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THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: 2006

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Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance is still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will stimulate a dialogue among governments,

NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

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Foreword

The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

by

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common

“informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire were pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
December, 2006

Executive Summary

This report provides an in-depth analysis of the findings from the second survey of democratic values in Mexico undertaken by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). It can be seen as a diagnosis – from the viewpoint of public opinion – of the quality of democracy in Mexico. In it, the reader will discover that the young Mexican democracy evinces signs of stability and strength, as well as exhibiting weaknesses, while confronting both challenges and opportunities. The study forms part of the first round of the Barometer of the Americas, which will eventually include the other nineteen countries on the American continent. To participate in the Barometer of the Americas adds great value to the results for Mexico, putting the Mexican findings into comparative perspective with results other countries of the region.

Mexico has undergone major changes in the past two decades. In economic matters, it went from a closed economy to one of the most open economies of the region. The opening of the economy had its formal origin in 1986 when Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a predecessor organization to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Now, two decades later, Mexico has signed free-trade agreements with the European Union, with all countries in North and Central America, as well as with many in South America.

Mexico's political opening and democratic transition are similarly recent and dramatic. Starting with the convulsive events of 1968 and evolving quickly since the end of the eighties, Mexico has experienced increasing electoral competition and political participation. The electoral reforms of the nineties not only encouraged electoral participation, but Mexican elections have become increasingly clean and fair. Several states of the republic, for the very first time in that decade, experienced an alternation of power between political parties. The intensification of electoral competition culminated in 2000 with the turnover of the presidency, after seven decades in the power of a single party.

The results presented in this publication should be understood as a function of the socioeconomic and political context of mid-2006, just prior to the presidential election. In the first chapter, we review a few main economic and political indicators, describing this specific moment in Mexican history for the reader. The survey took place in June 2006, in the month preceding a hotly-contested presidential election. The 2006 election posed a challenge for Mexico's young democracy, given that the predicted margin of difference between the two leading presidential candidates was less than one percentage point.

The interested reader will find a detailed description of the methodology of the study in Chapter II, as well as in the two appendixes at the end of the report. These sections show the methodological robustness of the research, featuring sample selection and composition, survey characteristics, fieldwork and instrument (i.e., questionnaire) used.

In Chapter III, we analyze how the Mexican population understands the term *democracy*. The most common understanding (seven out of every ten surveyed in Mexico) is a normative or axiomatic perception of *democracy*, one which emphasizes the processes or values presumably found in a democracy. The political culture of Mexico now seems very much

focused on democracy as a process. Of the fifteen countries included in this preliminary report on the 2006 Barometer of the Americas, only two (Costa Rica and Chile) yield a greater percentage of the population whose understanding of democracy is normative.

Chapter IV analyzes two types of attitudes considered to be crucial in the emergence of a political culture conducive to the establishment of a stable democracy: support for the political system and tolerance. As will be seen in this chapter, close to 70% of Mexicans back their political institutions.

On a political-tolerance index, ranging from 0 (representing a situation in which all Mexicans would deny dissidents these political rights) to 100 (all Mexican citizens would extend political rights to dissidents), Mexico scored 56.2 in 2006 (slightly below the 57.5 of 2004). Said score is surpassed by only five countries of the fifteen first completed in the 2006 Barometer of the Americas.

The Mexican data show a trend toward greater support for the political system. One may suppose that such an increase in political support represents enhanced popular confidence in the authentically-democratic character of the Mexican polity, given a turnover of the party in power that occurred in 2000. Mexico is now second (after Costa Rica) in support for the political system, among the fifteen countries in this study. Political support may have decreased, however, in the post-electoral atmosphere of 2006, a decline that could only be determined by further survey research.

The combination of high political tolerance and a high degree of support for the political system are the conditions most conducive to a stable democracy. In 2006, as in 2004, the percentage of Mexicans exhibiting those two attributes was 41%. Only Costa Rica outdid Mexico in the percentage of citizens of exhibiting this combination of attitudes among the fifteen LAPOP countries in 2006. The number of Mexicans expressing attitudes consistent with and supportive of a stable democracy may be consolidating at a level quite above what would have been the case in the sixties or seventies. Mexico's political culture now seems to be among those in Latin America and the Caribbean most conducive to democratic political life. This is a notable phenomenon, certainly one of the more surprising, and fortunate, findings of LAPOP 2006.

Chapter V explores the relationship between corruption and democracy. The chapter compares perceived levels of corruption in Latin America, using data from Transparency International. It also analyzes actual victimization of citizens by corruption in Mexico, using data from the LAPOP 2004 and 2006 surveys, and explores the relationship between corruption and legitimacy, cross-referencing victimization levels with indicators of support for and confidence in the political system, political tolerance, respect for governmental institutions, and evaluations of system performance.

These results are less encouraging. They show that, both for perceptual indicators and actual victimization, Mexico exhibits an incidence of corruption among the highest in Latin America. Indeed, the percentage of the Mexican population falling victim to corruption

increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, with the distribution of the phenomenon being more homogeneous among the country's varying socio-demographic segments.

Moreover, the data suggest that exposure to and participation in corruption erodes democratic political culture, since it has a negative impact on perceptions of and confidence in political institutions, but leads to justification of the activity, which may in turn lead to an erosion of legality in Mexico. Undoubtedly, corruption is one of the most important and urgent issues on the national agenda.

Another serious problem in many countries of Latin America, including Mexico, is criminality. Chapter VI presents data on exposure to crime and the state of law. Mexican citizens continue to exhibit uneasiness and anxiety regarding their own exposure to crime and that of their family and friends. Mexico's crime victimization rate grew three points beyond that seen in 2004. In comparative terms, exposure to crime is high in Mexico, matched only in Ecuador and exceeded only in Peru and Chile.

Additional data suggest a lack of confidence in judicial institutions and other institutions in which Mexicans must confide if they wish to improve their personal security and obtain justice should they fall victim to crime. However, the average score for confidence in the institutions of justice is not high in other countries of the region either, since Mexico placed third in 2006, just behind Costa Rica and Colombia.

Social-science theory and prior research done through LAPOP studies suggests that citizens who have been the victims of crime are more willing to endorse actions at the margins of the law in seeking to punish criminals. Data from the survey corroborate this hypothesis: having been a victim of a crime leads to an increased willingness to support extra-judicial procedures, which do not help to consolidate Mexican democracy.

Chapter VII analyzes indicators regarding local governments. The reasons for a recent growth in interest in this area are several: a growing sense that administrative centralization may not be the most efficient of administrative structures; a desire to accommodate political pressure from below; a genuine interest in democratization, represented by a belief that "local governments are closer to the people"; and stimuli from international donors to get decentralization programs going.

Although Mexican citizens in 2006 were more inclined to request help from municipal governments than from federal congresspeople or from other federal officials, their actual attempts at doing so dropped vis-à-vis levels seen in 2004. Attending town meetings likewise decreased in June 2006, when the survey was done.

One possible mechanism that might induce local governments render better services to its citizens is to transfer more monies to them. However, Mexicans do not seem to agree. Almost half of them believe that transferring municipal powers to the federal government would be the best way to improve local services.

Notwithstanding a general level of suspicion toward the potential of local governments, organizing citizens at a neighborhood and community level into self-help efforts can be a factor motivating phenomena such as town-meeting attendance, petitioning for help from local government, and even a greater willingness to pay higher taxes for better local services. Even listening to the radio and reading the newspaper can have positive effects on certain types of local participation. As difficult as it seems for Mexico's citizenry to make sense of decentralization, the link between strengthening organizations in civil society and the increased capacity of municipal government should not be overlooked.

In Chapter VIII, we address electoral behavior. The electoral behavior of Mexicans is structured by party affiliation and by certain socio-demographic factors, especially education. This chapter presents data on ideology and party leanings, on satisfaction with democracy and on approval of the president.

The data show that one's sympathy (or lack thereof) toward the PAN, PRI or PRD determines, to a substantial degree, other attitudes or orientations, including one's ideological self-placement, one's opinions regarding democracy, one's approval of the president, and one's opinions on electoral reform possibilities. Since party sympathies often depend on retrospective evaluations of government performance, recent trends toward partisan alternation in the control of government (at multiple levels) imply that Mexican voters will have more tools for judging the success or failure of governmental policies and, therefore, in deciding whether they will continue to support their party, will shift their support to another party, or whether they will lose their tendency to support any given party. Political attitudes and opinions will, however, continue to depend on the intensity of an affective link exhibited by individuals toward political parties.

For the first time in the 2006 Mexico survey, two possible electoral reforms are explored: reelection and a run-off vote. Both issues are relatively new, since neither was explored in the 2004 LAPOP study. The Mexican citizenry does not currently endorse either proposed reform. The data shown here represent an initial exploration of public opinion on issues that, because of their complexity, should perhaps be taken up again, using a greater number of indicators in subsequent surveys.

The final chapter deals with the topic of social capital, a concept that has generated great interest in the social sciences recently. The LAPOP 2006 survey permits extensive measurement of the amount of social capital existing in Mexico, since it includes questions on institutional and interpersonal trust, as well as measures of formal and informal social participation. Moreover, the LAPOP data set permits an evaluation of changes in Mexico between 2004 and 2006, as well as a comparison of Mexico with the rest of Latin America.

The specialized academic literature has documented a positive relationship between social capital and democratic development. Generally speaking, the data reported for Mexico in this chapter show signs of recovery: institutional trust increased for seven of the twelve institutions measured over levels seen in 2004; interpersonal trust is stable and varies according to the reference group (the closer to the reference group, the greater the trust);

participation in formal institutions increased significantly over 2004; and one-third of the population is highly active in informal channels of participation.


However, comparatively speaking, Mexico remains in the lower ranks on some of the social capital indicators presented here. It is not clear whether this is due to there having been erosion in country's social capital prior to 2004 or whether Mexico has always generated less social capital. We will leave the answer to this important question for future studies.

I. Context

1.1 Economic context


The country's economic outlook has not changed substantially from conditions prevailing in 2004, when the previous study was done by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). No abrupt economic changes were observed during the six-year period in which Vicente Fox headed the government. However, macro-economic stability is not necessarily reflected in the people's perception of the economic environment

According to data from LAPOP 2006, 54.6% of informants believe the current economic situation is the same as 12 months ago, compared to 32.2% who consider it worse, and only 13.2% who believe it to be better. The data are shown in Graph I.1.



Graph I.1. "Do you think that the current economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?" Mexico, 2006.

Likewise, the perception of one's personal or familial economic situation does not reflect perceptions greatly different from considerations about the national economy, as can be observed in Graph I.2. Those that believe their personal economic situation is the *same* as twelve months ago were 59.8%, while those that felt the situation was *worse* represented 25.9%, and those perceiving an improvement, 14.4%.




Graph I.2. “Do you think your personal economic situation is better, the same or worse than twelve months ago?” Mexico, 2006.

When interviews for the LAPOP 2006 study were being conducted, the Fox administration was in its final weeks and faced an ample agenda of topics remaining unresolved, including various economic challenges, thereby leaving a complex scenario for the following administration.

1.1.1 Economic agenda pending the following government


Among the most relevant issues pending for the Mexican government was that of generating jobs. Job creation became one of the primary issues in the electoral campaigns of the presidential candidates in 2006. The goal of the Fox administration, to promote employment and generate 1.3 million jobs per year was not met and there was no marked improvement in the indicators for this field, as can be seen in Graph I.3.



Graph I.3. Annual Unemployment Rate in Mexico: 2001 – 2006: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (2006: first two trimester). Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática


Likewise, the *informal* sector (unrecorded economic activity which consequently escapes official statistics) of the national economy continues strong. According to estimates published by the World Bank, the informal sector in Mexico generated the equivalent of 30.1% of the GDP in 2000. Comparing Mexico's informal economy to that of other countries in the area, Mexico is below Brazil (39.8% of GDP) and Colombia (39.1% of GDP), but above Costa Rica (26.2%), Argentina (25.4%) and Chile (19.8%).

The sending of remittances, especially from the United States, is another familial coping mechanism in an economic scenario characterized by low generation of jobs and low wages. The increase in remittances from Mexican workers abroad has continued steadily upward in recent years, to the extent of becoming one of the most important factors in the national economy, as is shown by the trend apparent in Graph I.4




Graph I.4. Remittance Income in Millions of US Dollars: Evolution by Trimester from First Trimester of 2001 to June of 2006. Source: Banco de México

The average dollar amount per remittance remained constant during the Fox administration (the average for the whole period of January 2001 to June 2006 is 329 dollars). What produced an increase in remittance income is the growth in the number of operations, that is, the number of people sending money from outside the country, as can be seen in Graph I.5



Graph I.5. Thousands of Remittances Transferred to Mexico: Evolution by Quarter from January 2001 to June 2006. Source: Banco de México

Insofar as economic growth is concerned, the Fox administration did not meet its goal of 7% per year. Since the last LAPOP survey, the year of greatest economic growth was 2004, with 4.2%, as illustrated in Graph 1.6. Data for 2005 and estimates for 2006 and 2007 by CEPAL show somewhat more moderate growth, a bit less than 4%. However, these figures are substantially better than the zero percent produced in 2001.



Graph I.6. Growth of Gross National Product in Mexico: 2001 to 2007.
 Source World Bank, 2000 al 2005, and estimates from ECLAC for 2006 and 2007.

1.1.2 Advances and achievements

Undoubtedly, having controlled macroeconomic variables so as to attain economic stability has, as a consequence, implied a more positive environment for investment and growth. Indicative of the attainment of economic stability is the recently-achieved control of inflation which, in the past two year, was less than 4%.

Per capita income has been growing constantly for the past few years. Table I.1 compares data for major economies in the region and for Mexico's partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico's production per capita is above-average for the region, and even doubles or is close to doubling the figures for other major Latin American countries. For example, Mexico exhibits higher figures, especially in the past few years, than those turned in by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. As for its NAFTA partners, the country is still considerably below Canada and the United States. Canadians in 2004 had a per capita income 4 times greater than Mexicans, and the United States 6 times greater.

Countries	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Mexico	5,110	5,560	5,960	6,290	6,790
Argentina	7,470	7,010	4,050	3,670	3,580
Brasil	3,590	3,040	2,790	2,680	3,000
Chile	4,860	4,590	4,350	4,390	5,220
Latin America & the Caribbean	3,680	3,542	3,279	3,274	3,576
Canada	21,810	22,100	22,660	24,560	28,310
United States	34,400	34,800	35,230	37,780	41,440

Table I.1. Annual Per Capita Income in US Dollars in Seven Countries of the Americas: 2000 – 2004. Source: World Bank

Finally, the governmental strategy for combating poverty seems partially to have achieved its goal of reducing the percentage of the country's poorest population (see Table I.2), at the same time that indicators such as infant mortality have improved: in 2004, 23 children of every 1000 births died compared to an average of 27 children dying per thousand born in Latin American and the Caribbean. This figure is quite a bit higher than the 7 children per thousand in the United States. On the other hand, life expectancy in Mexico is 75 years compared to 72 in the Latin American region and 77 in the United States.¹

Type of Poverty	2000	2002	2004
Food Insufficiency (Extreme Poverty)	18.6	15.8	13.7
Food, Health and Education (Medium Poverty)	25.3	21.8	19.8
Overall Consumption (Moderate Poverty)	45.9	43.0	39.6


Table I.2. Percentage of Homes in Mexico Considered Poor, According to Three Definitions of Poverty: 2000 – 2004
Source: Secretaría de Desarrollo Social, Mexico

1.2 Political context

The LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico was done during the last month of the campaign to elect a president of the Republic, to renew both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as holding local elections for governorships and mayoralities in several states of the Republic. Expectations of a very close race between the presidential candidate of the governing party (PAN), Felipe Calderón, and the former head of the government of the country's capital, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who was put forward by a coalition headed by the PRD, tended to polarize the positions of both candidates. The campaigns reinforced existing partisan predispositions, revived animosity between the parties, and, in the final stretch of the election, crystallized opinions and attitudes. The results of the LAPOP 2006 survey are partially a reflection of the effects of the campaign.

¹ Data from the World Bank: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>

The 2006 political race, shows an equilibrium of forces unprecedented in the Mexico's history, especially when considered at the level of states. Today, as never before, more states are governed by different parties. At a municipal level, a wide-ranging distribution of power is even more evident. Open political competition provides the citizenry with the opportunity to evaluate and compare the government programs of the different parties, and the electoral system allows them to judge, with their vote, whether it is wise for a given political party to repeat one additional period of governance, or whether a change would be wise (in Mexico, the reelection of specific presidents and governors is not permitted, nor is the immediate reelection of deputies, both local and federal, or mayors). At the time the LAPOP 2006 was done, the distribution of the states governed by different political parties was as shown in Graph I.7.



Graph I.7. States Governed by Differing Political Parties, March 2006.
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico.

The PRI's presence, despite not being the party that controlled the federal government continued to be important in early 2006, since it governed in the majority of states. However, increasingly, the PAN, and especially the PRD, was gaining more states. In particular, once these parties win a state, they have not been wont immediately thereafter to loose them. Of the states undergoing alternation, only Nuevo León and Chihuahua have returned to the previous party (from the PAN to the PRI) and only Tlaxcala has

changed parties yet again (from the PRI to the PRD to the PAN). Alternation at a municipal level is even more tangible. The distribution of power at a state and municipal level, the abundance of divided state governments (in which the governor's party does not have a majority in the local congress) and widespread citizen expectations that renewal in government is possible makes for an ideal framework for examining the values and democratic culture of Mexicans.

1.2.1 Recent elections

The results of the mid-term elections of 2003 left the parties and citizenry unsatisfied. Balloting reflected the lowest levels of participation in history (42 percent). Many citizens argued they were disenchanted with *democracy*, understood as *alternation*, while others argued that the “real change” still had not occurred. Meanwhile, the states continued their electoral processes and local electoral dynamics depended increasingly less on the “coattail effects” of contests at a federal level. Therefore, the states that underwent alternation from the PRI to another party continued being governed, in general, by the PRI or the PAN. The PAN repeated electoral victories in states where it already governed: Aguascalientes, Baja California, Jalisco, Querétaro, Guanajuato and Morelos. In addition, the PRD repeated prior electoral successes in Baja California Sur, the Federal District, Zacatecas and Chiapas. The PAN included San Luis Potosí and Yucatán on its side while the PRD won control of Guerrero and Michoacán.

1.2.2 Presidential contest of 2006

For some, the race for the presidency of Mexico in 2006 began practically the same day President Vicente Fox was elected in July 2000. Opponents popped up according to the public office they held, be they elected by the majority or named as part of the cabinet. The head of the Mexico City government, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, became the most visible PRD candidate for the presidency. On behalf of the PAN, the Secretary of the Interior, Santiago Creel, initially became the leading figure for the presidential nomination. In the PRI, the leader of the party, Roberto Madrazo, would be the most visible pre-candidate.

Notwithstanding their initial advantages, a pre-candidate's visibility and name recognition would not prove sufficient to guarantee their nomination, especially in the case of the PAN, where, for an ample period of time, President Fox's wife, Marta Sahagún, was considered a possible candidate for the presidency. In the end, contenders were determined by a variety of procedures: the PAN by semi-open primary, while the PRI and the PRD by open primary. The candidates ended up being: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, for the coalition Por el Bien de Todos (PRD, PT and Convergencia); Roberto Madrazo for the Alianza por México (PRI and PVEM), and Felipe Calderón for the PAN. In addition, two new parties ran for the first time: Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina, nominating Patricia Mercado, and Nueva Alianza, postulating Roberto Campa.

The close race that occurred between Calderón, the PAN candidate, and López Obrador, of the coalition Por el Bien de Todos, unleashed a negative campaign by both sides seeking to disqualify the opponent. As never before, television came to be the means of communication through which the candidates put forth their proposals and attacks. During the campaign, the politicization of Mexicans grew, as did discussions of relevant issues for the country, and even of the rules and functioning of democracy. Expectations for Mexico's immediate future are reflected in the findings of the LAPOP 2006 survey contained in this report.

1.3 Studies on electoral behavior and political culture in Mexico

The study of democratic culture in Mexico dates back to a first approximation of the late fifties (Almond and Verba 1963). In their pioneering study, Almond and Verba concluded that Mexican political culture is “parochial” and “aspirational,” strongly guided by its sense of nationality and by its institutions, but exhibiting high levels of passivity regarding levels of political participation. The absence of political competition, due to PRI domination in all electoral arenas, was perhaps the direct cause of this passive behavior. As was mentioned, Mexican democracy underwent increasing and constant change, especially starting in the mid-eighties, when the hegemony of the PRI witnessed the beginning of the end. In a parallel manner, public opinion polls began to reflect this change, and interest in a possible democratic transition attracted new and improved research on the political opinions and attitudes of Mexicans.

Fortunately, in addition to the Almond and Verba study, to date there is a wide range of studies on democratic culture (Alduncin 1986, 1991, 1993, 2002; Beltrán, et al. 1996; Camp 2001; Moreno 2004; Secretaría de Gobernación 2002, 2003, 2005) and on electoral behavior (Domínguez and McCann 1996; Domínguez and Poiré 1999; Domínguez and Lawson 2004, to mention only the most representative), that describe in detail the attitudes, motivations and orientations of Mexicans, especially during electoral periods. Moreover, there are also studies locating Mexico in the comparative analysis of values and democratic culture (Inglehart, Basáñez and Moreno 1998). Additionally, the literature on Mexican political attitudes has diversified, encompassing specific topics which include party identification (Estrada 2005, 2006; Moreno 2003), strategic voting (Magaloni 1996; Magaloni and Poiré 2004; Poiré 2000), retrospective voting (Buendía 1996), and the effects of campaigns and mass media (Lawson 2002). The research agendas of these topics are open and take directly from studies such as LAPOP 2006. Among the other topics referenced in this study, we should point out the following research: national surveys on victimization by the Instituto Ciudadano Sobre Estudios de Inseguridad (ICESI); the Encuestas Nacionales sobre Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (ENCBG) by Transparencia Mexicana; and surveys on social capital by Data Opinión Pública y Mercados.

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II. Methodology¹

The survey serving as empirical evidence for this study was designed to represent the country's adult population, such that we may learn about and analyze the values and attitudes of citizens regarding their political system. This chapter provides details on how the study was done, the sample characteristics, fieldwork criteria, and the justifications for having followed these procedures.²

2.1 Selection of the sample and characteristics of the survey

The universe included in this survey is of Mexicans, 18 year or older, living within the country. The sample is designed to reflect, as much as possible, the characteristics of the adult population in terms of their geographic and socio-demographic distribution. For the survey, personal interviews were done at informants' homes. They were selected following probabilistic sampling methods in multiple stages and, at the end of the selection, through quotas reflecting population distribution by sex and age. No interview took place on the street nor in businesses or establishments, unless the business location coincided with the domicile of the person selected and the latter agreed to be interviewed there. It was a requisite that the person live at the domicile selected.

The survey was done from June 6-29, 2006, only a few days before elections were held for the president of Mexico and for renewing the federal congress. The electoral campaigns of the two main candidates, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), ideologically center-right, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the coalition Por el Bien de Todos, made up of leftist parties headed by the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), were characterized by the intense use of televisión spots, the majority of which were negative in tone.

