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Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer


Anthony A. Harriott, Ph.D.
University of West Indies, Mona

Balford A. Lewis
University of West Indies, Mona

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
AT MONA, JAMAICA



The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2014:

Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

By:

Anthony A. Harriott, Ph.D.

Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government,
UWI, Mona


Balford A. Lewis

Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government,
UWI, Mona

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.

LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, Mona



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April, 2015

The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2014:

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INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

Investigation

Professor Anthony A. Harriott, PhD.,
Centre for Leadership and Governance,
Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Balford A. Lewis,
Centre for Leadership and Governance,
Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Fieldwork Coordination

Balford A. Lewis
Centre for Leadership and Governance,
Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Research and Editorial Support

Paul Martin, PhD. and Kenisha V. Nelson

General Coordination

Nicole Hinton
Research Coordinator, LAPOP
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. USA

Mariana Rodríguez
Program Coordinator, LAPOP
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. USA



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, Mona



List of Figures	ix
List of Maps.....	xiii
List of Tables	xiii
Preface	xv
Prologue: Background to the Study.....	xvii
Acknowledgements	xxvii
Introduction.....	xxxix
Understanding Figures in this Study	xxxix
Part I: Insecurity, Governance, and Civil Society in Jamaica and in the Americas	1
Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas.....	3
I. Introduction.....	3
II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas	5
<i>Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics.....</i>	<i>9</i>
III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas	11
IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer.....	15
<i>Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?</i>	<i>25</i>
V. Conclusion.....	27
Appendix	28
Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas	29
I. Introduction.....	29
II. Main Findings.....	30
III. The Evolution of Household Wealth.....	31
IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet	36
V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?.....	39
VI. Conclusion	44
Appendix	46
Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas	49
I. Introduction.....	49
II. Main Findings.....	50
III. Personal Experiences with Corruption.....	51
IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?	58

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?.....	63
VI. Conclusion	66
Appendix	68
Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas.....	71
I. Introduction.....	71
II. Main Findings of this Chapter	71
III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy	72
IV. Local Level Participation	74
<i>Local Meeting Attendance</i>	75
<i>Demand Making on Local Government</i>	76
V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government	81
<i>Satisfaction with Local Services</i>	82
<i>Trust in Local Government</i>	92
VI. Conclusion	95
Appendix	97
Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas.....	103
I. Introduction.....	103
II. Main Findings.....	104
III. Support for Democracy	105
IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions.....	106
V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability	115
<i>Support for the Political System</i>	116
<i>Political Tolerance</i>	120
<i>Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability</i>	124
VI. Conclusion	128
Appendix	130
Part II: Insecurity, Community Participation and Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime Control, and Democratic Attitudes in Jamaica	137
Chapter 6. Crime, Insecurity, and Social Capital in Jamaica.....	139
I. Introduction.....	139
II. Crime and Insecurity in Jamaica	139
<i>Reported Crime Victimization in Jamaica</i>	142
<i>Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica</i>	146
<i>The Importance of Citizen Security</i>	149
III. Civil Society, Social Cohesion, and Social Capital in Jamaica: Resources in Programs Targeting Issues of Violence and Security.....	152
<i>Inter-Personal Trust as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica</i>	153

<i>Sense of Solidarity and Willingness to Intervene</i>	157
<i>Citizens' Participation in Community Organizations</i>	158
<i>Factors Associated with Levels of Community Participation in Jamaica</i>	161
IV. Conclusion	162
Appendix	164
Chapter 7. Citizens' Attitudes towards the Police in Jamaica: Implications for Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime Control	165
I. Introduction	165
II. Trust in the Police	167
<i>Factors Associated with Trust in the Police</i>	168
III. Citizens' Evaluation of the Performance of the Police	171
<i>Factors Associated with Positive Evaluation of the Police</i>	173
IV. Perceptions of Police Misconduct	175
<i>Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police</i>	176
<i>Perception of the Extent of Police Harassment</i>	178
V. Implications for Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime Control	179
VI. Conclusion	180
Appendix	181
Chapter 8. Beyond Crime and Security: Perceptions of Jamaicans on Selected Citizen Rights, Actions, and Issues	183
I. Introduction	183
II. The Construct of Tolerance	183
III. Support for the Rights of Homosexuals in Jamaica	184
<i>Who is more likely support the rights of homosexuals?</i>	187
IV. Support for Same Sex Marriage	189
V. Support for Abortion Rights	191
VI. Social Activism	193
VII. Social Responsibility	197
<i>Perception the Role of Government in Reducing Income Inequality</i>	198
<i>Environmental Protection or an Economic Growth Agenda?</i>	201
VIII. Conclusion	203
Appendix	205
References	207
Appendices	227
Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent	229
Appendix B. Sample Design	231
Appendix C. Questionnaire	241

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012	6
Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time.....	6
Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012	8
Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time	12
Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014.....	13
Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time	16
Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014	17
Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014	18
Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time	19
Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014	20
Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014	21
Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014	22
Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014	23
Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014	24
Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014	26
Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014.....	27
 Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014	 32
Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index	34
Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014	35
Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014.....	37
Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014.....	37
Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time	38
Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014	39
Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014	40
Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time	40
Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014.....	42
Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014.....	44
 Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014.....	 53
Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014 ..	54
Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time	55
Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014	56
Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014.....	58
Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014	59
Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time.....	60

Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014.....	61
Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014	62
Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014	63
Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014.....	65
Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014.....	65
Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014...	66
Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014	75
Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	76
Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014	77
Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014.....	78
Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014	79
Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014	80
Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014	81
Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014	84
Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category	85
Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	86
Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	87
Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014	88
Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services.....	89
Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014....	90
Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014	91
Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time.....	92
Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014	94
Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time	106
Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	108
Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014	109
Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014	110
Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014	111
Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014	113
Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014.....	114
Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014.....	115
Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014.....	117
Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014.....	119
Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	121
Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014.....	123
Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	125
Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014	126

Figure 6.1. Breakdown of Responses to the Most Serious Problem Question, Jamaica 2014	141
Figure 6.2. Personal and Household Crime Victimization, Jamaica 2014	143
Figure 6.3. Crime Victimization over time, Jamaica 2006-2014	144
Figure 6.4. Place of Most Recent Crime Victimization, Jamaica 2014.....	145
Figure 6.5. Total Crime Victimization by Counties, Jamaica 2014	146
Figure 6.6. Perception of Neighbourhood Security in Jamaica, 2014	148
Figure 6.7. Average Perceptions of Neighbourhood Insecurity, Jamaica 2006-2014	149
Figure 6.8. Citizens' Opinions on how to Reduce Crime, Jamaica 2014.....	151
Figure 6.9. Citizens' Involvement in Organized Activity to Improve Neighbourhood Security, Jamaica 2014.....	152
Figure 6.10. Level of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2014.....	154
Figure 6.11. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2006-2014	155
Figure 6.12. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2014.....	156
Figure 6.13. Interpersonal Trust by Social Solidarity, Sense of Reciprocity, Perception of Insecurity and Age, Jamaica 2014.....	157
Figure 6.14. Sense of Solidarity and Willingness to Intervene, Jamaica 2014	158
Figure 6.15. Degree of Participation in Community Groups and Organizations, Jamaica 2014	160
Figure 6.16. Degree of Participation in Community Groups and Organizations over Time, Jamaica 2006-2014	161
Figure 6.17. Degree of Community Participation by Interest in Politics, Gender, Voting Behaviour and Size of Town of Residence, Jamaica 2014	162
Figure 7.1. Citizens' Trust in the Police in Jamaica, 2014.....	167
Figure 7.2. Average (0-100) Degree of Trust in Police over Time in Jamaica, 2006-2014	168
Figure 7.3. Determinants of Trust in the Police, Jamaica 2014.....	169
Figure 7.4. Trust in Police by Crime Victimization, Confidence in the Judiciary, Support for Vigilante Justice, and Community Participation, Jamaica 2014.....	170
Figure 7.5. Trust in Police by Level of Education and Age Group, Jamaica 2014	171
Figure 7.6. Citizens' Evaluation of Performance of the Police in Jamaica, 2014	172
Figure 7.7. Citizens' Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of the Police in Jamaica, 2014	173
Figure 7.8. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of the Police in Jamaica, 2014.....	174
Figure 7.9. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of the Police in Jamaica, 2014.....	175
Figure 7.10. Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police in Jamaica, 2014	177
Figure 7.11. Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police over Time in Jamaica, 2006-2014	177
Figure 7.12. Reported Levels of Police Harassment in Jamaica, 2014	179
Figure 8.1. Approval for Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office in Jamaica, 2014	185
Figure 8.2. Citizens' Support for the Political Rights of Regime Critics versus Support for the Political Rights of Homosexuals, Jamaica 2014.....	186
Figure 8.3. Degree of Approval for Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office in Jamaica, 2006- 2014	187
Figure 8.4. Predictors of Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office, Jamaica 2014.....	188

Figure 8.5. Support for Rights of Homosexuals by Age, Political Tolerance, Wealth, and Gender, Jamaica 2014	189
Figure 8.6. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2014.....	190
Figure 8.7. Approval of Same-sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2006-2014.....	191
Figure 8.8. Qualified Support for Abortion Rights in Jamaica, 2014.....	192
Figure 8.9. Qualified Support for Abortion Rights in Jamaica, 2012-2014	193
Figure 8.10. Degree of Citizen Support for Selected Acts of Social and Political Activism in Jamaica, 2014	194
Figure 8.11. Citizens' Support for Selected Acts of Illicit Engagement over Time.....	195
Figure 8.12. Citizens' General Support for Illicit Engagement, Jamaica 2006-2014.....	196
Figure 8.13. Determinants of Support for Illicit Engagement in Jamaica, 2014	196
Figure 8.14. Support for Acts of Illicit Engagement by System Support, Wealth and Age.....	197
Figure 8.15. Citizens' Support for Government Intervention to Reduce Inequality in Jamaica, 2014	200
Figure 8.16. Support for Government Intervention to Reduce Inequality in Jamaica, 2008-2014	201
Figure 8.17. Preference for Environmental Protection versus Economic Growth Priorities in Jamaica, 2014	203

List of Maps

Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country	14
Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014.....	41
Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	83
Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014	93
Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014	118
Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014	122
Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014.....	127

List of Tables

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance.....	116
Table 6.1. Pre-Coded “Most Important Problem” Item.....	140
Table 6.2. Categorization of Most Serious National Problem Responses.....	141
Table 8.1. Gini Index for Jamaica and Selected Latin American Countries	199

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development



Prologue: Background to the Study

Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Political Science
Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
Vanderbilt University

and

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science
Founder and Senior Advisor to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
Vanderbilt University

The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “informed consent” form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.



With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO[®] (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the “Adgys”[®] questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency

between the coding in the questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed “Rapid Response Report,” based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team’s or donor’s priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-



















specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.

This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.

This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

Country	Institutions		
Mexico and Central America			
Costa Rica		 C C P	 Estado de la Nación EN DESARROLLO HUMANO SOSTENIBLE
El Salvador			
Guatemala	 Universidad Rafael Landívar Tradición Jesuita en Guatemala		
Honduras	 FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras	 Hagamos Democracia	
Mexico	 data Opinión Pública y Mercados	 ITAM INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO	
Nicaragua			
Panama	 CIDEM Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas		

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru		
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Caribbean	
Bahamas	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	



Canada and United States

Canada	
United States	  

Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

The AmericasBarometer project has been made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both of these institutions. At USAID Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite have consistently contributed constructive insights to the project and facilitated its use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt John Geer has been a tireless advocate of the project, which is fortunate to be housed within and benefit from a department that is brimming with talent. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, in other research units such as the Center for Latin American Studies, in the Office of Contract and Research Administration, and in the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected data collection efforts associated with the 2014 AmericasBarometer came from USAID, Vanderbilt, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden. We thank the individuals that we have worked with at each of these institutions for their important contributions.

We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marengo, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts. Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting

the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita Corral, Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez, Brian Faughnan, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodríguez, and Vivian Schwartz-Blum. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Fred Batista, Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Mollie Cohen, Claire Evans, Adrienne Girone, Matthew Layton, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Trevor Lyons, Arturo Maldonado, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. We especially want thank those graduate students who worked alongside us as research assistants over the past two years on activities related to the development, implementation, auditing, analysis, and reporting of the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados, Mexico ●Dr. Vidal Romero, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Subdirector of the project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, Doctoral Candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Researcher of the Project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador
Guatemala	●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA
Honduras	●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Ken Coleman, Research Faculty, University of Michigan, USA ●Mr. Eduardo Marenco, LAPOP Consultant, Managua, Nicaragua
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, PhD candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Research Staff, Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica
Panama	●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, PA, USA
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Argentina	●Dr. Germán Lodola, Professor, Department of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Frederico Batista Pereira, PhD candidate at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA ●Matthew Layton, PhD candidate at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba, Bolivia ●Dr. Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba, Bolivia
Chile	●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia ●Dr. Miguel García, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia

Country	Researchers
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco, Quito, Ecuador [now at Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.] ●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Program Manager, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Diana Orcés, Research Affiliate, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, and Assistant Professor, Oakland University, USA
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, USA ●Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Principal Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, Peru
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay ●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA ●Dr. Mariana Rodríguez, Program Coordinator, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Bahamas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●M'Wale Rahming, President, Public Domain, Nassau, Bahamas
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Francois Gélinau, Professor and Research Chair in Democracy and Legislative Institutions, Laval University, Quebec, Canada. ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Roody Reserve, PhD student in Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Balford Lewis, Research Fellow, Centre for Leadership and Governance, UWI, Mona, Jamaica ●Anthony A. Harriott, Professor of Political Sociology, Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, and the Head of Department of Government at the Mona Campus, UWI, Jamaica
Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jennifer Goede, Executive Director, DataFruit, Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago ●Dr. Mark Kirton, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago
North America Group	
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Nat Stone, Manager, POR Knowledge Management and Practices at Public Works and Government Services Canada and Professor (part-time) at Algonquin College, School of Business, Ottawa, Canada ●Dr. Keith Neuman, Executive Director of the Environics Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Founder and Senior Advisor to LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Research Professor, Spanish and Portuguese Department, Vanderbilt University, USA

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Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014

Introduction

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago*. In Part I, we devote the first chapter to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity in the region. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters of Part I to address topics that are considered “core” to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends for the region, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses in large part on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, we highlight the position of Jamaica in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

The first chapter demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in Part I is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond the personal finances of citizens of the Americas and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 3 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw



corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens in the Americas interact with their government is local. In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the

attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Part II of this report includes three chapters that focus only on Jamaica, and analyze results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer for issues that are fundamental for democratic governance: crime and insecurity and implications for social capital in Jamaica; citizens' attitudes towards the police and implications for police-citizen partnership in crime control; and Jamaicans' tolerance for the rights of



homosexuals, support for abortion, perceptions of social activism, attitudes towards the welfare state, and support for environmental protection.

Chapter 6 examines the relationships among community participation, interpersonal trust, and crime for the adult voting age population in Jamaica. This chapter shines a spotlight on individuals and communities, given their relevance to contemporary approaches to addressing issues of crime and insecurity that take into account both the localized nature of crime and the utility of involving citizens programs and policies designed at improving security. Hence, the chapter pays particular attention to assessing active local civil participation and interpersonal trust among Jamaicans, which constitute a community's stock of social capital. Social capital is purported to be a community's inventory of social trust and norms of reciprocity embedded in social networks that have been found to facilitate collective actions. The cohesion among groups that it generates is assumed to have implications for different aspects of community wellbeing, including neighbourhood safety and security.

Crime and crime-related concerns are identified as the most serious problem facing Jamaica. Nearly 50% of respondents in 2014 reported that citizen security was the most important problem facing Jamaica in 2014. Still, we find a downward trend in both crime victimization rates and citizens' sense of neighbourhood insecurity over the five rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey. In 2014, only 6.7% of Jamaicans report having been a victim of a crime. The overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicate that they believe their neighbourhoods are safe; 82.9% feel their neighbourhoods are safe, with 39.5% among that portion saying they feel very safe. Only 17.1% indicate that their communities are unsafe.

A key finding of Chapter 6 is the location where most criminal acts are experienced. The plurality of victims (41.8%) report that they experienced the criminal act at home. Another 33.7% report that the incident took place elsewhere in their neighbourhood. In total, nearly 3 out of 4 of all victims report that they were victimized in their neighbourhood. These numbers effectively underscore the point that crime is predominantly a community problem, and as a consequence, requires a community response.

Regarding rates of community involvement by Jamaicans, we find that citizen participation in religious organizations, parents' associations, and community improvement groups has declined between 2006 and 2014 (but remained relatively stable since 2010). We find that 68.4% of those surveyed express the view that their neighbours are either "somewhat" or "very trustworthy." Only 11.7% of respondents describe people in the neighbourhood to be "untrustworthy." When compared to 2012, we find that on a 0 to 100 scale of interpersonal trust, the average level of trust Jamaicans have in their neighbours has significantly declined in 2014 (from 60.5 in 2012 to 55.6 in 2014).

Findings of falling levels of community participation and (albeit slightly) lower interpersonal trust seem to augur poorly for an "active local citizenship approach" to treating with the problems of neighbourhood crime and insecurity. This seemingly inauspicious outlook is, however, counterbalanced by findings that the majority of Jamaicans express the feelings that members of their communities are strongly bonded to each other, and would be a willingness to help or to act in the interest of others and on behalf of their community "for the common good." The vast majority of Jamaicans think that their neighbors get a long (65.4%) and that people in their neighborhoods are willing to help other neighbors (61.4%). This inventory of collective efficacy and the large albeit

declining stock of social capital may be a useful resource in efforts to ensure social order in community.

Chapter 7 focuses on citizens' attitudes towards the police and the implications of such attitudes for police-citizen partnership in controlling neighbourhood crime. Specifically, the chapter examines citizens' trust members of the police force, evaluations of police performance, and experiences with police corruption and harassment.

Consistent with their mandate, police as law enforcers are expected to conduct themselves equably and act with due regard to the rights and expectations of citizens. The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey affirms that there continues to be a trust deficit, with over half of citizens reporting low levels of trust in the police force, and 1 in 4 Jamaicans indicating that they do not trust the police at all. Furthermore, a nearly 10-point decline from 40 on a 0 to 100 scale to 38.3 in public trust in the police between 2012 and 2014 should be cause for concern.

Yet, interestingly, when it comes to citizens' evaluations of the work that police are doing in their own neighbourhoods, they are more positive. On the question of police performance, 61.8% evaluate the police's efforts in their neighbourhoods as "good" or "very good." And, further, average national rates of bribe solicitation by the police remain low. Police corruption victimization rates have been relatively stable since 2006, with a slight downward trend leading into 2012. In 2014, the national average rate of bribe solicitation (5.7%) was just marginally higher than it was in 2012, but still quite low and within the range that it has been in recent years according to the AmericasBarometer survey. Additionally, the vast majority of respondents (67.7%) do not think that police harassment is a problem in their communities

These findings suggest that, while the average person's observations of or encounters with the police at the local level are benign, there is an impression of the police that the broader, national force contains elements and behaviours that are untrustworthy. Those perceptions may be fuelled by the involvement of some police in instances of misconduct, which are appropriately reported on to the national citizenry who, in turn, reasonably express low general trust in the police.

One broad implication of the findings is that the police will attract more trust and support to the extent that they become more effective and less dependent on the use of force and harassment of citizens; exhibit increased respect for citizen rights; and improve levels of integrity within the force. Some decentralization of tasks and roles together with more robust internal and external accountability, monitoring and evaluation may be required for the attainment of substantial change in the force and as a consequence earning increased citizen trust and support while fomenting even better police-community relations.

The final chapter of this report (Chapter 8) examines Jamaicans' views regarding the rights of particular individuals and groups to participate freely in some of societies important civil and political processes. Specifically, it assesses issues pertaining to social tolerance, focussing on attitudes to the rights of members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, citizens' approval of certain forms of social activism, and opinions on issues of social responsibility.

The chapter defines social tolerance as respect and accommodation for the personal choices and lifestyle preferences of others, the results point to a tendency of social and political exclusion by



Jamaicans when it comes to the LGBT community. The overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicate strong opposition to the idea of affording homosexuals the basic democratic right of running for public office. When asked to express their approval or disapproval on 7-point scale, on which 1 represents “strongly disapprove” and 7 “strongly approve,” 69% of respondents selected “1,” the most extreme level of disapproval while only about 5% responded “strongly approve.” When the data on this 7-point scale is converted to a 0-100 point metric scale, it was found that average support among Jamaicans is just 16 degrees on the 100-point scale. This is a nearly 5-point decrease support when compared to the 2012 AmericasBarometer results. The data also found Jamaicans to be even more unsupportive of same-sex marriage, with average approval being a mere 5.1 degrees on the 0 to 100 scale, and with no statistically significant change in this measure since 2010.

Another important social attitude considered in this chapter is people’s opinions on abortion rights. In Jamaica, 34.1% of those surveyed express disagreement with the view that an abortion is justified if the reason is to protect the mother’s health.

On the issue of social activism, the results show that Jamaicans are strongly in favour of legal rather than illegal forms of protest. In a democratic environment, nonetheless, the prevailing level of support for illicit forms of protest in Jamaica is troubling. On a 0 to 100 scale, the national average is 36 degrees of support for vigilante actions in cases where the state fails to prosecute and punish criminals and 18 degrees of support for individuals working with groups on seditious measures to achieve political goals. There is an overall pattern of incremental change in the support for the blocking of roads, vigilante justice, and attempt to overthrow the government up to 2012; in the 2014 round, however, citizens’ approval for these activities increased notably, especially with regard to the support for illegal protest measures, such as the blocking of roads. The prominence of age as a predictor of support for these illicit means of protest is notable. Younger Jamaicans are more likely to approve these protest measures than those in the older age cohorts.

Finally, Chapter 8 examines the sense of social responsibility among the Jamaican citizenry. The notion of social responsibility denotes an obligation of an agent to serve and be accountable to society at large with regard to the impact of its interventions or lack thereof. It is also about an expectation that individuals and organizations will be mindful of the interest of society as a whole in the pursuit of personal or societal goals. Social responsibility is a value emphasizing good citizenship, or a situation in which people, organisations, and the state behave with sensitivity to social, cultural, economic, and environmental issues, with the aim of positively impacting society as a whole, in both the short and the long term.

On the premise that the “struggle against poverty and the challenge of dangerous climate change are two sides of the same coin,” citizens’ views on the role of government in redistributing income in the interest of the poor, and their sense of priority as it relates to pursuing policies to ensure environmental protection versus maximizing economic growth were probed. The 2014 data show that there is very strong support among the citizenry for the government to introduce policy measures to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor in Jamaica. On the familiar 0 to 100 scale, mean support for government interventions is 71 degrees. This is a moderate but statistically significant decline from the average of over 75 degrees obtained on this measure since 2008. Findings also indicate that in a context of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment, Jamaicans clearly support the prioritizing of an economic growth agenda over environmental protection concerns. The

majority of respondents, 52%, favour measures to grow the economy, with 1 in 5 indicating that both factors should receive due attention in a development thrusts.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

Part I:
**Insecurity, Governance, and Civil
Society in Jamaica and in the Americas**

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

Nicole Hinton and Daniel Montalvo

with

Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a “security trap,” where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, “The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy.”

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.¹ First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime’s ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue

¹ Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, “crime and violence carry staggering economic costs” that consume approximately 8% of the region’s GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care” (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.² Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.³
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

² The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

³ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,⁴ Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,⁵ some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.⁶ We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa⁷ (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

⁴ The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

⁵ Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

⁶ Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

⁷ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.



Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012⁸

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.⁹ Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁰




Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

⁸ Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.

