
The Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua: 2006

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Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is proud to have sponsored the surveys on democracy and governance carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) over the last two decades in Latin America and the Caribbean. LAPOP's findings have been instrumental for USAID'S national missions, as much for the diagnosis of the nature of challenges to democracy as for the promotion of dialogue and debate regarding policy in Latin American countries, in the monitoring of current USAID programs, and in the evaluation and assessment of USAID's performance in democracy and good governance in the region. LAPOP's reports have often been the "voice" of the citizens concerning the quality of democracy. It is our hope that the 2006 study will also be useful for policy makers, defenders of democracy, contributors and practitioners.

The decision to carry out these studies on the status of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean originated in USAID's nation missions in which field officers have increasingly depended on these studies as a tool for management and policy design. The breadth and depth of the questionnaires has allowed us to go beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic wellbeing, and other conditions, and to explore in depth specific practices and cultures in order to identify the sectors in which our contribution can be of the most use in the promotion of democracy. The surveys are a unique resource for USAID inasmuch as they represent a source of consistent, high quality, and comparative value over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson of Vanderbilt University and his extraordinary doctoral students who come from all over the hemisphere as well as the participation and expertise of various scholars in the region and the expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent tendencies in these surveys have made them even more useful than before. One is the inclusion of additional countries to the base of the survey, using a common fund of questions for all the countries. This allows for valid comparisons to be made using different political systems and for making such comparisons over time. The second and even more important tendency is the introduction of "special samples" in specific regions or as a function of specific projects in some of the countries in which USAID conducts democracy programs. The result is an increased capacity of USAID missions to examine the impact of its programs by comparing with reliable statistics changes in areas where the programs exist with changes outside program areas. This allows for "before and after" comparisons of our work as well as comparing changes in regions where we have programs and regions where we do not. These methodologies should have the effect of providing one of the most rigorous proofs of the effectivity of our programs and contributions in any field.

The promotion of democracy and good governance is a priority of the United States government foreign policy, and our financial investment and efforts to this end are substantial. However, democratic development is a relatively new development area, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of aid through donations are still in the initial stage. It is critical for us to be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning through experience and continuously improving our program. To meet this

challenge, USAID has taken a new initiative called Strategic and Operational Research (SORA) with the support of the National Academy of Sciences. SORA has incorporated in its work the opinions of numerous political science and research methodology experts. LAPOP surveys on democracy are a critical component of this assessment effort. We hope that their findings will foster dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the general public, over the long term, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

Dr. Margaret Sarles
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Foreword

The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

By Mitchell A. Seligson
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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series

and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of

anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire were pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa

Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

Country	Researchers
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Country	Researchers
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
December, 2006

Executive Summary

Opinion polls rarely delve into what democracy means to citizens. The meaning of democracy is especially important in a country like Nicaragua. Despite having been almost 30 years since the fall of the Somoza dictatorship and 17 years since the electoral reshuffle of the FSLN, institutional weakness and lack of substance have characterized the national scene.

Because of the dearth of information about this issue, LAPOP decided to include a question series designed to examine citizen concepts of democracy. The questions were grouped in four theoretical categories. The results indicated that slightly over half of the survey participants (55%) expressed standard concepts of democracy while about 7% had pragmatic or utilitarian concepts. Although only 5% have a negative concept of democracy, for fully one third of Nicaraguans, democracy has no meaning at all.

One of the principle objectives of the LAPOP study is to measure the degree of legitimacy given to the political system by citizens, that is, to measure support for the system. In Nicaragua, legitimacy is not only one of the lowest rated countries on the continent, but also has suffered a slight but significant decline since the study was carried out in 2004. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the level of political tolerance has fallen since the studies at the end of the 1990s, it has not changed much since 2004.

Overall, the Nicaraguan average is lower than the averages of other countries in the region. The levels of these two dimensions of the study (support for the system and tolerance) show that 25% of Nicaraguan citizens favor stable democracy, a comparatively low percentage.

On the issue of corruption, almost 90% of Nicaraguans feel that corruption among public officials is fairly widespread or very widespread. In terms of real experiences of corruption, at the courts, and to a lesser degree, at municipalities is where the highest incidence of requests for bribes is reported. However, despite the perception of corruption, Nicaraguans have had comparatively low levels of victimization by corruption.

In any case, our analysis confirms that victims of corruption show slightly but significantly lower levels of support for the system than those who have not experienced this behavior.

Sixteen percent of Nicaraguans claim to have been victims of some type of crime in the last year. Two thirds of these were “minor” incidents (without physical aggression). Not surprisingly, crime victims grant less legitimacy to the political system than non-victims.

Regarding the feeling of security in the country, women, particularly educated women, perceive a greater lack of public safety than men do. It is to be expected that the feeling of insecurity will have a negative effect on Nicaraguan support for the system.

When Nicaraguans need help, they are more likely to turn to their local government rather than to a state representative or the national government. Nevertheless, the number of citizens who actually seek some form of government help is small (10%) compared to other countries. On the other hand, though the number of citizens who say that they have participated in local affairs (open town hall meetings or municipal sessions) is barely 12%, this percentage is close to the average of the other countries in the region.

Alternatively, of the almost 30% of citizens who had some type of business with city halls in the last year, the large majority (72%) said they were treated well or very well, and 86% were helped satisfactorily to get what they needed. In addition, the level of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities (53 on a 0-100 scale) is moderately high, comparatively speaking.

Finally, close to half of the survey participants consider that government decentralization should be extended, and close to a third would be willing to pay higher taxes in order for local governments to be able to provide better services.

Concerning the electoral system, the study found that most Nicaraguans who did not vote in the last presidential election abstained due to lack of identification (46%), and to a lesser degree (17%), due to lack of interest. Older citizens, the better educated, and the better politically informed vote most frequently.

It was found that trust in political parties has risen since 2004 although trust in elections dropped almost eight points (on a 0-100 scale).

Interpersonal trust among Nicaraguans is at 60 points (on a 0-100) scale), close to the average of the rest of the countries in the region. The rate of civic participation, on the other hand, is 21 points on the 0-100 scale, two points lower than the 2004 study.

Finally, the level of social capital, which combines interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation, was close to 50 points on the 0-100 scale.

I. NICARAGUA: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

This chapter presents basic data from the Nicaraguan national context. The first section of the chapter explains changes in the political system and the democratic regime in Nicaragua since the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship. The second analyzes the Nicaraguan government's presidential system and the organization of the State; the third discusses human development in Nicaragua in the contexts of Central America and the world according to the latest UNDP Human Development Report. The fourth section of the chapter offers basic data regarding the country's economy; in the fifth, Nicaragua's political context is analyzed, including political parties and Nicaragua's electoral system and recent data from the country's electoral processes.

Introduction

Any analysis of Nicaraguan political culture cannot omit the fact that in its recent history, the country has traversed a short period of changes which moved in opposite directions. It began with the transition process oriented toward a socialist society with its associated values, promoted from 1979 to 1990 and ending with the electoral defeat of the FSLN. Later there was a new transition toward a market economy, the restructuring of the political system, and the fomenting of new functional values.¹

From there, the political system in Nicaragua today is the process of accelerated changes that have affected all of the country's institutions and all of its political and social actors. Indeed, the recent history of the political system and democratic regime in Nicaragua involve the armed overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 and the drive toward a limited democracy as a result of the 1984 elections and more so since the 1990 elections. The process intensified during the term of office of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (1990-1996), which was characterized by, among other things, an extraordinary freedom of expression, until then unknown in the history of Nicaragua. The re-design of the political system formally began with the 1987 constitution and was improved by the constitutional reforms of 1995. At that time, important political sectors saw the necessity of a constitutional reform that would redefine the new economic paradigm, society itself, and political system institutions, now that the revolutionary context of the country was gone.

¹ See: Manuel Ortega Hegg. Valores éticos y desarrollo. El caso de Nicaragua. Forum Mundial de las Culturas, Barcelona, 2004. The chapter is based on other works as well, such as Manuel Ortega Hegg. Las Instituciones. En: Enciclopedia de Nicaragua. Volumen 2, Océano, Barcelona 2003; Manuel Ortega Hegg. Programa OEA de apoyo a la descentralización. La descentralización política en Nicaragua, 2003, inédito, Manuel Ortega Hegg. La reforma y modernización del Estado en Nicaragua. FLACSO, Sede Costa Rica, 2003, inédito.

A. Political reform of 1995

All this was possible because of a particular joining of forces in Nicaragua's National Assembly. The Sandinista/anti-Sandinista political polarization coming from the 1980s was temporarily overcome by the cooperation among important groups of representatives from the majority parties. These groups, together with minority parties represented in the National Assembly, fomented the first post-Sandinista constitutional reform which, among other things, leaned toward limiting the power of the presidency existing in the revolutionary period, and toward a greater balance of powers.

The primary reforms were the transfer of the president's power to levy taxes to the National Assembly exclusively; the granting of power to the National Assembly to approve international treaties and agreements signed by the president of the republic; the crafting of regulations against government corruption; greater control of the national budget, and other regulations to prevent immediate re-elections, dynasties, and nepotism.

In addition to the redistribution of powers between the executive and legislative branches, this reform also strengthened the judicial branch by establishing a minimum annual budget of 4% of the national income and granting it autonomy from the other branches. As we will see further on, however, this reform was not enough to diminish the strong political influences on the judicial branch, a factor that led to the political pact of 2000.

At the same time, the reform strengthened the municipalities, giving them ample authority, requiring appropriation of funds from the central government, and full political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy. The reform was also favorable to the autonomous regions of the Caribbean by granting them, among other things, veto power over any concession of their natural resources to the central government if their own autonomous governments did not support such concessions. Along with this the Council of Economic and Social Planning (CONPES) was established as an authority that would monitor the effects of government policies on civil society.

This reform was strongly resisted by the administration at that time and the FSLN itself, but in the end, its implementation was able to be negotiated. However, the reform was welcomed by the citizenry because of the horizontal redistribution of power among the branches of government and the vertical redistribution in the central government, autonomous regions, municipalities, and the population, with greater independence for each.

Constitutional reform was complemented by electoral reform that was very favorable to political pluralism and to the wide participation and representation of the country's minority parties.

B. Reforms of 2000

Nonetheless, the entire process stalled with the reforms made to the constitution and electoral law in January, 2000. A pact between the incumbent party, the Liberal Constitution Party (PLC), and the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) [Sandinista National Liberation Front], the two major political forces according the results of the 1996 elections, was seen by a wide spectrum of Nicaraguan society as backsliding of the country's institutional democratic process, since the objective of the pact was to guarantee power quotas to both parties to the detriment of pluralism and to the establishment of conditions of equal competition for all political groups.

The 2000 reforms focus on two fundamental aspects: reforms of the organizational paradigm of the State and electoral policies. Regarding the State organizational paradigm, the reforms increased the number of magistrates in the Supreme Court of Justice and the Supreme Electoral Council and formed an association out of the Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic (CGR). The reason for these changes was to put members of the two major political parties into these institutions, to the detriment of their professionalization.

Electoral system reforms were aimed at establishing electoral jurisdiction only between political parties, thus prohibiting the participation of other non-party groups, such as popular associations, in the electoral process. They were also aimed at setting up a new bipartisan system in the country. By imposing extremely rigid conditions on the establishment of legitimate parties and the presentation of their candidates, as well as demanding a large number of votes required to maintain their political franchise, they tried to make it as difficult as possible for other political groups to compete. Furthermore, the percentage required to win the first round of the presidential election was lowered from 45% to 40% and even 35% if the candidate in first place is ahead of the second place candidate by less than five percentage points. The reason for having two rounds in a presidential election is precisely to guarantee the high degree of legitimacy needed to cleanly and clearly elect a president, and the juggling of required percentages only detracts from the integrity of the electoral process.

Through various surveys, Nicaraguan citizens have shown their strong disapproval of these constitutional and electoral reforms, which diminish the degree of legitimacy of the new institutions that have been established as a result of the political pact.

C. The 2004 reforms

In 2004, reform efforts were again initiated with the intent of further reducing the power of the executive branch by conferring more power on the National Assembly, at the time controlled by the Alemán-Ortega alliance, which together held 81 of the 91 seats of the Assembly. These constitutional reforms were accompanied by the enactment of three laws through which the structure and method of election of authorities of two State regulatory entities—property management and the social security administration. At the same time, these reforms also transferred powers belonging to the executive branch to the legislative branch, such as the

appointment and removal from office of government ministers, directors of state agencies, and ambassadors, among others. The objective of the reforms was to reduce executive power and increase legislative power. In this way, the balance of powers is altered, and the legislature legislates, administers, and controls government business.

The reforms were never put into practice because the executive and the legislative branches were able to reach an agreement which suspended implementation of the reforms for two years. The agreement was reached after a crisis that required the intervention and mediation of the United Nations representative in Nicaragua and even the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. A standoff had been reached in which each side had received a favorable judgment: the Supreme Court of Justice, controlled by the FSLN party, had ratified the reforms, while the Central American Court of Justice sided with the Executive, declaring that the constitutional reforms violated not only the fundamental principles of the balance of powers by establishing the hegemony of the Legislative branch over the Executive, but also the principles of the Central American Integration System [*Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana*].

In the midst of the crisis, important sectors of Nicaraguan organized civil society and other groups made their disagreement with this political pact known in a variety of ways, one being a massive march in repudiation of the pact and the majority political parties.

A new government, elected in 2006, will immediately have to face the dilemma of the implementation of the reforms or come to an agreement of governability in the National Assembly that will repeal them. Nevertheless, it is considered that one of the substantive topics that the new administration will have to deal with is the joining of forces favorable to institutional reform that will repeal partisan reforms and establish a new democratic institutionalization in the country.

Democracy, the presidential system of government, and the organization of the State of Nicaragua

The presidential system of government is traditional in Nicaragua. This system puts forward that the first power of the State is the executive branch. This means that the representative of this branch formally uses the power and authority to counterbalance the other branches of government. In Nicaragua the real concentration of power has always been in the hands of the president of the Republic, notwithstanding the formal distribution of power established by the constitution and the laws among the branches. Indeed, this situation, in spite of the proclaimed separation of powers, has allowed the president, in practice, to limit and even subordinate other State powers.

The concentration of power in the executive branch was particularly high during the Sandinista period when the president was able to legislate by decree, levy taxes, sign international agreements and other accords without consultation with or consent of the other branches of government. This strong, formal presidentialism was recalibrated during the constitutional

reform process in 1995. Presently, the Political Constitution, in article 144 affirms that the executive branch is run by the president of the Republic, who is the chief of state, chief executive of the government, and commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan army. The president's powers are broad; nonetheless, they are not as great as they were as established in the Constitution of 1987, according to which the president also shared legislative power with the National Assembly.

In Nicaragua, the existence of a presidential system of government with broad formal powers is associated with the political culture of the elites, which have a strong tendency toward unipersonal and authoritarian governance. In practice, this has allowed authoritarian regimes such as the dynastic dictatorship of the Somozas (1936-1979) and the Sandinista revolutionary government (1979-1990).²

From this stems the on going concern of the democratic sectors of the country to strengthen its institutions and the mechanisms to control the Executive branch. The transformation of institutions into a situation of partisanship as an effect of the pact of 2000 as well as the yet to be implanted 2004 reforms which strengthen majority parties in the National Assembly by transfer of power from the executive, has tended to change the system of government into a kind of quasi-parliamentarian one. However, the difference between the Nicaraguan version and the classical parliamentarian regime is that, in practice, the National Assembly has no counterweight of power or control. Nevertheless, of late, the two reform parties (PLC and FSLN) appear to want to backtrack and have shown interest in not having these reforms put into effect in 2007 as planned. It is possible, therefore, that during the next administration, a new institutional reform will be proposed whose content will depend upon the cooperation of forces that will determine the outcome of the 2006 general elections.

A. The National Assembly

In Nicaragua, legislative power belongs to the National Assembly. The Assembly is constituted by 90 representatives and their respective alternates, elected by universal, equal, direct, free and secret vote within a system of proportional representation. Of these 90 representatives, 20 are elected nationally by all Nicaraguan voters; the other 70 are elected by voters in the 15 county districts and the two autonomous regions, the administrative divisions of the country. According to the 2000 constitutional reform, both the former president and vice-president, elected by direct popular vote for the previous government administration, are also representatives, the former by entitlement and the latter as an alternate, as well as second place finishers of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the same election. Representatives are elected for a period of five years, beginning at their swearing in on 9 January of the year after the election. The National Assembly is inaugurated by the Supreme Electoral Council.

The country's constitution establishes the appropriation of a sufficient portion of the General Budget of the Republic to the National Assembly.

² Manuel Ortega Hegg. Las Instituciones. En: *Enciclopedia de Nicaragua*. Volumen 2, Océano, Barcelona 2003.

B. Judicial Power

In Nicaragua, the jurisdictional authority to execute judgments of law belongs exclusively to the the judicial branch of the government constituted by the courts of justice. The system is an organic whole headed by the Supreme Court of Justice. There are appellate courts, district judges, and local judges. In addition, there are the military tribunals which deal strictly with military infractions and crimes without prejudice regarding appeals before the Supreme Court of Justice. During the constitutional reform in 1995, the *carrera judicial* was established and is, at present, in the development process. The Nicaraguan constitution appropriates no less than 4% of the General Budget of the Republic for the judicial branch.

The term of office of magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice and that of Appellate Courts is five years. The Supreme Court of Justice is constituted by 16 magistrates elected by the National Assembly and is divided into specialized courts. The Plenary Court considers and resolves appeals regarding constitutionality of the law and conflicts of authority and constitutionality among the branches of government. The magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice elect their president among themselves by majority vote for a term of one year, after which s/he can be re-elected.

The magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice are inaugurated before the National Assembly.

Administration of justice in Nicaragua includes popular participation in trials of conscientious objectors.

The pact of 2000 has affected the judicial branch of government because of its obvious partisan character which can be seen in, among other things, the election of magistrals and other important positions within the system. Although the *ley de carrera judicial* has been passed; it has not gone into effect because the determination of its regulation is frozen in the Supreme Court of Justice.

C. Electoral Power

The electoral power of the State, including organization, management and monitoring of elections, plebiscites and referendums, is the exclusive purvue of the Electoral branch of the government. This administration is composes of the Supreme Electoral Council and other subordinate electoral organs.

The current composton and organization of the electoral power of the State originated in the electoral reforms of 1996 and 2000. In 1996 the electoral power of the State was reconstituted into the following organs: the Supreme Electoral Council, the Electoral Councils of the Counties and Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast, and the Vote Receiving Boards. The electoral reform of 2000 added a new authority: the municipal electoral council. The Supreme Electoral Council is made up of five permanent magistrates and their substitutes, elected by the National Assembly from separate lists proposed for each position by the president of the Republic and by the representatives of the National Assembly in consultation with corresponding civil associations. Individuals are elected to council positions for a term of five years and enjoy full

immunity. The new electoral reform of 2000 increased the number of council magistrates to seven to include two representatives of major parties.

The 2000 electoral reforms turned the entire electoral organization—from the Supreme Electoral Council to the Vote Receiving Boards—into a two-pronged system by requiring that representatives from the winning party and second place finisher from the last election be elected alternatively as president and first member of these electoral councils. In this way, the system can guarantee that the interests of the major parties will be addressed but not those of the other competing parties. This measure has caused uncertainty among minority parties and suspicions over the neutrality and professionalism of this State power.³

Human development in Nicaragua

According to the 2005 census, Nicaragua's has 5,142,098 inhabitants. The country's population increased tenfold in a century's time, rising from four to 43 inhabitants per square kilometer; although an important decrease in the rhythm of population growth has been observed with respect to previous measurements.⁴ According to the 2006 Human Development Index, Nicaragua's position rose from 118 to 112, thus placing Nicaragua among the countries of medium level of human development, similar to most other Latin American countries. In Central America, Nicaragua is below Costa Rica (48) and Panama (58), both of which are among nations with a high level of human development. It is also below El Salvador (101) but above Honduras (117), and Guatemala (118). It is important to keep in mind that the HDI is an indicator that covers three dimensions of human well being: income, education, and health.⁵

According to this same report, the principle indices show the the following:

Life expectancy has risen to 70 years. The rate of enrollment in elementary school rose slightly to 70%. Regarding access to sources of cleaner water, there was a decline from 81percent in 2005 to 79% in 2006.

The national health budget as a function of Nicaragua's GNP is 3.7 compared to Costa Rica's, which is 5.8.

Per capita income in Nicaragua is 4,211 compared to Costa Rica's, 9,841.

On the other hand, the data indicate that poverty and inequality are the problems that affect the Nicaraguan people most seriously: 79.9% survive on two dollars a day, and 45.1% on one dollar, in spite of efforts of the war on poverty that have helped reduce the incidence of poverty since 1993.

Regarding inequality, 20% of the wealthiest Nicaraguans receive 49.3% of the country's income, or consumes a like percentage, compared to 5.6% by the poorest 20%. Inequality is also evident

³ Manuel Ortega Hegg. Las Instituciones. En: *Enciclopedia de Nicaragua*. Volumen 2, Océano, Barcelona 2003.

⁴ VIII *Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda*. Cifras Oficiales, Nicaragua, Mayo 2006.

⁵ *Human Development Report, 2005*. <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf>.

when the incomes of men and women are compared: 2,018 dollars for women and 4,512 for men.

The Nicaraguan economy

The Nicaraguan economy has performed modestly in recent years with downturns caused by natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch in 1998, or the fluctuations of prices of international exports. Nevertheless, the country’s economy has been growing, as can be seen in the following table, although the rhythm needs to be stronger in order to solve the country’s severe structural problems and provide the population with a better quality of life.

Table I-1. Evolution of the GNP in Nicaragua 2000-2006

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Tasa crecimiento anual del PIB	4.2	3.0	1.0	2.3	3.7	3.8	4.2

Source: Authors’ product based on FMI data. Data for 2005 and 2006 are projections.

In 2000, the Nicaraguan economy was boosted by reconstruction efforts in the wake of damages from Hurricane Mitch; however, in 2002 the economy felt the effect of the drop in export prices, changes in oil prices, and a large internal debt caused by bank failure. At the present time, the economy is recovering, but its performance continues to be sensitive to external events.

Nicaragua’s economic problems are structural in nature. The country continues to be one of Latin America’s most heavily agriculturally-based economies. Agriculture continues to provide 30.5% of the country’s jobs although the sector represents only 19% of the GNP. Nicaragua’s industrial sector is small and provides about 18% of the GNP; however, the service sector, which provides 40% of the jobs and represents 55.3% of the GNP, is extremely important. This piece of data must be put into perspective, as its size is closer to the size of the primary and industrial sectors rather than to a true value in that sector of the economy. Notwithstanding, it is a fact that the service sector has been growing, particularly tourism, in recent years.

Nicaragua’s economy is an open one with trade representing 88% of the GNP in 2005. Nevertheless, the country has a trade deficit due to the fact that imports exceed exports. Principle exports are coffee, beef, lobster, shrimp, gold, and fruit. Industrial products account for just 11.3% of exports. This puts Nicaragua at a disadvantage with regard to the recently signed Free Trade Agreement with the United States, given the subsidizing of the U.S. agricultural sector.

Nicaragua’s economy is indeed fragile. High environmental vulnerability, a productive economic base dependent upon agriculture, natural disasters, and the fluctuation of prices of primary products all impact the country’s economic performance. In contrast to Costa Rica, whose

diversified economy allows for greater stability in economic performance expectations, Nicaragua is highly sensitive to external changes. It is estimated that the country must project economic growth rates equal to or higher than the 2006 estimates (4%) just to enter the category of countries that the World Bank classifies as medium income countries and thus be able to provide a better quality of life for its citizens.

Nicaragua's employment situation is precarious as well and is an influential factor in the emigration of Nicaraguans to neighboring countries, especially Costa Rica.

It should be pointed out that in addition to the aforementioned factors, the lack of internal political consensus, which translate into serious governability problems, has been a contributor to the high economic instability, a factor that has negatively affected its performance in recent years.

The political context

A. The electoral system

In Nicaragua, the current electoral system is the result of a series of reforms which today tends to be a closed system. The system has alternated between a closed dictatorial system which lasted more than half a century to an open system designed in the 1980s and early 90s to be more in tune with the thrust of political pluralism, to offer guarantees of integrity of the ballot, and to offer support to minority parties. Finally, with the 2000 electoral reform, the country returned to a system that limits political pluralism and makes the exercise of electoral authority difficult.

As in all of Central America, national elections, including the election of the president of the Republic, constitute the most important political event and the most highly developed means of civic participation in national politics.

Because of this, electoral democracy has a very important role to play. However, as a result of the war during the 1980s, Nicaraguans have rediscovered the importance of the ballot as a mechanism that would guarantee change of power and allow citizens to evaluate the job performance of their leaders.

It is important to note that voter turnout in Nicaragua is very high compared to that of neighboring countries, as seen in the following table.

Table I-2. Electoral Participation 1990-2002 (in percentages)

Países	Electores registrados relativo a población con derecho al voto (Promedio 1990 – 2002)	Votantes relativos a población con derecho al voto (Promedio 1990 – 2002)	Votantes válidos relativo a población con derecho al voto (Promedio 1990 – 2002)
Costa Rica	90.9	68.8	66.5
El Salvador	88.3	38.7	36.5
Guatemala	78.0	36.2	31.5
Honduras	101.2	68.3	63.7
Nicaragua	95.8	77.9	73.7
Panamá	98.0	72.3	68.2
Rep. Dominicana	85.1	53.6	55.2

Source: Anexo Estadístico Informe PRODDAL. (Cfr Manuel Barahona, Pablo Sauma, Edelberto Torres Rivas. *Democracia, pobreza y desigualdades en Centroamérica, Panamá y República Dominicana*. Documento especialmente preparado para acompañar la presentación subregional del informe La Democracia en América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas, Guatemala, 25 de agosto de 2004. http://democracyreport.undp.org/Downloads/Democracia_pobreza_y_desigualdades.pdf

The highest voter turnout occurs during presidential elections; it diminishes for municipal elections, and is very low for regional elections.

Since the 1980s, there have been five national elections in Nicaragua (1984, 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2006) which have included two municipal elections and one regional election in the Autonomous Atlantic Regions. In addition, there have been three other separate regional elections (1994, 1998 and 2002). After the constitutional reforms of 1995, municipal elections separate from national elections were held in 1998 and 2004.

B. The party system in Nicaragua

Until the electoral reform of 2000, Nicaragua was involved in building a broad, competitive, pluralist party system. This system had been criticized for being too open, given the ease with which political parties could be formed under the law, with the resulting creation of numerous parties. This breadth was seen as a possible cause of governability problems due to splintering and dispersion of the political field and the possible difficulties in reaching consensus.

This broadness also manifested itself in the fact that in Nicaragua a monopolistic system of political parties in presidential and legislative elections existed. For regional and municipal elections, the law permitted the formation of so-called popular subscription associations, and for elections in the two Autonomous Regions, regional parties.

The party system was a novelty for a traditionally two-party country. The two-party system comes from the time of Nicaragua's independence from Spain and continued up until the time of the Sandinista revolution by means of various political pacts which divided power between the liberal and conservative parties. The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 produced the disintegration of that political system.