To guarantee the representativeness of the study, a probabilistic sample was used with multiple-stage selection that included the points surveyed, selection of homes, and selection of the persons to be interviewed. In the first stage of the sampling, 130 sampling points to be surveyed were chosen probabilistically, distributed in 29 of the 32 states of the country. In total, 1,560 interviews were done at these 30 points, that is, 12 interviews per sampling point, representing 89 of the 2445 municipalities of the country and 13 of the 16 precincts of the Federal District. Graph II.1 shows the distribution of the surveyed points on a map of Mexico.

¹ Much of the text of this chapter is reproduced from the LAPOP 2004 report, given that the same research methodology was used, permitting comparisons across time.

² The complete sample design can be consulted in Appendix II



Graph II.1. Distribution of the 130 Sampling Points in Mexico. Source: LAPOP, 2004.

For the first stage of the sampling, electoral sections were stratified according to region of the country (north, center-west, center and south) and by type of locality (urban or rural). Subsequently, 130 sections were chosen randomly, systematically taking the size of their nominal electors' list into account.

Table II.I shows the number of sampling points surveyed by region of the country and type of locality. Graph II.2 shows a map illustrating geographically each of these regions and listing the states included in each one.

	Urban	Rural	Total
North	20	8	34
Center-West	16	9	25
Center	34	9	43
South	14	14	28
Total	90	40	130

Table II.1. Number of Sampling Points by Region. Mexico, 2006.

The second stage in the selection of the sample began once the interviewers traveled to the points surveyed, defined by the addresses where the polling places of each electoral section of the sample were located. To select a dwelling where the interview was to be held, interviewers walked in a spiral from the northwest point of the block and chose the domicile in a systematic random manner.



Graph II.2. Regions of the Country Used as Sampling Strata. Source: LAPOP, 2004.

Once the domicile was selected for an interview, the interviewer chose the person randomly, though he/she made sure each point surveyed met the two sample-correction parameters: distribution by sex and population age, previously defined according to the electoral listings provided by the Instituto Federal Electoral. This distribution is generated by population data from the 2000 census. This means that, at a given point in the process, after an initially random selection of regions, electoral districts, sampling points and households, the selection was guided by sample-correction quotas.

Table II.2 shows which informant selection quotas were followed during fieldwork. Each quota was randomly assigned among the 130 points surveyed in the sample. Graphs II.3 and II.4 illustrate the distribution of these two variables, sex and age, in the sample. In turn, Table II.3 compares distribution by sex and age of the 1,560 interviews with population parameters in accordance with the IFE 2003 listing.


	Quota 1 (65 sections)		Quota 2 (65 sections)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
18 a 29 years	3	2	2	3
30 a 49 years	2	3	3	2
50 years and up	1	1	1	1

Table II.2. Selection Quotas Applied in the Sampling by Gender and Age. Mexico, 2006.



Graph II.3. Gender Distribution of the Sample. Mexico, 2006.

The size of the sample is 1,560 interviews (n=1560). This number was defined as a function of the theoretical margin of error desired to obtain a reliable inference of nationwide results. In this case, the margin of theoretical error is +/-2.5 percent, with a confidence level of 95%




Graph II.4. Age Distribution of the Sample. Mexico, 2006.

	Population (Electoral Registry)	Sample
Gender		
Men	48.7	49.2
Women	51.3	50.7
Age		
18-29	32.2	35.9
30-49	43.5	44.5
50 or more	24.2	19.6

Table II.3. Gender and Age Distributions of the Sample Compared with Population Parameters. Mexico, 2006.

As can be seen in Graph II.5 and Table II.4, the survey on attitudes toward democracy done for this study varies little with regard to census parameters such as education, so that no weighting factor was used.



Graph II.5. Distribution of the Sample by Educational Level. Mexico, 2006.

	Population (INEGI)	Sample	Difference
Educational Level	%	%	
Did not attend school	8.7	5.2	-3.5
Primary School	37.1	32.2	-4.9
Junior High School	24.0	28.0	4.0
High School or Equivalent	16.7	22.0	5.3
University or More	13.6	12.6	-1.0

Table II.4. Comparison of Educational Levels in the Simple with Population Parameters. Mexico, 2006.

To see sample and population distributions for each state, see the methodological appendix at the end of the report.

III. Conceptions of Democracy

Mexico has undergone dramatic political transitions since 1968, culminating in the election of the PAN's Vicente Fox as president in 2000 (see Domínguez and Lawson, 2004), the first president from a party other than the PRI, and in the July 2006 election of Felipe Calderón as another PAN president. The latter election generated massive street protests orchestrated by the second-place candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

The fact that one party governed for 75 years and that the 2006 election was so strongly contested by the losing candidate raises the question of just how DO Mexicans understand democracy. Clearly, there would have been reason to suspect some popular confusion about the content attributed to the concept of democracy in Mexican political dialogue prior to 1997, when the PRI lost control of Congress for the first time, or before 2000, when the PRI first surrendered the presidency after electoral defeat.

Yet, as we shall see popular Mexican conceptions of democracy are now, in 2006, not greatly different from those of citizens elsewhere in the Americas.

In this study, an open ended question was used, along with precoded categorizations based on pretesting the questionnaire to assess how citizens understand democracy:

DEM13: *¿En pocas palabras, que significa para Usted la democracia? [Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.]*

To create a single variable out of the three items in the series, a final question was asked:


DEM13D *¿De estos significados de la democracia que Ud. ha dicho, en su opinión cual es el más importante?*

There were thirty five pre-established codes emerging from the pretests of this open-ended question, which fell into a number of overarching categories: (i) democracy has no significance; (ii) freedom (six different codes were listed under freedom); (iii) economic definitions (six different definitions entailing an economic definition were available); (iv) suffrage (four different codes entailing voting, elections or suffrage were available); (v) equality (six sub-definitions exist); (vi) participation (four specific definitions entailed some form of participation); (vii) a state of law (four specific definitions entail some reference to a state of law); (viii) non-military government; (ix) reference to the absence or war or invasions; (x) other unclassifiable responses; and (xi) "don't know" responses.

These thirty five different codes were reassigned by the LAPOP Central Office to four overarching categories: (A) **instrumental or utilitarian definitions of democracy**, which are based on assessments of economic (or less likely political outcomes); (B) **normative or axiomatic definitions of democracy**, which are based on a substantive understanding of processes or values associated with democracy, but which do not depend on satisfaction with immediate outcomes; (C) **pejorative or negative**

understandings of democracy, held by citizens who think that democracy is a bad idea; and (D) **empty conceptualizations of democracy**, which characterize those citizens who cannot attribute a substantive interpretation to the concept or say that democracy has no meaning. The smaller codes were reassigned and aggregated, such that twenty such codes constitute the larger normative/axiomatic category; five constitute the larger instrumental/utilitarian category; eight constitute the larger pejorative/negative category; and three combine to form the empty category.


So how are Mexican citizens distributed across these four conceptualizations of democracy? Graph III.1 indicates that by far the largest category is the normative or axiomatic understanding of democracy, which is based on a neutral or positive substantive understanding of democratic processes or values presumably associated with democracy. Some 69.4% of the Mexican population exhibits a normative understanding of democracy, while 22.8% display an “empty conceptualization” of the term, 4.0% a utilitarian conceptualization and 3.7% a negative understanding of the concept. What is quite striking in 2006 is the extent to which substantive understandings of democracy have diffused throughout the Mexican population. While comparable data are not available from earlier periods in time, the ratio of “normative” to “empty” conceptualizations might have been quite different, should Almond and Verba (1965) have been correct that Mexico represented only an “aspirant democratic culture” in the late 1950s.



Graph III.1. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy. Mexico, 2006.

Equally interesting is the composition of the answers that comprise the “normative understanding category” in Mexico. What kind of substance are citizens attributing to the concept of democracy?

Graph III.2 suggests that the most common conceptualization with the overarching normative understanding of democracy is, by far, a specification that democracy equals “freedom of expression,” offered by nearly three in ten respondents who exhibit a normative understanding of democracy. But roughly one in ten also exhibit an “unspecified” understanding of democracy as equaling “freedom,” while similar percentages of those with a normative understanding see democracy as “the right to choose our leaders” and as equality (with a specification of equality in which realm). And between five and six percent each indicate that democracy equals “voting” and “power of the people,” while just under five percent of those with normative conceptualizations see democracy as “free elections” or “respect for human rights.”



Graph III.2. Normative Conceptions of Democracy. Mexico, 2006.

While the frequency with which other conceptualizations are held is insufficient to warrant graphic breakdowns of each, it is noteworthy that the most common **negative** conceptualizations involve “disorder, a lack of justice or corruption” (29% of those with pejorative understandings of democracy) or “lack of work” (25.9%), while the most common **utilitarian conceptions** were mentions pertaining to “economic well-being, growth or progress” (44.4%), “greater opportunity to find jobs” (22.2%), or “economic freedom” (20.6%). But each of these two overarching conceptualizations entails no more than 4% of all Mexican citizens.

3.1 Explaining How Mexicans Understand Democracy

In addressing what factors produce these understandings of democracy, we will first generate a multinomial logistic regression which will be placed in the appendix to this chapter, but discussed verbally. Multinomial logistic regression assumes, in this case, that variables can be adduced to predict how three (nominal or “named” but non-quantitative variables) will compare with a fourth baseline category. In this case the baseline category will be that 69% of Mexicans who have a normative conception of democracy. And the predictor variables will be used to distinguish between the other those who conceptualize democracy as “instrumental,” “negative” or “empty” and those with a normative conceptualization. Six predictors are entered into an equation seeking to distinguish each of three conceptualizations from the baseline normative conceptualization: sex, age, education, wealth (measured in terms of possessions), urban/rural status, and city size.


Among those defining democracy in utilitarian terms, **only** wealth is a significant predictor of a difference from the incidence of normative conceptualizations. The best way to read Graph III.3 is to compare the same color-coded bar representing either the upper (light blue) or the lower half (dark blue) of the wealth distribution profile across the four conceptions of democracy.¹ Comparing the length of the dark blue bar (“higher wealth groups”) in the normative understandings category with that of the light blue bar in the utilitarian understandings category, the ratio is 27.5 to 1.0, while when comparing the light blue bars representing lower familial wealth the ratio is 13.1 to 1.0.² Hence, from the contrasting ratios readers can intuitively grasp the statistical significance of wealth as a factor distinguishing the probability of holding a utilitarian conception versus a normative conception of democracy. Although citizens at both levels of familial wealth are much more likely to hold a normative conceptualization of democracy than a utilitarian conception, the upper wealth group is disproportionately more likely to do so.

¹ The nine categories of the wealth distribution were divided into two roughly equal segments, the “upper half” encompassing four categories and 654 individuals, while the “lower half” entailed five categories and 891 cases. For this reason, the cumulative length of dark blue bars (“lower half”) is longer than the cumulative length of light blue bars (“upper half”). The total does not add to 1560 because a few individuals did not provide sufficient data on household possessions to allow the wealth variable to be calculated.

² Specific ratios are calculated from the same data used to generate the graph, but not presented here.

Similarly, among Mexicans who define democracy in negative terms, *only* wealth is a significant predictor of differences from those who define democracy normatively. Graph III.3 also show what is at play with the negative conceptualizations, once again by comparing the ratios of the lengths. Here the respective ratios are: 26.5 to 1.0 (dark blue bars) and 14 to 1.0 (light blue bars). Once again, although citizens at both levels of familial wealth are far more likely to envision democracy in normative than in negative terms, the higher wealth groups are, again, disproportionately more likely to do so than are the lower wealth groups.


Finally, regarding those with little or no substantive understanding of democracy, wealth provides similar predictive capacity. The reasoning is the same as in the other two understandings. Compare the ratios once again. The ratio of those who hold normative conceptions of democracy to those who exhibit empty conceptions is 4.4 to 1.0 among individuals of greater familial wealth (dark blue bars), while among those from families of lesser wealth (light blue bars) to ratio of normative understandings of democracy to empty understandings in only 2.2 to 1.0. So lower levels of wealth correspond to a greater probability (although less than half) that an individual will have an empty, rather than normative, understanding of democracy.



Graph III.3 Conceptions of Democracy by Wealth (Possessions). Mexico

Source:
LAPOP 2006


With regard to empty conceptualizations, however, there are four additional variables that predict a differentiation from the baseline of normative conceptions of democracy. The first is gender. As Graph III.4 illustrates, by comparing the ratios across categories, that women, while still more likely to hold normative conceptions of democracy than empty conceptions (light blue bars, ratio of 2.4 to 1.0) exhibit a lower ratio favoring normative conceptualizations than do men (dark blue bars, ratio of 4.0 to 1.0).



III.4. Conceptions of Democracy by Gender. Mexico, 2006.


Graph III.5 illustrates the findings about the effects of education. In this graph, there are more bars to compare, with each color-coded bar representing an educational level. For example, the lightest-colored bars represent those with a university education, which is why such bars are lower than other bars, i.e., university-educated people still comprise only about 12.5% of the population. Comparing the length of the university bar in the normative conception of democracy category with the length of the university bar in the empty conception of democracy category, one can see that the ratio is approximately 20 times longer in the normative category. Hence, university-educated Mexicans are far more likely to hold a normative conception of democracy than an empty conception

thereof. However, in comparing the second-darkest bars, which represent those with a grade school education, we see that the ratio is approximately 1.7 to 1.0, with normative conceptions still being more common than empty conceptions of democracy. The net effect of education is to increase the “bias toward” a normative understanding of democracy, since the ratio of normative to empty conceptions goes up from 1.7:1 among those with grade school educations to 20:1 among those with university educations.




Graph III.5. Conceptions of Democracy by Educational Level. Mexico, 2006.

Next consider the effect of urban versus rural residence. In comparing the columns in Graph III.6 we would find that the ratio of the length of the dark blue column, representing urban residents, in the normative conception category to the light blue column in the empty category is 3.3 to 1. However, among rural residents, represented by the dark blue column, the bias in favor of normative conceptions over empty conceptions is only 2.3 to 1. Therefore, urban environments produce a stronger preference for normative over empty conceptions of democracy than do rural environments.



Graph III.6. Conceptions of Democracy by Type of Locality. Mexico, 2006.

Not surprisingly, city size also has an impact on which conception of democracy is most likely, although in a more complicated way than one might have expected. The proper reading of Graph III.7 is, once again, a comparison. When one compares the length of the appropriately color-coded lines with each other, it turns out that the ratio most favorable to normative conceptions of democracy over empty conceptions (5.4 to 1) is in small towns (second to lightest colored bars), while the ratios least favorable to normative conceptions over empty conceptions are in large cities (2.5 to 1 comparing second to darkest bars) and in rural areas (2.6 to 1 comparing lightest colored bars). Graph III.7 provides a dab of evidence that, as far as enhancing the probability of a normative understanding of democracy goes, small towns represent propitious environments



Graph III.7. Conceptions of Democracy by Size of City. Mexico, 2006.

3.2 Mexican Conceptions in Comparative Perspective

This study makes use of the surveys conducted by LAPOP for other countries in the region. In several of the chapters there are graphs presenting the results obtained from the other countries. In all instances of the use of data from other countries, the pooled sample is “weighted.” We did this because in some of the countries the sample sizes were much larger than others and because in two countries, specifically Ecuador and Bolivia, the sample themselves were weighted (see the country reports for those two cases for a full explanation). Hence, in Ecuador and Bolivia the samples were circa 3,000, while in the other countries the samples were about half that size. Thus the pooled sample produced a weighted file in which each country has a sample of 1,500. These weights do not affect in any way the means reported in the studies, but to produce correct means for Bolivia and Ecuador, the samples must be weighted. They do, however, affect the confidence intervals reported. In almost every case the weighted sample is smaller


than the actual sample, thus the confidence intervals reported are wider than they would have been without the weighting. This means that our results are actually a bit more precise than is displayed in these charts for nearly all of the countries, except for Bolivia and Ecuador, where the actual data are far more precise than shown here. In effect, the report uses a conservative estimate of confidence intervals for the pooled data set.

Given Mexico's long history of one-party rule, followed by a political opening in the last quarter century, it is intriguing to consider how Mexicans compare with citizens of other countries in Latin America and the English-speaking Caribbean with regard to the distribution of normative versus other conceptions of democracy. One could hypothesize, as Almond and Verba (1965) would have done forty two years ago that Mexican political culture is merely "aspirant" – implying that elites would have led any transition to democracy while mass political culture "trailed behind."

The data in Graph III.8 certainly suggest that the Mexican public is among the most advanced in the region in acquiring normative conceptions of democracy. Mexicans rank just below Chileans and Costa Ricans.³ Both Chile and Costa Rica are at 76% normative conceptions, while Mexico follows in third place at 69%, all considerably above the lowest such incidence, 51% in El Salvador. This is one among a number of indications in this study that Mexican political culture is, indeed, quite compatible with and supportive of democratic governance in 2006.⁴

³ While not considering internal differentiation among conceptions of democracy, other studies have also found both countries to rank ahead of Mexico in terms of citizen preference for democracy over other forms of government. See Seligson (2001: 91).

⁴ Indeed, some scholars have long questioned the Almond-Verba interpretation of Mexico as an aspiring democratic culture, arguing that the limitations were an authoritarian one-party system, closed by political elites who were not responsive to citizens and in which the source of "imbalance" between culture and structures may have come from authoritarian elites rather than from imperfections of the citizenry (Davis and Coleman, 1975). Recent scholarship, however, suggests that Mexican elites may well now be among the more tolerant among democracies in the region (Stevens, Bishin and Barr, 2006).



Graph III.8. Relative Frequency of Normative Conceptions of Democracy by Country. LAPOP, 2006.

These data may suggest, indirectly, why the highly contentious Mexican presidential election of 2006 did not descend into a greater degree of national trauma than, in fact, occurred.⁵ Political culture in Mexico now appears to be more fully centered on democracy as process. Some Mexicans focus on *elections* as a process crucial to democracy, while even more focus on *freedom of expression*. Both values have been on exhibit in the political processes of 2006-2007, during which an extraordinarily close presidential election was followed by massive street protests by a losing party. An electoral process of increasing credibility in recent decades has been put to the test by the most vociferous exercise of free expression in a post-election environment. Some decades ago, Mexico would have enjoyed neither close elections nor such boisterous freedom of expression. In 1968, for example, anti-regime protests led to a massive use of force against protestors. The political cultures of both elites and masses in Mexico appear to have changed and to guide behavior even in highly conflictual situations. Democracy is, after all, a set of procedures for addressing and resolving conflict. Both contested

⁵ The use of state violence to dislodge protestors from the streets of Oaxaca, after a disputed gubernatorial election there, however, leads one to appreciate that tolerance of political dissent has its limits in the new Mexico. See SourceMex, September 13, 2006. Available for paid subscribers at <http://ladb.unm.edu/sourcemex/>

elections where the outcome is in doubt and freedom of expression are crucial to the procedural essence of democracy. Mexicans most frequently define democracy as entailing one or the other of those conditions. And those beliefs seem to inform their behaviors in 2006-2007.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTER

Regression III.1

Alternative Conceptions of Democracy: Logistic Regression								95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
		B	Error típ.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower Limit	Upper Limit
0 Negative	Intercept	-2,623	1,008	6,772	1	0,009			
	Q1	0,111	0,273	0,166	1	0,684	1,118	0,654	1,909
	Q2	0,017	0,010	2,638	1	0,104	1,017	0,997	1,037
	ED	-0,021	0,041	0,263	1	0,608	0,979	0,905	1,060
	Wealth	-0,206	0,087	5,683	1	0,017	0,813	0,686	0,964
	UR	0,272	0,405	0,452	1	0,501	1,313	0,594	2,904
	City Size	-0,086	0,118	0,535	1	0,464	0,917	0,727	1,156
1 Empty	Intercept	0,659	0,486	1,837	1	0,175			
	Q1	0,364	0,131	7,709	1	0,005	1,440	1,113	1,862
	Q2	-0,004	0,005	0,539	1	0,463	0,996	0,986	1,006
	ED	-0,177	0,021	69,839	1	0,000	0,838	0,804	0,874
	Wealth	-0,100	0,041	5,958	1	0,015	0,905	0,835	0,980
	UR	0,417	0,201	4,315	1	0,038	1,517	1,024	2,247
	City Size	-0,276	0,056	23,982	1	0,000	0,759	0,680	0,848
2 Utilitarian	Intercept	-2,551	0,965	6,988	1	0,008			
	Q1	-0,020	0,265	0,006	1	0,939	0,980	0,583	1,646
	Q2	0,011	0,010	1,194	1	0,275	1,011	0,991	1,031
	ED	0,004	0,039	0,009	1	0,926	1,004	0,930	1,084
	Wealth	-0,229	0,084	7,508	1	0,006	0,795	0,675	0,937
	UR	0,590	0,388	2,313	1	0,128	1,803	0,844	3,854
	City Size	-0,116	0,116	1,011	1	0,315	0,890	0,709	1,117

Multinomial Regression Equation for Comparison of Determinants of Utilitarian, Negative and Empty Conceptions of Democracy Against Normative Category

IV. Democratic Stability

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has, since its inception, focused on two attitudinal orientations as crucial to the emergence of a political culture supportive of stable democracy. Those two orientations are *system support* – the kind of support for institutions and processes of governance that sustain citizens through short-term disappointments with distributive and policy outcomes – and *tolerance*, which is crucial to interaction of citizens in an atmosphere of democratic equality and to the preservation of those rights of minorities which are essential to making democratic rule indeterminate.

In one recent formulation of conditions essential to democracy, Linz and Stepan hold that the electoral game must become “the only game in town” for determining who governs. Certainly political elites – those who contest for power – must accept electoral competition as “the only game in town,” but so must normal citizens, whose role in the process is only occasional and often limited to electoral review and choice between competing political parties. If the temptation to determine who governs by non-electoral mechanisms proves to be widespread in a culture, it is difficult to imagine democratic institutions being sustained over the long term (Linz and Stepan, 1996:3). In a democracy, outcomes must be in doubt, and there must be structured processes for rotating elites. But the losers must accept defeat because they are committed to the processes by which elite rotation occurs.¹

However, tolerance is also crucial to democracy. Without tolerance, institutions cannot resolve conflict. Democracy can become the only game in town because no result of electoral competition, no decision taken by government, will be seen as determinative for all time. Additional decisions with differing results can always be made in a democracy. In one sense, the beauty of democracy is that the stakes are lowered, since most decisions are provisional. Conflict persists, to be sure. But few decisions are all-important. Additionally, the “teams are fluid.” The losers in today’s conflict may be winners in the conflict of tomorrow by recruiting some members of other teams. But in order for such fluidity to exist – certain basic rights must be accorded to and protected for minorities – freedom of speech, expression, assembly and association. Those rights for minorities are essential to their becoming a majority at a future point in time. Without widespread tolerance for those who are unpopular today, new majorities could not be constructed in the future. And without the possibility of constructing new majorities, democracy would not be indeterminate – it would not produce the contingent outcomes which lower the stakes for political teams.

¹ Acceptance of defeat because of support for institutional electoral processes is precisely what Andrés Manuel López Obrador rejected after the 2006 election. López Obrador’s refusal to concede defeat has sparked controversy inside his own PRD and especially among the public at large. See *SourceMex*, 17, 35 (September 20, 2006) and Consulta Mitofsky (September 2006). A survey by the Mitofsky organization was done between September 8-12 among a national level survey of 1,200 persons and reports that 64.5% of Mexicans believed that Felipe Calderón should be accepted as president, while 31.1% did not.

