

# **DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN PERU**

**Final Report**

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*This report analyzes the results of a national survey performed by Imasen S.A., under the direction of the IEP research team, in November 1998, with a representative national sample of 1,784 people. It also includes a comparison of these results with those of two similar surveys done by Apoyo S.A. in 1996 and 1997 at the request of USAID/Peru.*

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*Lima, May 14, 1999*

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## *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

### **Democratic Participation in Peru: An Overview**

An overview of the results of the 1998 survey reveals a complex panorama that raises questions about many of the prevailing images of democracy and the social framework that sustains it. It is generally assumed that democracy is based on some of the following elements: a) a generalized commitment to the idea of democracy as the best system of government; b) support for and confidence in political institutions; c) greater commitment to the system by the middle and upper classes —the ones who benefit most from the order it brings; d) significant interest in public and political affairs; and e) significant participation in community organizations and activities, according to the Tocquevillean image of democracy.

We will examine to what degree the survey results support these assumptions in Peru, and the implications for strengthening democracy in our country.

**Commitment to the idea of democracy.** The majority of Peruvians prefer democracy as the ideal form of government: 65 percent agree that democracy is preferable to any other form of government. In addition, 60 percent of Peruvians refuse to support a military coup under any circumstances, and 65 percent say that under no circumstances can a president be justified in assuming dictatorial powers. This implies the existence of a significant "hard-core" nucleus of support for democracy.

We know, however, that this expressed support for democracy does not always translate into a deep commitment to such a system. People may say they prefer democracy because that is considered socially "correct." For this reason, the survey went beyond simple statements in favor of democracy and tried to establish the potential for tolerance of military governments. Likewise, given that in Latin America new forms of authoritarianism are emerging that are not directly linked to the armed forces, but rather are manifestations of civil authoritarianism, respondents

were asked if they would tolerate, under some circumstances, the assumption of dictatorial powers by presidents. Once again, about two-thirds of those interviewed emphatically rejected both military coups and civilian authoritarianism, although one-third said that in some cases they could be justified. We thus find a clear majority in favor of democracy, although the one-third that could provide a social basis for authoritarian measures to be taken cause for concern.

What idea of democracy do citizens have in mind when they say they prefer this form of government? The survey asked what Peruvians understood by "democracy." In general, we found a balance among definitions associated with various traditions: liberal utilitarian (with emphasis on protection of individual rights), liberal republican (with emphasis on respect for the Rule of Law and balance of powers), substantive democratic (with emphasis on social justice), and radical democratic (which emphasizes equality and participation). A variety of definitions of democracy exist at all socio-economic levels of Peruvian society.

**Support for and confidence in political institutions: Peru as an extreme case.** Among the findings that stand out are the very low levels of citizen support for the political system and state institutions. Nearly half the people surveyed (49 percent) said they do not support Peruvian political institutions at all. It must be noted, however, that respondents seem to equate the political system with the government; there is a significant correlation between the level of support for the political system and people's opinions of the current president's administration. It is noteworthy that there is also a significant statistical correlation between those who support the political system and those who are tolerant of authoritarian conduct by presidents. We will address this in detail later.

The scale of confidence in institutions, which ranges from 1 to 7, with 4 as the midpoint, shows that only two institutions -neither one state-related-rank above the midpoint: the Catholic Church (with an average confidence level of 5.6), and neighborhood organizations (with an average of 4.2). These are followed by the Ombudsman's Office, an autonomous state institution, with an average citizen confidence level of 3.9. The fact that this institution has the highest trust level of all state institutions can be explained because its task is to safeguard respect for the rights of the person, which are often violated by the state itself. This is followed, in levels of confidence, by journalists (3.89), followed by the two state institutions (also autonomous) that are those closest to citizens: provincial and district

governments, with an average confidence rating of 3.7 and 3.6, respectively. Still lower are the Armed Forces, which in recent years have been closely associated with the Executive Branch (with an average confidence rating of 3.6), and labor organizations (3.5), which have largely lost public support in recent years.

The lowest levels of confidence registered are for political institutions that are fundamental to democracy: the Controller General (3.3), Attorney General (3.3), Police (3.1), Congress (2.7), and the Judicial Branch (2.6). The electoral institutions also demonstrate low levels of confidence: National Registry of Citizens (RENIEC), 3.6; Electoral Processes Office (ONPE), 3.5; and the National Electoral Jury (JNE), 3.4. This is consistent with the fact that 67 percent of those surveyed believe that electoral fraud is committed in Peru. It must be pointed out that the level of distrust in Peru with regard to the fairness of elections is about the same as the regional average, based on the 1996 *Latinbarómetro* survey.

Peru registers some of the region's lowest levels of public confidence in major political institutions, according to the 1996 *Latinbarómetro* survey. Peruvians especially distrust the following institutions: the Armed Forces, Congress, the judicial system and political parties. Peru is the most extreme case of the crisis of institutions affecting the region, especially in the case of Congress (only the level of confidence in Ecuador is lower than that in Peru) and the Judicial Branch (an institution in which the levels of confidence are the lowest in the region).

But the lack of confidence in institutions is only one manifestation of the general level of social distrust. Peruvians have a poor image of their compatriots (1997 *Latinbarómetro*), registering the lowest levels in the region. For this reason, the construction of democracy in this country must include the reconstruction of more basic social ties.

**Democracy and social groups.** How do different groups perceive democracy, the political system and its main institutions? Let's begin by identifying the social groups that show greater confidence in the political system and institutions. For this analysis, the national means obtained from the scales we have described were compared with variations in means obtained across various social categories, in order to determine whether these mean differences were statistically significant.

Young people show higher than average levels of support for the political system and trust in its main institutions. Support and trust are also greater than average among those who have less education, belong to the lowest socio-economic sectors and live in rural areas and, occasionally, among women. Paradoxically, the social sectors that traditionally are characterized by some form of exclusion are those that show above-average levels of support for the system and trust in its institutions. At first glance, this could suggest that the political system and institutions and, by extension, political democracy, find their most stable base of support among the social sectors most marked by social precariousness.

This impression is misleading, however, because these are exactly the same people who show the greatest tolerance for civilian and military authoritarianism. They also are relatively less interested in politics and public affairs, and have less knowledge of their rights and a lower level of awareness of their civic responsibilities. It must be noted that more than half the citizens of Peru have developed a significant awareness of the fact that they have rights, whether or not they feel that these rights are effectively upheld by the political system.

This apparent contradiction exists because the social sectors characterized by precariousness and exclusion are the sectors that are relatively more *disconnected* from the public arena, less likely to follow and be aware of national issues and problems or their rights and responsibilities, and farthest removed from political deliberation. This suggests that support for the system is a sign of a lower level of critical analysis.

On the other hand, those who show greater support for the system and its institutions are also more likely to tolerate military coups and presidential authoritarianism and be less interested in public affairs and politics. Far from being an expression of commitment to democracy, support for the political system appears instead to be acceptance of the authoritarian functioning of the current political system.

People with more formal education and those who live in Lima, meanwhile, show greater interest in public and political affairs, are more informed, are more aware of having rights, exercise their rights to a greater degree and fulfill their responsibilities, are more critical of the political system, and show a greater lack of confidence in its institutions. These same sectors show greater support for democracy as a political system, indicating

that criticism of the system is the result of identifying the system and its institutions with a government that is considered authoritarian.

Thus an increased awareness of their rights and responsibilities and greater interest in public affairs and politics lead people to be more critical of the functioning of the Peruvian political system and the democratic institutions that *actually exist*.

**Interest in political and public affairs in general.** Most Peruvians are, in general, greatly interested in public affairs and, to a lesser degree, in politics. The majority follow national events attentively; there is less interest in politics, although more than 50 percent claim to be interested. Although interest in politics is lower than interest in public affairs, the acceptance of politics in Peru is similar to that shown by citizens of other countries in the region. This indicates that although there are very high levels of distrust in and criticism of political institutions, this does not imply a detachment from the public sphere, which is a positive element.

**Participation in social organizations and community activities.** As we said at the beginning, a sort of Tocquevillean vision of democracy, resurrected in the current treatments of social capital (Putnam and others), emphasizes the idea that an intense associative life is a necessary, solid basis for democracy. Our data show that in Peru there exists a relatively large network of community organizations and significant participation in community activities. This confirms what was said earlier with regard to interest in public and political affairs. The institutional crisis has not caused retrenchment into private life.

People who are involved in community organizations also show greater levels of interest in politics, and those who are not involved say they would like to participate more. Of those, 60 percent say they do not do so because of a lack of time. People who participate more in social organizations are more likely to have less formal education and a lower socio-economic level. For this reason, promotional work with these social organizations is key to improving conditions for the excluded and vulnerable population. Again, however, the data contradict some commonly held beliefs that must be taken into account.

About half the people interviewed belonged to at least one community organization, and two-thirds said they had participated in some type of

community activity in the past year. Some people do not participate more in community organizations simply because such groups do not exist in the places where they live. If we analyze participation among those who say organizations exist in their communities, an interesting picture emerges. Involvement is generally significant, except in the case of political parties. Where religious communities exist, participation is around 40 percent. Similarly, where women's organizations exist, one-third of women participate in them. Thirty percent of those interviewed participate in parents' associations in communities where these exist (participation is somewhat higher among those over age 35). Participation is also significant in professional associations (in which 28 percent of people who have completed a university education participate). Lower levels of participation are found in unions and political parties.

These data must not lead us to draw ingenuous conclusions about these organizations or overestimate the democratic effects of community involvement and collective action. People who are involved in community organizations are not necessarily more interested in public affairs, nor do they reject in greater proportion military coups or civilian authoritarianism. This is because those who are more involved in community organizations are poorer and less educated, precisely the sectors that are least politicized and most likely to tolerate authoritarian forms of government.

Why does the socialization implied by greater community involvement not have a positive influence on development of democratic values? First, because precariousness and exclusion are associated with a lower level of interest in public affairs, less critical analysis and lower awareness of rights, all of which impede the development of democratic attitudes. In addition, participation alone does not seem to change this situation.

At the same time, community involvement does not necessarily imply a greater demonstration of democratic practices. The survey indicates that organizations that have a greater presence in communities nationwide are, in general, not voluntary in the strict sense of the term. That is, they have not sprung up "from below" through citizen initiative. The organizations that have a greater presence in the national sample are religious communities (which exist in 80 percent of respondents' communities) and women's organizations (which exist in 77 percent of the communities). These are followed by parents' associations (65 percent), sports clubs (64 percent) and neighborhood organizations (51 percent). Of these groups, only sports clubs,

neighborhood organizations and, to a certain extent, women's organizations (although these definitely depend on the support of the state and other institutions) arise spontaneously through citizen initiative. This could explain why involvement in organizations does not lead to the spread of democratic values. The fact that most organizations exist because of action by external agents (public and private) means that experiences in organizations are frequently characterized by a dynamic that is outside the participants' control and which limits their autonomy. Participation in these organizations therefore implies a lower degree of democratic practice.

Because participation in community activities addresses specific local problems; may have significant influence in the community, but its political impact is extremely limited.

The internal dynamics of existing organizations must also be considered. In many cases, leaders have a vertical and authoritarian attitude toward the rank and file. It is no surprise, then, three-fourths of those who participate in community organizations say they feel their opinions are rarely or never taken into account in these groups.

We indicated earlier that those who participate more in community organizations are from sectors with lower income and educational levels and those who live in rural areas. This calls into question the idea, held by many, that the economic and institutional crisis and the social fragmentation it causes reduce the possibility of collective action, weakening social ties among the most vulnerable and excluded sectors. On the contrary, the lowest levels of community involvement are associated with higher socio-economic levels. Participation and collective action appear to be tools used by excluded and vulnerable sectors to compensate for their situation and get goods and services that they cannot obtain through market mechanisms. For this reason, the decline in organizational dynamics and community participation should not be seen as a sign of crisis and fragmentation, but as the opposite: a satisfaction in the demand for collective goods. The survey shows that the level of participation in community organizations and activities is higher, on average, in places where consolidated basic services are lacking, but drops in areas where households are connected to water and electricity services.

Given this situation, there is special concern for young people, since they not only show a greater acceptance of authoritarianism and lack of

political awareness, but also lower levels of involvement in community organizations and activities. This is disturbing because young people appear to be more disconnected from traditional social ties. This means that strategies for social promotion must make young people an important target group and work to open spaces for their participation.

## INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID/Peru) commissioned this study as part of its Democratic Initiatives Program. The strategic objective of this program is to broaden citizen involvement in democratic processes. This overall objective includes four intermediate results: The first seeks to build more effective national institutions, in order to increase citizens' trust. The second intermediate result seeks to increase access to an effective and impartial justice system that inspires confidence. The third intermediate result seeks a better response by local governments, so constituents feel municipal governments respond effectively to their demands. The fourth intermediate result seeks to better prepare citizens, including those who are disadvantaged, to exercise their basic rights and fulfill their civic responsibilities.

### **Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results of the USAID Democratic Initiatives Program**

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Indicators
<i>SO: Broader citizen participation in democratic processes</i>	<i>a. Citizens who are active members of at least one civil society organization.</i> <i>b. Citizens who actively participate in solving problems in their communities.</i>
<i>IR1. More effective national institutions</i>	<i>1. Citizens who trust key national institutions.</i>
<i>IR2. Greater access to justice</i>	<i>2. Citizens who believe Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial.</i>
<i>IR3. Local governments more responsive to constituents</i>	<i>3. Citizens who believe local governments respond to their needs and demands.</i>
<i>IR4 Citizens better prepared to exercise their rights and responsibilities</i>	<i>4. Citizens who know where to go to protect their rights.</i> <i>5. Citizens in disadvantaged groups who know their basic rights and civic responsibilities.</i>

This study addresses each of these objectives, examining two main areas: the level and intensity of citizen participation, and the range of attitudes toward democracy, the political system and its institutions in Peru. This

document analyzes the results of a national survey carried out by the research team of the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP) in November 1998, with a representative sample of 1,784 people nationwide. IMASEN S.A., a well-known Peruvian opinion polling organization, conducted the survey.

This is the third survey on this subject conducted for the USAID/Peru Democratic Initiatives Program<sup>1</sup> The questions asked in 1998 were similar, and in many cases identical, to the questions in the 1996 and 1997 surveys. This study also included focus groups in the San Martín region, to complement survey data<sup>2</sup>. It will be noted that this year's results are substantially similar to those of the previous surveys, indicating a fairly high level of reliability in the results of the three surveys.

This report focuses on the 1998 survey, taking into account the results of the 1996 and 1997 polls. The main objective of the report is to describe and analyze the indicators used to measure each issue. In doing this, we have gone beyond a simple description of the data to analyze the relationships between the data and various control groups that we consider relevant<sup>3</sup>. We also have employed more complex statistical analysis techniques, such as regression analysis.

To truly understand the data from the Peruvian case, a comparative perspective is necessary. We have taken as a reference point the results of *Latinbarómetro*, an international survey carried out in 17 Latin American countries with the goal of providing various decision-making bodies in the region with information about issues of public interest. Although we have not had direct access to the *Latinbarómetro* database, we have used the reports of the main results from 1996 and 1997, published by the Peru Promotional Commission (PROMPERU).

This report consists of the following chapters:

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<sup>1</sup> The two previous surveys, in 1996 and 1997, were carried out by Apoyo Opinión and Mercado S.A. under the guidance of the Apoyo Institute. The samples for 1996 and 1997 consisted of 1,508 and 1,533 people respectively. A comparison of these samples is included in the appendix on methodology of this report.

<sup>2</sup> This information can be found in the appendix on methodology.

<sup>3</sup> We have taken into account a series of socio-demographic variables, such as sex, age, first language, education, area of residence and socioeconomic situation in order to identify the differences in the surveyed population and establish control groups.

- Chapter 1. Interest in public affairs and politics. In this section, we discuss the level of interest in public affairs and the communications media most frequently used by citizens. We also examine citizen attitudes toward politics in general.
- Chapter 2. Citizenship and community involvement. In this section, we address citizen participation in various community organizations and activities. We also analyze the importance that people attach to this participation.
- Chapter 3. Legitimacy of the political system and its institutions. In this section, we discuss citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system, examining both support for the political system in general and trust in key political institutions.
- Chapter 4. Citizenship and local governments. In this chapter, we analyze citizens' trust in and perceptions of the efficiency of local governments.
- Chapter 5. Citizens' attitudes toward basic rights and civic responsibilities. In this section, we first examine the level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities, not only in the overall population, but also in what has been identified as the disadvantaged population. We also analyze whether citizens know where to go to protect their rights.
- Chapter 6. Access to justice and public safety. In this chapter, we determine the level of public safety in Peru, access to and use of judicial system facilities, and the perception of a guarantee of fair justice for all.
- Chapter 7. Attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism. In this chapter, we analyze citizen perceptions of democracy and the extent and intensity of support for this system. We also examine the existing level of support for both civil and military authoritarianism.
- Chapter 8. Conclusions and recommendations.

## 1. INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLITICS

### 1.1 Interest in public affairs and politics, and trust in communications media

To function appropriately, democracy needs citizens who are interested in politics and public affairs. Otherwise, political debate is limited and of poor quality. A society whose citizens are largely disinterested and apathetic cedes its rights to pressure groups that are determined to defend their particular interests, a tendency that makes the democratic dynamic elitist and ignores the rights and interests of the majority.

Because of this lack of attention, people who are marginalized see little sense in following politics or public affairs, and a vicious circle results. It is, therefore, important to determine the level of interest in public affairs and politics in general. Only then is a more participatory democratic dynamic possible.

To examine this issue, the survey included a series of questions meant to measure how much attention people pay to national issues and their general attitude toward politics.

With regard to national issues, survey participants were asked how often they informed themselves about national events. Table 1.1 shows that slightly more than half of those surveyed (51 percent) inform themselves "frequently" about what is happening in the country, while slightly more than one-third (34 percent) inform themselves "occasionally". Only 12 percent said they inform themselves sporadically, or only when they are particularly interested in an issue (the sum of "never," "almost never" and "only when an issue interests me"). We can therefore conclude that Peruvians pay significant attention to issues of national interest.

**Table 1.1  
Interest in public affairs**

How frequently do you inform yourself about national events?	Percentage	Number of respondents
Frequently	51.8	911
Occasionally	35.9	632
Only when an issue interests me	6.7	117
Almost never	4.0	71
Never	1.5	27
Total <sup>4</sup>	100.0	1758

To more closely examine interest in public affairs, we also asked about the frequency of reading, watching or listening to the news. Table 1.2 shows the answers to the following question: "How often to you listen to radio news, watch television news or read news in a newspaper?" Respondents follow the news fairly closely, but -and this is most important- this is almost exclusively limited to television. Two-thirds of the people questioned said they frequently watched a television news program. Consumption of radio and newspaper news is more limited. In fact, nearly one-fifth of the people surveyed said they never read news in the newspaper.

**Table 1.2  
Frequency of news consumption through various media**

Frequency	Watch TV news	Listen to radio news	Read news in the newspaper
Frequently	64.2	35.4	20.6
Occasionally	31.9	53.9	60.7
Never	4.0	10.7	18.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

The importance of the results in Table 1.2 must not be underestimated. Newspapers have traditionally been considered the most important source of information, discussion and formation of public opinion. The survey indicates there is clearly less access to information through print media than through the visual medium par excellence, television<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> In this table, the number of respondents does not always equal the total sample (1784) because invalid responses (those who did not respond to the question) have been eliminated.

<sup>5</sup> Eighty-four percent of people questioned have television sets. This drops to 65 percent among people at low socio-economic levels and 26 percent among disadvantaged people.

The overwhelming predominance of television as the preferred medium for news consumption is confirmed by the results in Table 1.3, which shows that family and work networks are almost never used to gather information about current events. Nearly two-thirds of the people questioned rely on television to stay informed, while fewer than 5 percent rely on print media. Radio replaces television as the most frequently used information medium in rural areas and among people whose native language is not Spanish, who have no more than a primary education and whose socio-economic level is low.

Table 1.3  
The medium most frequently used  
to stay informed about national events

What medium do you most frequently use to stay informed about what is happening in the country?	Percentage	Number of respondents
Television	62.5	1,088
Radio	31.6	551
Newspapers	3.9	68
Family or friends	1.7	30
Coworkers	.3	5
Total	100.0	1,742

There is undoubtedly a close relationship between the information medium most frequently used and the level of trust in the medium. When survey participants were asked (Table 1.4) which medium they trusted most, more than two-thirds (68 percent) chose television and one-fourth mentioned radio. Far behind are newspapers (5 percent), family or friends (2 percent) and coworkers (less than 1 percent). It should be emphasized that television and, in a distant second place, radio, have become the information media par excellence and the ones that people overwhelmingly trust. Audiovisual media leave traditional forms of communication -newspapers, family, friends and coworkers- far behind. This has a significant effect on the country's political dynamics. The emphasis on the media in the public arena substantially increases the cost of participating in politics and tends to make politics more elite. Some say it also impoverishes and limits the space for public deliberation, although this is subject to debate. Overall, we see that Peru follows regional and global trends.

Table 1.4  
Most trusted communications medium

Communications medium	Percentage	Number of respondents
Radio	24.7	416
Television	67.7	1,141
Newspapers	5.3	90
Family or friends	1.6	27
Coworkers	.4	6
None	.4	6
Total	100.0	1,686

To complete the analysis of the public arena, let's look at citizens' attitudes toward politics. Survey participants were asked, "What is your attitude toward politics?" Table 1.5 shows the alternatives offered and their respective percentages. As in the analysis of interest in public affairs, we find that a slim majority of Peruvians show much or some interest in politics (53 percent if we add the top two categories), while approximately 38 percent say they have no interest and 9 percent say they dislike politics altogether.

**Table 1.5**  
**Attitudes toward politics**

What is your attitude toward politics?	Percentage	Number of respondents
I am interested and belong to a political party	12.1	199
I am interested, but independent	41.3	676
I am not interested in politics	37.6	616
I dislike politics and detest politicians	9.0	147
Total	100.0	1,638


The survey included a question about people's perception of their ability to influence politics: "To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Politicians (the government, Congress and others) decide what they want to do, and I can do nothing to change that" (Table 1.6). We see a certain balance between those who strongly agree and agree and those who disagree and strongly disagree with the statement. It is interesting to note that the answers to this question show a definite pattern of variation according to socio-demographic variables.

**Table 1.6**  
**Perception of influence in politics**

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Politicians decide what they want to do, and I can do nothing to change that"?	Percentage	Number of respondents
Strongly agree	12.5	205
Agree	26.8	438
Undecided	19.6	320
Disagree	34.4	562
Strongly disagree	6.8	111
Total	100.0	1,636

To evaluate the degree of interest in politics in Peru, it is necessary to compare it to the level in other countries of the region. Figure 1.1 shows results of the 1997 Latinobarómetro survey. Levels of interest in politics in Peru are close to the Latin American average. Despite a marked institutional crisis and strong anti-political attitudes, Peru follows global trends and is not characterized by a rejection of politics.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Latin America: Interest in politics, 1997**  
(Percentages)



Source: *Latinobarómetro 1997*.

## 1.2 Interest in public affairs and politics among control groups


To see how interest in politics and public affairs varies among different sectors of society, we established a scale for each issue.

The first, for interest in public affairs, was established as follows: Each response shown in Table 1.1 was assigned a point value. "Never" was given a value of 1, "almost never" a value of 2, and so on, with "frequently" assigned a value of 5. In this way, a *scale of interest in public affairs* was established with a range from 1 (no interest) to 5 (high interest), with a midpoint of 3 (those who only inform themselves when there is an issue of particular interest to them).

Using this scale, we calculated the mean level of interest for the entire sample, which is 4.32. We can then compare variations of the mean level of interest among various social groups (sub-populations of the sample). Figure 1.2 clearly shows the different levels of interest in public affairs. For easier comparison, the graph includes a vertical line showing the mean point-value of the sample as a whole. When a bar crosses the vertical line, it indicates that sub-population has an above-average interest in public affairs. In each case shown on the graph, the differences are statistically significant (they are not random results) according to a variance analysis done for each control variable.

