taylor, Grensted, Weingart, Quinn, and Williams this *summa dilectia* is not manifested to us but more importantly residing or present in us, and, therefore, there would be no need to emend or amplify the text.

Abelard’s earlier statement, as we have seen, identified justification and reconciliation with God’s binding us more fully to God through love by means not only of grace but of so singular a grace – as manifested to us in Christ’s life and Passion by his instructing us by word and example – that enkindled by such a great gift, our genuine love would endure anything for God. However, the subsequent passage goes on to define redemption as that highest love present in us through Christ’s Passion that frees us from the bondage to sin and obtains for us the true liberty of the children of God. In the former passage Abelard explains that in which our redemption consists and in the latter the means by which it takes place. It seems reasonable to identify the “having been justified in the blood of Christ and reconciled to God” of the first statement with the “redemption” of the second and both with atonement. If so, Abelard might appear to be completing his prior statement. The two statements, though differing, follow a similar structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement One</th>
<th>Statement Two</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) thesis:</td>
<td>(1) thesis:</td>
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<tr>
<td>. . . in hoc justificati sumus in sanguine</td>
<td>Redemptio itaque nostra est illa summa in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christi et Deo reconciliati, quod . . . nos sibi</td>
<td>nobis per passionem Christi dilectio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amplius per amorem adstrinxit</td>
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<td>(2) qualifying clause:</td>
<td>(2) qualifying clause:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam,</td>
<td>quae nos non solum a seruitute peccati liberat,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quod Filius suus nostram susceperit naturam</td>
<td>sed ueram nobis filiorum Dei libertatem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>et in ipsa nos tam verbo quam exemplo</td>
<td>acquirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instituendo usque ad mortem persttit</td>
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In the first Abelard does not speak of *filiorum Dei libertatis*, and in the second he makes no reference to *adstringere*, *exemplum* or *accensus*. In the first he places atonement in the context of God acting on us by Christ’s life and death to unite us with God, and in the second he describes atonement as the highest love residing in us through Christ’s passion that acts on us by freeing the soul from sin and acquiring for it the true freedom belonging to God’s children. In both passages he speaks of love in several ways. In the first he refers to (1) the *amor* through which God brings us to God more fully and (2) the *vera caritas* that fired by the divine grace in Christ would endure anything for God. The second treats love (1) as *illa summa dilectio* in us through Christ’s death and (2) as the *amor* of him who has shown us such grace than which no greater can be found, the love from which we may now do all things. Both also speak of fear. In the first, true love inflamed by grace fears nothing on God’s behalf. In the second, because of the grace shown to us and the liberty of the soul from sin we may act out of love, rather than fear. In the first he deals with grace (1) as set forth and the means by which God reconciles us to God and (2) as so great a gift that it may inflame our authentic love to avoid nothing in God’s behalf. In the second grace is shown to us to its greatest extent by God whom we now love rather than fear. *Exhibitus*, manifested or set forth, also appears in both. The first speaks of Christ’s life and Passion as *illa singularis gratia exhibita*, and the second of Christ as *qui nobis tantam exhibuit gratiam qua maior inueniri ipso attestante non potest*.

The second passage complements the first rather than completing or merely paraphrasing
it. Abelard seems to provide a kind of meditation on atonement considering it from this angle and then another rather positing a set of definitions.

However, what would we have if we should combine the two statements? We would still not have Abelard’s complete statement of the Atonement. It seems obvious that it was never Abelard’s intent to present a systematique here. The genre is purposefully exegetical, not dialectical. The disputation that recurs in the work is more rhetorical than purely logical. Here it is subservient to the exegetical enterprise. Moreover, a close examination of Abelard’s commentary as it proceeds seems to reveal his clear intention to engage Paul’s letter rather than to do formal theology. It may be that for him the major purpose for exegeting Romans is more his advancement in his own theological development than pedagogy or self-promotion.

To the last passage Abelard attaches scriptural references to clarify and to substantiate his description of the working of God’s redemptive grace. Again the order of his reasoning is instructive. He has said:

Our redemption is that highest love in us
That highest love [is] in us by means of Christ’s passion
That highest love in us by means of Christ’s passion frees us from bondage to sin
That highest love in us by means of Christ’s passion acquires for us the true freedom of God’s children
Because that highest love in us by means of Christ’s passion frees us from bondage to sin and acquires for us the true freedom of God’s children, we may do all things not out of fear but out of love of the one who has shown us grace than which no greater can be found,
    as Christ himself attests.

To that he now adds::
“Maiorem hac,” inquit, “dilectionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.”

De hoc quidem amore idem alibi dicit: “Ignem ueni mittere in terram, et quid uolo nisi ut ardeat?” Ad hanc itaque veram caritatis libertatem in hominibus propagandam se uenisse testatur. Quod diligenter attendens, Apostolus in sequentibus ait quia “caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris, per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Ut quid enim Christus” etc.; et iterum: “Commendat autem caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc” etc.