For these reasons, then, LAPOP has, for a decade, examined the combination of political tolerance and system support as being particularly important to the construction of a political culture supportive of democracy.

4.1. Political Tolerance in Mexico

As in past studies sponsored by LAPOP, four questions have been used to create a scale of political tolerance. Each question is introduced by a common background reference to a hypothetical kind of person who criticizes not only a given government in Mexico (and other LAPOP countries), but also criticizes the system of government itself. Subsequently, respondents are asked about whether such persons should be allowed to engage in a variety of political acts, using a ten point scale express disagreement or agreement with extending political rights to such a group. The ten point scale is the following:

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en México. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

Thereafter, questions are asked about allowing such people to vote (D1), participate in political demonstrations (D2), run for office (D3) and give televised speeches (D4). The specific text of these questions is below:

D1. *Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas?*


D2. *¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.*

D3. *¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?*

D4. *¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?*

The levels of tolerance in Mexico for political dissidents are quite stable between 2004 and 2006, as can be seen in Graph IV.1. Tolerance for all four types of political participation (by those who speak poorly of the Mexican system) exceeds 50% and no such level of tolerance has varied by more than 3.5% between 2004 and 2006. Tolerance for two types of political participation by dissidents has gone up (voting and participation in peaceful demonstrations) very slightly, while tolerance for two other types of

participation (running for office and giving speeches on TV) has decreased by slightly greater margins.




Graph IV.1. Tolerance of Political Activity by System-Opposing Groups. Mexico, 2004 – 2006.

4.1.1 A Comparative View of Political Tolerance

When the four items are combined into an index ranging from 0 (representing a situation in which all Mexican citizens would deny these four political rights to dissidents) and 100 (when all Mexican citizens would extend these four political rights to dissidents), the score on combined index would be 56.2 in 2006 (down slightly from 57.5 in 2006).

The 56.2 score for Mexico is exceeded by only five countries in the LAPOP 2006 data set: Jamaica (72.7), Costa Rica (62.2), Haiti (62.1), the Dominican Republic (58.9), and barely by Chile (56.3). Mexico's relatively high ranking on political tolerance is

remarkable, given that Costa Rica and Chile are among the Latin American states with the longest history of democracy (albeit Chile's was interrupted for 17 years), and that Jamaica has a long history of partisan alteration in government in the English-speaking Caribbean. Even the Dominican Republic has a history of partisan alternation in governance that is longer than Mexico's. Mexico's emergence, therefore, as a relatively tolerant political culture is striking, especially when considered in comparison to certain Andean and Central American countries where the level of measured political tolerance is much lower.



Graph IV.2. Average Political Tolerance Score by Country. LAPOP, 2006.

4.1.2 Explaining Political Tolerance in Mexico


Using linear regression to predict variation in levels of political tolerance in Mexico produces some intriguing insights (see chapter appendix for regression results). Nine variables are found to be significant predictors of tolerance for political activity by dissidents (at the conventional $p < .05$ level). Those include: (i) household wealth (individuals from wealthier households are more tolerant); (ii) sex (men are more tolerant); (iii) city size (residents of rural areas or smaller cities are more tolerant); (iv) life satisfaction (less satisfied individuals are more tolerant); (v) having a sense of oneself as *not being corrupt* (those with that sense are more tolerant); (vi) having *a sense that others are corrupt* (those least likely to see other as “clean” tend to be more tolerant); (vii) those that attend political party or political movement meetings with greater frequency are more tolerant; but, curiously, (viii) those who attend parents association meetings frequently tend to be *less tolerant*, as do (ix) those who attend union meetings frequently (frequent union meeting attenders are *less tolerant*). Clearly, not all organizations in civil society are equally conducive to the emergence of a culture supportive of a democratic polity. And not all desired conditions in life co-vary, i.e., one can be satisfied with one’s life and still be relatively politically intolerant.

A few of these findings deserve additional comment. Given a long history of corporatist linkage to the once-dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional, many labor unions in Mexico might be in a defensive posture by 2006. The opening of the economy of since the 1990s and the decline of PRI-dominance has led some unions to face pressures not previously experienced. That may lead to intolerant behaviors by labor union members. Indeed, some aspects of the once-authoritarian nature of state-sponsored labor unions may persist and encourage intolerant behaviors (see Davis and Coleman, 1986). Similarly, parents who attend parents’ association meetings may be especially assertive parents in seeking to advance the interests of their children and, as such, less tolerant of those whose views or whose interests differ. Perhaps the most surprisingly significant finding is that those who see others as being more corrupt are likely to be more politically tolerant. While the proper interpretation of this result is not obvious, it may reflect a kind of “resigned to the imperfections of human nature” quality of those who are politically most tolerant.

If one relaxes the criterion of political significance (to $p < .10$), then two other variables would be construed as significant: (x) political knowledge (those who know more about politics are more tolerant); and, again somewhat surprisingly, (xi) those who *have not* contributed to neighborhood solutions are politically more tolerant than are those who have. Again, the latter tendency surprises, but may result from the frustrations of genuinely democratic problem-solving. Working with one’s neighbors on how best to address common problems need not necessarily lead to greater tolerance for others.

Illustrative of one of the bivariate relationships that proves to be statistically significant when holding other variables constant is that seen in Graph IV.3. This graph illustrates how the frequency of attendance at union meetings is a negative correlate of political

tolerance. While the error bars are large in this case, due to the finite number of individuals who attend union meetings regularly, the findings still hold up in multivariate analysis.



Graph IV.3. The Negative Effects of Attending Union Meetings on Political Tolerance. Mexico, 2006.

A more complete list of the variables entered into a multiple regression equation producing the results above can be found in Regression IV.1 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

4.2. Socio-Political Tolerance

Another way to examine tolerance in Mexico is to consider whether homosexuals should be allowed to run for office. As in many Western societies, homosexuality has become a much more visible social phenomenon in Mexico, as movements have emerged seeking legal protections and rights for gay and lesbians – both as singles and as partners.

However, the on-going World Values Study suggests that Mexico has not progressed as far as have some other societies in moving toward a post-materialist culture in which self-expression (of homosexuals, among others) prevails over classic materialist values, such as concern for economic well-being. For example, in a recent compilation of results in 43 countries for the years 1990-1993, Mexico ranked 14th among the 43 countries in the percentage of citizens indicating that they would NOT like to have a homosexual as a neighbor (60%). Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Portugal and Spain all ranked lower on this indicator of social intolerance. In terms of the percentage indicating that “homosexuality could *never* be justified,” Mexico ranked 24th of 43 societies, with 58% saying “never justifiable” in Mexico, comparable to the 57% recorded in the United States. On this measure, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Portugal all had higher percentages indicating that homosexuality could never be justified. Yet, as a religiously conservative society, Mexico ranked 10th of the 43 societies in indicating that it was appropriate for churches to speak out on homosexuality, with 60% indicating approval. On this measure, only Chile ranked above Mexico among Latin nations, but Argentina was tied at 60% (Inglehart, Basáñez and Moreno, 1998: V80;V307;V163).


More than a decade has passed since those data were collected, but they illustrate that about 60% of Mexicans expressed serious reservations about homosexuality as a “post-materialist self-expressive value.” While LAPOP does not directly ask about homosexuality per se, the 2006 survey did include, for the first time, this question:

D5. *Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?*

In Graph IV.4, we see that a good number of Mexicans do not favor homosexuals running for office. One in five (20%) give the lowest possible rating (1) on a ten-point scale, where low ratings indicate total disapproval. The mean score is 5.54 on the ten point scale. But the second most common score is a 10, a judgment indicating complete approval of homosexuals running for office and one which 15.4% of Mexicans render in 2006. On the issue of homosexuality in public life, Mexico remains a polarized society, although the 2006 data suggest movement toward acceptance over the past decade. If we take 5.54 as the midpoint, above which some measure of approval exists, then some 51.5% of the Mexicans who express opinions on this issue (5.1% didn’t do so) take a view expressing a measure of socio-political tolerance on homosexuality,² a percentage

² If we include that 5.1%, then 49.0% of Mexicans express socio-political tolerance of homosexuality in 2006.

greater than the 40% figure that seemed to emerge consistently in the early 1990s. And, indeed, Mexico ranks as the single most tolerant polity among LAPOP countries studied in 2006 on this issue, with only Chile (at an average rating of 5.40) approximating the Mexican average. The average ratings on approval of homosexuals running for office were under 3 on the same ten point scale in the least tolerant societies, such as Honduras (2.68) and Jamaica (2.78).³



Graph IV.4. “And, now, changing the theme and thinking about homosexuals, to what degree would you approve or disapprove of permitting such people to run for political office?” Mexico, 2006.

³ These data are from analyses not shown in a table. Other average scores include: Costa Rica (4.73); Panamá (4.53); Colombia (4.49); Perú (4.15); Guatemala (4.08); Bolivia (3.99); Nicaragua (3.92); Ecuador (3.84); República Dominicana (3.22) and El Salvador (3.00).

4.3. Support for the Political System

For forty years, political scientists have focused on the concept of diffuse regime support, dating back to Easton's seminal (1965) work and the classic Almond-Verba (1963) five-nation study. The fundamental idea was that stable democratic polities cannot emerge and be sustained unless a type of citizen support emerges that transcends satisfaction or dissatisfaction with immediate political outcomes. All citizens in democratic polities will confront disappointment with political decisions or outcomes on some occasions. But in a system based on the consent of the government, support must exist for the procedures by which decision-makers are selected and the processes by which governance occurs. Since such support is tied **not** to specific outcomes of the political process, and may even coexist with discontent with specific outcomes, it was denoted initially as *diffuse regime support*, with the concept of "regime" referring to a set of operating rules and procedures (which might be formal or informal).

Over the years, much attention has been devoted to the measurement of diffuse regime support. LAPOP takes off on the pioneering work on Seligson and colleagues (Seligson, 1983; Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982; Muller, Seligson and Turan, 1987) and uses a six-item sequence of questions, each of which uses the following seven-point scale.

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada				Mucho			No sabe

And thereafter, each of six political subjects are assessed using that seven point scale, five of which deal with political institutions or processes, and one deals with affect toward the larger national community.

B1. *¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de México garantizan un juicio justo?*

B2. *¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de México?*

B3. *¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político mexicano?*


B4. *¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano?*

B6. *¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político mexicano?*

B43. *¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser mexicano?*

The distribution of mean support scores in Mexico in 2006 and 2004 is indicated in Graph IV.5 on a measurement scale that has been transformed into 0 [where all citizens would be giving the most negative assessments] to 100 metric [where all citizens would be giving the most positive evaluations]. Note that there has been a trend toward increasing political support in Mexico, especially on three of the measures comprising the diffuse support scale: B2 (respect for political institutions), B4 (pride in living under the Mexican political system): and B43 (pride in being Mexican). However, the other three measures also held steady between 2004 and 2006. One suspects that this pattern of overall improvement in political support may represent a growth in belief in the genuinely democratic character of Mexican politics, given the rotation in governing party that occurred with the presidential election of 2000 and the very competitive election of 2006.⁴ While there is ample reason for Mexicans to be disappointed in specific aspects of the performance of the administration of Vicente Fox (whose *Partido Acción Nacional* did not control a majority in Congress), growth of support for the larger political system was visible late in the Fox years.


⁴ Of course, post-election controversy in 2006 may erode those recent gains in future years.



Graph IV.5. Average Support Levels for Political Institutions. México, 2004 – 2006.

4.3.1 A Comparative View of Political Support

The growth of system support in Mexico is quite dramatic, both from an historical perspective – especially for those who remember the tragic political protests and ensuing deaths of 1968 – and from a comparative perspective. Graph IV.6 presents comparative data on system support from the countries under study in LAPOP in 2004 and 2006. Here it can be seen that in 2006 Mexico ranks second in political support among the fifteen countries under study with a mean score of 60.8, having increased from a mean of 58.4 in 2004. Mexico is second only to Costa Rica, whose mean score is 64.0 in 2006, but which has eroded from 2004 (67.6). And the Mexican support score is considerably higher than the lowest of countries, which are in the upper 30% or 40% range.




Graph IV.6. Average Level of Political Support among LAPOP Countries. 2006.

4.3.2 Explaining Political Support in Mexico

A multiple regression analysis identifies five statistically significant predictive correlates of the level of political support in Mexico. Statistically significant predictors (at the conventional level of $p < .05$) include: (i) living in a non-urban community; (ii) having been exposed to fewer types of corruption in the past year; (iii) not having been a victim of a crime in the past year; (v) believing in the efficacy of the current administration; and (v) being satisfied with the services of local government. By far the strongest relationship is between belief in the efficacy of the current government and system support (Beta = .440), while the second strongest relationship is between satisfaction with the services of local government and system support (Beta = .161). Additionally, by


relaxing the criterion for determining statistical significance to $p < .10$, one would identify (vi) political knowledge; (vii) reading about current events in the newspaper and (viii) *not having contributed* to the solution of neighborhood problems as additional predictors of system support. The latter relationship may seem surprising, but might be indicative of individuals “taking problem solving into their own hands after having despaired of governmental inaction.” If so, it would be comprehensible that those who have contributed to neighborhood efforts to solve problems might be less supportive of the political system.

Illustrative of two strong predictors of political support in Mexico are the results presented in Graphs IV.7 and IV.8. Graph IV.7 illustrates how having been a victim of a crime in the past twelve months erodes political support. Those who have been exposed to crime have an average political support score of only 55.8 (on a 100 point scale) versus an average score of 62.1 among those not exposed to a criminal act in the past year.



Graph IV.7. Effect of Having Been a Crime Victim on Political Support. Mexico, 2006.

Graph IV.8 illustrates an even more dramatic effect of how a sense of government efficacy generates strong political support. Efficacy consists of high evaluations on a seven point scale (1-7) on how the government is doing in a number of performance areas: (i) combating poverty, (ii) promoting and protecting democratic principles, (iii) combating corruption in the government, (iv) protecting human rights, (v) improving security for citizens, and (v) combating unemployment. These are all found in the sequence of questions which start with an N in the 2006 LAPOP questionnaire (see appendix). As mentioned above, the sense of having an efficacious government is the strongest predictor of political support. Among Mexican citizens who see their government as efficacious (defined as above the mean of such perceptions) the average level of political support is 68.6 (on a 100 point scale), while the average level of political support among those under the mean sense of governmental efficaciousness is only 53.0.



Graph IV.8. Effect of the Sense of Governmental Efficacy on Support for the Political System. Mexico, 2006.

A more complete list of the variables entered into a multiple regression equation producing the results above can be found in Regression IV.2 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

4.4. Support for Stable Democracy In Mexico

There is ample reason for Mexican citizens to be discontented with specific instances of governmental malfunctioning and with specific policy outcomes. For example, in Chapter 5 it will be seen that Mexico leads most other LAPOP countries in 2006 in terms of exposure to corrupt acts – the soliciting of bribes – by public officials in the past year. At 37.1%, the Mexican total is roughly four times that of Chile (9.4%). Additionally, Chapter 6 will report Mexico ranks third among the LAPOP countries in terms of the percentage of citizens reporting that they have been subjected to a crime in the past twelve months. While most crimes have not been violent, self-reports of exposure to crime in Mexico have grown by three points since 2004. So with government unable to guarantee the sanctity of property and person in Mexico, and with over a third of citizens having been exposed to the solicitation of a bribe by a public official in the past year, it is remarkable that so many Mexicans exhibit political tolerance and support their political system.

The combination of high political tolerance and a high degree of political support are the conditions most conducive to stable democracy. In 2006, as in 2004, the percentage of Mexicans who exhibit those two traits concurrently is 41%. Indeed, while exposure to both corruption and crime has seemingly grown in Mexico between 2004 and 2006, system support remains high and has even grown (from 58.4% to 60.8%) over the same years, a statistically significant increase.⁵ Hence, while there was reason for specific support to decline, diffuse support has inched upwards. That upwards trend was sufficient to counterbalance the slight erosion in political tolerance that occurred in Mexico (down from 57.5% in 2004 to 56.2% in 2006), leaving the proportion who exhibit both high diffuse support and high political tolerance essentially unchanged at 41.1%.⁶

Interestingly, those who are high on tolerance but low on system support (the “unstable democracy” cell in Table IV.1) declined from 21.1% in 2004 to 16.6% in 2006, while those who are high on system support but low on tolerance (the “authoritarian stability” cell in Table IV.1) increased from 23.2% in 2004 to 29.2% in 2006. The proportion in the “democratic breakdown” cell in Table IV.1 remained very similar at 14.4% in 2004 versus 13.1% in 2006.

Given a close and hotly contested presidential election in 2006, the extent to which Mexico’s political culture is truly supportive of a stable democracy was put to the test in the second half of the year. On-going street protests of the official count of the presidential election by one groups of partisans, PRDistas, required tolerance from supporters (largely PANistas) of the officially declared victor, Felipe Calderón, and from another group of apparent losers, i.e., the supporters of the PRI. In order to sustain the announced outcome of the electoral process, support for procedures and institutions was

⁵ An analysis of variance on a difference of means test yields an estimated significance of $p = .02$.

⁶ A similar difference of means analysis indicates that the decrease in political tolerance between 2004 and 2005 is *not* statistically significant.

required, since the protestors argued that electoral fraud had occurred.⁷ The 41% who exhibited attitudinal orientations supportive of stable democracy in Mexico in June 2006 (the time of the LAPOP survey) must surely have played a role in mitigating post-election conflict, driven by the discontent of the 36% who voted for Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Had political tolerance between much less widely distributed and system support been much lower, the possibility of violent conflict would surely have been higher in late 2006. Regardless of whether the 2006 electoral results were correctly counted or not, it is remarkable that Mexico did not descend into a 1968-style conflict. That it did not may in some part be a result of the emergence of a political culture supportive of democracy.

	High Political Tolerance		Low Political Tolerance	
	2004	2006	2004	2006
High System Support	Stable Democracy		Authoritarian Stability	
	41.3%	41.1%	23.2%	29.2%
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy		Democratic Breakdown	
	21.1%	16.6%	14.4%	13.1%

Table IV.1. Support for Stable Democracy in Mexico: 2004 - 2006


4.4.1 A Comparative Perspective on Support for Stable Democracy

As noted above, given the incidence of certain negative outcomes (exposure to crime) and negative experiences (exposure to corrupt public officials) in Mexico, it is seemingly remarkable that as many as 41% of Mexican citizens exhibit attitudes consistent with a stable democratic polity. Even more remarkable is where that proportion places Mexico in comparative terms (see Graph IV.9). Only Costa Rica, at 49.8%, exceeds Mexico in the proportion of citizens exhibiting such attitudes among 2006 LAPOP countries. By contrast, the proportion of citizens high on system support and high on political tolerance ranges only between 11.9% and 21.2% in three Andean countries, less than half the Mexican proportion. Mexico's second place finish among LAPOP countries in 2006 was, in fact, mirrored among a smaller set (10) of LAPOP countries in 2004. So Mexico would today seem to be less an "aspirant democratic culture"⁸ than are most other Latin American countries, and maybe not too distant from consolidating a democratic culture. While Costa Rica certainly does not represent a gold standard for cultures supportive of stable democracy, the Costa Rican example has long been held up as a country where

⁷ Another hotly contested election in the state of Chiapas came a few weeks after the presidential election, this time with the PRD as the apparent victor in a gubernatorial race, while the PAN supported an electoral challenge mounted by the PRI candidate who finished a close second. See *SourceMex*, 17, 31 (August 23, 2006). Accessible for paid subscribers at <http://ladb.unm.edu/sourcemex/>

⁸ The phrase was used by Almond and Verba (1963) to contrast Mexico with four, seemingly more fully established, democracies, based on national surveys done in the late 1950s.

democratic institutions are valued by citizens.⁹ Mexico has a ways to go to reach the Costa Rican standard. But no other LAPOP country is closer.



Graph IV.9. Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy Among LAPOP Countries. 2006.

4.5 Conclusions

For seventy-five years, Mexico's one-party polity was *sui generis* in Latin America. While opposition candidates often alleged that the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* sustained its electoral majorities by coercion and fraud, creative clientelism was perhaps a more compelling explanation of the PRI's remarkable longevity in power. And so was

⁹ Recent events in which three ex-presidents have found themselves in legal trouble may have given Costa Ricans reason to doubt the quality of their leadership, but, given that all were subject to legal proceedings, may also have solidified the sense that "no individual is beyond the law," a belief helpful to democracy.

as sense of powerlessness. Based on a 1969 survey, Coleman (1972:32) found that in Mexico City, if “confronted by a candidate for the PRI that they didn’t like,” nearly half (48%) the residents of the capital city would simply abstain (out of a belief that an opponent could not win) and a small number (3%) would even have voted for a PRI candidate they disliked, while 17% could not begin to envision what they would do. The competitive political environment of Mexico in 2006 is political light-years away from such a situation. Mexicans now have an ample array of political choices grouped in three “party families” on the left, center and right, and they avail themselves of those options. Mexican citizens no longer feel powerless in electoral competition and they have certainly come to believe that elections matter. As seen in this chapter, nearly 70% of Mexicans support their political institutions. Later, in Chapter 6 (Graph VI.5), data are presented indicating that the Federal Electoral Institute was one of the more respected institutions in public life in the country, at least going into the disputed 2006 elections.

Coleman (1972: 35-44) also found that support for civil liberties, measured in a fashion roughly comparable to the measurement of political tolerance in the 2006 LAPOP study, was more limited in 1969. Today’s levels of political tolerance in Mexico seem higher than they were in earlier decades.¹⁰

To be sure, politically intolerant Mexicans still exist in 2006. And disappointed partisans have severely questioned the integrity of Mexico’s electoral institutions in 2006. So political support may have eroded in the post-election environment, an erosion that could only be captured by additional survey research. Additionally, Mexicans have a sizable number of distressing experiences with corrupt public officials. Yet, in spite of all that, the number of Mexicans expressing attitudes consistent with a stable democracy may be consolidating at a level far beyond what would have been the case in the 1960s or 1970s. Mexico’s political culture appears to be among those in Latin America and the Caribbean currently most supportive of democratic political life. This is a remarkable phenomenon. It is one of the most striking findings in LAPOP 2006.