Once the Sandinista revolution was brought down, a new political party system was created. However, since that time, the two-party system has returned only in the sense that most of the

votes in elections are cast for two parties, even when there are other competitors. In the 1984 elections, the two primary political forces took 77% of the votes; in 1990, the primary groups received 90% of all certified votes, while the third group did not reach 1%. In 1996, the major parties took 98.6% of the vote. This tendency seems to have varied somewhat in the recent 2006 elections in which the electorate divided itself among four major groups; the largest percentage of votes was 38%. This, at least for the moment, has halted the two-party dominance and again opened the door to increased party pluralism. Nevertheless, the two-party system that had prevailed until 2001 had some peculiarities that are worth mentioning. The only fixed point in this regard was the party which arose from the Sandinista revolution: the FSLN. Its electoral participation has varied since the 1984 and 1990 elections, but remained the same in the elections of 1996 and 2001. Thus, since the 1980s the FSLN has faced successive coalitions of anti-Sandinista parties in a highly polarized environment. Neither has there been one single third electoral force; it has varied in each election.

A second characteristic of the two-party system is that it prevails despite the existence of multiple political parties. In the 1996 elections, 26 different political groups competed; 19 of these disappeared because they did not receive enough votes to elect even one representative. In the 2001 elections, 23 groups ran candidates. This is an indication of the highly volatile situation of having so many parties participating in the election process. This characteristic has to do with the fact that in Nicaraguan political parties traditionally begin working only around election time. During other times, they seem to disappear from the map.

A fourth characteristic has to do with social support and the changes that have transpired in how deeply rooted among the electorate political parties have become from 1979 to the present. As with other factors, social support changed during the Sandinista revolution. Before that, Anastasio Somoza's liberal nationalist party had an important captive clientele in the country, although its true dimension was always difficult to gauge, given the frequent fraud employed to keep him in power. The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship and its effect on the political environment and the party system changed the tendency toward partisan support in favor of the FSLN. For this reason, the FSLN is the exception to the intermittent performance and lack of social support among other political forces.

The FSLN is considered the best organized party in Nicaragua and has strong social support among differing population segments, although its electoral niche is about 22%, which does not change much from its core of militants and unconditional sympathizers. Nevertheless, the FSLN has been losing votes since 1984, when it obtained 63% of the vote. In 1996, this percentage was reduced to 38% of all certified votes. Another tendency of the FSLN has been to cluster around its leader rather than the party itself, but this situation does not differ greatly from that of the rest of the country's political parties.

Until the time before the 2006 elections, the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) [Liberal Constitutionalist Party] had vied for contention as a party opposing the FSLN. The polls indicated a niche of 20% of the voters, which remained at this percentage in the 2006 elections.

The political pact between the PLC and the FSLN established the PLC as the second major party of the country's two-party system by setting requirements for registration and general electoral competence that are difficult for other political groups to meet. Nonetheless, the 2006 election results have the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) [Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance], a dissident faction of the PLC, as the second most important political parties, almost tied with the PLC.

Some political analysts believe that political parties in Nicaragua are not internally democratic. Formal democratic processes tend to take a back seat to the conditions and choices imposed by the party leader. Internal ethics and regulations tend to be very weak and in practice do not function.⁶

Recent studies of Nicaragua's political culture

Prior studies of Nicaraguan political culture are discussed elsewhere.⁷ Regarding the sources of the studies, two currents seem to appear: first, the studies based on historical and documentary sources; and second, and without rejecting theoretical and historical elements, sources that incorporate empirical knowledge acquired through opinion polls, interviews, and other data gathering instruments.

Highlighted in the first group of sources are the more systematic studies by Nicaraguan authors such as Emilio Alvarez Montalbán's *Cultura política nicaragüense*; Oscar René Vargas' *El Síndrome de Pedrarias*, and more recently *Entre el Estado conquistador y el Estado Nación: providencialism, pensamiento político y estructuras de poder en el desarrollo histórico de Nicaragua*, by Andrés Pérez Baltodano.⁸ These three authors are in agreement in a study of political culture based on the identification of traits or characteristics of the political culture of the elites throughout the country's history. Pérez Baltodano explains that political culture begins from the analysis of a religious viewpoint that he sustains as a providentialist (the view that history is a process that is in the hands of God and that human beings can neither construct it nor change it), and which translates into politico-cultural perceptions and practices that are both pragmatic and resigned.

This cosmic vision argues the author, is what prevents the democratization of the political culture and keeps Nicaraguans prisoners in an imaginary, antidemocratic dictatorial world. In all three cases, one of the main concerns is the need to explain the behavior and practices of the political system as well as the backwardness of the country. In this vein, Karlos Navarro has contributed

⁶ Manuel Ortega Hegg. Las Instituciones. En: *Enciclopedia de Nicaragua*. Volumen 2, Océano, Barcelona 2003.

⁷ See: Manuel Ortega Hegg. *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización en Nicaragua*. CASC-UCA-FLACSO Programa El Salvador, 2001.

⁸ Emilio Álvarez Montalbán. *Cultura política nicaragüense*, Pavsá, Managua, 1999; Oscar René Vargas. *El Síndrome de Pedrarias*. CEREN, Managua, 1999; Andrés Pérez Baltodano. *Entre el Estado conquistador y el Estado Nación: providencialismo, pensamiento político y estructuras de poder en el desarrollo histórico de Nicaragua*. IHNCA-UCA-FFEBERT, Managua, 2003.

to the knowledge in this field and adding the concern about the concrete analysis of democratic institutions.⁹

More recently, other studies have discussed this subject but have incorporated empirical data with political culture thought. The studies of Dr. Mitchell Seligson, formerly of the University of Pittsburg and presently scientific coordinator and editor of the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University (LAPOP) stand out for their empirical content derived from surveys.¹⁰ The fundamental concern of these studies is the analysis of the political culture of democracy from the citizens' point of view. These studies are based on public opinion surveys but also include interviews of specific groups that are important for the democratic development of the country, such as teachers, members of NGOs, attorneys, and the like. These studies are remarkable for the methodological rigorousness as well as their periodic and systematic character, all of which allow for comparisons over time.

François Houtart and Genevieve Lemercinier, and Manuel Ortega Hegg,¹¹ have done research on the subject at the Centro de Análisis Sociocultural (CASC) of the Universidad Centroamericana; Luis Serra and Pedro López did a study on the political culture of democracy in Nicaragua in 2004 as a part of a project coordinated by Mitchell Seligson; Sofia Montenegro and Elvira Cuadra, at the Centro de Investigaciones de la Comunicación (CINCO) have investigated the political culture of young people¹². In addition, Melvin Sotelo has made significant contributions to the analysis of political culture of the revolutionary generation;¹³ Rodolfo Delgado at the Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses (IEN)¹⁴ has analyzed the political culture of the country with a focus on identifying the characteristics of the population's culture as opposed to the political culture of the elites and the possibilities of establishing a democracy and of creating conditions of

⁹ Karlos Navarro. *Entre el poder y la historia. Ideologías trasmutadas*. CNE, Managua, 2000.

¹⁰ Mitchell A. Seligson. *Auditoría de la Democracia. Nicaragua, 1999*. Managua, 2000; hay estudios previos de 1991, 1995, 1997, 1999, y un estudio de 2004; también: "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, México and Nicaragua," en: Diamond, Larry: *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (USA; Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994).

¹¹ Cfr. las siguientes obras de F Houtart y G Lemercinier. *La Cultura en Managua: una cultura en transición*. CASC-CETRI, Managua, 1998; *Campeños y cultura. Análisis de los perfiles culturales de una población campesina nicaragüense*. CASC-CETRI, Managua, 1988; *La Cultura religiosa de las comunidades eclesiales de base en Nicaragua*. CASC-CETRI, Managua, 1989; *La conciencia social de los trabajadores del azúcar*. CASC-CAL, Managua, 1991; *El campesino como actor. Sociología de una comarca de Nicaragua*, El Comején. CASC-CETRI, Managua, 1992; *La mujer urbana en Nicaragua. Visión del mundo, religión y dimensión ético-política*. Nicaragua, Managua, 1993; *Juventud popular urbana y participación social en Nicaragua. El caso de los barrios populares de Managua*. CASC, Managua, 1993. De Manuel Ortega Hegg pueden verse las siguientes obras: *Cultura política y actitudes hacia las elecciones y el régimen de autonomía en las regiones autónomas*. IPADE, Managua, 1999; *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización*. CASC-FLACSO Programa El Salvador, San Salvador, 2001; en coautoría con Marcelina Castillo: *Cultura política local y percepción ciudadana en 14 municipios de Las Segovias*. CASC-IPADE, 1999; en coautoría con Ricardo Córdova: *Centroamérica: Gobierno local y participación ciudadana en Nicaragua*, FLACSO Programa El Salvador, 1996

¹² Sofia Montenegro-Elvira Cuadra. *Jóvenes y cultura política en Nicaragua. La generación de los noventa*. Hispamer, Managua, 2001.

¹³ Melvin Sotelo. *Los Jóvenes. Otra cultura*. Nueva Nicaragua, 1995.

¹⁴ Rodolfo Delgado. *Cultura política*. Cuaderno IEN No.1, Managua, 1997.

governability in both groups. Manuel Orozco has also undertaken research in finding the relation between political culture and democracy.¹⁵

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
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¹⁵ Manuel Orozco. Sostenibilidad democrática y cultura cívica: la cultura política de Nicaragua en cambio. En Rodríguez Forisabel el alii. *El Sentir democrático. Estudios sobre la cultura política centroamericana.* EFUNA, Heredia, 1998.

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II. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

Between June 11 and June 28, 2006, the Centro de Análisis Sociocultural (CASC) [Center for Sociocultural Analysis] of the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), carried out a field study entitled “The Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 2006.” The aim of this study was to gather knowledge of the political culture of the Nicaraguan people. The survey is a part of a series of studies on political culture developed in Nicaragua by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University carried out in 15 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean coordinated by Dr. Mitchell Seligson of Vanderbilt University and, as explained in Chapter I, began in 2004. In this section, we describe the characteristics of the final sample obtained for the present study, and we compare these characteristics with the characteristics of the population in 1995.¹



Fuente: Ineter.

Figure II-1. Political map of Nicaragua

¹ For details of the study methodology, see Appendix A: Description of the study methodology.

Characteristics of the sample

The presentation of data from this report begins with a general view of the simple characteristics. The sample used for this study is the same one used for the 2004 LAPOP study in Nicaragua. It is based on the 1995 National Census because the results of the more recent 2005 census had not been published at the time this study was designed.

The final sample obtained has 1,762 certified interviews and is representative of the adult Nicaraguan population over age 16. The estimated confidence level for the national sample is 95% with a margin of error of ± 0.025 (2.5%). The complete design of the sample can be found in the appendices.

The sample for the 2004 and 2006 studies is equally distributed by gender, as can be seen in Figure II-2; the distribution is identical for both samples. Of those surveyed, 49.8% are male and 50.2% are female. Place of residence is divided into 58.6% urban dwellers and the remaining 41.4% rural inhabitants. These data correspond to the population distribution as measured by the 1995 Nicaragua National Census, which found that 49.1% of adults older than 16 are male, and 50.9% are female; also 59.5% of the population lives in urban areas while 40.5% lives in the countryside.

In Table II-1 at the end of this section, the distribution of the demographic variables of the 2005 population is presented; in Table II-2, the distribution of these variables in the sample taken for the survey is presented with the purpose of making some comparisons between the demographic variables of the total population of the country and the survey sample.




Figure II-2. Distribution of survey participants by gender

Figure II-3 shows that slightly more than a third of survey participants (35.7%) are young people between the ages of 16 and 25. About a quarter (24.8%) is between 26 and 35, and the rest are over 35.




Figure II-3. Distribution of survey participants by age

Regarding education, three of ten respondents have attended elementary school (35.6%) while 43.1% have attended high school. Figure II-4 shows that there are lower proportions of individuals who have had no formal education and of those who are college educated, 9.0% and 12.3% respectively.




Figure II-4. Distribution of survey participants by educational level

The religious composition of Nicaragua has become pluralized. Figure II-5 reflects this pluralism although Catholicism continues to be the country's predominant religion; 62.6% of respondents said that they were Catholics while 20.2% said that they were evangelicals. Eleven and seven tenths percent said that they did not belong to any religion. A small minority said that they belonged to non-Christian religions, and another small group belongs to Christian non-Catholic religions not a part of the traditional evangelicals or Pentecostals already grouped in the second category.




Figure II-5. Distribution of survey participants by religion

In answer to the question of whether or not they intended to go to another country to live or work in the next three years, 20.2% of respondents said that they do have this intention, less than the 27% who answered affirmatively in 2004.²




Figure II-6. Do you intend to go to another country to live or work in the next 3 years?

² Luis Serra Vásquez – Pedro López Ruiz. Mitchell Seligson, Coordinador científico. *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Nicaragua, 2004*. Vanderbilt University – UCA-USA-AID. www.lapopsurveys.org. Except where the text may indicate the contrary, our comparisons with 2004 were based on this report.

In article 8 of its Political Constitution, Nicaragua defines itself as a multiethnic nation. Figure II-7 shows the distribution of survey participants by self-identification of their ethnicities. The majority of the respondents self-identified as *mestizo* (mixed race) (71.3%), white (25.5%), 2.3% Afro-Caribbean black, and 1.0% as indigenous.




Figure II-7. Distribution of survey participants by self-identified ethnicity

Figure II-8 shows the monthly family income of the survey participants, in cordobas. Over half of those interviewed (52.8%) had incomes below 100 dollars a month.³ About a third (31.6%) had incomes between 100 and 200 dollars a month; slightly over 15% has incomes over 200 dollars a month.




Figure II-8. Distribution of survey participants by monthly family income (in cordobas)

³ One dollar = 17.86 cordobas.

The country's most urgent problem, in the view of 27.0% of respondents, is unemployment, followed by poverty with 24.5% and economic problems (15.0%). The perception of unemployment as Nicaragua's most urgent problem is similar to that of 2004 although at that time, 35% felt this way. On the other hand, compared to 2004, the second problem mentioned was the economy (23%) followed by poverty (22%). This order is different in 2006, with poverty as the second most urgent problem and economic problems third.




Figure II-9. In your opinion, what is the country's most urgent problem?

Figure II-10 shows the distribution of survey participants by city size; 14.5% of participants live in Managua, the capital city. Two of ten live in large cities and a lesser number live in small cities; 11.1% live in medium sized cities while the rest of the participants (40.1%) live in rural areas.




Figure II-10. Distribution of survey participants by city size

Comparison of sample characteristics with population characteristics

Because the more recent 2005 census data had not been published, the data used to design the sample for this study were obtained from the 1995 Population Census.

The total population of the country according to the 2005 census is 3,232,611 urban inhabitants (58.9%) and 2,250,836 inhabitants (41.1%)⁴ in rural areas. In Table II-1 we present characteristics of the country's population as a means to corroborate whether the sample obtained is truly representative of the Nicaraguan population.

Table II-1. Population characteristics of the 2005 study

Characteristics	Población	Porcentaje
N	5,483,447	100.0
Sexo (%)		
Hombres	2,796.512	50.9
Mujeres	2,797.457	49.1
Área (%)		
Urbana	3,232,611	58.9
Rural	2,250,836	41.1
Departamento (%)		
Nueva Segovia	214.844	3.9
Madriz	135.551	2.5
Estelí	220.206	4.0
Chinandega	450.823	8.2
León	394.598	7.2
Managua	1,411.219	25.7
Masaya	324.816	5.9
Carazo	193.752	3.5
Granada	193.752	3.5
Rivas	169.480	3.1
Jinotega	302.418	5.5
Matagalpa	494.295	9.0
Boaco	171.534	3.1
Chontales	185.783	3.4
Río San Juan	97.683	1.8
RAAN	259.005	4.7
RAAS	388.120	7.1

Source: Resultados del Censo Nacional de Población para el 2005, INEC, 2006.

4 Source: Resultados del Censo Nacional de Población para el 2005, INEC, 2006.

Table II-2 indicates that for most of the demographic variables the distribution relative to the sample taken for the 2004 survey matches the distribution of the 2006 sample.

Table II-2. Sample characteristics 2004 and 2006

Characteristics	Muestra 2004	Muestra 2006
N	1430	1762
Sexo (%)		
Hombres	45,3	49,8
Mujeres	54,7	50,2
Edad (%)		
18 a 34 años	60,2	60,5
35 años y más	39,8	39,5
Área (%)		
Urbana	58,4	58,6
Rural	41,6	41,4
Nivel de escolaridad (%)		
Ninguno	15,7	9,0
Primaria	39,3	35,6
Secundaria	32,4	43,1
Superior	12,7	12,3
Departamento (%)		
Nueva Segovia	7,1	6,9
Madriz	2,1	2,6
Estelí	2,9	3,4
Chinandega	10,8	11,1
León	13,2	14,0
Managua	17,8	17,0
Masaya	2,3	2,5
Carazo	2,0	2,0
Granada	5,0	5,2
Rivas	4,1	4,1
Jinotega	4,3	4,9
Matagalpa	9,5	8,9
Boaco	2,8	2,5
Chontales	1,7	1,6
Río San Juan	2,0	1,8
RAAN	3,1	2,7
RAAS	9,3	8,9

Distribution by place of residence and gender completely corresponds with the 2006 sample and the population. County distribution in the sample, on the other hand, differs notably in Managua, León and Chinandega. In Managua, the sample underestimates the real weight, while in León and Chinandega it is overestimated.

Conclusions

This study is based on a common survey done in 15 participating countries in the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) using strict scientific techniques to ensure the reliability and validity of its results such as a probabilistic representative national sample, a questionnaire used in various prior studies and administered by duly trained and supervised survey takers, and data processed and analyzed by means of the latest generation of statistics software.

The final sample obtained was 1,762 certified interviews and is representative of the Nicaraguan adult population over age 16 with regard to age, gender, religion, place of residence as well as other sociodemographic characteristics. The level of confidence for the national sample is 95% with a margin of error of ± 0.025 (2.5%).

The fact that most of the survey questions that serve as the foundation of this study in 2006 were also used in the 2004 study allows for comparison of the data and also to follow the evolution of political culture over time.

The rest of this report offers the results of the Nicaragua study.

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III. THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

Nicaragua is a new democratic country. The bases for its democracy were established following the 1979 overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, the Sandinista revolution, and the electoral defeat of the FSLN in 1990. Since then, a broad spectrum of public liberties and unrestricted freedom of expression have been established. Although citizen rights have been expanded, the fragile Nicaraguan economy lacks the resources to guarantee these rights; furthermore, the country's weak institutions have as of yet been unable to grasp the concept of democratic constraints.

In this chapter, we propose to offer answers to at least four questions: What does democracy mean to Nicaraguans? What is the definition of democracy? If the degree of democracy could be measured, in what position would Nicaragua be compared to neighboring countries? And, which factors are associated with democratic or authoritarian thinking?

This chapter's focus is determination of the solidity of democratic culture among Nicaraguans. Political science distinguishes at least two types of democratic concepts: ideal, standard or prescriptive, and practical or procedural concepts referring to the actual workings of democracy. A non-standard concept of democracy, for example, might indicate a weak belief in democracy that would lead to an eventual weak defense of democracy in the face of any type of threat. Robert Dahl pointed out that any definition of democracy contains an element of the ideal, of what should be, and another real, objectively perceivable element in terms of procedures, institutions, and game rules. To distinguish between these two types of definitions, Dahl presents the concept of polyarchy (many bosses) to refer exclusively to true democracies. Polyarchy can be defined as a type of government characterized by the existence of real conditions of competition (pluralism) and citizen participation in public affairs (inclusion).

In his book, *The dilemmas of democratic pluralism: Autonomy v. control* (1982), Dahl lists seven political institutions that define polyarchy through which it may be possible to detect the presence or non-presence of this regime:

- Elective offices for the control of political decisions.
- Free, periodic, impartial elections.
- Inclusive suffrage.
- The right to hold public office in the government.
- Freedom of expression.
- The existence of a variety of sources of information and their protection under the law.
- The right to form autonomous, political party or interest group types of associations or organizations.¹

With Dahl's distinction in mind, our study includes a survey question with multiple response choices (DEM13). The question allows survey participants to select three responses: DEM13.

¹ Robert A. Dahl. *Los dilemas del pluralismo democrático*. Autonomía vs control. Alianza Editorial, México, 1991. (Primera versión en inglés, 1982), pag. 21.

Briefly, what does democracy mean to you? (Do not read choices. After the first and second responses are given, ask, “Does it mean anything else?” Accept a maximum of three responses.

To create a single variable outside the four items in this question series (DEM13 A, B, C, D), we had to identify the meanings respondents offered for the first question. We focused on the answers to DEM13D, which include all participants who gave more than one answer to this item. For survey participants who responded only to DEM13A (gave a single answer), we took their response to be the most important since no other was given.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which is a part of this research, classified the participants’ definitions of democracy in four categories. The first category includes practical or utilitarian definitions; the second, standard or axiomatic definitions. We assume that individuals do not form their beliefs in a vacuum; thus, we intend to highlight that political beliefs in general express either a practical or axiomatic rationale. This is an increasingly held perspective and has been used in public opinion research (cfr Bratton and Mattes 2002; Sarsfield and Carrión 2006).

Practical or utilitarian definitions of democracy are based on the evaluation of economic or political performance. For example, when asked to define democracy, a citizen will say, “Well being, economic progress, growth,” or “more job opportunities.”

Standard or axiomatic definitions of democracy do not contain practical or utilitarian notions, at least in terms of direct, immediate benefits for individuals. For example, when asked to define democracy, the citizen will respond, “Free elections” or “Power in the hands of the people.”

In the third and fourth categories, we grouped “negative concepts of democracy” and “null concepts,” respectively. In the negative category are opinions that democracy is a bad idea. For instance, some citizens state that democracy to them means “disorder, injustice, corruption” or “lack of freedom.” The null category is for “do not know” responses or those who say that democracy has no meaning or “other meanings.”

The value of this analysis is that it can have relevant theoretical consequences. Political legitimacy and tolerance (our dependent variables) can be more contingent if citizens mold their beliefs in a pragmatic way rather than in a standard way. If political legitimacy and tolerance are not founded in standard concepts, these important attitudes can be fragile and ephemeral in the face of political or economic crises.

In this chapter we examine in detail survey participants’ concepts of democracy. We also study the factors that help to predict the bases of these concepts.

Definitions of democracy

In the 2006 LAPOP study, a question about the meaning of democracy was included. First, participants were asked to give three meanings of democracy and then choose which, in their judgment, was the most important. (See Table III-1)

Questions used for the study of the definitions of democracy

DEM13. Briefly, what does democracy mean to you? [NOTE: Do not read choices. After the first and second answers are given, ask, “Does it mean anything else to you?”] Accept up to three responses.

DEM13D. Of these meanings of democracy that you have given, which, in your opinion, is the most important? [Ask this only if respondent gave two or three answers to this question; no answer is DK/NR. Write down the code.]88. NS 99. INAP [One answer or none]

Table III-1 shows the various responses given for the most important meaning of democracy: 35.8% said liberty; 25.9% did not know; 3.7% equality; 1.2% participation; 2.8% the right to choose leaders; well being/economic progress, 1.7%; elections/voting, 3.1%; other choices. The table shows that one quarter of respondents were unable to offer a meaning for democracy.

Table III-1. Opinions about the meaning of the word “democracy” (most important meaning)

Válidos	Frecuencia	Porcentaje válido
Libertad	631	35.8%
Igualdad	65	3.7%
Participación	21	1.2%
Bienestar, progreso económico	30	1.7%
Elecciones, voto	54	3.1%
Derecho de escoger los líderes	50	2.8%
Obedecer la ley	4	0.2%
Más oportunidad de trabajo	26	1.5%
Poder del pueblo	80	4.5%
Capitalismo	5	0.3%
No sabe, no responde	456	25.9%
Otro	340	19.3%
Total	1762	100.0

To further illustrate, Appendix B presents the second most important meaning of democracy chosen by participants. The meaning of liberty, equality, and participation prevails.

Depth of the meanings of democracy

Survey participants could offer up to three definitions of democracy.

To analyze the depth of the meaning, a new variable was devised called “depth of the meaning of democracy” which can be divided in four categories:² “blank,” those who offered no meanings,

² Blank: individuals unable to articulate a definition for the word “democracy.” Shallow: persons able to offer only one definition; Intermediate: persons offering two definitions; Deepest: persons able to give three definitions. These categories were taken from the Costa Rica LAPOP report.

“shallow,” for those who offered one definition, “intermediate,” for those who gave two definitions, and “deeper.”

Figure III-1 shows that one in three were able to offer three definitions for democracy. However, it can be seen that the largest group was those who could not offer any definition at all.




Figure III-1. Depth of the meanings of democracy

Table III.2 gives the results of the depth of the meanings of democracy as they relate to the level of education of the survey participants. As can be observed, there are significant differences according to the respondents’ level of education: almost six in ten of those who were unable to give any definition had an elementary school education or less while two in ten with collage studies are in the category of “deepest meaning” (having offered three definitions). This suggests the important of education as a means of civic socialization.

Table III-2. Depth of the meaning of democracy, 2006, according to educational level

		Grados de Educación			Total
		Primaria o menos	Algún grado de secundaria	Post Secundaria	
Significados de Democracia	Vacio	322 57.2%	213 37.8%	28 5.0%	563 100.0%
	Poco profundo	167 43.6%	168 43.9%	48 12.5%	383 100.0%
	Intermedio	107 36.4%	142 48.3%	45 15.3%	294 100.0%
	Más profundo	190 36.4%	236 45.2%	96 18.4%	522 100.0%
Total		786 44.6%	759 43.1%	217 12.3%	1762 100.0%

Chi square= 80,91; Sig < ,000

Alternate concepts of democracy

To analyze the concepts of democracy from another perspective, the classification used by researchers in Costa Rica was used here; from the concepts of democracy given for variable DEM13, the Costa Rica researchers constructed another variable with four categories: standard or axiomatic concept of democracy; pragmatic concept, negative concept, and “blank.” Standard responses are grouped by individuals who understand democracy as “free elections” or “power in the hands of the people.” The pragmatic or utilitarian concepts are grouped by those who feel that democracy means “wellbeing, economic progress, growth,” or “more job opportunities.” Negative concepts came from those who think that democracy is a bad idea and give the term the meanings of “disorder, injustice, corruption,” or “lack of freedom.” The “blank” category corresponds to persons unable to define democracy in any way.

Figure III-2 shows that slightly over half of Nicaraguans have standard concepts of democracy (55.0%) and that only 7.3% have practical concepts. The first group is thus eight times as large as the second. A small minority (4.9%) has negative concepts, and as mentioned in the last section, a relatively large number (32.7%) was unable to offer a definition of democracy.




Figure III-2. Alternate concepts of democracy according to the standard v. utilitarian debate, Nicaragua 2006

Comparative analysis of alternate concepts of democracy

Figure III-3 shows alternate concepts of democracy in Latin America according to the standard versus pragmatic view. Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico show the highest inclination toward standard concepts; on the other hand, those with the most pragmatic concepts are: Panama, El Salvador, and Guyana.