As Figure 1.2 shows, there is a relatively high general interest in public affairs. The mean for the overall sample, 4.32, indicates that people pay attention to public affairs at a level between "occasionally" and "frequently." There are, however, differences in the distribution of this interest. Interest is greater among people in urban areas, especially Lima, those with more education, those whose first language is Spanish, those who are older or have a higher socio-economic level, and among men.

**Figure 1.2**  
**Interest in public affairs among various control groups**




Range of scale: 1 to 5

We established a second scale to measure respondents' attitudes toward politics. For the question shown in Table 1.5, we used a method similar to that of the previous scale, assigning point values to each possible answer. "I dislike politics" was given a value of 1, "I am not interested in politics" a value of 2, "I am interested but independent" a value of 3 and "I am interested and belong to a political party" was given a value of 4. The result is a *scale of interest in politics* ranging from 1 to 4, where the lowest value indicates a complete rejection of politics and the highest value reflects great interest. The midpoint is 2.5.

Figure 1.3 shows the mean variation among relevant sub-groups on this second scale. As with the previous graph, a vertical line shows the overall mean for easier comparison.

**Figure 1.3**  
**Attitude toward politics among various control groups<sup>6</sup>**



Range of scale: 1 to 4

<sup>6</sup> In this graph, as in many that appear in this report, the scale is not presented with its minimum and maximum values. Instead, a range is selected to emphasize the differences among control groups.

The overall mean on the second scale is 2.57, almost the same as the midpoint, falling between "I am not interested in politics" and "I am interested but independent." The population obviously has a less-than-positive reaction to the word "politics." The graph shows variations in average interest in politics among various control groups similar to those in Figure 1.2 (interest in public affairs), but more accentuated. People who are more interested in politics are generally those who live in urban areas, men, those with higher educational and socio-economic levels, older people and those whose first language is Spanish.

In conclusion, we find that Peruvian citizens have a relatively high level of interest in public affairs and average interest in politics, similar to the Latin American average. The more favored social and economic groups show relatively greater interest in both issues. Unfortunately, the fact that the least-favored groups show the least interest is likely to have a negative effect on their possibilities of changing their situation.

### **1.3 Factors determining interest in public affairs and politics**

The previous analysis suggests that interest in public affairs and politics is closely related to certain socio-demographic variables, such as education, area of residence and socio-economic level. The analysis of means, however, does not provide the answer to a fundamental question: How heavily does each of these socio-demographic variables weigh in the level of interest in politics and public affairs? It is probable that the greater interest among residents of Lima and other urban areas is due not so much to area of residence, in itself, but to the fact that the average educational level is higher there than in rural zones. Regression analysis is the statistical technique that allows us to determine how each independent variable contributes to the dependent variable when all other independent variables remain constant.

Table 1.7 shows the results of a regression analysis for the scale of interest in public affairs using the variables shown in Figure 1.2. Interpretation of the coefficients is relatively easy. The column of standardized Beta coefficients indicates the specific weight of each interest-predicting variable when the other variables in the model are controlled (remain constant)<sup>7</sup>. To see whether this interest-predicting variable is

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<sup>7</sup> The table also includes non-standardized B coefficients. It is difficult to interpret these coefficients because they are expressed in the original scale of measure of

statistically significant or not, we must look at the significance column beside the respective t value<sup>8</sup>. To make visual analysis of the table easier, an asterisk (\*) is included beside each standardized Beta value that shows statistical significance.

**Table 1.7**  
**Regression analysis of various control variables**  
**for the scale of interest in public affairs<sup>9</sup>**

Predictive Variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t value	Significance
	B	Standard Error	Beta		
Education Level	.053	.006	.267*	9.067	.045
Socio-economic condition	.092	.020	.143*	4.613	.000
Age	.009	.002	.131*	5.619	.000
Region	.111	.031	.095*	3.540	.000
Sex	.074	.039	.042*	1.903	.000
Native language	.048	.055	.020	.872	.000
Constante	3.100	.092		33.879	.000
R <sup>2</sup> Ajustado	.193				

The regression analysis shows that the major factor in interest in public affairs is education level, followed by socio-economic level, age, area of residence and sex. Interest in public affairs tends to increase as education, socio-economic level and age increase, as well as among urban residents and men. The regression shows that language alone is statistically insignificant in explaining variations in interest in public affairs.

Table 1.8 shows the results of the regression analysis for the scale of interest in politics. We see that interest increases with education level and age and is greater among men. The regression shows that area of residence,

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each independent variable. It is better to consider the standardized Beta coefficients, since they are expressed in comparable units.

<sup>8</sup> In social sciences, the value 0.05 is generally considered the significance criterion, implying acceptance of a maximum probability of error of 5 percent. Values above 0.05 are not significant (that is, the probability of error is higher than 5 percent). Values less than 0.05 are accepted as significant.

<sup>9</sup> In the regressions, for the variable "Sex" we assigned a value of zero to women and one to men. In the regression presented here, the fact that the Beta coefficient for the variable "Sex" has a positive value means men tend to be more interested in public affairs than women. For area of residence, we assigned codes of 0 for rural areas, 1 for urban areas, and 2 for Metropolitan Lima. For the survey participant's first language, we assigned a value of 0 to those whose first language is Quechua or Aymara and 1 to those whose first language is Spanish.

language and socio-economic condition alone are not sufficient to explain differences in degree of interest in politics.

**Table 1.8**  
**Regression analysis of the scale of interest in politics,**  
**using various control variables**

Predictive Variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t value	Significance
	B	Standard Error	Beta		
Education Level	.028	.006	.153*	4.717	.000
Age	.007	.002	.112*	4.262	.000
Sex	.136	.041	.083*	3.343	.001
Socio-economic condition	.032	.021	.054	1.571	.116
Region	-.043	.032	-.039	-1.315	.189
Native language	.035	.060	.015	.585	.559
Constant	1.902	.098		19.468	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.043				

Education is the variable that most influences interest in politics and public affairs. Other factors include age (young people are less interested) and sex (men show greater interest). It follows that to increase levels of interest in public affairs, with the goal of building a more solid foundation for democracy in the country, it is important to work with women, young people and sectors of society which have the least education.

## 2. CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION\*

### 2.1 Participation in civil society organizations

As we have pointed out, interest in public affairs and politics is important in the development of participatory democracy. Similarly, involvement in civil society organizations and community activism and participation are fundamental to creation and development of a civil society that nurtures democracy and fosters development of what some authors have called a society's "social capital,"<sup>10</sup> which leads in turn to economic development.

Given the importance of social and political participation in consolidating democracy, we measured this participation more precisely than in the two previous surveys. One problem is that the change in formulation of the questions makes it difficult to compare the results of this survey with those of previous polls. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to present information that is comparatively valid.

We will begin by examining participation in civil society organizations. Obviously, citizen participation is only possible where the opportunity exists. One indispensable requirement, therefore, is the existence of the organizations necessary for such participation. In the 1996 and 1997 surveys, respondents were asked how frequently they participated in a series of organizations, without first establishing whether or not these organizations existed in their communities. Because of the way the question was phrased, a high percentage of those interviewed showed a low level of participation (responding that they never or almost never attended meetings of these


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\* In order to better explain the different types of participation in community activities, we distinguish between "participation in civil society organizations" and "community participation or activism." The first refers to participation as a member of a formal organization of civil society (such as parents' associations, women's groups, etc.), attendance at meetings, etc. The second refers to involvement in activities aimed at achieving community or neighborhood improvement.

<sup>10</sup> As Putnam has argued, societies with a high concentration of social capital, such as northern Italy, have a greater possibility of developing a civic culture, which leads to greater levels of economic and social development (Robert Putnam, *Social Capital: Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993).


organizations). Figure 2.1 shows the responses to this question. Sixty-five percent or more of those interviewed show a very low frequency of participation in most organizations. Only in two kinds of associations - parents' associations and religious communities, both Catholic and non-Catholic- was the low frequency around 50 percent (indicating a greater degree of participation in these organizations). As the graph shows, the differences between 1996 and 1997 were very small.

**Figure 2.1**  
**Low frequency of participation in civil society organizations**  
**1996 and 1997**



The graph suggests a high level of citizen apathy, but this impression is misleading; the percentages of low participation are overestimated because survey participants were not asked first whether these organizations existed in their communities and whether they were members. In the 1998 survey, therefore, the people interviewed were given a list of organizations and asked whether these groups existed in their neighborhoods. Those who responded affirmatively were then asked whether or not they were members. This allows us to more precisely judge whether the levels of participation shown in the earlier surveys resulted from a lack of opportunity or a conscious decision not to participate. The following graph shows the results of these questions:

**Figure 2.2**  
**Existence of and membership in community organizations**  
**Percentage responding affirmatively to both questions, 1998**



The preceding figure demonstrates the extent of Peru's social fabric. The data show that certain civil society organizations, such as religious communities (Catholic and non-Catholic), women's groups, parents' associations and, to a lesser degree, sports clubs and neighborhood associations, are inserted in the society to a significant extent. In all these cases, more than 50 percent of the people interviewed stated that these organizations existed in their communities. On the other hand, there is little insertion on the part of organizations typically associated with political activity and demands, such as political parties and unions<sup>11</sup>, which show levels of participation around or below 30 percent.

These data raise the question of what percentage of citizens take advantage of these opportunities. The answer is not discouraging. As we see in Table 2.1, the level of participation is not to be dismissed lightly. More than half the people interviewed said they belonged to some organization, 31 percent belonged to only one group and 24 percent to two or more organizations.

<sup>11</sup> While only 14 percent of respondents said unions existed in their communities, 17 percent said they belonged to unions. This is evidently explained by the fact that unions are functional, not territorial, organizations, which implies that membership is not determined by place of residence. Even so, the low level of participation in this type of organization is noteworthy.

**Table 2.1**  
**Membership in some civil society organization**

	Percentage	N° of respondents
Organization does not exist, respondent does not belong or no response	45.0	802
Belongs to one organization	31.4	560
Belongs to two organizations	15.0	268
Belongs to three organizations	6.1	108
Belongs to four to six organizations	2.2	46
Total	100.0	1,784

Forty-one percent of the people who said religious communities existed in their localities also said they were members. Of the women who said women's organizations existed in their communities, 33 percent said they participated. Thirty percent of those who said parents' associations existed in their localities also said they were members, a percentage that increases to 43 percent among respondents between ages 35 and 44. Thirty percent of those who said neighborhood organizations existed in their communities also were members. Twenty-eight percent of university graduates belonged to a professional association. Twenty-six percent of survey respondents who said business or producers' associations existed in their communities belonged to such groups<sup>12</sup>. Twenty-five percent of those who said there were sports clubs in their communities belonged to such clubs. Participation in unions and political parties stood at 17 percent<sup>13</sup> and 15 percent, respectively, for survey respondents who said those organizations existed in their neighborhoods. In sum, in Peru there is significant participation in organizations.

Next we will evaluate the "intensity" of this participation. How frequently do people who say they are members of these organizations participate? These data from the 1998 survey are shown in Table 2.2. It must be noted that because of changes in the formulation of the questions, these responses cannot be compared with those of previous years. As Table 2.2 shows, more than 30 percent of members of most civil society organizations say they frequently participate in meetings.

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<sup>12</sup> This percentage is underestimated, since obviously the majority of people are neither businesspersons nor producers.


<sup>13</sup> Because neither unions nor political parties have territorial bases in all communities, these percentages are not reliable indicators of participation in these organizations.

Table 2.2  
Intensity of participation in civil society organizations, 1998 (Percentages)

Organization	Frequently	Occasion-ally	Almost never	Never	No. of respon-dents
Parents' association	37.4	57.0	3.1	2.5	321
Women's association	54.7	41.1	2.4	1.8	287
Religious communities	46.2	49.7	2.9	1.2	543
Neighborhood associations	33.6	58.2	6.6	1.6	244
Producers' associations	29.6	57.4	9.3	3.7	54
Professional associations	45.0	45.0	10.0	0.0	20
Unions	32.4	56.8	5.4	5.4	37
Political parties	21.3	62.7	12.0	4.0	75
Sports clubs	44.0	52.9	4.7	0.4	255

These data regarding participation are consistent with the results of the 1996 Latinobarómetro survey, in which Peruvian averages for participation were at or above the Latin American average (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3  
Latin America: Participation in selected civil society organizations, 1996 (Percentages)



Source: *Latinobarómetro* 1996.

We must not be carried away, however, by an overly optimistic image based on these levels of participation. People who do participate in these

organizations feel they have little influence in decisions. Seventy-six percent of those who participate in these groups said their opinions were rarely or never taken into account, a figure that dropped to 59 percent among those who had held leadership positions in their organizations and rose to 88 percent among those who had not held an office in the past year. This could indicate a lack of democracy within the organizations.

**Table 2.3**  
**Influence in the organizations in which respondents participate**

To what degree do you believe your opinion is taken into account in decision-making in the organizations in which you participate?	Total	Have you held an office in your organization in the past year?	
		Yes	No
Much	24.2	40.6	19.1
Little	64.8	53.8	69.1
Not at all	11.0	5.6	11.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Other questions must also be taken into account. First, the organizations that show the greatest participation are those that are not "voluntary," that is, those that did not arise from the participants' spontaneous organization but are offshoots of pre-existing groups. Parents' associations and religious organizations are examples of such groups. For this reason there are limited opportunities for democratic participation within this organizations. While women's organizations have significant voluntary and participatory elements, they undeniably depend to a great degree on state institutions and NGOs. Because they are often linked to activities connected with food supply and subsistence, involvement is often a result of simple necessity and not necessarily of a desire to participate. Participation in neighborhood associations is not strictly voluntary either, because people belong to these organizations simply because they live in a particular place.

Problems can be seen not only within organizations, but also in their relationships with non-members. Sixty-four percent (954 respondents) of the people interviewed said they would like to participate more; of these, 58 percent do not do so because of a lack of time. Thirty-eight percent of the total number of people interviewed, however, said they do not participate more because they do not agree with how these organizations function.

**Table 2.4**  
**Reasons for non-participation in organizations**

Why don't you participate more?	Percentage	N° of respondents
Lack of time	58.1	542
In my neighborhood/community there are no organizations that deal with issues that interest me	16.8	157
I don't like the way organizations in my neighborhood function	8.4	78
They haven't given me the opportunity	8.4	78
I don't always understand what they are discussing	4.9	46
I don't think I have the necessary education	2.4	22
Other reasons	1.1	10
Total	100.0	933


For all these reasons, care must be taken not to jump too quickly to the conclusion that participation in civil society organizations is closely linked to strengthening of civil society or beneficial effects on democracy. These can result, but only under certain conditions, which do not necessarily exist in our country. This has important implications for promotional work that seeks to foster democratic values, since such work tends to revolve around grassroots organizations.

Who are the people who show the greatest level of involvement in civil society organizations and community activism? To answer this question, we established an index or scale of participation in civil society organizations in order to calculate the mean level of participation for the sample as a whole, then analyzed how the mean level of participation in particular control groups varies from the overall mean. We used the following procedure to create the scale: For each association examined here, a point value of zero was assigned to those who said they were not members of the organization. Those who said they were members but never participated were given a point value of 1. If they said they almost never participated they were given a point value of 2, and so on, up to a value of 4 for those who said they participated frequently. The point values for each association were then added<sup>14</sup>. This resulted in a scale ranging from 0 (no association membership)

<sup>14</sup> Associations considered in the scale were: parents' associations, women's groups, religious groups, professional associations, neighborhood organizations, unions, political parties and producers' and cultural organizations. Despite the high level of participation in sports clubs, these were not considered because previous surveys did not take them into account. Because of the aforementioned incompatibility of questions, the analysis was only done with data from the 1998 survey.

to 21 (the highest value for participation found in the survey). In themselves, the values of the range are not important. What is important is the way the means of each control group vary on this scale. This is shown in Figure 2.4. The bars show the mean point value of involvement in community organizations for each group. For easier comparison, the thicker line on the graph shows the mean of the sample as a whole<sup>15</sup>.

**Figure 2.4**  
**Participation in civil society organizations in various control groups**



Range of scale: 0 to 21

<sup>15</sup> The mean of the sample seems to be far from the maximum mean on the scale because no respondent participates frequently in all possible organizations. The highest point value found in the sample, 21, corresponds to a single respondent who participated "frequently" in three organizations and "occasionally" in three others. Few respondents show high point values on the scale; only 32 respondents registered between 13 and 18 points.

The responses are enlightening; they cast doubt on the common notion that socially precarious and excluded sectors -the victims of social fragmentation- participate less because of their marginalization (Figure 2.3). The data show that participation in civil society organizations is higher than average in rural areas, among people at a low socio-economic level, among women, among those whose first language is not Spanish, and among people who have less education. This idea is reinforced when we consider that the mean on the scale of participation in community organizations for the sample as a whole is 2.98, while it is 4.09 for the disadvantaged group<sup>16</sup> and 2.78 for the non-disadvantaged group

In Peru, participation in civil society organizations is somewhat lower among those whose situation is relatively better than average. This suggests that the people who participate in civil society organizations probably do so as a strategy for improving their living conditions. That is, collective action may constitute a strategy by which they seek to satisfy their various basic needs. The following data reinforce this argument: Those whose houses are connected to a water system show a mean level of participation of 2.65, while this level rises to 4.70 among those who do not have water service.

There is also a significant difference in levels of participation according to age group. Young people's participation is clearly below the mean. This may be because there are not specific organizations for young people, or it may be that there is more of a tendency toward individualism among youth. We do not have sufficient information to draw a conclusion.

It is interesting to note that the social groups showing greater participation in civil society organizations are the same ones that show relatively less interest in politics and public affairs. This confirms the idea that participation, in and of itself, does not lead to or result from greater commitment in the public sphere. Nor does it have a democratizing effect.

In order to identify those factors that contribute to the decision to participate in civil society organizations, a regression analysis was done with the control variables shown in the preceding graph. The results are shown in Table 2.5.

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<sup>16</sup> The disadvantaged group is made up of people whose highest education level is completion of primary school and who are at the lowest socio-economic level or whose first language is Quechua or Aymara (see Chapter 5).

**Table 2.5**  
**Regression analysis of participation in civil society organizations,**  
**according to various control variables**

Predictive Variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard Error	Beta		
Age	.041	.007	.147*	5.939	.000
Socio-economic condition	-.337	.086	-.130*	-3.935	.000
Sex	-.758	.166	-.107*	-4.562	.000
Region	-.436	.134	-.093*	-3.254	.001
Education Level	-.023	.025	-.029	-.930	.352
Native language	.005	.234	.001	.023	.981
Constant	3.201	.388		8.247	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.074				

The results in this table show that when we control for the effects of the other variables, neither education level nor first language becomes a significant predictor of participation in civil society organizations. This means that participation is not a result of having either less education or a first language other than Spanish. It is the result, first of all, of age, followed in order by socio-economic situation, sex and area of residence. The negative signs for coefficients of these variables (except age) indicate that the poorest people, women and residents of rural areas tend to show higher levels of participation in civil society organizations. Similarly, the positive sign associated with the age variable indicates that the greater the age, the higher the probability of participation in these organizations.

So far, we have examined citizen participation in civil society organizations. Participation does not stop there, however. It is also expressed in a significant way by involvement in activities related to community welfare, through forms of participation that lead to solving particular problems without committing people to all the tasks involved in participation in a formal organization. This will be examined in detail in the following section.

## 2.2 Involvement in community-based activism

The potential positive effects of involvement (improvement of social conditions, increase in self-esteem, better income redistribution, etc.) can also -perhaps especially- be achieved through self-help activities, particularly those related to community or neighborhood improvement. To measure the degree to which Peruvians are involved in this kind of community-based activism, respondents were asked the questions shown in Table 2.6 (the percentages indicate the affirmative responses to each of the questions for each survey year).

**Table 2.6**  
**Frequency of involvement in community-based activism, 1996-1998**  
**(Percentage of affirmative responses)**

Question	1996	1997	1998
Have you tried to solve some problem in your community?	36.0	35.0	30.8
Have you donated money or material to solve some problem or make some improvement in your community?	33.9	29.0	27.0
Have you provided your own work or labor?	45.9	46.4	39.1
Have you attended meetings to solve some problem or make some improvement in your community?	50.7	47.6	45.5
Have you helped form a new group to resolve some local problem or seek some improvement in your community?	n.d	24.5	23.0

The preceding table does not show substantial change from year to year, although there is a downward trend in community based activism. The data are insufficient for us to draw a definite conclusion, however.

The table shows a relatively high level of participation in meetings to solve a problem or make some improvement in the community. About half the people surveyed said they had taken part in this type of meeting. Fewer than one-third, however, said they had donated money or materials to solve a community problem or improve their neighborhoods, while a similar number said they had helped form a group for such a purpose.


These percentages support the idea of a socially active population, as was seen in the previous section. Although it is true that the majority of those interviewed survey do not take part in each of these activities, at least

one-third, and in some cases a significantly higher percentage, say they participate in this kind of community-based activism. As we will see on the following scale of community participation, only one-third of those interviewed said they did not participate in any of these activities.

To identify the groups that tend to show a higher degree of community-based activism, a scale was established that combined the questions in the preceding table. A point value of 1 was given to every activity in which the respondent participated. If the person did not participate in an activity, a point value of 0 was assigned. The scale of community-based activism, therefore, ranges from 0 (did not participate in any of the five activities) to 5 (participated in all of them). Once again, the absolute values on the scale are not significant in themselves. What is important are the relationships found in the various groups with regard to community-based activism. In Figure 2.5 we see the mean point values of this participation according to various control variables.

The relationships shown in this figure are similar to those found in the section about participation in civil society organizations. In general, traditionally excluded groups show a somewhat higher level of community participation. For example, the mean levels of involvement are higher among those whose first language is Quechua, the poor, residents of rural areas and those who have little education (primary school or less). We also find a lower degree of involvement among young people. There is, however, one important exception. While women show a higher degree of participation in civil society organizations than men, they tend to show a lower level than men in community-based activism. This difference is easily explained. At the beginning of this chapter, we saw that there was greater involvement in three types of associations: parents' associations, religious communities and women's groups. Women tend to have a greater presence in the latter two, which is reflected in the higher point value of their participation. Women tend to participate less than men in activities associated with community self-help, however, since it is generally the head of household (most of whom are men) who is responsible for participating in self-help activities, especially those requiring labor for construction or other action.

**Figure 2.5**  
**Community involvement among various control populations**



Range of scale: 0 to 5

It should be noted that although the mean differences shown in the preceding graph are all statistically significant, in absolute terms there is not a great deal of difference among them. The results confirm what we have already said about participation in civil society organizations: Collective action appears to be a resource for trying to meet basic needs. Thus, those whose houses have water and electricity connections show a mean level of community-based activism of 1.49, while those who lack such connections show a mean of 2.17. Similarly, among the

disadvantaged group we find that the mean level of community activism is 1.91, while among others it is 1.61.

To identify which of the indicated factors are most important in determining levels of community-based activism, we did a regression analysis. The results, presented in Table 2.7, show that neither language nor area of residence is a significant predictor of involvement when we control for age, sex, education and socio-economic condition. Of all these variables, the most important in determining the level of community-based activism is age, followed by social class.

**Table 2.7**  
**Regression analysis of community-based activism**  
**according to various control variables**

Predictive Variables	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Age	.016	.003	.127*	4.892	.000
Socio-economic condition	-.126	.039	-.111*	-3.222	.001
Sex	.275	.077	.088*	3.587	.000
Education level	.028	.011	.081*	2.491	.013
Region	-.091	.061	-.044	-1.483	.138
Native language	-.202	.108	-.048	-1.865	.062
Constant	1.156	.179		6.443	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.035				

Based on the regression sample, the education variable deserves special comment. Education level is a statistically significant determining factor in community involvement, but in the opposite way than expected. We had argued that involvement was a compensating strategy used by excluded sectors, and that more privileged groups would show lower levels of participation. We thus expected the coefficient of the education variable to have a negative value (participation increases as education level decreases). But the regression analysis shows that the education variable has a positive sign, meaning that people do not get more involved in community-based activism simply because they have less education, but for other reasons (for example, a lack of basic services). When we isolate the effects of other variables, we see that education has a positive effect on community-based participation. This makes sense if we assume that education is an asset that favors collective action.