¹⁰ For example, in Coleman’s 1969 survey in Mexico City, only 49% of respondents indicated that they believed that “counter-revolutionary parties” should be allowed to hold elective office, while in the 2006 LAPOP study 57% of a national sample held that “those who speak against our system of government” should be allowed to run for public office.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTER

Regression IV.1 Determinants of Tolerance for Political Activity by Dissidents

Determinants of Tolerance for Political Activity by Dissidents					
Linear regression					
Predictor	B	S.E.	Standard -ized Beta	t	Signifi- cance
Household Possessions [Sum of R series]	.734	.325	.073	2.261	.024
Education (in years) [ED]	.082	.215	.013	.382	.702
Age (years) [Q2]	-.027	.054	-.014	-.495	.621
Sex (dummy) [Q1R]	3.794	1.440	.073	2.636	.008
<i>Political Knowledge [Conpol]</i>	.063	.035	<i>.054</i>	1.791	<i>.073</i>
City Size - DF High [TamanoR]	-1.054	.510	-.060	-2.067	.039
Victim of Crime in Past Year [vic1r]	.028	.017	.044	1.592	.112
Life Satisfaction [LS3]	-2.000	.936	-.057	-2.136	.033
<i>Contributed to Neighborhood Solutions [CP5rev]</i>	-2.957	1.532	<i>-.053</i>	-1.930	<i>.054</i>
Frequency Attend PTA [CP7rev]	-1.026	.752	-.038	-1.363	.173
Frequency Attend Union Meetings [CP10rev]	-4.759	1.546	-.084	-3.077	.002
Frequency Attend Political Party Meetings [CP13rev]	2.463	1.114	.061	2.211	.027
Self Corruption (1 is corrupt, 10 is clean) [Mex28]	1.632	.466	.116	3.506	.000
Other Corrupt (1 is corrupt, 10 is clean) [Mex29]	-.830	.411	-.066	-2.019	.044
Constant	53.562	.5720		9.379	.000

Dependent Variable: Tol
Adjusted R² = .036; Males = 1; Females = 0

Regression IV.2 Determinants of Political Support


Determinants of Political Support Linear regression					
Predictor	B	S.E.	Standard -ized Beta	t	Signifi- cance
Household Possessions [Sum of R series]	.182	.218	.023	.834	.404
Education (in years) [ED]	.016	.046	.003	.108	.914
Age (years) [Q2]	.057	.036	.039	1.578	.115
Sex [Q1dummy]	-.885	.953	-.022	-.929	.353
<i>Political Knowledge [Conpol]</i>	.044	.024	.048	1.852	.064
City Size – DF High [TamanoR]	-.938	.341	-.068	-2.756	.006
Total Number of Manners in Which Has Been Extorted in Past Year [EXCTOTR]	-1.081	.451	-.055	-2.377	.018
Victim of Crime in Past Year [vic1r]	-.024	.012	-.047	-1.986	.047
Efficacy of Current Government [EFICGOV]	6.236	.331	.440	18.818	.000
<i>Contributed to Neighborhood Solutions [CP5rev]</i>	-1.741	1.016	-.039	-1.714	.087
Satisfaction with Services of Municipal Government [SGL1R]	3.401	.486	.161	6.993	.000
Political Tolerance [TOL]	.025	.018	.032	1.402	.161
<i>Reads Newspaper Current Events [A3recode]</i>	.935	.491	.046	2.101	.057
Constant	24.340	3.076		7.914	.000

Dependent Variable: psa5 (coded with positive reactions having high values)
Adjusted R² = .269 Men = 1; Women = 0.

V. Corruption and Democracy

The growing corruption faced by many Latin American countries should be seen as a *significant threat* to democratization (Seligson 2006) and to processes of democratic governability (Bailey and Parás 2006). Nye defines *corruption* as “behavior deviating from the normal obligations of the public function, seeking private gain...monetary or status” (1967). From this viewpoint, corruption is understood as a deviation from the state of law and, because of that, it has a direct impact on democratic quality.

As is shown in Map V.1, there seems to be a direct relationship between levels of development and perceived levels of corruption.¹ The majority of countries in Latin America can be seen to have a low score on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which implies considerable levels of corruption. However, the map also shows notable differences among countries in the region, which is the reason for the analysis in this chapter. We want to answer four questions: How does Mexico compare with other countries in Latin America as to levels of perception of and victimization by corruption?; How have the levels of victimization by corruption evolved in Mexico over the past two years?; What are the socio-demographic predictors of victimization by corruption?; and What is the relationship between victimization by corruption and political legitimacy?



Map V-I Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Source: Transparency International, 2005.

The chapter is organized into four sections. In the first, perceived levels of corruption are compared for fourteen countries in Latin America, using aggregate data from Transparency International. In the second, we analyze victimization by corruption in

¹ The methodology of the index and map may be found in: <http://www.transparency.org/>

Mexico using data from the LAPOP 2004 and 2006 surveys. This section includes the analysis of trends in this indicator for Mexico, as well as a comparative perspective with the other countries included in the survey, along with an analysis of the main socio-demographic predictors of victimization by corruption. It is important to point out that there are methodological differences between perception of and victimization by corruption. These are discussed in the first section of this chapter. The second section also includes a discussion on two new variables included in the LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico, which have to do with self-placement regarding corruption, that is, where informants position themselves and where they place their acquaintances on a scale of corrupt-clean (used as a predictor of political tolerance in the preceding chapter). In the third section, we explore the relationship between corruption and legitimacy, correlating the average victimization levels with indicators of political support and trust in the system, political tolerance, respect for political institutions, and evaluation of the political system's performance. In the last section, we present chapter conclusions.

5.1 Mexico from a comparative perspective

How does Mexico compare with the other countries in Latin America on levels of corruption? We will respond to this question using two types of complementary indicators: the first of them has to do with the perceptions that informants have regarding the existence and extent of corruption.² The second type of indicator consists of self-reported *facts*, that is, the informant's participation in corrupt activities. Such experience with corruption can be measured two ways: a question about whether the person has fallen victim to corruption, while the other one deals with his/her participating in bribes without specifying the condition of victimization. In the second part of this section, we discuss the benefits of measuring corruption as victimization and analyze, in detail, the performance of this indicator for Mexico.

Table V.1, second column, reports experiences with bribes in fourteen Latin American countries. This question is an indicator measuring corrupt activity (i.e., facts), but without specifying the condition of victimization. As can be seen, after Paraguay, Mexico is second in the incidence of self-reported corrupt acts, with a third of the population (31%) saying he/she paid a bribe in the past twelve months.³ As is shown, there are large differences among countries. A first comparative indication is the fact that Paraguay and Mexico are quite a bit above the rest of the region. The last two columns of the table present perceptual indicators of corruption. There, we find smaller differences among countries and smaller variations regarding the indicator of experience with bribes. In the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Paraguay once again obtains the worst score of the

² This column the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (which exclusively reflect the opinions of businessmen and analysts from each country) and of questions asking about the perceptions (not the facts) of the informants.

³ There is a major methodological difference that has to do with how questions are worded. Other studies used *soborno* to measure corruption, which does not necessarily have the same connotation as the word *mordida*, which is used in the LAPOP questionnaire and in the National Survey on Corruption and Good Government. We believe the word *mordida* (a colloquialism better typifying the condition of being a victim of corruption) is more accessible and clearer for informants.

region. However, Mexico is above seven of the fourteen countries for this indicator on which a high score indicates the perception of less corruption. Data from the last column are relevant because, with the exception of four countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela), in the rest of the countries, more than half the inhabitants consider corruption to affect political life to a large degree, that is, there is a generalized perception of the political impact of the perception.

Country	Experiences with bribery ^{a b}	Index of Corruption Perception (0 = highly corrupt; 10 = highly transparent) ^c	Places Where Corruption Affects Political Life Strongly ^a
Paraguay	43%	2.1	51% - 70%
Mexico	31%	3.5	51% - 70%
Guatemala	25%	2.5	31% - 50%
Bolivia	20%	2.5	> 70%
Ecuador	18%	2.5	51% - 70%
Dominican Republic	16%	3.0	51% - 70%
Peru	14%	3.5	> 70%
Panama	9%	3.5	51% - 70%
Argentina	6%	2.9	51% - 70%
Colombia	6%	4.0	51% - 70%
Venezuela	6%	2.3	11% - 30%
Nicaragua	5%	2.6	31% - 50%
Costa Rica	4%	4.2	31% - 50%
Chile	3%	7.3	51% - 70%

a) Source: Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International, 2005.

b) Question text: "In the last twelve months, have you, or anyone who lives in your house, paid any form of bribe?"


c) Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International, 2005. Perceptions of the degree of corruption in each country by businesspeople and analysts.

Table V.1 Comparison of Experiences with Bribery and Perceptions of Corruption in Fourteen Latin American Countries. Source: Transparency International, 2005.

5.2 Victimization from corruption in Mexico

The data discussed so far have major limitations, the main one being that they measure only perceptions/impressions. Some of these indicators suffer from problems of endogeneity (Seligson 2006). To complement and delve further into the analysis, this section presents findings from indicators that reflect facts more than perceptions, specifically with the condition of having been a victim of corruption. Graph V.1 reports the incidence of this condition in seven different behavioral settings. In comparison with 2004, we observe a significant increase in the payment of bribes when having dealings in courts, doubling such incidence from 13.5% in 2004 to 25% in 2006, although in both years very few citizens have actually had experiences in court. Similarly, we see a significant increase, although much smaller in magnitude, in bribes paid to policemen.

For the other situations, we do not find statistically significant changes in the last two years, but it remains worthy of note that one-fourth of the population reports being a victim of corruption at a municipal level. In the remaining situations, a level of about 12% is maintained.




Graph V.1. Exposure to Corruption in Mexico: 2004–2006.


Let us now analyze the total percentage of the population that has been a victim of corruption during the past year on at least one occasion.⁴ Graph V.2 shows that this percentage increased five points over the past two years, going from 32% of the population to 37.1%. Said increase is statistically significant. Remember that this indicator records behavioral *facts*, not perceptions. This is relevant because it indicates that current government efforts (federal and state) are not bearing fruit in reducing levels of corruption. However, it is also important to point out that, when comparing data from LAPOP (Graph V.2) with that from the Global Corruption Barometer (second column of Table V.1), we find not much difference regarding the percentage of the population that has been victim to corruption.

⁴ It is important to point out that, in 2006, an item from 2004 was not included (accused by a police officer for an infraction not committed) in the list of situations where people could have been victims of corruption. Due to this change, the data reported in this chapter do not necessarily coincide exactly with the 2004 report and relationships between variables may show changes.

This aggregate data likewise indicates that there is a strong concentration of corruption victims, since the majority of Mexicans (six of every ten) report not having been a victim of corruption in the past year. This is consistent with the findings of other surveys (Bailey and Parás 2006) and suggests there are segments of the population that are much more exposed to, affected by or actively engaged in corruption than other segments. As can be seen in Graph V.3, in 2006, 17.9% of informants fell victim to one act of corruption, 12.9% to two, 3.5% to three and 2.7% to four (or more). The only statistically significant change between 2004 and 2006 is in the percentage of the population that has been the victim of two acts of corruption. How does Mexico compare with the rest of the countries in Latin America and which segments are most vulnerable to corruption?




Graph V.2. Percentage of the Population that Has Been a Victim of Corruption At Least One Time in the Past Year. Mexico, 2004–2006.



Graph V.3. Number of Distinct Ways in Which Citizens Have Been Victimized by Corruption in the Past Year. Mexico, 2004–2006.

To respond to the first question, let us see how Mexico compares to the rest of the countries as to the percentage of the population that has been the victim of corruption during the past year on at least one occasion. Graph V.4 shows that, for 2006, of the fifteen countries, Mexico has, after Haiti, the highest index of corruption (similar, statistically speaking, to Bolivia and Jamaica). In comparative terms, we observe that there are six countries where the magnitude of the problem of corruption is serious in the sense of having about one-third or more of the population as victims of this problem. In these six countries the incidence two or three times more than in the rest of the countries. It is also important to point out that, of the ten countries where there are measurements for both 2004 and 2006, only Mexico and Costa Rica show statistically significant increases. The ordering of the countries in Graphs V.4 differs from that presented in Table V.1. We should remember that, strictly speaking, the questions are not comparable. Table V.1 asks whether the informant paid any bribes. The LAPOP survey measures whether the informant was a victim of corruption. We believe the index of victimization


is more a more valid indicator because it is easier for the informant to admit having been a victim than to confess having paid a bribe. Independently of that, in both types of measurements, Mexico is among the countries with greatest corruption.



Graph V.4. Percentages of National Populations That Have Been A Victim of Corruption During the Past Year. LAPOP Countries, 2006.


Let us go on now to an analysis of the segments most vulnerable to corruption. In order to highlight the differences, we will continue to use the same indicator (percentage of the population that has been the victim of corruption at least once). No significant differences are detected between 2004 and 2006 in the following population segments: gender, age, income and education. Below, we report on segments where we do find major movements between 2004 and 2006. Graph V.5 shows differences by the size of the city in which the interview was held. A significant increase in the percentage victimized by corruption can be seen for rural areas and in middle-sized cities. The rest of the segments do not differ significantly. Of major consequence, however, is the fact that practically 50% of the population of the Mexico City metropolitan area reports having been the

victim of corruption in the past year. The rest of the country has levels of victimization of about one-third of the population.



Graph V.5. Percentages of the Mexican Population That Have Been Victimized by Corruption At Least One Time in the Past Year. Mexico 2004-2006

Graph V.6 shows differences in victimization of corruption by region. In it we can see that the differences in 2006 are minimal, that is, the four regions yield similar percentages. What is most relevant in this graph is the significant increase in victimization recorded in the northern and central-western regions for 2006. It is not clear why there is currently greater victimization in rural areas, in middle-sized cities, and in the northern and central-western regions of the country, as Graphs V.5 and V.6 reveal. What we can say is that there appears to be an increase in acts of corruption occurring precisely in those segments where it was lowest in 2004. This may contribute to a weakening of support for political institutions.




Graph V.6. Percentages of the Mexican Population That Have Been Victimized by Corruption At Least One Time in the Past Year by Region. Mexico 2004-2006

In Regression V.1 (see the technical appendix at chapter-end), there is a linear regression model having, as a dependent variable, the number of times the person was the victim of corruption in the past year. So as to complement the analysis of segments vulnerable to victimization, the model uses main demographic categories as independent variables, reproducing Seligson's analysis in Ecuador (2001) and the LAPOP 2004 survey in Mexico. In the latter report, it was pointed out that the following segments were those most prone to be the victims of corruption: men, young people, those with higher income and inhabitants of the Center and South of the country. As results from Regression V.1 show, with the exception of men—who continue to be victims of corruption to a greater degree than women—the rest of the segments cease to be predictors of corruption. We also note that, in fact, the model shows that, in 2004, the condition of living in the North or Center-West were significant predictors. Differences with the 2004 report may be due, in part, to the fact that, in 2006, the question “Have you, during the past year, been accused by a policeman of an offense you did not commit?” was not included.

In addition to this indicator being included in 2004, it is probable that unjustified police accusations were more common in the segments pointed out as having the highest exposure to corruption in the 2004 report (i.e., men, young people, those with higher income, and those living in the Center and South of the country). Another possible explanation would represent a more negative interpretation, specifically that Mexico is experiencing a widespread increase in corruption. According to such an interpretation, we would no longer find segments more prone than others to experiencing greater levels of corruption, since being a victim of corruption is now independent of socio-demographic conditions.


The LAPOP 2006 survey includes two questions about personal self-placement and the placement of the informant's acquaintances on a scale of "clean-corrupt." The exact wording is: "Using a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is "very corrupt" and 10 is "very clean," where would you be? and "Where would you place your acquaintances?" Graph V.7 shows the average score on this perceptual scale regarding personal levels of corruption and those of acquaintances. The graph shows an interesting relationship between these two variables. Those persons who have not been victim of corruption have the highest averages for personal placement and that of acquaintances. This means that they rate themselves and their friends as "cleaner." The average decreases for those who have been victims on one or more occasions. Average scores are markedly lower in ranking the cleanness or corruption of acquaintances by those who have been victims of four acts of corruption in the past twelve months. The preceding suggests that personal experiences with corruption and the perception of the same are interrelated.



Graph V.7. Victimization of Acts of Corruption by Self-Placement on a Scale of Corruption. Mexico, 2006.


5.3 Effects of victimization by corruption on legitimacy

The graphs presented in this section show the relationship existing between the frequency of victimization from corruption and the perceptions of informants on topics relating to legality and the justification of corruption. In Graph V.8, we can see that the average score (on a scale of 1 to 7) for courts, political institutions and the Mexican political system is greater for those who have not been victims of corruption. This suggests that the condition of being the victim of corruption may be eroding perceptions of the legitimacy of the system.




Graph V.8. Mean Perceptions of the Courts, Political Institutions and the Political System (on a scale of 1 to 7) by the Frequency of Corruption Victimization. Mexico, 2006.

Graph V.9 reports a similar relationship between the condition of being the victim of corruption and support for the Mexican political system, as well for trust in the justice system. As is shown in the graph, those who have not been victims show greater levels of support for the system and trust in the justice system (remember that the impact of corruption in supporting the system was explored by means of a regression in point 4.3.2 of this report).




Graph V.9. Tendency to Support the Political System, Confidence in the Justice System and Levels of Political Tolerance by the Number of Ways Victimized by Corruption in the Past Year. Mexico, 2006.

In Graph V.10, we compare the perception of how generalized corruption is for 2004 and 2006. This indicator shows the perceived breadth of public-sector corruption, that is, Mexicans' perception of how generalized corruption is among public officials. The question offers four categories of replies and, in each of them, we see statistically significant changes over the past two years. The perception that corruption among public officials is "very generalized" rose 10 points. However, the perception that it is "somewhat generalized" decreased 17 points. We also note that the response categories indicating a narrower range of corruption also increased in 2006. This means the group of persons perceiving that corruption is not generalized (categories "little generalized" or "not at all generalized") is larger. If we join together the two upper categories ("much" and "somewhat") on the perceived extent of corruption and we compare the two years we have, there seems to be a favorable decrease in the indicator, dropping from 84% to 75%.




Graph V.10. Perceptions of the Extent of Corruption Among Public Officials. Mexico, 2004-2006.

Finally, we present two graphs of an indicator that is of the utmost relevance, because it encompasses the justification of corruption, an indirect indicator of permissiveness. In the first (V.11), we see that, even though the majority of Mexicans considers it unjustifiable to pay bribes due to poor services, the percentage of persons believing the opposite, that is, that corrupt acts are, indeed, justifiable, doubled in 2006.



Graph V.11. “Do you think that, in our society, paying bribes is justifiable given poor public services, or that it is not justifiable?” Mexico, 2004–2006.

The second graph, Graph V.12, shows the relationship between the condition of being a victim of corruption and the justification of the same. As can be seen, there seems to be a significant relationship, since among those who have not been victims of corruption, the percentage of responses not justifying this activity is greater than among those who have, indeed, been victims on one or more occasions.



Graph V.12. Index of Corruption Victimization compared with Tendency to Justify Corruption. Mexico, 2006.

5.4 Conclusions

The results analyzed in this chapter are not encouraging. They show that, both for perceptual indicators and indicators of actual victimization, Mexico ranks among the countries experience the greatest levels of corruption in Latin America. They likewise show that the percentage of the population that has been the victim of corruption increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, the distribution of this phenomenon being much more homogeneous among the varying socio-demographic segments of the country. In addition, the data suggests that corruption victimization has an impact on perceptions, on trust in political institutions, on justification of this activity, and on the willingness to trust other individuals, which may transform into an erosion of legality in Mexico. Undoubtedly, corruption is one of the most important and urgent issues on the national agenda.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX OF THE CHAPTER

Regression V.1. Corruption Victimization

Victimization by Corruption Linear Regression					
Predictor	B	S. E.	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	.594	.152		3.910	.000
Gender (Male)	.305	.053	.145	5.730	.000
Age [Q2] How many years old are you?	-.007	.002	-.100	-3.079	.002
ED What was the last year of school you completed?	.021	.008	.086	2.642	.008
Wealth Individual wealth measured by possession of physical goods.	-.013	.017	-.024	-.762	.446
CHILDREN [Q12] How many children do you have?	.042	.016	.089	2.615	.009
MARRIED Marital Status	.174	.057	.081	3.047	.002
CITY SIZE Size of Locality	-.061	.022	-.086	-2.801	.005
NORTH Lives in North	.119	.076	.049	1.559	.119
CTROOC Lives in Center-West	.038	.082	.014	.465	.642
SUR Lives in South	.101	.081	.039	1.250	.212

a. Dependent Variable: exctot. Total index of corruption victimization: number of ways victimized in the past year.

VI. Crime Victimization and the Rule of Law

Both development experts and citizens agree that “for many urban dwellers a complex layering of multiple forms of violence, fear and insecurity, has become ‘routinized’ or ‘normalized,’ ... (including) widespread theft, mugging and burglary, crimes associated with alcohol and drug misuse, gang violence, prostitution, and commonplace intra-family abuse (Moser and MacIlwaine, 2005: 90).

Among the major concerns of Mexican citizens is exposure to crime. In the 2004 LAPOP study, Mexico’s self-reported annual crime victimization rate of 17.3% was the highest of eight countries in the study, although El Salvador ranked a close second at 17.1%. In the 2006 LAPOP study, Mexico’s self-reported victimization has increased to 20%.

Other survey projects also reveal profound citizen concerns about crime rates. For example, a project entitled Justice in Mexico, located at two universities in San Diego, has sponsored surveys in Mexico City pertaining to the theme. An initial question – without prior guidance – asked citizens to identify “the principal problem that exists in Mexico City.” The most common mentions by far in surveys in May of 2002 and April of 2003 were those of insecurity, robbery and crime. In May of 2002 those references totaled 62% of all mentions, while in April of 2003 such mentions reached 48%. It should be noted that the problem was perceived as slightly less acute in one’s own neighborhood, where the percent of “principal problem mentions” were 47% in 2002 and 30% in 2003. Additionally, average ratings of the performance of the Mexico City police tended toward the negative side of a seven-point scale (Parás, 2002; 2003).

So there is ample reason to suspect that Mexican citizens continue to experience unease and distress about their own exposure and that of family and friends to crime. In addition to the psychic distress this causes families, as well as the actual losses of property that occur and the physical and psychological harm that result from the most violent crimes, there may well also be negative consequences for democracy and the due process of law. Social science theory and prior research via the LAPOP studies both suggest that citizens who have been victimized by criminals are more willing to violate the rule of law in seeking to punish criminals.¹ Additionally, communities where the incidence of crime is higher may also provide a supportive cultural context in which departures from the due process of law will be socially approved.

¹ For example, a secondary analysis of the 2004 LAPOP data for Mexico reveals that significantly more Mexicans who had been victims of crimes in the past year would have endorsed departures from the law to capture criminals, by a margin of 38.1% to 29.5% over those who had not been victims of a crime.

6.1 Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective


The first issue that should be addressed comparatively is the extent to which citizens have been exposed to crime in various countries, and to which types of crime they have been exposed. These two questions in the survey help to quantify such exposure:

VIC1: "Have you been a victim of some act of criminality in the last twelve months?

Yes, (2) No [Skip next question], (8) Don't Know [Skip next question]; and

VIC2: To what type of criminal act were you subject? (1) Robbery without aggression or physical threat, (2) Robbery with aggression or physical threat, (3) Physical aggression without robbery, (4) Rape or sexual assault, (5) Kidnapping, (6) Damage to property, (7) Robbery at your home (88) Don't know, and (99) Inappropriate (not a victim)."

In comparative terms, exposure to crime is quite high in Mexico, as the 20.2% of Mexicans who report victimization in 2006 is exceeded only by the rate of victimization for Peruvians (26.2%) and Chileans (23.1%) and only matched by Ecuadorians (20.0%). Mexico's rate of victimization grew by nearly three points over 2004 (17.3%), as can be seen in Graph VI.1.




Graph VI.1. Percentage of Interviewees Who Have Been Victims of a Crime in the Past Year: LAPOP Countries, 2006.

6.1.1 Types of Crime Victimization in Mexico

The types of crime to which Mexican citizens most frequently report themselves as having been subjected in the past twelve months involve personal property: robbery *without* aggression or a physical threat (41.7%); robbery *with* aggression or a physical threat (29.4%); robbery of one's home (11.3%); and damage to one's property (9.4%). Less common are crimes of violence: physical aggression without robbery (7.8%), and rape or sexual assault (0.3%; too small to appear clearly on the pie chart).² [See Graph VI.2.] Recall, however, that the 2006 data refer to the one in five Mexican citizens that report themselves as having been subjected to a crime in 2006.