⁹ The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.

¹⁰ Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/>. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.



Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).




Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording

incidents of robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.¹¹ The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).¹²

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the

¹¹ There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

¹² An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates*. According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions¹³ not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and

¹³ In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.

Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.¹⁴

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:¹⁵

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.¹⁶ Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,¹⁷ the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

¹⁴ InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Taxis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

¹⁵ Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

¹⁶ Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

¹⁷ It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.¹⁸ The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.¹⁹ However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.




Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

¹⁸ Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

¹⁹ As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.

Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.





Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Map 1.1 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana (shaded with the darkest color in Map 1.1) is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure

1.5 demonstrates, it still ranks low in comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.²⁰



Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country²¹

²⁰ It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

²¹ Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are

IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:²²

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]
 (88) DK [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**] (98) DA [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]

Figure 1.6 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.²³ We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.6 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5

categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.

²² LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because no changes were introduced within those periods.

²³ Figure 1.6 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

adults living in an urban area reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).²⁴




Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.7 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.7 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate “security” as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).

²⁴ See also Figure 1.15.




Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?
 [fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.8, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.




Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent's household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.9 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.²⁵ We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

²⁵ This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.




Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality/canton/parish
- (4) In another municipality/canton/parish
- (5) In another country
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Figure 1.10 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).




Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these “VICBAR” questions:

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]

Figure 1.11 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;

and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.²⁶




Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.12 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When

²⁶ When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country across the board (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

comparing the two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.²⁷




Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

Next, Figure 1.13 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and

²⁷ Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).

yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.²⁸




Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁸ When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

Finally, Figure 1.14 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series – burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.²⁹




Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁹ When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.³⁰ In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.³¹ The results in Figure 1.15 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

³⁰ Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

³¹ Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.16 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.³² The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

³² The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.




Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

**Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014
(Figure 1.16)**

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
66 years or older	-0.094*	(-5.09)
56-65 years	-0.069*	(-3.82)
46-55 years	-0.026	(-1.45)
26-35 years	0.004	-0.23
16-25 years	0.022	-1.18
Skin Tone	-0.033	(-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.076*	-4.35
Years of Schooling	0.199*	-10.73
Woman	-0.071*	(-4.70)
Urban	0.212*	-10.61
Guatemala	-0.03	(-1.32)
El Salvador	-0.040*	(-1.98)
Honduras	-0.027	(-1.18)
Nicaragua	-0.050*	(-2.27)
Costa Rica	-0.135*	(-5.67)
Panama	-0.268*	(-8.69)
Colombia	-0.055*	(-2.74)
Ecuador	0.055*	-2.05
Bolivia	-0.024	(-0.92)
Peru	0.055*	(-3)
Paraguay	-0.125*	(-6.11)
Chile	-0.183*	(-6.84)
Uruguay	-0.014	(-0.70)
Brazil	-0.082*	(-3.93)
Venezuela	-0.016	(-0.87)
Argentina	-0.003	(-0.19)
Dominican Republic	0.004	(-0.17)
Haiti	-0.065*	(-2.89)
Jamaica	-0.253*	(-10.09)
Guyana	-0.225*	(-8.28)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.207*	(-8.87)
Belize	-0.073*	(-3.93)
Constant	-1.604*	(-85.00)
F	37.2	
Number of cases	38102	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).¹ Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than \$2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on \$10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious \$4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.² Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.³ So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if

¹ Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of “Latin America and the Caribbean” in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

²<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp>

³<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life>

delegated sufficient political authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we document are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	DK 88	DA 98
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88	98
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R15. Computer	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R18. Internet	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R1. Television	(0) No [Skip to R26]			(1) Yes [Continue]	88	98
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
						99 INAP

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown

slightly since 2006 (when it was 89%).⁴ Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.




Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014⁵

⁴ In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

⁵ This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.

Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common; roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.⁶ We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.⁷ For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

⁶ This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. *AmericasBarometer Insight* Report 2008, no. 6. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf>. The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

⁷ Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer.⁸




Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.⁹

⁸ If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.




Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014¹⁰

Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.¹¹ Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).¹² It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:¹³ the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities, being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from

¹⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

¹¹ In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

¹² In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

¹³ The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

their parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.¹⁴ Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**

- (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
- (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
- (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
- (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
- (88) **[Don't read]** DK
- (98) **[Don't read]** DA

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide the sample by quintiles of household wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership

¹⁴ See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173> and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf

following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than 6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile, 3 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the median wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.




Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014




Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6). More importantly, the relative stability of respondents' perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.




Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time




Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).




Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014





Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Map 2.1). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have

the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Map 2.1 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.



Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014¹⁵

¹⁵ The estimated economic perceptions score for each country in Map 2.1 is available in Appendix 2.2. For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity* (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF's April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF's projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent's views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.10).¹⁶




Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of

¹⁶ Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year's growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.



the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.11 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood¹⁷ and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.¹⁸ Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.¹⁹

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educate individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing. Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

¹⁷ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

¹⁸ See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

¹⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,²⁰ 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both

²⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.



prevent money from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.


Appendix

Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.175*	(-22.82)
Man in a Couple	0.035*	(5.57)
Woman in a Couple	-0.014*	(-2.25)
Woman Living Alone	-0.042*	(-7.43)
Level of Education	0.346*	(59.08)
Skin Tone	-0.134*	(-19.55)
16-25 Years	-0.003	(-0.49)
26-35 Years	-0.018*	(-3.18)
46-55 Years	0.008	(1.55)
56-65 Years	0.020*	(3.79)
66 Years or Older	0.004	(0.74)
Guatemala	-0.060*	(-6.21)
El Salvador	-0.083*	(-9.45)
Honduras	-0.034*	(-3.04)
Nicaragua	-0.142*	(-15.57)
Costa Rica	0.119*	(13.25)
Panama	0.033*	(3.29)
Colombia	-0.012	(-1.18)
Ecuador	-0.039*	(-3.12)
Bolivia	-0.130*	(-8.53)
Peru	-0.077*	(-9.08)
Paraguay	0.022*	(2.83)
Chile	0.076*	(8.88)
Brazil	0.093*	(10.67)
Venezuela	0.052*	(5.38)
Argentina	0.058*	(8.11)
Dominican Republic	-0.010	(-0.86)
Haiti	-0.162*	(-11.86)
Jamaica	0.024*	(2.39)
Guyana	0.017	(1.38)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.143*	(18.17)
Belize	0.010	(1.23)
Constant	-0.102*	(-11.69)
Number of observations	33769	
Population size	29411.22	
Design df	1912	
F(32, 1881)	413.07*	
R ²	0.3952	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Appendix 2.2. Estimated Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014. Empirical Basis for Map 2.1



Appendix 2.3. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(Z Statistic)
GDP Growth Rate (Estimated)	0.178*	(2.19)
Rural	0.018*	(2.82)
Woman	-0.060*	(-10.48)
Wealth Quintile	0.041*	(6.65)
Level of Education	0.037*	(5.16)
Skin Tone	-0.015*	(-2.18)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.035*	(6.13)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	-0.031*	(-5.32)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	-0.023*	(-3.92)
16-25 Years	0.038*	(5.23)
26-35 Years	0.020*	(2.79)
46-55 Years	0.000	(-0.03)
56-65 Years	0.003	(0.43)
66 Years or Older	-0.008	(-1.30)
Constant	-0.094	(-0.50)
var(Country-Level)	0.104	
var(Individual-Level)	0.901	
Number of groups	23	
Wald $\chi^2(14)$	385.25*	
Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank¹ finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).² Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silverson and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007;

¹ The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.

² Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.

- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.
- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.³ Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.5% of the overall sample reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 14% were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 2.9% of respondents reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.5% were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals with children in school were asked for a bribe related to education while nearly 8% of respondents who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.

³ As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada




Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.⁴ In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure

⁴ The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

3.2).⁵ This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).⁶




Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

⁵ The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

⁶ While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences than any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.




Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.⁷ Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.⁸ Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

⁷ For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

⁸ Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.




Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.⁹ Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to

⁹ Measured from the question WF1: “Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No”

occur in places where the rule of law is objectively weaker.¹⁰ As we model these differences, we include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.¹¹

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.¹² In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.¹³ This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

¹⁰ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.

¹¹ The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

¹² As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

¹³ We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.




Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.¹⁴ Specifically, respondents are asked:

¹⁴ This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]

(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is “very uncommon” and 100 represents the perception that corruption is “very common.”

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.




Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014




Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to “the government” even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.




Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014




Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so

again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.¹⁵




Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are

¹⁵ The coefficients are standardized-the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.

widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.¹⁶

	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	88	98

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.¹⁷

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.¹⁸ All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

¹⁶ This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

¹⁷ Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).

¹⁸ In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect—the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p < 0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.




Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014




Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014




Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this



concern, Chapter 4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014
(Figure 3.5)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.097*	(-4.51)
Woman	-0.262*	(-16.57)
Level of Education	0.081*	(3.88)
Wealth Quintile	0.132*	(6.68)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.081*	(4.77)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.326*	(17.12)
Skin Tone	-0.040	(-1.80)
16-25 Years	-0.090*	(-4.47)
26-35 Years	0.006	(0.28)
46-55 Years	-0.037	(-2.02)
56-65 Years	-0.089*	(-4.54)
66 Years or Older	-0.189*	(-8.57)
Guatemala	-0.056*	(-2.46)
El Salvador	-0.254*	(-9.39)
Honduras	-0.041	(-1.59)
Nicaragua	-0.177*	(-7.73)
Costa Rica	-0.166*	(-5.94)
Panama	-0.102*	(-3.11)
Colombia	-0.223*	(-8.68)
Ecuador	-0.065*	(-2.04)
Bolivia	0.029	0.89)
Peru	-0.032	(-1.49)
Paraguay	0.005	(0.29)
Chile	-0.364*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	-0.307*	(-12.16)
Brazil	-0.203*	(-7.15)
Venezuela	-0.049*	(-2.03)
Argentina	-0.120*	(-5.27)
Dominican Republic	-0.082*	(-3.22)
Haiti	0.393*	(15.17)
Jamaica	-0.237*	(-10.32)
Guyana	-0.124*	(-4.80)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.225*	(-9.03)
Belize	-0.059*	(-3.46)
Constant	-1.448*	(-63.98)
Number of observations	29123	
Population size	25866.08	
Design df	1969	
F(34, 1936)	55.79*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.

Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014
(Figure 3.10)

(Figure 3.16)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	0.076*	(5.00)
Rural	-0.083*	(-4.72)
Woman	-0.044*	(-3.51)
Level of Education	0.128*	(7.68)
Wealth Quintile	0.083*	(5.60)
Received Assistance From the Government	-0.034*	(-2.40)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.123*	(8.58)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.27)
16-25 Years	-0.103*	(-6.55)
26-35 Years	-0.003	(-0.17)
46-55 Years	0.007	(0.45)
56-65 Years	0.024	(1.51)
66 Years or Older	0.054*	(3.69)
Guatemala	-0.043*	(-1.99)
El Salvador	-0.070*	(-3.45)
Honduras	-0.082*	(-3.69)
Nicaragua	-0.094*	(-4.52)
Panama	-0.095*	(-4.67)
Colombia	0.082*	(3.35)
Ecuador	-0.175*	(-6.03)
Bolivia	-0.136*	(-4.38)
Peru	0.035	(1.79)
Paraguay	0.062*	(3.07)
Uruguay	-0.151*	(-7.92)
Venezuela	0.040	(1.93)
Argentina	0.028	(1.58)
Dominican Republic	0.052*	(2.10)
Haiti	-0.156*	(-6.50)
Jamaica	0.047*	(2.27)
Guyana	0.055*	(2.32)
Belize	0.005	(0.27)
Cut1	-3.212	(-74.48)
Cut2	-1.429	(-50.13)
Cut3	0.404	(15.59)
Number of Interviews	22124	
Population size	20675.9	
Design df	1354	
F(31, 1324)	32.32*	
Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses.		
* p<0.05		

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.

Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as “neither good, nor bad.”
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens’ evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the “third wave” of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization’s influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet’s study of Bolivia’s 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata’s findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti’s cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in



government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falletti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...	
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?	
(1) Yes	(2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?	
(1) Yes [Continue]	(2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1]
(98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]	

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.¹ The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.²




Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country, the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the

¹ Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.

² Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

2014 AmericasBarometer – there is no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.




Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level

since 2006. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.




Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated with political federalism.³ Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.

³ We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.




Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).

Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with

age until people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.




Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014⁴

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruptions are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.

⁴ For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.




Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month
 (3) Once or twice a year (4) Never
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning “never” and 100 meaning “once a week.”

Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.




Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA


Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Map 4.1⁵ we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti’s rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.

⁵ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix.



Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.8, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region.




Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.9 we further explore citizens' evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding "Good" or "Very Good" views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.




Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.⁶ Figure 4.10 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

⁶ We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.11 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela's decline. Compared to 2012,

Venezuelans rated schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political and social instability in the country.




Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.12 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has

declined dramatically in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services ($r = .44$) than the quality of roads ($r = .33$) and health services is also more weakly correlated ($r = .29$) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.




Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.13). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas in 2014 rated them slightly higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level ($r = .26$).




Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.⁷ Figure 4.14 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts.

⁷ A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.

Chileans appear to be quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is $r=.30$. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.




Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.15 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest. Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government's services are failing them.

We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.




Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.16, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. The public now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.





Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time



Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Map 4.2 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale.⁸ Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Map 4.2 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally high

⁸ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix

levels of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated ($r = .39$).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.




Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.⁹ People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin

⁹ Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.



tone) these findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have similar levels of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local

government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.17 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	0.196*	-11.05
Perception of Insecurity	0.027	-1.5
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.117*	-6.16
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.551*	-39.67
Perception of the National Economy	0.033	-1.75
66 years or older	0.02	-1.08
56-65 years	0.059*	-3.14
46-55 years	0.050*	-2.52
26-35 years	-0.043	-1.96
16-25 years	-0.179*	-7.42
Skin Tone	0.033	-1.52
Wealth Quintiles	-0.064*	-3.2
Years of Schooling	0.078*	-3.53
Women	0.068*	-3.99
Urban/Rural	0.127*	-5.89
Guatemala	-0.105*	-4.56
El Salvador	-0.073*	-3.32
Honduras	-0.073*	-3.24
Nicaragua	0.067*	-3.12
Costa Rica	-0.112*	-4.26
Panama	-0.123*	-4.56
Colombia	-0.059*	-2.71
Ecuador	-0.073*	-3.08
Bolivia	-0.174*	-4.79
Peru	0.002	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.053*	-2.46
Chile	0.03	-1.17
Uruguay	0.100*	-4.48
Brazil	-0.031	-1.35
Venezuela	-0.105*	-5.14
Argentina	-0.003	-0.15
Dominican Republic	-0.027	-1.21
Haiti	-0.215*	-9.69
Jamaica	-0.091*	-3.77
Guyana	-0.186*	-7.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.073	-1.91
Belize	-0.063*	-2.4
Constant	-1.966*	-87.78
F	60.11	
Number of cases	35412	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL

	Standardi zed Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.034*	-5.36
Perception of Insecurity	-0.113*	-16.73
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.056*	-8.68
Requested Help from Municipal Office	-0.041*	-6.24
Perception of the National Economy	0.141*	-20.49
66 years or older	0	-0.02
56-65 years	-0.004	-0.64
46-55 years	0.001	-0.13
26-35 years	0.016*	-2.21
16-25 years	0.055*	-8.1
Skin Tone	-0.018*	-2.31
Wealth Quintiles	0.039*	-5.5
Years of Schooling	-0.016*	-2.09
Women	0.039*	-7.37
Urban/Rural	-0.034*	-3.8
Guatemala	0.01	-1.2
El Salvador	0.026*	-2.34
Honduras	0.025*	-2.73
Nicaragua	0.044*	-5.28
Costa Rica	0.009	-0.82
Panama	0.047*	-4.9
Colombia	0.009	-1.03
Ecuador	-0.005	-0.44
Bolivia	-0.008	-0.57
Peru	-0.026*	-3.05
Paraguay	0.009	-0.85
Chile	0.019	-1.91
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.17
Brazil	-0.073*	-6.78
Venezuela	-0.013	-1.36
Argentina	0.039*	-3.62
Dominican Republic	-0.049*	-3.75
Haiti	-0.026	-1.92
Jamaica	-0.093*	-8.95
Guyana	-0.046*	-4.45
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.016	-0.96
Belize	-0.005	-0.48
Constant	-0.002; -0.26	
F	47.69	
Number of cases	35412	
R-Squared	0.08	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.049*	-8.45
Perception of Insecurity	-0.086*	-14.6
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.361*	-57.08
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.043*	-7.96
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.014*	-2.5
Perception of the National Economy	0.068*	-11.08
66 years or older	0.021*	-3.36
56-65 years	0.009	-1.41
46-55 years	0.000	-0.05
26-35 years	-0.014*	-2.16
16-25 years	0.004	-0.57
Skin Tone	0.004	-0.57
Wealth Quintiles	-0.009	-1.53
Years of Schooling	-0.040*	-5.93
Women	0.010*	-2
Urban/Rural	0.027*	-3.76
Guatemala	-0.060*	-6.87
El Salvador	-0.002	-0.18
Honduras	-0.009	-1.01
Nicaragua	-0.020*	-2.12
Costa Rica	-0.020*	-2.33
Panama	-0.088*	-8.98
Colombia	-0.068*	-7.24
Ecuador	-0.040*	-4.47
Bolivia	-0.062*	-5.29
Peru	-0.089*	-10.56
Paraguay	-0.003	-0.31
Chile	0.006	-0.57
Uruguay	-0.026*	-2.9
Brazil	-0.080*	-8.03
Venezuela	0.017	-1.62
Argentina	-0.048*	-4.54
Dominican Republic	-0.052*	-5.78
Haiti	-0.071*	-7.57
Jamaica	-0.092*	-11.32
Guyana	-0.040*	-4.13
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.133*	-9.93
Belize	-0.070*	-7.48
Constant	0.004; -0.51	
F	177.14	
Number of cases	35011	
R-Squared	0.2	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 4.4. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014



Appendix 4.5. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas



Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004-2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in

hard times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.

Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for “democracy” as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V’s goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill¹ and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The “Churchillian” question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average² is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has included since 2006³ and by sub-region.⁴ Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the

¹ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

² As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.

³ Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.

Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.




Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” citizens responded to the following questions:

- | |
|---|
| B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system? |
| B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? |
| B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? |
| B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police? |
| B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church? |
| B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church? |
| B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties? |
| B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? |
| B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country? |

⁴ Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.



As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.⁵ The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.⁶ A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

⁵ This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

⁶ Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).




Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country's average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust

in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the “pacification” of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).




Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.⁷ Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this

⁷ Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

concept. Responses were recoded 1 (“yes” the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 (“no” it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.⁸

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.⁹ These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

⁸ These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach’s α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.

⁹ Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.




Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trustful of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.




Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.¹⁰ Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but

¹⁰ Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces ($r = .34$), the national police ($r = .67$), and the justice system ($r = .50$). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, $r = .44$, $r = .69$, and $r = .45$.

low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an

increase of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.¹¹ Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.





Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Map 5.1 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system.

¹¹ However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously the AmericasBarometer surveyed 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.



Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables, presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.¹² As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a

¹² Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the America's newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.10, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.¹³




Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

¹³ When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: [<i>Probe: To what degree?</i>]
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.¹⁴

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.¹⁵ Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

¹⁴ The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

¹⁵ These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).

How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.11 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.





Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Map 5.2, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).



Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.¹⁶ The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.12. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.¹⁷ And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to “their” executive.

¹⁶ Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

¹⁷ When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy's champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.




Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.13. Alarming, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.13, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.14.





Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Map 5.3 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.



Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public



concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix


Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.047*	(-6.24)
Sex	0.014*	(-2.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031*	(-4.42)
Years of Schooling	-0.005	(-0.69)
Skin Tone	0.002	(-0.34)
16-25 years	-0.009	(-1.26)
26-35 years	-0.011	(-1.62)
46-55 years	0.021*	(-3.24)
56-65 years	0.022*	(-3.46)
66 years or older	0.042*	(-6.84)
Presidential Job Approval	0.199*	(-28.64)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.120*	(-19.79)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.007	(-1.28)
Corruption Victimization	-0.082*	(-13.34)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.043*	(-6.57)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.107*	(-15.58)
Guatemala	-0.038*	(-3.96)
El Salvador	0.017	(-1.80)
Honduras	-0.003	(-0.27)
Nicaragua	0.058*	(-5.96)
Costa Rica	0.047*	(-4.80)
Panama	0.046*	(-4.73)
Colombia	0.042*	(-4.36)
Ecuador	0.064*	(-6.70)
Bolivia	-0.082*	(-6.54)
Peru	-0.014	(-1.40)
Paraguay	-0.019*	(-2.07)
Chile	0.095*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	0.051*	(-5.17)
Brazil	0.041*	(-4.24)
Venezuela	0.019	(-1.90)
Argentina	0.033*	(-3.37)
Dominican Republic	-0.067*	(-6.58)
Haiti	0.082*	(-8.09)
Jamaica	-0.017	(-1.92)
Guyana	-0.047*	(-4.87)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.003	(-0.20)
Belize	-0.041*	(-3.95)
Constant	-0.007; (-1.04)	
F	135.06	
Number of cases	32152	
R-Squared	0.17	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.059*	(-8.49)
Sex	0.013*	(-2.31)
Years of Schooling	-0.022*	(-3.07)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.030*	(-4.73)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.70)
16-25 years	0.026*	(-3.74)
26-35 years	-0.001	(-0.09)
46-55 years	0.01	(-1.46)
56-65 years	-0.001	(-0.17)
66 years or older	0.011	(-1.72)
Presidential Job Approval	0.235*	(-31.81)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.111*	(-18.21)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.017*	(-2.86)
Corruption Victimization	-0.050*	(-7.85)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.046*	(-6.86)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.075*	(-11.27)
Guatemala	-0.022*	(-2.44)
El Salvador	-0.029*	(-3.48)
Honduras	-0.026*	(-3.02)
Nicaragua	0.018*	(-2.04)
Costa Rica	0.074*	(-9.18)
Panama	-0.004	(-0.43)
Colombia	-0.013	(-1.55)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.105*	(-8.89)
Peru	-0.068*	(-8.48)
Paraguay	-0.078*	(-8.91)
Chile	-0.071*	(-8.02)
Uruguay	0.008	(-0.85)
Brazil	-0.041*	(-4.71)
Venezuela	-0.004	(-0.43)
Argentina	0.006	(-0.76)
Dominican Republic	-0.079*	(-8.79)
Haiti	-0.041*	(-4.30)
Jamaica	-0.018*	(-2.20)
Guyana	-0.040*	(-5.09)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.006	(-0.48)
Belize	-0.038*	(-4.31)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	103.2	
Number of cases	31909	
R-Squared	0.13	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


Appendix 5.3. Estimated System Support by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.1



Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.10, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.054*	(7.26)
Sex	0.017*	(3.29)
Years of Schooling	-0.015*	(-2.14)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.014*	(-2.18)
Skin Tone	-0.002	(-0.31)
16-25 years	0.042*	(6.25)
26-35 years	0.003	(0.49)
46-55 years	0.012	(1.87)
56-65 years	0.020*	(3.11)
66 years or older	0.038*	(5.95)
Presidential Job Approval	0.315*	(43.58)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.110*	(17.62)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.013*	(2.43)
Corruption Victimization	-0.064*	(-10.56)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.076*	(11.90)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.066*	(-9.72)
Guatemala	-0.064*	(-6.93)
El Salvador	-0.055*	(-6.69)
Honduras	-0.063*	(-6.81)
Nicaragua	0.005	(0.55)
Costa Rica	0.099*	(11.16)
Panama	-0.052*	(-5.61)
Colombia	-0.048*	(-5.36)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.107*	(-8.93)
Peru	-0.082*	(-8.59)
Paraguay	-0.122*	(-13.23)
Chile	-0.070*	(-7.04)
Uruguay	-0.006	(-0.60)
Brazil	-0.149*	(-13.80)
Venezuela	-0.039*	(-3.61)
Argentina	0.021*	(2.41)
Dominican Republic	-0.098*	(-10.67)
Haiti	-0.134*	(-12.55)
Jamaica	-0.091*	(-11.60)
Guyana	-0.069*	(-7.71)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.019	(-1.29)
Belize	-0.054*	(-6.00)
Constant	0.011; (1.45)	
F	155.91	
Number of cases	31976	
R-Squared	0.23	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


Appendix 5.5. Estimated Political Tolerance by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.2



Appendix 5.6. Coefficients for Figure 5.12, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	-0.006	(-0.61)
Sex	-0.047*	(-8.75)
Years of Schooling	0.114*	(-15.05)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037*	(-5.21)
Skin Tone	0.022*	(-2.63)
16-25 years	0.009	(-1.28)
26-35 years	-0.012	(-1.63)
46-55 years	-0.013*	(-1.98)
56-65 years	-0.014*	(-2.06)
66 years or older	-0.016*	(-2.39)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.086*	(-10.97)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	-0.022*	(-3.31)
Attended Municipal Meeting	-0.007	(-1.08)
Corruption Victimization	-0.008	(-1.27)
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.005	(-0.80)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	0.046*	(-6.10)
Guatemala	-0.113*	(-11.22)
El Salvador	-0.019	(-1.91)
Honduras	-0.009	(-0.84)
Nicaragua	0.026*	(-2.25)
Costa Rica	0.002	(-0.14)
Panama	-0.095*	(-9.21)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.14)
Ecuador	-0.037*	(-2.99)
Bolivia	-0.053*	(-3.60)
Peru	-0.042*	(-3.69)
Paraguay	0.021	(-1.80)
Chile	0.050*	(-3.93)
Uruguay	0.090*	(-7.10)
Brazil	0.035*	(-2.99)
Venezuela	0.068*	(-5.10)
Argentina	0.040*	(-3.29)
Dominican Republic	0.041*	(-4.07)
Haiti	0.041*	(-4.03)
Jamaica	0.050*	(-3.80)
Guyana	0.040*	(-3.42)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.131*	(-6.71)
Belize	0.032*	(-2.65)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	55.94	
Number of cases	31853	
R-Squared	0.12	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 5.7. Estimated Stable Democracy Attitudes by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.3



Part II:
Insecurity, Community Participation and
Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime
Control, and Democratic Attitudes in
Jamaica

Chapter 6. Crime, Insecurity, and Social Capital in Jamaica

Anthony A. Harriott and Balford A. Lewis

I. Introduction

The notion of “community participation” has been central to the political and policy discourses concerning neighbourhood safety and security and approaches to policing and crime control (Hughes and Rowe 2007). It is acknowledged, on the one hand, that high levels of community violence and the associated insecurity and mistrust can restrict interaction among community members, and in turn, limit opportunities for meaningful participation in developmental activities (Innes 2004). On the other hand, effective neighbourhood policing and the success of most crime control measures are highly dependent on citizen cooperation, and sometimes even active citizen involvement.

