
Political Culture of Democracy in Peru, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer*’s biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University (Canada) and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Vanessa Reilly
Democracy Specialist
Bureau for Latin American & the Caribbean
US Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background of the Study

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and

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Chile (N = 1,965) Ecuador (N=3,000), and Brazil (N = 2,500).

preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

³ All **AmericasBarometer** samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.

In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	 UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	
Bolivia		 Ciudadania Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Brazil		 Universidade de Brasília
Chile		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador		
Paraguay		 Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela		

Caribbean		
Dominican Republic		
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad & Tobago		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bembry, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the data bases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science •Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science •Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department •Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP •Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP
Mexico and Central America Group	
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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA •Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
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Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA •Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA •Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants •Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
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Canada	•Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2010

Executive Summary

The global financial crisis temporarily halted the impressive economic growth cycle Peru had been experiencing since 2002. But despite the stagnation of 2009, the country seems to be destined for rapid economic recovery. Current forecasts place Peru's economic growth rate at 6.8% for 2010, although the actual rate will likely be a bit higher, considering the 10% growth rate measured between April and June of this year. Given that the economic slowdown of 2009 was not dramatic (especially when compared to the negative growth experienced by other countries in the region), the effect on the general population was not as severe as that caused by previous crises.

The above does not imply, however, that the crisis has gone unnoticed. As we indicate in the first chapter, although the crisis had a modest impact on employment levels, it most affected wage rates, which is the typical source of income for the middle class. Salaries were affected to a lesser degree and for less time. Even with respect to wage rates, however, the impact of the crisis has not been very severe. Furthermore, the global crisis did not have a significant impact on total poverty levels in Peru, which actually decreased (although at a lower rate than before) between 2008 and 2009. Therefore is it clear that, fortunately for Peruvian democracy, the global crisis had a limited impact on the national economy and its effect – according to existing information – has been temporary. However the effects of the crisis, albeit modest, were not evenly distributed. Our survey found that those residing in rural areas and those who possess less material wealth declared a greater decrease in income than that which was declared by those who reside in urban areas and those who possess less material wealth.

The central question of our study, given the current context, is: to what extent has the global economic crisis influenced citizen support for democracy and democratic practices? The answer appears evident, given that the global economic crisis – as we have argued – has not had a significant impact in Peru. Indeed, when measuring attitudes toward democracy, democratic principles, and democratic practices, we find little difference between 2010 and 2008 and, therefore, we should conclude that the global crisis has not had an important effect on attitudes towards democracy in Peru.

The above conclusion should not necessarily induce enthusiasm, however. As we will demonstrate in the following pages, public opinion in Peru has reached a state of deep misgiving and discontent with the country's political institutions, which then influences attitudes towards democracy and its associated principles. To begin with, current support for democracy has diminished in comparison with the results of a 2008 survey. In that year the average support for democracy was measured at 65.5 on our scale of 0 to 100; in 2010 the average has decreased to 60.1 and the difference is statistically significant. In fact, Peru is one of the few countries in the region in which the national average of support for democracy decreased between those two years. This decrease places Peru at the lowest regional ranking of average support for democracy in 2010 (Figure III.10). There are various explanations for such a low level of attitudinal support for democracy. In the last 40 years, Peru has experienced moments of high political expectation followed by great disappointment. The most recent example is the government of Alberto Fujimori, who despite his successes in political economy and internal security, caused great disappointment when he abused his power and mobilized a vast network of corruption in his attempt to maintain the presidency. To this one must add the significance of popular discontent with the degradation of the quality of daily life as a result of corruption and a lack of personal safety. We shall see that these issues are of great concern to many Peruvians. In addition, it is important to note that Peru continues to be a country of profound inequalities and discrimination, with a rural sector that is generally marginalized from the benefits of modernity enjoyed by various cities, particularly the capital. Our analysis will reveal that

levels of support for democracy are affected by, among other factors, perceptions of government success or failure in combating poverty and unemployment (which is referred to in abbreviated form as “economic performance”), as well as by victimization as a result of corruption.

Support for the political system is also very low in Peru, among the lowest in the entire region. Perhaps a brief spot of hope worth mentioning on that subject is that in 2010, average support for the political system was higher than that measured by surveys in 2006 and 2008, although the difference nears the margin of error. We also find that in Peru, perceptions of government success or failure in combating poverty and unemployment have the strongest effect on support for the system. The second most impactful variable is the size of the town in which a person resides: the smaller the locality, the greater the support for the system. Even so, we find that residents of the southern *sierra* show a substantially lower level of support for the political system in comparison to those who do not reside in this area. This is a clear indication that social exclusion has a negative effect on citizen attitudes towards the political system and suggests that this is one of the challenges which the young Peruvian democracy needs to address.

The relatively precarious public opinion commitment to democracy is newly confirmed as such when comparing the predilection for supporting military coups in Peru in contrast to the levels of support found in other countries. Peru is characterized by one of the highest national averages on the scale of support for military coups, barely below that of Belize, Mexico, and Guatemala. This attitude has not significantly changed between 2006 and 2010 and a series of variables, as much demographic as having to do with evaluating the performance of the government and the political system, are at play. For example, younger people (those between 15 and 25 years old) have the highest tendency to support a military coup d'état. This does not bode well for what it could signify for the future of the Peruvian political system. Along similar lines, people with less material possessions and those with lower levels of formal education are more inclined to support coups. Therefore, it is clear that the struggle against poverty and for the improvement of education could have a positive effect on democratic attitudes. But the performance of the government and political system also has an effect on those attitudes. Those who have a poor opinion of the government's economic performance and those who have been directly affected by corruption or have an elevated fear for their personal safety are more willing to accept an interruption of the democratic process by a military coup d'état.

Having touched upon the themes of corruption and delinquency, we should note that perceptions in Peru of a lack of security against delinquency continues to be the highest in the region: in the last three surveys performed by the Americas Barometer (2006, 2008, and 2010), Peru placed either first or second in the distribution of countries according to average perceptions of personal safety. Furthermore, in 2010 Peru placed first among all countries surveyed regarding levels of crime victimization or petty crime. The figures are no better when examining corruption. In the level of surveyed perceptions of corruption among public officials, Peru ranks third among the region's national averages. It also ranks third in the figures for corruption victimization, with 32% of respondents declaring that they have been victimized by at least one act of corruption.

Some countries experience levels of insecurity as high as those found in Peru; others share the high percentage of crime victimization or petty crime. Similarly, other countries share the questionable merit of having widespread perceptions of general corruption among public officials similar to the state of perceptions in Peru, as well as comparable average measurements of corruption victimization. What distinguishes Peru with respect to other countries is that none of the latter consistently place among the highest in rankings of these variables, which is to say that none of the other countries fit the profile of Peru: high corruption, both actual and perceived, high levels of crime victimization, and a strong sense of

a lack of personal safety. These factors place Peru in a unique position in the region and help to explain why Peruvians have such a negative attitude towards democracy and the political system.

In a more detailed examination of crime and corruption, it is important to discuss which groups are most prone to suffer from these types of actions. In the case of crime victimization and petty crime, we find that people living in Lima or in the large cities, who are characterized by higher levels of education, in addition to those between the ages of 18 and 45, have a higher probability of declaring that they have been victimized by delinquency in the year prior to the survey. With respect to corruption, our study reveals that those most prone to be affected by this phenomenon are male, of higher levels of formal education, and employed. In other words, those who have a higher probability of involvement in the public sphere are those who are most prone to be victims of corruption.

We have already indicated the serious impact of delinquency, perceptions of personal safety, and corruption on support for the system and its political institutions. Our study reveals that these factors have a greatly negative effect on the willingness of citizens to support the rule of law (meaning the compromise with the authorities to always respect the law). In Peru, nearly half the respondents (49.5%) are willing to, on occasion; accept that the authorities act outside the law. This level of support for the rule of law is among the lowest in the countries surveyed in 2010 and is measured at barely above that of Ecuador and El Salvador. One of the factors that determine this attitude is having been a victim of delinquency, which speaks to how this social problem corrodes citizen support for the rule of law.

All the above helps to understand why we find that Peru has the fourth lowest level of support for the political system among the other countries in the region, with an average level that has not substantially varied between 2006 and 2010. But even more worrying is our finding that Peruvians find themselves in the penultimate ranking in the region with respect to political tolerance. Therefore not only are levels of support for the system in Peru low, but also political tolerance is poor. This unique combination of attitudes, low support for the system, and low political tolerance is designated in our study as “democracy at risk.” The opposite attitudes, high support and high tolerance, are designated in our study as “stable democracy” because their combination favors the stabilization of a democratic political system in which institutions are respected and enjoy citizen support. As the reader can imagine – given the preceding discussion – this favorable combination is particularly scarce in Peru, which is ranked second to last in the region, above only Paraguay. These attitudes have not meaningfully varied between 2006 and 2008. In this case, the statistical analysis demonstrates that two factors play a decisive role in determining these attitudes: the perception of the government’s economic performance and the perception of internal security or personal safety. In this case, we see that the combination of the perception that the government is doing poorly in the struggle against poverty and unemployment with the sense of a lack of personal safety affect the attitudes that favor the establishment of a stable democracy.

To a certain extent, negative attitudes towards the political system as a whole also have an impact on attitudes towards other political institutions. With the exception of the Catholic Church, the media, and the armed forces (institutions that enjoy approval rates above 50), the rest of the institutions – all of a political nature – receive approval ratings below 50. Political parties, Congress, and the presidency inspire the lowest levels of confidence among citizens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, the institution charged with defending citizen rights, has an average confidence rating of less than 40, which is less than that of the national police force. In sum, our analysis of citizen attitudes towards the political system demonstrates widespread discontent, which without a doubt undermines the legitimacy of the system. In almost all the attitudes that would be conducive to the establishment of a stable democracy, Peru is at extremely low levels when compared to other countries in the region.

Attitudes towards political institutions are not the only important ones for the adequate function of a democracy. Other attitudes and even behaviors also have an impact that needs analysis. One of these is interpersonal trust, since a society that trusts its members has a better chance of finding common ground. In Peru, more than half of respondents affirmed that the people in their community have little or no trust in others. In this respect, Peru is last among the countries surveyed in 2010. When the factors that predict this attitude are analyzed, one begins to understand why interpersonal trust is so low in Peru. The strongest predictor for this attitude is the sense of personal safety and as we have indicated, the perception of a lack of personal safety in Peru is the highest among the countries surveyed in 2010.

In terms of civic engagement, we find that Peruvians are involved in civil society to a relatively significant extent. For example, we observe high levels of participation in meetings of religious organizations, and also in parents associations, committees dedicated to the betterment of the community, and women's groups. In this last case, we find that Peru leads the rankings on participation in women's groups. This may be due to the high level of distrust in the political system, or perhaps to the fact that citizens in Peru consider themselves obliged to compensate for the deficiencies of the state; what is certain is that the levels of civil engagement in Peru are relatively high when compared to those in other countries. This suggests a relatively active civil society.

Activism is not limited to community or religious action, but rather also applies to unconventional forms of participation. Our survey found that 12.2% of respondents indicate having participated in protests or public demonstrations, a percentage which is a third higher than that of all other surveyed countries. The subject which provoked the most protest activity, as one can imagine, is the economy, followed by political issues, education issues, and issues of public services. In this case, we find that those who reside in the southern *sierra* (an area of high concentrations of indigenous people), those who have been affected by delinquency and corruption, and those who declare having more of an interest in politics are the most inclined to become involved in protests and public demonstrations.

One of the subjects we have been analyzing with care since 2006 is the attitude of the Peruvian citizenry towards their local governments. In terms of participation in municipal meetings, we find that a relatively small proportion, 11.8%, declare having taken part in such an activity. This percentage places Peru in a middling position in the region and has not significantly varied between 2006 and 2010. Interest in politics is a factor that influences such participation, but it is not the only factor at play. Residing in rural areas and being above the average age are also factors that encourage participation in local government meetings. A slightly higher percentage, 14.2%, declares having solicited help from or having petitioned a municipal official. Again, this percentage places Peru in middling position when compared to that found in other countries, and, in this case, we did find a significant decrease from the 2006 figure (21.2%). One of the variables used in this study in order to measure economic performance by local government was citizen satisfaction with the services afforded to them by that local government. In this case we found that the grand majority (close to 60%) consider these services to be neither good nor bad, although almost a quarter of respondents indicate that they are bad or very bad. The degree of satisfaction with local governments in Peru is, again, among the lowest in the region (the fourth lowest, above only Suriname, Jamaica, and Belize). In our report we demonstrate how dissatisfaction with the services provided by the municipality translates to the lowest levels of support for the system and of trust in political institutions.

In the last three chapters of the report, we examine themes of particular relevance to the Peruvian case. In the chapter on ethnicity and discrimination in Peru, we find that despite the fact that people are reluctant to admit having been a victim of discrimination, indirect forms of measurement allow us to expose the notable, and concerning, existence of discrimination in Peru. The majority of people are

willing to accept the existence of discrimination produced by the economic situation, but there is more reluctance to accept general discrimination. The results also suggest that racial discrimination in Peru is among the highest in countries that have a large proportion of indigenous peoples. To affirm that there is discrimination in Peru is not a novel discovery. What our study adds to the discussion is the confirmation that much of this discrimination is “invisible.” Naturally, while the existence of a certain problem is denied, little will be done to resolve it. One of the initial steps in this regard is to persuade the conscience that discrimination exists, a necessary step for discussion on how to reduce it. In relation to citizen perception on the role of the state in the economy and society, we found that in Peru there is relatively broad support for state participation in various aspects of society. Although the degree of support in Peru for state intervention is not among the highest in the region, the difference with countries that experience the highest levels of support is not large. This indicates, as we have already noted, a remarkable confluence of opinions on the role of the state in the region, with the notable exception of the United States. It is clear that most Latin American citizens call for a greater, not lesser, role of the state.

We have argued that differing opinions on the appropriate role of the state are central to the increase of social conflict in Peru, to the extent that they are a product of a rejection of policies adopted by the state or the result of demands for specific state interventions. One of the characteristics of social conflict in Peru is the use of unconventional forms of protest such as those generally associated with direct action, such as roadblocks and invasions of territory. For this reason, in this chapter we discuss the existing level of support among society for these types of actions. In addition, we are interested in knowing what degree of support exists for participation in groups dedicated to the overthrow of an elected government by violent means. Our findings are that, with some variability, Peru occupies a middling place with relation to other countries in the region in terms of support for participation in these groups. This means that approval for direct action on political motivations is neither very high nor very low. Finally, our analysis reveals that political discontent (expressed through dissatisfaction with presidential performance), the perception of the severity of the financial crisis and the decrease in family income, the presence of democratic values, residence in the southern *Sierra*, a low level of education, and youth are all factors that increase support for direct action in politics.

Finally, we find a notable decrease in the percentage of people who declare sympathy with a political party between 2006 and 2010 (29.9% and 21.2%, respectively). We also find that clientelistic practices in Peru are relatively widespread, although they do not reach the average levels found in surveys of various other countries. In the Peruvian case, clientelism of partisan origin is at a median level for the region.

In conclusion, our study demonstrates that economic growth alone does not guarantee an automatic improvement in support for democracy and its institutions in Peru. It is also important that citizens perceive that the government is effectively dealing with issues that affect not only the economic situation of the majority but also the quality of daily life. The strengthening of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the decrease in delinquency, and the sense of personal security – which affects many Peruvians – should be monitored with the same attention as that given to the behavior of macroeconomic variables.

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place in the 30's. This economic crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn, but then we turn to the core of our analysis, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering. Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September, 2008; several months after the 2008 AmericasBarometer fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still being felt, albeit unequally, around the globe.

In the prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal economies have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens' support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, "democracy recession", and then discuss democracy at the country level. We will conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

Economic Overview

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, world real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3% by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to -1.4% (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway.⁴ Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a world-wide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered across the

⁴ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).

globe. Forty three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 per day. Moreover, initial predictions were that more than 1 billion people were expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.⁵




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections, 2007-2011
(Source IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010)⁶

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labour Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 was estimated at 6.6%, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has reduced work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.⁷ Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2% of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide.⁸

All these figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was more uneven and not as severe in many countries.⁹ Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong

⁵ See www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm and <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

⁶ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).

⁷ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2010), 42.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁹ Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9% between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%).¹⁰ Economic recovery, however, seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6% in 2010 and 2011, respectively.¹¹ On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.¹²

The financial disaster has had a negative impact on the labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8% during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.¹³ Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9% in 2009.¹⁴ These are just some examples of the serious effects that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances (that is, money sent home by family members working abroad) on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.¹⁵ Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region's nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure I.2).

¹⁰ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the 'Rainy Day' at Hand?," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

¹³ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

¹⁴ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.

¹⁵ See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>




Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as Reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4% in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25% in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.¹⁶

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.¹⁷ As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate¹⁸.

¹⁶ See

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/3349341110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

¹⁷ Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).

¹⁸ These data are based on the seven largest economies of the region (they represent 91% of the regional GNP).




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4% in 2007 to -6.5% in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.5% between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9% in 2010 - 2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but nine of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP. The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was -1%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.¹⁹

¹⁹ Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB's latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable...”²⁰

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Peru

As has been indicated elsewhere²¹, Peru has been one of the countries with the most economic dynamism in the region during the last four or five years. In 2008, the Peruvian economy grew by 9.8%,

²⁰ Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

²¹ Julio F. Carrión, “Peru’s Confidence,” *Americas Quarterly*, July 2009, pp. 35-39.

which was the second highest growth in the region for that year²². As was to be expected given the global crisis, the Peruvian economy contracted in 2009, but despite this disacceleration the economy finished the year with positive growth of 0.9%, which was above the regional average. For 2010, it is predicted that GDP will increase by 2.8%, but the most recent reports demonstrate that the growth will probably be higher. For example, the National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI) in Peru reported that growth during the first trimester of the current year was 6%. In April alone, growth was 9.3%, which suggests a rapid economic acceleration.

The impact of the crisis on the labor market does not appear to have been very severe in Peru. Unemployment in metropolitan Lima, for example, stayed constant between 2008 and 2009 (8.4%)²³. Although inflation increased from 1.8% to 5.8% between 2007 and 2008, this growth in consumer prices does not appear to have been directly related to the global crisis. In fact, inflation in 2009 was only at 2.9%, which indicates stabilization.

The crisis was felt more strongly in the decrease of wage levels, which experienced a notable shrink between 2007 and 2009, although they were beginning to show a slight recuperation at the beginning of 2009. This is shown in Figure I.5, although average wages are still far from reaching the levels present at the beginning of 2007.




Figure I.5. Index of Real Wages in Metropolitan Lima, 2007-2009

Curiously, while average wages diminished during the crisis period, salaries increased slightly during the first part of 2008, although they later fell somewhat (see Figure I.6). As is known, wages are the form payment for laborers and unskilled workers, while salaries are assigned to people who possess qualified work or perform a qualified service. The information presented suggests that the sectors of the middle class, or lower middle class, who tend to be compensated in the form of salaries, saw their income proportionally more affected relative to the lower sectors as a result of the crisis. It is probable that this was due to the existence of unions, which can protect workers' income in the case of a crisis. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that, on average, people who receive a salary receive higher remuneration than those who receive a wage.

²² All the data in this section, including the graphics, are provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI), unless otherwise indicated.

²³ CEPAL-OIT Bulletin, *Coyuntura laboral en América Latina y el Caribe*. June 2010, No. 3.




Figure I.6. Index of Real Salaries in Metropolitan Lima, 2007-2009

Partially owing to the fact that wages did not experience as strong a decline in 2008 and to the fact that they increased in relation to 2007, poverty levels in Peru have continued with their slight tendency to fall. The percentage of poor people in Peru in 2008 was less than that registered in 2007 (36.2% and 39.3%, respectively). There was even a slight fall registered in this percentage in 2009 (Figure I.7). Previous data clearly suggest that that the global economic crisis had an effect on the Peruvian economy, but these effects were not as negative as initially expected. This can only be taken as good news; as demonstrated in our previous report (Carrion and Zarate 2009), levels of dissatisfaction with political institutions in Peru were already very pronounced. One wonders what would have happened to Peruvian democracy if the social consequences of the global economic crisis had been more negative.



Figure I.7. Total Poverty Rate in Peru, 2004-2009

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.²⁴

²⁴ Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).

According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I.8).




Figure I.8. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Declines from 2003-2010

This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.²⁵ Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g., Iran and Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).

Examining Freedom House's specific classification of countries (Table I.1), we find that in 2009, 89 countries continue to belong to the "free" category, representing 46 percent of the world's 194 countries as well as 46% of the global population. The number of countries that are considered "partly free" decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of "not free" nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24% of the world's population, respectively. More than 2.3 billion individuals reside in "not free" countries, that is, ones where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China, makes up 50 percent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and nine of the 47 countries considered "not free" scored the lowest possible ratings in both civil liberties and political rights.²⁶

²⁵ Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."

²⁶ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

Table I.1. Global Trends in Freedom 1979-2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

Within Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development, according to Freedom House, in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the "electoral democracy" category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.²⁷ Figure I.9 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered "free" by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated "partly free" because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current "democracy recession" in the Americas, much as there is a "democracy recession" in the world as a whole.




Figure I.9. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.²⁸ For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for

²⁷ *Ibid*

²⁸ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

democracy.²⁹ So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, the authoritarian regimens can reinforce the antidemocratic culture.

Dimensions of Democracy in Peru

In the Peruvian case, the scores assigned by Freedom House stayed the same between 2008 and 2010, which implies that there was no democratic recession and that Peru continues to be classified as a “free” country. This does not mean, however, that Peruvian democracy is impeccable. The scores given to the country on the scale of “political rights” and “civil liberties” were 2 and 3, respectively. This implies that, with respect to political rights, Peru is a country in which rights are generally respected, but there continue existing problems of political corruption, political violence, political discrimination against a minority, or undue military influence in the political process. Peru was scored at 3 on civil liberties in 2009 and 2010, which means that these liberties, although present, are precarious and demonstrate serious deficiencies in three or four aspects typically associated with civil liberties.

The most remarkable political events since the publication of our last report include the condemnation of Alberto Fujimori to 25 years in prison for violations of human rights and the growth of social conflict, which reached a high point of confrontation in the city of Bagua during June of 2009. We will discuss these points in the following paragraphs.

In November of 2000, Alberto Fujimori resigned the presidency of Peru via fax from Japan. Despite the Peruvian government’s demands for extradition, Japan refused to consider them, arguing that Fujimori was a Japanese citizen. In November of 2005, Fujimori made a surprise flight to Chile via Mexico, apparently with the intention of running as a candidate in the presidential elections of 2006. He was detained in Chile, however, and sent to Peru in September 2007 after an extradition process. In December of the same year, Fujimori was condemned to six years in prison for illegal raids and abuse of authority, but the verdict that garnered more national and international attention was the charge of violations of human rights. In April of 2009, a tribunal of three judges found him guilty of these charges and condemned him to 25 years in prison. Some months later, in July of the same year, Fujimori was also found guilty of the charges of corruption and condemned to six additional years in prison. In this way, Peruvian democracy, which was restored in 2000, was able to successfully confront the delicate question of how to sanction violations of the rule of law by a former president without succumbing to political vengeance.

Another important event of the last two years is related to the increase in social conflicts. According to data provided by Defensoría del Pueblo, in 2007, 215 acts of collective protest were registered in the entire country³⁰. This number increased by more than double in the following year, reaching a registered 719 acts of protest. It is difficult to argue that this increase was due to the global crisis, since the Peruvian economy experienced significant growth in 2008. On the contrary, one would think that these conflicts increased as a result of efforts to obtain better conditions in a context in which

²⁹ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

³⁰ The data on collective protest have been taken from the annual reports by Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú of 2007, 2008 and 2009.

those involved believed they would be able to succeed in their demands due to the country's economic growth.

In 2009, there was a reduction in levels of social conflict in numerical terms (they went from 719 to 414), but their intensity increased. One event in particular garnered national and international attention. In June of 2009, a group of indigenous people from the province of Bagua blocked highways in protest against the passing of various legislative decrees for the use of agrarian lands and forests, which, they alleged, not only posed risks to their rights to the land but could also result in environmental degradation. The indigenous groups also protested that these legislative decrees had been released without prior consultation with them. The confrontations that came about when the police decided to remove the barricades on the highways resulted in, according to the Defensoría del Pueblo report, the deaths of 10 demonstrators and 23 police officers, the disappearance of one police officer, and more than 200 injured persons ³¹.

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends”³², as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al.³³ found that no democracy had collapsed where the country's per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the inoculation “protection” of historically adequate levels of economic development.³⁴

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al.³⁵ also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries

³¹ Defensoría del Pueblo, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Defensoría del Pueblo, Lima, May 2010. Available at <http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/inform-anuales.php>

³² Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

³³ Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?", *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).

³⁴ Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

³⁵ Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

placing most nations in Przeworski et al.'s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.³⁶ Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?³⁷ In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

Following a discussion of the economic crisis' impact on the region and Peru, the present chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Peru. It also analyzed the trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the AmericasBarometer 2010. In Chapter III of this study we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter we will examine three main variables (among others), namely, support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction, as the three key variables to understand the crisis impact on democracy in the region as a whole, and in Peru since 2008.

³⁶ Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Insurgency and Inequality," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).

³⁷ Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52.no. 2 (2010).

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and Peru economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 AmericasBarometer study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer the questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis, 2) who did they blame for it, and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We first present a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where Peru is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was, we ask who is to blame for it. The following is the text of the items themselves:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis, others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Peruvians
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of the country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including all 25 countries in the AmericasBarometer 2010³⁸, we can see in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.

³⁸ This study was carried out in 26 countries, including Haiti. However, the information of Haiti has not been included, because of the earthquake in January of this year; the data set of that country was available after this report was written.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas, 2010

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica, Nicaragua, the United States, and Honduras have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis, although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceive a crisis.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis

In Peru, as in the other countries, the majority think that we are experiencing a crisis, but only a third of respondents consider the crisis to be very serious (Figure II.3). In this sense, Peru finds itself in the small group of countries in which a minority (a third or less) consider the crisis to be acute. These countries include Brazil (for whom 32% of those surveyed think that the crisis is serious), Panama (30.8%), Costa Rica (28.8%), Chile (22.3%), and Uruguay (10.4%).




