


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# The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica, 2008: The Impact of Governance

by:

**Dr. Lawrence A. Powell, Polling Director, Centre for Leadership and Governance,  
Department of Government, UWI, Mona**  
**Balford A. Lewis, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social  
Work, UWI, Mona**

**Series General Editor  
Mitchell A. Seligson**



**Centre for Leadership & Governance,  
University of the West Indies, Mona**



This study was done with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

March, 2009

# The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica, 2008: The Impact of Governance

## INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

### Investigation

- Lawrence Powell, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, UWI, Mona

- Balford Lewis, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona

### Sample Design and Fieldwork Coordination

- Roy Russell, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona

### Data Processing Coordination


- Gregory Baker, Population and Development Data Lab UWI, Mona

### Data Entry Supervision

- Janice Thomas and Natalee Lindsay, Population and Development Data Lab UWI, Mona

### General Coordination

- Dominique Zéphyr  
LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst  
Vanderbilt University, USA



Centre for Leadership & Governance,  
University of the West Indies, Mona



## Table of Contents

Index of Figures .....	v
Index of Tables .....	xi
Preface .....	xiii
Prologue: Background to the Study.....	xv
<i>Acknowledgements</i> .....	xxii
Executive Summary .....	xxv
<b>PART ONE: THEORY AND CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Context of Democratic Development in Jamaica, Method and Data Description.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1. Social, Economic and Political Context .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2. Survey Design and Sample Characteristics.....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1. <i>The Survey</i> .....	6
2.2. <i>Design Considerations</i> .....	6
2.3. <i>Sampling Procedures</i> .....	6
2.3.1. Selection of Primary Sampling Units .....	7
2.3.2. Selection of Respondents.....	8
2.4. <i>The Questionnaire</i> .....	10
2.5. <i>The Fieldwork</i> .....	10
2.6. <i>Data Management and Control</i> .....	11
2.7. <i>Sample Characteristics</i> .....	11
2.8. <i>Conclusion</i> .....	17
<b>Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>19</b>
1.1. <b>Theoretical Framework .....</b>	<b>19</b>
1.2. <b>Working hypothesis.....</b>	<b>20</b>
1.3. <b>Support for the Idea of Democracy per se. ....</b>	<b>23</b>
1.4. <b>Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends.....</b>	<b>24</b>
1.5. <b>Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions.....</b>	<b>28</b>
1.6. <b>Social Capital.....</b>	<b>31</b>
1.7. <b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>PART TWO: GOVERNANCE .....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Chapter II. Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>35</b>
2.1. <b>Theoretical Framework .....</b>	<b>35</b>
2.2. <b>How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy? .....</b>	<b>36</b>
2.3. <b>Assessing the Problem of Corruption in Jamaica.....</b>	<b>37</b>
2.3.1. <i>Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption in Jamaica</i> .....	37
2.3.2. <i>Comparative Perspective on Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption</i> .....	38
2.4. <b>Defining and Dealing with Corruption .....</b>	<b>43</b>
2.4.1. <i>Identifying Who Justifies</i> .....	45
2.5. <b>Measuring Corruption Victimization .....</b>	<b>47</b>
2.5.1. <i>The Index of Corruption Victimization</i> .....	49
2.5.2. <i>Levels of Corruption Victimization in Jamaica</i> .....	49
2.5.3. <i>Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective</i> .....	50
2.5.4. <i>Determinants of Corruption Victimization</i> .....	52
2.6. <b>Impact of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy.....</b>	<b>54</b>
2.7. <b>Conclusion.....</b>	<b>55</b>

APPENDIX CHAPTER II.....	56
<b>Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy.....</b>	<b>61</b>
3.1 Theoretical framework .....	61
3.2. How Might Crime Victimization Affect Support for Stable Democracy?.....	64
3.3. Crime Victimization and Insecurity in Jamaica .....	64
3.3.1. Extent of Crime Victimization.....	65
3.3.2. Crime Victimization Over Time.....	66
3.3.3. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Jamaica.....	67
3.4. Perception of Security in Jamaica.....	70
3.4.1. Comparative Perspective on Perception of Insecurity .....	71
3.4.2. Determinants of Sense of Insecurity in Jamaica.....	74
3.5. Impact of Crime Victimization and Sense of Insecurity on Support for Stable Democracy .....	77
3.6. Conclusion.....	79
APPENDIX CHAPTER III.....	81
<b>Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>83</b>
4.1 Theoretical framework .....	83
4.2. How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy? .....	85
4.3. Support for Local Government in Jamaica .....	85
4.4. Trust in Local Government .....	86
4.5. Support for Decentralization.....	89
4.5.1. Comparative Perspective on Support for Decentralization.....	92
4.5.2. Determinants of Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities .....	92
4.5.3. Decentralization of Economic Resources.....	94
4.5.4. Determinants of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources .....	95
4.6. Satisfaction with Performance of Local Government .....	95
4.6.1. Comparative Perspective on Satisfaction with Local Services.....	97
4.7. Citizens' Involvement with Parish Council.....	98
4.7.1. Participation in terms of Meeting Attendance.....	99
4.7.2. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Parish Council Meeting .....	100
4.7.3. Participation in terms of Demand-making .....	101
4.7.4. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Parish Council Meeting .....	102
4.8. Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy .....	104
4.9. Local Civic Participation in Jamaica.....	106
4.9.1 Measuring Civil Society Participation .....	106
4.9.2. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Civic Organizations .....	108
4.10. Local Civic Participation and Support for Stable Democracy .....	110
4.11. Conclusion.....	116
APPENDIX CHAPTER IV.....	117
<b>Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy .....</b>	<b>121</b>
5.1. Theoretical framework .....	121
5.2 How might perception of government's economic performance affect support for stable democracy?..	123
5.3. Measuring Perception of Government Economic Performance.....	123
5.3.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	124
5.3.2. Comparative Perspective on Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	124
5.4. Perception of National Economic Situation in Jamaica .....	126
5.4.1. Perception of the State of the Economy.....	129
5.4.2. Comparative Perspective on Citizens' Perception of the Country's Economic Situation .....	130
5.4.3. Determinants of Perception of Economic Performance of Government.....	132

5.5. The perception of government economic performance and its impact on support for stable democracy	135
5.6. Conclusion.....	137
APPENDIX CHAPTER V.....	138
<b>Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political legitimacy .....</b>	<b>139</b>
6.1. Theoretical Background .....	139
6.1.1. <i>The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation.....</i>	<i>139</i>
6.2. Support for the System in Jamaica.....	141
6.2.1. <i>Comparative Perspective on System Support.....</i>	<i>144</i>
6.2.2. <i>Predictors of System Support.....</i>	<i>145</i>
6.3. Political Tolerance.....	149
6.3.1. <i>Comparative Perspective on Political Tolerance.....</i>	<i>150</i>
6.4. Prospect for Democratic Stability in Jamaica.....	152
6.4.1. <i>Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy.....</i>	<i>155</i>
6.5. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions .....	159
6.5.1. <i>Support for Key Institutions in Jamaica.....</i>	<i>160</i>
6.6. Other Opinions of Jamaicans about Democracy .....	162
6.7. Conclusion.....	168
APPENDIX CHAPTER VI.....	169
<b>Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties .....</b>	<b>171</b>
7.1. Political Parties and Electoral Behaviour in Jamaica .....	171
7.2. Interest in Politics in Jamaica .....	173
7.3. Voter Participation.....	174
7.3.1. <i>Determinants of Voter Participation.....</i>	<i>176</i>
7.3.2. <i>Ideological Orientation and Voting Behaviour.....</i>	<i>179</i>
7.3.3. <i>Ideological Orientation and Party Identification.....</i>	<i>180</i>
7.3.4. <i>Voter Participation and Support for a Stable Democracy.....</i>	<i>181</i>
7.4. Political Party and Democracy.....	182
7.4.1. <i>Attitude to the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective.....</i>	<i>183</i>
7.5. Beyond the Vote.....	184
7.6. Conclusion.....	189
APPENDIX CHAPTER VII.....	190
<b>PART THREE: BEYOND GOVERNANCE .....</b>	<b>191</b>
<b>Chapter VIII. Psychocultural Factors in Jamaican Democracy: Need-Satisfaction, Responsibility, Attribution and Trust .....</b>	<b>193</b>
8.1. Perceived Satisfaction of Basic Psychosocial Needs .....	193
8.2. Who Is Responsible for Citizen Need Provision – Individual or Government?.....	196
8.3. Causal Attribution – Is the Individual or Society ‘to Blame’ for Financial Outcomes? .....	199
8.4. Interpersonal Trust Levels .....	202
8.5. Conclusion.....	205
<b>Chapter IX. Police-Citizen Relations in a Context of Economic Insecurity and Need Deprivation .....</b>	<b>207</b>
9.1. Four Aspects of Police-Community Relations .....	207
9.1.1. <i>Determinants of Negative Attitudes to the Police.....</i>	<i>209</i>
9.2. Common or Opposed Interests.....	212
9.3. Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration .....	212
9.4. Willingness to Work with the Police.....	213
9.4.1. <i>Determinants of Willingness to Work with the Police.....</i>	<i>214</i>
9.5. The Police-Citizen Rapport Scale .....	217
9.6. Interactions of Police-Citizen ‘Rapport’ with Demographic, Economic Security, and Psychosocial Variables .....	218
9.7. Conclusion.....	220

APPENDIX CHAPTER IX.....	221
Appendixes.....	223
Appendix I: The IRB “informed consent” document.....	223
Appendix II: The Questionnaire.....	225
References.....	257

## Index of Figures

Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of Respondents by Constituency .....	13
Figure 2. Distribution of the Sample by Region .....	14
Figure 3. Distribution of the Sample by Area of Residence .....	15
Figure 4. Distribution of the Sample by Gender .....	15
Figure 5. Distribution of the Sample by Level of Education .....	16
Figure 6. Distribution of the Sample by Age of Respondents .....	17
Figure I.1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective .....	24
Figure I.2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective .....	26
Figure I.3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective .....	28
Figure I.4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance) .....	30
Figure I.5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance) .....	31
Figure I.6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective .....	32
Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Magnitude of Corruption .....	38
Figure II.2. Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Year .....	39
Figure II.3. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008 .....	40
Figure II.4. Determinants of Perception that Corruption is Widespread, Jamaica 2008 .....	41
Figure II.5. Corruption Perception by Perception of Family's Economic Wellbeing .....	42
Figure II.6. Corruption Perception by Level of Education .....	43
Figure II.7. Percentage of Population Justifying Acts of Corruption .....	44
Figure II.8. Justification of Acts of Corruption by Year .....	44
Figure II.9. Probability of Justifying Acts of Corruption, Jamaica 2008 .....	45
Figure II.10. Justification of Acts of Corruption by Age .....	46
Figure II.11. Definition and Justification of Corruption in Jamaica .....	47
Figure II.12. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2008 .....	50
Figure II.13. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2008 .....	50
Figure II.14. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective .....	51
Figure II.15. Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption, Jamaica 2008 .....	52
Figure II.16. Corruption Victimization by Perception of Family's Economic Wellbeing .....	53
Figure II.17. Corruption Victimization by Wealth .....	54
Figure III.1. Respondents Victimized by Crime .....	66
Figure III.2. Respondents Victimized by Crime by Year .....	67
Figure III.3. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime .....	68
Figure III.4. Impact of Region of Residence on Crime Victimization in Jamaica, 2008 .....	69
Figure III.5. Impact of Education on Crime Victimization in Jamaica, 2008 .....	70
Figure III.6. Sense of Security among Jamaicans .....	71
Figure III.7. Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2006-2008 .....	72
Figure III.8. Perception of National Insecurity in Jamaica .....	73
Figure III.9. Sense of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2008 .....	74

Figure III.10. Determinants of perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008 .....	75
Figure III.11. Impact of Sex on Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008.....	76
Figure III.12. Impact of Education on Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008 .....	76
Figure III.13. Impact of Crime Victimization on Political Legitimacy .....	77
Figure III.14. Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust .....	78
Figure III.15. Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy.....	79
Figure IV.1. Trust in the Local Government in Jamaica, 2006-2008 .....	87
Figure IV.2. Comparison between Trust in Local Government and Trust .....	88
Figure IV.3. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative Perspective .....	89
Figure IV.4. Citizens Support for the Transfer of Responsibilities and Resources to Local Government.....	91
Figure IV.5. Comparative Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities and Economic Resources .....	91
Figure IV.6. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective .....	92
Figure IV.7. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities .....	93
Figure IV.8. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities .....	93
Figure IV.9. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective.....	94
Figure IV.10. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources .....	95
Figure IV.11. Respondents' Evaluation of Quality of Service Offered by Parish Council .....	96
Figure IV.12. Satisfaction with Local Services.....	97
Figure IV.13. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective .....	98
Figure IV.14. Participation at the Local Level.....	99
Figure IV.15. Participation in Local Meetings: 2006-2008 .....	100
Figure IV.16. Participation in Parish Council Meetings in Comparative Perspective.....	101
Figure IV.17. Demand-Making to the Local Government.....	102
Figure IV.18. Demand-Making to the Local Government: 2006-2008 .....	103
Figure IV.19. Demand Making on Parish Council in Comparative Perspective .....	104
Figure IV.20. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy.....	105
Figure IV.21. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust.....	105
Figure IV.22. Average Citizens' Participation in Civic Organizations.....	107
Figure IV.23. Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group in.....	108
Figure IV.24. Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association in.....	109
Figure IV.25. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements in Comparative Perspective.....	110
Figure IV.26. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the idea of democracy per se .....	111
Figure IV.27. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right of Public Contestation.....	111
Figure IV.28. Participation in Meeting of Religious Group by Support for the .....	112
Figure IV.29. Participation in Meeting for Committee for Community Improvement by Support for the Right of Public Contestation.....	113
Figure IV.30. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance .....	113
Figure IV.31. Participation in Meeting for Committee for Community Improvement by Political Tolerance.....	114

Figure IV.32. Participation in Meeting of Religious Group by Political Tolerance .....	114
Figure IV.33. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy .....	115
Figure IV.34. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust .....	116
Figure V.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance Indicators .....	124
Figure V.2. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Year .....	125
Figure V.3. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective ..	126
Figure V.4. Perception of the Relative Importance of National Economic Problems in Jamaica .....	129
Figure V.5. Perception of Country's Economic Situation .....	130
Figure V.6. Perception of National Economic Situation in Comparative Perspective .....	131
Figure V.7. Perception of Personal Economic Situation .....	132
Figure V.8. Predictors of the Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	132
Figure V.9. Impact of Wealth on Government Economic Performance .....	133
Figure V.10. Impact of Perception of National Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	134
Figure V.11. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	134
Figure V.12. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Democracy .....	135
Figure V.13. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for the Right of Public Contestation .....	136
Figure V.14. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Political legitimacy .....	136
Figure VI.1. Comparative Average Scores in System Support Items and Index, 2008 .....	143
Figure VI.2. Comparative Average Scores in System Support Items and Index: 2006-2008 .....	144
Figure VI.3. Comparative System Support Index .....	145
Figure VI.4. Predictors of System Support .....	146
Figure VI.5. Support for the System by Perception of the Performance of Government .....	146
Figure VI.6. Support for the System by Interest in Politics .....	147
Figure VI.7. Support for the System by Wealth .....	148
Figure VI.8. Support for the System by Age .....	148
Figure VI.9. Attitudes of Jamaicans to Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, Tolerance Index: 2006-2008 .....	150
Figure VI.10. Attitudes of Jamaicans to Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, Tolerance Index: 2006-2008 .....	151
Figure VI.11. Political Tolerance Index by Country, 2008 .....	152
Figure VI.12. Attitudes in Support for Stable Democracy, 2006-2008 .....	154
Figure VI.13. Attitudes in Support for Stable Democracy .....	155
Figure VI.14. Predictors of Democratic Stability, 2008 .....	156
Figure VI.15. Support for a Stable Democracy by Perception of Government Economic Performance .....	156
Figure VI.16. Support for a Stable Democracy by Interest in Politics .....	157
Figure VI.17. Support for a Stable Democracy by Wealth .....	158
Figure VI.18. Support for a Stable Democracy by Age .....	158
Figure VI.19. Legitimacy of Core Institutions, 2008 .....	160

Figure VI.20. Legitimacy of Core Institutions, 2006- 2008.....	161
Figure VI.21. Attitude of Jamaicans to the Principle of Rule of Law, 2006.....	162
Figure VI.22. Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2008 .....	163
Figure VI.23. Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2006-2008 .....	164
Figure VI.24. Citizens Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy in Jamaica – 2008 .....	165
Figure VI.25. Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy, 2006–2008 .....	166
Figure VI.26. Citizens’ Assessment of the Strength of the Jamaican Democracy, 2008.....	167
Figure VI.27. Strength of the Jamaican Democracy, 2006-2008.....	167
Figure VII.1. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective.....	174
Figure VII.2. Voter Participation .....	175
Figure VII.3. Determinants of Voter Participation .....	176
Figure VII.4. Voter Participation by Age.....	177
Figure VII.5. Voter Participation by Interest in Politics .....	177
Figure VII.6. Voter Participation by Gender.....	178
Figure VII.7. Ideological orientation of Jamaicans.....	179
Figure VII.8. Ideological Orientation by Voter Participation .....	180
Figure VII.9. Ideological Orientation by Party Identification.....	181
Figure VII.10. Voting Behaviour by Support for the Democratic System of Government in a Jamaica .....	182
Figure VII.11. Citizens Attitude on the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties.....	183
Figure VII.12. Citizens Attitude on the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008.....	184
Figure VII.13. Encouraging the Vote as a form of Political Participation.....	185
Figure VII.14. Working in Campaigns as a form of Political Participation.....	186
Figure VII.15. Working in Campaigns as a form of Political Participation in Comparative Perspective .....	187
Figure VII.16. Attendance at Political Party Meeting as a form of Political Participation.....	188
Figure VII.17. Involvement in Protest as a Form of Political Participation.....	189
Figure VIII.1. Degree of Needs Satisfaction by Perceived Adequacy of Income .....	196
Figure VIII.2. Citizen Perception of Responsibility for Need Provision.....	199
Figure VIII.3. Average Importance of Individual (‘External’) Causal Attributions for Poverty in Jamaica .....	201
Figure VIII.4. Average Importance of Societal (‘Internal’) Causal Attributions for Poverty in Jamaica .....	202
Figure VIII.5. Reported Level of Mis-Trust among Jamaicans .....	204
Figure VIII.6. Sense of Trust among Jamaicans .....	204
Figure IX.1. Citizen Perception of Police Actions and Intentions in Communities .....	209
Figure IX.2. Selected Factors Explaining Negative Attitudes to the Police .....	210
Figure IX.3. Negative Attitude to Police by Crime Victimization.....	211
Figure IX.4. Negative Attitude to Police by Age.....	211
Figure IX.5. Respondents Opinions on Citizen-Police Interest on Community Issues .....	212
Figure IX.6. Perception of the Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration .....	213
Figure IX.7. Citizen Attitude to Cooperation with the Police in Crime Control Initiatives .....	213
Figure IX.8. Selected Factors Explaining Willingness to Work with the Police .....	214

Figure IX.9. Willingness to Work with the Police by Participation in Community Improvement Initiatives .....215

Figure IX.10. Willingness to Work with the Police by Area of Residence .....215

Figure IX.11. Willingness to Work with the Police by Age .....216

Figure IX.12. Willingness to Work with the Police by Level of Education .....217



## Index of Tables

Table 1. Distribution of Enumeration Districts According to Stratum by Area of Residence.....	8
Table 2. Gender and Age Distribution of Quota by Cluster Type .....	9
Table 3. Selected Descriptive Statistics from Population Census (2001) and LAPOP (2008) Survey.....	12
Table V.1. Pre-Coded ‘Most Important Problem’ Item. ....	127
Table V.2. Categorization of Items to Determine most Serious national Problem.....	128
Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities .....	140
Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Jamaica, 2008 .....	153
Table VII.1. General Election Results, 1944-2007 .....	172
Table VIII.1. Perceived Satisfaction Levels for 5 Types of Psychosocial Needs, by Income Adequacy and Unemployment Concern .....	195
Table VIII.2. Individual versus Government Responsibility for Need Provision.....	198
Table IX.1. Perceived Police Citizen Rapport Levels, by Demographic, Economic Security and Psychosocial Needs Measures.....	219



## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer’s* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez  
*AmericasBarometer* Grant Manager at USAID



## Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson  
Centennial Professor of Political Science  
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project  
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy,

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into

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<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting<sup>2</sup> in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely

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<sup>2</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	 
Guatemala	
El Salvador	 
Honduras	 
Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	 
Panama	

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	 CEDROS Gallup INTERNATIONAL	
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Bolivia	 Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	
Paraguay	 CIR Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Chile	 Instituto de Ciencia Política	
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasília	
Venezuela	 CISOR	

## Caribbean Group

<b>Dominican Republic</b>	 	
<b>Guyana</b>		
<b>Haiti</b>		
<b>Jamaica</b>	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>	

## Canada and United States

<b>Canada</b>		
<b>United States</b>	<p><b>VANDERBILT</b>  <b>UNIVERSITY</b></p>	

## Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
<b>Mexico, Central America, North America Group</b>	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> <li>● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala</li> <li>● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc.</li> <li>● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Andean/Southern Cone Group</b>	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.</li> <li>• Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> <li>• Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública</li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay</li> </ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile</li> </ul>
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo</li> </ul>
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia</li> </ul>
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois</li> <li>• Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
<b>Caribbean Group</b>	
Republica Dominicana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee</li> <li>• Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies</li> <li>• Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2008



## Executive Summary

Jamaica participated in this series of biennial cross-national, LAPOP-directed and USAID financed political culture studies for the first time in 2006. Key findings of that landmark national survey were, inter alia, that Jamaicans are patriotic and prefer the democratic system of government over other regime types, that there is a relatively high degree of confidence in core public institutions, and most significantly, that the political values and attitudes prevailing at that time held encouraging prospects for the stability of the Jamaican democracy.

This 2008 study was undertaken with the aim of broadening our understanding of the dynamics of Jamaica's political culture, with a focus on assessing the impact of citizens' involvement with governance on relevant democratic structures, processes and outcomes. As with the 2006 study, findings obtained from this sample survey are expected to be generalizable to all voting age residents of Jamaica. With this goal in mind, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed, in line with a framework proposed by the LAPOP organization for its collaborating countries. The obtained sample of 1499 persons was self-weighted and was determined to be representative of Jamaica's adult population in terms of its gender, age and spatial distribution, based on the composition of the 2001 Population Census

This report presents the findings of the 2008 survey with comparative information on key democracy and governance indicators, firstly from a national perspective utilizing results from the 2006 study, and then cross-nationally utilizing information from other LAPOP countries.

The report is organized in three parts:

- Section 1: This is an introductory section providing information relating to the context of the study, the survey design and including a discussion on the theories underpinning the linkage between citizen perception of and experience with governance and support for stable democracy, and a preliminary analysis of the main descriptive cross-national evidence from the **AmericasBarometer** 2008 series
- Section 2: The focus of this part is on selected governance-related issues that are assumed to influence system legitimacy and citizens' support for a stable democracy. The results of empirical tests made to determine the extent to which relevant perceptions and experiences influence support for the four identified dimensions of democratic governance are also reported in this section
- Section 3: In the two chapters of this section, issues relating to psycho-cultural factors in Jamaican democracy and questions pertaining to police-citizen relations in a context of economic insecurity are explored

The presentation in **Chapter 1**, titled '**Building Support for Stable Democracy**', proposed a theoretical framework for the analysis of the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** data set. The thrust of

the arguments and supporting literature in this section is that confidence in and support for democracy may be a function of citizens' perceptions of and experiences with governance. More specifically, it was proposed that: *Citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies.* It is further presumed that attitudes in support of a democratic regime are multi-dimensional, hence the focus on the following four key dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role:

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchilleian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

The presumption underlying the choice of these dimensions is that these sets of beliefs are essential for the consolidation and stability of a democracy.

In the chapters that follow in Part 2, empirical tests were made to determine the extent of citizens' perception of and experience with relevant governance-related variables and the probability they might influence support for the aforementioned dimensions of democratic governance. Each chapter begins with a review of the theory informing the examination of the respective issue.

## **Chapter 2: Corruption and its Impact on Support for a Stable Democracy**

Chapter 2 begins with the assumption that corruption is a serious national problem in whatever form or extent it exists, since it erodes citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system. Additionally, it is presumed to undermine government efficiency as it mis-allocates scarce resources, distorts transaction cost and negatively impacts on the investment climate and the national image as a whole. As a consequence, it was classified as an important governance-specific concern for analysis in this section.

The problem of corruption was assessed in terms of citizens' perception of its magnitude, and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. It was found that citizens' perception that corruption is widespread in the public sphere is exceptionally high in absolute as well as in comparative terms. On a corruption perception index ranging from 0 – 100, Jamaica's obtained an alarmingly high score of 86 points, a two-point increase over 2006. Among the twenty-two countries that participated in the 2008 LAPOP survey, Jamaica was ranked at the top the chart, the country with the highest level of citizens' lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials in the Region. Level of education and perception of family's economic well-being were found to be statistically significant determinants of whether or not citizens perceive corruption to be widespread in society.

With respect to citizens' direct experience with corrupt acts or proposals, there was a decline from 34 to 26 points on the corruption victimization index. Socio-economic status was the only statistically significant determining factor, with wealthier persons being more likely to be victimized than the less wealthy.

Most significantly, it was found that citizens' exposure to or perception of corruption did not significantly influence their attitudes and values relating the aforementioned components of support for stable democracy.

### Chapter 3: Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

In this chapter, it was assumed that crime victimization and to a lesser extent, fear of crime or sense of insecurity might negatively impact citizens' level of tolerance, causing them to lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital; eroding support for the right to public contestation; and driving citizens to lose confidence in their political institutions, especially the police and the judiciary.

It was found that despite Jamaica's reputation of being one of the world's foremost 'high crime' societies--due particularly to its alarmingly high homicide figures—the crime victimization rate was found to be relatively low and even on the decline. In fact, the country is curiously ranked at the bottom of the chart among the LAPOP countries participating in the 2008 study. Level of education and region of residence were found to be statistically influential factors in explaining the likelihood of being victimized, with persons pursuing or having completed tertiary level schooling being nearly twice as likely to be victimized than those who are either pursuing or have only completed primary education. As expected, persons living in the County of Cornwall, which includes the tourist city of Montego Bay and the resort areas along the west and sections of the North Coast, are much less likely to be victimized when compared to those living all other areas.

Despite the unusually low victimization rate of a mere eight points on the 100-point crime victimization index, most Jamaicans are, nonetheless, pre-occupied with the problem of crime and violence. When asked to identify the most serious problem facing Jamaica, 62 per cent of respondents identified security-related fears as their major concern. Of note also is the finding that the intensity of national insecurity (that crime threatens the country's well-being) differs significantly from local insecurity (the feeling of insecurity at the community level). In essence, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level, indicating a reasonable sense of safety in their neighbourhood; yet are overly preoccupied with impact of crime at the national level. From a comparative perspective, though, sense of individual insecurity in Jamaica is quite low. Interestingly, on the basis of this measure, Jamaica is ranked at the bottom of the chart with the United States and Canada, meaning that residents feel nearly as safe in their neighbourhoods as nationals of these countries.

With respect to the impact of these factors on support for a stable democracy it was found that, consistent with the aforementioned assumptions, exposure to criminal acts negatively impacts citizens' attitude in support of political legitimacy and their propensity to trust their fellow

citizens. Also, it was found that sense of insecurity erodes citizens' belief in the idea and principles of democracy.

#### **Chapter 4: The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on Support for Stable Democracy**

The basic assumption informing this chapter is that citizens who participate in and evaluate local government positively are possibly more approving of the right of public contestation and inclusive participation, and in turn are likely to exhibit greater belief in the legitimacy of national institutions and the political system as a whole.