Overall, we find that those who show greater involvement in civil society organizations and community-based activism tend to belong to less-favored groups in Peruvian society, such as women, those with the least education and the poor. This indicates that these groups assume these forms of collective action as a strategy for compensating for things they lack. While these actions are useful in attaining that goal, however, they do not necessarily have a democratizing effect. To achieve this, other conditions must exist that lead civil society organizations to function democratically, with fluid relationships between leaders and the rank and file, as well as between members and non-members.

### 3. LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

#### 3.1 Overall support for the political system

Various studies have shown a close relationship between trust in the political system and maintenance of democracy. Conventional wisdom holds that satisfaction with the workings of the political system and its institutions leads to "diffuse support" for the system. This in turn becomes a sort of "reserve" of legitimacy that the democratic system can use when the country finds itself in a difficult situation. This means that satisfaction with and trust in the political system not only serve to strengthen existing democracy; more importantly, they lay the groundwork for future legitimacy. As we will see, however, the assumptions inherent in this conventional understanding are not borne out in Peru. The survey shows extremely high levels of distrust in the political system and its institutions. This does not, however, imply rejection of democracy itself. On the contrary, it is a critical reaction to a government that is considered authoritarian. Support for the system, on the other hand, is associated with greater tolerance for authoritarian behavior.

To what degree are Peruvians satisfied with the political system and its institutions? To measure the level of satisfaction, we used a scale of support for the political system that has been used successfully on other occasions. The scale includes five questions and begins with the following phrase: "Now we would like to talk about political institutions in Peru, such as the Presidency, Congress, the Judicial Branch, political parties, etc., that is, the political system in general. I am going to read you a series of questions and would like you to tell me where you see yourself on the scale from 1 to 7." The response options range from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("very much"). The questions are:

- Do you believe the Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial?
- Do you trust the political institutions in Peru?
- Do you believe the Peruvian political system protects people's fundamental rights?
- Are you personally satisfied with the Peruvian political system?


- Do you personally support the institutions of the Peruvian political system?

The 1998 survey shows that Peruvians have a fairly critical attitude toward their political system. For each of the questions, no fewer than one-third of the respondents chose the extreme option of distrust. In some cases, the proportion expressing extreme distrust neared 50 percent of respondents.

As we see in Figure 3.1, when asked whether they personally supported Peru's political institutions, 49 percent of the people interviewed said "not at all." If the two lowest points on the scale are combined, the percentage of discontent with the Peruvian political system is overwhelming, never lower than 53 percent. In every case, 50 percent or more of those interviewed placed themselves at one of the two points representing greatest discontent with the political system.

At the other extreme of the distribution is a tiny percentage that expresses satisfaction with the Peruvian political system. When the highest three points of satisfaction are combined, the percentages do not exceed 12 percent, and in two cases they barely reach 9 percent (see Figure 3.1).

**Figure 3.1**  
Indicators of support for the Peruvian political system, 1998



To compare levels of citizen acceptance of the Peruvian political system shown in this survey with those of previous years, we established an index or scale of support for the political system, adding the responses to the five preceding questions (and dividing by 5 to maintain the original range of the scale). Like the survey questions, the resulting scale has a range of 1 to 7, where 1 constitutes complete rejection of the system and 7 represents total support, with 4 as the midpoint. The overall mean on the scale of

support for the political system is 2.45. This figure clearly indicates citizen dissatisfaction with the general workings of the Peruvian political system, since it is well below the midpoint of 4<sup>17</sup>.

If we compare the results of the 1998 survey with those of the two previous years, we find a drop in the mean level of support for the Peruvian political system, as we shall see in the following graph.

While the mean level of support in 1996 was 3.15, in 1997 it was 3.12, and in 1998 it was only 2.45. It is difficult to determine to what degree this drop reflects a real trend of growing discontent with the Peruvian political system, or whether it reflects normal variations of probability sampling or results from changes in the way the question was phrased.


Whether or not the degree of support for the political system has actually decreased, it is important to note that the levels shown in the last three years are extremely low. In every case, the mean level of support was below the midpoint of the scale.

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<sup>17</sup> It must be noted that two of the questions in the 1998 survey were phrased differently from the previous polls. In 1996 and 1997 respondents were asked, "To what degree do you feel proud to live under the Peruvian political system?" In 1998, this was changed to: "Are you personally satisfied with the Peruvian political system?" Similarly, in 1996 and 1997 respondents were asked, "To what degree do you believe the Peruvian political system must be supported?" In 1998, however, they were asked, "Do you personally support the institutions of the Peruvian political system?" We believe the formulation of the question in the 1998 survey is more precise than in previous years, in the sense that the respondent is asked directly about his or her level of satisfaction with -- and support for -- the system, particularly because the normative element ("must be supported") is removed and the respondent is asked directly whether he or she supports the system.

Empirical evidence that the new formulation is better than that of previous surveys is seen when we compare the Alpha coefficients of reliability of the respective scales (the Gutmann Alpha coefficient is used to measure the degree of correlation or internal consistency of the items in a particular scale or index. Values of .8 or above indicate the scale is highly reliable.) While the scale of support for the political system has an Alpha coefficient of .786 and .801 in 1996 and 1997 respectively, that figure rises to .819 in 1998.


Figure 3.2  
Support for the political system, 1996-1998



How do the mean levels of support for the political system vary by control group? We find statistically significant differences in mean levels of support for the system by age, education level, place of residence and socio-economic level. The means are higher among young people, those with less education, those at lower socio-economic levels and those who live in rural areas (Figure 3.3).

These differences, however, must not make us lose sight of the important fact that citizen dissatisfaction with the political system is fairly widespread. In fact, among those more inclined to support the Peruvian political system, such as youth (18-24 years), residents of rural areas and the poor, the mean level of support is less than 3, a figure that is substantially below the midpoint (4) of the scale.


Figure 3.3  
**Support for the Peruvian political system among various control groups**



Range of scale: 1 to 7


These results allow us to better understand what has been said in previous sections. We see that, on average, the most precarious and excluded sectors tend to support the political system to a greater degree, while those whose situation is better are more critical. This could indicate that support for the political system is a sign of a lower level of critical analysis, an argument that is confirmed when we contrast the scale of interest in public affairs with that of support for the political system (Figure 3.4); we find that those who show greater interest in public affairs support the system to a lesser degree.

**Figure 3.4**  
**Support for the Peruvian political system according to interest in public affairs**



If we look separately at how the scales of information consumption (radio, television, newspapers) correspond to support for the political system, we find the clearest behavior in the variable related to following television news (Figure 3.5). Those who most frequently watch television news programs show the least trust in the political system.


**Figure 3.5**  
**Support for the Peruvian political system according to television news consumption**



As stated earlier, support for the political system therefore could result from a lower level of critical analysis. Thus, it is erroneous to think


that support for the political system can lead to greater support for democracy. This becomes clear when we see that those who show a greater support for the political system are those who have a higher opinion of the functioning of democracy in the country (figure 3.6), but are more likely to accept an authoritarian government (figure 3.7)

**Figure 3.6**  
**Support for the political system**  
 according to opinion of the functioning of democracy in Peru




We also see that those who most staunchly support democracy as a system show mean levels of support for the system below those of people who say an authoritarian government may sometimes be better than a democratic one (Figure 3.7).

**Figure 3.7**  
**Support for the Peruvian political system**  
 according to opinion of democracy as a political system




Survey data reinforce the correlation between support for the political system and greater tolerance for authoritarianism. We established a scale of tolerance toward authoritarian behavior by presidents, which is analyzed in detail in Chapter 7. We found that those who were more tolerant of presidential authoritarianism also showed greater support for the political system (Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8  
Support for the Peruvian political system  
according to tolerance for presidential authoritarianism



We also find that greater support for the political system is associated with a higher opinion of President Fujimori's performance (Figure 3.9). This shows that people closely associate the political system with the government. The Pearson correlation between support for the political system and a higher opinion of Fujimori's performance is a relatively high .38. To a large degree, therefore, criticism of the system is criticism of the government, rather than rejection of democracy as a political system.

**Figure 3.9**  
Support for the Peruvian political system




according to opinion of President Fujimori's performance

What we have seen so far suggests that the president is identified with authoritarian behavior. The Pearson correlation between the evaluation of President Fujimori's performance and tolerance for presidential authoritarianism is .24, which represents a moderate correlation.

We should point out that support for the political system is related to the respondent's ideology as measured on a continuum from left to right. The data show that respondents who place themselves farther to the right on the scale tend to support the system to a greater degree (Figure 3.10). Because the government is identified with a center-right position, support for the system is greater among those who also place themselves on that part of the spectrum.

**Figure 3.10**  
Support for the Peruvian political system



according to respondent's ideology

In summary, support for the political system is extremely low. Those who tend to show somewhat greater support live in precarious conditions, and their support could be a function of a lower level of critical analysis. This greater support is associated with a relatively higher opinion of the present administration's performance and greater tolerance of authoritarian behavior by presidents. These low levels of support, therefore, do not represent a lower level of support for democracy as a system, but a lack of support for a government that is perceived as authoritarian.

Of all the control variables shown in Figure 3.3, which are the greatest factors in determining levels of support for the system and what is their relative weight? The regression analysis shown in Table 3.1 provides some answers:

**Table 3.1**  
**Regression analysis of support for the political system**  
**using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Error Estándar	Beta		
Education level	-.047	.009	-.177*	-5.345	.000
Age	-.016	.002	-.173*	-6.389	.000
Region	-.209	.048	-.133*	-4.362	.000
Socio-economic condition	.083	.030	.097*	2.763	.006
Sex	.080	.059	.035	1.355	.176
First language	.128	.088	.038	1.442	.149
Constant	3.412	.146		23.289	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.053				

We find that support for the political system is, first of all, inversely proportional to the respondent's education, with those having more education showing less support for the system. Age is in second place, there is greater support among young people. In third place is area of residence, with greater support found in rural areas. Lastly, and interestingly there is a positive correlation between socio-economic level and degree of acceptance of the political system when we control for education, area of residence and other variables. Neither sex nor language is statistically significant in determining levels of support for the system.

Earlier in this section, when we analyzed the means, socio-economic condition showed an inverse relationship to support for the political system. That is, the mean level of support was higher among those at lower socio-economic levels. The regression analysis, however, shows that the socio-economic variable has a positive sign. This does not contradict what we have already seen, but it shows that if all other variables remain constant, a higher socio-economic level has a positive effect on support for the system. In other words, people do not support the system more simply because they are poor, but because they have less education, are younger or live in rural areas.

The variables shown in the preceding table are not the only ones that can be used to predict levels of support for the system. As we have seen, there are political variables that appear to be associated with this dependent variable. For this reason, we did a second regression analysis, including political variables such as interest in public affairs, following television news,

ideology, opinion of the functioning of democracy<sup>18</sup>, opinion of the president's performance, tolerance for presidential authoritarianism, and preference for democracy as a political system<sup>19</sup> (Table 3.2).

**Table 3.2**  
**Regression analysis of support for the political system**  
**using various control and "political" variables**

	Non-standardized		Standardi	t value	Signifi-
	coefficients		zed coef.		
	B	Standard	Beta		cance
		error			
Education level	-.034	.010	-.119*	-3.510	.000
Age	-.010	.003	-.117*	-3.985	.000
Region	-.176	.053	-.107*	-3.345	.001
Socio-economic condition	.073	.030	.085*	2.413	.016
Sex	.105	.063	.046	1.657	.098
First language	.113	.106	.030	1.061	.289
Opinion of Fujimori's performance	.333	.042	.262*	7.972	.000
Evaluation of the functioning of democracy in Peru	.265	.046	.185*	5.744	.000
Scale of support for authoritarian behavior by presidents	.094	.032	.092*	2.941	.003
Following of television news	-.160	.069	-.072*	-2.325	.020
Scale of <i>extreme left</i> and <i>extreme right</i>	.036	.016	.061*	2.222	.027
Preference for democracy as a system	.042	.046	.027	.900	.368
Scale of interest in public affairs	-.012	.050	-.007	-.235	.814
Constant	1.555	.324		4.805	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.235				

The results of the regression analysis allow us to compare various elements. First, the incorporation of the additional variables significantly improves the ability to make predictions, as can be seen in the increase of the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> value from .051 to .235. We also find that the variables that appeared to be significant predictors of support for the system are still

<sup>18</sup> In order to incorporate this last variable in the regression, it had to be redefined as follows: A point value of 0 was assigned to those who said democracy in Peru worked very poorly, and values of 1, 2 and 3 respectively to those who considered it poor, average and good. At the other end of the scale, those who said it worked well were assigned a point value of 4.

<sup>19</sup> This variable was redefined as follows: A point value of 1 was given to those who said an authoritarian government is sometimes preferable to a democratic one; a value of 2 to those who said it makes no difference; and a value of 3 to those who said democracy is preferable to any other form of government.

statistically significant when new variables are incorporated. This indicates that education, social class, age and area of residence are significant predictors of levels of support for the system. With respect to the political variables included in this second regression analysis, we find something very important. The variables that best indicate support for the system are support for President Fujimori's administration and a positive opinion of how democracy works in the country. After the sociodemographic variables of education, age and area of residence, the next most important variable is tolerance for authoritarian behavior by a president. The other variables that influence support for the political system are following television news and the respondent's ideology. The regression shows that interest in public affairs and preference for a democratic government are not determining factors in support for the system if the other variables remain constant.


The regression analysis confirms what we have seen earlier in this section. It is worth noting that the variable that most strongly indicates support for the political system is the respondent's opinion of Fujimori's performance, which reinforces the idea that respondents closely associated the political system with the government. The second strongest variable is the evaluation of how well democracy functions. This supports the argument that those who are less critical of the functioning of the democracy are those who show greater support for a system that has, in general, lost public backing.

### 3.2 Trust in political institutions

To more accurately gauge citizens' attitudes toward the Peruvian political system, respondents were asked about their level of confidence in various political and non-political national institutions. As in the preceding case, we used a seven-point scale whose midpoint, or neutral point, is four. As we saw earlier when we analyzed the degree of support for the political system, respondents showed a marked lack of trust in political institutions. Using as a point of comparison the level of confidence in the Catholic Church, whose mean of 5.6 in 1998 places it at a relatively high trust level, we can see more clearly the degree of distrust in Peru's political institutions.

Let's begin by considering purely political institutions. Going from least to greatest, in the 1998 data, the mean level of trust in the Judicial Branch is 2.6; in Congress, 2.7; in the Attorney General's Office, 3.3; in the Controller General, 3.3; and in the Ombudsman's Office, 3.9. When we compare these results with earlier polls, there is not a clear trend of change (Figure 3.11).

Figure 3.11  
Trust in political institutions, 1996-1998




What stands out is that all institutions except the Ombudsman's Office inspire low levels of trust, below the midpoint on the scale. One explanation for the higher rating of the Ombudsman's Office is its clear independence

from the Executive Branch and its dedication to the defense of civil rights that often are violated by other state institutions.


Let's look at other institutions considered in the survey. As we have seen, the Catholic Church is the institution that inspires greatest trust (with a mean of 5.6 in 1998). In 1998, journalists had a mean trust level of 3.9; the Armed Forces, 3.6; and the National Police a very low 3.1. This is not surprising when we consider the data about lack of public safety presented in Chapter 6. We do not find significant variations when we compare these results with those of previous years (Figure 3.12).

**Figure 3.12**  
**Trust in the Catholic Church, journalists, the Armed Forces and Police**  
**1996-1998**




Among institutions that are not linked to the central government and that are, by nature, closer to the people, we find that the 1998 survey shows show a mean trust level of 3.8 in provincial governments and 3.6 in district governments. As we have seen, neighborhood organizations show a relatively high level of 4.2, above the midpoint. Unions have a mean of 3.5. There are no significant variations when we compare these results with the surveys of the last two years (see Figure 3.13).

**Figure 3.13**  
**Citizen trust in municipal governments, neighborhood organizations and unions, 1996-1998**



Finally, let's look at the 1998 data regarding citizen trust in institutions related to elections. The survey shows a mean level of trust of 3.4 in the National Elections Board (JNE), a mean of 3.5 in the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE), and a mean of 3.6 in the National Registry of Identity and Civil Status (RENIEC) among respondents who say they are familiar with these institutions (a relatively small percentage in comparison to those who recognized other institutions we have mentioned previously). Taking into account data from previous years, there seems to be a downward trend, although it is difficult to know for certain, since the differences are clearly within the margin of sample error (Figure 3.14).

**Figure 3.14**  
**Trust in electoral institutions, 1996 - 1998**



To round out an analysis of the trust level in electoral bodies, we must take into consideration other survey data, which show that the great majority of those interviewed (67 percent) believe electoral fraud is committed in Peru. It must be noted that the survey was done just a few days after the municipal elections in October 1998. According to the results of the 1996 *Latinobarómetro* survey, the lack of faith in clean elections in Peru was no higher than the Latin American average.

Before continuing with the comparative analysis of trust in political institutions, it is worth noting that the people interviewed were not familiar with many of the institutions mentioned in the survey questions. For this reason, many did not respond to questions about their level of confidence in these institutions. The results we have examined so far refer to cases in which the survey respondents replied to questions about their level of trust in certain institutions. In all the years of the survey, however, a certain percentage of people have not responded because they did not know or were unfamiliar with the institution mentioned in the question (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3**  
**Percentage of those interviewed who did not know or were unfamiliar with various institutions**


Institution	Don't know			Unfamiliar with institution			Total percentage of non-respondents		
	1996	1997	1998	1996	1997	1998	1996	1997	1998
Congress	5.9	3.8	3.4	n.d.	1.2	2.6	5.9	5.0	5.9
Judicial Branch	4.3	3.7	3.1	n.d.	1.4	2.2	4.3	5.1	5.3
Attorney General	6.0	8.7	8.6	20.1	3.0	7.0	26.1	11.7	15.6
Ombudsman's Office	4.4	8.9	10.2	23.0	4.6	8.0	27.5	13.5	18.2
JNE	5.9	8.5	5.9	10.9	2.2	4.8	16.8	10.7	10.7
RENIEC	4.7	10.7	10.0	27.7	5.9	9.4	32.4	16.6	19.5
ONPE	3.6	10.2	7.4	18.8	6.8	7.2	22.4	17.1	14.6
Controller General	4.8	11.9	14.6	25.5	7.8	13.2	30.2	19.8	27.7
District Government	8.8	5.0	1.9	n.d.	0.1	0.7	8.8	5.2	2.6
Provincial Government	6.1	7.0	1.9	n.d.	0.1	0.7	6.1	7.0	2.6
Armed Forces	4.6	3.8	1.8	n.d.	0.8	0.8	4.6	4.7	2.7
National Police	3.0	3.5	1.0	n.d.	0.6	0.7	3.0	4.1	1.7
Catholic Church	3.5	3.7	0.8	n.d.	0.6	0.3	3.5	4.3	1.1
Journalists	5.2	5.0	4.2	n.d.	1.0	1.8	5.2	6.1	6.0

As we can see, the least-known institution is the Controller General, followed in order by the National Registry of Identity and Civil Status (RENIEC) and the Ombudsman's Office. The level of unfamiliarity is higher among women, people with less education, those whose first language is Quechua, those at lower socio-economic levels and those who live in rural areas. For example, 40 percent of respondents answered "Don't know" or

"Not familiar with the institution" when asked about RENIEC, a figure that rose to 50 percent for the Controller General. In the *Latinobarómetro* survey the percentage of non-responses is not as high, probably because that survey was carried out only in urban areas, not in rural zones or Quechua-speaking communities.

Continuing our comparative analysis of Peru, according to the results of the 1997 *Latinobarómetro* survey, we find that levels of trust in Peruvian institutions differ significantly from those of other countries in the region. The *Latinobarómetro* data show Peru to be above the Latin American average in citizen trust in the Catholic Church and television, and below average in trust in the presidency and the police. Especially noteworthy is Peruvians' lack of confidence in the Armed Forces, the Judicial Branch, Congress and political parties. Only in Argentina and Bolivia is there a lower level of trust in the Armed Forces, and Peru shows the lowest level of trust in the Judicial Branch in the entire region. Only Ecuadorans show less confidence in Congress, and only Ecuadorans and Brazilians show lower levels of trust in political parties (see Figure 3.15).

**Figure 3.15**  
**Trust in institutions in Latin America, 1997**




Source: *Latinobarómetro* 1997.

Unfortunately, the levels of distrust in Peru are not only related to the country's institutions. Personal relationships are also greatly affected. If personal trust is considered a very important social basis for sustaining

democracy, there is cause for great concern. Peruvians have a poor image of themselves, seeing themselves as dishonest and lacking in solidarity and respect for the law. According to the 1997 *Latinobarómetro* survey, in these areas Peruvians had by far the poorest self-perception in the region (see Figure 3.16).

**Figure 3.16**  
**Latin America: Opinion of fellow citizens, 1997**



Source: *Latinobarómetro* 1997.

Analysis of levels of confidence in institutions does not paint an optimistic picture. We find that institutions, especially those associated with the government and its influence, have little public support. On the other hand, institutions that show the greatest independence from the Executive Branch, such as the Ombudsman's Office and local governments, generally inspire greater confidence. The institutions most trusted by citizen are those that are not state-related, such as neighborhood organizations and the Catholic Church. We must emphasize that rebuilding trust in the country's institutions is also related to reconstructing interpersonal relationships, which have deteriorated greatly in recent years.

## 4. CITIZENSHIP AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

### 4.1 Citizen perceptions of local government performance

With the 1980 return to constitutional government and subsequent municipal elections, Peruvians once again were able to take part in this important aspect of governance. The possibility of democratically electing our local authorities is certainly fundamental to democracy. Local governments in our country play a central role in defense of citizens' rights, as intermediaries between society and politics, in tasks associated with food supply and subsistence, in improving living conditions and in many other areas, along with their traditional tasks of local administration. The fact that citizens can elect and monitor their local governments implies that they have a closer relationship with the state and greater influence, and that we all, therefore, have a better basis for participatory democracy.

In recent years, however, local governments have been plagued with problems. One was terrorist activity; many mayors and council members, or candidates for those offices, were threatened or assassinated by terrorists. Violence, however, has not been the only challenge facing local governments in Peru. Another has been scarcity of resources. The economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s severely affected local budgets, and although local governments now have more resources in absolute terms<sup>20</sup>, they continue to be handicapped because the resources are insufficient for the responsibilities they must assume. Despite these challenges, however, local governments throughout the country have continued to be the state presence that maintains the closest relationship with citizens. This results from their attention to communities' concrete demands and problems, as well as the fact that they are directly elected by universal secret ballot.

In the past few years, local governments have found themselves facing a new challenge, as their traditional functions are reduced and

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<sup>20</sup> The increase in economic resources has been greater at the district than the provincial level.

superceded in attempts to turn them into agents of the Executive Branch's political projects. Local governments have many functions, including security, housing, transportation, sanitation services, health, education, culture, tourism, recreation, and storage and commercialization of food products. In many of these areas, local governments compete with dependencies of the Ministry of the Presidency, such as FONCODES<sup>21</sup>, PRONAA<sup>22</sup> and INFES<sup>23</sup>.

Despite these limitations, as we saw in the previous chapter, local governments and the Ombudsman's Office are the state institutions that inspire the greatest confidence. Moreover, people consider local governments the institutions that contribute most to solving problems in their communities. When participants in the 1998 survey were asked what institution would best solve their communities' main problems, one out of two answered "local government." In the 1996 survey, respondents were asked what institution best contributed to solving community problems and were given the options of local government, Congress and central government. Sixty-one percent responded "local government."

So far we have spoken of local governments in general, but it is necessary to distinguish between two forms of local government: district governments and provincial governments (which are larger territorial units that include various districts). There are a large number of district governments (1,818 nationwide) and fewer provincial governments (slightly more than 190). Given the country's diversity, local governments, whether district or provincial, differ greatly from one another. There are, for example, great disparities in population. Taking an extreme case, the most densely populated district of Lima, San Juan de Lurigancho, has more than 730,000 residents, while more than half the districts in the country have fewer than 5,000 residents and nearly one-third have fewer than 2,000. Areas of action, therefore, differ greatly among locations.

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<sup>21</sup> The Social Compensation and Development Fund (Fondo de Compensación y Desarrollo Social), created in 1991 to ease the effect of the economic adjustment politics implemented during President Alberto Fujimori's first term.