Figure II.3. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis, Peru 2010

Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first (Figure II.4).




Figure II.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? According to Citizens in the Americas Who Perceive a Crisis, 2010

The majority of citizens who perceive a crisis in the Americas blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Fewer than 10% of Latin Americans who perceive a crisis blame the “rich” countries or advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many individuals in these countries, instead, blame

themselves for the economic crisis. We examine these results by the major regions in the Americas, with the results shown in Figure II.5.




Figure II.5. Who is Responsible for the Economic Crisis? Perspective by Regions of the Americas, 2010

In Peru, a third of respondents blame the current government for the crisis, which is higher than the percentage found in the South American region as a whole, where only 16.2% of respondents fault the current government for the crisis. The fact that a good part of respondents in Peru blame the government for the crisis is understandable considering that the survey occurred almost halfway through the term of Alan García, who was elected in 2006 (Figure II.6). In any case, it remains noteworthy that the percentage of Peruvians who assign responsibility to the current government for the crisis is practically double the mean registered in South America.




Figure II.6. Who is responsible for the crisis? Peru, 2011

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis, as well as who was blamed for it. Here, we will explore how citizens experience the crisis.

Job Loss

The questions utilized in this section are the following:

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
- (3) No, did not lose your job
- (4) Did not work because you decided not to work or disabilities
- (88) DK (98) DA

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7 below. While three-quarters of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7% did, but found a new one, and 8% of the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, over 16% of respondents report lost jobs.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years (see Figure II.8).




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years

The Peruvian Case

Approximately 26% of Peruvian households had at least one member who lost his or her job in 2008 or 2009 (Figure II.9). This percentage is located at a median point between the extremes found in the 2010 survey. For example, almost 40% of Mexican households had a member that lost his or her job; this is consistent with the macroeconomic information that indicates that Mexico was the Latin American country most affected by the crisis. At the other extreme lies the Bolivian case, where only 16% of households experienced a similar situation.




Figure II.9. Percentage of Peruvians who lost their Jobs, 2010

When we analyze loss of employment according to demographic variables, we find the following. In the first place, women were most affected in the labor market as a result of the crisis (Figure II.10). For example, while 40% of men who lost their jobs were unable to find another, almost 60% of women could not find new employment. This disadvantaged position of women can also be appreciated when we examine the percentage of respondents who lost their jobs but were able to find a new one: among men, almost six out of every ten were able to find new work; among women, this figure hardly reached three out of every ten.

Another important finding of our study is that neither age nor level of education appear to have significantly influenced unemployment levels (be it temporarily or somewhat more permanently)³⁹ in Peru. Rather, place of residence does appear to have been a factor, though the effect is not very marked. Persons residing in urban areas constitute 77% of our sample population but only represent 70% of those who lost their jobs and were able to find new work. This suggests that persons residing in these areas had relatively more difficulty in finding new work, in comparison with those residing in rural areas. We say relatively because the great majority of those who were able to find new work live in cities, although this proportion is slightly less than what one would expect considering their weight in the total population.

³⁹ Here and in all other analyses of Peru, we include the extremely small group of people who declared having no level of formal education (12 persons in total) in the group of those who completed or had at least one year of primary education.




Figure II.10. Percentage who lost Their Jobs, by Sex, Age, Education, and Place of Residence, Peru 2010

Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) Increased? [\[Go to Q11\]](#)
- (2) Remained the same? [\[Go to Q11\]](#)
- (3) Decreased? [\[Go to Q10F\]](#)

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.11) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth saying that it has increased.

Peru data are not different. More than a half (56.6%) indicate that family income remained the same, whereas a 19.3% declare that the income increased, and 24.1% states it decreased.




Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Changes in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who says that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas.




Figure II.12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years?
(Percentage of Total Population)

Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II.13, a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.

Moreover, Figure II.13 shows that as family wealth declines, the degree percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; the poorest individuals in the region (those in the first quintile of wealth shown in the figure) are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.⁴⁰




Figure II.13. Percentage of Individuals in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

When we examine the Peruvian data we find a similar situation, with no significant differences. While 29.9% of residents in the poorest areas of the country (rural areas) state that their family income has decreased, 22.4% of residents in the urban areas declare the same.

The difference is within the margin of error. On the other hand, the differences are more acute when we examine the distribution of this variable by level of wealth. In this case, the percentage among

⁴⁰ For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>)

the poorest (those in the lowest quintile) report a decrease in their income that is more than twice the percentage found among the top quintile (32.2% and 15.5%, respectively).

As a rule, the poorer the person, the greater his or her their income decline. Those in the middling quintile (3) show a decrease in income that is not significantly different from those who are immediate below or above that level.




Figure II.14. Percent of Individuals in Peru who Declare a Decrease in Their Family Income, by Area of Residency and Level of Wealth, 2010

Perceptions of Both the Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondents' perceptions of their personal and national economic situation. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Don't know (98) Doesn't answer

IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

We now couple these items with the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.15, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy and also for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.




Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy During Hard Times in the Americas, 2010

In Peru we find a similar situation. Persons who report having lost their capacity to earn in the last two years tend to have a more negative opinion of their own economic situation and that of the country. And, as was to be expected, those who saw their earnings decrease are also those who tend to have a negative retrospective evaluation of the economic situation, both personal and national (Figure II.16).




Figure II.16. The Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and their Perceptions of the Economy in Hard Times in Peru, 2010.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our study finds that in Latin America and the Caribbean combined, the percentage of persons who think we are experiencing a very serious crisis and those who think the crisis is not very serious is identical (45.7%). In Peru, however, only a minority (a third of respondents) think that the crisis is very serious and the great majority (approximately two-thirds) declare that there is a crisis but it is not very serious. We also find that while in the whole of South America only 16% blame the current government for the crisis situation, in Peru this percentage is practically double (33%). The majority tendency among Peruvians to blame the government of Alan García for the crisis is moderated by the fact that the great majority think the crisis is not serious.

The crisis, serious or no, has not equally affected all. In Peru, women and those residing in rural areas were those most affected in terms of employment, which is to say, those who were already in underprivileged positions in the labor market. In terms of income, the poor and those who reside in urban areas were most affected by the crisis. As was to be expected, those who have most seen their earning capacity reduced have a tendency to a more negative evaluation of the country's economic situation.

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during these hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.⁴¹ Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy, while poor national economic indicators may affect individuals support for key components of democracy.⁴²

Given the severity of the most recent economic recession in many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and focus on Peru.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures, that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to "life satisfaction," or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness.⁴³ On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.⁴⁴

⁴¹ But see the work of Bermeo, who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

⁴² Córdova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean": Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

⁴³ Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002): Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000).

⁴⁴ Carol Graham, *Happiness Around the World : The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and Perception : Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank : Brookings

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are the citizens of the Americas now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

[GIVE CARD "A"]

LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.

On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment? Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**

[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible." Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible			Doesn't Know	Doesn't Answer		

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Colombians are, on average, those who report the greatest increases in satisfaction with their lives in 2010 over 2008. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than they report it was in 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.⁴⁵ Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction/happiness. But this finding is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

Institution Press, 2009), Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

⁴⁵ To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 survey, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have repeated cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.




Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction, and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of its population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Uruguay, in contrast, fewer than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just less than one-half expressed an increase.




Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondents' evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year. Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3, that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. Figure III.3 shows this is the pattern for practically each country in the study. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated indicating that, as we suspected, there is a strong link between the two.




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of their Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to the one that they reported having possessed two years earlier.⁴⁶ To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex,

⁴⁶ We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles.⁴⁷ Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”).

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction. We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation, have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s evaluation that his is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all of the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance*.⁴⁸ Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.

⁴⁷ As it was mentioned before, this new methodology allows classify the people from poor to Rich, taking into account the local economic conditions (Córdova 2009).

⁴⁸ This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government’s effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010

The corresponding analysis for Peru demonstrates that various previously identified factors also explain the change in levels of satisfaction with life: whether there was a decrease in household income, whether the respondent has a negative retrospective evaluation of both personal and national economic situations, and finally, whether the respondent is young (Figure III.5).




Figure III.5. Determinants of a Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction, Peru 2010

While it is reasonable to find that persons who have suffered a deterioration of their economic conditions (whether due to a loss of income or because they consider their personal economic situation to be bad or worse than the previous year) will experience a decline in their satisfaction with life (Figure III.6), it is a bit more difficult to understand why age is related to this attitude. Effectively, the older the respondent, the greater is his or her tendency to declare a decrease in satisfaction with life (Figure III.7). For example, the youngest group, those between 18 and 25 years old, declare the *greatest increase* in

levels of satisfaction with life, while the oldest segment, those of 65 years and older, report a greater reduction in their satisfaction with life in relation to two years ago. Persons in the intermediate age groups demonstrate more moderate changes in this variable, although in general they are at positive levels. As was previously mentioned, it is possible that physical or even economic changes associated with gradual aging could explain this attitude.




Figure III.6. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Loss of income and Perception of Personal Economic Situation, Peru 2010




Figure III.7. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Age Group, Peru 2010

Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.8.⁴⁹ The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bars show the average levels found in 2008.⁵⁰

The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction.

The only countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.

The Venezuelan decline was the sharpest. On the other hand, there was no country in which support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010, at least as measured by this general “Churchill” item that has been so widely used in the comparative study of democracy.

⁴⁹ Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4.** Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

⁵⁰ Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname), we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.




Figure III.8. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (See Figure III.9).




Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Figure III.9 shows that age and education are the most important predictors of support for democracy. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this again here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the AmericasBarometer 2010, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find that higher levels of wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.⁵¹

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.9 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* impact of a reduction in income with increased support for democracy. But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests

⁵¹ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the region.

Support for Democracy in Peru

Support for democracy in Peru, unfortunately, is the lowest level registered in the 2010 survey (Figure III.10). This level is even lower than that found in 2008, when the mean support for democracy in Peru was higher than the levels of only three other countries (Paraguay, Guatemala, and Honduras). There are various reasons that could explain this extremely low degree of attitudinal compromise with democracy. During the last forty years, Peru has experienced moments of great political expectation followed by great disappointments. The most recent example is the government of Alberto Fujimori, which despite its successes in economic policy and internal security brought great disappointment when it attempted to maintain its power through the abuse of it and via the utilization of a vast corruption network. To this it is necessary to add the significant citizen discontent with the quality of daily life caused by corruption and a lack of personal safety, which, as we shall see in the corresponding chapters, greatly affects Peruvians. In addition, it is important to indicate that Peru continues to be a country of profound social inequalities and discrimination, with a rural sector that is generally marginalized from the benefits and modernity enjoyed by various cities in Peru, particularly the capital.




Figure III.10. Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010

The low levels of support for democracy in Peru have been relatively stable between 2006 and 2010, although they demonstrated a slight improvement in 2008: the point values on the scale tend to fluctuate around 60 points, reaching a peak of 65.5 in the aforementioned year (Figure III.11). As we have stated, support for democracy in Peru is the lowest among all the countries surveyed in 2010, and it is relatively similar to that found in countries that have a democratic tradition weaker than that of Peru, such as Guatemala, Paraguay, and Honduras.




Figure III.11. Mean Support for Democracy in Peru, 2006-2010

What factors influence this weak support for democracy in Peru? To answer this question, we performed a regression analysis including the variables displayed in Figure III.9, in addition to others which we considered useful for explaining the Peruvian case. First, we included a dummy variable of a demographic nature which we considered important for predicting attitudes toward democracy and the political system in general. This variable measures if the respondent resides in the Sierra Sur (the area where the highest concentrations of indigenous people are found) or in another part of the country. Other variables of interest are those related to being a victim of corruption and crime, size of place of residence, and interest in politics. The results of the regression analysis are displayed in Figure III.12. As in the analysis of the group of countries, support for democracy in Peru is determined by evaluations of the economy and by age and place of residence. Those persons who have a negative evaluation of the government's performance on the economy and who think we are going through a serious economic crisis tend to demonstrate a lower level of support for democracy. Those residing in urban areas and who are in the older age groups have a greater propensity to support democracy than those who reside in rural areas or are in the younger age groups. Finally, and as in the findings for the group of countries, the level of material wealth influences the degree of support for democracy to an important extent.

In a somewhat surprising fashion, giving our expectations, residency in the Sierra Sur does not significantly affect support for democracy when we control for the aforementioned factors.




Figure III.12. Determinants of Support for Democracy, Peru 2010

In the following figure, we illustrate the impact of two of these variables on the level of support for democracy. Figure III.13 clearly demonstrates the important effect of public perceptions of the government's performance on the economy on the degree of support for democracy: those who tend to have a more negative opinion of the performance display a lower level of support for democracy. In return, those who have a very positive opinion of the government's actions to combat unemployment and poverty tend to manifest a higher level of support for democracy. In addition, this graph demonstrates that support for democracy is lowest among those who perceive the economic crisis to be very serious.

In Figure III.14, we present the correlation between levels of support for democracy, levels of material wealth, and the degree of interest in politics. As was demonstrated in the regression analysis, persons with higher levels of material wealth and interest in politics are those who tend to display a higher level of support for democracy.




Figure III.13. Support for Democracy, Perceptions of the Government's Performance on the Economy, and Evaluation of the Seriousness of the Economic Crisis, Peru 2010




Figure III.14. Support for Democracy, Material wealth, and Interest in Politics, Peru 2010

Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of one's government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that the performance of government in

satisfying citizen needs and demands is central⁵² Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years.⁵³ Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer data, but we look at it in this year's report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has utilized a System support index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 based, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.15 some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 up to 60.4. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the inauguration of the new administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new government administrations usually get. Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Uruguay and Nicaragua also saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, only Belize, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008-2010. The other countries remained statistically unchanged.

⁵² System Support is an index created from five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V in Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

⁵³ Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).




Figure III.15. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

In the regression analysis, we again find that perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with system support, illustrated in Figure III.16. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Older people and women have significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Surprisingly, unemployment does not have a significant impact on system support. *The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance.* Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.




Figure III.16. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance appears in Figure III.17. Note that in Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela and Peru significant increases were found. On the other hand, only in Guatemala and Belize were significant declines recorded by the two surveys.




Figure III.17. Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance are in part driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III.18. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the increase in satisfaction with governments' management of the economy, the greater the increase in system support.




Figure III.18. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

Not only is this result found at the national level, we find it regionally as well. In Figure III.19 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but use the subnational strata of each sample. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum, and in other countries regions are used for the strata. Details of the sample designs taking note of these strata are contained in the appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.




Figure III.19. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Sub national Level Analysis.

Support for the Political System in Peru

In the previous section, we discussed the low level of support for democracy present in Peru. Here we should indicate that there also exists an extremely low level of support for the political system as a whole. As we will see in greater detail in Chapter V, Peru occupies the fourth lowest position with respect to support for the political system in the 2010 survey round. In the surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008, Peru also held a very low place in the regional distribution of support for the system. In this section we are interested in determining which factors explain this low level of support. To this end, we performed a regression analysis in which we included all the variables utilized in Figure III.12. We also find that in Peru the most impactful factor in support for the system is the perception of how well the government is realizing its battle against poverty and unemployment (which we here refer to in abbreviated form as “government performance”). In addition, we find that residents of the Sierra Sur have a substantially lower level of support for the political system in comparison to persons who do not reside in that area (Figure III.20). This is a clear indicator that social exclusion has a negative effect on public attitudes toward the political system and suggests that this is one of the challenges that the young Peruvian democracy needs to address.




Figure III.20. Determinants of Support for the System in Peru, 2010

In Figure III.21 we illustrate this correlation between residency in the Sierra Sur and size of the place of residence, on one hand, and support for the system, on the other.




Figure III.21. Support for the Political System, Size of the Place of Residency, and Residency in the Sierra Sur, Peru 2010

The regression analysis also demonstrates that, as in the previously presented case of all the countries of the Americas, perceptions of the economic situation play a decisive, though not exclusive, role in the determination of levels of support for the system. For example, those who tend to have a negative perception of their personal economic situations with relation to the immediate past are those who display a lower level of support for the system (see Figure III.22). In similar vein, those who are most dissatisfied with the government's performance on the economy tend to support the political system

to a lesser degree. In fact, a stronger rejection of the way in which the president is generally performing leads to a stronger disapproval of the political system. Again, deficient management of the economy has negative effects on the accumulation of the “reservoir of goodwill” which consolidating democracies need in order to survive tensions created by the crisis.




Figure III.22. Support for Democracy by Evaluations of the Government's Performance on the Economy, Retrospective perceptions of Personal Economic Situation, and Presidential Approval, Peru 2010

Let us move to considering the determinants of satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions.

Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that the satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns.⁵⁴ During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered in their own countries. The question thus becomes: Are citizens of the countries of the Americas less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy in their countries when

⁵⁴ Dalton, Russell J. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*; Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Peru?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA

An examination of Figure III.23 shows that in a number of countries average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 on our 0-100 scale to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 to 46.3. Other statistically significant decline occurred in the Dominican Republic. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were heavily felt by most citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period. On the other hand, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased sharply. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009.⁵⁵ In that country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. The largest shift occurred in Paraguay, a country at the very bottom of satisfaction in 2008, with a score of 30.2, leaping to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April, 2008 election that brought the decades long dominant party rule to an end in that country; no doubt this was a factor in the robust increase in democratic satisfaction measured in the 2010 survey. Other significant increases occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the FMLN) won power for the first time in the presidential election prior to the survey. In many countries, however, there was no statistically significant shift in satisfaction with democracy in spite of the severe economic crisis that left its imprint world-wide.

⁵⁵ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 123 - 125.




Figure III.23. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Moving on to the determinants of democratic satisfaction, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among citizens in the western hemisphere, shown in Figure III.24. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older people have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while wealthier and more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small. More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the presidents' performance during hard economic times are also highly important.




Figure III.24. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Satisfaction with Democracy in Peru

As was to be expected giving the low support for democracy and the political system that we previously found, the great majority of Peruvians (61%) declare being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in the country; less than 40% declare being satisfied (Figure III.25).




Figure III.25. Satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions, Peru 2010

This places Peru in the fourth lowest position among the surveyed countries, much lower than neighboring and similar countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador (see Figure III.26). Although the mean found in the 2010 survey is slightly above that found in 2006 and 2008, the difference is not

statistically significant (Figure III.27), this suggests that this attitude is relatively stable in Peru during the second half of the decade.




Figure III.26. Satisfaction with the Way in which Democracy Functions in the Americas, 2010




Figure III.27. Satisfaction with Democracy by Survey Year, Peru 2006-2010

What are the factors that affect levels of satisfaction with the way that democracy functions in the country? Our regression analysis reveals that some of the variables mentioned in the previous section are also significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy in Peru (Figure III.28).




Figure III.28. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Peru, 2010

For example, and as was to be expected given the previous findings, the perception of government performance in managing unemployment and poverty influences the degree of satisfaction with democracy (Figure III.29). Another variable of an economic nature that also influences this support is the negative perception of the national economy. In the same Figure III.29, we can appreciate that the way in which the respondents' evaluations of the president's performance influence the nature of their evaluation

of democratic performance: Those who think the president is doing a good job tend to have a higher level of satisfaction with democracy in Peru.




Figure III.29. Satisfaction with Democracy, Perception of the Government's Performance on the Economy, Presidential Approval, and Perception of the National Economy, Peru 2010

Our analysis also discovers that those who perceive that we are going through a very serious crisis and those who have suffered a loss of family income have a greater degree of dissatisfaction with democracy (Figure III.30). This again demonstrates the important role the economic crisis has played in the determination of certain political attitudes. Finally, the corrosive effect of corruption is clear: persons who declare having been victims of corruption are less inclined to declare that they are satisfied with democracy than those who have not been victimized in the same way (see also Figure III.30).




Figure III.30. Satisfaction with Democracy, Perception of the Seriousness of the Crisis, Education, and Victimization by Corruption, Peru 2010

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America's history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens' support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.⁵⁶ The comparisons 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III.31. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces, in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries, and especially low in Panama and Costa Rica. On our 0-100 scale, only one country scores even as high as 50. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, the only country to score above 50, and, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2010. Post-coup, support for such illegal take-overs of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they saw no reason for it; or, it could be that the

⁵⁶ The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject, some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified; and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100= a military coup is justified and 0=a military coup is not justified.

experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras. We also note that coup support increased significantly only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010. Coup support also declined significantly in 2010 from 2008 levels in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana.




Figure III.31. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III.32, that unfortunately this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that citizens in the Americas, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk. Interestingly, women also express (slightly) higher levels of this support. However, the effect is very small. Older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding and consistent with previous results is the positive effect of the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of

support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for authoritarian alternatives. Perception of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.




Figure III.32. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Excluding Haiti)

Support for Military Coups in Peru

In Peru we find that a percentage oscillating between 29% and 55% is willing to support a military coup, depending on the motive. The lowest percentage (29%) is willing to support a coup in a context of high unemployment, but more than half of respondents (55%) are willing to show support for a coup if it is meant to confront a situation in which there are high levels of corruption (Figure III.33). Again, it is evident that corruption has a negative effect on attitudes that are conducive to a solid democracy.




Figure III.33. Support for a Military Coup under Different Circumstances, Peru 2010

The relatively precarious attitudinal compromise with democracy in Peru is reconfirmed when we compare dispositions toward supporting a coup d'etat in Peru with those found in other countries in the region (Figure III.34). In this graph, which indicates the mean values obtained in each country on a scale of support for military coups, we see Peru holding one of the highest places, with a mean value of support for coups that is barely below that of Belize, Mexico, and Guatemala. The latter hold the highest places on the scale of support for military coups.




Figure III.34. Support for Military (police) Coups in the Americas

In terms of registered changes in attitudes in the past years, the data suggest that, in the three questions that comprise this scale, there exists a slight decrease in the level of support in 2010 in comparison to the survey data of 2006 and 2008, although the reduction is not statistically significant (Figure III.35).




Figure III.35. Support for Military Coups by Survey Year, Peru 2010

In Peru, support for military coups is determined by three types of factors: first, those related to government performance in managing the economy and the issues of unemployment and poverty; second, those related to socio-demographic characteristics, and third, those related to issues of corruption and crime (Figure III.36 presents the corresponding results of a regression analysis of corruption). In the first place, we observe that, as in previous cases of support for democracy, the political system and satisfaction with democracy, the perception of government performance on the economy influences the degree of support for military coups. A negative perception of government performance increases the degree of support for coups. In similar vein, those who have a negative evaluation of the country's economy have a greater tendency toward supporting interruptions of democracy by a military coup d'etat (Figure III.37).




Figure III.36. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Peru, 2010

We also observe, as demonstrated in the same Figure III.37, that this attitude is influenced by the level of wealth: those who have less material wealth demonstrate a greater inclination toward support for military coups. With respect to demographic factors, we find that support for military coups is strongly influenced by level of education (Figure III.37): persons who received post-secondary education declare less of a willingness to support coups than those who claim a year of secondary education. As has been mentioned in previous reports, younger respondents demonstrate a greater inclination toward support for military coups against democracy than do older respondents.




Figure III.37. Support for Military Coups by Evaluations of the Economy, Education, Wealth, and Age, Peru 2010

Finally, the data reveal that those who have a more precarious family economic situation and those who feel more unsafe in their neighborhoods have a greater inclination toward support for military coups (Figure III.38). This is consistent with the current literature that argues that states of fear, whether caused by economic insecurity or by threats to personal safety, tend to increase the presence of authoritarian attitudes.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ See, for example, Gurr (1970); Altemeyer (1981; 1988); Stenner (2005).




Figure III.38. Support for Military Coups by Perception of Personal Safety and Total Family Income Situation, Peru 2010

Conclusion

In this chapter we found that despite the severe economic crisis that has been experienced in the Americas, general disenchantment with democracy has not developed. Only in six out of 23 countries for which there is data are 2010 levels of support for democracy significantly lower than those registered in 2008. However, this does not mean that the crisis and the way in which governments confronted it have not had an effect on public attitudes which are closely linked to support for democracy and the political system. For example, we have seen that those who consider us to be living in a very serious economic crisis tend to have a lower level of support for democracy and the political system, less satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions, and a greater inclination to support for military coups than those who have a more positive opinion of the crisis. In this sense, the economic and financial crisis has eroded those attitudes which are favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

In Peru, unfortunately, the news is not encouraging. As we have already mentioned in our previous reports⁵⁸ and discussed in detail in a recent publication (Carrion 2009), there exists an important breach of political confidence in Peru. Despite the recent economic bonanza, the country holds one of the last places in the distribution of attitudes related to support for democracy, the political system, and the rejection of military coups d'état. This fact is surprising, because if one analyzes the recent trajectory of the country's economic performance and of the evolution of poverty levels, one finds a notable performance, particularly when compared with other countries in the Andean region.

How can we explain this discrepancy between economic improvement and the existing high level of political discontent? Without doubt, much of the explanation can be found in the country's recent history. The revelations of vast corruption in the government of Alberto Fujimori probably contribute to

⁵⁸ See Julio F. Carrón and Patricia Zárate (2007; 2009).

the further solidification among the population of the idea that nothing good can be expected from politicians in power. The confirmation that his administration was not only guilty of the vices for which it had condemned previous governments but had also brought corruption levels to extraordinary heights may have contributed to the population's registered lack of confidence for the political system as a whole. This lack of confidence does not appear to have diminished, despite the past years of economic growth.

The growing unease that exists in Peruvian society toward the levels of corruption and delinquency (as we shall see in the corresponding chapters) has a pernicious effect on attitudes toward democracy and the political system. And despite the fact that Peru has not been one of the countries most affected by the global economic and financial crisis, there is wide discontent with the performance of the current president in the fight against unemployment and poverty. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, this discontent is an important factor in attitudes toward democracy and the political system.