Figure III-3. Alternate concepts of democracy according standard v. utilitarian debate in Latin America, 2006

Alternate concepts of democracy and educational level

The level of education a person has an important effect on the standard concept of democracy and the blank classifications; the higher the level of education, the higher the tendency to offer standard or axiomatic definitions. Conversely, persons with low educational levels are often unable to offer any definition for the term democracy. Educational level was found not to influence those who gave negative definitions.




Figure III-4. Concepts of democracy according to level of education 2006 Nicaragua

Alternate concepts of democracy and age

Age influences practical concepts of democracy. Individuals over age 30 tend to express such concepts whereas those under age 30 are often unable to offer any kind of definition for democracy. This result indicates one of the functions of concepts of democracy among Nicaraguans is age.




Figure III-5. Concepts of democracy according to age group 2006 Nicaragua

Alternate concepts of democracy and intention to vote in 2006 elections

The intention to vote is another factor that helps to predict concepts of democracy. Among those with standard concepts of democracy, the intention to vote in the 2006 elections is strong. On the other hand, among those without any concept of democracy, there is no intention to vote. Abstainers tend to cluster in this null category. No group stands out among participants clustered in negative and utilitarian concept categories.




Figure III-6. Concepts of democracy according to intention to vote in 2006 elections in Nicaragua

References

1. Dahl, Robert A. *Los dilemas del pluralismo democrático. Autonomía vs control*. Alianza Editorial, México, 1991. (Primera versión en inglés, 1982), pag.21.

IV. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

In this chapter, we discuss how Nicaraguan political attitudes support political stability under democratic conditions. To this end, we first look at the level of support for the political system; then we examine political tolerance as a key value in allowing democracy to prosper. Next, we analyze the relation between the levels of support for the political system, and later we present a set of evaluations of democracy in Nicaragua; finally, we present our conclusions.

Support for the political system

Political support for the system has to do with the legitimacy granted by citizens to that system. We will consider legitimacy as Seymour Martin Lipset's view that legitimacy is "the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate for society."¹ This means that legitimacy is tied to the trust generated in the citizens of a society that its social standards and procedures are appropriate and that they are respected and followed by political actors. These qualities permit stability and even the reproduction of the system over time, given that legitimacy gives strength to the system to overcome crises of ungovernability which can negatively affect it. According to Córdova and Cruz (2004), until recently efforts to measure legitimacy had been made using the University of Michigan scale of Trust in Government.² However, the Michigan scale gave too much weight to lack of satisfaction with government leaders' performance. For this reason, to analyze the belief in the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan political system, we use a "political support/alignment" scale developed by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project, used in various international comparative studies as a better tool with which to measure legitimacy.³

¹ Cited by Ricardo Córdova and José Miguel Cruz. *La Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador*, 2004. Percepciones y realidades de la población salvadoreña. Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP), Mitchell A Seligson, scientific coordinador, Vanderbilt University-IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO-USAID, 2005.

² Millar, Arthur H. (1974). Political Issues and Trust in Government. *American Political Science Review*, 68.p.951-972.

³ See also:

Seligson, Mitchell A.(1983). On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico. *Social Indicators Research*, 12. p. 1-24.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Muller, Edgard N. (1987). Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983. *International Studies Quarterly*. P. 301-326.

Muller, Edward N.; Jukam, Thomas O. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1982). Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A comparative Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 26. P.240-264.

Booth, John A. y Seligson, Mitchell A. Political culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, en: L. Diamond (ed). (1993). *Political culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. P. 107-138.

Finkel, Steven; Muller, Edward. y Seligson, Mitchell A. (1989). Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science*. 19. p. 551-560.

This scale was devised to measure the level of political support that citizens grant to the system of government, as opposed to the current administration. In political science literature, this is called “diffuse support” or “support for the system.”⁴ The scale is based on five items, each of which uses a six-point response format, ranging from “not at all” to “very much.” The questions are the following:

Write numbers 1-7, and 8 for a “do not know” response		
B1. To what extent to you think that Nicaraguan courts guarantee fair trials? (<i>Probe: If you think that the courts do not guarantee justice <u>at all</u>, choose number 1; if you think that the court guarantee justice <u>very much</u>, choose number 7 or an intermediate number</i>)	B1	
B2. To what extent do you respect Nicaragua’s political institutions?	B2	
B3. To what extent do you believe that a citizen’s basic rights are well protected by the Nicaraguan political system?	B3	
B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the Nicaraguan political system?	B4	
B6. To what extent do you feel that the political system of Nicaragua should be supported?	B6	

The coding system of these variables was originally based on a 1-7 scale, but to make the results more understandable, they were converted to a more familiar percentage scale of 0-100.⁵

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2002). Trouble in Paradise: The impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999. *Latin American Research Review*, 37, no. 1.

⁴ Easton, David. (1975). A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, p. 435-457.

⁵ One point was subtracted from each variable to give each a range of 0-6; later the resulting number was divided by six to produce a range of 0-1, which was then multiplied by 100 to produce a 0-100 range.

The figure below shows the average obtained for each question: the highest is respect for institutions at 53.9; at an intermediate level at 43.1 is support for the political system and trust in the courts (46.0). The lowest percentages were pride in living under the Nicaraguan political system (40.3) and belief that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the country's political system (42.8).




Figure IV-1. Average of questions that comprise the scale of political support for the system

A. Levels of political support for the system (2004-2006)

Since data from the 2004 national survey are available, it is possible to show the evolution of political support for the system between 2004 and 2006. Figure IV-2 shows the changes in responses to the questions used to construct the support for the system scale. In general, a declining tendency in political support for the system in three of the five items: institutions, support, and pride in living under the Nicaraguan political system. The other dimensions do not show significant changes. One possible explanation for the decline could be the political crisis between the Executive and the National Assembly that occurred during this period, one of the crucial points of which was the constitutional reforms intended to reduce the power of the executive branch. The crisis warranted the intervention of the OAS and the UNDP and was resolved by suspending the effectiveness of the reforms until ten days after the new administration had been inaugurated.




Figure IV-2. Average of questions that comprise the scale of political support for the system 2004-2006)

From the five questions, a scale to measure political support for the system was constructed. The scale is an average of the five previously shown items. In Figure IV-3 we present the 2004-2006 results to observe the evolution of attitudes for the entire period. As can be seen, political support for the system, as seen on the scale, has declined significantly between 2004 and 2006, which also indicates that the legitimacy of the political system in Nicaragua has also diminished in the last two years.




Figure IV-3. Political support for the system in Nicaragua (2004-2006): Scale of most important items

B. A comparative view of political support for the system

This study also makes reference to other LAPOP surveys taken in the region. In several chapters there are figures that present the results from the countries where the surveys were conducted. In all cases in which data from other the other countries were used, the sample was weighted. This was done because in some of the countries the sizes of the samples were larger than others, and specifically because in two of them, Ecuador and Bolivia, the samples themselves were weighted (see country reports for these two for a more detailed explanation). Thus, in Ecuador and Bolivia, the samples were close to 3,000, whereas in the rest of the countries, the samples were about half that size. Later, the sample set produced a weighted file in which each of the countries had a sample of 1,500. This weighting did not in any way affect the averages reported in the studies, but in order to reach the correct averages for Ecuador and Bolivia, the samples needed to be weighted. However, this procedure does affect confidence intervals. In almost all cases, the

weighted sample is smaller than the original, and therefore, the confidence intervals reported are broader than they would have been had they not been weighted. The difference, however, is minimal, except for Bolivia and Ecuador. The result is that the report uses a conservative estimate of confidence intervals for the data set.

Figure IV-4 shows the data obtained for Nicaragua and the other countries in which the LAPOP survey was taken. As can be seen, political support for the system has declined in Nicaragua, from 49.9 in 2004 (see Figure IV-3) to 45.3 in 2006.

After analyzing the data from Nicaragua within the framework of the comparative study of Central American, Caribbean, and South American countries, we found that Nicaragua is one of five countries with lowest levels of political support for the system (45.3). The other four are: Ecuador (37.4), Paraguay (39.1), Haiti (41.6), and Peru (43.9).




Figure IV-4. A comparative view of political support for the system

C. Explanation of the levels of political support for the system in Nicaragua

The data show that political support for the system is decreasing in Nicaragua although it is also necessary to indicate that not all survey participants responded in the same way. Some Nicaraguans expressed much higher political support for the system than others. The reasons for these differences of opinion should be explored further. The following pages present first the significant statistical findings for the bivariate analysis done for the set of sociodemographic variables, attitudes, and evaluations of various aspects of national life.

D. Model of political support for the system

The predictor model establishes a series of variables that hypothetically would be related to support for the system (See Table IV-1, Appendix B). Of these, only five have a statistically significant impact on such support: the survey participant’s trust that the judicial system pursues and punishes criminals; evaluation of the current administration; perception of the country’s economic situation; victimization by crime; and exposure to news in the media.

E. Trust in the justice system and political support for the system

The impact of survey participants’ trust in the judicial system on the levels of political support for the system is another aspect analyzed in this study. In Nicaragua, there is increasing distrust in the judicial system. The participants were asked:

<p>AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or an assault, how much would you trust the judicial system to punish the guilty party (parties)? [Read choices] (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Not much (4) Not at all (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>AOJ12</p>
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Figure IV-5 indicates the tendency toward increased political support for the system as trust that the judicial system will punish the guilty increases.




Figure IV-5. Political support for the system according to trust in the efficacy of the judicial system

F. Job performance rating of the president and political support for the system

President Bolaños’ job performance rating is determined to be a factor associated with political support for the system. The item on the questionnaire is as follows:

<p>M1. And speaking in general about the current administration, would you say that the job President Enrique Bolaños is doing is: [Read choices] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (so-so) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (the worst) (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>M1</p>
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Figure IV-6 illustrates that political support for the system increases as the president's job performance rating rises, except among the group that rates his performance as "very good."




Figure IV-6. Political support for the system according to the president's job performance rating

G. The country’s economic situation and political support for the system

Survey participants were asked to evaluate Nicaragua’s economic situation.⁶ The evaluation of a country’s economic behavior is considered an important factor in the level of political support for the system. The Nicaraguan economy has not shown the desired performance in recent years, and this situation has undoubtedly had an impact on citizens’ opinions. In Figure IV-7, it can be seen that over half of survey participants (66.5%) perceive poor national economic performance while 29.0% feel that it has been neither good nor bad, and only 4.5% feel that the economy is good or very good.




Figure IV-7. The country’s economic situation

⁶ Question SOCT1 on the survey.

The data show that the evaluation of the country's economic situation is strongly associated with level of political support for the system, as can be seen in Figure IV-8. Persons perceiving that the economic situation is bad show lower levels of political support for the system. On the basis of the data, it can be confirmed that there is a clear association between the perception of the state of the national economy and the degree of legitimacy granted to the political system.




Figure IV-8. Political support for the system according to the country's economic situation

H. Victimization by crime and political support for the system

In the analysis, we will now focus on the impact of crime on the levels of political support for the system. To analyze this aspect, three questions were asked, one of which deals with crime victimization. The question was posed as follows:

VIC1. Have you been a victim of a criminal act in the last 12 months? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to AOJ8] (8) DK [go to AOJ8]	VIC1	
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In Figure IV-9 it can be seen that crime victims show lower levels of political support for the system.⁷




Figure IV-9. Political support for the system according to victimization by crime

⁷ This topic is discussed in greater depth in Chapter V of this study.

I. Exposure to the news and support for the system

The survey questionnaire included four questions to determine the frequency with which survey participants listen to/read/look at the news.⁸ From the four items, a scale of exposure to the news was devised. Figure IV-10 indicates that people who are not exposed to the media are those who express the highest levels of political support for the system; the tendency is then for support for the system to decline as exposure to the news rises.




Figure IV-10. Support for the system according to exposure to the news

J. Set of items of political support extended to the system

In this study, we work from the hypothesis that political support for the system is related to citizen trust in a series of institutions that extend beyond those that are strictly part of the political system. This supposes that to measure this support it is necessary to include other items as as a part of the extended political system.

⁸ Questions A2 and A4i on the questionnaire.

Figure IV-11 presents the results of the 2006 survey. A logical extension of institutions not political *per se* is the Catholic Church, which is included in this part of the survey because of the far-reaching political and social influence it enjoys in Latin American, making the Church a referent for all other institutions. This factor is fully verified by the results of this study. Our data show that the most trusted institution is the Catholic Church (64.5), followed by the media (59.2), the armed forces (57.9), the national police (52.3), and the mayoralties (51.6). In the second group are the Office for the Defense of Human Rights (45.3), the Supreme Electoral Council (44.6), the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (42.2), the justice system (40.9), elections (40.5), the Comptroller of the Republic (40.4), the National Assembly (38.7), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (38.5) and the Supreme Court of Justice (38.3). In this same group, at the lowest levels are the central government (37.4) and political parties (32.8).




Figure IV-11. Institutional trust

Tolerance

According to Isidro H. Cisneros, in democracies, political design is recognized as a fundamental, positive characteristic of the rules of the game of democracy since the opposition constitutes the indispensable control in government action. On the contrary, in authoritarian regimes, any difference of opinion with respect to behavior or official doctrine is considered a threat to the system as a whole.⁹ Nicaragua has undergone long periods of authoritarianism; in this country, the democratic process is a relatively new phenomenon. For this reason, following up the issue of tolerance is very important because tolerance represents a key challenge to the advancement and consolidation of democratic order. In this section, we explore the topic of political tolerance in Nicaragua.¹⁰

Political tolerance has been measured in many studies by focusing on the willingness of individuals to extend civil liberties to specific groups. In other studies, the groups are selected by the researcher; or lists of groups are made and the participant chooses the group s/he “likes least.”¹¹ There is a certain amount of evidence that both methods produce similar results.

Studies carried out by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project have allowed us to include four tested survey questions referring to four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, demonstrate peacefully, run for public office, and express oneself freely. The participant is given a card on which is a ten-point scale. A ten-point response format was used, ranging from 1 (strong disapproval) to 10 (strong approval). The questions are as follows:

⁹ Isidro. H. Cisneros. Tolerancia. EN: Varios. *Léxico de la Política*. FLACSO-SEP CONACYT_HeinrichBöll Stiftung-CFE, México, 2000.

¹⁰ For this section we used the conceptual framework developed in: Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1995). El Salvador: *De la Guerra a la paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA y FUNDAUNGO.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua: mimeo, United States Agency for International Development.

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Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. *Auditoria de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO.

Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2001). *Cultura Política, gobierno local y descentralización*. América Central. Volumen I. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador.

¹¹ Sullivan, John L.; Piereson, James E. y Macus, George E. (1979). An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s-1970s. *American Political Science Review* 73. p. 787-794.

	1-10, 88
D1. There are persons who always speak negatively about the type of government in Nicaragua; not just the current administration, but the type of government itself. How strongly to you approve or disapprove of these persons having the right to vote ? Please read me the number on the scale. [Probe: How strongly?] Please read me the number on the scale:	D1
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these persons can protest peacefully as a way of expressing their point of view? Please read me the number on the scale.	D2
D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these persons running for public office ?	D3
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these persons going on television to give a speech ?	D4

The coding system of these variables was originally based on a 1-10 format. To make the results easier to interpret, they have been converted to a scale of percentages ranging from 1-100.

Figure IV-12 shows the averages from each question: run for public office (50.8), speak freely (49.7), vote (55.8), and demonstrate publically (57.7). It is important to note that with the exception of free speech, the percentages from all questions were 50 points or higher.




Figure IV-12. Averages from questions that comprise the scale of tolerance of citizen rights

A. Evolution of tolerance levels in Nicaragua

Given that in 2004 this same survey was taken in Nicaragua, we can track the evolution of tolerance levels between 2004 and 2006. The following figure shows the change in results from questions used to create the political tolerance scale. In general, it can be seen that between 2004 and 2006 tolerance diminishes for all but one item: approval of running for public office. However, the change is not significant.




Figure IV-13. Average of questions that comprise the tolerance scale (2004-2006)

A scale to measure political tolerance was devised from the four items.¹² The previous figure shows a drop in political tolerance levels in Nicaragua between 2004 and 2006. In Figure IV-14 tolerance shows a slight decline from 55.3 in 2004 to 53.5 in 2006.




Figure IV-14. Tolerance in Nicaragua (2004-2006)

¹² In order not to lose a significant number of participant responses in the tally, if two or more of the four items were answered by a participant, the average was taken from the responses to those items. If the participant answered fewer than two items, s/he is eliminated from the analysis.

The historical evolution of the political tolerance index in Nicaragua since 1991 is shown in the following figure. The figure illustrates how political tolerance evolved positively throughout the 1990s, reaching its high point in 1999. In 2004 tolerance dropped to its 1995 level and dropped again slightly in 2006.¹³ It is important to note, however, that tolerance is stable on the positive side of the scale (+50). The decline in tolerance may be explained by the fact that the peace agreements in the late 1980s and early 1990s, together with psychological fatigue from armed conflicts and the electoral defeat of one of the majority parties in 1990, had led to higher levels of tolerance in the interest of peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, post-transition conflicts, unfulfilled social expectations, and high corruption in the Arnaldo Alemán administration have brought about a decline in political tolerance.




Figure IV-15. Evolution of tolerance in Nicaragua

¹³ Cfr. The comparative data from the 1991, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004 indexes have used in the 2004 LAPOP report. They are based on previous surveys by Dr. Mitchell Seligson (www.lapopsurveys.org) and the survey results from that year. Cfr. Luis Serra Vásquez-Pedro López Ruiz. Mitchell Seligson, Coordinador Científico. *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Nicaragua*, 2004, op. cit. Pag. 45. The data from the 2006 index correspond to those of this LAPOP survey.

B. A comparative view of tolerance

The data analysis from Nicaragua, placed in a comparative study of study Central America, the Caribbean, and South America countries, shows that Nicaragua is one of the intermediate level countries in terms of tolerance (53.5), above Bolivia (43.9), Ecuador (46.8), Honduras (46.2), Guatemala (52.7), Panamá (48.0) y Colombia (51.8); but below Peru (53.6), El Salvador (55.8), Mexico (56.2), Chile (56.3), Paraguay (57.4), the Dominican Republic (58.9), Haiti (62.1), Costa Rica (62.2) Guyana (64.3) and Jamaica (72.7).




Figure IV-16. A comparative view of tolerance

C. An explanation of tolerance levels in Nicaragua

Figure IV-13 shows political tolerance levels fell in Nicaragua between 2004 and 2006. What explains this? In the following sections, the statistically significant findings from the multiple regression analysis are reported and later the results of the bivariate analysis of the set of demographic variables on attitudes and evaluations of various aspects of national life are discussed.

D. Tolerance model

In Appendix B the results are presented of the multiple regression analysis for statistically significant predictors of tolerance when each of the variables remains constant. These results show that there are two main tolerance predictors: educational level and home furnishings. The variables of age, ideology, the president's job performance rating, and satisfaction with democratic governance are kept in the model despite their being statistically insignificant. In the next section the results of the bivariate analysis will be discussed.

E. Education and tolerance

Education is found to be a factor associated with tolerance Figure IV-17 demonstrating that among those with low levels of formal education, tolerance is low, whereas tolerance rises as educational levels rise.




Figure IV-17. Tolerance according to educational level

This same tendency of tolerance level growth as educational levels rise is gender dependent. For citizens with no formal education, tolerance levels for men and women are about equal; however, both groups' tolerance drops among those with an elementary school education, and then rises as people go on to high school and college. Figure IV-18 illustrates this tendency.




Figure IV-18. Tolerance according to educational level, by gender

F. Index of home wealth and tolerance

Figure IV-19 shows that tolerance levels are lower among those with fewer home furnishings (our measure of home wealth), and the tendency is for tolerance to increase as home furnishings increase.




Figure IV-19. Tolerance according to home furnishings

Support for stable democracy

Before discussing the next step in our analysis, it is necessary to clarify that the theoretical framework of this study¹⁴ establishes that support for the system of government and tolerance are both necessary for long term democratic stability.¹⁵ This means that for a truly democratic regime to exist, citizens must believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and at the same time be tolerant of the political rights of others such that a regime of the majority can coexist with certain minority rights.

Based on these theoretical approaches, we will analyze the interrelation of support for the system and tolerance, for which both scales will be dichotomized into “high” and “low.”¹⁶ However, “it must be noted that the relationships described here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic, in other words, systems in which competitive elections regularly take place and in which wide participation is possible. These attitudes within authoritarian systems would have completely different implications.”¹⁷

Table IV-1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. Political systems that predominantly show high support for the system and high tolerance tend to favor stable democracy. This can be explained logically in that in non-coercive contexts, legitimacy is necessary for the system to be stable, and tolerance is necessary to keep the system democratic.¹⁸

Another possible combination is obtained when support for the system is high and tolerance is low (stable authoritarian cell). Here, the system tends to remain stable (due to high support) even though the democratic government may be in danger in the medium term. It is often said that this type of system tends to move toward an authoritarian regime.

The other two combinations involve low support for the system. Both are illustrated in the lower cells on the Table and are linked to unstable situations. In the low support-high tolerance cell, there is a tendency toward unstable democracy. The logic here is that instability could lead to a greater democratization in the middle term, or the situation could remain unstable. On the other hand, low support and low tolerance could cause the breakdown of democracy, or instability could continue. However, it must be said that “based on public opinion polls as the only source

¹⁴ This theoretical framework was first presented in: Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1993). *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en el Salvador*. San Salvador: IDELA.

¹⁵ For this section, we use the conceptual framework developed in: Seligson, Mitchell A. (1996). *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua: mimeo, United States Agency for International Development. Seligson, Mitchell A. y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (1995). Nicaragua 1991-1995: una cultura política en transición, en R. Córdova Macías y G. Maihold (compiladores). *Cultura Política y transición Democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses y Centro de Análisis Sociocultural de la UCA-Managua.

¹⁶ Each of these is a 0-100 scale with a midpoint of 50.

¹⁷ Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoria de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburg, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO. P.89

¹⁸ See also: Dahl, Robert. (1971) *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2004). *La Cultura política de la democracia en México, Centroamérica y Colombia, 2004: El Salvador*. Vanderbilt University, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO.

of information, a breakdown cannot be forecasted, given that there are many other associated factors, such as the roles of the elites, the position of the military, and the support or opposition of international actors. However, political systems in which the masses do not support the foundational institutions of democracy or the rights of the minority tend to be more vulnerable to a breakdown of democracy.”¹⁹

Table IV-1. Theoretical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in democratic societies

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia	
	Alto	Bajo
Alto	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
Bajo	Democracia inestable	Rompimiento democrático

A. Empirical relationship between tolerance and support for the system in Nicaragua

The following is an analysis of the interrelation between both variables. Since the variables were dichotomized into “high” and “low,” the results of the 2006 study in Table IV-2 show that 16.5% of respondents fall in the authoritarian stability cell, the least populated in the table. One in four supports the system and is tolerant (24.9% in the stable democracy cell) while 27.1% place into the instable democracy cell, and 31.5% in the breakdown of democracy cell, the most populated in the table.

Table IV-2. Empirical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in Nicaragua (2006)

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia	
	Alto	Bajo
Alto	Democracia estable	Estabilidad autoritaria
	24.9	16.5
Bajo	Democracia inestable	Rompimiento democrático
	27.1	31.5

A comparative view of the results over time is possible because of the availability of data from the 2004 study. In Table IV-3 the evolution of the four cells for the period of 2004-2006 is presented. The “stable democracy” cell shows a drop from 28.3% to 24.9% between 2004 and 2006. The “unstable democracy” cell shows a slight increase. Finally, the “breakdown of democracy” cell rose noticeably from 24.8% to 31.5% between 2004 and 2006. These results could be related to the exacerbation of the institutional crisis brought about by the political pact between the two majority parties, PLC and FSLN, and the confrontations of these forces with the executive branch. Among other effects, the crisis has caused a weakening of the rule of law, an increase in uncertainty, and a decline of citizen confidence in democratic institutions.

19 Seligson, Mitchell A.; Cruz, José Miguel y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. (2000). *Auditoria de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburg, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO. P.89.

Table IV-3. Empirical relationship between support for the system and tolerance in Nicaragua (2004-2006)

Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia			
	Alto		Bajo	
	Democracia estable		Estabilidad autoritaria	
Alto	2004	2006	2004	2006
	28.3	24.9	20.0	16.5
Bajo	Democracia inestable		Rompimiento democrático	
	2004	2006	2004	2006
	26.8	27.1	24.8	31.5

B. A comparative view of democratic stability

In order to analyze the data from Nicaragua within the framework of this comparative study of Central America, the Caribbean, South America and Mexico, emphasis must be placed on the “stable democracy” cell. In Figure IV-20, it can be seen that Nicaragua is in the middle, (24.9), above Ecuador (12.0), Bolivia (19.7), Paraguay (20.0), Peru (21.4), Panama (22.8) and Haiti (23.5); it is below Honduras (25.2), Guatemala (26.8), Chile (29.9), Colombia (30.6), Guyana (31.5), El Salvador (32.2), Jamaica (36.2), the Dominican Republic (38.2), Mexico (41.3) and Costa Rica (50.2).




Figure IV-20. Attitudes that favor stable democracy: Nicaragua in a comparative view

Evaluations of democracy

A. Evaluations of the democratic process

A battery of questions included in the questionnaire permitted us to measure citizens’ opinions about several aspects of the democratic process in the country. Survey participants were first asked: “PN5. In your opinion, is Nicaragua: very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?” Figure IV-21 shows that 7.9% believe that the country is very democratic; 39.3% somewhat democratic; 41.3% not very democratic; and 11.5% not at all democratic.




Figure IV-21. Opinions regarding the democratic character of the country

Another question asked participants about the relationship between the degree of citizen satisfaction and the performance of democratic governance:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the performance of democratic governance in Nicaragua?
 (1) very satisfied (2) satisfied (3) unsatisfied (4) very unsatisfied
 (8) DK/NR

PN4

Figure IV-22 shows that 3.3% feel very satisfied, 39.7% satisfied, 49.0% unsatisfied, and 8.0% very unsatisfied.

It is important to point out that five out of ten Nicaraguan citizens feel unsatisfied with the performance of democratic governance.




Figure IV-22. Degree of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance in the country

B. Democracy as a type of government

Another question series in the survey was designed to explore support for the system as opposed to other authoritarian types of government. The first question probes the preference for a strongman as opposed to the current democratic system. Participants were asked:

<p>AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strongman that does not have to be elected by popular vote. Others say that although things are not perfect, electoral democracy, in other words, popular vote, is always the best type of government. What do you think?</p> <p>[Read]</p> <p>(1) We need a strongman that does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is best (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>
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Figure IV-23 shows broad and categorical support for electoral democracy (72.4%), as opposed to 16.0% who prefer an unelected strongman, and 11.6% who do not know.




Figure IV-23. Support for electoral democracy

The second question of this type explores the preference for a democratic regime as opposed to a regime that is not. Participants were asked: “DEM2. With which of the following three statements do you most strongly agree: (1) For people like me, it does not matter whether the regime is democratic or not, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government (3) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government might be preferable to a democracy, (8) Do not know”. Figure IV-24 indicates a solid preference for democracy as the form of government (56.8%); 17.0% authoritarian government; 15% do not care whether the government is democratic or not; and 11.2% do not know.