Over the years, and despite some declines noted recently, Jamaica has stood among the group of countries in the Americas with the highest rates of homicides (UNODC 2013), though the rate of common crime victimization among voting age adults stands among the lowest in the region according to LAPOP survey data. In the face of this dichotomy, concerns about crime and security have been identified as among the most serious problems facing the country by a number of studies, including successive AmericasBarometer surveys by LAPOP.

Issues of insecurity and crime carry important human and material costs. Drawing from recent research, the UNDP’s Caribbean report (2012) places these concerns into perspective by focusing on the costs of youth involvement in crime. The report refers to the “exceptional nature” of youth violence and emphasizes ways in which such crimes pose a challenge for human development. Society, it argues, faces “the direct monetary costs...of corrective measures” including the cost of “security, policing, judicial processing, and incarceration, in addition to private security expenditure by businesses and individuals” as well as “indirect monetary and economic costs” such as loss of wages of the imprisoned and “loss of life among young productive citizens” as well as “lower economic growth and reduced tourism revenues.” In terms of monetary cost, the UNDP report estimates that in 2005, youth crime cost Jamaica approximately 3.21% of its GDP (UNDP 2012, 49-50).

This chapter addresses the relationships among community participation, interpersonal trust, and crime for the adult voting age population in Jamaica. The chapter first provides an overview of Jamaicans’ experiences with, and perceptions of crime. The chapter then turns to examine the extent to which Jamaicans trust people in their neighbourhoods and participate in their communities, and offers discussion with respect to the implications of these findings for crime reduction and security improvement in the country.

II. Crime and Insecurity in Jamaica

The AmericasBarometer routinely collects data on citizens’ perceptions of the most serious problem facing society. The question (coded A4 in the dataset) is open-ended and interviewers code responses in the field into one of a large number of possible categories which are listed in Table 6.1. Respondents are asked to indicate what they believe is the “most serious problem faced by the

country” and interviewers select from the list of pre-established categories the issue area that best reflects the answer provided by the respondents.

Table 6.1. Pre-Coded “Most Important Problem” Item

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]			
Armed conflict	1 (30)	Inequality	20 (58)
Bad government	2 (15)	Inflation, high prices	21 (02)
Corruption	3 (13)	Kidnappings	22 (31)
Credit, lack of	4 (09)	Land to farm, lack of	23 (07)
Crime	5 (05)	Malnutrition	24 (23)
Discrimination	6 (25)	Migration	25 (16)
Drug addiction; consumption of drugs	7 (11)	Politicians	26 (59)
Drug trafficking	8 (12)	Popular protests (strikes, blocking roads, work stoppages, etc.)	27 (06)
Economy, problems with, crisis of	9 (01)	Population explosion	28 (20)
Education, lack of, poor quality	10 (21)	Poverty	29 (04)
Electricity, lack of	11 (24)	Roads in poor condition	30 (18)
Environment	12 (10)	Security (lack of)	31 (27)
External debt	13 (26)	Terrorism	32 (33)
Forced displacement of persons	14 (32)	Transportation, problems of	33 (60)
Gangs	15 (14)	Unemployment	34 (03)
Health services, lack of	16 (22)	Violence	35 (57)
Housing	17 (55)	War against terrorism	36 (17)
Human rights, violations of	18 (56)	Water, lack of	37 (19)
Impunity	19 (61)	Other	38 (70)
DK	88	DA	98

To achieve parsimony in analysis and presentation of this question, the 38 codes in the grid above (Table 6.1) were re-classified into five overarching categories as shown in Table 6.2. These categories distinguish among issues that are related to the economy, security, basic services, politics, or “other.”

Table 6.2. Categorization of Most Serious National Problem Responses

Economy	Security	Basic Services	Politics	Other
Credit, lack of	Delinquency, Crime, Violence	Water, lack of	Armed conflict	Inequality
Unemployment	Gangs	Roads in poor condition	Corruption	Forced displacement of persons
Economy, problems with, crisis of	Kidnappings	Education, lack of, poor quality	Human rights, violations of	Discrimination
Inflation, High prices	Security (lack of)	Electricity, lack of	Bad government	Drug addiction
Poverty	War against terrorism	Health services, lack of		Population explosion
Land to farm, lack of	Terrorism	Transportation, problems of		Environment
External debt	Violence/ Crime	Housing		Migration
		Malnutrition		Drug trafficking
				Popular protests (strikes, roadblocks, work stoppages, etc.)
				Other

Figure 6.1 shows the 2014 distribution of responses in Jamaica across the five categories established above. One in two Jamaicans identifies security-related concerns as the most serious national problem. Despite the unusually hard economic times, socio-economic concerns rank second and a full 10 percentage points lower than issues related to security/crime.




Figure 6.1. Breakdown of Responses to the Most Serious Problem Question, Jamaica 2014

Reported Crime Victimization in Jamaica

It is worth noting that although security is perceived as a national problem by many in Jamaica, crime itself tends to be unevenly dispersed across communities with some, mainly urban and inner city areas, more prone to crime than others. Further, as previous LAPOP studies have shown, high levels of concern about crime at the national level do not necessarily translate into comparable levels of perception of neighbourhood insecurity. The analysis of responses to selected items focusing on the problem of crime and the associated fear of crime in the following sections further illustrates these points. We begin, though, with a look at national crime victimization rates for Jamaica's voting age population.

For a first-hand account of citizens' personal experience as victims of crime and their account of household victimization, the survey asked individuals the following questions:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]				
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)				

As the pie chart to the left in Figure 6.2 shows, when asked if they had personally been the victim of at least one criminal act (survey code VIC1EXT) in the past 12 months, only approximately 6.7% of those interviewed answered affirmatively. This low national rate of personal victimization is consistent with the low crime figures found in previous LAPOP surveys of Jamaica and reported in this, and some scholarly and other publications, over many years. Jamaica's rate of crime victimization (6.7%) results in the country being ranked as the country with the lowest national crime victimization rate for the voting age population in the Latin America and Caribbean region, according to LAPOP's 2014 AmericasBarometer.

In the "Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World" (UN/World Bank 2007, 39) it is argued rates of crime reporting to local authorities reflect trust in the justice system as much as they do actual victimization. The report states:

An important finding of this study is that in Jamaica a lower percentage of crimes are reported to the police in areas with higher crime rates. The reporting rate can plausibly be interpreted as a measure of confidence in the police, as people will be more likely to report when they trust the police and believe they will respond. Lack of trust and confidence in the police is then lower in areas with higher local crime rates. This suggests also that official police data distort the true geographic profile of crime, because official data are biased downwards for higher crime areas.

It must be noted that the rates were reported by individuals in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer surveys to interview teams that were clearly identified to respondents as independent from the police and any other government authorities. Therefore, the discussion linking trust in the police to crime

reporting does not apply directly to these rates, which provide an unfiltered perspective on crime experiences among the voting age population in Jamaica.

The low national rate of personal victimization found in the survey is mirrored in low levels of reports of household victimization. The pie chart on the right of Figure 6.2 shows results relating to the item on household crime victimization. Level of exposure to crime on this measure is also relatively low. Fewer than 6% of respondents report that someone in their household was victimized by crime within 12 months prior to the survey.




Figure 6.2. Personal and Household Crime Victimization, Jamaica 2014

Figure 6.3 illustrates trends found in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer surveys of Jamaica in self-reported, personal crime victimization national rates between 2006 and 2014. The results indicate a marginal year-to-year decline in victimization since 2010, with a statistically significant decrease between 2010 and 2014. In short, the survey data reveal that the national rate of individual crime victimization in Jamaica (excluding homicides and focusing on the voting age population) is low and decreasing over recent years.




Figure 6.3. Crime Victimization over time, Jamaica 2006-2014

We further examine the issue of crime in Jamaica by disaggregating the victimization data according to place of occurrence by analysing responses to the following item:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

(1) In your home
 (2) In this neighbourhood
 (3) In this parish
 (4) In another parish
 (5) In another country
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As Figure 6.4 illustrates, the plurality of victims, 41.8%, report that they experienced the criminal act at home; 33.7% report that the incident took place in their neighbourhood. These numbers effectively underscore the aforementioned observation that crime is predominantly a localized problem, and as a consequence, requires a community response. In total, nearly 3 out of 4 of all victims report that they were victimized within their neighbourhood.




Figure 6.4. Place of Most Recent Crime Victimization, Jamaica 2014

Not only do individuals tend to experience crimes within their community (more often than outside of it), but certain parts of the country tend to experience more crime than others. This distribution of crime is reflected in police crime data, which tend to show that violent crimes continue to be predominantly restricted to certain “hotspots.” That said, there is a perception in Jamaica that crime has diffused into some previously “quiet” communities. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of reported victimization by sub-region in Jamaica according to the 2014 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey. The survey stratifies the country into four main regions: Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR, comprising Kingston, St. Andrew, Spanish Town, and Portmore) Surrey, Middlesex, and Cornwall. The survey data are representative of the population in each of these regions, by the nature of the sample design. Figure 6.5 shows variation in crime rates across these regions, such that 8.9% of residents of the KMR region report being victimized by crime, while 5.9% do so in Surrey, 6.6% in Middlesex, and 3.6% in Cornwall.




Figure 6.5. Total Crime Victimization by Counties, Jamaica 2014

Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica

As reported above, nearly 50% of the Jamaican population perceive crime and violence and related security concerns as the most serious national problem in 2014. Yet, Jamaica recorded a mere 7% personal victimization rate over the same period of observation. Indeed, crime impacts not only those who are victimized but also others who recognize the increased likelihood that they also might eventually be the victim of a crime. Additionally, as noted in prior LAPOP reports, high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. It is quite possible that perceptions of insecurity are heightened in contexts in which the media frequently reports on heinous and sometimes brazen acts of criminality, including the increasing prevalence of gang activities and violent crimes in some previously crime-free areas. These and other factors can create situations in which perceptions of insecurity are high nationally, while actual victimization and community-level insecurity – on average across the country (that is, including both hotspots and safer places) – are relatively low. Furthermore, insecurity can be aggravated under conditions in which trust in the judicial institutions and processes of the state is low. It is also useful to underline that some areas are more prone to crime than others and that individuals living in the more crime-prone areas who have experienced crime are likely to be among those expressing higher levels of insecurity.

The AmericasBarometer measures perception of security at the community level in a couple of ways. First, the survey asks about general feelings of safety in the neighbourhood and, second, the survey asks about citizens' sense of safety when moving around in their neighbourhood. The specific questions are worded as follows:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

- (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Now thinking about specific situations, how safe do you feel in the following situations?								
	Very Safe	Safe	Neither Safe nor Unsafe	Unsafe	Very Unsafe	DK	DA (Refused)	Not Applicable
IVOL10. Walking alone in your neighbourhood during the day [Read: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, very unsafe]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99

The pie charts in Figure 6.6 below show the percentage distribution of responses to the questions posed on perceived neighbourhood security. As depicted by the chart to the left, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicate that they believe their neighbourhoods are safe; 82.9% feel their neighbourhoods are safe, with 39.5% among that portion saying they feel very safe. Only 17.1% indicate that their communities are unsafe. These results comport with the aforementioned findings with respect to relatively low national rates of crime victimization and the tendency for crime to be concentrated within certain spots within the country.

When the issue is further probed by looking at individuals' sense of safety when walking alone in the community during the day, an even higher percentage of the population indicates that they feel safe. Of the 82.8% that report feeling safe, 39.5% and 43.4% feel "very safe" or "somewhat safe," respectively, when walking alone in their neighbourhood during the day. Only about 4.6% say they feel "unsafe" in a similar situation.




Figure 6.6. Perception of Neighbourhood Security in Jamaica, 2014

When we examine perceptions related to citizen safety over time, we see that insecurity has declined: citizens reported feeling safer in their neighbourhoods in 2012 and 2014 compared to earlier years of the AmericasBarometer survey. Figure 6.7 demonstrates this downward shift in *insecurity*. Following LAPOP standard practices, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater sense of *insecurity*. The results point to a general decrease in the average citizen's perception of neighbourhood insecurity over the five rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey, with a net 11.3-degree decline between 2006 and 2014 (Figure 6.7). This decrease began between 2006 and 2008 and then levels stabilized in 2010, before dropping again in 2012 and holding steady into 2014.




Figure 6.7. Average Perceptions of Neighbourhood Insecurity, Jamaica 2006-2014

What factors predict higher levels of insecurity? In analyses not presented here for the sake of brevity, we find that in Jamaica in 2014, those who are younger, those who are female, and those who are wealthier report somewhat higher degrees of insecurity.

The Importance of Citizen Security

As noted in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' (ICHR) "Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights" (2009, 6), "incumbent upon States is a normative core demanding the protection of rights particularly vulnerable to criminal or violent acts." The document further explains that the concept of "security" has changed over the years and the emphasis in current approaches to public security, therefore, is not on "national security" and "internal security" but "citizen security," highlighting on the one hand, the supremacy of the security of individuals and social groups, and on the other, the role of the citizenry in helping to ensure the security of their neighbourhood (2009, 89).

Indeed, in its 2012 Caribbean Human Development Report, the UNDP lists community collaboration and broad public support among its key recommendations in state efforts to address issues related to security in the region (UNDP 2012, Ch. 6). There is also growing consensus in research and policy circles that governments need to go beyond law enforcement and criminal justice options in their efforts to address problems of neighbourhood crime and insecurity (World Health Organization 2002). In a number of cases in different countries, strategies aimed at mitigating security-related risk factors, both at the individual and community levels, have proven to be more cost effective, and to lead to more sustainable results than the traditional sector-driven, crime control alternatives (Gottfredson, and Hirchi 1990). Some studies examining alternative approaches to social control have confirmed, on the one hand, growing public support for greater investment in crime prevention measures rather than for focusing resources on enforcement (Waller 2013, 322). On the other hand, there is an increased willingness on the part of communities to participate in such efforts to secure their

neighbourhoods (Harriott and Lewis 2012). The increasingly popular UNDP's "Community Security and Social Cohesion" (2009) approach is informed primarily by this "community-driven" philosophy. It emphasizes "participatory assessments, planning and accountability and seeks to improve service delivery, reduce social exclusion, enhance relations between social groups and strengthen democratic governance" as means to identify the "causes of insecurity" and develop a "coordinated response" within neighborhoods (UNDP 2009 [Executive Summary], 2).

Approaches along these lines necessarily involve agencies of the state working collaboratively with civil society groups and organizations to influence behaviour, thinking, and attitudes, with the key goal of preventing potential offenders from turning to crime and correcting those who have already done so.¹ The work undertaken by state agencies with communities is facilitated to the extent that there are shared perspectives on the best way to address issues of crime and violence.

In order to determine the extant level of support for preventative approaches to crime control in Jamaica, responses to the following question were included in the 2014 AmericasBarometer:

AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: Implement preventive measures or Increase punishment of criminals?
(1) Implement preventive measures
(2) Increase punishment of criminals
(3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA

As Figure 6.8 shows, more than a half of the respondents (56.5%) prefer increased punishment for criminals as the means for curbing crime, while 32.7% prefer increasing preventive measures, and 10.8% opt for a combination of preventative and punitive measures.

¹ Given that governments in developing countries such as Jamaica are often unable to adequately address citizen security needs due to resource constraints, the role of bilateral or multilateral agencies is also critical to the process.




Figure 6.8. Citizens' Opinions on how to Reduce Crime, Jamaica 2014

As the summary of responses in Figure 6.8 illustrates, Jamaicans largely support an enforcement approach to crime control. This preference for strong, punishment-oriented approaches to issues of crime and security is mirrored, in fact, by some inner-city, and usually volatile, communities that are known to employ informal means of social control in dealing with crime and insecurity in their neighbourhood. Obviously, a desired model of citizens' contribution to the safety and security of their communities would be one that buttresses rule of law and state legitimacy rather than one that circumvents those institutions.

Previous LAPOP studies have shown Jamaicans' willingness to work with the police and other stakeholders in efforts to improve police-citizen relations (Powell and Lewis 2008) and to reduce gang-related activities in their communities (Harriott and Lewis 2012). In the 2014 AmericasBarometer, citizens' accounts of actual participation in neighbourhood activities out of their concern about crime were captured in responses to the following item:

VIC44. In the last 12 months, out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbours of your community?

Despite their reporting of crime and crime-related concerns as Jamaica's most serious national problem, only 10.1% of Jamaicans report having been involved in any organized activity within the last 12 months, aimed at dealing with the problem of neighbourhood insecurity (Figure 6.9).




Figure 6.9. Citizens' Involvement in Organized Activity to Improve Neighbourhood Security, Jamaica 2014

Of course, effectively dealing with the problem of crime requires a well-coordinated and comprehensive national strategy, involving local citizens' active participation, which in turn requires communities with the organizational capacity and structures, as well as the requisite attitudes in support of cooperation among community members and with other stakeholders. Hence, the following sections focus on civil society strengthening and social cohesion as mechanisms for attaining social order and neighbourhood security.

III. Civil Society, Social Cohesion, and Social Capital in Jamaica: Resources in Programs Targeting Issues of Violence and Security

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have become increasingly active in many countries of the Americas, including Jamaica, but their vibrancy and impact have not been uniform across the region, whether by sector or nationally (Martin, Gilens, and Benjamin 2014). Sources speak to the “growing visibility,” “enhanced standing” and “spirited activism” of these groups in demanding accountability and in promoting transparency, inclusiveness, and flexibility; as well as to their increasing presence in the provision of basic services to sections of society (FOCAL 2006, 2-6). Others emphasize their contribution to national development and democratic consolidation in general, highlighting their role in facilitating citizen engagement, and in turn, engendering an open and transparent decision making process and increased citizen participation in public affairs (Barrett 2010). The UN Report, *People Matter: Civic Engagement in Public Governance* (United Nations 2008) argues that CSOs “have qualities and strengths that enable them to pursue activities that strengthen citizen trust in government by fostering public participation in key processes of public policy development, public service delivery and public accountability” (2008, 23). Studies cutting across the development and governance spectra offer a range of potential gains from increased citizen engagement. Fung (2006) posits, for example, that improved quantity and quality of citizen participation militates against special interest biases in

developmental policies; creates better informed citizens with greater capacity for constructive input; promotes greater institutional accountability; and fosters popular mobilization of communities outside of the usual political spheres. Arguing similarly, Manor (2004, 27) states that when the political process provides for “disadvantaged groups to engage in public affairs, their confidence, skills, connections, organizational strength – and thus their capacity to influence their own destinies grow,” resulting in a mutually beneficial situation for citizens, political leaders and governments alike. Strong empirical support for these claims was found by Robinson (2004, 8) who asserted that, “outcomes related to the material benefits of active participation for low income groups point to a notable shift in policy and priorities towards expenditures that directly benefit the poor.”

Indeed, the term “civil society” has taken on a variety of meanings depending on the perspectives of users, who may range from scholars to journalists, politicians to the ordinary citizen, and others, including members of the development community (Finke 2007). This presumably accounts for some sources offering different, and sometimes contradictory perspectives regarding the efficacy of citizen participation in community-strengthening (e.g., Crook, and Sturla Sverrisson 2001; Golooba-Mutebi 2004). On the question of definition, the *UN Global Compact* describes civil society organizations (CSOs) as NGOs and non-profit agencies that seek “positive social and environmental change.” A more comprehensive framework proffers, in part, that civil society consists of formally and informally constituted groups that operate independently of the state and the private sector to advance various interests, in ways that enable citizens to collectively enunciate their concerns in a search for change (Jaysawal 2013). So, in essence, citizen participation is often channelled through CSOs as defined above, and the usefulness of such groups in community development is manifested primarily by the popular local participation they are presumed to facilitate.

In practice, community participation entails the active involvement of individuals in collaborative activities aimed at changing problematic conditions in their neighbourhood or to influence policies and programs that affect the quality of life of community members (Ohmer 2007). It must be noted, though, that while the literature on local civil participation tends to emphasise “the deepening of democratic governance” as a desired outcome, this goal is never an end in itself. Of greater significance are the positive results that are assumed to emerge from such associative activities. Purportedly, societies with more active community-level citizenry exhibit more stability than those in which people’s involvement centres only on occasional political involvement such as through the act of voting (Vargas-Cullell and Rosero-Bixby 2004). Such stability is explained, in part, by the higher degree of interpersonal trust that has been found to be characteristic of neighbourhoods with active local citizen engagement (Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Booth and Richards 2006).