<sup>22</sup> National Program of Food Supply Support (Programa Nacional de Apoyo Alimentario), set up in 1992 as a combination of the Direct Assistance Program (Programa de Asistencia Directa or PAD) and the National Office of Food Supply Support (Oficina Nacional de Apoyo Alimentario or ONAA).

<sup>23</sup> Institute of Educational and Health Infrastructure (Instituto de Infraestructura Educativa y de Salud).

The three successive surveys included four questions related to district and provincial government performance, based on citizens' opinions of three elements:

- Quality of services provided by the government ("Do you believe the services provided to your community by the district/provincial government are: very poor, poor, average, good or very good?")
- Quality of treatment by the government ("When you or your neighbors have gone to do business with the district/provincial government, what kind of treatment have you received: very poor, poor, average, good or very good?")
- Citizen trust in local governments:
  - "How much confidence do you have in the district government?"
  - "How much confidence do you have in the provincial government?"


The first two variables were measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 ("very poor") to 5 ("very good"). The third question was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 ("No confidence") to 7 ("Great confidence"). Because of the different ranges, we converted them to a single scale of 0 to 100 in order to compare the results.

As Figure 4.1 shows, there has been no great change from year to year in citizens' opinions of treatment or services or their confidence in district or provincial governments.

Citizens tend to have a relatively neutral opinion of the treatment and services provided by their local governments, with mean levels of acceptance near the midpoint of the scale (shown on the graph by a thicker line). In fact, the mean levels in evaluation of services and treatment provided by district governments are above the midpoint, indicating there is not a negative perception of these governments. In 1998, the mean level of the evaluation of services provided by the district government is slightly below the midpoint. Respondents are somewhat more critical, however, when asked about their confidence in local governments. Although the mean levels of confidence in district and provincial governments (along with the Ombudsman's Office) are the highest of all state institutions, the mean does not exceed the midpoint of the scale. The lack of confidence that most Peruvians feel toward the political system also extends to local governments,

although not in the extreme levels seen in attitudes toward other State institutions.


**Figure 4.1**  
**Perception of the quality of treatment and services provided by local governments and the level of confidence they inspire**  
**1996-1998**



To determine how attitudes toward local governments vary among various control groups, we established two summary scales, one for district governments and one for provincial governments. Each scale includes the three variables we have discussed: treatment, services and confidence. The resulting scales range from 0 to 100<sup>24</sup>, with 0 indicating a completely negative opinion of local governments and 100 a completely positive opinion. The results from the three survey years are shown in Figure 4.2. Although the graph suggests ups and downs in attitudes toward local governments, the values are sufficiently similar and close to the midpoint that they could be the result of sample variation probability.

<sup>24</sup> Once the range of 0 to 100 was established, the variables were added and the sum divided by the number of variables, in order to maintain the range of 0 to 100.

**Figure 4.2**  
**Scale of opinions of local governments, 1996-1998**




We find that people are generally more satisfied with provincial governments than district governments, but this is due to the weight of the Lima province in the sample. In comparison with other areas, the Peruvian capital is characterized by a generally high opinion of the provincial government. In all the questions on the scale of provincial government response, and on the scale itself, Lima shows the highest means, exceeding the rest of the country and the country as a whole (see Figure 4.3). The survey was carried out in November 1998, just a few weeks after the reelection of the provincial mayor of Lima, Alberto Andrade, who received more than 60 percent of the vote and whose administration had a high approval rating<sup>25</sup>.

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
<sup>25</sup> Andrade had 74 percent approval rating in Lima, according to survey by Apoyo Opinión y Mercado S.A. on the second half of October 1998.

**Figure 4.3**  
**Variables in local government performance, according to area of residence**



A comparison of the scales of opinion of district and provincial governments by area of residence (Figure 4.4) shows that the Lima sample is responsible for the trend toward a higher opinion of provincial governments. In rural areas, district governments receive a slightly higher rating than provincial governments; in urban areas other than Lima there is no difference between provincial and district governments.


**Figure 4.4**  
**Mean levels of scale of opinion of district and provincial governments by area of residence**



We will now examine how the means of opinion of local government vary by control groups. At the district level (Figure 4.5), we find that only

two variables, area of residence and native language, show statistically significant variation from the mean. People who live in rural areas and those whose first language is Spanish have a higher opinion of local governments.

**Figure 4.5**  
**Opinion of district government according to control variables**



Range of scale: 0 to 100

To determine which of these variables have a greater influence on opinions of district governments, we did a regression analysis of this scale using control groups. Besides area of residence and native language, we found education to be a variable that influences perception of local government performance (Table 4.1).


How can these results be interpreted? We have maintained that people who are excluded or in precarious situations show greatest support for institutions, and that this support results from a lower level of critical analysis. What we see at the district level appears to confirm this hypothesis, but we do not have enough evidence to know whether this influences opinions of district governments. It is possible that people in rural areas (who generally have less formal education) feel closer to the district government and therefore have a higher opinion of it.

**Table 4.1**  
**Regression analysis of the scale of district government performance**  
**using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Region	-2.174	.744	-.094*	-2.921	.004
Native language	3.795	1.311	.080*	2.895	.004
Educational level	-.285	.134	-.074*	-2.131	.033
Sex	-1.084	.911	-.032	-1.190	.234
Age	.028	.038	-.021	-.737	.461
Socio-economic condition	.482	.468	.038	1.030	.303
Constant	50.594	2.155		23.479	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.013				

The mean levels of opinion of provincial governments show statistically significant variations according to sex, area of residence and first language (Figure 4.6). The greatest support for provincial government is found in Lima (that city showed the highest means of opinion of provincial government and high support for Andrade). Support in rural areas is greater than in "other urban" areas, and there is more support among women than men. This suggests as an hypothesis that those who are traditionally more excluded show greater support for this institution, perhaps because they are less critical. We find, however, that those whose first language is Spanish support the provincial government more than those whose first language is Quechua or Aymara, which contradicts our earlier hypothesis. This survey does not provide enough information to explain this phenomenon.

**Figure 4.6**  
**Opinion of provincial governments according to various control variables**



Range of scale: 0 to 100

Which of the variables most influence opinions of provincial governments? The following table shows the regression analysis of the scale of performance of provincial governments using control variables.

**Table 4.2**  
**Regression analysis of the scale of performance of provincial governments, using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	St. error	Beta		
Native language	5.644	1.404	.116*	4.021	.000
Educational level	-.432	.142	-.109*	-3.050	.002
Region	2.543	.805	.105*	3.161	.002
Age	.082	.040	-.060	-2.041	.041
Sex	-1.749	.962	-.050	-1.818	.069
Socio-economic condition	.223	.485	.017	.459	.647
Constant	50.241	2.310		21.752	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.028				

Here we observe that, as with district governments, the factors that most affect people's opinions of their provincial governments are native language, education and area of residence. Those with a higher opinion of

provincial governments are those whose first language is Spanish and those with less education. Unlike the case of district governments, those with a higher opinion of provincial governments are not the residents of rural areas but those in urban zones, especially Lima.

#### **4.2 Local government responsiveness to citizen demands**

To complete our analysis of local government performance and attempt to answer the questions raised in the previous section, we must examine citizens' perceptions of local governments' responsiveness to their demands. The survey included two questions on this issue: "How often do you believe the local government (mayor or council) responds to what people want: always, most of the time, sometimes, almost never or never?" The question was asked about both district and provincial governments. Table 4.3 shows the results:

**Table 4.3**  
**Citizen perceptions of level of responsiveness**  
**of local governments**  
**(Percentages)**

The government responds to what people want ...	District governments	Provincial governments
Always	5.0	5.8
Most of the time	11.1	13.5
Sometimes	47.5	48.5
Almost never	25.2	22.6
Never	11.1	9.7


A very small proportion, about 5 percent, said local governments "always" respond to demands, while a somewhat larger group, about 10 percent, said local governments "never" respond. Between these extremes we find that the great majority (about 50 percent) believes local governments are "sometimes" sensitive to citizens' demands. As we can see, the majority of people do not think local governments, whether district or provincial, are particularly sensitive to what people want, although there is not a general rejection of the governments. If the sum of the clearly positive responses ("always" and "most of the time") is compared with that of the

clearly negative responses ("almost never" and "never"), the negative opinion is definitely greater than the positive. Fewer than one-fifth of those interviewed had a positive opinion of district or provincial government responsiveness, while one-third or more think these governments never or almost never respond to people's demands. This is true even though, as we have seen, local governments are the State institutions that inspire the greatest confidence.

Who has the highest opinion of the responsiveness of district and provincial governments to citizens' demands? In order to calculate a mean that could be compared to various control groups, we assigned point values to each of the responses shown in the preceding table. A value of 1 was assigned to "never," while at the other extreme, a value of 5 was given to "always". We can now answer this question with the following two graphs, which show attitudinal differences toward the sensitivity or responsiveness of district governments (Figure 4.7) and provincial governments (Figure 4.8).

**Figure 4.7**

**Citizen perceptions of the level of responsiveness**




## of district governments

Range of scale: 1 to 5.

In the case of district governments, the groups with an opinion of the responsiveness of local governments that exceeds the mean (2.74) are women, people with less education, residents of rural areas and those whose first language is Spanish (Figure 4.7).

**Figure 4.8**  
Citizen perceptions of the level of responsiveness  
of provincial governments



Range of scale: 1 to 5.

In the case of provincial governments, the groups whose opinion of local government responsiveness to citizen demands is higher than the mean

(2.83) are residents of Metropolitan Lima, those with a higher socio-economic level, women and those whose first language is Spanish (Figure 4.8).

To see which variables are statistically significant in determining perceptions of the level of responsiveness of local governments, we did two regression analyses, one for district governments (Table 4.4) and one for provincial governments (Table 4.5). This analysis is discussed in following paragraphs.

**Table 4.4**

**Regression analysis of the scale of responsiveness of District Governments, according to various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Sex	-.106	.048	-.054*	-2.201	.028
Region	-.121	.039	-.094*	-3.112	.002
Educational level	-.011	.006	-.054	-1.683	.093
Age	.002	.002	.025	.959	.338
Native language	.240	.068	.091*	3.510	.000
Socio-economic condition	.038	.025	.053	1.541	.123
Constant	2.689	.110		24.344	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.014				

In the case of district governments, we find that the most statistically significant socio-demographic variables are sex, area of residence and native language. This is consistent with the hypothesis we have already presented, which holds that those who are excluded and have a lower level of critical analysis, as well as women and residents of rural areas, tend to have a higher opinion of district government responsiveness. The behavior of the language variable, however, shows a lower level of support among those whose first language is Quechua, which contradicts this hypothesis.

These paradoxes appear again in the regression applied to analyze the responsiveness of provincial governments. The only two determining variables are sex and native language, with women tending to have a higher

opinion, as do people whose first language is Spanish. It is not clear how these variables operate in determining perceptions of the responsiveness of provincial governments. Perhaps there are the ones who come into contact with local governments.

**Table 4.5**

**Regression analysis of the scale of responsiveness of provincial governments, according to various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standard. Coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Sex	-.118	.049	-.060*	-2.429	.015
Region	.076	.040	-.058	-1.922	.055
Educational level	-.007	.007	-.032	-1.014	.311
Age	.002	.002	.022	.830	.407
Native language	.280	.069	.105*	4.044	.000
Socio-economic condition	.044	.025	.060	1.753	.080
Constant	2.511	.112		22.444	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.025				

**4.3 Community involvement and attitudes toward local governments**

Finally, we will examine the possible impact of involvement in community activism and activities organized by local governments on citizens' opinions of the governments' performance.

We will begin by looking at the impact of participation in activities organized by local governments. One measure of this participation is attendance at town council meetings, government sessions or meetings called by the government. The survey found that nearly one-fourth of the people interviewed had been invited to a meeting of this type during the past year, while one-fifth of the entire sample actually attended. If we consider

only those who were invited, however, 80 percent said they attended the meeting.

**Table 4.6**


**Attendance at councils or meetings called by the local government during the past year**

Total of respondents in sample			Total of respondents who were invited		
	N° of respondents	Percentage		N° of respondents	Percentage
Was invited	427	<b>23.9</b>	Attended	342	<b>80.1</b>
Was not invited or did not respond	1,357	76.1	Was invited, but could not attend	64	15.0
Total	1,784	100.0	Was invited, but attendance was not deemed important	21	4.9
			Total	427	100.0

Is there a relationship between those who are invited and those who attended in such meetings and opinion of the government's performance? The answer is affirmative. Citizens invited by local governments to various activities have higher opinions of the governments' performance than those who were not invited. For example, those who were invited to councils or other meetings called by the government have a higher opinion of district government performance (on the scale of opinion of local governments, which includes treatment, services and level of confidence) than those who were not invited to any such meeting (Figure 4.9). We did not find, however, that participation in councils or other meetings affected attitudes toward provincial governments. We also see little variation, and certainly no statistically significant difference, in the means on the opinion scale between those who invited and those who did not. There is, however, in the case of district governments. This is to be expected, since provincial governments, because they cover a broader area, use these mechanisms to a lesser extent.

**Figure 4.9**

**Involvement in participatory mechanisms of local governments**




## and opinion of the government's performance

If we also take into account the variable of local government responsiveness, we find that those who were invited have a better impression of this responsiveness than those who were not invited (see Figure 4.10). This is important because it shows that citizens' attitudes toward local governments, while colored by their general perception of the political system, can be changed to a certain degree if they take part, or are at least invited to take part, in participatory public mechanisms of local governments.

Figure 4.10


### Involvement in participatory mechanisms of local governments and opinions of local government responsiveness



Now we will analyze whether involvement in community organizations and activities influences citizens' attitudes toward local governments. This would make sense, because local governments tend to support these organizations and promote various community activities. We did not find a statistically significant relationship between opinions of local governments and the scale of participation in community organizations, but the data do show that involvement in community activism has a positive influence on

people's opinions of local governments. Those with higher levels of involvement showed a more positive attitude toward local governments than those with lower levels of community-based activism (Figure 4.11).

**Figure 4.11**  
**Community involvement and opinion of local governments**



Community involvement also had a greater effect on attitudes toward district governments than on opinions of provincial governments. This is understandable, because the district government has more contact with people in the community. Once again, the relationship between activism and opinion of local governments is important because it suggests that the most active members of Peruvian society have a more positive opinion of the role of local government, which is the state institution that figures most prominently in most people's daily lives.

## 5. CITIZENS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THEIR BASIC RIGHTS AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES

When survey participants were asked what is meant by democracy, we found that in general the strongly associate the concept with defense of citizens' rights. The quality of democracy, therefore, depends largely on people being awareness of having rights and being familiar with them, as well as on their perception of how well these rights are upheld and the mechanisms for doing so. When citizens are better informed and more aware of their rights and obligations, it is possible to lay a more solid foundation for democracy in the country.

### 5.1 Knowledge of rights

We will begin the analysis in this chapter by examining citizens' level of knowledge of their constitutional rights, since this is a prerequisite for insisting that these rights be upheld. Of all the rights in the Peruvian Constitution, we will consider only three areas that are closely linked to strengthening the democratic system: personal freedom, freedom of expression and political participation. The Peruvian Constitution includes the first two under the chapter on fundamental rights of the individual and the third under political rights and duties.

*Personal freedom.* This could also be called "physical freedom." People can only be deprived of their freedom under a series of rules that balance the state's duty to guarantee public safety and order with the rights of citizens who are under suspicion. This implies, among other things, that a person who has been detained appear immediately before a judge and that his or her whereabouts be a matter of public record. The Peruvian Constitution establishes that no one can be held without a court order and that anyone detained must be placed at the disposition of the appropriate court within 24 hours or a reasonable time given the distance<sup>26</sup>. It also establishes that "authorities are obligated to make public, without delay and in writing, the

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<sup>26</sup> This time limit does not apply to cases of terrorism, espionage and illicit drug trafficking, in which suspects can be detained for up to 15 days.

whereabouts of the detained person." The survey analyzed people's knowledge in this area through two questions:

- The detained person's right to have his or her whereabouts made public without delay.
- Knowledge of the maximum time a person can be held by police without a court order in cases other than drug trafficking, espionage or terrorism.

*Freedom of expression.* Freedom of expression consists of seeking, receiving and disseminating information and ideas of various kinds through any medium. This freedom, along with those of opinion and information, is indispensable for political participation and oversight of public authorities, since it permits the exchange of ideas on various public issues. The Peruvian Constitution guarantees all these freedoms. The survey analyzed citizens' knowledge of whether the Constitution guarantees:

- The right to publicly express their ideas.


*Political participation.* If people are to fully take part in the country's public affairs, their fundamental rights and freedoms must be respected. Participation includes electing representatives, holding public office or taking part in direct democratic action, such as recalling or removing authorities and requiring accountability. To measure citizens' knowledge in this area, they were asked if the Constitution guarantees the following:

- The right to information from any public entity (unless releasing such information would jeopardize national security)
- The right to request that a public official who does not carry out his or her functions be replaced
- The right to information about the actions and expenditures of public officials

Citizens' knowledge of these rights has not varied substantially in the three years of the survey. More than 50 percent of those interviewed are aware of these rights (Figure 5.1). Knowledge does vary according to the type of right under discussion. While scarcely more than half the respondents know that police authorities must provide information about a detained person's whereabouts or the maximum time of detention, or that public officials must provide information to citizens, more than 80 percent know the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression. This is largely due to the

media's dissemination of information about this right and its place in a democracy, as well as their demand that the right be upheld<sup>27</sup>.

**Figure 5.1**  
**Knowledge of rights, 1996 -1998**  
**(Percentage who say the Constitution guarantees this right)**



Underlying the respondents' knowledge of the existence of these rights is not only direct knowledge from reading the Constitution or indirect knowledge through the media, but a deeper awareness that they are citizens who have rights. To more closely examine this idea, the survey included a question about a right that does not appear in the Constitution, "the right to have the state provide work to those who need it." Sixty-five percent of those interviewed said this right is in the Constitution<sup>28</sup>, making it one of the "best-known" rights. This suggests that citizens' attitudes toward their rights are a combination of formal knowledge and a demand for rights they consider just.

<sup>27</sup> In the survey we included an open question (no suggested responses) about the personal definition of democracy. Thirty seven percent associated democracy with respect of freedom of expression.

<sup>28</sup> The Peruvian Constitution does say people have a right to work. In addition, it provides a legal framework, recognizing that work is a duty and a right, but it never says the State is obligated to provide citizens with work.

## 5.2. The disadvantaged group

In our analysis of citizens' attitudes toward their rights, it is important to examine the attitudes of the most vulnerable sectors of society. To do this, we created a category called the "disadvantaged group," based on three socio-economic variables: education, socio-economic condition and native language. Having little education, being poor and being victims of racial discrimination seriously limit people's development and their ability to exercise their rights.

With this in mind, we included in the disadvantaged group:

- People of both sexes whose highest educational level was primary school and *who also had one of the following characteristics*:
- Quechua or Aymara as a first language, *or*
- Being at the lowest socio-economic level<sup>29</sup>.


Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of people in the sample who are considered part of the "disadvantaged group." The same figure shows the proportion of this group in previous surveys. As we see, the disadvantaged group has been increasing since the first study was done in 1996, from 9 percent to 13 percent in 1997 and 15 percent in 1998. This increase does not necessarily mean living conditions have worsened; it may be due to the greater coverage of small localities in rural areas (campesino communities) in the 1998 survey in comparison to the previous polls. For example, the percentage of people in the sample whose first language is Quechua or Aymara increased from 9 percent in 1996 to 17 percent in our survey, a percentage closer to the census figures of 20 percent.

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<sup>29</sup> The socio-economic variable is based on possession of the following appliances: television, telephone, refrigerator, washing machine or an automobile manufactured in the past five years. People at the lowest socio-economic level have no appliances or only one, usually a television set. Respondents who said they had a telephone or automobile were not included in the disadvantaged group.

**Figure 5.2**

**Disadvantaged groups, 1996-1998**



It is interesting to note the composition of the disadvantaged group. According to our definition, everyone in this category has a primary education or less and the majority speak Quechua or Aymara as a first language (54 percent) and are at the lowest socio-economic level (74 percent). The proportion of survey respondents in the disadvantaged group is smaller in urban areas, especially Lima. This is clearly related to native language, since a greater proportion of people whose first language is Quechua or Aymara is found in rural areas. The proportion of the disadvantaged group increases with the age of the people interviewed, being greatest among people over age 54, which is also the group that includes the largest percentage of people who have no formal education or have only attended or completed primary school. There is no real difference between the percentage of women and men in this group and the overall sample. Table 5.1 summarizes the characteristics of the disadvantaged group in the 1998 survey, comparing them to those who are not disadvantaged and the sample as a whole.

Table 5.1 also includes information about knowledge of rights and involvement in community organizations and activities, as well as participation in training activities on citizens' rights. As we can see, only in the case of community involvement do people in the disadvantaged group show a somewhat higher level than those who are not disadvantaged. This confirms the analysis of citizenship and participation presented in Chapter 2. On the other hand, survey respondents in the disadvantaged group showed


less knowledge of where to go in case of mistreatment when compared to other groups and as a percentage of those who participated in training courses about citizens' rights.

**Table 5.1**  
**Sociodemographic characteristics of the disadvantaged group**

<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Disadvantaged group</b>	<b>Non-disadvantaged group</b>	<b>Total sample</b>
Education	100% have completed primary school or less	12% have completed primary school or less	25% have completed primary school or less
Native language	54% have a first language other than Spanish	10% have a first language other than Spanish	17% have a first language other than Spanish
Socio-economic level	74% have no appliances	5% have no appliances	16% have no appliances
Zone	83% live in rural areas and 7% in Lima	20% live in rural areas and 32% in Lima	29% live in rural areas and 28% in Lima.
Age	35% belong to the 45+ age group	22% belong to the 45+ age group	24% belong to the 45+ age group
Sex	There are no differences according to sex; women represent 50% of each of these groups		
Participation in civil society organizations	47% show a high level of participation	35% show a high level of participation	36% show a high level of participation
Community activism	54% show a high level of participation	44% show a high level of participation	45% show a high level of participation
Training courses in citizens' rights	17% have received training courses about rights	44% have received training courses about rights	40% have received training courses about rights
Know where to complain if mistreated by a public servant	27% do not know where to complain if mistreated by a public servant	19% do not know where to complain if mistreated by a public servant	20% do not know where to complain if mistreated by a public servant
Type of mistreatment they thought of when asked if they knew where to complain if mistreated by a public servant	67% thought of physical mistreatment	47% thought of physical mistreatment	49% thought of physical mistreatment


Once the disadvantaged group is defined, we can analyze differences in attitudes toward citizens' rights between this group and the national sample. Unlike the national sample, in which more than 50 percent of those interviewed knew their rights, in the disadvantaged group the levels of knowledge did not exceed 50 percent except in the case of freedom of expression, as we see in the following graph.

**Figure 5.3**  
**Knowledge of rights, 1998**  
**National sample and disadvantaged group**



The disadvantaged group's level of knowledge of rights has changed since the first survey, with a large increase in the case of freedom of expression and a slight positive trend in knowledge of other rights (Figure 5.4).


**Figure 5.4**  
**Disadvantaged group: knowledge of rights, 1996 -1998**



On the basis of the six rights shown in Figure 5.1, we designed a *scale of knowledge of rights*. For each question, we assigned a point value of 0 to those who said they did not know if the right was included in the Constitution or who wrongly said no, and a value of 1 to those who correctly said that the Constitution guarantees the right. Thus the scale has a range of values from 0 ("Does not know any rights") to 6 ("Knows all rights"), with 3 as the midpoint on the scale. The mean for the national sample is 3.7 - above the midpoint. The mean level of knowledge of rights for the disadvantaged group, on the other hand, is 2.3, definitely below the midpoint (Figure 5.5).


If we look at changes in the mean levels on this scale over the three years of the survey, we find a slight trend toward greater knowledge of rights (see Figure 5.5) in both the national sample and the disadvantaged group, although there is still a gap between the two.

**Figure 5.5**  
**Scale of knowledge of rights, 1996-1998**



Next we will analyze how the means on the knowledge of rights scale vary according to various control groups (Figure 5.6). We see greater knowledge of rights as the respondent's educational level increases (this association is found in all years of the survey). Those with primary education and residents of rural areas show the least knowledge of their rights, while those at a higher socio-economic level show greater knowledge. The levels are also greater, on average, among men, people whose first language is Spanish and residents of Lima. The disadvantaged group shows a mean level of knowledge far below that of the non-disadvantaged group (which exceeds the national mean).