Figure IV-24. Preference for a democratic regime

The third question probes support for a democratic system in spite of its problems when compared to other types of government. Participants were asked:

<p>ING4. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other type of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>	<p>ING4</p>	
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This question was recoded to ING4R to give it a 0-100 format. Figure IV-25 shows a favorable tendency to support a democratic system, with percentages averaging 60.37.




Figure IV-25. Democracy is better than any other type of government

Conclusions

The data from our survey show that political support for the system has declined slightly in Nicaragua between 2004 and 2006. This is important because support for the system constitutes a fundamental aspect of political culture associated with political stability. In Nicaragua, the multiple regression analysis reveals that there are three predictors of support for the system: trust in the judicial system to punish the guilty, the president's job approval rating, and the evaluation of the country's economy.

However, in this chapter it is shown how political tolerance, a fundamental component of a democratic political culture, has declined slightly between 2004 and 2006 as a result of a decline in this aspect among women. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are two predictors of tolerance: educational level and home furnishings.

An examination of the connection between support for the system and political tolerance allowed us to create four possible combinations. The data show that the distribution of survey participants

in these four categories is as follows: 24.9% in the stable democracy cell; 16.4% in authoritarian stability; 27.1% in instable democracy; and 31.5% in the breakdown of democracy. Compared to 2004, these data show a clear tendency of deterioration of the stability of the democratic system between then and 2006, probably as a consequence of the deepening of the political crisis that arose from the pact between the FSLN and the PLC and the confrontations with the executive branch and these political forces during this period.

Lastly, the survey data show strong support for electoral democracy (72.4%) as opposed to an unelected strongman (16.0%); 56.8% prefer democracy as the form of government as opposed to 17.0% who would prefer an authoritarian form of government; for 15.0%, it does not matter whether the government is authoritarian or democratic, and 11.2% did not know. On a 0-100 scale, the average of Nicaraguans who think that democracy is better than any other form of government is 60.37.

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V. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY

Of late, awareness of the problem of corruption is spreading. Corruption undermines democratic regimes and the legitimacy of their institutions, social values and development. This topic is of such concern that at the end of 2003, under a United Nations initiative, the first international instrument designed to go up against the scourge of corruption. The United Nations International Convention against Corruption complements the Interamerican Convention against Corruption ratified by the members of the OAS in 1997. This convention recognizes the importance of raising awareness in the populations of the region of the existence and gravity of corruption as well as the need to increase civil participation in the prevention of and struggle against corruption and unpunished crime. Given that this type of crime can have international effects, the convention also recognizes the need for cooperative action among the States to effectively combat corruption, from whence also comes the need to adopt an international instrument to combat corruption. In particular, appropriate measures must be taken against corrupt public officials and the products of their acts.

In Nicaragua, the topic of transparency and the struggle against corruption have been a top priority of public opinion polls in recent years. President Enrique Bolaños' (2002-2006) campaign platform focused on transparency and fighting corruption. The trial, conviction, and 20 year prison sentence of former Nicaraguan president Arnaldo Alemán (1997-2001) served to heighten this discussion in the media and among the population.

Nonetheless, the perception of corruption has not improved. According to the index of the perception of corruption¹ published by Transparency International, in 2005 Nicaragua had a rating of 2.6 on a 1-10 scale, ten being the highest level of transparency and one the highest level of corruption. This ranks Nicaragua as 107th in the world transparency ranking. In 2004, Nicaragua had a rating of 2.7, which means that the 2005 ranking is a slightly worse. These data indicate that Nicaragua continues to be one of the 70 countries in which “the situation of corruption continues to be alarming.”²

On the other hand, the Latin American Index of Budgetary Transparency [Índice Latinoamericano de Transparencia Presupuestaria]³ calculates that for eight Latin American countries in 2005, Nicaragua and El Salvador were the only countries whose index rating

¹ This index evaluates concrete actions taken by countries fighting against corruption by classifying countries according to the degree to which corruption is perceived to occur among public officials and politicians. Cfr. Grupo Cívico Ética y Transparencia. Capítulo Nacional de Transparencia Internacional. Nicaragua, Percepción de Corrupción de Transparencia Internacional 2005. www.transparency.org/cpi/2005.

² Grupo Cívico Ética y Transparencia. Capítulo Nacional de Transparencia Internacional. Nicaragua en el Índice de Percepción de Corrupción de Transparencia Internacional 2005. www.transparency.org/cpi/2005.

³ The aim of the index is to evaluate how transparent budgetary practices are in study countries; it is devised on the basis of a perception survey of experts and budget users, the analysis of the practical conditions of the budget process, and a guide which allows the perception survey to be linked to the information analysis available to the public and the degree of openness of the stages of budget preparation. Cfr. Ana Quirós Viquez (Coordinadora). Índice Latinoamericano de Transparencia Presupuestaria. Informe NACIONAL, 2005, Nicaragua. Managua, octubre 2005.

declined since 2003. Among participating countries, Nicaragua is in next to last place; only El Salvador is lower.⁴

Why, in a country that dared to try a former president of the republic for corruption, does the perception of corruption increase?

The Civic, Ethical, and Transparency Group bases its placement of Nicaragua on the index on the fact that despite the country's effort to prosecute a case of corruption so publically, the process did not produce the expected results. The Group offers as an example the well known "Huaca" case in which the Nicaraguan State was looted by the party in power at the time and government officials in collusion with then president Alemán. Ethics and Transparency notes how this case illustrates the political control of the judicial system because political deals have determined, until now, the path and reach of the process. Thus, until today, none of the parties indicted in this crime have been formally imprisoned. Former president Alemán was under house arrest for a time but could go anywhere he chose to in Managua, and today he is a free man who can go anywhere in the country. Not a cent of the stolen money was ever recovered; moreover, the money was distributed as bonuses among 300 government officials including controllers, representatives, ministers, and even President Bolaños (Alemán's vice-president at the time), never given back, and none of these individuals were ever investigated.

Another amount of money diverted to pay campaign expenses has not been recovered both because the 34 indicted officials have immunity from prosecution and have not relinquished it, including President Bolaños, who was initially willing to do so.⁵

It is not surprising, therefore, that the issue of corruption is perceived as such a serious problem for most of the citizens in this country.

This chapter aims to explore the relation between the perception of corruption in daily life and its impact on the development of a culture of support for democracy under the supposition that corruption erodes trust in the system's political institutions. In the pages that follow we present the survey results regarding corruption in Nicaragua as follows: in the first section, we present the results of the perception of the magnitude of the problem of corruption in Nicaragua; secondly, we explore the levels of corruption in the country from the battery regarding victimization by corruption; third, we identify the characteristics of crime victims; and finally, we look at the empirical relationship between legitimacy and corruption.

⁴ Nicaragua moved from 46.4 in 2003 to 38.5 in 2005 on a scale of 1-100 while El Salvador moved from 40.3 to 31.1 during the same period. Cfr. Ana Quirós Viquez (Coordinadora). Índice Latinoamericano de Transparencia Presupuestaria. Informe NACIONAL, 2005, Nicaragua. Managua, octubre 2005.

⁵ Grupo Cívico Ética y Transparencia. Capítulo Nacional de Transparencia Internacional. Op. Cit.

Perception of the magnitude of corruption

To begin the examination of survey results for this topic, it is important to look at Nicaraguans' perceptions of the level of corruption existing in the country. We asked participants the following question:

EXC7. Keeping in mind your personal experience or experiences you have heard about, is corruption among public officials. ...? **[Read choices]** (1) Very widespread (2) Somewhat widespread (3) Not very widespread (4) Not at all widespread (8) DK/NR **EXC7**

The results shown in Figure V-1 reveal that two thirds of the population (66.1%) believe that corruption is very widespread; another significant number of persons (21.9%) believe that it is somewhat widespread; 9.1% not very widespread; and only 3.0% said not at all widespread. This perception of corruption among public officials increased in 2006 when compared to the results of LAPOP's 2004 survey.

The perception of corruption among public officials has risen in 2006 if the results of the 2004 LAPOP survey are considered; in that year 49.1% of survey participants thought that corruption was very widespread among public officials; 23.5 % somewhat widespread; 22.2% not very widespread; and 5.2% not at all widespread.

It can be pointed out that if these results do not constitute an indicator of the corruption that actually exists in the country, they do show the magnitude of its perception among Nicaraguans. This is important because in citizens' political behavior perceptions are even more important than the facts.




Figure V-1. How widespread is corruption among public officials?

Which elements can be associated with a higher or lower perception of corruption in the country? We will now look into some of the clues provided by the survey that brought us closer to some of the answers to this question. First, the data show that the perception of corruption depends, in part, upon the level of information that citizens say that they have. Thus, as can be seen in Figure V-2, a greater perception of lack of transparency among public officials is correlated with with the level of knowledge of political affairs. A high level of knowledge translates into a greater perception of corruption; conversely, a low level of knowledge of political affairs is associated with low or no perception of corruption in the country.




Figure V-2. Perception of corruption according to level of political knowledge

The correlation of political knowledge and the perception of corruption is tied to the creation of public opinion, which itself depends upon available information and the experiences individuals undergo. Further on, we will go into detail in citizens' daily experiences related to corruption. Now we will examine the information aspect, and in particular, the main source of the information—the media. In this part of the study, we explore the relationship between the perception of corruption among Nicaraguans and the habit of listening to/watching/reading the news in the media. The assumption is that people who follow the news or are better informed will tend to see more corruption than those who do not or are not. To perform this analysis, various survey items were used to measure the frequency with which individuals watch the news on television, listen to the news on the radio, or read the news in the newspapers.

The data reveal the following: opinions of the perception of corruption in Nicaragua are not associated with listening to the news on the radio or not; rather, they have to do with getting the news from television or the newspapers (see Figure V-3 and Figure V-4). The relationship is statistically significant in both cases, particularly with regard to reading the news in newspapers. Data from the 2004 LAPOP survey indicate that those who never listen to the radio have a higher perception of corruption than those who listen once in a while although the levels of perception rose among those who listened regularly. Nevertheless, the differences are not statistically significant as they were for those who read newspapers or watch the news on television.




Figure V-3. Perception of corruption according to frequency of reading the news




Figure V-4. Perception of corruption according to frequency of watching the news on television

The data thus show that the perception of corruption is associated with the frequency with which a citizen receives information about public affairs and follows up on the activities of government officials; however, that perception is created by following the news on television or in the newspapers rather than listening to the news on the radio.

Since in Nicaragua television and newspapers have more impact in urban areas, and radio is more influential in rural areas, our hypothesis is that the perception of corruption is more an urban phenomenon than a rural one. In other words, given that the perception of corruption is linked to following the news on television and in the newspapers which are more urban-type media, our hypothesis is that a greater or lesser perception of corruption is related to the individual's area of residence and the population of that area. Figure V-5 reveals that, indeed, corruption is more highly perceived in Managua, the capital, than in any other city. It also reveals that in rural areas, the inhabitants tend to perceive less corruption than anywhere else.




Figure V-5. Perception of corruption according to city size

Levels of corruption

Another factor that influences the perception of corruption is personal experience with corruption in daily life. In this case the source of the perception is real life experience. The importance of this aspect is that perception and reality do not always coincide, but both influence political behavior. When the perception of corruption is added to the evidence from personal experience it is to be expected that its influence on trust and on a political culture of support for the system will be much greater.

In this part of our study, we used a battery of items to look into the experiences of bribery or illegal payments that citizen have had to engage in in various settings of daily life. It is not our intent to reduce corruption to the aspects explored in the questionnaire; rather we wish to find a way to measure corruption from the incidence of victimization, that is to say, from the number of occasions in which citizens have been involved in corruption during the last year.

The following is the battery of questions asked:

Now we would like to talk about your personal experience with some things that happen in real life. . .	No	Sí	NS	No aplica
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the past year?	0	1	8	9
EXC6. Has a government employee asked you for a bribe in the last year?	0	1	8	9
EXC11. Have you done any business with the municipality in the last year? [If not, mark 9; if so, ask the following]: To do some type of business at the municipal government offices (like a getting a permit) in the last year, have you had to pay more than the law requires?	0	1	8	9
EXC12. In order to expedite a transaction or solve a problem during the last year, did you offer a gift to a public official?				
EXC13. Do you have a job? [If not, mark 9; if so, ask the following] At your workplace, have you been asked for a bribe in the last year?	0	1	8	9
EXC14. In the last year, did you have any dealings in court? [If not, mark 9; if so, ask the following]: Have you had to pay a bribe in court in the last year?	0	1	8	9
EXC15. Did you use public medical, services in the last year? [If not, mark 9; if so, ask the following]: To be attended to in a hospital or clinic during the last year, did you have to pay a bribe?	0	1	8	9
EXC16. Did you have a child in school during the last year? [If not, mark 9; if so, ask the following]: At school during the last year, did you have to pay a bribe?	0	1	8	9
EXC17. Did anyone aske you for a bribe to avoid having your electricity shut off?	0	1	8	9

The questions in this series all refer to acts or bribery, or *mordida* (“bite”) that survey participants may have faced in the last year. It can also be seen that that the first two questions and the last

one were asked of survey participants (EXC2, EXC6, EXC17). This means that most of the items (EXC11 to EXC16) were asked only if the person had had any contact with those particular events and government services. This is important to keep in mind because real cases of corrupt acts depend on how much contact with or use of services from those institutions while other cases of this nature do not necessarily depend upon such contact.




Figure V-6. Experience with corruption in Nicaragua

Figure V-6 shows that the most common experience with corruption in Nicaragua over a year's time is bribery—the *mordida*—in courts (22.9%). Also frequent is bribery in municipalities (12.6%); bribery in hospitals (10.2%); bribery in the workplace (9.9%); bribery in schools (9.3%) bribery for electrical service (8.2%). As we pointed out earlier, all these experiences, with the exception of the last one, affect only those who have accessed the services mentioned in the items, but the magnitude of the problem cannot be ignored. It needs to be said that although the least frequent incidents of corruption occurs outside with police officers or with a public official, they are not insignificant either.

The aggregate of the experiences with corruption obtained from the survey reveals that a total of 18% of Nicaraguans have been victims of corruption over the course of one year, which means that close to one in five Nicaraguans were victims of bribery over a year's time. Even worse is that the data show an increase in the number of these experiences: from 16.3% in 2004 to 18% in 2006.

What is Nicaragua's position among other countries with regard to victimization by corruption? Comparative data from the study of Central American and South American countries show that Nicaragua is not among the countries with the highest incidence of corruption in daily life. The levels of corruption found put the country between more and less corrupt countries compared to its Central American neighbors. It should be noted that the differences among most of the countries are minimal; the only countries whose differences stand out are, on one hand Haiti, Mexico, Bolivia and Jamaica for the high levels of victimization (50.1%, 37.1%, 34.6% and 34.0% respectively) and Chile and Colombia for the lowest levels (9.4% and 9.7% respectively).




Figure V-7. Victimization of corruption by country

Victims of corruption

In this section, our aim is to find answers to the following question: Who are the most frequent victims of corruption? For this purpose a linear regression was done to start identifying the variables that predict whether a person is likely to become a victim of corruption or not? Next, a scale created as dependent variable that joined the various types of victimization by corruption by frequency of events over a year's time. In this way, the variable contained non-victims (expressed as 0) up to 5, the maximum number of experiences of corruption.

The results of the regression to establish the characteristics of the most frequent victims (see Appendix B) indicate that individuals who are most likely to be victimized by corruption are men with a higher level of resources (measured as home furnishings).

An examination of the data resulting from using the condition of having been or not having been a victim of corruption, during the last year, shows that 22.0% of corruption victims were men, and women, 14.0% (see Figure V-8). Similar differences have been observed in other studies and have been explained that they are probably due to the men have a higher degree of contact with institutions, walks on public streets more frequently, is more likely to be stopped by a police officer, and, in general, are present in public spaces more often than women.⁶




Figure V-8. Victimization by corruption, by gender

With regard to age, Figure V-9 shows that victimization by corruption has a strong connection with individuals in the medium age bracket. These persons are more likely to become victims of

⁶ Ricardo Córdova Macías-José Miguel Cruz, Mitchell Seligson (scientific coordinator and editor). *La Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2004*. ARD, Vanderbilt University, FUNDAUNGO-IUDOP-UCA-USAID.

corruption in Nicaragua, and in this sense, they are more vulnerable to abuse by public officials and the police. As in the previous case, it is possible that persons in this age bracket have more contact with the municipal government regarding requests and public services and are thus exposed to this type of risk more often.




Figure V-9. Victimization by corruption by age range

The results also show that people who have greater resources at home tend to be more frequent victims of corruption. The variable, after the regression exercise, was found to be significant in the understanding of the phenomenon of corruption.

Recognition of corruption

What do Nicaraguans identify as corrupt acts? How socially acceptable is corruption in Nicaragua? To answer these questions, the research includes an item series designed to measure the possibility of identifying corruption as such or not as well as the implicit acceptance of or permissiveness toward corruption. In Nicaragua, people in certain circles often say that corruption is institutionalized, meaning that the population has come to see corruption as an inevitable part of daily life, even socially acceptable. What is the extent of the belief that corruption is normal among the survey participants?

Three items were used to measure these attitudes:

I would like you to tell me if you think that the following actions are: 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.
DC1. For example: A representative accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars from a business concern. Do you think that what s/he did is: [Read choices] : 1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK/NR=8
DC10. A mother with several children needs a birth certificate for one of the children. So that she does not have to waste time waiting, she pays the municipal employee an extra 90 pesos. Do you think that what the woman did is: [Read choices] : 1) Corrupt and she should be punished 2) Corrupt, but she is justified 3) Not corrupt 8) DK/NR
DC13. An unemployed person is the sister-in-law of an important politician, who uses his influence to get her a government job. Do you think that the politician is [Read choices] : 1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK/NR=8

In Table V-1 shows two observations are worth noting: the first is that not all individuals are unanimous in their recognition of acts of corruption as such; the second is that there are differences in how corruption is identified according to the type of behavior.

Thus, the data show that 11.0% do not consider it corrupt for a public employee to accept an additional payment to expedite a service; 13.7% do not consider getting a job from an influential family member who works in government corrupt; 3.6% do not think that even taking a bribe from a business concern is corrupt. However, it must be said that 48.4% of survey participants considered that the taking of a bribe by a public official to expedite some type of government business is corrupt; 58.7% consider it an act of corruption for a high powered government official to get a job for a relative; and 89.0% consider it corrupt for a representative to accept a bribe from a business dealing. While it is encouraging that the recognition of corruption has increased, there is a long way to go.

Table V-1 shows how, despite the fact the most of the survey participants identify these acts as corrupt, not everyone believe that they should be punished, and important segments justify them, with permissiveness varying with one type of act or another.

Table V-1. Opinions of corrupt acts (in percentages)

Situación	Corrupto y debe ser castigado	Corrupto pero justificado	No corrupto
Empresa da coimas a diputados	89.0	7.4	3.6
Pagar extra para sacar partida	48.4	40.6	11.0
Usar palanca de familiar en el gobierno para conseguir empleo	58.7	27.5	13.7

A scale was constructed from these questions with values ranging from 0-100, 0 indicating that people believe that corrupt acts should be punished, and 100 indicating that people do not consider the acts corrupt. The average on the scale is 21.7. To comment further, the link with the other variables shows that this attitude is relation to certain characteristics of the survey participants. For example, for educational level, the results indicate that persons with lower levels of education tend not to consider the previously mentioned act corrupt, thus exhibiting higher levels of permissiveness regarding them (see Figure V-10).




Figure V-10. Perception of no corruption according to educational level

The results regarding average monthly family income and the level of home furnishings (see Figure V-11) indicate that people who have fewer resources and lower incomes are higher on the scale of “no perception” of corruption compared to people who have more resources and higher incomes. This might be explained by the fact that traditional culture has made various practices of political clientelism seem normal, meaning practices that tend to involve the poorest and most vulnerable.




Figure V-11. Approval of corruption according to home furnishings

Corruption and democracy

How does corruption affect democracy? It is often said that corruption diverts public resources to private, illicit ends, delegitimizing the workings of the State apparatus, affecting institutional trust, and eroding support for the system.

Regarding this, Córdova and Cruz have pointed out how the link between corruption and democracy tends to establish itself theoretically, and when efforts have been made to make it empirical, it has been reduced to the evaluation of the perception of corruption with the major or minor conditions of democracy in countries. Furthermore, they indicate that when it has been attempted to link corruption more individually with citizen support for political regimes, the efforts have been more focused on the indicators of the perception of corruption than on the event of corruption itself.⁷

Both authors point out that “in answer to these gaps,” Seligson developed a method of measuring the impact of corruption on democracy by linking a direct measurement of victimization by corruption with the index of support for the political system on an individual level. Seligson’s

⁷ Ricardo Córdova Macías-José Miguel Cruz. *La Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador*. Op. Cit, pag. 91.

premise is that support for the system on an individual level, in other words, legitimacy, is a fundamental requirement for democratic stability, especially in Latin America, which has a long history of political instability. The basic hypothesis is that those who have been most victimized will not support the system as much as those who have not been victimized”⁸

Survey results indicate that corruption does indeed impact institutions and the political system. In a particular way, the data allows us to affirm that being a victim of corruption diminishes trust in the institutions of the judicial system. This affirmation is very important because in this case we are dealing with the effects of trust in institutions such as the courts, state attorneys’ offices, public prosecutors, and the police, whose duty it is to enforce the law.




Figure V-12. Institutional trust according to victimization by corruption

These same data show in Figure V-13 that individuals who have not been victimized by corruption tend to show higher levels of support for the system which lower levels of support for the system are more evident among victims.

⁸ Ricardo Córdova Macías-José Miguel Cruz. *La Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador*. Op. Cit, pag. 91.




Figure V-13. Support for the system according to victimization by corruption

Furthermore, the data indicate that having been a victim of corruption affects the level of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance⁹ and the opinion of the degree of democracy that exists in the country.¹⁰




Figure V-14. Satisfaction with democratic governance according to victimization by corruption

Conclusions

In this chapter, we examined the results regarding corruption and transparency and how they affect the political culture of Nicaragua. The main outcomes reveal that two thirds of the population (66.1%) believes that corruption is very widespread, and another 21.9% feel that it is somewhat widespread. Nine and one-tenth percent think it is not very widespread and only 3% said that it is not at all widespread. The perception of corruption among public officials rose in 2006 compared to the data from the 2004 LAPOP survey; that year 49.1% of survey participants said that corruption is very widespread; 23.5% somewhat widespread; 22.2% not very widespread and 5.2% not at all widespread.

⁹ The question was: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with how democracy works in Nicaragua?”

¹⁰ This refers to question “PN5. In your opinion, is Nicaragua very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic, or not at all democratic?”

On the other hand, the data show that the perception of corruption partly depends upon the level of information that citizens have. High levels of political knowledge are linked to a higher perception of corruption; conversely, a low level of knowledge about political matters is associated with a low or non-existent perception of corruption in the country.

Information and the perception of corruption among Nicaraguans are related to hearing or watching the news in the media. However, the perception of corruption in Nicaragua is not associated with listening to the news on the radio; it does have to do with reading the news in the newspapers and watching the news on television.

The data also show that a lesser or greater perception of corruption is related to the area where an individual resides and the size of the area population. Thus, for example, there is a greater perception of corruption in the capital city than in any other city or type of city. Also, it has been observed that in rural zones, inhabitants tend to perceive less corruption than in any other part of the country.

The most common experiences of corruption—the “bite”—in Nicaragua over the course of a year are: bribery in courts (22.9%); bribery in municipal offices (12.6%); bribery in hospitals (10.2%); bribery in the workplace (9.9%); bribery in schools (9.3%); bribery of electric service employees (8.2%) and bribery of police officers (7.3%). These experiences affect only persons who use these services, but the magnitude of the corruption cannot be overlooked. It should be noted that the lowest incidence of corruption is with police officers or a government employee, but this is by no means insignificant.

The aggregate of all experiences with corruption obtained from the survey reveals that of the 18% of Nicaraguans have been involved in them, meaning that almost one in five Nicaraguans have had some experience with *mordidas* or bribery over the course of a year. Even worse, the data show that the incidence of these acts has increased from 16.3% in 2004 to 18.9% in 2006.

Compared to other neighboring Central American countries, however, Nicaragua ranks in the intermediate category among the more and less corrupt.

Regarding victims of corruption, our study results indicate that 22% of the victims are men, while 14% are women. Similar differences have been seen in other studies and have been explained by the likelihood of men having more contact with institutions, being in public places more often than women, which makes men more vulnerable to being stopped by the police.

Regarding age, victimization by corruption is associated with persons of intermediate age. It is likely, as with the previous case, that people in this age bracket have more reason to come in contact with public officials and services and are thus more exposed to the risk of becoming involved in corruption.

Similarly, persons with fewer resources in their homes tend to be victimized by corruption more often. The reason may be that these individuals, because of their social vulnerability, are less able to rise and defend their interests in the face of abuse.

Regarding recognition of corruption and its level of social acceptance, the data show that for 11% of the population it is not corrupt for a public official to accept an extra amount of money to expedite a requested service; 13.7% do not think that getting a job through an influential relative who works in government is corrupt; but for 3.6% neither is it corrupt for a representative to accept a bribe from a business. However, it must be said that 48.4% of survey participants considered that the taking of a bribe by a public official to expedite some type of government business is corrupt; 58.7% consider it an act of corruption for a influential government official to get a job for a relative; and 89.0% consider it corrupt for a representative to accept a bribe from a business dealing. It is encouraging that the data indicate that the majority of the survey participants recognize these acts as corrupt; nonetheless, there is a long way to go because there are important segments of the population that do not believe that these acts should be punished and still others who justify one or another of them.

The association with the other variables shows that the perception of corruption is linked to certain characteristics of the survey participants. For example, regarding educational level, the results indicate that the lower the level of education, the more the previously discussed acts were not considered corrupt. Also, individuals with few resources and lower incomes have higher average values on the scale of “no perception” of corruption than person with resources and higher incomes. This might be explained by the fact that traditional culture has made various practices of political clientelism seem normal, meaning practices that tend to involve the poorest and most vulnerable;

Finally, the survey results indicate that corruption has an impact on institutions and the political system. In a particular way, the data allows us to affirm that being a victim of corruption diminishes trust in the institutions of the judicial system. On the other hand, persons who have not been victimized by corruption tend to express higher levels of support for the system; conversely, support for the system is lower among victims. Furthermore, the data show that having been victimized by corruption also affects the level of satisfaction the performance of democratic governance¹¹ and, in a significant way, opinions as to the degree of democracy that exists in the county.¹²

References

¹¹ The question was as follows: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with how democracy worked in Nicaragua?”

¹² This refers to question “PN5. In your opinion, is Nicaragua very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?”

1. Córdova Macías, Ricardo; Cruz, José Miguel; Seligson, Mitchell (coordinador científico y editor). *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2004*. ARD, Vanderbilt University, FUNDAUNGO-IUDOP-UCA-USAID.
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VI. CRIME AND DEMOCRACY

In this chapter we present the survey results regarding victimization and seek to measure the impact of crime (measured as the experience of being directly involved in a criminal event) as well as the impact of insecurity on democracy and the rule of law in Nicaragua.¹ In several sections of this chapter victimization data, who are the most frequent victims are and their characteristics, and how these are linked to trust in the system. In a special section of this chapter, we present the results of items regarding citizen insecurity and its connection to support for the system. The chapter concludes with the most important findings on this topic.

