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The Missing Link: Politics and Political Interest in Unequal Societies

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The Missing Link

Politics and Political Interest in Unequal Societies[1][2]

Rafael Piñeiro[3] **and Fernando Rosenblatt**[4]

Abstract

Income distribution inequality is one of the major problems in Latin America; however, few studies have addressed the relationship between income distribution and political interest. This contrasts with the vast literature that has been addressing the relationship between inequality, democratization and democratic stability. Using LAPOP data this paper seeks to highlight how the distributive conflict affects individuals' attitudes toward politics. We claim that this depends on the way that collective action problems are solved in order to channel the poor's interests to the political arena. Using a graphical approach, following the logic of multilevel analysis, we intend to show how the effect of unequal income distribution on political interest is mediated by the existence of successful politicians with strong redistributive claims.

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1. Introduction

How does inequality affect political interest? Is there a straightforward relationship between pervasive inequality and low political interest? Some theories have addressed this relationship. Nonetheless, they do not problematize the way that distributive conflict is translated into the political arena. They share a missing link: politics. In this paper we argue that inequality matters for political attitudes, but its impact is mediated by the existence of a certain political menu. More specifically, we claim that it is mediated by the presence of parties or leaders that activate the distributive conflict.

Those studies that have addressed citizens´ attitudes, values and behavior have privileged variables associated with socioeconomic development, putting aside the question of income distribution. The only empirical study on this subject was conducted by Solt (2008); however, he neglects the impact of political variables. Studying wealthy democracies, he attributes an unmediated effect of inequality on political involvement. On the other hand, there is a vast body of literature that addresses the relationship between inequality, democratization and democratic stability with a focus on the role of agency (e.g. Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Rueschemeyer 2004). In particular, this literature explains the way that the poor can overcome collective action problems to generate political outcomes.

It is our purpose to fully account for the combined effect of income inequality and political strategies on citizens´ attitudes toward the political arena. We believe that this will enable us to understand the actual role of inequality and, therefore, some of the challenges that still afflict democracies in developing countries.

Income inequality is one of the main problems afflicting Latin America. In fact, it is the most unequal region in the world. In this context, some scholars have explained the determinants of inequality and poverty reduction (e.g. Roberts 2002; Huber et al. 2006; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Kelly and Morgan 2011). However, those studies do not address the impact of leaders that politicize and sometimes reduce inequality on citizens´ attitudes and behavior. Hence, there are no studies that survey the impact of inequality and citizens´ different resources on their attitudes in unequal societies. Using the vast amount of data from the Latin

American Public Opinion Project (heretofore, LAPOP), this paper shows how distributive conflict differently affects individuals' attitudes towards politics. We argue that the difference hinges on the way the poor solve their collective action problems to translate their interests to the political arena. Moreover, it is our claim that in those scenarios where there are successful political options with a strong redistributive rhetoric, the conflict becomes activated. Hence, citizens' attitudes toward politics change from apathy to interest.

The paper will proceed as follows: In the next section we will discuss how the literature has neglected the role of politics when analyzing the impact of inequality on political attitudes and involvement. In this section we will develop our own argument on the relationship between inequality and political values and behavior. In the third section, we will present our empirical analysis. Fourth, we will introduce the results of our statistical analysis. Finally, we will present a discussion and some conclusions of our analysis.

2. Inequality and involvement in politics: collective action costs as the missing link

The relationship between inequality and democratic consolidation (in its various conceptions) has increasingly gained scholarly attention. However, Solt (2008) conducted the first empirical analysis on the effect of inequality on political attitudes. Solt (2008) divides the debate on the impact of inequality on citizens' involvement in politics into three groups. First, he identifies the theory of *relative power*. This approach assumes that there is a linear relationship between economic power and political power. Possession of resources is translated in the marginalization of the political interests of those who have fewer resources. Consequently, it is assumed that the poor will be alienated and will show greater apathy towards politics since their interests are not politicized (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). This also generates low involvement of the rich since they do not feel their interests are threatened (Solt 2008).

The second approach introduced by Solt emphasizes *conflict*. As opposed to the previous perspective, greater distributive conflict leads to greater interest in politics (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Brady 2004). In Solt's words: "…higher levels of inequality cause divergences in political

preferences that fuel debates about the appropriate course of policy; these debates then cause higher rates of political mobilization" (2008, 49). He also claims that polarization between the rich and the poor increases with inequality. In this perspective we could include Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson´s (2005) works, since their models assume that the distributive conflict is automatically translated into the political realm.

Solt identifies a third approach which he refers to as the *resource theory*. This theory focuses at the individual level. It assumes that political participation has a cost, and involvement is a function of individuals´ resources, i.e. their capacity to pay the cost of participating (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). It depends on the individual´s income. Consequently, those who have enough resources (the rich) to pay that cost will have greater involvement than those who do not have them (the poor):

> "According to the resource theory, then, inequality should affect political engagement because for any given average income, higher levels of inequality mean fewer resources with which to pay the costs of engagement for a country's poorer citizens and more such resources for its richer citizens. Greater inequality should therefore be expected to result in less political engagement among the relatively poor, but more political engagement among the better off." (Solt 2008, 49-50).

The resource theory has the problem of presenting participation solely as an individual´s decision, alienated and indifferent of other individuals.

Solt tests these three different approaches in upper-middle income democracies. To test political involvement he uses political interest, political discussions, and electoral participation as dependent variables. He concludes that results are only consistent with the *relative power theory.* In a nutshell, lower quintiles of income have less political involvement. In his own words: "Declining political interest, discussion of politics, and participation in elections among poorer citizens with rising inequality attest to the increased ability of relatively wealthy individuals to make politics meaningless for those with lower incomes in such circumstances." (2008, 58).

What is the problem with these approaches? All of them assume that inequality generates specific political outcomes; though completely different and contradictory ones. Nevertheless, the three share a missing link: politics. In this paper we argue that inequality and one´s position in the income distribution matter, but, their impact is mediated by the kind of political options available. More specifically, we claim that it is mediated by the existence of parties or leaders that activate the distributive conflict.