In this sense, our study demonstrates that the growth of the economy in itself does not guarantee an automatic improvement in attitudinal support for democracy and its institutions. It is also important that citizens perceive the government as performing effectively in dealing with issues that affect not only the economic situation of the majority but also the quality of daily life. The strengthening of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the reduction of delinquency, and the sense of a lack of personal safety which affect many Peruvians should be attended to with the same fervor as that which is given to the behavior of macroeconomic variables.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter III

Table III.1. Predictors of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction. Complete Sample, 2010*

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.025*	(-4.58)
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-0.067*	(-10.98)
Urbano	-0.007	(-0.94)
Nivel educativo	-0.015*	(-2.09)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.013	(-1.90)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.027*	(-3.25)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.001	(-0.09)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.020*	(-2.94)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.115*	(-14.37)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.151*	(-18.48)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.048*	(-7.52)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.104*	(-15.70)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.023*	(-3.54)
No hay crisis económica	-0.005	(-0.81)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	(-6.2)
Constante	0.003	(-0.5)
R-cuadrado = 0.122		
Número de casos = 32699		
* p<0.05		

*Los efectos fijos de país se incluyeron en la regresión, pero no se muestran aquí para ahorrar espacio

Table III.2. Predictors of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.002	-0.09
Edad	-0.075*	(-3.13)
Urbano	0.006	-0.16
Nivel de educación	0.001	-0.04
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.062	(-1.82)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.028	-0.72
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.157*	(-4.19)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.096*	(-2.56)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.026	(-0.80)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.038	(-1.07)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.005	-0.14
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.123*	(-4.38)
No hay crisis económica	0.015	-0.63
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.006	(-0.19)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.022	-0.64
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.023	(-0.97)
Constante	0.004	-0.13
R-cuadrado = 0.109		
Número de casos = 1321		
* p<0.05		

Table III.3. Predictors of Support for Democracy. Complete Sample, 2010*

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	-0.029*	(-5.09)
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	0.112*	-17.93
Urbano	0.024*	-2.71
Nivel educativo	0.080*	-10.41
Quintiles de riqueza	0.044*	-5.84
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.036*	-4.4
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.006	-0.81
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.009	(-1.30)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	0.002	-0.22
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.01	(-1.47)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.017*	(-2.61)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.012	-1.81
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.026*	(-3.57)
No hay crisis económica	-0.011	(-1.59)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.056*	-6.01
Constante	0.006	-0.75
R-cuadrado = 0.07		
Número de casos = 32182		
* p<0.05		

* Los efectos fijos de país se incluyeron en la regresión, pero no se muestran aquí para ahorrar espacio

Table III.4. Predictors of Support for Democracy, Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	0.006	-0.23
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.028	(-0.87)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.070*	(-2.65)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.038	-0.92
Mujer	0.016	-0.57
Edad	0.046	-1.52
Urbano	0.164*	-2.5
Tamaño del lugar	0.047	-0.77
Nivel de educación	0.0	0.0
Quintiles de riqueza	0.081*	-2.36
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.008	(-0.23)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.019	(-0.58)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.0	-0.02
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.007	(-0.22)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.021	(-0.67)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.021	-0.78
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.025	(-0.93)
No hay crisis económica	-0.019	(-0.64)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.079*	(-2.48)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.074	(-1.92)
Interés en la política	0.099*	-2.92
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.122*	-3.84
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.02	(-0.47)
Constante	0.019	-0.54
R-cuadrado = 0.075		
N. de casos = 1254		
* p<0.05		

Table III.5. Predictors of System Support. Complete Sample, 2010*

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.022*	-4.62
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	0.036*	-6.44
Urbano	-0.036*	(-4.66)
Nivel educativo	-0.023*	(-3.38)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	(-0.91)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.134*	-17.87
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.047*	(-7.69)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.058*	(-8.54)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.005	(-0.74)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.052*	(-7.62)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.008	(-1.35)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.020*	(-3.62)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.003	(-0.54)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.019*	(-2.84)
No hay crisis económica	0.006	-0.9
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.387*	-48.04
Constante	-0.005	(-0.73)
R-cuadrado = 0.308		
Número de casos = 32961		

* p<0.05

* Los efectos fijos de país se incluyeron en la regresión, pero no se muestran aquí para ahorrar espacio

Table III.6. Predictors of Support for Democracy. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.042	(-1.55)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.068*	(-2.82)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.037	(-1.44)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.024	(-0.87)
Mujer	0.04	-1.61
Edad	-0.018	(-0.70)
Urbano	0.116*	-2.3
Tamaño del lugar	0.157*	-3.45
Nivel de educación	-0.071*	(-2.46)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.011	-0.42
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.082*	-2.56
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.065*	(-2.25)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.03	(-0.92)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.042	-1.55
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.039	(-1.19)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.029	(-1.00)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.034	-1.07
No hay crisis económica	0.03	-0.82
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.005	(-0.18)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.033	(-0.94)
Interés en la política	0.105*	-4.43
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.399*	-12.6
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.082*	(-2.13)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.15)
R-cuadrado = 0.282		
N. de casos = 1279		

* p<0.05

Table III.7. Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy. Complete Sample, 2010*

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.001	-0.2
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	0.018*	-3.07
Urbano	-0.024*	(-3.19)
Nivel educativo	-0.037*	(-5.56)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.005	(-0.73)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	0.207*	-26.47
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	-0.080*	(-11.75)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	-0.021*	(-3.18)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.067*	(-9.91)
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.025*	(-4.23)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.009	(-1.66)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.018*	(-2.87)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.045*	(-7.27)
No hay crisis económica	0.018*	-3.08
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.183*	-24.34
Constante	0.002	-0.3
R-Squared = 0.233		
Número de casos = 32403		
* p<0.05		

* Los efectos fijos de país se incluyeron en la regresión, pero no se muestran aquí para ahorrar espacio

Table III.8. Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.038	(-1.55)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.047	(-1.66)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.101*	(-3.73)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.009	-0.25
Mujer	0.012	-0.45
Edad	-0.025	(-0.87)
Urbano	-0.055	(-1.16)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.008	(-0.16)
Nivel de educación	-0.068*	(-2.29)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.027	-0.74
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.068*	-2.26
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.02	(-0.70)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.046	(-1.23)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.042	(-1.34)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.084*	(-2.72)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.013	-0.44
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.032	(-1.23)
No hay crisis económica	-0.014	(-0.42)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.102*	(-3.25)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.01	(-0.29)
Interés en la política	0.038	-1.11
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.181*	-6.17
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.044	(-1.43)
Constante	0.004	-0.14
R-cuadrado = 0.166		
Número de casos = 1253		
* p<0.05		

Table III.9. Predictors of Support for a Military Coup D'etat. Complete Sample, 2010*

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.009	-1.66
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	-0.116*	(-17.97)
Urbano	-0.005	(-0.50)
Nivel educativo	-0.071*	(-9.33)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.027*	(-3.74)
Satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual	-0.016*	(-2.00)
Percepción negativa de la situación económica nacional	0.052*	-6.8
Percepción negativa retrospectiva de la situación económica nacional	0.016*	-2.23
Percepción negativa de la situación económica personal	-0.011	(-1.52)
Percepción negativo retrospectiva de la situación económica personal	-0.023*	(-3.32)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.062*	-10.09
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.007	(-0.96)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.054*	-7.73
No hay crisis económica	-0.014	(-1.73)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.013	(-1.58)
Constante	0.011	-1.25
R-cuadrado = 0.07		
Número de casos = 32376		
* p<0.05		

* Los efectos fijos de país se incluyeron en la regresión, pero no se muestran aquí para ahorrar espacio

Table III.10. Predictors for Support for a Militar Coup D'etat. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	0.026	-0.82
Percepción de inseguridad	0.093*	-3.33
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.054*	-2.01
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.054	(-1.85)
Mujer	0.007	-0.28
Edad	-0.087*	(-3.57)
Urbano	0.072	-1.22
Tamaño del lugar	0.096	-1.78
Nivel de educación	-0.114*	(-3.24)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.112*	(-3.92)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.019	-0.66
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	0	0
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.038	(-1.29)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.007	(-0.25)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.070*	-2.24
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.051	-1.76
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.014	-0.45
No hay crisis económica	-0.017	(-0.54)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.025	-0.75
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.069*	(-2.03)
Interés en la política	0.006	-0.2
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.121*	(-3.19)
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.011	(-0.27)
Constante	0.004	-0.13
R-cuadrado = 0.112		
Número de casos = 1256		
* p<0.05		

Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

Introduction

As we have seen in the first chapters, the economic crisis has affected Peruvian citizens' perceptions of this last year, although not dramatically, considering that only a third of them consider the crisis to be very serious. In this sense, public interest has been more focused in the municipal and regional elections, which revive attention to issues of criminality, delinquency, and citizen participation in local spaces. The economic growth of the past years highlights regions that have been pushing for progressively higher budgets and for creating more positions in local bureaucracies. This has somewhat revitalized the domestic economy but has been coupled with a decentralization process that is still in progress and a political weakness that prevents the control of the basic security apparatus and affects the fight against corruption. These factors contribute to the focus of public perceptions on the daily facts of delinquency, which have affected the national environment. In this second part of the report, we will discuss topics related to delinquency, corruption, and local government.

In Part I of this report, we presented a general perspective of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on public perceptions of the crisis, answering the following question: *who had the most probability of being affected by the crisis?* We also presented a regional comparative evaluation of public perceptions having to do with key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact on the crisis with respect to unemployment and perceptions of national and personal well-being. We concluded Part I with an analysis of the extent to which those who reported having been affected by the crisis expressed less support for democracy. In Part II of this study, we intend to test diverse hypotheses related to the rule of law, delinquency, and corruption. The objective of this chapter is to determine the degree to which criminality and corruption are able to influence support for democracy. The variables utilized in Part I, which measure the effects and perceptions of the economic crisis, are used as additional control or predictor variables, but they do not constitute the central objective of the analysis.

The Context

During the past two decades, a great number of studies referring to public safety have been produced, which originated in the security crisis of the 1980s. In this moment, at a global level, we witness a shift in how delinquency is profiled. On one hand, rates of major crime are consistently dropping in most of the world (assassinations, kidnappings, organized crime, etc.). On the other hand, however, incidents of petty crime such as theft, robberies, and intimidation in public areas, etc. are exponentially increasing. This means that, although serious crimes are decreasing, a greater percentage of the population experience a lack of safety as citizens. This leads to a rise in perceptions of insecurity, which is reflected in all the surveys and in the elevation of this question to the status of a political problem.

The change in the profile of delinquency coincides with a period of redefining political forces in the whole world, as much their identity as their mission. The police force finds itself obligated to confront a new type of delinquency with inadequate tools (conceptual and administrative), having been designed for combating the type of delinquency experienced in previous decades. This leads to a decrease in confidence levels among the population in the performance of police forces, in addition to perceptions of insecurity that are exacerbated by a lack of confidence in the judicial system.

This transition is not uniform in all parts of the world, nor does it occur at the same rate. The problem becomes more complex when coinciding with processes of democratization launched during those same years. The result of this process is a gradual transition between what has been denominated as a “public order” orientation and a “public safety” orientation. This transition has been slower in Latin America when compared to other parts of the world. In the first case, in their focus on public order, the central mission of the police is to eliminate riots or problems that presuppose challenges to the rule of law and the control of the authorities. In the second case, the police understand that they should focus on the safeguarding of life and the population’s interests. In this way, a more proactive attitude toward crime is required of the police, which subordinates the fundamentally reactive attitude that has thus far been the primary case⁵⁹.

The state response to perceptions of insecurity and victimization is a key component of the perceptions that citizens construct about the democratic regime. States with high crime rates such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras show the lowest levels of assessment of democracy and the highest levels of support for policies of a “firm hand,” which do not always respect fundamental rights (Seligson and Booth, 2010).

The general sense of a lack of personal safety appears to affect the whole region, and Peru does not escape this tendency. The perception of insecurity is a constant of public opinion in Lima and the main cities of the country; despite this, the state has not implemented systematic efforts to solicit and process information about delinquency and criminality. Due to this shortage, some NGOs have assumed the task of collecting this type of information⁶⁰. In this study of the Barometer of the Americas, we introduce a comparative dimension of analysis of this topic and also present a series of data over time that for the Peruvian case cover 2006 from 2010.

Perceptions of Insecurity and Delinquency

In our country, the perception of a lack of safety in the face of delinquency continues to be the highest in the region: in 2006, Peru held the first place in perceptions of insecurity; in 2008, with the inclusion of Argentina, Peru passed to second place in the comparative study. Now, in 2010, we again head the list, above even Argentina, El Salvador, and Venezuela. This confirms what so many media pundits frequently discuss, urging actions to prevent the high levels of delinquency in the country. In the context in which we ended this study, facing municipal and regional elections, the topic is again under debate. Even the president of the republic, in his most recent annual address to the nation, spoke only of public safety, highlighting the low level of coordination between the National Police, municipalities, and neighborhood associations to the extent that is necessary for reinforcing political actions. Therefore, we are interested to see how these perceptions on the failure of security are related to support for a stable democracy and for the political system. The analysis begins with the following question and the results are presented in Figure IV.1.

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DR

⁵⁹ A conceptual revision of the topic of public security, with respect to the experiences of public participation, was undertaken by the Institute for Peruvian Studies (IEP) in 2006 in the report “Analysis of the experiences of effective public participation,” conducted on behalf of the National Council of Public Security of the Ministry of Interior, under the auspices of BID.

⁶⁰ Costa’s comparative exploration of this problem is interesting (2007). See Muñoz (2009) on the financing and “political economy” of security.




Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity in the Americas, 2010

As we have previously mentioned, Peruvians show the highest perception of insecurity on the continent, although the 2010 mean value on the scale of a sense of insecurity does not reach the levels registered in 2006 (Figure IV.2). What is certain, however, is that the figures do not dip below 50 points in the three rounds of surveys, while neighboring countries and even Mexico display very low levels of insecurity. This is worrying, because the sense of a lack of personal safety increases the lack of trust in others (as we will see in the corresponding chapter, Peruvians are the least trusting in the region) and engenders skepticism about the capabilities of the authorities, eroding in the process the little existing confidence in the political system.




Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in Peru, 2006-2010

Crime Victimization

LAPOP has developed a new item to measure crime victimization more accurately and thus obtain more precise responses. While in previous surveys crime victimization was asked by: *have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round, based on a series of experimental studies conducted by LAPOP that show that new wording helped increase the validity of the responses, this question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. In addition, items related to the place where the crime occurred were added. The following items were used in the questionnaire:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

VIC2AA. ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this Parish
- (4) In another Parish
- (5) In another country
- (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

- (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

Almost a third of respondents affirm having been a victim of a delinquent act and 15% of respondents declare that he or she, along with another member of the household, have together been victims of a delinquent act (Figure IV.3).




Figure IV.3. Victimization by Delinquency at the Level of Individual and Household, Peru 2010

At first glance, we can say that between 2008 and 2010 there has been an important increase in crime victimization, for in 2008 the percentage of respondents who affirmed having been a victim of a delinquent act reached 25.4% (Figure IV.4). Nevertheless, we should be very cautious of this assessment because the wording of the question has changed⁶¹, although in the Peruvian case we are inclined to think that crime victimization has actually increased. If we take into account citizens' responses to what is the country's principal problem, we find that in 2008 just as in 2006, around six percent (6.9% in 2006 and 6.0% in 2008) affirm that delinquency is the country's principal problem; this percentage has risen to 9.5% in 2010. In any case, while the percentage of those who declare having been a victim of delinquency did not significantly change between 2006 and 2008, it did in 2010 (Figure IV.4).

⁶¹ Question VIC1 as applied in 2006 and 2008 was: "Now, to change the topic, have you been a victim of any delinquent act in the last 12 months?"




Figure IV.4. Victimization by Delinquency, Peru 2006-2010

Nearly 22% of respondents were victims of a crime inside their house, which probably explains the high sense of insecurity, although the majority (37.4%) underwent this unpleasant experience in another district of the city (Figure IV.5). What is most worrying is the survey's indication that among those who report having been victims of a delinquent act, rates of armed robbery has increased (Figure IV.6). If in 2006 less than three percent of respondents declare having been victim of an armed robbery, in 2010, almost 19% affirm that they were attacked with a weapon. This aggravation of victimhood is a piece of data that needs to be taken into account in the elaboration of political problems of public safety.




Figure IV.5. Location of the Respondent's Crime Victimization, Peru 2010




Figure IV.6. Type of Delinquent act He/She was a Victim of, Peru 2006 and 2010

Consistent with what was previously found for a sense of personal insecurity, our country holds first place in victimization by crime among the group of countries studied by LAPOP (Figure IV.7). In 2008 it had held second place, following Argentina. These two variables, the sense of insecurity and crime victimization, are factors that lower the quality of democracy in Peru and erode political support.

However, though it is true that victimization by crime is a general problem in all the country's cities, not all citizens have the same probability of being a victim. In order to examine the determinants of the probability that a person will be a victim of a delinquent act, we performed a regression analysis taking into account socio-demographic characteristics such as sex, age, education, size of place of residence, and specific regions of residence (Lima, *costa norte* [northern coast], *costa sur* [southern coast], *sierra centro* [central sierra], etc.) as well as the wealth variable which we explicated in the first chapters. The regression results suggest that wealth (measured in terms of possessing material goods) does not have any significant effect on the probability of being a victim of a delinquent act, which is to say, being rich or poor does not guarantee being safe from a robbery or an act of aggression or property damage. Rather, we observe that the size of the location is actually a more important determinant; inhabitants of the capital or of the larger cities have a greater proclivity toward being victims of crime. So while in Lima, 34% are victims of delinquency, this percentage lowers to 19% in rural areas (Figure IV.8). This continues to be a considerably low percentage but it is less than what is registered in Lima or other big cities. The probability of being a victim also diminishes with age, since while only 18% of the group of respondents over 66 years old have been a victim of delinquency, this number surpasses 36% in the younger group. Finally, education is positively associated with the probability of being a victim of delinquency: respondents who have a higher level of education are more likely to be a victim of a crime than those who only have a primary level of education. These correlations are illustrated in Figure IV.9.




Figure IV.7. Percent of Persons who were Victims of Delinquency in Latin America, 2010




Figure IV.8. Predictors of Crime Victimization, Peru 2010




Figure IV.9. Crime Victimization by Education, Age, and Size of Location, 2010

Corruption

The Project for Public Opinion in Latin America has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were originally tested in Nicaragua (Seligson 1999, Seligson 1997) and have been perfected and improved in the diverse studies realized since then. Given that the definitions of corruption can vary from culture to culture, in order to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by posing questions such as: "In the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a governmental official?" We pose similar questions having to do with bribes in local government, public schools, work, courts, state health establishments, and other entities. This set provides two types of information. On one hand, it can be determined where corruption is more frequent. In addition, we can construct scales of corruption victimization that allow us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one environment from those who have been victims of corruption in multiple institutional environments. As in the studies of crime victimization, we assume that having been a victim once, as opposed to having had multiple experiences of corruption, has distinct implications.

The complete set of items related to corruption is the following:

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government?	99	0	1	88	98	
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?						
EXC13. Do you work?	99	0	1	88	98	
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?						
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts?	99	0	1	88	98	
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?						
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?						
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?						

One question related to the theme of corruption that measures perception (instead of victimization) was also included in the questionnaire:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read]
 (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK
 (98) DA

In the following paragraphs, we analyze the responses to these questions for Peru as well in the group of countries in the Americas.

In what turns out to be an unfortunate irregularity, Peru again holds one of the highest places among countries who perceive generalized corruption among public officials (Figure IV.10). Even though

in the 2008 study this negative perception had diminished with respect to 2006, in 2010 the percentage returns to the 2008 level (Figure IV.11).

While we find a high perception of corruption in countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica but a relatively low percentage of actual corruption victimization, in Peru we find perception reflects reality (as measured by the survey). In Figure IV.12, Peru holds third place among the countries of the region in terms of corruption victimization.




Figure IV.10. Perception of Corruption in the Americas, 2010




Figure IV.11. Perception of Corruption in Peru: 2006-2010




Figure IV.12. Corruption Victimization in the Americas, 2010

A third of the Peruvian population affirms having been a victim of at least one act of corruption and two out of every ten indicate having been victims of corruption three or more times (Figure IV.13). As in the case of perception of corruption, corruption victimization returns to the levels found in the 2006 survey (Figure IV.14).




Figure IV.13. Index of total Corruption Victimization, Peru 2010




Figure IV.14. Percentage of People Victimized by Corruption, Peru 2006 - 10

Who are most likely to be victims of corruption? As in previous years, we find that women have a lower probability of being victims of a corrupt act, as distinct from men. The more educated and people who work also have a greater probability of being victims of an act of corruption. Socioeconomic level does not play a important role in proclivity toward being a victim of corruption, but a greater level of education and having a job – factors that lead a person to have greater involvement with the public sphere

– are indeed significant variables in the probability of suffering a demand for a bribe (Figure IV.15). In Figure IV.16, we illustrate the correlation between these variables and the probability of being a victim of corruption.




Figure IV.15. Determinants of Corruption Victimization, Peru 2010




Figure IV.16. Corruption Victimization by Sex, Education, and Main Occupation, Peru 2010

The impact of Delinquency, Insecurity, and Corruption on System Support

It is often said that crime, the perception of insecurity, and corruption affect confidence in the system, its institutions, and democracy itself. This can be clearly observed in the Peruvian case, as well as in the Latin American region. In the previous chapter, we saw that the perception of insecurity significantly affects support for the system (Figure III.20). The way in which these variables are connected is illustrated in Figure IV.17: the lesser the degree of personal safety, the weaker the support for the system.

On the other hand, confidence in institutions is also seen to be affected, as much by crime victimization as by perception of corruption. We arrive at this conclusion after having created a variable of political legitimacy (using the same procedure employed in previous LAPOP studies), grouping citizen confidence in the judicial system, Congress, the national government, the Supreme Court, and political parties. This is our dependent variable. The factors that predict this attitude are presented in Figure IV.18. Apart from the president's job approval and interest in politics, the perception of corruption and corruption victimization emerge as factors that explain this confidence. Those who believe that corruption is somewhat or very generalized have less confidence in these key institutions, as do those who have not been victims of a delinquent act in the last year (Figure IV.19).




Figure IV.17. System Support by Perception of Insecurity, Peru 2010




Figure IV.18. Impact of the Perception of Insecurity and Corruption on Political Legitimacy, Peru 2010




Figure IV.19. Impact of the Perception of Corruption and Crime Victimization on Political Legitimacy, Peru 2010

Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Delinquency and Insecurity

In addition to the serious impact of crime, insecurity, and corruption on system support and its institutions, we find a troubling lack of support for the rule of law among the population. In this survey we ask whether in order to apprehend delinquents, authorities should always respect the law or if they may act outside the law:

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

(1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

We find that half of the surveyed population affirms that at times it is permissible to act outside the law (Figure IV.20) and lamentably this is the case in not only 2010 but also in the previous years of the survey.




Figure IV.20. Support for Respect of the Rule of Law, Peru 2010

The deterioration of the quality of life and the increase of public sentiments caused by the growth in delinquency lead many Peruvians to be willing to sacrifice the rule of law. When we compare the percentage of Peruvians who declare that the authorities must always respect the law, we find that only Ecuadorians and Salvadorans display lower levels than those found in Peru (Figure IV.21). This is to say, less than half of respondents support the rule of law (47% in El Salvador and 45.5% in Ecuador).

As in the case of support for the system, we intend to determine which variables explain this weak support for the rule of law, focusing overall on the variables that we have studied in this chapter. What we find is that those who have been victims of crime are those who are more willing to accept a violation of the rule of law. In the regression equation we also include confidence in the judicial system. This variable is also significant, similar to perception of the family economic situation (Figure IV.22). This is to say that those who have been victims of a delinquent act tend to believe, to a greater extent than those who have not been victims, that at times authorities may disregard the law, if it is for the sake of apprehending delinquents (Figure IV.23). The same perception is present among those who have less confidence in the judicial system and among those who affirm that their family income is insufficient and they have economic difficulties.




Figure IV.21. Support for the Rule of Law in the Americas, 2010




Figure IV.22. Determinants of Support for Respecting the Rule of Law, Peru 2010




Figure IV.23. Support for Respect of the Rule of Law, by Trust in the Judicial system, Crime Victimization, and Perception of Family Economic Situation, Peru 2010

Throughout this chapter, we have seen that victimization by crime and the perception of insecurity, as much as corruption victimization and the perception of generalized corruption among officials, continue to be the most serious problems facing our country. We also see that the situation is not only concerning in itself but is also worrying for its undermining of the rule of law and the legitimacy of institutions and the political system.

Conclusion

As we indicated at the beginning of this chapter, there is a disturbing growth in delinquency in Peru, which is also reflected in the increasing absence of public safety. Our study finds that, in general, there exists a generalized sentiment of a lack of personal safety in the region as a whole. Peru certainly does not escape this tendency. Furthermore, Peru has the highest mean on the scale of public insecurity for the region as a whole. This sense of insecurity is fed not only by perceptions but also by the presence – as revealed through our own surveys – of a significant amount of victimization. In the 2010 survey, Peruvians declare the highest level of victimization by crime of all the surveyed countries. As much in the perception of citizen insecurity as in victimization, this year's results are consistent with those of 2006 and 2008. The persons most likely to be victims of violence are those who live in metropolitan Lima, are between 18 and 24 years old, and who have higher levels of formal education.

Delinquency is not the only ill afflicting the Peruvian population, however. There is also an extremely widespread perception among the respondents that corruption among public officials is high. This perception has not significantly varied between 2006 and 2010. Similarly, a relatively high percentage of respondents in Peru declare having been a victim of at least one act of corruption. This is

one of the highest percentages among all the surveyed countries. We have argued that those who find themselves more involved in the public sphere are more likely to be victims of corruption: men, those who have more education, and those who are employed.

As is to be expected, these two social problems affect attitudes toward the political system and its institutions. We find, for example, that a greater sense of personal insecurity translates to a lower level of support for the system. In this vein, those who have been victims of corruption and delinquency tend to have lower levels of confidence in political institutions. Even more problematically, those who have been victimized are more willing to accept violations of the rule of law by the authorities.