The problem of criminality in Nicaragua: Victimization by crime

The right to personal, legal, and citizen integrity has become increasingly protected in Nicaragua by means of important progress in legal and institutional actions. The enactment of the Procedural Penal Code, the Law of Creation of the Public Ministry and the *ley de carrera judicial*, Law 230 for the protection of victims of domestic abuse, and Law 150 regarding sex crimes and programs such as Attention and Protection regarding sexual violence, are all clear examples of this concern. While Nicaragua has had a high security index compared to other countries in the region, levels of violence have increased. Data from the national police indicate that in 2005, 461 homicides and 235 murders were reported, and increase of 36% between 2001 and 2005.²

These statistics notwithstanding, our survey results indicate that less than 5% of Nicaraguans felt that the country's most important problem was criminal violence; (2.2%), juvenile gangs (1.1%), and insecurity (0.2%).

When asked if they had been the victims of physical aggression or any other criminal act in the last 12 months, (VIC1), 16% of survey participants said that they had. A comparison of these results with those from 2004 reveals that this percentage has risen slightly, from 15.2% in 2004 to 16.0% in 2006.

¹ This study does not cover all types of criminal violence occurring in Nicaragua. Here, victimization refers to incidents reported by victims, such as assaults, threats, robberies, and physical aggression. It does not refer to other types of crimes, such as homicide.

² *Anuario Policía Nacional*. Nicaragua, 2005.

The results from question VIC2,³ regarding the types of crime experienced by survey participants indicates a preponderance of property crimes: 34.4% of the crimes were theft without physical aggression (see Figure VI-1).




Figure VI-1. Types of crime experienced by victims

³ The question was formulated as follows: “What type of crime did you experience?” (01) Theft without physical aggression; (02) Theft with aggression or physical threat; (03) Physical aggression without theft; (04) Rape or other sexual assault; (05) Kidnapping; (06) Property damage; (07) Home invasion; (77) Other”.

Figure VI-2⁴ presents the results of the reclassification of crimes experienced by survey participants according to their seriousness. A little more than 84% of respondents had not been victimized by any type of crime in either 2004 or 2006. However, in both years, about 10% of respondents had been minor victims, and 5.8% had been severe victims in 2006, similar to 2004. This classification will be useful further ahead to measure the impact of victimization on determinants of social attitudes.




Figure VI-2. Victimization by crime in Nicaragua

⁴ The variable concerning the seriousness of crime experienced was created from the reclassification of responses in three categories. Individuals who had not been victimized were classified as “Non-victims;” those having been robbed without physical aggression, suffered property damage or home invasions were grouped as “minor victims;” “severe victims” are those who were robbed and assaulted.

A. Who are the most frequent victims of crime?

We were interested in identifying the most frequent victims of crime. For this purpose a logistical regression was performed with the identification variables and important contexts to determine who these individuals are.⁵ Significant predictors are gender, educational level, city size, and the perception of neighborhood gang threats.

Analysis of the regression shows that gender is a very important variable. The results indicate that men are more likely to be assaulted or experience some type of criminal violence. This confirms national police data, which indicates that in 2004, close to 90% of crime victims were men⁶ (see Appendix B).

Educational level also turned out to be a significant predictor of becoming a victim of crime. Better educated individuals are more frequently victimized than those with less education. Figure VI-3 gives the victimization percentages according to gender and educational level.




Figure VI-3. Victimization by crime according to gender and educational level

⁵ The regression results are shown in Figure VI.1.

⁶ *Anuario de la Policía Nacional*. Nicaragua, 2005. Op. Cit.

The size of the cities where survey participants live is also a significant variable when associated with crime victimization.

A little less than 25% of Nicaragua’s population lives in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua. The data show that the people in Managua are the most affected by the incidents of criminal violence compared to people who live in other areas of the nation, especially those who live in rural areas. Figure VI-4 shows that in the capital, crime victimization reaches 30.1% of the population while in most other cities victimization ranges between 13.8% and 16.9%, and in rural zones it is 11.7%.




Figure VI-4. Victimization by crime according to size of residence area

Finally, individuals who report a greater threat from gangs in their neighborhoods are also victimized by crime more frequently, as can be seen in Figure VI-5.




Figure VI-5. Victimization by crime according to gang threat

B. Victimization and trust in the system

The survey included a question regarding trust that the justice system will punish those found guilty of committing robberies and assaults. About 50% of the population responded that they had little or no confidence that the justice system would punish the guilty. On a 0-100 scale on which non-victims are compared to victims, the results indicated that those who were victimized by crime in the year before the survey was taken had much less trust than non-victims.

Our research reveals that the impact of crime reaches the institutions within the justice system and the wider group of specific institutions of the political system as well. Non-victims tend to express more trust in judicial system institutions and institutions in general; however crime victims express less trust in institutions such as the police, the public prosecutor, the courts, and state attorneys' offices as well as in institutions not directly related to the justice and the prosecution of crime: the electoral court, political parties, municipalities, and others.

Table VI-1. Trust in institutions according to crime victimization

		Confianza hacia diversos niveles institucionales		
		Confianza en que el sistema castigará al culpable	Confianza en las instituciones de justicia	Confianza en las instituciones en general
Víctimas de crimen	Sí	41.1	40.8	43.0
	No	52.1	43.6	46.1

The impact of victimization on the validity of the rule of law is another aspect investigated in this study. Survey participants were asked:

<p>AOJ8. In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should act within the law or s can they sometimes act outside the law? (1) They should always act within the law (2) Sometimes they can act outside the law (8)DK</p>	AOJ8
---	-------------

The survey results demonstrate that crime victims are more likely to approve of the authorities' acting outside the law. Of these, 51.1% were minor victims and 47.2% were severe victims. In countries like Nicaragua with weak institutions and in which there is a tendency for individuals to disregard the rules, another negative effect of criminality is the creation of an environment of permissiveness in which the authorities can act without regard for the law, which will only lead to further erosion of the country's institutions and the rule of law.

On the other hand, the effect of crime also affects support support for the system although it does not seem to affect satisfaction with democratic governance or tolerance levels. (See Table VI-2).

Table VI-2. Average of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, support for the system, and political tolerance according to crime victimization

Víctimas del crimen	Satisfacción con el funcionamiento de la democracia	Apoyo al sistema	Tolerancia
No	46.2	46.3	53.4
Sí	46.3	41.2	54.0

Victims of criminal violence do not trust institutions; furthermore, they mistrust somewhat more the entire institutional structure of the political system than those who have not been involved in a traumatic criminal act.

Feeling of insecurity due to crime

One of the most important effects of criminal violence is an increase in the perception of insecurity. The feeling that one is unsafe is a complex perception in which a variety of factors

play a role, such as direct victimization, the level of knowledge of legal instruments and mechanisms of protection, institutional trust, and in particular, the justice system, and the overall feeling of protection or lack thereof due to these and other factors. To begin the examination of insecurity, we analyzed the results of the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the possibility of becoming a victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, not very safe, or very unsafe? **AOJ11**
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Not very safe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/NR

As previously mentioned, feeling unsafe is a multi-factored problem. A linear regression analysis to identify the variables behind the feeling of insecurity (see Table VI-4, Appendix B) shows that gender and educational level are significant predictors of the feeling of insecurity, as can be seen in Figure VI-6.




Figure VI-6. Feeling of insecurity according to gender and educational level

In addition, victimization by crime also significantly affects the perception of insecurity (Figure VI-7).




Figure VI-7. Feeling of insecurity according to victimization by crime

Finally, another important effect of the feeling of insecurity is associated with the phenomenon of juvenile gang activity. The data indicate that the more active gangs are in neighborhoods where survey participants live, the greater the feeling of insecurity. (Figure VI-8).




Figure VI-8. Feeling of insecurity according to the perception of neighborhood gang activity

As previously mentioned, the perception of lack of public safety affects the level of support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance in Nicaragua. Figure VI-9 shows the results of cross referencing these variables: satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance drops significantly as feelings of insecurity rise. This tendency is not as clear with regard to support for the political system.




Figure VI-9. Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance according to the feeling of insecurity

In this chapter, we have examined the problems of criminality and insecurity and their interrelation with democratic stability in Nicaragua. The data show that more than 84.0% of the population has not been victimized in any way, at least during the past year; however, more than 10% have undergone some type of minor victimization, and only 5% have been severely victimized.

The examination of these survey data reveals that men, the better educated, city dwellers (especially inhabitants of the capital city) inhabitants of neighborhoods with gangs, are the most frequent victims of crime.

Our research shows that victimization affects institutional trust and support for the system. Individuals who have not been victimized by crime tend to express more trust in the justice system and in institutions in general. However, those who have been involved in a criminal event express less confidence in institutions such as the police, the prosecutor’s office, the courts, and

prosecutors' as well as other institutions not connected with justice or criminal prosecution, such as the electoral court, political parties, municipalities, and others.

Victimization also has an important impact on the rule of law. Survey results show that crime victims are more willing to approve of authorities acting outside the law: 51.1% for victims of minor crimes and 47.2% for severely victimized individuals. This is a troubling finding in a country like Nicaragua, whose institutional structure is weak, because it sets up an environment of permissiveness in which the authorities can act without regard for the law, which will only lead to further erosion of the country's institutions and the rule of law. On the other hand, crime also affects satisfaction with democratic governance, support for the system, and tolerance levels. This research confirms that one of the most important effects of criminal violence is the increase in the subjective perception of insecurity. This is a complex perception in which various factors play a part, such as direct victimization, the level of knowledge of legal instruments and mechanisms of protection, institutional trust, and in particular, the justice system, and the overall feeling of protection or lack thereof due to these and other factors.

Survey data analysis indicates that lack of public safety in Nicaragua affects support for the political system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. This satisfaction drops significantly as the feeling of insecurity rises; nonetheless, this tendency is not as clear with regard to support for the political system.

References

1. Anuario Policía Nacional. Nicaragua, 2005.

VII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Local Central American administrations are fully involved in the processes of modernization and change. The peace agreements in the area in the 1990s have created conditions for the construction of a general democratic framework as well as for reform and modernizing the State, including decentralization. These processes have been driven by three tendencies: the first is the global tendency of State reform, given that the traditional centralized State does not function within the processes of accumulation of capital because of the obstacles it creates in an accelerated development of free markets that accompanies globalization. Secondly, there is a tendency of democratization among nations as well as of bringing the State closer to its citizens by providing citizen participation, on one hand, and leaving subnational appeals that are meaningful for the people as an important component of State activity on the other. The third is endogenous processes of revindications of area populations in search of full responses from the State to unsatisfied needs and unsatisfactory access to services and opportunities. It should be mentioned that this last point the peace process and transition to democracy have made these demands a top priority of Central American populations after their long postponement due to armed conflict in the region. In Nicaragua, these processes were begun early—during the 1980s—and continue today.

The current Nicaraguan municipal regime has recent precedents in the Sandinista revolution, such as the re-establishment of municipal autonomy, which had been suppressed since 1929 in the municipality of Managua and since 1936 in the remaining municipalities of the country.

The Law of Municipalities, called Law 40, enacted in 1988, is the core of today's municipal structure.

In 1999, Law 40 in line with the requirements of the 1995 constitutional reform with regard to municipal environments. Within the administrative political framework of this reform was the State decentralization debate, a process that was initiated by a variety of sectoral events during the administration of Violeta Chamorro (1990-1996) and with antecedents from the Sandinista government's regionalization process.

At present the country has 153 municipalities. Most of them have made progress in strengthening their weak technical and administrative capacities as well as their poor resources. The law of municipal transfers has fortified the capacity of municipalities to make investments with their own resources, something that previously only a third of the country's municipalities could do. Nonetheless, local governments have played a very important role in the governability of the country; even with scarce resources, they have been able to resolve some of the population's most urgent problems and guarantee citizen participation opportunities in local affairs.

Regarding the decentralization of the State, there has been more talk than action. The precedents of the process began in 1982 with the regionalization of the country by the Sandinista government; however, the only regions left today are the *Regiones Autónomas del Atlántico-Caribe* [Atlantic-Caribbean Autonomous Regions] established by law 28.

After 1990, local governments were strengthened by incipient processes of administrative deconcentration and decentralization although advances were limited, slow, and intermittent, depending upon the governments in power. Attempts at decentralization have been reduced to pilot projects of deconcentration; the most noticeable changes occurred in judicial settings rather than in everyday reality. Decentralization of the fiscal-financial sector was strongly resisted; full proposals for decentralizing this sector were never even placed on the central governments' agenda. Nevertheless, a swift balancing of the process shows that important citizen participation initiatives were generated as well as a higher degree of openness in local government, successful experiences of local development, sporadic and inchoate as they may be.

Recent studies on decentralization in Central America indicate that among the actors, no one opposes decentralization policies, at least not openly.¹ Political parties as well as the central government, civil society, mayors associations, and even international aid groups have demonstrated their support for the process. This, then, is a most opportune time to advance such policies. However, in practice, the commitment to this issue varies by actor, and the debate over the decentralization paradigm might produce a pressing need to harmonize the models.²

Indeed, in Nicaragua as in all of Central America, there are two models for decentralization being argued: the neoliberal model which is carried out by structural adjustments and reductions of public spending, transferring central government responsibilities to local governments but not the resources with which to manage those responsibilities; and the democratic decentralization model which attempts to bring the state closer to the citizenry in order to make use of the allocative advantage of local governments, strengthen its autonomy, improve its role in the promotion of local development, and the provision of goods and services to the population. It is undeniable that participation and harmonization processes of local Central American actors must engage in, over the short and medium terms, an open, transparent debate on the models in contention.

In this chapter we present the topic of Nicaraguans' attitudes and evaluation of their local governments. In the first section we analyze the relationship between citizens and the various levels of government; in the second, citizen participation in municipal government is discussed; then, we explore the evaluation of government business transactions. Later, satisfaction with municipal services is examined; after that, satisfaction with treatment received at municipal offices. We then look at opinions regarding who has dealt with community problems most effectively; next, trust in the municipality as an institution; and finally, the conclusions.

¹ Ortega Hegg-Manuel. *Gobierno local y participación ciudadana en Centroamérica*. Cuadernos CASC, 2003.

² Ortega Hegg, Manuel. *Apoyo a los procesos de reforma y modernización del Estado en Centroamérica. La descentralización política en Nicaragua*. Estudio para OEA, San José 2004. Mimeo.

Relationship of citizens with the various levels of government

Three items on the questionnaire are designed to explore the relationship or contact between survey participants and representatives, national government, and the municipalities. Participants were asked:

And now, speaking of another topic, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve on their own, so they seek help from a government official or a government office.					
Have you ever sought help to solve a problem from. . .?	Sí	No	DK/NR		
CP2. A representative of the National Assembly?	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. A local authority (regional coordinator, regional councilman, mayor, councilman)?	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. A government minister or ministry, secretary, public institution or state office?	1	2	8	CP4	

The answer choices were recoded to produce a 0-100 format in order to simplify the analysis.³ Figure VII-1 shows that in 2006, on average, 4.2% of survey participants have requested help from state representatives and 2.9% from the state government, and, 10.0% from the municipality. In 2004 these percentages were larger in all three categories. It should be noted that the municipal government, due to its ties with the citizens and their daily lives and the types of authority it has, are in closer contact with citizens than other representatives or public administrations.




Figure VII-1. From whom have you requested help?

³ A new question was devised from each original; thus, CP” became CP2RR, CP4 became CP4RR, and CP4A became CP4ARR. The new questions were recoded to 1-100 and 2=0, and the response choices of “do not know” were eliminated. The new response format, then, is 0-100.

A. A comparative view of requests for support for the municipality

A comparison of the Nicaragua data with the results from other countries in the region of Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, seen in Figure VII-2 shows that Nicaragua has a low percentage of request for help from municipalities. Figure VII-1 also shows that the number of requests for help from municipalities decreased between 2004 and 2006.




Figure VII-2. A comparative view of requests for municipal support

Participation in municipal government administrative activities

Direct citizen participation in local government affairs has increased in the region since the initiation of new democratic processes and state reform. New municipal codes of countries in the region contain spaces and mechanisms for direct citizen participation.

In Nicaragua, current legislation envisions as spaces and mechanisms for direct citizen participation municipal development committees, settlers’ assemblies, and municipal town councils, conceived of as an assembly process of consultations with the population held 60 days before the actual town council meeting takes place, giving citizens the right to present to the Municipal Council their own projects regarding Ordinances and Resolutions. The law of citizen participation, signed in 2003 establishes a citizen consultancy with the legislative process, the integration of political parties in the various requests for citizen participation, the right to

participate in the creation of standards in autonomous regional settings and the duty of the Regional Council to hold hearings regarding ordinance and resolution initiatives presented, the right of settlers to participate in the creation of municipal standards and the duty to hold hearings on all ordinance and resolution projects. This law also establishes the right of citizen participation in the formulation of national public policy through the National Sectorial Councils, the right of citizen participation in the formulation and hearings regarding public policy in the Autonomous Regions and counties, the right to participate in the formulation of municipal public policies through the Municipal Development Committees, as a discussion space, hearings on public investment plans, development programs, and other matters of interest to the municipality. This law regulates citizen participation in municipal town councils and the formulation of the municipal budget and investment plan. It is developing the right of citizens to participate and promote the holding of special town councils and the formulation of the municipal budget and plan. These rights were previously set forth in the Law of Municipalities and the Municipal Budgetary Regime Law. It also regulates the right to Petition and Complaint, establishes the defense council of citizen participation through a special public prosecutor and a National Council of Citizen Participation.

It should be mentioned that legislative advances do not always go hand in hand with advances in the practice of participation, although there are positive indications regarding this issue.

This section examines citizen participation regarding three mechanisms that allow for ties to local government: attendance at a town hall meeting, attendance to a council session, and the presentation of requests or petitions.

A. Attendance at a town council meeting

Town hall meetings are a traditional means of citizen participation in municipal affairs, and the law requires that these meetings be held at least twice a year. The Municipal Council must call a first town council meeting at the end of the year to present for consideration the proposed budget for the next year; the second must be called at the beginning of the following year to give accounts through a report on the previous year's budget performance.

B. Participation levels at town council meetings

In the survey we asked participants:

Now let's talk about your municipality...		
NP1. Have you attended an open town council meeting or a municipal session in the last 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Do not know/ Do not remember	NP1	

The question was designed to determine participation levels at town council meetings or municipal sessions. Figure VII-3 shows that 11.1% have attended, 84.7% have not, 4.3% do not

know. In 2004, this same survey found that participation in town council meetings was slightly higher: 15.0%. These data seem to indicate a slight decline in town council meeting participation.




Figure VII-3. Attendance at an open town council meeting or municipal session in the past twelve months

Is there any link between participation in town council meetings and the size of the municipal population? Figure VII-4 shows that the curve is an inverted “U,” meaning that the larger the city, the lower the participation. This tendency coincides with that observed in other countries such as El Salvador, where as population rises, participation falls. A possible explanation for this is the fact that in Nicaragua, the traditional concept of the town hall meeting is an assembly-like process held for sixty days, with more than one daily session. This concept was designed precisely to adapt the consultation of the local government to the size of the municipality so that as many citizens as possible could attend. However, it must be said that not all municipalities hold all the town council meetings and not all conduct them as assembly-like processes, as the law requires.




Figure VII-4. Attendance at a town hall meeting or a municipal session according to population stratum

C. Determinants of attendance at a town council meeting or other type of meeting

Determinants of attendance to a town council meeting or some other type of meeting were analyzed using a logistical regression since the dependent variable is dichotomous.⁴ Table VII.1 in Appendix B shows the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of attendance at town council meetings or some other type of meeting when each of the other variables remains constant. The results show that there are four significant predictors: (a) populational stratum of place of residence, in particular since inhabitants of the capital city attend town council meetings less frequently than those who live in medium-sized cities (which were chosen as the referente category because they showed the highest level of participation); (b) exposure to the news (the higher the exposure, the higher the participation in town council meetings); (c) people who try to persuade others to vote for a candidate or party attend town council meetings more frequently; and (d) having worked for a candidate's political campaign or a political party in the most recent elections are also more likely to attend town council meetings. The variables of gender, age, educational level and home furnishings have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant.

⁴ For purposes of the logistical regression analysis, questions NP1 was converted to NP2, The choices were recoded to 0 (No) and 1 (Yes) and the "do not know" choices were eliminated.

D.A comparative view of attendance at a town council meeting or municipal session

The comparative study for the countries of Central America, the Caribbean, and South America shows that Nicaragua is in seventh place in terms of attendance to open town council meeting or meetings called by the mayor. Nicaragua (11.6) is below the Dominican Republic (22.9), Honduras (18.5), Peru (14.7), Guyana (14), Haiti (12.9) and Bolivia (12.6), but above the other ten study countries. See Figure VII-5.




Figure VII-5. A comparative view of attendance at a town council meeting or a municipal session

E. Do public officials pay attention to requests for assistance from the population?

The response of local governments to requests presented at town council meetings or municipal sessions is considered a factor that can encourage or discourage citizen participation.⁵

We asked participants the following question:

<p>NP1B. To what extent to you feel that city hall officials pay attention to citizens in these meetings? (1) A great deal (2) some (3) little (4) none (8) DK</p>	<p>NP1B</p>	
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Figure VII-6 shows the survey participants' perception of how much attention municipal officials pay to people who seek help in town council meetings and municipal sessions: 12.5% said a great deal, 29.0% some, 32.5% little, 18.5% none and 7.5% do not know.




Figure VII-6. How much attention do city hall officials pay to citizen requests at those meetings?

⁵ Cfr. Manuel Ortega Hegg. Construyendo la participación ciudadana en Centro América. Experiencias y tendencias regionales de participación ciudadana en la gestión local. Cuadernos, CASC-UCA, Managua, 2003.

F. Submission of requests for help or petitions

Closeness with local government facilitates contact between officials and the population and the direct presentation of citizens' needs. The survey contains a question designed to measure this relationship through the presentation of petitions or requests:

<p>NP2. Have you requested help or presented a petition to any office, official or councilman in the last 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Do not know/Do not remember</p>	<p>NP2</p>	
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Figure VII-7 shows that only 12.3% had presented some type of request to the municipality while 83.4% had not, and 4.3% did not know.




Figure VII-7. Have you requested help or presented a petition to a government office, official or councilman in the last twelve months?

Comparing the results of participation by means of town council meetings (11.1%) and direct presentation of requests (12.3%), the slightly higher percentage of the latter might be explained by the fact that a town council meeting is a collective participation mechanism, and the types of requests or demands made at these meetings take on characteristics of collective or neighborhood benefits, such as street repair or paving, park beautification, street lights, and the like; on the other hand, the presentation of requests is a mechanism more suited to solving individual problems and meeting individual needs. The comparison may indicate a particularly important flow of matters of an individual nature that are dealt with every day by local governments.

G. Presentation of requests for help (2004-2006)

Nonetheless, it is interesting to see that the comparison of the results from this question with the 2004 national survey indicates a considerable decline in the percentage of petition presentation: from 18.1% in 2004, it dropped to 12.3% in 2006.

Evaluation of government business transactions

In this section we analyze three questions related to business transactions with the municipality. The first inquires about doing business with the local government:

<p>MUNI8. Have you tried to transact some type of government business or requested a document at city hall during the last year? (1) Yes [continue] (0) No [go on to MUNI11] (8) DK/NR [Go on to MUNI11]</p>	<p>MUNI8</p>	
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Figure VII-8 shows that 29.6% of respondents did conduct business transactions with the government; 70.3% did not, and 0.2% did not answer. In other words, three out of ten people have done some business with the municipality during the last year.




Figure VII-8. Have you done business with the government or requested a document at city hall in the last year?

The second question was posed to persons who had done business at city hall:

MUNI9. How were you treated? [Read choices]

- (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (so-so)
 (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) NS/NR (9) Not applicable

MUNI9

Figure VII-9 shows the responses of participants who had done business with local government and their assessment of how they were treated in the process: 10.6% said that they had been treated very well, 61.2% well, 21.9% neither well nor poorly, 5.6% poorly, and 0.8% very poorly. The results are very positive, demonstrating that the principle of closeness to the municipal administration is highly favorable for the establishment of excellent relations with the citizenry if this principle becomes an institutionalized practice.




Figure VII-9. Treatment received at government office

The third question on this subject was asked to determine the final result of participants' transactions.

MUNI10. Was your business or petition taken care of?	(1) Sí	MUNI10
(0) No (8) DK/NR (9) Does not apply		

Figure VII-10 shows the responses from participants who had conducted some type of business transactions with the government; 86.4% of them resolved their request or obtained the document requested; only 13.6% of their cases were not resolved. This indicates a high level of effectivity on the part of municipal administrations.




Figure VII-10. Business was taken care of

An evaluation of the set of three questions referring to citizen business at city hall was fairly positive for local administrations. Of the total number of respondents, three in ten had some municipal business to transact over the past year; of those who had, the majority evaluated the treatment received very positively while the effectivity of the officials was also high; eight out of ten had been able to complete their transactions. The data show that the combination of good treatment and effectivity is an excellent formula for good government that the majority of local administrations around the country are putting it into practice.

Satisfaction with municipal services

Citizen satisfaction with municipal services, in general, was measured by the following question:

SGL1. Would you say the services provided by city hall are? [Read choices]			SGL1
(1) Very good	(2) Good	(3) Neither good nor bad (so-so)	
(4) Bad	(5) Very bad (the worst)	(8) Do not know	

The results are shown in VII-11. Survey participants' evaluation is more positive than negative regarding municipal services: 4.9% believe that they are very good, 25.5% good, 52.1% neither good nor bad, 13.4% bad, and 4.2% very bad.




Figure VII-11. Evaluation of services provided by the municipality

A. Populational stratum and satisfaction with services provided by the municipality

In this study we explored the possible connection between the size of the municipal population and satisfaction with local government services. The results show that a connection does indeed exist. Figure VII-12 demonstrates that the inhabitants of more sparsely populated municipalities express less satisfaction with municipal services; the level rises as population rises, and those who show the highest level of satisfaction are medium sized populations.⁶ A future study might go into greater depth regarding this measurement to seek the ideal sized municipality, comparing other factors and their relation to satisfaction with municipal services.




Figure VII-12. Satisfaction with municipal services according to population stratum

⁶ To simplify the analysis of question SGL1, a new variable was created (SGL1R), recoded to a 0-100 format. In the following analysis this variable is recoded.

B. Satisfaction with services provided by municipalities (2004-2006)

In the 2004 national survey, we asked a question about satisfaction with municipal services. The responses to the question allowed us to see the evolution of the levels of satisfaction between 2004 and 2006. The average in 2004 was 50.2, and in 2006, it rose to 53.4.

Determinants of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities

Table VII.2 in Appendix B presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with services provided by the municipality when each of the other variables remains constant. The results indicate three basic predictors of satisfaction with municipal services: perception of security in the area of residence (people who feel insecure tend to offer more negative opinions of municipal services), the evaluation of the country's economy and their own financial situation (better rating of municipal services when the perception of the national economy and their own financial situations is more positive). The variables of educational level, gender, age, and home furnishings have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant. (See Appendix B).