When presenting the *resource theory* Solt argues: "Individuals therefore can be expected to make decisions about engaging in politics just as they make decisions to consume any other good; that is, they will be engaged only to the extent they are willing to pay the costs" (2008, 50). Involvement in politics cannot be analyzed with the lens used to understand the market of some good. This is because the end for which one decides to be involved hinges on others´ actions; this is why political science has claimed that politics implies collective action (Olson 1965).

The other two approaches could be regarded as belonging to the same theory. Their sole difference lies in the probability each assign to the ability of the poor to solve their collective action problems to channel their distributive interests to the political arena. Those who sustain that unequal distribution discourages participation of the poor assume that they are not able to pay the collective action costs involved in introducing electorally viable political options (*relative power theory*). On the other hand, those who believe that greater redistributive conflict generates greater involvement believe that those costs do not exist, and that the conflict is automatically translated into the political arena (*conflict theory*).

It seems reasonable to think that political involvement is associated to an end, which is linked to collective action. Secondly, those actions do have a cost, but they are neither *zero* (as the theory of conflict assumes) nor *infinite*, in the sense that they are unaffordable (as the theory of relative power claims). Income distribution and an individual´s economic situation have an effect over citizens´ involvement in politics. Nevertheless, it is our claim that this effect is mediated by the chances that citizens have to solve their collective action problems. Hence, we will try to demonstrate that this possibility is not fixed but varies. More specifically, this implies that the relationship is mediated by the existence of successful candidates or parties that promote their interest in the political debate.

Our argument is not new. Several authors have already analyzed that the way collective action problems are solved explains transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy. The poor are the ones with collective action problems (Houle 2009). Their only advantage lies in their number. However, several scholars have highlighted how coordination has been historically elusive. This is why those who have studied democratization focusing on agency have paid significant attention to the way the poor can solve their collective action problems. Several scholars, while agreeing with the argument raised by modernization theory, have tried to open the black box in order to explain how modernization leads to democracy. For this purpose, these works bring agency back to the scene.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) developed a historical comparative analysis and claimed that class interests mediate the efforts towards –and against- democratization. In this sense, they claimed that subordinate classes were the ones that fought for democracy. Boix (2003) claims, agreeing with Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, that democracy is the result of power struggle. The variables he considers for his game theory model are: a) economic equality and, b) capital mobility. He claims that political regimes are a consequence of the *balance of power among the parties in contention*. If the lower classes can overcome their collective action problems the cost of repression for the wealthy rises, diminishing the cost for democracy.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) present a similar theory. They also conceive regime transition as related to "conflict between elite and citizens over politics" (2005, 16). In order to channel a unified interest Acemoglu and Robinson claim that citizens only need to solve their collective action problems. If they can, this allows them to make an effective demand for democracy. This is possible, they argue, when economic crises occur. In those instances citizens can challenge the elite with potential social unrest. The elite, faced with the threat of a revolution, extend the vote because "…[it] has to make a credible promise to set policies that the majority prefer; in particular, it must make a credible commitment to future pro-majority policies" (2005, 26). Hence, confronted with the promise of democratization the majority avoids the revolutionary path because it implies many costs, and they "know" that democracy will

"look after their interests." They claim that the potential threat of revolutions is the "…spark that ignites the democratization process…" (2005, 36).

These theories raise two issues that are illustrative for our argument. First, political outcomes are the result of collective action. In this sense the ability of the poor to solve their collective action problems explains democratic transitions. Second, they fight for democracy, because this regime involves the promise of equality. Once transition to democracy has been achieved, it seems reasonable to assume that collective action problems persist and the distributive conflict has not vanished.

Under democracy parties are necessary or even essential (Schattschneider 1942). Parties solve collective action problems (Aldrich 1995). Nevertheless, as the vast literature on party-citizen linkages suggest, representation of the poor´s redistributive interests cannot be taken for granted (Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010). When those interests are neglected, indifference and alienation results (Downs 1957). Some argue that this is a direct consequence of rampant inequality, again, as the *relative power* theory presented above suggests. We believe that the existence of inequality neither prevents nor boosts the emergence of political parties or leaders that politicize the distributive conflict. Hence, one purpose is to show this and to highlight the diverse impact that the existence of political leaders or parties with strong redistributive rhetoric have on citizens´ attitudes.

Latin America is a region that has been widely highlighted as the most unequal (ECLAC 2010). Solt (2008) warns against analyzing the relationship between inequality and political involvement in poor democracies, because in those cases citizens are involved in clientelistic networks. As mentioned earlier his argument neglects a specific role to politics, i.e. to political agents. Second, each type of linkage might have different consequences for the quality of representation or even for the quality of public policies. [5] Nevertheless, neither programmatic nor clientelistic linkages ensure that inequality will or will not be politicized.

[5] See below for discussion on what we do not mean with our argument.

Huber et al. (2006) present an interesting argument about the impact of politics on differences on inequality in Latin America.[6] In a nutshell their argument is:

> "…we would expect that countries with longer records of democracy would have lower degrees of inequality, because democracy over the long term offers the possibility for the underprivileged to organize and make their voices heard. The prime instrument for influencing policy in democracies is the political party. Political parties differ in their worldviews and commitments to redistribution and their corresponding appeals to the electorate. Accordingly, we would expect countries with stronger party blocs committed to redistribution (i.e., stronger party blocs to the left of center) to have less inequality. Finally, the main ways that parties influence the distribution of income is through legislation on public expenditure and on regulation of labor markets. Accordingly, we would expect countries with more redistributive expenditures and stronger pro-labor legislation to have lower degrees of inequality." (2006, 944).