Despite the promise that the transfer of functions and resources from the national to local government should facilitate greater responsiveness and effectiveness, and an overall improvement in the delivery of certain local services, Jamaicans are still more trusting of the Central Government over their local authority. This is understandable given that, on a whole, Jamaicans are intensely dissatisfied with the performance of their local authorities, the most dissatisfied in the Americas based on LAPOP 2008 data. Support for the decentralization per se among Jamaicans is, nonetheless, reasonably strong compared to other countries in the region.

When citizens' level of involvement in local democratic governance in terms of level of participation in the affairs of their Parish Council in the form of meeting attendance and demand-making was examined, Jamaica fared well both in terms of its mid-range scores on both indicators and its relatively high rank among other countries in the Americas. Local civic participation was also found to be comparatively high, with Jamaica obtaining second-highest score on attendance to meetings of religious groups and above-median rank on other indicators.

On the whole, it was found that higher levels of participation with local authorities and greater social collaboration among community members positively impact support for a stable democracy.

#### **Chapter 5: Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy**

Citizen satisfaction with the economic performance of the incumbent political administration is understood to be a critical condition for system legitimacy. The assumption is that citizens who evaluate their governments as being efficacious, especially in terms of economic performance, are more likely to have a stronger belief that democracy is the best regime type.

In this analysis it was found that Jamaicans evaluate their Government quite negatively on its performance in the handling of the country's economic affairs. But because of the gravity of the crime problem, economic concerns are not paramount in the minds of most Jamaican. Only about three in 10 respondents perceived the economy as the most serious national problem. This is despite the fact that nearly 60 per cent assess the country's economic situation to be in a bad state, with a large proportion of this segment – 24 per cent – judging it to be very bad. In judging

their personal economic situation, the greater proportion of Jamaicans – 43 per cent – evaluated their economic welfare to be neither good nor bad.

Citizens' perception of the performance of the government in the handling of the country's economic affairs was found to impact on their support for a stable democracy, by way of its effect on support for democracy per se; attitudes in support of the right to public contestation, and attitudes in support of political legitimacy of core regime institutions.

## **Chapter 6: Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy**

In this chapter, our analysis was informed by the notion that pervasive society-wide attitudes and values indicating political tolerance and broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for maintenance of a stable democracy--hence this examination of the various attitudes, opinions values and behaviours of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. In essence, the ultimate objective was to determine the extent to which the country's democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

Significantly, it was found that since 2006 there has been a moderate decline in the prospect of the stability of the Jamaican system of government. This was influenced primarily by a measureable decline in political tolerance over the period. However, a sizeable increase in the indicators of generalized system support has had a compensating effect, facilitating a situation in which one third of the population was categorized to be supportive of a stable democracy, on the basis of their high support for the system and correspondingly high level tolerance. An appreciable increase in the segment of the population with attitudes in support of authoritarianism was identified as a cause for concern.

Despite the marginal decline in the support for stable democracy index, prospects for stability in Jamaica remain quite favourable in comparative terms. When ranked with other Latin American and Caribbean countries on this indicator, Jamaica was ranked fifth in terms of the percentage of citizens with values and attitudes deemed indicative of the propensity to support a stable democracy.

## **Chapter 7: Voting Behavior and Political Parties**

Because of the widespread recognition of the importance of the vote in the democratic process, we commenced the analysis of the data in this chapter by examining the political behaviours of Jamaicans with respect to the exercise of the franchise. It was found that the comparatively high interest in politics expressed by Jamaicans in this study was not reflected in their level of political participation in terms of the vote. The voter participation rate was 65 per cent, in line with average turnout since 1972, but much less than rates of as high as 87 per cent recorded up to 1980. Consistent with the literature, age was found to be the most influential determinant of voting behaviour, and persons who voted were found to be more likely to embrace the values and attitudes assumed to be conducive to support for a stable democracy.

Not surprisingly, it was found that interest and confidence in the party and popular party identification are low in Jamaica, and more recently have been on the decline. With regards to ideological orientation of party affiliates, it was found that there was no statistically significant difference in the political leanings of the supporters of the two major political parties.

Political participation, measured in terms of citizens' involvement in election campaigning and non-violent protest, seemed quite low in absolute terms. But when level of involvement in these types of activities was compared with that of other LAPOP countries, Jamaica commanded a middle-range ranking on the respective measures.

## **Chapter 8: Psychocultural Factors in Jamaican Democracy**

In this chapter subjective, 'psychocultural' factors underlying Jamaican orientations to political democracy were examined. Among these were scales measuring Jamaicans' perceived need-satisfaction levels, their societal norms as to whether the individual or the government ought to be responsible for meeting citizen needs across a variety of life domains, and Jamaicans' basic orientations with respect to causal attribution, and interpersonal trust.

With respect to five identified types of psychosocial needs, it was found that Jamaicans are most need-satisfied in their 'relatedness' needs, i.e. love-friendship and esteem. 'Growth' needs are also quite high. Jamaicans report feeling weakest in satisfying basic 'existence' needs involving a subjective sense of health-security and financial-security. There is no significant difference in need satisfaction levels between the genders, however, there are substantial need-satisfaction differences between economically-secure and economically-insecure respondents. Perceived income adequacy, in particular, is significantly related to all five types of needs, with those who report that their total family income is "enough" consistently showing higher levels of need satisfaction than those who report that it is "not enough."

The survey also sought to ascertain preferences as to whether the individual or the government should be responsible for meeting citizen needs across 14 life domains. These life domains are the ones around which political debates over the proper scope and functions of the 'twentieth-century welfare state' have typically been waged within modern industrialized democracies. For Jamaicans, the individual-government balance tips strongly in the direction of government as the preferred solver of related social problems in matters of health and medical care, disability, retirement income, employment and training, education, nutrition, housing, and work injury compensation. Only in the domain of child care was there prevalent sentiment for solving the problems at the individual level. With respect to 'internal' (personal factors) versus 'external' (societal factors) bias in judging situations related to their fellow citizens' economic difficulties, it was found that Jamaicans attribute the causation for poverty to a mixed combination of external and internal factors. Neither clearly prevails.

With respect to generalized interpersonal trust, it was found that relatively high levels of distrust exist within Jamaican society (83.5 %), indicating a need for national strategies that concentrate more intensively on building social capital within communities as a precondition to sustained economic development, violent crime reduction etc. The 'good news' regarding trust is that when

the trust question is asked in a way that includes one's generalized conception of human nature, reported trust levels are found to be considerably higher.

## Chapter 9: Dilemmas of Police-Citizen Relations and Economic Insecurity

This chapter explored several key components in the mix of social problems that have compounded in Jamaica over the past few decades--which includes antagonistic community-police relations, economic insecurity and need deprivation among chronically unemployed young males, neighbourhood-based deeply-entrenched political 'garrisons' with local 'dons', drug trafficking as an alternate underground economy, and associated record levels of retaliatory murder in a 'culture of tribal violence'.

Questions were included in the 2008 Jamaican LAPOP, in consultation with USAID, which were designed to tap Jamaicans' sentiments on police-citizen relations, their views on the causes of chronic poverty within Jamaican society, and their concerns about ongoing economic insecurity and unemployment. Particular emphasis was placed on examining differences on these dimensions between younger and older respondents, as a consensus seems to be emerging among Jamaican policymakers that the 'way out' of these tangled social problems may be to strengthen social capital and positive societal engagement among Jamaican youth through national social policies that provide meaningful life alternatives at critical life junctures.

The 2008 survey included several basic questions on police-community relations in Jamaica, designed to tap four interrelated aspects of the relationship between law enforcement authorities and the citizens they serve within neighbourhoods. Respondents were asked if they feel the police are considered to be "helpful" friends, or "abusive" enemies when they come into their neighbourhoods to enforce laws, and whether respondents perceive this police-citizen relationship as a zero-sum or non-zero-sum game. A third question asked if respondents think a "working relationship" between citizens and police in their neighbourhood is possible and could make a positive difference, and a fourth question probed whether they would be willing to cooperate with police on community projects to combat crime.

Findings indicate that -- contrary to impressions common in sensationalistic media reports -- most Jamaicans feel that when the police come into their neighbourhood they are "there to help" rather than "there to abuse", and 3 out of 4 feel the interests of the police and the people in their neighbourhood are "in common", rather than "opposed". Only about half of the respondents, however, are optimistic that combined police-citizen efforts could actually make a tangible difference in effectively combatting crime. About two-thirds of Jamaicans say they would be willing to cooperate in "working closely" with police to fight crime in such a joint programme, with only a third saying they would hesitate. We conclude that Jamaicans are generally supportive of police attempts to tackle crime in their community, but a sizeable majority also fear that police are ultimately losing the battle with criminal elements, which leaves them "sceptical, but still hoping".

To operationalize the notion of degree of 'rapport' between citizens and police, an additive scale was developed that combines the four survey items into an easily interpretable composite

measure. ‘Rapport’ was then broken down by demographic, economic security, and psychocultural variables. Among the demographic factors, age clearly has a significant effect on perceived police-citizen rapport, with youth viewing the relationship as a more antagonistic one than older age groups do. Economic insecurity also is clearly related to levels of rapport, with the most extreme categories in terms of income inadequacy and unemployment anxiety reporting substantially lower levels of perceived community rapport with police than is the case for the more economically-comfortable categories.

In terms of psychosocial influences, subjective ‘need satisfaction’ and ‘life satisfaction’ levels are significantly related to citizen-police rapport levels, with the least-“satisfied” perceiving lower rapport. In conclusion, police-citizen ‘rapport’ is related to all three types of factors – demographic, economic security, and psychosocial. In particular, the pattern that emerges from these findings suggests that police-community rapport is least ‘healthy’ among the youngest segments of the population and the economically disadvantaged and need deprived.

**PART ONE:**  
**THEORY AND**  
**CROSS-NATIONAL**  
**COMPARISONS**



# Context of Democratic Development in Jamaica, Method and Data Description.

## 1. Social, Economic and Political Context

From a political standpoint 2007 could be considered to have been one of the most eventful years of Jamaica's post-independence environment. Of particular significance was the staging of two major elections – the general and the local government elections – within three months of each other. The general election, Jamaica's fifteenth, was held on September 3, and resulted in the removal of the eighteen-year-old People's National Party (PNP)-led administration in the narrowest margin of victory since the advent of universal adult suffrage in 1944. In the final count, the victorious Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) was confirmed the winner of 32 seats in the 60-seat parliament with the other 28 being won by the People's National Party. The new JLP administration, led by Bruce Golding, acted expeditiously in completing the election process by holding the local government elections on December 5 of 2007. As was predicted, the governing JLP won this contest decisively, winning in 135 of the 227 local divisions thus gaining control of nine of the Island's thirteen Parish Council authorities.

And as has been the situation historically, the country's political context continues to be characterized by incidents of partisan political violence, allegations of corruption and persistent reports of human rights abuses by members of the security forces. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, Freedom House has again, in its *Freedom of the World* (2007) survey, classified Jamaica as a functioning and 'free' electoral democracy. This survey categorizes nations as being 'free', 'partly free' or 'not free' on the basis of their score on a political rights and civil liberties scale, which ranges from 1 – 7, with scores closer to 1 indicating 'free' and 7 being 'not free'. Jamaica's freedom status for 2007 equated that for 2006, when the country was also listed as 'free', based on the average of scores of two (2) for 'political rights' and three (3) for 'civil liberties'

On the economic front, the growth of 1.2 per cent in Gross Domestic Product for 2007 was mainly attributed to the performance of the services sector which grew by 1.9 per cent. Growth prospects were stymied by factors that included the increasing price of imported oil and grain, a weakening consumer demand for Jamaican exports in some advanced countries such as the USA, the introduction of passport requirement regulations for tourists from the USA (which negatively affected tourist arrivals), the devastation caused by hurricane 'Dean' (August 2007) and other weather systems, reduced business activities due to uncertainties prior to the general and local government elections, and increased prices which accounted for the 16.8 per cent rate of inflation in that year (*ESSJ 2007*).

Overall, output from the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, and Mining and Quarrying sectors fell. However, the wider-sector picture included positive contributors such as private remittance inflows totalling US\$1,965.3 million, or an 11.1 per cent increase when compared to 2006, and tourism which realized an increase in income despite a decline of 4.5 per cent in visitor arrivals.

Among other indicators, net international reserves declined to US\$1877.7 million in 2007 from US\$2,317.6 million in 2006 (*ESSJ* 2007).

One of the significant aspects of the economic context with regard to investment and banking was the phenomenal growth of and eventual collapse of a number unregistered investment schemes. According to a policy brief outlining a study conducted by the Kingston-based Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI), “with only limited knowledge of the scope and structure of these organizations, many Jamaicans have eagerly invested in them, with the hope of multiplying their returns through the unusually high interest rates offered by these entities.” By mid-2008, the Government’s securities regulatory agency, the Financial Services Commission (FSC), issued cease-and-desist orders against these organizations, resulting in the suspension of their activities and as a consequence, the inability of depositors to access the billions of dollars that were invested in these schemes. The aforementioned CaPRI report predicted possible social unrest if depositors were not eventually paid but argued that such protest “was likely to be short-lived and probably isolated.”

The social context continued to be most prominently characterized by a spiralling crime rate, high levels of unemployment and allegations of widespread corruption. Jamaicans indicated via several surveys conducted in 2007 that crime was society’s number one problem. In this study, when asked to identify the most serious problem facing Jamaica currently, 62 per cent of those surveyed reported security-related issues as their major concern. This is understandable, given murder figures of 1,574 for 2007, the second highest in the country’s recent history and representing an increase over 2006 but falling short of the 1,674 or 64 per 100,000 inhabitants recorded in 2005. As part of a strategy to address the problem Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin, who headed the military wing of the security forces (Jamaica Defence Force) until 2007, was appointed to replace the resigning police commissioner with a mandate to urgently address the problems of crime and violence, especially the frightening and escalating murder rate. The arrest of a number of police officers for corruption since his appointment marks his delivery on a promise to deal firstly with criminality in the force as part of a strategy in dealing with the larger crime problem.

With regards to employment levels, the labour force participation rate stood at 64.8 per cent in 2007, an increase by 0.1 per cent over 2006. The male participation rate continues to be substantially higher than that of females, with the former averaging 73.7 and the latter being 56.5 per cent. The average rate of unemployment was 9.9 per cent for 2007 compared to 10.3 per cent for 2006. Rate of unemployment for males was 6.2 per cent, 14.5 for females and 23.6 for youth (listed as those 14 -24 years) (see *ESSJ* 2007).

Meanwhile, Jamaicans continue to perceive corruption as a serious national problem and a major hindrance to development. Of note is Transparency International’s 3.3 rating for Jamaica on the 2007 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)<sup>3</sup>, a marginally lower score than the 3.7 obtained in 2006.

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<sup>3</sup> The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures ‘the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians’ in a particular country. Scores can range from ‘0’ signifying highly corrupt to ‘10’ indicating not at all corrupt.

The agency ranked Jamaica at 84 on that basis, compared to the highest-ranked Caribbean country, Barbados, at 23 with a score of 6.9, but above Haiti at 177 with a score of 1.6, among the 180 countries surveyed. Countries with a score of below 5.0 such as Jamaica are considered to have “a serious corruption problem.”

Not surprisingly, the issue of corruption featured prominently in last elections, and the promise of implementing measures to control the problem was a major platform on which the September general election was contested. In fact, it has been widely acknowledged that the PNP lost a close election primarily as a result of persistent allegations of the involvement of some of its senior officials in some high-profile corruption scandals. Following the election, a former junior minister of that administration and his assistant were arrested on corruption charges, and there were reports of further evidence of malfeasance in some other cases that were the subject of further investigation.

On the question of prospects for social stability, it was concluded in a recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country programme report that “while the country is currently experiencing modest growth and improved socio-economic and environmental indicators, vulnerabilities persist, particularly in social sectors”. As a consequence, Government has significantly expanded its involvement in the social sector through initiatives such as the removal of tuition fees at the secondary level of education and the introduction of free health services in the Island’s public health care facilities. International development agencies have been equally responsive with targeted social interventions. The 2007-2011 UNDP programme effort has as its “three key national priorities: (a) HIV/AIDS; (b) environment and poverty; and (c) justice, peace and security” (UNDP/Jamaica 2007-2011, pp. 2-3). And the 2006-2009 World Bank assistance package of “up to \$150 million between, as well as technical and advisory services” was geared towards developing Jamaica’s social sector, stimulating socio-economic growth, and “improving human development...and help reduce and prevent crime.” (CAS for Jamaica, [worldbank.org](http://worldbank.org), 2008). Also of significance are the ongoing United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of key sectors in the economy, promoting sustainable natural assets management, improving the education and health status among youth and vulnerable groups, and its governance-strengthening initiatives aimed at increasing accountability, citizen participation and community security.

On a whole, the only significant difference in context since the last study is a change of political administration in 2007, which places a different political party at the helm of government.

## 2. Survey Design and Sample Characteristics

### 2.1. The Survey

Jamaica participated in this series of biennial cross-national, LAPOP directed and USAID financed political culture studies for the first time in 2006. Key findings of that landmark national survey were, inter alia: that Jamaicans are deeply patriotic and overwhelmingly prefer the democratic system of government over all other regime types, that there is a relatively high degree of confidence in core public institutions, and that despite the low level of trust that is accorded to partisan political organizations such as political parties, support for the political system overall, is average when compared to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most significantly, it was concluded then that on a whole, the prevailing political attitudes and values foreshadowed that the prospect for the stability of the Jamaican democracy was highly favourable.

This 2008 study was undertaken with the aim of broadening our understanding of the dynamics of Jamaica's political culture, with a focus on assessing the impact of citizens' involvement with governance on relevant democratic structures, processes and outcomes. As with the 2006 study, findings obtained from this sample survey are expected to be generalizable to all non-institutionalized, voting age citizens of Jamaica. In the following sub-sections, we describe the design followed in pursuit of these goals.

### 2.2. Design Considerations

Information generated from public opinion surveys often fails to accurately represent the views of targeted populations due primarily to flaws in the design of the samples utilized in such studies. This is understandable considering that time and cost constraints often necessitate the use of smaller samples which do not always adequately reflect the characteristics of the populations involved. It follows, therefore, that the accuracy of the information produced on the basis of public opinion studies might be significantly enhanced if samples are designed to sufficiently include participants from the various sectors of the population, ideally in the proportions they are distributed within these sectors. In other words, sample representativeness should be a critical consideration in the design of these studies.

With this in mind, the sample for this 2008 round of survey was carefully designed to reflect the key characteristics of the voting age population of Jamaica based on the composition of the 2001 Population Census. As with the 2006 study, the sample is self-weighted and was configured to be representative of all Jamaicans, eighteen years and older, who reside permanently in the country and live in private dwellings. This means that persons who live in institution-type residences such as army bases, school dormitories, orphanages and guest houses were excluded in this design.

### 2.3. Sampling Procedures

In order to obtain a sample with the properties discussed earlier, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed, in line with a framework proposed by the LAPOP organization

for its collaborating countries. As the term multi-stage implies, sample selection was done in a number of phases. In the first stage of the process, the country was divided into the following four regions or strata:

- Stratum 1 – This is comprised of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) which is the country’s main commercial and administrative centre and the most densely populated area in Jamaica. It is comprised of Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Spanish Town and the City of Portmore
- Stratum 2 – This is county Surrey excluding Kingston and urban St. Andrew. This stratum includes areas which are involved in both large and small scale farming of sugarcane, bananas, coconuts and livestock
- Stratum 3 - This is the county of Middlesex, excluding Spanish Town and Portmore. Manufacturing and agricultural activities include bauxite mining and sugarcane and poultry farming
- Stratum 4 – This is the county of Cornwall which includes the City of Montego Bay and the main tourist areas along the west, and sections of the north coast

This stratification was undertaken with the goal of accomplishing greater representativeness and dispersion of the units that were selected in the sample. The underlying assumption is that sampling units within each of these strata are basically homogeneous, while there are marked differences that distinguish the four regions from one other. Such strata features enhance sample reliability and, in turn, reduce variance in the estimates calculated from the data.

### 2.3.1. Selection of Primary Sampling Units

In stage 2 of the process, there was a further sub-division of each stratum into Urban and Rural Areas, with the aim of ensuring that sampling units were selected in the proportion that they are distributed in rural and urban neighbourhoods across the Island. This was followed by the selection of a sample of Enumeration Districts (EDs) from each sub-stratum. EDs are relatively small localities that are demarcated and diagramed by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica<sup>4</sup> for sampling purposes. They are the primary sampling units (PSU) in this design. As a consequence, they were carefully chosen using a probability proportional to size (PPS) selection process, meaning that they were randomly selected in proportions reflecting the urban/rural distribution of EDs within each stratum and also, according to the distribution of these localities among the four regions.

As illustrated in Table 2.1 below, the selection process began with the cross-tabulation of stratum with area of residence in order to identify the number of EDs that are situated in the different

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<sup>4</sup> **The Statistical Institute of Jamaica** is the Government agency ‘invested with powers to collect, compile, analyse, abstract and publish statistical information in relation to commercial, industrial, social, economic and general activities and condition of the people’.

geographical segments. A systematic sample with a random start design was then used in the selection of a sample of EDs from each of the segments. More specifically, a national sample of EDs was chosen as follows:

- A sampling ratio of 1 to 32<sup>5</sup> was calculated on the basis that approximately 164 EDs would be required to generate a national sample with target N of 1500, using pre-established quotas shown in table 1
- Random numbers (with an upper limit of 35) were then generated by the computer, one for each geographical segment, to indicate a starting point for the systematic selection of the sample of ED each segment
- The sample of localities was then compiled by selecting every 35<sup>th</sup> ED, beginning at the randomly established starting point and proceeding to the end on the list of EDs for each segment

Table 1 shows the number of EDs selected within each segment after the different regions were sub-divided according to their urban-rural profile. Of the 164 EDs chosen, 48 per cent were situated in urban areas, in line with the distribution of these sampling units at the national level.

**Table 1. Distribution of Enumeration Districts According to Stratum by Area of Residence**

Stratum	Area of Residence					
	Urban		Rural		Total	
	Frame	Sub-set	Frame	Sub-set	Frame	Sub-set
<b>KMR</b>	1524 (15)	51	-	-	1,524	51
<b>Surrey</b>	97 (1)	3	485 (15)	15	582	18
<b>Middlesex</b>	492 (34)	14	1,298 (25)	40	1,790	54
<b>Cornwall</b>	344 (18)	10	961 (16)	31	1,305	41
<b>Jamaica</b>	<b>2,457</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>2,744</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>5201</b>	<b>164</b>

( ) = Randomly selected starting point

### 2.3.2. Selection of Respondents

In stage 3, fieldworkers were dispatched to the selected EDs with guidelines for the creation of clusters from which a sample of households, and ultimately, the sample of respondents were chosen. Ideally, we should have continued with the probabilistic selection of sampling units in this stage of the process. However, the location of randomly selected respondents would have

<sup>5</sup> This sampling ratio is obtained by dividing 5201, which is the total number of EDs, nationally, by 165.

been a relatively time consuming and an overly costly endeavour; hence the decision to use a cluster sampling technique with pre-determined quotas at this stage of the process. Clustering significantly reduce survey cost by arranging groups of interviews in relatively compact areas such as a particular block or row of dwellings. And, when quotas established in advance, we can ensure that the sexes and the different age groups are proportionately represented in the final sample of respondents.

Actually, the design provided for the drawing of two separate samples simultaneously;

- i. The LAPOP core sample with a target N of 1,500, designed to be representative of the population according to its spatial, age and gender distribution.<sup>6</sup>
- ii. A boost sample targeting an additional 300 persons of the 18 – 29 age cohort, which in effect, amounts to an over-sampling of the youth segment of the population.<sup>7</sup>

Before entering the field, interviewers were provided with diagrams<sup>8</sup> depicting the location and boundaries of their respective EDs. They were instructed to create at least one cluster comprising of thirty contiguous households, starting at a random point within the ED. Subsequently, a systematic sample with a random start technique was used in the selection of every third household<sup>9</sup> in each cluster. One adult occupant from each selected household<sup>10</sup> was then interviewed following the quota design outlined in Table 2. If there were two or more persons of the same sex and age group in a given household, the questionnaire was applied to the resident with the next birthday. As indicated, twelve and ten respondents (inclusive of the two additional respondents of the 18-29 age group per ED) were targeted from each rural and urban ED respectively. In instances where the quota is not achieved from a single cluster, more clusters are created and selection continues until the shortfall is covered.

**Table 2. Gender and Age Distribution of Quota by Cluster Type**

	Urban Cluster Quota = 8 + (2)		Rural Cluster Quota = 10 + (2)	
Age Group	Male	Female	Male	Female
18 -29	1 + (1)	1 + (1)	1 + (1)	1 + (1)
30 - 44	1	1	2	2
45 and over	2	2	2	2
<b>Total</b>	4 + (1)	4 + (1)	5 + (1)	5 + (1)
() = Youth Over-sample				

<sup>6</sup> Jamaica's 2008 report is based on the analysis of responses attributed to this sample.

<sup>7</sup> This youth boost sample will eventually be merged with the youth component of the core sample and examined separately, in order to provide our sponsors with detailed policy-relevant information on the interests, perceptions, attitudes, values and civic and political behaviour youth in Jamaica.

<sup>8</sup> These maps were obtained from the Cartography Department, Statistical Institute of Jamaica

<sup>9</sup> A household may consist of one person who lives alone, or a group of persons, relatives or not, which as a unit, jointly occupy the whole or part of a particular dwelling, having common arrangements for housekeeping and share in a least on meal.

<sup>10</sup> Especially in inner-city communities, dwellings may have more than one household. In such cases, only one household was included in a cluster.

## 2.4. The Questionnaire

The survey instrument, which is included in Appendix 1, is comprised of a common core of questions which allows us to examine the issues of political culture-, governance- and democracy-related issues in Jamaica and across participating countries in the Americas. Most of these questions are repeats of similar items that were included in the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, permitting both temporal and cross-country tracking of possible changes in the respective opinions, values, attitudes and behaviours. In addition to this set of LAPOP core questions, the Jamaica 2008 instrument included a series of country-specific items, focusing on topics such as citizens' perception of justice, the role of the state, and attitudes to the police and to the emerging practice of community policing in Jamaica. These questions were added primarily to inform policies and programmes being pursued by the USAID mission in Jamaica.

## 2.5. The Fieldwork

The fieldwork component of this survey was initiated with the pre-testing of the data collection instrument. This was done by interviewing a small group of individuals and progressively refining the questionnaire based on these respondents' understanding of the different items. These activities were supervised by Mr. Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, who collaborated with LAPOP Central and the Jamaican partners in producing the final version of the 2008 questionnaire.

Another important field-related event that preceded the actual survey was a one-day seminar convened for the training of prospective fieldworkers. All interviewers and field supervisors were required to participate in this workshop, which was designed to familiarize them with the questionnaire, interviewing procedures and prescribed fieldworkers conduct. Training was conducted by Mr. Dominique Zephyr with input from Mr. Roy Russell, whose research organization was contracted to administer the survey. Training activities included presentations, questioning, demonstrations, and simulation of interviews.

An important mandatory requirement was that interviewers obtain informed consent from potential respondents prior to the administration of the questionnaire. The content of this form (see appendix 2) was read to the targeted householder and a verbal permission to proceed requested. Only in instances where such consent was granted were interviews conducted.

Generally, fieldwork activities went smoothly, with minor 'entry problems' in selected inner city communities, and a relatively high refusal rate in some upper and middle class neighbourhoods in Saint Andrew. Although the quota sampling design provided for the skipping of households where the qualified person was 'not at home' or 'not currently available', an effort was made to revisit households where interviewers were invited to return at more convenient times. This practice significantly reduced non-response rate, especially in those households in which all adult members worked. Frequently expressed concerns related to the length of the questionnaire and the sensitive nature of some questions, especially those related to party preference and voting behaviour.