Given the critical role that it can have in fostering the conditions for citizen engagement in collaborative efforts to address issues of insecurity, the following sub-sections assess levels of social capital – understood along its three key dimensions of interpersonal trust, solidarity, and connections (engagement in community organizations) – in Jamaica.

Inter-Personal Trust as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica

Interpersonal trust is critical to the development and maintenance of any well-functioning voluntary relationship. Without some basic level of trust, members of a community would be less likely to initiate, invest in, or sustain neighbourhood groups and organizations (Simpson 2007). In the building of social capital, trust is an indispensable ingredient. In fact, some observers cite this form of

capital solely in terms of a community's inventory of interpersonal trust (e.g. (Helliwell and Putnam 2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Considering the line of argument that dealing with the problem of crime and insecurity is a “shared responsibility” requiring active community involvement, which in turn might reasonably be fuelled by trust among neighbours, responses to a question about trust in one's community are assessed here. The question (coded as IT1 in the AmericasBarometer) is worded as follows:

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

(1) Very trustworthy	(2) Somewhat trustworthy	(3) Not very trustworthy
(4) Untrustworthy	(88) DK	(98) DA

As indicated by Figure 6.10, individuals in Jamaica generally trust those from their neighbourhood: 68.4% of those surveyed express the view that their neighbours are either “somewhat” or “very trustworthy.” Only 11.7% of respondents describe people in the neighbourhood to be “untrustworthy.”




Figure 6.10. Level of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2014

With regard to how trust in neighbours has evolved over time in Jamaica, Figure 6.11 depicts national averages for this measure, for recent years, with responses scaled to run from 0 to 100, where the lowest value represents “untrustworthy” and the highest value represents “very trustworthy.” As shown, levels of interpersonal trust have been somewhat stable, with changes statistically insignificant over all periods, except for a decline between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 6.11. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2006-2014

What factors predict greater degrees of interpersonal trust? To answer this question, Figure 6.12 provides a graphical presentation of the statistical outcomes for a linear regression analysis. The analysis examines the extent to which personal characteristics, perceptions, and experiences explain differences in citizens' perception of the trustworthiness of their neighbours. As in previous charts such as this in this report, the horizontal orange line indicates the points at which estimates of zero (that is, of no relationship) are located. Each dot indicates the value of the standardized regression coefficient for the respective independent variable, and the 95% confidence interval around each coefficient is shown by a bar shaped as a horizontal "I" placed across the dot. Those coefficients with confidence intervals (horizontal "I"s) that intersect the orange line are not significant predictors (at $p < 0.05$) of citizens' trust in their neighbours.

As the figure shows, the coefficient for perception of insecurity is located completely to the left of the zero line, which signifies a negative and statistically significant relationship with citizens' level of trust in one another. In contrast, those factors that are completely to the right of the zero line are positively related to interpersonal trust. These include neighbours' willingness to help, neighbours get along with each other, wealth, and age.




Figure 6.12. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2014

The charts in Figure 6.13 illustrate bivariate relationships between interpersonal trust and a set of key significant variables from the regression analysis. As the graphs at the top of the figure show, people with perceptions that residents in their neighbourhoods get along with one another and are willing to help each other tend to have higher levels of interpersonal trust than those with the opposite views. The association with sense of insecurity is negative, meaning that the more unsafe people feel in their communities, the less trusting they tend to be of their neighbours. The final chart shows that age is positively associated with interpersonal trust: older persons trust more in people from their community.




Figure 6.13. Interpersonal Trust by Social Solidarity, Sense of Reciprocity, Perception of Insecurity and Age, Jamaica 2014

Sense of Solidarity and Willingness to Intervene

The core of what is commonly referred to as “collective efficacy” is the notion that well-organized communities are usually able to exert some control over the behaviour of fellow members due primarily to the fact that there is pervasive trust and solidarity among individuals and neighbourhood groups. In areas where residents are strongly bonded to each other, there will be a willingness to help or to act in the interest of others and on behalf of community “for the common good.” Collective efficacy might, therefore, be a useful resource in ensuring or enforcing social order in a community. It is considered a key element in community participation and a valuable mechanism for social control.

In this section, responses to items IVOL16 and IVOL17 are analysed to establish the extent to which Jamaican neighbourhoods are characterized by social solidarity and the inclination for reciprocity among members. These items, used as independent variables in the analysis in the preceding sub-section, are worded as follows:

IVOL16. People in my neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbours.			
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	
(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA (Refused)
IVOL17. People in my neighbourhood generally get along with each other. [Read alternatives]			
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	
(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA (Refused)

A description of responses to these items is shown in Figure 6.14. Starting with the issue of social solidarity, among those responding to item IVOL17, only 12.9% are unambiguous in their opinion that people in their community generally get along with each other. Another 52.5% are somewhat certain that their neighbours are close-knit, and only 3.9% of respondents indicate that community members definitely do not get along.

On the question of willingness to reciprocate, the distribution of responses is fairly similar to those for the previous item. As shown in the right pie chart of Figure 6.14, 13.5% express certainty that neighbours would lend a helping hand to someone in need, with another 47.9% giving tentative support for the statement. Approximately 1 in 5 Jamaicans are of the opinion that members of their community might not be very willing to assist a neighbour in distress.




Figure 6.14. Sense of Solidarity and Willingness to Intervene, Jamaica 2014

Citizens' Participation in Community Organizations

Membership in local organizations has been found to be a significant predictor of aptitude for cooperation in community-level development initiatives (Krishna 2002; Narayan and Pritchett 1999), and, when used as an indicator of social capital (Helliwell and Putnam 1995), it positively correlates with regional economic development (see also Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2007). Indeed, the role of active civic participation in the building and maintenance of a stable democracy is widely acknowledged (Ouma 2007; Vargas-Cullell and Rosero-Bixly 2004).

In Jamaica, citizens' participation in their communities usually takes the form of membership in community groups and organizations; attendance at meetings and functions; making monetary

contributions to community efforts; helping to solve community difficulties or resolve disputes; and so on. Such involvement may be channelled through citizens' associations; parent-teachers associations; youth clubs; farmers' groups; church groups; sporting association; neighbourhood watch; and music and entertainment-related groups. In the case of this report, the focus is on citizens' level of involvement in their communities based on their responses to the series of questions about association with the entities referred to in the box below. This battery of questions has been asked in the AmericasBarometer survey instrument for all rounds in which Jamaica has been included, which allows the opportunity to examine trends in participation over time.

In this study, "community participation" is measured in terms of reported participation with locally-based organizations, excluding political parties and groups such as trade associations and unions. In order to provide a comprehensive measure of these items, an overall scale of civil society participation was calculated by converting the four response categories onto a 0-100 scale, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently (once a week) in a group. Following this conversion, the items were combined into an additive index. In the analyses that follow, the figures and discussion present each of the three measures individually and, as well, the additive "community participation" measure: the CP Index.

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them ...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them ...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. Meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? Do you attend them ...	1	2	3	4	88	98

Figure 6.15 shows degrees of participation in the respective organizations and with respect to the CP Index. Clearly, participation at the community level, based on all three indicators, is quite low in Jamaica in 2014. As has been the case in all previous LAPOP studies, attendance to religious meetings is much higher than the other two entities but still falls below the 50-point mark on the 0 to 100 scale. Reported participation in religious groups averages 48 on the 100-point scale, while for parent association and community improvement association, the national means are at 24.2 and 13.3 points, respectively.




Figure 6.15. Degree of Participation in Community Groups and Organizations, Jamaica 2014

Figure 6.16 indicates a pattern of overall decline in participation in key community groups in Jamaica over the period under review. The most striking decline when 2006 is compared to 2014 is the nearly 17 degree drop in attendance to religious functions. It is notable, though, that in the case of all three indices, attendance has been generally stable since the 2010 survey. Average participation, as summarized by the community participation index, reflects the general trend of lower citizen involvement in local organizations and groups in the 2010-2014 period, compared to previous years.




Figure 6.16. Degree of Participation in Community Groups and Organizations over Time, Jamaica 2006-2014

Factors Associated with Levels of Community Participation in Jamaica

In an attempt to determine which factors are associated with a greater or lesser level of civil society participation in Jamaica, Figure 6.17 examines some factors that might be considered of relevance to participatory tendencies: political interest, electoral engagement (voting), gender, and size of town. Each graph within the figure presents the bivariate relationship between one of those variables, on the one hand, and the community participation index on the other hand.

The results of these analyses show that as interest in politics increases, level of participation in community activities also increases. In addition, those who engage in elections by voting are more likely to participate in community groups. Further, females are more likely to participate than males.

Interestingly, there is very little difference in participation rates by size of the city/town in which an individual resides, though those in the capital show a somewhat lesser tendency to participate than those in the rest of the country.




Figure 6.17. Degree of Community Participation by Interest in Politics, Gender, Voting Behaviour and Size of Town of Residence, Jamaica 2014

IV. Conclusion

This chapter shines a spotlight on individuals and communities, given their relevance to contemporary approaches to addressing issues of crime and insecurity that take into account both the localized nature of crime and the utility of involving citizens programs and policies designed at improving security. In the latter part of the chapter, the focus is on assessing active local civil participation and interpersonal trust, which constitute a community's stock of social capital. Social capital is purported to be a community's inventory of social trust and norms of reciprocity embedded in social networks that have been found to facilitate collective actions. The cohesion among groups that it generates is assumed to have implications for different aspects of community wellbeing, including neighbourhood safety and security.

Again, in this round of the AmericasBarometer survey, crime and crime-related concerns are identified as the most serious problem facing Jamaica. At the same time, the analysis of questions relating to crime and insecurity reveals a general downward trend in both crime victimization and citizens' sense of neighbourhood insecurity over the five rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey. A



key finding is the location where most criminal acts are experienced. The plurality of victims, 41.8%, report that they experienced the criminal act at home. 33.7% report that the incident took place elsewhere in their neighbourhood. In total, nearly 3 out of 4 of all victims report that they were victimized in their neighbourhood. These numbers effectively underscore the point that crime is predominantly a community problem, and as a consequence, requires a community response.

Communities' capacity for interventions that would facilitate the reduction of exclusions and disparities which engender division, distrust and conflict are assumed to be greater to the degree that social capital is greater. From this perspective, the findings of falling levels of community participation and (albeit slightly) lower interpersonal trust seem to augur poorly for an "active local citizenship approach" to treating with the problems of neighbourhood crime and insecurity. This seemingly inauspicious outlook is, however, counterbalanced by findings that the majority of Jamaicans express the feelings that members of their communities are strongly bonded to each other, and would be a willingness to help or to act in the interest of others and on behalf of their community "for the common good." This inventory of collective efficacy and the large albeit declining stock of social capital may be a useful resource in efforts to ensure social order in community.

Appendix

**Appendix 6.1. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Jamaica, 2014
(Figure 6.12)**

	Coefficients	(t)
Years of Education	0.019	(0.64)
18-25 years	-0.030	(-1.23)
26-35 years	-0.030	(-1.06)
46-55 years	0.056*	(2.17)
56-65 years	0.029	(1.00)
66+ years	0.063*	(2.69)
Female	-0.044	(-1.89)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.060*	(2.34)
Urban	0.005	(0.19)
Community Participation	0.020	(0.80)
Tolerance	-0.040	(-1.54)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.134*	(-5.39)
Neighbours Get Along	0.267*	(7.40)
Neighbours Willing to Help	0.217*	(5.89)
Personal Crime Victimization	-0.044	(-1.81)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	40.40	
Number of cases	1321	
R-Squared	0.26	
Regression-Standardized coefficients with t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for the survey design * p<0.05		

Chapter 7. Citizens' Attitudes towards the Police in Jamaica: Implications for Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime Control

Anthony A. Harriott and Balford A. Lewis

I. Introduction

Trust in the police, much like trust in any one person or institution, essentially implies a belief that law enforcement officers have what Hardin (2006, 17) denominates as “the right intentions” and behaviour toward citizens to the extent that they seek to perform to a society’s expectations in the delivery of their prescribed duties and obligations. As a branch of the criminal justice system, the police are assigned the very important tasks of controlling crime, preventing disorder, and ensuring procedural justice. In return, they are expected to wield their authority in a fair, competent, certain, and impartial way, thereby ensuring that they provide protection and reassurance effectively and equally across society.

Indeed, in a democracy, state institutions are expected to serve the interests of citizens and the nation in general. In liberal democratic contexts these institutions are required to be responsive to citizens’ needs and expectations. Their image and citizens’ evaluation of their performance are hinged upon their success in engaging the citizenry and in building public trust. Some argue that the increased attention by social scientists to the study of trust as a general concept is likely the result of a trend of decline among western countries in confidence in social institutions such as the government, media, church and even the family (Anheier and Kendall 2002, 343). In the past in Jamaica, concerns have been raised about the problems of low and decreasing levels of confidence in major state institutions, particularly those responsible for public safety, and the implications of this trend for system legitimacy (Harriott 2001).

Like other state institutions, the police must enjoy the trust and respect of citizens if it is to be an efficient and effective public service institution. In other words, the police cannot be considered a legitimate institution of the state if the public does not have the sufficient confidence in its ability to ensure citizen security. In this way, the question of legitimacy is part and parcel of the measure of the quality of the relationship between police and citizens. Paraphrasing Peter Blau’s exchange theorizing on “the development of legitimate institutional power,” Wallace and Wolf (1998, 336) explain that, “the major determinant of legitimacy is found in the exchange aspect of power – namely, whether subordinates feel that power is being exercised not merely fairly but generously.” Legitimacy then, and hence trust in a public institutions, devolves power to authority “because legitimacy makes it right and proper to obey...” (Wallace and Wolf 1998, 336).

A conflictual relationship between police and citizens has been a longstanding feature of Jamaica’s security situation. Early attempts to establish a police force date to the seventeenth century but the first efforts to establish a permanent force were made in 1832, prior to the abolition of slavery in the Anglophone Caribbean. However, the observed inadequacy of that force at the time of the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 inspired the formation of what has evolved into the modern Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Yet, recorded instances of major events involving violent confrontations with the police continued, including the response to the Montego Bay “riot” of 1911, labour unrest of

1938, the Coral Gardens (in Montego Bay) clashes with Rastafarians in 1963, the Braeton killings of 2001, and the Tivoli Gardens clashes of 2001 and 2010.

Some sources have charged the police in Jamaica as militaristic and authoritarian in its approach to controlling crime, especially with regard to its regular use of special operational units (e.g. Meeks 2001). In addition, some vocal sectors of civil society cite brutality, extra-judicial killings, bias, and lack of professionalism (Gomes 2007). It is against this sort of background that the commissioner of the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) emphasized in his 2012 report that a “generally held feeling that agents of the state can act with impunity regardless of our most fundamental rights will lead to mistrust and challenge the moral argument for the state’s monopoly on the use of force” (Williams 2012, i). Similarly, Edmonds (2012) suggests that a successful fight against crime on the part of Jamaica’s police will require the “long and difficult task” of earning citizens’ trust and support.

Yet, the police in their own defence maintain that their use of what might be perceived as excessive force is, at times, related to the types of criminals they face and the high levels of violent crime that Jamaica experiences (see ESSJ 2013). Even Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), a very active civil rights organization, has noted the dangerous working environment for police that is based on an undesirable combination of gang activities, drug running, weapons possession, and the persistent problem of youth involvement in crime, likely the result of high youth unemployment levels as reflected at one point in 34% of the youth in the 15-24 age group being unemployed (Gomes 2007; see also UNDP 2012 regarding unemployment). Evidence of a high proportion of young males among the unemployed and under-employed, on the one hand, and their over-representation in the crime statistics on the other, has buttressed this view (see Pryce 2001).

Tension between the police and citizens in Jamaica over recent years has emerged from the incidence of police shootings, resulting in many instances in the deaths of the civilians involved. A report in the Jamaican newspaper *The Gleaner* from December 4, 2013, for instance, stated that police shot a man who allegedly engaged them in a shoot-out in the sometimes volatile area of August Town in the Jamaican capital. Individual citizens as well as organized rights groups such as JFJ¹ and Families Against State Terrorism (FAST) have regularly protested against what they have described as unwarranted shootings on the part of Jamaica’s police. Allegations of the existence of death squads within the force, though vehemently denied by the police, resonate negatively within a large segment of the public to the detriment of improved police-community relations and the reputation of the force. In response to such public anxiety, the police announced in a recent official Constabulary Communications Commission (CCN) release, the intention of the Police High Command “to probe allegations of police excesses” based on “recent complaints from citizens regarding the conduct of some of its members while on operational duties” (Johnson 2013). It is striking that there is evidence of recent downward trends in the number of deaths at the hands of the police, notably in 2014 (Williams 2014).

In the following sections we examine questions related to citizens’ attitudes toward the police, starting with an analysis of items examining different aspects of the issue of citizens’ trust and

¹ For example, “JFJ works primarily with the families of victims whose rights have been breached by members of the security forces, ranging from unlawful search or detention, to excessive use of force and extra-judicial killings....While we primarily carry out our work independently...we also collaborate with like-minded local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based citizens’ groups” (JFJ Report 2012, 1).

confidence in members of the police force. The chapter then examines citizens' evaluation of police performance and experiences with police corruption and harassment.

II. Trust in the Police

Since the AmericasBarometer was first carried out in Jamaica in 2006, the survey has tracked citizens' level of trust in the police and other key national institutions. A battery of questions used to measure citizens' level of trust in selected institutions asks respondents to rate their level of trust on a 1-7 scale, for which 1 signifies no trust at all and 7 a lot of trust. We begin our examination of citizens' attitudes toward the police by analyzing responses to the following item:

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of responses on this scale. As depicted by the fact that 25.1% fall into the first category, 1 in 4 Jamaicans express a total lack of confidence in the police. This is compared to less than 6.7% who express having a lot of trust in the police. The intensity of citizens' mistrust is further highlighted by the fact that while only about 27% of respondents express a moderate to a high level of trust by selecting 5, 6, or 7 on the scale, about 55% identified their sense of trust at the low end of the scale by choosing a score between 1 and 3.




Figure 7.1. Citizens' Trust in the Police in Jamaica, 2014

In order to facilitate interpretation and comparison of the findings of this 2014 study with results of previous years, the scale of responses presented in Figure 7.1 is recalibrated from 0-100, where 0 signifies no trust at all in the police and 100 represents a lot of trust. Figure 7.2 shows average national trust in the police on this 0-100 scale for the 2006 to 2014 studies. As illustrated by the graph, the trend of a progressive decline in confidence over the first three rounds of the AmericasBarometer

was broken in 2012, with a significant, 16-degree increase in trust in the police between 2010 and 2012. In 2014, however, citizens' belief in the police declined by 10 points to 38.3 on the 100-point scale, the second lowest level of trust in the police since the first AmericasBarometer survey in Jamaica in 2006.




Figure 7.2. Average (0-100) Degree of Trust in Police over Time in Jamaica, 2006-2014

Factors Associated with Trust in the Police

Studies have found that citizens' attitudes vary according to the nature of their encounters with the police; policing style; perceptions of police agencies; policing as an occupation (Frank, Smith, and Novak 2005); perception of personal safety (Chow 2012); degree of militarization (see Wyrick 2013, 45-46); as well as a range of socio-economic factors. In this section, we deepen our understanding of the factors that best explain differences in levels of trust in the police among Jamaicans through the employment of regression analysis. The selection of independent variables for the equation is based, on the one hand, on the assumption that persons who regularly participate in collaborative efforts to improve the quality of life in their community are likely to be more trusting of the police. Also, given Jamaica's high rate of serious crimes and low conviction rates, those who have been a victim of crime are expected to be less trusting of the police, since such experiences might undermine perceptions of police legitimacy and, in turn, citizens' level of confidence in such institution. Additionally, given the high levels of insecurity in the country, and public concern regarding inefficacy of police response to the problem, we expect that citizens' senses of security and their attitudes toward extra-judicial or vigilante measures should be related to their levels of trust in the police.

Figure 7.3 provides a graphical summary of the outcome of the analysis. Once again in this report, only those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal "I"s) that do not intersect the orange

line are statistically significant predictors ($p < 0.05$) of trust in the police. The results of the analysis indicate that confidence in the efficacy of the penal system, perceptions of insecurity, level of community involvement, and older age are all positively correlated with citizens' degree of trust in the police. Showing statistically significant negative effects are crime victimization, support for vigilante justice, and urban residence. In other words, those who have been the victim of a crime in the past year, those who support vigilante justice, and those who reside in urban (versus rural) areas are less trusting of the police.




Figure 7.3. Determinants of Trust in the Police, Jamaica 2014

To further illustrate the nature of some of these relationships, trust in the police is cross-tabulated with a set of variables graphed in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. Figure 7.4 affirms that respondents who reported that they were the victims of a crime in the 12 months preceding the survey trust less in the police. Similarly, those who have little or no confidence in the ability of the justice system to punish the guilty trust in the police significantly less than those who have any confidence in the efficacy of the justice system. Regarding vigilante justice, despite some peaks and valleys, there is a downward trajectory indicating an overall negative relationship between the variables. As illustrated, persons who strongly support the use of vigilante measures in crime control efforts are likely to be less trusting of law enforcement officers. Lastly, those who actively participate in their community tend to have higher levels of trust in the police. It is important to note that the results in Figure 7.4 should not be interpreted as presenting one particular causal story, given that people's lack of confidence in the police could, in turn, also result in a tendency to have less confidence in the judiciary, have more support for the use of vigilante approaches to crime control, and participate in the community at a lower rate.




Figure 7.4. Trust in Police by Crime Victimization, Confidence in the Judiciary, Support for Vigilante Justice, and Community Participation, Jamaica 2014

Figure 7.5 illustrates the relationships between trust in the police, on the one hand, and age and place of residence, on the other hand. Respondents with higher levels of education are significantly less trusting of the police. Trust in the police increases with age, as those who are 56 years old, or older, trust more in the police than their younger counterparts.




Figure 7.5. Trust in Police by Level of Education and Age Group, Jamaica 2014

III. Citizens' Evaluation of the Performance of the Police

The January-March 2014 quarterly performance report published on the Jamaica Constabulary Force's (JCF's) website states that the JCF "continues to perform at a high standard within a very challenging environment." Assessments of this sort are typically based on the control of serious and other crimes from the standpoint of numerical reduction or containment. So, in a country with an exceptionally high murder rate, and a high rate of serious crimes more generally, any reduction in the incidence of these crimes by parish, urban/rural settings, police division, or for the nation as a whole tends to be viewed as a success on the part of the police. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, any appreciable improvement in attitudes toward the police will require enhanced performance, not only with regard to the basic safety and security functions, but equally in terms of outcomes related to the integrity of the personnel and systems of accountability, and regard for the rights of citizens (UNDP 2012).

Police performance is typically assessed in terms of numerical reductions in the various categories of crime; hence, it is understandable that assessments of police performance would assign priority weighting to declines in the more serious crimes. However, the systematic measurement of police successes or failures in terms of crime rates is problematic because reliable measures are either absent or deemed inadequate. Instead, evaluating police performance by asking citizens themselves how they view the job the police are doing in their communities can provide a more appropriate measure of how safe individuals feel in their communities and how well they think the police force is doing its job. Assessing police performance using public opinion is particularly relevant in Jamaica

given that the police are expected to be highly involved in the community by providing support for organizations like the Neighbourhood Watch Programme; work with youth through the police force's youth clubs programme, including the Safe Schools Programme; and targeted policing strategies such as "Operation Resilience."