As part of an edited volume Huber and Stephens (2010) present an interesting analysis on *social policy regimes* in Latin America.[7] They claim that Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are cases with social policy regimes that seem to be on the right path, i.e. these cases have made progress in reducing poverty and inequality, though they highlight several challenges for each case. What is interesting for our purposes is that they find that, in line with Huber et al. (2006) and Pribble, Huber, and Stephens (2009), a cumulative record on democracy and left party strength boosts income redistribution and poverty reduction. Hence, it is not democracy by itself that ensures redistributive consequences, but this result is mediated by the existence of a specific type of political party.

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[6] With a different focus, but still related to this trend in the literature, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens analyze the determinant of governments´ social security, welfare, health, and education spending. They find that political regime is a key variable to explain variance: "…democratic governments of all political stripes are more responsive to demands for state provision of social security and welfare, and for health and education services than are authoritarian governments." (2008, 431).

[7] Pribble (2011) has also categorized social policy regimes and introduced explanations for their configuration.

These studies do not explain how the distributive issue becomes activated nor how political supply interacts with distributive demands.[8] This is precisely the gap that we intend to fill. Our argument is not centered on policy outcomes; we focus on attitudes towards politics. Instead of explaining different levels of inequality or social spending, we will try to assess how inequality has different effects on citizens´ interest and involvement in politics. Also, following the literature on democratization that brought agency back to the scene, we assume that the poor have collective action problems in channeling their interests to the political arena. We claim that this depends on the existence (or the lack) of successful political alternatives with strong redistributive claims.[9]

Why focus on populist leaders and not programmatic party systems? Even though competition could be programmatic to a satisfactory degree, nothing assures that relevant parties will promote the interests of the poor. On the other hand, competition might be clientelistic, but leaders from one or more parties might conduct redistributive policies. Moreover, in the Latin American context programmatic parties are the exception (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Why don't we consider left-of-center parties instead of restricting the argument to populist leaders? We might have included left-of-center parties. However, in the absence of systematic and comparative analyses of left parties we preferred to conduct a conservative analysis rather than complicate our study with concepts that are frequently a matter of strong debates.

Our argument contrasts Roberts´ claim:

[8] However, to be fair, this is understandable since their goal is to explain different social policy regimes and their effect on inequality and poverty.

[9] Luna, Bidegain and Reserve introduce a novel account on the impact of "neo-socialist mobilization" on citizens´ values: "…cases undergoing "neo-socialist" mobilization seem to have gained at least some programmatic structure. This took place on the midst of unfavorable historical and structural conditions…polarizing political processes can lead to RPG [Responsible Party Government] especially when bottom-up organizing and collective action match leaders' mobilization attempts. Moreover, RPG emerges more often as a result of leftist-driven polarization, which also has to be sustained over a given significantly long period of time." (2011, 1). Their work inspires our endeavor and both are intertwined.

> "Class inequalities are more extreme in Latin America than in any other region of the world, yet class appears to have diminishing political value as an organizing principle, a source of collective identity, and an axis of partisan competition…Although social inequalities have been exacerbated and economic insecurity is widespread, parties are not cleaving the political arena along class lines. Instead, they have eschewed class identities and pursued cross-class strategies of political representation" (2002, 3-4).

In some sense our argument poses a relevant caveat to his claim. We argue that this is not a general trend, but it depends on the supply side.

Before proceeding to our empirical analysis we believe it is relevant to clearly state what we do not mean with our argument. Much has been written in the last few years regarding the pernicious effects of populism on democracy. The wave of populist regimes in Latin America has generated interesting scholarly work analyzing the impact of these type of regimes (e.g. Weyland, Hunter, and Madrid 2010). In this sense our argument does not necessarily contradict their findings. Neither a normative nor a theoretical implication of these populist governments on democratic stability, democratic quality, or the relationship between political actors will be derived from our analysis. We do not analyze the impact of the effectiveness of certain redistributive policies. We highlight how under some scenarios where inequality is rampant populist governments positively impact citizens´ interest and political involvement. Second, it is not our purpose to identify the historical conditions that determine the emergence of political actors who favor a strong redistributive rhetoric. Nevertheless, we do try to show how political strategies interact with distributive realities.

3. Explaining Interest and Involvement in Unequal Societies

3.1. Data and Measures

This paper analyzes the relationship between inequality and political interest in Latin American countries. Our argument involves individual level variables (interest in politics, income) and variables at the country level (inequality, populism). Individual-level data used in this paper are from LAPOP surveys. Countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

3.2. Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is referred to as interest in politics. For this purpose, we use the following variable from LAPOP: *pol1* (interest in politics). This is an ordinal variable with four values, where 1 represents "a lot"; 2 "some"; 3 "little"; and 4 "none" of interest in politics.

3.3. Independent Variables

Our independent variable is the interaction between income inequality measured by the Gini Index[10] (*gini*) and the existence of governments with a strong redistributive rhetoric. For the former we used the data available closest to the survey. The latter is operationalized as a dummy variable indicating the existence or absence of this type of governments (*presidente*). To classify our cases as populists we rely on recent literature on the subject (Hawkins 2009; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Lanzaro 2008; Casteñeda and Morales 2008). Given the wave of left governments in the region students of Latin America have distinguished between moderate and populist left governments. Although they have different criteria all these studies agree on the classification of each case (when their cases coincide). Our only disagreement with the literature is that we classify Argentina as a case with a populist president. Both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández revive of the tradition of the Peronist movement. At the same time, they have developed policies with a strong redistributive claim. Also, at the individual-

[10] World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/ .Last accessed 21st , July, 2011.

level we use LAPOP´s measure of income (*income*). The interviewee is asked: *Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children*? The variable´s range is from 0 to 10, corresponding to different levels of income, with 0 indicating the lowest and 10 indicating the highest.

Our model is completed with the inclusion of the "usual suspects", i.e. variables normally included in the literature, both at the individual and at the country level. At the country level we test GDP per capita (*pib*)[11], whether there was a parliamentary or executive election at the year of the survey (*elecc*). At the individual level we include the following controls: age (*age*), sex (*sex*), residence location (*ur*, urban or rural), years of education completed (*educ*) and the ideological self-placement (*ideol*).