## 2.6. Data Management and Control

A number of quality control measures were implemented to ensure the correct recording of responses in the field, to tracking of completed questionnaires and to preserve the integrity of the data during coding and data entry. Interviewers, coders and data entry clerks were closely supervised and various checks and balances were put in place for the early detection and correction errors and to ensure strict compliance with procedures stipulated by LAPOP for the accurate processing of the data. These included the use of common data entry formats developed for **AmericasBarometer** participating countries by the Universidad de Costa Rica. Special controls such as range check of data and automatic skip features were facilitated by the use of U.S. Census Bureau's CSPRO (Census and Survey Processing) public domain data entry software. Further, all data were entered twice; an initial entry, and then a re-entry for verification purposes. The resulting data file was then exported to the SPSS which along with a sample of fifty randomly selected questionnaires<sup>11</sup>, were then shipped to the LAPOP headquarters for the review and auditing of the data set.

In the end, the audit results confirmed that the data was of uniformly high quality and that all contractual standards with respect to the fieldwork and data management were met. The clean data set was then re-exported to STATA10 which was used to do the requisite tabulations, chart generations and other analyses.

## 2.7. Sample Characteristics

As previously explained, the sample was designed to be representative of the voting age population in terms of its gender, age and spatial distribution. As shown in Table 2.3, with regards to these key demographics, and selected social and economic factors listed, the sample is virtually identical to the adult population of Jamaica when matched with the 2001 Population Census data. The percentage of persons with secondary or higher level of education was the only indicator that was markedly higher in the LAPOP sample. This difference, nevertheless, is consistent with a trend of incremental expansion in enrolment at both the secondary and tertiary levels of education in Jamaica over the past decade<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> The random digits identifying the questionnaires for the auditing exercise was generated by LAPOP.

<sup>12</sup> Survey of Living Conditions Report, 2007

**Table 3. Selected Descriptive Statistics from Population Census (2001) and LAPOP (2008) Survey**

<b>Selected Population Characteristics</b>	<b>2001 Population Census</b>	<b>LAPOP 2008 Survey</b>
N(n) – Voting age Jamaicans	1,653,906	<b>(1499)</b>
<b>Gender</b>		
% Males	48.4	<b>50.1</b>
<b>Average age (years)</b>	40.3	<b>40.3</b>
% < 30 years of age	33.5	<b>35.9</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>		
% Single	55.0	<b>52.2</b>
% In union	40.1	<b>40.0</b>
<b>Education</b>		
% with secondary or higher	67.8	<b>75.5</b>
<b>Labour force participation</b>		
% in the labour force	67.4	<b>66.8</b>
<b>Region</b>		
% Kingston Metropolitan Area	30.9*	<b>28.0</b>
% Cornwall	24.8	<b>26.5</b>
% Middlesex	33.3	<b>34.6</b>
% Surrey	10.9	<b>10.8</b>

It is important to note also, that the 2008 sample was constructed to be as similar as possible to the one used in the 2006 survey. Indeed, an overarching goal of this series of studies is to track possible changes in certain attitudes and behaviours that are assumed to influence democratic stability. The more similar the samples, therefore, the greater the likelihood that an observed change in one period is a manifestation of a genuine shift in the respective attitude or behaviour and not just the function of differences in the samples.

It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that there was a slight modification to the 2008 design with respect to the basis on which the country was divided at the first level of stratification. In the review of the 2006 sampling methodology, it was concluded that stratifying the Country according to the three intact and precisely defined geographic regions (Counties) would invariably enhance heterogeneity among sampling regions and simultaneously ensure greater homogeneity within each stratum. As a consequence, and as indicated early in this section, the stratification variable for the first step of the 2008 design was ‘County’, with the Kingston Metropolitan Region being separated from Middlesex and Surrey and treated as a fourth stratum.

The map in Figure 2.1 shows the island-wide distribution of respondents by constituencies within the four strata. As depicted, respondents were drawn from all sixty constituencies with the size of the dots indicating the relative number of respondents interviewed in the selected EDs in the different constituencies. Understandably, most of the larger dots appear along the coastal areas where the larger population centres are located.




Figure 1. Spatial Distribution of Respondents by Constituency

Percentage distribution of respondents by Region is further illustrated by Figure 2.2. A little more than a third of persons interviewed (35.0%) reside in the County of Middlesex, the region in which the three largest parishes are situated. The KMR, which is significantly smaller than all other regions but the most densely populated, accounts for the next largest proportion (27.2%) of respondents.




Figure 2. Distribution of the Sample by Region

Further comparison of the two samples reveals a slight change in the distribution of respondents according to their area of residence. As shown in Figure 2.3, 60 per cent of respondents reside in rural areas in the 2008 compared to just over 53 per cent in the 2006 study.




Figure 3. Distribution of the Sample by Area of Residence

Figure 2.4 shows that the gender distribution of both the 2006 and the 2008 samples are somewhat even, with marginally more males in both years, in line with the gender profile of the population.




Figure 4. Distribution of the Sample by Gender

Figure 2.5 highlights appreciable differences in the samples in terms of the distribution of respondents based on their educational attainment. These apparent disparities, however, are as a result of a change in the operationalization of the ‘level of education’ variable in the current Study. In the 2006 Survey, persons completing the CAPE or A’ Level examinations (6<sup>th</sup> Form) were categorized as having attained ‘higher education’, given that this level of schooling is generally considered to be post-secondary education. In order to conform to a common framework for the analysis of the data agreed upon by the LAPOP participating Countries, however, it was decided that for the 2008 survey, this group of respondents should be grouped with secondary school leavers. Indeed, most individuals pursue these advanced level programmes in secondary schools and on completion, consider themselves as having only attained secondary level education.

As Figure 2.5 illustrates, about three out of four of the members of both samples were observed to have attained secondary level education or higher.




Figure 5. Distribution of the Sample by Level of Education

The similarity of the two samples in terms of the age distribution of members is illustrated in Figure 2.6. A comparison of related data values reveals that, except for the 46 – 55 cohort, the difference between corresponding categories was less than one percentage point for all age groups.




Figure 6. Distribution of the Sample by Age of Respondents

## 2.8. Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing description of the data for the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** survey, it can be concluded that key design goals pertaining to sample dispersion and sample representativeness were outstandingly achieved. Also, despite a change of the basis on which the Island was divided at the first level of stratification in the current design, the comparison of the 2006 and the 2008 samples has shown them to be markedly similar in terms of the targeted social and demographic variables. These sample characteristics will, firstly, allow us to make reasonably accurate generalizations about the relevant political orientations and behaviours for Jamaica as a whole. And secondly, where changes in these variables are observed from one period to another, it can be concluded with confidence that such changes are genuine shift in attitudes and not the product of differences in the samples.



# Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy<sup>13</sup>

## 1.1. Theoretical Framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, *et al.* 1996; Przeworski, *et al.* 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, *et al.* 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).<sup>14</sup> Yet, generating national wealth is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place overnight. Can governments, and international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued

<sup>13</sup> This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

<sup>14</sup> This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*<sup>15</sup>).<sup>16</sup> Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

## 1.2. Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.<sup>17</sup> Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable

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<sup>15</sup> Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

<sup>16</sup> According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

<sup>17</sup> We emphasize *support for stable democracy*, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).<sup>18</sup> Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.<sup>19</sup> The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

<sup>18</sup> Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

<sup>19</sup> For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn<sup>20</sup>:

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<sup>20</sup> We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

### 1.3. Support for the Idea of Democracy per se.

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the Americas Barometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

*ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.*

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.<sup>21</sup> At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

<sup>21</sup> Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I.1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org) to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

#### 1.4. Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends

In Robert Dahl’s classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP the following three items have been found to form a reliable scale.<sup>22</sup>

**Box 1.1. Right of Public Contestation Items**

*E5. Of people participating in legal demonstration. How much do you approve or disapprove?*

*E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?*

*E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?*

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

<sup>22</sup> Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7.




Figure I.2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

**B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale used for many years is comprised of the following four items listed in Box 1.2 below.

**Box I.2 Political Tolerance Items**

- D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (nationality) form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**?*
- D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views?*
- D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?*
- D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?*

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (d5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6<sup>th</sup> lowest in tolerance.




Figure I.3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

### 1.5. Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index<sup>23</sup> based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey, listed in Box 1.3.

<sup>23</sup> This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries

**Box 1.3 Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions Items**

*B14. To what extent do you trust the national government?*

*B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?*

*B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?*

*B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?*

*B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?*

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative size. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, just barely has a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.




Figure I.4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I.5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I.5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

## 1.6. Social Capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herrerros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

*ITI. Now, talking about the people from around here, would you say that the people are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy.*

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure I.6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

## 1.7. Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

**PART TWO:**  
**GOVERNANCE**



# Chapter II. Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

## 2.1. Theoretical Framework<sup>24</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of

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<sup>24</sup> This theoretical section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”<sup>25</sup> Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

## 2.2. How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow citizen.

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.<sup>26</sup> And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

<sup>25</sup> USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance ([www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html](http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html)) February.

<sup>26</sup> The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

## 2.3. Assessing the Problem of Corruption in Jamaica

In this effort to better understand the nature and scope corruption in Jamaica, we attempted to determine the extent of problem, firstly, in terms of citizens' perception of its magnitude, and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. This is followed by a more rigorous analysis of the data, including the development and testing of regression models with the aim of identifying the characteristics that might influence corruption perception and victimization, and ultimately, examining the impact of these factors on the prospect for a stable democracy.

### 2.3.1. Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption in Jamaica

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica in the ranks of the highly corrupt nations of the world. Most notable are the Transparency International's (TI) studies which assign participating countries a rating on its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians". Scores can range from '0' signifying very high level of perceived corruption, to '10' indicating no perceived corruption. On this index, Jamaica has been accorded a 'highly corrupt'<sup>27</sup> designation every year since it first participated in these TI series of surveys in 2002. In fact, the country's corruption situation is perceived to have worsened over the years, indicated by, on the one hand, by an overall slippage in the index over the last five years, from a rating of '4' in 2002 to '3.3' in 2007, and on the other, an effective decline in Jamaica's world ranking from 64 in 2005 to 84 in 2007.

Indeed, as previously stated, high levels of corruption perception might not necessarily be indicative of widespread actual corruption or vice versa. Surely though, confidence in the integrity of the country's political and other public officials is a critical requirement for good democratic governance. In this regard, corruption perception has routinely been a topic of interest in the **AmericasBarometer** series of studies. To measure citizens' perception of the magnitude of corruption in the different countries, responses to the following question are analysed:

*EXC7 Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public officials (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon?*

Figure II.1 shows the distribution of responses for this item in the case of Jamaica. As expected, in light of the findings of previously mentioned studies and anecdotal evidence from prevailing public discourse on the issue, the perception that corruption is commonplace in the various spheres of public life continues to be widespread. Of the 96 per cent of respondents who considered it to be common, 63.0% perceived corruption as being very common. The other nearly four per cent acknowledged its existence but considered it to be uncommon (2.5%) or very uncommon (1.4%).

<sup>27</sup> Countries obtaining scores of less than '5' are classified as 'highly corrupt'.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Magnitude of Corruption

### 2.3.2. Comparative Perspective on Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

In all societies, citizens will invariably perceive some amount of corruption in public affairs. In the case of Jamaica, however, the percentage of the population with the perception that corruption is commonplace in the public sphere is alarmingly high. In fact, when results depicted in Figure II.1 above are reconfigured on a 0 – 100 point scale, on which 0 indicates no perceived corruption and 100 means widespread corruption, Jamaica registered a score of 85.6 points, signifying an exceptionally high level of corruption perception in absolute as well as in relative terms. As Figure II.2 shows, this measure represents a marginal increase in corruption perception among the populace in 2008 compared to 2006.




Figure II.2. Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Year

The severity of citizens’ perception in relative terms is further highlighted in the display of comparative data on this indicator for the Americas. As illustrated by Figure II.3, among the twenty-two countries which participated in the 2008 LAPOP survey, Jamaica is positioned at the top the chart, registering the highest level of citizens’ lack of confidence in the integrity of elected and other public officials in these countries. Interestingly, Haiti’s score of 56.4 points located that country at the bottom of the list, indicating a comparatively low level of corruption perception among the Haitian people. This, on the face of it, would seem to suggest that Haiti has outperformed countries such as Canada (56.6) and the United States of America (64.8) on this corruption measure. In fact, what these results indicate is that, regardless of the level of actual corruption, citizens of Haiti perceive far less corruption in public affairs than their neighbours in other countries in the Region




Figure II.3. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Indeed, the fundamental concern should be with actual corruption. Often though, peoples’ decisions and actions are influenced more by perception than by actuality. An understanding of the dynamics of citizen’s perception of the problem, therefore, is critical to an appreciation of the overall effect of corruption on the different dimensions of a country’s political culture. With this in mind, we sought to further our grasp of the issue by establishing the distinguishing characteristics of those persons who perceive corruption to be ‘very common’ as opposed to those who perceive little or no corruption. In other words, the objective here was to identify the factors which explain why citizens living in the same country and sometimes even in the same community, can have such differing perception of the magnitude of corruption in public affairs

Accordingly, the further analysis of the data involved the design of a linear regression model comprising of selected socio-economic and demographic variables that might influence such perception. Summary statistics relating to the solution of this equation are presented in Table II.A1 in the appendix at the end of this chapter. Coefficients with an asterisk (\*) superscripted to their right distinguish factors that are statistically significant predictors. In this case, only two of

the independent variables – a person’s level of education and perception of family’s economic wellbeing worked out to be statistically strong determinant.

Figure II.4 provides a graphical presentation<sup>28</sup> of key aspects of the information contained in Table II.A1. The horizontal red line on this chart indicates the points at which variables with a mean of zero, (for example, Middlesex in this case) would be located. Each ‘dot’ indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable and the 95 percent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an “I”, placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal “I”s) that intersect the red line are not significant predictor ( $p < 0.05$ ) of citizens’ perception of corruption. In this case, the coefficient for ‘perception of family’s economic wellbeing’ is located completely to the left of the zero line, signifying a negative and statistically significant net impact on citizens’ perception. In contrast, ‘education’ is completely to the right of the line, indicating a positive net effect on this variable.




Figure II.4. Determinants of Perception that Corruption is Widespread, Jamaica 2008

Figure II.5 illustrates the relationship between the evaluation of family’s economic situation and perception of the prevalence of corruption in the society. Generally, citizens who are more dissatisfied with their family’s economic wellbeing are more likely to express the opinion that corruption is widespread in society. As indicated by the shape of the line, however, this inverse relationship exists only among those with extreme assessment of their family’s economic status. Persons who, on the one hand, are highly satisfied with the adequacy of their household economic resources and, at the other extreme, those who are highly dissatisfied, are the ones who

<sup>28</sup> This graphical approach to the presentation of the results of regression analysis will be use throughout this report. Tables showing actual regression coefficients, their statistical significance (i.e. coefficients with asterisks) and standard errors for the models are presented in an appendix at the end of the respective chapter.

are likely to hold the view that corruption is widespread among their elected and other public officials. In contrast, among those evaluating their economic resources to be inadequate, but not to the extent that cannot satisfy their basic needs, perception of the pervasiveness of corruption increase moderately as their assessment of their family's economic wellbeing improves.




Figure II.5. Corruption Perception by Perception of Family's Economic Wellbeing

The positive influence of education on whether persons hold the view that corruption is prevalent in the public sphere is depicted in Figure II.6. On a whole, the higher respondents' level of education, the higher the probability they will have the perception that corruption widespread in the society. If the responses of persons with tertiary level education were analysed separately, the average perception rating among the group would be above 90 point on the 100-point scale.

This outcome is understandable considering that more educated people are expectably more informed of current affairs, including reported allegations of malfeasance in public affairs. Further, greater awareness could mean higher level of sensibility towards the issue of corruption and as a consequence a greater propensity to classify a particular act as being corrupt.




Figure II.6. Corruption Perception by Level of Education

## 2.4. Defining and Dealing with Corruption

The fact that it is widely held that corruption is widespread in the public sphere does not necessarily suggest that it is equally generally abhorred. In the case of Jamaica for example, it has been widely argued that an overly bureaucratic and highly inefficient public sector provides an ideal environment for corruption. In fact, it is broadly accepted that in some instances, the making of illegal payments has become necessary for the timely delivery of most basic services. Bribe giving and taking have become so commonplace in some organizations that for many it is the accepted ‘new normal’ way of doing business with these entities. So although such acts are generally known to be illegal, there is a growing tendency for them to be justified on some expediency-explained pretext. In this section, we sought to further understand the dynamics of corruption perception and corruption victimization in Jamaica by firstly, examining citizens’ overall attitude to bribery, then by gauging their attitude to corruption with reference to two frequently faced dilemmas.

Firstly, we assess the extent to which Jamaicans acquiesce with acts of corruption by surveying citizens’ attitudes on the issue of bribe-giving by asking the following EXC items:

*EXCI. Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified?*

As Figure II.7 indicates, nearly four in ten Jamaicans feel that giving bribes is justified sometimes and under certain conditions.




Figure II.7. Percentage of Population Justifying Acts of Corruption

Figure II.8 shows that there has been an appreciable decline in tolerance for corruption since 2006. The proportion of the Jamaican populace expressing their acquiescence with bribery as a mean of getting things done was nearly 39 per cent in 2008, close to a 17 per cent decline over the two year period.




Figure II.8. Justification of Acts of Corruption by Year

### 2.4.1. Identifying Who Justifies

The demographic and contextual profile of persons who acquiesce with corruption in Jamaica is not significantly different than that of the rest of the population. This finding is based on the results of a logistic regression comprised of the independent variables shown in Table II.A2 in Appendix. Results of the analysis of the equation are displayed in Figure II.9 below. Age is the only factor that is statistically significant in determining a persons' propensity to justify corrupt practices in Jamaica.




Figure II.9. Probability of Justifying Acts of Corruption, Jamaica 2008

The negative influence of age on whether a person supports or rejects acts of corruption is depicted in Figure II.10. Support decreases with age except among those in the 46-55 age group in which there is no visible relationship between these factors.




Figure II.10. Justification of Acts of Corruption by Age

The two hypothetical dilemma in BOX II.1 were used to determine what acts are defined as being corrupt and the extent to which such acts are perceive to be justified.

**Box II.1 Questions Used to Measure Attitude to Corruption in Jamaicans**

Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as:

- 1) Corrupt and should be punished;
- 2) Corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or
- 3) Not corrupt.

**DC10.** A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays the government clerk \$1000. Do you think that what the woman did is... **[Read the options]:**

- (1) Corrupt and should be punished
- (2) Corrupt but justified
- (3) Not corrupt
- (8) DK

**DC10**

**DC13.** An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is.. **[Read the options]:**

- (1) Corrupt and should be punished
- (2) Corrupt but justified
- (3) Not corrupt
- (8) DK

**DC13**

Both scenarios are, in fact, descriptions of corrupt practices. And as Figure II.11 shows, these acts are broadly recognized as such. Eighty-two per cent and 70 per cent acknowledged bribe and nepotism as acts of corruption. What is disturbing, however, is percentage of Jamaicans acquiescing with these behaviours. With regards to the first case, 46 per cent of the respondents

indicated that though corrupt, it is justified for a parent to offer a bribe to expedite personal transactions at a government office. Thirty per cent did not define nepotism as corruption and among those who did, only 37 per cent considered it to be punishable offence.




Figure II.11. Definition and Justification of Corruption in Jamaica

## 2.5. Measuring Corruption Victimization

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of crime victimization, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The complete series of items that were used to determine the extent of citizens’ experience with corruption is shown in Box II.2. Items EXC11 to EXC16 are applicable only to subjects who are

employed, who have had contact with the specified agencies or who have accessed particular government services while EXC2, EXC6 and EXC17 were pose to all respondents.

**Box II.2. Corruption Victimization Items**

	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>N/A</i>
<i>Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...</i>				
<i>EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year?</i>				
<i>EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?</i>				
<i>EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the parish council office?</i> <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes → ask the following:</b> <i>During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?</i>				
<i>EXC13. Are you currently employed?</i> <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes → ask the following:</b> <i>At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an appropriate payment during the last year?</i>				
<i>EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts?</i> <b>If the answer is No → note down 9</b> <b>If it is Yes → ask the following:</b> <i>Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?</i>				
<i>EXC15. Have you used any public health services during the past year?</i> <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes → ask the following:</b> <i>In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?</i>				
<i>EXC16. Did you have a child in school during the past year?</i> <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes → ask the following:</b> <i>Did you have to pay a bribe at school during the past year?</i>				
<i>EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?</i>				

Admittedly, corruption defined in terms of ‘the abuse of entrusted power form private gain’<sup>29</sup> may involve acts such as elicit enrichment, influence peddling and indeed, any form of improper

<sup>29</sup> Transparency International. (2007). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved September 1, 2008 from [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)

payment or demand for such payment. However, as the scope of the afore-stated items (Box II.1) indicates, corruption in this study is operationalized narrowly in terms of victimization, or the number of acts of bribery faced by the respondent in the twelve months preceding the survey.

### ***2.5.1. The Index of Corruption Victimization***

The index of corruption victimization summarizes observations pertaining to the seven acts of corruption (EXC 2 – EXC 16) specified in Box II. Responses to these items were initially captured in the form of a 0 to 7 points scale. In creating the index, however, the relatively few responses that were located at the sixth and the seventh points on the scale were collapsed into the fifth, resulting in a new five-point scale. This corruption measure was calibrated to treat all victims of corruption equally, not taking into consideration the number of times the person was victimized. In this regard, the unit of analysis was people who had at least one experience with corruption during the previous twelve months.

### ***2.5.2. Levels of Corruption Victimization in Jamaica***

In light of the forgoing evidence of exceptionally high levels of corruption perception among Jamaicans, it is reasonable to presume the existence of a comparable high number of individuals acknowledging direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals in the population. However, as can be seen in Figure II.12, only one out of four Jamaicans has reported to have been exposed to some form of corruption, with about one half of these acknowledged victims reporting that they were victimized for two times or more.

Indeed, this rate of victimization may seem small if viewed solely against the background of an alarmingly high level of corruption perception. However, a situation in which 25 per cent of the population have reported been a party to an act of corruption or at least been approached with a corrupt proposal is certainly indicative of a crisis in governance.




Figure II.12. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2008

### 2.5.3. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

The extent and seriousness of the problem might be further clarified by analysing levels of victimization comparatively, firstly at the national level by examining trend since the 2006 survey, and then cross-nationally by matching victimization levels in Jamaica with those of other countries in the Region. Figure II.13 illustrates change in victimization at the national level, showing a decline of approximately 10 per cent, from 34 per cent in 2006 to 24.5 per cent in the 2008 study.




Figure II.13. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2008

Despite the measureable decline in the proportion of Jamaicans who reported that they were exposed to corruption in 2008 compared to 2006, victimization rate continues to be comparatively high. As shown in Figure II.14, Jamaica is ranked as the seventh most corrupt nation among the twenty-two countries reporting on this indicator in the 2008 LAPOP study. Haiti was found to be the most corrupt State with a 48 per cent victimization rate, 13 percentage points higher than Bolivia, the second most corrupt state. Columbia, Panama, The United States and Uruguay were the only countries with single digit index, scoring 9.5, 9.2, 9.0 and 8.9 per cent respectively.




Figure II.14. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

### 2.5.4. Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Results of a linear regression model designed to establish the factors that determine the likelihood that an individual might be a victim of corruption are graphically presented in Figure II.15. Again, independent variables that are statistically significant predictors are identified by confidence intervals (the horizontal “I”s) that do not intersect the red zero line at the centre of the chart. In this regard, only two factors were found to be significant predictors at a  $p < 0.05$  level of significance – wealth with a positive coefficient, and evaluation of family’s economic situation with a net negative contribution (See Table II.A3 in Appendix II).




Figure II.15. Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption, Jamaica 2008

Perception of family’s economic situation has been found to correlate negatively with level of corruption victimization. As Figure II.16 shows, Jamaicans who are less satisfied with the adequacy of their income are, on a whole, more likely to be the victim of corrupt acts or proposals. There is, however, a slight reversal of this negative impact among persons who evaluated their income to be inadequate, but not to the extent that cannot satisfy their basic needs. For this group, there likelihood of being victimized increases with more positive evaluation of family’s economic wellbeing.




Figure II.16. Corruption Victimization by Perception of Family’s Economic Wellbeing

Here wealth is used as a proxy variable for socio-economic status (SES). In order to highlight the influence of wealth on the likelihood of being victimized by corruption the original nine-category wealth variable was recoded into one with three categories based on the approximate value of capital goods of the respective household. Category 1 included households with an inventory of lower value items only, category 2 comprising those with low and medium range valued items and category 3 of those with an inventory comprising of higher value household goods in addition to the lower and medium priced items.

When the percentage of the population that reported being victimized by corruption was cross-tabulated with this new dichotomous wealth variable, the positive relationship between the two factors is quite obvious. As illustrated by Figure II.17, wealthier persons are more likely to have direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals than the less wealthy.




Figure II.17. Corruption Victimization by Wealth

## 2.6. Impact of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy

As theorized in the introductory section of this chapter, corruption yields a plethora of pernicious outcomes which serve to compromise the effectiveness of democratic governance. Inter alia, it is presumed to undermine the rule of law, decreases level of confidence in democratic institutions, erodes political legitimacy and in turn, increases the prospect for democratic instability. In this section we examine the substantive consequences of corruption on certain attitudes and values that are deemed critical for system stability.

With this aim in mind, we created and analysed a series of regression models designed to examine the influence of corruption perception and corruption victimization on the following system stability-related variables: support for democracy per se; political tolerance; right to public contestation; political legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Tables II.A4 and IIA5, which is appended at the end of this chapter, presents the list of the independent variables that were included in the different equations in treating with corruption perception and corruption victimization respectively.

With respect to the regression results displayed in Tables II.A4, the respective statistical outcomes indicate that none of the components of support for stable democracy was significantly influenced by corruption perception. It must be noted, however, that these results are, on a whole, consistent with the basic assumptions of the theories previously described. A closer examination of the tabulated results shows that the regression coefficient of three of the key components of the prospect for stability are negative, indicating that corruption perception has the effect of reducing citizens' support for democracy per se, support for the political opposition and support for the

legitimacy of the core democratic institutions, albeit at a levels that are not statistically significant.

Tables II.A5 summarize the results of the multivariable analysis involving corruption victimization as the key independent variable. Again, the negative regression coefficients suggest that exposure to corruption tends to undermine citizens' level of political tolerance, erode their support for the right to public contestation and support for system legitimacy and reduces interpersonal trust. However, none of these outcomes were statistically significant.

## 2.7. Conclusion

Corruption is a serious national problem in whatever form or extent it exists, since it erodes citizen belief in the legitimacy of the political system. Additionally, it is presumed to undermine government efficiency, as it mis-allocates scarce resources, distorts transaction costs and negatively impacts on the investment climate and the national image. As a consequence, it is an important governance issue.

The problem was assessed in terms of citizens' perception of its magnitude, and then by the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals. It was found that citizens' perception that corruption is widespread in the public sphere is exceptionally high in absolute as well as in comparative terms. Jamaica's score of 86 points was a two-point increase over 2006 and among the twenty-two countries which participated in the 2008 LAPOP survey, Jamaica was ranked at the top the chart on this perception measure. Level of education and perception of family's economic wellbeing were found to be statistically significant determinant of whether or not citizens perceive corruption to be widespread in society.

With respect to citizens' direct experience with corrupt acts or proposals, there was a decline from 34 to 26 points on the corruption victimization index. Socio-economic status was the only statistically significant determining factor, with wealthier persons being more likely to be victimized than the less wealthy.