**Figure 5.6**  
**Knowledge of rights in various control populations**



Range of scale: 0 to 6

It is important to keep in mind that respondents' attitudes toward their rights is not only a product of formal knowledge; it also stems from their perception of justice and their awareness of being citizens who have rights. We have seen that most of those interviewed incorrectly said the Constitution guarantees that the state will provide work for those who need it. If we analyze the variations in the responses to this question in the various control groups, we find that those who most often responded yes (incorrectly) are more educated, have a higher socio-economic level and live in Lima and urban areas. They also are not disadvantaged and show greater interest in politics and public affairs. At first glance, it seems paradoxical that those with higher levels of education erred most often in answering this

question. The reason is that people who are better educated and better off socio-economically also have a deeper sense of having rights, which leads them to believe that rights they consider just should be guaranteed by the state, a phenomenon unrelated to their actual knowledge of legal norms.

To determine the relative influence of these factors on people's knowledge of their rights, a regression analysis was done using the socio-demographic variables we have already mentioned plus two additional factors: training in citizens' rights and interest in public affairs, which includes following news on radio or television or in the newspaper (Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2**  
**Regression analysis of the scale of knowledge of rights**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Beta coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error			
Educational level	.079	.012	.197*	6.451	.000
Region	.398	.064	.170*	6.231	.000
Sex	.360	.079	.101*	4.539	.000
Age	.005	.003	.035	1.446	.148
Native language	-.103	.113	-.021	-.916	.360
Socio-economic condition	.046	.041	.035	1.118	.264
Scale of interest in public affairs	.232	.049	.115*	4.686	.000
Received training course in rights?	.264	.085	.072*	3.124	.002
Constant	1.062	.241		4.401	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.180				

The regression analysis confirms the assertion that people's knowledge of their rights is a function of a series of variables, the most important of which is educational level. (This is indicated by the fact that the Beta coefficient for education has the highest value.) Residence in urban areas is also associated with greater knowledge of rights. Residents of Metropolitan Lima are more likely to know their rights than residents of rural areas. Sex is also a significant predictor, as men are more likely than women to know their rights. Neither language nor socio-economic level appears to be significant when we control for the other variables.


Inclusion of the variables of information about national issues and training in citizens' rights increases the model's value as a predictive tool, since both appear to be statistically significant. People with a higher point value on the scale of attention to public affairs are more likely to have a higher mean level on the scale of knowledge of basic rights. Similarly, the results show that efforts by various nongovernmental organizations to teach people about their rights have borne fruit. People who have attended courses of this kind are more likely to know their rights than those who have not.

### **5.3 Protection of citizens' rights**

A person's awareness that he or she is a citizen who has rights is the first line of defense when the state attempts to violate those rights. We have seen that this knowledge varies widely depending on the specific rights in question and the person's socio-economic level. We also wondered about citizens' perceptions of how well these rights are defended in Peru. This is related to the chapter on legitimacy of the political system, since we want to measure the degree to which citizens believe their rights are upheld. We also consider it appropriate to include the issue here, however, since it is related to the discussion about people's knowledge of their rights.


Figure 5.7 shows the gap between people's knowledge of the rights guaranteed by the Peruvian Constitution and the protection of these rights. While more than half the people interviewed know their basic rights, fewer than one-fourth said the right in question is upheld in Peru. This may indicate their level of critical awareness. Previous surveys also show this gap between knowledge of rights and perceptions of how well these rights are defended, although it is not as great in some cases. For example, the right to hold elected officials accountable was known by 58 percent of respondents in 1996, but only 27 percent said the right was upheld in Peru. In 1997, those figures were 54 and 28 percent, while in 1998 they were 61 and 13 percent, respectively.

**Figure 5.7**  
**Knowledge and perception of defense of rights, 1998**



To gain an overview of citizens' opinions of how well their rights are protected and examine the different perceptions among various control groups, we used a question from the series about support for the political system: How well do you believe the Peruvian political system protects citizens' basic rights? The results were measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents "not at all," 7 represents "well" and the neutral point is 4. In 1996 and 1997 the mean was 3.1; in 1998 it dropped to 2.6. In all the surveys, the mean is below the midpoint. Figure 5.8 shows the mean variations according to significant control variables.

**Figure 5.8**  
**Defense of rights, by various control populations**



Range of scale: 1 to 7

People who are younger and less educated, live in rural areas, have a lower socio-economic level and are in the disadvantaged group show higher means; that is, they are more likely to believe that basic rights are protected in Peru.

This is consistent with our earlier argument that excluded groups and those in precarious conditions, along with young people, tend to be less critical of the system in general and have less knowledge of their rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that they are also more likely to believe that basic

rights are protected. Those in a better socio-economic situation, meanwhile, are more aware of having rights, and are more critical and more likely to believe that those rights are not being defended.

#### 5.4. Knowledge of responsibilities

Political democracy is based not only on citizens' active defense of their rights, but on their daily fulfillment of their responsibilities. When citizens do not carry out their duties and responsibilities, interpersonal relationships suffer and the quality of life deteriorates in the community and society as a whole. This survey, therefore, also included questions addressing the broad area of citizen responsibilities, from participation in local government affairs to denouncing corruption to tolerating bribery by public officials.

As with knowledge of their rights, people's attitudes toward their responsibilities differed widely depending on the specific duty in question. The great majority, 85 percent, said it is a duty to participate in local government affairs. This percentage has remained steady throughout the three years of the study (Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3**  
**Participation in local government affairs, 1996-1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Do you believe citizens have a duty to participate in local government affairs, or is this something we can do only when it interests us?	1996	1997	1998
It is a duty	74.5	73.9	69.4
It is a duty and a right	10.7	11.5	15.6
Only if it interests us	14.8	14.6	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N° of respondents)	(1,387)	(1,414)	(1,604)

A significant majority of respondents (65 percent) also said they would vote in elections even if it were not obligatory. Ninety-one percent of those interviewed voted in the last municipal elections (which were held just a few weeks before the survey was conducted).

More than half the population, 57 percent, would refuse to pay a bribe to speed up a bureaucratic procedure, and the remaining 43 percent would do so "if necessary."

Sixty-eight percent of the population would denounce corruption, a percentage that has remained steady throughout the three years of the survey (Table 5.4)


**Table 5.4**  
**Denouncing corruption, 1996-1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Would you denounce an act of corruption?	1996	1997	1998
Yes, I would denounce it	67.9	68.3	67.9
No, I would not denounce it	32.1	31.7	32.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N° of respondents)	(1,341)	(1,395)	(1,613)

To analyze the distribution of levels of acceptance of civic responsibilities in various sectors of the Peruvian population, we created an "index of acceptance of responsibilities." This index is based on two questions that have been included in all three surveys: the first asks if whether participation in local government affairs is a duty (and a right); the second analyzes attitudes toward corruption. The results are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.

On the basis of these two questions, we established an index that assigns a point value of 1 to each positive response ("participation is a duty," "would denounce an act of corruption") and 0 to other responses (including those who did not respond). The index thus ranges from 0 (negative response or no answer to both questions) to 2 (positive response to both questions). The midpoint of 1 indicates a positive response to one question and a negative response to the other. In the three years of the survey, we have found that the overall mean for the sample is above the midpoint on the index. In 1998 this mean was 1.38; in 1996 it was 1.39 and in 1997 it reached 1.41. Using this index, we can compare differences in the distribution of knowledge of responsibilities in various segments of the population (Figure 5.9).

**Figure 5.9**  
**Knowledge of responsibilities among various control**



**populations**

Range of scale: 0 to 2

We see that fulfillment of responsibilities is greater among those with higher educational and socio-economic levels, residents of urban areas including Lima, and men. People in the disadvantaged group show a lower level of knowledge of civic responsibilities than those who are not in this group.

This complements what we have said earlier: People in excluded and precarious segments of the population not only have less knowledge of their rights, they are less likely to fulfill some important responsibilities.

A regression analysis of these factors, along with variables related to interest in public affairs and training in citizens' rights, allows us to identify the most important factors in determining levels of fulfillment of responsibilities (Table 5.5). The variable that weighs most heavily in this determination is education. As with knowledge of rights, participation in courses on citizens' rights and interest in public affairs have a significant influence on fulfillment of responsibilities. Sex is also a significant variable.

**Table 5.5**  
**Regression analysis of the scale of knowledge of responsibilities,**  
**by social and sociodemographic variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Beta coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error			
Educational level	.023	.005	.150*	4.620	.000
Age	.004	.001	.068*	2.689	.007
Sex	.074	.033	.053*	2.238	.025
Area of residence	.014	.026	.015	.520	.603
Native language	.078	.047	.041	1.675	.094
Socio-economic condition	.029	.017	.057	1.718	.086
Scale of interest in public affairs	.060	.020	.076*	2.941	.003
Has received a training course in rights?	.106	.035	.074*	3.026	.003
(Constant)	.543	.100		5.422	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.080				

While it is true that knowledge of rights and responsibilities depends greatly on differences in educational levels (a variable that is difficult to change in the short term), we have also found that attention to national issues and participation in training programs play an important part in people's knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. This has a bearing on how educational work in citizens' rights can be reinforced. Training programs in recent years have apparently borne fruit, at least in Lima and other urban areas.

## 5.5 Knowledge of where to go to protect one's rights

As important as knowing one's rights is the willingness to defend them when they are violated. To determine the level of knowledge about where to go to protect one's rights, in all three years the survey has included a question presenting a hypothetical situation of mistreatment by a public official. Those interviewed are asked specifically: a) if they would know where to lodge a complaint and b) what type of mistreatment (physical abuse or lack of attention) they thought of when the question was asked. The 1998 survey included a third question: c) if the person actually would complain.

The majority of those interviewed said they would go to the police or the district attorney to denounce poor treatment. A lower percentage said they would go to the Ombudsman's Office or a human rights organization. These results are shown in Table 5.6.

**Table 5.6**  
**Where respondents would go to complain of mistreatment**  
**by a public servant**  
**1996 – 1998 (Percentages)**

Where respondents would go	1996	1997	1998
Police station	35,3	34,7	33,1
District attorney	34,8	28,0	28,6
Ombudsman's Office	12,1	19,5	12,4
Human rights organism	7,3	7,8	7,9
Other	10,5	10,0	18,0
Base <sup>30</sup>	(1136)	(1221)	(1424)

<sup>a</sup> "Other" includes the local government, a private lawyer and the superior of the public servant in question, among others. In 1998, the option "the person's superior" represented 10 percent of the valid responses. Here, however, we have grouped it with "Others" in order to compare the three years.


In response to the second point -the type of mistreatment that came to mind when asked the question- the majority thought of physical abuse. While this is cause for concern it is not surprising, given the low level of citizen confidence in the police and Armed Forces. Between 1996 and 1998 there have been two interesting changes. First, the percentage of those who said they thought of physical mistreatment dropped from 63 to 49 percent,

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<sup>30</sup> This base number is not a sum of the totals, because it excludes those who said they did not know where to lodge a complaint in case of mistreatment by a public official.

while the percentage who thought of "poor attention" increased from 20 to 28 percent. The percentage of those who mentioned "both" has also increased, although the 1998 figures are similar to those of the 1997 survey (Figure 5.10).

**Figure 5.10**  
**Percentage of citizens**  
**according to type of mistreatment that came to mind**  
**1996- 1998**  
**(Percentages)**




When asked if they actually would lodge a protest, a significant majority -as many as 84 percent- said they would complain if they were victims of mistreatment by a public official. It is expected that knowing where to go to complain would affect the probability that such a protest would be lodged. Among those who mention a place where they could complain, 86 percent said they would protest mistreatment by a public servant. This number drops by more than 10 points (to 75 percent) among those who do not know where to go to complain. It is important to note that even among those who do not know where to go to protest, a fairly high proportion (three out of four) said they would be willing to complain.

For a more thorough analysis of citizens' knowledge of institutions to which they have recourse for protection of their rights, we have taken a closer look at the question, "Do you know where to lodge a complaint if you are mistreated by a public official?", differentiating between those who said yes and those who said no (Figure 5.11). During the three years of the


study, about 80 percent of the respondents have known where to lodge a protest in case of mistreatment. Assuming a nationwide sample error of +/- 3 percent, the percentage has not varied substantially from year to year.

**Figure 5.11**  
**Knows where to go to protect rights, 1996 - 1998**  
**(Percentages)**



Analysis of this question according to control groups (Figure 5.12) shows that residents of urban areas (not including Lima), those whose first language is Spanish, those with more education, those with greater knowledge of their rights and responsibilities and those who do not belong to the disadvantaged group are more likely to know where to go to protest poor treatment by a public servant.

**Figure 5.12**  
**Knowledge of where to go to protect one's rights**  
**according to various control populations**  
**(Percentages)**



We did a regression analysis to determine which of the variables mentioned have the greatest impact on knowledge of where to lodge a complaint of mistreatment (Table 5.7). We found that the determining factors are higher educational level and residence in rural areas. These results are disturbing because of the significance of the area of residence. We would expect residents of urban areas to have greater knowledge of where to lodge a complaint in case of mistreatment, but we found the opposite to be true. The survey does not provide sufficient information to explain the behavior of this variable.

**Table 5.7**  
**Regression analysis of knowledge of where to go to protect one's rights,**  
**according to various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficient		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Educational level	.008	.003	.085*	2.633	.009
Region	-.036	.016	-.069*	-2.322	.020
Native language	.047	.027	.044	1.729	.084
Socio-economic condition	.009	.010	.031	.895	.371
Age	.001	.001	.029	1.126	.260
Sex	.009	.019	.011	.456	.649
Constant	.670	.045		14.850	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.008				

If we include interest in public affairs and participation in a course on citizens' rights, the model improves (the R<sup>2</sup> increases from .008 to .022) and educational level ceases to be significant (Table 5.8). People who live in rural areas, and those who stay informed through news reports and who have participated in courses on citizens' rights are most likely to know where to go to protect their rights.

**Table 5.8**  
**Regression analysis of knowledge of where to go to protect one's rights,**  
**according to control variables and other social variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	St. error	Beta		
Area of residence	-.042	.015	-.081*	-2.737	.006
Educational level	.004	.003	.050	1.498	.134
Age	.001	.001	.032	1.242	.214
Native language	.027	.027	.025	.997	.319
Sex	.008	.019	.010	.420	.675
Socio-economic condition	.001	.010	.005	.144	.886
Scale of interest in public affairs	.097	.021	.120*	4.750	.000
Has received training in basic rights?	.028	.012	.063*	2.355	.019
Constant	.577	.059		9.859	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.022				

Before ending this chapter, we must raise an issue that was analyzed in the survey and discussed in focus groups: racial discrimination. Approximately one-fifth of those interviewed (22 percent) said they had

suffered discrimination for various reasons related to their socio-economic condition, mainly because of their race<sup>31</sup>.

**Table 5.8**  
**People who have been discriminated against for various reasons, 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Reason	Percentage	N° of respondents
I have not been discriminated against	77.8	1340
Yes, because of my race	9.6	166
Yes, because of the way I talk	7.0	121
Yes, because of the way I dress	5.0	87
Yes, for other reasons	.5	9
Total	100.0	1723

This is the case for people whose first language is Quechua, who have little chance of reaching higher educational levels and who are treated poorly when they must deal with public officials or other people or groups with better education or a higher socio-economic level. These people are aware that such discrimination is wrong; they do not need a course to tell them so. What is needed is training for those who practice discrimination. As one woman from Shamboyacu said, "Don't give the women more courses. We already know our husbands shouldn't beat us. Give the courses to the men, so they'll learn not to be abusive" (November, 1998).

Throughout this chapter, we have seen that Peruvian citizens have a relatively high awareness of their rights, although there is a gap between excluded groups and those with better education and socio-economic conditions. There is also a sense that the system does not protect these rights, although excluded groups are more likely to feel their rights are protected. As a result, these groups are vulnerable and require special attention.

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<sup>31</sup> In previous years, the survey included a direct question about whether the person interviewed had been discriminated against on grounds of race. In 1996, 9 percent of respondents said yes, and in 1997, 10 percent responded affirmatively.

## 6. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

### 6.1 Public safety

This chapter should really be entitled "Justice and Lack of Public Safety." By including in this year's survey a series of questions designed to analyze the extent of crime in Peruvian society, we gathered additional information that, although new, is not surprising.

Daily life in Lima and other large Peruvian cities provides ample evidence of a lack of public safety. The Peruvian state's inability to guarantee its citizens a relatively tranquil life is not news, but it underscores a glaring deficiency.

According to the liberal tradition to which the Peruvian state claims to be an heir, one of the state's main functions is the protection of individuals and their property. In fact, in the strictest *Hobbesian*<sup>32</sup> tradition and those claimed by conservative-libertarians, this is considered the state's *only* legitimate arena of action. Survey results indicate, however, that the Peruvian state fails to fulfill this minimal function. Nationwide, three of every 10 people say they or family members have been victims of robberies or assault in the last 12 months.

In Lima, citizens at both the upper and lower levels of the socio-economic scale are frequent victims of crime. In Lima, four of every 10 people classified as poor have been victims of robberies or assault. This percentage is higher among those considered to be at a high socio-economic level: nearly five of every 10 were victims in the 12 months prior to the survey (Table 6.1).

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<sup>32</sup> "Hobbesian" is understood as the view that social order is made possible by the authority of the State.


**Table 6.1**  
**Crime rate in Peru, 1998**

Have you or your family been a victim of robbery or assault in the last 12 months?

RESP.	PERU	AREA OF RESIDENCE			SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL			METROPOLITAN LIMA Socio-economic level		
		Lima	Urb.	Rural	Low	Med.	High	Low	Med.	High
Yes	29.4	41.1	29.3	19.3	24.6	28.8	45.1	40.4	36.4	48.6
No	70.6	58.9	70.7	81.7	75.4	71.2	54.9	59.6	63.6	51.4

While dramatic, unfortunately the level of daily violence shown in the preceding table does not appear to be peculiar to Peru. The 1997 *Latinobarómetro* survey included a similar question to measure crime rates ("Have you or someone in your family been the victim of assault, aggression or another crime in the past 12 months?"). Forty-three percent of Peruvians responded affirmatively. This figure is higher than that of our survey, although this could be due to differences in the phrasing of the question and the characteristics of the sample population. (As we have said, the *Latinobarómetro* poll was basically urban, unlike our survey, which had a 30-percent rural sample.) Even so, the results for Peru, although above the Latin American mean, are not the highest in the region. As Figure 6.1 shows, three countries -- Mexico, Ecuador and Venezuela -- have crime rates higher than that of Peru.

**Figure 6.1**



**Crime rate in Latin America, 1997**

Source: *Latinobarómetro* 1997

Having established the percentage of citizens who have been victims of crime, we must examine the effectiveness of the legal system in handling these complaints. How has the state performed in the administration of justice for crime victims? Access to justice is another fundamental component of a democratic system, since it guarantees that conflicts are resolved within an institutional framework and according to rules established democratically by citizens and supported by the Constitution and legal codes. If the legal system fails in its task of administering justice in cases of personal violence, there is the risk that community members, dissatisfied with the service they have received, may resort to extrajudicial procedures.

The survey found that in cases of robbery or assault, the majority of those interviewed, around 55 percent, go to the police -the necessary first step in any legal process involving personal violence- to file a report. Forty percent, however, did not report the crime; of those who did, only 5 percent said they were "very satisfied" with the results and slightly more than one-third said they were "somewhat satisfied" (see Table 6.2).

**Table 6.2**  
**Various indicators of public safety**


*Percentage of respondents who...*

Filed a police report if they were victim of robbery or assault	55.6*
Did not go to police or municipal security force if victim of robbery or assault	40.2
Went to the police and were "very satisfied" with the results	5.4
Went to the police and were "somewhat satisfied" with the results	35.3
Went to the police and were "dissatisfied" with the results	41.0
Went to the police and were "very dissatisfied" with the results	18.2

\*An additional 4.2 percent reported the crime to *serenazgo*, the municipal security force

Given the high level of dissatisfaction with the system for handling robbery and assault, it is not surprising that, faced with choosing the best way to solve these problems in the future, only slightly more than half of those interviewed mentioned the judicial system (Figure 6.2). Seventeen percent, on the other hand, said "our own hands" and 27 percent chose "community organizations" as the best way to solve problems of crime and assault. As the following graph shows, these percentages have remained steady during the three years of the survey.

**Figure 6.2**  
**Best way of solving problems of robbery and assault, 1996-1998**



(Percentages)

The image that emerges is of citizens who find themselves exposed to high levels of personal violence, somewhat above the average for Latin America. And although most report the crime to the police, only a minimal


percentage is very satisfied with the results. As a result, only half of those interviewed would resort to the legal system or police in the future to solve problems related to robbery and assault.

Citizens' lack of enthusiasm for legal mechanisms is cause for concern, especially when added to the marked lack of confidence in the Judicial Branch of government as an institution. This goes beyond the lack of public safety experienced especially by certain segments of the population (those at a higher socio-economic level and those who live in urban areas, especially Lima). It is related, above all, to a sense that citizens' rights are unprotected, as well as elements of discrimination that persist in Peru.

## 6.2 Confidence that Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial

We used the following question to analyze the level of confidence in a fair trial in Peruvian courts: "Do you believe Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial?" The results were measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents "none," 7 represents "much" and the midpoint is 4. The mean level of confidence in a fair trial in 1998 was 2.46. The mean was 2.53 in 1996 and 2.59 in 1997 (Figure 6.3).


**Figure 6.3**  
**Confidence in a fair trial and the judicial system**  
**1996 – 1998**



The graph shows a low mean level of confidence, which has dropped this year in comparison to the last two years. In contrast, confidence in the judicial system rose slightly in 1998.

Among various control groups, confidence in a fair trial is higher among youth, people with less education, residents of rural areas and those at a lower socio-economic level. It should be noted, however, that all these groups show low mean levels of confidence, below 4, the midpoint on the scale.

**Figure 6.4**  
**Confidence in a fair trial in Peruvian courts,**



**according to various control groups**

Range of scale

A regression analysis to determine which control variables have the greatest influence on confidence in fair trials showed that age, education and area of residence are the determining factors. Younger people, those with less formal education and residents of rural areas feel trials more fair than others in Peru. Once again, it is the excluded groups that have the highest opinion of justice in Peru, just as we saw in the analysis of support for the political system (Table 6.3).

**Table 6.3**  
**Regression analysis of confidence in a fair trial,**  
**using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Age	-.017	.003	-.149*	-5.725	.000
Educational level	-.047	.010	-.145*	-4.476	.000
Area of residence	-.158	.057	-.083*	-2.792	.005
Native language	.199	.102	.050	1.958	.050
Socio-economic condition	.054	.036	.052	1.517	.129
Sex	.081	.070	.028	1.156	.248
(Constant)	3.382	.169		20.057	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.035				

Besides these control variables, other factors may influence levels of confidence in the country's justice system. To test this hypothesis, the regression analysis included such factors as involvement in a case before the court system, having been a victim of robbery or assault, a person's opinion of the best way to resolve problems of robbery or assault<sup>33</sup> and level of confidence in the protection of basic rights (Table 6.4). Including these variables improves the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> of the equation (raising it from .035 a .251) and shows that the control variables that remain significant are education and age. People with less education and those who are younger have the most positive opinion of the fairness of trials in Peru. What most stands out in the analysis, however, is the relative weight of the perception that basic rights are protected in Peru and option of resolving problems of robbery and assault through courts or community organizations. We find that confidence in the judicial system is not related to having been a victim of robbery or assault or having been involved in a case in the judicial system<sup>34</sup>. The administrative efficiency currently demonstrated by the courts (noticeable to people who have been involved in a court case) is not enough to inspire confidence and reverse the general lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions

<sup>33</sup> This variable includes three alternatives: handle the problems ourselves, solve them through community organizations and solve them through the courts.

<sup>34</sup> On the basis of the question about treatment by judges, we obtained a dichotomous variable with regard to whether or not the respondent was involved in a court procedure.