Results of the Regression Analysis of Chapter IV

Table IV.1. Predictors of Victimization by Crime. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Educación	0.264*	-3.5
Mujer	-0.105	(-1.97)
Edad	-0.253*	(-3.89)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.026	-0.34
Tamaño del lugar	-0.309*	(-2.63)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.123	(-1.91)
Costa Norte	0.034	-0.42
Costa Sur	0.052	-0.73
Lima Metropolitana	-0.147	(-1.12)
Selva	-0.031	(-0.36)
Sierra Centro	-0.021	(-0.30)
Sierra norte	-0.150*	(-2.01)
Constante	-0.844*	(-11.86)
F = 5.26		
Número de casos = 1483		
* p<0.05		

Table IV.2. Predictors of Corruption Victimization. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Educación	0.232*	-2.93
Mujer	-0.306*	(-4.26)
Edad	-0.134	(-1.93)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.101	-1.47
Tamaño del lugar	0.014	-0.11
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.027	(-0.38)
Costa Norte	-0.214	(-1.75)
Costa Sur	-0.08	(-0.83)
Lima Metropolitana	-0.189	(-1.07)
Selva	-0.183	(-1.70)
Sierra Centro	0.007	-0.09
Sierra norte	-0.164	(-1.47)
Blanca	-0.131	(-1.23)
Mestiza-indígena	-0.098	(-0.85)
Tiene trabajo	0.341*	-2.18
Estudiante	0.057	-0.61
Ama de casa	0.2	-1.42
Jubilado/no trabaja	0.155	-1.3
Constante	-0.805*	(-11.17)
F = 5.16		
Número de casos = 1442		
* p<0.05		

Table IV.3. Predictors of Support for the Rule of Law. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.140*	(-2.79)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.052	-0.93
Confianza en el sistema de justicia	0.166*	-2.66
Educación	-0.137	(-1.83)
Mujer	-0.013	(-0.27)
Edad	0.104	-1.74
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.018	(-0.22)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.181*	-2.48
Tamaño del lugar	0.115	-0.94
Costa Norte	0.061	-0.58
Costa Sur	-0.012	(-0.17)
Lima Metropolitana	-0.1	(-0.75)
Selva	0.03	-0.33
Sierra Centro	-0.104	(-1.25)
Sierra norte	-0.147	(-1.86)
Constante	-0.025	(-0.33)
F = 3.17		
Número de casos = 1431		
* p<0.05		

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

Introduction

The legitimacy of the political system has been conceived to be an essential element of democratic consolidation⁶². Recent investigations have emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson *et al* 2005) for many aspects of democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009, Gilley 2009). In this chapter, we bring our knowledge of political legitimacy to a greater depth, beginning with a reexamination of what has already appeared in studies previously published by LAPOP, particularly those studies that focus on the combined effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as predictors of future democratic stabilization. In this sense, scenarios of greater legitimacy and political tolerance are conceived as scenarios favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In previous Barometer of the Americas studies, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “support for the system,” and tolerance for political opposition were jointly employed in order to create a type of warning sign for those democracies which could be especially fragile. The theory indicates that both attitudes are necessary for maintaining long-term democratic stability. Citizens should believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and should also be willing to tolerate the rights of others. It is these contexts that enable the rule of the majority and the rights of minorities, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). Ideally, a political system should contain high levels of support for the system, as well as high levels of political tolerance, however, different combinations may occur, depending on precisely the degree to which a society gives legitimacy to its institutions and guarantees the right of opposition to minorities. Table V.1 presents all the possible theoretical combinations of support for the system and tolerance when both variables are divided into high and low levels.

Before concentrating on the results, we must explain how the indicators of support for the system and of tolerance were constructed. Support for the system is a summary measure that indicates the degree to which individuals trust, respect, and feel protected by the country’s political institution. This indicator is arrived at by averaging the responses provided to the following questions:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

⁶² Dictatorships can of course be popular and enjoy the support of wide sectors of the population, but when lacking these will use repression as the last resort. In democracies, governments who attempt to utilize repression usually rapidly collapse.

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven (1 to 7) is transformed to a scale of zero to one hundred (0 to 100), in which zero indicates the least possible support for the system, and a hundred indicates the most possible support.

It is now worth mentioning how the index of political tolerance is formed. We ask citizens to which extent they are willing to tolerate a series of political rights for those who are opposed to the country's system of government. The questions utilized were the following:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Peru form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Peru form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The original responses were placed on a scale of one to ten (1 to 10), in which one indicated strongly disagree, and ten indicated strongly agree. In this way, low point values indicate low tolerance for the political rights of those who do not agree with the form of government or low political tolerance. The original point values for each question were re-codified to the usual scale of zero to 100, and to create the index we did a simple mean of the responses to the four questions.

Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance

		Tolerance	
System Support (i.e., legitimacy)		High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability	
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk	

From a theoretical perspective, we analyze the interrelation between support for the system or legitimacy and tolerance, for which it is necessary to dichotomize both scales into the two categories of "high" and "low"⁶³. Table V.1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

Political systems with a high number of citizens, a high level of support for the system, and a high level of political tolerance are the political systems that can be predicted to be the most stable, those which will have a stable democracy. This prediction is based in the logic that in these non-coercive contexts, a high level of legitimacy is necessary for the system to be stable. If the citizens do not support their political system and if they have the liberty to act, then a change of the political system appears to be an inevitable eventual result. Stable systems, however, are necessarily democratic unless the rights of minorities are secure. Such security can of course come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be scarce opportunities for these minorities to compete for and reach positions of power. Under these conditions, majorities can also

⁶³ Each of these scales goes from 0 to 100 so that the median point which has been selected is 50. In this way, values of support for the system less than 50 are categorized as "low," and values of support for the system above 50 are considered "high." Similarly, for political tolerance, values less than 50 are considered "low" and values above 50 are "high."

suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are politically legitimate, demonstrate enjoying positive support for the system, and have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities are those who have the greatest probability of enjoying a stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When support for the system remains high but tolerance is low, which is to say in a context of *authoritarian stability*, the system tends to remain stable (due to high support), although the democratic government could be in danger in the medium term. Such systems can tend to move towards authoritarianism (oligarchy), in which democratic rights are restricted.

A situation of weak support for the system is expressed in the two boxes below the table and both could be directly related to situations of instability. Instability, nevertheless, need not translate to a reduction of civil liberties, being that instability can serve to increase the penetration of democracy in the system, especially when values move towards indicating tolerance. Accordingly, in a situation of weak support and high tolerance it is difficult to predict if instability will drive greater democratization or lead to a prolonged period of instability, potentially characterized by considerable violence. For this reason it is described as a scenario of *democratic instability*.

On the other hand, in situations of weak support and low toleration, the rupture of democracy seems to be an eventual outcome. Evidently, we cannot predict democratic rupture based only on opinion surveys, since there are many other factors that intervene in this process: the role of elites, the position of the military, and the existence of support or opposition from international actors, which are crucial to this process. Regardless, systems in which public opinion support neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities are vulnerable to a democratic rupture. As a result, these contexts are described as *democracies at risk*.

It is important to make note of two warnings that apply to this scheme. First, we have to consider that the correlations discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionalized democracies, which is to say systems that contain regular competitive elections that permit wide participation. These same attitudes would have completely different implications in authoritarian systems. For example, weak support for the system and high levels of tolerance could lead to a collapse of the authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption is that in the long term, the attitudes of the citizens as well as of the elites represent a difference in regime type. Attitudes and regime type can remain inconsistent for a long time. In fact, as was demonstrated by Seligson and Booth for the case of Nicaragua, this incongruence is what may have contributed to the fall of the Somoza regime. Regardless, the case of Nicaragua was one in which the existing system was authoritarian and used repression despite the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

In Figure V.1, we illustrate the distribution of this variable for 2010. Here is displayed the countries' positions on the axes of support for the system and political tolerance. Peru's position is marked with a black point. As we can see, Peru finds itself in the small group of countries defined as "democracies at risk," since it presents very low mean values of support for the political system as well as of tolerance for opposition. In fact, only Paraguay is in a similar position, closely followed by Guatemala. This is a very concerning situation because despite the fact that Peru has not been one of the countries more affected by the recent global crisis, its indicators of support for the system and political tolerance are, as we shall see in the following, among the lowest of the region in 2010. This poor performance in terms of attitudes conducive to a stable democracy was also found in our previous reports (Carrión and Zárate 2007; Carrión and Zárate 2009).




Figure V.1. Distribution of Countries on the Axes of Support for the System and Political Tolerance, 2010 (Figure courtesy of Juan Carlos Rodriguez Raga)

System Support

As previously mentioned, support for the political system is a necessary though certainly not sufficient requirement for the well functioning of a democracy. Certainly a blind and uncritical support for institutions, independent of how they function, is as damaging for democracy as the complete absence of support. However, in a context in which institutions function moderately well, a greater degree of support is preferable to a lesser degree. Moreover, support for the political system can have a self-perpetuating effect, since high levels of support favor citizen acceptance of public policies and their facilitation of its implementation, which in turn enables a greater degree of support for the system. What we are interested in determining here is citizen support for political *institutions* and not for the current government. This support, sustained over the years, can generate a “reservoir” (Easton 1965) that aids emerging democracies in successfully facing economic and political crises.

In the following pages we will examine the components of support for the system in Peru, as compared with those registered in other countries in region and as has evolved over the last four years.

Figure V.2 displays the distribution of the questions that measure the components of political support in Peru. Let us recall that the scale has a range of 0-100, with 100 signifying a strong support for the system. Peruvians have extremely low levels of confidence in any of the key institutions of the system and, in general, manifest little support for or pride in the political system. The best point value (53.2) was obtained in the question having to do with the respect that political institutions deserve. Support for the political system in general is barely at the median point on the scale. The same Figure V.2 displays what any observer of Peruvian politics knows: Peruvians have an extremely low level of confidence that the courts will guarantee fairness and justice in the country. The country also has a low point value in the question about whether basic rights are well-protected in Peru.




Figure V.2. Components of System Support in Peru, 2010

Given this distribution, it is not unusual to find that, again, levels of support for the political system in Peru are among the lowest in the region (Figure V.3). As we shall see, this has been a consistent pattern in the international rounds of surveys in which Peru has been included, which suggests that Peruvian democracy has serious deficits that need addressing.




Figure V.3. Support for the Political System from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

Political Tolerance

The importance of political tolerance in a political system that declares itself democratic cannot be understated⁶⁴. A democracy is threatened by not only the excessive power of minorities that usurp or corrode the power of the majority, but also by majorities that assume authoritarian attitudes and behaviors to the detriment of political minorities. In the end, it is easier to realize respect for political and civil liberties if the citizenry develops healthy levels of tolerance. This attitude is also important for helping to reduce the potential for serious conflicts due to the resentment of minorities who feel abused or oppressed by intolerant majorities.

For these reasons, the Barometer of the Americas has developed a set of questions that attempt to examine the degree of existing tolerance toward political minorities. These questions have been detailed in the previous pages; our interest here is to discuss political tolerance in Peru from a comparative perspective. As usual, we generated a scale of political tolerance with a range of 0-100, using the questions described in the first section of this chapter.

Figure V.4 presents the distribution of responses to the four questions of the 2010 survey. As in the case of support for the system, Peruvians display very low levels of political tolerance. In only one of the four questions did the mean of tolerance surpass the intermediate point on the scale (the right of persons to demonstrate in a peaceful manner). In two of the questions (the right to express themselves on television and the right to run for public office), the level of tolerance is especially low.




Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance, Peru 2010

We previously indicated that political tolerance in Peru is low. We can more clearly appreciate the great scarcity of tolerance that we find in Peru by comparing the mean values for other countries with those of Peru on the scale of tolerance. In this round of surveys, the tolerance found in Peru is similar to that found in Honduras and barely surpasses that registered in Bolivia and El Salvador. At the other extreme of the distribution, we find that political tolerance is very high in the United States, Costa Rica, and Argentina. The case of Argentina is interesting and worthy of attention. In the previous discussion, we observed that Peru as much as Argentina have extremely low levels of support for the political system

⁶⁴ For an extensive discussion, see Carrión and Zárate 2007.

when compared with the other countries in the region. With regards to political tolerance, however, Argentineans display one of the highest levels while Peruvians place among the lowest. In this manner, while generalized political discontent in Argentina coexists with a high level of tolerance (which places this country in the category of “unstable democracy” from an attitudinal perspective), in Peru, political discontent is added to low levels of tolerance – a problematic combination. For this reason Peru is considered, from the perspective of attitudes, a “democracy at risk.”




Figure V.5. Political Tolerance from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

An examination of the mean levels of tolerance and support for the system in Peru (Figure V.6) displays two important things: first, levels of support for the political system have remained relatively constant between 2006 and 2010 (around a 45 point value) and, second, levels of political tolerance, which were low in 2006, have fallen even further in 2010. So while there has been a slight upturn in the level of support for the system, political tolerance has somewhat diminished in Peru.




Figure V.6. System Support and Political Tolerance in Peru, 2006-2010

Support for a Stable Democracy

We have previously mentioned that the combination of a strong support for the political system with a high degree of tolerance toward minorities favors a stable democracy. In this section we examine what percentage of Peruvians manifest said combination. In order to determine this percentage, we divide each scale into two segments: high (if the point value is 50 or above) or low (a point value of 50 or less). In Table V.2 we present the distribution of these variables in Peru.

Less than a fifth of the sample (18.5%) manifest the most favorable combination for democracy: high tolerance and strong support for the political system. When we analyze this percentage from a comparative perspective, we see that it is the second lowest among the countries surveyed in 2010, above only Paraguay (Figure V.7). On the contrary, most respondents in Peru (38.3%) have the worst possible combination for democracy, which is to say, weak support for the system and low political tolerance. Finally, percentages that approach 20% are found in the other two cells with the remaining combinations.

Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance:
Peru, 2010

System Support (Legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 18.5%	Authoritarian Stability 22.6%
Low	Unstable Democracy 20.6%	Democracy at Risk 38.3%




Figure V.7. Support for a Stable Democracy from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

If we focus only on attitudes that favor a stable democracy (high tolerance and strong support for the system), we see that they have not varied much between 2006 and 2010. In 2006 we found that 21.2% manifested this combination of attitudes, which fell to 16.5% in 2008 but then increased to 18.5% in 2010 (Figure V.8). These fluctuations are not statistically significant because, as the respective figure shows, the intervals of confidence overlap.




Figure V.8. Support for a Stable Democracy by Year, Peru 2004-2010

What factors influence this combination of attitudes that are favorable to democracy? The results, displayed in Figure V.9, suggest that, as in the cases of support for democracy and the political system, the perception of the government's performance on the economy has an important effect on this combination of attitudes. The other factor that emerges as statistically significant is the perception of insecurity that, as we have also previously witnessed, influences the adoption of certain anti-democratic attitudes such as the justification of military coups.





Figure V.9. Who is most likely to Support a Stable Democracy in Peru? 2010

The way in which these two variables affect the combination of attitudes that favor a stable democracy is illustrated in Figure V.10. Those who have a favorable perception of the government's performance on the economy and those who declare a sense of personal safety are those who have the most probability of exhibiting the combination of strong support for the system and a high degree of political tolerance.



The Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions

It is important to examine the degree of citizen confidence in the central institutions of the political system (which we have done in the previous sections and in Chapter III), but it is also necessary to explore how Peruvians perceive other institutions that operate in society and that are relevant to citizens. Following the same procedure of transforming responses about confidence into a scale of 0-100, we present the results in Figure V.11.

Our findings are consistent with our previous studies. The Catholic Church appears as to be the institution that enjoys the most public trust, followed by communication media, the armed forces, and the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (state ombudsman). Approaching the intermediate point on the scale (50), we find elections in general and, a bit lower, the National Elections Board (JNE). This degree of intermediate confidence continues to be somewhat concerning because elections are a central foundation of a democratic regime. Despite the fact that the declared confidence in these institutions is not lower than that in others, it is still notable that it barely approaches the median point on the scale.

The institutions that enjoy the least degree of confidence among the respondents are the Supreme Court (36.1), the president (35.6), Congress (31.9), and the political parties (30). These results again suggest the low confidence that citizens have in institutions associated with democratic practices.




Figure V.11. Trust in Institutions in Peru, 2010

The low degree of public trust in these institutions demonstrates an immovability that continues to surprise. The mean values found in the three rounds of surveys remained practically identical for all institutions with two exceptions: elections and the JNE. Only in these two cases do we note fluctuations in the mean values of trust, with a higher mean found in 2006 than in 2010 and with intermediate values in 2008. This is to say that there was an important decline in public confidence in the institutions associated with democracy between 2006 and 2008, though there has been a slight recuperation in 2010, which has nevertheless not reached 2006 levels (Figure V.12).




Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions in Peru, 2006 – 2010

Support for Illiberal Presidents

The recent military coup in Honduras has demonstrated that the threat of military governments has still not been entirely eliminated from the region. But the challenges that Latin American democracies face proceed not only from a return of militarism but also from presidents elected with popular fervor who decide to use their popularity in order to alter the constitutional bases (which is to say liberal bases) of the political regime, changing the rules of the game that brought them to power, harassing the opposition in an anti-democratic manner, and creating autocratic presidencies. Examples such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua represent these types of threats. Recent developments in Ecuador and Bolivia suggest that these democracies could succumb to this tendency toward autocratic presidents, although it is still early to conclude that this is the case in these two countries. We want to highlight that Latin American democracy faces the danger of not only military coups but also civilian coups, in which presidents use their popularity to alter the democratic foundations of the political system using unconstitutional means, in violation of the frameworks that brought them to power in the first place. This is the dynamic of regimes that have been characterized as manifesting electoral or competitive authoritarianism⁶⁵.

Naturally, the autocratic attempts of elected presidents are made more difficult when they confront public opinion firmly committed to the liberal exercise of power, which is to say of power that respects the constitutional principles of checks and balances and that does not abuse its control of power in order to undermine the opposition. In this sense, we are interested in exploring public attitudes toward presidents who claim a disproportionate usufruct of power in the name of the common good. To examine these attitudes, our survey included the following questions, which were also included in the 2008 round.

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements

POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98)DA

POP102. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98)DA

POP103. When the Supreme Court blocks the work of our government, the Court should be disregarded by our presidents. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98)DA

As we have been doing, we transformed and combined the responses to these questions into a scale of 0-100, where zero represents a complete rejection of an illiberal exercise of power and 100 complete agreement with this type of power. The results for 2008 and 2010 are presented in Figure V.13. The data show that, in general, there exists a decrease in willingness to accept the illiberal exercise of power. In each of the three questions, Peruvians have a lesser mean value in 2010 than in 2008, and the differences are statistically significant. This indicates a real change in attitude.

⁶⁵ There exists a growing literature on these types of government. A good summary of the discussion can be found in the recent book by Levitsky and Way (2010).




Figure V.13. Support for an Illiberal Exercise of Power, Peru 2008-2010

When discussing support for democracy and the political system, satisfaction with democracy and tolerance, and support for military coups, Peru finds itself in the last places when compared to the other countries in the region. In the case of support for the illiberal exercise of power, however, Peru holds a relatively intermediate place in the distribution of countries (Figure V.14). Although Peru is not among the most liberal countries, in which a good proportion of respondents reject the assumption of dictatorial powers by the president, such as Costa Rica, the U.S., Jamaica, Guyana, or Argentina, neither is it among the most illiberal countries (those with a mean on the scale above 40, such as Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Paraguay, and El Salvador). This lesser inclination of Peruvians to support autocratic presidents is probably the result of their experience with Alberto Fujimori, who shut down Congress and the Supreme Court on April 5, 1992. In similar vein, the fact that many criticize the authoritarian conduct of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela could explain the low willingness of Venezuelans to support an illiberal exercise of power.




Figure V.14. Support for an Illiberal Exercise of Power in the Americas, 2010

The regression analysis permits us to identify the factors that influence this attitude. What we find is that, again, the perception of the government's performance on the economy plays an important role in determining this attitude (Figure V.15). In this case, the direction of the association is the opposite of what was found in previous cases, as is to be expected. Persons who are more content with the performance of the president are more willing to grant him or her extraordinary faculties of power (see Figure V.16).




Figure V.15. Determinants of Support for an Illiberal Exercise of Power, Peru 2010

The other two factors that significantly affect willingness to support an illiberal exercise of presidential power are of a socio-demographic nature. We find that women and those who have greater levels of formal education are *less* inclined to support an autocratic exercise of power (Figure V.16).




Figure V.16. Support for the Illiberal Exercise of Power by Perception of the Government's Economic Performance, Education, and Gender, Peru 2010

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that, in general, there exists widespread political discontent in Peru, which without a doubt undermines the legitimacy of the system. In almost all the attitudes that are conducive to the establishment of a stable democracy, Peru holds extremely low places when compared to the other countries in the region. Peruvians are just above Paraguay, Argentina, and Trinidad and Tobago

with respect to support for the system; Bolivia and El Salvador in levels of political tolerance; and Paraguay in the attitudinal combination that we here denominate as a stable democracy (high support for the system and high tolerance). The only exception to this pattern is in support for illiberal exercise of power, where the mean values found in Peru are at an intermediate point when compared to those of the region.

Among the variety of factors that influence each of these attitudes, we find that one constantly emerges: the perception of the government's performance on the economy, which is to say its ability to combat unemployment and poverty. This suggests that a good part of Peruvian voters evaluate the performance of the political system as a whole based in its ability to resolve these two problems, which affect many of them. And despite the fact that levels of poverty have somewhat declined and unemployment has not substantially increased during the global crisis, the majority of Peruvians expect more from their political system. We also find that corruption and the perception of insecurity affect some of the attitudes toward the political system. This is a challenge for the country's political institutions, hence it is necessary to realize not only economic stability but also recuperate public confidence in their institutions.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter V

Table V.3. Predictors of Strong Support for the System and High Tolerance. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.03	(-1.09)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.086*	(-2.80)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.019	-0.61
Percepción de la corrupción	0.017	-0.78
Mujer	0.049	-1.79
Edad	-0.046	(-1.77)
Urbano	-0.01	(-0.17)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.072	(-1.23)
Nivel de educación	-0.013	(-0.42)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.003	-0.07
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.028	-0.99
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.025	(-0.82)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.017	-0.45
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.022	-0.78
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.005	-0.14
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.037	(-1.28)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.026	(-0.82)
No hay crisis económica	0.013	-0.35
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.024	(-0.78)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.062	(-1.53)
Interés en la política	0.047	-1.3
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.205*	-5.78
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.017	(-0.39)
Constante	0.001	-0.02
R-cuadrado = 0.076		
Número de casos = 1260		
* p<0.05		

Table V.4. Predictors of Support for an Illiberal Government. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.028	(-0.97)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.031	-1.05
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.014	-0.42
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.01	(-0.36)
Mujer	-0.057*	(-2.61)
Edad	-0.063	(-1.88)
Urbano	0.039	-0.55
Tamaño del lugar	-0.072	(-0.97)
Nivel de educación	-0.097*	(-2.89)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.039	(-0.93)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.048	-1.29
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	0.025	-0.76
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.04	(-1.26)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.018	(-0.53)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.053	-1.57
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0	(-0.01)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.028	-0.78
No hay crisis económica	0.03	-0.64
Crisis económica muy seria	0.031	-0.94
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.011	-0.24
Interés en la política	-0.052	(-1.59)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.202*	-4.93
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.062	-1.49
Constante	0.017	-0.39
R-cuadrado = 0.078		
Número de casos = 1260		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

Attitudes toward democracy are influenced by a series of factors of a structural and socio-demographic nature (poverty, place of residence, education, age, level of economic development, to mention a few), contextual nature (the government in power, the presence or absence of political or economic crises), social nature (political activism, participation in civil society organizations), or even personal nature (personal characteristics such as interpersonal trust or self-esteem, early socialization, political experiences in adulthood, interest in politics, among others). In this chapter we will examine a number of these factors such as interpersonal trust, level of involvement in civil society organizations, participation in conventional or unconventional political activities, and interest in politics.

Interpersonal Trust and Democracy

Although debate about the true impact of interpersonal trust still continues, there exists sufficient evidence that indicates that societies that exhibit a high level of interpersonal trust tend to have a greater degree of democracy (Inglehart 1997). Naturally, one of the points of discussion is if this correlation signifies that interpersonal trust partially determines the level of democracy or if, on the contrary, democratic societies tend to generate in the medium or long term citizens with a high level of interpersonal trust (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Muller and Seligson 1994; Putnam 1993; Seligson 2002; Uslaner 2000). For some authors, such as Inglehart, interpersonal trust contributes to the development of democracy because it acts as a mechanism that favors the interaction between individuals and facilitates their participation in voluntary organizations. This, he writes, strengthens the democratic nature of a society.

In addition, another argument in favor of studying interpersonal trust is that it is part of a syndrome of attitudes that, as a whole, favor the establishment of a civic culture and a stable democracy as a result (Putnam 1993). In some cases, it is argued that interpersonal trust can generate greater trust in political institutions, which translates to a stronger support for democracy.

Without attempting to address the topic of whether interpersonal trust is an attitudinal requirement for the existence of a stronger democracy or if it is, on the contrary, the result of years of democratic practices, we here examine to what extent Peruvians trust their neighbors. To gauge this attitude, we utilized the following question:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [\[Read options\]](#)

(1) Very trustworthy	(2) Somewhat trustworthy	(3) Not very trustworthy	(4) Untrustworthy
(88) DK	(98) DA		

In Peru, more than half of respondents affirm that people in their community have little or no trust in others (Figure VI.1); a meager 10.7% declare that people tend to be very trusting.




Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust in Peru, 2010

How do we compare this level of interpersonal trust with the levels found in other countries? Are Peruvians more or less trusting than the typical Latin American? The response is clearly listed in Figure VI.2.

In order to obtain only one point value to compare with that of other countries, we transform the given responses to a scale of 0-100, in which 100 represents high interpersonal trust. For example, Peru's point value (46.2) indicates that most Peruvians are below the median point of interpersonal trust. In fact, the degree of interpersonal trust in Peru is the lowest registered in the 2010 survey.




Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in a Comparative Perspective, 2010

When we examine the evolution of this indicator over three national surveys conducted in recent years under the auspices of the Barometer of the Americas, we find that levels of interpersonal trust in Peru have not substantially varied (Figure VI.3). Although there was a slight increase when comparing 2006 and 2010, the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust in Peru, 2006-2010

What are the factors that affect levels of interpersonal trust in Peru? There are multiple variables that may affect this attitude. We have, in the first place, demographic factors. One can formulate a hypothesis, for example, that persons who live in rural areas and in small cities could display a greater level of interpersonal trust than those who live in urban areas or big cities, including metropolitan Lima. In addition, one can expect that persons of a higher level of education, owing to being better informed and to their better critical capacity for processing media information, could have a higher level of interpersonal trust than persons with less formal education. One can also expect, for example, that persons who have a precarious economic or social situation tend to have a less trusting attitude than persons who have a more comfortable position in society. Finally, factors associated with personal experiences with delinquency or corruption (or perceptions of insecurity toward these phenomena) can also be determinants of interpersonal trust.

Variables that measure these factors were included in the regression model, and the results are presented in Figure VI.4. The data support some of our hypotheses but do not support others. We find that economic factors do not play a determining role in this attitude. Whether measured in terms of level of wealth or in the perception of the family economic situation, or even measured in terms of the level of reduction in household income, none of the variables of a precarious economic situation emerge as a statistically significant factor in interpersonal trust. On the other hand, we find that place of residence (in this case, the size of the locality) does have a significant impact on interpersonal trust. The strongest influence on this attitude, however, is the perception of a lack of personal safety.

The perception that corruption is widespread among public officials is also a statistically significant factor. In the following paragraph, we discuss these findings in greater detail.




Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Peru, 2010

Figures VI.5 and VI.6 illustrate the relation between interpersonal trust and the variables that emerge as statistically significant. In the first of these graphs, we observe how interpersonal trust is much higher in rural areas than in metropolitan Lima. This is consistent with our findings since in rural areas people tend to know each other better and to establish closer means of economic cooperation than those found in the capital, where many of the relationships of this nature are impersonal. In Figure VI.6, we observe the strong impact of the current quality of life on levels of interpersonal trust. Persons who

consider corruption to be generalized in Peru tend to display a level of interpersonal trust that is substantially lower than those who do not consider corruption to be generalized in society. In similar vein, citizens who express a strong perception of a lack of personal safety present a lower degree of interpersonal trust than that of those who express a strong sense of security.




Figure VI.5. Interpersonal Trust by Size of Place of Residence, Peru 2010




Figure VI.6. Interpersonal Trust, Perception of Corruption, and Perception of Personal Insecurity, Peru 2010

Civic Participation

We have affirmed that interpersonal trust is one of the attitudes that are generally considered part of the social capital of a society. The other central component of social capital is active involvement in civil society organizations. Although there exists a growing literature that correctly indicates that not all voluntary organizations are beneficial for society (for example, organizations that are racist, xenophobic, or authoritarian)⁶⁶, participation in the organizations listed below is without doubt a productive step for a society that intends to be democratic. The theory on political participation indicates that it is good for democracy for a number of reasons, of which we will highlight two: this type of participation increases tolerance because it brings together people who have similar points of view, and second, this type of participation favors a good government because the citizens organize to demand effective services and rapid attention to their demands. To paraphrase Robert Putnam, citizens who demand good government, generally get it.

To study the degree of civic participation, we utilized the following questions:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]						
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98 N/A 99

The data show that of all the civic organizations examined, those of a religious nature are the ones that attract the most Peruvians. Following far behind are parents' associations and committees for the betterment community problem-solving, which generate the next highest levels of involvement (Figure VI.7).

⁶⁶ See for example Armony (2004).




Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Peru, 2010

Perhaps because there is a great lack of trust in the political system, or perhaps because citizens of Peru feel obligated to cover up state deficiencies, levels of civic involvement in Peru are in some cases very high when compared to those in other countries, especially with respect to participation in women's associations or groups (Figure VI.8). This suggests that civil society is relatively active.




Figure VI.8. Participation in Some Civic Associations in the Americas, 2010

When we analyze the distribution of this civic involvement by year, we find that no uniform pattern exists (Figure VI.9). In some cases, for example in that of participation in parent meetings, attendance has been gradually diminishing since 2006. In other cases, participation has remained more or less stable. Finally, attendance at meetings of a religious nature, which decreased between 2006 and 2008, grew substantially in 2010.




Figure VI.9. Participation in Civil Society Organizations, Peru 2006-2010

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations

One of the most frequent forms of political activism in Latin America and in Peru is participation in demonstrations or public protests. In order to analyze how involved Peruvians are in this form of political action, we posed the following question:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to JC1] (88) DK [Go to JC1] (98) DA [Go to JC1]

In 2010, 18.2% of respondents in Peru indicate having participated in a protest or public demonstration. What motivates this mobilization? The topic that arouses the most protest activity is related to economic issues, which is consistent with the information presented in the first chapter on the decline in salaries in the last year. Later come topics with associated with political issues, probably linked to a regional problem and to decentralization. Topics of education, public services, and human rights also arouse activism in the form of protests and demonstrations (Figure VI.10).




Figure VI.10. Motivations for Protests and Demonstrations, Peru 2010

Are Peruvians particularly inclined to participate in protests and demonstrations? To answer this question, it is necessary to compare the percentage registered in Peru with that in other countries. The distribution is displayed in Figure VI.11. In Peru, we find one of the highest percentages of participation in protests and public demonstrations in the region, which suggests that, effectively, this type of political activism is favored by Peruvians.




Figure VI.11. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

So now, what factors are associated with this inclination? Our logistic regression analysis (because the dependent variable is dichotomous) reveals the following: first, persons who reside in the Sierra Sur (an area of high concentrations of indigenous people and extreme poverty) have a greater tendency to participate in this kind of activity (Figure VI.12); second, persons affected by corruption and delinquency are more likely to participate in protests and demonstrations and, finally, those who declare having a greater interest in politics also participate more in protests. These associations are also illustrated in Figure VI.13. It is interesting to note that none of the variables associated with a precarious economic situation or with negative evaluations of the economy emerge as significant predictors of protest in Peru.




Figure VI.12. Predictors of Participation in Protests and Demonstrations, Peru 2010




Figure VI.13. Participation in Protests by Residence in the Sierra Sur, Interest in politics, and Corruption and Crime Victimization, Peru 2010

Interest in Politics

To study interest in politics, we utilized the following question:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

Less than 30% of the respondents in Peru in 2010 acknowledge having some or much interest in politics, while a third (33.6%) affirm not having any interest in it. Between these two poles we find a majority (38.1%) who declare having little interest in public issues (Figure VI.14).




Figure VI.14. Interest in Politics in Peru, 2010

If we transform these responses to obtain our scale of 0-100⁶⁷, we find that the median point value in Peru (33.5) is relatively low, but it is not the lowest (it is located between the options of “low” and “high”) when compared with that of other countries (Figure VI.15). The countries that present the highest mean value of interest in politics are the U.S., Uruguay, Canada, Suriname, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina. At the other extreme, the countries with less interest in politics are Guatemala, Ecuador, Guyana, and Chile. Peru is closer to the latter group than to the former.

⁶⁷ Using the following procedure to assign point values: not at all=0, a bit=25, some=50, a lot=100.




Figure VI.15. Interest in Politics in the Americas, 2010

Mean values of interest in politics in Peru has not varied much over the three conducted surveys, hovering around a point value of 33. Furthermore, the differences between the three years are not statistically significant (Figure VI.16).




Figure VI.16 . Interest in Politics in Peru, 2006-2010

Political Activism

To complete this chapter, we examine levels of public involvement in activities related to elections. To explore to what extent Peruvians participate in this type of activity, we posed the following questions:

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) DK (98)DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2006?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98)DA

The analysis suggests that the great majority of respondents refrain from this type of activity: an impressive 65% affirm never having tried to convince others to vote for a political party or candidate, and 94.2% indicate that he or she did not work for a candidate or party during the last presidential elections (Figure VI.17).




Figure VI.17. Political Activism in Peru, 2010

In comparative terms, the percentage of Peruvians who have tried to convince others to vote for a candidate or party is relatively high, though not among the highest in the region. However, on the other hand, the percentage who declare having worked for a political party or candidate is among the lowest in the region (Figure VI.18).




Figure VI.18. Political Activism in the Americas, 2010

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that levels of interpersonal trust in Peru are extremely low, the lowest among the 25 surveyed countries in 2010. This degree of interpersonal trust has not significantly varied between 2006 and 2010 and has been principally influenced by the size of the place of residence, the perception of a lack of personal safety, and having been a victim of corruption and delinquency.

We have also found that participation in civic organizations is not very high in Peru, but despite this the mean values of participation that we found are above those registered in various countries in the region. It is worth mentioned the fact that the percentage of persons who participate in a women's association or group is the highest in the region.

The percentage of activism in protests and demonstrations is also very high in Peru when compared to that of other countries. The greater part of this activism is found to be related to issues of an economic and political nature.

Peruvians are not particularly interested in politics, and the mean values in the country are comparatively and relatively low, although neither are they among the lowest in the region. Finally, with respect to activism related to elections, Peruvians tend to have an inclination to try to convince others to vote for a candidate or party (in which Peru is at a moderately high point in the region). They are not, however, interested in directly working for a party or candidate (the point value found in Peru is the third lowest).

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter VI

Table VI.1. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.031	(-1.18)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.258*	(-8.03)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.017	(-0.60)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.055*	-2.09
Mujer	-0.021	(-0.82)
Edad	0.02	-0.76
Urbano	-0.034	(-0.55)
Tamaño del lugar	0.118*	-2.02
Nivel de educación	0.05	-1.69
Quintiles de riqueza	0.025	-0.74
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.051	(-1.73)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.017	-0.52
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.064	(-1.59)
Constante	0.004	-0.13
R-cuadrado = 0.118		
Número de casos = 1406		
* p<0.05		

Table VI.2. Predictors of Participation in Protests. Peru 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	0.197*	-2.23
Percepción de inseguridad	0.07	-0.81
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.224*	-2.37
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.051	(-0.69)
Mujer	-0.118	(-1.33)
Edad	-0.009	(-0.09)
Urbano	0.01	-0.06
Tamaño del lugar	0.305	-1.67
Nivel de educación	0.096	-0.85
Quintiles de riqueza	0.073	-0.67
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.023	(-0.25)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.032	(-0.35)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.105	-0.97
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.04	(-0.41)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.065	-0.66
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.071	-0.79
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.078	(-0.85)
No hay crisis económica	0.016	-0.17
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.011	(-0.13)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.193	(-1.67)
Interés en la política	0.394*	-4.34
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.15	(-1.40)
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.206*	-2.46
Constante	-2.196*	(-19.07)
F = 3.85		
Número de casos = 1285		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

In this chapter we will discuss, from a comparative perspective, Peruvian voters' attitudes toward local governments, their involvement in them, and the way in which their experiences with local governments affect their overall opinion of the political system. Those who are interested in the existing literature on local governments in Peru can revisit our previous reports, where we present a summary of the state of the art.

Participation in Meetings of Local Government

One of the most important topics for determining the impact of local governments on the political system in general is the degree of public involvement in these governments. For this we utilize the following question:

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

The degree of public involvement in local governments, as we find it in Peru, is modest, but it is not extremely low. Participation in meetings organized by the municipality reaches a percentage of 11.6% of the respondents, which places Peru at the median point of the regional comparative table (Figure VII.1). While countries such as the United States and Canada register a substantially greater participation, in the case of Andean countries such as Bolivia and Peru, participation is around 11%. Even lower still are neighboring countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, or Brazil.




Figure VII.1. Participation in Meetings of Local Government in the Americas, 2010

Over the years that we have conducted this study, the percentage of public participation in municipal issues has mostly remained relatively stable, between 11.6% and 14.7% of respondents (Figure VII.2). Although we observe a slight decrease between 2006 and 2010, the reality is that the difference between these two years can be found within the margin of error (which is to say, within the margins of variation that one expects in surveys conducted at random) and hence is not statistically significant.




Figure VII.2. Participation in Meetings of Local Government in Peru, 2006-2010

To determine who are most inclined to participate in meetings of local government⁶⁸, we conducted a logistic regression analysis (since the dependent variable is dichotomous) and included a series of socio-demographic factors and a series of variables related to the perception of the economic situation, the government's performance, crime victimization and corruption, and interest in politics (Figure VII.3). One would expect that persons who find themselves in a precarious social and economic situation or who have a series of demands associated with their dissatisfaction with their economic situation or personal security would have a greater tendency to get involved in municipal meetings. The results demonstrate that this is not the case. Those who have a greater probability of attending these types of meetings are older persons and those who reside in rural areas. Furthermore, and as is to be expected, those who declare having a greater interest in politics are also those with a greater tendency to participate in municipal meetings. This suggests that the scale of municipal governments, generally smaller in rural areas, and a person's stage of life (persons of a more advanced age tend to have a greater likelihood of being parents of a family) are what influence participation. The way in which age, place of residence, and interest in politics are linked to participation in municipal meetings is illustrated in Figure VII.4.

⁶⁸ It is worth noting that when we refer to attendance of municipal meetings, we refer to meetings in general and not to municipal budget meetings. The percentage who declare having participated in a municipal budget meeting has remained relatively constant, between 4.3% (2006), 5.0% (2008), and 4.5% in the current year.




Figure VII.3. Determinants of Participation in Municipal Meetings, Peru 2010




Figure VII.4. Percentage of Participation in Meetings Local Government by Age, Place of Residence, and Interest in Politics, 2010

Citizen participation, particularly at the local level, has been a priority as much of the decentralization process as of the diverse organisms that support the work of sub national governments. The analysis demonstrates an important gap between respondents' perceptions of their mayor's interest in citizen participation⁶⁹ and their perceptions of their own influence as citizens over municipal issues.⁷⁰ On

⁶⁹ The question was: "How interested do you think the mayor is in the participation of the people in the work of the municipality?"

⁷⁰ The question was: "How much influence do you think have in what the municipality does?"

the familiar scale of 0-100, we find a very positive mean value in the respondents' evaluation of the mayor's interest in their participation. Nevertheless, the situation is different when we address perceptions on their own influence as citizens in what the municipality, being as the mean is less than half of what we found in the first case (Figure VII.5).




Figure VII.5. Perception of Public Influence in the Municipality and Perception of the Interest of the Mayor in Civic Participation in Peru, 2006 - 2010

Contacting Local Government

The local government is probably one of the sites that receive the most demands by the population. In order to explore the degree of participation in this activity and the manner in which the municipality responds to demands, we included the following two questions in the questionnaire:

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Go to SGL1**] (88) Doesn't know [**Go to SGL1**]
(98) Doesn't answer [**Go to SGL1**]

MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

About 14% of respondents assert having presented a petition to the municipality, although of this percent the majority (62.8%) indicate that their petition was not approved (Figure VII.6), which is problematic. The percentage of those who had solicited help from or presented a petition to the municipality is not overwhelmingly high (especially when compared to that of other countries), nevertheless, it is greater than the interaction that citizens have with other areas of the state. For example, in another section of the survey we asked if in order to resolve a problem they had asked for help from a Congressperson, a state official, or a local authority. The percentage of persons who did was 2% in the case of the Congressperson, 7% in the case of a public official, and 12% in the case of a local authority.




Figure VII.6. Contacting Municipal Government in Peru, 2010

Again, as with attendance of municipal meetings, Peru is at an intermediate position in the American region, in which Uruguay holds first place (as it did in 2008) with 19% of persons affirming having filed a petition to the municipality, while at the other extreme is Panama with only 5% (Figure VII.7). Peru held first place in 2006 among the countries surveyed that year, but it has declined to an intermediate position, not only because participation decreased by six percentage points between 2006 and 2010 (Figure VII.8), but also because more countries were included in the survey.




Figure VII.7. Contacting Municipal Government in the Americas, 2010

As we have mentioned, 21.2% of respondents in Peru acknowledged having contacted the municipality in 2006, but this percentage decreased to 17.1% in 2008 and now (2010) reaches 14.2% (Figure VII.8). It is clear that there is a tendency of decrease in Peru with respect to the percentage of persons who file a petition or solicit help from the municipal government. Without doubt the low percentage of the successful resolutions of these demands – as we have previously seen – is partially responsible for the decrease of this activity.

In an effort to identify who are most likely to look for help from or contact the local government, we conducted a logistic regression utilizing as predictors the same independent variables used to predict participation in municipal meetings but adding variables related to trust in the municipality, the respondent's perception of political efficacy, and the degree of participation in municipal meetings. The results (presented in Figure VII.9) indicate that older persons, those who attend municipal meetings, those who think they can have an influence on municipal issues, and those who report having been affected by delinquency have a greater possibility of petitioning the municipality (Figure VII.10).




Figure VII.8. Contacting Municipal Government in Peru, 2006-2010




Figure VII.9. Determinants of a Request for Help from or Contacting the Local Government, Peru 2010




Figure VII.10. Contacting Municipal Government by Age, Attendance of Municipal Meetings, Crime Victimization, and Perception of Influence in the Municipality, Peru 2010

Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

One of the variables that we have used at LAPOP to measure the performance of local governments has been citizens' satisfaction with services provided by the local government. To explore this satisfaction, we utilized the following question:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options]

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know
 (98) Doesn't answer

The great majority of respondents in Peru (58.7%) say that services provided by the municipality are neither good nor bad, and approximately 23% indicated that they are bad or very bad; less than 20% think that they are good or very good (Figure VII.11).




Figure VII.11. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, Peru 2010

When we assign a numeric value to these evaluations, creating a scale with a range of 0 to 100, we obtain a mean of 47.6 for Peru in 2010. This point value of satisfaction with municipal services is one of the lowest in the Americas, above only Belize, Jamaica, and Suriname (Figure VII.12). This mean value has remained relatively stable over the three studies conducted in Peru between 2006 and 2010 (Figure VII.13), and the country is at a similar place in the regional context, always among the last five countries in the region. The meager public satisfaction with municipal services is a worrying factor because this is in many cases the only contact that citizens have with the sphere of the state. A disappointing experience with local governments can have an impact on levels of support for the system.




Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with Local Government Services from a Comparative Perspective, 2010




Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with Local Government services in Peru, 2006-2010

To identify the factors that determine satisfaction with municipal services, we conducted a linear regression analysis in which we introduced the same variables used in the case of attendance of meetings and the request for or solicitation of help from municipalities. The results demonstrate that four are statistically significant variables: the perception that the mayor has an interest in the participation of citizens, public trust in the management of municipal funds, general confidence in local government, and the president's job approval. In general terms, those who have a greater trust in the municipality and who believe that they have influence in the work of the municipality tend to be more satisfied with the services provided by the local government (Figure VII.14). The correlation between these variables and satisfaction with the local government is demonstrated in Figure VII.14.




Figure VII.14. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Peru, 2010

As we have previously indicated, trust in the municipality is a key factor of satisfaction with local governments. From a comparative perspective, the mean value of confidence in local governments in Peru is one of the lowest in the region (Figure VII.15). The mean value of trust in the municipalities has remained practically unchanged between 2006 and 2010: in 2006 a mean value of 41.6 was registered (on the scale of 0 to 100) and we only surpassed Haiti in this year. In 2008, the mean value of trust was 42.1 and just above than Haiti and Panama. This year, with a mean value of 42, we hold the fifth lowest place. Although other institutions in Peru register lower mean values of confidence in 2010 (Congress, for example, presents a mean value of 32), what is certain is that local governments have challenges to face, particularly in the case of local governments outside of metropolitan Lima, since the capital registers a mean value of confidence higher than that registered in the interior of the country (45.4 compared to 40.6, respectively).




Figure VII.15. Confidence in Local Government in the Americas, 2010

The Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on Support for the Political System

Does satisfaction with local government services have any impact on support for the political system? The answer is yes, and the impact is seen not only in the case of support for the political system but also for the degree of confidence in the institutions of democracy. We arrive at this answer by way of the following procedure: maintaining the independent variables that we employed to predict support for the system in Chapter III, we add the variable of satisfaction with local government services in order to see whether it emerges as a statistically significant predictor not only of support for the system but also of confidence in the political institutions of democracy⁷¹.

The results are presented in Figure VII.16. As we can observe, in both cases the degree of public satisfaction with local government services exerts a significant influence on attitudes toward the political system: those who affirm that services provided by the local government are bad or very bad display less support for the political system and have less confidence in the country's political institutions.

⁷¹ The scale of confidence combines questions about the degree of confidence in the following institutions: the justice system, Congress, the national government, the Supreme Court, and political parties. The scale ranges from 0 to 100.

The improvement of services offered by the local government hence is desirable not only in itself but also because it has a positive effect on the development of attitudes that favor a stable democracy. In Figure VII.17 we illustrate the relation between these variables.




Figure VII.16. Influence of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on Support for the Political System and Confidence in its Institutions, Peru 2010




Figure VII.17. Correlation between Satisfaction with Local Government Services, System Support, and Confidence in Political Institutions, Peru 2010

Conclusion

In this chapter we have demonstrated that public involvement in issues related to local government – be it in terms of attending its meetings or in the participation in petitions directed towards it – is relatively modest but not so low when comparing Peru with other countries. In both cases of participation in local governments, Peru holds an intermediate place in the region. The corresponding statistical

analysis demonstrates that participation in meetings of local government is found to be influenced by age (with older persons participating to a greater degree than younger persons), place of residence (greater participation in rural areas), and interest in politics (as expected, persons who declare a greater interest in politics report a greater degree of participation). On the other hand, solicitation of help from or filing petitions with the municipal government is seen to be influenced by age (the older, the more participation), the sense of efficacy (the greater the sense of efficacy, the greater the participation), and having been victims of delinquency (victims tend toward greater participation).

Satisfaction with local governments is extremely low in Peru, among the lowest in the whole region (as is trust in these governments). This is consistent with the low levels of support for the system and its institutions in general that we found in previous chapters. In the specific case of local governments, this attitude is influenced by two general factors: the degree of trust that citizens have in them and the belief or absence thereof that they can influence its affairs. Citizens who are discontented with the services provided by the municipal government tend to have a lesser degree of support for the system and less confidence in its political institutions. For this reason, it becomes imperative that municipalities improve the quality of their services. This would not only improve conditions of daily life but also reinforce the public compromise with democracy.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter VII

Table VII.1. Predictors of Attendance of Municipal Meetings. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.081	(-0.81)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.015	(-0.14)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.129	-1.21
Percepción de la corrupción	0.024	-0.26
Mujer	-0.011	(-0.12)
Edad	0.282*	-2.9
Urbano	-0.506*	(-2.43)
Tamaño del lugar	0.164	-0.73
Nivel de educación	0.138	-1.29
Quintiles de riqueza	0.036	-0.32
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.049	-0.53
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	0.106	-1.02
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.159	(-1.34)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.021	-0.2
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.085	-0.76
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.043	-0.49
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.032	-0.31
No hay crisis económica	-0.119	(-1.19)
Crisis económica muy seria	0.01	-0.11
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.077	(-0.61)
Interés en la política	0.365*	-4.01
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.043	-0.39
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.093	-1.08
Constante	-2.283*	(-20.41)
F = 3.63		
N. de casos = 1269		
* p<0.05		

Table VII.2. Predictors of Filing Petitions to the Municipality. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	0.223*	-2.48
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.008	(-0.09)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.027	-0.29
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.057	(-0.57)
Mujer	-0.042	(-0.43)
Edad	0.370*	-4.03
Urbano	-0.041	(-0.24)
Tamaño del lugar	0.156	-0.97
Nivel de educación	0.2	-1.65
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.025	(-0.24)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.034	(-0.32)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.096	(-0.93)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.053	-0.6
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.037	(-0.34)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.188	-1.69
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.106	-1.16
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.21	(-1.87)
No hay crisis económica	0.05	-0.49
Crisis económica muy seria	0.106	-1.3
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.076	(-0.82)
Interés en la política	0.065	-0.71
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.028	-0.32
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.185	-1.89
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.492*	-7.11
Confianza en manejo de fondos por parte del municipio	-0.074	(-0.69)
Influencia ciudadana en la municipalidad	0.253*	-2.69
Interés del alcalde en la participación ciudadana	-0.018	(-0.19)
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.043	-0.43
Constante	-2.016*	(-17.86)
F = 4.74		
Número de casos = 1186		
* p<0.05		

Table VII.3. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Services. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	0.003	-0.12
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.014	(-0.51)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.045	(-1.73)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.028	(-1.11)
Mujer	0.039	-1.28
Edad	-0.018	(-0.66)
Urbano	-0.09	(-1.55)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.08	(-1.39)
Nivel de educación	-0.001	(-0.02)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.018	(-0.57)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.067	-1.97
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.029	(-0.98)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.065	(-1.67)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.013	-0.4
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.054	(-1.67)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.002	-0.08
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.018	(-0.75)
No hay crisis económica	-0.043	(-1.61)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.025	(-0.88)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.041	-1.24
Interés en la política	0.002	-0.09
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.024	(-0.75)
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.042	(-1.31)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.008	-0.28
Presentó una petición al gobierno municipal	-0.021	(-0.77)
Confianza en el gobierno municipal	0.249*	-6.84
Confianza en manejo de fondos por parte del municipio	0.186*	-5.92
Influencia ciudadana en la municipalidad	0.014	-0.55
Interés del alcalde en la participación ciudadana	0.126*	-4.6
Constante	-0.023	(-0.80)
R-cuadrado = 0.292		
Número de casos = 1162		
* p<0.05		

Table VII.4. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government on Political Trust. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.059*	(-2.58)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.037	(-1.32)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.007	(-0.31)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.063*	(-2.51)
Mujer	0	(-0.01)
Edad	-0.05	(-1.92)
Urbano	0.047	-0.97
Tamaño del lugar	0.055	-1.16
Nivel de educación	-0.098*	(-3.39)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.034	(-1.14)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.148*	-4.35
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.009	(-0.34)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.028	(-0.95)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.031	-1.29
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.002	(-0.06)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.007	-0.3
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.027	-0.82
No hay crisis económica	0.064	-1.72
Crisis económica muy seria	0.043	-1.65
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.008	(-0.28)
Interés en la política	0.039	-1.45
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.473*	-15.07
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.029	(-0.93)
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.055*	-2.09
Constante	0.009	-0.29
R-cuadrado = 0.365		
N. de casos = 1257		
* p<0.05		

Table VII.5. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government on System Support. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.044	(-1.65)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.066*	(-2.66)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.037	(-1.43)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.016	(-0.61)
Mujer	0.027	-1.07
Edad	-0.024	(-0.88)
Urbano	0.127*	-2.55
Tamaño del lugar	0.163*	-3.64
Nivel de educación	-0.072*	(-2.41)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.013	-0.48
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.087*	-2.7
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.055	(-1.96)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.025	(-0.78)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.049	-1.84
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.037	(-1.12)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.029	(-1.04)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.034	-1.08
No hay crisis económica	0.041	-1.13
Crisis económica muy seria	0.004	-0.15
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.04	(-1.17)
Interés en la política	0.109*	-4.63
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.383*	-11.78
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	-0.072	(-1.94)
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.097*	-3.49
Constante	0.001	-0.02
R-cuadrado =0.294		
N. de casos = 1250		
* p<0.05		

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. Ethnicity and Discrimination

The Debate about Racism in Peru

Discrimination has been dealt with by the Peruvian social sciences primarily through the study of racism and sexism. For Ames (2010)⁷² there have been three main debates about racism in Peru: its persistence (to know whether racism does or does not exist in post-oligarchic Peru), the forms which it currently takes (new forms of racism such as social status, for example), and how it has changed over time. Regarding its persistence, Ames reviews a vast literature that indicates that the principle racial categories that define today's racism come from the colonial period; hence it is pertinent to indicate the "colonial legacy" as a premodern leftover that remains a part of current social relations (Flores Galindo, 1988; Callirgos, 1993; Portocarrero, 1993; Manrique, 1999). In a critical line of focus, authors such as Mendez (2000), Oliart (1995), and Poole (2000) define these legacies of racism as much more contemporary, specifically originating in the beginning of the 19th century and during the global process of "biologization" of the races impelled by Social Darwinism. Finally, Ames indicates a third group of authors (Oboler, 1996; De la Cadena, 1997; Wilson, 2000) who link expressions of racism to cultural forms that pertain to each historical period (consequently, racism in Peru would be permanently reconfigured according to the era).