Most significantly, it was found that citizens exposure to or perception of corruption did not significantly influenced their attitudes and values relating the aforementioned components of support for stable democracy.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER II.

**Table II.A1. Factors Determining Perception of Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Linear Regression**

<b>Factors Determining Perception of Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Linear Regression</b>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>t</b>
Education	0.088*	(2.51)
Female	0.010	(0.42)
Age	-0.046	(-1.37)
Wealth	0.071	(1.87)
AREA SIZE	-0.051	(-0.47)
Perception of Family's Economic Situation	-0.087*	(-2.34)
Number of Children	0.013	(0.31)
Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)	-0.001	(-0.02)
Middlesex	0.000	.
Cornwall	-0.074	(-1.23)
KMR	0.040	(0.38)
Constant	0.003	(0.07)
R-Squared = 0.050		
Number of Observations = 1188		
* p<0.05		

**Table II.A2. Determinants of Justification of Corruption**

<b>Determinants of Justification of Corruption</b>		
	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Education	-0.075	(-1.04)
Female	0.031	(0.58)
Age	-0.285*	(-3.92)
Wealth	0.002	(0.04)
Area of Residence	-0.034	(-0.37)
Perception of Corruption	0.030	(0.40)
Corruption Victimization	0.040	(0.50)
Constant	-0.438*	(-4.69)
F = 2.28		
Number of Observations = 1201		
* p<0.05		

**Table II.A3. Factors Determining Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Logistic Regression**

<b>Factors Determining Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption in Jamaica – Results of Logistic Regression</b>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Education	0.029	(0.31)
Female	-0.121	(-1.51)
Age	-0.183	(-1.92)
Wealth	0.349*	(3.66)
AREA SIZE	0.660	(2.00)
Perception of Economic Situation	-0.178*	(-2.05)
Number of Children	0.092	(1.17)
Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)	0.049	(0.71)
Cornwall	0.026	(0.14)
KMR	0.534	(1.61)
Constant	-1.123*	(-8.60)
F = 3.76		
Number of Observations = 1301		
* p<0.05		

**Table II.A4. Impact of Perception of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Perception of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception of Corruption	-0.063	(0.05)	-0.013	(0.07)	0.014	(0.06)	-0.034	(0.05)	0.048	(0.05)
Satisfaction with Performance of Current Prime Minister	0.129*	(0.05)	0.004	(0.05)	-0.003	(0.06)				
Interest in Politics	-0.061*	(0.03)	0.027	(0.03)	0.024	(0.03)	0.047	(0.03)		
Education	0.185	(0.41)	-0.045	(0.30)	-0.087	(0.40)	-0.019	(0.27)	0.196	(0.26)
Female	-0.514	(1.47)	-2.762*	(1.08)	-0.454	(1.46)	1.203	(1.14)	-1.573	(1.24)
Age	0.224	(0.22)	0.174	(0.25)	0.006	(0.27)	-0.052	(0.21)	0.157	(0.22)
Age Square	-0.000	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	-0.918	(0.66)	-0.650	(0.66)	-0.829	(0.68)	-0.646	(0.50)	0.609	(0.47)
Perception of Family's Economic Situation	1.547	(1.22)	1.540	(1.05)	3.124*	(1.06)	0.987	(0.78)	0.979	(0.76)
AREA SIZE	0.057	(0.80)	0.108	(1.03)	-0.092	(1.27)	-0.624	(0.60)	1.728*	(0.62)
Constant	65.073*	(8.93)	69.162*	(12.38)	49.702*	(10.45)	48.214*	(7.69)	37.062*	(8.20)
R-Square	0.037		0.011		0.015		0.029		0.031	
No. of cases	1119		1152		1145		1165		1142	

\* p<0.05

**Table II.A5. Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Victimized by Corruption	0.088	(1.55)	-0.407	(1.60)	-0.282	(1.75)	-1.877	(1.25)	-0.483	(1.04)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current Prime Minister	0.125*	(0.04)	0.023	(0.05)	0.022	(0.05)				
Interest in Politics	-0.048	(0.03)	0.036	(0.03)	0.036	(0.03)	0.061*	(0.02)		
Education	0.117	(0.39)	-0.088	(0.29)	-0.177	(0.36)	-0.154	(0.25)	0.231	(0.25)
Female	-0.609	(1.42)	-2.730*	(1.04)	-0.350	(1.35)	1.009	(1.03)	-2.380*	(1.16)
Age	0.267	(0.23)	0.095	(0.24)	0.014	(0.28)	0.025	(0.22)	0.183	(0.20)
Age Squared	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	-1.030	(0.66)	-0.732	(0.63)	-0.904	(0.61)	-0.468	(0.48)	0.602	(0.44)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	2.140	(1.22)	1.689	(1.05)	3.045*	(1.05)	1.054	(0.82)	0.532	(0.75)
AREA SIZE	0.097	(0.81)	0.157	(1.08)	-0.185	(1.25)	-0.655	(0.60)	1.593*	(0.63)
Constant	57.878*	(6.95)	68.242*	(8.68)	50.083*	(8.16)	44.366*	(5.90)	41.936*	(6.30)
R-Square	0.034		0.013		0.019		0.037		0.030	
No. of cases	1222		1259		1252		1272		1253	

\* p&lt;0.05



# Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

## 3.1 Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of

certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it is difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents would be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was largely an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will

report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.<sup>30</sup> According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,<sup>31</sup> says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”<sup>32</sup> In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.<sup>33</sup> According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above

<sup>30</sup>In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

<sup>31</sup>According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

<sup>32</sup>Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 ([www.paho.org/english/DPI/r1970717.htm](http://www.paho.org/english/DPI/r1970717.htm)).

<sup>33</sup>Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.<sup>34</sup>

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

### **3.2. How Might Crime Victimization Affect Support for Stable Democracy?**

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

### **3.3. Crime Victimization and Insecurity in Jamaica**

Jamaica has earned for itself the unwelcomed reputation of being one of the foremost 'high crime' societies of the world. Indeed, for the past decade, the country has repeatedly been ranked among nations with the highest per capita murder rate, achieving a first place ranking in 2005 with its 1674 homicides or 64.10 per 100,000 inhabitants. Interestingly though, a number of

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<sup>34</sup>The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

studies have shown that while the violent crime rate is higher than most other nations, the overall crime rate is comparable to other countries of similar macro-economic profile.

Nevertheless, most Jamaicans are pre-occupied with the problem of crime and violence. In this study, when asked to identify the most serious problem facing Jamaica, 62 per cent of respondents identified security-related fears as their major concern. And recent crime statistics seem to highlight the cause for such pervasive anxiety. The wave of violent crimes in recent time has been unprecedented and unrelenting. In 2007, Jamaica saw yet another substantial rise in murders, from 1,340 to an unbelievable count of 1,574 in 2007. Reported shootings increased by 14% and break-ins by 11%, when compared to 2006.

Admittedly, the Jamaican crime problem is not new. A recent CIA document explains that "deteriorating economic conditions during the 1970s led to rising violence as gangs affiliated to major political parties, evolved in powerful organized crime networks involved in international drug smuggling and money laundering". Indeed, the origin of criminal violence in the Kingston inner-city can be traced to political factions linked to the major political parties. The recent surge, nevertheless, goes beyond the culture of political tribalism. Drug-related gang warfare is generally recognized as the major contributing factor. Jamaica has for a long time been a trans-shipment port for Colombian cocaine. Associated with these illicit narcotic activities is the trafficking in illegal weapons, primarily through the well publicized arms-for-drugs trade with Haiti. These weapons are then used to arm the community-based gangs which the police and crime experts have claimed are primarily responsible for the burgeoning crime and violence in the country.

Indeed, crime and violence are a development issue. Crime and violence directly effects human welfare in the short-run. However, their longer term effects on economic growth and social development might be much more devastating. World Bank estimates suggest that 'were Jamaica to reduce their rates of homicide to the level of Costa Rica, each country would see an increase in its growth rate of 5.4 percent annually'.<sup>35</sup>

In this section we examine Jamaica's crime problem from the perspective of citizens' personal experiences and perceptions. Analysis involves a determination of the extent of crime victimization and the development of a profile of the victims of criminal acts. An examination of the issue of perceived insecurity will followed, concluding with an attempt to establish the extent to which victimization and sense of security affect citizens' support for a stable democracy.

### ***3.3.1. Extent of Crime Victimization***

We start our analysis by examining the extent of crime victimization in the Jamaican population by analysing response to the following question:

**VICI:** "Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past twelve months?  
(1) Yes      (2) No      (8) Don't Remember

<sup>35</sup> World Bank (2007) Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

Surprisingly, as depicted in Figure III.1, only about eight per cent of respondents reported being a victim of a criminal act within the twelve months preceding this survey. This outcome is curious for a number of reasons. Firstly, in light of recent crime statistics indicating an islandwide trend of increasing incidence of virtually all types of serious criminal offences, this rate of victimization is seemingly quite low. Further, previous studies have placed average crime victimization rate at closer to 10 per cent over the past many years (Harriott et al, 1996, LAPOP, 2006).




Figure III.1. Respondents Victimized by Crime

### 3.3.2. Crime Victimization Over Time

The close to two percentage point decrease in crime victimization rate since 2006 is depicted in Figure III.2. It is well known that official crime statistics tend to understate crime rates in certain high crime areas. In the 'Joint Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank' observed that:

*An important finding of this study is that in Jamaica a lower percentage of crimes are reported to the police in areas with higher crime rates. The reporting rate can plausibly be interpreted as a measure of confidence in the police, as people will be more likely to report when they trust the police and believe they will respond. Lack of trust and confidence in the police is then lower in areas with higher local crime rates. This suggests also that official police data distort the true geographic profile of crime, because official data are biased downwards for higher crime areas.*

In this regard, it is widely held that surveys of this sort should provide a more accurate picture of crime rates in these areas. Our experience in the field in the execution of this survey, however, suggests that there is a general unwillingness on the part of residents of these high-crime areas to discuss community-based crime issues. One explanation is that to complain about the problem of crime in the community would be tantamount to questioning the efficacy of the ‘area don’ in securing the neighbourhood. Indeed, the primary role of the ‘don’ is to protect members of his community. Any expression of doubt or disapproval as to his performance of this task might attract even fatal sanctions.




Figure III.2. Respondents Victimized by Crime by Year

### 3.3.3. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Jamaica

It has been authoritatively argued that the Island’s crime problem is predominantly an inner-city phenomenon; a possible reason for the surprisingly low national victimization rate. In a recent British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report, for example, Jamaica’s Deputy Commissioner of Police Mark Shields, seconded from Britain’s Scotland Yard to help with crime control efforts, remarked that “The reality is that there is high crime in Jamaica, but it is in (certain) crime hotspots. The perception is that the whole of Jamaica has crime, which is not true”<sup>36</sup>. This assessment was corroborated by a recently issued Crime and Security Report on Jamaica by the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) of the United States Department of States which declared:

<sup>36</sup> Soutik, B. Jamaica Struggles to Fight Crime. *BBC News Americas*. Retrieved May 16, 2008, from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6657203.stm>

*While the north coast has also seen a rise in homicides; it remains comparatively crime free within the resort/tourist areas and very low in the surrounding vicinities... Occasionally, violence between rival political parties in low-income areas will flare up, but there is almost always an ulterior, criminal motive behind this violence.*<sup>37</sup>

Here we examined the extent to which the data support this and some other conjectures on crime and violence in Jamaica by creating a regression model with the socio-demographic variables in Figure III.3 as possible predictors. The dependent variable was dichotomous, with categories of being a victim or not being a victim of a criminal act. Outcomes of this analysis are tabulated in Appendix III, Table III.A1 at the end of this chapter and presented graphically in Figure III.3. Coefficients with the asterisk (\*), ‘region’ and ‘education’, are the only statistically significant determinants of the likelihood of being a victim of crime in Jamaica.




Figure III.3. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime

The extent to which region of residence explains differences in the probability of being criminally victimized is illustrated graphically in Figure III.4. Clearly, the results have confirmed the widely held view that although crime is becoming much more widespread in Jamaica, it is still predominantly restricted to certain ‘hotspots’. As depicted, persons living in the County of Cornwall, which include the tourist city of Montego Bay and the other resort areas along the west and sections of the North Coast, are much less likely to be victimized when compared to those living all other areas. Not surprisingly, the county of Surrey which includes the Kingston

<sup>37</sup> Overseas Security Advisory Council. Jamaica 2008 Crime & Safety Report. Retrieved October 13, 2008, from: <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=80861>

Metropolitan Region records the highest rate of victimization, nearly three times that of Cornwall.




Figure III.4. Impact of Region of Residence on Crime Victimization in Jamaica, 2008

The relationship between crime victimization and education might be further highlighted by cross-tabulating both factors. Result of this bivariate analysis, depicted in Figure III.6 emphasizes the net positive impact that a citizens' level of education has on their likelihood of being targeted by criminals. As indicated, persons with tertiary level schooling are nearly two times more likely to be victimized than those who are either pursuing or have only completed primary education.




Figure III.5. Impact of Education on Crime Victimization in Jamaica, 2008

### 3.4. Perception of Security in Jamaica

As reported elsewhere in this publication, 62 per cent of the population identified crime and violence and related security concerns as the most serious national problem. Yet, Jamaica recorded a mere eight points on the 100-point crime victimization index. Such widespread pre-occupation with personal safety concerns might therefore be attributed to the alarmingly high murder rate and the wide exposure given to these crimes of violence by the popular media. Indeed, crime impacts not only those who are victimized but also on others who recognize the increased likelihood that they also might eventually be victimized. This underscores the importance of perception as an issue of concern in this study.

Harriott et al (1998) found that approximately 40% of the population believed that they were at high risk for crime and had great levels of anxiety about being victims of physical violence. This fear of violence has also been noted in de Albuquerque & McElroy (1999) which found a high sense of insecurity especially in Urban Areas. In an effort to obtain citizens' current evaluation of their vulnerability to crime and violence, respondents were asked the following question:

*AOJ11 Speaking of the place or neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?*

The distribution of responses on this item is depicted in Figure III.6. Nearly 80 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. Close to one in three persons reported feeling very safe in their communities. Only six per cent of the sample considered their neighbourhood to be very unsafe.




Figure III.6. Sense of Security among Jamaicans

### 3.4.1. Comparative Perspective on Perception of Insecurity

Figure III.7 shows that there has been an appreciable decline in perception of insecurity in Jamaica since the 2006 study. So whereas sense of insecurity at the national level has increased considerably over that same period (see Figure III.8), sense of security at the community level has been improving. In other words, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level but are overly preoccupied with impact of crime at the national level.




Figure III.7. Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2006-2008

The severity of the perceived impact of the crime problem at the national level is illustrated by distribution of responses to the question:

*AOJ11A. And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? [Read the options]*  
*(1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR*

As can be seen in Figure III.8, virtually the entire population is concerned about the eventual negative impact of crime on their wellbeing. Ninety-six per cent of the citizenry perceive the current state of delinquency as a threat to the nation’s wellbeing.




Figure III.8. Perception of National Insecurity in Jamaica

From a comparative perspective, at the level of the Americas, sense of insecurity in Jamaica is low. Residents feel nearly as safe in their neighbourhoods as citizens of the United States and Canada. Of course, there are contextual dimensions to sense of security. This raises questions about parity in sense of safety in cross national terms. In other words, is feeling ‘unsafe’ in Jamaica the same as feeling ‘unsafe’ in the USA or Canada?




Figure III.9. Sense of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2008

### 3.4.2. Determinants of Sense of Insecurity in Jamaica

To determine which factors are associated with a greater or lesser perception of personal safety, we conducted a multivariable analysis by controlling the socio-demographic variables specified in Table III.A2 in a regression model using the perception of insecurity index as the dependent variable. The results are interesting both because of the factors that were found to be significant, as for those that turn out to be statistically unimportant.

As summarized in Figure III.10, only two factors – gender and level of education were found to be strong predictors, both with net positive contribution.




Figure III.10. Determinants of perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008

Crime victimization data above showed that the percentage of males who were victim of a crime within the year preceding this 2008 survey was slightly higher than that of females. However, as depicted graphically in Figure III.11 above, this difference was not statistically significant, meaning that women have an almost equal probability of being victim of crime as men. Notwithstanding having roughly the same likelihood of been victimized, it has always been the case that the fear of crime victimization in Jamaica is higher among women than among men (LAPOP, 2006; Harriott et al 1997).

The graph in Figure III.11 shows cross-tabulation of gender and sense of insecurity. It highlights the fact that, on a whole, women continue to harbor a greater sense of fear about their personal safety.




Figure III.11. Impact of Sex on Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008

The influence of citizens’ educational achievement on their sense of insecurity is illustrated in Figure III.12. As the relative height of the bars indicates, as a persons’ level of education increases so should their perception of insecurity. Mean perception of insecurity for those with tertiary level schooling is a clear 10 points higher than those with no schooling at all. Supposedly, this positive correlation is explained by the increased awareness that is associated with higher levels of education, given the evidence elsewhere in this study of a pattern of increased listening, viewing and reading of the news among more educated persons in Jamaica.




Figure III.12. Impact of Education on Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008

### 3.5. Impact of Crime Victimization and Sense of Insecurity on Support for Stable Democracy

Some questions of interest at this point are: What impact do citizens' experience with criminal acts and their sense of insecurity have on maintaining the rule of law? Can deterioration in security eventually lead the population to support actions that undermine democratic legitimacy? Are persons who are affected directly by crime, violent or not? And finally, are those who feel a great degree of insecurity less willing to support democracy?

With these questions in mind, we created and analysed a series of regression models designed aimed determining the influence of crime on the following system stability-related dimensions: support for democracy per se; political tolerance; right to public contestation; political legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Firstly with respect to the crime victimization, Table III.A3 (appended at the end of this chapter), presents the list of the independent variables that were included in the linear regression equation. The regression outcomes in Table II.A1 shows that persons who are exposed to criminal acts are different from other citizens in terms of their attitude in support of political legitimacy and their propensity to trust their fellow citizens.

Crime victimization impacts negatively on citizens' values and attitudes in support of political legitimacy in Jamaica. As illustrated in Figure III.13, persons who have been victim of at least one criminal act are less likely to be supportive of system legitimacy.




Figure III.13. Impact of Crime Victimization on Political Legitimacy

The negative relationship between crime victimization and interpersonal trust is illustrated in Figure III.14. Crime victimization has the effect of reducing citizens' trust in each other, making people more suspicious of their neighbours and less likely to work together on community issues.




Figure III.14. Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust

And lastly, with respect to sense of insecurity, the regression was re-run with the same set of independent variables used linear regression equation in Table III.A4. The regression outcomes in Tables II.A1 show that the only governance component that is statistically affected by a person's sense of insecurity is support for the idea of democracy. Sense of insecurity erodes citizens' belief in the idea and principles of democracy.




Figure III.15. Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy

### 3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, it was assumed that crime victimization and to a lesser extent, fear of crime or sense of insecurity might negatively impact citizens’ embrace of tolerance, cause them to lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, erode support for the right to public contestation, and drive citizens to lose confidence in their political institutions, especially the police and the judiciary.

It was found that despite Jamaica’s reputation of being one of the foremost ‘high crime’ societies of the world, due particularly to its alarmingly high homicide figures and rate, crime victimization rate was found to be relatively low and even on the decline. Our experience in the field in the execution of this survey, however, suggests that there is a general unwillingness on the part of residents of certain high-crime areas to discuss community-based crime issues, hence the likelihood of under-reporting serious crimes. We argued that a possible reason for this reluctance to discuss community crime problem could be a fear of retribution since to complain about the problem in garrison communities might be seen as questioning the efficacy of the ‘area don’ in securing the neighbourhood. Indeed, the primary role of the ‘don’ is to protect members of his community. Any expression of doubt or disapproval as to his performance is might attract serious and even fatal sanction.

Level of education and region of residence were found to be influential factors in explaining the likelihood of being victimized, with persons with tertiary level schooling being nearly two times more likely to be victimized than those with only primary education. And as expected, persons living in the County of Cornwall, which include the tourist city of Montego Bay and the other

resort areas along the west, and sections of the North Coast, are much less likely to be victimized when compared to those living all other areas.

Of note also is the finding that the intensity of national insecurity (that crime threatens the country's wellbeing) differs significantly from local insecurity (the feeling of insecurity at the community level). In essence, people are less concerned about their individual security at the community level, indicating a reasonable sense of safety in their neighbourhood; yet are overly pre-occupied with impact of crime at the national level.

With respect to the impact of these factors on support for a stable democracy, it was found that in line with the aforementioned assumptions, exposure to criminal acts negatively impacts citizens' attitude in support of political legitimacy and their propensity to trust their fellow citizens. Also, it was found that sense of insecurity erodes citizens' belief in the idea and principles of democracy.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER III.

Table III. A1. Factors Determining Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008

Factors Determining Perception of Insecurity in Jamaica, 2008		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	T
Education	0.077*	(2.26)
Female	0.075*	(3.21)
Age	-0.048	(-1.46)
Wealth	-0.014	(-0.40)
AREA SIZE	-0.037	(-0.28)
KMR	-0.012	(-0.08)
Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)	-0.054	(-1.55)
Middlesex	0.000	.
Cornwall	-0.096	(-1.57)
Constant	-0.003	(-0.06)
R-Squared = 0.030		
Number of Observations = 1365		
* p<0.05		

Table III. A2. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Jamaica, 2008

Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Jamaica, 2008		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Education	0.263*	(2.14)
Female	-0.162	(-1.48)
Age	0.029	(0.27)
Wealth	0.160	(1.37)
AREA SIZE	0.244	(1.11)
KMR	0.188	(0.94)
Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)	0.030	(0.18)
Cornwall	-0.407*	(-2.35)
Constant	-2.512*	(-18.87)
F = 3.64		
Number of Observations = 1362		
* p<0.05		

**Table III. A3. Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Crime Victimization	-0.026	(0.03)	-0.012	(0.04)	-0.054	(0.04)	-0.075*	(0.02)	-0.068*	(0.03)
Satisfaction with Performance of Current Prime Minister	0.115*	(0.04)	0.014	(0.05)	0.018	(0.05)				
Political Interest	-0.045	(0.03)	0.038	(0.03)	0.038	(0.03)	0.059*	(0.02)		
Education	0.088	(0.39)	-0.094	(0.29)	-0.109	(0.38)	-0.181	(0.24)	0.277	(0.26)
Female	-0.915	(1.45)	-2.675*	(1.03)	-0.169	(1.39)	0.988	(1.03)	-2.600*	(1.16)
Age	0.308	(0.22)	0.111	(0.23)	0.030	(0.27)	0.029	(0.22)	0.158	(0.20)
Age Squared	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	-1.017	(0.66)	-0.709	(0.63)	-0.902	(0.65)	-0.453	(0.46)	0.698	(0.43)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	2.199	(1.22)	1.752	(1.04)	3.067*	(1.04)	1.257	(0.80)	0.617	(0.73)
AREA SIZE	0.103	(0.81)	0.168	(1.08)	-0.274	(1.27)	-0.735	(0.60)	1.615*	(0.63)
Constant	57.776*	(6.73)	67.914*	(8.49)	49.470*	(8.18)	44.012*	(6.01)	42.008*	(6.38)
R-Squared	0.034		0.013		0.022		0.041		0.037	
No. of cases	1205		1243		1235		1255		1237	

\* p<0.05

**Table III. A4. Impact of Perception of Personal Security on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Perception of Personal Security on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Crime Victimization	-0.068*	(0.03)								
Education	0.277	(0.26)	-0.040	(0.28)	-0.144	(0.36)	-0.074	(0.27)	0.407	(0.23)
Female	-2.600*	(1.16)	-2.386*	(1.06)	-0.150	(1.39)	1.388	(0.96)	-1.246	(1.16)
Age	0.158	(0.20)	0.050	(0.22)	-0.026	(0.26)	-0.021	(0.20)	0.168	(0.20)
Age Squared	0.000	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.002	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	0.698	(0.43)	-0.681	(0.63)	-0.850	(0.64)	-0.411	(0.49)	0.747	(0.40)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.617	(0.73)	1.478	(1.01)	2.877*	(1.02)	0.758	(0.76)	-0.293	(0.64)
AREA SIZE	1.615*	(0.63)	0.085	(1.09)	-0.224	(1.28)	-0.845	(0.58)	1.344*	(0.53)
Perception of Insecurity			-0.113*	(0.04)	-0.083	(0.04)	-0.139*	(0.03)	-0.280*	(0.03)
Satisfaction with Performance of Current Prime Minister			0.005	(0.0)	0.008	(0.05)				
Political Interest			0.034	(0.03)	0.035	(0.03)	0.055*	(0.02)		
Constant	42.008*	(6.38)	73.641*	(8.12)	54.185*	(7.61)	49.503*	(5.70)	51.739*	(6.12)
R-Squared	0.037		0.028		0.027		0.063		0.139	
N. de cases	1237		1252		1245		1264		1246	

\* p<0.05

# Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on Support for Stable Democracy

## 4.1 Theoretical framework<sup>38</sup>

What role, if any, does local-level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the centre of the process. Worldwide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities. In contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

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<sup>38</sup> The theoretical portions of this section was written by Daniel Montalvo.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level is bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Alburquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).<sup>39</sup>

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase in the competition for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was theirs an active civil

<sup>39</sup> There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

society. This thinking was crystalized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963)*. That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played and active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that rules in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple association express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

#### **4.2. How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?**

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

#### **4.3. Support for Local Government in Jamaica**

Jamaica's experience with local government dates back to the late 1600s when the then British Colonial Administration introduced Parish-level local authorities with the promise that the decentralization of the specified resources and responsibilities would strengthen political representation and streamline the delivery of certain local services. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, there was substantial growth in overall the Jamaican population which was accompanied by a significant expansion in the eligible voting citizenry, occasioned to a great

extent by advent of universal adult suffrage in 1944. It was therefore necessary to further subdivide each parish authority into smaller parochial divisions in order to maintain a citizen-to-elected official ratio that would facilitate the best quality political representation possible. This development marked the birth of the local ‘Parish Council’ system, as currently exists in Jamaica today.

At present, there are 13 Parish Councils, one for each Parish, except in the case of Kingston and Saint Andrew where the Kingston and Saint Andrew Corporation (KSAC) constitutes a single council incorporating both Parishes. These thirteen local authorities are further divided into 227 parochial divisions, each headed by an elected councilor, who represents that division on the respective Parish Council.

In recent years a number of initiatives have been undertaken by the Central Government, designed to modernize and upgrade the legal and institutional framework relating to the operations of the Parish Councils, with the goal of enhancing the capacity of these bodies to achieve their mission of ‘strengthening participatory governance at the local level’ (MLGE, 2006a). Notably was the establishment of a Local Government Reform Unit (LGRU) under the Local Government Reform Act, 2001, with the mandate to pursue the requisite development planning, infrastructure upgrading, capacity building, research, and legislation pertinent to the furthering of community-based democratic governance in Jamaica. Although the LGRU has made a deliberate effort to engage the various sectoral interest groups in the planning and implementation of Local Government reform thus far, concerns have been raised about the level of commitment of Central Government to the devolution of power. Further, there remain some amount of uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of local authorities and with regards to their capacity to perform the designated roles and tasks in a timely and efficiently manner.