**Table 6.4**  
**Regression analysis of confidence in a fair trial,**  
**using various control variables and factor of access to judicial system**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard Error	Beta		
Educational level	-.030	.010	-.092*	-2.975	.003
Age	-.010	.003	-.090*	-3.566	.000
Region	-.094	.056	-.048	-1.685	.092
Socio-economic condition	.038	.035	.036	1.109	.268
Sex	.050	.068	.017	.733	.464
Native language	.038	.101	.009	.377	.706
Confidence that rights are protected	.419	.022	.448*	18.678	.000
What is the best alternative for solving problems of robbery and assault?	.130	.028	.109*	4.559	.000
Have you been involved in a case before a court?	.025	.070	.008	.354	.724
Have you been a victim of robbery or assault?	.011	.077	.003	.139	.890
(Constant)	1.648	.245		6.721	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.251				

The survey shows people still are not familiar with newer conflict resolution mechanisms, such as extrajudicial conciliation. This is a mechanism by which individuals or institutions, with the consent of the parties involved, administer justice to resolve disputes. Slightly more than 80 percent of those interviewed had never heard of extrajudicial conciliation<sup>35</sup>.

The survey included two questions about extrajudicial conciliation. First, respondents were asked if they had heard of this mechanism, then they were asked if they would make use of it.

Table 6.5 shows that 18.7 percent of the valid responses (people who made some response) said they had heard of extrajudicial conciliation (a total of 262 respondents). Not all of these people, however, knew exactly what extrajudicial conciliation involved. The same

<sup>35</sup> This proceeding was established under Law 26872 on November 1997, and took

table shows that only 8.7 percent of those interviewed knew it was a way to resolve civil problems outside the court system. That means 9 percent of the population knows what extrajudicial conciliation is.

**Table 6.5**  
Knowledge of the existence of extrajudicial conciliation

If you have heard of extrajudicial conciliation, what do you believe it involves?	N° of respondents	Percentage	Accumulated percentage
Handling criminal cases such as robbery, assault and murder	34	2.4	2.4
Handling civil cases such as child support	122	<b>8.7</b>	11.1
Handling any case -- civil or criminal -- outside the court system	106	7.5	<b>18.7</b>
Have never heard of extrajudicial conciliation	1142	81.3	100.0
Total	1404	100.0	

About half the 262 respondents who said they had heard of extrajudicial conciliation knew it involved handling civil cases outside the court system (see Table 6.6)

**Table 6.6**  
Understanding of the meaning of extrajudicial conciliation

If you have heard of extrajudicial conciliation, what do you believe it involves?	N° of respondents	Percentage
Handling criminal cases such as robbery, assault and murder	34	13.0
Handling civil cases such as child support	122	<b>46.6</b>
Handling any case -civil or criminal- outside the court system	106	40.5
Total	262	100.0

Would people take advantage of extrajudicial conciliation? If we consider only those who say they have heard of extrajudicial conciliation, 78 percent (181 respondents) would make use of this mechanism.

## 7. ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

In this study, we have analyzed various elements that form the basis for a dynamic democratic system: interest in public affairs and politics, community participation, legitimacy of institutions, awareness and knowledge of rights, and fulfillment of responsibilities. Now we will directly address respondents' opinions of democracy itself as a political system.


To analyze the overall level of commitment to democracy, respondents were asked to indicate with which of the following phrases they most agreed:

- "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government"
- "To ordinary people, it makes no difference whether the system is democratic or not"
- "An authoritarian government may sometimes be preferable to a democratic government"

Two of every three respondents said they preferred democracy to any other form of government. Although only 15 percent said an authoritarian government is sometimes preferable to a democratic one, a disturbing 19 percent said it makes no difference (see Figure 7.1). Although the majority of Peruvians are committed to democracy, therefore, for approximately one-third that commitment does not appear to be strong.

**Figure 7.1**  
Attitudes toward democracy, 1998


(Percentages)



These results are similar to those of various public opinion pollsthat have shown the majority of Peruvians to be committed to the abstract idea of democracy. The 1997 *Latinobarómetro* survey, for example, included a similar question, and 60 percent of those interviewed chose the first option ("democracy is always preferable") (see Figure 7.2).

Compared to other Latin American countries, Peruvians' support for democracy as a political system is close to to the regional mean, neither among the highest (such as Uruguay, Argentina or Colombia) or the lowest (such as Ecuador, Paraguay and Brazil). The proportion who say an authoritarian government is sometimes preferable is also around the regional mean, not nearing either the strong democratic convictions of Uruguay (where only 7 percent chose this option) or the relatively high tolerance for authoritarianism of Paraguay (where 39 percent said an authoritarian government can sometimes be justified).

**Figure 7.2**  
Latin America: Attitudes toward democracy, 1997  
(Percentages)



Source: *Latinobarómetro* 1997.

### 7.1 What do people understand by democracy?

But what is democracy? There are various interpretations of the concept, each emphasizing different aspects or dimensions. In theory, there are at least four great visions of democracy. One, linked to a liberal-utilitarian tradition, identifies democracy with the protection of people's rights (negative freedom). A second, aligned with the republican tradition, emphasizes respect for laws and the State of Law as expressed in the Constitution. A third, in a more classical tradition, identifies democracy with participation and the will of the majority. A fourth, more radical concept, is associated with achievement of substantive goals, such as justice. What do Peruvians understand by democracy? Is their perception aligned with one of these views?

When respondents were asked to describe in a few words what they understood democracy to be, without the suggestion of possible responses, one-third (34 percent) gave no answer at all. It is worth noting that this percentage is as high as 55 percent among people whose first language is Quechua or Aymara, 58 percent in rural areas, and 64 percent among those who have no more than a primary education. Of those who responded to the question (Table 7.1), the majority (37 percent) equated democracy with respect for freedom of opinion. In second place among these spontaneous answers is "respect for citizens' rights" (23 percent), followed by "equality of rights" (13 percent) and "people taking part in decision making" (9 percent). The following table suggests a broad range of concepts of democracy that must be analyzed more carefully.

**Table 7.1**  
**"Spontaneous" definitions of democracy**<sup>36</sup>

What do you understand democracy to be?	Percentage	N° of respondents
Freedom of expression	37.0	435
Respect for citizens' rights	22.8	268
Equality of rights	13.3	156
Participation of the people	10.6	125
Respect for the State of Law	2.8	33
Administration with justice	3.7	43
Wellbeing of all	3.0	35
Other response	7.0	82
Total	100.0	1177

To better determine the concept Peruvians have of democracy, the survey included a question asking respondents to choose the most important aspect of democracy from a list of four options, each related to a different way of understanding the term (see Table 7.2). More than half chose the option "respect for the rights of the individual." In a distant second place, with 26 percent, is the definition of democracy as "equality and social justice," followed by "respect for laws and the Constitution" with 17 percent, and finally "government by the majority" with barely 5 percent. It is interesting to note that when asked to choose among four specific meanings of the word "democracy," the percentage responding "don't know" is reduced to only 6 percent (in comparison to the 34 percent when the question was open, with no suggested responses). It must also be noted that the

<sup>36</sup> The total number of valid responses is only 1,177, 66 percent of the total sample of 1,784, because as we indicated earlier, 34 percent of the people interviewed did not respond to this question.

percentages do not vary significantly by social class or other sociodemographic variables.

**Table 7.2**  
Definitions of democracy

Which of the following meanings of democracy is most important to you?	Percentage	N° of respondents
Respect for the rights of the individual	51.8	868
Respect for laws and the Constitution	16.9	283
Government by majority	5.2	87
Equality and social justice	26.2	439
Total	100.0	1677

Survey respondents were also asked what they considered most necessary in order for democracy to work well in Peru. They were offered four alternatives, each related to a different concept of democracy (Table 7.3). As the table shows, the percentages of responses to the first four options are fairly similar.

**Table 7.3**  
Main requirement for democracy to work well

Of the following options, which do you believe is the main requirement for democracy to function well in Peru?	Percentage	N° of respondents
Honest and effective leaders	23.8	396
Greater participation by the people	20.2	337
Respect for laws and the Constitution	23.9	398
Respect for human rights	19.7	328
Accountability of public officials	12.1	201
Other	.4	6
Total	100.0	1666


The results summarized here do not allow us to conclude that there is a single, overall view of democracy in the country. Rather, they suggest the coexistence of various concepts. "Democracy" appears to have multiple meanings combining liberal, republican, classical and radical concepts. It is also interesting to note that there is no clear tendency toward change in the concept of democracy among different socio-economic groups. Liberal concepts are more significant for sectors at lower socio-economic levels, just as substantive concepts are for those at higher socio-economic levels.

## **7.2. Preference for democracy according to control groups**

Most people say they prefer democracy as a political system, but which ones prefer it to a greater degree and which to a lesser extent? To answer this question, we established a scale of preference for democracy on the basis of the question shown in Figure 7.1. A point value of 1 was assigned to the response that "an authoritarian government may sometimes be preferable to a democratic government," a value of 2 was assigned to the response that "to ordinary people, it makes no difference whether the government is democratic or not," and a value of 3 to the response that "democracy is preferable to any other form of government." The scale ranges from 1 to 3, with 2 as the neutral or midpoint. We found that the mean for the overall sample is 2.51, falling between the responses "democracy is preferable" and "to ordinary people it makes no difference."

We used this scale to analyze how means of preference for democracy vary according to our control variables (Figure 7.3). The sociodemographic variables showing statistically significant mean variations are: age (with mean levels of preference for democracy slightly lower among youth), educational level (with the lowest means among those who have less than a secondary education), and socio-economic situation (with a lower mean at the lower end of the socio-economic scale). Preference for democracy is greater among those over age 45, those who have a higher education, either technical school or university, and those at the highest socio-economic level. These groups show means on the scale that exceed that of the sample as a whole (2.51).

**Figure 7.3**  
Scale of preference for democracy as a form of government,  
according to control groups




Range of scale: 1 to 3

Statistically significant differences from the mean are also produced by social and political variables (see Figure 7.4), including interest in public affairs (the mean level of preference for democracy is lower among those who show little or no interest), interest in politics (the degree of preference is lower among those who show less interest), and among those who feel they have little political influence<sup>37</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Capacity for political influence is based on the results of the following question: "To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Politicians (the government, Congress and others) decide what they want, and I can do nothing to change that?'" Given options ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree," 12.5 percent chose "strongly agree," 26.8 percent chose "agree," 19.6 percent were "undecided," 34.4 percent chose "disagree," and 6.7 percent said they "strongly disagree."

**Figure 7.4**  
**Scale of preference for democracy,**  
**according to relevant social and political variables**



Range of scale: 1 to 3

The results shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 confirm the hypothesis we have been developing in previous chapters. While most young people and people in precarious socio-economic conditions prefer democracy, the percentages are not as great in other sectors of society. In addition, lack of interest in politics and public affairs and a person's sense that they have no influence lead to a lower level of commitment to the democratic system.


### 7.3 "Depth" of support for democracy

#### 7.3.1 Support for military authoritarianism

Rhetorical support for democracy as the best system of government is one thing; maintaining this support under difficult circumstances is something else entirely. To measure the depth of support for democracy, the survey included a series of questions about possible support for military governments under certain circumstances:

- Do you believe a military coup would be justified to better solve the country's economic problems?
- Do you believe a military coup would be justified to better solve the problem of violence in the country?
- Besides the two situations just mentioned, do you believe there are other circumstances in which a military coup would be justified, or do you believe there is no justification for a military government?

**Figure 7.5**  
**Justification for military coup, 1998**  
**(Percentages)**




**Figure 7.5 shows that more than two-thirds of those interviewed say a military coup cannot be justified under any of the circumstances described, but a disturbing minority of about 30 percent is willing to justify a coup in each of these situations. These results are consistent with the fact that about one-third of those**

interviewed was indifferent or said an authoritarian government is sometimes preferable to a democratic one (Figure 7.1.)

To analyze the relationship between tolerance for military authoritarianism and various control variables, we established a scale of tolerance for military coups based on the three questions we have discussed. In each case, a point value of 0 was assigned if the respondent said a military coup would not be justified, and 1 if they said it would be justified. The resulting scale ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 representing complete rejection of a military coup in any situation and 3 representing justification of a coup under the mentioned circumstances. Once again, we see that while 61 percent of those interviewed would not support a military coup under any circumstance, a disturbing 19 percent would support a military coup in all the situations mentioned, and a similar percentage would do so under some circumstances. This means nearly 40 percent of those interviewed would consider support for a military government justifiable in certain critical situations.

The surveys in the previous two years included the same questions about support for a military coup. Figure 7.6 shows the results of the scale of support for military coups from those years, compared to those from 1998. The preference distribution has not changed significantly in the past few years. Nearly two-thirds of Peruvians systematically refuse to support a military government while about one-fifth would support a coup under some circumstances.

Figure 7.6  
Scale of tolerance for military coups, 1996-1998  
(Percentages)




What kinds of people are most inclined to justify authoritarianism in critical situations? To answer this question, we calculated the mean level of tolerance for military coups for various control groups, using the previously described scale. Figure 7.7 shows the variables that produce statistically significant mean differences.

**Figure 7.7 clearly shows which sociodemographic groups are more likely to tolerate a military coup. Young people (ages 18-24) show the highest mean on the scale of tolerance for a military coup. We must keep in mind, however, that the mean level of rejection of coups among young people, in each situation mentioned, is never less than 62 percent. That is, the majority of young people reject military coups, but this rejection is not as strong as in other sectors of society.**

**Following young people, we found that those with a lower educational level (primary or less) are above the mean in justifying a military coup. Educational level is the most significant of all the factors shown on the graph; those who have completed college show the highest level of rejection of military coups. Finally, people at the lowest socio-economic level also tend to show a level of tolerance for military coups above that of those at the highest socio-economic level.**

**Figure 7.7**  
**Mean level of tolerance for military coups**  
**in various control populations**



Range of scale: 0 to 3

To complete this analysis, we did a regression to determine which of the variables we have mentioned are the strongest factors in tolerance for a military coup. The results are shown in the following table. The data show age and education, in that order, to be statistically significant, producing regression coefficients with a negative sign. This means that when we control for all other variables, people with a higher educational level are less likely to justify a military coup. This supports our earlier argument. Neither interest in public affairs nor interest in politics is a strong factor in tolerance of military coups.

**Table 7.4**  
**Regression analysis of tolerance for military coups**  
**using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standard. Coef.	t value	Signifi- cance
	B	Standard error	Beta		
Age	-.010	.003	-.104*	-3.565	.000
Educational level	-.027	.010	-.095*	-2.656	.008
Native language	.194	.100	.054	1.940	.053
Sex	.043	.066	.018	.651	.515
Socio-economic condition	-.008	.033	-.009	-.241	.809
Area of residence	-.002	.053	-.001	-.037	.971
Interest in public affairs	.054	.043	-.037	-1.260	.208
Interest in politics	-.025	.042	-.016	-.592	.554
Constant	1.654	.225		7.348	.000
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.016				


### 7.3.2 Support for civilian authoritarianism

Experience in Latin America in the past few years shows that progress toward democracy is not interrupted only by military coups, but also when democratically elected presidents assume authoritarian powers, as in Peru. For this reason, the survey included an additional series of questions to measure the level of support for civilian authoritarianism. The questions are similar to those concerning military coups:

- Would you agree that the president may assume dictatorial powers to solve the country's economic problems?
- Would you agree that the president may assume dictatorial powers to better solve the problem of violence in the country?
- Besides the situations we have just mentioned, do you believe there are other circumstances under which the president can be justified in assuming dictatorial powers, or do believe there is no justification for such powers?

Figure 7.8 shows the percentages of those who responded affirmatively to each of these questions.

**Figure 7.8**  
**Justification for presidential authoritarianism, 1998**  
**(Percentages)**



The preceding graph shows that support for civilian authoritarianism is, on average, fairly similar to the level for military authoritarianism. It is interesting to note, however, that the greater degree of support for civilian authoritarianism is related to solving the problem of violence in the country.

**To analyze the relationship between support for civilian authoritarianism and the control variables, we designed a scale similar to that established for military authoritarianism. The scale ranges from 0 (rejection of authoritarian presidents under all circumstances) to 3 (justification of an authoritarian president in all the situations mentioned). The national mean is 0.76, below the midpoint of the scale (1.5). The mean and distribution of frequencies on this scale are similar to those registered on the scale of tolerance for military coups (which had a mean of 0.87). Sixty-five percent of the sample shows a point value of 0, representing rejection under all circumstances of the idea of presidents assuming authoritarian powers. At the other extreme, 16 percent show willingness to support an authoritarian president in all the situations mentioned.**

It is interesting to note the close relationship between support for military coups and support for authoritarian civilian governments. The Pearson correlation between the two scales is .348, indicating that although

the segments of society most receptive to these forms of authoritarianism are not identical, there is a moderately strong correlation between them. Similarly, the relationships we have already seen between support for a military government and variables such as age, education and socio-economic level also hold true for the scale of support for civil authoritarianism (Figure 7.9).

a) Young people (ages 18-24) are more inclined to tolerate authoritarian civilian presidents than older people (45 years and up).


b) People with less formal education (primary school or less) have a higher mean point value on the scale of tolerance for civilian authoritarianism than those who have completed college. We must not forget, however, that for those who have a primary education or less, the proportion of rejection of civilian authoritarianism in the three situations mentioned is no lower than 63 percent.

c) People at the lower end of the socio-economic scale tend to have a higher mean level of tolerance for civilian authoritarianism than those at the high end.

d) Residents of rural areas are more likely to accept presidential authoritarianism than those in urban areas.

These data support the hypothesis that we have been developing throughout this report: Although they show above-average levels of participation in community-based activities and support for the political system and institutions, young people and sectors of society characterized by exclusion and socio-economic precariousness consistently show less *relative* interest in public affairs and politics, less awareness of their rights and responsibilities and greater tolerance for authoritarian forms of government.

**Figure 7.9**  
 Mean level of tolerance for civilian authoritarianism,  
 according to various sociodemographic variables



Range of scale: 0 to 3

Besides sociodemographic variables, we must consider other factors, such as support for the political system, opinions of how well democracy works in Peru, and opinions of President Fujimori's performance. We have analyzed support for the political system in the chapter on legitimacy. To examine the other factors, the survey included two questions about people's opinion's of President Fujimori's performance and the functioning of democracy in the country (Tables 7.5 and 7.6 respectively). As Table 7.5 shows, more than half of those interviewed characterized the president's performance as average, while 20 percent consider it good or very good and one-fourth say it is poor or very poor.

**Table 7.5**  
**Opinion of President Fujimori's performance**

What is your opinion of President Fujimori's performance?	Percentage	No. of respondents
Very good	2.1	37
Good	18.5	325
Average	54.6	961
Poor	17.3	305
Very poor	7.4	131
Total	100.0	1759


Sixty percent of those interviewed say the functioning of democracy in Peru is average, while 8 percent say it is good or very good and one-third say the opposite.

**Table 7.5**  
**Perception of how well democracy works in Peru**

Do you believe democracy in Peru works ... ?	Percentage	No. of respondents
Very well	.8	13
Well	7.2	118
Average	59.9	984
Badly	22.9	376
Very badly	9.3	153
Total	100.0	1644

Besides the proportion of respondents in each of these categories, however, it is important to look at their relationship between these variables and support for authoritarian civilian governments. As Figure 7.10 shows, we found statistically significant mean differences between these variables and tolerance for civilian authoritarianism.

**Figure 7.10**  
**Tolerance for civilian authoritarianism,**  
**according to selected political variables**



Range of scale: 0 to 3

As we have seen in other parts of this report, especially the chapter about legitimacy of institutions, we find that the people who are most tolerant of civilian authoritarianism also have the highest opinion of President Fujimori's performance. This is understandable when we examine the president's leadership characteristics. Those who characterize the president's performance as good or very good show higher mean levels of support for presidential authoritarianism than those who consider his performance poor or very poor. Similarly, a positive opinion of the political system in general is associated with greater tolerance for civilian authoritarianism. Underscoring this idea, we see that those who have a higher opinion of the way democracy works in Peru are more likely to agree that presidents may assume dictatorial powers in certain situations. This is not contradictory if we keep in mind that people tend to equate the government with the political system, and that there is a perception that the present government is authoritarian.

These ideas are confirmed by a regression analysis incorporating all the variables shown (Table 7.7).

**Table 7.7**  
**Regression analysis of tolerance of authoritarian civilian governments, using various control variables**

Predictive variables	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Beta coef.	t value	Significance
	B	Standard error			
Age	-.030	.009	-.110*	-3.165	.002
Educational level	-.007	.003	-.078*	-2.677	.008
Sex	.102	.063	.045	1.616	.106
Area of residence	.037	.052	.024	.716	.474
Native language	.063	.100	-.018	-.631	.528
Socio-economic condition	.001	.031	.001	.027	.978
Opinion of President Fujimori's performance	.247	.043	.189*	5.731	.000
Support for the political system	.096	.031	.097*	3.091	.002
Opinion of how well democracy works	.048	.047	.034	1.035	.301
Constant	.201	.214		.936	.349
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.083				

As in the case of support for military authoritarianism, the regression analysis shows that both age and educational level are statistically significant in determining tolerance for civil authoritarianism. The negative signs of their respective coefficients are consistent with earlier findings and indicate that greater age and higher educational level are associated with lower tolerance for civil authoritarianism. The regression analysis also shows that support for the political system in general and the Fujimori administration in particular are factors in tolerance for civil authoritarianism. Greater support for the system and a higher opinion of President Fujimori's performance are associated with greater tolerance for forms of civil authoritarianism.

In conclusion, although a large segment of the population prefers democracy to any other form of government, 35 to 40 percent of those interviewed would justify a military coup or authoritarian civilian government under certain critical circumstances. This support appears to be determined

by two sociodemographic characteristics, age and education, with young people and those having less formal education being more likely to justify this behavior than other groups. Other factors in tolerance for civilian authoritarianism are support for the political system and the person's opinion of President Fujimori's performance. As we have seen, given the nature of the president's leadership and the strong association between the government and the political system, tolerance for authoritarianism is related to a higher opinion of the president's performance and greater support for the system.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We said in the *Introduction* that the basic objective of this study was to analyze the level and intensity of community-based participation and chart Peruvians' attitudes toward democracy and its political institutions. With these two objectives in mind, this section summarizes our most important findings and conclusions.

We will begin with community-based participation. A basic element of public involvement is awareness of national issues. Our findings about the level of citizens' interest in public affairs and politics in general are noteworthy. On average, Peruvians follow national and political issues relatively closely, although slightly less interest is shown in politics, and they do so primarily through television news. Peruvians clearly preferred audiovisual media, and most of those surveyed considered television to be a reliable source of information. Whether or not information provided by television is, in fact, reliable is another issue, but the survey results show most Peruvians trust it.

But paying frequent attention to "national issues" does not necessarily translate into interest in politics. Although nearly 50 percent say they are interested in politics, a similar percentage say they have no interest or actually hate politics. Despite the extent of anti-political sentiment in the country, however, this is similar to the average for Latin America.

Interest in politics and national affairs is not uniformly distributed. Certain social sectors show levels of attention to public affairs and interest in politics below the mean. People with less formal education, young people, those at lower socio-economic levels and residents of rural areas show less interest in politics than other groups.

With regard to involvement in community-based organizations and neighborhood activism, our study has found a significant organizational fabric in Peru despite the crisis. More than half the people interviewed said organizations such as women's associations, religious communities, parents' associations, neighborhood organizations or sports clubs exist in their communities. About one-third (31 percent) said they belong to at least one

such organization and another 24 percent to two or more. That means 55 percent belong to at least one community group. In comparative terms, that places Peru near the regional mean for overall involvement and even higher for some organizations.

While we found that people in rural areas, those with less education, poor people and youth showed relatively less interest in public affairs, community-based activity is a different matter. Although their interest in public affairs and politics is below the mean, these groups participate more frequently in community and neighborhood organizations. This involvement appears to be a mechanism for obtaining, through collective action, goods and services that cannot be obtained through the market. This is borne out by the fact that the sectors showing highest participation are those with less access to basic services.