4. Hypotheses

In countries with higher levels of inequality, individual interest in politics depends on the existence of successful leaders or parties with strong redistributive claims. Our theoretical argument is that collective action costs (for the poor) are neither zero nor infinite. For reasons not studied here, the distributive conflict can be politicized or not (hence, cannot be conceived as constant). Sometimes parties or leaders are successful in offering policies with strong redistributive claims. In those instances collective action costs are paid. We can affirm that where leaders or parties represent the poor´s interests and are successful (i.e. become elected) this generates greater interest in politics. More specifically, the existence of populist leaders in unequal societies fosters political interest of citizens. In this sense we can argue that politics has been the missing link in the analysis of the relationship between inequality and political involvement. We test these claims with the interaction of our theoretically relevant independent variables: income distribution, income and populist (leaders or parties) in government. In more unequal societies (i.e. with higher Gini index), interest in politics is greater for people with low

[11] World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/ .Last accessed 21st , July, 2011.

income when a populist leader governs than in countries without those leaders, regardless of income distribution. As our theory suggests, this is because the distributive conflict becomes politicized.

5. Method and Model

Our theory involves the inclusion of individual-level and group-level variables; therefore, a multilevel analysis should be conducted. According to Jones' (2008) notation, the model with one predictor at the individual-level (level-1) and one at the group-level (level-2), assuming that these two groups of variables vary by group (i.e. country), is:

$$y_i = \beta_{j[i]} + \beta_{1j[i]} x_{i1} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

$j=1\ldots J$ for the number of level-2 units and $i=1\ldots n_i$ for the number of level-1 units within a given level-2 unit. Also, $\beta_{1j[i]}$ is the slope coefficient for a level-1 covariate x_{i1}. If we assume that $\beta_{j[i]}$ varies randomly as a function of some level-2 covariate z_j, and $\beta_{1j[i]}$ is a function of a level-2 covariate, z_j then:

$$\beta_{j[i]} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} z_j + \mu_{0j} \quad (2)$$

$$\beta_{1j[i]} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} z_j + \mu_{1j} \quad (3)$$

The multi-level model is expressed in this way:

$$y_i = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} x_i + \gamma_{01} z_j + \gamma_{11} z_j x_i + \mu_{1j} x_i + \mu_{oj} + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where:

γ_{00} = is the intercept estimate

γ_{10} = is the slope coefficient for the effect of x_i on y_i, when z_j =0

γ_{01} = is the slope coefficient for the effect of z_j on y_i, when x_i =0

γ_{11} = is the interaction between x_i and z_j. This is what Jones (2008) refers to as "cross-level interaction." As the author suggests (in line with Gelman and Hill 2007) in the empirical analysis we will *mean-center* the covariates at the individual level.

μ_{1j} = error term for the varying slope coefficient γ_{10}

μ_{oj} = error term for the random intercept term

ε_i = level-1 error term.

Finally, it is assumed that:

$$\varepsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2)$$

$$\mu_{oj} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\mu_0}^2)$$

$$\mu_{1j} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\mu_1}^2),$$

$$\text{with } \operatorname{cov}(\mu_{0j}, \mu_{1j}) = \sigma_{\mu 01}$$

For individual *i* in country-year *j* the equation to be estimated would be: [12]

$$pol1_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} presidente * gini_j + \gamma_{02} presidente_j + \gamma_{03} gini_j + \gamma_{04} pib + \gamma_{05} elecc + \gamma_{10} sex + \gamma_{20} cage + \gamma_{30} ur + \gamma_{40} cideol + \gamma_{50} cideol^2 + \gamma_{60} ceduc + \gamma_{70} cincome + \gamma_{11} gini * presidente * cincome + \mu_{10ji} + \mu_{20ji} + \mu_{30ji} + \mu_{40ji} + \mu_{50ji} + \mu_{60ji} + \mu_{0j} + \varepsilon_i$$

[12] The "*c*" (e.g. *cincome*) before the name of some individual-level covariate implies that they are mean-centered.

6. Multi-Level Analysis with Visualization

Bowers and Drake (2005) argue that if a researcher is interested in the direct effects of group-level variables, the relevant sample size is the number of groups. Given our theoretical argument our main interest lies on the effects on the outcome (political interest) of country level variables. The relevant sample size is 18 (number of countries included in each LAPOP survey) [13] . Bowers and Drake mention that: "Estimates from a multilevel model with [few] degrees of freedom for country-level variables may not be consistent and will not have known sampling distributions—and thus hypothesis tests in this case will be uninterpretable in the likelihood framework, even if those [few] countries were a random sample from the population of countries" (2005, 302).

Is it impossible to empirically test our argument? Fortunately the answer is no. Bowers and Drake claim that "…visualization of multilevel data can help analysts with small samples of level-2 units (like countries or states) learn about their data and present results that are not dependent on asymptotic or distributional assumptions" (2005, 302).

Following this line, Gelman and Hill mention that: "…the multilevel estimate can be close to complete pooling for groups with small sample size and close to no pooling for groups with large sample size..." (2007, 270-271). As we have already mentioned, we are in the second scenario. In graph 1 (see below) we compare the difference between estimation from unpooled (black points) and pooled from a multilevel empty model (red circles).

We will proceed with the graphical analysis comparing results of estimation of political interest from country-year models. In graph 1 country-year estimations are ordered by Gini levels (left to right). At first glance the graph does not present any systematic evidence of significant differences in estimations between country-years depending on Gini levels. However, if we look at the more unequal country-years (from 0.51 to the right), it is possible to see that individuals in countries with populist presidents (dashed line) seem to present higher interest in politics. On the other hand, more equal countries do not seem to present this pattern.

[13] Although we worked 18 countries x 3 years (waves of LAPOP) we cannot assume independence of group level variables.

It could be argued that interest in politics in more equal countries is not affected by the presence of populist presidents. In any case, the differences in estimates are not statistically significant.