#### **4.4. Trust in Local Government**

Despite the aforementioned efforts to strengthen governance through the promotion of increased citizen participation in government at the local level, there is a continuing debate about the relevance, usefulness and sustainability of Parish Councils in Jamaica. In this regard, we begin this examination of citizens’ attitude towards Local Government by assessing their overall support in terms of the level of trust they afford this institution. In order to make this determination, we analysed responses to the item Box IV.1:

##### **Box IV.1 Trust in Local Government Item**

*B32. To what extent do you trust the Parish Council or municipality?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Not at all						A lot		Doesn’t know

Respondents were required to locate their sense of trust on the seven-point scale shown in the box above. As illustrated, 1 indicates no trust at all while 7 signifies a very high level of trust. Analysis involved the conversion of values obtained on this 1-7 scale their corresponding values on the easier to interpret 0-100 metric-format<sup>40</sup>. Average trust in Local Government in Jamaica was thus calculated to be just over 43 on the 100-point scale, an indication of low levels of confidence among the citizenry in this institution. It nevertheless represents a slight increase in level of trust since 2006 (Figure IV.1).




Figure IV.1. Trust in the Local Government in Jamaica, 2006-2008

Despite the promise that the devolution of functions and resources should facilitate greater responsiveness and an overall improvement in the delivery of local services, Jamaicans are more trusting of the Central Government over their local authority. As Figure IV.2 indicates, confidence in the national administration is just about 50 points compared to close to 43 points for the local government.

<sup>40</sup> Scale conversion is accomplished by reducing each score by 1 and then dividing by 6 to create a new range of 0-1. A metric scale is then obtained by multiplying by 100. All subsequent scales in this report are re-calibrated in this manner.




Figure IV.2. Comparison between Trust in Local Government and Trust in National Government

Comparatively, Jamaica is positioned at the lower end of the list of twenty-two countries participating in the LAPOP 2008 survey, being one the twelve countries with average trust falling below the 50-point mark on the metric scale. At the bottom of the chart is Haiti with 38 points, the only country obtaining a score of less than 40, and at the top is the Dominican Republic with nearly 64 points, being the only country scoring above 60 points (Figure IV.3).




Figure IV.3. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.5. Support for Decentralization

Devolution, as a form of administrative decentralization usually involves the transfer from central government, the authority for decision-making, finance, and management to semi-autonomous municipalities with the understanding that such bodies will provide public services within clearly and legally defined geographical boundaries. Understandably, citizens will be inclined to support such a system if they believe their local authorities possess the competencies to handle the devolved responsibilities and resources in a way that would ensure the provision of local services in a more efficient, equitable, and effective manner.

In this section, we examine the extent to which Jamaicans support the transfer responsibilities and economic resources relating to the provision of local services from the Central Government to the Parish Councils. For this we analyse responses to the items in Box IV. 2

**Box IV.2 Support the Transfer of Responsibilities and Economic Resources**

**LGL2A.** Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given *more responsibilities*? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) Somewhat more to the central government
- (3) The same amount to the central government and the parish councils
- (4) Somewhat more to the parish councils
- (5) Much more to the parish councils
- (8) DK/DN

**LGL2B.** And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Somewhat more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the parish councils
- (4) Somewhat more the parish councils
- (5) Much more the parish councils
- (8) DK/DA

Figure IV.4 shows, a breakdown of citizens’ preferences with regards to the transfer of administrative responsibilities and control over resources to their local authority. The distribution of responses on both items suggests that Jamaicans are divided on the question of devolution. People are apparently not convinced that the transfer of the respective functions and the control of resources will ensure the provision of local services with greater efficiency. In both cases, the larger proportion is in support of the status quo. However, if we were to combine the categories representing those who believe ‘much more’ and ‘some more’ should be transfer to either Central or Local Government, there is a slightly stronger support for decentralization.




Figure IV.4. Citizens Support for the Transfer of Responsibilities and Resources to Local Government

In order to be better able to make comparisons on the issue of citizens’ support for decentralization, we converted responses on these two items to measures on the familiar 100-point scale. What is readily noticeable that Jamaicans express greater confidence in the competence of their local authority to undertake the requisite functions than in their trustworthiness in managing the public resources. Figure IV.5 Shows slightly stronger support for the transfer of responsibilities.




Figure IV.5. Comparative Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities and Economic Resources

#### 4.5.1. Comparative Perspective on Support for Decentralization

Examined comparatively, support for the decentralization of responsibilities relating to local service in Jamaica is reasonably strong, compared to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The country is ranked among the nine top nations in terms of its score on this measure (Figure IV.6). At the top of the list is Bolivia with 61 points and at the lower end is Honduras with 32 points.




Figure IV.6. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.5.2. Determinants of Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities

In an attempt at determining the factors that relate to support for decentralization of responsibilities, we analyzed a linear regression model made up of the factors displayed in the Figure IV.7 (See statistical outcomes in Appendix IV.A1 which is appended at the end of this chapter). The coefficient for satisfaction with the services offered by Local Government is positive and is the only statistically significant factor.




Figure IV.7. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities

The frequency polygon in Figure IV.8 shows that persons providing a positive evaluation of the quality of the services offered by the local authority are more likely to support decentralization of responsibilities to the Local Government.




Figure IV.8. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities

### 4.5.3. Decentralization of Economic Resources

With respect to support for the decentralization of economic resources, Jamaica performed slightly better on this measure, albeit obtaining a lower score nationally when compared to support for the transfer of responsibilities. The highest average score on this item was also 61 points obtained by Costa Rica with Honduras again assuming a last place with 36 points (Figure IV.9).




Figure IV.9. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.5.4. Determinants of Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources

With respect to support for the decentralization of economic resources, the same set of control variables were used in the regression. As Figure IV.10 shows (Regression results in Table IV.A2), none of the factors was found to be significant predictor of persons who were likely to support transferring control of economic resources to the local authority.




Figure IV.10. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

#### 4.6. Satisfaction with Performance of Local Government

The decentralization of governmental resources, functions and responsibilities has been justified primarily on the premise that the resulting close proximity between the citizenry and local public officials should promote greater sensitivity, responsiveness and accountability, and as a consequence, greater organizational effectiveness and improved service delivery. In this section we examine citizens' evaluation of the effectiveness of Local Government, measured in terms of their level of satisfaction with the services provided by Parish Councils.

When asked to indicate their assessment of the quality of services provided by the council by responding to the following question:

*SGL1. Would you say that the services the parish council is providing are...? [Read options]  
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (Fair) (4) Poor (5) Very Poor (8) Doesn't know*

The overwhelming majority of respondents rated the services provided by their council to be either mediocre or poor. Less than 14 per cent offered the positive assessments, of 'Good' or 'Very Good'. As Figure IV.11 shows, 38 percent evaluated the quality of service to be just fair. Most significantly, nearly one in two respondents expressed their outright dissatisfaction with the performance of their Parish Council by assessing the quality of service to be 'Poor' (31.4%) or 'Very Poor' (17.5%).




Figure IV.11. Respondents' Evaluation of Quality of Service Offered by Parish Council

The further analysis of this issue involved the reconfiguration of the results in Figure IV.11 on the familiar 0 – 100 point scale in order to facilitate easy comparison of findings at both the national and regional level. Figure IV.12 shows that despite two additional years of a local government reform programme that promised enhanced efficiency on completion, there was no change in citizens' level of satisfaction with the quality of services provided by the Island's Parish Councils.




Figure IV.12. Satisfaction with Local Services

#### 4.6.1. Comparative Perspective on Satisfaction with Local Services

The severity of citizens' dissatisfaction with the performance of their local authorities is highlighted by the comparative information presented in Figure IV.13. The 37-point rating obtained by Jamaica on this measure is the lowest among the countries participating in the 2008 study. Haiti is ranked immediately above Jamaica with approximately 40 points. Nine of the twenty-one countries in this comparison scored less than 50 points on this indicator. Brazil is positioned at the top of the chart with 58 points, followed by the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Columbia and Guatemala, each with approximately 56 points.




Figure IV.13. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.7. Citizens’ Involvement with Parish Council

In this section we examine the nature and extent of citizens’ involvement with their local authority. As indicated earlier, the devolution of governmental operations has been justified on the basis that local administration engenders greater community engagement in the affairs of government which creates the likelihood of greater satisfaction with the services offered by the various public bodies. So in essence, it is not only the transfer of power, resources and responsibilities, but more fundamentally, it involves the meaningful participation of community members in identifying community needs, setting priorities, searching for solutions to problems and holding public officials accountable for the actions. Here we examine the issue of local

democratic governance in terms of citizens' level of participation in the affairs of their Parish Council.

#### 4.7.1. Participation in terms of Meeting Attendance

Firstly, we consider participation in meetings of Parish Council as an indicator of community engagement. Accordingly, the following question was posed:

*NPI. Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?*  
(1) Yes      (2) No      (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember

As shown in Figure IV.14, only about 14 per cent of ten respondents reported that they attended the meeting of their Parish Council within the last 12 months.




Figure IV.14. Participation at the Local Level

#### 4.7.2. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Parish Council Meeting

Figure IV.15 shows that there has been an appreciable increase in level of participation in Parish Council meeting in Jamaica between 2006 and 2008. This is not surprising given that this survey was done just a few weeks after the parochial elections. It is usual for citizens involvement with political organizations to increase at election time.




Figure IV.15. Participation in Local Meetings: 2006-2008

Figure IV.16 presents a comparative picture of attendance to Parish Council meetings within LAPOP countries. Jamaica assumes a seventh place position on this indicator in relation to other Latin American and Caribbean nations. Ranked at the top on this measure is the Dominican Republic, with a score of nearly 17 out of a possible 100 points. This score is more than four times the mean score obtained by Panama, the country at the bottom of the chart.




Figure IV.16. Participation in Parish Council Meetings in Comparative Perspective

### 4.7.3. Participation in terms of Demand-making

The extent of citizens’ involvement in the form of demand-making on their Parish Council was also examined in this study. When asked:

*NP2. Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or parish councillor of the parish council within the past 12 months?*

Only 13 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that they have sought help from their local authority (Figure IV.17).




Figure IV.17. Demand-Making to the Local Government

This relatively low rate of demand-making by citizens on their Parish Council is consistent with a trend described in Munroe and Bertram (2006) where it is explained that shrinking public resources have, over the years, resulted in the reduced capacity of political representatives to satisfy the demands and expectations of their constituents. This has led to a progressive decline in clientilistic politics, which was characterized by political favouritism in the allocation of state resources. This in turn has meant an overall reduction in the reliance of the populace on the resources of state institutions.

#### 4.7.4. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Parish Council Meeting

Figure IV.18 shows that participation in Parish Council activities in terms of demand-making was virtually the same as in 2006.




Figure IV.18. Demand-Making to the Local Government: 2006-2008

Figure IV.19 shows that Jamaica’s demand-making score of 13 per cent places it at just about at the median position in the array of scores of other LAPOP countries. At the top of the list on this indicator of community involvement is Uruguay with just below 20 points and Panama at the other extreme with about seven points.




Figure IV.19. Demand Making on Parish Council in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.8. Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy

In this section we use multivariate analysis to determine the relationship between satisfaction with the services provided by their local authorities and support for a stable democracy. Accordingly, we created and analysed a series of regression models designed to examine the influence of level of satisfaction on the targeted system stability-related dimensions: support for democracy per se; political tolerance; right to public contestation; political legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Table IV.A3 which is appended at the end of this chapter, presents the list of the independent variables that were included in the different equations and the respective statistical outcomes.

Satisfaction with local services correlates positively with political legitimacy with core regime institutions and interpersonal trust. As Figure IV.20 indicates, persons who are more satisfied with the services provided by the local authorities are likely to be more supportive of the legitimacy of core regime institutions.




Figure IV.20. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy

Figure IV.21 shows the mostly positive relationship between citizens' satisfaction with local services and interpersonal trust. Persons who are moderately positive in their assessment of the quality of local services are more likely to express greater trust in their neighbours. However, those with overly positive assessment are likely to be less supportive.




Figure IV.21. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust

## 4.9. Local Civic Participation in Jamaica

It is widely acknowledged that the active participation of citizens in the organizations of civil society is critical to the building and maintenance of a strong and stable democracy (Burns, 2001; Crotty, 1991; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Putman, 2000; Shlozman, 1999; Vargas-Cullell & Rosero-Bixly, 2004). In this section we assess the state of democracy in Jamaica from this Tocquevillian perspective, by examining the popularity of selected associative activities that are proposed to contribute to the building of a nation's stock of social capital. As indicated earlier in this report, unlike other forms of capital that are located in the actors, social capital is located "in their relations with other actors" (Coleman, 1988) and as a consequence, is necessary for enhancing political institutional performance and in turn, fostering social and economic development. Our emphasis here is on civil society participation, a key dimension of social capital.

### 4.9.1 Measuring Civil Society Participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. These items, known as the CP series, (as in "community participation") is shown in Box IV.3 below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.<sup>41</sup> The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in all the organizations listed below.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

<sup>42</sup> The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and to take the average of the four. If a respondent provides a "don't know" to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.

**Box IV.3 Survey Items used to Measure Level of Civic Participation among Jamaicans**

*I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]*

<i>CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...</i>	<i>Once a week</i>	<i>Once or twice a month</i>	<i>Once or twice a year</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>DK/DR</i>	
<i>CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them....</i>	1	2	3	4		<i>CP6</i>
<i>CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4		<i>CP7</i>

Figure IV.22 shows the intensity of citizen’s participation in terms of the frequency at which they attend the respective civil society organizations. Attendance at meetings of religious organizations obtained the highest average participation of about 81 points on the 100-point scale. This is followed by a little over 48 points for those attending parent teachers’ association meetings and a low 32 points for those attending any community improvement organizations.




Figure IV.22. Average Citizens’ Participation in Civic Organizations

### 4.9.2. Comparative Perspective on Participation in Civic Organizations

Relatively high level of attendance to church related functions is an indication of the significance of religion in the lives of the Jamaican people. As is the case universally, church attendance is an important ritual in the practice of religion. As Figure IV.23 indicates, high involvement with religious group activities is common to most countries in the Americas. Among the LAPOP countries, Jamaica is ranked number two in terms of this indicator, with Haiti at the top of the list with about 82 points. Argentina and Uruguay average scores of 24 and 20 points respectively placed them at the bottom of the chart.




Figure IV.23. Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.24 shows that with respect to participation in parent association meetings, Jamaica is among the top six countries in the Americas on this indicator, with Haiti at the top of the chart with 66 points and the United States at the bottom with 24 points.




Figure IV.24. Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association in Comparative Perspective

Level of participation in meetings organized to deliberate on matters relating to community development is generally low in the Region. Only Canada scored the passing grade of a just 50 points on this indicator. More than one half of the participating countries obtained scores of less than 30 points with Argentina and Uruguay receiving average scores of 17 and 13 pints respectively.(Figure IV.25)




Figure IV.25. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements in Comparative Perspective

#### 4.10. Local Civic Participation and Support for Stable Democracy

In this section we determined the possible impact that the different forms of social collaboration among community members might have on their support for a stable democracy. The aforementioned governance-related variables were examined individually.

Firstly, we analyse the effect on support for democracy per se. Table IV.A4 (Appendix IV.) summarizes the results of the multivariable analysis involving the three meeting-attendance indicators as independent variables and support democracy as the dependent variable. As Figure IV.26 shows, none of the respective outcomes were statistically significant, suggesting that the frequency of meeting attendance does not significantly affect citizens' support for the idea of democracy in Jamaica.




Figure IV.26. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the idea of democracy per se

The second regression model analyzed the impact of local civic participation on support for the right of public contestation. The graphical presentation of the multivariate analysis in Figure IV.27 shows that attendance at the meetings of community improvement organization and meetings of religious groups are significant predictors of citizens' support for the right to contestation (See regression results in Table IV.A5).




Figure IV.27. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Right of Public Contestation

As illustrated in Figure IV.28, the relationship between attendance at church-related meetings and right to public contestation is mostly negative. Persons who attend religious regularly are generally less likely to support the right of oppositional groups and activities in society.




Figure IV.28. Participation in Meeting of Religious Group by Support for the Right of Public Contestation

On the contrary, as Figure IV.29 indicates, the relationship between participating in meetings for community improvement is positively related to right to public contestation. Jamaicans who actively participate in meetings organized to find solutions to problems in their community or to contribute to community improvement are generally more likely to support oppositional groups and activities.




Figure IV.29. Participation in Meeting for Committee for Community Improvement by Support for the Right of Public Contestation

Thirdly, we examine the impact of local civic participation on political tolerance. As Figure IV.30 (Regression results in Table IV.A6) indicates, two factors – frequency of attendance to community improvement meetings and church-related functions are both negatively related to political tolerance.




Figure IV.30. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance

As depicted in Figure IV.31, person who are more actively involved in community development-related activities are less tolerant than those who are least involved.




Figure IV.31. Participation in Meeting for Committee for Community Improvement by Political Tolerance

Frequency of participation in meetings of religious groups was also found to be inversely related to sense of political tolerance. As Figure IV.32, the embrace for tolerance declines sharply among those who participate more frequently in meetings of a religious nature.




Figure IV.32. Participation in Meeting of Religious Group by Political Tolerance

A regression model was also solved to determine the extent to which social collaboration among community members in the form of participation in community development programmes and meetings of parents association and religious groups affect citizens' belief in system legitimacy. As Figure IV.33 shows (Regression results in Table IV.A7), none of the factors were found to be useful in explaining differences in support for political legitimization among Jamaicans.




Figure IV.33. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy

Also, as Figure IV.34 shows, none of the forms of local civic participation were found to impact level of interpersonal trust to an extent that is statistically significant (Regression results in Table IV.A8).




Figure IV.34. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust

### 4.11. Conclusion

The basic assumption informing this chapter is that citizens who participate in and evaluate local government positively are possibly more approving of the right of public contestation and inclusive participation, and in turn are likely to exhibit greater belief in the legitimacy of national institutions and the political system as a whole.

On the whole, Jamaicans were found to be intensely dissatisfied with the performance of their local authorities, the most dissatisfied in the Americas based on LAPOP, 2008 data. Support for the decentralization responsibilities and economic resources in Jamaica are, nonetheless, reasonably strong compared to other countries in the Region.

When citizens' level of involvement in local democratic governance is examined, in terms of level of participation in the affairs of their Parish Council in the form of meeting attendance and demand-making, Jamaica fared well both in terms of its mid-range scores on both indicators and its relatively high rank among other Countries in the Americas. Local civic participation was also found to be comparatively high with Jamaica obtaining second highest score on attendance to meetings of religious groups and above median rank on other indicators.

On a whole, it was found that higher levels of participation with local authorities and greater social collaboration among community members positively impact support for a stable democracy.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER IV.

Table IV. A1 Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	T
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	0.084*	(2.35)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	-0.024	(-0.63)
Education	0.026	(0.66)
Female	-0.012	(-0.41)
Age	0.049	(1.26)
Wealth	-0.028	(-0.76)
AREA SIZE	-0.012	(-0.29)
Constant	-0.005	(-0.12)
R-Squared = 0.010		
Number of Obs. = 1005		
* p<0.05		

Table IV. A2 Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	T
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	0.039	(1.12)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.040	(1.13)
Education	-0.037	(-1.00)
Female	0.006	(0.20)
Age	0.010	(0.26)
Wealth	-0.055	(-1.45)
AREA SIZE	0.002	(0.04)
Constant	0.003	(0.07)
R-Squared = 0.009		
Number of Obs. = 1005		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV. A3 Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.025	(0.06)	-0.046	(0.05)	-0.026	(0.05)	0.208*	(0.03)	0.152*	(0.04)
Satisfaction with Performance of Current Prime Minister	0.126*	(0.05)	0.028	(0.05)	0.038	(0.06)				
Political Interest	-0.047	(0.03)	0.037	(0.03)	0.034	(0.03)	0.033	(0.02)		
Education	0.071	(0.44)	-0.054	(0.34)	-0.428	(0.42)	-0.249	(0.27)	0.196	(0.26)
Female	-0.964	(1.66)	-2.562*	(1.21)	0.209	(1.47)	0.873	(1.01)	-2.945*	(1.27)
Age	0.222	(0.26)	0.066	(0.26)	-0.057	(0.29)	0.053	(0.26)	0.250	(0.22)
Age Squared	-0.000	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)
Wealth	-0.827	(0.79)	-0.957	(0.70)	-0.926	(0.71)	-0.430	(0.52)	0.406	(0.44)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	2.166	(1.27)	1.860	(1.13)	3.134*	(1.11)	0.069	(0.88)	-0.124	(0.85)
AREA SIZE	0.002	(0.92)	-0.299	(1.14)	-0.153	(1.42)	-0.321	(0.68)	1.288*	(0.61)
Constant	59.067*	(7.98)	71.119*	(9.95)	53.848*	(8.88)	38.050*	(6.79)	37.992*	(7.24)
R-Square	0.032		0.014		0.020		0.075		0.048	
No. of Cases	1041		1066		1060		1073		1059	

\* p<0.05

**Table IV. A4 Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Idea of democracy**

Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the Idea of democracy		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	T
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	-0.082	(-1.74)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	-0.000	(-0.01)
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements	-0.005	(-0.15)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.109*	(2.72)
Political Interest	-0.062	(-1.91)
Education	0.025	(0.56)
Female	0.007	(0.22)
Age	0.210	(1.41)
Std_q2sq	-0.088	(-0.57)
Wealth	-0.063	(-1.28)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.092	(1.94)
AREA SIZE	0.016	(0.32)
Constant	-0.002	(-0.04)
R-Squared = 0.039		
Number of Obs. = 1160		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV. A5 Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Public Contestation**

<b>Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Public Contestation</b>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>T</b>
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	-0.120*	(-2.77)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	0.044	(1.17)
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements	0.036*	(0.92)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.036	(0.68)
Political Interest	0.047	(1.19)
Education	-0.008	(-0.23)
Female	-0.037	(-1.66)
Age	0.032	(0.20)
Std_q2sq	-0.037	(-0.21)
Wealth	-0.066	(-1.35)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.075	(1.69)
AREA SIZE	0.023	(0.31)
Constant	0.033	(0.44)
R-Squared = 0.027		
Number of Obs. = 1194		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV. A6 Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance**

<b>Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance</b>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>T</b>
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	-0.090*	(-2.21)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	0.013	(0.37)
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements	-0.104*	(-2.68)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.030	(0.60)
Political Interest	0.047	(1.37)
Education	0.008	(0.19)
Female	0.018	(0.61)
Age	0.047	(0.28)
Std_q2sq	0.047	(0.27)
Wealth	-0.066	(-1.49)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.125*	(3.13)
AREA SIZE	0.004	(0.05)
Constant	-0.022	(-0.30)
R-Squared = 0.038		
Number of Obs. = 1187		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV. A7 Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy**  
**Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>T</b>
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	-0.023	(-0.54)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	-0.000	(-0.01)
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements	-0.006	(-0.16)
Political Interest	0.080*	(2.49)
Education	-0.011	(-0.33)
Female	0.026	(0.98)
Age	0.079	(0.45)
Std_q2sq	0.069	(0.38)
Wealth	-0.049	(-1.13)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.055	(1.48)
AREA SIZE	-0.065	(-1.34)
Constant	-0.004	(-0.09)
R-Squared = 0.035		
Number of Obs. = 203		
* p<0.05		

**Table IV. A8 Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust**  
**Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust**

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficient.</b>	<b>T</b>
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	-0.041	(-1.34)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	-0.014	(-0.56)
Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements	0.016	(0.51)
Education	0.032	(1.00)
Female	-0.040	(-1.50)
Age	0.159	(1.02)
Std_q2sq	-0.023	(-0.14)
Wealth	0.050	(1.38)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.016	(0.45)
AREA SIZE	0.096*	(2.05)
Constant	-0.018	(-0.38)
R-Squared = 0.030		
Number of Obs. = 1187		
* p<0.05		

# Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

## 5.1. Theoretical framework<sup>43</sup>

The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the question of the impact of the perception of government performance on support for stable government. It has become commonplace in the field of democratic governance, in talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s that researchers began to take note. During this time, mostly in the developed world and especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so too did one’s opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and

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<sup>43</sup> This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton’s three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, bad economic outlooks and perceptions affected “peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, those citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government. However according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, and “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed. Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the

political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions. Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

## 5.2 How might perception of government’s economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

## 5.3. Measuring Perception of Government Economic Performance

The first stage in the assessment of the Government’s performance the survey of citizens’ perception of its efficacy with the use of the two items listed in Box V.1 below. Specifically, the focus is on the respondents’ evaluation of the effectiveness of the Administration in terms of its success in fighting poverty and unemployment. As further illustrated Box V.1, the familiar seven-point scale was used to capture respondent’s evaluation on these items. The rating given was then re-calibrating into the easier-to-interpret score on the 0-100 metric scale.

### Box V.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance Items

*NI. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?*

*NI2. To what extent would you say the current government fights unemployment?*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Not at all</b>						<b>A lot</b>	<b>Doesn’t know</b>

### 5.3.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance

Jamaicans evaluate their Government quite negatively as it relates to its performance in fighting poverty and unemployment. As shown in Figure V, both scores fall below the 40-point mark on the 100-point scale with its handling of the fight against poverty being accorded a slightly higher rating.




Figure V.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance Indicators

### 5.3.2. Comparative Perspective on Perception of Government Economic Performance

In order to facilitate the comparative analysis of findings relating to this problem, an overall performance index was calculating by obtaining the mean of the assessment outcomes on these two variables. Mean performance on this indicator for Jamaica for 2008 was a score of 36 on the 100-points scale. As Figure shows, Jamaicans have become more positive in their impression of the performance of the Government in the management of the country's economic affairs.




Figure V.2. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Year

Perception of performance indicators for countries participating in the 2008 survey indicates that nationals across the Americas are generally unhappy with the performance of their governments in handling the economic affairs of their respective countries. As figure V.3 shows, only five countries obtained scores of over 50 points on the measure. Jamaica's score of 36 points accorded it an eight place ranking among the twenty-one Latin American and Caribbean countries. Uruguay was the best performer on this index followed by Costa Rica with approximately 55 and 52 points respectively. At the bottom of the list is Haiti with 27 points and Paraguay with an unusually low rating of 14 point.




Figure V.3. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

### 5.4. Perception of National Economic Situation in Jamaica

The primary objective of this section is to establish citizens’ assessment of the gravity of the country’s economic problems relative to other national concerns. In other words, how do Jamaicans rank problems relating to the economy in terms of seriousness, in relation to other social or political problems? This determination was made on the basis of the analysis of data collected in response to the analysis of item A4 shown in Table V.1 below. This is a multi-response, open-ended question which required respondents simply to indicate their opinion of the ‘most serious problem faced by the country’. Interviewers were asked to select from the list of pre-established codes in Table V.1 the problem that best reflect the answer provided by the respondents.

**Table V.1. Pre-Coded ‘Most Important Problem’ Item.**

<b>A4. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country?                      [DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]</b>			
Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drug trafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, roadblocks, , etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of	22
Forced displacement of persons	32	Kidnappings	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence/Crime	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Population explosion	20	Other	70

In order to accomplish the goal of ranking problems with the economy with other social and political problems, the thirty-six codes in the grid above (Table V.1) were re-classified by LAPOP into the five overarching categories used to group the problems as shown in Table V.2.

**Table V.2. Categorization of Items to Determine most Serious national Problem**

<b>Economic</b>	<b>Security</b>	<b>Basic Services</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Others</b>
Credit, lack of (09)	Delinquency, Crime, Violence (05)	Water, lack of (19)	Armed conflict (30)	Inequality (58)
Unemployment (03)	Gangs (14)	Roads in poor condition (18)	Corruption (13)	Forced displacement of persons (32)
Economy, problems with, crisis of (01)	Kidnappings (31)	Education, lack of, poor quality (21)	Human rights, violations of (56)	Discrimination (25)
Inflation, High prices (02)	Security (lack of) (27)	Electricity, lack of (24)	Bad government (15)	Drug addiction (11)
Poverty (04)	War against terrorism (17)	Health services, lack of (22)		Population explosion (20)
Land to farm, lack of (07)	Terrorism (33)	Transportation, problems of (60)		Environment (10)
External debt (26)	Violence/ Crime (57)	Housing (55)		Migration (16)
		Malnutrition (23)		Drug trafficking (12)
				Popular protests (strikes, roadblocks, work stoppages, etc) (06)
				Other (70)

Figure V.4 shows the distribution of responses across the five categories established above. Security-related concerns are pre-eminent. Sixty-two per cent of the population identified criminality as the most serious problem facing the country. Concern about the economy is ranked second, with only 27 per cent of citizenry considering it to be the most important national problem. Problems in the other three categories are distributed among the other 11 per cent of the population.