We also found significant involvement in self-help or neighborhood-improvement activities. About 40 percent of people interviewed said they had donated their labor to or participated in meetings about some community project. Thirty percent of respondents also said they had tried to solve some community or neighborhood problem. These percentages do not seem to have changed over the last three years. Again, the most economically precarious groups show a level of community involvement above the mean. This confirms the view that in Peru community-based participation is a strategy used by poor sectors to gain access to things they lack.

Young people's attitudes deserve special mention. Youth show levels of attention to public and political issues that are below the mean, as well as lower levels of involvement in neighborhood organizations and community activism. We therefore believe it is important to do promotional work with young people, opening greater possibilities for their participation.

Moving from the social to the political arena, we find that a large majority of those interviewed have a very negative opinion of the political system and its fundamental institutions. Nearly half say they do not support the institutions of the Peruvian political system at all, and one-third believe the political system does not uphold citizens' basic rights. The degree of legitimacy of the political system and its institutions is clearly very low. This is not surprising, although it is certainly cause for concern. The Peruvian political system demonstrates serious deficiencies in defending citizens' basic

rights, including a lack of impartial trials. This is of particular concern, because it shows how much legitimacy these institutions have lost and how much must be done to change the situation.

Not only is there a general lack of support for the political system itself; trust in key institutions is also very low. Levels of confidence in the judicial system, Congress, the Attorney General's office and the Comptroller General are all extremely low; some, in fact, are the lowest in Latin America. In this climate of general dissatisfaction with and distrust in the political system, we find that higher levels of confidence may be a sign of lack of information and lack of critical analysis. In fact, levels of support for the system are above the mean among young people, those with less formal education and residents of rural areas. We must remember that these are precisely the groups that show the lowest levels of information about and interest in politics.

The state institutions inspiring greatest confidence are the Ombudsman's Office and local governments. Given the Ombudsman's Office's role and evident autonomy, it is easy to understand why it is the State institution that enjoys the highest level of trust. Local governments inspire greater confidence because they have become more dynamic in recent years and are more involved in people's daily lives.

When Peruvians' opinions of local government performance are analyzed, we find that community involvement and participation in events organized by local governments play a significant role in formation of a positive opinion.

Political democracy is based on a series of institutions established to defend civil rights. This assumes, however, that citizens know what these rights are. We find that about two-thirds of those interviewed show a clear awareness that they have rights. The problem lies in the general perception that these rights are not respected and upheld in Peru. There is a significant gap between people's awareness that they have rights and their view of how these rights are upheld. To cite two examples: 69 percent say correctly that the Constitution guarantees replacement of public authorities who do not perform their functions properly, but only 23 percent believe this right is upheld in Peru. In addition, 81 percent of respondents are aware that they have the right to freedom of expression, but only 31 percent believe this right is respected.

Many rights are not respected in Peru; the right to personal safety is particularly lacking. Nearly one-third of respondents said they or a family member had been victim of a robbery or assault in the 12 months preceding the survey. This percentage increases to 45 percent in Lima. These figures suggest a lack of ability on the part of the Peruvian State to provide a safe environment for citizens. Of particular concern is the fact that 40 percent of the victims did not file police reports. Of those who did, only 5 percent said they were "very satisfied" with the results and 35 percent said they were "somewhat satisfied." The remaining 60 percent said they were "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with the results when they reported the crime to the police.

In analyzing backing of democracy as a political system, we find significant support for the idea that democracy is the best system of government. About 60 percent of those interviewed say they prefer democracy and reject political authoritarianism, both military and civil. The remaining 40 percent show a certain level of tolerance for authoritarianism and say it can be justified under certain circumstances.

What kinds of people are most inclined to accept authoritarian behavior? Consistent with earlier findings, those who show less preference for democracy are younger, live in economically precarious situations and demonstrate less interest in public affairs and politics. These same groups show greater support for the political system and greater trust in its institutions. They also have a higher opinion of how well democracy works in Peru and of President Fujimori's performance. People who have more formal education and a better socio-economic situation, on the other hand, are less tolerant of authoritarianism and show greater interest in public and political issues. They are also more critical of how democracy functions in Peru and have a lower opinion of the president's performance.

This occurs because the survey respondents tend to equate the political system and its institutions with the present government, which is considered authoritarian. Greater confidence in the system, therefore, is not a sign of higher democratic values, but rather the opposite.

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In summary, among the causes for concern found in this study are an extreme lack of confidence (even in comparison to Latin American averages) in public institutions. The institution in which citizens trust least is the Judicial Branch, while the greatest confidence is inspired by the Ombudsman's Office and local governments (showing that the latter could provide a way to bridge the gap between society and political institutions). There is also a low level of support for the political system in general. More encouraging signs, on the other hand, include significant levels of community involvement, fairly high levels of interest in public affairs and politics, a relatively high awareness of rights, and a majority preference for democracy as a political system (even though one-third of those interviewed express a certain level of tolerance for authoritarian forms of government).

Sectors of society characterized by various forms of precariousness and exclusion, such as youth, show relatively greater trust in political institutions, support the political system in greater proportion, and give higher marks to the functioning of democracy in the country, while showing lower levels of interest in politics and political affairs, less awareness of their rights and responsibilities, and greater tolerance for authoritarian forms of government. People with higher educational and socio-economic levels are less likely to trust political institutions, show less support for the political system, and are more critical of the way democracy works in our country. They also are more interested in politics and public affairs, more conscious of their rights and responsibilities, and show a greater commitment to democracy than the national average.

This apparent contradiction becomes clear when we find that the relatively higher levels of trust in institutions, support for the political system and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in our country could be expressions of lower levels of critical analysis and capacity for exercising rights, rather than expressions of a greater commitment to democracy. On the other hand, greater distrust in institutions and the political system goes hand in hand with a greater commitment to democracy; this is because the government is generally equated with the political system and its institutions, and there is a strong perception that the government is authoritarian. This brings into question the conventional belief that strengthening of democracy corresponds with greater levels of trust in the political system and its institutions.

Sectors of society characterized by precariousness and exclusion tend to be more involved in community organizations and activities, which is a positive sign if we assume that this community participation has a positive influence on participation in democratic processes. We find, however, that neighborhood involvement does not have much effect on commitment to democracy. This is true partly because participation alone cannot bring about change in other structural conditions, and partly because existing organizations, by their nature and dynamics, do not have a decisive impact in the political arena, although they may have positive social effects.

#### *Some recommendations*

- Youth work is a priority, especially in rural areas and among poor sectors. This is also an area in which programs can produce relatively rapid results, since it is more difficult to change structural factors such as poverty, educational level and exclusion from society, which have a negative effect on democratic values. Work with young people could be decisive.
- While participation in community-based organizations and activism is important and socially excluded sectors participate in these activities - and there is a willingness to increase involvement- people are also critical of organizations that *actually exist*. It is also important to remember that while community involvement may have a significant impact on living conditions in communities, it does not have much effect in the political arena or on democratic views and values. It is not, therefore, a matter only -- or even mainly -- of strengthening these organizations to a certain degree, but rather of breaking down the barriers that keep some people at a distance, as well as fostering democratic relationships within these organizations.
- Local governments play a key role in defending citizens' rights and attending to their demands. These are the State institutions that are closest to citizens and enjoy relatively high levels of trust and legitimacy in comparison to other government entities. This implies that strengthening local governments could

have a positive effect on people and their relationships with institutions in the public and political arenas.

- Finally, while it is true that greater citizen awareness is important in broadening democratic values and strengthening democracy as a system, it is equally important to change the political institutions themselves. Most people's sense of distance from these institutions does not stem from a lack of awareness or attention to public and political affairs. On the contrary, it is a result of an awareness of their rights and a capacity for critical analysis that must be accompanied by institutional mechanisms that defend these rights. The distrust in and lack of identification with political institutions occurs, quite simply, because they function poorly in Peru.

## APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

This section explains in greater detail a few points that were only mentioned in the body of the report, such as: 1) sample selection; 2) questionnaire design; 3) definition of control variables; 4) establishment of indicators of democratic participation; and, 5) a brief report on the focus groups.

### 1. Sample selection

The *survey universe* includes all men and women between ages 18 and 65, from all socio-economic levels in both rural and urban areas of the various geographic regions of the country.

The original *sample size* was 1,500 interviews nationwide. This was increased by 10 percent for a total of 1,650, which were proportionally distributed according to the weight of the population in each department and the respective types of communities.

Since an additional percentage is always necessary in the application of a survey (in case it is necessary to eliminate some responses), the final sample was 1,784 people, more than 250 more than in the two previous surveys. This sample size allows us to reduce the margin of error of the total sample. For global results, in the worst case ( $p=50$  and  $q=50$ ), the margin of error is estimated at  $\pm 2.4\%$ , for an accuracy of 95.5% (see Table 1).

**Table 1**  
**Sample size and margin of error<sup>38</sup>**  
**1996 – 1998**

Survey year	Sample size	Margin of error
1996	1508	+ - 3.0
1997	1533	+ - 3.0
1998	1784	+ - 2.4

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<sup>38</sup> All calculation of margin of error was done by IMASEN S.A.

The sample includes nearly all departments in the country, taking into account the most representative provinces and districts in each. Table 2 shows the sample composition by department and area of residence (Metropolitan Lima, other urban and other rural).

**Table 2**  
**Sample composition for the 1998 survey**

Department	Area of residence			Total
	Lima <sup>39</sup>	Otherurban	Other rural	
Amazonas		12	18	30
Ancash		43	29	72
Apurímac		10	20	30
Arequipa		63	18	81
Ayacucho		19	20	39
Cajamarca		28	76	104
Callao	43			43
Cusco		33	49	82
Huancavelica		8	22	30
Huánuco		19	34	53
Ica		37	7	44
Junin		52	30	82
La Libertad		73	29	102
Lambayeque		63	14	77
Lima	455	37	23	515
Loreto		56	24	80
Moquegua		9	2	11
Pasco		10	6	16
Piura		87	25	112
Puno		35	49	84
San Martín		29	19	48
Tacna		14	3	17
Tumbes		13		13
Ucayali		15	4	19
Total	498	765	521	1784
	27.9	42.9	29.2	100.0

Table 3 shows the margin of error by area of residence (with an accuracy of 95.5%).

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<sup>39</sup> We only considered the metropolitan area of the department of Lima, along with the constitutional province of Callao. Other urban and rural areas of the department of Lima are included in other areas of residence.

**Table 3**  
**Margin of error by area of residence**

Area of residence	Sample size	Margin of error
Lima	498	+ - 4.5
Other urban	765	+ - 3.6
Other rural	521	+ - 4.4

As a *sample method*, IMASEN S.A. used a multi-stage probability design with random selection of sample points.

- In urban areas: streets, buildings and houses by the random route method<sup>40</sup>
- In rural areas, a skip interval was used.
- Selection of residences and people was done by the Kish method<sup>41</sup> .

## **2. Questionnaire design<sup>42</sup>**

The IEP research team designed the questionnaire used in the 1998 survey on the basis of questionnaires used in previous studies and on the lines of analysis presented in the study proposal. We included about 106 variables in addition to questions corresponding to the respondent's "control data" (sex, age, education, etc.).

Once the questionnaire was designed, we did a pilot test in peripheral areas of Lima and a Quechua-speaking community in the Department of Ayacucho. To ensure proper use of the questionnaire, we also developed, in conjunction with IMASEN S.A., a training manual for interviewers that covered selection of residences and people to be interviewed as well as formulation of questions.

## **3. Definition of control variables**

As agreed in discussions with the USAID/Peru team, we considered the following demographic, social and economic variables in establishing

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<sup>40</sup> Random route implies a stairstep system based on a designated starting point.

<sup>41</sup> System of random numbers combining the number of the questionnaire with the number of persons in a household who have the required characteristics.

<sup>42</sup> A copy of all the questions in the questionnaire can be found at the end of the appendix.

sample control groups: sex, age, native language, education, area of residence and socio-economic condition<sup>43</sup>. Each of these variables has been incorporated in each of the bases of the survey.

### Sex

This variable has only two categories:

*SEX*

0. Female
1. Male

### Age

The age variable has a range of values from 18 to 65 years, corresponding to the sample universe. They were divided into 10-year groups except for the last category, which has a 20-year range.

*EDADREC*

1. 18-24 years
2. 25-34 years
3. 35-44 years
4. 45 and over

### Native language

The questionnaire included the question, "What language have you spoken at home since you were a child?", with the following options: 1) Spanish, 2) Quechua, 3) Aymara, 4) Spanish and Quechua, 5) Spanish and Aymara, 6) Other (native), 7) Other (foreign).

The Quechua/Aymara category includes those who said their first language was Quechua or Aymara alone and those who spoke Quechua/Aymara and Spanish simultaneously as native languages.

*ETNIA*

0. Quechua /Aymara

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<sup>43</sup> The name of the variable in the database appears in italics before the name of the category.

1. Spanish

**AREA OF RESIDENCE**

The two previous studies included two control variables: area of residence (urban and rural) and region of origin (Lima, southern and northern coast, southern and northern mountains, a zone known as the "Andean trapezoid" and jungle). For this study, we decided to use only one variable that grouped together three areas of residence, differentiating not only between urban and rural but between Lima and the rest of the country. We did not use region of origin as there is a high margin of error by region, which makes it difficult to compare results from one year to another.

*REGREC*

- 0. Other rural
- 1. Other urban
- 2. Lima

**Educational Level: years of schooling completed** (edu2r)

As the surveys have been carried out by different polling companies using different methods for grouping educational levels, in order to make a comparison among the three years of the survey we considered the variable "Years of study completed." On the basis of this variable, we developed the following educational groups:

*EDU2R*

- 1. Primary (0 to 6 years of schooling completed)
- 2. Secondary: (7 to 11 years of schooling completed)
- 3. Higher education incomplete: (12 to 15 years of schooling completed)
- 4. University complete or more: (16 or more years of schooling completed)

**Socioeconomic Level** (nivsoc)

As with education, because of the different methodologies used by the survey companies we considered as a *proxy* socio-economic level the possession of the following goods or domestic appliances:

has a television

has a refrigerator

has a telephone

has a washing machine

has an automobile manufactured in the past five years

We assigned a point value of 0 to those who had none of these appliances and 1 for each appliance. The resulting scale ranges from 0 to 5, on the basis of which three levels were established:

*NIVSOC*

1. Low (has no appliances or one appliance)
2. Medium (has 2 or 3 appliances)
3. High: has 4 or 5 appliances

Table 4 shows the makeup of the different control variables in the 1998 sample and the previous studies:

**Table 4**  
**Control variables 1996 – 1998**

Variable	Categories	Census	1998	1997	1996
Sex	Female	50.9	50.2	50.6	51.3
	Male	49.1	49.8	49.4	48.7
Age	1 18 to 24	26.4	24.8	24.1	27.1
	2 25 to 34	29.0	29.4	25.9	26.9
	3 35 to 44	20.4	21.5	23.5	22.8
	4 45 and up	24.2	24.3	26.5	23.2
Native language	Quechua/Aymara	19.7	16.7	11.4	8.8
	Spanish	80.3	83.3	88.6	91.2
Area of residence	Other rural	29.8	29.2	29.4	29.5
	Other urban	41.4	42.9	39.2	40.2
	Lima	28.8	27.9	31.4	30.3
Years of schooling completed	Primary		25.4	23.6	23.9
	Secondary inc./complete		43.8	43.0	42.8
	Higher ed. incomplete		13.3	19.1	20.8
	University completed		17.4	14.3	12.6
Socio-economic condition	Low socio-ec. level		46.7	48.3	44.2
	Medium socioec. level		38.1	41.2	45.1
	High socioec. Level		15.2	10.6	10.7

It is important to note that although the proportion of surveys in rural areas is similar in all three years, the sample dispersion is much greater in the 1998 study. While the 1996 survey included 28 small population centers and the 1997 study included 29, the 1998 study has surveyed 89 small population centers, including many peasant communities. More than 60 percent of the population centers in the survey had fewer than 500

inhabitants, confirming the greater dispersion of the sample. This is reflected, for example, in the high percentage of imprecise responses ("don't know/no answer" or "don't know") in the questions about trust in institutions or asking for a spontaneous definition of democracy.

#### **4. Development of indicators of democratic participation**

Given the strategic objective and intermediate results of the USAID/Peru Democratic Initiatives Program, summarized in the introduction to this report, we established a series of indicators based on the methodology of the 1996 and 1997 surveys. In cases where a similar question was not included in the 1998 survey, the indicator was recalculated for the previous years.

##### **Strategic Objective: Greater citizen participation in democratic processes**

*Indicator (SOa): Percentage of citizens who are active members of at least one civil society organization.*

As we said in the final study report, in this case we could not establish the same indicator because the questions of the 1998 survey were more specific, and therefore exaggerated involvement. In the 1996 and 1997 surveys, respondents were asked directly how often they participated in various organizations, without first establishing whether or not these organizations existed in their communities. As a result, a large percentage of respondents said they never or almost never attended meetings of these organizations. In the 1998 survey, respondents were specifically asked whether these organizations existed in their communities. Only those who said the organizations did, in fact, exist were then asked whether or not they participated in these groups.

##### Previous methodology

The previous studies considered frequent participation in the following organizations:

- (cp7) Parents' association
- (cp13) Women's association
- (cp6) Catholic community or non-Catholic religious community
- (cp9) Professional association
- (cp3) Community organization
- (cp10) Unions

- (cp17) Political parties or groups
- (cp30) Other organizations

A point value of 1 was given to those who frequently attended meetings and a point value of 0 to those who sometimes, almost never or never attended. An active member was defined as one who frequently attended meetings of at least one of the organizations mentioned. Table 5 shows the calculation of the indicator using this methodology.

**Table 5**  
**Participation in civil society organizations, 1996-1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Active member of at least one civil society organization	1996	1997
Is an active member	46	49
Is not an active member	54	51
<i>Base</i>	(1508)	(1533)

New methodology

For the 1998 study we have designed an alternative indicator that takes into consideration the same organizations used for the indicator under the previous methodology (parents' association, women's association, Catholic or non-Catholic religious community, professional associations, community or neighborhood organizations, unions, political parties and other organizations, which in the 1998 survey include producers' and cultural associations), both in the overall sample and in the smaller sample of respondents who belong to at least one civil society organization.<sup>44</sup> We differentiated five groups within the sample and assigned them the following point values:

- Zero: Cases in which the organization does not exist, the person is not a member or does not respond.
- One: People who, although members of an organization of civil society, never or almost never attend.
- Two: Those who are members and sometimes attend meetings of an organization.
- Three: Those who occasionally attend meetings of two or three organizations.
- Four: Those who frequently attend meetings of one or more organizations.

As the following table shows, 30 percent of the total sample frequently attend meetings of one organization or more. More precisely, 55 percent of those who are members frequently attend meetings of one organization or more.

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<sup>44</sup> Does not include sports clubs.

**Table 6**  
**Frequency of attendance at meetings of civil society organizations**  
**in which person participates (frecorg), 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

	Frequency of attendance	N° of respon- dents	Percentage	Valid percentage
Valid responses	Never or almost never attends	46	3	5
	Sometimes attends meetings of one organization	285	16	29
	Sometimes attends meetings of two or three organizations	107	6	11
	Frequently attends meetings of one or more organizations	532	<b>30</b>	<b>55</b>
	Total	970	54	100.0
Eliminated Organization does not exist/is responses not a member/no response		814	46	
Total		1784	100.0	

*Indicator (SOB): Percentage of citizens who actively participate in solving problems in their communities.*

This indicator can be established in the same way for the three years of the study, taking into account the following questions:

- (CP5) Have you worked or tried to solve some problem in your (community/neighborhood)?
- (CP5a) Have you donated money or materials to help with some problem or improvement in your (community/neighborhood)?
- (CP5b) Have you contributed your own labor?
- (CP5c) Have you attended meetings to solve some problem or make some improvement in your (community/neighborhood)?

Each of these questions has three categories: 1) yes, 2) no, and 3) don't know. We grouped into a single category the responses No and Don't know, producing two response categories for each of the questions. The new, recoded variables are added to produce the scale of community-based activism<sup>45</sup>:

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<sup>45</sup> In the scale of community-based activism described in the chapter on participation in organizations of civil society, we consider an additional factor that was included in the questionnaire as of 1997. The person interviewed was asked if they had helped form a group

#### Scale of community-based activism

0. Does not participate
1. Participates in 1 activity
2. Participates in 2 activities
3. Participates in 3 activities
4. Participates in all the activities mentioned

We consider those who participate in three or four activities to have a high level of activism, and those who participate in two, one or no community activities to have a low level of activism.

**Table 7**  
**Community-based activism (parcomr), 1996 - 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Citizens actively involved in solving problems in their communities	1996	1997	1998
High level of participation	32	29	23
Low level of participation	68	71	77
Base	(1508)	(1533)	(1784)

#### **Intermediate Result N° 1: More effective national institutions**

*Indicator (R1.1): Percentage of citizens who have confidence in key institutions*

We established the indicator of confidence in institution on the basis of valid responses to the following questions:

- (B13) How much confidence do you have in Congress?
- (B27) How much confidence do you have in the judicial system?
- (B15) How much confidence do you have in the Attorney General's Office?
- (B17) How much confidence do you have in the Ombudsman's Office?
- (B11) How much confidence do you have in the National Elections Board (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones or JNE)?
- (B11a) How much confidence do you have in the National Office of Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales or ONPE)?

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to solve problems in their communities. Because cases in which the person did not respond were not taken into consideration, the percentage of valid responses was lower.

- (B28) How much confidence do you have in the National Registry of Identity and Civil Status (Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil or IDENTIDAD)?
- (B15b) How much confidence do you have in the Comptroller General's Office?

As each of these questions was measured on a scale of seven values, with 1 signifying no confidence and 7 high confidence, the resulting scale of the sum of the eight variables had a range of values from 8 to 56. The scale is divided into high and low levels of confidence as follows:

- Low level of confidence (8-35)
- High level of confidence (36-56)

**Table 8**  
**Citizens' trust in key national institutions (confiar)**  
**1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

<i>Trust in key national institutions</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>
High trust in key national institutions	25	18	20
Low trust in key national institutions	75	82	81
Base <sup>46</sup>	(695)	(1124)	(1107)

#### Confidence in the electoral system

As in the case of confidence in institutions, we considered the variables of confidence in the following institutions: JNE, ONPE and RENIEC. The resulting scale had a range of values from 3 to 21. The range of values from 15 to 21 was considered a high level of confidence, and the range from 3 to 14 a low level of confidence.

**Table 9**  
**Confidence in the electoral system (siselecr), 1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

<i>Confidence in electoral system institutions (JNE, ONPE, RENIEC)</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>
High level of confidence	25	18	20
Low level of confidence	75	82	81
Base	(933)	(1213)	(1367)

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<sup>46</sup> Although the samples in 1996, 1997 and 1998 were 1,508, 1,533 and 1,784 cases respectively, the base only includes valid responses for the indicator under discussion.

## Intermediate Result N° 2: Greater access to justice

*Indicator: Percentage of citizens who believe Peruvian courts ensure a fair trial.*

To establish this indicator, we considered the following question: To what degree do you believe Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial? This question was measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents no confidence and 7 great confidence. The value 8 (Don't know) was considered a lost value. Values were grouped into two categories:

- Low level of confidence (1-4)
- High level of confidence (5-7)

**Table 10**  
**Citizens who believe Peruvian courts**  
**ensure a fair trial (b1r), 1996 –1998**  
**(Percentages)**

<i>Confidence that Peruvian courts ensure a fair trial</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>
High level of confidence	11	11	8
Low level of confidence	89	89	92
Base	(1424)	(1416)	(1692)

## Intermediate Result N° 3: Local governments that are more responsive to constituents

*Indicator: Percentage of citizens who believe local government is responsive to their needs and demands.*

In the 1996 and 1997 studies, this indicator was based on the following questions:

- (sgl1d) What is your opinion of the services provided by the district government in your community: very good, good, average, poor or very poor?
- (sgl2d) When you or your neighbors have gone to the district government to do some administrative business, have they treated you: very well, well, average, poorly or very poorly?

- (sgl1p) What is your opinion of the services provided by the provincial government in your community: very good, good, average, poor or very poor?
- (sgl2p) When you or your neighbors have gone to the provincial government to do some administrative business, have they treated you: very well, well, average, poorly or very poorly?
- (b22) Confidence in the district government
- (b23) Confidence in the provincial government
- Who do you believe has best solved the problems of your community: the central government, Congress or local government?