D. A comparative view of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities

A comparison of the data from Nicaragua and the other Central American, Caribbean, and South American countries shows that despite the fact that satisfaction with municipal services has risen (53.4), it is less than that expressed by all the other Central American countries except Costa Rica (45.2); in addition, it is also less than Colombia (54.0), Ecuador (57.5) and the Dominican Republic (57.7), but above Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, Guyana, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, Jamaica y Haiti.




Figure VII-13. A comparative view of satisfaction with services provided by municipalities

Satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities

Another question was designed to measure satisfaction with treatment received at municipal offices on the part of survey participants and that of participants' neighbors.

<p>SGL2. How do you feel that you or your neighbors were treated when you went to city hall to transact some type of business? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (so-so) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) Do not know</p>	<p>SGL2</p>
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Figure VII-14 shows a slightly more positive evaluation by participants regarding how they were treated at municipal offices: 3.7% said very well, 34.0% well, 46.9% neither well nor poorly, 13.3% poorly, and 2.1% very poorly.




Figure VII-14. Satisfaction with treatment received at city hall

A. Perception of insecurity and satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities

In the bivariate analysis and multiple regression, it was found that the perception of insecurity is a factor associated with citizen satisfaction with treatment received in municipal offices. Figure VII-15 shows that as the perception of security rises, so does satisfaction with treatment received from municipalities.




Figure VII-15. Satisfaction with treatment received at municipal offices according to perception of insecurity

B. Determinants of satisfaction with treatment received in municipalities

Table VII.3, in Appendix B summarizes the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with the treatment received at municipal offices when each of the other variables remains constant. Predictors of satisfaction are educational level, trust in the judicial system, the perception of insecurity in place of residence, victimization by crime, and evaluation of the country's economy. The variables of gender, age, home furnishings, and populational stratum have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant. (See Table VII-3, Appendix B).

To whom should more obligations and money be given?

Another survey question asked about an issue of heated debate and the topic of many recent articles in Nicaragua: state government decentralization and giving local governments more obligations and resources. The question is as follows:

<p>LGL2. In your opinion, should more obligations and money be given to city halls or should the national government assume more obligations and provide more municipal services?</p> <p>(1) More for city hall (2) Let the national government assume more obligations and services (3) Change nothing [DO NOT READ] (4) More to city halls if services are improved [DO NOT READ] (8) Do not know/No response</p>	<p>LGL2</p>
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Figure VII-16 shows that 48.2% survey participants feel that municipalities should have more obligations and more funds; 32.7% think that the state government should assume more obligations and provide more municipal services; also, 4.3% feel that the municipalities should have more obligations and funds on condition of providing better services. In total, 52.5% favor local governments; 3.3% do not want any changes to be made, and 11.5% do not know or did not answer. This result is consistent with previous studies. The 2000 study showed that 43.5% of respondents in the national sample agreed strongly with the decentralization of the state government to which 31.1% who said that they agreed somewhat can be added.⁷

⁷ Manuel Ortega Hegg. *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización*. El caso de Nicaragua. CASC-UCA-FLACSO, Programa El Salvador, San Salvador, 2001.




Figure VII-16. Should more obligations and money be given to the national or local government?

Willingness to pay higher taxes

Given the positive evaluation of the treatment received by citizens at city hall and satisfaction with municipal services, we asked participants if they were willing to pay higher municipal taxes.

<p>LGL3. Would you be willing to pay higher taxes to city hall to obtain better municipal services, or do you think paying higher taxes is pointless? (1) Willing to pay higher taxes (2) It is pointless to pay higher taxes (8) Do not know</p>	<p>LGL3</p>
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Figure VII-17 indicates that 61.9% think that it is pointless to pay higher taxes; 31.5% expressed willingness to pay higher taxes so that the municipality could provide better services; and 6.6% do not know.




Figure VII-17. Willingness to pay higher taxes to city hall

It should be said that this same question was asked in the 2001 study, and the results were as follows: 25.2% were willing to pay higher taxes; 70.4% said that paying higher taxes was pointless; and 4.4% did not respond.⁸ By comparing the results, it is possible to confirm that in 2006, more citizens expressed willingness to pay higher municipal taxes than in 2001.

⁸ Manuel Ortega Hegg. *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización*, op. cit.

A. Trust in resource management

One factor that contributes to the payment of taxes is trust in the wise use of resources. In the questionnaire, we asked:

<p>MUNI6. What degree of confidence do you have that city hall will manage its funds properly? [Read choices] (3) Very confident (2) Somewhat confident (1) Not very confident (0) Not at all confident (8) DK/NR</p>	MUNI6
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Figure VII-18 shows the result. The data indicate that low levels of trust in management of municipal funds: 22.1% said not at all confident, 40.0% not very confident, 28.3% somewhat confident, 5.3% very confident, and 4.3% do not know. Adding the choices of little or no confidence, the result is that 62.1% of respondents express low levels of trust in management of municipal funds. The percentage of not at all confident (22.1%) is very similar to the percentage of respondents who said that paying higher municipal taxes is pointless (61.9%).




Figure VII-18. Confidence in city hall's management of funds

B. Participation in the preparation of the municipal budget

Question MUN15 seeks to measure the level of participation in the preparation of the municipal budget. Figure VII-19 shows a very low degree of participation in municipal budget preparation: 5.3% said that they had participated, 93.6% had not participated, and 1.1% did not respond.




Figure VII-19. Participation in the preparation of the municipal budget

Trust in municipalities

Question B32 seeks to measure the level of trust in municipalities. Participants were asked:

B32. To what extent do you trust city hall?	B32
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Answer choices were distributed on a seven point scale. This variable was converted to variable B32R with a 0-100 format. Figure VII-20 shows that the level of trust in municipalities rose between 2004 and 2006.




Figure VII-20. Trust in municipalities 2004-2006

A. Determinants of trust in municipalities

The results of the multiple regression analysis on determinants of trust in municipalities are shown in Table VII.4. The intent was to identify the statistically significant predictors of trust in municipalities when each of the other variables remaining constant. There are four basic predictors of trust in municipalities: (a) those who feel more unsafe in their neighborhoods express lower levels of trust in municipalities; (b) inhabitants of medium sized cities trust

municipalities more than those who live in rural areas (the base category); and (c) people who have higher trust in political parties also have higher trust in municipalities. The variables of gender, age, and home furnishings have been kept in the model despite their not being statistically significant (see Table VII.4, Appendix B).

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have examined the evaluations and attitudes of Nicaraguan citizens with regard to local governments. The data show evidence of a greater closeness of the citizenry with their local governments in terms of having sought help in solving their problems.

In addition, the data indicate low levels of participation regarding attendance to open town council meetings or municipal sessions (11.1%) and the presentation of requests for help or petitions (12.3%).

In general, there is trust in municipalities. The data show satisfaction with municipal services in general, a positive evaluation with business transactions at municipal offices, and satisfaction with treatment received at city hall.

Despite the fact that the majority of respondents expressed agreement with giving more obligations and money to municipalities, high levels of mistrust can be seen with respect to the management of municipal funds.

References

1. Manuel Ortega Hegg. *Cultura política, gobierno local y descentralización. El caso de Nicaragua*. CASC-UCA-FLACSO, Programa El Salvador, San Salvador, 2001.
2. Ortega Hegg-Manuel. *Gobierno local y participación ciudadana en Centroamérica*. Cuadernos CASC, 2003.
3. Cfr. Manuel Ortega Hegg. *Construyendo la participación ciudadana en Centro América. Experiencias y tendencias regionales de participación ciudadana en la gestión local*. Cuadernos, CASC-UCA, Managua, 2003.
4. Ortega Hegg, Manuel. *Apoyo a los procesos de reforma y modernización del Estado en Centroamérica. La descentralización política en Nicaragua*. Estudio para OEA, San José 2004. Mimeo.

VIII. VOTING BEHAVIOR

As in all of Central America, Nicaraguan national elections, which include the election of the president of the republic, are the premier political events and the most highly developed means of civil participation in national politics. At present, the Nicaraguan electoral system provides for elections for president, vice-president, and representatives every five years, and elections every four years in the municipalities and the two autonomous regions.

Voter turnout in Nicaraguan national elections has traditionally been high. The abstention average in the last three elections is about 21%, and in 2001, it was about 15%. This high level of participation in national elections contrasts with a lower level of participation in elections in municipalities and autonomous regions, 40 % and almost 60% of abstentions, respectively.

Nevertheless, it is evident that electoral democracy is important in Nicaragua, especially national elections. The importance of the vote has been has grown substantially since the end of the conflict in the 1980s, a factor which has promoted awareness among Nicaraguans that voting is a means to guarantee change of government administrations and the ability to rate the job performance of their leaders.

This chapter examines voting behavior among Nicaraguan citizens. In the first section we look at the characteristics of individuals who voted and of those who did not vote in the last elections; in the second, we discuss the representation of citizen interests; in the third, we analyze trust in political parties; in the fourth, we analyze trust in elections; in the fifth, we discuss political inclinations; in the sixth, evaluations of the current administration; in the seventh, we analyze respondents' opinions on electoral reform; and in the eighth, we present our conclusions.

Nicaraguan voters

In this study we analyze voting behavior in the 2001 presidential elections. According to the data from the survey taken after these elections, the reported intention to vote was 61.3% of the 1,762 survey participants. The intention to vote is underreported because effective participation in this election was reported as 85%.

A. An educated guess about non-voters

Now we will examine the reasons given by non-voting participants for not having voted. To determine these reasons, the following question was asked:

<p>VB4. [Only for persons who did not vote] [Do not read choices] Why did you not vote in the last presidential election? [check just one response]</p> <p>1 Lack of transportation 2 Illness 3 Lack of interest 4 Did not like any of the candidates 5 Do not believe in the system 6 Lack of identification card 7 Did not appear on voter rolls 10 Not old enough 11 Arrived late; polling place was closed 12 Had to work/lack of time 13. Physical limitation or handicap 14. Another reason (88). DK/NR (99) Not applicable</p>	VB4
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Table VIII-1 indicated the reasons given by respondents for not voting. Of the factors mentioned, the most common was lack of identification card (46.1%), lack of interest (16.9%) and not being old enough (10.4%). Less frequently specific factors such as illness (6.1%) and not appearing on voter rolls (6.1%) were given.

Table VIII-1. Reasons why survey participants did not vote in the last presidential election

	Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje válido
Falta de cédula de identidad	309	17.5	46.1
Falta de interés	113	6.4	16.9
No tener edad	70	4.0	10.4
Enfermedad	41	2.3	6.1
No se encontró en el padrón electoral	41	2.3	6.1
No le gustó ningún candidato	16	0.9	2.4
No cree en el sistema	12	0.7	1.8
No sabe	12	0.7	
Tener que trabajar	9	0.5	1.3
Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado	7	0.4	1.0
Falta de transporte	5	0.3	0.7
Incapacidad física o discapacidad	1	0.1	0.1
Otra razón	46	2.6	6.9
Total	670	38.0	100.0
Perdidos	99 No aplica	1080	61.3
Total	1762	100.0	

B. Determinants of the vote

The determinants of the vote were analyzed using logical regression since the dependent variable was dichotomic: voted or did not vote.¹ Table VIII-2 in Appendix B shows the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of intention to vote when each of the other variables remains constant. There are three basic predictors for the intention to vote: educational level, age, and level of political knowledge. The variables of gender, home furnishings, the president's job performance rating, and trust in political parties were kept in the model, despite their not being statistically significant.

C. Socio-demographic explanations

Some analysts said that numerous studies on voting behavior in the United States indicate that the most important characteristics for predicting voting behavior are education, age, and gender. They point out that those who vote most infrequently are youth and elders, as indicated by the inverted "U" on the figures. Those who have recently become old enough to vote are the least likely to vote. The tendency to vote rises with age until late maturity, when interest in voting begins to wane.² This pattern of the relation between intention to vote and age in Nicaragua is slightly different, more like an inverted "J;" those who have recently become old enough to vote show the lowest tendency to vote while as age increases, so does the tendency to vote. When people become senior citizens, their interest in voting declines, but the decline is slower than the one observed in the United States. Figure VIII-1 shows the data on voting behavior from the 2006 survey in Nicaragua.

¹ For this chapter, variable VB2 was recoded; those who did not vote were assigned 0 points and those who did vote were assigned 1 point. The new variable is VB2R.

² Seligson, Mitchell, A. et al. Who votes in Central America? A comparative analysis. En: M.A. Seligson y J. Booth (eds.). (1995). *Elections in Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Citado por Ricardo Córdova M y Miguel Cruz. *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador*, 2004. Mitchell A. Seligson, coordinador y editor. ARD-Vanderbilt University-IUDOP-UCA-Fundaungo-USAID.




Figure VIII-1. The vote according to age

The results of exploring the relationship between educational level and intention to vote indicate that those with lower levels of education are less inclined to vote than those with higher levels of education. See Figure VIII-2.




Figure VIII-2. The vote according to educational level

The intention to vote according to level of education can be seen in Figure VIII-3. There are slight differences between men's and women's behavior. Men with no formal education or with college education tend to vote more than women at those same levels do. At the high school level, the differences virtually disappear.




Figure VIII-3. The vote according to educational level, by gender

D. Income level and intention to vote

To determine whether there is any connection between income levels and the intention to vote, a scale of measurement of home furnishings was used; the scale was created from various questions on the possession of material goods in the home.³ Figure VIII-4 shows that the intention to vote increases as home furnishings move toward a medium level.




Figure VIII-4. The vote according to home furnishings

³The scale was constructed from the sum of questions: R1+R3+R4+R4A+R5+R6+R7+R8+R12+R14+R15. In total, the scale ranges from 1 to 14. For purposes of the bivariate analysis, this scale is trichotomized into low, medium and high levels of home furnishings.

E. Level of information and intention to vote

In this section, we look at the relation between the level of information and political knowledge of the survey participants and their intention to vote. The results are shown in Figure VIII-5; they indicate that individuals with lower levels of information vote less frequently. The tendency is for intention to vote to rise as the level of political knowledge increases.




Figure VIII-5. The vote according to level of information

F. Political factors

In this section, we analyze the relationship between the worth of democracy among participants and their intention to vote. This analysis comes from the evaluation of two dimensions of this topic: preference for a democratic regime and the preference for electoral democracy. The participants were asked:

<p>DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree most?</p> <p>(1) To people like me, it does not matter whether the government is democratic or not</p> <p>(2) Democracy is more preferable than any other form of government.</p> <p>(3) Under certain circumstances an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic government.</p> <p>(8) DK</p>	<p>DEM2</p>
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Figure VIII-6 suggests that the intention to vote is greater among persons who believe that an authoritarian government is preferable under certain circumstances. These are followed by persons who say that democracy is preferable to any other type of government, then those who either do not know, did not respond, and finally those for whom type of government does not matter.




Figure VIII-6. The vote according to preference for a democratic regime

To explore more in depth the relationship between political factors and the intention to vote, the participants were asked the following question:

<p>AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not need to be elected by popular vote. Other say the even though things may not work well, electoral democracy, meaning the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read]</p> <p>(1) We need a strong leader who does not need to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is always best (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>
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Figure VIII-7 shows that the intention to vote is greater among those who prefer electoral democracy compared to those who favor a strong leader, followed by those who do not know. It is important to point out that of the total number of persons surveyed, 72.4% prefer electoral democracy, compared to 16.0% who prefer a strongman, and 11.6% who said that they do not know. Note that the difference between the previous question and this one is that this item inquires about the need for a strongman unelected by popular vote while the previous item asks about certain circumstances in which an authoritarian government would be preferable to a democratic one.




Figure VIII-7. The vote according to preference for electoral democracy

It is thought that voting experience is a factor associated with the intention to vote. For this reason, we analyze this topic in two dimensions: the practice of persuasion and involvement. Regarding the first, the following question was asked:

PP1. During the elections, some people try to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a particular candidate or party? **[Read choices]**

(1) Often (2) From time to time (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/NR

Figure VIII-8 shows that persons who have become involved in political activities and work to persuade others to vote for a particular party or candidate exhibit a higher intention to vote than those who have not become involved.




Figure VIII-8. The vote according to persuasion of others to vote

Regarding involvement, we asked:

<p>PP2. There are people who work for a particular party or candidate during electoral campaigns. Did you work for a party or candidate during the 2001 presidential election? (1) Yes, I did (2) No, I did not (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>	
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The results are shown in Figure VIII-9. It can be seen that those who did participate in political activities express a higher intention to vote. In this case, those who become involved in political activities show a much greater intention to vote than those who do not.




Figure VIII-9. The vote according campaign involvement

The relationship between trust in political parties and the intention to vote is discussed in the segment.⁴ Figure VIII-10 shows that individuals who have more trust in political parties show a greater intention to vote.




Figure VIII-10. The vote according to trust in political parties

⁴ Question B21 in the questionnaire has been recoded to B21R in order to put it in 0-100 format.

G. Perception of insecurity and the intention to vote

Another factor associated with the intention to vote is the perception of insecurity. Participants were asked:

<p>AOJ11A. And speaking about the country in general, how much does the level of crime threaten our future well being? [Read choices] (1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Not much (4) Not at all (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>	
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Figure VIII-11 indicates that individuals who perceive a higher level of insecurity show a lower intention to vote; the tendency increases to a maximum point among those who perceive some insecurity and then begins to decline as the perception of insecurity declines.




Figure VIII-11. The vote according to perception of insecurity

Trust in political parties

One of the aims of the present study was to measure survey participants' trust in political parties. With this in mind, a survey question, to be measured on a 1-7 scale, as previously explained, was included. To simplify the analysis, the original item B21 was converted to a 1-100 format (B12R). Figure VIII-12 shows low trust in political parties among Nicaraguan citizens although such trust has increased significantly between 2004 and 2006.




Figure VIII-12. Trust in political parties 2004-2006

A. Determinants of trust in political parties

We also wanted to identify the predictors of trust in political parties. Table VIII-3 in Appendix B presents the results of the multiple regression analysis of the statistically significant predictors of trust in parties when each of the other variables remains constant. There are five basic predictors of trust in parties: educational level (more educated persons show more trust), home furnishings (those with better home furnishings show less trust), perception of neighborhood security (those who feel safer trust parties more), persuasion of others to vote for a particular candidate or party (persuaders trust parties more), and the evaluation of the country's economy (those who see a better economic picture trust parties more). The variables of gender, age, degree of satisfaction with democratic governance, opinion about democracy in the country, and the evaluation of personal economic situation have been kept in the model for the purpose of controlling such demographic variables, despite their not being statistically significant (see Table VIII-3 in Appendix B).

Trust in elections

The year this study was undertaken, 2006, was an election year in Nicaragua. Thus, it was deemed relevant to include a survey question to measure trust in the election process measured on a scale of 1-7 points. As in other previously discussed cases, the analysis of the item was simplified by changing the original item (B47) to a 1-100 format (B47R).

Figure VIII-13 shows that, unlike trust in political parties, trust in elections declined between 2004 and 2006.




Figure VIII-13. Trust in elections

A. Determinants of trust in elections

Multiple regression analysis offers predictors of trust in elections. Table VIII-4 in Appendix B presents the results of this analysis with the statistically significant predictors of trust in elections when each of the variables remains constant. There are five basic predictors of trust in elections: degree of satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance, opinion of democracy in the country, evaluation of the country's economic situation, the need for democracy in the country, and trust in political parties. The variables of age, educational level, gender, home

furnishings, ideology (left-to-right scale), perception of insecurity in place of residence, and the threat of crime have been kept in the model, despite their not being statistically significant (see Table VIII-4 in Appendix B).

Political inclinations

In this study, political preferences among the participants is explored. This was done by asking the following question:

<p>NICVB3 [VB3]. For whom did you vote for president in the last presidential election? [DO NOT READ LIST OF CHOICES]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0. None (went to vote but left ballot blank or invalidated vote) 1. Enrique Bolaños, PLC 2. Daniel Ortega, FSLN 3. Alberto Saborío, PC 77. Other 88. DK/NR 99. N/A (Did not vote) 	NICVB3
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The analysis was simplified by creating a new variable—parties—in which the choices of invalid ballot/blank ballot, do not know/no response were eliminated, as well as inapplicable responses for not having voted, leaving only those who voted for the FSLN, PLC and others. Table VIII-2 shows the results.

Table VIII-2. Party voted for (2001)

Partido Político	Frecuencia	Porcentaje	Porcentaje Válido
FSLN	450	25.5	48.5
PLC	444	25.2	47.9
Otros	33	1.9	3.6
Total	927	52.6	100.0
No aplica	835	47.4	
Total	1762	100.0	

These results do not coincide with the actual data obtained from the 2001 elections. The PLC received 56% of the votes, and the FSLN 42%. In both cases the votes for these parties were the most they have ever received.

Within the two political aspects, we were also interested in exploring the survey participants' ideologies and their self-placement on a scale. Figure VIII-14 shows this self-placement on a left (1) to right (10) scale. The average is 5.26, almost in the center and leaning slightly to the right.




Figure VIII-14. Ideology

The insertion of the ideology variable into the analysis allows us to cross reference this variable on the entire scale of party preference. Note that in the cross reference we lose 835 cases resulting from the sum of lost cases for both variables; this number drops to 783 because not all survey participants voted in the previous election. Table VIII-3 shows the cross referencing of both variables. As indicated earlier, the ideology average is 5.26 on the 1-10 scale, in other words, in the center with a slight inclination toward the right.

Table VIII-3. Ideology and party voted for in 2001, cross-referenced

		Partido por el que votó 2001			Total
		PLC	FSLN	Otros	
L1. Ideología (escala izquierda- derecha)	1 Izquierda	22 (6.0%)	71 (18.1%)	2 (8.3%)	95 (12.1%)
	2	20 (5.5%)	60 (15.3%)	2 (8.3%)	82 (10.5%)
	3	25 (6.8%)	38 (9.7%)	0 (.0%)	63 (8.0%)
	4	32 (8.7%)	46 (11.7%)	1 (9.1%)	79 (10.1%)
	5	60 (16.4%)	49 (12.5%)	6 (25.0%)	115 (14.7%)
	6	53 (14.5%)	39 (9.9%)	5 (20.8%)	97 (12.4%)
	7	35 (9.6%)	30 (7.6%)	1 (7.7%)	66 (8.4%)
	8	50 (13.7%)	37 (9.4%)	4 (4.8%)	91 (11.6%)
	9	29 (7.9%)	12 (3.1%)	1 (7.7%)	42 (5.4%)
	10 Derecha	40 (10.9%)	11 (2.8%)	2 (8.3%)	53 (6.8%)
Total		366 100.0	393 100.0	24 100.0	783 100.0

It should be noted that the results of cross referencing ideology and party preference (as measured by the party for which respondents voted) should be interpreted taking into account that the survey results of parties voted for in 2001 do not coincide with official electoral data, as indicated previously.

Evaluations of government

President Enrique Bolaños’ job performance rating was considered a timely question to ask given that this was the final year of his administration. Thus, the following question was asked:⁵

<p>M1. And speaking about the current administration, would you say that the job that Presidente Enrique Bolaños is doing is: [Read choices] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (so-so) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/NR</p>	<p>M1</p>
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Figure VIII-15 shows that 1.0% felt his job performance was very good, 17.0% good, 49.4% neither good nor bad, 26.7% bad, and 15.9% very bad.




Figure VIII-15. Job performance rating of President Bolaños

⁵ President Enrique Bolaños’ term of office ends on 10 January 2007. The presidential election will be held on 5 November 2006.

Conclusions

In this chapter it has been demonstrated that the main reasons given for not voting in the 2001 national elections were: lack of national identity card (46.1%), lack of interest (16.9%), not old enough (10.4%). Less frequent responses were illness (6.1%) and not appearing on voter rolls (6.1%).

The statistical determiners of the intent to vote, after performing the regression analysis, are the three predictors: educational level, age, and level of political knowledge. The age, home furnishings, president's job performance rating, and trust in political parties variables were kept in the analysis despite their not being statistically significant.

In this chapter it is demonstrated that those who become involved in political activities and work to persuade others to vote for a candidate or party show a higher intention to vote than those who do not.

The survey data also indicate a low level of trust in political parties but a high level of trust in elections.

Similarly, a rating of neither good nor bad is observed with regard to the performance of President Bolaños.

References

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IX. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEMOCRACY

Social capital is a relatively new term that has recently been used by authors such as Robert Putnam. The history of the term can be found in the works of Bourdieu on social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital, and in the slightly older works of Coleman, Putnam, and Fukuyama.¹ Social capital could be defined as the set of shared values among members of a society that favors the establishment of an environment of trust that foments cooperation, in other words, an environment that fosters reciprocity and the achievement of common goals. There are many other definitions of social capital. We have highlighted Putnam's definition as it affirms that social capital can be understood as "the aspects of social organization, such as trust, standards, and networks that can improve a society's efficiency by facilitating coordinated action."² Social capital is really about highlighting the so-called non-conventional factors that the traditional literature in the field did not take into account, but that these authors show as being of fundamental importance.

In this chapter, social capital in Nicaragua is analyzed. We want to examine the relationship between interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation, and the variables of political culture that are keys to the reproduction of the system. More precisely, this chapter analyzes the survey participants' opinions about interpersonal trust and factors associated with this type of trust; then, the relationship between trust and satisfaction with the democratic governance. Finally, we devise a social capital variable that combines interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation and analyze for possible associations.

¹ Bourdieu, Pierre (2003). *Capital cultural, escuela y espacio social*. Siglo XXI Editores, Argentina; también: Gustavo Téllez Iregui (2002). Pierre Bourdieu. *Conceptos básicos y construcción socioeducativa*. Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, Bogotá; Putnam, Russell D. (1993). Making democracy work. *Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; también: Putnam, Russell D. *Bowling alone: The collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon and Schuster; Coleman, James (2000). *Social capital in the creation on human capital*. In: P.Disgupta e I.Serageldin (eds). *Social capital: a multifaceted perspective*. Washington, D.C. The WB; Fukuyama, Francis (1995): *Truth: The social virtues and the creating of prosperity*, New York: Free Press.

² Putnam, Russell D. (1993). *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Interpersonal trust in Nicaragua

The issue of interpersonal trust was analyzed using the following question: “IT1. Now, speaking about the people from around here, would you say that the people in your community are: (1) Very trustworthy, (2) Somewhat trustworthy, (3) Not very trustworthy, (4) Not at all trustworthy, (8) Do not know.” Figure IX-1 shows the results: in 2006, the favorable level of trust, in general, 62.2%; 30.0% very trustworthy, and 32.2% somewhat trustworthy; not very trustworthy, 27.3%, and not at all trustworthy, 10.6%. Compared to the data from 2004, the level of trust is observably higher.




Figure IX-1. Interpersonal trust in Nicaragua by survey year (2004-2006)

In order to make comparisons among the study countries, the previous question was converted to a 0-100 scale in which 100 is the highest possible level of trust and 0, the lowest. This exercise revealed that Nicaraguans have, on this scale a trust level of 60.2, below Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador, but above Guatemala in the Central American region. Figure IX-2 shows the ranking of interpersonal trust among the study countries; Nicaragua ranks in the middle.