Figure V.4. Perception of the Relative Importance of National Economic Problems in Jamaica

#### 5.4.1. Perception of the State of the Economy

A recent development in studies in comparative political science and public opinion surveys on support for democracy is the introduction of two new perception variables aimed at eliciting citizens' impressions on the state of the national economy on the one part, and on the other their evaluation of their own economic situation. The aim is to capture what has been described as, respectively, a “sociotropic” and “ideotropic” views of the economy. These two dimensions of national and personal wellbeing are measured in this study using the SOCT1 and the IDIO1 items respectively.

It is important to point out that these items measure citizen perception of the *state of the economy*, and do not make any direct association between that perception and the role that the government may have had in producing a particular outcome. Generally speaking, people tend to blame or praise their incumbent government for the performance of the national economy (the sociotropic) and are more likely to do so than to associate government performance with their own personal economic situation (the ideotropic). This is, admittedly, not always what obtains. Hence an attempt in this section to determine the extent to which these two factors predict citizen evaluation of the economic performance of the current political administration in Jamaica.

We start this analysis with a focus on citizens' “sociotropic” view of the Jamaican economy by posing the following question:

**SOCTI.** How would you describe the **country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

Figure V.5 depicts the distribution of citizens' evaluation on this item. Interestingly, citizens on the most part, present quite a negative view of the state of the national economy. Nearly 60 per cent assess the country's economic situation to be in a bad state, with a large proportion of this segment – 24 per cent - judging it to be very bad. Those with a very positive view of the economy represent a mere 7.4 per cent of the population.




Figure V.5. Perception of Country's Economic Situation

#### 5.4.2. Comparative Perspective on Citizens' Perception of the Country's Economic Situation

Comparatively speaking, Jamaicans are among the most highly dissatisfied people in the Americas on the basis of their assessment of their country economic situation. Curiously though, Jamaica is ranked in the company of the United States and Haiti on this measure (Figure V.6). With a score of 31 points, Jamaica obtains a slightly higher rating than the USA and nearly two times the grade obtained by Haiti. Uruguay, Chile and Brazil are at the top of the list with roughly 47 points each. Of note is the fact that none of the countries in the survey received a passing grade, suggesting probably that expectations of people in the region with regards to the nations' economic wellbeing are unrealistically high.




Figure V.6. Perception of National Economic Situation in Comparative Perspective

An examination of citizens' self-assessment of their economic situation (the ideotropic) was solicited using the following item:

**IDIO1.** How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

As Figure V.7 shows, the greater proportion of Jamaicans - 43 per cent - evaluated the personal economic situation as being neither good nor bad.




Figure V.7. Perception of Personal Economic Situation

### 5.4.3. Determinants of Perception of Economic Performance of Government

An attempt to identify the factors that explain differences in citizens' perception of the economic performance of the government involved the development of a linear regression model comprising the control variables listed in Table V.A1 in the Appendix 5. As indicated by the graphical presentation of the results in Figure V.8, in addition to wealth, the 'sociotropic' and 'ideotropic' variables are statistically significant factors.




Figure V.8. Predictors of the Perception of Government Economic Performance

In order to highlight the impact of wealth on citizens’ view of the government performance on national economic affairs, we cross-tabulated the re-coded wealth variable<sup>44</sup> with the perception of government economic performance indicator. Figure V.9 shows that wealthier persons are less likely to assess the government positively with regards to their performance with the economy.




Figure V.9. Impact of Wealth on Government Economic Performance

Figure V.10 shows the relationship between citizens’ perception of the national economic situation and their evaluation of the governments’ economic performance. As the shape of the frequency polygon illustrates, the correlation between these two factors is somewhat ambiguous among persons who assess the national economic situation in highly positive terms. Among persons with the view that the national economy is good to very good, their perception of the economic performance of the government become progressively more negative with more positive assessment. However, for all other groups, the relationship between evaluation of national economic situation and perception of economic performance of the government is positive, with the more positive the evaluation of the former the more positive citizens’ perception of the latter.

<sup>44</sup> Recoding involved the classification of respondents were into three groups based on the approximate value of their household inventory of capital goods.




Figure V.10. Impact of Perception of National Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance

From Figure V.11 it can be observed that individuals who have more positive perceptions about their personal economic situation are similarly likely to hold a more positive view of the government economic performance.




Figure V.11. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance

### 5.5. The perception of government economic performance and its impact on support for stable democracy

The guiding question for this section is: How do citizens’ perception of the performance of the government in the handling of the country’s economic affairs impact on their support for a stable democracy? In order to make this determination, we created and analysed a series of regression models designed to examine the influence of citizens’ evaluation of government performance on the familiar list of governance variables: support for democracy per se; political tolerance; right to public contestation; political legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Tables V.A2 which is appended at the end of this chapter, presents the list of the independent variables that were included in the different equations. The respective statistical outcomes indicate that citizens’ perception of the government’s economic performance significantly influences citizens’ support for democracy per se; attitudes in support of the right to public contestation and attitudes in support of political legitimacy of core regime institutions.

Figure V.12 shows that as citizens’ perception of the performance of the government in managing economic challenges becomes more positive, support for democracy is likely to become more intense.




Figure V.12. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Democracy

With regards to support for the rights of the opposition, Figure V.13 shows that as citizens’ perception of the economic performance of the government becomes more favourable, respect for the right of public contestation increases also improves.




Figure V.13. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for the Right of Public Contestation

And finally, there is also a strong positive correlation between citizens' evaluation of the economic performance of the government and attitudes in support of political legitimacy of core regime institutions (Figure V.14). Persons entertaining positive views of the government's performance are highly more likely to support the institutions of the state.




Figure V.14. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Political legitimacy

## 5.6. Conclusion

Citizen satisfaction with the economic performance of the incumbent political administration is understood to be a critical condition for system legitimacy. The assumption is that citizens who evaluate their governments as being efficacious, especially in terms of economic performance, are more likely to have a stronger belief that democracy is the best regime type.

In this analysis, it was found that Jamaicans evaluate their Government quite negatively on its performance in the handling of the country's economic affairs. But because of the gravity of the crime problem, economic concerns are not paramount in the minds of most Jamaicans. Only about three in 10 respondents perceived the economy as the most serious national problem. This is despite the fact that nearly 60 per cent assess the country's economic situation to be in a bad state, with a large proportion of this segment – 24 per cent – judging it to be very bad. In judging their personal economic situation, the greater proportion of Jamaicans – 43 per cent – evaluated the economy as being neither good nor bad.

Citizens' perception of the performance of the government in handling the country's economic affairs was found to impact on their support for a stable democracy, by way of its effect on support for democracy per se; attitudes in support of the right to public contestation, and attitudes in support of political legitimacy of core regime institutions.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER V.

**Table V.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance**

Perception of Government Economic Performance		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	T
Education	-0.035	(-1.37)
Female	0.033	(1.40)
Age	0.042	(1.31)
Wealth	-0.071*	(-2.34)
AREA SIZE	0.017	(0.49)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.143*	(4.67)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.207*	(5.82)
Constant	0.004	(0.11)
R-Squared = 0.087		
Number of Observations = 1331		
* p<0.05		

**Table V.2 Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy**

Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Inter-Personal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. Est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.127*	(0.04)	0.080*	(0.04)	0.072	(0.04)	0.297*	(0.03)	0.046	(0.02)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current Prime Minister	0.060	(0.05)	-0.018	(0.06)	-0.016	(0.06)				
Political Interest	-0.057*	(0.03)	0.027	(0.03)	0.028	(0.03)	0.027	(0.02)		
Education	0.165	(0.39)	-0.098	(0.29)	-0.221	(0.36)	-0.102	(0.23)	0.224	(0.26)
Female	-0.826	(1.38)	-2.875*	(1.00)	-0.330	(1.32)	0.588	(0.93)	-2.300	(1.17)
Age	0.214	(0.23)	0.076	(0.24)	-0.007	(0.27)	-0.089	(0.19)	0.181	(0.20)
Age Squared	-0.000	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	0.003	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	-0.927	(0.65)	-0.680	(0.61)	-0.845	(0.63)	-0.175	(0.44)	0.599	(0.43)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	1.950	(1.22)	1.590	(1.01)	2.915*	(1.03)	0.227	(0.73)	0.355	(0.73)
AREA SIZE	0.106	(0.81)	0.130	(1.08)	-0.190	(1.27)	-0.742	(0.56)	1.505*	(0.64)
Constant	57.836*	(6.95)	68.469*	(8.77)	50.766*	(8.25)	37.919*	(5.22)	40.992*	(6.50)
R-Square	0.045		0.019		0.022		0.159		0.031	
No of cases	1218		1254		1247		1267		1242	
* p<0.05										

# Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political legitimacy

## 6.1. Theoretical Background

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>45</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

### 6.1.1. *The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation*

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support”, along with tolerance to political opposition, have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000).

With the foregoing in mind, a more rigorous study the strength and well-being of a democracy might involve the analysis of the outcomes of this legitimacy/tolerance equation. This composite measure is created by combining the system support index with the political tolerance index to create a ‘support for a stable democracy’ indicator. Indeed, the durability of a democracy is influenced, on the one hand, by the extent to which there is popular recognition of the legitimacy of the system of government and, on the other, the degree to which people recognize and are respectful of the rights and liberties of, especially, those with whom they disagree. The basic

<sup>45</sup> Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

assumption of this legitimacy/tolerance model, therefore, is that system stability is more likely in situations where these two features of a stable democracy exist concurrently at a comparatively high level (Seligson 2000).

Table VI.1 shows the two-by-two table depicting the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance that are assumed to exist in a democratic society. This model<sup>46</sup> will facilitate the joint analysis of these two dimensions of system stability in this study

**Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities**

<b>SYSTEM SUPPORT (Legitimacy, etc)</b>	<b>POLITICAL TOLERANCE</b>	
	<i>HIGH</i>	<i>LOW</i>
<i>HIGH</i>	<b>Stable Democracy (1)</b>	<b>Authoritarian Stability (2)</b>
<i>LOW</i>	<b>Unstable Democracy (3)</b>	<b>Democracy at Risk (4)</b>

But before we establish the respective system support and political tolerance values that will be cross-tabulated to populate this grid, let us review the meaning of the content of each cell, one-by-one.

Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such

<sup>46</sup> From Mitchell A. Seligson. Towards a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America, *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe*, (July-December), 11 (2), 2000, pp. 5-29

systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, which incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

## 6.2. Support for the System in Jamaica

In order to measure system support, an index was created on the basis of the analysis of responses to items presented with instructions in Box VI.1<sup>47</sup>. It is a composite indicator which is designed to capture the key dimensions of support for the political system – respect for political institutions, pride to live under the current political system, belief that the courts guarantee a free trial, belief that basic human rights are protected and support for the political system on the whole. As previously stated it is a generalized measure of system support, developed by Mitchell

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<sup>47</sup> This index has been widely used to measure system support and its validity and reliability have been repeatedly confirmed. In terms of reliability, for example, Cronbach's Alpha has always been above the .70 threshold. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha was .79.

Seligson of LAPOP<sup>48</sup> and is based on Easton’s notion of ‘diffuse support’<sup>49</sup> and Lipset’s conceptualization of ‘legitimacy’<sup>50</sup>.

As further illustrated Box VI.1 below, the familiar seven-point scale was used to capture respondent’s attitudes on each item. The system support index was obtained by aggregating the average variable value of each of these items, calculating the mean, and then re-calibrating the obtained average on the 0-100 metric scale.

**Box VI.1. Items used in the Seligson’s Index of Support for Democracy**

*Respondent is given the card and the following instructions:*

*Now we will use a card ... This card has a 7-point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1 meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7 meaning A LOT. For example, if I ask you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don’t like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all A lot							Doesn’t know

- B1.** *To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2.** *To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?*
- B3.** *To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?*
- B4.** *To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?*
- B6.** *To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?*

Figure VI.1 summarizes the outcomes relating to respective institutions and democratic values, and the resulting system support index. Looking at the items individually, support for the political system, for the effectiveness of courts and respect for the political institutions received average scores that were above the 50-point mark. Respondents’ evaluation of the extent to which basic

<sup>48</sup> See Mitchell A. Seligson, ‘On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico.’ Social Indicators Research 12 (January 1983b): 1-24.

<sup>49</sup> Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>50</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset defined legitimacy as ‘the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society. (*Political man: The social basis of politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981, p.77. Simply put, it is citizens’ confidence in their government right to rule.

rights are protected obtained the lowest score of just below 45 points and the resulting system support index of about 53 on the 100 point scale.




Figure VI.1. Comparative Average Scores in System Support Items and Index, 2008

This measure of 53.6 points on the Seligson’s 100-point index represents a moderate increase in citizens’ support for the system since 2006. As Figure VI.2 shows, there was a similar marginal improvement in average support on all five components of the system legitimacy indicator. Interestingly, citizens’ rating of the extent to which the political system protects the basic rights of citizens was the most unfavourable for both years and also recorded the smallest increase in support in 2008. This raises questions about the efficacy of the nation’s human rights instruments and institutions in the guaranteeing citizens’ rights.




Figure VI.2. Comparative Average Scores in System Support Items and Index: 2006-2008

### 6.2.1. Comparative Perspective on System Support

Figure VI.3 shows comparative system support information for Latin American and Caribbean countries that participated in the 2008 LAPOP study. Jamaica’s performance on this measure is relatively good. Its nearly 54 points middle-range score positions the country at ninth place among the 22-country study; just two places below the United States of America with just above 54 points. At the top of the list is Canada with close to 65 points and at the bottom is Paraguay with nearly 30 points.




Figure VI.3. Comparative System Support Index

### 6.2.2. Predictors of System Support

We sought to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of system support in Jamaica by analyzing a linear regression model made up of the factors displayed in the first column in Table VI.A1 which is appended at the end of this chapter. As shown in Figure VI.4, wealth and age are statistically significant but with contrasting net contribution support for the system.




Figure VI.4. Predictors of System Support

Figure VI.5 shows the relationship existing between citizens' perception of the performance of the incumbent administration and support for the system. As depicted, persons who are positive in their assessment of the performance of the government are more likely to be supportive of the political system.




Figure VI.5. Support for the System by Perception of the Performance of Government

Figure VI.6 shows that in general, the higher a person's the level of interest in politics, the higher the probability that such an individual will be supportive of the political system. However the positive correlation between these factors, exist only among persons reporting little interest and a lot of interest in politics. Among those who are just somewhat interested, system support falls slightly as interest increases




Figure VI.6. Support for the System by Interest in Politics

Again we use the recoded wealth variable to emphasize the impact of economic status on support for the system. Recoding involved the classification of respondents were into three groups based on the approximate value of their household inventory of capital goods<sup>51</sup>. As shown in Figure VI.7, socio-economic status, indicated wealth negatively impacts citizens' sense of legitimacy, meaning that wealthier persons are likely to be less supportive of the system.

<sup>51</sup> Category 1 included households with an inventory of lower value items only, category 2 comprising those with low and medium range valued items and category 3 of those with an inventory comprising of higher value household goods, in addition to the lower and medium priced items.




Figure VI.7. Support for the System by Wealth

Figure VI.8 shows that the contribution of age to the level of support accorded to the system is generally positive. With the exception of persons below the age of thirty-five, increasing age is associated with stronger support for the system.




Figure VI.8. Support for the System by Age

### 6.3. Political Tolerance

Box VI.2 below re-presents the items used previously for creating the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness. The “political tolerance” index is generated from responses to these same items. Again, the index is obtained by aggregating the score attributed to each item, calculating the mean score and then re-calibrating this average on the 0-100 metric scale.

**Box VI.2. Questions Used to Measure Level of Tolerance**

*Respondent is given the card and the following instructions:  
(This card has a 10-point scale which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 mean that you strongly approve.)*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>Doesn't Know</b>
<b>Strongly disapprove</b>					<b>Strongly approve</b>					

*The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Jamaica. (Please tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.)*

**D1.** *There are people who speak negatively of the Jamaican form of government, not just the current government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote?*

**D2.** *How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?*

**D3.** *How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office?*

**D4.** *How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people going on television to make speeches?*

Respondents’ attitudes to these dimensions of political tolerance are summarized in Figure VI.9 The analysis of responses on an item by item basis indicates that Jamaicans are basically tolerant of the political rights of fellow citizens.

As the values on respective bars in Figure VI.9 indicate, right to demonstrate received the highest level of approval, approximately 63 out of the possible 100 points. This is followed closely by the right to vote with just over 61 points. Respondents were less supportive of persons’ right to use the public media to express opposing views and right to seek public office. An averages score of just over 50 points were obtained on both of these indicators.

A political tolerance index was created by aggregating the average response value of each of these items, calculating the mean, and then re-calibrating the resulting average on the 0-100 metric scale. The resulting tolerance index<sup>52</sup> for Jamaica worked out to be 57.2 points on this scale.

<sup>52</sup> The average score of these items have been confirmed to represent a reliable measure of political tolerance, yielding a Cronbach alpha of .87 with regards to this sample.




Figure VI.9. Attitudes of Jamaicans to Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, Tolerance Index: 2006-2008

### 6.3.1. Comparative Perspective on Political Tolerance

Viewed in relation to the remarkably high index of 72.7 reported in the 2006 survey, this score represents a marked decline in political tolerance among Jamaicans over a two-year period. Of significance is the seemingly proportionate decline in average support for the different dimensions of tolerance between 2006 and 2008, as indicated by relative height of the corresponding bars shown in Figure VI.10. This, on the face of it, signifies a growing unwillingness on the part of Jamaicans to recognize and respect the civil liberties of fellow citizens, especially those with whom they have strong disagreement. Of note however, is the fact that this survey was conducted at the end of a prolonged election campaign, shortly after a fiercely contested General Election and within weeks of the Local Government elections. At that time, party identification remained strong and partisan political tension was still quite high in some areas, to the extent that fieldwork had to be extended due to difficulties in entering some inner city communities. It is possible, therefore, that the increased intolerance is largely the result of the timing of the survey.




Figure VI.10. Attitudes of Jamaicans to Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, Tolerance Index: 2006-2008

Despite a substantial decline in level of political tolerance among the citizenry since the 2006 study, level of tolerance in Jamaica remains comparatively high when matched with other Latin American and Caribbean countries. As depicted in Figure VI.11, Jamaica is ranked sixth of the twenty-three countries participating in the 2008 series of survey. Canada and United States top the list with scores of 73 and 68 points respectively, followed by Argentina, Paraguay and then Jamaica. Guatemala and Bolivia recorded the lowest scores of 47 and 43 points respectively.




Figure VI.11. Political Tolerance Index by Country, 2008

#### 6.4. Prospect for Democratic Stability in Jamaica

In this section we examine the joint effect of system support and political tolerance on the prospect for the stability of the Jamaican democracy. Both variables are dichotomized by recoding their 0-100 scales into two categories of ‘Low’, which includes all scores on the original scale which were equal to or less than 50 and ‘High’, to include all cases above 50.

Results from the cross-tabulation of the dichotomized system support and the political tolerance index for Jamaica are displayed in Table VI.2 Citizens whose attitudes and values are reflective of their support for a stable democracy, that is, those with high system support matched by high tolerance, are just over 34 per cent of the citizenry. Ideally, this segment of the population should, at least be a simple majority. In this case, however, it is a mere one-third albeit the largest of the four groups. At the other extreme, those classified in cell 4, who exhibit low support for basic

political institutions and equally low respect for the basic rights of minorities, accounts for 25 per cent of the population. Theoretically, this one-quarter of the population harbours attitudes and values that might have the effect of undermining democratic stability. This is indeed, a relatively large group to which much attention should be paid. Because what it means is that one in four Jamaican has expressed their lack of support for the extant political system and are likely to be inclined to accept its substitution for some alternative regime type in which basic rights and liberties are abridged.

Where system support is high but tolerance is low, as represented by the 17 per cent in cell 2, the system may remain stable due to the influence of strong citizen support. However, democratic rule may be compromised by the restriction of certain rights and liberties of minorities in attempts to appease the majority or simply to protect the regime from oppositional activities. So despite an environment of pervasive democratic attitudes, an authoritarian regime may develop, characterized by stability but also by widespread violation of civil liberties

Approximately 24 per cent of the population, those tabulated in cell 3, are characterized by high level of tolerance but low system support. Theoretically, low level of legitimacy is linked to instability. However, the concurrence of high level of political tolerance among these individuals is a positive for system durability since the prevalence of values and attitudes that are respectful and supportive of the positions of minorities could mean that opposition forces are afforded greater opportunities to agitate, which might eventually lead to the deepening of democracy.

**Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Jamaica, 2008**

<b>SYSTEM SUPPORT (Legitimacy, etc)</b>	<b>POLITICAL TOLERANCE</b>	
	<i>HIGH</i>	<i>LOW</i>
<i>HIGH</i>	<b>Stable Democracy (1) 34.3</b>	<b>Authoritarian Stability (2) 17.1</b>
<i>LOW</i>	<b>Unstable Democracy (3) 23.7</b>	<b>Democracy at Risk (4) 25.0</b>

The decrease in the number of individuals with high level of tolerance has resulted in an overall decrease in the percentage of Jamaicans exhibiting high support for the system and high tolerance concurrently. As Table VI.12 shows, the proportion of citizens whose values and attitudes in support of a stable democracy declined marginally, by about two percentage points since 2006.




Figure VI.12. Attitudes in Support for Stable Democracy, 2006-2008

Assessed comparatively, Jamaica’s support for a stable democracy score, 34.3%, is high when matched with some other countries in the Americas. As shown in Figure VI.13, the country is outperformed by only four other nations in the Region, with Canada at the top of the list with an exceptionally high 66.6 per cent of the population exhibiting the values and attitudes that are presumed to be supportive of a stable system. Costa Rica is a distant second with 42 points followed by the United States, Uruguay and then Jamaica. Paraguay is at the bottom of the list with only about ten per cent of its population strongly supporting a stable democracy.




Figure VI.13. Attitudes in Support for Stable Democracy

### 6.4.1. Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy

In an attempt at deepening our understanding of this issue of democratic stability, we did additional analysis to determine the distinguishing characteristics of the group whose attitudes were established to be conducive to the support of a stable democracy. Here the dependent variable is binary - the recoded ‘support for a stable democracy’ indicator – where category ‘1’ is comprised of those who support stability and category ‘0’ of those classified in the other three groups who are not strong supporter of a stable democracy. In the analysis, we utilized a logistic regression model made up of the independent variables displayed in Figure VI.14 below. Regression outcomes are presented in Table IV.A2 at the end of this chapter. The factors found to have the greatest influence on support for a stable democracy were efficacy of Government, interpersonal trust, support for citizens’ right to contestation and age.




Figure VI.14. Predictors of Democratic Stability, 2008

The relationship between perception of Government’s economic performance and support for a stable democracy is positive and statistically significant. The linear relationship represented by the polygon in Figure VI.15 indicates that the more positive an individual’s perception of the performance of the Government, the more intense such individual’s attitudes and values that are supportive of a stable democracy.




Figure VI.15. Support for a Stable Democracy by Perception of Government Economic Performance

Figure VI.16 shows that in general, the higher a person's the level of interest in politics, the higher the probability that such an individual will have high support for a stable political system. However the positive correlation between these factors, exist only among persons reporting little interest and a lot of interest in politics. Among those who are just somewhat interested, attitudes in support of a stable democracy fall slightly as interest increases.




Figure VI.16. Support for a Stable Democracy by Interest in Politics

In order to highlight the impact of socio-economic status (SES) on the prospect for stability, we cross-tabulated the recoded wealth variable with the support for a stable democracy indicator. As Figure VI.17 shows, persons with lower inventory of capital goods are much more supportive of a stable democracy than wealthier individuals.




Figure VI.17. Support for a Stable Democracy by Wealth

By and large, age is also positive and significant factor in explaining support for a stable democracy. So as Figure VI.18 shows, in general, as an individuals' support for stability in the political system is likely to increase as their age increases. The exception is with younger persons in the 18 -35 age cohort, among whom there is an inverse relationship, with system stability declining steadily as those individuals approach their mid-thirties.




Figure VI.18. Support for a Stable Democracy by Age

## 6.5. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

Questions about the relationship between citizens' confidence in their political institutions and the durability of the democracy in which they live have been extensively addressed in studies of political culture over many years. In virtually all the studies reviewed, there has been compelling support for the notion that the level of popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the institutions is indicative of the strength of the support for the system overall and in turn, a good measure of the prospect for the stability of the democracy. Indeed, if citizens have confidence in the institutions and instruments of the system, there is a greater likelihood they will respect and accept the right and authority of the State. Understandably, if citizens' trust in the institutions and instruments used in the promotion democratic norms, they will be more inclined to perceive the decisions of the State as more legitimate (Weatherford 1992).

So theoretically, confidence in the political system, to a great extent, originates from confidence citizens place in the social and political institutions and political actors. Such trust is developed on the basis of the evaluation of the efficacy of these entities based on societal expectations. This evaluation might not automatically generate a political response but can translate into attitudes of confidence or distrust (Easton 1975). It is the character of prevailing attitude – positive or negative - that influences the support that the citizens give to the institution or politician, which in turn, can potentially be changed into action. In other words, the degree of confidence that citizens place in their democratic institutions determines political actions and outcomes. It follows therefore that confidence in political and actors helps to consolidate and deepen the democratic process. Further, as Mishler and Rose (1997) posit, confidence engenders 'collective power' which enables the state to make decisions and allocate resources without the use of force and without the need to obtain the permission of the citizenry for every course of action.

Consequently, as in previous AmericasBarometer series of surveys, this 2008 study sought to track citizen confidence in a wide variety of democratic institutions. A preliminary examination of trust in institutions such as the courts and political parties was already undertaken in Chapter I. Also, the issue of generalized system support was explored earlier in this chapter. In this section of this chapter, we provide an overall picture of the legitimacy of the entire range of institutions covered in the 2008 survey.

We do this by asking respondents to express their level of confidence in key institutions in Jamaica. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of questions requiring respondents to locate their trust in selected institution on a 1-7 scale on which '1' indicates no trust at all and '7' a lot of trust. Subsequent to the reading of the instruction reproduced in Box VI.3 below, respondents were read the institutions one by one and asked to offer a rating.

**Box VI.3. Questions Used to Measure Confidence in Core Regime Institutions**

*Now we will use another card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score.*

*(Institutions were then read to respondents one at a time)*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all						A lot	Doesn't know

**6.5.1. Support for Key Institutions in Jamaica**

Figure VI.19 shows that the sense of trust in public institutions among Jamaicans is generally low. Of the organizations observed, the highest achieving organizations received only mid-range scores, together scoring an average of just about 50 on the 100-point scale. The army and the mass media enjoy the highest level of trust, scoring 57 and 56 points respectively. Other institutions receiving marginally above 50 points were the Supreme Court, the Electoral Office and the Justice System. The institutions expressed least trust are Parliament, the Police and political parties, receiving mean scores of 47, 42 and 41 respectively.




Figure VI.19. Legitimacy of Core Institutions, 2008

Further analysis of the issue of trust in institutions involved the tracking of changes between the 2006 and the 2008 waves of surveys. As Figure VI.20 shows, citizens confidence most of the key institutions have increased marginal since the 2006 survey. This rise in confidence is assumingly related to the promise of improved governance associated with the election of a new administration, given that this survey was done just three months after the General Elections and less than a month following the parochial polls.