Graph 1. Pooled vs Unpooled Empty Model

Continuing with our graphical approach, we compare the estimation of the same regression model run for the 18 countries[14] in three different ways. First, we present the confidence intervals for each covariate for each country ordered by Gini (Graph 2). Then, we focus on the relationship between income (measured at the individual level) and interest in politics in each country. For this purpose we display an xyplot with regression lines for each country. Finally, we group those regression lines by GDP, Gini, and the presence of a populist president to fully appreciate the relevance of group-level variables.

Graph 2 presents confidence intervals at 95% for each covariate in each country. Countries are arranged by Gini. As age, income, education, and ideology were mean-centered, and sex is zero for men and urban is zero for a person who lives in the city, the estimation of the

[14] To simplify the analysis we only report the results for 2010. Anyway, the results for 2008 and 2006 are not different for those of 2010 (available under request).

intercept for each country shows the interest in politics of a male, who resides in a city, with an average age, income, and ideological position. If Gini has a direct and unmediated effect on political interest, it ought to have a systematic effect reflected in the intercept, i.e. a decreasing effect of the estimation from bottom to top. However, as Graph 2 shows this is not the case. For example, Colombia is the most unequal country, and Venezuela is almost the most equal country included in our study. However, both have almost the same estimation for the intercept. Meanwhile Chile is in the middle of our Gini level distribution and presents the lowest estimation. Hence, there is no systematic relationship between Gini, by itself, and interest in politics. In general, this is also evident for the direct effect of individual-level variables.



Graph 2. Confidence Intervals for OLS Regression by Country

Following the graphical approach made by Bowers and Drake (2005), Graph 3 shows the within-country regressions from our model with solid lines, outlier resistant within-country regressions with dashed lines, and the scatterplot for the relationship between income and interest in politics for each country. Panels are plotted in increasing order of Gini from bottom to

top and left to right. The "+" symbol included in some panels signals that it was an electoral year in that country. Also, the "*" indicates the presence of a populist president. The graph shows that different countries present different relationships between income and interest in politics. Some countries have a positive relationship with a steep slope, while the regression line for other countries seems to reveal the absence of a systematic relationship. Regarding our theoretical concern, not all countries seem to follow the prediction of the relative power theory. Moreover, the relationship is not dependent on the Gini level. We can infer that other variables could be mediating the estimation of interest in politics.

It is our claim that that variable is the existence of a populist president. Focusing on the upper-level of the xy plot (i.e. the most unequal countries), it is possible to see that there is no association between income and interest in politics. At the same time, lower-income individuals in Bolivia (who has a populist president) show more interest in politics than in any other country with similar levels of inequality. Looking at the panels located in the middle of the xy plot, it is possible to see that Nicaragua follows the same pattern as Bolivia, against countries with similar levels of inequality (the rest of the panels located in the middle of the xy plot). However, this is not the case with Ecuador, which has a steeper positive slope. Nevertheless, the level of inequality in Ecuador is much lower than Nicaragua and Bolivia. In the lower level of the xy plot, the regression line of Venezuela show that there is now relationship between income and interest in politics. However, the average level of interest is lower than countries with similar level of inequality. Finally, Argentina shows the same pattern as countries without populist presidents at the same level of Gini (e.g. Uruguay).



Graph 3. Interest in Politics vs Income Within Countries

In our last graph we group the regression lines for each country by the level of GDP, the existence/absence of populist presidents and, finally, by the Gini level. [15] Countries with a high Gini, low GDP and populist presidents have flatter regression lines and show that low income individuals have slightly more interest in politics than low income individuals in countries without a populist president.

More surprisingly, in countries with low GDP, a high Gini, and populist presidents, low income individuals show more interest in politics than low income individuals in countries with medium and high GDP with a high Gini. This is in line with our theoretical assumptions: the level of distributive conflict is mediated by the supply of political options. In other words, regardless of the level of GDP per capita, lower income individuals become more interested in politics when there is a populist president that channels their distributive preferences. In more equal countries with high GDP (Venezuela and Argentina) this does not hold. This is also in line

[15] We divided the level of GDP as follows: up to U$S 4999 we labeled the GDP per capita as "low". From 5000 to 9999 as "medium" and, above 10000 as "high". Also, we divided the Gini levels as high and low. We computed as low those countries that were below 51.99.

with our theory since we expect that the marginal impact of populist leaders is greater in depressed countries (low GDP and a high Gini).



Graph 4. Within Country Regression Grouped by levels of GDP per capita, Gini and Type of President

7. Discussion

Throughout this paper, we have insisted on the relevance of political variables that mediate the relationship between income inequality and interest in politics. We have followed the logic of multilevel analysis with a graphical approach. This analysis provides some insights to our previous theoretical discussion. We claim that the relative resources and conflict theory were essentially the same with only one different assumption (i.e. the probability each assigned to the ability of poor people to afford the costs of collective action). We have argued that holding constant the collective action costs for the poor is misleading, because there might be political entrepreneurs who are willing to pay those costs –politicizing the distributive conflict. This is the missing link between distributive conflict and politics in previous theories.

We have shown that in scenarios with low inequality combined with either medium or high GDP the presence of a populist president is irrelevant (Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela). Also, the relative power theory´s prediction works. However, in scenarios of high inequality the relative power theory does not seem to hold. In countries with a high Gini and low GDP (Bolivia and Nicaragua) the poor's interest in politics is dependent on the presence of leaders with a strong redistributive rhetoric. Having a populist president seems to increase interest in politics of those individuals with low income. This becomes more evident when comparing the former with the interest of the poor in countries with a high Gini and high GDP without a populist president (Chile). Note that this finding conflicts with the prediction of the resource theory too. Consequently, poor people in poor countries should have greater collective action costs. However this does not seem to happen. Again, this is dependent on the political supply.