As the 1998 questionnaire did not include the last question, we followed the same methodology, but only considered the first six variables.

The questions about treatment and services have five values: 1) Very poor or very poorly; 2) Poor or poorly; 3) Average; 4) Good or well; and 5) Very good or very well. Following the previous methodology, we divided this scale into two categories. One group included responses ranging from very poor/poorly to average (a value of 0), and the other responses of very good/well and good/well (a value of 1). The questions about confidence were divided in categories ranging from 1 to 4 (a value of 0) and 5 to 7 (a value of 1). Adding the six variables (previously recoded according to the two values indicated) produced a scale ranging from 0 to 6.

We consider the percentage of high responsiveness by local governments to be the responses with values of 4, 5 and 6 on this scale. The number of valid responses considered in the indicator is the same under both the previous and new methodologies.

**Table 11**  
**Percentage of citizens who believe local government**  
**is responsive to their needs and demands, 1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Percentage of citizens who believe local government is responsive to their needs and demands	1996	1997	1998
Very responsive to constituents (previous methodology: glantr)	14	18	
Very responsive to constituents (new methodology: goblocr)	16	20	16

	Base	(925)	(1032)	(1305)
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In the 1998 study, we considered it important to distinguish between district and provincial governments. We therefore calculated the indicator for each type of local government.

**Table 12**  
**Percentage of citizens who believe district government is responsive to their needs and demands, 1996 – 1998**  
**New methodology (goblocdr: indicator with six variables)**  
**(Percentages)**

Percentage of citizens who believe district government is responsive to their needs and demands	1996	1997	1998
High responsiveness to constituents' needs	22	25	19
Low responsiveness to constituents' needs	78	75	81
Base	(1212)	(1309)	(1491)

**Table 13**  
**Percentage of citizens who believe provincial government is responsive to their needs and demands, 1996 – 1998**  
**New methodology (goblocpr: indicator with six variables)**  
**(Percentages)**

Percentage of citizens who believe provincial government is responsive to their needs and demands	1996	1997	1998
High responsiveness to constituents' needs	23	28	21
Low responsiveness to constituents' needs	77	72	79
Base *	(1067)	(1124)	(1365)

\* Total number of valid responses for this indicator in the national samples of 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively.

**Intermediate Result: Citizens better prepared to exercise their basic rights and civic responsibilities.**

*Indicator: Percentage of citizens who know where they can go to protect*

*their rights.*

#### Previous methodology

The indicator was based on the following questions:

Do you know where to lodge a complaint if a public official mistreats you?  
(var DC10)

What type of mistreatment did you think of when you heard the preceding question? (var DC11).

If the person said they had thought of physical mistreatment, we considered the valid responses for variable DC10 to be:

- District attorney
- Private lawyer
- Police station
- Community self-defense committee (*ronda*)
- Local ombudsman's office for children and adolescents (Demuna, only valid for 1998)

All correct responses were assigned a point value of 1 and incorrect responses a value of 0, resulting in one variable: Knows where to lodge a complaint in case of physical mistreatment, with two categories:

0. Does not know where to go
1. Knows where to go

If the respondent said he or she thought of poor attention, we considered the following responses valid:

- District attorney
- Ombudsman's Office
- Private lawyer
- Public official's superior

Using the same procedure, we established a single variable: Knows where to lodge a complaint in case of poor attention, with two categories:

0. Does not know where to go
1. Knows where to go

For cases in which the response was "both types of mistreatment," we considered the valid responses to be:

- District attorney or justice of the peace
- Private lawyer

- Police station
- Community self-defense committee (*ronda*)
- Ombudsman's Office
- Public official's superior

We repeated the same procedure to establish the variable: Knows where to go in case of both types of mistreatment, with two categories:

- 0. Does not know where to go
- 1. Knows where to go

We selected those cases in which the person interviewed responded that he or she had thought of some type of mistreatment, excluding responses of "Don't know/know answer" to variable DC11 ("What type of mistreatment did you think of when you heard the question?"), and added the three variables we have already described.

**Table 14**  
**Knowledge of where to go to protect rights (dc10ind)**  
**1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

Response	1996	1997	1998
KNOWS WHERE TO GO	58	60	65
Base	(1286)	(1312)	(1663)

*\* The total only includes cases in which the respondent indicated the type of mistreatment received (physical mistreatment, poor attention or both).*

In the 1998 study, we suggest that more important than knowing the specific place to go to lodge a complaint in case of mistreatment, is knowing whether the person interviewed would lodge such a complaint. In addition, the places mentioned by the respondents, such as local governments or human rights organizations, are closer to the people. Even if their legal functions do not include handling this kind of complaint, they are possible recourses for a citizen whose rights have been violated.

Taking this into consideration, we have calculated the percentage of citizens who mentioned a government organism or human rights organization as a place to go to protect their rights, without taking into account the type of mistreatment the respondent had in mind.

**Table 15**  
**Knowledge of where to go to protect rights, 1996 – 1998**  
**New methodology (dc10rr)**  
**(Percentages)**

Response	1996	1997	1998
KNOWS WHERE TO GO	77	82	80
Base *	(1467)	(1495)	(1784)

*\* The total only includes cases in which the respondent indicated the type of mistreatment received (physical mistreatment, poor attention or both).*

*Indicator: Percentage of citizens in disadvantaged groups who know their basic rights and civic responsibilities.*

First we defined the disadvantaged group, then we established the indicator of rights and responsibilities.

### **DISADVANTAGED GROUP**

#### **a. Previous definition of disadvantaged group**

- Women with 0 to 15 years of education complete at socioeconomic level B, C or D.
- Men with 0 to 4 years of education complete
- Men whose first language is Quechua

**Table 16**  
**Disadvantaged group, 1996 – 1998**  
**Previous methodology (gdmétant)**

	1996	1997	1998
Percentage of the sample	52	53	53
Number of cases	786	798	944
Total number of sample cases	1508	1533	1784

As this definition of the disadvantaged group was actually very broad, including people with more years of secondary education, we decided to limit the disadvantaged group as follows:

#### **b. New definition of disadvantaged group**

As the report indicates, we considered three variables: education, native language and socioeconomic level. The most important variable is education, so we decided to include in the disadvantaged group only people with a primary education. Language may not be as important as area of residence, but it serves as a proxy for ethnicity. Because of it is closely related to education, socio-economic level is also a factor in knowledge of rights and, in general, in access to goods and services. Thus the disadvantaged group includes respondents with the following characteristics:

- men and women with 0 to 6 years of education complete and
- respondents with a low socio-economic level, or
- respondents whose first language is Quechua

**Table 17**  
**Disadvantaged groups, 1996 – 1998**  
**New methodology (gd)**

	1996	1997	1998
Percentage of the sample	9	13	15
Number of cases	140	192	268
Total number of sample cases	1508	1533	1784

We established the indicator of knowledge of rights and responsibilities on the basis of two series of variables:

- *Knowledge of rights*
- *Knowledge of responsibilities*

Knowledge of rights

This series consists of six questions, the first five of which have the same format:

1. (DC1a) Does the Constitution include the right to freedom of expression?
2. (DC4a) Does the Constitution include the right to have the whereabouts of a detained person made known without delay?
3. (DC5a) Does the Constitution include the right to receive information you request from any public entity (except information affecting national security)?
4. (DC6a) Does the Constitution include the right to request the replacement of a public official who does not fulfill his or her functions?
5. (DC7a) Does the Constitution include the right for the electorate to hold public officials accountable for their actions and the expenses they incur?

These questions have three categories of responses: "yes," "no," and "don't know/no response." Since "no" is incorrect and "don't know" indicates lack of knowledge, these were grouped into a single category and assigned a point value of 0. The other response was given a point value of 1:

0. The Constitution does not include the right, or the respondent does not know whether the Constitution includes the right
1. The Constitution includes the right

The last question was formulated as follows:

6. (DC9) If you were arrested for any reason other than drug trafficking, espionage or terrorism, do you know for how long you can be held without a court order?

This question had the following response categories: "no more than 24 hours" "any other answer" "don't know/no response." Since the only correct response is no more than 24 hours, the other categories were combined and assigned a point value of zero, and the response "no more than 24 hours" was given a point value of one.

This produced a scale of knowledge of rights with a range from 0 to 6. The scale was divided in two to define a high and a low level of knowledge of rights.

**Table 18**  
**Knowledge of rights (derr), 1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

<i>Level of knowledge of rights</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>
High	53	55	55
Low	47	45	45
Base *	(1508)	(1533)	(1784)

#### Knowledge of responsibilities

We established an index of knowledge (or fulfillment) of responsibilities based on the following two questions:

- (RC1) Do you believe that participation in local government affairs is a right of citizens, or is it something we can do only if it interests us?
- (RC3) Speaking of acts of corruption (for example, a public servant asks for a bribe to speed up paperwork), I am going to read you three statements and I would like you to tell me with which you agree more (only read the first three)

**Table 19**  
**Knowledge of responsibilities (respr), 1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

<i>Level of knowledge of responsibilities</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>
High	48	52	51
Low	52	48	49
Base *	(1508)	(1533)	(1784)

On the basis of knowledge of rights and responsibilities, we established an indicator of knowledge of rights and responsibilities. We added both values to obtain one variable of Knowledge of rights and responsibilities,

which presented three values: zero, one and two. We assumed that a high level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities corresponded to those who had a high level of knowledge of each of the previously described variables.

The following tables show the percentages of a high level of knowledge in both the national sample and the disadvantaged group, calculating with both the old and the new definition of disadvantaged groups.

**Table 20**  
**Previous methodology for disadvantaged groups (gdmétant) and**  
**new methodology for indicator of rights and responsibilities (derespr)**  
**1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

	1996	1997	1998
High level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities in disadvantaged group	23.5	23.1	23.7
High level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities in national sample	29.1	31.8	32.2

**Table 21**  
**New methodology for disadvantaged groups (gd)**  
**and indicator of rights and responsibilities (derespr)**  
**1996 – 1998**  
**(Percentages)**

	1996	1997	1998
High level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities in disadvantaged group	11.4	13.5	10.4
High level of knowledge of rights and responsibilities in national sample	29.1	31.8	34.9

## 5. Focus groups

The original purpose of the focus groups was to compensate for the lack of sample dispersion in rural areas and obtain information to complement the pilot test of the questionnaire. When the sample design was established with the survey taker, however, some very small rural localities and a few peasant communities were included (in fact, the pilot test of the questionnaire was carried out in a Quechua-speaking peasant community). As a result, the focus groups became a way of finding out whether people in poor and rural areas understood the issues addressed by the questionnaire,

as well as gathering complementary information since the questionnaire was already so long that we could not include additional questions.

We held five focus groups in the region of San Martín, which was chosen because it is an area that has received great support from USAID. The specific districts visited were: a) In the province of Picota, the districts of Villa Picota, Shamboyacu and Tres Unidos, and b) in the province of San Martín, the district of Shapaja.

**Table 21**  
**Focus groups by district**

	Focus groups	Others
Villa Picota	1. Male and female leaders	Conversation with mayor and council members
	2. Secondary school students	Conversation with female leaders and some students of secondary schools in district annexes
Tres Unidos	3. Male leaders	
	4. Female leaders	
Shamboyacu		Conversation with some community members and school students
Shapaja	5. Male and female leaders	

Principal topics of discussion were:

- Community involvement
- Perceptions of civilian and military authoritarianism
- Their understanding of democracy
- Trust in political institutions

The first thing we found was that among the organized population, leaders of organizations of civil society understood the issues under discussion, although they had less well-defined opinions about democracy and authoritarian governments. For the most part, they associated democracy with community activity, but the majority was unaware of such issues as separation of powers, autonomy, State of Law, etc. So it was understandable that they justified, to some degree, the president's authoritarian conduct.

Leaders' attitudes depended, to a great extent, on previous experience they had had in unions or politics. In the latter case, their

understanding of issues and the ensuing discussion were much more stimulating.

In general, local authorities who assumed their posts through elections were more critical of "politics;" they said they held public office but were not politicians, and held politics in low regard.

The case of young people was particularly interesting. We talked with secondary school students between ages 13 and 16, and found differences between urban and rural areas. Young people from urban areas had greater contact with the media, have electricity during at least part of the day, and can listen to the news and, in some cases, read the newspaper. Students of the rural areas we visited (Barranquita, for example) did not have electricity; some listened to battery-operated radios but did not use them extensively. The first group was more critical about national events, including those involving their teachers, while the second group had more difficulty expressing their opinions. The first group was also more emphatic in rejecting any type of authoritarianism, while the second group justified military coups more than civilian authoritarianism. In later conversations, we were able to determine that they had grown up in emergency zones<sup>47</sup>, where living under military rule was a "normal" daily occurrence and military personnel were seen as keeping order in depressed and fragmented communities that lived in constant tension between terrorism and drug trafficking (for example, Castilla in Villa Picota and Shamboyacu).

Focus group participants emphasized the need to receive training in issues related to democracy, an opinion echoed by local authorities. Lack of knowledge of the functions of various government institutions and of basic rights and responsibilities was evident.

It must be remembered that we spoke with local leaders, who supposedly have more training than the rest of the population, from which we conclude that people at the grassroots have even less information. It is also important to point out that access to communications media is a primordial factor in helping people develop a more critical attitude, but this cannot be achieved if the population does not have access to basic services such as electricity and water.

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<sup>47</sup> This is the term given to districts or provinces in which the State suspends constitutional guarantees because the zone is in a "state of emergency" because of terrorism, drug trafficking or a natural disaster.

**Table 22**  
**Description of Scales, 1998**

Scales		Original Variable(s)	
Description	Range	Description	Range
(intap) Interest in public affairs	1-5	(p1) How frequently do you inform yourself about national events?	1-5
(intpol) Interest in politics	1-4	(a5) What is your attitude toward politics?	1-4
(partsoc) Participation in civil society organizations	9-36	(part1) Participation in parents' association (part3) Participation in sports clubs (part4) Participation in women's clubs, mothers' associations, kitchen soups. (part5) Participation in religious communities (part6) Participation in professional associations (part7) Participation in neighborhood associations (part8) Participation in labor unions (part9) Participation in political parties (part10) Participation in producers' associations	1-4
(partcom) Community participation	5-10	(com1) Have you tried to solve a community problem? (com2) Have you donated money or materials to solve a community problem? (com3) Have you donated your labor? (com4) Have you attended meetings to solve a community problem? (com5) Have you helped creating a new group to solve a community problem?	1-2
(apoyosp) Support for the political system	1 to 7	(b1) Do you think that Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial? (b2) Do you trust Peru's political institutions? (b3) Do you think that people's basic rights are protected in Peru? (b5) Are you personally happy with Peru's political system? (b6) Do you personally support the political institutions?	1-7
(gld) Opinion of district governments	1 to 100	(gldser) Opinion about the services provided by the district government (gldtrat) Opinion about the treatment by the district government (gldconf) Confidence in the district government	1-100
(glp) Opinion of provincial governments	1-100	(glpser) Opinion about the services provided by the provincial government (glptrat) Opinion about the treatment by the provincial government (glpconf) Confidence in the provincial government	1-100

Scales		Original Variable(s)	
Description	Range	Description	Range
(der) Knowledge of basic rights	0-6	(dc1ar) Freedom of expression (dc4ar) Notification of the place of detention (dc5ar) Information from any public entity (dc6ar) Replace a public official who does not carry out his or her functions (dc7ar) Information about the actions and expenditures of public officials (dc9r) Maximum time a person can be held by police without a court order	0-1
(resp) Knowledge of responsibilities	0-2	(rc1rr) It is a duty to participate in local government affairs (rc3rr) Would you denounce an act of corruption?	0-1
(b3) Perception of defense of rights	1-7	(b3) Do you think that people's basic rights are protected in Peru?	1-7
(b1) Confidence in a fair trial in Peruvian courts	1-7	(b1) Do you think that Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial?	1-7
(demo3r) Preference for democracy	1-3	(demo3) "Is democracy preferable to any other form of government?"	1-3
(m1r) Opinion of President Fujimori's performance	1-5	(m1) Do you approve the way Fujimori is doing his job?	1-5
(golpe) Tolerance for military coups	0-3	(gol1) Justification of coups to solve economic crises (gol2) Justification of coups to solve problems of violence (gol3) Justification of coups to solve other problems	0-1
(auto) Tolerance for civilian authoritarianism	0-3	(auto1) Justification of dictatorial powers to solve economic crises (auto2) Justification of dictatorial powers to solve problems of violence (auto3) Justification of dictatorial powers to solve other problems	0-1
(ideo1) Scale of Ideological self-placement	1-10	(ideo1) In a scale where 1 is 'extreme left' and 10 'extreme right', where would you place yourself?	1-10
(glrecep1) Responsiveness of distrital government	1-5	(glrecep1) Do you think that the distrital government is responsive to what the people want?	1-5
(glrecep2) Responsiveness of provincial government	1-5	(glrecep2) Do you think that the provincial government is responsive to what the people want?	1-5
(np1) Attendance to town meetings	1-4	(np1) Have you attended a town meeting or other open meetings convoked by local governments?	1-4

**Table 23**  
**Sample composition for the three surveys: 1996 – 1998**

Department	1996		1997		1998	
	Provinces	Cases	Provinces	Cases	Provinces	Cases
<b>Lima</b>		<b>472</b>		<b>498</b>		<b>558</b>
	Lima	422	Lima	397	Lima	455
	Huarochiri	15	Huarochiri	15	Huarochiri	13
	Huaura	20	Huaura	12	Huaura	35
	Barranca	15	Barranca	15	Callao	43
			Callao	49	Cañete	12
			Cañete	10		
<b>Amazonas</b>						<b>30</b>
					Chachapoyas	10
					Bagua	8
					Utcubamba	12
<b>Ancash</b>		<b>80</b>		<b>80</b>		<b>72</b>
	Huaraz	40	Santa	20	Santa	31
	Casma	10	Huaraz	10	Huaraz	15
	Santa	20	Caraz	10	Yungay	10
	Yungay	10	Yungay	25	Huari	16
			Carhuaz	15		
<b>Apurímac</b>						<b>30</b>
					Abancay	13
					Andahuaylas	17
<b>Arequipa</b>		<b>55</b>		<b>55</b>		<b>81</b>
	Arequipa	55	Arequipa	55	Arequipa	58
					Camaná	12
					Castilla	11
<b>Ayacucho</b>		<b>29</b>		<b>30</b>		<b>39</b>
	Huamanga	29	Huamanga	30	Huamanga	22
					Huanta	9
					Lucanas	8
<b>Cajamarca</b>		<b>85</b>		<b>85</b>		<b>104</b>
	Cajamarca	75	Cajamarca	75	Cajamarca	22
	Chota	10	Chota	10	Chota	24
					Cajabamba	11
					Hualgayoc	23
					Jaen	24
<b>Cusco</b>		<b>80</b>		<b>80</b>		<b>82</b>
	Cusco	35	Cusco	35	Cusco	27
	Anta	15	Anta	15	La Convención	16
	Canchis	15	Canchis	15	Canchis	20
	Quispicanchis	15	Quispicanchis	15	Quispicanchis	11
					Calca	8
<b>Huancavelica</b>						<b>30</b>
					Huancavelica	15
					Tayacaja	7
					Angaraes	8
<b>Huanuco</b>		<b>45</b>		<b>45</b>		<b>53</b>
	Huánuco	45	Huánuco	45	Huanuco	24
					Dos de Mayo	15
					Leoncio Prado	14
<b>Ica</b>		<b>45</b>		<b>45</b>		<b>44</b>
	Ica	30	Ica	30	Ica	18
	Chincha	15	Chincha	15	Chincha	21

Department	1996		1997		1998	
	Provinces	Cases	Provinces	Cases	Provinces	Cases
					Nazca	5
<b>Junín</b>		<b>70</b>		<b>70</b>		<b>82</b>
	Huancayo	60	Huancayo	50	Huancayo	35
	Tarma	10	Tarma	20	Tarma	18
					Chanchamayo	16
					Jauja	13
<b>Lambayeque</b>		<b>60</b>		<b>60</b>		<b>77</b>
	Chiclayo	50	Chiclayo	40	Chiclayo	51
	Lambayeque	10	Lambayeque	20	Lambayeque	19
					Ferreñafe	7
<b>La Libertad</b>		<b>90</b>		<b>90</b>		<b>102</b>
	Trujillo	70	Trujillo	70	Trujillo	53
	Chepén	20	Chepén	10	Chepen	1
			Ascope	10	Otuzco	21
					Pacasmayo	16
					Sanchez Carrion	11
<b>Loreto</b>		<b>71</b>		<b>70</b>		<b>80</b>
	Maynas	60	Maynas	60	Maynas	59
	Alto Amazonas	11	Alto Amazonas	10	Alto Amazonas	21
<b>Moquegua</b>						<b>11</b>
					Mcal. Nieto	11
<b>Pasco</b>		<b>35</b>		<b>35</b>		<b>16</b>
	Pasco	25	Pasco	25	Pasco	16
	Oxapampa	10	Oxapampa	10		
<b>Piura</b>		<b>96</b>		<b>95</b>		<b>112</b>
	Piura	51	Piura	35	Piura	45
	Sullana	20	Sullana	20	Sullana	19
	Talara	10	Talara	10	Talara	15
	Paita	15	Bernal	15	Ayabaca	20
			Paita	15	Morropon	13
<b>Puno</b>		<b>100</b>		<b>100</b>		<b>84</b>
	Puno	75	Puno	75	Puno	16
	San Román	15	San Roman	15	San Roman	14
	Yunguyo	10	Chucuito	10	Azangaro	19
					Chucuito	16
					Huancane	9
					Lampa	10
<b>San Martín</b>		<b>40</b>		<b>40</b>		<b>48</b>
	San Martín	30	San Martín	30	San Martin	17
	Lamas	10	Lamas	10	Moyobamba	14
					Mrcal. Caceres	17
<b>Tacna</b>		<b>20</b>		<b>20</b>		<b>17</b>
	Tacna	20	Tacna	20	Tacna	17
<b>Tumbes</b>						<b>13</b>
					Tumbes	13
<b>Ucayali</b>		<b>35</b>		<b>35</b>		<b>19</b>
	Crnel. Portillo	35	Crnel. Portillo	35	Crnel. Portillo	19
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1508</b>		<b>1533</b>		<b>1784</b>

**TABLE 24**  
**DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES OFFICE - USAID/PERÚ**  
**INDICATORS 1996 - 1998**

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Indicators	Previous Methodology			New Methodology		
		1996	1997	1998	1996	1997	1998
SO1: Broader citizen participation in democratic Processes	a. Percent of citizens who are active members of at least one civil society organization.	46 (1508)	49 (1533)				
	b. Citizens who actively participate in solving problems in their communities	32 (1508)	29 (1533)	23 (1784)			
IR1.1. More effective national institutions	1. Citizens who trust key national institutions.	25 (695)	18 (1124)	20 (1107)			
IR1.2. Greater access to justice	2. Citizens who believe Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial.	11 (1424)	11 (1416)	8 (1692)			
IR1.3. Local governments more responsive to constituents	3. Citizens who believe local governments respond to their needs and demands.	Ind. with six var.			District Government		
		14 (925)	18 (1032)		22 (1212)	25 (1309)	19 (1491)
		Indic. with seven variables			Provincial Government		
		16 (925)	20 (1032)	16 (1305)	23 (1067)	28 (1124)	21 (1365)
IR1.4. Citizens better prepared to exercise their rights and responsibilities	4. Citizens who know where to go to protect their rights.	58 (1286)	60 (1312)	65 (1663)	77 (1467)	82 (1495)	80 (1784)
	Disadvantaged groups	52 (786)	53 (798)	53 (944)	9 (140)	13 (192)	15 (268)
	Percent of citizens who know their basic rights and civic responsibilities	23 (1508)	28 (1533)		29 (1508)	32 (1533)	32 (1784)
	5. Percent of citizens in disadvantaged groups who know their basic rights and civic responsibilities	17 (786)	20 (798)		11 (140)	14 (192)	10 (268)
	Previous methodology for disadvantaged groups and new methodology for indicator of rights and responsibilities	24 (786)	24 (798)	26 (944)			