“No one has greater love than this than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends”. Elsewhere the Lord says of this love, "I have come to cast fire on the earth, and what do I will but that it blaze forth?" For this purpose he thus testifies that he came in order to spread true liberty of love among humans. Closely examining this, the apostle later declares: "Because the charity of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. For why did Christ die?" etc. And again, "God commends God’s charity toward us; because when as yet we were sinners."

Where do these citations fit in the preceding statement? They follow *ipso attestante* appositively. This is followed by a set of brief quotations in answer to the question: what is this grace by means of Christ’s Passion that liberates us from enslavement and fear? Grace here for Abelard is larger than any specific atoning process or its effect. It is the supreme redemptive gift, not the gift of justification, reconciliation, or even the forgiveness of sins. It is the gift that make these accessible. It is the gift through Christ of the highest love, of the love that inflames and delivers the human soul, of the love that the Holy Spirit pours into the human heart, and of the love that sinful human beings do not merit but desperately require. The atonement for Abelard is God’s love by Christ in us, which binds us to God and in turn effects justification and sanctification.

Abelard ends his commentary on Rom 3:26 by promising further exposition on redemption later on in his exegesis of Romans. He also acknowledges his discussion as abbreviated. However, to compensate for the incompleteness of his interpretation he refers the reader to a fuller treatment in *Tropologiae*, a work lost or never written.
Quae quidem plenius suo loco exponemus. Nunc autem succincte, quantum ad expositionis breuitatem pertinet, de modo nostrae redemptionis quid uidetur nobis sufficiat. Si qua uero desunt perfectioni, Tropologiae nostrae tractatui reseruamus. But we will expound these things more fully in their proper place. But now succinctly, as befits a brief exposition, this view of the manner of our redemption should suffice. But if our interpretations lack completeness, let us reserve further explanation for our treatise Tropology.

If Abelard’s comments here do not amount to a complete theory, so the remarks in this paper do not tell the whole story of Abelard’s efforts to grasp the Atonement. He addresses the question of redemption in various other important places in his theological writings that bear comparison and contrast with what Abelard has set forth in his exegesis of Rom 3:26. However, that would require not only several papers but also a monograph or two.

This paper has attempted to re-open the question of what Abelard really says about the atonement but only in one very specific context. It is much indebted to the superior efforts of other scholars especially Weingart, Quinn, Williams, Peppermüller and Buytaert. It, however, tries to supplement them with additional commentary and textual analysis albeit limited to a small compass.


Peppermüller II 280, 23 corrects the apparent typographical error in Buytaert 117, 247: *adstrinxit* rather than *adstrixit*.

Buytaert 117, 242-248. The documentation in this paper cites the Buytaert edition but follows Peppermüller’s corrections.

Rom 8:21.

Buytaert 118, 256-261.

There was no standardized version of the Vulgate in the Middle Ages. The most accessible modern versions, the Stuttgart and the revised Clementine editions, vary from each other and sometimes from the particular Latin Bible utilized by a given medieval author. When possible this paper repeats the Latin Scripture as Abelard cites it.

Ps 14:1-2; 53:1-2; 140:1-3; 10:7; Is 59:7-8; Ps 36:1.

Buytaert 113, 102-123.
11 Buytaert 113, 124-128.
12 Buytaert 113-114, 129-130.
13 Such as vel, aut, itaque, et, etiam, ita, ergo.
14 Buytaert 114, 131.
15 Buytaert 114, 131-134.
16 Buytaert 114, 135-138.
17 Buytaert 114, 138-140.
18 Buytaert 114, 140-144.
19 Buytaert 114, 144-146.
20 Buytaert 114, 146-155.
21 Buytaert 114, 151-154.
22 Buytaert 114, 154-157.
23 Buytaert 114-115, 157-161.
24 Buytaert 115, 161-164.
25 Gratian, *Decretum Gratiani* ch. 63, c. 11, q. 3 (1, 660 Friedberg). Buytaert 114, 165-166.
26 Buytaert 115, 166-173.
27 Buytaert 115, 174-178.
28 Buytaert 115, 178-183.
30 Buytaert 115, 184-191.
31 Buytaert 116, 192-196.
33 Buytaert 116, 202-204.
34 Buytaert 116, 205-209.

Composed sometime before 1153, it may have been written by an anonymous student of Abelard and includes notes taken from Abelard’s lectures: Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolæ Pauli e Schola Petri Abaelardi, ed. A. M. Landgraf (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1937-1945).

Abelard treats this matter later in his comments on Rom 5:5-8 in the Com. Rom. pp. 154-156.

No such work has survived, and there is some question whether or not Abelard ever finished it. See . . .
Buyaert 118, 270-274.