It should be acknowledged that the differences between countries in most cases are not statistically significant. Recalling our introduction to the graphical approach, it should be emphasized that our data contained a limited number of countries. This becomes evident in Graph 4 since some panels are empty and others have only one case. Limited country units prevents running a multilevel model, making it difficult to test our hypothesis. Furthermore, our theory involves some interactions further complicating the statistical analysis.

Nevertheless, this statistical analysis might lead to typology building by combining GDP, Gini and the type of president (as it is implied in our analysis presented above).We have identified some subsets of cases that could be studied in depth to fully account the causal mechanism that operates in our theory (Collier, Laporte, and Seawright, 2008). For example, from our graphical approach it follows that it could be worth comparing cases with low GDP and a high Gini that have and that do not have populist presidents.

In this line, it is worthwhile to discuss our conceptualization of types of presidents. For the sake of simplicity we have opted to include leaders with strong redistributive claims, those that different scholars have signaled as populist leaders. However, it is possible that the poor's collective action costs are not only paid with the promise of potential redistribution from leftist governments. It might be possible that leaders from the right could also offer clientelistic or populist promises too. Even more, collective action costs might be paid by someone who offers security or by the provision of another kind of public good which is relevant for the poor in their country. Finally, we have only considered the "promise" of redistribution. Nevertheless, it might be interesting to survey how the effective reduction of inequality operates on citizens′ attitudes. For example, the Frente Amplio in Uruguay has conducted a massive health reform, a progressive tax reform, and has implemented a policy of cash transfer for the poorest. Although its redistributive (populist) rhetoric is far from that of Evo Morales in Bolivia or Chávez in Venezuela, the actual policies implemented (regardless their quality) have had redistributive consequences.

Much has been written about the quality of democracy in Latin America. For two decades, scholars have insisted on the relevance of political stability and democratic institutions. This preoccupation has put aside the study of the latent (or explicit) distributive conflict in the most unequal region in the world. We argue that it is imperative to analyze how distributive conflicts enter the political arena and how they are mediated by political agents in different contexts. This can help in understanding how democracy works in unequal societies, and how it should work to achieve the desired mix between quality and stability. Our work has tried to contribute to this line of research.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics Pooled					
Variable	**Year**	**Mean**	**Std Dev**	**Min**	**Max**
pol1	2006	2.00	0.97	1.00	4.00
pol1	2008	2.03	0.96	1.00	4.00
pol1	2010	2.14	0.98	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
ur	2008	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00
ur	2010	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	4.46	2.50	0.00	10.00
income	2008	4.13	2.32	0.00	10.00
income	2010	4.07	2.28	0.00	10.00
age	2006	38.28	15.54	16.00	97.00
age	2008	38.98	15.97	16.00	101.00
age	2010	38.61	15.79	16.00	96.00
educ	2006	8.91	4.65	0.00	24.00
educ	2008	8.90	4.57	0.00	18.00
educ	2010	9.39	4.49	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	5.73	2.55	1.00	10.00
ideol	2008	5.73	2.47	1.00	10.00
ideol	2010	5.68	2.43	1.00	10.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
Variable	**Year**	**Country**	**Mean**	**StdDev**	**Min**	**Max**
pol1	2008	ARG	2.28	0.94	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	ARG	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	ARG	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	ARG	4.78	2.64	0.00	10.00
age	2008	ARG	36.65	14.60	18.00	81.00
educ	2008	ARG	10.89	4.06	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	ARG	5.52	1.86	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	ARG	2.31	0.96	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	ARG	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.0
sex	2010	ARG	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	ARG	3.10	2.06	0.00	10.00
age	2010	ARG	35.49	14.13	18.00	70.00
educ	2010	ARG	10.41	4.19	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	ARG	5.15	1.80	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	BOL	2.05	0.96	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	BOL	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	BOL	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	BOL	3.28	1.33	0.00	8.00
age	2006	BOL	36.86	15.31	18.00	92.00
educ	2006	BOL	10.24	5.30	0.00	24.00
ideol	2006	BOL	5.23	2.17	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	BOL	2.02	0.94	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	BOL	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	BOL	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	BOL	3.90	1.68	0.00	10.00
age	2008	BOL	36.88	15.21	18.00	93.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
educ	2008	BOL	10.12	4.86	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	BOL	5.17	2.14	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	BOL	2.24	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	BOL	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	BOL	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	BOL	4.38	1.65	0.00	10.00
age	2010	BOL	37.10	15.09	18.00	86.00
educ	2010	BOL	10.37	4.54	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	BOL	5.23	1.93	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	BRA	2.15	0.96	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	BRA	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	BRA	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	BRA	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN
age	2006	BRA	39.76	16.34	16.00	86.00
educ	2006	BRA	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN
ideol	2006	BRA	5.75	2.36	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	BRA	1.95	0.90	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	BRA	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	BRA	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	BRA	2.78	1.84	0.00	10.00