This distribution is similar to the distribution recorded in LAPOP 2004. In that year also the most common crimes reported pertained to personal property: robbery *without* aggression or a physical threat (52.2%); robbery *with* aggression or a physical threat (22.4%); robbery of one's home (10.1%); and damage to one's property (9.7%). Violent crimes reported in 2004 included: physical aggression without robbery (4.1%), and kidnapping (1.5%).



Graph VI.2. Types of Crimes Experienced. México, 2006


² In fact, there was only one case of rape or sexual assault among the 1560 respondents in Mexico.

A seemingly plausible hypothesis is that crime would be more common in urban environments. Graph VI.3 indicates that this is the case. The rate of reported victimization varies between 11.8% among residents of small cities to 33.3% among residents of Mexico City [which may help to account for the propensity of Mexico City respondents to identify crime as the major problem in their city and neighborhood, as was found in the Parás surveys of 2002; 2003].



Graph VI.3. Crime Victimization by Size of Locality. Mexico, 2006.

But what about the composition of reported crimes? Does that vary by city size also? As Graph VI.4 indicates, it does, but not always in the way that one might expect. In a number of ways, residents of rural areas and Mexico City seem most exposed to similar types of crimes, including both robbery *with* (24% and 42%, respectively) and *without* (46% and 47%, respectively) physical aggression. Residents of small, medium and large cities are, in relative terms, more exposed to household robberies (18%, 14%, and 23% respectively). And residents of rural areas, medium and large cities are those most exposed to malicious property damage (12%, 16% and 15%, respectively). Perhaps, most surprisingly, it is residents of small (18%) and medium (14%) cities that are most frequently report physical aggression without robbery.




Graph VI.4. Types of Crime Experienced by Size of Locality. Mexico, 2006.

6.2 Trust in Institutions of the Justice System


Faith in the rule of law in Mexico is dependent on faith in a host of institutions: courts, police, prosecutors, etc. A number of institutions were the subject of questions the “B series” that read like this:

B10A-B32, B37: *“Hasta que punto tiene Usted confianza en... [nombre de institución]? Los entrevistados escogieron un numero de una tarjeta (Tarjeta A) que varia así, entre 1 (nada de confianza) y 7 (mucha confianza).”*

Tarjeta “A”



Graph VI.5 illustrates how institutions pertaining to the administration of justice stack up against others in Mexico, using red bars to highlight such institutions and blue bars for others. Among eleven institutions rated, the highest mean score for any institution associated with the administration of justice is the Supreme Court, which received a mean score of 4.4. The entire justice system received a score of 4.04, while the police received a mean rating of 3.3, the lowest of all eleven institutions. The Procuraduría General received a mean rating of 4.3. This suggests a lack of confidence in judicial and other institutions upon which Mexicans need to rely in seeking to enhance their security or to seek justice, in the event that they happen to be victims of a crime.



Graph VI.5. Confidence in Public Institutions. Mexico, 2006.

Related to the generally low ratings accorded to institutions associated with the justice system is one datum pertaining to the 13% of Mexican citizens who had some dealings with a court during the past year. Of that number, a quarter (25%) indicated that they had to pay a bribe (*mordida*) in their dealings with the court.³ Such experiences may help to explain why public opinion holds these institutions in relatively low regard.


6.2.1 Comparative Perceptions of the Justice System

Graph VI.6 conveys where Mexico ranks in the region in terms of public trust in the institutions of the justice system in 2004 and 2006, using the same question employed above, but transformed into a 100 point scale.⁴ Mexico's mean rating of 50.6% places it in third place in 2006, just behind Costa Rica (52.6%) and Colombia (50.7%). Mexicans have been essentially stable in their assessment of their justice system between 2004 and 2006, while the citizens some countries (notably the Central American cases of Costa

³ These results come from Question EXC13.

⁴ It will be noted that in Graph VI.5, the "justice system" gets a mean value of just over 4 on a 7 point scale, i.e., just beyond the midpoint. On Graph VI.6, using a different metric, the "justice system" receives a value of 50.6 on a 100 point scale, also just beyond the midpoint.

Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras) exhibit declining faith in their national systems of justice.




Graph VI.6. Average Levels of Confidence in Justice System in LAPOP Countries. 2006.

6.3 Preoccupation with Personal Security in Neighborhood

As previously indicated, crime is much in the minds of Mexican citizens because it is a frequent occurrence in some settings. One survey item asked about the sense of security that citizens feel at the most local level, i.e., in their own neighborhood:

AOJ11: “*Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde Usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, se siente Ud. ... (1) Muy seguro, (2) Algo seguro, (3) Algo inseguro, (4) Muy inseguro, o (8) No sabe?*”

Graph VI.7 indicates that there has been a slight, but statistically significant,⁵ erosion of the sense of security that Mexican citizens feel in their own neighborhoods, as might be expected given their reports of increasing personal exposure to crime between 2004 and 2006.



Graph VI.7. Degree to Which Residents Feel Safe in Their Neighborhood. Mexico: 2004–2006.


⁵ Statistical significance can be attained with small percentage differences when comparing Ns of 1556 interviews in 2004 with 1560 interviews in 2006.

6.4 Crime as a Threat to Future Well-Being in Mexico

The degree to which crime preoccupies citizens in Mexico can also be judged by this question:

AOJ11A: “Y hablando del país en general, qué tanto cree Usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar del futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho, (2) Algo, (3) Poco, (4) Nada o (8) No sabe”

As is apparent in Graph VI.8, nearly two thirds (64.9% of the 97.6% who have an opinion) express “much concern” about the impact of crime on citizen welfare in the future. The second most common response is to express “some concern” about future welfare (25.1%), while expressions of “little concern” (7.8%) and “no concern” (2.2%) barely exceed one in ten Mexicans. These data corroborate the Parás findings in Mexico City that citizens see crime as a major challenge, with both immediate and longer term implications.



Graph VI.8. “To what extent is crime a threat to future well-being?” Mexico, 2006.


6.5 Justice from the Court Systems of Mexico

Using the a 7 point scale much like that employed in Graph VI.5, respondents were asked to rate their confidence that the courts of Mexico would guarantee a fair trial, with 1 representing a belief that the courts would “guarantee no justice” and a 7 representing a belief that the courts of Mexico would guarantee “much justice.” The mean score on this item was a 4.12, which placed this item in the same range as ratings of specific institutions in the justice system of Mexico (range of 3.26 to 4.42).

A more specific kind of assessment of projected outcomes of judicial processes results from the answers received to the following question, which projects a hypothetical judicial system response to a crime to which the respondent would have been subjected:

A0J12: “*Si Usted fuera victima de un robo o asalto, cuanto confiaria en que el sistema judicial castigaria al culpable?* (1) Mucho, (2) Algo, (3) Poco, (4) Nada, o (8) No sabe”

Graph VI.9 indicates that far fewer than half of Mexican citizens exhibit “much confidence” (7.5%) or “some confidence” (24.8%) that the guilty party would be brought to account, while the most common responses are to express “little confidence” (40.6%) or “no confidence” (27.1%). Clearly, personalizing the issue of the responsiveness of the judicial system does little to enhance the confidence of Mexican citizens that justice will be done by their court system.



Graph VI.9. Degree of Confidence that the Judicial System Will Punish the Guilty. Mexico, 2006.

6.6 Effects on Victimization on Respect for Due Process

A very important question is the extent to which having been victimized in a crime erodes support for the rights of the accused and the due process of law. While the 2006 LAPOP survey does not permit an extensive examination of this question, one survey item gives some insight:

AOJ8: “*Para poder capturar delincuentes, cree Usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre, (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen, o (8) No sabe.*”

Overall, only about six in ten (58%) of Mexicans take the posture that public officials should *always* respect the law, even when pursuing criminals. However, the distribution of such views differs significantly between those who have been subject to a crime in the last year and those who have not. Table VI.1 indicates that having been a victim of a crime reduces the percentage of citizens believing that the authorities should always respect the law in pursuing criminals from 60.7% to 47.7%. While such a decrease, in and of itself, is not devastating to the rule of law, being victimized does lead to increased support for extra-legal procedures. And that *does not help* the consolidation of Mexican democracy.

What Public Officials Should Do	Victim of Crime in Last Year	Not a Victim in Last Year	Sub-Totals
Should Always Respect the Law	47.7%	60.7%	58.0%
On Occasion, Can Act at Margin of the Law	52.3%	39.3%	42.0%
N of cases	300	1173	1473

Table VI.1. Effects of Crime Victimization on Respect for the Law. Mexico, 2006.

6.7 Do Conceptualizations of Democracy Affect Respect for Due Process?

Chapter 3 considered alternative possible conceptualizations of democracy: normative (69.5% of Mexican citizens); Utilitarian (4.0%); Negative (3.7%) and “Empty” (22.8%). Presumably, those holding normative conceptualizations of democracy ought to be more inclined to hold that public officials should always respect the law, even when seeking to hold criminals accountable. The latter three groups – those with negative, empty or utilitarian conceptualizations - might be more inclined to assert that public officials could, on occasion, act at the margins of the law when seeking to hold guilty parties accountable.

But that is not, in fact, the case. In an analysis not shown here, variation across the four groups ranged from 56.1% among those with a negative conception of democracy arguing that public officials should always respect the law to 58.1% among those with a normative conception to 58.4% among those with an “empty” understanding of democracy. These differences are not statistically significant.

6.8 What Determines Respect for Due Process?

In a logistic regression equation, having been a victim of a crime in the last twelve months is the only variable that is a statistically significant predictor of whether an individual believes that public officials should always respect the law. Those who have been a victim are significantly less likely to believe that public officials must be bound by the law. None of the most common individual-level demographic variables (wealth, education, age or sex) predicts the belief that public officials must always respect the law, nor does political knowledge, city size, the extent to which one has been solicited for bribes, or being a member of the stable democracy contingent (high on system support and high on tolerance). See Regression VI.1 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

References:

Moser, Caroline and Cathy McIlwaine, *Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction*, World Development, 34, 1 (July 2005).

Parás, Pablo. *PowerPoint Decks on Crime Victimization Surveys, under Data and Indicators page of the “Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico Project* website. San Diego: UCSD Center for US-Mexican Studies and USD Trans-Border Institute. Available at <http://www.justiceinmexico.org>

TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTER

Regression VI.1 Determinants of Belief that Public Officials Must Respect the Law

Determinants of Belief that Public Officials Must Respect the Law when Seeking to Hold Criminals Accountable: Logistic regression					
Predictor	β	S.E.	Wald	Significance	Exp(β)
Wealth[Sum of R series]	.031	.025	1.472	.225	1.031
Education (in years) [ED]	.004	.017	.062	.803	1.004
Age (years) [Q2]	.001	.004	.020	.888	1.001
Sex [Q1dummy]	-.062	.111	.311	.577	.940
Political Knowledge [Conpol]	-.001	.003	.072	.789	.999
City Size, DF = 5 [TamanoR]	-.044	.040	1.219	.270	.957
Victim of Crime in Past 12 Month [VIC1R]	-.005	.001	13.346	.000	.995
Number of Types of Extortion to Which Exposed [EXCTOTR]	.034	.052	.431	.511	1.035
Stable Democrat [High on System Support; High on Tolerance] [Bar 2x2]	.000	.001	.042	.837	1.000
Constant	.342	.257	1.766	.184	1.408

Dependent Variable: A0J8 (recoded as a dummy variable)
 One degree of freedom for each predictor, nine in the equation.
 Nagelkerke $R^2 = .017$; Percent of Cases Correctly Assigned = 58.7%
 Males = 1; Females = 0.

VII. Local Government

In Mexico, as well as elsewhere in the Americas, a surge of interest in municipal government has occurred in recent decades. The causes of such growth in interest in local government are multiple: a growing sense that administrative centralization may not be the most efficient of administrative structures; a desire to handle political pressures from below for political opening by controlled devolution of responsibilities to lower levels of governance; a more genuine interest in democratization, accompanied by the belief that “local governments can be closer to the people”; and encouragement, if not pressure from, international donors to implement decentralization programs.

Throughout the era of one-party dominance by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (1917-2000), Mexico has been a highly centralized state. Nonetheless, as Victoria Rodríguez (1997) has indicated, the three last PRI presidents, starting with Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), all undertook programs of administrative decentralization, presumably putting greater responsibilities and budgetary resources in the hands of state and local governments. Rodríguez and other scholars of Mexico’s decentralization efforts (Cabrero Mendoza, et al., 1998) have often argued that, prior to 2000, the major motivation was to delay the pace of political evolution. In a one-party state, appearing to cede control to opposition parties in local and state governments could play a role in “releasing tension” caused by macro-level pressures for political change. And, in fact, as local level elections were won in increasing numbers by opposition parties (the PAN and the PRD, principally) as the 1990s wore on, the “release of political tension function” was, in some part, real.

Ultimately, however, the recognition of opposition victories at the state and local level, contributed to the accumulation of pressures for national-level political change, which reached a milestone with the election of Panista Vicente Fox in 2000.

Mexico’s 32 states have retained their boundaries for over a century but the demographic profile of those states and of the country has changed. With a population of over 103 million, Mexico is now a largely urban country, with over 62% of the national population in 2005 living in cities of 500,000 or more (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática: II Censo de Población y Vivienda 2005*). Indeed, there are now 11 cities of over one million population in Mexico, 23 of between 500,000 and 999,999, 89 municipalities of between 100,000 and 499,999 and 688 towns of between 10,000 and 99,999. Clearly, the quality of local governance matters. If local governments can be made into effective instruments for service delivery and tools for development, as well as being responsive to citizen interests, the quality of life of millions of Mexican citizens would be greatly enhanced.

Scholarly examination of the effort to invigorate municipal governance in Mexico, however, yields cautious optimism, at best, or more pessimistic readings, at worst. Illustrative of the latter perspective is Rowland (2006: 6):

...In urban Mexican municipalities, large populations combine with underdeveloped local institutions of administration and government, to result in myriad difficulties for residents to express their preferences to government, let alone have these taken into account in local policy-making. Indeed, it is questionable whether local jurisdictions that encompass over 100,000 residents... are able to enjoy many of the purported benefits of decentralized government.

The 2006 LAPOP study in Mexico affords a measurement of the extent to which Mexican citizens believe that local government affords them an opportunity to make their preferences known on matters of public policy and the extent to which they see local institutions as being responsive to their interests. Additionally, the effect of a presidential election year, such as 2006, can be assessed indirectly by comparing prior results from 2004 with those of the current survey.

7.1 Citizen Requests for Help from Various Levels of Government

The first issue that should be addressed comparatively is the extent to which citizens seek out local government as a preferred institution for seeking government assistance, redress of grievances, or as a channel for expressing policy preferences. In both 2004 and 2006, the LAPOP survey asked these three questions:

“In order to resolve a problem, have you ever asked for help or cooperation from...”

CP2: Any deputy of the Congress


CP4: Any ministry/secretariat, public institution or office of the national government,

CP4a: Any local authority (mayor or councilperson)?

Yes, (2) No, (8) Don't Know”


To simplify this analysis, the options are recorded in terms of the percentage saying “yes” among all respondents. In Graph VII.1, we can observe that an election year tends to depress self-reports of all forms of political participation in Mexico, although the depressive effect may have been exacerbated by the fact that this survey was taken in the month before a heavily contested three-party presidential election. Note that the curve for 2004 is systematically higher than that for 2006.

More to the point, however, is that in both years, the number of citizens reporting prior contacts with local government officials is two to three times that reported for contacting a congressperson, and also above the level of contacts with federal agencies. So, at one level, the thesis that municipal government is “closer to the people” is borne out by the frequency of contacting behavior. Local governmental units are more frequently the units of government contacted by Mexican citizens.



Graph VII.1. Percentage of the Population That Has Requested Help from Various Governmental Agencies. Mexico: 2004 – 2006.

An obvious question is whether the size of the municipality affects the recourse that citizens take to local officials, as opposed to national level officials or to appeals for help to their congressperson. As Rowland suggests, attaining the promise of responsive local government is especially challenging in larger urban settings. Graph VII.2 does suggest that citizens are most likely to seek help from local governments in rural areas or in small cities, rather than in medium or large cities (including Mexico City).



Graph VII.2. Persons that Have Sought Help from an Official of Local Government by City Size. Mexico, 2006.

7.1.1 Determinants of Citizen Requests for Help from Local Officials

Employing logistic regression as a multivariate analytical tool to assess which variables best predict whether citizens have requested help from local officials leads to identification of a lengthy list of significant predictors at the conventional level of $p < .05$: (i) age (older citizens request help more frequently); (ii) political knowledge; (iii) city size (with smaller environment most likely to enhance requests for help), (iv) the frequency of attendance in the past year of meetings of community improvement associations; (v) the frequency of listening to radio news; (vi) the frequency of reading news in the newspaper; (vii) a belief that the quality of local services is not good, and (viii) believing that *local officials do not listen* to citizens who attend public meetings. While none are statistically significant, it is of interest that wealth (measured by possessions), education and TV news-watching all depress (slightly) the tendency to seek help from local governments. See Regression VII.1 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

7.2 Recent Participation in Local Government

Two survey questions explore citizen participation in local government in the last twelve months. By putting a time limit on recalled behavior, more accurate recollections will sometimes be generated. The two survey questions are these:


NP1: “Have you attended an open town meeting or a municipal or district (delegacional) session during the last twelve months?”

NP2: “Have you sought help or made any request to an office, some official, a councilperson or representative of the municipal government during the last twelve months?”

Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know.


As will be seen in Graph VII.3, when a twelve-month time frame is established, reported gaps in participation levels between 2004 and 2006 decrease. In 2004, 13% of Mexican citizens reported attending an open town meeting versus ten percent in 2006. And, after rounding, the same percentage of citizens reported having presented a petition or some kind of request for help before municipal authorities in both years, i.e., 18%.⁶

⁶ Note that inclusion of a time frame actually increases reports of attempts made to seek help from local officials. The percentage reporting such attempts on CP4a (without a specified time frame) is 14%, but reaches 18% on NP2, when the last twelve months is stipulated as the time referent.



Graph VII.3. Types of Local Participation: Attending Sessions of Municipal Council and Asking for Help from a Local Official. México: 2004 – 2006.


With regard to city size, there is a curvilinear relationship, with residents of rural areas, small cities and Mexico City those most likely to exhibit each behavior, while residents of medium and large cities are a bit less likely to do so. For example, the blue and red lines in Graph VII.4 show that those in rural areas, small cities, medium cities (in 2006) and Mexico City report more attempts to solicit help in the last twelve months than do residents of large cities. The blue and red curves indicate that attendance at municipal or *delegacional* meetings is greater in rural areas, small cities and Mexico City than in either medium or large cities in both 2004 and 2006. Graph VII.4 also illustrates how attendance at municipal or *delegacional* meetings declined in most geographical settings between 2004 and 2006, except in Mexico City.



Graph VII.4. Two Forms of Local Participation by Size of Locality. México: 2004–2006.


7.2.1 Local Participation in Comparative Perspective

Focusing on the frequency of making requests or of presenting petitions to local government officials in the last twelve months, Graph VII.5 puts Mexican experiences in comparative perspective. While the rate of Mexican requests to local officials has declined by 0.5% between 2004 and 2006, the Mexican rate is still fifth highest among the fifteen LAPOP countries for which data are currently available. Additionally, among the ten cases where data from 2004 and 2006 are available, eight experienced declines in local participation rates, and Mexico's decline was the smallest among those eight. Two other Central American cases – Honduras and El Salvador-- experienced increases in the making of requests of local governments, with the Salvadoran jump being particularly striking. But given regional standards, Mexicans report taking recourse to seeking assistance from local governments more than do citizens in most Central American countries (excluding Costa Rica and El Salvador) and more than do citizens in a number of South American countries (excluding Perú and Chile).



Graph VII.5. Proportion Asking for Help from Local Government in LAPOP Countries. 2006.

Mexican citizens compare less well with other countries in the region on their frequency of attendance at meetings of a municipal (or sub-municipal [delegational]) council. In 2004, 12.8% of Mexican citizens reported having attended such a meeting, but in 2006 the percentage reporting having done so in the last twelve months is only 9.6, leaving Mexico behind seven other countries in the region (Dominican Republic, Honduras, Perú, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador). These data are presented in Graph VII.6.



Graph VII.6. Proportion Attending a Municipal Council (or Sub-Municipal Council) Meeting in the Past Year in LAPOP Countries. 2006.

7.2.2 Determinants of Attendance at Open Town/Delegation Meetings

While the size of the city in which an individual lives is often a significant predictor of the probability of her attendance at meetings of the town council or district assembly when examined alone, a more complex multivariate analysis reveals that only four variables are strongly associated (at the conventional level for statistical significance of $p < .05$) with attendance at such meetings. Statistically significant predictors of attendance are: (i) watching TV news; (ii) frequency of attending meetings of a community improvement association; (iii) frequency of attending meetings of a professional or trade association; and (iv) frequency of attending meetings of a political party or movement. This suggests that the kind of social capital generated via associational activity carries over into municipal life⁷. Additionally, (v) sex (with males coded as 1 and females as 0) and (vi) the frequency of attending union meetings predicts attendance at town council

⁷ Social capital is discussed at length in Chapter IX of this report.


meetings at a level of near-statistical significance. However, attendance at union meetings makes attendance at open town (or delegation) meetings *less likely*. Unions may represent a kind of “closed social capital” that turns inward, rather than outward. And some of the classic demographic variables (age, education, or an income-proxy) do not influence attendance at town council meetings, nor do city size or one’s level of faith in municipal officials, when the effects of other variables are taken into account. See Regression VII.2 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

7.3 Responsiveness, Respect and Quality of Local Services

More important than the amount of participation in local government institutions – either input-oriented participation (such as offering views on policy choices) or extractive participation (such as requesting help with a specific need) – is the quality of the participation experienced. A small number of good participatory experiences may deepen the commitment of people to democratic institutions. A large number of unsatisfactory interactions with local officials may erode confidence in the democratic nature of local institutions of governance. The current survey, as did the LAPOP survey of 2004, asked this question:


NP1B: “To what extent do you think that officials of the local government (or district councils) pay attention to what people ask in public meetings? They pay attention: (1) much, (2) somewhat, (3) little, (4) not at all, or (8) don’t know.”

Graph VII.7 illustrates the distribution of responses in both 2004 and 2006, excluding “don’t knows” which totaled only 3% -6% in the two years. The sense of responsiveness has decreased between 2004 and 2006. While the differences are only marginal, the percent of citizens saying that local officials pay “much” or “some” attention to citizen petitions drops from 36% in 2004 (5% “much” and 31% “some”) to 33% in 2006 (3% “much” and 30% “some”). These levels suggest that the quality of interaction with local officials is imperfect. Fewer than one in twenty Mexican citizens seem highly impressed with the responsiveness of local elites.



Graph VII.7. “How much attention do local governments pay to citizens?” México: 2004–2006.

As Graph VII.8 indicates, there is a significant difference by location between the frequency of “much” and “some attention” responses, e.g., responses that might be construed as positive. Residents of Mexico City (40%) and medium-sized cities (39%) offer one of these two responses with greater frequency in 2006 than do residents of other sized cities or rural areas, none of which surpasses 32% in these positive response categories.




Graph VII.8. Differences in the Proportion Holding the Local Government to be “Very” or “Somewhat” Attentive to Citizens by Size of Locality. México, 2006.

The survey also asked citizens about the quality of the services rendered by local government via this item:

SGL1: “Diría Ud. que los servicios que el municipio/la delegación esta dando a la gente son...[Leer alternativas.]: (1) Muy buenos, (2) Buenos, (3) Ni buenos ni malos, (4) Malos, (5) Muy malos, o (8) No sabe.”


Evaluations of the quality of the services being rendered by municipal governments are quite similar in both 2004 and 2006. Graph VII.9 shows that the dominant response in each case is that the services performed by local governments are “neither good nor bad” (or, if volunteered, “regular”), with half of Mexican citizens in each year offering this response. There is a slight positive skewness in the distribution of answers, with positive answers totaling 26%-27% and negative answers falling in the range of 22%-25% in each year. But, given the preponderance of “neither good nor bad” answers, it seems unlikely

from these readings of existing government services that Mexican citizens are likely to see decentralization as a “solution” to their personal or community problems.



Graph VII.9. Quality of Services Rendered by Local Governments. Mexico, 2006.

Would there be a difference due to city size? Is it conceivable that citizens evaluate the quality of public services differently in urban settings of different sizes? Using the 2006 data, Graph VII.10 suggests that the most positive assessments of services provided by local governments occur in medium-sized cities, in which total positive response reaches 35% - ten points over any other city size. Indeed, fewer than 15% of citizens of medium sized cities evaluate such services negatively. By contrast, large cities other than Mexico City tend, disproportionately, to generate “neither good nor bad” evaluations of services provided by local government (57%), while rural areas are those where negative evaluations (28%) of local services are rendered most frequently.




Graph VII.10. Quality of Services Rendered by Local Governments by Size of Locality. México, 2006.

Additionally, the theory of political support suggests that there can be a difference between diffuse support, which is directed toward institutions and processes, and specific support, which is a result of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with immediate or recent governmental policies. One potential determinant of diffuse support would be a sense that one is treated with respect by governmental agents in interactions with them. Certainly, one might hope that “localness” would lead to interactions between government agents and citizens that would be respectful. Does living in the same community conduce to such ends?

The survey includes this relevant question:

SGL2: “*Como considera que le han tratado a Usted o sus vecinos cuando han ido al municipio (o a la delegación) para hacer trámites? Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien, (2) Bien, (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular), (4) Mal, (5) Muy mal, (8) No sabe.*”

Graph VII.11 demonstrates that the modal response (46%) is that citizens are treated “neither well nor poorly” upon visiting governmental offices, but over a third (34%) indicates that they or their neighbors are generally treated well, and another 2% indicate that citizens are treated very well. On the negative side, fewer than one in five say that they are treated poorly (15%) or very poorly (2%). So the balance tips toward a positive assessment of treatment by local officials.




Graph VII.11. Evaluations of How One Has Been Treated in Dealings with Local Government. Mexico, 2006.

Once again, however, the size of the locality may determine the degree of intimacy attained in interaction with government officials. It might be supposed that the sense of respect accorded by government officials would vary inversely with the size of the community, i.e., the smaller the community, the greater the sense of respect accorded.

The reality is a bit more complex, as can be seen in Graph VII.12. The two environments in which over four in ten Mexican citizens report that they or their neighbors are treated with respect by local government officials are rural areas (41%) and medium-sized cities

(44%). And negative assessments of such interactions are particularly rare (only 9%) in medium-sized cities. By contrast, the larger the city, the greater the percentage of citizens indicating that they have been treated “neither well nor poorly” by local government officials, culminating in the 51% of Mexico City residents who take such a posture. Negative assessments of how citizens are treated reach one in five in only two settings: large cities (20%) and small cities (22%). On balance, what happens when citizens enter the portals of local government buildings might, in medium cities and rural areas in particular, lead to greater system support as citizens in these environments often come away with the sense of having been treated with respect.




Graph VII.12. Evaluations of How One Has Been Treated in Dealings with Local Government by Size of Locality. Mexico, 2006.

7.3.1 Mexicans Views of Municipal Service Quality in Comparative Perspective

While the views of Mexican citizens are only modestly supportive of the quality of services received from municipal governments, in this respect they are typical of citizens

of the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean and Latin America. The array of standardized scores (such that 100% would be equivalent to all citizens saying that services received from local government are “very good” while 0% would be when all citizens hold municipal services to be “very poor”) runs from 32.6% in Haiti to 57.7% in the Dominican Republic. Mexico, while ranking below the median (in ninth place of fifteen countries) still ranks closer to the Dominican Republic than to Haiti). There has been virtually no change on this measure in Mexico between 2004 and 2006. These data are presented in Graph VII.13



Graph VII.13. Satisfaction with Local Government Services Among LAPOP Countries. 2006

7.3.2 Determinants of Perceived Responsiveness, Respect and Quality of Local Services

One demographic variable, (i) gender, is a significant predictor of the extent to which Mexican citizens feel that they are treated well when they visit government offices, with females expecting favorable treatment. But neither the income-surrogate (household possessions) nor education, nor age determines the perceived response. Neither does city

size or political knowledge (which did not even enter the regression equation, although allowed to do so) have an impact. Three determinants are *the strongest determinants of how citizens feel they will be treated*: (ii) *their assessment of the current quality of government services*; (iii) *their level of confidence in municipal authorities*; and (iv) *their sense that local officials will listen to citizens who come to speak*. It is interesting that frequent participation in other organizations of civil society (neighborhood associations, civic improvement organizations, religious groups, unions, political parties) do not contribute significantly to citizen perceptions of treatment by local officials.⁸ Neither does political knowledge (which does not even enter the regression equation) nor does city size. See Regression VII.3 in Technical Appendix to this chapter.

7.4 Citizen Views on the Premises of Decentralization


The decentralization efforts started by President de la Madrid and sustained by Presidents Salinas de Gortari, Zedillo and Fox, have been predicated, in part, on the notion that local citizens would like more governmental functions performed locally. Do Mexican citizens, in fact, prefer local government as the best instrumentality for service delivery?

The 2006 survey permits an assessment of this issue, as did that of 2004, via the following survey question. Note that two of the response alternatives were not read to respondents, but were recorded only if volunteered.

LGL2: *En su opinión...se le debe dar mas obligaciones y mas dinero a los municipios/delegaciones, o se debe dejar que el gobierno federal asume mas obligaciones y servicios municipales?* (1) *Mas al municipio/delegación*, (2) *Que el gobierno federal asume mas obligaciones y servicios*, (3) *No cambiar nada* [NO leer alternativa], (4) *Mas al municipio si da mejores servicios*, [NO leer alternativa], o (8) *No sabe*.


In point of fact, Mexican citizens have yet to be convinced that decentralization is a viable strategy for improving the services that they receive (see Graph VII.14). Question LGL2 refers specifically to municipal services, but nearly half (49%) of those responding to the survey question believed that the Federal Government would do better at and should assume greater responsibility for municipal service delivery, while another 6% volunteered that the existing distribution of powers was appropriate. On the other hand, a sizable proportion of Mexicans do believe that municipal government should assume more functions (36%), while another 8% indicated conditional approval of a transfer of responsibilities to local governments IF the quality of services were to improve.

⁸ Many of these indicators of social capital were tried, and found statistically insignificant, prior to settling on Regression VII.3.



Graph VII.14. Posture Toward Governmental Roles in Municipal Service Delivery. Mexico, 2006.

On this kind of issue, one could also imagine that city size would influence attitudes. And, in Graph VII.15, that proves to be the case. As might be suggested by the preceding analyses, residents of medium-sized cities are those most likely unconditionally to favor municipalities assuming more responsibilities (44%), and most likely to offer contingent approval (11%) of their doing so. Only in medium sized cities could a majority be assembled in favor of municipalities assuming more responsibilities. By contrast, both in Mexico City and in large cities, a preponderance of citizen (> 55%) favor the Federal government assuming more responsibilities for municipal service delivery. In both rural areas and small cities, opinion is more widely dispersed. Still, prior to talking about taxation, it is clear that medium-sized cities are those most likely to have a citizenry receptive to the idea of decentralization.




Graph VII.15. Posture Toward Governmental Roles in Municipal Service Delivery by Size of Locality. México, 2006.

Of course, taxes always DO matter to citizens. So the acid-test for any scheme for municipal decentralization is whether citizens would be willing to pay more taxes to their local government in hopes of receiving better services. The survey included this item, which addresses the trade-off between higher taxes and better services at the municipal level.

LGL3: “*Estaría Ud. dispuesto a pagar mas impuestos al municipio delegación para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales/delegacionales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar mas impuestos al municipio/delegación? (1) Dispuesto a pagar mas impuestos, (2) No vale la pena pagar mas impuestos, o (8) No sabe.*”

Even though the question is predicated on the assumption of receiving better municipal services, Graph VII.16 reveals that three quarters of Mexicans (75%) reject the proposed


tradeoff while 15% indicate that they would be willing to pay higher taxes and a tenth (10%) indicate uncertainty.⁹



Graph VII.16. Willingness To Pay More Taxes for Better Municipal Services. Mexico, 2006.

Given the pattern observed heretofore in this chapter, it might be expected that residents of medium cities might be more willing to trade higher taxes for improved public services. Surprisingly, however, the locations in Mexico where citizen are most willing to endorse such a trade-off are Mexico City (18%) and rural Mexico (17%), as is indicated in Graph VII.17. Small cities are those where the trade-off would be most difficult to sell, with only 10% envisioning a trade-off between higher taxes and better services being a good deal. Overwhelmingly, the message is clear in environments ranging from the most urban to the most rural: *Mexicans are simply unconvinced that better services will result from municipal government if their taxes are raised.*

⁹ While, in general, we exclude “don’t know” answers from the graphs, in this case such an answer can be interpreted substantively as indicating indecision, a less forceful form of rejection than a “no vale la pena” response.



Graph VII.17. Willingness To Pay More Taxes for Better Municipal Services by Size of Locality. Mexico, 2006.

7.4.1 Determinants of Citizen Views on Premises of Decentralization

Assuming that the ultimate test is a willingness to pay higher taxes in the hope of achieving better municipal services, this variable was chosen as the focus (dependent variable in which variation will be explained) of a multivariate analysis. Statistically significant predictors of the willingness to pay more taxes (in the hope of attaining better municipal services) include: (i) the frequency of listening to radio news (frequent listeners more willing to pay taxes); (ii) the citizen's sense of their own current economic situation, with those enjoying better circumstances being willing to pay more taxes; (iii) the confidence that citizens have in municipal officials; and (iv) if citizens that feel that local officials pay attention to citizen concerns at municipal meetings. However, it is interesting that the perceived quality of existing municipal services (or perceived lack of quality thereof) does *not* predict the willingness to pay more taxes for better such services. Perhaps those who feel that existing services are good feel no need to sacrifice

for better services. None of demographic variables (household possessions, education, age or sex) has a significant impact, nor does political knowledge or city size, once the effects of other variables are controlled. See Regression VII.4 in the Technical Appendix to this chapter.

7.5 Implications for Decentralization in Mexico

The 2006 LAPOP survey in Mexico suggests the difficulty of enlisting citizen participation in urban government and the challenge of generating citizen enthusiasm about governmental plans for decentralization. While Mexican citizens in 2006 are more likely to have sought assistance from municipal governments than from federal deputies or other federal officials, their attempts to do so dropped (from levels observed in 2004) in the month before the 2006 presidential election. This suggests that even “extractive behavior” may still be seen as risky, and something to be timed to favorable moments. Attendance at town meetings was also off in June 2006, when the survey was conducted.

There are curiously mixed results as to which city size is most conducive to positive interactions with local governments. Residents of medium sized cities are less likely than residents of rural areas, small cities or Mexico City to have engaged in either type of participatory behavior (attendance at town meetings or seeking help from municipal officials), yet it is precisely the residents of such cities who are most likely to see municipal officials as respectful of citizens, responsive to them, and to assess municipal services positively. Consequently, residents of such cities are willing to see more services transferred from federal to local administration. Nonetheless, residents of middle-sized cities are among those *least* willing to pay more taxes in support of better local services, while those in large cities, including the Distrito Federal, are more willing to make a trade-off between higher taxes and better local services.

One possible mechanism for making local governments more accountable to citizens is the institution of the neighborhood council. Yet in a recent study, Rowland (2006: 35-36) concludes that such potential is attained only rarely, saying:

Neighborhood councils have not evolved into functioning mechanisms for the communication of preferences and demands of sub-local areas. Instead, they continue to exist as a mix of old-style patronage (albeit for a greater variety of political parties than previously) and a new style of irrelevance to local government actions... The dependence of neighborhood councils on municipal governance or political parties for their operating resources combines with the lack of any power to demand attention and action for pressing neighborhood problems. The result is to render most neighborhood councils passive... Local governments and political parties appear to take advantage of this situation for short-term electoral gains, rather than working to establish more effective forms of neighborhood representation.

The 2006 LAPOP study provides public opinion data consistent with such a situation and with the further irony that, in spite of the argument adduced by recent Mexican presidents, by international donor agencies, and by political parties that “local governments are closer to the people,” Mexican citizens seem not to agree. Just under half of them believe that transferring municipal powers to the Federal government would be the best way to improve local services. And the percentage that would prefer service delivery by the Federal government is even greater in large cities. Centralization of political authority will die hard in Mexico.

Nonetheless, neighborhood and community organizing for self-help efforts do contribute to subsequent attendance at town meetings, to requests for assistance from local government, and even to a willingness to pay higher taxes. And radio listening and newspaper reading have positive effects on certain types of local participation. Hence, difficult as it may be to give meaning to “decentralization” to the citizenry of Mexico (or many other countries), the link between strengthening organizations in civil society and enhanced municipal governance should not be overlooked. Few other levers exist. If, as Rowland suggests, formal neighborhood associations prove to be difficult channels for the representation of citizens’ interests before municipal authorities – other informal channels may exist. The challenge is to find ways to support such informal channels without subjecting them to politicization in a way that foments dependence, rather than autonomy.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTER

Regression VII.1 Determinants of Request for Help from Local Officials

Determinants of Requests for Help from Local Officials: Logistic Regression					
Predictor	β	S.E.	Wald	Significance	Exp(β)
Household Possessions [Sum of R series]	-.066	.049	1.776	.183	.936
Education (in years) [ED]	-.118	.092	1.653	.199	.889
Age (years) [Q2]	.171	.062	7.599	.006	1.187
Sex [Q1R dummy: male=1]	.007	.162	.002	.967	1.007
Political Knowledge [conpol]	.009	.004	4.808	.028	1.009
City Size [TamanoR]	-.151	.058	6.911	.009	.859
Attends Meetings of Community Improvement Organization [CP8R]	.466	.079	35.163	.000	1.593
Listens to Radio News [A1R]	.204	.079	6.566	.010	1.226
Watches TV News [A2R]	-.096	.105	.830	.362	.908
Reads News in Newspaper [A3R]	.274	.086	10.268	.001	1.315
Local Officials Listen [NP1Brev]	-.385	.175	4.804	.028	.681
Quality of Local Services [SGL1R]	-.222	.081	7.418	.006	.801
Constant	-1.942	.615	9.964	.002	.143

Dependent Variable: CP4A (recoded as a dummy variable)
 One degree of freedom for each predictor, twelve in the equation.
 Nagelkerke $R^2 = .124$; Percent of Cases Correctly Assigned = 85.5%

Regression VII.2. Determinants of Attendance at Open Town Meetings

Determinants of Attendance at Open Town Meetings					
Logistic regression					
Predictor	β	S.E.	Wald	Significance	Exp(β)
Household Possessions [Sum of R series]	-.080	0.61	1.739	.187	.923
Education (in years) [ED]	.071	.110	.421	.517	1.074
Age (years) [Q2]	-.012	.078	.025	.874	.988
Sex [Q1R dummy: male=1]	.333	.202	2.276	.099	1.396
Political Knowledge [conpol]	.003	.005	.454	.500	1.003
City Size (TamanoR)	.084	.069	1.465	.226	1.087
Watches TV News [A2]	.361	.138	6.811	.009	1.435
Frequency of Attending Community Improvement Meetings [CP8]	.720	.095	56.976	.000	2.055
Frequency of Attending Professional or Trade Assoc. Meetings [CP9]	.317	.132	5.739	.017	1.373
<i>Frequency of Attending Union Meetings [CP10]</i>	-.345	.192	3.239	.072	.708
Frequency of Attending Meetings of Political Party or Movement [CP13]	.505	.124	16.510	.000	1.657
Confidence in Municipal Authorities [B32]	-.017	.055	.092	.762	.984
Constant	-5.673	0.666	72.479	.000	.003

Dependent Variable: NP1 (recoded as a dummy variable).
 One degree of freedom for each predictor, twelve in the equation.
 Nagelkerke $R^2 = .185$; Percent of Cases Correctly Assigned = 90.3%

Regression VII.3. Determinants of Sense of Respect Accorded by Municipal Officials

Determinants of Sense of Respect Accorded by Municipal Officials					
Linear regression					
Predictor	B	S.E.	Standard- ized Beta	t	Significan ce
Household Possessions [Sum of R series]	.013	.022	.027	.577	.564
Education (in years) [ED]	.056	.040	.077	1.413	.158
Age (years) [Q2]	.029	.029	.045	1.000	.318
Sex [Q1Rdummy; male=1]	-.170	.074	-.098	-2.282	.023
City Size [TamanoR]	-.029	.024	-.052	-1.173	.241
Frequency of Listening to Radio News [A1rev]	-.020	.033	-.026	-.594	.533
Frequency of Watching TV News [A2rev]	.061	.048	.054	1.269	.205
Frequency of reading news on Internet [A41R]	-.031	.052	-.027	-.600	.549
Frequency of Attendance at Meetings of Religious Organizations [CP6R]	.037	.028	.056	1.336	.182
Level of Confidence in Municipal Authorities [B32]	.094	.022	.193	4.284	.000
Municipal Authorities Listen [NPB1rev]	.393	.082	.212	4.770	.000
Quality of Current Municipal Services [SGL1rev]	.272	.041	.307	6.590	.000
Own Economic Situation [IDIO1rev]	.069	.049	.061	1.418	.157
Constant	2.257	.144		15.718	.000

Dependent Variable: SGL2rev (recoded with positive reactions having high values)
Adjusted R² = .325

Regression VII.4. Determinants of Willingness to Pay more Taxes in Exchange for Better Local Services

Determinants of Willingness to Pay More Taxes in Exchange for Better Local Services: Logistic Regression					
Predictor	β	S.E.	Wald	Significance	Exp(β)
Household Possessions [R series]	-.058	0.49	1.407	.236	.943
Education (in years) [ED]	-.009	.088	.010	.922	.991
Age (years) [Q2]	.068	.061	1,217	.270	1.070
Sex [Q1Rdummy; male=1]	.060	.156	.145	.703	1.061
Political Knowledge [conpol]	.004	.004	.909	.341	1.004
City Size [TamanoR]	-.020	.056	.128	.721	.980
Listens to Radio News [A1]	.270	.072	13.972	.000	1.309
Own Economic Situation [IDIO1]	.274	.108	6.403	.011	1.315
Local Officials Pay Attention to Citizens [NP1Brev]	.497	.167	8.858	.003	1.643
Level of Confidence in Municipal Authorities [B32]	.120	.049	5.992	.014	1.128
Quality Perceived in Existing Local Services [SGL1]	.097	.092	1.130	.288	1.102
Constant	-4.309	.535	64.907	.000	.013

Dependent Variable: LGL3 (recoded as a dummy variable)

One degree of freedom for each predictor, twelve in the equation.


Nagelkerke $R^2 = .071$; Percent of Cases Correctly Assigned = 85.2%

VIII. Electoral Behavior

Democratic transition in Mexico has been gradual. Various academicians have underscored the importance of the electorate as the main protagonist in the changes that have taken place in recent years (Domínguez and McCann 1996; Domínguez and Poiré 1999). For some, alternation among power-holders at all levels of government has been the undisputed evidence that allows us to speak of democratic advances (Lujambio 1995; Lujambio and Vives 2000). Likewise, local political life has undergone constant change. Increasingly, more states and municipalities are governed by different parties, so that the citizenry has the opportunity to evaluate the performance of politicians at different levels of government. The evolution of Mexican democracy has implied new experiences with political life and customs for a broad segment of the Mexican electorate.

Despite the ever-increasing presence of partisan alternation in power and, therefore, of the spread of the policy proposals and achievements of the different parties in the government, enduring socio-demographic differences persist, characterizing diverse segments of the Mexican electorate. Of all the predictors of electoral behavior, education is the one that most efficiently discriminates between predicted behaviors (Dalton 2002), and has the advantage of being a variable easily obtainable, since it appears in practically all surveys, as compared to indexes of political sophistication (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 2000). Education has been positively associated with an enhanced knowledge of politics and with greater political sophistication (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996). In other words, the greater an individual's education, the more interest in politics the person is likely to exhibit, the more resources available to the individual to analyze political information, and the greater the readiness of an individual to participate in political life. Graph VIII.1 shows the differences between groups of party sympathizers with regard to their levels of education.¹⁰


¹⁰ Due to the date of the LAPOP survey, only a few weeks before the 2006 presidential elections in Mexico, analyses of electoral behavior were conducted with reports on voting in earlier elections. The percentages of responses to the question regarding voting refer to the presidential election of 2000 (question VB2) or to the midterm legislative election of 2003 (question VB6), whose effect was captured more efficiently in LAPOP 2004. For this reason, reported voting totals are highly over-represented (Abelson, Loftus and Greenwald 1992). Therefore, the question used in this chapter for distinguishing support among different parties is that of party sympathy (question MEXVB11).



Graph VIII.1. Partisanship by Educational Level. Mexico, 2006.

Of the three major parties, PAN, PRI and PRD, the PRI is the one showing its highest level of sympathy in the segments of the electorate with lowest levels of education, decreasing as levels of education increase. The PRD exhibits a bi-modal pattern having larger numbers of sympathizers among those who have no formal education but also among those that have a college degree or more. Moreover, the PAN also shows a bi-modal pattern: the PAN has more adherents among those informants with secondary education and among those with college or more. Such differences in support most probably respond to party contact strategies with their potential electors. The content of platforms, but even more the focus of diverse government programs, may be the determining factors in party preference.

The impact of increasing party competition on diverse segments of the electorate varies. The assimilation of political information and its discussion differs in intensity and frequency among individuals, to a good degree due to varying levels of interest, of resources at hand and of free time. Graph VIII.2 shows the frequency of political discussion among individuals of differing educational levels.




Graph VIII.2. Frequency of Political Discussion by Educational Level. Mexico, 2006.

In Graph VIII.2, we see that, among respondents of higher educational levels, political discussions are more frequent. As the informants' levels of education increase (currently averaging 7 years nationally), we expect political discussions to be more frequent and of higher quality.

8.1 Ideology and party loyalty

Ideology (just like party loyalty) is a informative short-cut reducing the costs of acquiring information about party proposals and candidates, and is useful in orienting individuals' political attitudes (Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 1991; Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991, Shively 1979). Previous studies on ideology show that the Mexican electorate is on the center-right of the ideological spectrum (Moreno 1998, 1999, 2003). Notwithstanding those findings, it has

also been shown that ideology depends on party loyalty. Individuals choose their party and once they have found its ideological niche, they proceed to place themselves in the ideological spectrum (Estrada 2005). Due to the absence of ideological content in the political debate of the elites, a broad sector of Mexican electorate understands parties more in terms of their supposed positions regarding diverse public affairs or *issues* (Estrada and Parás 2006). There is, then, a relationship between informants' self-ascribed ideological position and the party they support, as is shown in Graph VIII.3




Graph VIII.3. Ideological Self-Placement by Partisanship. Mexico, 2006.

Despite the fact the majority of individuals place themselves in the center of the ideological spectrum, party differences exist at the extremes. While more individuals supporting the PRD identify themselves as being on the extreme left, the center-right segment of the population contains more individuals backing the PRI and the PAN. As was mentioned previously, Mexican parties have been successful in identifying themselves with an ideological placement, despite the fact that, in Mexico, the ideological labels lack the traditional content of left or right prevailing in other countries.

8.2 Satisfaction with democracy

Whether the consolidation of democracy is related to political alternation or not, for some party followers, the level of faith in the democratic regime is a function of the victory of their favorite party, especially at a federal level. If this argument is true, then we would find those citizens backing a party that has governed at all levels will feel more satisfied with democracy than those backing a party that has not. Graph VIII.4 shows the levels of satisfaction with Mexican democracy by party loyalty.




Graph VIII.4. Degree of Satisfaction with Democracy by Partisanship. Mexico, 2006.

While individuals backing the PAN are more frequently satisfied or very satisfied with democracy, those allying themselves with the PRD are more frequently unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with democracy in Mexico. That is, individuals who support the party in power show greater approval of democracy, while individuals supporting a party that has

not governed federally are less satisfied with the condition of democracy in Mexico. From this we may infer that alternation in power, as well as having the opportunity to pursue the specific objectives and platforms of one's preferred political party, might be determining factors in the level of satisfaction that citizens exhibit with democracy in Mexico.

8.3 Presidential approval

Presidential approval can be measured using retrospective evaluations of the economy (Buendía 1996; Kinder and Keiwiet 1981), since the electorate can be seen as a type of “god” of vengeance or reward that can use its vote to punish or reward the performance of the party in power (Key 1966). During the administration of President Vicente Fox, the economy was a constant in his favor. However, even so, a variety of economic goals posited at the beginning of his mandate were not attained. Moreover, presidential approval is strongly related to party loyalty (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Fiorina 1981). But differing segments of the electorate are attentive to differing issues, notwithstanding their underlying party loyalties. During his six-year term, Fox was a popular president and this is reflected in the evaluation of the citizenry regarding his performance in different areas. Graph VIII.5 shows different evaluationd for President Fox's efforts by policy-making arena, controlling for levels of presidential approval.




Graph VIII.5. Average Rating of Governmental Performance by Levels of Presidential Approval. México, 2006.

Those approving President Fox's efforts mention protecting human rights and promoting democratic principles as the policy areas evaluated most favorably, while those disapproving the president's efforts mention combating unemployment and combating corruption as the categories in which the president's administration was evaluated the worst. The administration of Vicente Fox is perceived as a driving force behind democratic values, though citizens point out his failure to reverse certain negative trends of past years, such as corruption, unemployment and poverty.

8.4 Election reforms

Democratic transition in Mexico has been gradual. For that reason, it is perceived as a process yet unfinished. That is, the areas of opportunity increase as the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of democracy becomes more sophisticated. Expectations

are that the pursuit of democracy leaves in its wake a trail of reforms discussed in-depth. Proof of this process is the debate surrounding two reforms: the immediate reelection of legislators and the possibility of establishing run-off elections for the presidency. Just as has been shown throughout this chapter, opinions on these topics differ based on the party preferred by respondents, as is shown in Graph VIII.6.




Graph VIII.6. Opinion about Runoff Elections by Partisanship. México, 2006.

The idea of a run-off election is endorsed more by PAN loyalists than by PRI or PRD sympathizers. In a scenario of run-off elections, if voters were only to take into account their self-placement in the ideological spectrum (see Graph VIII.3), then the PRD would be the party that would potentially have the least support, since the PRI and the PAN share the center-right segment of the electorate. That is, if the chief executive were elected by run-off election in a second round, the PRD's possibilities would be minimized by the strength that a PAN-PRI coalition would have.

In Latin America, only Costa Rica and Mexico do not have immediate reelection of their legislators. Opposition to immediate reelection, despite the practice being increasingly

widespread in the region, is the position taken by the majority of the Mexican electorate, as shown in Graph VIII.7



Graph VIII.7. Opinions about Reelection of Legislators by Partisanship. México, 2006.

Support for permitting the immediate reelection of legislators varies according to the party backed by respondents: those sympathizing with the PAN agree more than do sympathizers of other parties that immediate reelection should be permitted, while those sympathizing with the PRD are less in agreement. Opposition to said reform may be due, perhaps, to politicians not being well evaluated by the citizenry, so that proposing that immediate reelection should be permitted would suggest the possibility of leaving politicians in their posts longer, a prospect unlikely be favored.

Both possible reforms, run-off elections and reelection, are relatively new issues yet to be explored in-depth. Therefore, we believe the data shown here are a first approximation to a complex issue that, because of its importance, should be dealt with more in-depth using the largest number of indicators in future research..

8.5 Conclusions

The electoral behavior of Mexicans is related to their partisan leanings and is driven by certain socio-demographic factors, mainly education. Party loyalty for the PAN, PRI or PRD determines, to a good measure, not only ideological self-placement, but also opinions about democracy, approval of the sitting president, and opinions about potential electoral reforms. Since party loyalty depends on retrospective evaluations of government performance, to the degree that party alternation continues spreading to other levels of government, individuals will have more tools to judge the success or failure of government policies and, therefore, to decide whether they continue to support their party or decide to shift their support to another party. Many political attitudes and opinions will continue to depend on the intensity of the affective links that individuals have toward political parties.

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IX. Social Capital

Social capital is a relatively recent concept that has taken on a great relevance. The words of Paldam serve to illustrate the apparent expansion and explosion of the concept: “one of the principal virtues of social capital is that it is close to becoming a common concept for all the social sciences” (2000: 631). The concept has its origins in the work of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, the latter two having the greatest influence.¹ Coleman argues that social capital helps to explain cooperative behavior between individuals and he shows the positive effect it has on human capital (1994). Putnam, in turn, shows the importance of social capital as a determining factor in institutional and social performance, studying civic traditions in Italy (1993) and, later, documenting in detail the weakening of civic participation in the United States (2000).

Even though there is no universally-accepted definition of the concept, there is consensus in the literature in identifying two dimensions of social capital: the cognitive and the structural.² The *cognitive* focuses mainly on trust (among individuals and toward institutions) and the level of reciprocity existing in a society. The *structural* focuses on collective organization and participation. Taking this into account, we define social capital as the “norms and values permitting cooperative behavior in groups” (Fukuyama 1997) and “any aspect of informal [or formal] social organization that constitutes a productive resource for one or more actors” (Coleman 1994: 170). This definition allows us to place our emphasis on participation in civil society, in addition to qualifying the concept as productive.³

The LAPOP 2006 survey affords us good tools for measuring social capital in Mexico, since it includes questions referring to institutional and interpersonal trust and questions on formal and informal social participation. In addition, it permits an evaluation of the evolution of these dimensions of social capital over time and allows one to compare Mexico with the rest of Latin America.

9.1 Cognitive dimension of social capital

Trust can be understood as the capacity to interact with something or someone without requiring being on guard (Tway 1994: 8) or as expectations that we learn and confirm ourselves socially vis-à-vis others and the organizations and institutions in which we live (Barber 83: 165). Therefore, it is difficult to speak of a general type of trust, making it necessary to measure trust in specific and particular situations. That is, we need to

¹ Even when the impact of Bourdieu is less widely acknowledged, it is important to recognize the relevance of his work, especially in determining the allocation of the benefits of social capital.


² Some have criticized the concept of social capital as being too broad conceptually to the point of becoming entirely too diffuse or too general.

³ Several authors have pointed out that there is a “dark side” of social capital. Our label *productive* refers more to the aspect of efficiency than to normativity. That is, our definition admits the possibility of said “dark side.”

measure the trust that an individual has in other persons (someones) and institutions (somethings) with which they interact on a regular basis. Trust can be classified into four types: family, social (generalized and/or toward strangers), institutional and civic (Stone 2001). The first three are measured directly by the LAPOP survey (twelve institutions and six groups of people) and are treated below.

9.1.1 Institutional trust

The LAPOP surveys of 2004 and 2006 measure trust in institutions using a scale from 1 (no trust) to 7 (a very high level of trust). Graph IX.1 compares the averages for twelve institutions for the two years. Institutions are ranked from greater to lesser trust according to the result of the last survey. Comparing the findings from 2004 with those from 2006, two things stand out: first is the fact that seven out of twelve institutions show a statistically significant shift in their average score, a positive change in six of them. The armed forces, Federal Electoral Institute, federal government, Congress, Supreme Court and municipalities have improved their score over the past two years (only the police did worse and the rest of the institutions did not show any significant changes). Second is the fact that there is little change in the order of the institutions. Even when there are slight shifts in the order, we can see that, in both surveys, we have the same institutions occupying the first five places and the same institutions occupying the intermediate spots (from six to nine), with the same in the last three places. What is worrisome about this stability in the order of trust is that the last spots are occupied by institutions that are crucial to a young Mexican democracy, such as the Congress, Supreme Court, Attorney General's Office, and the political parties. A similar argument was put forth in Chapter 6, specifically referring to institutions that have to do with the justice system (see Graph VI.5).




Graph IX.1. Trust in Institutions. Mexico: 2004-2006.

It is important to pose the question: How good/bad is the level of institutional trust in Mexico? To answer that, we should first set criteria for determining what constitutes a good, regular or bad score. We propose a “low” score for those institutions whose average score is less than two; a “regular” one for those between two and five; and a “good” score for those averaging more than five. Under this criterion, in 2006 we have only four of twelve institutions with a “good” score and the rest with a “regular” one.

9.1.2 Interpersonal trust

The LAPOP 2006 survey included an indicator of interpersonal trust, permitting comparing Mexico with other Latin American countries. The question was worded: “Now, speaking of people from around here, would you say that the people in your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, a little trustworthy or not trustworthy?” (*Ahora hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable or nada confiable?*) This


question is more precise than the generalized indicator of trust in the World Values Survey. Its greater precision can be explained by two reasons: it offers more response options, which eliminated problems of range restriction and it asks about the trust of close individuals, that is, about members of the informant's community.⁴ In Mexico, the results from this question do not present any significant variation between 2004 and 2006. One-fifth of the population said that the people in their community were very trustworthy, slightly less than half are of the opinion they are somewhat trustworthy, and one-quarter say they are a little trustworthy and about 10% believe they are not trustworthy (see Graph IX.2).



Graph IX.2. Interpersonal Trust. Mexico: 2004-2006.

⁴ The exact question used by the World Values Survey to measure generalized trust is: "Would you say that most people can be trusted or you can not be too carefull when dealing with other?" For a detailed discussion of the topic, see: P. Parás and L. Estrada: "From Inches to Centimeters: The Uncritical Use of Available Measures," a paper presented at the 60th annual conference of the AAPOR, Miami FL, May 12-15, 2005


With a single indicator, it is difficult to determine whether we should describe Mexican society as untrusting or somewhat trusting. To further explore levels of interpersonal trust in Mexico, we analyze below the results of this question comparatively. Graph IX.3 shows the average score (on a scale of 0 to 100) of this indicator of generalized trust. First we observe that Mexico does not present any statistically significant variation between 2004 and 2006. With regard to other countries, we see that Mexico is an average country with higher levels of trust than Haiti, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama, levels similar to Nicaragua, Guatemala, Jamaica, Chile and the Dominican Republic, and a score lower than El Salvador, Colombia, Honduras and Costa Rica. Judging from the results, we can also say that it is a fairly stable indicator, since, with the exception of two countries showing a significant increase in the average of interpersonal trust (Nicaragua and Honduras), all the others have a score comparable to that of 2004.



Graph IX.3. Interpersonal Trust in the LAPOP Countries: 2004–2006.

As was mentioned previously, *trust* is, by definition, situational, so that measuring it requires two or more indicators. The case of institutional trust we presented above

clearly shows how Mexicans trust some institutions more than others, and we would expect the same with interpersonal trust. So as to complement the analysis of this indicator, the LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico asks about trust in five additional groups of people. The results of the average scores (scale of 0 to 100) of these variables is shown in Graph IX.4. The first thing we see is that, in fact, levels of trust vary significantly according to the reference group. Comparing these groups, we find that trust of family members, as would be expected, is quite high. Trust in people from the community, among neighbors and toward private shop-keepers, show scores between 52 and 54 points, which can be seen as normal. Finally, those groups socially furthest from the informant show the lowest scores. In the case of government workers, the score is probably correlated with trust in institutions.



Graph IX.4. Trust in Groups of People by Social Proximity. Mexico, 2006.

9.2 Structural dimension of social capital


In order to analyze the structural dimensions of social capital in Mexico, we will divide the type of participation into *formal* (through an organization formally constituted) and *informal* (through the community). Both are treated in the LAPOP 2006 survey and together provide a good overview of civil participation. It is important to point out that the amount, quality and direction of said participation responds, to a substantial degree, to the structural characteristics in which participation develops. That is, a structure can trigger or facilitate participation, it putting within the reach of citizens (and motivating) formal channels of participation (Krishna 2002). On the other hand, in the absence of sufficient or accessible formal channels of participation, informal channels of participation may emerge which, on some occasions, become *safety nets* for the social fabric.⁵

9.2.1 Participation in organizations formally constituted

The LAPOP survey asks about participation in the six different types of organizations shown in Graph IX.5. From these findings, two things warrant mention. First is that in four of the six institutions there was no significant change between 2004 and 2006. However, there is a considerable increase in participation in religious organizations and a major decrease in participation in unions. The case of religious participation is important because it is the channel of formal participation most relevant in Mexico, but also because it is probable said increase is due to the growing diffusion of non-Catholic religious organizations. It should be pointed out that this increase in religious participation in Mexico has been detected in other surveys.⁶ The second point to underscore pertains to the point made above about how structure can determine the manifestations of social participation. It is not by chance that we find the greatest percentage of participation in organizations whose coverage and attraction is deepest. Both churches and schools are organizations that are close to the great majority of Mexicans and it is, therefore, in these organizations that we find the greatest participation. On the extreme opposite, we find that workplace organizations attending to specific segments of the population, such as professional associations and unions, are of smaller size.


⁵ In Mexico, particularly important is the anthropological work on these social-support networks done by Dr. Larissa Adler.

⁶ The most notable of these is the evolution of religious participation detected in the World Values Survey.



Graph IX.5. Average Levels of Participation in Formal Organizations. Mexico: 2004–2006.


Are these levels of participation high or low? We could also ask whether said levels are “sufficient” or “healthy,” but the answer to these questions would be read too much into the results of the survey. In order to offer a partial interpretation of how to interpret such an incidence, we present two pieces of data: the distribution of the number of organizations in which Mexican participate and the comparative average number of associations in which they participate. Graph IX.6 shows the percentage of adults not participating in any of the six institutions measured decreases significantly from 24.9% in 2004 to only 17.1% in 2006. This was to be expected because of the increase in religious participation. Consistent with the preceding, the percentage of the population participating in a single institution grew significantly. The data are positive from the point of view of the amount of civic participation, since they show a considerable increase in the number of persons participating in one to four institutions.



Graph IX.6. Number of Formal Institutions in Which Mexicans Participate: 2004–2006.

On the average, Mexicans participated in 1.6 institutions in 2004 and 1.7 in 2006. Let us see now how this average compares with the rest of the countries in Latin America. Graph IX.7 shows three groups of countries. The grouping with greatest participation is made up of countries with average participation in two association or groups (Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru). The second group, to which Mexico belongs, includes countries averaging around 1.5, and includes Ecuador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Colombia. On the bottom are countries with lower averages (Panama, Chile, El Salvador and Costa Rica). The order of the countries in this indicator of formal participation is quite different from that of interpersonal trust (Graph IX.3), suggesting that the correlation is small between both. From these data, it is difficult to conclude whether participation is low, high, unhealthy or healthy in Mexico. There are many other institutions in which individuals can participate and it would be impossible to include all of them in a multi-topic survey such as LAPOP 2006. Of the three institutions, we can consider three of them as (almost) universal: religious ones, those seeking to improve the community and political parties. The other three deal with specific segments of the population (i.e., parents, professionals and workers). Were we to analyze the data in

another way, for example, examining participation in parents' association only among those having children of school age, levels of participation would be greater. Therefore, we believe that the indexes reported in Graph IX.7 situate Mexico at a level which could be considered healthy.




Graph IX.7. Average Number of Formal Organizations in Which Persons Participate in LAPOP Countries, 2006.

In order to understand those factors having an impact on participation, we ran a linear regression having, as a dependent variable, the number of organizations which informants say they participate in. The model includes eight demographic and three substantive variables. On the one hand, we observe that neither age, education, socioeconomic level (wealth), nor the religious beliefs of the informant are significant predictors, that is, participation is independent of these four variables. We do find a significant impact in the other six demographic variables: women participate more than men, married people more than single/widowed/divorced people. Those with a greater number of children participate more than those with no or fewer children and there is greater participation in

rural areas than in urban ones. The preceding would be expected if we take into account that the type of organization measured in LAPOP can over-represent the participation of some groups and under-represent that of others. For example, measuring participation in schools makes it more probable that groups such as married people, with larger numbers of children, (and perhaps women) participate in this type of organization. Insofar as substantive variables are concerned, it is interesting to observe that two of them have a statistically significant impact on levels of participation. Data from LAPOP show that there is a direct relationship between being a victim of corruption and participation: the greater the victimization, the greater the participation. It is hard to explain this relationship (confirmed empirically by the LAPOP reports of other countries), which suggests that being a victim of corruption triggers (and, in this sense, has a positive effect on) the participation of people, perhaps to attempt to control/avoid corruption or even perhaps to spur corruption (in the event that corruption might generate a benefit for people). The regression does not show a similar relationship between the victims of hold-ups and participation that has been detected in other studies (Parás 2003). Finally, a direct relationship can be seen between the level of interpersonal trust and formal participation, which confirms much of the literature on social capital that suggests a mutual reinforcement between the cognitive and structural components of the concept.


Below, we report additional data related to social capital which have to do with the dialogue between citizens and their officials. The first piece of data refers to citizens' demands for support/services from officials, presented in a graph in Chapter 7 (see Graph VII.1). A decrease in the demand for public support can be seen. The decrease is marked in the case of support requested from officials, though it remains marginal in the other two cases. The second datum has to do with public protests and does not show any significant differences between 2004 and 2006 (Graph IX.8). For 2006, we see that 14.6% say they have participated in some public protest (8.9% sometimes and 5.7% almost never). From the group that has protested, we find a large percentage of recent activity, since 54.6% say this form of participation occurred during the last year. These data could imply a pre-electoral distancing from and/or distrust of citizens toward their representatives and officials. It is not clear whether the post-electoral context of 2006 will reinforce these trends even more. On the positive side, this increase can be interpreted as social participation that serves to present demands and hold the government accountable.



Graph IX.8. Frequency of Participation in Public Protests. Mexico: 2004–2006.

9.2.2 Informal participation through the community

With regard to informal participation, respondents were asked whether they had contributed to the solution of some problem in their locality or neighborhood during the past year. One-third of Mexicans responded affirmatively to this question (32.1% in 2004 and 30.8% in 2006). This third of the population seems particularly active: 68.9% say they have contributed with work, 57.4% by attending community meetings, 52.7% by contributing money, and 30.7% by helping organize some new group to solve a specific problem. Even though these levels of participation can be taken as relatively high, we find that Mexico is one of the countries with the least informal participation. Graph IX.9 compares countries as to the percentage of persons active in community support. Mexico is fourth from the bottom of all LAPOP 2006 countries.



Graph IX.9. Levels of Informal Participation in Groups Seeking to Solve Some Community Problem in LAPOP Countries, 2006.

9.3 Conclusions

A specialized literature in the social sciences has documented the positive relationship social capital has with democracy and development. Data for Mexico reported in this chapter show there are signs of recovery: institutional trust in seven of the twelve institutions measured increased; interpersonal trust is stable and varies according to the reference group (greater closeness to the reference group, greater trust); participation in formal institutions increased significantly; and one-third of the population is highly active in channels of informal participation.

However, from a comparative point of view, Mexico is among the lowest for some of the social-capital indicators presented here. It is not clear whether this is due to the fact, in recent times, there was an erosion of the amount of social capital in the country, or whether Mexicans have always exhibited less social capital. We leave the answer to this important issue for future studies.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX TO THE CHAPTER

Regression IX.1. Determinants of Formal Participation.

Determinantes de la Participación Formal					
	B	Error típ.	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constante)	1,407	0,191		7,357	0,000
Q1 Gender (males)	-0,266	0,065	-0,103	-4,062	0,000
Q2. Age in years.	-0,004	0,003	-0,045	-1,392	0,164
ED Last year of school completed?	0,003	0,010	0,012	0,362	0,717
Q3 Religion (Catholic)	0,001	0,087	0,000	0,009	0,993
Q11 Marital Status (married)	0,307	0,069	0,117	4,415	0,000
WEALTH. Household wealth measured by physical possessions.	-0,029	0,020	-0,043	-1,470	0,142
Q12 Number of children	0,065	0,020	0,111	3,290	0,001
UR Lives in urban area	-0,327	0,084	-0,103	-3,878	0,000
EXCTOTR Total number of ways has been subjected to extortion/bribery in the past year	0,118	0,032	0,096	3,753	0,000
VIC1 Victim of a crime in the past twelve months	0,052	0,082	0,016	0,634	0,526
IT1 Interpersonal confidence	0,189	0,037	0,129	5,129	0,000

a. Dependent Variable: Participation in Formal Organizations

Appendix A: Sample design

For the study, a probabilistic sample was used with multi-stage selection. In the first stage, the 130 points surveyed were selected. The sample framework used were the electoral sections defined by the Instituto Federal Electoral, which governed the elections of July 6, 2003. Electoral sections are a reliable and representative sampling unit of the country's population, insofar as their coverage encompasses 96.42 percent of Mexicans 18 years or older which, in turn, is the target population of the survey. Sampling by electoral sections is the one most used nowadays by the main commercial interviewing agencies and in academic studies related to political culture, electoral behavior and public opinion. Market studies generally use another framework, that of basic geostatistical areas (*Áreas Geoestadísticas Básicas: AGEB*), which have the disadvantage of not representing the totality of the country's rural localities, especially those with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.

Electoral sections were stratified by region of the country (North, Center, West-Center and South) and by type of locality (urban and rural). Once the sections were ordered from largest to smallest in each stratum, according to the size of their nominal list of electors, 130 sections were chosen in systematic random manner. Therefore, each electoral section had a probability of selection proportional to its size within each stratum.

The sample was designed to have a theoretical margin of error of ± 2.5 percent with a confidence level of 95%.

The margins of error by stratum used in sampling are shown in Table AI.1

	Size of Sample	Margin of Error
Type of Locality		
Urban	1086	± 3.0
Rural	474	± 4.5
Region of Country		
North	408	± 4.9
Center-West	300	± 5.7
Center	516	± 4.4
South	336	± 5.4

Note: At a confidence level of 95%

Table AI.1. Margins of Error in Subsamples Corresponding to Sampling Strata.

The third stage consists of the selection of the dwelling where the interview was to be held. This stage began once the interviewers went to the points surveyed, defined by the addresses at which the polling places for each electoral section of the sample were located. Starting from this address, each interviewer spiraled outward, beginning from the northwestern point, so as to finally select the homes in which the interviews would be held. That was done clockwise, first in the block chosen and subsequently in neighboring

blocks. Homes within each block were also selected in systematic random order, with an interval as a function of the number of homes per block and of the characteristics of the neighborhood. In the case of dwellings that were apartment buildings or vertical condominiums, each building was taken as a block and the selection interval applied. Industrial and commercial areas were not included in the run-through of the interviewers. In rural areas, the run-through was done in a spiral or oscillatory manner according to the characteristics of the locality and a selection interval was also applied.

In the third stage of sampling, the interviewer chose the informant randomly, ensuring that each point surveyed complied with two sample-correction parameters: gender and age of the informant. As was mentioned in Chapter II, it was a requisite that the person interviewed live in the home selected and that he/she be at least 18 years of age. In cases where the selected person declined the interview, the interviewer substituted another home for the home in which the interview was refused, selecting the substitute home in systematic random form. One and only one adult was interviewed in each home.

Fieldwork

The study was organized and coordinated by the company DATA Opinión Pública and Mercados (DATA OPM). Personnel were instructed and trained specifically for the project analyzed in this report. DATA OPM is experienced doing surveys of an academic nature, in addition to commercial public opinion studies.

Work began with a pretest on May 19-21, 2006. Sixteen complete interviews were done. The areas where the interviews were done were the Federal District and the State of Mexico, including sectors of low, middle and upper incomes, both in urban and rural areas.

The person responsible for training and supervising the fieldwork and data-entry was trained by María Fernanda Boldi on May 22, 2006. In turn, this team trained the fieldworkers between May 29 and June 3.

Fieldwork was carried out from June 6-29, 2006. Participating were 48 interviewers and 23 field supervisors. Twelve different routes were defined to cover the country. Interviewers took, on the average, two full workdays to complete the 12 interviews from the starting point.

Training in the use of CSPRO for data-entry personnel was done on July 6, data-entry and verification of data was done during the period of July 6-14, and coding was done between June 26 and July 13. Eight persons participated in the coding, four in data-entry.

Data were entered into the CSPRO program twice, according to LAPOP data-verification standards.

Fieldwork supervision was simultaneous with the fieldwork itself. The methods used were:

1. Direct supervision: 15% of the sample (235 persons)
2. Supervision by revisiting homes selected: 10% of the sample (155 persons)
3. Supervision by frequency: supervision the database in SPSS, taking the initiation points as reference.

The main problems faced during fieldwork were:

1. In some parts of the country, people said they did not understand the questions in the questionnaire. This happened especially in rural communities.
 2. It was common that people complained about the length of the questionnaire.
 3. In the southern areas of the country, especially Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Michoacán, Hidalgo and Veracruz, roads were damaged by rain. In some rural areas of these regions, transportation was quite deficient.
 4. In Veracruz, the situation was delicate, since there had been recent assassinations in the south and this made participation hard because of distrust. In some rural areas of Michoacán and Guerrero, there was a strong presence of drug trafficking (drug-producing areas). In Mexico City and the city of Veracruz, there were dangerous areas with a strong presence of gangs.
 5. In several places, but especially Mexico City, many people questioned the motivations of the survey, assuming that it was “surely for the benefit of some political party.” At DATA OPM offices, we received two phone calls from persons wanting to know if we worked for the government and against the coalition Por el Bien de Todos candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. It is important to mention that the fieldwork was done during the last month of campaigning in the closest presidential election in the modern history of our country.
 6. In some areas, young men were underrepresented in local populations, since many of them have emigrated to the United States.
- Estimates of non-responses (averages):
- a) Homes with no one to interview. Estimate: 38%, The incidence is relatively high since fieldwork was done during the week (workdays). It was much lower on weekends.
 - b) Persons that did not want to do the survey. Estimate: 25% (3 of every 12 interviews, on the average).
 - c) Persons suspending the interview once started. Estimate: 9 % (slightly more than one person for each 12 interviews, on the average).
 - d) Workdays to complement a point surveyed: 2 days, on the average.

	North	Center-West	Center	South	Proportion by Type of Locality
Population (2000 Census)					
Urban	76.7	66.0	79.6	52.0	70.2
Rural	23.3	34.0	20.4	48.0	29.8
Total Proportion by Region	26.0	19.4	32.8	21.8	100
Sample					
Urban	76.5	66.0	79.1	50.0	69.6
Rural	23.5	34.0	20.9	50.0	30.4
Total Proportion by Region	26.2	19.2	33.1	21.5	100

Table AI.2. Comparison Between the Population and Simple by Region and Type of Locality.

Federal Entity	Population %	% of Sample	% Difference
Baja California	10.5	11.8	1.3
Baja California Sur	1.7	-	-1.7
Coahuila	9.1	8.8	-0.3
Chihuahua	12.7	14.7	2.0
Durango	5.7	5.9	0.2
Nuevo León	15.8	14.7	-1.1
San Luis Potosí	8.6	8.8	0.2
Sinaloa	9.6	8.8	-0.8
Sonora	9.0	8.8	-0.2
Tamaulipas	11.8	11.8	0.0
Zacatecas	5.5	5.9	0.4

Table AI.3 . Northern Region.

Federal Entity	Population %	% of Sample	% Difference
Aguascalientes	5.0	8.0	3.0
Colima	2.9	-	0.0
Guanajuato	24.7	28.0	3.3
Jalisco	34.2	32.0	-2.2
Michoacán	21.0	20.0	-1.0
Nayarit	4.9	8.0	3.1
Querétaro	7.2	4.0	-3.2

Table AI.4. Center-West Region.


Federal Entity	Population %	% of Sample	% Difference
Distrito Federal	31.2	30.2	-1.0
Hidalgo	6.9	7.0	0.1
Estado de México	39.3	39.5	0.2
Morelos	5.0	4.7	-0.3
Puebla	14.5	14.0	-0.5
Tlaxcala	3.0	4.7	1.7

Table AI.5. Central Region.

Federal Entity	Population %	% of Sample	% Difference
Campeche	3.0	-	-3.0
Chiapas	16.5	17.9	1.4
Guerrero	13.5	14.3	0.8
Oaxaca	15.0	14.3	-0.7
Quintana Roo	3.9	3.6	-0.3
Tabasco	8.5	7.1	-1.4
Veracruz	32.1	32.1	0.0
Yucatán	7.5	10.7	3.2

Table AI.6. Southern Region.

Appendix B: Questionnaire



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

June 2006

Dear Sir or Madame:

You have been chosen by a drawing to participate in a public-opinion study financed by Vanderbilt University. I am here on behalf of Data Opinión Pública and Mercados to request an interview that will take 30-40 minutes.

The main goal of the study is to learn about the opinion of people regarding different aspects of the situation in Mexico.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may leave questions unanswered or finish the interview at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have any questions regarding the study, you can call Data Opinión Pública and Mercados, at (55) 55 23 05 07, and talk with Carlos López and/or Nuria De los Ríos.

Do you wish to participate?

Data Opinión Pública y Mercados ~ México D. F. ~ <http://www.dataopm.net>

Tel. (55)55 23 05 07~ Fax (55) 56 82 17 36 ~ Email: clo@dataopm.net

Versión # 23bR IRB Approval: 060187

 USAID DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA	 Opinión Pública y Mercados
 Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: MEXICO, 2006

© Vanderbilt University 2006. Derechos reservados. All rights reserved. País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAIS	1
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
ESTRATOPRI: 1 Norte, 2 Centro-Occidente, 3 Centro, 4 Sur	ESTRATOPRI	10 _____
UPM. _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ESTADO : _____	MEXESTADO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MUNICIPIO: _____	MEXMUNICIPIO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
DISTRITO (o parroquia, etc.): _____	MEXDISTRITO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SECCIÓN ELECTORAL _____	MEXSECELECT	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector _____	SEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. México DF (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	MEXIDIOMA	

		[IDIOMAQ]	
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]			-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2006		FECHA	<div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center;"> <div>-----</div> <div style="display: flex; gap: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> </div> <div style="display: flex; gap: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> </div> </div>
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO Leer alternativas SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMAL ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA			

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1
---	-----------

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO Leer alternativas ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]	A4	<div style="display: flex; gap: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 20px;"></div> </div>
---	-----------	---

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”] . Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.			
	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia , corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley , menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en Paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80
NS/NR	88	88	88
Código (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEN13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.]	DEM13D	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
88.NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]		

Ahora, cambiando el tema.....[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS/NR		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	SOCT1	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor(8) NS/NR	SOCT2	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde o regidores)	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4	

PROT1. alguna vez, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR		PROT1
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	PROT2

<i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...</i>	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP	
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio/colonia?	1	2	8	9	CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio o colonia, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10

CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
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LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (Leer alternativas) (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1
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LI. ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1 En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, hay gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Si 1 es muy de izquierda y 10 es muy de derecha ¿Dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda										Derecha
										(NS/NR=88)

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio/delegación...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal/delegacional durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios del municipio/delegación hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso: (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	NP1B
NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico del municipio/delegación durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio/delegación está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	SGL1
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al municipio (la delegación) para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR	SGL2
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a los municipios/delegaciones, o se debe dejar que el gobierno federal asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio/delegación (2) Que el gobierno federal asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO Leer alternativas] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO Leer alternativas] (8) NS/NR	LGL2

LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio/delegación para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales/delegacionales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio/delegación?(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR	LGL3	
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Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC13	

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC16	

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?	POP1	
POP1. [Leer alternativas] 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. 8. NS/NR		
POP2. [Leer alternativas] 1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o al contrario], Aun cuando estorben la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso. 8. NS/NR	POP2	

POP3. [Leer alternativas] 1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario], 2. Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR	POP3
POP4. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario], 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro. 8. NS/NR	POP4
POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. 8. NS/NR	POP5

VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8]	VIC1	
VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no víctima)	VIC2	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR	AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	AOJ11	
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]*.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada				Mucho			NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de México garantizan un juicio justo? (<i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7, o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)	B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de México?	B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político mexicano?	B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano?	B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político mexicano?	B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE)?	B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Federal?	B14	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría General de la República?	B16	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación?	B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio/delegación?	B32	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser mexicano?	B43	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37	

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
N1. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.	N1	

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
N3. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	N3	
N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	N9	
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	N10	
N11. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	N11	
N12. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.	N12	

[Recoja tarjeta A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Vicente Fox es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1	
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[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo Muy de acuerdo							NS/NR

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los mexicanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	PN2	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	DEM23	

RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en México? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿México es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5	

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	E14	
E2. Que las personas invadan fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	E16	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32	
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político mexicano?	D33	
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	D34	
D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?	D36	
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	D37	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en México. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</i>		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5

RECOGER TARJETA "C"

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR	DEM2	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	AUT1	

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	PP1	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2000? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	PP2	

Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigada; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.					
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8		DC1			
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar un acta de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga \$50 pesos de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) Corrupto pero se justifica 3) No corrupto 8)NS/NR		DC10			
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8		DC13			

	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP		
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC2	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC6	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el	0	1	8	9	EXC14	

	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP		
último año?						
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8	9	EXC15	
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8	9	EXC16	
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?	0	1	8		EXC18	
EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar mordidas (o sobornos) es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	0	1	8		EXC19	
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					EXC7	

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...		
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de Estados Unidos? [NO Leer alternativas: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI1	
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Senado de México? [NO Leer alternativas: Enrique Jackson] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI2	
GI3. ¿Cuántos estados tiene México? [NO Leer alternativas: 32 o 31 estados y un DF] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en México? [NO Leer alternativas: seis años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4	
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO Leer alternativas: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también “Lula”] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5	

VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Está Usted empadronado? [SOLO SI NO COMPRENDE PREGUNTE: ¿Tiene credencial para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales del 2000? (1) Sí votó [<i>Siga</i>] (2) No votó [<i>Pasar a VB4</i>] (8) NS/NR [<i>Pasar a VB6</i>]	VB2	
MEXVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO Leer alternativas LISTA] 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) Vicente Fox de la Alianza por el cambio (PAN/PVEM) Francisco Labastida del PRI Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas de la Alianza por México (PRD/PT/Convergencia/PSN/PAS) Otro _____ 88. NS/NR [<i>Pasar a VB8</i>] 99. Inap (No votó) (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)	MEXVB3	
VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] [No leer alternativas] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] 1 Falta de transporte 2 Enfermedad 3 Falta de interés 4 No le gustó ningún candidato 5 No cree en el sistema 6 Falta de cédula de identidad 7 No se encontró en padrón electoral 10 No tener edad necesaria 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar/ falta de tiempo 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad 14. Otra razón (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)	VB4	
VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cual de las siguientes fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos] Las cualidades del candidato El partido político del candidato El plan de gobierno del candidato (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó)	VB8	

VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones de 2003? 1. Sí 2. No. [pasa a VB10] 8. NS/NR. [pasa a VB10]	VB6	
MEXVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado federal en las últimas elecciones de 2003? 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. PAN/Partido Acción Nacional 2. PRI/Partido Revolucionario Institucional 3. PRD/Partido de la Revolución Democrática 4. PT/Partido del Trabajo 5. PVEM/Partido Verde Ecologista de México 6. PAS/Partido Alianza Social 7. Convergencia/Partido Convergencia 8. PSN/Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista 9. PLM/Partido Liberal Mexicano 10. Fuerza Ciudadana 88. NS/NR 99. INAP (no votó)	MEXVB7	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]	VB10	
MEXVB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas LISTA]. 1. PAN/ Partido Acción Nacional 5. PT / Partido del Trabajo 2. PRI/ Partido Revolucionario Institucional 6. PANAL/ Partido Nueva Alianza 3. PRD/ Partido de la Revolucion Democratica 7. PASC/ Alianza Socialdemócrata y Campesina 4. PVEM/ Partido Verde Ecologista 8. Otro _____ 88. NS/NR 99. INAP	MEXVB11	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR		POL1
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer alternativas) 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) NS/NR		POL2

USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo , ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala						NS/ NR		
	Muy en desacuerdo	1	2	3	4	5	6		
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA1	
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo?	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA2	
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA3	
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 7	2	3	4	5	6	8	AA4	

RECOGER TARJETA “B”

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:									
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, secretarías, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR								DIS2	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (99) INAP (no buscó trabajo)								DIS3	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR								DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR								DIS5	

MEX7 – En general, ¿usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la reelección de diputados federales? (Sondear: y diría que está muy o algo de acuerdo? – muy o algo en desacuerdo?) (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de Acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR [8]								MEX7	
MEX10 – Actualmente, los diputados y senadores cuentan con fuero, el cual les permite no ser sometidos a procedimientos judiciales mientras dure su cargo. Con cuál de las siguientes posturas está más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] (1) El fuero debe desaparecer por completo, ya que propicia la impunidad (2) El fuero debe mantenerse como está para garantizar la independencia de los legisladores (8) NS/NR [NO Leer alternativas]								MEX10	
MEX18 En algunos países los presidentes son seleccionados en dos rondas. En la primera ronda compiten todos los candidatos de todos los partidos, pero en la segunda ronda sólo se elige entre los dos candidatos que resultaron más votados en la primera ronda. ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en establecer un sistema de dos rondas para elegir al presidente aquí en México? (Sondear: Y diría que está muy o algo de acuerdo? – muy o algo en desacuerdo?) (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR [NO Leer alternativas]								MEX18	

MEX19 En general, qué tan bien representan los diputados de México los intereses de los ciudadanos (Leer alternativas) (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR	MEX19	
MEX20 Y pensando en el diputado de su distrito en particular (no importa si Usted votó por él o no) ¿Qué tan bien representa los intereses de los ciudadanos de este distrito? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR [8]	MEX20	
MEX22 Con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo: (1) En general, los diputados buscan representar los intereses de los ciudadanos (2) Los diputados sólo buscan satisfacer sus propios intereses (8) NS/NR	MEX22	

Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre grupos de personas. Para cada uno ¿podría decirme cuánta confianza tiene en ellos: nada, poca, algo o mucha?	Nada Poca Algo Mucha	NS/NR		
MEX23. Sus familiares	1 2 3 4	8	MEX23	
MEX24. Personas de su colonia/barrio	1 2 3 4	8	MEX24	
MEX25. Personas que trabajan en las tiendas donde usted compra	1 2 3 4	8	MEX25	
MEX26. Personas que se encuentran en la calle	1 2 3 4	8	MEX26	
MEX27. Las personas que trabajan en las oficinas de gobierno	1 2 3 4	8	MEX27	
	Muy corrupto Muy limpio	NS/NR		
MEX28. Utilizando una escala de 1 a 10 , donde 1 es “muy corrupto” y 10 “muy limpio”, ¿usted dónde se colocaría?”	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88	MEX28	
MEX29. Y usando esa misma escala de 1 a 10 , donde 1 es “muy corrupto” y 10 “muy limpio”, ¿en dónde colocaría a sus conocidos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88	MEX29	

MEX30 ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual monetaria por parte del gobierno? (SI) ¿Sabe usted si es apoyo del gobierno federal o del gobierno del estado (del gobierno del DF)? (1) No, nadie [pasa a ED] (2) SI, del gobierno federal (3) SI del gobierno estatal/gobierno del D.F.[(8) NS/NR	MEX30	
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MEX31 – [PARA LOS QUE CONTESTARON SI] ¿Me podría decir quién o quiénes reciben ayuda del gobierno? (ENCUESTADOR: No Leer alternativas) (Sondee: Alguien más?)			MEX31	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
	Si mencionó	No mencionó	1	
a. Abuela/Abuelo	1	2		
b. Mamá/Papá	1	2		
c. Esposa/esposo	1	2		
d. Hermana/hermano	1	2		
e. Hija/hijo	1	2		
f. Suegra/suegro	1	2		
g. El mismo entrevistado	1	2		
h otro ¿quién? _____	1	2		

Ahora le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9				
Bachillerato/Profesional Tecnico/Media Superior	10	11	12				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
NS/NR	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)

Q2

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[no leer alternativas]**

- (1) Católica
 (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)
 (3) Otra no cristiana
 (5) Evangélica
 (4) Ninguna
 (8) NS/NR

Q3

<p>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]</p> <p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$800 (02) Entre \$801 - 1600 (03) \$1601 -2400 (04) \$2401 - 3200 (05) \$3201 - 4000 (06) \$4001 - 5400 (07) \$5401 - 6800 (08) \$6801 - 10000 (09) \$10001 - 13500 (10)\$Más de 13500 (88) NS/NR</p> <p>RECOGER TARJETA “E”</p>	<p>Q10</p>	
<p>Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?</p> <p>No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap</p> <p>Sí → preguntar:</p> <p>¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, <u>escribir cantidad y especificar moneda</u>]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>	
<p>Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada(8) NS/NR (99) Inap.</p>	<p>Q10B</p>	
<p>Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo, Sí preguntar dónde]</p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q10C</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades (8) [No leer] NS/NR</p>		
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q11</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS/NR.....88.</p>	<p>Q12</p>	<p>_____</p>

MEXETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona: blanco, mestizo, indígena, Afro-mexicano (negra), mulato, u otro? (1) Blanco(2) Mestizo (3) Indígena (4) Negro o Afro-mexicano (5) Mulato (7) Otro (8) NS/NR	MEXETID	
MEXETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	MEXETIDA	
MEXLENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Español (2) Nahuatl (3) Maya (4) Zapoteca (5) Mixteca (6) Otro (nativo) _____ (7) Otro(s) extranjero (s) (8) NS/NR	MEXLENG1	
MEXLENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (Acepte una alternativa) (1) Español (2) Nahuatl (3) Maya (4) Zapoteca (5) Mixteca (6) Otro (nativo) _____ (7) Otro(s) extranjero(s) (9) Ningún otro NS/NR [8]	MEXLENG1A	
MEXLENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: (Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) (1)Sólo español (2) Español e idioma nativo (3)Sólo idioma nativo (4) Español e idioma(s) extranjero(s) (8)NS/NR	MEXLENG4	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: (**leer todos**)

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1	
R3. Refrigerador (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más		R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15	

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar “No” en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista 4. Comerciante 5. Campesino o agricultor 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano 8. Servicio doméstico 9. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa [Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista [Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR 	OCUP1	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 9. INAP 	OCUP4	
<p>OCUP1A En esta ocupación Usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Asalariado del gobierno? 2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	OCUP1A	
<p>OCUP1B. ¿Además de usted en total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde trabaja? [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 	OCUP1B	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <p>Sí</p>	OCUP1C	

No NS/NR INAP		
DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS/NR (99) Inap	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>


MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1	
MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿dónde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2	
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	
Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

<p><i>Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.</i></p> <p><i>Firma del entrevistador</i> _____ <i>Fecha</i> ____/____/____</p> <p><i>Firma del supervisor de campo</i> _____</p> <p><i>Comentarios:</i></p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p><i>Firma de la persona que digitó los datos</i> _____</p> <p><i>Firma de la persona que verificó los datos</i> _____</p>




Tarjeta # 1






Tarjeta “A”






Tarjeta “B”





Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta “E”

Ningún ingreso

Menos de \$800

Entre \$801-1600

\$1601-\$2400

\$2401-\$3200

\$3201-\$4000

\$4001-\$5400

\$5401-\$6800

\$6801-10000

\$10001-\$13500

\$Más de 13500

Appendix C: Precision of the results

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling errors and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the gathering and processing of the information. These errors can be controlled by constructing a good measurement instrument, good interviewer training, good field supervision, and with good programs to input data such errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the comparison of the result of the sample with the population gives an idea if those errors have generated biases that might make the sample unrepresentative of the population. The use of hand-held computers that have been employed in the AmericasBarometer 2006 in some of the countries studied likely reduces these errors by allowing for consistency checks during the actual process of interviewing. In addition, eliminating the process of data entry eliminates errors at this stage as well. With the traditional process of paper questionnaires, it is necessary to code the questionnaires in the office and to clean the data, which is also a process that can generate error. With paper questionnaires, this process goes on only weeks after the data have been collected. Correcting the errors detected in the office during the cleaning process, or by programs that detect errors, still leaves many of those errors uncorrected or uncorrectable.

On the other hand, sampling errors are a produce of chance and result from the basic fact of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, it must be realized that this is only one of the many possible samples that could be drawn. The variability that exists between all of these possible sampling errors could be known only if all possible samples were drawn, which is obviously impossible for practical and cost reasons. In practice, what one does is to estimate the error based on the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sampling error of a statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar circumstances. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design of the sample. The Design Effect, DEFT, indicates the efficient of the design employed in relation to a design of simple random sampling (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by the both designs (complex and SRS) is the same; that is to say, the complex sample is as efficient as the SRS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample produces an error larger than that obtained by SRS.

$$DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$$

In the table below are presented the confidence intervals (95%, that is 1.96 of the EE), and the design effects (DEFT). The table shows also the statistical value of the question (mean or percentage). The EE are estimated by STATA 9. The extreme values originate in a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socio-economic situation, and this reduces the efficiency of the cluster sampling.

It is worth noting that the sampling error is usually 10% to 40% larger than what would have been observed by SRS. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important system support index, (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. That means that confidence interval at 95% (given by the 1.96 of the EE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT from the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained by SRS.

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Error	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			itlr			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican Rep.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican Rep.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53