Figure IX-2. Interpersonal trust by country

Which factors are associated with interpersonal trust among Nicaraguans? To answer this question, two variables were analyzed: age and educational level. As can be seen in Figure IX-3, the relation between age and interpersonal trust from an inverted “U:” the highest level of trust appears among people in the age brackets in the middle; the lowest among youth and older citizens.




Figure IX-3. Interpersonal trust according to age

The results of the analysis of the interpersonal trust variable with educational level can be seen in Figure IX-4. The form is inverted: those without formal education and those with college education show the highest level of trust compared to persons who have primary and secondary education levels.




Figure IX-4. Interpersonal trust according to educational level

According to the authors mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, interpersonal trust, a basic component of social capital, is closely tied to social cohesion, which is tied to support for the system. This is so because social cohesion is related to the fostering of integration and participation of all members of a society in the social and economic affairs of the country.

This assertion has been verified for Nicaragua in this study. Figure IX-5 shows that trust among citizens is related to support for the system and with satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. The tendency is the greater the trust, the greater the support for the system and the greater the satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance.




Figure IX-5. Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democracy according to interpersonal trust.

Institutional trust

The topic of institutional trust was discussed in Chapter IV of this study. It is brought into the discussion again at this point in the interest of enhancing the previous analysis since institutional trust is considered a component of social capital.

In order to visualize the effects of institutional trust as a part of this analysis, a scale was constructed from institutional trust items that are common in all countries participating in the 2006 edition of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project.³

The gender and home furnishings variable were not shown to affect levels of institutional trust. On the other hand, education, average family income, and city size did affect institutional trust.

Indeed, the data demonstrate that institutional trust is greater at the extremes of the educational level distribution (persons with no formal education and those with higher education).




Figure IX-6. Institutional trust according to level of education

³ The scale of institutional trust was built from averaging the results of the variables recorded from 0-100 of the following items: B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B18, B20, B21, B31 and B32.

In addition, the size of the city of residence turned out to be significant when related to levels of institutional trust and more particularly, living in an urban or rural area. In this way, it is possible to observe that participants who live in urban areas express less trust in institutions than those who live in medium sized or small cities. The result can be connected to the virtual absence of state institutions in rural areas of the country, meaning that survey participants living there do not develop ties to institutions as city dwellers do.




Figure IX-7. Institutional trust according to city size

Civic participation

Citizen participation has been identified as another basic component of social capital. To evaluate this condition, we asked various survey questions designed to measure attendance at meetings, membership in organizations, or participation in a variety of types of gatherings within local government settings. The results from these questions are shown in Figure IX-8. They show that Nicaraguans are more active in religious, educational, and community organizations. Except for religious organizations, the others show low levels of participation.




Figure IX-8. Averages of questions regarding civic participation or attendance

The next step was to devise a scale of a group of items, precisely those shown in the figure above.⁴ This step allows us to see that the average of civic participation in Nicaragua is low (20.6). Moreover, this average is even lower than the 2004 average of 23.1.

⁴ All items were recoded as follows to convert them to 0-100 scales. The “Yes” answers were assigned a value of 100; “No” answers were assigned 0. Items CP8 and CP13, were modified as follows: once a week=100; once or twice a month=66; once or twice a year=33; never=0. The results of these scale items were later averaged to obtain a single measurement of civil participation.

Once we obtained the average for Nicaraguan participation, we wanted to identify the characteristics of those who participate. The hypothesis in this case is that participation means different things to different people. To verify this, it was necessary to analyze the scale devised with the following variables: gender, level of education, size of city of residence, and victimization. The results of this exercise indicate that the first two variables do not show significant differences, but city size and victimization did.

Figure IX-9 shows that persons who live in small cities and rural areas become more involved in civic activities.




Figure IX-9. Civic participation according to size of city of residence

The other significant variable was victimization. Figure IX-10 shows how the level of civic participation related to the condition of crime victimization. As can be observed, persons who have been victimized by crime, particularly victims of minor crime, tend to participate more than those who have not been victimized. This result may seem contrary to ordinary expectations; however, it is precisely having been victimized that may spur crime victims to stop being passive and act to try to change the status quo.




Figure IX-10. Civic participation according to degree of victimization by crime

Is there a relationship between civic participation and the legitimacy granted to the system? The data seem to indicate that such a relationship does not exist. Figure IX-11 shows that the level of support for the system does not vary with different levels of civil participation.




Figure IX-11. Support for the system according to level of civic participation

Social capital

This final section of the chapter deals with the combining of the interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation variables to create the social capital variable;⁵ later, the relationship of this new variable with other variables is explored.

Figure IX-12 shows that the magnitude of social capital is affected by the size of an individual's city of residence. The data indicated that social capital is to be found more frequently in rural areas and small cities as opposed to larger cities and the capital. It is more likely that closeness and familiarity help to build social capital in smaller areas than in larger ones where relationships tend to be more impersonal.




Figure IX-12. Social capital according to city size

⁵ The social capital variable is a product of the combination of the variables of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civil participation. All of these variables are placed on a 0-100 scale and averaged.

Another factor that appears to be associated is the feeling of insecurity. Figure IX-13 shows that individuals who feel more unsafe tend to show less social capital than those who feel safer. The explanation for this may be that the feeling of insecurity is often linked to suspicion and lack of trust in the social environment, both of which negatively impact the building of social capital.




Figure IX-13. Social capital according to feeling of insecurity due to crime

Gang presence in neighborhoods is connected to the feeling of insecurity. As expected, this factor is also related to social capital. Figure IX-4 indicates that the more a neighborhood is affected by gangs, the lower the level of social capital. The reason for this is that gangs tend to become a dissociative element in neighborhood relations, thus weakening the building of social capital among neighbors.




Figure IX-14. Social capital according to gang effects on neighborhoods

Finally, we wanted to know whether there was a connection between social capital, support for the system, and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure IX-15. It can be seen that as the level of social capital rises, the level of support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance increase.




Figure IX-15. Support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance according to level of social capital

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the level of support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance is strongly linked to interpersonal trust among citizens.

The analysis of civic participation as a fundamental element of social capital demonstrates that Nicaraguans are more active in religious, educational, and community organizations. Except for religious organizations, the others show low levels of participation.

On the other hand, social capital, measured in this case by means of a variable designed by combining the scale of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and civic participation, is linked to the performance of democratic governance and the legitimacy of the system. Analysis of the data

shows that as the level of social capital rises, so does support for the system and satisfaction with the performance of democratic governance.

References

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APENDICE A: DESCRIPCIÓN METODOLÓGICA DEL ESTUDIO

1. Carta de consentimiento

Junio, 2006

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo del Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Nicaragua.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse al Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural, al 278 - 3923 con Marcelina Castillo.

¿Desea Participar?

2. Cuestionario en español

Versión # 23b IRB Approval: 060187

 Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural	
 Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LA CULTURA POLITICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: NICARAGUA, 2006

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAIS	5
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
Estratopri: (501) Norte centro; (502) Pacífico (503) Costa Atlántica	ESTRATOPRI	5 _ _
UPM. _____	UPM	_ _ _
Departamento : _____	NICDEPT	_ _
Municipio: _____	NICMUNICIPIO	_ _
DISTRITO, BARRIO, O COMARCA: _____	NICBARRIO	_ _
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	SEGMENTO	_ _ _
Sector _____	SEC	_ _ _
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	_ _ _
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	NICIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista: día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2006	FECHA	_ _ _ _
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	
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A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4	<input type="text"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios		02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos		59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno		15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente		10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración		16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico		12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas		14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza		04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)		06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio		22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro		31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)		27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo		33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de		07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el		60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia		57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda		55
Explosión demoGráfico	20	Otro		70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	No sabe		88

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, que significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.

	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?	
		2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a las leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80
NS/NR	88	88	88
Código (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]	DEM13A _ _	DEM13B _ _	DEM13C _ _

DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? **[Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.]** **DEM13D** |_|_|

88. NS 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]

Ahora, cambiando el tema.... [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe		SOCT1	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe		SOCT2	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) No sabe		IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe		IDIO2	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación...?	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún diputado de la National Assembly	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (Coordinador regional, consejal regional, alcalde, concejal)	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. A algún ministro o ministerio, secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4	

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi	(3) nunca	(8) NS	PROT1	
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hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]		nunca					
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS	(9) inap	PROT2	

<i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP		
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8			CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio o colonia?	1	2	8	9		CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9		CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9		CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9		CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9

CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10	
CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13	

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ...? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	LS3	
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es...? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	IT1	
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ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1	
Izquierda					Derecha					(NS=88)	

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...		
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1	
NP1B. ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la alcaldía hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	NP1B	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	NP2	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) No sabe	SGL1	
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la alcaldía para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe	SGL2	
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la alcaldía, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?	LGL2	

(1) Más a la alcaldía (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más a la alcaldía si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta		
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe	LGL3	
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí, ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR	MUNI5	
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la alcaldía? [Leer alternativas] 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6	
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en la alcaldía durante el último año? (1) Sí [siga] (0) No [pase a MUNI11] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11]	MUNI8	
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (pésimo) (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	MUNI9	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	MUNI10	
MUNI11. ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la alcaldía? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	MUNI11	
MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? [Leer alternativas] (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR	MUNI15	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	JC13	

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la National Assembly o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS	JC16	

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con ¿cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo? POP1. [Leer alternativas] 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. 8. NS/NR	POP1	
POP2. [Leer alternativas] 1. La National Assembly impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la National Assembly. 8. NS/NR	POP2	

<p>POP3. [Leer alternativas] 1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario], 2. Aún cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP3</p>	
<p>POP4. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros Presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario], 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros Presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP4</p>	
<p>POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP5</p>	

<p>VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>	
<p>VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer las alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (8) NS (99) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p>VIC2</p>	
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS</p>	<p>AOJ11</p>	
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ12</p>	
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS</p>	<p>AOJ17</p>	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		8
Nada				Mucho			No sabe	

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe			
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? (<i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)		B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua?		B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense?		B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense?		B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político nicaragüense?		B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Consejo Supremo Electoral?		B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército de Nicaragua?		B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la National Assembly?		B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la República?		B15	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?		B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?		B32	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser nicaragüense?		B43	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?		B16	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría para la defensa de los derechos humanos?		B17	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República?		B19	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37	
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47	

Ahora, usando **la tarjeta “A”**, por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
N1. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.		N1	
N3. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		N3	
N9. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.		N9	
N10. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.		N10	
N11. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.		N11	
N12. Hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.		N12	

[Recoja tarjeta A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Enrique Bolaños es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1	
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[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe	

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los nicaragüenses tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		PN2	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		DEM23	

RECOGER TARJETA B

<p>PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR</p>	PN4	
<p>PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS/NR</p>	PN5	

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	E16	
NICE17. Que las personas se presten a dar su voto a un candidato o partido a cambio de regalos.	NICE17	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		88	
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba				No sabe	

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		D32
D33. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político nicaragüense?		D33
D34. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		D34
D36. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		D36
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		D37

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Nicaragua. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe	

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5

[Recoger tarjeta C]

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS</p>	DEM2	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	AUT1	

<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	PP1	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2001? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	PP2	

<p>Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.</p>		
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas]: 1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8</p>	DC1	
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 90 pesos de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas]: 1) corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) corrupto pero se justifica 3) no corrupto 8)NS</p>	DC10	
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñada de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que el político es [Leer alternativas]: 1) corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) corrupto pero justificado 3) no corrupto NS=8</p>	DC13	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	EXC7	
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Ahora queremos saber cuanta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente... GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI1	
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la National Assembly de Nicaragua? [NO LEER: Eduardo Gómez] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI2	
GI3. ¿Cuántos Departamentos tiene Nicaragua? [NO LEER: 15 o 17, ACEPTAR CON Y SIN REGIONES AUTONOMAS] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Nicaragua? [NO LEER: 5 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4	
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; aceptar también “Lula”] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5	

VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (8) NS [Pasar a VB6]	VB2	
NICVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA] 4. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 5. Enrique Bolaños, PLC 6. Daniel Ortega, FSLN 7. Alberto Saborío, PC 77. Otro 88. NS/NR 99. Inap (No votó) (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)	NICVB3	

<p>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] [No leer alternativas] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] 1 Falta de transporte 2 Enfermedad 3 Falta de interés 4 No le gustó ningún candidato 5 No cree en el sistema 6 Falta de cédula de identidad 7 No se encontró en padrón electoral 10 No tener edad necesaria 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar/ Falta de tiempo 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad 14. Otra razón (88). NS/NR (99) Inap (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</p>	<p>VB4</p>	
<p>VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos] (1) Las cualidades del candidato (2) El partido político del candidato (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato (8) NS (9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p>VB8</p>	
<p>VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones? 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a VB10] 8. NS [Pasar a VB10]</p>	<p>VB6</p>	
<p>NICVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones? 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. PLC. 2. FSLN 3. PC 77. Otro 88. No sabe 99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>NICVB7</p>	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>	

<p>NICVB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>1. PLC 2. FSLN 3. ALN-PC 4. ALIANZA MRS 5. AC 88. No sabe 99. INAP</p>	NICVB11	
<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS</p>	POL1	
<p>NICPOL3 ¿Piensa votar en las próximas elecciones del 2006? 1) Sí 2) No (Pasar a POL2) 88) NS/NR (Pasar a POL2)</p>	NICPOL3	
<p>NICPOL4. [Para los que dicen que van a votar], ¿cual sería la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos]</p> <p>(1) Las cualidades del candidato (2) El partido político del candidato (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato (88) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votará)</p>	NICAPOL4	
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) N/S</p>	POL2	

<p>NICPOL5. Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿por cual candidato votaría usted para Presidente de la República? [No leer lista]</p> <p>0) Ninguno 1) José Rizo, PLC 2) Daniel Ortega, FSLN 3) Eduardo Montealegre, ALN-PC 4) Herty Lewites, Alianza MRS 5) Edén Pastora, AC 8) NS/NR</p>	NICPOL5	
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USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.

<p>Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa nada de acuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?</p>	Escala						NS/ NR		
	Muy en desacuerdo					Muy de acuerdo			
<p>AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?</p>	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA1	
<p>AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</p>	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA2	

AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA3	
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, ¿se justifica a veces que sus padres les peguen?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA4	

RECOGER TARJETA “B”

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:

DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS2	
DIS3: Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (No buscó trabajo)	DIS3	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS5	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...								
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?								
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar								
Table abajo para código]								
	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°		
Ninguno	0							ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11			
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
No sabe/no responde	88							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Q2			
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Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [no leer alternativas] (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová) (3) Otra no cristiana (5) Evangélica (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar	Q3	
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<p>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E] Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? (00) Ningún ingreso (01) C\$ 500 córdobas o menos (02) Entre C\$ 501- C\$ 900 córdobas (03) C\$ 901-C\$1,750 córdobas (04) C\$1751-C\$2,600 córdobas (05) C\$ 2601-C\$3500 córdobas (06) C\$3,501-C\$ 5.300 córdobas (07) C\$ 5,301-C\$7000 córdobas (08) C\$ 7001-C\$8750 córdobas (09) C\$ 8751-C\$ 13,100 córdobas (10) C\$ 13,101-y más (88) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10</p>	
<p>Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap Sí → preguntar: ¿Cuanto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, <u>escribir cantidad y especificar moneda</u>]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>	
<p>Q10B. ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	<p>Q10B</p>	
<p>Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10C</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. [No leer] NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10D</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q11</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? (00= ninguno) NS.....88.</p>	<p>Q12</p>	

<p>NICETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-caribeña u otro?</p> <p>(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (morena) (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-caribeña (7) Otro</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p>	NICETID	
<p>NICETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-caribeña u otro?</p> <p>(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (morena) (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-caribeña (7) Otra (8) NS/NR</p>	NICETIDA	
<p>NICLENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa]</p> <p>(1) Español (2) Una lengua indígena [Mískito, Sumu o Mayangna, Rama] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR</p>	NICLENG1	
<p>NICLENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (<i>Acepte una alternativa</i>)</p> <p>(1) Español (2) Una lengua indígena [Mískito, Sumu o Mayangna, Rama] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (7) Ningún otro NS/NR [8]</p>	NICLENG1A	
<p>NICLENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(<i>Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.</i>)</p> <p>Sólo español [1] español e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3]</p> <p>español e idioma extranjero [4] NS/NR [8]</p>	NICLENG4	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: (<i>leer todos</i>)					
R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	R1
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Sí	R3
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4A
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R6
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	R7
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	R8
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R12
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R14
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	R15

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar “No” en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista 4. Comerciante 5. Campesino o agricultor 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano 8. Servicio doméstico 9. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa [Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado , jubilado, rentista [Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR 	<p>OCUP1</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 	<p>OCUP4</p>	
<p>OCUP1A En esta ocupación usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Asalariado del gobierno? 2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	<p>OCUP1A</p>	
<p>OCUP1B1. ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 	<p>OCUP1B1</p>	
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR 	<p>OCUP1C</p>	

9. INAP		
---------	--	--

DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS (99) Inap	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
---	---------------	---

MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente, en el campo, en un pueblo? ¿O en una ciudad? 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1	
MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2	
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____/____/____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Comentarios:

Firma de la persona que digitó los data _____


Firma de la persona que verificó los data _____



Tarjeta # 1




Tarjeta "A"






Tarjeta ‘B’





Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) C\$ 500 córdobas o menos
- (02) Entre C\$501- C\$ 900 córdobas
- (03) C\$ 901-C\$ 1,750 córdobas
- (04) C\$1,751-C\$ 2,600
- (05) C\$ 2,601-C\$ 3,500 córdobas
- (06) C\$3,501-C\$ 5,300 córdobas
- (07) C\$ 5,301-C\$ 7,000 córdobas
- (08) C\$7,001-C\$ 8,750 córdobas
- (09) C\$ 8,751-C\$ 13,100 córdobas
- (10) C\$ 13,101-y más

3. Descripción técnica de la muestra

1. Diseño de la muestra

La muestra empleada para este estudio es la misma que corresponde a la muestra diseñada para el estudio del 2004. Se basa en los datos de la población del Censo Nacional de Población de 1995 dado que los resultados del Censo de Población del 2005 no habían sido publicados al diseñarse el estudio.

1.1. Universo de estudio

Nicaragua se divide actualmente en 15 departamentos Y 2 Regiones Autónomas, los que a su vez están conformados 153 por Municipios. La población total del país para el 2005 se distribuye en 3, 322,860 habitantes para el área urbana (60.6%) y 2,271,109 para el área rural (39.4%).

El universo de la encuesta del 2006 es de cobertura nacional, contempla las tres regiones: norte-centro, Pacífico y Atlántico que incluye las regiones Autónomas del Atlántico Norte y Sur y por áreas urbanas y rurales.

1.2. Población de estudio

Las unidades objetos de estudio o población de estudio están constituidas por la población civil mayor de 16 años de edad; se excluyen de la muestra las personas que al momento de la aplicación de la encuesta se encuentran internados en hospitales, orfanatos, cárceles, cuarteles, etc.

1.3. Unidad estadística de observación y Unidad final de selección

Como el estudio incluye temas no solo referidos a la persona en edad de votar (mayor de 16 años), sino también al jefe del hogar y sus miembros la unidad estadística de observación utilizada es el hogar debiendo cada persona pertenecer a un solo hogar.

Todos los miembros de un mismo hogar habitan una vivienda que puede ser compartida con miembros de otros hogares. La vivienda es una unidad fácil de identificar en el terreno, con relativa permanencia en el tiempo, característica que le permite ser considerarla como la unidad final de selección, identificada en los segmentos censales tanto el área urbana como en la rural.

1.4. El Método de Muestreo

El método del muestreo es el procedimiento mediante el cual se determina el tamaño e la muestra, la conformación de dominios de estudio, la definición de etapas, de selección de

unidades de muestreo, las estimaciones poblacionales a partir de los data muestrales y el cálculo de los errores implícitos de estas estimaciones. 77

Para definir el método de muestreo a utilizar se consideraron los siguientes puntos:

- a. Obtener muestras representativas para los siguientes niveles, estratos y dominios de estudio.
 - Total de país
 - Estratos de primera etapa
 - ✓ Norte - Centro
 - ✓ Pacífico
 - ✓ Costa Atlántica.
 - Estratos de segunda etapa
 - ✓ Area urbana
 - ✓ Area rural
 - Dominios de Estudio
 - Municipios con más de 100,000 habitantes, inclusión forzosa
 - Municipios con 25,000 a 100,000 habitantes
 - Municipios con menos de 25,000 habitantes
- b. Efectuar los cálculos de errores de muestreo que corresponden a estas Estimaciones.
- c. Facilitar la operatividad de la encuesta.
 - a. Utilizar el mejor y más actualizado marco de muestreo para cada municipio (Data del Censo de 1995 y cartografía suministrada por el INEC).

El método utilizado fue de muestreo probabilístico en todas sus etapas, estratificado, por conglomerados, multietápico, con selección aleatoria de unidades en todas sus etapas, incluyendo la selección final de la persona mayor de 16 años a ser entrevistada dentro del hogar de la muestra.

El muestreo es estratificado por regiones (Norte-Centro, Pacífico y Atlántico) y en áreas urbano y rural. Es multietápico porque iniciará con la selección de Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM, municipios), se sigue con las Unidades secundarias de Muestreo (USM) en cada UPM conformada por segmentos censales, que son sectores de viviendas con límites bien definidos e identificables tanto en el área urbana como en la rural y las Unidades Finales de Muestreo (UFM) conformadas en conglomerados de tamaño de 6 a 8 viviendas en el área urbana y de 10 a 12 viviendas en el área rural.

En cada vivienda de la muestra se seleccionó un solo hogar como Unidad de observación y finalmente se selecciona y entrevista solo una persona mayor de 16 años, seleccionada mediante

⁷⁷ Córdova, P: Introducción a la Investigación por muestreo. Edit. DGEA, México, 1972. Presentación por Leslie Kish, Edición 2000. Ecuador.

un proceso de cuota. Como norma de selección probabilística no se admite sustitución o reemplazo de las viviendas.

La asignación de los tamaños de muestra asegura la consistencia, suficiencia y eficiencia muestral para cada estrato y a nivel de agregado total. En cada uno de los estratos la selección de municipios se realizará con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño de cada dominio según la población de 1995.

Los resultados del estudio permite obtener resultados válidos a nivel nacional y por áreas urbana – rural. Se tomaron en cuenta las characteristics sociodemográficos consideradas. Los resultados no son válidos a nivel de departamento ni por municipios.

2. Marco Muestral

El Marco de Muestreo está constituido por el inventario cartográfico del Instituto Nacional de Censos y Estadísticas. Para la selección de la muestra se utilizó la división de los 12,070 segmentos censales de los 153 municipios de todo el país, existentes en 1995, desglosados por área de residencia urbana y rural. También se utilizaron los data de población correspondientes al censo de 1995 dado que cuando se diseño la muestra el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) no había publicado el resultado del censo del 2005. ⁷⁸

3. Tamaño de muestra

Para la determinación del tamaño de muestra se toma en cuenta el tamaño de la población, la cual es grande y lo que se quiere estimar, que en este caso son proporciones.

La fórmula utilizada para el tamaño de muestra es:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n-1}} \quad (1)$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ}{E^2} \quad (2)$$

Donde:

E= Margen de error

P= Porcentaje de población con un atributo dado del 50 %.

Q= (1-P) Porcentaje de la población sin el atributo considerado, Q=50 %.

Z= Valor de la distribution normal. Para un nivel del 95 % de confianza, este valor es 1.965.

n= Tamaño de Muestra

⁷⁸ Fuente: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC)

1. Cálculo del tamaño de la muestra, niveles de confianza y márgenes de error

El nivel de confianza deseado para toda la muestra nacional es del 95 por ciento, por lo que $Z_{0.95}=1.965$. El margen de error es de ± 2.5 por ciento. Se asume una proporción 50/50 ($P=0.50$ y $Q=1-P=0.50$) para variables dicotómicas, en el peor de los casos.

Bajo estas condiciones y utilizando la fórmula 1, se obtiene un tamaño de muestra global de 1500 viviendas. Este tamaño de muestra fue asignado proporcionalmente por estratos y dominios de estudio. La distribución de las viviendas de la muestra y los segmentos puede verse en el siguiente Table.

Table 1

Nicaragua: Distribution de la Población, viviendas y segmentos del país por regiones y estratos: urbano/rural, según tamaño de los municipios

Norte-Centro				
Urbano				
	Población			
Municipios de 100,000 y más Hab.	Urbana	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Esteli	99116	0.519	39	6
Matagalpa	91729	0.481	36	5
		1.000		
Subtotal	190845	0.275	75	11
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	353999	0.511	139	23
Municipios de menos de 25,000	148408	0.214	58	9
Subtotal	693252	1.000	272	43
Rural				
	Población			
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	Rural	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Estelí	26737	0.320	10	1
Matagalpa	56733	0.680	10	1
		1.000		
	83470	0.080	20	2
Municipios de	577188	0.552	100	10

25,000 a 100,000 Hab.				
Municipios de menos de 25,000 Hab.	385031	0.368	72	7
Subtotal	1045689	1.000	192	19
Pacífico				
Urbano				
	Población			
Municipios de 100,000 y más Hab.	Urbana	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Granada	93253	0.056	20	3
Tipitapa	122758	0.074	26	4
Chinandega	130323	0.078	28	4
Masaya	125449	0.075	28	4
León	152278	0.092	33	5
Managua	1039488	0.625	222	32
		1.000		
Subtotal	1663549	0.705	357	52
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	527955	0.224	113	17
Municipios de menos de 25,000 Hab.	169792	0.072	36	6
Subtotal	2361296		506	75
Rural				
	Población			
Municipios de 100,000 y más Hab.	Rural	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Granada	29605	0.191	11	1
Tipitapa	1843	0.012	0	0
Chinandega	26294	0.170	11	1
Masaya	32480	0.210	11	1
León	46036	0.297	20	2
Managua	18690	0.121	10	1
		1.000		
Subtotal	154949	0.176	63	6
Municipios de	443582	0.504	180	18

25,000 a 100,000 Hab.				
Municipios de menos de 25,000 Hab.	282043	0.320	115	11
Subtotal	880574		358	35
Atlántico				
Urbano				
	Población			
Municipios de 100,000 y más Hab.	Urbana	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Nueva Guinea	57243	0.237	22	3
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	140626	0.583	61	9
Municipios de menos de 25,000	43326	0.180	18	3
Subtotal	241195		101	15
Rural				
	Población			
Municipios de 100,000 y más Hab.	Rural	Peso	Viviendas	Segmentos
Nueva Guinea	64681	0.160	11	1
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	271983	0.672	50	5
Municipios de menos de 25,000	67822	0.168	10	1
Subtotal	404485		71	7
Subtotal urbano	3295743		879	133
Subtotal rural	2330749		621	61
Total	5626492		1500	194

2. Tamaños y distribución de la Muestra por estratos

Los márgenes de error por estratos asumiendo un nivel de confianza del 95 % se detallan en el siguiente Table:

Table 2
Tamaños de muestra y márgenes de error por estrato

Estratos	Tamaño de Muestra	Margen de error (%)
Regiones:		
Norte-Centro	464	4.5
Pacífico	864	3.3
Atlántico	172	7.4
Areas:		
Urbana	879	3.3
Rural	621	3.9
Total del país	1500	2.5

El margen de error de la Región del Atlántico resulta un poco más alto que el de las otras dos regiones. Esto forzosamente será así porque es la región cuyo costo de operación es el más alto.