Figure VI.20. Legitimacy of Core Institutions, 2006- 2008

Interestingly, confidence in both arms of security forces, the police and the army, has declined since the 2006 study. This development is explicable on two grounds. The first relates to widespread and escalating crime problem over which the security forces have had little success in curbing. As previously indicated, the amount of trust citizen attribute to their national institutions is usually base on their assessment of the efficacy of such entity in performing prescribed functions. Secondly, reports of police excess in treating with alleged offenders have been receiving much media exposure, fuelling allegations of human rights and other abuses by the security forces. Understandably, people are preoccupied about the problem of crime and violence,

overwhelmingly identifying it as the most serious problem facing the country. However, as highlighted by the analysis of responses to the following survey item:

**AOJ8.** *In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or occasionally, they can operate at the margin of the law?*  
(1) *They should always respect the law*  
(2) *Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally*  
(3) *Don't Know*

The Jamaican populace is unambiguous in their support for the principles of rule of law and due process. As Figure VI.21 shows, nearly nine out of ten persons support the observance the law under all circumstances. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that organizations whose modus operandi are often judged in breach of this important democratic principle would fail to attract broad support and trust of the people.




Figure VI.21. Attitude of Jamaicans to the Principle of Rule of Law, 2006

## 6.6. Other Opinions of Jamaicans about Democracy

Norris (1999)<sup>53</sup> posits that studies aimed at measuring citizens' attitudes in support of the system should necessarily examine the extent to which there is popular support for the key principles of the regime type. Indeed, we have already determined that there is strong belief in some basic rules and values of democracy, in particular, the right to due process and the supremacy of the

<sup>53</sup> Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

rule of law. Also questions relating to citizens' respect for the civil liberties and the political freedom of fellow citizens were extensively examined as part of the focus on the embrace of tolerance. In this concluding section of this chapter we further examine the issue of system legitimacy in Jamaica by analysing attitudes in support democracy per se by exploring the degree to which democracy is valued as a form of government, or in other words, the strength of the rejection of authoritarian options. We then examine citizens' perception of the efficacy of their democracy by obtaining their evaluation of the degree of democratization and their level of satisfaction with working of the system.

In our attempt at gauging the level of support for the idea of democracy, we analyzed responses to the following question, commonly referred to as the Preference for Democracy (PFD) item:

- DEM2.** *With which of the following statements do you agree the most?*
- (1) *To people like me, it does not matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic*
  - (2) *Democracy is preferable to any other type of government*
  - (3) *In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one*
  - (8) *Don't Know*

As shown in Figure VI.22, Jamaicans overwhelmingly expressed a preference for democracy as a system of government. Nearly three out of four respondents indicated that democracy is preferable to any other regime type. Sixteen per cent of the population felt that there may be instances when an authoritarian regime can be better while about one in ten indicated indifference or uncertainty when questioned as to their regime preference, reporting that it did not believe it mattered whether the regime was democratic or not.




Figure VI.22. Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2008

Figure VI.23 presents information relating to changes in attitude on regime preference since the 2006 study. The respective shifts in preferences are seemingly small. However, when examined closely it becomes obvious that there is a cause for serious concern. Firstly, the percentage of the population supporting the democratic form of government has declined marginally. But much more troubling is the significant increase in the number of Jamaicans now favouring the authoritarian option. This segment has increase by nearly 60 per cent, from 10.6 to 16.8 per cent of the population over the two year period. One reasonable assumption is that this decline in the support for the idea of democracy might be linked to citizens' level of satisfaction with the performance of the Jamaican democratic system, a conjecture that was also addressed in this section.




Figure VI.23. Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2006-2008

Admittedly though, support for the current regime type is still relatively strong, despite the reported decline. However, studies on political support in western democracies have shown that it is not unusual for there to be a high level of support for democracy as a form of government yet low satisfaction with the way the system works. Hence the practice of some scholars to examine citizens' evaluation of the performance of a regime as separated dimension from that of their support for democracy as an ideal form of government.<sup>54</sup> In this study, respondents were asked to report their evaluation of the performance of the current regime in their answer to the following question:

<sup>54</sup> See the discussion of Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 'Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis, in Norris (1999).

*PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is working in Jamaica?*<sup>55</sup>

Figure VI.24 summarizes the responses to this item. As shown, there are as many Jamaicans who are satisfied with the way democracy is working than those who are dissatisfied. Of the 50 per cent expressing satisfaction, about 45 per cent reported being just satisfied while little above five per cent was very satisfied. Feelings of dissatisfaction were moderate, about 41 per cent, with little more than eight per cent reporting intense dissatisfaction with the performance of their democracy.




Figure VI.24. Citizens Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy in Jamaica – 2008

As expected, there has been a slight decline in the overall level satisfaction with the performance of the Jamaican democracy (Figure VI.25).

<sup>55</sup> This question has been extensively used to measure support for the performance of democratic regimes. In addition to the many LAPOP studies, it has been used in regional democratic values surveys such as the Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and the Latinobarometer.




Figure VI.25. Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy, 2006–2008

Finally, we asked respondents to give their opinion the extent to which they believe the Jamaican system of government is democratic by posing the following question:

*PN5. In your opinion, is Jamaica very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?*

- (1) Very democratic      (2) Somewhat democratic      (3) Not very democratic  
 (4) Not at all democratic      (8) DK/DR

Only about four per cent of the population considered the country to be totally undemocratic. Six out of every ten Jamaicans opined that the system is somewhat democratic and one in five felt is very democratic (Figure VI.26).




Figure VI.26. Citizens' Assessment of the Strength of the Jamaican Democracy, 2008

Comparatively, the categories with the view that Jamaica is democratic – saying it is somewhat democratic and those assessing it to very democratic - have declined from 83.7 per cent in 2006 to 79.6 per cent in 2008 (Figure VI.27). This is interesting given the fact that this survey was done within three months of the General Elections and a few weeks after the parochial polls, both of which were generally considered to be free and fair and to a great extent, also ‘free from fear’. Obviously, this is an indication that Jamaicans expect more of their democracy – more meaningful participation than which is currently afforded by the right to participate in periodic elections.




Figure VI.27. Strength of the Jamaican Democracy, 2006-2008

## 6.7. Conclusion

In this chapter our analysis was informed by the notion that pervasive society-wide attitudes and values indicating a propensity for political tolerance and the broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy--hence this examination of the various attitudes, opinions values and behaviours of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. In essence, the ultimate objective was to determine the extent to which the country's democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

Significantly, it was found that since 2006 there has been a moderate decline in the prospect of the stability of the Jamaican system of government. This was influenced primarily by a measureable decline in political tolerance over the period. However a sizeable increase in the indicators of generalized system support has had a compensating effect, facilitating a situation in which one third of the population was categorized to be supportive of a stable democracy, on the basis of their high support for the system and correspondingly high level tolerance. An appreciable increase in the segment of the population with attitudes in support of authoritarianism was identified as a cause for concern.

Despite the marginal decline in the support for stable democracy index, prospects for stability in Jamaica remain quite favourable in comparative terms. When ranked with other Latin American and Caribbean countries on this indicator, Jamaica ranked fifth in terms of the percentage of citizens with the values and attitudes deemed indicative of the propensity to support a stable democracy.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER VI.

Table VI. A1. Factors Explaining System Support in Jamaica – Result of the Linear Regression, 2008

Determinants of System Support		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	T
Education	-0.043	(-1.29)
Female	0.007	(0.33)
Age	0.083*	(2.76)
Wealth	-0.083*	(-2.15)
Area Size	0.004	(0.06)
Area of Residence	-0.016	(-0.28)
Political Interest	0.071*	(2.15)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current Administration	0.237*	(6.19)
Corruption Victimization	-0.024	(-0.46)
Crime Victimization	-0.002	(-0.03)
Constant	0.001	(0.02)
R-Squared = 0.084		
Number of Observations = 1309		
* p<0.05		

Table VI. A2. Factors Explaining Support for Stable Democracy in Jamaica – Result of the Logistic Regression, 2008

Determinants of Support for a Stable Democracy		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	T
Education	-0.043	(-1.29)
Female	0.007	(0.33)
Age	0.083*	(2.76)
Wealth	-0.083*	(-2.15)
Area Size	0.004	(0.06)
Area of Residence	-0.016	(-0.28)
Political Interest	0.071*	(2.15)
Satisfaction with Performance of Current Administration	0.237*	(6.19)
Corruption Victimization	-0.024	(-0.46)
Crime Victimization	-0.002	(-0.03)
Constant	0.001	(0.02)
R-Squared = 0.084		
Number of Observations = 1309		
* p<0.05		



# Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties

## 7.1. Political Parties and Electoral Behaviour in Jamaica<sup>56</sup>

Jamaica is, in terms of population size, the largest of the English-speaking Caribbean countries and has been widely recognized for the vibrancy of its democratic system of government, having had one of the longest periods of uninterrupted, partisan alteration in government, representative type democracy in the Region. Important constitutional changes in 1944 – that arriving with the advent of universal adult suffrage – and 1962 (the independence constitution) cleared the path for wide popular electoral participation and for Jamaican leadership to undertake the primary if not altogether full responsibility for the country’s own destiny (see Nettleford, 1971; Munroe, 1972).

The systematic substitution between only two major political parties – the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) – as victor or victim at the polls over a prolonged period within the modern ‘democratic’ process under universal suffrage is itself notable. Generally, although there was no constitutional requirement stipulating a maximum tenure of two terms for a party in government, seemingly by tacit agreement the electorate adhered to a maximum of two terms for each party, and thereby sustained a strong two-party democracy, with third parties having no place in the substantive equation after the 1940s. The change from two-term stints came with a mandate for the PNP in the 1989 and in three subsequent elections - 1993, 1997, 2002 (see Table VI.1). The PNP was led in the 1989 elections by Michael Manley while the three succeeding elections saw the PNP being led by Percival J. Patterson. Patterson retired as party president and prime minister early in 2006, thereby giving way to a keen four-way party leadership contest from which Jamaica’s first female prime minister, Portia Simpson-Miller emerged.

The historic four-term reign of the People’s National Party came to an end with the September 2007 general election which resulted in the removal of the Portia Simpson-Miller-led administration in the narrowest margin of victory under universal adult suffrage. The victorious Jamaica Labour Party eventually held 32 seats to the PNP’s 28 in the 60 seat parliament, again emphasizing the resilience of Jamaica’s two-party dominant system of electoral politics.

Indeed, after the initial count that showed figures of 33 seats to 27 the Electoral Commission’s chairman, Professor Errol Miller reiterated the call for an adjustment in the number of constituencies to an odd number between 60 and 65. At the time he revealed that, of 808,240 persons or 60.4 per cent of the electorate of 1.3 million who voted 405,215 favoured the JLP and

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<sup>56</sup> This introductory section was written by Dr. Paul Martin of the Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.

402,275, the PNP.<sup>57</sup> Other groups such as the National Democratic Movement accounted for the remaining votes (see, e.g., *The Gleaner*, 6 September 2007, p. 1)

In an election that was generally acknowledged to be free and fair, there were nevertheless allegations of misconduct regarding violence and the inability of registered voters to cast their votes were made in relation to some constituencies (see, e.g., *Dalley vs. Broderick*, *The Jamaica Gazette Extraordinary [JGE]*, no. 41C, 16 Oct. 2007). Additionally, challenges against new MPs who were alleged accused of holding dual citizenship and having sworn allegiance to a foreign power in contravention of Jamaica’s constitution were lodged and were being formally pursued in the courts (see, e.g., *Mitchell vs. Mair*, *JGE*, no. 41A, 16 Oct. 2007).

Expressing a preference to complete the election process and get on with the business of government under its mandate that included rebuilding the economy as well as stemming poverty, a spiralling crime rate and corruption, the new JLP administration, led by Bruce Golding pushed through the local government elections on December 5 of 2007, having in the role of opposition complained about the PNP’s delays in conducting these polls. As was expected, the governing JLP won this contest decisively, winning in 135 of the 227 local divisions thus gaining control of nine of the Island’s thirteen Parish Council authorities and shared another, St. Ann’s, with the PNP who took three.

**Table VII.1. General Election Results, 1944-2007**

Year	Number of Seats	Seats Won		
		JLP	PNP	Independent/Other Parties
1944	32	22	5	5
1949	32	17	13	2
1955	32	14	18	-
1959	45	16	29	-
1962	45	26	19	-
1967	53	33	20	-
1972	53	16	37	-
1976	60	13	47	-
1980	60	51	9	-
1983	60	60	-	-
1989	60	15	45	-
1993	60	8	52	-
1997	60	10	50	-
2002	60	26	34	-
2007	60	32	28	-

Sources: Statistical Institute of Jamaica. (2000). *Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica 1999*. Kingston: Author, p. 48; and the Electoral Office of Jamaica (2002. These fall just short of 100%). The final figures for ballots cast in 2007 were unavailable from the Electoral Office at the time of writing.

<sup>57</sup> See table 1.1 for the Electoral Office’s final figure for the 2007 election (obtained in 2008) which was 58.99 [rounded off to 59.0].

It has been argued that the 1962 constitution has tacitly limited the possibility of electoral success for a third political party in Jamaica and made for a powerful prime minister while enshrining the British sovereign as the head of the state and offering only qualified legal recognition of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the population (Lewis, 2001; Munroe, 1972). Yet the constitution has remained substantially in place although minor amendments have been carried out from time to time to permit the state to conduct its business in relation to the economy and attend to, for instance, various rights-based social demands. Other recent directions in reform that have attracted much debate have included, for instance, pieces aimed at offering greater access to public information, and structuring the flow of political party funding. Significant public sector and local government reform (for this latter, see, e.g., PIOJ, 2006) processes have engaged legislators in recent years.

Interestingly, in the past two years, there has been a slight reversal of a previously troubling trend of declining confidence in political institutions (see Figure VI.20, Chapter 6) and falling levels of electoral participation. And following the deep polarization of the electorate along ideological lines during the 1970s and for some time later, it was promoted in some quarters that that sort or level of adversarial politics and the violence that it attracted on the ground ought to be consigned to history. For the PNP too, the idea of a rift or separation between the public and private sectors had to be superseded. Currently, differences between the two major parties from the perspective of ideology and policy approaches are no longer noticeable.

In this chapter we examine Jamaicans' attitudes and behaviours in relation to public political participation or what Dalton (2006) referred to as 'conventional political action' such as voting, participating in political campaigns and interest groups, and other activities normally directly associated with partisan politics.

## 7.2. Interest in Politics in Jamaica

We start though by assessing comparatively, the level of interest that Jamaicans have in politics relative to that expressed in other countries in the Americas. Indeed, in a free society, and one in which the vote is optional, level of participation in political events and activities should be driven, in part, by the degree to which the populace is interested in politics. We explored level of political interest by soliciting responses to the following question:

**POL1.** *How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?*

1) *A lot*      2) *Some*      3) *Little*      4) *None*      8) *DK/DR*

When responses were re-calibrated on the familiar 100-point scale, Jamaica obtained an ostensibly low political interest score of 45 points. But as shown in Figure VII.1, only the Dominican Republic was ranked above Jamaica on this measure. At the low end of the chart is Chile with just below 23 points.




Figure VII.1. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective

### 7.3. Voter Participation

It has been widely acknowledged in discussions in comparative political science and public opinion studies that the term democracy can be quite elastic and as a consequence, “can mean all things to all people” (Bratton, 2002, p. 6). Nevertheless, while the jury is still out on questions pertaining to what democracy really is, how it might be measured, and how to classify countries according to their level of democracy, there is widespread acceptance of the suggestion that some basic conditions for a representative democracy are competitive elections, broad citizen participation, and the respect and protection of civil and political rights (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989). Indeed, free elections and inclusive citizenship should be considered among the basic elements of a political democracy (Dahl, 1999) since it is the mechanism through which the legitimacy of the regime is validated (Benavides et al., 2003).

In an earlier study in which Jamaicans were asked to define democracy, it was found that the word was predominantly conceptualized in normative terms. In other words, it is widely perceived in terms of generally accepted democratic practices such as elections, voting, and popular participation (Boxill, et al., 2006). It was also reported early in this document that Jamaicans overwhelmingly prefer the democratic system of government over all other regime types. Assumingly, therefore, there is widespread appreciation of the importance of the vote in the democratic process. In this section we examine the extent to which these understandings are reflected in the political behaviours of Jamaicans with respect to the exercise of the franchise.

Firstly, level of participation in the recently held general election was determined by analyzing responses to the following question:

*VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections?*  
(1) Voted  
(2) Did not vote  
(8) DK

As Figure VII.2 shows, approximately sixty-five per cent of the population answered in the affirmative.




Figure VII.2. Voter Participation

It is worth noting at this point that unlike most of the countries participating in this survey, the Jamaican political system is modeled off the Westminster democratic parliamentary system of government of the United Kingdom and is therefore not presidential in terms of its election of its head of government. Most importantly, the Prime Minister is not chosen directly by the popular

vote. Instead, the eventual holder of the office is selected by party delegates as leader of the respective party. Such individual is elevated to the office of the Prime Minister if his or her party wins the general election by having the most seats in the Parliament.

### 7.3.1. Determinants of Voter Participation

Our attempt at determining the factors that influence voter participation among Jamaicans involved the development of a logistic regression since the dependent variable was dichotomous with categories of voted or did not vote. The control variables used in the model are shown in Table VII.A1 which is appended at the end of this chapter. As the respective coefficients and the graphical presentation (Figure VI.3) of the results indicate, political interest, age and gender were the only significant factors in this model.




Figure VII.3. Determinants of Voter Participation

Studies on electoral behavior, especially in the United States, have consistently found age to be strong predictor of voter participation. However, as in the case in this study, the relationship is never usually linear. Rather, as indicated by the in Figure VII.4, younger and older persons are less likely voters, hence the inverted “U” shape of the graph. So as the figure depicts, the likelihood of voting increases with age until later in life when interest in voting begins to wane.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>58</sup> See Seligson, Mitchell, A. et al. Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis. In: M.A. Seligson and J. Booth (eds.). (1995). *Elections in Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, cited by Ricardo Córdova M. and Miguel Cruz. *The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador*, 2004.




Figure VII.4. Voter Participation by Age

Also, as might have expected, interest in politics correlates positively with citizens' likelihood of exercising their franchise. As Figure VII.5 shows, persons with greater interest in politics are much more likely vote than those with little interest.




Figure VII.5. Voter Participation by Interest in Politics

Studies of voting behaviour in advanced democracies like the United States have found no significant difference between the sexes in relation to voter turnout (Babour and Wright, 2006:594). However, as Figure VIII.6 highlights, female are marginally more likely to vote than male in Jamaica.




Figure VII.6. Voter Participation by Gender

The literature on voting behavior has long pointed to the importance of citizens' assessment of the efficacy of government and their evaluations of the economic performance of the incumbent administration (perceived and/or actual) in determining level of electoral and civil participation in both new and established democracies (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Espinal, Hartlyn, & Kelly, 2006; Fiorina, 1978; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Fuchs et al., 1998; Linde & Ekman, 2003) None of these factors were found to be significant predictors of voting behaviour in the above equation. Also, the idea that less privileged groups voted less, a factor which undermines the representation and interest of the poor (Lijpart, 1997) was not supported by the data

### 7.3.2. Ideological Orientation and Voting Behaviour

The impact of citizens’ ideological orientation on voting behaviour was found to be statistically insignificant in the above equation. Its positive coefficient indicates, however that right-leaning electorates are more likely to exercise their franchise, albeit not with a statistically significant difference. Ideological orientation was measured using the Left-Right ten-point scale shown in Box VII.1. Respondent were asked to locate their political leaning the scale of 1 – 10, where 1 indicates left and 10 is right in term of political sympathy.

#### Box VII.1. Ideological Orientation Item and Scale

*L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those who sympathize more with the left and those who sympathize more with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	D/K(88)
Left									Right	

As Figure VII.7 shows, political tendency of Jamaicans is mostly to the centre on the political spectrum, with a slight leaning to the right. The average ideological self-identification score is just below 6 points on this Left-Right scale.




Figure VII.7. Ideological orientation of Jamaicans

With regards the question concerning a relationship between self-ascribed ideological position and voting behaviour, it can be observed in Figure VII.8 that the bivariate analysis of the two variables showed the slight difference between the groups.




Figure VII.8. Ideological Orientation by Voter Participation

### 7.3.3. Ideological Orientation and Party Identification

As previously mentioned, the deep polarization of the electorate along ideological lines that characterized the Jamaican political landscape during the 1970s, where supporters of the PNP were predominantly left leaning and those supporting the JLP mostly sympathizing with the right, is no longer what obtains. Yet it is widely argued that electorates' party identification tend to define their ideological orientation (Popkin, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Here we examine the extent of the relationship between these two factors.

Figure VII.9 shows that when party identification is cross-tabulated with ideological orientation, there is only a slight difference in the political leanings of the supporters of the two major political parties, with PNP affiliates remaining marginally more leftist than the JLP. In this chart, the red line indicates a national ideology score of approximately 6.0 on the Left-Right scale. The mean ideology scores for those who voted for the respective political parties contesting the September 2007 General Election are indicated in the little box, with the 95 percent confidence interval around that mean shown by the familiar horizontally placed "I". The larger the number of respondents reporting that they voted for the respective party in this study, the narrower the confidence interval. Only voters of the PNP obtained an average score (5.8) that placed them to the left of the national average. There was no difference in the ideological leaning of electorates supporting the other parties, all of whom are slightly to the right-of-centre on the scale.




Figure VII.9. Ideological Orientation by Party Identification

### 7.3.4. Voter Participation and Support for a Stable Democracy

Higher level of political participation is presumed to positively impact system support and ultimately increase citizens’ support for a stable democracy. Figure VII.10 shows that the data confirm both of these hypotheses with regards to the vote. Persons who voted in the last elections are more likely to have the values and attitudes that make them more supportive of the system and in turn, support for a stable democracy.




Figure VII.10. Voting Behaviour by Support for the Democratic System of Government in a Jamaica

#### 7.4. Political Party and Democracy

Political parties have been the most dominant approach to political organization historically and are still widely considered critical to the functioning of the democratic system (Webb, 2007). The centrality of these organizations to modern democratic polity has been demonstrated by their resilience in established Western democracies and their rapidly acquired relevance in more recently established democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world (van Biezen, 2004) As famously asserted, ‘the political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties’ (Schattschneider, 1942:1). In effect, as Ingrid van Biezen correctly argued ‘they have now become firmly rooted, to the point that they are widely seen as a *sine qua non* for the organization of the and for the expression of political pluralism’ (van Biezen, 2004: 1)

In this study we sought to establish the extent to which Jamaicans share this view of the centrality of political parties to the democracy by posing the following question:

**DEM23.** *Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree or disagree with this statement?*

As Figure VII.11 illustrates, significantly more Jamaicans disagreed with the idea that democracy can exist without political parties. Nevertheless, given the very strong support for the representative democracy established early in this report, it might have been expected that there would be greater acclamation for the institutions that are so widely acknowledged to be central to

the process. Indeed, it is the role of the political party to transmit public opinion from the level of the citizen to the level of leadership. They mobilize grass-root political participation, channel interest and demands in the definition of policy alternatives and recruit and offer candidates for public office (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The problem though, is that these institutions are failing to effectively fulfill these mediating roles to the expectation of electorates in Jamaica. Instead, fringes of the major parties have long been associated with political violence and more recently with distortion and other forms of criminal activities. Not surprisingly, therefore, interest and confidence in the party and popular party identification has been historically low in Jamaica and more recently have been on the decline in some areas.




Figure VII.11. Citizens Attitude on the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties

#### 7.4.1. Attitude to the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective

There is a growing body of survey-based evidence of significant levels of disaffection with and distrust for parties on a worldwide basis. Figure VII.12 shows that in comparative perspective, Jamaica is at the bottom of the chart on the index of support for a democracy without political parties in the Americas, ranked with Venezuela and Argentina with virtually identical scores. Interestingly, Haiti out perform the United States on this measure, obtaining an exceptionally high score of over 67 points, followed in the distance by Colombia and the United States, both with approximately 54 points.




Figure VII.12. Citizens Attitude on the Idea of Democracy without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective, 2008

### 7.5. Beyond the Vote

Political participation has been defined as the active engagement of citizens with public institutions, an activity which falls into three well-defined modes: voting, election campaigning and contacting or pressuring either individually or through group activity, including non-violent protests (Dalton (2006; Verba et al., 1978; Parry et al., 1992). In this final section, we examine political participation beyond the exercise of the franchise.

Unlike some Latin American countries such as Peru, voting in Jamaica is by choice and is not mandatory under the law. As a consequence, political participation might involve simply trying to convince others to participate in the political process by casting their vote or working with particular candidates to promote the vote and usually to channel it in a particular direction. To

determine the prevalence of these types of participation in Jamaica, we asked the following questions:

**PP1.** During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR

**PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2007?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR

Figure VII.13 shows a breakdown of response on the question of convincing other to vote. As can be observed, 44 per cent of respondents have participated in this activity, with just about nine per cent having done so frequently.




Figure VII.13. Encouraging the Vote as a form of Political Participation

Participation at a more public and partisan level, that of getting involved in the campaign of a particular candidate is less common. As Figure VII.14 indicates, only about 11 percent have participated at this level.




Figure VII.14. Working in Campaigns as a form of Political Participation

Viewed comparatively, participation levels in Jamaica falls the in mid-range when compared to other countries in the Americas (Figure VII.15). Of note is the generally low level of participation at this level, with no country registering a score of as much as 20 points, and Chile obtaining a very low score of just below three points on this participation index.




Figure VII.15. Working in Campaigns as a form of Political Participation in Comparative Perspective

Our next concern was with participation in terms of attendance at meetings with political agendas. As Figure VII.16 shows, 24 per cent of respondents reported having participated by attending meetings of a political nature, with 19 per cent of that amount doing so only once or twice within one year.




Figure VII.16. Attendance at Political Party Meeting as a form of Political Participation

Figure VII.17 shows that political participation at the level of demonstration and protest is even less prevalent. When respondents were asked:

***PROT2.** In the past year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?*

Only four per cent of those responding indicated that they have been involved in such activities.




Figure VII.17. Involvement in Protest as a Form of Political Participation

## 7.6. Conclusion

Jamaica boasts a vibrant, uninterrupted multi-party representative democracy notwithstanding the systematic substitution between only the two major political parties since the advent universal suffrage in 1944. The comparatively high interest in politics expressed by Jamaicans in this study was not reflected in their level of political participation in terms of the vote. Voter participation rate was 65 per cent, in line with average turnout since 1972, but much less than rates of as high as 87 per cent recorded up to 1980. Consistent with the literature, age was found to be the most influential determinant of voting behaviour and persons who voted were found to be more likely to embrace the values and attitudes that are assumed to be conducive to their support for a stable democracy.

Not surprisingly, it was found that interest and confidence in the party and popular party identification low in Jamaica and more recently have been on the decline. With regards to ideological orientation of party affiliates, it was found that there was no statistically significant difference in the political leanings of the supporters of the two major political parties.

Political participation measured in terms of citizens involvement in election campaigning and non-violent protest seemed quite low in absolute terms but when level of involvement in these types of activities were compared with that of other LAPOP countries, Jamaica commanded a middle range ranking on the respective measures.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER VII.