age	2008	BRA	41.43	16.96	18.00	94.00
educ	2008	BRA	7.29	4.33	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	BRA	5.84	2.18	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	BRA	1.95	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	BRA	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	BRA	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	BRA	2.75	1.72	0.00	10.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
age	2010	BRA	39.51	16.10	18.00	89.00
educ	2010	BRA	8.13	3.94	0.00	17.00
ideol	2010	BRA	5.84	2.32	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	CHL	1.83	0.93	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	CHL	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	CHL	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	CHL	4.88	2.22	0.00	10.00
age	2006	CHL	43.21	16.55	18.00	91.00
educ	2006	CHL	10.46	3.98	0.00	19.00
ideol	2006	CHL	5.26	2.34	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	CHL	1.69	0.87	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	CHL	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	CHL	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
income	2008	CHL	4.00	2.58	0.00	10.00
age	2008	CHL	43.60	16.49	18.00	91.00
educ	2008	CHL	10.48	3.83	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	CHL	5.54	2.15	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	CHL	1.86	0.91	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	CHL	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	CHL	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	CHL	4.75	2.70	0.00	10.00
age	2010	CHL	42.80	16.63	18.00	96.00
educ	2010	CHL	11.00	3.85	0.00	17.00
ideol	2010	CHL	5.48	2.29	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	COL	2.02	0.96	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	COL	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	COL	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
income	2006	COL	3.74	1.82	0.00	10.00
age	2006	COL	37.33	15.01	18.00	97.00
educ	2006	COL	8.58	4.41	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	COL	6.24	2.52	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	COL	2.14	0.96	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	COL	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	COL	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	COL	3.89	1.87	0.00	10.00
age	2008	COL	36.83	14.71	18.00	90.00
educ	2008	COL	8.77	4.30	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	COL	6.21	2.47	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	COL	2.17	0.95	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	COL	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	COL	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	COL	4.26	1.90	0.00	10.00
age	2010	COL	37.15	15.25	18.00	89.00
educ	2010	COL	9.93	4.69	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	COL	6.34	2.44	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	CRI	1.98	0.98	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	CRI	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	CRI	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	CRI	5.07	2.59	0.00	10.00
age	2006	CRI	40.56	16.66	18.00	93.00
educ	2006	CRI	8.80	4.49	0.00	20.00
ideol	2006	CRI	5.90	2.52	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	CRI	1.81	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	CRI	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
sex	2008	CRI	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	CRI	4.52	2.24	0.00	10.00
age	2008	CRI	40.78	17.14	18.00	96.00
educ	2008	CRI	8.16	4.20	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	CRI	6.45	2.66	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	CRI	2.19	1.07	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	CRI	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	CRI	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	CRI	3.62	2.25	0.00	10.00
age	2010	CRI	39.29	16.30	18.00	90.00
educ	2010	CRI	8.4	4.2	0.0	18.0
ideol	2010	CRI	5.79	2.56	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	DOM	2.24	1.08	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	DOM	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	DOM	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	DOM	5.08	2.40	0.00	10.00
age	2006	DOM	38.63	15.94	18.00	90.00
educ	2006	DOM	7.76	4.79	0.00	20.00
ideol	2006	DOM	7.23	2.85	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	DOM	2.41	1.13	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	DOM	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	DOM	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	DOM	5.51	2.38	0.00	10.00
age	2008	DOM	41.17	16.28	18.00	101.00
educ	2008	DOM	7.32	4.54	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	DOM	7.00	2.85	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	DOM	2.34	1.07	1.00	4.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
ur	2010	DOM	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	DOM	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	DOM	3.86	2.35	0.00	10.00
age	2010	DOM	41.21	16.76	18.00	90.00
educ	2010	DOM	8.62	4.81	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	DOM	6.38	2.99	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	ECU	1.68	0.83	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	ECU	0.25	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	ECU	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	ECU	6.35	2.06	0.00	10.00
age	2006	ECU	38.56	15.01	18.00	95.00
educ	2006	ECU	10.57	4.15	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	ECU	5.78	2.34	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	ECU	1.86	0.88	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	ECU	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	ECU	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	ECU	4.2	1.6	0.0	10.0
age	2008	ECU	38.37	15.42	18.00	90.00
educ	2008	ECU	10.48	4.18	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	ECU	5.37	2.47	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	ECU	1.93	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	ECU	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	ECU	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	ECU	4.45	1.65	0.00	10.00
age	2010	ECU	39.38	15.74	18.00	91.00
educ	2010	ECU	10.50	4.12	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	ECU	5.43	2.31	1.00	10.00