The debate about racism returned with force in Peru after the analysis and recommendations of the Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. One of the principle conclusions of the Commission, namely, that the greater part of those killed by internal armed conflict were those whose mother tongue was Quechua, revived the concern over to what extent racism had been a contributing factor to the nature of the murders that Shining Path and the Armed Forces inflicted on the rural population. Questions on the nature of the Peruvian state and its weak ability to relate to, and hence defend, all its citizens returned as a topic of intense polemic.

Therefore, extrapolating to more current processes, if we conduct an "anthropology of the state" (which is to say, an analysis of the ways in which various state institutions connect with citizens), we will probably find what various authors have described as patron-client relationships between mestizos and the indigenous in oligarchic Peru. These include treating indigenous women as girls and the application of otherwise inapplicable rules for the obtainment of economic benefits, among others. Similar behaviors have been described for the case of health professionals in rural areas who oblige expectant mothers to pay certain fees in order to access their services (Cardenas, 2007).

In the last years, we have seen interesting debates about the topic of racism in the wake of circumstantial events that were denounced in the press⁷³. More recently, as a result of massive protests against the 1090 Decrees and the murder of police and natives in the province of Bagua in Amazonas, the differences between the government and the native community have deepened. The former has been accused of insensitivity toward multiculturalism and little respect for "other" lifestyles: therefore, of racism. Ames suggests that much of the current government discourse around the mineral and petroleum

⁷² Ames, Patricia. "Discrimination, inequality, and territory: new and old hierarchies defined." Paper presented at the International Conference *Development, Inequalities, and Social Conflicts: A Perspective from the Andean Countries* organized by the Institute for Peruvian Studies in the city of Lima (June 28, 29, and 30, 2010).

⁷³ The best known were discrimination against domestic servants at exclusive resorts in Lima or the "award" given by the NGO *Survival* to a columnist for the newspaper daily, *Correo*, for its racist declarations against the natives of Bagua.

concessions in the Peruvian jungle – reflected in the discourses of President Alan García – come from a “localized” vision of the indigenous person from the Amazon region: he lives in an “empty” or “wasted” space. Similar processes of “localization” of the indigenous population have occurred in the Andes: the Peruvian sierra is an “inhospitable” place that requires integration with the coastal areas of the country in the name of progress.

Faced with these perspectives on the relevance of culture and the type of a society, Nopo, Chong and Moro (2010) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between inequalities that are based in discrimination and those which are better explained by a lack of skills or “initial endowments” (such as health care during the first years of life, a quality education, among others). These authors call attention to how in multiracial countries, poverty tends to be seen as a factor of discrimination, while in more homogenous countries, poverty is not directly related to discrimination. Castillo, Petrie, and Torero (2010) detail an experiment in which a group of *limeños* were asked to select partners for a group based on, first, photographs, and second, previous behavior. When having to select based exclusively on photographs, the majority privileged criteria such as height or being a woman, while being indigenous was a strong predictor of not being chosen for a group. However, once they knew about the performance of each of the possible partners, all phenotypical criteria disappeared from the equation and confidence in the subject became of primary importance. As a conclusion to their experiment, the authors speak to the importance of being able to incentivize interpersonal relationships between different groups of humans, in such a way as so these interactions will lower the prejudices associated with certain physical characteristics.

In the 2010 study, our survey measured diverse aspects related to discrimination and racism. Not all the countries of the study are included in these questions; the countries which contain the most questions related to racism and discrimination are Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In some questions, Colombia and Ecuador are also included and in a few cases Brazil and the Dominican Republic also appear. These countries have been included in consideration of the fact that they contain larger indigenous or African-descended populations.

One of the most complex issues when studying the role of ethnicity in Peruvian society and politics was determining the size of the population of persons of Andean descent. Estimates vary significantly according to the source. In a relatively recent work, Van Cott (2006) writes that 38% of the Peruvian population is of indigenous origin. Therefore, it is necessary to begin the discussion recognizing this absence of consensus on the size of the indigenous population in Peru.

Ethnic Self-identification

In the questionnaire, we introduced a series of questions about ethnic self-identification and mother tongue in order to approach the issue of the size of the country’s indigenous population. These questions were:

PERETIDA. Do you think your mother is or was white, mestizo, indigenous, black or mulatto?

(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Other
 (88) DK (98) DA

LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]

(1101) Spanish (1102) Quechua (1103) Aymara (1106) Ashaninka (1107) Aguaruna
 (1104) Other (indigenous) (1105) Other (foreign) (88) NS (98) NR

LENG4. Speaking about the language that your parents knew, your parents speak or spoke: [Interviewer: if one of the parents spoke only one language and the other two, mark 2.] [Read the options]

(1) Spanish only (2) Spanish and indigenous language (3) Indigenous language only
 (4) Spanish and foreign language (88) DK (98) DA

The great majority of the surveyed population self-identifies as mestizo: 78.9% in Peru versus the 67.9% that we found in the rest of the countries where these questions about ethnicity and discrimination were applied⁷⁴. As we can observe in Figure VIII.1, the percentage of respondents that self-identify as indigenous is extremely low, barely reaching 3.3%. This percentage has diminished with respect to 2008 (when it was 7%).

Regardless, when we pose questions about mother tongue, we find that the percentage of persons whose mother tongue was Quechua or another native language reached 14.3% in 2010 (Figure VIII.1). The percentage of respondents whose mother tongue was not Spanish⁷⁵ increased to 31.5% in rural areas (Figure VIII.2).

Similarly, when we inquire about that the language that they speak when speaking to their parents, 28.8% of all respondents in Peru indicate that that parents speak or spoke Spanish *and* an indigenous language. Therefore, depending on the way in which belonging to this group is defined, the percentage of indigenous people in Peru varies between 14% and 31%.




Figure VIII.1. Ethnic Self-identification and Mother Tongue, Peru 2010

⁷⁴ Which is to say, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.

⁷⁵ In the category of Spanish we have also included a foreign language, which in the 2010 sample was only one case.




Figure VIII.2. Mother Tongue by Geographic Area of Residence, Peru 2010

Measuring and Explaining Racism in Peru

Any analysis of the prevalence of racism in Peru that is based on surveys will be a source of controversy: some believe that this is not the best way to examine the problem, while others argue that people are reticent and tend to hide their true sentiments when asked about this issue. Regardless, recognizing that there is no unique or exclusive way to study racism, our survey included three questions that can help us identify the prevalence of racism in Peru from a comparative perspective. These questions were:

Now I'm going to read some statements and I would like for you to answer to what extent you agree or disagree with them, using this 7-point scale, where 1 means *strongly disagree* and 7 means *strongly agree*.

RAC3A. The mixture of races is good for Peru. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

RAC3B. You would agree to one of your daughters or sons marrying an indigenous person. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

RAC3C. You would like your skin to be of lighter color. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were originally measured on a scale of 1 to 7 and were later converted to a scale of 0 to 100. In the case of the first two questions, the direction of the response was inverted: those who most disapproved of miscegenation or of his or her daughter marrying an indigenous person would receive a point value of 100 and those who most approved would receive a point value of 0. In the case of Question RAC3C, the original direction of the responses has been maintained.

Is racism a serious problem in Peru? Let us see how the responses to these three questions are distributed (Figure VIII.3). In the case of disapproval of miscegenation, we find that Peru is at an intermediate point between the extremes of the Dominican Republic, which has a point value of 53.4, and Brazil, which has a point value of 12. In Peru the mean was 24.7, which suggests that most persons agree that miscegenation is good for the country. In the question about the marriage of a daughter to an indigenous person, we find a bit more resistance from the respondents, with a mean value of 33 for this question, barely below that which was found in the Dominican Republic and Bolivia. Finally, a greater

part of Bolivians and Peruvians, compared with the populations of the other surveyed countries, prefer to have lighter skin. It is clear that racist attitudes exist in Peru, and depending on the specific situation, this racism is either moderate or somewhat more pronounced.




Figure VIII.3. Racist Attitudes in Select Countries of the Americas, 2010

We have combined the first two questions on miscegenation and a possible marriage to an indigenous person in order to create a scale of racism⁷⁶. Peru, with a mean value of 28.3, is located below only the Dominican Republic and Bolivia (Figure VIII.4).




Figure VIII.4. Racism in Select Countries in the Americas, 2010

An indirect way to measure the existence of racist attitudes is to ascertain what people think about why the majority of indigenous people are poor. The specific way in which we phrase the question is the following:

⁷⁶ We have not included the third variable of skin color because the reliability analysis demonstrates that the Cronbach alpha for the scale is less than 0.6 when it is included.

RAC1C. According to the data from the Population Census, indigenous people are poorer, in general, than the rest of the population. What do you think is the principal reason for this? **[Read options] [Allow only one answer]**

- (1) Because indigenous people do not work enough
- (2) Because indigenous people are less intelligent
- (3) Because indigenous people are treated in an unjust manner
- (4) Because indigenous people have a lower education level
- (5) Because indigenous people do not want to change their culture
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

It is interesting to note that in countries where the mean value of racism is lower, the greater part of the population attribute indigenous poverty to the unjust treatment that this population receives. For example, in Brazil and Colombia, 78.8% and 57.3%, respectively, affirm that the main reason behind indigenous poverty is that they are treated unjustly. In Peru, the percentage is substantially lower, 35.4%, and is barely above that of Bolivia, where 31.3% cite the same reason. Taking all possible causes into account, respondents in Peru attribute a low level of education to be the principle explanation for indigenous poverty, while only 6.8% say that it is because they do not work enough or they are less intelligent (in Ecuador, this last percentage is 22.7%) (Figure VIII.5).




Figure VIII.5. Main Reason for Indigenous Poverty in Comparative Perspective, 2010

So now, who have a tendency to display more racist attitudes? If we observe Figure VIII.6 -which presents the results of the corresponding regression analysis- we note that four factors are the most important: geographic area of residence, a negative perception of the national economy, interpersonal trust, and the language spoken by the parents.




Figure VIII.6. Determinants of Racist Attitudes, Peru 2010

We want to emphasize here two of these correlations. First, the correlation between interpersonal trust and racist attitudes: those who trust more in others tend to be less racist (Figure VIII.7); this is related to our previous discussion in which we indicated that interpersonal relationships play an important role in eliminating first a lack of trust in others and then in undermining the barriers of racism. The other finding that we want to highlight is that, contrary to what one would expect, racism is more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas. This could suggest that some residents of this area have internalized the traditional racist discourse that permeates Peruvian society.




Figure VIII.7. Racist Attitudes According to Degree of Interpersonal Trust and Geographic Area of Residence, Peru 2010

Racial and Other Types of Discrimination

The presence of racist attitudes among the population is one thing; the presence of discrimination caused by these or other attitudes (such as machismo) is another. Racism and discrimination, although related, are two analytically distinct phenomena and should hence be analyzed separately. In this study, we included a series of questions about diverse types of discrimination that the respondent may have encountered:

And thinking about the last five years, have you felt discriminated against or have you been badly or unjustly treated: [Repeat after each question: many times, sometimes, a few times, or never]						
	Many times	Sometimes	A Few times	Never	DK	DA
DIS11. Because of your skin color? Would you say this has happened many times, sometimes, a few times, or never?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS17. Have you felt discriminated against because of the way you speak or because of your accent?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Because of your economic situation?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Because of your gender or sex?	1	2	3	4	88	98

We need first to examine the distribution of responses to each of these questions. At first sight, a great majority declare never having been a victim of discrimination of any motive. Perhaps the type of discrimination that the majority is likely to recognize is that of economic origins, for which approximately 32% affirm having once suffered this type of discrimination (Figure VIII.8). At the other extreme, we find discrimination based on gender or sex, for which a meager 8.8% are willing to accept having been affected by this type. If we were to take an uncritical approach to this number, one could think that Peru had reached Scandinavian levels in terms of equality of the sexes, which is obviously not the case. The more plausible explanation for this figure is that gender discrimination is still taboo in Peru and few women are willing to accept that they suffer from it⁷⁷. Between these two extremes, we find that approximately 20% recognize having been a victim of discrimination based on skin color or manner of speaking (general indicators of racial discrimination) at one point.

⁷⁷ When we disaggregate gender discrimination according to the sex of the respondent, we find that while 5.7% of men recognize having been discriminated against for this reason, 11.3% affirm having been a victim of this type of discrimination. This latter percentage reveals that even among women, the acceptance of gender discrimination can be a sensitive topic.




Figure VIII.8. Frequency of Discrimination of Various Types, Peru 2010

However, the recognition of the existence of discrimination in Peru changes completely when the respondent is asked if, when thinking of what would have happened to another person in the same situation, they believe they have experienced an instance of discrimination. This phrasing makes it easier for the respondent to accept the existence of behavior that is socially considered as incorrect, though this does not imply that it has actually been eliminated. More specifically, the questions that we posed to indirectly measure the presence of diverse forms of discrimination are the following:

Now thinking about what could have happened to another person, have you experienced or witnessed situations in which another person has been discriminated against, badly or unjustly treated?: [Repeat after each question: **many times, sometimes, a few times, or never**]

	Many times	Sometimes	A few times	Never	DK	DA
RAC1A. Because of his/her skin color? Would you say this has happened many times, sometimes, a few times, or never?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1B. Have you seen another person being discriminated against because of the way he/she speaks or for his/her accent?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Because of his/her economic situation?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Because of his/her gender or sex?	1	2	3	4	88	98

The distribution of responses to these questions (Figure VIII.9) suggests a completely different view on the prevalence of discrimination in Peru. While in the previous case, only 20% of respondents

declare having personally experienced discrimination based on skin color or manner of speaking, here we find that between 62% and 67% of respondents affirm having “experienced or witnessed” discrimination motivated by skin color or manner of speaking. In addition, almost 66% of respondents declare having had a close experience with discrimination based on economic condition. Finally, in a clear contrast to the meager 8.8% found in the previous case, almost 50% of respondents state having experienced gender discrimination.




Figure VIII.9. Percentage Who Have Experienced or Witnessed Discrimination of Various Types, Peru 2010

If we assign a numeric value to the responses presented in Figure VIII.9, we can calculate a mean value that can be compared to that of other countries⁷⁸. For this series in particular, one four countries had the same questions: Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, and Guatemala. How can we compare Peru to these countries in this respect? In the case of experiencing discrimination based on skin color, we find that Peru is at a relatively high position among the countries surveyed on this, with a mean value that is below only that of Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. Among the four countries that were surveyed on discrimination based on manner of speaking, Peru is in second place, barely below Bolivia. In the remaining forms of discrimination, those based in gender and economic condition, Peru is in third place.

⁷⁸ The values were: Never=0, rarely=33, sometimes=66, many times=100.




Figure VIII.10. Percentage Who Have Experienced or Witnessed Discrimination of Various Types, from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

Conclusion

The previous discussion allows to conclude that despite the fact that persons in Peru are reluctant to admit having been a victim of diverse types of discrimination, indirect forms of measurement permit us to expose the notable and worrying existence of discrimination in Peru. The majority of persons are willing to accept the existence of discrimination based on economic condition, but there is a greater reluctance to acknowledge gender discrimination. The gathered information also suggests that racial discrimination in Peru is among the highest among countries that have a large indigenous population.

To affirm that discrimination exists in Peru is not a novel discovery; regardless, our study contributes to the proof that a good part of this discrimination is “invisible.” Naturally, while the problem is denied to exist, little can be done to resolve it. One of the initial steps toward this aim is to promote awareness of the existence of discrimination, a necessary step for a discussion on how to reduce it and how to find more concrete and less discursive forms of inclusion.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter VIII

Table VIII.1. Predictors of Racist Attitudes. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.013	(-0.43)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.016	(-0.45)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	0.051	-1.86
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.063	(-1.46)
Mujer	0.036	-1.34
Edad	0.016	-0.56
Urbano	-0.146*	(-2.42)
Tamaño del lugar	0.024	-0.44
Nivel de educación	-0.006	(-0.13)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.019	(-0.48)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.012	(-0.40)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.002	(-0.06)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	-0.033	(-1.00)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.103*	-3.22
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.004	-0.14
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	-0.005	(-0.15)
No hay crisis económica	0.023	-0.71
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.025	(-0.75)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.047	-1.14
Interés en la política	-0.006	(-0.22)
Confianza interpersonal	-0.06	(-1.94)
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.021	(-0.64)
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.039	-0.67
Blanca	0.021	-0.68
Madre blanca	-0.012	(-0.39)
Castellano	-0.037	(-0.81)
Padres-Castellano	0.090*	-2.35
Constante	0.005	-0.15
R-cuadrado = 0.05		
Número de casos = 1245		
* p<0.05		

Chapter IX. The Role of the State and Social Conflicts

Introduction

In this chapter, we will discuss two related topics. The first refers to public attitudes toward the role of the state in the economy and society. The election of left-wing governments that criticize the market model and propose a greater participation of the state in society has reopened the debate on this important topic. In one way or another, a good part of social conflicts in Peru today are a reflection of the different existing visions for the role of the state in society. In addition, many social protests originate in demands of the state. In this sense, we consider it appropriate to also study in this chapter public involvement in protest activities.

The Role of the State

One of the topics that have most grabbed the attention of academics as well as policymakers is the role of the state in the economy and in development in general. During the peak of import substitution industrialization, the state played a central role in the national economy and became an important partner associated with foreign and national capital. The surge of classic populism associated with this model of industrialization fomented a political thought and form of articulation with society and the state in which the state played a predominant role. The regulation of economic activity and social relations in general, the promotion of economic development, the control of natural resources, and social protection were assumed to be the natural duties of the state.

The debt crisis, the collapse of various Latin American economies as a result of the hyperinflation crisis of the eighties, and the exhaustion of import substitution industrialization policies undermined the existing faith in the role of the state as a motor of development and the central regulator of social life. The rise to prominence of the Washington Consensus and the expansion of neo-liberal ideas offered an alternative model of development, in which the state played a role that was subordinate to that of the market. The implementation of market reforms in various Latin American countries in the nineties generated an important change in the role of the state in the region. The privatization of state enterprises, the significant reduction of subsidies, the liberalization of foreign commerce, and the dismantling of state social security nets in countries that adopted the more aggressive forms of market policies significantly contracted the role of the state in economic and social life. Some authors saw in this the contraction of the state-centric model associated with classic populism (Cavarozzi 1996; Garretón 1995), a redefinition of the role of the politics (Lechner 1998) and the rise of a new socio-political matrix in which the market played a central role (Garretón 2002; Garretón et al. 2003).

The consequences of adopting the Washington Consensus have been multiple and not all positive. Latin American economies realized a significant economic stabilization, dramatically reducing fiscal deficits and in the process defeating hyperinflationary spirals. The opening and liberalization of markets favored the development of more efficient economies but led to two undesirable social and economic consequences, at least in the first years of implementation. Unemployment and poverty increased, as well as general social instability. In some countries, market policies coincided with a crisis of the party system, which in a way weakened the existing democracies. Diverse new electoral vehicles appeared, in some cases created around personalities and in others reflecting regional or other specific demands.

The election in various Latin American countries of left-wing governments, which in some cases adopt market rhetoric opposed to the Washington Consensus, has again brought to the table the discussion on the role of the state in society and in economic development. Although in some cases left-wing governments' economic policies are characterized more by continuity than by change, in others, especially in Venezuela, the state has assumed policies that were prevalent in the seventies and eighties. The academic discussion is now centered on the supposed "return of the state" (Adrianzén 2010).

Given the importance of the debate on the role of the state to contemporary Latin American politics, the Barometer of the Americas included the following series of questions:

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7.

(88) DK (98)DA

ROS1. The Peruvian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Peruvian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Peruvian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Peruvian government should implement **strong** policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS5. The Peruvian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS6. The Peruvian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

As we have done in previous cases, the responses to these questions were transformed in order to generate a scale with a range of 0 to 100⁷⁹, with the point value of 100 signifying a strong degree of agreement with state intervention. The distribution of the means for each of these questions is presented in Figure IX.1.




Figure IX.1. Attitudes toward the Role of the State, Peru 2010

A quick glance at the mentioned graph permits us two conclusions: first, Peruvians have, on average, a favorable attitude related to state participation in diverse areas of social activity, and, second, this favorable attitude is much stronger when having to do with the provision of a social safety net. In

⁷⁹ The original value associated with each response was subtracted by the unit. The result was divided by 6 and then multiplied by 100.

effect, in each of these questions, the mean value of the responses is above 50, which indicates a favorable attitude toward state intervention. But in some cases, this favorable attitude is very strong, as in the case of state intervention to reduce income inequalities between rich and poor and to provide retirement pensions and health services.

How can we compare these attitudes found in Peru with those of other countries? To compare, we aggregated all the responses into one scale, which also has a range of 0 to 100. The distribution of mean values for each of the surveyed countries is presented in Figure IX.2. The results are exceedingly interesting. It is evident that there is a clear difference of opinion between public opinion in the U.S. and in Latin America with respect to this topic. The United States is the only country in which the mean on the scale of the role of the state does not reach 50; in fact, it is barely above 40. The countries closest to the United States is Honduras, which has a mean on the scale of practically 73, more than 30 points above the mean found in the United States. To have an idea of the profound difference of these attitudes, consider that the difference between the most “statist” Latin American country (Paraguay) and the least “statist” (Honduras) is half the difference found between the United States and Honduras. This suggests that despite the existing differences among the different Latin American counties, these differences occur in a context of generally positive attitudes toward state participation. In this context, Peru is among the countries that have a less statist attitude.




Figure IX.2. Attitudes toward the Role of the State in the Americas, 2010

Owing to the significant consensus related to this attitude in Peru, our expectation is that few factors will influence the decision to support a major state intervention in social or economic affairs. Our general hypothesis is that those who are more to the left of the political spectrum and those who suffer a greater social instability will be those who are more inclined to favor a greater state participation in society. To empirically prove these ideas, we conducted a regression analysis in which we include these and other variables of a socio-demographic nature. The results are presented in Figure IX.3. What we observe is that the model explains a very modest variance of the dependent variable. This is consistent with our expectation, given the high degree of consensus that exists in relation to this topic. In addition, we find that only three of these variables emerge as statistically significant. One of the variables is associated social instability (the perception of the family's economic situation), the other with the condition of the national economy, and the last with a demographic condition (residence in an urban area). What provokes our attention is that ideological self-definition does not appear as a significant factor in determining this attitude.




Figure IX.3. Determinants of Attitudes toward the Role of the State, Peru 2010

When we analyze the relation between some of the significant predictors of attitudes toward the state, we find that the relation does not appear to be completely linear. For example, the association between the perception of the family economic situation and attitudes toward the role of the state demonstrate that those who find themselves in a more unstable situation tend to have a more positive attitude toward state participation than those who declare a more comfortable economic position. But the relation is not completely linear, as can be seen in Figure IX.4. A relatively similar pattern can be found in relation to the retrospective perception of the national economy.




Figure IX.4. Attitudes Toward the Role of the State, by Perception of the Family Economic Situation, Negative Retrospective Perception of the National Economy, and Residency Area, Peru 2010

In sum, we find that in Peru there exists strong support for state participation in society, although this support is not as strong as that registered in other countries. However, the difference between the countries that register the most and least support for state participation in the economy and the provision of social security is not very pronounced, which suggests a relative regional consensus (with the exception of the United States).

Social Conflict and Approval of Direct Action for Political Reasons

The interest in and academic study of “social conflicts” in Peru – using this specific terminology – comes about as a product of two phenomena. First, of a contextual nature, is the cycle of protests that Peru experienced during the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). While social conflicts have always existed, it was paradoxical that in those years of transition to democracy, conflicts rose to new and high levels. The climate of consensus on the importance of democratic forms and the commitment to processes of institutionalization – impelled by political elites from Lima by way of forums such as the National Accord – contradicted the appearance of protests around the country⁸⁰.

A second phenomenon that explains the interest in and study of conflicts proceeds from the substantial improvement in its sources of information and the systemization of the corresponding data, as a result of the effort initiated by the Defensoría del Pueblo (state ombudsman) in 2004. This has been key in subsequent attempts to classify and measure social conflict, but without an organized and systematic first effort to collect information – albeit incomplete – little has been able to be progressed upon in the last years.