**Table VII.A1. Determinants of Voting Behaviour in Jamaica**

<b>Determinants of Voting Behaviour in Jamaica</b>		
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Education Level	0.068	(0.88)
Female	0.152*	(2.29)
Age	0.284*	(4.17)
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-0.141	(-1.96)
Area of Residence	0.108	(1.41)
Efficacy of the Current Government	0.067	(1.08)
Ideological Orientation	0.120	(1.79)
Political Interest	0.647*	(8.08)
Constant	0.643*	(7.80)
F = 11.21		
Number of Observations = 1140		
* p<0.05		

**PART THREE:**  
**BEYOND**  
**GOVERNANCE**



# Chapter VIII. Psychocultural Factors in Jamaican Democracy: Need-Satisfaction, Responsibility, Attribution and Trust

This chapter examines several of the subjective, ‘psycho-cultural’ factors underlying Jamaican orientations to political democracy that can be measured empirically in an ongoing, nationally-representative survey. As originally conceived by political culture and comparative political systems theorists like Almond & Verba (1963), and Pye (1962, 2000), culturally-prevalent subjective orientations toward social life form the overall “atmosphere” or “milieu” within which democratic politics takes place. In order to explore some of these societal ‘habits of the heart’, several previously-tested, multi-item scales were included in the 2008 LAPOP survey instrument which have implications for Jamaican democratic development and long-term policy design. Among these were scales measuring Jamaicans’ perceived need-satisfaction levels, their societal norms as to whether the individual or the government ought to be responsible for meeting citizen needs across a variety of life domains, and Jamaicans’ basic orientations with respect to causal attribution, and interpersonal trust.


## 8.1. Perceived Satisfaction of Basic Psychosocial Needs

The purpose of this first set of measures was to attempt to get a sense--grounded in prominent theories of ‘basic human psychosocial needs’ in anthropology, clinical and social psychology and social work literatures--of the extent to which Jamaican respondents feel their needs are being adequately met within the context of Jamaican society, i.e. in addition to some of the ‘economic needs’ measures elsewhere in this survey.

The questions roughly approximate the “existence”, “relatedness”, and “growth” need clusters posited by human need theorists like Maslow (1968, 1970), Alderfer (1972) and others, tracking these across five different need facets, but minus the “need hierarchy” assumption. The question lead-in, and the ‘need-ladder’ question wordings for the five psychosocial need-satisfaction items (JAMNEED1-5), were as follows:

**Box VIII.1. Survey Items Used to Measure Perceived Psychosocial Need Satisfaction Among Jamaicans**

*Now I am going to show you five different “ladders of life”. On each “ladder”, please indicate the “step” or the “rung” that best reflects how you truly feel about your present life circumstances. The “top” of the ladder is 10, and the “bottom” of the ladder is 0, however you may use any number between 0 and 10 to describe how you feel about your life.*



**Table VIII.1. Perceived Satisfaction Levels for 5 Types of Psychosocial Needs, by Income Adequacy and Unemployment Concern**

	<i>Existence Needs: financial security</i>	<i>Existence Needs: health security</i>	<i>Relatedness Needs: friendship, love</i>	<i>Relatedness Needs: esteem</i>	<i>Growth Needs: self-actualization</i>
Total sample	6.61	5.99	8.03	8.03	7.43
<i>GENDER</i>					
Male	6.66	6.14*	7.98	8.01	7.49
Female	6.55	5.85	8.08	8.05	7.36
<i>INCOME ADEQUACY</i>					
“Enough” (Q10D=1,2)	6.84***	6.58***	8.33***	8.28***	7.76***
“Not Enough” (Q10D=3,4)	6.29	5.16	7.64	7.75	6.96
<i>UNEMPLOYMENT CONCERN</i>					
Least concerned (JAMPOV2=3,4)	7.16	6.63**	8.11***	7.97	7.24*
Most concerned (JAMPOV2=1,2)	6.62	5.98	7.83	7.95	7.60
*p<.05. **p<.01 ***p<.001 (Indicates significant difference between means, where groups are compared.)					

Table VIII.1 summarizes average levels of need satisfaction across the five need domains, further broken down by gender and by two economic security measures (income adequacy, unemployment concern). Overall, Jamaicans are most need-satisfied in their ‘relatedness’ needs, i.e. love-friendship ( $x=8.03$ ) and esteem ( $x=8.03$ ). Growth needs (what Maslow termed “self-actualization”) are also quite high ( $x=7.43$ ). Jamaicans are generally weakest in satisfying their more basic ‘existence’ needs -- with sense of ‘health-security’ averaging 6.61, and ‘financial-security’ at 5.99.

One finds no significant difference in need satisfaction levels between the genders, except for a slight difference between males and females in meeting their financial security needs (JAMNEED2), with women reporting somewhat lower levels than men. When broken down by two economic security measures, however, there are substantial need-satisfaction differences between economically-secure and economically insecure respondents. Perceived income adequacy (Q10D), in particular, is significantly related to all five types of needs, with those who report that their total family income is “enough” consistently showing higher levels of need satisfaction than those who report that it is “not enough.”

Figure VIII.I shows the cross-tabulation of the needs satisfaction index, (obtained by aggregating the response values of the JAMNEED series (1-5), calculating the mean score and then recalibrating this average on the 0-100 metric scale) and the dichotomized perceived adequacy of income variables to highlight the positive relationship.




Figure VIII.1. Degree of Needs Satisfaction by Perceived Adequacy of Income

Chronic concern about unemployment (JAMPOV2) apparently also relates to need levels, but somewhat more narrowly, to only respondents' base-level health-security and financial-security needs. On the first two need types (JAMNEED1, 2), those who report being "concerned" or "very concerned" that they will be "left without work or unemployed during the next 12 months" report significantly lower levels of health-security and financial-security need satisfaction than those who say they are "a little" or "not at all" concerned about unemployment.

## 8.2. Who Is Responsible for Citizen Need Provision – Individual or Government?

Another important psycho-cultural aspect of the political culture of any democratic society is the tendency of its citizens to attribute responsibility for solving emergent social problems to either the individual, or to the government, respectively--and the related tendency to prefer 'private' or 'market' solutions', versus 'public' or 'state' solutions to those problems (Shirazi & Biel, 2005; Morris & Peng, 1994; Fiske & Tetlock, 2000; Verba, 1987; Rotter, 1966). Anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists tell us that these public/private preferences are often, in turn, a function of the degree of 'individualism' or 'collectivism' embedded in the dominant customs of the culture as a whole--which has implications for what kinds of policy solutions a people will deem appropriate and fair, and are willing to tolerate (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Frey & Powell, 2005; Triandis, 1995, 2001.).

Items JAMINGV1 through JAMINGV14 of the 2008 Jamaica LAPOP questionnaire were designed to operationalize this psycho-cultural dimension by measuring Jamaicans' preferences with respect to their basic orientations to 'individual' versus 'governmental' responsibility for solving social problems--within a number of life domains that are typically of concern to citizens of any society. These 14 life domains are, not accidentally, those around which political debates over the proper scope and functions of the 'twentieth-century welfare state' have most often been waged within modern industrialized democracies (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sabbagh, Powell & Vanhuysse, 2007).

**BoxVIII.2. Survey Items Used to Measure Individual vs. Government Responsibility for Need Provision)**

*Now I am going to read you a list of things people typically need at different stages of their lives. For each item, indicate whether you feel the GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it to all as a basic citizen benefit, or you feel INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it for themselves. As shown on this card, you can use any number between 1 and 10 to indicate your views. (rated need / problem domains . . .)*

**JAMINGV1.** *The first item is . . . Adequate health and medical care . . .*

*Should the individual or the government be responsible for providing this?*

**JAMINGV2.** *The next item is . . . "An adequate retirement income in old age". . .*

*Should the individual or the government be responsible for providing this?*

**JAMINGV3.** *Employment training and retraining*

**JAMINGV4.** *Financial assistance to the disabled*

**JAMINGV5.** *Financial assistance during periods of unemployment*

**JAMINGV6.** *Adequate housing, a decent place to live*

**JAMINGV7.** *Financial assistance to poor families*

**JAMINGV8** *Adequate health and medical care for the elderly*

**JAMINGV9** *Employment, a decent job*

**JAMINGV10** *Adequate health and medical care for the poor*

**JAMINGV11** *Financial assistance to tertiary (university-level) students*

**JAMINGV12** *Replacement of income lost due to accidental injury at work*

**JAMINGV13** *Adequate nutrition for school-age children*

**JAMINGV14** *Child-care assistance for working parents*

As Table VIII.2 shows, the belief that government ("10" on each item) as opposed to the individual ("1" on each item) is more responsible for citizen need provision is pronounced across all 14 life domains that have been addressed by social policies of the modern industrial 'welfare state'. In all domains the individual-government balance tips in the direction of government as the preferred solver of related social problems. Other comparative studies (e.g. Sharazi & Biels, 2005; Frey & Powell, 2005) using these same items have corroborated this overall societal preference for government dependency rather than individual autonomy, in contrast to the substantially more individualistic orientations of citizens in nations like the United States – where mean scores for all 14 items are consistently lower on the 1-10 scales.

As further indicated by Table VIII.2, Jamaicans are strongest in this preference for ‘government responsibility’ in areas that relate to health and medical care, and for the protection of potentially helpless socially-disadvantaged groups such as the disabled and elderly. Note that support is higher for government-provided health care for the elderly and the poor, as vulnerable socially-disadvantaged groups, than for health care for all citizens generally. Where there is the presumption of potential self-support among able-bodied citizens, the balance tips somewhat towards a ‘mixed’ individual-government responsibility for need provision. Thus average levels for employment, training, unemployment, university support, housing support, and injury compensation are seen to be consistently somewhat lower.

**Table VIII.2. Individual versus Government Responsibility for Need Provision**

Type of problem or need	Mean score (1-10 scale)	standard deviation
Adequate health and medical care for the elderly	8.54	1.97
Adequate health and medical care for the poor	8.46	2.01
Financial assistance to the disabled	8.38	1.98
An adequate retirement income in old age	8.08	2.26
Adequate health and medical care	7.90	2.36
Financial assistance to poor families	7.87	2.27
Adequate nutrition for school-age children	7.37	2.61
Employment training and retraining	7.10	2.52
Financial assistance to tertiary (university-level) students	6.65	2.63
Employment, a decent job	6.63	2.77
Financial assistance during periods of unemployment	6.30	2.80
Adequate housing, a decent place to live	6.14	2.83
Replacement of income lost due to accidental injury at work	6.12	2.87
Child-care assistance for working parents	4.57	3.20

Scores on the 1-10 scale were converted to an easier to interpret 0-100 metric-format scale<sup>59</sup> and the result re-presented in Figure VIII.2. Overall, the dominant cultural trend is clearly in the direction of preferring government dependency rather than individual autonomy, as the dominant societal pattern of need provision. In the context of a developing economy with very limited resources, the ‘gap’ between such strong expectations for the paternal role of government in meeting citizen needs and the reality of scarce available resources is a likely contributor to the citizen-government and neighbourhood-police tensions, and to a chronic sense of inequity and unfair treatment -- regardless of which party is currently in power.

<sup>59</sup> Scale conversion was accomplished by reducing each score by 1 and then dividing by 9 to create a new range of 0-1. A metric scale is then obtained by multiplying by 100.




Figure VIII.2. Citizen Perception of Responsibility for Need Provision

### 8.3. Causal Attribution – Is the Individual or Society ‘to Blame’ for Financial Outcomes?

In any democratic political culture, citizens’ judgments related to resource allocation, privilege, prejudice, and discrimination are, as Tajfel observes, “powerfully molded...by conceptualizations of social causality” (1972, p.149). Research on ‘causal attribution’ has attempted to understand how individuals construct these explanations of their own and others’ behavior, and of related allocations of costs and benefits among various social groups (Heider 1944; Zucker & Weiner, 1993; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993a,b). In the version of attribution theory developed by Kelley (1967), people answer the question of why others in society (e.g., corporate executives, welfare recipients) behave in a certain manner by beginning with the question of whether the source or cause of that behavior is *internal* (deriving from the personality or belief system), or *external* (deriving from social conditions or the vicissitudes of life).

As a measure of internal versus external attributional bias in judging situations related to their fellow citizens’ economic difficulties, Jamaican respondents in the 2008 LAPOP survey were asked questions JAMPOV4A-JAMPOV4L, as listed with the distribution of responses by categories and per item in Box VIII.3.

**Box VIII.3. Survey Items Used to Measure Individual (‘Internal’) vs. Societal (‘External’) Causal Attributions for Poverty**

“How important is this cause as a reason why people are poor in Jamaica?”	% <i>Very important</i>	% <i>Somewhat important</i>	% <i>Not important</i>
<i>‘EXTERNAL’ CAUSES . . .</i>			
<i>Low wages in some businesses and industries</i>	64.3	30.0	5.7
<i>Failure of private industry to provide enough jobs</i>	62.4	27.3	10.3
<i>Lack of equal opportunity in Jamaican society</i>	58.0	33.4	8.6
<i>Being taken advantage of by persons who are better off than themselves</i>	46.5	34.5	19.0
<i>Failure of society to provide good schools for many Jamaicans</i>	45.7	25.5	28.7
<i>Lack of access to credit</i>	39.8	36.5	23.7
<i>Prejudice and discrimination against persons because of their colour or race</i>	39.0	29.2	31.8
<i>‘INTERNAL’ CAUSES . . .</i>			
<i>Laziness, little or no ambition</i>	73.8	21.3	4.9
<i>Failed to take advantage of educational and training opportunities available to them</i>	70.0	24.5	30.0
<i>Lack of intelligence, ability, and talent</i>	62.7	27.9	9.4
<i>Lack of character and will power</i>	52.8	35.9	11.3
<i>Lack of thrift and proper money management</i>	51.9	35.4	12.7

An examination of Figures VIII.2 and VIII.3 shows that Jamaicans attribute causation for poverty to a mixed combination of external and internal factors. Neither clearly prevails. Among the strongest ‘external’ explanations (Figures VIII.3) are low wages in business and industry, failure of industry to provide jobs, lack of equal opportunity, and class-based exploitation (“being taken advantage of by persons who are better off than themselves”). Most Jamaicans do not, however, apparently feel that poverty is a product of colour- or race-based prejudice and discrimination. .




Figure VIII.3. Average Importance of Individual ('External') Causal Attributions for Poverty in Jamaica

Several 'internal' attributions are also prominent – laziness, lack of intelligence and ability, and failure of individuals to make use of the opportunities given to them (Figure VIII.3). The latter pattern suggests that there is some degree of stereotyping and stigmatization of the poor class.




Figure VIII.4. Average Importance of Societal ('Internal') Causal Attributions for Poverty in Jamaica

### 8.4. Interpersonal Trust Levels

Another pivotal 'psycho-cultural' factor within any democratic political culture is the mutual sense of reciprocity that exists between its citizens - the willingness of individuals to 'trust' other persons generally, and to have trust in civic leaders, government, and the major social institutions. The efficiency, adjustment, and survival of individuals and groups within the society depends on the continued presence of such trust. (Rotter, 1967, 1971; Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Deutsch, 1960, 1962; Axelrod, 1984; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Hudson 2004).

Lucian Pye's (1962, p.55) classic study of personality and political identity in Burmese culture, *Personality and Nation Building*, for example, observed that where interpersonal trust was lacking, "the basic feeling of distrust leaves people unsure of their control over the world and hence fearful that the world is either against them or indifferent to them." More recent work of Axelrod (1984), Dasgupta (1988), Putnam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995) has generally corroborated these earlier findings on the relationship between trust and the development of civil society, stressing the centrifical role of trust as 'social capital' in maintaining an ongoing sense of cooperation and perceived fairness within cultures. Studied across a variety of social science disciplines, a sense of interpersonal trust has been shown to be associated with socially-efficient outcomes, moderation of fear, greed, and opportunism among parties in social transactions; and support for democracy, equality, and civic norms (Frey & Powell, 2005).

To what extent are Jamaicans predisposed to trust other persons, and to have trust in leaders and the major institutions of their society? To operationalize “trust”, the items from social psychologist J. Rotter’s (1967) original “scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust” were included in the 2008 LAPOP. The two items analysed in this study are shown in Box VIII.4

#### Box VIII.4. Interpersonal Trust Items

**IT1B.** “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted to keep their promises, or that you can never be too careful when dealing with other people?”

- (1) Most people can be trusted
- (2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people
- (8) DK/DR

**JAMTRUST1.** “Would you say that most people are essentially good and can be trusted, or that most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted?”

- (1) Most people are essentially good and can be trusted. –OR–
- (2) Most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted.
- (8) DK/DR

As Figure V111.5 indicates, relatively high levels of generalized interpersonal *distrust* within Jamaican society (83.5 %) present impediments to civil society and democratic development efforts, suggesting a need for national strategies that concentrate more intensively on building social capital within communities as a precondition to any sustained economic development, violent crime reduction etc. This, in turn, would require that policymakers begin to take such ‘psycho-cultural’ indicators more seriously in formulating long-term development plans.




Figure VIII.5. Reported Level of Mis-Trust among Jamaicans

The ‘good news’ regarding trust, to the extent that any can be said to exist, is that when the trust question is asked in a way that includes one’s generalized conception of human nature (Table VIII.6), reported trust levels are found to be considerably higher. This suggests that the distrust might be a temporary cautious personal response to perceived societal disintegration and high crime in recent years, rather than to a more permanent culturally-based scepticism about other people or human nature.




Figure VIII.6. Sense of Trust among Jamaicans

## 8.5. Conclusion

As these examples illustrate, subjective ‘psycho-cultural’ aspects of the political culture are important factors undergirding democratic development strategies, and can be meaningfully gauged on an ongoing basis in nationally administered sociobarometers. To assume that such culturally-rooted factors as responsibility norms, need-satisfaction levels, and basic orientations to causal attribution and interpersonal trust are unimportant, or unmeasurable, runs the risk of generating national policies that will be behaviourally and culturally inappropriate.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to derive specific policy recommendations, however, the illustrative examples sketched here do suggest a need to better understand, and to approach with culturally-appropriate national policies, the social dynamics generating the low levels of trust that were revealed in the 2008 LAPOP. The revealed personal insecurities in basic financial and health-related need satisfactions, and the expressed overall preferences for predominantly ‘government’-based solutions in a variety of social policy domains can, in turn, provide policymakers with significant contextual clues as to how best to rationalize the necessary social intervention strategies, without encountering culturally-based resistance or noncompliance.



# Chapter IX. Police-Citizen Relations in a Context of Economic Insecurity and Need Deprivation

The deteriorative social problems that have accumulated in Jamaica over the past few decades are a complex, multivariate, 'tangled ball of yarn', that has repeatedly puzzled and frustrated policymakers trying to solve them. Included in the tangle are antagonistic community-police relations, low interpersonal trust, lack of confidence in socio-political institutions, juvenile delinquency among chronically unemployed young males, neighbourhood-based deeply-entrenched political 'garrisons' with local 'dons', drug trafficking as an alternate underground economy, and associated record levels of retaliatory murder and a 'culture of tribal violence' between the entrenched garrison-based gangs (Brown & Chevannes, 1998; Chevannes 1992, 1998, 2001, 2006; Figueroa, 1994; Harriott 2003, 2004; Harriott & Satchell, 2008; Levy, 2001: Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997; Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence, 2002; Rapley, 2006).

While we cannot possibly address all of these issues in this brief chapter, we can hopefully shed some light on several of the most essential components in the mix. To that end, questions were included in the 2008 Jamaican LAPOP (in consultation with USAID) which were designed to tap Jamaicans' sentiments on police-citizen relations, their views on the causes of chronic poverty within Jamaican society, and their concerns about ongoing economic insecurity and unemployment. Particular emphasis was placed on examining differences on these dimensions between younger and older respondents, as a consensus seems to be emerging among Jamaican policymakers that the 'way out' of these tangled social problems may be to strengthen social capital and positive societal engagement among Jamaican youth through social policies that provide meaningful life alternatives.

## 9.1. Four Aspects of Police-Community Relations

The 2008 LAPOP survey included several basic questions on police-community relations in Jamaica. These were designed to tap four interrelated aspects of the relationship that is perceived to exist between law enforcement authorities and the citizens they serve within neighbourhoods.

The first question (JAMPOLICE1) asks if respondents feel that the police are considered to be "helpful" friends, or "abusive" enemies when they come into neighbourhoods to enforce the laws. The second question (JAMPOLICE2) looks at whether respondents perceive this police-citizen relationship as being a zero-sum game (fundamentally opposed interests, one side's gain is the

other's loss) or a non-zero-sum game (both sides share common, complimentary interests; both sides can win). The third question (JAMPOLICE3) attempts to get a sense of whether respondents think a "working relationship" between citizens and police in their neighbourhood is possible and could make a positive difference. The fourth question (JAMPOLICE4) specifically asks if the respondent would be willing to cooperate with police on community projects to combat crime, or if they would hesitate to do so.

The full wordings of the four items are listed in BOX IX.1.

### Box IX.1. Survey Items Used to Measure Police-Citizen Relations

Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...

**JAMPOLICE1.** *When the police come into your neighborhood do you usually feel that they are there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you?*

(1) help (2) abuse (8) NS/NR

**JAMPOLICE2.** *Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighborhood are basically opposed, or that you have a lot in common with the police--that you share similar interests?*

(1) interests opposed (2) a lot in common, share similar interests  
(8) NS/NR

**JAMPOLICE3.** *Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference?*

(1) Yes, would help a lot (2) Yes, would help somewhat  
(3) No, would not help, make no difference (8) NS/NR

**JAMPOLICE4.** *Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be willing to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel hesitant to do that?*

(1) very willing (2) willing (3) somewhat hesitant (4) very hesitant  
(8) NS/NR

As Figures IX.1 through IX.4 indicate, the often-negative impressions of police-community relations featured in sensationalistic news media accounts of emergent crises do not very accurately reflect the view that prevails within the broader Jamaican society (Powell & Waller, 2007; Jamaica Gleaner, 2005). As Figure IX.1 shows, 85% of respondents to the 2008 LAPOP survey say they feel that when the police come into their neighbourhood they are "there to help you" rather than "there to abuse you".

In general this pattern resembles that found in previous studies of attitudes towards the police, namely, that overall Jamaicans are highly supportive of police attempts to tackle crime in their community, but a sizeable majority also fear that police are ultimately losing the battle with criminal elements, which leaves them "sceptical, but still hoping" (Powell, Bourne and Waller, 2007, p. 55).




Figure IX.1. Citizen Perception of Police Actions and Intentions in Communities

### 9.1.1. Determinants of Negative Attitudes to the Police

Our goal in this section is to identify the characteristics of those community members who are likely to feel that the police come into their neighbourhoods only to ‘abuse’. This will help to distinguish these individuals from other community members who reported positive attitudes to the police for possible intervention programmes.

To achieve this, we designed a logistic regression model comprised of selected socio-economic and demographic variables that could potentially influence such perceptions. In selecting control variables for the regression model, we assumed that involvement in community development and church-related activities might influence perceptions of and attitudes to the police, hence the inclusion of these variables in the equation. We focused our analysis on those persons with negative impressions of the actions and intentions of the police.

Summary statistics relating to the solution of this equation are presented in Table IX.A1 in the appendix at the end of this chapter. Coefficients with an asterisk (\*) superscripted to their right identify factors that are statistically significant predictors of negative perceptions of the police. In this case, only two of the independent variables – crime victimization and age were found to be strong determinants.

Figure IX.2 provides a graphical presentation<sup>60</sup> of key aspects of the information contained in Table IX.A1. The horizontal red line on this chart indicates the points at which variables with a mean of zero (for example, involvement in community improvement projects, in this case) would be located. Each ‘dot’ indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable, and the 95 percent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an “I” placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal “I”s) that intersect the red line are not significant predictors ( $p < 0.05$ ) of citizens’ perception of the nature police of actions. In this case, the coefficient for ‘age’ is located completely to the left of the zero line, signifying its negative and statistically significant net impact on citizens’ perception. In contrast, ‘crime victimization’ is completely to the right of the line, indicating a positive net effect on citizens’ impression of the police.




Figure IX.2. Selected Factors Explaining Negative Attitudes to the Police

Persons who actively participate in religious group activities and those who have been a victim of a crime are more likely to have negative impressions of the police, but as previously indicated, crime victimization is the only statistically significant factor. Consistent with the literature, persons who are victims of crime are usually less trusting of rule of law-related institutions, as such experiences tend to erode confidence and undermine their sense of the legitimacy of such structures. As the bivariate analysis of the two factors in Figure IX.3 shows, persons who reported having been victimized are likely to have negative perceptions of the police intentions and actions in their interaction with the community.

<sup>60</sup> This graphical approach to the presentation of the results of regression analysis was used throughout this report. Tables showing actual regression coefficients, their statistical significance (i.e. coefficients with asterisks) and standard errors for the models are presented in an appendix at the end of the respective chapter.




Figure IX.3. Negative Attitude to Police by Crime Victimization

Age is also an influential factor in determining the likelihood that citizens will harbour negative feelings towards the police. As Figure IX.4 shows, younger persons are much more suspicious of the intentions and actions of the police.




Figure IX.4. Negative Attitude to Police by Age

## 9.2 .Common or Opposed Interests

When asked for their views on the question of shared interest between the police and the community, 3 out of 4 Jamaicans (75%) feel the interests of the police and the people in their neighbourhood are “in common”, rather than “opposed”. (Figure IX.5)




Figure IX.5. Respondents Opinions on Citizen-Police Interest on Community Issues

## 9.3. Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration

As Figure IX 6 shows, about half of the respondents (49%) are optimistic that combined police-citizen efforts could actually make a tangible difference in effectively combating crime.




Figure IX.6. Perception of the Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration

#### 9.4. Willingness to Work with the Police

When specifically confronted with the prospect of a government programme (or allied non-government agencies) intervention for a police-citizen anti-crime partnership, about two-thirds of Jamaicans (68%) say they would be willing to cooperate in “working closely” with police to fight crime in such a programme, with only a third saying they would hesitate to do so (Figure IX.7).




Figure IX.7. Citizen Attitude to Cooperation with the Police in Crime Control Initiatives

### 9.4.1. Determinants of Willingness to Work with the Police

Again, we use multivariate analysis techniques to determine the characteristics of persons who are more likely to participate with the police in their crime control efforts. A logistic regression model with variables shown in Table IX.A2 (Appendix IX) was solved generating the specified results. As indicated, people who participate in parent/teacher associations and church-related activities, those living in rural areas, persons of higher socio-economic status (measured in terms of household inventory of capital goods), older persons, women, and the more educated are more likely to work with the police. However, only age is of a statistically significant level with a positive influence. The other factors contribute negatively to citizens' willingness to collaborate, with the only statistically significant factor being participation in community improvement activities. In order to highlight the nature of relationship to the factors that are strongly correlated, statistically significant factors are cross-tabulated below with the related explanation.




Figure IX.8. Selected Factors Explaining Willingness to Work with the Police

It was assumed that persons who are actively involved in collaborative activities in their community would be more willing to work with the police in enhancing neighbourhood security. As indicated previously, and as the horizontal bars and coefficients in Figure IX.8 above illustrates, persons who participate in parents associations and religious group activities are, indeed, more disposed to helping the police, but not at statistically significant levels. In contrast, persons who are highly involved in community projects geared towards the development of their neighbourhoods are less willing to collaborate with the police at a statistically significant level. At lower levels of participation, willingness to collaborate increases moderately. However as participation levels wax, interest in cooperating decreases rapidly (Figure IX.9).




Figure IX.9. Willingness to Work with the Police by Participation in Community Improvement Initiatives

Challenges with regard to police-citizen relationship and crime in Jamaica are predominantly inner city problems. It is ironic then that urban dwellers are the ones who are most averse to cooperating with police in addressing these difficulties in their communities. As Figure IX.10 shows, persons residing in rural areas have indicated a greater willingness to collaborate with the police in dealing with neighbourhood crime.




Figure IX.10. Willingness to Work with the Police by Area of Residence

Figure IX.11 highlights the overall positive relationship between age and willingness to work with the police in dealing with the crime problem. More matured persons are much more willing to work with police than youth and middle-age persons. One possible explanation for the positive-then-negative correlation between 18 and 46 is the impact of police youth clubs in most communities. Usually, members of these organizations are mostly teenagers and young adults. After the mid-thirties, interest and participation in these groups tend to wane significantly.




Figure IX.11. