

**A Study of the Latin American Public  
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

# **The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 2004**

**Mexico in Times of Electoral Competition**



**MEXICO**

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  - Alejandro Moreno, ITAM
- 
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Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series  
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**ITAM**







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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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BID	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
IDH	Índice de Desarrollo Humano
Km	kilómetros
OPAL	Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina
USAID	Agencia Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos



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## Executive Summary

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This study explores some of the fundamental features of democracy. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the context in which Mexican democracy has evolved in recent years. On the economic front we focus on the expectations generated by the 2000 political transition. Overall there was great disappointment. Gross domestic product and unemployment figures portray a stagnating economy during 2000-03, which in large measure was driven by an economic downturn in the United States. As the US economy recovered in 2004, however, so did Mexico's. On the political front we focus on electoral politics and highlight that elections have become highly competitive albeit with rather low voter turnout. Finally we review the empirical literature on Mexican political culture, beginning with Almond and Verba's landmark study and continue with sociological research that focuses on aggregate data. We round out the review by briefly highlighting work produced during the last two decades that takes advantage of polling data.

Chapter 2 outlines the methodology utilized for generating the study's empirical evidence. We conducted a survey in March 2004 that included 1,556 Mexicans 18 years and older who were interviewed in their homes. The survey included 130 sampling sites, chosen randomly. Respondents were selected using quotas based on age and gender to produce representative samples of the whole adult population. The margin of error is  $\pm 2.5$  percent with a confidence interval of 95 percent. We note, however, that the fieldwork coincided with corruption scandals involving prominent Mexican politicians that likely affected citizens' perceptions of corruption at the time of sampling.

Understanding support for democracy motivates chapter three. Our analysis begins by focusing on two key elements, support for institutions and political tolerance. Drawing on previous research we identify 21 indicators of support for institutions. National pride stands out as an important predictor. Political parties enjoy dismal levels of support. In comparative perspective, on a scale 0 to 100, Mexico scored 58 points with respect to support for institutions. It occupied third place among the eight countries included in the project. Costa Rica, the region's oldest and most stable democracy, led the eight nations with a score of 68. Mexico scored above the 8-country average of 55.8. To analyze the determinants of institutional support we present a model wherein education level, favorable perceptions of the economy, satisfaction with municipal services, satisfaction with democracy (shortcomings notwithstanding), presidential approval and confidence that voting matters, all impact positively on support for the system. Petitions made to the authorities, perceptions of corruption and distrust all undermine support for institutions.

Four indicators determine political tolerance: the right to vote, protest, run for office, and free expression for citizens who explicitly oppose the political system. Mexicans are more tolerant of dissidents' right to vote than they are of seeing them run for office. Although Mexicans are more tolerant than intolerant they demonstrate low levels of tolerance more generally. Compared to the eight countries included in the project, Mexico (57 points) scores above the average (54.7) and ranks in third place. To identify the determinants of political tolerance we present a model wherein the dependent variable is an index constructed on the basis of the four indicators of tolerance mentioned above. The factors that help to explain political tolerance include level of education, religiosity and regional factors.

A stable democracy is considered to be one with high levels of institutional support and high levels of political tolerance. According to these factors 41.3 percent of Mexicans' views support a stable democracy whereas 14.4 percent, due to low levels of support for institutions and political tolerance, are anti-democratic. In comparison to other countries, however, Mexico occupies second place with respect to support for a stable democracy, 7 points behind Costa Rica and 8 points above the regional average. We study the determinants of support for stable democracy in a model that shows that the effects of education and outlook on the economy diminished. Satisfaction with democracy, national pride, religiosity, and regional factors emerge as statistically significant indicators of support for a stable democracy whereas views of corruption among public officials have a negative effect.

Chapter 4 focuses on corruption and its effects on democracy. In Mexico 73 percent of citizens perceive that corruption among public officials is common. Compared to the other eight nations, however, the differences are not major. Costa Rica scored the highest on the perceived level of corruption (74.4 percent) whereas El Salvador had the lowest score (65.5 percent). There are noticeable differences, however, with respect to the incidence of corruption. The data show that 33 percent of citizens have been direct victims of corruption. This is the highest level reported followed by Honduras (18.9 percent). We present two models for analyzing the incidence of corruption. The first takes as its dependent variable the number of times a person has been a victim of a crime and the second tests whether the high level of corruption in Mexico is correlated with the tolerance Mexicans have for corruption.

In Chapter 5 we focus on the rule of law and its relationship with democracy. One way of evaluating the status of the rule of law is to assess the level of equity with respect to access to judicial institutions. Utilizing a 0 to 100 scale Mexico scored 64 points on citizen confidence in national judicial institutions. This ranks third behind Costa Rica (76) and El Salvador (68). When confidence in institutions is disaggregated we found considerable variation in support for sundry judicial institutions. The National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) registered the highest level of support (66) whereas the police scored the lowest (42). We also present a model that shows that level of education, satisfaction with judicial procedures, and confidence in judicial institutions help to explain support for the political system.

We address local governments in Chapter 6. It is fashionable to argue that more efficient local governments spur participation and hence democratization. We first examine the level of satisfaction with municipal governments, which is average in Mexico. Mexico only ranks ahead of Panama. We present a model that shows that the perception of security, confidence in police, and level of education all help to explain satisfaction with municipal services. We also explore citizen participation in municipal meetings. Thirteen percent of those interviewed claimed to have participated in a municipal government meeting. Level of education and age are important predictors of participation.

Electoral participation is studied in chapter 6 wherein we present a model that seeks to account for its determinants. Key predictors include age, level of education, participation in political and social associations, political sophistication and confidence in political institutions. These variables are all positively correlated with participation. We also analyze support for two controversial electoral reforms, the reelection of federal deputies and voting rights for Mexicans

living abroad. We find evidence of weak support for reelection and strong support for expanding voting rights for Mexicans living in the United States.

In Chapter 8 we study social capital basing our discussion on Putnam's work that emphasizes social trust participation in civil society. Mexico scores low on social trust according to our poll as well as others (for example, the World Value Surveys). Mexicans do not trust one another and this suggests that the accumulation of social capital is highly unlikely. Mexico also scores low on levels of participation in civil society with citizens on average participating in only 1.5 organizations (including religious associations). It ranks fifth along with Panama among the countries included in the project. To study the determinants of participation we divide into two categories, participation in community and professional associations. Young people, married people, women, and those exposed to the media are more likely to be active. Level of income is negatively correlated with participation. Participation in professional associations is a function of age, gender (men are more likely to participate) and wedding status. City size, whether one has been a victim of a crime and level of exposure to the media help to account for participation in professional associations.





## Preface

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Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG”. Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups—ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

Margaret Sarles  
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## Prologue

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### **Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response**

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The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortuitously, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.<sup>1</sup> As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those sureys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately  $\pm 2.5\%$  sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bi-variate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/dsd/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/)).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
August, 2004



## **1.0 The Context**

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In recent years Mexico has undergone profound political and economic changes. These have generated a new wave of social science research on these topics to which we contribute. The goal of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the Mexican case to contextualize the study the Survey of Democracy (la Auditoría de la Democracia). The chapter includes three parts: the economic context, the political context, and research on political culture in Mexico.

### **1.1 The Economic Context**


The Survey of Democracy is carried out in Mexico during a period of profound changes. Sea changes in politics and society require that we evaluate democratic conditions in our country. Analysis of democratic conditions should include analysis of sociopolitical condition as well as economic conditions that affect the daily lives of Mexicans. In what follows we present a survey of economic conditions that Mexico confronts today. Even though circumstances at the individual level vary considerably, all Mexicans are affected by national economic conditions. During 1994-95 Mexico suffered its worst economic crisis since 1929 when the international economy was about to slip into the Great Depression. The abrupt devaluation left millions of Mexican in poverty. The prosperity that many anticipated because of the North American Free Trade Agreement never materialized. Instead the context is that during the last five years there has been a slow albeit inconsistent economic recovery.

#### **1.1.1 How Rich or Poor is Mexico?**

Vicente Fox became president in December of 2000. During his six-year presidential term, known in Mexico as a “sexenio,” economic recovery was slow up until the second half of 1994. In Chart I.1 we present annual GDP growth rates according to Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geographic Information (INEGI, System of National Accounts). The chart shows that after rapid growth of more than 7 percent during the last year of President Ernesto Zedillo’s administration that growth has averaged less than 1 percent per year. In 2000 there was a dip of 0.4 percent. This has caused discontent among Mexicans since they believed that political change would come with economic change, particularly since many believed that economic hardships had political roots.

The economic landscape improves in 2004. Economic integration with the United States benefited Mexico as that country recovered in the wake of the September 11 tragedy. But this had its down side as the US economy struggled during 2001-03. A strong US recovery has brought good news. During the first trimester of 2004 Mexican GDP climbed 3.7 percent. This provides compelling evidence of an economy that is gathering steam.

**Chart I.1 Mexico's GDP Growth**




Measured in purchasing power parity, evidence suggests that there has been progress. According to the World Bank, per capital GDP has increased from \$4,020 in 1998 to \$5,920 in 2002. World Bank figures also indicate that Mexico has surpassed the averages of other Latin American and Caribbean countries in other areas. For example, life expectancy in Mexico is 74 years compared to the average of the other nations in the region that is 71 years. Mexico is second only to Chile with respect to infant mortality at 25 deaths per 1000. The average for the region is 27 deaths per 1000.

### **1.1.2 Unemployment in Mexico**

The unemployment rate in Mexico has increased during the last three years, reaching its highest rate of 3.9 percent during the first trimester in 2004. (See Chart I.2. below) This trend is worrisome because it implies that economic recovery has not translated into more jobs. The open rate of unemployment measures the proportion of the economically active population above 12 years of age that worked less than one hour per week during the reference period.

**Chart I.2 Mexico's Official Unemployment Rate**



### **1.1.3 International Commerce**

Foreign commerce, according to World Bank data, has declined modestly in recent years. Exports of goods and services in 1998 were 30.7 percent of GDP. These had declined to 27.2 percent in 2002. Imports have also declined; from 32.8 percent of GDP in 1998 to 29.2 percent in 2002. This downward trend can at least be partially explained by the weak economic performance of Mexico's principal trading partner, the United States.

## **1.2 The Political Context**

### **1.2.1 Recent Elections**

The Survey of Democracy in Mexico was carried out in a year replete with local elections. Nonetheless, 2003 was more significant because of pivotal midterm elections. These elections failed to motivate the electorate: abstention reached 58 percent, a high point in recent years. Compared with 10 years ago Mexico today is a more democratic country that enjoys a freer press and unbridled democratic competition even if this means that citizens are were less interested in voting in the 2003 midterm elections than they were 10 years ago when the participation rate reached 77 percent.

Midterm election results demonstrate the government's party, the National Action Party (PAN), struggled at the polls. During the 2000 presidential elections, the coalition PAN-PVEM (Green Ecological Party of Mexico) won with 43 percent of the votes; only three years later the PAN obtained 31 percent of the votes. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the former governing party for more than 70 years, together in alliance with the PVEM won 37 percent of the votes. During 2000 the PRI obtained 36 percent of the vote. The left of center Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) increased its share of votes slightly between 2000 and 2003, from 17 to 18 percent respectively.

In sharp contrast to previous elections, Mexicans viewed the 2003 election as free and fair. The Federal Electoral Institute by then was viewed to be adequately professional and legitimate to dissipate any doubts and accusations of fraud. The elections were peaceful and in cases where there were controversies the issues were resolved legally with the mediation of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE).

### **1.2.2 Mexican Politics at a Crossroads**

The economic situation and the electoral results of 2003 demonstrate the frustration of Mexicans associated with the difference between expected and actual change. Simply put, President Vicente Fox raised expectations during his successful campaign for the presidency and did not deliver promised results. A national poll conducted three years into his administration revealed that only 8 percent of the population believed that Fox had accomplished more than they expected; 25 percent believed that Fox had delivered roughly what they expected; and 65 percent believed that he had done less than they expected. (Ipsos-Bimsa) Also, in early 2004 several corruption scandals that were given unprecedented coverage in the press increased discontent and disinterest with politics and politicians. Mexican politics is at a critical juncture and this makes the systematic evaluation of Mexican democracy is an important task.

### 1.3 Quantitative research on Mexican Political Culture

Empirical research on political culture in Mexico dates back to the 1950s when American political scientists, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, included the Mexican case in their comparative research into political attitudes and democracy in five countries. In addition to Mexico they also studied England, Germany, Italy and the United States. Their book, *The Civic Culture*, originally published in 1963, is required reading for the serious analyst of political culture in Mexico. It is so not just because it was the first study that analyzed individual level polling data but also because several of its theoretical propositions are still debated today. One crucial proposition is that a stable democracy requires a propitious blend of favorable values and attitudes.

Almond and Verba's pioneering work presented us with a portrait of Mexican political culture is one of a society on the throes of modernization. It was beginning what would later be known as the period of stabilizing development (1950s and 60s) that included, inter alia, strong economic growth with low inflation as people migrated from the countryside to cities; as import substitution industrialization advanced; as the mass media evolved; and as literacy rates declined. Between 1940 and 1970 economic growth averaged 6 percent – easily among the highest in the developing world. Economically and socially, the nation evolved while politics mostly stood still as the country operated under a dominant party system that had been founded in 1929 by the victors of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) that had acquired a corporatist character during the 1930s under President Lázaro Cárdenas. Almond and Verba concluded that Mexican political culture was parochial and ambitious, guided by strong appreciation for its nationality and institutions. It contained a high degree of subjective political competence albeit, in contrast, with significant passivity among citizens. Almond and Verba note, “the Mexicans surveyed demonstrate relatively high levels of subjective political competence, [...] but, as we have seen, there sense of competence does not stem from political participation.” (1963/1989: 351).

Apart from the plethora of methodological debates generated by Almond and Verba's seminal contribution, many of which were raised in their subsequently published *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1989), these authors departed from an assumption that, when viewed from the standpoint of modern social science, was dubious at best. *The Civic Culture* assumed that Mexico was a democracy. The academic consensus is that Mexico was not. In the late 1980s the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who famously stated that Mexico was a “perfect dictatorship,” succinctly captured this view. Mexico, in fact, was a political system that exercised high degrees of citizen control whose institutions effectively disguised the absence of electoral competition. There was little repression but much co-optation in a heavily clientistic regime where the boundaries between the dominant party and government were blurred. The symbiotic relationship between the party and government permeated society.

Since the publication of *The Civic Culture* Mexico has undergone profound economic, political and social change. As we have seen in previous sections the Mexican economy has gone from being a closed economy to a highly open one that is tightly integrated with the United States. Politically the dominant party system has transitioned to one where there is genuine electoral competition among three major parties at the local, state and national level. The systematic study of Mexican political cultures in recent decades has reflected these transformations. As a result, research questions have been reframed, from a focus on authoritarian political culture with

minimal participation to a much more sophisticated line of inquiry related to public opinion, electoral behavior, and attitudes towards democracy. Methodology has also advanced. Even though Almond and Verba conducted polls and analyzed individual level data, the majority of quantitative research carried out during the 1980s was based on aggregate data. With few exceptions carried out during the 1970s, it is not until the 1980s that the emphasis on polling data recovers. By the 1990s it flourishes and begins to dominate the quantitative research on Mexico.

The quantitative literature on Mexican political culture is much too large for us to provide a detailed summary here. This makes it worthwhile for us to present an analytically informed classification of the literature.

It was during the 1970s and 80s that scholars began to note the gradual weakening of the social bases of the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) support. This weakening was explained in part by the electoral reforms of 1976 as well as arguments based on modernization theory. Electoral studies produced in the 1970s and 80s were based on aggregate data and were guided by sociological methods. Among the most notable of these we can include, (Ames 1970; Segovia 1974; Estévez y Ramírez 1985; Lehr 1985; Peschard 1988a, 1988b, 1991, 1993; González Casanova 1990; Molinar y Valdés 1987; Molinar y Weldon 1990, 1994; Pacheco 1991, 1992; Klesner 1993; Tarrés 1994. More references are listed in the bibliography at the end of this chapter). It should be noted that among these sociological approaches that some, such as Ames (1970), were based on rational choice, or had a psychological orientation such as Tarrés – the difficulties of relying on aggregate data notwithstanding.

Another strand of the empirical quantitative research followed Almond and Verba by focusing on values. The following approaches and suppositions predominated in this literature: polling and individual level analysis; theories of modernization, wherein it was assumed that Mexican society was in transition from tradition towards modernity; socialization theories; legacies of authoritarianism; and the evolution of a democratic culture. (Segovia 1975; Seligson 1984, Alduncin 1986; Hernández y Narro 1987). These works reopened the research agenda on Mexican values. The National Bank of Mexico's Department of Sociopolitical Studies has fueled this agenda with a large series of regularly published polls in sundry values (Alduncin 1991, Alduncin 1993; Alduncin 2002; Moreno 2004, in press). The focus on values has been taken up once again recently and many of the questions raised deal precisely with the form in which Mexicans perceive democracy and what they expect from it (Domínguez y McCann 1995b; Durand 1995; Serrano 1998; Beltrán, et. al. 1996; Meyenberg y Flores 2000; Camp 2001, 2003; Secretaría de Gobernación 2002; Moreno 2003a, 2003b; Moreno and Méndez 2003; Basáñez and Moreno 2004).

A third strand of the quantitative literature on Mexican political culture are comparative studies, which were also inaugurated by Almond and Verba. Due to growing collaboration with foreign scholarship Mexico can increasingly be studied in comparative perspective. The most well known studies are the World Value Surveys in which Mexican participation extends to four periods carried out between 1981 and 2000. This project now includes more than 80 societies. The World Value Surveys offer the most comprehensive list of publications on values and political culture in which references Mexico (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Basáñez and Moreno 1998; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart, et. al. 2004; Catterberg and Moreno

2003; Moreno 1999a; Moreno 2003b, 2004, in press; Moreno and Méndez 2003; Basáñez and Moreno 2004). The Latinbarometer, whose results are not easily accessible to academics but have been frequently published in sundry media outlets since 1996, in 1994 reported on 17 countries in Central and South America is also a key source of empirical data. The poll, Latin Mirror, sponsored by *The Wall Street Journal* in 1998 also produced national samples of several Latin American countries including Mexico. Roderic A. Camp in 1998 also coordinated a poll on Mexican views on democracy (Camp 2001). Since 1997 researchers from the Center of Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) in Mexico have carried out the Mexican component of the Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems (CSES) coordinated by Michigan University that includes many countries. The empirical evidence generated by these projects has permitted increasingly systematic and comparative research on Mexican political culture.

The resurgence of polling during the 1980s – which was in part inspired by the 1988 presidential elections – permitted a first wave of studies on political culture and electoral behavior. The new studies little by little began to incorporate approaches, in addition to sociological ones, that included psychological rational choice and became increasingly sophisticated in the application of statistical methods. This branch of research dominates the majority of extant scholarship on electoral behavior and political culture in Mexico where elections are competitive and of great consequence. US scholarship produced in the 1950s and 60s served as a theoretical base for the new wave of Mexican scholarship. The Economic Theory of Democracy by Anthony Downs, *The American Voter* by University of Michigan scholar Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *Retrospective Voting* by Morris Fiorina, and many other related works guided scholarship on Mexico during the 1990s. This scholarship is large and growing and includes, among many others, the following: (Domínguez and McCann 1995a, 1995b; Buendía 1997, 2000; Magaloni 1994, 1996, 1997 2000; Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Moreno and Yanner 1995; Camp 1997; Domínguez and Poiré 1999; Moreno 1999b, 2003a; Moreno and Pierce 2002; Méndez 2003; Poiré 2002a, 2002b, 2002; Beltrán 2000, 2003; Buendía and Somuano 2003; Domínguez and Lawson 2004). The last of these, Domínguez and Lawson (2004) includes the first panel study that was carried out during the 2000 presidential campaign. Fewer studies focused on public opinion surveys that by and large dealt with how Mexicans perceived and evaluated economic reforms in recent years (Buendía 1996, Kaufman and Zuckerman 1998; Moreno 2003c).

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## 2.0 Methodology

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The survey utilized in this study samples Mexico's adult population. It permits us to analyze the values and attitudes citizens hold toward the political system. This chapter provides an overview of the study's research design and a justification of the methods used. The complete design for the sample may be consulted in Appendix II.

### 2.1 Sample selection and data collection

The target population for this survey were Mexican citizens 18 years and older that live in Mexico. The sample was designed to reflect as closely as possible the general characteristic of the entire adult population with respect to geographic and social demographics. For this poll interviews were carried out in interviewees' homes. These subjects were selected following a multiple stage probabilistic sampling method and, at the end of selection, quotas were applied in order to generate population distributions by gender and age. No interview was conducted on the street, in a business establishment, or other establishments (i.e. coffee shops, bars, etc.) unless these establishments were also the homes of the interviewees. We required that the interviewee be interviewed in his or her residence and that they be interviewed on a weekend date inasmuch as this increased the likelihood that we would find the qualified candidates at home.

The survey was conducted between March 13 and 17 in 2004, just a few days after several corruption scandals erupted known as the "video scandals" (*videoescándalos*). The scandals implicated the President of the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), Jorge Emilio González, as well as Mexico City government officials, including Secretary of Finance Gustavo Ponce and the leader of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico City's assembly. The video scandals launched investigations that implicated Mexico City's mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador who at the time was the frontrunner for the Mexican presidency in national polls. In the wake of the video scandals polls showed citizens' growing concern with corruption. This fact should be kept in mind when considering the analysis of attitudes towards corruption carried out in chapter IV.

To guarantee that the sample utilized in this study is representative, subjects were sampled following multiple stage probabilistic sampling methods covering the locations where we sampled, the selection of homes and the selection of individuals. In the first stage 130 sampling locations were selected probabilistically and these were distributed in 29 of 32 states. 1,560 interviews were conducted in these locations; that is, 12 interviews per location that represent 89 municipalities of the 2,445 that exist in Mexico as well as 13 of the 16 delegations in Mexico City. For monitoring reasons we had to exclude 4 cases; one in Guadalupe, Nuevo León, one in San Luís Rio Colorado, Sonora, and two in Tacámbaro Michoacán. The final sample size was 1,560 interviews. Chart II.1 shows the geographic dispersion of the sampling locations.

**Chart II.1 Geographical Distribution of the Nation's 130 Sampling Sites**



For the first stage of sampling electoral groups were stratified according to country region (north, center-west, center, and south) and by locality type (rural and urban). Afterward 130 groups were selected randomly while controlling for the features of electoral lists.


Table II.1. shows the number of sampling locations by region and locality type. Chart II.2 illustrates these geographic regions and the states contained therein.

**Table II.1 Proportion of Strata used in the Sample Design**

	Urban	Rural	Total
North	26	8	34
Center-west	16	9	25
Center	34	9	43
South	14	14	28
Total	90	40	130

The second stage of sampling began once the pollsters fanned out to the sampling locations, which were identified according to the positioning of voting booths for each of the electoral groups in the sample. To choose the address where the poll interview was undertaken, pollsters walked in a spiral trajectory beginning with the northeast zone of the block and chose the address randomly according to this method in a systematic way.

**Chart II.2 Country Regions Utilized for Sample Strata**




Once the address was selected for an interview the pollster chose the home randomly while assuring that at each location the parameters for the sample were controlled for: age and sex distribution in accordance with the electoral data provided by Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). These distributions are the same as those provided by 2000 census data. This means that at the time of choosing interviewees the process was guided by the sampling correction distribution.

Table II. 2 shows the selection parameters for interviewees that guided pollsters in the field. Each quota was randomly assigned among the 130 sampling locations. Charts II.3 and II.4 illustrate the distribution of sex and age in the sample. Table II.3 compares the distribution by age and sex among the 1,556 interviews with the population parameters contained in IFE's 2003 list, the 2000 census, as well as projections for 2004 for each category.

**Table II.2 Selection Quotas Utilized for Sex and Age Applied in the Sample**

	Quota 1 (20 points)		Quota 2 (80 points)		Quota 3 (30 points)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
18-29	3	3	2	2	1	1
30-49	2	2	3	3	2	2
50 or more	1	1	1	1	3	3


**Chart II.3 Sample Distribution According to Gender**



The sample size was 1,556 interviews (n=1,556). This number was derived theoretically by the desire to obtain a margin of error of  $\pm 2.5$  percent and a 95 percent confidence interval for the national sample. As noted above, because of monitoring issues we had to discard 4 cases that did not permit us to achieve our desired sample size of 1,560.



**Chart II.4 Sample Distribution According to Age**




**Table II.3 Comparison of the Sample Distribution by Sex and Age With Population Parameters**

	Population parameters	Sample
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	48.7	50.4
Female	51.3	49.6
<b>Age</b>		
18-29	32.2	32.1
30-49	43.5	43.6
50 or more	24.2	24.4

Our experience with Mexican polling suggests that studies tend to slightly over-represent individuals with higher levels of education since these are more likely to participate in interviews. With this in mind we consider census projections for 2004 on the adult population's level of education. (The weighting is applied utilizing SPSS statistical routines applying the following formula to obtain the weights:  $p=X/x$ , where  $p$  is the weighted value,  $X$  is the population parameter, and  $x$  is sample estimator). As we can see in Chart II.5 and in Table II.4, the poll on attitudes towards democracy estimated in this study vary only slightly with respect to census parameters for which no weights were utilized.

**Chart II.5 Sample Distribution According to Level of Education**

Sample distribution according to level of education



**Table II.4 Sample Distribution by Level of Education**

	Population (INEGI)	Sample	Difference
Level of education	%	%	
No schooling	8.7	5.7	-3.0
Elementary	37.1	35.3	-1.8
Middle school	24.0	27.0	3.0
High school or equivalent	16.7	19.0	2.3
University and beyond	13.6	13.0	-0.6

Interested readers may consult the appendix at the end of this report to see data for the sample and population distributions by Mexican state.

### 3.0 Support for a Stable Democracy

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The point of departure for a study of Mexican political culture is the evaluation of support for political institutions. The manner in which citizens view and assess institutions was an integral component of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*. Today academics and the majority of citizens consider that Mexico is a democracy. In recent studies, including many cited in chapter 1, the focus has been on determining the degree of support for democratic institutions as well as the determinants of this support.<sup>2</sup> In this chapter we deal with the following questions: How supportive are Mexicans of their political institutions? What institutions do they most (least) support and why? What is the level of support in Mexico in comparison to the other cases included in the project Central America, Mexico, and Colombia 2004? How tolerant are Mexicans? And, finally, what are the determinants for individuals' support for a stable democracy and what are the implications for Mexican democracy?

During Mexico's political transformation of the last two decades the country has evolved thanks in large measure to electoral reforms that have had profound consequences for democratization.<sup>3</sup> The Mexican political transition is considered to be a "voted transition,"<sup>4</sup> in contrast to other modes of transitions such as the "pacted" or negotiated ones; for example, Spain and Venezuela. Mexico's electoral transition, rather than being negotiated by political elite, directly implicated the voting public. Thus, the research agenda has tended to focus on voters and elections. Related research agendas have focused on institutional change, particularly changes in executive-assembly relations. The Mexican regime experienced historic change when the PRI lost its seat majority in the lower chamber during the 1997 midterm elections producing divided government. Since this watershed event Mexicans have been growing accustomed to divided government. Other institutions, such as the Supreme Court to take one example, had previously been invisible to the average citizen, now play more visible roles from the standpoint of public opinion. In recent years the media has also evolved considerably and its independence is growing.<sup>5</sup> These changes have resulted in great measure because of the dismantling of a highly coercive state apparatus and the weakening of the dominant party. They also have resulted from a society that has undergone profound economic liberalization since the mid 1980s when Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and signed a plethora of free trade agreements beginning with NAFTA in the early 1990s.

#### 3.1 Support for Institutions

Our baseline expectation is that political change has improved perceptions of Mexican institutions. Practically overnight, the PRI's defeat in the 2000 presidential contest transformed perspectives on institutions.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, this expectation cannot simply be addressed by

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<sup>2</sup> See Domínguez and McCann 1995b, Camp 2001, Secretaría de Gobernación 2002, Moreno 2003a, Moreno and Méndez 2003. Complete references in Chapter I.

<sup>3</sup> See José Woldenberg, 2002, *La construcción de la democracia*, México D.F.: Plaza and Janés.

<sup>4</sup> The term is suggested by Mauricio Merino, 2003, *La transición votada*, México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

<sup>5</sup> Chappell Lawson, 2002, *Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of the Free Press in Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>6</sup> Alejandro Moreno, "La sociedad mexicana y el cambio", *Este País*, April 2002.

relying exclusively on a poll. It is based on evidence produced by other research.<sup>7</sup> What we can analyze is the current state of support for institutions. Table III.1 shows a list of sundry institutions and the average level of confidence measured on a scale of 0 to 100 where 100 represents the highest level of support. The first item on the list, national pride, stands out. Almond and Verba detected the significance of Mexican nationalism in the 1950s, which they viewed to be a favorable indicator of support for the system. In fact, Mexican nationalism has been strengthening during the last decade amidst economic opening and globalization, which may suggest that this increase is rooted in something other than a return to the revolutionary nationalism fostered for more than a half century by PRI governments.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, this nationalism contrasts sharply with the pride Mexicans express for living under their political system, which registers at 57 in Table III.1.

The Catholic Church enjoys second place in terms of public confidence or support (85 percent of the Mexican population claims to be catholic) This is consistent with findings that show that the church fares well in predominantly catholic countries.<sup>9</sup> However, the difference in level of support for the church and other institutions, such as the media and political institutions, is generally minor. It is worth noting the following contradiction: political institutions on average score an average of 64 whereas support for the congress and political parties register 45 and 34 points respectively. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) is not listed in the table but available evidence since the 1996 electoral reforms that bolstered the institution and produced more competitive and cleaner elections suggests that the IFI enjoys high approval ratings. IFE's former president, José Woldenberg, has noted on several occasions that confidence in the IFE takes off after its consolidation and subsequent competitive elections.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Moreno 2003a, *El votante mexicano*, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> Moreno 2004 in press.

<sup>9</sup> See Alduncin 1991, Secretaría de Gobernación 2002, Camp 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Woldenberg 2002, op. cit.

**Table III.1 Indicators of Regime Support in Mexico**

<b>Estadísticos descriptivos</b>		
	<b>N</b>	<b>Media</b>
B43R National pride	1537	89.06
B20R Catholic Church	1517	72.14
B12R Armed forces	1501	67.68
B45R National Commission for Human Rights	1462	66.20
B37R Mass media	1518	65.97
B6R Support for the Mexican political system	1490	64.11
B2R Political institutions	1506	63.20
B40R Indigenous movements	1411	61.78
B4R Proud of living in the Mexican political system	1510	57.09
B47R Elections	1524	55.58
B48R Free trade agreements	1428	54.76
B14R National government	1510	54.72
B11R Elections	1527	54.67
B3R Respect for human rights	1493	53.74
B1R Judiciary Courts	1438	53.14
B32R City Mayors	1520	53.07
B16R Attorney General	1490	52.98
B13R Congress	1455	51.89
B31R Supreme Court of Justice	1469	51.86
B18R Police	1530	42.44
B21R Political parties	1531	41.51
<b>N</b>	<b>1156</b>	

Indigenous movements and armed forces share similar -- and healthy -- levels of support, scoring slightly more than 61. That indigenous movements score so highly is an interesting finding and is likely a function of the Zapatista movement in southern Mexico. On January 1, 1994 an indigenous movement calling itself the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) declared war against the Mexican government in the state of Chiapas. Serious armed clashes lasted only a few days but the EZLN became highly visible thereafter thanks to a successful marketing campaign led by its charismatic masked leader, Sub commander Marcos. The Zapatistas successfully developed something a favorable image in Mexico and abroad. During the first few months of President Fox's new government in 2001 the Zapatistas marched from Chiapas to the capital. In the congress they reiterated their principal demands, including autonomy for indigenous communities. Within a few weeks the lower house of congress approved the Law for Indigenous Citizens (*Ley Indígena*). The Zapatistas have had minimal visibility in the national media since the approval.


The National Commission for Human Rights, like the IFE, is a relatively new institution that

enjoys high levels of citizen support. Its visibility spiked when it made recommendations to the military and police forces. Nonetheless, even though this institution fares well, Mexicans in general express that there is very little respect for basic citizen rights. With respect to free trade citizens by and large support it. NAFTA is the most important deal among many and enjoys broad support due to the fact that most exports flow to the United States and liberalization has increased access to a vast array of foreign products.

Elections received a score of 55. We note that the question was asked twice during the electoral process, once at the beginning and the other close to the end and the results were virtually identical. Elected officials, however, seem to enjoy the lowest levels of support. At the local level there are municipal presidents who scored a 53. They are followed by the President of the Republic who has enjoyed score of more than 50 and even 60 at some points during his administration that began in December 2000. The one episode where his support declined sharply followed the approval of an unpopular fiscal reform in early 2002. Table III.1 shows that support for the national government is similar to levels of support for the legal system and Supreme Court. These are bit higher than those of the police and the attorney general. The courts register a score below 50. The Congress and political parties enjoy low levels of support.

How do Mexican institutions fare in comparative perspective? Chart III.1 presents data that permits comparison for some of the indicators presented in Table II.1. The categories include the following: Confidence in the courts (B1, in accordance with the question's number that appears at the end of this report), respect for political institutions (B2), protection of citizens' rights (B3), the satisfaction of living under Mexico's political system (B4), and support for the Mexican political system (B6). Chart III.1 presents comparative results for other countries included in the project. Costa Rica, the region's oldest democracy, demonstrates the highest support for the political system with an average score of 68. El Salvador (60), Mexico (58) and Colombia (57) follow. Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua score just above 50 and Guatemala scores a little below 50. Support for the political system in Mexico is above the regional average of 55.8, 10 points below Costa Rica and 9 points above Guatemala.

**Chart III.1 Support for the System: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



The individual level determinants of support for the Mexican political system are analyzed in Table III.2 that presents results for a multiple linear regression in which the dependent variable is the support score, ranging from 0 to 100, for each interviewee. The predictive model follows the model developed by Mitchell Seligson for Ecuador.<sup>11</sup> The model for Mexico, as is the case with all of the models contained in this report, includes additional independent variables. The model in Table III.2 includes the results for 11 independent variables. The first explanatory variable is level of education, measured as the highest grade completed in school. The analytic expectation is a positive relationship between education and support for a democratic political system. (We would expect a negative relationship between level of education and support for an authoritarian system). Democracies find fertile ground among educated citizens inasmuch as these appreciate civil and political liberties, rule of law, and choices at the ballot box. Empirical evidence supports this proposition.<sup>12</sup>

A second explanatory variable concerns the perspectives on the economy. The logic is straightforward: positive views on the state of economic activity should generate more favorable support for the system. The third variable focuses on the level of satisfaction with public services at the municipal level. Although this variable focuses on views of local performance, the logic appears sound: higher satisfaction with public services should produce more support for the political system. A fourth variable estimates participation: assistance at municipal meetings. We have mixed expectation based on this variable because participation may not necessarily be linked with greater support for the system. It may be the case, as is common in Mexico, that

<sup>11</sup> Seligson, "Auditoría de la democracia: Ecuador 2001", manuscript; Pittsburg University, Cedatos, USAID.

<sup>12</sup> See several chapters in Camp 2001, complete reference in Chapter I.

citizens participate precisely to complain about the system's shortcomings. Thus, we use a fifth variable to estimate citizens' demands made in municipalities that reflect two possible motivations: on one hand, to make demands in municipalities requires a baseline of confidence in authorities' ability to address issues; on the other hand, participation reflects a certain degree of discontent with the state of affairs. For instance, in Mexico many victims of crimes do not turn to the authorities for assistance because they do not have confidence that these can take effective action or make a difference. Thus not reporting crimes reflects a lack of confidence in the system. In this instance we expect demands to reflect negatively on system support.

Other variables that we expect to be negatively correlated with system support are the perception of corruption among public officials and political confidence, simply understood as the perception that public officials are more interested in serving private rather than public interests. Theoretically and empirically corruption is negatively associated with democracy as is demonstrated in the literature that we review in Chapter IV.<sup>13</sup> Finally, we include other variables that we expect would have a positive correlation with system support: satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, presidential approval ratings, the recognition that democracy can have conflicts and be inefficient, and the expectation that voting can lead to change. In a sense these variables represent another facet of system support though we have been careful to ensure that these variables are not endogenous insofar as these measures focus on different dimensions from the dependent variable.

Table III.2 presents the model's results that show that the majority of our analytic expectations are supported empirically. Ten of the eleven explanatory variables are statistically significant. The one that is not significant is the variable that measures participation in municipal meetings. As noted above we had ambiguous expectations with regards to this variable's effects. Support for Mexico's institutions is greatest among those Mexicans with more schooling, those that believe the economy is in good shape, those that are satisfied with municipal services, those that are satisfied with democracy, those that approve of the president's performance, those that understand democracy's pitfalls, and those that believe that voting matters. In sharp contrast, demands to local authorities are negative and significantly correlated with institutional support as are perceptions on corruption and views that politicians are most concerned with private rather than public interests. In sum, positive views towards democracy and good performance strengthen support for the system whereas corruption and lack of trust tend to reduce it.

### 3.2 Political Tolerance

In addition to support for institutions, which can be understood as acceptance of the rules of the game and processes as "the only game in town," democratic political culture also requires a certain level of tolerance that reflects the appreciation of -- borrowing from Giuseppe DiPalma -- coexistence among diverse views within these rules and processes.<sup>14</sup> Even though democracy should have legal and institutional means to avoid violence as a political option, it is also that

<sup>13</sup> To mention some, see Moreno 2003b, *Corruption and Democracy* (reference in Chapter I); Eric M. Uslaner and Gabriel Badescu, 2003, "Honesty, Trust, and Legal Norms in the Transition to Democracy", in Janos Kornai et.al., *Creating Social Trust: Problems of Post-Socialist Transition*. And also Eric Uslaner, 2004, "Trust and Corruption", in Johan Graf Labsoford et. al., *Corruption and the New Institutional Economics*, London: Routledge.

<sup>14</sup> Giuseppe Di Palma, 1990, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.



case that it requires norms and values that respect diversity. In this section we analyze the levels of political tolerance and its determinants.


Chart III.2 shows levels of tolerance under headings specific to Mexican politics. These categories indicate the support Mexicans express towards the right to: a) *vote* for people who speak ill of the country's form of government; b) *protest* or to take part in peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their view; c) *run* or to be a candidate for public office; and d) *free expression* or the right for individuals who speak ill of the government to appear on television to express their views (italicized words correspond to the variable listed in the chart). Among these categories, tolerance is best reflected in the right to protest peacefully, which registers a score of 62 on a scale of 0 to 100 where 100 is the maximum level of tolerance. The rest of the headings are above a score of 50 with similar scores. We can argue on the basis of these scores that Mexicans are more tolerant than intolerant and that the levels of tolerance in general are low. How do we explain this finding that Mexico supports these rights but does so only modestly? In other words, political disagreement is tolerated but it is also the case that important segments of the population are intolerant. As other studies have noted Mexicans appear to suffer from a shortage of tolerance in their inchoate democracy.<sup>15</sup>

Mexico occupies third place among the eight countries studied in this project with respect to levels of political tolerance. Chart II.3 illustrates this result. Panama scores 65 and Mexico (58) and Costa Rica (57) follow. Costa Rica's score is low in comparison to the level of system support where it leads as we illustrated in Chart III.1. Costa Ricans are less tolerant than we would expect given their democratic history and support for their system. In this comparison Mexico once again places above the regional average, which is 54.7. Guatemala once again failed to break the 50 threshold.


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<sup>15</sup> Moreno 2003, *El votante mexicano*, op. cit.

**Chart III.2 Political Tolerance in Mexico**



**Chart III.3 Political Tolerance: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



What explains political tolerance in Mexico? Table III.3 presents a linear regression model where the dependent variable is an index of tolerance (0-100) that is constructed from the following variables:

On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 indicating that you firmly disagree and 10 indicating that you firmly agree:

D1. There are individuals who entirely disagree with the government, not just the government in power but also all governments. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that these individuals have a right to vote? Please read the number to me: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]

D2. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that these individuals should be allowed to demonstrate peacefully with the purpose of expressing their point of view? Please read the number to me.

D3. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that these individuals are permitted to run for public office? Please read the number to me.

D4. To what degree do you approve or disapprove that these individuals are permitted to appear on television to address the public?

There is a statistical justification for considering a single index ( $\alpha = .84$ ). The independent variables included in the explanatory variable are level of education, the regional context, and religiosity. We expect education will foster tolerance given that intolerance tends to abound among the less secure. Insecurity should tend to provoke a negative reaction against diversity and this should be ameliorated with greater education. Regional differences should reflect variation in economic development and socioeconomic conditions more generally. Mexico's north and center contains populations that are economically better off so these should be relatively tolerant in comparison to the south and center east that are characterized by social conservatism and economic backwardness. Religiosity, measured according to the frequency at which individuals attend religious services, may be indeterminate with respect to any theoretical priors. On one hand, modernization theory links tolerance with growing secularism. Along these lines the expectation is that religiosity and tolerance should be negatively correlated.

Multivariate analysis provides evidence for some of these propositions. Level of education is positively and significantly correlated with tolerance. Better educated Mexicans are more tolerant. As expected, Mexicans in the south and center-east of the nation are less tolerant than those that live in the center of the country (the center is omitted as a baseline comparison because we use regional dummy variables in the analysis). The north, however, does not prove to be significantly different from the center of the nation (that includes the national capitol). Finally, a surprising finding is that of religiosity: Mexicans who attend church tend to be more tolerant which contradicts the modernization argument that posits that greater secularism should foster greater tolerance. The reverse seems to be the case.

### **3.3 Support for a Stable Democracy**

Up to this point we have reviewed levels of support for institutions as well as political tolerance in Mexico and in comparative perspective. We have also analyzed their determinants. Following the work of Seligson, considering these two variables jointly help us to analyze support for a stable democracy. To understand how fertile a political culture may be for democracy it is insufficient to analyze support for a form of government. We also need to understand levels of tolerance.<sup>16</sup> Following Seligson, Table III.4 illustrates combinations of system support and

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<sup>16</sup> Moreno and Méndez, 2003, "Attitudes Towards Democracy: Mexico in Comparative Perspective". See complete reference in Chapter I.


political tolerance. In both cases we used scores ranging from 0 to 100. We consider “high” system support for scores ranging from 50 to 100 and low scores below 50. We present a 2X2 table and list the proportions that fall within each dimension.

**Table III.4 Support for a Stable Democracy: a Classification of Attitudes Towards Democracy in Mexico: Intolerance Index**

Support for	High		Low	
	High	Stable democracy(41.3%)	Authoritarian stability (23.2%)	
institutions	Low	Unstable democracy (21.1%)	Democratic breakdown (14.4%)	

The table shows that 41 percent of Mexicans show a high level of support for institutions as well high levels of tolerance. Following Seligson we tag this group “stable democracy,” that is, those that are favorable attitudes for democratic rule. A second group, 23 percent, possesses high levels of support for institutions and low levels of political tolerance. We label this group as “authoritarian stability” insofar as they support institutions but are intolerant, which complicates democratic rule but would support authoritarian rule. The third group demonstrates low support for institutions with high levels of political tolerance. These individuals demand political rights but are dissatisfied with the institutional context. Seligson refers to this as “unstable democracy” and consists of 21 percent of Mexicans. The final group consists of 21 percent of Mexicans and is dubbed “democratic breakdown.” Here we are dealing with citizens that do not support institutions and express low levels of tolerance. This combination of attitudes provides infertile terrain for democracy.

**Chart III.4 Support for Democracy: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



In comparative perspective Mexico comes in second place with respect to the proportion of individuals that fall into the “stable democracy” group. The data illustrated in Chart III.4 refers to the percentages of the “stable democracy” category for each of the countries in the study. The regional average is 33 percent, which means that 1 in 3 citizens in these countries reveal attitudes favorable for democracy, which appears rather low. Mexico is 8 points above this average and 7 below Costa Rica, the region’s oldest and most stable democracy. It is noteworthy that by this measure that the majority of Costa Ricans do not possess attitudes favorable for democracy.

What factors help us to understand whether Mexicans are more or less likely to support a stable democracy according to the two dimensions analyzed above? Our analysis in this chapter suggests that level of education, the perception of system performance, and attitudes towards democracy more generally, among others, are important. In this section we analyze these and other predictors. However, we now utilize as our dependent variable the support for democracy estimates derived in Table III.4. Given that we will now be dealing with a categorical dependent variable we will utilize a logistic regression wherein the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for support for a stable democracy and 0 for everything else. The results are presented in Table III.5.

It immediately stands out from the model that the importance of education is weakened whereas others take on greater importance in predicting support for a stable democracy. Perceptions of economic conditions, of both personal and national conditions, also do not matter as much as they did for predicting support for institutions. Support for democracy is in part explained by the degree of satisfaction with democracy; the perception that there are values that unite Mexicans (which reflect the strong sense of national community and pride discussed above), and religiosity. The only significant regional category is the north, a highly industrialized region where there have been the highest number of alternations in power in state level executives during the last 15 years. The north possesses the highest favorable score in support for a stable democracy. The factor that most inhibits support for a stable democracy is the perception of corruption among government officials. The higher the perception of corruption the lower is the likelihood that there will be support for a stable democracy.

### **3.4 Conclusions**

We have argued that Mexicans are now living in a democracy that initially liberalized electorally and has subsequently transformed the weight of key institutions. Support for the system is broad and surpasses the average of the countries included in this project; however, it is tempting to lower our expectation that democracy requires that a majority view it as the only valid institutional arrangement. The comparison with Costa Rica is telling in this regard because of high support for the system and has enjoyed a venerable democracy. Levels of political tolerance in Mexico also exceed the average of the countries studied; nonetheless, it is somewhat low given that there is a broad group of citizens that do not recognize the rights of individuals who openly oppose or criticize the government. Four out ten Mexicans demonstrate favorable attitudes for a stable democracy. Another four out of 10 demonstrate only support for institutions or political tolerance. The rest hold political cultural outlooks that are hostile towards democracy. This is consistent with surveys such as Latinbarometer, World Values, or the National Survey of Citizenship and Culture carried out by the Mexican Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación) that finds that roughly one fifth of the population would tolerate an authoritarian or even military regime.



## 4.0 Corruption and Democracy

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Democracy is based on the rule of law. If corruption is understood as “illegal behavior (or scarcely legal) by political elite in order to manipulate state activities in pursuit of private gains,”<sup>17</sup> then we can conclude that corruption is antidemocratic. This, however, is just a conceptual issue. Empirically it has been demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between corruption and democracy, or rather between corruption and democratic attitudes.<sup>18</sup> Corruption is not limited to the actions of political elite, but also to the permissiveness and propensity of citizens to engage in illegal activities for private gain. Corruption undermines trust, which is indispensable for democratic performance. Moreover, as Francis Fukuyama and other scholars have noted, it also helps to increase interpersonal and economic trust within a society.<sup>19</sup>

In this chapter we analyze the incidence of corruption in Mexico and its determinants. Viewed comparatively, Mexican society is relatively permissive towards corruption though the situation has improved in recent years.<sup>20</sup> The alternation in political power in 2000 brought with it an expectation that governments would take serious steps to combat corruption. Nonetheless, during the first three years of the Fox Administration few new measures were taken. The poll that we analyze in this report was taken just after a series of corruption scandals that we discussed in Chapter II. The video scandals, as these became known in the media, consisted of several videos disseminated within days a series of corrupt actions: the president of the Green Party (PVEM) who appeared to be engaged in negotiations involving millions of dollars in exchange for a change in zoning rules in an area of Cancún governed by the PVEM; Mexico City’s Finance Secretary betting public funds in the Bellaggio Hotel in Las Vegas; and several videos of the PRD’s Mexico City assembly leader, René Bejarano, receiving bags of cash from businessman Carlos Ahumada. The latter resulted from investigation tied to construction permits linked to the previous administration that might have implicated the Mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who had been leading in the polls for the 2006 presidential election.

The shock of these scandals was not that Mexicans discovered that corruption existed among high level officials – indeed they assumed that these were commonplace. Early in the Fox administration, for instance, a major scandal broke with respect to roughly 50 million dollars that were allegedly funneled to the PRI’s presidential campaign during the 2000 election. The shock was that the video scandals produced acts of corruption on tape that Mexicans could see with their own eyes verifying the impunity. This was a first. The PVEM president, for example, asked directly in the video “How much do we get?” whereas the PRD assembly leader could be seen stuffing cash into a bag and his pockets. These scandals broke just before the poll for this study was carried out and this, of course, can affect the attitudes towards corruption that we report. We note this because other polls carried out by the media within days of the scandals reflected an increase in corruption’s importance as the country’s major problem.

### 4.1 Perceptions on Corruption

According to the poll presented in Chart IV.1, 34 percent of Mexicans believe that corruption is

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<sup>17</sup> This definition is used by Eric Uslaner, 2004, op. cit.


<sup>18</sup> Moreno 2003b, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Francis Fukuyama, 1995, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, Nueva York: Free Press.

<sup>20</sup> Moreno, 2003b, op. cit.

widespread among public officials whereas 39 percent believe that it is somewhat widespread. In other words, 73 percent or nearly 3 in 4 Mexicans believe that corruption is relatively common.


**Chart IV.1 Perceptions of Official Corruption in Mexico**



Although this level seems high, it does not differ much from what we observe in the majority of countries studied in the project. In accordance with the data presented in Chart IV.2, which shows an average of perceptions on corruption that range from 0 to 100 (with 100 representing a belief of generalized corruption), Mexico scores 73 points. Together with Mexico, five other nations score averages between 71 and 74 points. Honduras and El Salvador possess levels of slightly below 69 and 66 points respectively. Notwithstanding these differences, however, the gap between the highest and lowest score is only 8 points, which is not considerable. We may argue that perceptions on corruption in the region are more or less similar.




**Chart IV.2 Perceptions of Corruption: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



## 4.2 Victimization of corruption in Mexico

The previous discussion centered on perceptions. When we incorporate the incidence or victimization of corruption we start to see important differences between Mexico and the other countries. In accordance with the data illustrated in Chart IV.3, 39 percent of Mexicans report that they paid a bribe (*mordida*) to the police; 23 percent reported having seen a similar action conducted with a public official; 21 percent reported that they had to pay an additional sum in addition to what is stipulated by law to complete a transaction; 18 percent reported that a police officer had asked them for a bribe; 13 percent said that a public official had asked for a bribe; and 14 percent reported that a bribe was requested in a judicial proceeding. Other types of corruption reported include those associated with schooling (13 percent), at work (10 percent), and at hospitals (9 percent). Moreover, 9 percent reported that they had been accused of an infraction that they had not committed by a police officer.


**Chart IV.3 Experiences with Corruption in Mexico**




When we consider the incidence of corruption in a single indicator, including only direct incidents, we develop an estimate that reflects the extensiveness of corruption in Mexico. This indicator only includes 8 of 10 experiences illustrated in the previous chart. Chart IV.4 illustrates the results. Nearly 67 percent of Mexicans have not experienced corruption in the last year. In other words, nearly 33 percent or 23 million adults have directly experienced corruption. 15 percent have experienced it only once; 10 percent have had two experiences, 5 percent three times, and 4 percent have had four or more experiences. It is noteworthy that Mexicans lead in 6 of 8 categories of corruption.

Viewed comparatively, the 33 percent of Mexicans that were victims of corruption in the last year significantly exceeds the levels observed in other countries. According to the data illustrated in Chart IV.5, levels were considerably lower in the runner-up countries: Honduras registered 19 percent; Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama registered 18 percent; and Colombia and Costa Rica each registered 15 percent. Costa Rica provided an odd result because their perception of corruption among public officials is the highest whereas the incidence is low.

**Chart IV.4 Incidence of Being a Victim of Corruption**



**Chart IV.5 Incidence of Corruption in Comparative Perspective**




Among the countries included in this project it appears that Mexico suffers from the highest incidence of corruption. It may be the case, however, that our indicator may not be ideal given


that the poll was conducted in the wake of the video scandals. Be that as it may, the survey does examine direct experiences as well as perceptions of official corruption. What explains the propensity to be a victim of corruption? Table IV.1 presents results from a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the number of times an individual has been a victim of corruption. The model primarily includes socio-demographic and regional variables following the work defined by Seligson for this report. For this reason our theoretical expectations are ambiguous and we comment on the findings presented in the table below.

The data illustrate that men are more likely to experience corruption. We can speculate that they are more likely to do so perhaps because they are less likely to work at home or because they drive more thereby leaving themselves more exposed to crime than women. But this is only conjecture. Younger individuals are also more likely to be victims than are older individuals. Level of education does not seem to have an effect but level of income does. The latter may mean that to the extent that one has the income to help facilitate a “transaction” the more likely one is to be singled out or to be willing to pay a bribe. Regionally, the incidence of corruption is likely to be lowest in the north and center-east than the rest of the country than in the center. There is no difference, however, in the south. Another variable suggests that greater exposure to the mass media – which reflect urbanization – the more likely an individual will be a victim. Even though this analysis takes each of these variables individually and does not include interaction effects, it is not difficult to develop a rough profile of the likeliest victim in Mexico. They are likely to be young middle class men living in urban settings (though we deduce this based on the media exposure variable) in the center and south of the country. Some of these profiles are illustrated in charts IV.6 and IV.7. We reiterate that these simply profile likely victims.

**Chart IV.6 Incidence of Corruption According to Gender and Age**



**Chart IV.7 Incidence of Corruption by Region**




Up to this point we have provided a general overview of corruption in Mexico as well as analysis

of those that are most likely to be victims. Nonetheless, there remain several lines of inquiry. Are Mexicans more tolerant and likely to excuse corruption than are the other countries included in the study? Which citizens, if any, are more likely to tolerate or excuse corruption? To answer this second question we ran a logistic regression where 1 equals those who believe it is justified to pay a bribe due to poor public service. The results are presented in Table IV.2.

The regression presents an interesting result: a positive and significant relationship between level of income and tolerance for corruption. The more a Mexican earns the more likely that he or she will justify the bribe due to the inefficiency of public services. The middle and upper classes are willing and able to bribe when they have to conduct public transactions. In contrast, the less economically developed south is relatively more tolerant of corruption than the north, which is more developed.

As we argued at the outset, we expect a negative relationship between corruption and democracy is negative. At the same time, though, one normative expectation is that a democracy should be able to limit corruption to minimal levels. Chart IV.6 provides data on this point though the results are not statistically significant. Among those that were not victims of corruption 60 percent support the institutional system. This proportion falls to 55 percent among those that were victims three or four times in the last year. Support for stable democracy is 42 percent among those who were not victims or were victimized only once. This proportion is stable as the incidence increases, however, it drops sharply to 27 percent for citizens victimized 5 or more times. The data therefore provides some support for the argument that corruption undermines democracy.

**Chart IV.8 Incidence of Corruption and Support for the System**



### 4.3 Conclusions

It seems that Mexicans are the most familiar with corruption among the nations included in this study. One in three Mexicans reported that he or she was a victim of corruption within a year of the poll we administered. Mexican democracy carries with it the burden of high levels of corruption that does not stand out as solely a function of the PRI regime. A new generation of politicians from all of the major parties has demonstrated its capacity to engage in corrupt acts. It appears that corruption is adapting to the new political context. We have showed in this study that there is some evidence that the incidence of corruption reduces support for the system and for stable democracy. Citizens are exposed to corrupt action at any time and almost any place, but particularly so in the nation's center and south. One importance advance is the approval and implementation of the Federal Transparency and Public Information Law, which had been in place for a year as of this writing. Its primary function is to make transparent the management of public funds and to widen access to public information for citizens. To be sure, the effectiveness this favorable law will need to be evaluated in the future and it is also the case that it is only the beginning. In this chapter we presented data that reveals that corruption remains a serious problem for Mexican democracy and will improve only slowly.






## 5.0 Rule of Law and Victimization of Crime

The rule of law and democracy are generally associated inasmuch as it is difficult to conceive of a healthy democracy without rule of law. Free and fair competitive elections are a necessary condition for all healthy democracies. For many, however, this minimalist definition is inadequate. It is also necessary to establish the rule of law and provide access to the judicial system for all citizens. Often, however, rule of law (ROL) works against democratic principles and majority rule. ROL presupposes that minority rights will be respected. For this reason, as Jean Hampton notes, contemporary democracies are substantially different from ancient democracies. Today majority rule needs to be accompanied with respect for minority rights (1994:13). For Guillermo O'Donnell (1999) one of the principal failures of the rule of law in Latin America is that access to judicial processes is unequally distributed.

In Chart V.1 we see confidence levels in the judicial system in the project's eight countries. Costa Rica, the nation with the longest democratic tradition from among the eight, also enjoys the highest level of confidence in the judicial system. Honduras and Nicaragua possess the lowest levels of confidence. Mexico occupies 3<sup>rd</sup> place after Costa Rica and El Salvador respectively. In the study's questionnaire the question used to measure confidence in the judicial system is b10a, where we asked interviewees to choose a number between 1 and 7 where one indicated no confidence and 7 high confidence. We asked them to choose a number that indicates the maximum confidence that they have in the judicial system.


**Chart V.1 Confidence in the Judicial Process: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



Confidence in Mexican judicial institutions varies. As we see in Chart V.2 the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) receives the highest marks followed by the Attorney General (*Procuraduría General de la República, or PGR*) and the Supreme Court (*Suprema*

*Corte de Justicia de la Nación, or SCJN*). The police enjoy the lowest levels of confidence along with political parties at the bottom of the list.

**Chart V.2 Confidence in Legal Institutions**



Given the presumptive relationship between the rule of law and democracy we should expect that evaluations concerning judicial institutions should influence citizen support for the political system. Rising levels of support for judicial institutions should translate to rising levels of support for the political system. In Table V.1 we observe that in Mexico greater support for the PGR, SCJN, CNDH, and the police is associated with greater support for the political system.

The institution whose evaluation is most strongly correlated with support for the political system in the PGR and it is followed by the CNDH. Confidence in the police is the variable that least influences support for the political system (given that the independent variables utilize the same scale, 0 to 100, we use the regression coefficients as a relative indicator of importance).


Considering the importance of judicial institutions it is imperative to know what shapes confidence in these institutions. Confidence in these four institutions, PGR, SCJN, CNDH, and police, is highly correlated among them and factor analysis shows that they group along one dimension. For this reason we constructed an additive index of these four variables (alpha coefficient: .77). The results from the regression reported in Table V.2 permits us to identify those factors that determine confidence in judicial institutions.

The first thing that stands out is the perception of honesty of judges and the police: if citizens perceive that these are honest this increases confidence in judicial institutions. Also, very obviously, we find that the degree that people perceive that criminals will be punished (AOJ12)


the more confidence people have in the judicial system.

For Mexicans corruption of judges and the police is a serious problem. On a scale from 1 to 100 where 1 indicates that police are thoroughly corrupt and 100 indicates that they are honest and honorable, they score 23. Judges scored higher, 39, which is still very low. The relationship between honesty of judges and police and confidence in institutions may be seen in Charts V.3 and V.4.

**Chart V.3 Police Corruption and Trust in Legal Institutions**




**Chart V.4 Corruption of Judges and Trust in Legal Institutions**



We also need to consider level of education as a determinant of confidence in judicial institutions. As we can see in Chart V.5, higher levels of education translate into lower levels of confidence in judicial institutions. This pattern is commonplace in studies of the rule of law in Mexico: people that are more educated not only have less confidence they also challenge it more than the less educated, which is to say that the less educated have a higher propensity to disobey the law than the highly educated (Buendía and Navarrete, 2003).

**Chart V.5 Level of Education and Confidence in Legal Institutions**




## 5.1 Satisfaction with Judicial Proceedings

One additional element that might influence confidence in judicial institutions is the treatment that citizens receive in the judicial process (see Chart V.6). In the poll, 29 percent of those interviewed reported having been involved in such processes. From among these, 46 percent signaled having had a satisfactory experience whereas the rest said the experience was unsatisfactory. When we include this variable in our regression model this variable generates one of the strongest determinant of confidence in the judicial system that almost matches the variable on the perceived honesty of judges and the police.<sup>21</sup>


As Chart V.7 shows the satisfaction with judicial proceedings demonstrates important regional differences. Rural areas and small cities demonstrate higher levels of satisfaction than do the nation's large cities.

<sup>21</sup> The incorporation of this variable also modify the results of the regression in Table V.2. The most significative change is related with the "Judicial system punishing delinquents" (it is not significative at a level .05 or minor).

**Chart V.6 Satisfaction with the Tribunal Process and Trust in Legal Institutions**



**Chart V.7 Satisfaction with Tribunal Process by City Size**



## 5.2 Victimization


Illegal behavior undermines interpersonal and social trust and therefore weakens the social fabric of any community and weakens the rule of law. As Carl Schmitt has noted, the rule of law is the

opposite of a police state and has as its goal the maintenance of a judicial order. (2001:141) The state's goal is to guarantee order, peace, and security.


Given that many crimes go unreported to officials it is important to recognize “shadow data” of crimes committed in a country. This data gives is a clue with respect to true levels of victimization.

In Chart V.8 we see that 17.3 percent of those interviewed reported having been a victim of crime in the previous year. Of the 8 nations in the study Mexico scores the highest level of victimization and it is followed by El Salvador. The majority of the crimes reported consists of non violent crime (52.2 percent) and this is followed by violent crime (22.4 percent).

**Chart V.8 Victimization Rate**




**Chart V.9 Victimization Rate and Type of Crime**



It is the case that roughly two thirds of victims do not report the crime (Chart V.10). This behavior is clearly an indicator of the lack of confidence that victims have in the judicial authorities as well as the belief that nothing will result if they report the incident (53.6 percent). Once again we find that the confidence that the judicial system will punish wrongdoers is a key element in the relationship between citizens and the authorities: only 37 percent of Mexican believe that the judicial system will punish violators.




**Chart V.10 Denouncement of Crimes**



Notwithstanding citizens' vulnerability to crime and the perception that those who commit crimes are not punished, almost half of the interviewees (47 percent) expressed the belief that the Mexican political system protects their basic rights.

**Chart V.11 Reasons for Not Denouncing a Crime**



### 5.3 Conclusion

Viewed in comparative perspective Mexico has the highest level of crime among the eight countries included in the project. Nonetheless, this fact coexists with positive opinions with respect to judicial processes. Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction is that citizens are especially critical of those institutions tied to police activity while they support the Supreme Court and National Commission for Human Rights. One might even conclude that Mexicans have little faith in officials while they retain faith in institutions.

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## 6.0 Local Government and Democracy

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Decentralization is one of the primary reform proposals on the table. The goal is to improve governmental efficiency and accountability. A World Bank Study by Javed Burki and Perry noted:

“It is expected that decentralized governments will respond more efficiently to demands for services, that they will adapt more flexibly to changing local circumstances, and that compared with highly centralized governments they will be more accountable.”<sup>22</sup>

Strong local governments generate considerable positive externalities: more professional municipal administration, more collaboration with the private sector, administrative innovation, and “an increase in local participation in public decision-making”(Ibid.). The latter is particularly relevant for this study. One major policy recommendation is that local governments increase their responsibility in providing public services. A key issue, however, is feasibility: how ready are local governments to take on this task?

### 6.1 Approval of Municipal Governments

For Mexicans the quality of municipal services is average or mediocre. Chart VI.1 shows that almost half of respondents indicate that services are “neither good nor bad” and only 26 percent rate them as good. We do not observe significant regional variation. Levels of regional development do not seem to affect citizens’ ratings of municipal services. The nation’s less developed southern region produced similar scores to the better-developed northern region.


Although there are not important cross national differences among the countries included in this project, Mexico scores below most countries with respect to the quality of municipal services. (Chart VI.2.) More important still, citizen evaluations in the eight countries are by and large satisfactory at best: on a scale of 0 to 100 scores of public service approval range from 47 to 58.

What might explain levels of satisfaction with municipal services? One central function of all governments is to provide security for citizens. Thus, we expect that more secure citizens will be more supportive of local government. The regression results presented in Table VI.1 show that this relationship does exist. Similarly, confidence in the police has a positive effect on citizens’ approval of local government. These results indicate the significance of security on the approval rates of local governments.


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<sup>22</sup> S. Javed Burki and Guillermo E. Perry. 1997. *The Long March. A Reform Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean in the Next Decade*. Washington: The World Bank, 115 p.

**Chart VI.1 Evaluation of Municipal Services**



**Chart VI.2 Evaluation of Municipal Services in 8 Countries**




One might hypothesize that citizen participation in community affairs might be associated with higher levels of public services offered by local governments. The evidence does not support this

for the Mexican case. Another variable that may be associated with approval of municipal governments is city size: smaller cities might imply closer proximity between the government and citizens and more attention to their demands. We do not find evidence for this hypothesized relationship in Mexico.

One factor that does influence satisfaction with municipal services is level of education: more education is associated with more satisfaction, particularly among those with university studies. (Chart VI.3.) This relationship was also found in Ecuador.<sup>23</sup> The mechanism behind this relationship is unclear. It might be the case that more educated citizens are better informed about local government services and hence are more likely to take advantage of them (and hence be more satisfied). In the absence of information regarding services the average citizen might find it difficult to link public services with the local authorities.

**Chart VI.3 Satisfaction with Municipal Services by Level of Education**



## 6.2 Citizen Participation in Municipal Issues


At first glance data on assistance to local council meetings seems small. (Chart VI.4.) In the Mexican case 13 percent report that they have assisted a council meeting during the last year. In absolute terms, though, the figure is enormous. In Mexico this means that somewhere between 8 and 9 million citizens have assisted a local town meeting. It may be the case that the sample suffers from overrepresentation but this is the best indicator we currently possess.

To understand which factors help to explain assistance a local meetings we carried out a logistic regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual has attended a


<sup>23</sup> M. Seligson and A.P. Córdova. 2002. *Auditoría de la democracia: Ecuador*. Quito, Ecuador: CEDATOS, 215 p.

meeting and 0 if he or she has not. The results are reported in Table VI.2. As is the case with other measures of participation, the two variables that are most important are age and education: older and more educated individuals are more likely to participate. (Charts VI.5 and VI.6.) Participation increases and reaches a maximum at age 55 and declines sharply thereafter. With respect to education, primary and secondary levels of schooling do not appear to matter but participation increases sharply with higher levels of schooling.


**Chart VI.4 Participation in Municipal Councils in Comparative Perspective**



**Chart VI.5 Participation in Municipal Council Meetings by Education**



**Chart VI.6 Participation in Municipal Council Meetings by Age**




It is very likely that the jump that we see in Chart VI.6 can be explained by the fact that young people do not feel especially invested in the locale where they live since their parents chose it for them. This changes among those between 45 and 55 who usually have lived in their community for some years and have an interest in improving their community. Older citizens, who probably

have spent many years in their community, reduce their participatory activities as they age.


In the model we included variables tied to the issue of public security. The hypothesis is that people more preoccupied with this issue, including those that participated at the local level to combat crime, are more likely to attend municipal meeting to express their opinions. Nonetheless, none of the variables associated with security issue produces statistically significant results. One possible explanation of this result is the perception of the majority of Mexicans (roughly 6 out of 7) who believe that the authorities do not pay attention to their complaints or reports of local problems (Charts VI.7 and VI.8.) In this scenario citizens believe that it would be unproductive to assist municipal meeting when there is a high likelihood that their petitions will be ignored.

**Chart VI.7 Receptivity by the Municipal Authorities of Citizens' Petitions**





**Chart VI.8 Responsiveness Towards Complaints by the Municipal Authorities**




### **6.3 Petitions Made to Municipal Governments**

Approximately 20 percent of citizens have petitioned the authorities. (Chart VI.9.) It is not clear how petitions are made, whether they are made formally or informally, during municipal meetings, during visit to the authorities, or perhaps even at social functions. It is precisely this flexibility with respect to where citizens may petition that makes this practice considerably more extensive than assistance at municipal meetings.


To better understand the determinants of whether citizens petitioned municipal governments we conducted a logistical regression. (Table VI.3.) We included once again factors associated with public security. This time we found that individuals who participated in community organizations to fight crime are more likely to present petitions than those who did not. This segment may not assist council meetings but they do make demands on local governments.

Once again we find that level of education has a positive impact on citizen participation. As education increases so does the likelihood that citizens will petition municipal governments. The size of a city also influences participation. However, the result contradicts the expectation we outlined above and is statistically significant at the .01 level. Upon inspection we see that small cities and rural zones have similar numbers of petitions presented and that medium size cities generate considerably lower numbers of petitions. We do note, though, that notwithstanding the regression's non-linear functional form does not appear to adequately capture the data's underlying structure.


**Chart VI.9 Petitions Presented to a Municipal Authority During the Previous Year**



**Chart VI.10 Petitions Presented to a Municipal Authority by Level of Education**




**Chart VI.11 Petitions Presented to a Municipal Authority by City Size**



## 6.4 Confidence in the Management of Municipal Finances

Another element that bears on the citizen-government relationship is the confidence citizens possess with respect to the management of public finances. In the Mexican case we find that 74 percent of Mexicans have little or no confidence in the management of municipal finances. Without much doubt, the perception of government corruption weighs on this perception.

**Chart VI.12 Confidence in the Management of Public Funds by Municipal and Local Governments**



## 6.5 Conclusions

We find that satisfaction with municipal governments in Mexico leaves a great deal to be desired. This is so even though local governments have been strengthened in recent reform efforts – efforts supported by an array of forces. The Mexican population does not consider that local governments are particularly accountable or responsive – governments do not appear to listen to complaints and petitions. Also, corruption's shadow feeds mistrust between municipal governments and citizens. This suggests that decentralization that empowers local governments will not necessarily translate to support for democracy. Empowering local governments will need to be accompanied with other reforms. In the Mexican case one important reform will be reelection at the local level. Without this reform it is difficult to imagine that levels of accountability will increase.

## 7.0 Electoral Behavior

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### 7.1 Electoral Participation

Democracy is inconceivable without universal voting rights for the adult population and privacy at the ballot box. Everyone agrees that these are necessary elements. Disagreements emerge with respect to the degree of citizen participation that defines a democracy. For some democracy should be highly participatory. (Pateman 1970) For classic minimalists, most famously Schumpeter, the relevant factor is electoral competition among elite. The extent of participation is secondary in this view. Others, such as Lijpart (1997), worry that less privileged groups vote less and that this undermines the representation of their interests.

Independent of the posture that one takes with respect to this debate on participation, representation and democracy, it is certainly the case that accountability requires, at a minimum, that elected officials can be punished at the polls for their performance. Citizens must periodically have the opportunity to “throw the rascals out.” Thus, it becomes critical to understand who votes and why as best as science permits.

Polls always generate difficulties in the study of electoral participation. Their advantage is that they make explanations at the individual level possible but there are serious problems measuring who actually resorts to the ballot box. In the US, for instance, the National Election Studies polls tend to over represent electoral participation by 17-18 points. (Teixeira 1992) Studies carried out in Mexico show that over representation varies between 10 and 15 points. (Buendía and Somuano 2003)

The poll that we are concerned with here has levels of over representation that are considerably higher still. In 2003 42 percent<sup>24</sup> of the population voted whereas the poll registers a participation rate of 71 percent. In the presidential election of 2000 sixty four percent of citizens of citizens voted whereas the poll provided us with a participation rate of 76 percent where. In the best case we get a participation rate of 22 percent whereas in the worst we get 29 percent. For these reasons we are cautious with analysis of our results and we note similarities and differences with previous studies.

To understand the determinants of electoral participation we generated a logistical regression. The results (Table VII.1) show that the most influential variables are: age, education, participation in political and social associations,<sup>25</sup> political sophistication,<sup>26</sup> and confidence in political institutions.<sup>27</sup>

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
<sup>24</sup> Percentage of the population registered in the voting lists.

<sup>25</sup> The variables CP6 and CP13 were submitted to a factor analysis grouped in two components. The first factor include the assistance to sindical, professionals, cooperatives, civil associations, political parties and community organizations meetings, (questions CP8 and CP13). We generate an additive index with this questions (Alpha: .76).

<sup>26</sup> Following to Zaller (1992), this variable was constructed with the questions of factual informations as knowing the U.S and Brazil president's name, the presidential term in Mexico and the number of entities that the country has. By a factor analysis we found that the four variables are related, they were grouped in just one component.

<sup>27</sup> This variable was constructed with 7 questions that measure pride, respect and political system support as well as confidence in the elections, the Congress, the federal government and the political parties (questions B2, B4, B6, B11, B13, B14 and B21) . These variables were grouped in just one component in the factor analysis (Alpha coefficient : .82)

Age, education, and political sophistication behave as expected: older, better educated and more politically sophisticated increase the likelihood of voting. Age, moreover, shows a curvilinear relationship we would expect: middle age citizens are more likely to vote than the very young or very old. (Chart VII.1).




Confidence in political institutions also pushes citizens to the polls. It is obvious that a lack of confidence in political institutions generates alienation and that these citizens are less likely to make their way to the ballot box on election day.

For several decades now, as Verba and Nie (1972) first noted, scholars have posited that there is a positive correlation among distinct modes of participation. One specific argument is that non-electoral participation is associated with electoral participation. If someone attends union or religious meetings the person is more likely to vote. This hypothesis turns out to be accurate for Mexicans: those who assist social or political meetings are more likely to vote.


## 7.2 Support for Electoral Reforms

For more than 40 years the primary political reforms have been electoral in nature. The federal government and political parties regularly propose electoral reforms. Today, two are hotly debated in the legislature and with the parties: reelection for federal deputies and voting rights for Mexicans living abroad.

**Chart VII.2 Reelection of Deputies**



**Chart VII.3 Voting by Mexicans Abroad**




In Chart VII.2 we see that most Mexicans oppose reelection of federal deputies (72 percent). Only 14 percent support reelection. Support increases when important considerations are introduced such as increased professionalism (34 percent) or greater accountability (42 percent). Nonetheless, opposition remains stiff.

In contrast, reforms aimed at permitting the more than six million Mexicans living in the United States enjoy widespread support. Sixty percent support this reform whereas only 21 percent oppose it. (Chart VII.3) There have been divisions with respect to which elections Mexicans abroad should be permitted to vote in. Thirty seven percent say that they should be permitted to vote in any election whereas 34 percent say that they should be permitted to vote only during presidential contests.

On other electoral matters, 62 percent of Mexicans approve of current legislation that fixes a quota designed to increase the number of women that qualify to be elected federal deputies. (Chart VII.4) Political parties, except for those that utilize primaries for electing their candidates, are required to set aside a quota for female candidates.

Finally, only 41 percent favor that federal deputies should have the ability to approve public works and services for their electoral districts. No doubt this view is a function of voters' negative image of Mexican legislators.

**Chart VII.4 Support for Women's Minimum Quotas and the Financing of Projects in the Representatives Districts**



### 7.3 Bibliography

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## 8.0 Social Capital

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Putnam has succinctly described that social capital refers to “social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance and trust.” His classic study of civic traditions in Italy set the stage for the research program on social capital and democracy. Social capital implies participation and empowerment of distinct segments of society and a robust civil society. In this chapter we analyze social capital in Mexico. Components studied include trust, organizations, and participation in associations. Mexico has been characterized to be a society that is low on both trust and civic participation. We find that this continues to be the case and compare Mexico’s performance to that of countries included in the project.

### 8.1 Trust


Mexicans possess very low levels of social trust. Only 20 percent consider that citizens in their own community are “very trustworthy.” The average in the other seven countries is 30 percent with Costa Rica and Honduras registering the highest scores, 40 and 39 percent respectively. (Chart VIII.1) Only Panama scored below Mexico (19 percent). In the poll we asked respondents to choose from among four levels of trustworthiness: “very, somewhat, little or not” trustworthy. Here it is worth noting that other important surveys, such as the World Values Survey or the European Survey or Values, relied on a dichotomous phrasing of the question: do you trust the majority of your fellow citizens or not? Of the 81 countries included in these studies Mexico occupies 54<sup>th</sup> place with respect to social trust between 1995 and 2002. In 2000 twenty one percent of those polled said that they trusted the majority of their fellow citizens, which stands in sharp contrast those countries that topped the list, Denmark and Sweden that scored 67 and 66 percent respectively.<sup>28</sup>

It is worth highlighting that although the two studies rely on a different phrasing of the question, the proportion of Mexicans who they that they trust the majority of their fellow citizens is roughly one fifth. Only 20 percent of Mexicans in the Mexico and Central America (CAM) survey say that their fellow citizens in their own community are “very” trustworthy and roughly 20 percent say that they trust the majority of fellow citizens in general in the other polls. It is also worth noting that this correlation between polls does not hold for other countries. In El Salvador, for instance, 15 percent say that they trust in the majority whereas 35 percent say that citizens in their community are very trustworthy. In Colombia the numbers are 11 and 29 respectively. We reiterate that the key difference between the two polls is that the World Values Surveys frame the question broadly whereas the CAM focuses on what they believe about citizens in their own community. This accounts why levels of confidence are generally higher in the latter. Mexicans, however, express low levels of trust in general and to those in their own community.

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<sup>28</sup> Ver Ronald Inglehart, et. al., 2004, *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999 and 2000 Values Surveys*, México D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores.

**Chart VIII.1 Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective**



If this seems to be an enormous disadvantage recent propositions by Putnam with respect to what he calls bonding social capital and bridging social capital merit some attention. The first refers to the affinity that exists within a community that links individuals who share a common inward-looking orientation. The second refers to affinity that exists among diverse types of individuals that shapes an outward-looking orientation. Bonding implies the formation of a personal relationship due to frequent or constant interaction, whereas bridging refers to linking groups or individuals from different communities. Putnam argues that bridging social capital is considerably more difficult to accomplish since “birds of a feather” are more likely to bond. Nonetheless, in developing countries marked by diversity, bridging becomes crucial for the functioning of democracy. Mexico is more a less homogeneous nation in many respects. Nonetheless, the democratic transition, changes in values and economic transition, all contributed to the fault lines of divisions. It is notable that in Mexico estimates of bonding versus bridging social capital are roughly similar. This is not so in all countries. In Colombia and El Salvador bonding social capital is considerably higher. In Mexico these are nearly identical.

## 8.2 Civil Society Participation


Participation in civic associations is illustrated in Chart VIII.2. Religious associations and churches are well attended. Fifty one percent of interviewees say that they assist this type of association. Associations affiliated with schools follow these. Forty four percent report participation in these associations. Thirty one percent report having assisted meetings associated with community development or improvement. Much lower levels of assistance were reported for associations linked to political parties (14 percent), employment, merchants or producers (11 percent), labor (10 percent), cooperatives (7 percent), and civic associations (7 percent).

From among these different types of associations Mexicans average attendance at roughly 1.5


types of associations with religious ones leading the pack by a considerable margin (Chart VIII.3.) This average is just below the mean for the eight countries included in the study. Honduras (2.0), Colombia (1.9) and Guatemala (1.8) average the highest level of attendance. Costa Rica (1.3) and El Salvador (1.2) scored the lowest.

From among the different types of participation that we have seen thus far we can make empirical and conceptual distinctions. On one hand there is community participation, represented by attendance at religious and educational associations. On the other hand we have assistance at the rest, community development, political associations, etc. These can be considered professional in nature rather than communitarian. Following Seligson's work on the Assessment of Democracy in Ecuador, Table VIII.1 presents the results of a factor analysis by principal components that generate these two types of participation, professional (factor 1) and community (factor 2). Factor one explains 38 percent of the variance whereas factor 2 explains 14 percent. *Fiabilidad* analysis by parts reveals that the variables group statistically on the first factor, which produces a Cronbach alpha of .75 whereas the second factor, which consists of two variables, produces an alpha of .39.

**Chart VIII.2 Types of Participation in Mexico**



**Chart VIII.3 Social participation: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



**Table VIII.1 Types of Participation in Mexico**

Matriz de componentes <sup>a</sup>		
	Componente	
	1	2
CP6 Religious Associations	.284	.725
CP7 Educational Associations	.480	.607
CP8 Association for comunal development	.611	.210
CP9 Associations of professionals	.632	-.192
CP10 Labor Unions	.694	-.234
CP11 Cooperatives	.696	-.059
CP12 Civic Associations	.715	-.251
CP13 Political Party	.658	-.183

Método de extracción: Análisis de componentes principales.  
a. 2 componentes extraídos


The factor analysis permitted us to construct two dependent variables. The first is an estimate of professional participation. It is an index constructed with the variables whose factor loading corresponds to the first component. The second estimates community participation. It too is an index constructed with the variables whose factor loading corresponds to the second component.

Table VIII.2 presents analysis of community participation for which analysis of (fiabilidad) was more or less weak. The model includes a series of socio-demographic variables, whether a person had been a victim of crime in the last year, and the degree of confidence in local authorities to resolve issues. According to the results the following are more likely to participate; men, younger citizens; married individuals; the less wealthy; and those who have been victims of crime. Interestingly, level of education and confidence in the authorities to resolve issues did not produce significant results with respect to community participation.

Table VIII.3 presents analysis of professional participation, for which the analysis of (fiabilidad) was considerably more robust. In this men are considerably more active participants than women, older citizens more so than the young, and married individuals more so than the non-married. Level of education did not matter much. Interestingly, level of income was not significant in this model even though it had been in the previous model. Number of children did not yield significant results even though it has been in Seligson's previous analyses. For professional participation city size has a strong and significant positive effect as do media exposure and whether or not the individual has been a victim of a crime. Also, a lack of confidence in the authorities to resolve issues inhibits professional participation.


One final facet of participation in Mexico's civil society is illustrated by charitable donations. According to the data illustrated in Chart VIII.4 twenty one percent of Mexicans say that they have contributed to the community with their own labor. Nineteen percent say that they have participated in a community meeting. Eighteen percent say they have donated money, 12 percent say they have organized a group to resolve a community problem and 8 percent say they helped to organized a group to help counter crime in their community.

**Chart VIII.4 Types of Participation in Community Organizations**



In comparative perspective, as we can see in Chart VIII.5, barely one third of Mexicans say that they have contributed or attempted to contribute to resolve a community problem. The regional average is 33 percent, with Panama and Honduras leading the group with 38 and 37 percent respectively.

**Chart VIII.5 Participation in Community Organizations: Mexico in Comparative Perspective**



According to the regression model presented in Table VIII.4, the primary determinants of community participation are age, media exposure, and whether or not the person has been a victim of a crime. Those that work against community participation are urban context and lack of confidence in the local authorities. As we can observe, this last variable is consistently negative with respect to participation more generally. The shortage of trust in the government acts as a drag on participation in Mexico.

### 8.3 Conclusions

Democracy requires a gradual accumulation of social capital. In Mexico, people possess low levels of trust both in general and towards those who live in their community. We have identified two types of participation, professional and community. The first seems to attract males and older individuals whereas the second attracts younger individuals and females. It turns out that poor confidence in local authorities works against higher levels of participation. This is a key issue for the future well being of Mexican democracy.



## Appendices

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Appendix A: Study Design

Appendix B: Questionnaire

Appendix C: IRB Letter

Appendix D: Technical Note and Regression Tables



## Appendix A: Study Design

For the survey we used a multistage probability sample. In a first stage we selected 130 polling points using the list of electoral sections as defined by the Federal Elections Institute (IFE) for the July 2003 national elections. Electoral sections are reliable sampling units and allow us to have a representative sample of the adult population in the country, not just the voting population. Their coverage is about 96.42 percent of the total Mexican population 18 years old and older. Sampling based on electoral sections is the most widely used in Mexico by commercial polling firms and has been used in recent academic studies about political culture, voting and public opinions research. Marketing research is based mostly on the so-called AGEs, or Basic Geographical-Economic Areas, which have the disadvantage of not covering the whole rural population, especially towns and communities with less than 2,500 inhabitants.

Electoral sections were stratified according to region (north, central-west, central and south), as well as by urban-rural conditions. We ranked a total of over 60 thousand sections from larger to smaller according to the size of registered voters in each section, and we selected 130 using systematic sampling. The probability of selection was proportional to size within each stratum. The sample has a  $\pm 2.5$  percent margin of error with a 95 percent confidence level.

Margins of error per strata are shown in Table AI.1.

**Table AI.1 Margins of Error for Each Subsample Corresponding to Sampling Strata**

	Sample size	Margin of error
Urban-rural condition		
Urban	1,079	$\pm 3.0$
Rural	477	$\pm 4.5$
Region		
North	407	$\pm 4.9$
Central-west	298	$\pm 5.7$
Central	515	$\pm 4.3$
South	336	$\pm 5.4$

Note: Confidence level: 95%

Households were selected in a second stage of selection. This stage began once interviewers had found the address for a specific electoral section. Each interviewer selected a number of households in a systematic manner, starting from the Northeast corner of the block containing the section address. Interviewers walked clockwise from that corner and selected households according to a selection interval, first in the section's block and then moving into adjacent blocks. In case the block had condominium or apartment buildings, each building was considered a block. Industrial and commercial zones were excluded in the selection process. Selection in rural areas also followed a systematic sampling based on intervals.

In the third stage of selection, interviewers selected a single respondent in each household, following quota sampling based on sex and age. As mentioned in Chapter II, it was required that respondents were 18 years old or older and lived in the selected household. In case the selected person declined to be interviewed, we substituted the household with another following the same sampling procedures. We interviewed only one adult per selected household.

## Fieldwork

The survey was organized and coordinated by this report's authors. Fieldwork, coding and data processing were conducted by a group of professional interviewers named CAMPO (Associated Consultants on Marketing, Advertising and Opinion, A.C.). It is important to mention that CAMPO is not a commercial polling firm, but an independent group of fieldwork coordinators and interviewers that offer their services to both commercial and academic survey projects. CAMPO staff was trained and specifically instructed for this project both in the application of the questionnaire and the selection of respondents.

There were 14 routes of fieldwork across the country in which 70 interviewers participated, along with 35 supervisors and 3 fieldwork coordinators. Each interviewer conducted on average six face-to-face interviews per day. CAMPO processed and verified the data using CSPRO software. Fieldwork supervision took place in three stages: a) During fieldwork: there was a direct supervision in 10 percent of the selected sections in which supervisors made sure that interviewers were applying the questionnaire correctly. b) After fieldwork: supervisors returned to 10 percent of the selected households where effective interviews took place to verify the proper application of the questionnaire to the selected respondent. And c) Statistical supervision: There was a statistical verification of the data through a double entry in CSPRO. This double entry reduced the chances of mistakes caused by data processing. Also, there was a general revision based on interviewer number in order to identify unusual patterns of responses. Twenty people participated in the process of coding and data entry.

**Table A1.2 Comparing Population and Sample Distributions by Region and Urban-Rural Categories**

	North	Central-west	Central	South	Total Proportion
Population (Census 200)	%	%	%	%	%
Urban	76.7	66.0	79.6	52.0	70.2
Rural	23.3	34.0	20.4	48.0	29.8
Percent per region	26.0	19.4	32.8	21.8	100
Sample					
Urban	76.4	64.4	79.0	50.3	69.3
Rural	23.6	35.6	21.0	49.7	30.7
Percent per region	26.2	19.2	33.1	21.6	100

**Table A1.3 Region: North**

State	Population %	Sample %	Difference %
Baja California	10.5	11.8	1.3
Baja California Sur	1.7	-	-1.7
Coahuila	9.1	8.8	-0.3
Chihuahua	12.7	14.7	2.0
Durango	5.7	5.9	0.2
Nuevo León	15.8	14.5	-1.3
San Luís Potosí	8.6	8.8	0.2
Sinaloa	9.6	8.8	-0.8
Sonora	9.0	8.6	-0.4
Tamaulipas	11.8	11.8	0.0
Zacatecas	5.5	5.9	0.4

**Table A1.4 Region: Central-West**

State	Population %	Sample %	Difference %
Aguascalientes	5.0	8.1	3.1
Colima	2.9	-	-2.9
Guanajuato	24.7	28.2	3.5
Jalisco	34.2	32.2	-2.0
Michoacán	21.0	19.5	-1.5
Nayarit	4.9	8.1	3.2
Querétaro	7.2	4.0	-3.2

**Table A1.5 Region: Central**

State	Population %	Sample %	Difference %
Distrito Federal	31.2	30.1	-1.1
Hidalgo	6.9	7.0	0.1
Estado de México	39.3	39.6	0.3
Morelos	5.0	4.7	-0.3
Puebla	14.5	14.0	-0.5
Tlaxcala	3.0	4.7	1.7

**Table A1.6 Region: South**

State	Population %	Sample %	Difference %
Campeche	3.0	-	3.0
Chiapas	16.5	17.9	1.4
Guerrero	13.5	14.3	0.8
Oaxaca	15.0	14.3	-0.7
Quintana Roo	3.9	3.6	-0.3
Tabasco	8.5	7.1	-1.4
Veracruz	32.1	32.1	0.0
Yucatán	7.5	10.7	3.2



## Appendix B: Questionnaire

Versión # 8.1 Martes, 10 de Febrero de 2004; IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



### UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Centroamérica, México y Colombia 2004: Versión México

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	PAIS	
FOLIO: Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]:	IDNUM	
Estado:	MPROV	
Municipio:	MCANT	
Localidad:	MPAROQ	
Tipo de localidad	MZONA	
Sección electoral	MSEC	
Manzana (o Punto muestral)	MMANZ	
Estrato: 1 Norte, 2 Centro-Occidente 3, Centro, 4 Sur	MESTRAT	
Subestratos: 1 Urbano, 2. Rural	MUR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Lengua indígena con traductor	IDIOMAQ	

Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	
<b>MA4. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema <b>más grave</b> que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b> (01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (09) Falta de crédito (10) Problemas del medio ambiente (11) Drogadicción (12) Narcotráfico (13) Corrupción (14) Pandillas (15) Mal gobierno (16) Migración (17) La guerra contra terrorismo (88) No sabe	MA4	
Anotar si no existe código: _____		

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A3</b>	
<b>A4.</b> Lee noticias vía Internet	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A4</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT3</b>	
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO1</b>	
<b>IDIO4.</b> Comparada con la de sus padres, ¿cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es mucho mejor que la de ellos, algo mejor, igual, algo peor de o mucho peor que la de ellos? (1) Mucho mejor (2) Algo mejor (3) Igual (4) Algo peor (5) Mucho peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO4</b>	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	<b>CP5</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [ <b>Seguir con CP5A</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pasar a CP6</b> ] (8) NS [ <b>Pasar a CP6</b> ]		
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>CP5A</b>
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>CP5B</b>
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>CP5C</b>
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>CP5D</b>
<b>CP5E.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo para combatir la delincuencia en su barrio?	(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>CP5E</b>

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP6</b>	
Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP7</b>	
Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP8</b>	
¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP9</b>	
¿Reuniones de un sindicato?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP10</b>	



	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
¿Reuniones de una cooperativa?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP11	
CP12. ¿Reuniones de alguna asociación cívica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP12	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP13	
PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS		PROT1	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR		
<b>CP1.</b> Al presidente de la República	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP1</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado federal	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP2</b>	
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4</b>	
<b>CP4A.</b> A alguna autoridad local (alcalde o regidores)	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4A</b>	

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS (8) NS	<b>LS3</b>	
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<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	<b>IT1</b>	
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	<b>IT2</b>	
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	<b>IT3</b>	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio (delegación)...

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto u otra reunion convocada por el alcalde (jefe delegacional) durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP1A.</b> ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal (delegacional) durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1A</b>	
<b>NP1B.</b> ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que las autoridades municipales (delegacionales) hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>NP1B</b>	
<b>NP1C.</b> Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro del consejo municipal (delegacional), ¿Que tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso? (1) Mucho (2) algo (3) poco o (4) nada? (8) NS	<b>NP1C</b>	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina municipal (delegacional) , síndico del municipio (funcionario de la delegación) durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/no recuerda	<b>NP2</b>	
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio (la delegación) está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio (de la delegación)? (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI6</b>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC4</b>	

<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>JC13A.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	(1) Si podría haber	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8)NS	<b>JC13A</b>	
<b>GBMIL1.</b> Alguna gente dice que estaríamos mejor si el país fuese gobernado de manera diferente. Algunos dicen que los militares deberían gobernar el país, mientras otros dicen que únicamente debería gobernar los civiles. ¿Qué piensa ?	(1) Los militares	(2) Los civiles	(8) NS	<b>GBMIL1</b>	

<b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pasar a ST1]</b>	<b>VIC1</b>	
<b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? <b>[No lea las alternativas]</b> (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)	<b>VIC2</b>	
<b>AOJ1.</b> <b>[Si responde “Sí” a VIC1]</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No lo denunció <b>[Pasar a AOJ1B]</b> (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1</b>	
<b>AOJ1A.</b> ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? <b>[marcar una sola alternativa y pase a ST1]</b> (1) Al ministerio público (2) Policía (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1A</b>	
<b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	<b>AOJ1B</b>	

De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	<b>MUY SATISFECHO</b>	<b>ALGO SATISFECHO</b>	<b>ALGO INSATISFECHO</b>	<b>MUY INSATISFECHO</b>	<b>NO HIZO TRAMITES</b>	<b>NS/ NR</b>		
<b>ST1.</b> La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>	
<b>ST2.</b> Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>	
<b>ST3.</b> Los ministerios públicos	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST3</b>	
<b>ST4.</b> La alcaldía/jefe delegacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>	

<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS	<b>AOJ8</b>	
<b>AOJ9.</b> Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿Cree usted que: Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar al domicilio del sospechoso o la policía puede entrar a la casa del sospechoso sin necesidad de una orden judicial? (1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (2) La policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial (8) NS	<b>AOJ9</b>	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	<b>AOJ11</b>	

<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11A</b>	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>	
<b>AOJ16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo? (1) mucho (2) Algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>AOJ16</b>	
<b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? (1) Si <b>[Seguir con AOJ16B]</b> (2) No <b>[Pasar a AOJ 17]</b> 8 (NS)	<b>AOJ16A</b>	
<b>AOJ16B.</b> ¿Esto pasa con mucha frecuencia, de vez en cuando o casi nunca? (1) Con mucha frecuencia (2) De vez en cuando (3) Casi nunca? (8) NS (9) Inap	<b>AOJ16B</b>	
<b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (1) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	<b>AOJ17</b>	
<b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de esta ciudad/pueblo protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? (1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS	<b>AOJ18</b>	
<b>AOJ19.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que los trámites en los tribunales toman el tiempo apropiado o cree que demoran demasiado? (1) Tiempo apropiado (2) Demoran demasiado (8) NS	<b>AOJ19</b>	

**[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a Ud. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
							(8) No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de México garantizan un juicio justo? <i>Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.</i>		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de México?		<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político mexicano?		<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano?		<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político mexicano?		<b>B6</b>	
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		<b>B10A</b>	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las elecciones?		B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerza Armadas?		B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?		B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la República?		B16	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía?		B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?		B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio /Presidente Municipal?		B32	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37	
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?		B40	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser mexicano?		B43	
B45. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos?		B45	
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47	
B48. ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?"		B48	

**[NO RECOJER TARJETA "A"]**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nada					Mucho		(8) No sabe
Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Vicente Fox...? (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)							
N1. Combate la pobreza.							
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.							
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.							
[Recoja tarjeta "A"]							

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Muy en desacuerdo			Muy de acuerdo				(8) No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, NS=8		
ING2. En los países democráticos hay muchos pleitos y cuesta mucho tomar decisiones. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		ING2	
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los mexicanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2	
PN2A. Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2A	

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
desaprueba firmemente						aprueba firmemente				No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		E16	

**[No recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	Anotar 1-10,88= NS		
<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		<b>D32</b>	
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político mexicano?		<b>D33</b>	
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		<b>D34</b>	
<b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		<b>D36</b>	
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en México. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88		
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>	
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>	
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>	
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>	
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los <b>homosexuales</b> , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>	
<b>D6.</b> Y siempre pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión a <b>expresar su punto de vista</b> ?		<b>D6</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada...		
<b>LIB1.</b> Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB1</b>	
<b>LIB2.</b> Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB2</b>	

<b>LIB3.</b> Participación política (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB3</b>	
<b>LIB4.</b> Protección a derechos humanos (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	<b>LIB4</b>	

<b>ACR1.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios. (8) NS/NR	<b>ACR1</b>	
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<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿diría que está satisfecho, muy satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en México? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión ;México es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) algo democrático (3) poco democrático (4) nada democrático (8) NS	<b>PN5</b>	
<b>PN6.</b> Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, México se ha vuelto más democrático, igual de democrático o menos democrático? (1) muy democrático (2) igual de democrático (3) menos democrático (8) NS/NR		

<b>DEM13.</b> En pocas palabras, ¿que significa para Ud. la democracia? [No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta] (1) Libertad (2) Igualdad (3) Bienestar, progreso económico (4) Capitalismo (5) Gobierno no militar (6) Libre comercio, libre negocio (7)Elecciones, voto (10)Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción (12)Participación (13)Gobierno de la gente (14)Obedecer la ley Otro (anotar) _____ (88) NS/NR	<b>DEM13</b>	
<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. (8) NS/NR	<b>DEM2</b>	
<b>DEM6.</b> Ahora le voy a leer un par de frases sobre la democracia. Por favor, dígame con cual está más de acuerdo: (1) En general, y a pesar de algunos problemas, la democracia es la mejor forma de gobierno (2) Hay otras formas de gobierno que pueden ser tan buenas o mejores que la democracia (8) No sabe	<b>DEM6</b>	
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde	<b>DEM11</b>	

<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	<b>AUT1</b>	
<b>[OPTIONAL, EXCEPTO EN GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS] AUT2.</b> El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora (8) NS	<b>AUT2</b>	

<b>PP1.</b> Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [lea las alternativas]	<b>PP1</b>	
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(1) Frecuentemente	(2) De vez en cuando	(3) Rara vez	(4) Nunca	(8) NS/NR		
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2000?					<b>PP2</b>	
(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR						
<b>ABS5.</b> ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?					<b>ABS5</b>	
(1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR						

<b>M1.</b> Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Vicente Fox es:	<b>M1</b>	
(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR		

Me gustaría que me indique si Ud. considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corrupta y debe ser castigada; 2) corrupta pero justificada bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corrupta.						
<b>DC1.</b> Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una mordida de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera Ud. que el diputado es:	DC1					
1) corrupto y debe ser castigado						
2) corrupto pero justificado						
3) no corrupto NS=8						
<b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Ud. Cree que el político es:	DC13					
1) corrupto y debe ser castigado						
2) corrupto pero justificado						
3) no corrupto NS=8						

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que la vida...	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC1</b>	
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC2</b>	
<b>EXC4.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando mordidas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC4</b>	
<b>EXC5.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una mordida a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC5</b>	
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC6</b>	
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en su municipio/delegación en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para tramitar algo en el municipio / delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC11</b>	
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC13</b>	
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC14</b>	

<b>“no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima, soborno) en los juzgados en el último año?				(9)		
<b>EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (soborno, coima)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC15</b>	
<b>EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (soborno, coima)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC16</b>	
<b>EXC17. ¿Alguna gente le pidió una mordida (soborno, coimas) para evitar el pago de la luz eléctrica?</b>	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC17</b>	
<b>EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad, el pagar mordidas (sobornos, coimas) es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?</b>	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC18</b>	

<b>EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada(4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR</b>	<b>EXC7</b>	
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**[Ahora vamos a usar tarjeta “D”] Entregar tarjeta “D”**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

INSTITUCIONES	Grado de corrupción											
	Muy corruptos					Muy honrados					NS	
<b>PC1.</b> Los diputados	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC1</b>
<b>PC2.</b> Los ministros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC2</b>
<b>PC3.</b> Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC3</b>
<b>PC5.</b> Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC5</b>
<b>PC8.</b> Los profesores universitarios	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC8</b>
<b>PC9.</b> Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC9</b>
<b>PC12.</b> Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC12</b>
<b>PC13.</b> Los militares	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>
<b>PC14.</b> Los líderes de los partidos políticos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>
<b>PC15.</b> Los líderes de las ONG's	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC15</b>
<b>PC19.</b> La prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC19</b>
<b>PC21.</b> Los Presidentes de la República	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC21</b>

**Recoja Tarjeta D**

<b>Ahora me puede decir...</b> <b>GI1. ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George W. Bush; acepta “Bush” o “George Bush”]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	<b>GI1</b>	
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<b>GI3.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuántos estados tiene México? <i>[No leer, 32]</i> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI3</b>	
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en México? <i>[No leer, seis años]</i> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI4</b>	
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <i>[No leer, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva; acepta "Lula"]</i> (1) Correcto(2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI5</b>	

**L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA “E”:** Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1 (NS=88)	
Izquierda					Derecha						

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS		
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	DER1	
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	DER2	
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	DER3	
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	DER4	

VB1. ¿Esta Ud. empadronado? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2000? (1) Sí votó [siga] (2) No votó [pasar a VB4]	VB2	
MVB3. ¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en las elecciones pasadas del 2000? [Si no votó, seguir con VB4. Si votó, pasar a VB5] 1. Vicente Fox de la Alianza por el Cambio (PAN/PVEM) 2. Francisco Labastida del PRI 3. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas de la Alianza por México (PRD/PT/Convergencia/PSN/PAS) 4. Otro. ¿cuál? _____ 5. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR 99. Inap (No votó)		
MVB4. Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato/partido (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07) No se encontró en el padrón electoral (10) No tener edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar Otro _____ (88) NS/NR	MVB4	
MVB5. Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para Diputados Federales en el 2003? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [PASE a VB6] (8) NS/NR	MVB5	

MVB6. ¿Por cuál partido votó para Diputados Federales en las elecciones pasadas del 2003? 1. PAN 2. PRI 3. PRD 4. PT 5. PVEM 6. PAS 7. Convergencia 8. PSN 9. PLM 10. Fuerza Ciudadana 11. Voto nulo/voto en blanco 88. NS/NR 99. Inap (No votó)	MVB6	
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Hoy en día se habla mucho sobre reformas electorales. Me interesa conocer sus opiniones sobre las siguientes reformas. Vamos a usar otra vez la tarjeta "C". **[Entregue la tarjeta "C"]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente										No sabe
Aprueba firmemente										

<b>EREF1.</b> ¿Hasta que punto apruebe o desapruebe el fijar una cuota mínima para aumentar el número de mujeres que puedan ser electas diputadas?[Léame el numero]		<b>EREF1</b>	
<b>EREF3.</b> ¿Poner en manos de los diputados el derecho de financiar obras públicas y servicios públicos en sus distritos electorales? ¿Hasta que punto aprobaría o desaprobaría?		<b>EREF3</b>	

<b>MEX1.</b> En general, ¿cuál es su opinión acerca del Instituto Federal Electoral, IFE: (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Regular ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (6) No sabe ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX1</b>	
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En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 10 significa "completamente limpias y equitativas" y 0 significa "completamente fraudulentas e inequitativas", ¿cómo calificaría a las elecciones en los siguientes niveles? (**MOSTRAR TARJETA M**)

<b>MEX2.</b> Las elecciones de Presidente de la República	<b>MEX2</b>	
<b>MEX3.</b> Las elecciones de Diputados Federales	<b>MEX3</b>	
<b>MEX4.</b> Las elección para Gobernador en su Estado	<b>MEX4</b>	
<b>MEX5.</b> Las elección para Presidente Municipal en el lugar donde usted vive	<b>MEX5</b>	

<b>MEX6.</b> A la hora de votar, ¿qué debería tomar más en cuenta un diputado? ( <b>LEER</b> ) (1) La postura de su partido político (2) A los ciudadanos de su distrito electoral o entidad (3) No sabe ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX6</b>	
<b>MEX7.</b> En general, ¿usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la reelección de diputados federales? ( <b>INSISTIR</b> ): ¿está muy o algo ( <b>ACUERDO/DESACUERDO</b> )? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni uno ni otro ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (6) No sabe ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX7</b>	
<b>MEX8.</b> ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la reelección de diputados federales si ésta significara una mayor profesionalización? ( <b>INSISTIR</b> ): ¿está muy o algo ( <b>ACUERDO/DESACUERDO</b> )? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni uno ni otro ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (6) No sabe ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX8</b>	
<b>MEX9.</b> ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la reelección de diputados federales si ésta significara una mayor rendición de cuentas? ( <b>INSISTIR</b> ): ¿está muy o algo ( <b>ACUERDO/DESACUERDO</b> )? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni uno ni otro ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (6) No sabe ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX9</b>	
<b>MEX10.</b> Actualmente, los diputados y senadores cuentan con fuero, el cual les permite no ser sometidos a procedimientos judiciales mientras dura su cargo. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes posturas está más de acuerdo? El fuero... ( <b>LEER</b> ) (1) Debe desaparecer por completo, ya que propicia la impunidad (1) Debe mantenerse como está para garantizar la independencia de los legisladores (2) No sabe/No contestó ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX10</b>	
<b>MEX11.</b> ¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que los Mexicanos que viven en el extranjero puedan votar en las elecciones que se realizan en México? (1) A favor (2) En contra (3) Ni uno ni otro ( <b>NO LEER</b> ) (4) No sabe/no contestó ( <b>NO LEER</b> )	<b>MEX11</b>	

<b>MEX12.</b> ¿Usted que preferiría...? Que los mexicanos que viven en el extranjero puedan votar... <b>(LEER)</b> (1) En todas las elecciones, incluyendo las federales, estatales y municipales (2) Sólo en las elecciones para Presidente de la República (3) No sabe/ No contestó <b>(NO LEER)</b>	<b>MEX12</b>	
<b>MEX13.</b> En su opinión, ¿cómo deberían los partidos políticos seleccionar a sus candidatos? <b>(LEER)</b> (1) A través de elecciones primarias abiertas a todo el electorado (2) A través de elecciones primarias abiertas sólo a militantes del partido (3) En las convenciones del partido con delegados electos (4) Que el liderazgo del partido postule a los candidatos (5) No sabe/ No contestó <b>(NO LEER)</b>	<b>MEX13</b>	

De los distintos niveles de gobierno: el federal, estatal y municipal. Me podría decir, ¿quien cobra el...**(LEER)**?

<b>MEX14.</b> El Impuesto Sobre la Renta <b>[No leer: El gobierno federal]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>MEX14</b>	
<b>MEX15.</b> El Impuesto al Valor Agregado, IVA <b>[No leer: El gobierno federal]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>MEX15</b>	
<b>MEX16.</b> El Impuesto Predial <b>[No leer: El gobierno municipal]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>MEX16</b>	
<b>MEX17.</b> La tenencia vehicular <b>[No leer: El gobierno estatal]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>MEX17</b>	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

**[Encestador: llenar:]** \_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]**

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de..	Segundo año de..	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	<b>ED</b>	_ _ _
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o mas		
No sabe/no responde	(88)							

<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	<b>Q2</b>	_ _ _
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar	<b>Q3</b>	
<b>Q4.</b> ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado)? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca	<b>Q4</b>	

<b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos <b>familiares mensuales</b> de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? <b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F ] AJUSTAR POR CADA PAIS, CADA UNO CON 11 RANGOS (0-11)</b> (0) Ningún ingreso (1) Menos de \$800 (2) Entre \$801 a \$1,600 (3) Entre \$1,601 a \$2,400 (4) Entre \$2,401 a \$3,200 (5) Entre \$3,201 a \$4,000 (6) Entre \$4,001 a \$5,400 (7) Entre \$5,401 a \$6,800 (8) Entre \$6,801 a \$10,000 (9) Entre \$10,001 a \$13,500 (10) Más de \$13,501 (88) No contestó	<b>Q10</b>	
<b>Q10A.</b> ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? (1) Sí <b>[sigue]</b> (2) No <b>[saltar a Q11]</b> (8) NS/NR	<b>Q10A</b>	
<b>Q10B.</b> ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR	<b>Q10B</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> <b>(3)</b> Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)	<b>Q12</b>	
<b>Q13.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos debería tener una persona como usted en toda la vida? _____	<b>Q13</b>	____ ____
<b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS	<b>Q14</b>	
<b>Q15.</b> ¿Vivió Ud. en los EEUU en los últimos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>Q15</b>	

<b>METID.</b> ¿Se considera blanco, mestizo, indígena o negro? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Otra _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>METID</b>	
--	--------------	--

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[leer todos]**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora [nevera]	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional no celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R12</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R14</b>	
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R15</b>	

<b>OCUP1.</b> ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Oficinista 3. Vendedor 4. Campesino 5. Peon agrícola	<b>OCUP1</b>	
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6. Servicio Domestico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante 13. Ama de casa 14. Pensionado rentista 88. NS		
<b>OCUP1A</b> En esta ocupación Usted es: 1. Asalariado del gobierno o autonoma? 2. Asalariado sector privado? 3. Patron o socio empresa menos de 5 empleados? 4. Patron o socio empresa 5 o más empleados? 5. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 6. Trabajador no remunerado 8. NS	<b>OCUP1A</b>	
<b>DESOC1.</b> ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año? (1) Sí (2) No <b>[PASE A T1]</b> (3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista	<b>DESOC1</b>	

<b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____  <b>T1.</b> Duración de la entrevista <b>[minutos, ver página # 1]</b> _____	<b>T1</b>	
--	-----------	--

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Firma del codificador \_\_\_\_\_


Comentarios: \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_


Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_




## Tarjeta “A”



## Tarjeta “B”



## Tarjeta “C”



## Tarjeta “D”

Muy honrados

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Muy corruptos

## Tarjeta “E”

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
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**Izquierda**

**Derecha**

## **Tarjeta “F”**

**Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:**

- (00) Ningún ingreso**
- (01) Menos de \$800**
- (02) Entre \$801- \$1,600**
- (03) \$1,601-\$2,400**
- (04) \$2,401-\$3,200**
- (05) \$3,201-\$4,000**
- (06) \$4,001-\$5,400**
- (07) \$5,401-\$6,800**
- (08) \$6,801-\$10,000**
- (09) \$10,001-\$13,500**
- (10) \$Más de \$13,501**

## Tarjeta “M”

<b>Completamente equitativas</b>	<b>limpias y</b>	<b>10</b>
		<b>9</b>
		<b>8</b>
		<b>7</b>
		<b>6</b>
		<b>5</b>
		<b>4</b>
		<b>3</b>
		<b>2</b>
<b>Completamente fraudulentas e inequitativas</b>		<b>1</b>
		<b>0</b>





## Appendix C: IRB Letter

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### University of Pittsburgh *Institutional Review Board*

Exempt and Expedited Reviews  
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

3500 Fifth Avenue  
Suite 105  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213  
Phone: 412.383.1480  
Fax: 412.383.1146  
e-mail: [irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu](mailto:irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu)

TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*

DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

**Approval Date:** 01/12/2004

**Renewal Date:** 01/12/2007

CR:ky



## Appendix D: Technical Note and Regression Tables

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### Technical Note

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/dsd/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/)).

## Regression Tables

**Table III.2 Predictors of Regime Support in Mexico**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Not standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	27.480	4.552		6.037	.000
	ED Education	-.321	.134	-.067	-2.393	.017
	SOCT1REC Perception about country's economic situation	1.947	.696	.080	2.798	.005
	SGL1REC Satisfaction with municipal services	1.275	.687	.052	1.856	.064
	NP1REC Attendance to municipal meetings	1.506	1.800	.024	.837	.403
	NP2REC Demands to municipal authorities	-3.343	1.531	-.063	-2.183	.029
	PN4REC Satisfaction with democracy	4.715	.906	.150	5.204	.000
	M1REC Presidential approval	3.481	.773	.134	4.505	.000
	EXC7REC Corruption of public officials	-1.616	.751	-.060	-2.152	.032
	PN2A Politicians want power for their own benefit	-.631	.316	-.059	-1.996	.046
	ING2 Democratic countries have too much quibbling and is difficult to reach agreements	1.950	.338	.169	5.765	.000
	ABS5REC Voting can change the things	3.420	1.196	.082	2.859	.004
a. Dependent variable: PSA5 Regime support						

**Table III.3 Predictors of Political Tolerance in Mexico**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constante)	47.254	2.747		17.199	.000
	ED Education	.677	.137	.127	4.960	.000
	NORTH North	1.495	1.535	.028	.974	.330
	CTROOCC Center-West	-4.898	1.685	-.083	-2.907	.004
	SOUTH South	-6.900	1.647	-.121	-4.188	.000
	Q4REC Attendance to religious services	2.120	.684	.079	3.101	.002

a. Dependent variable: Political tolerance

**Table III.5 Predictors of Support for a Stable Democracy**

Variables in the Equation				
	B	E.T.	gl	Sig.
<sup>a</sup> SOCT1REC Country economic situation	.084	.081	1	.301
IDIO1REC Personal economic situation	.031	.089	1	.730
PN4REC Satisfaction with democracy	.356	.094	1	.000
EXC7REC Corruption of public officials	-.242	.080	1	.002
PN2. National identification	.166	.043	1	.000
Q4REC Religiosity	.208	.071	1	.003
ED. Education	.011	.014	1	.445
NORTH. Region	.559	.135	1	.000
Constant	-2.592	.539	1	.000

a. Dependent variable: Support for a stable democracy



**Table IV.1 Predictors of the Incidence of Corruption**

		<b>Coefficientes<sup>a</sup></b>				
		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.372	.205		1.816	.070
	MALE male	.155	.059	.067	2.613	.009
	Q2 Age	-.006	.002	-.079	-2.699	.007
	ED Education	-.008	.009	-.030	-.861	.389
	Q10 Family income per month	.059	.015	.117	3.827	.000
	City size	-.076	.024	-.098	-3.213	.001
	NORTH north	-.344	.083	-.132	-4.141	.000
	Center-West	-.362	.091	-.125	-3.995	.000
	SOUTH South	.078	.091	.027	.856	.392
	Media exposure	.068	.014	.139	4.968	.000

a. Dependent variable: EXCTOTR The number of times an individual has been a victim of corruption

**Table IV.2 Predictors of Tolerance Towards Corruption**

Variables in the Equation					
		B	E.T.	gl	Sig.
Paso a 1	HOMBRE. Male	.096	.172	1	.576
	Q2. Age	-.014	.007	1	.047
	ED. Education	-.025	.026	1	.333
	Q10. Income	.117	.044	1	.007
	NORTE. North	-.537	.248	1	.031
	CTROOCC. Center-West	-.145	.245	1	.553
	SUR. South	.478	.221	1	.031
	Constant	-1.908	.423	1	.000
a. Dependent variable: Tolerance towards corruption.					

**Table V.1 Predictors of Support for the Mexican Political System**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	27,566	4,126		6,681	,000
	B16R Attorney General	,196	,031	,201	6,249	,000
	B18R Police	,075	,027	,081	2,719	,007
	B31R Supreme Court	,138	,032	,135	4,369	,000
	B45R National Comission for Human Rights	,158	,027	,159	5,798	,000
	ED Education	,360	,206	,054	1,745	,081
	Q1 Sex: Male	1,600	1,387	,028	1,153	,249
	RIQUEZA Wealth	-,132	,274	-,014	-,483	,629
	EDAD Age	,371	,544	,019	,683	,495

a. Dependent variable: B6R Political system support

**Table V.2 Predictors of Trust in Legal Institutions**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	41,934	4,626		9,064	,000
	JC10R Justification of a coup to stop delinquency	-,003	,012	-,006	-,229	,819
	AOJ11R Possibility of being robbed or assaulted	,058	,021	,074	2,727	,006
	AOJ12R Judicial System punishing delinquents	,109	,021	,145	5,268	,000
	PC2R Perception of Corruption among Ministers	,069	,031	,074	2,188	,029
	PC5R Perception of Corruption among Police	,135	,031	,144	4,318	,000
	PC12R Perception of Corruption among Judges	,161	,029	,194	5,633	,000
	VIC1R Crime victims in the past year	-,015	,016	-,027	-,969	,333
	Q2 Age	-,068	,047	-,043	-1,442	,149
	SIZE City size	,662	,449	,043	1,476	,140
	EDR Education	-3,810	1,110	-,115	-3,434	,001
	Q1 Sex	-,018	1,200	,000	-,015	,988
	Q10 Income rank	-,168	,342	-,017	-,492	,623
	RIQUEZA Wealth	,158	,280	,020	,567	,571

a. Dependent variable: CONFINST Trust in Rights Protection Institutes

**Table V.3 Predictors of Trust in Legal Institutions, Including Satisfaction with Legal Proceedings**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	39,397	6,065		6,495	,000
	AOJ11R Possibility of being robbed or assaulted	,066	,036	,083	1,834	,067
	AOJ12R Trust in Judicial System punishment to delinquents	,054	,037	,065	1,427	,154
	PC2R Perception of Corruption among Ministers	,034	,054	,036	,634	,527
	PC5R Perception of Corruption among Police	,152	,052	,158	2,937	,003
	PC12R Perception of Corruption among Judges	,185	,050	,208	3,692	,000
	Q2 Age	,010	,076	,006	,134	,893
	TAMAÑO City size	-,573	,760	-,035	-,754	,451
	EDR Education	-3,515	1,757	-,104	-2,001	,046
	RIQUEZA Wealth	-,121	,401	-,015	-,302	,763
	ST2R Satisfaction with court procedures	,133	,036	,173	3,705	,000

a. Dependent variable: CONFINST Trust in Rights Protection Institutes

**Table VI.1 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
Model		Not standarized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	32,923	3,766		8,741	,000
	CP5R Participation in their communities	,009	,012	,019	,738	,461
	AOJ11R Possibility of being robbed or assaulted	,127	,019	,174	6,638	,000
	B18R Police	,039	,018	,058	2,193	,028
	Q1 Female	2,022	1,096	,048	1,844	,065
	CASADO Marital Status	-,006	,012	-,013	-,480	,632
	Q2 Age	,035	,050	,024	,691	,490
	Q12 How many children do you have?	,039	,326	,004	,121	,904
	ED Education	,399	,154	,082	2,589	,010
	TAMAÑO City size	-,048	,390	-,003	-,122	,903

a. Dependent variable: SGL1R Evaluation of Council's services

**Table VI.2 Predictors of Assistance at Municipal Meetings**

		Variables in the Equation			
		B	E.T.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1	CP5R Participation in local issues	,012	,002	,000	1,012
	AOJ11R Probability of being a crime victim	,002	,003	,599	1,002
	B18R Trust in police	,003	,003	,253	1,003
	Q1(1) Female	-,288	,168	,087	,750
	Q2 Age	,020	,008	,010	1,020
	MARRIED(1)	,026	,190	,893	1,026
	Q12 Number of children.	,006	,050	,905	1,006
	Q10 Familiar income per month	-,083	,048	,086	,920
	WEALTH	,014	,039	,720	1,014
	ED Education	,091	,026	,001	1,096
	SIZE City size.	,108	,062	,079	1,114
	Constant	-4,165	,535	,000	,016
a.					

**Table VI.3 Predictors of Petitions Made Toward Municipal Government**

Variables in the Equation		B	E.T.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1	CP5R Participation in local issues	,012	,001	,000	1,012
	AOJ11R Probability of being a crime victim	,000	,002	,873	1,000
	B18R Trust in police	-,004	,002	,107	,996
	Q1(1) Female	-,066	,140	,635	,936
	Q2 Age	,007	,006	,314	1,007
	MARRIED(1)	,259	,158	,102	1,295
	Q12 Number of children	,024	,042	,561	1,025
	WEALTH	,037	,029	,193	1,038
	ED Education	,061	,021	,004	1,063
	SIZE City size	,130	,052	,012	1,139
	Constant	-3,401	,436	,000	,033
a. .					



**Table VII.1 Predictors of Electoral Participation**

		Variables in the Equation			
		B	E.T.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step a 1	Q1(1) Female	-,086	,123	,486	,918
	Q2 Age	,040	,005	,000	1,041
	ED Education	,042	,020	,036	1,043
	WEALTH	,044	,027	,106	1,045
	MESTRAT Region (South)			,509	
	MESTRAT(1) North	,064	,185	,731	1,066
	MESTRAT(2) Mid -West	,294	,208	,157	1,342
	MESTRAT(3) Center	,067	,186	,718	1,070
	SIZE City size	,056	,051	,275	1,057
	SOFIS Political sophistication	,006	,003	,022	1,006
	CONFPOL Trust in political institutions.	,007	,003	,017	1,007
	CP5R Participation in local issues.	,002	,001	,181	1,002
	PARTSOC Participation in social associations.	,004	,002	,067	1,004
	PARTPOL Participation in political associations.	,016	,007	,016	1,016
	PROT1R Participation in demonstrations or protests.	,004	,004	,221	1,004
	Constant	-2,647	,482	,000	,071
a.					

**Table VIII.2 Determinants of Community Participation**

<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>						
Model		Coefficients		Not standardized coefficients		Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
1	(Constant)	.896	.164		5.458	.000
	MALE Male	-.130	.042	-.083	-3.130	.002
	Q2 Age	-.006	.002	-.103	-2.852	.004
	ED Which is your last school grade?	.001	.007	.003	.084	.933
	MARRIED Married.	.212	.046	.130	4.582	.000
	Q12 How many children do you have?	.056	.013	.167	4.358	.000
	Q10 Family income per month	-.023	.010	-.067	-2.216	.027
	City size	-.045	.015	-.085	-2.961	.003
	VIC1REC Victim of a crime	.098	.056	.048	1.760	.079
	NP1C Asuming that you have a problem in your community and you go with the municipal authorities, ¿What do you think they could make?...Many, Something, Few or Nothing	-.040	.024	-.043	-1.631	.103
	EXPMEDIO Media exposure	.041	.010	.122	4.250	.000

a. Dependent variable: Community participation

**Table VIII.3 Determinants of Professional Participation**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
Model		Not standarized coefficients		Standarized coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.657	.262		-2.513	.012
	MALE male	.122	.066	.048	1.832	.067
	Q2 Age	.003	.003	.037	1.021	.308
	ED Which is your last school grade?	.011	.011	.037	1.041	.298
	MARRIED. married	.243	.074	.093	3.302	.001
	Q12 How many children do you have?	.006	.021	.011	.299	.765
	Q10 Familiar income per month	-.009	.017	-.017	-.554	.580
	Size of the city	.141	.024	.166	5.867	.000
	VIC1REC Victim of a crime	.235	.089	.071	2.644	.008
	NP1C Asuming that you have a problem in your community and you go with the municipal authorities, ¿What do you think they could make?...Many, Something, Few or Nothing	-.153	.039	-.104	-3.963	.000
	Media Exposure	.108	.015	.199	6.981	.000

a. Dependent variable: Professional participation

**Table VIII.4 Determinants of Activities by Contribution**

		Variables in the Equation			
		B	E.T.	gl	Sig.
Paso 1 <sup>a</sup>	Male	.022	.120	1	.855
	Q2. Age	.019	.005	1	.000
	ED. Education	.025	.018	1	.169
	Q10. Income	-.063	.030	1	.038
	Urban	-.572	.136	1	.000
	Media exposure index	.078	.028	1	.005
	VIC1REC. Victim of a crime	.402	.156	1	.010
	NP1C. Trust that the authorities will listen your demands (from many to few)	-.197	.070	1	.005
	Constant	-1.342	.401	1	.001

a. Dependent variable: participation in community by contribution

## **The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004**

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public  
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**