The AmericasBarometer includes the following questions to measure citizen evaluations of police performance:

POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied , or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighbourhood? [If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) NS (98) NR				
IVOL14. Taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your neighbourhood are in controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, neither good nor poor job, a fairly poor job or a very poor job? (1) very good job (2) fairly good job (3) neither good nor poor job (4) fairly poor job (5) very poor job (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)				

Figure 7.6 displays the results for question IVOL14. It shows that the majority of respondents (61.8%) feel that the police are doing a good job in controlling crime in their neighbourhoods. This proportion comprises 19.1% that view police performance as "very good" and 42.7% as "fairly good." On the other hand, 21.1% of Jamaicans think the police do a poor job in controlling crime in their neighbourhoods.




Figure 7.6. Citizens' Evaluation of Performance of the Police in Jamaica, 2014

As displayed in Figure 7.7, 2 out of 3 respondents (approximately 68%) indicate that they are satisfied with the police. This majority includes 60.6% who responded that they are "very satisfied"

with police performance and 7.3% who said they are “satisfied.” In contrast, 32% of Jamaicans report some level of dissatisfaction with the police in 2014.




Figure 7.7. Citizens’ Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of the Police in Jamaica, 2014

These results are important because they contrast, to some degree, with the results for trust in the police. They suggest that there is a tendency among individuals to report more positive evaluations of the work that police are doing in their own communities and yet less positive evaluations of the police force in general.

Factors Associated with Positive Evaluation of the Police

Identifying the types of citizens who are more likely to evaluate the police as doing a good job in controlling crime, specifically, in their neighbourhoods could provide valuable information about the nature of police performance across Jamaica. To determine the individual-level factors associated with more positive views of the police, Figure 7.8 displays the results of a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is a recoded measure of IVOL14, where those who evaluated the police’s effectiveness in controlling crime as fairly or very good recoded as 1 and all other responses are coded as 0. Once again we test the hypothesis that active involvement in community development activities is related to perceptions of and attitudes toward the police. The model also controls for trust in the police, assuming that this factor might be influential in both directions. That is, positive evaluations of the police can engender greater trust in the institution and vice versa. Further, it is assumed that people’s experience with crime and their sense of safety can affect their assessment of police performance.

The results in Figure 7.8 show that while trust in the police increases the likelihood of positively evaluating police performance in controlling crime, crime victimization, feelings of insecurity, urban residence, and greater household wealth all decrease this likelihood.




Figure 7.8. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of the Police in Jamaica, 2014

To further illustrate some of the relationships outlined above, Figure 7.9 presents bivariate relations between the dependent variable, on the one hand, and a set of independent variables, on the other. The line graph in the upper left quadrant of the figure illustrates the nature of the relationship between trust in the police and citizens' assessment of police performance. As the direction of the line indicates, as confidence in the police increases, assessment of their performance increases. It could be reasonably inferred that the converse is also true: positive evaluation of the police's effectiveness in controlling neighbourhood crime is associated with higher levels of trust in the force.

As observed in the bar graph located in the upper right quadrant of Figure 7.9, positive impressions of the police are negatively related to perception of insecurity. Respondents who reported feeling very unsafe in their neighbourhood are two times less positive in their evaluation of the efforts of the police. Finally, the bar graphs at the bottom of the figure show that rural dwellers and Jamaicans with lower household wealth are more likely to have positive evaluations of police performance in controlling crime in their communities.




Figure 7.9. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of the Police in Jamaica, 2014

IV. Perceptions of Police Misconduct

Police misconduct can be broadly divided into two strands: corruption, which may have a myriad of sub-categories; and citizen abuse, which can also take a variety of forms and might be physical as well as emotional in nature (Rossof, Pontell, and Tillman 2007; Delatre 2002).

Some sources in Jamaica, including several vocal civil society entities, have cited evidence of police misconduct, elements ranging from bias toward citizens in carrying out their responsibilities (Chevannes 2001), to a lack of professionalism, and even illegality of conduct (Gomes 2007), including kidnappings, wrongful arrest, and leaking of sensitive information to criminals. In a 2009 newspaper article in *The Gleaner*, Quill (2009) makes reference to rogue cops who participate in activities ranging from “working with drug traffickers, protecting shipments, taking bribes, shaking down criminals supplying ammunition to leaking information to criminals.” The author also identifies other types of police misconduct and citizen abuse, including false arrests, shootings, and brutality, and called on the police federation to be more attentive to corruption or alleged misconduct in the ranks of the force. According to the CHDR (2012, 85), in the Caribbean in general, “specialized police units dedicated to responding to gangs are themselves frequently the target of suspicions about serious misconduct and human rights violations” (CHDR 2012, 85). Moreover, the Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2014 (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2013) report cites numerous instances of arrests of police personnel on charges of misconduct.

The following sections examine the problems of bribe taking and citizen harassment as elements of police misconduct in Jamaica.

Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police

Bribery is a major element in corruption, and unfortunately bribe-giving and bribe-taking are also a significant features of many transactions involving state institutions in the developing world (Pogge 2000; Treisman 2000; see also Dewey 2012). Soliciting bribes is also a major form of police misconduct in many of these countries (Ikovic 2003).

Media reports in Jamaica often point to the success of sting operations set up to snare police officers who are involved in corrupt practices. The police's Anti-Corruption Branch arrested 65 police personnel in 2013 alone. Of these, 47 of the police personnel were assigned to the Jamaica Constabulary Force and 11 to the then Island Special Constabulary Force (ISCF), whereas seven were special constables. Overall, for 2013 the Branch received about 1,184 reports that included 826 corruption-related cases (see *ESSJ* 2013, 24.9).

Like other crimes, bribe solicitation can be concentrated in certain areas or to individuals. Therefore, it is useful to get a picture of the extent to which the average citizen experiences bribery by the police force. In order to establish citizens' account of the pervasiveness of this form of misconduct, responses to the following question are analysed:

EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?			
(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) NS	(98) NR

Figure 7.10 shows that, on average in Jamaica, just under 6% of respondents indicate that a police officer solicited a bribe within the 12 months prior to the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey. Further, as illustrated in Figure 7.11, bribe solicitation rates by the police decreased steadily between 2006 and 2012, pushing back upward just slight, negligible amount in 2014.




Figure 7.10. Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police in Jamaica, 2014




Figure 7.11. Reported Bribe Solicitation by the Police over Time in Jamaica, 2006-2014

Perception of the Extent of Police Harassment

Harassment involves exposure to undue and often illicit attention perpetrated by some individual or group with power or authority, legal or illegal. In this regard, Hardin's (2003, 77) statement that a fundamental challenge of public administration in democratic governance "is how to design a state to protect the people against each other while not interfering in their lives beyond what is necessary to maintain social order" is quite relevant. From this perspective, harassment with impunity indicates a design or implementation flaw in police accountability to the public.

In Jamaica, media reports highlight from time to time citizens' complaints or protest action against what is perceived as unwarranted use of force against them or their community with allegations often highlighting the alleged victims' lower socio-economic situation, area of residence, or occupational status. This has been supported by scholarly accounts of the problems associated with stigmatization of entire poor, urban communities, with the argument that many such areas "are subject to over-policing" and "harassment based on a lower threshold of criminal guilt being applied to them relative to other citizens" and "are thus more likely to be unjustly arrested or detained" (Harriott 2001, 61). Other categories of misconduct include casual stops and searches of motor vehicles, illegal detentions, and false arrests, as well as the excessive use of force, including beatings and shootings. The general salience of the issue of police harassment in the Jamaican environment is evident in light of ongoing efforts to reform the police force and the quest to improve relationships between the police and the communities they serve (see JCF 2014; ESSJ 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey looks extensively at the problem of crime and insecurity, including an examination of the role of the police as an agency of formal control. With regard to the issue of citizens' encounters with the police in law enforcement or other policing activities, the survey asks respondents about concerns over harassment to determine the extent to which this is perceived to be a problem in citizen-police relations. To measure perceptions of police harassment, the following question was included in the 2014 survey:

IVOL15. To what extent is police harassment a problem in your neighbourhood? Is it: [Read alternatives]			
(1) A very big problem	(2) A big problem	(3) Neither a big nor small problem	
(4) A small problem	(5) No problem	(88) DK	(98) DA (Refused)

As shown in Figure 7.12, slightly less than a third of Jamaicans view police harassment as a problem to some degree in their neighbourhoods. However, the vast majority of respondents do not think that police harassment was a problem in their communities. This comports with the earlier description of evaluations of police efforts in the community, which tend toward the positive.




Figure 7.12. Reported Levels of Police Harassment in Jamaica, 2014

V. Implications for Police-Citizen Partnership in Crime Control

Confidence is an essential element for a “good” or effective relationship between police and citizens (Loader 2006). Yet, scholarly and official sources acknowledge a trust and confidence deficit spanning many years in Jamaica. The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey affirms that there continues to be a trust deficit, with over half of citizens reporting low levels of trust in the police force (Figure 7.1 of this chapter). Yet, interestingly, when it comes to citizens’ evaluations of the work that police are doing in their own neighbourhoods, they are more positive. And, further, average national rates of bribe solicitation by the police remain low. This suggests that, while the average person’s observations of or encounters with the police at the local level are benign, there is an impression of the police that the broader, national force contains elements and behaviours that are untrustworthy. Those perceptions may be fuelled by the involvement of some police in instances of misconduct, which are appropriately reported on to the national citizenry who, in turn, reasonably express low general trust in the police.

If the police are to become more trusted in the public eye, they must be less reliant on the use of force, and they must do so by continuing to improve their crime control performance, displaying greater respect for the rights of all citizens, and improving integrity within their ranks. Moreover, although rates of crime victimization, complaints of harassment, and bribe-solicitation are relatively low, these incidents can have a significant impact in public confidence in the police. Official efforts to address these problems cannot be purely aimed at perception management; that is, simply telling the public that misconduct is limited to a minority of police officers. Visible behavioural change is required, which simultaneously should be encouraged by appropriately structuring the relationship between the police and the public.

Inarguably, public trust and confidence in the police are related in part to the state of police-community partnerships which are structured in different ways in Jamaica. They include partnerships in policing neighbourhoods, such as neighbourhood watch systems through which the citizens actively participate as extensions of the police. There are also partnerships with civic groups to accomplish specific local projects, as well as partnerships to accomplish more transformative and programmatic objectives, such as community policing or “proximity policing” which entail developing new types of relationships between police and citizens. It cannot be over emphasized that all of these sorts of projects require a greater degree of mutual trust and confidence between police and the public. The police may have to improve their organizational structure to accommodate these strategies at the local or community level.

VI. Conclusion

This chapter focuses on citizens’ attitudes towards the police and the implications of such attitudes for police-citizen partnership in controlling neighbourhood crime. It examines questions pertaining to trust in the police, citizens’ evaluation of police performance and level of satisfaction with the performance of members of the force. The chapter also takes a look at reported bribe solicitation on the part of police officers and citizens accounts of the extent of harassment by the police as key aspects of police misconduct in Jamaica.

Consistent with their mandate, police as law enforcers are expected to conduct themselves equably and act with due regard to the rights and expectations of citizens. Indeed, the public’s evaluation of the police is closely linked to police success in embracing citizens’ confidence and support. In this regard, a nearly 10-point decline in public trust in the police between 2012 and 2014 should be cause for concern.

On the question of police performance, 61.8% evaluate the police’s efforts in their neighbourhoods as “good” or “very good.” Crime victimization, support for vigilante justice, lack of trust in the ability of the justice system to punish the guilty, low community participation, and urban residence all decrease the probability of having positive evaluations of police performance.

With regard to bribe solicitation by the police, rates have been relatively stable since 2006, with a slight downward trend leading into 2012. In 2014, the national average rate of bribe solicitation was just marginally higher than it was in 2012, but still quite low and within the range that it has been in recent years according to the AmericasBarometer survey.

One broad implication of the findings is that the police will attract more trust and support to the extent that they become more effective and less dependent on the use of force and harassment of citizens; exhibit increased respect for citizen rights; and improve levels of integrity within the force. Some decentralization of tasks and roles together with more robust internal and external accountability, monitoring and evaluation may be required for the attainment of substantial change in the force and as a consequence earning increased citizen trust and support while fomenting even better police-community relations.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1. Determinants of Trust in the Police, Jamaica 2014
(Figure 7.3)

	Coefficients	(t)
Years of Education	-0.000	(-0.01)
18-25 years	0.012	(0.36)
26-35 years	0.052	(1.79)
46-55 years	0.021	(0.62)
56-65 years	0.085*	(2.76)
66+ years	0.171*	(7.76)
Female	0.039	(1.45)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.049	(-1.98)
Urban	-0.061*	(-2.27)
Personal Crime Victimization	-0.057*	(-2.41)
Vigilante Justice	-0.088*	(-3.62)
Community Participation	0.066*	(2.29)
Perception of Insecurity	0.003	(0.11)
Justice System Punishes the Guilty	0.271*	(9.59)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	16.05	
Number of cases	1359	
R-Squared	0.15	
Regression-Standardized coefficients with t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for the survey design * p<0.05		

Appendix 7.2. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of the Police, Jamaica 2014 (Figure 7.9)

	Coefficients	(t)
Years of Education	-0.122	(-1.51)
18-25 years	-0.134	(-1.95)
26-35 years	-0.070	(-0.90)
46-55 years	0.015	(0.22)
56-65 years	0.029	(0.34)
66+ years	-0.003	(-0.04)
Female	-0.017	(-0.31)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.131*	(-2.02)
Urban	-0.196*	(-3.02)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.325*	(-6.30)
Personal Crime Victimization	-0.161*	(-2.56)
Trust in Police	0.674*	(7.77)
Community Participation	0.059	(0.84)
Constant	0.595*	(8.54)
F	11.89	
Number of cases	1413	
Regression-Standardized coefficients with t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for the survey design * p<0.05		

Chapter 8. Beyond Crime and Security: Perceptions of Jamaicans on Selected Citizen Rights, Actions, and Issues

Balford A. Lewis and Kenisha V. Nelson

I. Introduction

While formal democratic procedures revolve around elections, robust liberal democracies are marked by, among other things, an ethos of choice, peaceful coexistence, participation, and inclusiveness. Jamaica is commonly described as a stable democracy, founded on the British tradition, and exists within the wider democratic dynamic of the Caribbean (Potter et al. 2004, 448). Like many countries of the region, it wrestles with chronic crime and security-related challenges, including increasing incidence of human rights denial and abuse in some spheres (Williams 2012); issues that can, in effect, undermine a culture of inclusion, tolerance, and participation.

In a democracy, the rights of all of citizens are expected to be respected and duly protected. Tolerance, which is about the support for political as well as social rights of minorities, rests on this principle. This chapter focuses on issues of tolerance and inclusion in Jamaica. Specifically, it examines attitudes and perceptions on selected topics relating to social tolerance, social activism, and social responsibility, including analysis to identify the characteristics of citizens who are likely to exhibit these traits.

II. The Construct of Tolerance

Tolerance is understood in this report as the extent to which people respect and accommodate the views, positions, and behaviours of others, especially those that are at odds with the sentiments and practices of the majority (Bromwell 2008). Tolerance is a critical ingredient in the maintenance of a democracy. It is central to the process of conflict resolution and compromise in an environment of competing views and interests. A democracy depends on the input of those with opposing and even unpopular views. The extent to which the system entertains and protects the rights of those holding differing views from the majority is one aspect that determines the sustainability of a democratic system of government. At the least, the level of public support for tolerance of minority views has obvious and important implications for the degree and quality of citizens' participation in the governmental process. Yet the creation of such an inclusive and tolerant atmosphere continues to be viewed as one of the "key challenges in constructing and deepening democracy in our hemisphere" (Seligson and Moreno Morales 2010).

Social tolerance constitutes civility and inclusiveness in practice (Schatz 2003) and relates to the respect for the personal choices and lifestyle interests of others even when those preferences vary from one's own and/or the majority. Intolerance implies a tendency for social exclusion and a support for discrimination. One demographic that has been the victim of social *exclusion* in Jamaica is the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Community. Over the years, the AmericasBarometer has collected data on the level of support for the civil and political rights of

homosexuals as an indicator of social tolerance, and these data are analysed in this chapter as a way to further understand social tolerance in Jamaica.

It has been suggested that “in hugely interesting ways, states have come to see that their political power, their legitimacy, indeed their standing as global citizens, are now bound up with how they recognize and treat ‘their’ gay citizens” (Franke 2009, 4-5). Jamaica has been commonly described by international human rights and homosexual activists as “homophobic,” having displayed conspicuous anti-gay tendencies and actions (Strommen 2014). The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey found that the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans were strongly opposed to having homosexuals “enjoy the basic democratic right of the freedom to run for public office” (Harriott and Lewis 2012, 196). Such antipathy pervades all strata of the polity and is purported to be “undergirded by the retained Offences against the Person Act that refers to ‘the abominable crime of buggery’” (Green 2010). Some argue that this discrimination is because of the culture of *machismo* (Morales 1996), while others cite “the overall low level of education of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean compared to North America” (Seligson and Moreno Morales 2010). It is fair to say that no single cause is likely to explain attitudes toward gay individuals in a country such as Jamaica; rather, what we can do is to examine levels of tolerance/acceptance of the rights of homosexuals and the predictors of those attitudes.

This is an opportune moment to assess attitudes toward homosexuals in Jamaica for a number of reasons. First, the topic has recently been particularly salient in the country. For example, agitation over increased tolerance towards homosexuals and counter-arguments spilled over into a wider activist movement and debate that culminated in major street protests in 2014. Second, several across the Americas countries have been offering equal rights to same-sex couples (Forgie 2011). These changes are consistent with a more general push, globally, to ensure civil rights for homosexuals, including official recognition of same-sex marriage. Third, LAPOP has been asking questions about attitudes toward homosexuals in Jamaica for several rounds of the AmericasBarometer, which allows for interesting cross-time analysis on this topic.

The following sections examine the level of social tolerance estimated by gauging citizens’ support for homosexuals to be allowed some basic civil and political rights that are freely enjoyed by others in society.

III. Support for the Rights of Homosexuals in Jamaica

As previously stated, the term social tolerance speaks, generally, to respect for the personal interests, preferences, and lifestyle choices of fellow citizens. In the section below, we examine citizens’ attitudes to the issue of rights of homosexuals as an indicator of social tolerance in Jamaica. We gauge citizens’ support for civil and political rights of this demographic by analysing responses to the following item:

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure 8.1 summarizes the attitudes of respondents to this dimension of tolerance. As indicated, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans are intensely opposed to allowing homosexuals the basic

democratic right of running for public office. Some 7 out of 10 or, 69%, selected the most extreme level of disapproval while only about 5% responded that they “strongly approve.” Disapprove




Figure 8.1. Approval for Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office in Jamaica, 2014

Caribbean nationals have tended to express a strong opposition to homosexuality, with earlier AmericasBarometer surveys indicating that in the Americas, Haiti and Jamaica have been consistently among the most resolute opponents homosexual's political rights in the region. Though not depicted in a graph here, that same result holds for the 2014 AmericasBarometer: once again Jamaica and Haiti rank lowest in the region on tolerance of the civic liberties of gay individuals.

To put these low levels in perspective, we can compare tolerance of the rights of gay individuals to run for office with tolerance of the rights of regime critics to participate in politics. In the AmericasBarometer study, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they support the rights of fellow citizens with whom they disagree, to run for political office as well as to enjoy some other basic democratic rights. In Figure 8.2 below, we display citizen support for political rights of others generally, compared with their support for the rights of homosexuals to enjoy similar rights. The marked difference (25.6 degrees) in these levels of support indicates the extent of the discriminatory tendencies towards homosexuals in Jamaica with regards to their right to freely participate in political processes.




Figure 8.2. Citizens' Support for the Political Rights of Regime Critics versus Support for the Political Rights of Homosexuals, Jamaica 2014

The question of whether homosexuals should be allowed to seek public office has been a subject of public debate in Jamaica for some time. It is therefore useful to establish how support for the rights of homosexuals in Jamaica has evolved over time. In order to facilitate this analysis, we recalibrated the information on the 10-point scale in Figure 8.1 to a 0 to 100 point scale, in which 0 signifies absolutely no support and 100 means unreserved support. As Figure 8.3 shows, there has been a pronounced change concerning the level of support for homosexual rights in Jamaica since 2006. Although the level of approval is generally low for all periods (the highest is 20.8 degrees), the outcome for 2008 points to a lowest level of support at 8.7 degrees. The nearly five-degree decline in 2014 compared to 2012, though not statistically significant, represents a substantial erosion of support in over two years (from 20.8 to 16 respectively).




Figure 8.3. Degree of Approval for Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office in Jamaica, 2006-2014

Who is more likely support the rights of homosexuals?

With such a substantial segment of the population in favour of denying of homosexuals the right to seek political office, it is useful to examine the types of citizens in a society that would be more likely to be tolerant of this minority group. With this objective in mind, a linear regression model comprised of selected socio-demographic and other relevant factors was tested and the results are presented graphically in Figure 8.4.

Given that churches have contributed to the marginalization of homosexuals in Jamaica by openly characterizing the lifestyle as an affront to the teachings of the Bible and as otherwise immoral, it is assumed that religiosity, measured here as the importance of religion in peoples' lives, would be a relevant factor in determining support for the political rights of homosexuals. The importance of education has also been cited (Seligson and Moreno Morales 2010). It is also assumed here that, given the pervasiveness of the intolerance shown towards gays in Jamaica, in addition to education, an individual's exposure to what is happening on this matter outside of Jamaica or awareness of current affairs may be an additional influencing factor. As a consequence, we control for "Attention to News," which is a measure of the frequency of attention to the news whether by TV, radio, newspapers or the internet. Level of community participation is deemed relevant and so the community participation index (see Chapter 6) is also added to the model. It also hypothesized that an individual's level of support for democracy can influence that individual's level of tolerance, hence the inclusion of a variable capturing this value.




Figure 8.4. Predictors of Homosexuals' Right to Run for Office, Jamaica 2014

Figure 8.4 provides a graphical summary of the outcome of this multivariate analysis. The results show that those who are more politically tolerant, female, and more educated are more tolerant of the right of gay individuals to run for political office. Wealth is also positively correlated with tolerance, but the result falls just outside the threshold for statistical significance in this study. Those who place a high level of importance on religion are less tolerant, as expected. In contrast, we did not find the hypothesized relationships for the attention to news and community participation measures.

The charts in Figure 8.5 further illustrate the nature of the relationship between support for the political/civic rights of homosexuals and a set of the above-noted independent variables. With regard to age and wealth, a statistically significant difference in support exists only between some cohorts and quintiles, respectively. Generally speaking those who are younger and those who are wealthier tend to be marginally more supportive of the rights of gay individuals to run for office in Jamaica.




Figure 8.5. Support for Rights of Homosexuals by Age, Political Tolerance, Wealth, and Gender, Jamaica 2014

IV. Support for Same Sex Marriage

We now examine citizens' attitudes toward homosexuals enjoying a basic civil right afforded to heterosexual couples – the right to marry. Not surprisingly, given the culture revealed in the above analyses and in previous LAPOP reports, the issue of same-sex marriage has not been well received in Jamaica, though it is a widely debated topic elsewhere in the region and beyond. In the United States, for example, the subject remains salient as many states legislate or contemplate legislation to permit same-sex marriage. Public opinion surveys show that 50% of Americans endorse the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and this level of support has been consistently increasing. The Pew Research Centre for People and the Press has asserted, in regard to its 2013 online survey results, that in the United States the “rise in support for same-sex marriage over the past decade is among the largest changes in opinion on any policy issue over this time period” (Pew Research Center 2013). In the Caribbean, however, those increasing levels of tolerance and acceptance found elsewhere have had little resonance in the debate about the rights of homosexuals in Jamaica, and previous AmericasBarometer surveys have found public support to be generally low across the region.

In this round, we continue to track citizens' attitude toward the issue by reviewing responses to the following item:

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

As illustrated by Figure 8.6, Jamaicans unequivocally reject the notion of same-sex couples being afforded the right to marry. Ninety six percent of those surveyed are either neutral or outright disapproving in that they selected “5” or below on the 10-point scale, with 89% expressing total disapproval by choosing “1.” This level of opposition is markedly stronger in 2014 than the stance taken against homosexuals being permitted to run for public office in Jamaica.




Figure 8.6. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2014

Again, for easy comparison over time, we reconfigured the response categories displayed in Figure 8.6 to a 0 to 100 point scale in which 0 signifies absolutely no support for gay marriage and 100 signifying the strongest level of support. When compared to the results for 2012 (Figure 8.7), there is virtually no change in the usual hard line rejection of same-sex marriage by Jamaicans in 2014. Although these recent results show a marginal increase in support since 2010 (3.5 to 5.1 degrees), the 1.6 degree change in citizens’ approval is not statistically significant, meaning that there has been technically no change in attitude over time on average in the country.




Figure 8.7. Approval of Same-sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2006-2014

V. Support for Abortion Rights

Another important social issue in Jamaica is the debate over abortion rights. Over the years since the 1970s the Jamaican government has facilitated reviews and adjustments of Jamaica's official abortion policy through consultations with stakeholder groups and members of the public. The main bodies in the ongoing process are the Abortion Policy Review Advisory Group and a Joint Select Committee of Parliament. The rationale offered is that there is a need to enact new legislation to regulate the use of the different termination procedures, given evidence of the risk to life and the "danger of unsafe abortions to women's reproductive health." This idea of offering the choice to have an abortion has, however, been resisted by the Church and others advancing the pro-life agenda (Maxwell 2012).

Sections 72 and 73 of Jamaica's Offences against the Person Act – dating from the nineteenth century – outlaw abortion or premature termination of a pregnancy (Ministry of Justice). The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that thousands of abortions are done in Jamaica annually and that complications resulting from unsafe termination practices rank within the top 10 causes of death among Jamaican mothers (Campbell 2014). While no official figures were located for Jamaica, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reports 31 unsafe abortions per 1,000 for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 (PAHO 2011). PAHO defines unsafe an abortion "as a procedure for terminating a pregnancy performed by persons lacking the necessary skills or in an environment not in conformity with minimum medical standards" (Ganatra 2014).

Currently, doctors have the option of terminating pregnancies in cases in which they deem that the life of the mother is at risk. Some argue that this option should be extended to circumstances involving rape and incest. In this study, however, we keep the focus on what already exists in law –

situations involving a risk to the mother's health. As in the 2012 round, this 2014 survey elicited citizen views about possible justification of abortion by posing the following question:

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?
 (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA

As Figure 8.8 shows, Jamaicans largely view as justifiable the interruption of a pregnancy in circumstances where pregnancy is deemed a risk to the mother's well-being; 65.9% of those surveyed expressed their agreement with the view that an abortion is justified if the reason is to protect the mother's health. Conversely, just over a third of Jamaicans do not believe an abortion is justified even if the mother's health is in danger.




Figure 8.8. Qualified Support for Abortion Rights in Jamaica, 2014

Figure 8.9 shows that when compared to the 2012 AmericasBarometer results, there is evidence of a marginal but statistically insignificant decline in support for the termination of a pregnancy to protect the health of the mother (from 68.9% in 2012 to 65.9% in 2014).




Figure 8.9. Qualified Support for Abortion Rights in Jamaica, 2012-2014

VI. Social Activism

In a democracy, when sections of society perceive or experience marginalization, discrimination, abuse, or neglect, their right to alert public officials of the urgency of their situation through peaceful protest should be accommodated and protected. Sources highlighted in previous studies of this series have argued that public protest seems to be becoming a “normalized” method of political participation in the Americas (e.g. Cleary 2000). Supporting this observation, one Caribbean scholar has inquired rhetorically, whether the “‘historically favourable political culture’ which was inherited together with a sophisticated complex of liberal democratic institutions sufficiently well entrenched to withstand the hurricane-like social storms that are roaring throughout the region?” (Ryan 2000, 253).

In Jamaica’s democratic environment, peaceful protest behaviour such as picketing, road marches, and protest meetings in public spaces as well as other channels that are legally permitted are widely accommodated. However, such actions frequently exceed what is deemed peaceful to include the blocking of roads and defacing and destroying public property. Commonly advanced reasons for such protest behaviours may include demands for road repairs; improvement in the water supply; reaction to police actions or inaction in containing criminal activity; and perceived or actual state encroachment on basic citizen rights and privileges. Activist measures can range from activities commonly referred to as “acts of civil disobedience,” such as failure of demonstrators to heed a lawful order to disperse, to barbaric acts such as “vigilante beatings and killings.” In the following section, we examine citizens’ attitudes toward range of protest and activism activities by analysing responses to the following questions:

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?

In our usual attempt to simplify the interpretation and comparison, the results were re-categorized onto the familiar 0-100 point scale and displayed in Figure 8.10. The results affirm that Jamaicans are strongly in favour of legal rather than illegal forms of protest and activism. For example, mean support for legal demonstrations averages 66.1 degrees on the 0 to 100 scale. Average national approval of block roads and vigilante justice is at 36.3 on the same scale, and support for people working in a group to overthrow the government is much lower: 18.4 degrees on the 0 to 100 scale.




Figure 8.10. Degree of Citizen Support for Selected Acts of Social and Political Activism in Jamaica, 2014

Further analysis of the citizen activism data involves the charting of average approval for those activities that are prohibited by law in Jamaica. The aim is to highlight changes in the support for these forms of illegal actions over time. As shown in Figure 8.11, there is an overall pattern of incremental, positive change in the support for all three modes of engagement up to 2012. In the 2014 round, however, Jamaican citizens' approval for these activities increased substantially, especially with regard to the support for illegal protest measures, such as the blocking of roads. Of note is the magnitude of the increase in support of these activities since 2006.

Largely, the results for the years 2006-2012 point to a gradual increase in support for vigilante justice, illegal protest action, and attempts to overthrow government. What might be considered to be truly significant increases are found in the 2014 data. Support for vigilante justice went from 31 to 36.3

degrees between 2012 and 2014; support for illegal protest went from 25 to 36.3 degrees between 2012 and 2014; and support for attempting to overthrow the government went from 13.3 to 18.4 degrees between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 8.11. Citizens' Support for Selected Acts of Illicit Engagement over Time

Consistent with the approach in the other sections of the report, we combine the average outcome on each of the measures displayed in Figure 8.11 to create an index of support for illicit engagement.¹ Figure 8.12 shows the pattern of incremental change in support for these activities, and in particular, a sizable increase between 2012 and 2014 (from 23.1 to 30.4 degrees).

¹ This is the mean of the aggregated values of items E3, E15, and E16.




Figure 8.12. Citizens' General Support for Illicit Engagement, Jamaica 2006-2014

Figure 8.13 shows statistical outcomes for a regression analysis that was computed to determine the factors that distinguish persons who support these activities from those who do not. The results show that persons with weaker support of the political system, those in the lower wealth quintiles and younger persons are more likely to support these illicit acts of protest. Those who are more educated, on the other hand, are less supportive.




Figure 8.13. Determinants of Support for Illicit Engagement in Jamaica, 2014

The charts in Figure 8.14 illustrate the relationship between support for acts of illicit engagement and three of the independent variables. Of note is the strong correlation between age and such acts of protest: persons in the 18-25 age group are two times more likely to approve of these activities than those in the 66 and older cohort. Higher levels of support for the political system are associated with lower approval for these measures. With regard to wealth, a statistically significant difference in support for these forms of engagement exists only when a comparison is made between persons in the first (poorest) and the other wealthier categories.




Figure 8.14. Support for Acts of Illicit Engagement by System Support, Wealth and Age

VII. Social Responsibility

The notion of social responsibility is the idea that institutions and individuals be mindful of the interest of society as a whole in the pursuit of personal or societal good. It is a value emphasizing good citizenship and entails a situation in which people, organisations, and the state behave with sensitivity to social, cultural, economic, and environmental issues, all with the aim of positively impacting society as a whole, in both the short and the long term. This understanding is also compatible with the term, “sustainable development.”

In essence, sustainable development is “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” It subsumes two key

ideas. First, there is the notion of needs, especially of the basic ones of people living in poverty globally that should be high on the agenda for attention. Second, there is the concept of preservation, which speaks to the “limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs” (see International Institute for Sustainable Development/IISD 2013; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 43). In this section, aspects of these two dimensions – needs and preservation – are investigated. First, we examine Jamaican citizens’ sense of social responsibility as it relates to their perception of the role of government in reducing income inequality. Next, we investigate the attitudes of Jamaicans toward economic development at the risk of the environment.

Perception the Role of Government in Reducing Income Inequality

One result of changes in the social and economic spheres in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last two decades has been the growth of the informal sector and an overall decline in levels of social protection (Jensen 2010). It has been noted, however, that while most countries in the world have become more unequal in recent years, the Latin America and Caribbean region is an important exception (Lustig, López-Calva, Ortiz-Juarez 2013). Having “long been the region with the widest income and asset disparities, major recent improvements have been the result of more progressive public spending and targeted social policies” (UNDP 2010, 6). This notion of public spending and targeted social policies raises the question of the role of government in the distribution of opportunities and resources in the economy.

Indeed, a key feature of modern organized societies is the important, albeit, varying role of the state in attending to the social and economic well-being of its citizens. Addressing poverty has been an agenda item of the state, and is often used as a development strategy. The UN Research Institute for Social Development argues that one reason for the persistence of poverty is that contemporary efforts aimed at reducing it have been being focused increasingly on “targeting the poor,” an approach that frequently neglects important “institutional, policy and political” considerations that may be causes of poverty and inequality as well as deterrents to mitigating them (UNRISD 2010, 1). Reducing poverty is a matter of implementing appropriate economic strategies; adopting relevant social policies; as well as the sorts of politics that stress the requirements of society’s poor (Mittelman 2008, 1639). Further, the “protection of civic rights, active and organized citizens, well organized and representative political parties and effective states with redistributive agendas are all important for sustained progress towards poverty reduction” (UNRISD 2010, 2).

The need to address poverty and the related quality of life issues is particularly important in the context of Jamaica’s ongoing economic difficulties and evidence of a widened income gap between upper and lower socioeconomic groups in recent years. Table 8.1 below, displays Gini Indices² for selected years from 2002 to 2012 for Jamaica and selected Latin American countries. Of the countries listed, Jamaica is shown to have had the lowest index for 2002, (48.3); and also for 2004, (45.5). With an index of 59.9 for 2011, however, it is evident that there is a trend towards increased inequality over time and also comparatively, when the performance of other listed countries is considered.³

² The **Gini Index** is used to quantify the degree of inequality within a population or country. Inequality is represented on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 representing total inequality. In other words, the higher the value, the higher the degree of inequality.

³ The Gini Index is based on the World Bank’s most recent entry for the countries listed. This index is not available for most countries in the Caribbean, including the countries participating in this 2014 round of the LAPOP survey. Guyana,

Table 8.1. Gini Index for Jamaica and Selected Latin American Countries

Country \ Year	2002	2004	2005	2008	2009	2011	2012
Colombia	60.7	58.3	56.9	57.2	56.7	54.2	53.5
Costa Rica	50.7	48.7	47.6	48.9	50.7	48.6	48.6
Dominican Republic	50.1	52.0	51.1	49.0	48.9	47.4	45.7
El Salvador	53.1	49.0	50.3	46.8	48.3	42.4	41.8
Honduras	58.9	58.5	59.7	61.3	57.0	57.4	-
Jamaica	48.3	45.5	-	-	-	59.9	-
Mexico	49.7	46.1	-	48.3	-	-	48.1

Source: World Bank and IMF data

Governments often respond to income inequality with various measures. State-implemented poverty alleviation programmes over the years in Jamaica are evident in the health, education, housing, and other sectors. Among the initiatives are the Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), the Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP), state regulated minimum wage limits, and periodic adjustment of the income tax threshold.

For several rounds, the AmericasBarometer survey, has included questions for which respondents were asked to indicate their level of support for state intervention in reducing income inequality by selecting a point on a 7-point scale, on which “1” signifies strong disagreement and “7” indicates strong agreement with the following statement:

ROS4. The Jamaican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

As shown in Figure 8.14, there is very strong support among the citizenry for the government to introduce policy measures to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor in Jamaica. For 2014, 83.9% of those surveyed selected the mid-point of “4” or above on the scale, with 40.7% expressing unreserved agreement by choosing the highest number (indicating the highest degree of support) on the seven-point scale.

Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Bahamas were not included in this chart because they have no reported Gini Index since 2000.




Figure 8.15. Citizens' Support for Government Intervention to Reduce Inequality in Jamaica, 2014

How has this support for government intervention evolved over time? To facilitate this analysis, the response categories presented in Figure 8.14 are rescaled to run from 0 to 100 (where 0 represents absolutely no support for government initiated effort to reduce inequality and 100 represents unequivocal support), and compared with similar results from previous years. Figure 8.16 shows that between 2008 and 2012, there was a period of relatively stable support for strong state action against inequality and, in 2014, we find a small but statistically significant decline in citizens' support for such measures (from 77.6 degrees in 2012 to 71.6 in 2014).




Figure 8.16. Support for Government Intervention to Reduce Inequality in Jamaica, 2008-2014

Environmental Protection or an Economic Growth Agenda?

As previously indicated, the idea of sustainable development suggests that meeting the needs of the future depends on how well we balance social, economic, and environmental objectives in the present. Development initiatives with the potential to generate meaningful economic growth, which in turn might alleviate poverty and reduce inequality, often conflict with established goals of and requirements for environmental preservation. In the case of Jamaica, there are some notable recent cases in which the authorities have had to respond to groups raising such concerns.

One project that has been associated with much controversy over the last two years is the proposed use of Goat Islands within the Portland Bight as the central point in the development of a logistic hub. Reports from the government's official information arm, the Jamaica Information Service (JIS), stated in 2014 that the Port Authority of Jamaica and China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) had arrived at a basic understanding regarding the broad conditions for continuing talks on this development (see JIS "Goat Island," and JIS "Portland Bight/Goat Island," 2014). This announcement has taken the Jamaican government, which emphasizes its responsibility to provide employment and stimulate economic growth, into a public debate with those advocating for the environment about the potentially negative effects of this development. The Jamaica Environment Trust (JET), for example, has pointed to endangered fauna, mangroves, interrupting those who fish for a living, and other environmental and economic elements that could be adversely affected if this project is implemented. The government, nonetheless, has continued to promote this proposed US\$1.5 billion development but with the assurance that, if pursued, it will be managed in ways that will protect the environment as much as is practically possible.

Indeed, the notion that the “struggle against poverty and the challenge of dangerous climate change” are “two sides of the same coin” (Naidoo 2009, 107) is becoming more and more of a reality in the lives of many Jamaicans. A notable illustration of this reality is the case of residents and tradespersons living in a popular fishing and entertainment village of 3,000 people in the south coastal district of Alligator Pond in central Jamaica. These persons have complained publicly of damage to their properties and livelihoods, as well as further potential damage as a result of continued erosion of the coastline and of the seemingly inadequate response by the responsible government agencies. It has been argued that even among policymakers, there remains a tendency to ignore or downplay the impact of human activities on such climate change-related degradation (Jaysawal 2013, 7).

The policy for “National System of Protected Areas” (1997) has among its aims, the promotion of both economic development and environmental conservation (ICPD Beyond 2014, 11). Therefore, in the context of the prevailing economic crisis, sluggish economic growth, and high unemployment, as well as the consequent need for large investment projects such as the proposed Goat Island development, Jamaicans were asked to declare their sense of priority as it relates to measures to promote economic growth or environmental protection with the following question:

ENV1. In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: protecting the environment, or promoting economic growth?	
(1) Protect the environment	
(2) Promoting economic growth	
(3) [Don't read] Both	
(88) DK	(98) DA

As shown in Figure 8.17, Jamaicans express higher support for prioritizing an economic growth agenda over environmental protection in 2014. The plurality of respondents, 52.1%, favours measures to grow the economy, with 1 in 5 indicating that both factors should receive due attention when considering priorities.




Figure 8.17. Preference for Environmental Protection versus Economic Growth Priorities in Jamaica, 2014

VIII. Conclusion

This chapter examines the perceptions of Jamaicans regarding the rights of particular individuals and groups to participate freely in some of societies important civil and political processes. Specifically, questions pertaining to social tolerance, focussing on attitudes to the rights of members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community, citizens' approval of certain forms of social activism, and opinions on issues of social responsibility are examined.

On the subject of social tolerance, defined as respect and accommodation for the personal choices and lifestyle preferences of others, the results point to a tendency of social and political exclusion by Jamaicans when it comes to the LGBT community. With regard to attitudes in this realm, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicate their strong opposition to the idea of affording homosexuals the basic democratic right of running for public office. When asked to express their approval or disapproval on 7-point scale, on which 1 represents "strongly disapprove" and 7 "strongly approve," 69% of respondents selected "1," the most extreme level of disapproval while only about 5% responded "strongly approve." When the data on this 7-point scale is converted to a 0-100 point metric scale, it was found that average support among Jamaicans is just 16 degrees on the 100-point scale. This is a nearly 5-point decrease support when compared to the 2012 AmericasBarometer results. The data also found Jamaicans to be even more unsupportive of same-sex marriage, with average approval being a mere 5.1 degrees on the 0 to 100 scale, and with no statistically significant change in this measure since 2010.

Another important social attitude considered in this chapter is people's opinions on abortion rights. In Jamaica, 34.1% of those surveyed express disagreement with the view that an abortion is justified if the reason is to protect the mother's health.

On the issue of social activism, the results show that Jamaicans are strongly in favour of legal rather than illegal forms of protest. In a democratic environment, nonetheless, the prevailing level of support for illicit forms of protest in Jamaica is troubling. On a 0 to 100 scale, the national average is 36 degrees of support for vigilante actions in cases where the state fails to prosecute and punish criminals and 18 degrees of support for individuals working with groups on seditious measures to achieve political goals. There is an overall pattern of incremental change in the support for all three modes of engagement up to 2012; in the 2014 round, however, citizens' approval for these activities increased notably, especially with regard to the support for illegal protest measures, such as the blocking of roads. The prominence of age as a predictor of support for these illicit means of protest is notable. Younger Jamaicans are more likely to approve these protest measures than those in the older age cohorts.

The final section focuses on the sense of social responsibility among the citizenry. The notion of social responsibility denotes an obligation of an agent to serve and be accountable to society at large with regard to the impact of its interventions or lack thereof. It is also about an expectation that individuals and organizations will be mindful of the interest of society as a whole in the pursuit of personal or societal goals. Social responsibility is a value emphasizing good citizenship, or a situation in which people, organisations, and the state behave with sensitivity to social, cultural, economic, and environmental issues, with the aim of positively impacting society as a whole, in both the short and the long term.

On the premise that the "struggle against poverty and the challenge of dangerous climate change are two sides of the same coin," citizens' views on the role of government in redistributing income in the interest of the poor, and their sense of priority as it relates to pursuing policies to ensure environmental protection versus maximizing economic growth were probed. The 2014 data show that there is very strong support among the citizenry for the government to introduce policy measures to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor in Jamaica. On the familiar 0 to 100 scale, mean support for government interventions is 71 degrees. This is a moderate but statistically significant decline from the average of over 75 degrees obtained on this measure since 2008. Findings also indicate that in a context of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment, Jamaicans clearly support the prioritizing of an economic growth agenda over environmental protection concerns. The majority of respondents, 52%, favour measures to grow the economy, with 1 in 5 indicating that both factors should receive due attention in a development thrusts.

Appendix

**Appendix 8.1. Predictors of Homosexuals Right to Run for Office,
Jamaica 2014 (Figure 8.4)**

	Coefficients	(t)
Years of Education	0.145*	(4.12)
18-25 years	-0.033	(-0.80)
26-35 years	0.006	(0.16)
46-55 years	-0.035	(-1.08)
56-65 years	-0.034	(-1.33)
66+ years	0.007	(0.26)
Female	0.124*	(4.17)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.060	(1.92)
Urban	0.045	(1.65)
Political Tolerance	0.119*	(4.46)
Support for Democracy	0.023	(0.73)
Community Participation	0.029	(0.99)
Attention to News	0.017	(0.63)
Importance of Religion	-0.063*	(-2.15)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	8.67	
Number of cases	1314	
R-Squared	0.07	
Regression-Standardized coefficients with t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for the survey design * p<0.05		

**Appendix 8.2. Determinants of Support for Illicit Engagement,
Jamaica 2014 (Figure 8.13)**

	Coefficients	(t)
Years of Education	-0.076*	(-2.16)
18-25 years	0.170*	(4.46)
26-35 years	0.091*	(2.66)
46-55 years	-0.048	(-1.38)
56-65 years	-0.058	(-1.81)
66+ years	-0.123*	(-4.25)
Female	-0.026	(-0.94)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.086*	(-2.54)
Urban	0.006	(0.21)
Community Participation	-0.013	(-0.42)
System Support	-0.106*	(-3.47)
Political Interest	0.048	(1.44)
Importance of Religion	-0.020	(-0.67)
Justice System Punishes the Guilty	-0.058	(-1.80)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	15.68	
Number of cases	1363	
R-Squared	0.09	
Regression-Standardized coefficients with t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for the survey design * p<0.05		

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Appendices



Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, Mona



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

February 25, 2014

Dear Sir/Madam:

You are being asked to participate in a research study. This research involves a survey of public opinion on behalf of Vanderbilt University and the University of the West Indies at Mona and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the local and national situation. The study is being conducted so that we can better understand what people think about their country, although we cannot offer you any specific benefit. We plan to conduct a series of lectures based on the results of what people say. We will never disclose your individual opinion.

You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey in a kind of lottery system. You will not be paid for your participation, but your participation will not cause you to incur any expenses.

This survey is completely voluntary and it will take approximately 45 minutes to complete.

Your answers will be kept confidential. Your address will not be recorded. We will not ask for your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Balford Lewis whose phone number is 977-3565 or 322-7089.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it. The study IRB Approval number is: 110627

Do you wish to participate?



Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design AmericasBarometer 2014 Survey in Jamaica

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey targeted all voting age adults, living in private dwellings in the three counties and all fourteen parishes in the Island of Jamaica.