Overall, social conflict is understood as collective action by a group of citizens on a controversial topic whose point of dispute is the action or inaction of the state. To arrive at a process of collective action—what is strictly known as “protest”—we observe a series of cumulative stages. First, needs for state action or inaction come about. Second, distinct from the creation of needs, is the emergence of perceptions toward these: material motivations for collective action can exist (poverty, inequality, etc.),

⁸⁰ Following this logic, it was very normal for social conflicts to manifest during the Fujimori period: the closed nature of the political system was quite conducive to them.

which if not reflected in perceptions will never be a source of protest. Third, provoked by perceptions, the state response is key: a state that ignores or downplays these objective and subjective conditions will aggravate the conflict. In this way, a fourth stage is brought about: the emergence of a demand, made concrete by specific social actors, be they “mediators” or “political brokers” that formally petition the political system. These actors, in marginal or peripheral areas, are often empowered actors, as opposed to the greater part of local society. Finally, if the demand is not addressed (by either acceptance or refusal), we find a phase of collective and protest action (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).

As mentioned above, much of the information on the management of social conflicts comes from the regular reports of the Defensoría del Pueblo (State Ombudsman). Whatever the value of this work, in recent years we have seen other attempts to register the number of conflicts and to classify their current status. One of the most recent is the study conducted by the Office for Administration of Social Conflicts of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM). Through monthly tracking of major conflicts (in the press and through local informants), the Ombudsman outlined a thematic classification of these conflicts. Conflicts are classified into the following categories: social-environmental, territorial, having to do with issues of local government, regional government, and national government, electoral, labor, communal, having to do with the illegal cultivation of coca, and “other.” In addition, the PCM, through the Office for Administration of Social Conflicts, has emphasized the prism of “governance”: while social conflicts can be justified by the actions or inaction of the state, it is the presence of certain local actors that ultimately explains why a potential conflict eventually escalates into a direct confrontation with the state.


In this sense, a view that summarizes the major pending issues that concern the state’s agenda, as well as the actors that mobilize around them, should at least recognize two processes that Peru is currently going through. The first is the growing disaffection of the rural population toward industrial extractive activity, which is seen as incompatible with agriculture, livelihoods, and the gathering that supports their main private income. To this, we should add that this perception of incompatibility is often sustained not only in economic terms but also in cultural terms by local populations (who, in many cases, speak another language and differentiate themselves from the mestizo and white populations).

The second process – key for understanding social conflict in Peru—is to recognize that while many populations in the country are not reluctant to allow private investment in their locations, they demand as a condition for their approval the just redistribution of the wealth generated by the extraction of natural resources. Thus, the demands for public resources (for their designation as public goods and for their proper management) and for private resources (meaning the extracted goods provided by companies) explain many of the causes and manifestations of current social conflict.

To the extent that we have already examined the degree of public involvement in protest activities (and the reasons that motivate them) in Chapter VI, our interest in this chapter is to ascertain the level of attitudinal support for actions that are generally associated with protest and social conflict, such as roadblocks and the invasion of territory. For this we utilize the following questions of the questionnaire:

[Give the respondent card "E"]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.



E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?

E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?

The distribution of the responses, transforming the original code to a scale of 0-100, is displayed in Figure IX.5. In it is proved the low approval for the employment of these methods of direct action. The mean values of the three questions are less than 30 and in two cases are less than 20. It is clear that among these three activities of direct action, participation in roadblocks receives the greatest attitudinal support. A surprising result is our finding that approval of participation in groups that utilize violent methods to seek to overthrow an elected government is similar to the level of approval for the invasion of private property or territories as a form of protest.




Figure IX.5. Approval of Direct Methods of Political Action, Peru 2010

Between 2006 and 2010, we find a slight but sustained increase in support for the invasion of properties and territory. In the other two questions, the variations are contained within the margins of error (see Figure IX.6).




Figure IX.6. Approval of Direct Methods of Political Action, 2006-2010

The comparative analysis of these attitudes reveals some interesting patterns. In the case of approval for the invasion of private properties or land (Figure IX.7), the strongest support—with point values slightly above 20—is found in Honduras, Belize, and Colombia, and the weakest—around 10—is in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Guyana, and Jamaica. Peru is at an intermediate point but is closer to the group that displays stronger support for this type of activity than the group that has a lower point value. With respect to approval of roadblocks, Peru's position in the region is at a low medium. On the other hand, in terms of approval of persons who participate in groups dedicated to the violent overthrow of an elected government, Peru holds a higher position than in the previous cases, with point values similar to those found in Panama and Ecuador.




Figure IX.7. Approval of Direct Political Action in the Americas, 2010

What factors lead a person to have a favorable attitude toward the employment of direct, even violent, action in order to attain political objectives? We are able to indicate three groups of factors: first, and probably the most important, is political discontent. Persons who find themselves profoundly unsatisfied with the institutions of the political system, with the performance of these institutions, or even with the way in which the president has performed his job are probably more inclined to approve of these types of political action. The second type of variable refers to the deterioration of the economic situation, be it personal or national, with those who have suffered the consequences of the economic crisis being more inclined to support direct or violent political actions. Finally, the third group of variables that can affect this attitude is related to the assessment of democracy. Individuals who reject the idea of democracy are probably more inclined to also approve of unconventional political actions. These types of variables, in addition to those of a socio-demographic nature, were incorporated into a regression analysis, in which the dependent variable is the scale of attitudinal support for direct actions motivated by political reasons. The results are presented in Figure IX.8.




Figure IX.8. Determinants of Approval of Direct Action for Political Reasons, Peru 2010

The results confirm several of our initial hypotheses but do not confirm others. We find that political discontent, measured in diverse forms, is a powerful predictor of willingness to approve of the use of direct action means for political purposes. For example, those who disapprove of the president's performance and those who are unsatisfied with the way in which democracy is functioning in the country display higher levels of approval of direct political action than those who are content with the president's performance or the way in which democracy functions (Figure IX.9). We do not find that support for the political system in general is a significant predictor of this attitude.




Figure IX.9. Approval of the Use of Direct Action, by Presidential Approval and Satisfaction with Democracy, Peru 2010

The results also confirm that those who perceive that we are experiencing a very serious crisis, or who have been directly affected because their income decreased have a greater inclination to approve of the use of direct actions than those who do not perceive that the crisis is very serious or who have not seen their income decrease (Figure IX.10).




Figure IX.10. Approval of the Use of Direct Action by Change in Household Income and Perception of the Seriousness of the Economic Crisis, Peru 2010

We must also mention the significant impact that democratic values have on this attitude. Persons who disapprove of the idea of democracy, those who exhibit low levels of tolerance, and those who approve of military coups are also those most inclined to approve of the use of direct methods of political action. In Figure IX.11, we illustrate the correlation between support for democracy and this attitude.




Figure IX.11. Approval of the Use of Direct Action by Support for Democracy, Peru 2010

Finally, we find that a set of demographic factors have an important impact on the attitude that we investigate. For example, residents of the Sierra Sur tend to have a greater inclination to approve direct action in comparison with those who reside in other areas. In a similar manner, the greater the degree of material wealth, the lower the degree of approval of direct action. In addition, persons who have a higher level of education have a marked disposition against the use of these actions. And as is to be expected, younger persons demonstrate a greater tolerance for direct action than do older persons (Figure IX.12).




Figure IX.12. Approval of the Use of Direct Action by Socio-Demographic Variables, Peru 2010

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed public perceptions of the role of the state in the economy and society and we have analyzed attitudes toward the use of direct forms of actions in the pursuit of political objectives. What we have found is that in Peru, there exists relatively widespread support for state participation in diverse aspects of society. Although the degree of support for state intervention as found in Peru is not among the highest in the Americas, the difference with the highest point values in the region is relatively small. This indicates, as we have already noted, a remarkable confluence of opinions in the region, with the notable exception of the United States. It is evident that the greater part of Latin Americans call for the growth of state.

We have argued that the role of the state plays a central role in the increase of social conflicts in Peru, to the extent that they are the product of a rejection of the policies adopted by the state or the result of demands that call for a specific state intervention. One of the characteristics of social conflict in Peru is the use of unconventional forms of action such as roadblocks and the invasion of land. For this reason, in this chapter we discussed the existing level of support among society for these type of action. Additionally, we are interested in knowing the existing degree of support for participation in groups dedicated to the violent overthrow of an elected government. Our findings are that, with some variability, Peru is at an intermediate position with relation to other countries in the region, which means that approval of direct action for political motives is neither very high nor very low.

Finally, our analysis reveals that political discontent, expressed in dissatisfaction with the way in which democracy is functioning or in the disapproval of the president's performance, the perception of the severity of the crisis and the decrease in family income, the presence of anti-democratic values, residency in the Sierra Sur, a low level of education, and youth are factors that increase support for direct action in politics.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter IX

Table IX.1. Predictors of Attitudes toward the Role of the State. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Auto-definición ideológica	-0.006	(-0.22)
Victimización por crimen	0.042	-1.29
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.052	(-1.58)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.018	(-0.59)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.031	-0.81
Mujer	-0.047	(-1.70)
Edad	0.012	-0.41
Urbano	0.148*	-2.18
Tamaño del lugar	0.089	-1.29
Nivel de educación	0.006	-0.15
Quintiles de riqueza	0.053	-1.34
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.03	(-0.93)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.014	(-0.38)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.063*	-2
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.058	-1.77
Miembro del hogar perdió empleo	-0.003	(-0.07)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.007	-0.23
No hay crisis económica	-0.047	(-1.32)
Crisis económica muy seria	-0.038	(-1.24)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.096*	(-2.38)
Interés en la política	0.016	-0.42
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.006	(-0.13)
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.011	-0.28
Constante	0.038	-0.83
R-cuadrado = 0.034		
Número de casos = 1160		
* p<0.05		

Table IX.2. Predictors of Support for Direct Action for Political Reasons. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Victimización por crimen	-0.053	(-1.81)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.019	-0.71
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de la corrupción	-0.001	(-0.05)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.125*	(-3.74)
Mujer	-0.067*	(-2.37)
Edad	-0.113*	(-3.96)
Urbano	-0.048	(-0.78)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.044	(-0.71)
Nivel de educación	-0.090*	(-2.68)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.068*	(-1.98)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.075*	(-2.12)
Apoyo al sistema	0.066	-1.38
Tolerancia Política	0.192*	-4.96
Satisfacción con la democracia	-0.141*	(-4.18)
Apoyo a la democracia	-0.139*	(-4.46)
Apoyo a golpe de Estado militar	0.111*	-3.84
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía personal	-0.039	(-1.42)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.036	(-0.85)
Percepción retrospectiva negativa de la economía nacional	0.031	-1.01
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.021	-0.56
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	-0.013	(-0.43)
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.070*	-2.06
No hay crisis económica	0.061	-1.45
Crisis económica muy seria	0.066*	-2.19
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.036	(-0.99)
Interés en la política	0.005	-0.13
Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno	0.101*	-2.71
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.083*	-2.53
Constante	-0.009	(-0.24)
R-cuadrado = 0.2		
Número de casos = 1187		
* p<0.05		

Chapter X. Voters and Political Parties

Introduction

In this chapter, we will examine voters' attitudes toward political parties and the way in which voters relate to them. Political parties in Peru have undergone important changes in the last 20 years. In comparative studies, the party system in Peru has been described as incipient or rudimentary (Mainwaring and Scully 1996). Toward the end of the eighties, the party system in Peru appears to have undergone a relative consolidation, adopting a more or less European model with parties or alliances that organize themselves along the left-right spectrum. This model encountered a crisis in the nineties, as much because of public disenchantment with traditional parties as due to the erosion of representative democracy caused by the Fujimori regime, among other factors. The return of competitive democracy in the new millennium saw the rise of new organizations in which ideological elements are subordinate to the electoral attractiveness of the leader.

While some longstanding parties remain, such as Acción Popular, the Popular Christian Party, and especially the Partido Aprista Peruano, they are quite weakened (with the notable exception of the Aprista party). Parties that originate in certain regions of the country or are based on a personality have risen to prominence in the last decades and compete, in some cases very successfully, with the traditional groups. Among these new organizations, the strongest are Alianza para el Futuro (AF), Perú Posible (PP), Restauración Nacional (RN), and Partido Nacionalista del Perú (PNP). AF claims to represent the ideals and positions of Former President Alberto Fujimori and is led by his daughter Keiko, who holds one of the highest places in the opinion surveys on the 2011 presidential candidates. The other new party, which performed very well in the 2006 elections, is PNP, led by Ollanta Humala. This party is of a nationalist nature and has succeeded in attracting several sectors which were once connected to the left, Marxist and no.

Political Parties

The weakening of the old parties and the current rapid fragmentation among the new parties have eroded, as we have seen in Chapter V, public confidence in political parties. The question of whether citizens still consider that democracy needs these is an important question. To examine this attitude, we utilized the following question:

DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The results for 2010 and the previous years are presented in Figure X.1. In none of these years did the point value surpass 50. This means that, on average, Peruvians tend to believe that democracy cannot exist without political parties. Furthermore, when we observe the evolution of this attitude over the last years, we see that the opinion that parties are necessary for the functioning of a democracy is strengthening. This fact is, without doubt, positive and probably reflects the public's experience of the nineties, in which the demonization of parties was used to undermine democracy.




Figure X.1. Degree of Disagreement with the Phrase “Democracy can exist without political parties,” Peru, 2010

The comparative analysis of this attitude reveals that Peruvians have a relatively positive position toward the necessity of parties for democracy when compared to other countries in the region (Figure X.2). For example, the percentage of respondents who agree with the affirmation that democracy can exist without political parties is very high in countries such as the United States, Panama, Honduras, and Canada. Peru, on the other hand, finds itself closer to the countries in which the percentage of those who agree with this statement is lower, such as Costa Rica, Jamaica, Uruguay, and Belize.




Figure X.2. Degree of Disagreement in the Americas with the Phrase “Democracy can exist without political parties”

Regardless, the recognition that parties are necessary for the existence of a democracy does not mean that the majority of Peruvians identify with any of them. In Figure X.3 we illustrate the responses to the following question:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]

In 2006, the survey was conducted during a few weeks of the second round of the elections, an electoral context that marked a profound polarization of the electorate with respect to the candidature of Ollanta Humala, the head of the National Party of Peru (PNP). Despite this effervescent political context, only 30% of respondents that year declared allegiance with a political party. The degree of partisan identification fell by approximately 10 percentage points in the successive surveys, reaching 21% in 2010 (Figure X.3).




Figure X.3. Party Identification, Peru 2006-2010

Now, among the approximately 20% of Peruvians who identify with a party, how can we distribute this arrangement of preferences? For the most recent survey, we find that the majority of allegiances are for the Aprista Peruano party (Figure X.4). This is similar to what we found in the 2006 survey. But the important difference between these two years is that in 2008, almost half of those who declared allegiance to a party mentioned Apra as their preferred party. In 2010, however, this percentage is at only 24%.




Figure X.4. Party Identification in Peru, 2010

Other important changes in the distribution of preferences are the drastic fall in preference for the Unión por el Perú (UPP) party (20.7% in 2008, 8.6% in 2010) and the important growth of the Alianza for el Futuro Fujimorist party, which went from 4.6% in 2008 to 14.7% in 2010. It is worth mentioning that a good part of the fall in preference for UPP can be explained by the prominence of the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) under its own banner. We can remember that Ollanta Humala, the head of the PNP, was a

candidate of the UPP in 2006. In 2010, among those who declare allegiance to a party, 15.4% prefer PNP. In 2008, that percentage was barely 5.4%.

Political Parties and Voters

A central topic of the analysis of the political parties is their relationship with the voters. Parties attempt to attract support not only by way of communication media but also via more direct forms of interaction with the voters. Clientelism is a traditional form, pernicious to democracy, of linking parties and citizens. Clientelism has been defined in diverse ways, but in general it can be considered as the asymmetric relationship between two actors in which the one with more power offers material goods in exchange for loyalty or personal services⁸¹. The key to a clientelist relationship is that the favors which are offered (for example, goods or products in exchange for votes) are particularistic, which is to say, they cannot be offered to the whole of a community or locality but rather only to those who are a part of the clientelist network. One way to examine the use of clientelist methods by political parties or candidates is by way of examining the favors that they offer to voters. In addition, we are interested in knowing if these offerings had any influence on the decision to vote. In our survey, we utilize the following questions in order to explore this relationship:

CLien1. In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or object in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?

- (1) Often [Continue with CLien2]
- (2) Sometimes [Continue with CLien2]
- (3) Never [Skip to RAC1C]
- (88) DK [Skip to RAC1C] (98) DA [Skip to RAC1C]

CLien2. And thinking of the last time this happened; did what they offer make you more likely or less likely to vote for the candidate or party that offered you those goods?

- (1) More likely
- (2) Less likely
- (3) Equally likely
- (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Naturally, the responses to these questions should be taken with certain caution. It is logical to think that many people would feel a certain fear of declaring that a party or candidate had offered them benefits in exchange for their vote. Regardless, and despite this limitation, the information that we have collected is very new to the Peruvian context.

How many persons admit having received such an offer? Figure X.5 demonstrates that the great majority declare not having been subjected to this demand, but 3% affirm that parties or candidates “frequently” offer them something in exchange for their vote. 9% say that only on rare occasions have they received such an offer. Among those who were given the offer, half affirm that it had no effect, be it positive or negative, while 14% indicate that it made them more inclined to vote for the candidate or party that made the offer (a third said that it had them less inclined).

⁸¹ For a recent discussion of clientelism in various countries: see Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).




Figure X.5. Percentage who Admit Having received a Clientelist Offer and Response to the Effect of this Offer on their Vote, Peru 2010

So now, how do we compare these data with that found in other countries? More specifically, is the proportion of Peruvians who declare they “rarely” or “frequently” have received an offer of this nature high or low, comparatively? In order to make this comparison, we constructed a scale of clientelism, assigning a value of 0 to those who declare never having received an offer, 50 for “rarely,” and 100 for “frequently.” In this way, our scale has a theoretical distribution of 0-100. Figure X.6 displays the results. Peru is found to be at a relatively intermediate position, with countries such as the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Mexico, and Paraguay demonstrating a prevalence of clientelism that surpasses that found in Peru. On the other hand, however, clientelism in Peru is above that found in countries that have a greater tradition of democracy (such as Costa Rica and Uruguay) or that have a party system equally or more disjointed than that found in Peru (Ecuador, Nicaragua).




Figure X.6. Clientelism in the Americas, 2010

Who are the persons most likely to be victims of clientelism? To answer this question, we conducted a regression analysis in which we include as predictors variables associated with place of residence, socioeconomic levels, gender, age, education, and recent unemployment. The results are displayed in Figure X.7.




Figure X.7. Predictors of Clientelism, Peru 2010

A factor that emerges as a strong predictor is place of residence, with persons who live in rural areas demonstrating a greater propensity for receiving offers of clientelism. In addition, those who are encountering several economic difficulties or whose household has a person who has recently lost their job are also more likely to be victims of this type of vote-buying (Figure X.8).




Figure X.8. Clientelism by Rural-urban Area, Family Income, and Job Loss of a Member of the Family, Peru 2010

Conclusion

Although the level of partisan identification is extremely low in Peru (only 20% declare identifying with a party), this does not mean that Peruvians believe democracy is possible without parties. In fact, we find that the belief that democracy requires parties is stronger in Peru than in its neighbors and various other countries. The weak ability of parties to arouse mass identification is probably explained by the fact that relatively few Peruvians declare having received a clientelist offer by a party or candidate. As we indicated in this chapter, Peru is at an intermediate position in the distribution of partisan clientelism in the region, with countries such as the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Mexico, and Paraguay demonstrating a greater prevalence of clientelism than that found in Peru. On the other hand, however, clientelism in Peru surpasses that found in other countries, which have a greater democratic tradition (such as Costa Rica and Uruguay) or who have a party system equally or more disjointed as that found in Peru (for example Ecuador and Nicaragua).

Our statistical analysis reveals that persons who live in rural areas, declare having great economic difficulties, and who have a member of the family who was unemployed as a result of the last crisis are more likely to receive clientelist proposals.

Results of the Regression Analysis in Chapter X

Table X.1. Predictors of Propensity to Clientelism. Peru, 2010

Predictores	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	-0.019	(-0.69)
Edad	-0.012	(-0.47)
Urbano	-0.175*	(-2.96)
Nivel de educación	0.021	-0.73
Quintiles de riqueza	0.031	-0.89
Recibe ayuda del gobierno	0.014	-0.41
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.077	(-1.95)
Miembro de hogar perdió empleo	0.063*	-2
Disminución del ingreso del hogar	0.005	-0.15
Tamaño del lugar	0.005	-0.12
Sierra sur vs. resto del país	0.081	-1.72
Constante	0.004	-0.11
R-cuadrado = 0.058		
Número de casos = 1392		
* p<0.05		

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Appendices

Appendix I: Technical Description of the Sample Design

Since 2006, a national survey has been conducted in Peru as part of the LAPOP Project. One of the key elements of the series of LAPOP studies is the rigorous sample design that each of the countries involved in the project has followed.

Universe

The universe of this survey is the whole of the national territory, which contains seven strata: metropolitan Lima (including Callao), the *Costa Norte* [northern coast], the *Costa Sur* [southern coast], the *Sierra Norte* [northern sierra], the *Sierra Centro* [central sierra], the *Sierra Sur* [southern sierra], and the *Selva* [rainforest]. Each stratum is divided into urban and rural areas. The units of our study are persons of voting age, which is to say, those who are 18 years old or older. The population who reside in the following collective units are excluded: hospitals, orphanages, military barracks, hotels, prisons, and similar institutions.

Population

The units of this study are persons of voting age, which is to say, those who are 18 years old or older. The population who reside in the following areas are excluded: hospitals, orphanages, military barracks, hotels, prisons, and similar institutions.

A respondent can choose “business-household” as their place of residence; the person will be dealt with only in terms of their household. We included this option because in some marginal urban areas, it is common for families to have a small grocery store in their garage or in a room next to the living room.

Sampling method

In the three studies conducted in Peru between 2006 and 2010, we have utilized a probabilistic, stratified, multistage sample.

Stratified sampling assures a higher level of confidence for the sample because it decreases the variance of the estimates. A stratification is more efficient when the units belonging to a single stratum are more homogenous, and when strata are more heterogeneous among themselves. Even if these conditions are not strictly present, any stratification will improve the quality of the estimates. The only condition is that a single unit must be part of only one stratum and that the group of strata comprise the total population or universe of the study. Stratification allows us to have both representativeness and dispersion of the sample.

The sample was gathered in various stages (a *multistage* or *polystage* sample). In the first stage, we selected the localities. In the second stage, we selected the areas within these localities. In the third stage, we selected the households within these areas. In the last stage, we selected the persons to interview within these households. Only one person was interviewed per household.

Lastly, we utilized a *probabilistic* sample, in which each unit of the universe was assigned a probability of being selected (a known value above zero). This type of sample allows us to calculate sampling errors. At the same time, calculating sampling error gives us the opportunity to generalize the

results of the sample to the study population, which allows us to specify the precision of our inferences. It is worth mentioning that the last stage of the selection process (selection of the person within the household) is conducted using a quota system, with the aim of guaranteeing that the sample has the same distribution of variables of sex and age as that found within the universe.

Sampling Frame

To design the sample, we utilized as a sampling frame the total population at the district level as derived from the Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda, 2007 (CENSO 2007), which was conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Informática y Estadísticas (INEI).

The sampling frame prepared by Ipsos APOYO Opinion and Market codifies the different areas at all levels of aggregation, districts, areas, and street blocks. Codifying the sample according to these basic indicators facilitates the selection of areas and the adequate inclusion of the appropriate socioeconomic strata as required by the investigation. This sampling frame was prepared according to the new INEI records⁸² and operates based on a system developed by the Department of Statistics and Sampling at Ipsos APOYO Opinion and Market for the permanent preparation of indicators and standardized classifications.

Peru is divided into 24 administrative departments and one constitutional province. The departments are divided into provinces and these into districts. There are a total of 195 provinces and 1,832 districts. Each district is identified with the following code: UBIGEO (a national code that identifies districts, provinces, and departments).

In some cases, districts are grouped together to form an urban quarter within a city. For this reason, we have used “localities” for this sampling design: they are either districts or an agglomeration of districts. For example, in the Ancash department, there is the locality (or city) of Huaraz, which comprises the districts of Huaraz and Independencia.

Therefore, for the purpose of the survey design, we utilized 1,714 localities.

Stratification

Using INEI data, we calculated the percentage of those who are 18 years old or older at the level of province (this percentage was assigned to all districts in the same province). Even so, composition by area (urban/rural⁸³) corresponds to INEI estimates for 2007.⁸⁴

The distribution of the target population (who are 18 years of age or older), based on geographic region⁸⁵ and area, is shown in the following table.

⁸² The census mappings are from 2001. They are the most recent mappings available.

⁸³ INEI considers centers populated by at least 2,000 inhabitants or 100 contiguous households to be urban areas.

⁸⁴ These estimates are also available at the district level.

⁸⁵ The Arequipa + Costa Sur stratum was created taking in account the low population density of the Costa Sur on its own and Arequipa's cultural proximity to the Costa Sur. The criteria for stratification by natural region or area is more adequate in national samples than in stratification by department, which is due among other factors to the fact that there are departments that belong to two regions and that being from the coast, sierra, or rainforest is a factor that generally characterizes the opinion and behavior of the Peruvian population.