Table 3
Tamaño de Muestra distribuida por estrato

ESTRATO	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL
NORTE-CENTRO			
Más de 100,000 Hab.	75	20	95
25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	139	100	239
Menos de 25,000 Hab.	58	72	130
Subtotal	272	192	464
PACÍFICO			
Más de 100,000 Hab.	357	63	420
25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	113	180	293
Menos de 25,000 Hab.	36	115	151
Subtotal	506	358	864
ATLÁNTICO			
Más de 100,000 Hab.	22	11	33
25,000 a 100,000 Hab.	61	50	111
Menos de 25,000 Hab.	18	10	28
Subtotal	101	71	172
TOTAL	879	621	1500

3. Muestra de Municipios y asignación por estrato

La cantidad total de municipios seleccionados fue de 46, que es suficiente para alcanzar la representatividad de todo el país, dado la homogeneidad entre municipios que pertenecen al mismo estrato o dominio.

Para la distribución de municipios se utilizó la información de las cantidades de viviendas y segmentos detalladas antes y se realizó la asignación de la cantidad de municipios óptima necesaria por estrato y por dominio. Una vez que se fijó el tamaño de muestra de municipios se realizó la selección de estos.

En la muestra fueron incluidos en forma automática (selección forzosa o probabilidad 1) los que tenían una población superior a los 100,000 habitantes. Los municipios de selección forzosa fueron en la Región Norte-Centro: Estelí y Matagalpa; en la Región del Pacífico: Granada,

Tipitapa, Chinandega, Masaya, León, Chinandega, Masaya y Managua y en la Región del Atlántico fue Nueva Guinea. Los otros municipios de la muestra en cada estrato y dominio de estudio fueron seleccionados con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño de acuerdo con la población estimada al 2004, de la lista de los restantes municipios ordenados de menor a mayor población.

Table 4
Distribution de la muestra por regiones y áreas

POR REGIONES	MUESTRA	SEGMENTOS
NORTE-CENTRO	464	62
PACÍFICO	864	110
ATLÁNTICO	172	22
TOTAL	1500	194
POR AREAS		
URBANO	879	133
RURAL	621	61
TOTAL	1500	194

4. Ajuste por no cobertura

Para garantizar la precisión deseada de la muestra se utilizará el sistema de muestreo con “Ajuste por no cobertura”. Con esto se garantizará que el margen de error no sea superior al 2.5 por ciento deseado.

En distintas encuestas que el Instituto de Encuestas y Sondeos de Opinión (IDESO-UCA) ha realizado se han observado que la tasa de no cobertura en los diferentes municipios del país oscila entre 15 y el 25 por ciento de casos en los que no se puede realizar la entrevista por diferentes razones. Las tasas de no cobertura promedio por región son: para el Centro Norte, el 17 por ciento, para el Pacífico 18 por ciento y para la Región del Atlántico 19 por ciento. No hay diferencias significativas en las tasas de no cobertura por área urbana y rural. Los motivos más frecuentes de no entrevista son: no se encuentran en la vivienda, solamente hay personas menores de 16 años, únicamente se encuentran personas empleadas que no residen habitualmente en la vivienda seleccionada, la persona entrevistada se cansa antes de concluir la entrevista y el rechazo total a la encuesta.

El proceso de ajuste de la muestra por no cobertura consistirá en aplicar a los estratos y dominios el factor de no cobertura correspondiente en cada Región obteniéndose así el tamaño de muestra operativo final. La muestra final n_f , se calcula mediante la fórmula $N_f = (1+t)n$, siendo t el factor de no cobertura. De esta forma la muestra final para todo el país será $n_f = 1762$ viviendas, distribuidas por estrato como se indica en el siguiente Table.

Table 5
Tamaños de muestras esperados y ajustados

Estrato	Tamaño de Muestra esperado	Tamaño de Muestra ajustado
Regiones:		
Norte-Centro	464	542
Pacífico (sin Managua)	864	1016
Atlántico	172	204
Areas:		
Urbana	879	1032
Rural	621	730
Total del país	1500	1762

5. Detalles del Diseño: Fracciones de Muestreo

Para la determinación de las fracciones de muestreo (f) se deberán considerar las distintas etapas de selección.

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3$$

Donde:

f_1 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 1: UPM

f_2 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 2: segmentos.

f_3 = Probabilidad de selección del conglomerado dentro del segmento.

$$f_j = \frac{n^i}{N^i}$$

f_j = Fracción de muestreo de la etapa i .

n^i = Tamaño de muestra para etapa i .

N^i = Total de viviendas en etapa i .

Dado que se toman conglomerados de h viviendas por segmento de muestra, la fracción se tiene:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 f_3} = \frac{f}{f_1 h/TVS}$$

Donde:

TVS = Es el número total de viviendas en el segmento.

6. Probabilidad final de selección

En general, la probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado cualquiera en la ciudad c está dada por:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{nc}{N_c} = f_c$$

Donde:

P_c = Probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado de h vivienda en la ciudad c.

T_{Mc} = Número de segmentos a seleccionar en la ciudad y en estas a h viviendas finales.

T_{Tc} = Total de viviendas en la ciudad.

nc = Tamaño de la muestra en la ciudad c.

N_c = Tamaño de la población área c.

f_c = Fracción global de muestreo por ciudad c (UPM).

Table 6
Distribution de la muestra de viviendas por municipios y áreas de residencia

Norte-Centro											
Municipios con menos de 25,000 Hab.											
Municipio	Población		Segmentos		Tamaño de muestra			Tamaño a seleccionar			
	Urbana	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Total	Urbano	Rural	Total	
Ciudad Antigua	1738	2383	1	1	6	10	16	7	11	18	
San José de los Remates	2060	7028	1	1	6	10	16	7	11	18	
San Lucas	886	11563	1	1	6	10	16	8	12	20	
Esquipulas	7180	10621	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Wiwilí de abajo	6171	13731	1	1	7	11	18	8	12	20	
Santo Tomás	14281	7224	2	1	14	10	24	16	12	28	
San Sebastián de Yalí	4422	18285	1	1	7	11	18	8	12	20	
Subtotal			9	7	58	72	130	68	82	150	
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.											
El Jicaró	10040	17846	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Ocotal	32829	1300	3	1	18	10	28	20	12	32	
Somoto	19639	17310	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Ciudad Darío	11414	27280	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Río Blanco	16264	22666	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Wiwilí	5299	45308	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Jalapa	36119	22304	3	1	18	10	28	20	12	32	
Boaco	24753	33731	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
El Tuma -La Dalia	6705	58080	2	1	12	10	22	14	12	26	
Jinotega	39343	54026	3	1	19	10	29	22	12	34	
Subtotal			23	10	139	100	239	160	120	280	
Municipios con más de 100,000 Hab.											
Estelí	99116	26737	6	1	39	10	49	48	12	60	
Matagalpa	91729	56733	5	1	36	10	46	40	12	52	
Subtotal			11	2	75	20	95	88	24	112	
Subtotal			43	19	272	192	464	316	226	542	
Municipios con menos de 25,000 Hab.											
Municipio	Población		Segmentos		Tamaño de muestra			Tamaño a seleccionar			
	Urbana	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Total	Urbano	Rural	Total	
Dolores	6850	667	1	1	6	10	16	8	12	20	

Quezalguaque	1913	8156	1	2	6	21	27	7	24	31
El Realejo	6018	5226	1	2	6	21	27	8	24	32
Achuapa	3257	10812	1	2	6	21	27	7	24	31
El Almendro	2750	13460	1	2	6	21	27	7	24	31
Santa Teresa	5658	15244	1	2	6	21	27	7	24	31
Subtotal			6	11	36	115	151	44	132	176
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.			Segmentos		Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar			
			Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural
Tola	2559	22454	1	2	6	20	26	8	24	32
Villanueva	5376	24524	1	2	6	20	26	8	24	32
Somotillo	14915	16207	2	2	14	20	34	16	24	40
Larreynaga	7604	24188	2	2	13	20	33	16	24	40
El Sauce	11592	21206	2	2	14	20	34	16	24	40
Nagarote	25674	8969	2	2	14	20	34	16	24	40
Rivas	26823	19361	2	2	14	20	34	16	24	40
Diriamba	38092	21519	2	2	14	20	34	16	24	40
El Viejo	55264	39365	3	2	18	20	38	24	24	48
Subtotal			17	18	113	180	293	136	216	352
Municipios con más de 100,000 Hab.			Segmentos		Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar			
			Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural
Granada	93253	29605	3	1	20	11	31	24	12	36
Tipitapa	122758	1843	4	0	26	0	26	32	0	32
Chinandega	130323	26294	4	1	28	11	39	32	12	44
Masaya	125449	32480	4	1	28	11	39	32	12	44
León	152278	46036	5	2	33	20	53	40	24	64
Managua	1039488	18690	32	1	222	10	232	256	12	268
			52	6	357	63	420	416	72	488
Subtotal			75	35	506	358	864	596	420	1016
Atlántico										
Municipios con menos de 25,000 Hab.										
Municipio	Población Urbana	Población Rural	Segmentos		Tamaño de muestra		Tamaño a seleccionar			
			Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural	Urbano	Rural
Corn Island	7733	0	2	0	12	0	12	16	0	16
El Tortuguero	1257	9753	1	1	6	10	16	8	12	20
Subtotal			3	1	18	10	28	24	12	36
Municipios de 25,000 a 100,000 Hab.										
Muelle de los Bueyes	4037	24022	2	2	12	20	32	16	24	40
Bluefields	47886	2969	4	1	28	10	38	32	12	44
Siuna	13785	64384	3	2	21	20	41	24	24	48

Subtotal			9	5	61	50	111	72	60	132
Municipios con más de 100,000 Hab.										
Nueva Guinea	57243	64681	3	1	22	11	33	24	12	36
Subtotal			15	7	101	71	172	120	84	204
Total			133	61	879	621	1500	1032	730	1762



APÉNDICE B: Tables de análisis

Table III-1 Opiniones sobre el significado de la palabra democracia (en el segundo significado)

Válidos	Frecuencia	Porcentaje válido
Libertad	119	6.8%
Igualdad	107	6.1%
Participación	16	0.9%
Bienestar, progreso económico	53	3.0%
Elecciones, voto	80	4.5%
Derecho de escoger los líderes	86	4.9%
Obedecer la ley	4	0.2%
Más oportunidad de trabajo	53	3.0%
Poder del pueblo	54	3.1%
Capitalismo	13	0.7%
No sabe, no responde	4	0.2%
Otro	1173	66.6%
Total	1762	100.0

RESUMEN DEL MODELO

Table IV-1 Predictores de apoyo al sistema

Modelo	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error t _{íp.}	Beta		
1 (Constante)	27.402	3.840		7.137	.000
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	.108	.190	.020	.572	.567
HOMBRE. Sexo	-1.023	1.244	-.023	-.822	.411
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.018	.042	.012	.425	.671
URBAN. Urbano	2.688	1.504	.058	1.787	.074
WEALTH8. Riqueza individual medida por la posesión de bienes	.768	.440	.061	1.746	.081
L1. Posición donde se ubica según el sentido que tienen los términos izquierda y derecha	.372	.240	.043	1.554	.120
AOJ17R. Percepción de amenaza de pandillas	-.006	.019	-.010	-.330	.741
AOJ12R. Si fuera víctima de un robo o atraco, ¿cuánta confianza tendría en que el sistema judicial castigará al culpable?	.064	.018	.103	3.596	.000
M1R. Evaluación del gobierno actual	.102	.030	.098	3.370	.001
PN5R. ¿Cuán democrático es su país? (0-100)	.031	.024	.037	1.303	.193
SOCT1R. Evaluación del desempeño económico actual del país	.127	.033	.116	3.848	.000
IT1R. La gente de su comunidad es confiable (0-100)	.019	.020	.028	.967	.334
IDIO1R. Evaluación de la propia situación económica	.070	.038	.056	1.867	.062
VIC1R. Víctima de un delito en los últimos 12 meses	-3.703	1.676	-.062	-2.209	.027
AOJ11R. Probabilidad de ser víctima de un robo o asalto	-.003	.021	-.004	-.132	.895
MEDIAAW. Índice de exposición a los medios	-.062	.025	-.073	-2.476	.013

Variable dependiente: PSA5 Escala apoyo al sistema

R cuadrado= .081

R cuadrado corregido= .069; sig <.05

Table IV-2 Predictores de la tolerancia

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	40.040	3.580		11.183	.000
ED Nivel Educativo	.721	.216	.115	3.342	.001
Q1R Género recodificada	.277	1.463	.005	.189	.850
Q2 Edad	.050	.048	.030	1.023	.307
WEALTH Equipamiento del hogar	1.336	.486	.090	2.749	.006
L1 Ideología (Escala izquierda-derecha)	-.327	.284	-.032	-1.150	.250
M1RR Evaluación trabajo presidente Bolaños recodificado	.053	.035	.043	1.529	.126
PN4R Grado de satisfacción con funcionamiento de la democracia recodificada	.045	.033	.039	1.369	.171

Variable dependiente: TOL Escala Tolerancia
 R cuadrado= .038
 R cuadrado corregida= .032; sig <.05

Table V-1 Predictores de victimización por corrupción

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	.122	.058		2.120	.034
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?	-.004	.005	-.028	-.937	.349
HOMBRE. Sexo	.132	.032	.099	4.186	.000
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?	.000	.001	.008	.303	.762
WEALTH. Equipamiento del hogar	.039	.011	.103	3.403	.001
UR. Urbano	.023	.037	.017	.612	.541

Variable dependiente: exctot Índice de victimización por corrupción
 R cuadrado=.020
 R cuadrado corregida=.017; sig. <.05

Table VI-1 Predictores de victimización por crimen

VARIABLES	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
ED. Nivel educativo	.049	.020	6.079	1	.014	1.051
HOMBRE. Sexo	.347	.135	6.610	1	.010	1.415
Q2. Edad	.005	.004	1.606	1	.205	1.005
Wealth. Equip. del hogar	-.020	.049	.171	1	.679	.980
Capital nacional	.779	.224	12.104	1	.001	2.180
Ciudad grande	.145	.212	.466	1	.495	1.156
Ciudad mediana	.036	.249	.021	1	.884	1.037
Ciudad pequeña	.135	.223	.364	1	.546	1.144
aoj17r. Amenaza de pandillas	.008	.002	17.819	1	.000	1.008
Constante	-2.840	.267	112.953	1	.000	.058

Variable dependiente: vic1r Víctima de crimen.
R cuadrado Nagelkerke= .71; sig. <.05

Table V-4 Predictores de inseguridad por delincuencia

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	42.223	3.372		12.521	.000
ED Educación	-.816	.221	-.109	-3.699	.000
HOMBRE. Sexo	-6.353	1.485	-.102	-4.277	.000
Q2 Edad	.052	.049	.027	1.070	.285
Wealth. Equip. hogar	-.020	.493	-.001	-.040	.968
VIC2RR Grado de victimización	6.960	1.359	.123	5.123	.000
JUSTIN Confianza en instituciones de justicia	-.061	.033	-.044	-1.849	.065
Alr Oye noticias en la radio	.019	.019	.024	.990	.322
AOJ17r Presencia de pandillas en barrio	.219	.022	.241	9.980	.000

Variable dependiente: aoj11r Sensación de inseguridad por crimen
R cuadrado= .026
R cuadrado corregida= .021; sig.<.005

Table VII-1 Predictores de la asistencia a un cabildo u otra reunión

VARIABLES	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
ED Nivel educativo	.023	.024	.887	1	.346	1.023
Q1R Género recodificada	.311	.167	3.465	1	.063	1.365
Q2 Edad	.003	.005	.345	1	.557	1.003
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	.097	.058	2.811	1	.094	1.101
MEDIOS Exposición a noticias	.008	.003	5.315	1	.021	1.008
PP1RR Persuasión a otros para votar recodificada	.011	.002	19.067	1	.000	1.011
PP2R Trabajó para algún candidato o partido recodificada	1.064	.207	26.429	1	.000	2.897
CAPITAL. Capital nacional	-1.845	.399	21.368	1	.000	.158
GRANDE. Ciudad grande	-.416	.275	2.294	1	.130	.660
PEQUE. Ciudad pequeña	-.208	.285	.535	1	.464	.812
RURAL. Área rural	-.076	.253	.089	1	.765	.927
Constante	-3.243	.391	68.807	1	.000	.039

Variables introducidas en el paso 1: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTHR, MEDIOS, PP1RR, PP2R, CAPITAL, GRANDE, PEQUE, RURAL.
 Variable dependiente: NP1R.
 R cuadrado de Nagelkerke=.145, sig. <.05

Table VII-2 Predictores de la satisfacción con los servicios que presta la alcaldía

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	40.861	2.448		16.691	.000
ED Nivel educativo	.303	.155	.060	1.954	.051
Q1R Género recodificada	.562	1.043	.013	.538	.591
Q2 Edad	-.004	.034	-.003	-.114	.909
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	.232	.349	.019	.666	.505
AOJ11RR Percepción de inseguridad en el lugar o barrio donde vive recodificada	-.051	.017	-.074	-3.048	.002
SOCT1R Situación económica del país recodificada	.139	.027	.132	5.068	.000
IDIO1RR Situación económica personal recodificada	.174	.031	.146	5.517	.000

Variable dependiente: SGL1r Satisfacción servicios alcaldía está dando recodificada.
 R cuadrado=.071
 R cuadrado corregida=.067; sig.<.005

Table VII-3 Predictores de la satisfacción con el trato recibido en las alcaldías

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	47.260	3.157		14.968	.000
ED Nivel educativo	.389	.156	.082	2.499	.013
Q1R Género recodificado	.471	1.040	.012	.453	.651
Q2 Edad	.054	.034	.044	1.605	.109
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	.486	.375	.043	1.297	.195
AOJ12rr Confianza en el sistema judicial en castigar recodificada	.067	.015	.120	4.516	.000
AOJ11RR Percepción de inseguridad en el lugar o barrio donde vive recodificada	-.041	.017	-.065	-2.450	.014
VIC1RR Víctima hecho delincuencia recodificada	-3.363	1.402	-.064	-2.399	.017
EESTRATR Estrato poblacional del lugar de residencia recodificado	-.427	.406	-.033	-1.052	.293
SOCT1R Situación económica del país recodificada	.089	.026	.091	3.466	.001

Variable dependiente: SGL2r Satisfacción trato recibido en las municipalidades recodificada
R cuadrado=.049
R cuadrado corregido=.043; sig.<.05

Table VII-4 Predictores de la confianza en las Alcaldías

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	41.414	3.167		13.077	.000
ED Nivel educativo	.357	.231	.046	1.548	.122
Q1R Género recodificado	.373	1.524	.006	.245	.807
Q2 Edad	-.004	.050	-.002	-.078	.938
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	-.846	.559	-.046	-1.513	.130
AOJ11RR Percepción de inseguridad en el lugar o barrio donde vive recodificada	-.057	.025	-.055	-2.299	.022
CAPITAL. Capital nacional	-.845	2.667	-.009	-.317	.752
GRANDE. Ciudad grande	4.466	2.311	.055	1.932	.053
MEDIANA. Ciudad mediana	5.971	2.666	.058	2.240	.025
PEQUE. Ciudad pequeña	3.473	2.421	.037	1.435	.152
b21r Confianza en los partidos políticos recodificada	.309	.025	.293	12.449	.000

Variable dependiente: b32r Confianza en las Alcaldías recodificada
 R cuadrado=.102
 R cuadrado corregida=.096; sig. <.05

Table VIII-2 P redictores del Voto

	B	E.T.	Wald	Gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
ED Nivel educativo	.036	.017	4.385	1	.036	1.037
Q1R Género	-.048	.107	.201	1	.654	.953
Q2 Edad	.046	.004	133.556	1	.000	1.047
Wealth Equipamiento	-.019	.037	.267	1	.605	.981
GItot Nivel de conocimiento político	.133	.045	8.861	1	.003	1.142
M1RR Evaluación del trabajo del presidente	.004	.002	2.216	1	.137	1.004
b21r Confianza en los partidos políticos	.002	.002	1.908	1	.167	1.002
Constante	-1.716	.225	57.965	1	.000	.180

a Variable(s) introducida(s) en el paso 1: ED, Q1R, Q2, Wealth, GItot, M1RR, b21r.

Table VIII-3 Predictores de confianza en los partidos políticos

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	25.259	4.203		6.010	.000
ED Nivel educativo	.473	.232	.064	2.036	.042
Q1R Género recodificado	-.977	1.571	-.016	-.622	.534
Q2 Edad	-.009	.052	-.005	-.172	.864
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	-1.195	.521	-.068	-2.294	.022
AOJ11RR Percepción de inseguridad en el lugar o barrio donde vive recodificada	-.075	.025	-.075	-2.936	.003
PN4r Grado de satisfacción con funcionamiento de la democracia recodificada	.060	.038	.044	1.586	.113
PN5R Opinión sobre la democracia en el país recodificada	.054	.032	.045	1.666	.096
PP1RR Persuasión a otros para votar recodificada	.123	.027	.113	4.490	.000
SOCT1R Situación económica del país recodificada	.144	.041	.095	3.527	.000
IDIO1RR Situación económica personal recodificada	-.013	.047	-.007	-.272	.786

Variable dependiente: b21r Confianza en los partidos

R cuadrado=.044

R cuadrado corregida=.038; sig. <.05

**Table VIII.5 Predictores de confianza en las elecciones
Coeficientes(a)**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Error típ.	Beta		
(Constante)	19.777	5.897		3.354	.001
ED Nivel educativo	.071	.282	.009	.252	.801
Q1R Género recodificado	3.398	1.901	.049	1.788	.074
Q2 Edad	-.118	.064	-.054	-1.852	.064
WEALTHR Equipamiento del hogar	.407	.620	.021	.656	.512
L1 Ideología (escala Izquierda-derecha)	.588	.371	.043	1.584	.113
AOJ11A Percepción amenaza delincuencia	.034	.029	.033	1.175	.240
PN4r Grado de satisfacción con funcionamiento de la democracia recodificada	-.100	.046	-.065	-2.181	.029
PN5R Opinión sobre la democracia en el país recodificada	.151	.040	.111	3.762	.000
AOJ11RR Percepción de inseguridad en el lugar o barrio donde vive recodificada	.007	.031	.006	.224	.823
AUT1r Necesidad democracia electoral recodificada	-1.509	2.447	-.017	-.616	.538
SOCT1R Situación económica del país recodificada	.113	.047	.067	2.416	.016
b21r Confianza en los partidos políticos recodificada	.370	.031	.333	12.015	.000

Variable dependiente: b47r Confianza en elecciones.

R cuadrado=.140

R cuadrado corregida=.131; sig. <.005

APÉNDICE C. Precisión de los resultados

Toda encuesta está afectada por dos tipos de errores: los errores de no muestreo y los de muestreo. Los errores de no muestreo son los que se cometen durante la recolección y procesamiento de la información. Éstos se pueden controlar construyendo un buen instrumento de medición, capacitando adecuadamente a los encuestadores, supervisando el trabajo de campo y con programas apropiados de captura de data. Dichos errores se pueden controlar pero no se pueden cuantificar. Sin embargo la comparación de los resultados de la muestra con los de la población da una idea de si esos errores han generado sesgos que restan representatividad a la muestra. El uso de computadoras *palms* probablemente redujo estos errores al efectuar chequeos de consistencia de las respuestas y de flujo de la entrevista en el mismo lugar y momento en que ésta se efectuaba. Además, al eliminarse el proceso de digitación, se eliminaron los errores que se generan con esa actividad. Con el procedimiento tradicional de cuestionario en papel, hay que efectuar en la oficina procesos de codificación y crítica de la información (eliminados con las *palms*) en los que se pueden también generar errores. Con cuestionarios en papel, es solo después de varias semanas del momento de la recolección del dato que pueden efectuarse chequeos de consistencia en la computadora. Corregir los errores detectados en la oficina durante la crítica o por los programas que detectan inconsistencias es difícil o imposible dada la separación en tiempo y espacio entre los momentos de la entrevista en el papel y detección de estos errores.

Por otro lado, los errores de muestreo son producto del azar y resultan del hecho de entrevistar a una muestra y no al total de la población. Cuando se selecciona una muestra, ésta es una de las tantas muestras posibles a seleccionar de la población. La variabilidad que existe entre todas estas posibles muestras es el error de muestreo, el cual podría medirse si uno dispusiese de todas esas muestras, situación obviamente irreal. En la práctica, lo que se hace es estimar este error sobre la varianza obtenida a partir de la misma muestra.

Para estimar el error de muestreo de un estadístico (promedio, porcentaje o razón), se calcula el error estándar, el cual es la raíz cuadrada de la varianza poblacional del estadístico. Esto permite medir el grado de precisión con que el estadístico se aproxima al resultado obtenido de haberse entrevistado a todos los elementos de la población bajo las mismas condiciones. Para el cálculo de este error es muy importante considerar el diseño con el que se seleccionó la muestra. El efecto del diseño, DEFT, indica la eficiencia del diseño empleado en relación a un diseño de muestreo irrestricto aleatorio (MIA). Un valor de 1 indica que el error estándar obtenido por ambos diseños (complejo y MIA) es igual; es decir, el muestreo complejo es tan eficiente como un MIA con el mismo tamaño de muestra. Si el valor es superior a 1, el muestreo complejo produjo un EE mayor al obtenido con un MIA.

$$DEFT = EE_{\text{complejo}} / EE_{\text{MIA}}$$

En la Table se presentan los intervalos de 95% de confianza (1,96 veces el EE) y los efectos de diseño (DEFT). La Table muestra también el valor del estadístico en cuestión (promedio o porcentaje). Los EE se estimaron con el paquete de cómputo Stata 9. Valores extremos se

originan en un alto grado de homogeneidad dentro de cada conglomerado. En otras palabras, en estos casos hay una importante segregación espacial de las personas según su condición socioeconómica, lo que resta eficiencia al muestreo por conglomerados para medir estas characteristics.

Vale decir que el error muestral usualmente es entre 10% y 40% más grande que el que se habría obtenido con el muestreo irrestricto al azar. Por ejemplo, en el caso de Costa Rica, el importante índice de apoyo a la democracia (PSA5) tiene un error muestral de 0,66. Esto quiere decir que el intervalo de confianza a 95% (dado por 1,96 veces el EE) para el promedio de este índice (64,0) va de 62,7 a 65,3. De acuerdo con el DEFT de la Table, este intervalo es 26% mayor que el que se habría obtenido con MIA.

País	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			itlr			Corvic		
México	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panamá	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Perú	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
R.Dominicana	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haití	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

País	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft	Promedio	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
México	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panamá	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Perú	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
R.Dominicana	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haití	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53