Population: The survey is designed to reflect the key demographic characteristics of the adult population of Jamaica based on the distribution of these factors in the 2011 Population Census. The sample is self-weighted and is configured to be representative of all residents, eighteen years and older, who live permanently in Jamaica and reside in private dwellings. Persons with the following living arrangements at the time of the survey were excluded from the population:

- members of the military who reside in non-private households
- trainees for the police force who reside temporarily in the police academy and other facilities
- persons who are incarcerated
- students 18 years of age or older and who reside in boarding institutions
- persons who at the time of the survey were in hospitals (including the psychiatric hospitals)
- fishermen and others who at the time of the survey were residing on the cays of Jamaica, including Pedro Cays, Lime Cays and Morant Cays
- homeless persons
- persons staying in hotels and other places of temporary lodging

Unit of Observation: The study contains topics that refer not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household.¹ However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider the dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in Jamaica. This means that every eligible Jamaican, as defined above, had an equal and known chance of being included in the sample. The obtained multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed with the objective of accomplishing the highest level of representativeness and dispersion of selected sampling units, and in turn, the respondents for this study.

¹ In this survey, a household (private) is defined as a group of persons who live together and who share common utilities and facilities. A household may consist of persons who are related (e.g. members of a family) or unrelated persons. A household must be separate and independent of other households.

Table A1 shows Jamaica's 18 years old and over population according to the 2011 census data. The 1,830,351 voting-age adults are distributed by the 14 parishes that are located in the respective regions – five each, in Cornwall and Middlesex and four in Surrey and further categorized by urban and rural areas and sex.

Table A1. Distribution of the Jamaican Population 18 Years old and over by Parish, Urban and Rural Areas, and Sex.

Geographical Areas		Urban			Rural			Total
County	Parish	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Surrey (587,253)	Kingston	29,582	29,387	58,969	-	-	-	58,969
	St. Andrew	164,965	191,531	356,496	26,720	28,673	53,493	409,989
	St. Thomas	8,641	9,439	18,080	22,264	22,213	44,477	62,557
	Portland	6,391	7,028	13,419	21,721	20,598	42,319	55,738
Middlesex (829,421)	St. Mary	8,971	9,371	18,342	28,609	28,679	57,288	75,630
	St. Ann	16,619	17,569	34,188	40,972	39,770	80,742	114,930
	St. Catherine	126,774	145,727	272,501	39,503	38,331	77,834	350,335
	Clarendon	27,048	28,518	55,606	52,901	50,341	103,242	158,848
	Manchester	22,394	24,506	46,798	42,195	40,685	82,880	129,678
Cornwall (413,667)	Trelawny	4,622	5,090	9,712	20,627	19,379	40,006	49,718
	St. James	35,267	39,638	74,905	24,186	23,901	48,087	122,992
	Hanover	2,560	2,676	5,236	20,437	19,893	40,330	45,566
	St. Elizabeth	7,511	8,136	15,647	41,590	43,896	85,486	101,133
	Westmoreland	12,944	12,877	25,821	35,292	33,156	68,448	94,269
(1,830,351)	Jamaica	474,259	531,493	1,005,720	417,016	409,515	824,631	1,830,351

III. Sampling Method

As shown in Table A1, Jamaica is divided into three counties – Cornwall, Middlesex and Surrey. These regions are treated as intact strata in this design. Additionally, the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR), which is comprised of the capital city, Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Portmore and Spanish Town are separated from the respective parishes and counties and treated as a separate stratum.

Table A2 shows the aforementioned strata with related sub-strata, and the urban/rural distribution of the population and enumeration districts in the different strata.

Table A2 – Urban/Rural Distribution of Adult Population and EDs by Region

STRATUM		Urban		Rural		Total	
No.	Area/Parish	Population	ED*	Population	ED (PSU)	Population	ED (PSU)
1	KMR [Kingston, Urban St. Andrew; Portmore, Spanish Town]	634,598	1,686	-	-	634,598	1686
2	SURREY Rural St. Andrew, St. Thomas, Portland	29,289	98	180,523	539	209,812	637
3	MIDDLESEX St. Catherine [exclude Spanish Town and Portmore] St. Mary, St. Ann, Manchester, Clarendon,	118,715	495	474,858	1,496	593,573	1,991
4	CORNWALL (Trelawny, St. James, Hanover, Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth)	113,431	349	290,236	1,113	403,667	1,462
JAMAICA		896,033	2,628	945,617	3,148	1,841,650	5,776

* ED = Enumeration District

IV. Sampling Procedures

Other design requirements are summarized as follows:

- The possibility of calculating sampling errors corresponding to these strata
- Minimize travel time in survey operations
- Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results
- Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available
- Expectation of 30 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU)
- Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in each urban and rural cluster

In order to obtain a sample with the aforementioned properties, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample (with household level quotas) was designed, in line with a framework proposed by LAPOP for its collaborating countries. As the term multi-stage implies, sample selection was done in a number of phases. In the first stage of the process, the country was divided or **stratified** into four regions or strata. Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It

reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance within strata and not between them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis. For this study, Jamaica was divided into the following four strata identified in Table 3 above:

- Stratum 1 – This is comprised of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) which is the country's main commercial and administrative centre and the most densely populated area in Jamaica. It is comprised of Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Spanish Town and the Municipality of Portmore
- Stratum 2 – This is county Surrey excluding Kingston and urban St. Andrew. This stratum includes areas which are involved in both large- and small-scale farming of sugar cane, bananas, coconuts and livestock
- Stratum 3 – This is the county of Middlesex, excluding Spanish Town and Portmore. Manufacturing and agricultural activities include bauxite mining and sugar cane and poultry farming
- Stratum 4 – This is the country of Cornwall which includes the City of Montego Bay and the main tourist areas along the west, and sections of the north coast

These strata were selected with the aim of maximizing the degree of representativeness and dispersion of the units that were selected in the sample. The underlying assumption is that sampling units within each of these strata are basically homogeneous whereas there are marked differences that distinguish the four regions from one other. Such strata features enhance sample reliability and, in turn, reduce variance in the estimates calculated from the data.

The next step in the stratification process involved the division of these four strata into the 14 parishes that are located in the respective regions. At this level of stratification, the parishes, serving as municipalities in this design, are categorized according to size based on number of residence. Intervals for the classification of municipalities were, Under 100,000 (small), 100,000 – 200,000 (medium) and Over 200,000 (large). Each parish was further divided into Urban and Rural Areas, with the aim of ensuring that sampling units were selected in the proportion that they are distributed in rural and urban neighbourhoods across the Island.

With this categorization of population data, the following step-by-step procedures were then followed in completion of the sampling process:

- Each parish is further stratified into constituencies, which were the primary sampling units (PSU) in this study.
- Within parishes, a simple random sample of constituencies was selected (see Table A3). Forty-five of the 63 constituencies were selected. A minimum of two constituencies were selected from each parish. This was done to facilitate the calculation of sampling errors between as well as within constituencies within parishes.



- Within selected constituencies enumeration districts (EDs)² were categorized dichotomously as urban or rural, based on degree of urbanization.
- Two hundred and fifty EDs were then selected using a probability proportional to size (PPS) approach. This sampling method gave a larger probability of selection to the larger EDs, while at the same time the probability of selection of households will be the same, irrespective of the ED from which they are selected. More specifically, they were randomly selected in proportions reflecting the urban/rural distribution of EDs within each stratum and also, according to the distribution of these localities among the four regions.

² EDs are relatively small localities that are demarcated and diagrammed by the **Statistical Institute of Jamaica** for sampling purposes. The **Statistical Institute of Jamaica** is the Government agency 'invested with powers to collect, compile, analyse, abstract and publish statistical information in relation to commercial, industrial, social, economic and general activities and condition of the people'.

Table A3. Selected Statistics by Parish and Constituency

Parish	Constituency	Population			Constituency Selected	No. of ED's			ED's Selected		
		Under 100,000	100,000-200,000	Over 200,000		Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
	East	√			√	-	84	84	-	5	5
Kingston	Central	√			√	-	81	81	-	5	5
	West	√			-	-			-	-	-
	East –Rural	√			-				-	-	-
	East			√	√	-	73	73		5	5
	North East			√	-	-			-	-	-
	N. Central			√	-	-	81	81	-	5	5
	N.West			√	√	-	71	71	-	5	5
	West			√	√	-	103	103	-	5	5
St.Andrew	W. Rural			√	√	49		49	5	-	5
	W. Central			√	-	-	66	66	-	5	5
	S. West			√	√	-	84	84	-	5	5
	E. Central			√	√	-	107	107	-	5	5
	S.East			√	√	-	67	67	-	5	5
	South			√	√	-	63	63	-	5	5
St. Thomas	East	√			√	56	54	110	3	2	5
	West	√			√	65	49	114	3	2	5
Portland	East	√			√	62	46	108	3	2	5
	West	√			√	64	15	79	4	1	5
St. Mary	South East		√		-				-	-	-
	Central		√		√	55	36	91	4	1	5
	West		√		√	68	25	93	4	1	5
	North East		√		√	41	40	81	2	3	5
St. Ann	North West		√		√	47	39	86	3	2	5
	South East		√		-				-	-	-
	South West		√		-				-	-	-
Trelawny	North	√			√	64	41	105	3	2	5
	South	√			-	52	21	73	-	-	-
St. James	North West		√		√	-	126	126	-	5	5
	East Central		√		√	7	85	92	1	4	5
	West Central		√		√	11	70	81	1	4	5
	South		√		-				-	-	-

Table A3. Selected Statistics by Parish and Constituency

Parish	Constituency	Population			Constituency Selected	No. of ED's			ED's Selected		
		Under 100,000	100,000-200,000	Over 200,00		Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Hanover	East	√			√	43	23	66	3	2	5
	West	√			-	70	23	93	-	-	-
Westmoreland	East		√		√	98	-	98	5	-	5
	Central		√		√	41	42	83	2	3	5
	West		√		√	51	26	77	3	2	5
St. Elizabeth	North East		√		√	53	29	82	3	2	5
	South East		√		√	85	-	85	5	-	5
	North West		√		-				-	-	-
	South West		√		√	59	15	74	4	1	5
Manchester	North East		√		-				2	3	5
	North West		√		√	49	36	85	3	2	5
	Central		√		√	29	62	91	1	4	5
	South		√		√	94	7	101	4	1	5
Clarendon	North			√	√	73	-	73	5	-	5
	North West				√	54	20	74	1	4	5
	North Central			√	√	77	-	77	-	5	5
	Central			√	√	4	75	79	1	4	5
	South East			√	√	55	42	97	-	5	5
	South West			√	√	75	8	83	4	1	5
St. Catherine	North East			√	√	81	-	81	-	5	5
	North West			√	√	33	56	89	3	2	5
	East Central			√	√	8	74	82	2	3	5
	West Central			√	√	65	26	91	3	2	5
	Central			√	√	-	114	114	-	5	5
	South Central			√	√	7	84	91	1	4	5
	South East			√	√	-	110	110	-	5	5
	South			√	√	9	153	162	1	4	5
	South West			√	√	31	77	108	1	4	5

Selection of Clusters

The next stage in the sampling process involved the creation of clusters within the selected EDs. An average of three clusters, each with a size of approximately 30 households was created. A

sample of **one** of these clusters was selected at random. Clustering significantly reduces survey cost by arranging groups of interviews in relatively compact areas such as a particular block, avenue or row of dwellings. And more importantly, when quotas are established in advance, it is easy to ensure that the sexes and the different age groups are proportionately represented in the final sample of respondents.

Selection of Households within the Selected Cluster

Households within a selected cluster were selected systematically (systematic sampling). Having defined and selected a cluster within a selected ED, a starting point was determined. The first household selected was determined by a random number between 1 and 3. If the random number selected for example was 2, then every 3rd household thereafter was selected in the sample, that is, households 2,5,8,11, etc. Specifically, interviews should be carried out at every third household. In other words, each time an interview is completed, the next interview cannot be carried out in the following two households.

In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or nobody at home, the interviewer selects the adjacent dwelling. In those cases in which the interviewer reaches the end of the block without completing the quota of six interviews, he or she can proceed to the next cluster follow the same routine as in the first cluster.

Selection of Persons within Selected Households

A single respondent will be selected in each household, following a quota sampling based on sex and age (as shown in Table 4 below). The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2001 population census. The respondent should be a permanent household member, neither a domestic employee nor a visitor. If there are two or more persons of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire should be applied to the person with the next birthday.

Table 4: Quota by Sex and Age Group

Sex/Age group	18- 29	30- 45	45 and over	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

V. Estimation of Design Effect and Sampling Error

Further analysis of the sample involved the estimation of the sampling error based on the size of the sample and the design effects associated with items in the questionnaire. Basically, the estimation of the sampling error of a given statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio) involves the calculation of the standard error, taking the design effect of the sample into consideration. The standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the respective statistic, permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar conditions. The Design Effect (DEFT) on the other hand, indicates the efficiency of a given design relative to one obtained using a simple random sampling (SRS) technique. These effects, understood as the quotient

between the variance obtained from a simple random sample (SRS) and a complex design, differ for each variable, and can be represented by the equation: $DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$.

As Table 5 indicates, the size of the obtained sample (effective interviews) was 1,500. Given the characteristics of the design utilized, the sampling error of the survey is ± 2.50 , assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design, a 50-50% distribution for a dichotomous variable, and a 95% confidence interval. That is, 95% of the time the true value of an answer will be within the $\pm 2.52\%$ of the estimate produced by this sample. Since the survey is based on a stratified and clustered sample, for the analysis of the data we took into account the “complex” sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the results presented in this study.

VI. Sample Characteristics





As previously explained, the sample was designed to be representative of the voting age population in terms of its gender, age and geographical distribution. As shown in Table 5, with regard to these key demographic factors, the obtained sample is virtually identical to the adult population of Jamaica when matched with the 2011 Population Census data.

Table 5: Selected Descriptive Statistics from Population Census (2011) and LAPOP (2014) Survey

Selected Population Characteristics	Population Census 2011	LAPOP 2014 Survey
N(n) – Voting age Jamaicans	1,830,351	(1508)
Region		
% KMR	34.6	35.5
Surrey	11.4	10.2
Middlesex	32.4	32.2
Cornwall	22.6	22.2
Gender		
% Males	49.5	50.4
Age		
Average age (years)	38.4	39.8

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Jamaica 2014, Version # 15.2.4.3 IRB Approval: 110627

	<p>Centre for Leadership & Governance, University of the West Indies, Mona</p> 
	

LAPOP: Jamaica, 2014

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PAIS. Country:					23
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados			
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]					<input type="text"/>
ESTRATOPRI: (2301) KMA (2302) Surrey (except Urban St Andrews and Kingston) (2303) Middlesex (2304) Cornwall					<input type="text"/>
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality [voting age population according to the census; modify for each country, using the appropriate number of strata and population ranges]: (1) Large (more than 200,000) (2) Medium (between 100,000-200,000) (3) Small (< 100,000)					<input type="text"/>
UPM [Primary Sampling Unit]: _____					<input type="text"/>
PROV. Parish: (2301) Kingston (2306) St. Ann (2311) St. Elizabeth (2302) St. Andrew (2307) Trelawny (2312) Manchester (2303) St. Thomas (2308) St. James (2313) Clarendon (2304) Portland (2309) Hanover (2314) St. Catherine (2305) St. Mary (2310) Westmoreland					<input type="text"/>
MUNICIPIO. Constituency: _____					23 <input type="text"/>
JAMSEGMENTO. E.D. Segment [official census code] _____					<input type="text"/>
CLUSTER. [Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____ [Every cluster must have 6 interviews; assigned key-code by field supervisor]					<input type="text"/>
UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use country's census definition]					<input type="text"/>
TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area					<input type="text"/>
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (2) English					<input type="text"/>
Start time: _____:_____					<input type="text"/>

FECHA. Date Day: ____ Month: ____ Year: 2014	
--	--

<p>Do you live in this home? Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p> <p>Are you a Jamaican citizen or permanent resident of Jamaica? Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p> <p>How old are you? [Only continue if they are at least 18 years old] Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p> <p>NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT AND RECEIVE CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.</p>
--

Q1. Sex [Record but do not ask]: (1) Male (2) Female	
Q2Y. In what year were you born? ____ year (8888) DK (9888) DA	
LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are: [Read options] (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]			
Armed conflict	1 (30)	Inequality	20 (58)
Bad government	2 (15)	Inflation, high prices	21 (02)
Corruption	3 (13)	Kidnappings	22 (31)
Credit, lack of	4 (09)	Land to farm, lack of	23 (07)
Crime	5 (05)	Malnutrition	24 (23)
Discrimination	6 (25)	Migration	25 (16)
Drug addiction; consumption of drugs	7 (11)	Politicians	26 (59)
Drug trafficking	8 (12)	Popular protests (strikes, blocking roads, work stoppages, etc.)	27 (06)
Economy, problems with, crisis of	9 (01)	Population explosion	28 (20)
Education, lack of, poor quality	10 (21)	Poverty	29 (04)
Electricity, lack of	11 (24)	Roads in poor condition	30 (18)
Environment	12 (10)	Security (lack of)	31 (27)
External debt	13 (26)	Terrorism	32 (33)
Forced displacement of persons	14 (32)	Transportation, problems of	33 (60)
Gangs	15 (14)	Unemployment	34 (03)
Health services, lack of	16 (22)	Violence	35 (57)
Housing	17 (55)	War against terrorism	36 (17)
Human rights, violations of	18 (56)	Water, lack of	37 (19)
Impunity	19 (61)	Other	38 (70)
DK	88	DA	98

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
---	--

IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
--	--

Now, let's talk about your local government...	
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or officer of the parish council within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
SGL1. Would you say that the services the Parish Council is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.	
CP4A. In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a local public official or local government officer: for example, a mayor or parish councilor? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months? (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year (4) Never (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
--	--

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]								
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	INAP	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA	
---	--

For the next two statements, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

IVOL16. People in my neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbors. (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)		
IVOL17. People in my neighbourhood generally get along with each other. [Read alternatives] (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)		
IVOL19. What is the likelihood that people from your neighbourhood would intervene if a fight broke out in front of your house, with someone being beaten? [Intervene means personally intervene in the fight] [Read alternatives] (1) Very unlikely (2) Unlikely (3) Neither likely nor unlikely (4) Likely (5) Very likely (88) DK (98) DA (refused)		
IVOL20. How much litter, broken glass, or trash is on the sidewalks and streets in your neighbourhood? [Read alternatives] (1) None (2) Some (3) A lot (88) DK (98) DA		
IVOL21. How much graffiti (paint) is there on buildings and walls in your neighbourhood? [Read alternatives] (1) None (2) Some (3) A lot (88) DK (98) DA		
IVOL22. How many vacant lots or deserted houses or storefronts are there in your neighbourhood? [Read alternatives] (1) None (2) Some (3) A lot (88) DK (98) DA		

[GIVE CARD A TO THE RESPONDENT]

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98	
Left												

[TAKE BACK CARD A]

PROT3. In the last 12 months , have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	
--	--

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	_ _
VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]					_ _
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? [fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A					_ _
VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? [Read the options] (01) Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home while you were not at home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (09) Burglary of your home while you were at home (10) Extortion (11) [Don't read] Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)					_ _
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighbourhood (3) In this parish (4) In another parish (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A					_ _
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)					_ _

Now I will be asking you some questions about specific incidents that you may have experienced. These questions are referring to what may have happened to you *personally* in the last five years -- that is since 2009. Things that you have just mentioned can be mentioned again.

IVOL3. In the last five years, has anyone stolen, or tried to steal something from you by using force or threatening you with force? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA	_ _
IVOL4. Excluding thefts by using force or threat, there are many other types of theft of personal property, such as pick-pocketing or theft of a purse, wallet, clothing, jewelry, mobile phone, and mp3 player, or sports equipment. In the last five years (that is, since 2009) have you personally been victim of any of these incidents? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA	_ _

Now I am going to ask about other incidents when someone has used force against you, or threatened to do so. Once again, I want to ask you to think about the last five years - that is, since 2009. This might have involved someone you knew, or someone you did not know at that time. Remember that your answers will, of course, be treated confidentially and anonymously. Robberies or personal thefts that you may have just mentioned must **not** be mentioned now.

<p>IVOL5. In the past five years (that is, since 2009), has anyone slapped you, hit or punched you, kicked you, thrown something at you, or attacked you with a weapon in a way that really upset or angered you? Do NOT include horseplay, and do not include incidents of a sexual nature or incidents of domestic violence. (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA (Refusal)</p>	
<p>IVOL6. In the past five years (that is, since 2009), has anyone seriously threatened to slap, hit, punch or kick you, threatened to throw something at you or otherwise injure you, or threatened you with a weapon in a way that really upset or angered you? In addition to not including robberies or personal thefts that you may have just mentioned, do NOT include threats made as jokes, and do not include incidents of a sexual nature or incidents of domestic violence. (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA (Refusal)</p>	

Follow-up questions

**[ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE QUESTIONS IVOL3– IVOL6 WAS “(1) YES”.
IF THE ANSWER TO ALL QUESTIONS IVOL3 – IVOL6 WAS “(2) NO” GO TO POLE2N]**

[INTRODUCTION TO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SERIES]

You have told me that you have been a victim of one or more crimes in the last five years. I will now ask you for a few details about these incidents.

[ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF ANSWER TO IVOL3 WAS “(1) YES”]

<p>IVOL3A. You mentioned that someone had stolen, or tried to steal, something from you by <u>using force or threatening</u> you with force. When did this happen? Was it within the last 12 months – i.e., since [February 2013], or was it before this, or both? [PROBE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE WHETHER CODE 1 OR 2 APPLIES IF UNCLEAR] (1) Last 12 months [Continue] (2) Before that [Go to next crime] (3) Both [Continue] (88) DK (cannot remember) [Go to next crime] (98) DA [Go to next crime] (99) INAP [Go to next crime]</p>	
<p>IVOL3B. [If during the last 12 months] How often did this happen during the last 12 months? (1) once (2) twice (3) three times (4) four times (5) five times or more (88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL3C. The last time that this happened, did this happen in your home, near your own home, at your workplace, elsewhere in your city or local area, elsewhere in the country, or abroad? (1) at your own home (2) in your neighbourhood (3) at your workplace (4) elsewhere in the city or local area (5) elsewhere in the country (6) abroad (88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL3D. (The last time), how many people were involved in committing this offence? (1) one person (2) two people (3) three (4) four (5) five (6) six or more people (88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL3G. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a weapon? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [GO TO IVOL3H] (88) DK [GO TO IVOL3H] (98) DA [GO TO IVOL3H] (99) INAP [GO TO IVOL3H]</p>	
<p>IVOL3G1. What was the weapon? Did the offender(s) have a handgun (revolver/pistol), long gun (such as a shotgun, rifle, machine gun), knife, glass bottle, other weapon and/or something used as a weapon? [RECORD ALL THAT APPLY] (1) Handgun (2) Long gun (3) Knife (4) Glass bottle (5) Other/something used as a weapon (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL3H. Did you see a doctor or other health professional as a result of this incident? (1) yes (2) no (88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	

<p>IVOL3I. (The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p> <p>(88) DK (cannot remember) [GO TO NEXT CRIME] (98) DA (Refusal) [GO TO NEXT CRIME] (99) INAP [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p>	
<p>IVOL3J. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way the police dealt with your (their) report?</p> <p>(1) Yes (satisfied) (2) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (3) No (dissatisfied)</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p>	
<p>[ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF ANSWER TO IVOL4 WAS "(1) YES"]</p>	
<p>IVOL4A. You mentioned theft of personal property in which there was no force or threat of force. When did this happen? Was it within the last 12 months – i.e., since [February 2013], or was it before this, or both?</p> <p>[PROBE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE WHETHER CODE 1 OR 2 APPLIES IF UNCLEAR]</p> <p>(1) Last 12 months [Continue] (2) Before that [Go to next crime]</p> <p>(3) Both [Continue] (88) DK (cannot remember) [Go to next crime]</p> <p>(98) DA [Go to next crime] (99) INAP [Go to next crime]</p>	
<p>IVOL4B. [If during the last 12 months] How often did this happen during the last 12 months?</p> <p>(1) once (2) twice (3) three times (4) four times (5) five times or more</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL4C. (The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p>	
<p>[ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF ANSWER TO IVOL5 WAS "(1) YES"]</p>	
<p>IVOL5A. You mentioned you have been assaulted by someone. Remember that your answers will, of course, be treated confidentially and anonymously. When did this happen? Was it within the last 12 months – i.e., since [February 2013], or was it before this, or both?</p> <p>[PROBE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE WHETHER CODE 1 OR 2 APPLIES IF UNCLEAR]</p> <p>(1) Last 12 months [Continue] (2) Before that [Go to next crime]</p> <p>(3) Both [Continue] (88) DK (cannot remember) [Go to next crime]</p> <p>(98) DA [Go to next crime] (99) INAP [Go to next crime]</p>	
<p>IVOL5B. [If during the last 12 months] How often did this happen during the last 12 months?</p> <p>(1) once (2) twice (3) three times (4) four times (5) five times or more</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL5C. The last time that this happened, did this happen in your home, near your own home, at your workplace, elsewhere in your city or local area, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?</p> <p>(1) at your own home</p> <p>(2) in your neighbourhood</p> <p>(3) at your workplace</p> <p>(4) elsewhere in the city or local area</p> <p>(5) elsewhere in the country</p> <p>(6) abroad</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA (refused)</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL5D. How many people were involved in committing this offence?</p> <p>(1) one person (2) two people (3) three (4) four</p> <p>(5) five (6) six or more people</p> <p>(88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL5F. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a weapon?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [GO TO IVOL5G] (88) DK [GO TO IVOL5G]</p> <p>(98) DA [GO TO IVOL5G] (99) INAP [GO TO IVOL5G]</p>	

<p>IVOL5F1. What was the weapon? Did the offender(s) have a handgun (revolver/pistol), long gun (such as a shotgun, rifle, machine gun), knife, glass bottle, other weapon and/or something used as a weapon?</p> <p>[RECORD ALL THAT APPLY]</p> <p>(1) Handgun (2) Long gun (3) Knife (4) Glass bottle</p> <p>(5) Other/something used as a weapon (88) NR (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL5G. Did you see a doctor or other health professional as a result of this incident?</p> <p>(1) yes (2) no (88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL5H. (The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p> <p>(88) DK (cannot remember) [GO TO NEXT CRIME] (98) DA (Refusal) [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p> <p>(99) INAP [GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p>	
<p>IVOL5I. On the whole, were you (were they) satisfied with the way the police dealt with your (their) report?</p> <p>(1) Yes (satisfied) (2) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (3) No (dissatisfied)</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p> <p>[GO TO NEXT CRIME]</p>	
<p>[ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF ANSWER TO IVOL6 WAS "(1) YES"]</p>	
<p>IVOL6A. You mentioned you have been threatened by someone. Remember that your answers will, of course, be treated confidentially and anonymously. When did this happen? Was it within the last 12 months – i.e., since [February 2013], or was it before this, or both?</p> <p>[PROBE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE WHETHER CODE 1 OR 2 APPLIES IF UNCLEAR]</p> <p>(1) Last 12 months [Continue] (2) Before that [Go to POLE2N]</p> <p>(3) Both [Continue] (88) DK (cannot remember) [Go to POLE2N]</p> <p>(98) DA [Go to POLE2N] (99) INAP [Go to POLE2N]</p>	
<p>IVOL6B. [IF during the last 12 months] How often did this happen during the last 12 months?</p> <p>1) once (2) twice (3) three times (4) four times (5) five times or more</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL6C. The last time that this happened, did this happen in your home, near your own home, at your workplace, elsewhere in your city or local area, elsewhere in the country, or abroad?</p> <p>(1) at your own home</p> <p>(2) in your neighbourhood</p> <p>(3) at your workplace</p> <p>(4) elsewhere in the city or local area</p> <p>(5) elsewhere in the country</p> <p>(6) abroad</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL6D. (The last time) How many people were involved in committing the offence?</p> <p>(1) one person (2) two people (3) three (4) four</p> <p>(5) five (6) six or more people</p> <p>(88) DK (98) DA (refused) (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL6F. Did (any of) the offender(s) have a weapon?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [GO TO IVOL6G] (88) DK [GO TO IVOL6G]</p> <p>(98) DA [GO TO IVOL6G] (99) INAP [GO TO IVOL6G]</p>	
<p>IVOL6F1. What was the weapon? Did the offender(s) have a handgun (revolver/pistol), long gun (such as a shotgun, rifle, machine gun), knife, glass bottle, other weapon and/or something used as a weapon?</p> <p>[RECORD ALL THAT APPLY]</p> <p>(1) Handgun (2) Long gun (3) Knife (4) Glass bottle</p> <p>(5) Other/something used as a weapon (88) NR (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	
<p>IVOL6G. (The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (cannot remember) (98) DA (Refusal) (99) INAP</p> <p>[GO TO NEXT SECTION – POLE2N]</p>	

POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied , or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighbourhood? [If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
IVOL14. Taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your neighbourhood are in controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, neither good nor poor job, a fairly poor job or a very poor job? (1) very good job (2) fairly good job (3) neither good nor poor job (4) fairly poor job (5) very poor job (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
IVOL15. To what extent is police harassment a problem in your neighbourhood? Is it: [Read alternatives] (1) A very big problem (2) A big problem (3) Neither a big nor small problem (4) A small problem (5) No problem (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe ? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
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Now thinking about specific situations, how safe do you feel in the following situations?

	Very Safe	Safe	Neither Safe nor Unsafe	Unsafe	Very Unsafe	DK	DA (Refused)	Not Applicable	
IVOL10. Walking alone in your neighbourhood during the day [Read: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, very unsafe]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
IVOL11. Walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark [Read: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, very unsafe]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
IVOL12. Walking alone outside your neighbourhood during the day [Read: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, very unsafe]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	
IVOL13. Walking alone outside your neighbourhood after dark [Read: very safe, safe, neither safe nor unsafe, unsafe, very unsafe]	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	99	

PESE1. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighbourhood is higher, about the same, or lower than in other neighbourhoods? (1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
PESE2. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighbourhood is higher, about the same, or lower than 12 months ago? (1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighbourhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
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IVOL24. Is there a criminal gang or gangs in your neighbourhood? (0) No [Go to AOJ12] (1) Yes [Continue] (88) DK [Go to AOJ12] (98) DA (Refused) [Go to AOJ12]	
IVOL25. Compared to one year ago, do you think gangs in your neighbourhood now are: [Read alternatives] (1) More of a problem (2) Less of a problem (3) About the same (88) DK (98) DA (Refused) (99) INAP	
IVOL26. How much do neighbourhood gangs get in the way of you being able to do everyday things, like going to the store or going out at night? [Read alternatives] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA (Refused) (99) INAP	

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: Implement preventive measures or increase punishment of criminals? (1) Implement preventive measures (2) Increase punishment of criminals (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all				A lot			Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA								
I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point in between the two.)								
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?								
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?								
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?								
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?								
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?								
B11. To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Commission?								
B12. To what extent do you trust the Jamaica Defence Force?								
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?								
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?								
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?								
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?								
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?								
B21A. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?								
B32. To what extent do you trust the local government?								
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?								
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?								

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?	
JAMB50. To what extent do you trust the Office of Utilities Regulations (OUR)?	
JAMB51. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Contractor General (OCG)?	
JAMB52. To what extent do you trust The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM)?	

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	Note down 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats (fights) government corruption?	
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?	

NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	Note down 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
B3MILX. To what extent do you believe that the Jamaican Armed Forces respect Jamaicans' human rights nowadays?	
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
MIL4. To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of Jamaica to improve national security?	

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is "Not at all" and 7 is "A lot," how likely is it that people in your neighbourhood would be punished by authorities for...:	(88) DK (98) DA
PR3A. Buying pirated (bootleg) DVDs. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?	
PR3B. And for obtaining electricity (bypassing the meter) without paying? How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?	
PR3C. And for occupying or invading a vacant lot. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?	
PR4. To what degree do you feel that the Jamaican government respects the private property of its citizens? Please use the same scale from 1 is "not at all" to 7 is "a lot."	

[TAKE BACK CARD B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of Prime Minister Portia Simpson? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
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SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied , or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? Are you... [Read alternatives] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you... [Read alternatives] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	

INFRAX. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? [READ ALTERNATIVES] (1) Less than 10 minutes (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour (4) More than an hour and up to three hours (5) More than three hours (6) [DON'T READ] There are no police/they would never arrive (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
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[GIVE CARD C TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Strongly disagree						Strongly agree	Doesn't know	Doesn't answer

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

ROS4. The Jamaican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
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Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
MIL7. The Army ought to participate in combating crime and violence in Jamaica. How much do you agree or disagree?	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>

[TAKE BACK CARD C]

ENV1. In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: protecting the environment, or promoting economic growth? (3) Protect the environment (4) Promoting economic growth (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Jamaica? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger? (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>

[Give Card D TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you *strongly disapprove* and 10 means that you *strongly approve*. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
Strongly disapprove										Strongly approve	

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in Jamaica. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: <i>[Probe: To what degree?]</i>	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?	

[TAKE BACK CARD D]

[GIVE CARD C TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now, I am going to read you a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the 1-7 ladder, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree," please tell me the number that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98		
Strongly disagree						Strongly agree		DK	DA	
You see yourself as:										
PER4. An anxious and easily upset person.										
PER9. A calm and emotionally stable person.										

[TAKE BACK CARD C]

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98) DA	<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
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	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the parish council office? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your local government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99					
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99					
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99					
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99					
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99					
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	
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Now, I am going to read a list of situations that might or might not be a problem in some neighbourhoods. Please, tell me if the following situations are a problem that is very serious, somewhat serious, a little serious, not serious at all, or are not a problem in **your neighbourhood**. [Repeat after each question: “Is this very serious, somewhat serious, a little serious, not serious at all, or not a problem in your neighbourhood?” to help the interviewee]

	Very serious	Somewhat serious	A little serious	Not serious at all	Not a problem	DK	DA	
DISO7. Young people or children in the street doing nothing, wandering around here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO8. Young people or children living here in your neighbourhood who are in gangs	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO10. Selling or trafficking of illegal drugs here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO18. Gangs fighting here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO14. Drug addicts in the streets here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO16. Assaults of people while they walk on the streets here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO17. Shootings here in your neighbourhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of the following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighbourhood.	Yes	No	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	DK	DA	N/A
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighbourhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR3]				88	98	
						[Skip to VICBAR3]		
VICBAR1F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighbourhood?	1	2				88	98	
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighbourhood?	1	2				88	98	
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in the last 12 months in your neighbourhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to FEAR10]				88	98	
						[Skip to FEAR10]		
VICBAR7F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99

	Yes	No	DK	DA	
FEAR10. In order to protect yourself from crime, in the last 12 months, have you taken any measures such as avoiding walking through some areas in your neighbourhood because they are dangerous?	1	0	88	98	
VIC44. In the last 12 months, out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	1	0	88	98	

	A lot	Some what	A little	Not at all	DK	DA	N/A	
FEAR6e. And in general, how worried are you that someone in your family will be assaulted on public transportation? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99 [Does not use public transportation]	
FEAR6f. And how worried are you about the safety of children in school? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99 [Does not have any close children in school]	

VB1. Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA	
INF1. Do you have a voter registration identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2011? (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB4NEW] (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10]	
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VB3n. Who did you vote for in the last general election of 2011? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (00) None (Blank ballot) [Go to VB101] (97) None (null ballot) [Go to VB101] (2301) PNP [Go to VB10] (2302) JLP [Go to VB10] (2303) NDM [Go to VB10] (2377) Other [Go to VB10] (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10] (99) INAP (Didn't vote) [Go to VB4NEW]	
VB4NEW. [ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN'T VOTE. DON'T READ ALTERNATIVES] [If respondent says "I didn't vote because I didn't want", ask why did not he/she want] Why did you not vote in the last general election? [Only allow one response] (1) Was confused (2) Didn't like any of the candidates, didn't like the campaign (3) Do not believe in elections/electoral authorities (4) Do not believe in democracy (5) Bureaucratic matters (voter registry) (6) Age-related matters (too young, too old) (7) Not in the district/away from home (8) Not interested in politics (77) Another reason (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (voted) [AFTER THIS QUESTION GO TO VB10]	

VB101. [ONLY FOR THOSE WHO RESPONDED “NONE (BLANK OR NULL)” ON VB3n] Why did you cast a null or blank ballot in the last general election? [DON'T READ ALTERNATIVES] (1) Was confused (2) Wanted to express their discontent with all of the candidates; didn't like any of the candidates (3) Do not believe in democracy, wanted to protest against the political system (4) Do not believe in elections/electoral authorities (5) Not interested in politics (6) My vote does not make any difference (7) Another reason (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (2301) PNP (2302) JLP (2303) NDM (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
VB20. If the next general elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read options] (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
CLIEN1n. Thinking of the last general elections, any candidate or political party offered a favor, gift, or other benefit to a person whom you know in exchange for that person's support or vote? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
CLIEN1na. And thinking about the last general elections of 2011, did someone offer you something, like a favor, gift or any other benefit in return for your vote or support? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
[GIVE CARD G TO THE RESPONDENT] FOR1n. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. Which of the following countries has the most influence in the Caribbean? [READ CHOICES] (1) China, that is mainland China and not Taiwan (2) Japan (3) India (4) United States (5) Brazil (6) Venezuela (7) Mexico (10) Spain (11) [Don't read] Another country, or (12) [Don't read] None (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
FOR4. And within 10 years , in your opinion which of the following countries will have most influence in the Caribbean? [Read options] (1) China (2) Japan (3) India (4) United States (5) Brazil (6) Venezuela (7) Mexico (10) Spain (11) [Don't read] Another country (12) [Don't read] None (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>

[TAKE CARD G. HAND OUT CARD H] FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be the model for the future development of our country ? [Read options] <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (1) China (3) India (5) Singapore (7) South Korea (11) Venezuela, or (13) [Don't read] None/we ought to follow our own model (14) [Don't read] Other </div> <div> (2) Japan (4) United States (6) Russia (10) Brazil (12) Mexico (88) DK (98) DA </div> </div>		_ _
[TAKE CARD "H"] FOR6. And thinking now only of our country , how much influence do you think that China has in our country ? [Read options] <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (1) A lot [Continue] (3) A little [Continue] (88) DK [Go to FOR6b] </div> <div> (2) Some [Continue] (4) None [Go to FOR6b] (98) DA [Go to FOR6b] </div> </div>		_ _
FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is very positive, positive, negative, or very negative? <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (1) Very positive (3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative (5) Very negative (88) DK (98) DA </div> <div> (2) Positive (4) Negative (6) [Do not read] Has no influence (99) N/A </div> </div>		_ _
FOR6b. Again thinking about only our country , how much influence does the United States have in our country ? [Read alternatives] <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (1) A lot [Continue] (3) A Little [Continue] (88) DK [Go to MIL10A] </div> <div> (2) Some [Continue] (4) None [Go to MIL10A] (98) DA [Go to MIL10A] </div> </div>		_ _
FOR7b. The influence that the United States has on our country is very positive, positive, negative, or very negative? <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> (1) Very positive (3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative (5) Very negative (88) DK </div> <div> (2) Positive (4) Negative (6) [Do not read] Has no influence (98) DA (99) N/A </div> </div>		_ _

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust **the governments** of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	Don't know/No opinion	DA	
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	

MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
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Now we want to ask you about a different topic

VOL207n. Do you think that to correct a child who misbehaves it is necessary to hit or physically punish them? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
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Now let's talk about your experience. Remember that if you are uncomfortable or for another reason prefer not to answer these questions, just tell me and we will move to the next question.

VOL208n. When you were a child, your parents or guardians would hit or physically punish you in some way to correct your misbehaviour? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
--	--

Now I am going to read some situations in which some people think that it is justified that the husband hits his wife/partner and I will ask your opinion...	Would approve	Would not approve but understands	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA
DVW1. His wife neglects the household chores. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	1	2	3	88	98

DVW2. His wife is unfaithful. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	1	2	3	88	98
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IVOL27. Security is a major concern for many people today, and some people have guns in their homes to protect themselves and their families from potential dangers. On the other hand, some people think keeping a gun at home could be dangerous. On average, do you think the availability of a gun in the home makes that home safer or less safe, or does it make no difference in terms of safety? (1) safer (2) less safe (3) no difference (4) [DO NOT READ] both (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)	
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The next two questions are about exposure to violence.

IVOL7. In your lifetime, have you ever witnessed a serious attack, shooting, or beating in which another person was badly injured or killed? (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)	
IVOL8. In your lifetime, has anyone you felt very close to been killed by violence? [Do not include those killed in war] (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA (Refused)	

Now changing the topic,

WF1. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions and benefits under the National Insurance Scheme (NIS)?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

|||

CCT1B. Now, talking specifically about the Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH), are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this programme?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

|||

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years [Use the table below for the code]

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o
None	0					
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	
6th form/ "A" level	12	13				
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+		
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+	
Doesn't know	88					
Doesn't respond	98					

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK (98) DA

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options]

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

- (01) Catholic
- (02) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).
- (03) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).
- (04) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)
- (05) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).
- (06) LDS (Mormon).
- (07) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lanza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
- (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).
- (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).
- (12) Jehovah's Witness.
- (88) DK (98) DA



<p>Q5B. Could you please tell me how important is religion in your life? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important</p> <p>(88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Working? [Continue]</p> <p>(2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue]</p> <p>(3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) A student? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Taking care of the home? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(7) Not working and not looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(88) DK [Go to Q10NEW] (98) DA [Go to Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?</p> <p>(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?</p> <p>(3) Owner or partner in a business</p> <p>(4) Self-employed</p> <p>(5) Unpaid worker</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA</p> <p>(99) N/A</p>	
<p>[GIVE CARD F TO THE RESPONDENT]</p>	
<p>Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?</p> <p>[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]</p> <p>(00) No income</p> <p>(01) Less than \$6,000</p> <p>(02) \$6,000 - \$9,000</p> <p>(03) \$9,001 - \$12,000</p> <p>(04) \$12,001 - \$18,000</p> <p>(05) \$18,001 - \$22,500</p> <p>(06) \$22,501 - \$27,000</p> <p>(07) \$27,001 - \$31,500</p> <p>(08) \$31,501 - \$36,000</p> <p>(09) \$36,001 - \$45,000</p> <p>(10) \$45,001 - \$54,000</p> <p>(11) \$54,001 - \$72,000</p> <p>(12) \$72,001 - \$90,000</p> <p>(13) \$90,001 - \$126,000</p> <p>(14) \$126,001 - \$162,000</p> <p>(15) \$162,001 - \$216,000</p> <p>(16) More than \$216,000</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA</p>	

Q10G. How much money do you **personally** earn each month in your work or retirement or pension? [If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]

- (01) Less than \$6,000
- (02) \$6,000 - \$9,000
- (03) \$9,001 - \$12,000
- (04) \$12,001 - \$18,000
- (05) \$18,001 - \$22,500
- (06) \$22,501 - \$27,000
- (07) \$27,001 - \$31,500
- (08) \$31,501 - \$36,000
- (09) \$36,001 - \$45,000
- (10) \$45,001 - \$54,000
- (11) \$54,001 - \$72,000
- (12) \$72,001 - \$90,000
- (13) \$90,001 - \$126,000
- (14) \$126,001 - \$162,000
- (15) \$162,001 - \$216,000
- (16) More than \$216,000

(99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

- (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
- (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
- (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
- (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time

(88) **[Don't read]** DK

(98) **[Don't read]** DA

(1) Increased?
(2) Remained the same?
(3) Decreased?
(88) DK (98) DA

(1) Single (2) Married
(3) Common law marriage (Living together) (4) Divorced
(5) Separated (6) Widowed
(7) Civil union
(88) DK (98) DA

Q12Bn. How many children under the age of 13 live in this household? _____
00 = none, (88) DK (98) DA

Page | 262

ETID. Do you consider yourself black, Indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-Jamaican, mark (4) Black] (1) White (4) Black (5) Mixed (6) Indian (9) Chinese (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA	
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LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options] (2301) English only (2302) Patois only (2303) Both English and Patois (2304) Other (88) DK (98) DA	
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WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options] (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA	
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GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA				
For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? [Don't read: Barack Obama, accept Obama]	1	2	88	98
GIX4. In which continent is Nigeria? [Don't read: Africa]	1	2	88	98
GI4. How long is the government's term of office in Jamaica? [Don't read: 5 years]	1	2	88	98
GI7. How many MPs (Members of Parliament) does the House of Representatives have? [WRITE DOWN THE EXACT NUMBER STATED. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]	Number: _____		8888	9888

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	(88) DK (98)DA
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R15. Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R1. Television	(0) No [Go to R26]	(1) Yes [Continue]	(88) DK	(98)DA	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) INAP

R26. Is the house connected to the public sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	(88) DK	(98)DA
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These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

FORMATQ. Please indicate the format in which THIS specific questionnaire was completed 1. Paper 2. Android 3. Windows PDA	
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COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent] Time interview ended _____ : _____	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____	
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
SEXI. Note interviewer's sex: (1) Male (2) Female	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 40px; height: 20px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>


I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above. Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____/____/____	
Field supervisor's signature _____ Comments: _____	
[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____	
[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who verified the data _____	



Card A (L1)


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Left					Right				

Card B






Card C



Card D





Card G

Brazil

China

Spain

United States

India

Japan

Mexico

Venezuela

Card H

Brazil

China

South Korea

United States

India

Japan

Mexico

Russia

Singapore

Venezuela

Card F

- (00) No income**
- (01) Less than \$6,000**
- (02) \$6,000 - \$9,000**
- (03) \$9,001 - \$12,000**
- (04) \$12,001 - \$18,000**
- (05) \$18,001 - \$22,500**
- (06) \$22,501 - \$27,000**
- (07) \$27,001 - \$31,500**
- (08) \$31,501 - \$36,000**
- (09) \$36,001 - \$45,000**
- (10) \$45,001 - \$54,000**
- (11) \$54,001 - \$72,000**
- (12) \$72,001 - \$90,000**
- (13) \$90,001 - \$126,000**
- (14) \$126,001 - \$162,000**
- (15) \$162,001 - \$216,000**
- (16) More than \$216,000**



Color Palette



[DO NOT GIVE TO RESPONDENTS. THIS IS JUST FOR INTERVIEWERS]

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1 ⁰	2 ⁰	3 ⁰	4 ⁰	5 ⁰	6 ⁰	
None	0						
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
6th form/ "A" level	12	13					
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+			
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+		
Doesn't know	88						
Doesn't respond	98						

[DO NOT GIVE TO RESPONDENTS. THIS IS JUST FOR INTERVIEWERS]

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? **[Do not read options]**

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

(01) Catholic

(02) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).

(03) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).

(04) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)

(05) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) LDS (Mormon).

(07) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).

(11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).

(12) Jehovah's Witness.

(88) DK

(98) DA

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life.

The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq) and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org.

In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

USAID/Jamaica
142 Old Hope Road,
Kingston 6
Jamaica, W.I.
Phone: (876) 702-6445
Fax: (876) 702-6385
kingstondir@usaid.gov