Table 1. Distribution of the Population 18 Years of Age and Older by Geographic Region (Strata)

Región	Urbano	Rural	Total			
Costa Norte	2,733,810	15%	414,127	2%	3,147,936	18%
Arequipa + Costa Sur	1,422,343	8%	103,857	1%	1,526,200	9%
Lima	6,022,987	34%	6,898	0%	6,029,885	34%
Selva	1,170,778	7%	902,515	5%	2,073,293	12%
Sierra Centro	716,651	4%	398,940	2%	1,115,592	6%
Sierra Norte	498,624	3%	1,036,067	6%	1,534,692	9%
Sierra Sur	1,297,927	7%	1,187,153	7%	2,485,079	14%
Total	13,863,120	77%	4,049,557	23%	17,912,677	100%

Localities were classified according to the size of the urban population 18 years of age and older and the following strata were created:

E1.	Metropolitan Lima	
E2.	Large localities:	Localities with more than 100,000 urban inhabitants 18 years of age or older
E3.	Medium-size localities:	Localities with 20,000 to 99,999 urban inhabitants 18 years of age or older
E4.	Small localities:	Localities with 5,000 to 19,999 urban inhabitants 18 years of age or older
E5.	Rural localities:	Localities with less than 5,000 urban inhabitants 18 years of age or older

The distribution of the population according to these criteria is displayed in the following table:

Table 2. Distribution of the Population by Size of Locality and Urban or Rural Area

ÁMBITO		Población mayor de 18 años	
Urbano	Lima Metropolitana	6,022,987	34%
	Localidades grandes	3,187,840	18%
	Localidades medianas	1,546,075	9%
	Localidades chicas	1,632,698	9%
Rural	Localidades rurales	4,049,557	23%
	Áreas rurales de zonas urbanas	1,473,521	8%
Total		17,912,677	100%

This classification allows us to select disperse localities. The localities which comprise our rural sample correspond to Stratum 5, which represents the rural area sectors within urban localities.

The distribution of the sample is proportional to the distribution of the universe (as displayed in Table I). The following table presents the distribution of the sample for the study:

Table 3. Distribution of the sample by stratum and urban or rural area

Región	Urbano	Rural	Total
Costa Norte	229	15%	35
Arequipa + Costa Sur	119	8%	9
Lima	499	34%	5
Selva	98	7%	76
Sierra Centro	60	4%	33
Sierra Norte	42	3%	87
Sierra Sur	109	7%	99
Total	1,156	77%	344
			23%
			100%

Stages of Selection

1. Selection of sampling units within strata (PSU)

The sampling points were selected within each stratum, which were formed by crossing the natural region and area (urban or rural) variables. In the urban areas we performed a substratification based on the type of locality (large, medium, or small). In rural localities, the substratum corresponds to the department.

Within each substratum, localities were selected proportionally from the population of those 18 years of age or older, according to urban or rural area.

2. Selection of areas (cluster)

Within each city, we randomly selected an area (a group of approximately 40 street blocks), using a computer program that utilized INEI mapping as its sampling frame. We used systematic sampling to select areas, randomly at first in order to ensure dispersion within each locality and with probability of selection proportional to the number of households within it. Street blocks were selected and interviewers were required to interview 5 persons per block in the urban areas. In the interior cities and metropolitan Lima, each street block that comprised the sampling frame derived from Ipsos APOYO Opinion and Market was assigned a predominant socioeconomic level. In these cities, selection was aimed at a proportional stratification of predominant socioeconomic level for the street block. For 2010, we determined, using the same areas as the 2008 study, an initial random sorting of street blocks for each of the selected areas.

3. Selection of households

In the second phase, we selected the households⁸⁶ within each street block that comprised the sample. We began with the selected block, using the computer program to randomly choose the order of progress from one household to another, the street corner on which to begin, the direction of progress, and the initial step for selecting the first household to interview. In cases in which a household refused an interview, if it was unoccupied, or if the person selected for interview was absent, we would skip three households and

⁸⁶ In some housing units there can exist more than one household. In the case in which the selected housing unit contains more than one household, we then randomly select one of households to be a part of the sample. By household, we mean a group of persons, relatives or not, who inhabit part of or the whole of a housing unit, share the main meals, and share other basic living necessities. The exception is a household which comprises only one person. Domestic servants are not considered part of the household.

choose the fourth. In cases in which the entire street block had been attempted without completing the quota of five interviews, we would continue on to the following street block, following the numeration on the road map.

4. Selection of the person to interview

Within each household, a member of household would be selected for interview according to a set of required conditions: the person could not be part of the household service, nor a visitor; the person had to be 18 years of age or older. Each interviewer was responsible for fulfilling a quota of respondents based on sex and age so that the final sample would reflect the same distribution as that of the universe with respect to these variables.⁸⁷

Sexo		Edad	
Hombres	50%	18 a 24	22%
Mujeres	50%	25 a 39	36%
Total	100%	40 a más	42%
Total		100%	

If there were two or more persons of the same sex and age range in a household, then we would interview the person whose birthday was closest.

Calculating the Margin of Error

Since the sample design involves a sampling of conglomerates or clusters, we should consider the effect of the design⁸⁸ on calculating the standard error of our estimates. The effect of the design is defined as the ratio between the variance of the estimator as obtained by the adopted sample design, and the variance of the estimator corresponding to a simple random sample.

The effect of the design on a two-phase sample depends on the size of the conglomerate (\bar{M}) and on the inter-cluster correlation coefficient (δ), which are displayed in the following equation:

$$\text{Effect of the design (}efd\text{)} = 1 + (\bar{M} - 1)\delta$$

The inter-class correlation coefficient (δ) provides a measure of the degree of homogeneity within the conglomerates.

The size of the “effective” sample for a two-phase sample design (in conglomerates) is equal to:

$$n_{\text{effective}} = n(efd)$$

in which n is the size of the sample in a simple random sampling

⁸⁷ The census distribution of these variables is displayed in Appendix I.

⁸⁸ Kish, L. (1965) *Survey Sampling*. John Wiley & Sons.

In the case of this research, (\bar{M}) assumes average values of 5 in urban areas and 10 in rural areas. The value of (δ) that we will use is 0.09⁸⁹. Hence the effects of the design are 1.4 for an urban area and 1.8 for a rural area.

In this manner, we can conclude that assuming the proportion of the incidence rate of the studied phenomena is 0.5 (the maximum variability) and the level of confidence is 95% ($Z=1.96$), then the probable margins of error can be expected to be those displayed in the following table:

Table 4. Maximum Expected Margin of Error by Stratum

Estrato	Margen de error máximo esperado
Costa Norte	7.2
Arequipa + Costa Sur	10.2
Lima	5.1
Selva	9.2
Sierra Centro	12.4
Sierra Norte	11.0
Sierra Sur	8.4
Urbano	3.4
Rural	7.1
Total	3.0

The distribution of our sample is proportional to the population of each stratum and does not need to be weighted. The strata are representative but have different margins of error.

There is a difference between the population of those 18 years of age and older as used in this study and the figure provided by Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda, 2007. The reason for this difference is that in this most recent census, the distribution by sex and age is available for a population that contains an approximate non response rate of 2.87%. As we have mentioned in this document, in order to estimate the population which is 18 years of age or older, we used the total population of Peru, which is 28,220,764, and applied a factor at the province level according to the percentage of persons who are at or above 18 years of age in each province and using an “incomplete” census figure, which is to say, one in which 27,412,157 inhabitants were counted at the national level.

Sample Description

The sample has a homogenous distribution in terms of sex, with 50.3% being women and 49.7% being men, similar to the previous three years of the survey. The mean age of the sample is 39 years; nevertheless, a group of youth from 18 to 25 years old constitutes 25.3% of the sample (Figure 1).

⁸⁹ This value is derived from the analysis conducted by processing the questions related to urban violence that were included in the Detailed Report on Opinion Data from October 2003.




Figure 1. Distribution of the Sample by Sex and Wider Age Group, Peru 2006-2010

More than 80% of respondents have a secondary or higher education, while 16.3% have only primary or no level of education (Figure 2). As we have seen in previous studies, the data on level of education conceals important gaps, especially between urban and rural areas and to a lesser degree between men and women. While 13.8% of men have a primary education or less, this percentage increases to 18.9% for women. On the other hand, 12% of the sample's urban population have a primary education or less, while the figure for the rural population is 30.8%. This percentage is much lower than that which was registered in 2006, which was 38% (Figure 3).




Figure 2. Distribution of the Sample by Level of Education, Peru 2006-2010




Figure 3. Level of Education According to Geographic Area and Sex, Peru 2010

Appendix II: Informed Consent Letter



Peru, January 2010

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion study, which is being funded by Vanderbilt University in the United States. On behalf of Ipsos APOYO Opinion and Market, I am soliciting you for an interview that will last from 30 to 40 minutes.

The main objective of the study is to know people's opinions about different aspects of the country's situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may choose to not respond to questions or to end the interview at any moment. The responses that you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have questions about this study, you can contact Ipsos APOYO Opinion and market by telephone at (01) 610-0100 and ask for Ghislaine Liendo or Karina Miranda, the people responsible for this project.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix III: The Questionnaire

Perú, Versión # 10.0 **IRB Approval:** #090103

IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos



El Barómetro de las Américas: Perú, 2010

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PAÍS.

01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	11
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]** _____

ESTRATOPRI: (1101) Costa Norte (1102) Costa Sur (1103) Lima Metropolitana (1104)
Selva (1105) Sierra Centro (1106) Sierra norte (1107) Sierra Sur

UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____

PERDEPT. Departamento: _____

PROV. Provincia : _____

MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____

PERDISTRITO. DISTRITO: _____

PERSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____

PERSEC. Sector: _____

CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral)

[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]

UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:

(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4)
Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español

Hora de inicio: _____ : _____

FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2010

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra:
[Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS
(98) NR

A4. En su opinión, ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [ANOTAR;
SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]

NS	88	NR	98
----	----	----	----

DEM13. En pocas palabras, ¿qué significa la democracia para usted?
[ANOTAR; SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]

(88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, cambiando de tema... [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “**todos los días**”, “**una o dos veces por semana**”, “**rara vez**”, o “**nunca**” para ayudar el entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	NR
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	88	98
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	88	98
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	88	98
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	88	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**?

¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)
(4) Mala (5) Muy mala (péssima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)
(4) Mala (5) Muy mala (péssima) (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses **su** situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]

CP2. ¿A algún congresista?

1	2	88	98
---	---	----	----

CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, la municipalidad, o el prefecto?

1	2	88	98
---	---	----	----

CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98
--	---	---	----	----

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde

NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso... **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No **[Pase a SGL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SGL1]**

(98) No responde **[Pase a SGL1]**

MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición?

(1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son:

[Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)
(4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR

SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?

(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)
(4) Mal (5) Muy mal (88) NS (98) NR

LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?

(1) Más al municipio
(2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios
(3) No cambiar nada **[NO LEER]**
(4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios **[NO LEER]**
(88) NS (98) NR

LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar **más responsabilidades**? **[Leer las alternativas y entregar tarjeta 1]**

(1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional
(2) Algo más al gobierno nacional
(3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y a la municipalidad
(4) Algo más a la municipalidad
(5) Mucho más a la municipalidad
(88) NS (98) NR

LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país, ¿Quién debería **administrar más dinero**? **[Continuar con tarjeta 1]**

(1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional
(2) Algo más el gobierno nacional
(3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y la municipalidad
(4) Algo más la municipalidad
(5) Mucho más la municipalidad
(88) NS (98) NR
[RECOGER TARJETA 1]

LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad?
 (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos
 (88) NS (98) NR

MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?

(1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR

MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio?
 [Leer alternativas]

(3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza
 (0) Ninguna confianza (88) NS (98) NR

MUNI11. ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia?

(1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? [Leer alternativas]

(3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (88) NS
 (98) NR

SGR1. [NO APLICAR EN LIMA METROPOLITANA] ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el gobierno regional está dando a la gente son...? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)
 (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR

CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.

Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**


	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98	INAP 99

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del cero al diez. El cero es el escalón más bajo y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es el escalón más alto y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja el escalón que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquele a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].



LS6A. ¿En qué escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es:

[Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable
(88) NS (98) NR


IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que:

[Leer alternativas]

(1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada
(88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

**[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]**

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?

(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los **últimos 12 meses**? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta?

[NO LEER. MARCAR SÓLO UNA ALTERNATIVA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de servicios públicos

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...?

[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?

(1) Sí se justifica (2) No se justifica (88) NS (98) NR

JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

(1) Sí se justifica (2) No se justifica (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Perú garantizan un juicio justo?
(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas del Perú?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político en el Perú?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político del Perú?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político del Perú?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser peruano(a)?

B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?

B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la SUNAT?

B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?

B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República?

B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la fiscalía de la Nación?

B33. [No aplicar en Lima Metropolitana]

¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su gobierno regional?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Perú en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado
(5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR

WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado
(5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Alan García es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo
(5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR

M2. Hablando del Congreso Nacional y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los congresistas del Congreso Nacional peruano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?

(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal
(5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo				
							88	98

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones

POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar **directamente** y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

Continuamos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7 escalones. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. **NS = 88, NR = 98**

ROS1. El Estado peruano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS2. El Estado peruano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS3. El Estado peruano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS4. El Estado peruano debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS5. El Estado peruano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS6. El Estado peruano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Perú. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona indígena. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3C. A usted le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Perú?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS
(98) NR

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Perú es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?


(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático
(88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprueba que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en el Perú. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos. Recuerde que la escalera va de 1 a 10, donde 1 significa que *desaprueba firmemente* y 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*



D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Perú, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: **[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]**

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Perú. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el **derecho a casarse**?

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:

[Leer alternativas y entregar tarjeta 3]

(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, **O**
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, **O**
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
(88) NS (98) NR

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?

(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o
(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor
(88) NS (98) NR

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca
(88) NS (98) NR

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?

(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...				88	98	
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio durante el último año, como un permiso por ejemplo, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?						
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja?	99	0	1	88	98	
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima (o soborno en los últimos 12 meses?						
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?	99	0	1	88	98	
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima (o soborno) en los juzgados en este último año?						
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?						
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio?						
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER]

(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada
 (88) NS (98) NR

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta “D”] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo							Muy de acuerdo	NS	NR

¿Usted se considera una persona que es?

PER1. Sociable y activa

PER2. Una persona criticona y peleonera

PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestar

PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual

PER6. Una persona callada y tímida

PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa

PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada

PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable

PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave
- (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o
- (3) No hay crisis económica **[Pase a VB1]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a VB1]** (98) NR **[Pase a VB1]**

CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: **[Leer alternativas y entregar tarjeta 4. , MARCAR SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

- (01) El gobierno anterior
- (02) El gobierno actual
- (03) Nosotros, los peruanos
- (04) Los ricos de nuestro país
- (05) Los problemas de la democracia
- (06) Los países ricos [Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]
- (07) El sistema económico del país, o
- (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto
- (77) **[NO LEER]** Otro
- (88) **[NO LEER]** NS
- (98) **[NO LEER]** NR
- (99) INAP

VB1. ¿Tiene DNI (Documento Nacional de Identidad)?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No
- (3) En trámite
- (88) NS (98) NR

PERVB2B. ¿Votó en la segunda vuelta en las elecciones presidenciales de 2006?

- (1) Sí votó
- (2) No votó **[Pasar a VB10]**
- (8) NS/NR **[PASAR A VB10]**

PERVB3B. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la segunda vuelta? **[NO LEER LISTA]**

(1101) Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú - UPP)
 (1102) Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA)
 (1103) Blanco o viciado
 (88) NS/NR
 (99) INAP (No votó)

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

(1) Sí (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]**

(1101) Unión por el Perú - UPP
 (1102) Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA
 (1103) Partido Popular Cristiano
 (1104) Fuerza 2011
 (1105) Solidaridad Nacional
 (1106) Perú Posible
 (1107) Partido Nacionalista (PNP)
 (1108) Acción Popular
 (1109) Somos Perú
 (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones y entregar tarjeta]**

(1) No votaría
 (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente
 (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
 (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía, o
 (88) NS (98) NR

CLien1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?

(1) Frecuentemente
 (2) Rara vez
 (3) Nunca **[Pase a RAC1C]**
 (88) NS **[Pase a RAC1C]** (98) NR **[Pase a RAC1C]**

CLien2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?

(1) Más inclinado
 (2) Menos inclinado
 (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población, las personas indígenas son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? **[Entregar y leer tarjeta 5. Permitir sólo una respuesta]**

(1) Porque las personas indígenas no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas indígenas son menos inteligentes
 (3) Porque las personas indígenas son tratadas de manera injusta
 (4) Porque las personas indígenas tienen bajo nivel educativo
 (5) Porque las personas indígenas no quieren cambiar su cultura
 (88) NS
 (98)NR

RAC4. ¿Usted cree que las personas indígenas son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?

(1) Mucho mejor
 (2) Mejor
 (3) Igual
 (4) Peor
 (5) Mucho peor
 (88) NS
 (98)NR

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

y pensando en los últimos **cinco** años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS17. Se ha sentido discriminado por su forma de hablar o acento?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Por su condición económica	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Por su género o sexo	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente:

[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1B. Ha visto que otra persona ha sido discriminada por su forma de hablar o acento?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno, como por ejemplo: **Vaso de leche, Juntos, Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS)**?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) =
_____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^º	2 ^º	3 ^º	4 ^º	5 ^º	6 ^º	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11		
Superior	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
NS	88						
NR	98						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)

Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... **[Leer alternativas y entregar tarjeta 6]**

- (0) Participando en una asociación civil o comunitaria
- (1) Participando en un movimiento o partido político
- (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones
- (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario
- (4) Ninguna de estas
- (5) **[NO LEER]** Otra

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]

Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia?

[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SÓLO UNA]

[Si dice "el futuro" preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]

- (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral
- (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos
- (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras)
- (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación
- (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas
- (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros)
- (7) Salud
- (8) Medio ambiente
- (9) Situación del país
- (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada
- (11) Otra respuesta

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?

(1) Correcta

(2) Equivocada

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

HAICR1. Podría decirme ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país?

[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SÓLO UNA]

(01) TV

(02) Diario

(03) Radio

(04) Iglesia

(05) Centro comunitario

(06) Escuela

(07) Familiares

(08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio

(09) Amigos

(10) Vecinos

(11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios)

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión?

[ANOTAR.] _____

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para saber si “cree en Dios pero no pertenece a ninguna religión” o si es “ateo, no cree en Dios”]

(88) NS

(98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes

(4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS

(98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) 100 soles o menos
- (02) De 101 a 200 soles
- (03) De 201 a 400 soles
- (04) De 401 a 600 soles
- (05) De 601 a 800 soles
- (06) De 801 a 1200 soles
- (07) De 1201 soles a 1600 soles
- (08) De 1601 a 2000 soles
- (09) De 2001 a 3000 soles
- (10) Más de 3000 soles
- (88) NS
- (98) NR

[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No **[Pase a Q10C]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a Q10C]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a Q10C]**

Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Mucho
- (2) Algo
- (3) Poco
- (4) Nada
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en las últimos doce meses?

- (1) Ha aumentado
- (2) Se ha mantenido igual
- (3) Ha disminuido
- (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en las últimos doce meses
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? **[Si responde “Sí”, preguntar ¿En dónde?]**

[No leer alternativas]

- (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente **[Siga]**
- (2) Sí, en los estados Unidos y en otros países **[Siga]**
- (3) Sí, en otros países (no en estados Unidos) **[Siga]**
- (4) No **[Pase a Q14]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a Q14]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a Q14]**

Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos?

[Leer alternativas]

- (1) Todos los días
- (2) Una o dos veces por semana
- (3) Una o dos veces por mes
- (4) Rara vez
- (5) Nunca
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas 1 a 4]**

- (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar
- (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades
- (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades
- (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades
- (88) **[No leer]** NS
- (98) **[No leer]** NR

Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) ¿Aumentó? **[Pase a Q11]**
- (2) ¿Permaneció igual? **[Pase a Q11]**
- (3) ¿Disminuyó? **[Pase a Q10F]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a Q11]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a Q11]**

Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]

- (1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario
- (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo
- (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien
- (4) El negocio familiar se quebró
- (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse
- (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar
- (7) Desastre natural/ Pérdida de cultivo
- (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos
- (8) Otra razón
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP ("Aumentó", "Permaneció igual" o NS/NR en Q10E)

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]

- (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado
- (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID)

- (88) NS (98) NR

Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____
00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra?

[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-peruana, codificar como (4) Negra]

(1) Blanca [Pase a PERETIDA]	(2) Mestiza [Pase a PERETIDA]
(3) Indígena [Siga]	(4) Negra [Pase a PERETIDA]
(5) Mulata [Pase a PERETIDA]	(6) Oriental [Pase a PERETIDA]
(7) Otra [Pase a PERETIDA]	(88) NS [Pase a PERETIDA]
(98) NR [Pase a PERETIDA]	

PERETIDA2. ¿A qué grupo étnico pertenece usted? [No leer alternativas]

ANOTAR _____

(77) Otro

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PERETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata?

(1) Blanca	(2) Mestiza	(3) Indígena	(4) Negra	(5) Mulata	(7) Otra
(88) NS	(98) NR				

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [No leer alternativas] [acepte una alternativa, no más]

(1101) Castellano	(1102) Quechua	(1103) Aymara	(1106) Ashaninka
(1107) Aguaruna	(1104) Otro (nativo)	(1105) Otro extranjero	
(88) NS	(98) NR		

LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]:

(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)

(1) Sólo castellano	(2) Castellano e idioma nativo	(3) Sólo idioma nativo
(4) Castellano e idioma extranjero	(88) NS	(98) NR

IND1. ¿Cree usted que los grupos indígenas están ayudando a que nuestro país sea más democrático, menos democrático o ellos no están teniendo ningún impacto en nuestra democracia?

(1) Más democrático	(2) Menos democrático	(3) No tienen impacto
(88) NS	(98) NR	

IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas]

(1) Mucha	(2) Algo
(3) Poca [Pasar a IND4]	(4) Ninguna [Pasar a IND4]
(88) NS [Pasar a IND4]	(98) NR [Pasar a IND4]

[Preguntar sólo a los que respondieron "Mucho" o "Algo" a IND2]

IND3. En su opinión, ¿por qué algunos grupos indígenas han sido efectivos en tener influencia sobre los debates políticos en este país? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Porque tienen más dinero/recursos
- (2) Porque pueden trabajar bien con grupos no-indígenas
- (3) Porque ellos representan a la población indígena
- (4) Porque tienen buenas ideas
- (5) Porque tienen buenos líderes

(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) Inap

[Preguntar a Todos]

IND4. ¿Qué tan efectivos son los grupos indígenas para convencer a la gente de que los temas indígenas son importantes? (1) Muy efectivos (2) Algo efectivos
(3) Poco efectivos (4) Nada efectivos (88) NS (98) NR

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet?

[Leer alternativas]

- (1) Diariamente
- (2) Algunas veces a la semana
- (3) Algunas veces al mes
- (4) Rara vez
- (5) Nunca

(88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el

Internet? [Leer opciones]:

(1) Diariamente	(2) Algunas veces a la semana	(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Rara vez	(5) Nunca	(88) NS
		(98) NR

GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER:** Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde

GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene el Perú? **[NO LEER: 24]**

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el periodo presidencial en Perú? **[NO LEER: 5 años]**

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R3. Refrigeradora	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4. Teléfono fijo (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No			(1) Sí	

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**
- (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**
- (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?
- (2) Asalariado en el sector privado?
- (3) Patrono o socio de empresa?
- (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?
- (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]

- (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
- (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
- (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
- (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
- (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
- (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
- (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)
- (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
- (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
- (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)
- (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
- (12) Artesano
- (13) Servicio doméstico
- (14) Obrero
- (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
- (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo.
 (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo.
 (3) No, no perdió su trabajo
 (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo
 (88) NS (98) NR

OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? **[No leer alternativas]**

(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
 (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
 (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
 (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
 (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
 (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
 (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)
 (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
 (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
 (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)
 (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
 (12) Artesano
 (13) Servicio doméstico
 (14) Obrero
 (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones?

(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a SAL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SAL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a SAL1]**

PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Sistema privado, es decir una AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones)
 (2) Sistema público o de seguro social
 (7) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted aportó a su fondo de pensiones? [Leer alternativas]:

(1) Todos los meses
 (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o
 (3) No aportó
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

[Preguntar a todos]**SAL1. ¿Tiene usted seguro médico(a)?**

(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Finalizar] (88) NS [Finalizar] (98) NR [Finalizar]

SAL2. Su seguro médico es... [Leer opciones]

(1) Del gobierno, parte del seguro social
 (2) De otro plan del Estado SIS, EPS
 (3) Es un plan privado
[No leer]: (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado
 (88) NS (98) NR
 (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)

SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario?

(1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____

(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]

Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ :

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____

INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____

SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ **Fecha** _____ / _____ / _____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios: _____

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta 1


1. Mucho más al gobierno nacional
2. Algo más al gobierno nacional
3. La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y a la municipalidad
4. Algo más a la municipalidad
5. Mucho más a la municipalidad

Tarjeta “A”

¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta “B”




Tarjeta 2

1. Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física
2. Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física
3. Robo con arma con agresión o amenaza física
4. Agresión física sin robo
5. Violación o asalto sexual
6. Secuestro
7. Daño a la propiedad
8. Robo de la casa
9. Extorsión


Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta “D”



Tarjeta “E”



Tarjeta 3

1. A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o
2. La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o
3. En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático

Tarjeta 4

1. El gobierno anterior
2. El gobierno actual
3. Nosotros, los peruanos
4. Los ricos de nuestro país
5. Los problemas de la democracia
6. Los países ricos
7. El sistema económico del país
8. Nunca ha pensado en esto

Tarjeta “F”

- (00) Ningún ingreso**
- (01) 100 soles o menos**
- (02) De 101 a 200 soles**
- (03) De 201 a 400 soles**
- (04) De 401 a 600 soles**
- (05) De 601 a 800 soles**
- (06) De 801 a 1200 soles**
- (07) De 1201 soles a 1600 soles**
- (08) De 1601 a 2000 soles**
- (09) De 2001 a 3000 soles**
- (10) más de 3000 soles**

Tarjeta 5

- (1) Porque los indígenas son menos inteligentes
- (2) Porque los indígenas tienen menos educación
- (3) Porque los indígenas no trabajan lo suficiente
- (4) Porque los indígenas son tratados de manera injusta
- (5) Porque los indígenas no quieren cambiar su cultura

Tarjeta 6

1. Participando en una asociación civil o comunitaria
2. Participando en un movimiento o partido político
3. Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones
4. Participando en un movimiento revolucionario