pol1	2006	GTM	1.67	0.84	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	GTM	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	GTM	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	GTM	3.05	1.96	1.00	10.00
age	2006	GTM	35.83	14.05	18.00	88.00
educ	2006	GTM	6.51	4.50	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	GTM	5.49	1.93	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	GTM	1.73	0.85	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	GTM	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	GTM	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	GTM	2.71	2.25	0.00	10.00
age	2008	GTM	39.41	15.55	18.00	89.00
educ	2008	GTM	6.01	4.77	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	GTM	5.79	2.42	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	GTM	1.94	0.93	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	GTM	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	GTM	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	GTM	2.95	2.31	0.00	10.00
age	2010	GTM	38.42	15.61	18.00	86.00
educ	2010	GTM	7.62	4.80	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	GTM	5.59	2.26	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	HND	1.91	0.88	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	HND	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	HND	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	HND	4.76	2.01	0.00	10.00
age	2006	HND	35.99	13.98	18.00	87.00
educ	2006	HND	7.23	4.16	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	HND	6.64	2.61	1.00	10.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
pol1	2008	HND	2.10	0.86	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	HND	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	HND	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	HND	5.71	2.03	0.00	10.00
age	2008	HND	35.34	14.18	18.00	90.00
educ	2008	HND	7.25	4.32	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	HND	6.09	2.38	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	HND	2.22	0.95	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	HND	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	HND	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	HND	4.00	1.87	0.00	10.00
age	2010	HND	35.94	14.78	18.00	89.00
educ	2010	HND	7.15	4.10	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	HND	6.67	2.29	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	MEX	2.30	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	MEX	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	MEX	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	MEX	4.56	2.35	0.00	10.00
age	2006	MEX	37.61	14.31	18.00	86.00
educ	2006	MEX	8.57	4.30	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	MEX	5.99	2.41	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	MEX	2.07	0.86	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	MEX	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	MEX	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	MEX	4.58	2.31	0.00	10.00
age	2008	MEX	40.84	16.67	18.00	90.00
educ	2008	MEX	8.27	4.47	0.00	18.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
ideol	2008	MEX	5.91	2.37	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	MEX	2.17	0.92	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	MEX	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	MEX	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	MEX	4.28	2.48	0.00	10.00
age	2010	MEX	39.42	15.78	18.00	87.00
educ	2010	MEX	8.95	4.44	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	MEX	5.60	2.46	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	NIC	1.97	0.97	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	NIC	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	NIC	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	NIC	3.55	2.10	0.00	10.00
age	2006	NIC	35.50	16.77	16.00	90.00
educ	2006	NIC	7.34	4.23	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	NIC	5.26	2.58	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	NIC	1.82	0.94	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	NIC	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	NIC	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	NIC	2.57	1.85	0.00	10.00
age	2008	NIC	34.15	15.27	16.00	89.00
educ	2008	NIC	8.01	4.75	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	NIC	5.74	3.20	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	NIC	2.09	0.93	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	NIC	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	NIC	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	NIC	3.14	1.87	0.00	10.00
age	2010	NIC	34.18	15.25	16.00	90.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
educ	2010	NIC	8.01	4.61	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	NIC	5.68	3.03	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	PAN	1.84	0.89	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	PAN	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	PAN	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	PAN	2.22	1.41	0.00	10.00
age	2006	PAN	38.47	14.70	18.00	84.00
educ	2006	PAN	9.22	4.39	0.00	20.00
ideol	2006	PAN	5.07	2.11	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	PAN	1.98	0.91	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	PAN	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	PAN	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	PAN	3.32	1.70	0.00	10.00
age	2008	PAN	38.98	15.76	18.00	86.00
educ	2008	PAN	10.24	3.97	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	PAN	5.85	1.85	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	PAN	2.13	0.95	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	PAN	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	PAN	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	PAN	3.81	1.79	0.00	10.00
age	2010	PAN	37.71	14.77	18.00	83.00
educ	2010	PAN	10.61	3.94	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	PAN	6.08	2.25	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	PER	2.07	0.90	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	PER	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	PER	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	PER	4.44	2.15	0.00	10.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
age	2006	PER	38.39	15.18	18.00	89.00
educ	2006	PER	10.82	4.09	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	PER	5.61	2.13	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	PER	1.96	0.87	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	PER	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	PER	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2008	PER	4.78	2.16	0.00	10.00
age	2008	PER	39.02	15.78	18.00	86.00
educ	2008	PER	10.67	4.23	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	PER	5.60	2.15	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	PER	2.01	0.91	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	PER	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	PER	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	PER	5.08	2.06	0.00	10.00
age	2010	PER	39.04	16.09	18.00	87.00
educ	2010	PER	11.08	3.94	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	PER	5.48	2.03	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	PRY	1.83	0.98	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	PRY	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	PRY	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	PRY	5.62	2.24	0.00	10.00
age	2006	PRY	35.46	12.68	18.00	65.00
educ	2006	PRY	8.75	4.90	0.00	21.00
ideol	2006	PRY	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN
pol1	2008	PRY	2.12	0.97	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	PRY	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	PRY	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
income	2008	PRY	5.38	2.15	0.00	10.00
age	2008	PRY	35.74	12.77	18.00	65.00
educ	2008	PRY	8.99	4.47	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	PRY	5.52	2.22	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	PRY	2.09	0.95	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	PRY	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	PRY	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2010	PRY	5.33	2.80	0.00	10.00
age	2010	PRY	36.21	13.02	18.00	65.00
educ	2010	PRY	9.49	4.51	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	PRY	5.84	2.12	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	SLV	2.02	0.98	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	SLV	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	SLV	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	SLV	3.82	2.22	0.00	10.00
age	2006	SLV	37.43	15.61	18.00	89.00
educ	2006	SLV	7.91	5.06	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	SLV	5.74	2.90	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	SLV	2.14	1.03	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	SLV	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	SLV	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	SLV	4.10	2.26	0.00	10.00
age	2008	SLV	38.45	16.50	18.00	87.00
educ	2008	SLV	8.40	5.31	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	SLV	5.30	2.95	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	SLV	2.14	1.01	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	SLV	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
sex	2010	SLV	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	SLV	3.99	2.22	1.00	10.00
age	2010	SLV	38.11	15.91	18.00	84.00
educ	2010	SLV	8.70	5.13	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	SLV	5.22	2.52	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	URY	2.32	1.12	1.00	4.00
ur	2006	URY	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	URY	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2006	URY	4.01	2.82	0.00	10.00
age	2006	URY	44.93	17.70	18.00	88.00
educ	2006	URY	9.30	4.09	0.00	18.00
ideol	2006	URY	5.19	2.50	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	URY	2.29	1.11	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	URY	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	URY	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	URY	4.21	2.79	0.00	10.00
age	2008	URY	45.30	17.94	18.00	91.00
educ	2008	URY	8.98	3.87	0.00	18.00
ideol	2008	URY	5.09	2.57	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	URY	2.52	1.12	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	URY	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	URY	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	URY	5.34	2.78	0.00	10.00
age	2010	URY	44.62	18.07	18.00	92.00
educ	2010	URY	9.51	3.97	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	URY	4.69	2.51	1.00	10.00
pol1	2006	VEN	2.04	1.01	1.00	4.00

Descriptive Statistics No Pooled						
ur	2006	VEN	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
sex	2006	VEN	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
income	2006	VEN	7.31	2.54	0.00	10.00
age	2006	VEN	36.27	14.06	18.00	89.00
educ	2006	VEN	10.50	4.45	0.00	20.00
ideol	2006	VEN	5.33	3.08	1.00	10.00
pol1	2008	VEN	2.18	0.97	1.00	4.00
ur	2008	VEN	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
sex	2008	VEN	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2008	VEN	3.71	1.73	0.00	10.00
age	2008	VEN	38.66	15.17	18.00	89.00
educ	2008	VEN	9.96	3.63	0.00	17.00
ideol	2008	VEN	5.25	2.46	1.00	10.00
pol1	2010	VEN	2.25	0.98	1.00	4.00
ur	2010	VEN	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
sex	2010	VEN	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
income	2010	VEN	4.22	1.90	0.00	10.00
age	2010	VEN	39.39	14.86	18.00	90.00
educ	2010	VEN	10.51	3.80	0.00	18.00
ideol	2010	VEN	5.87	2.37	1.00	10.00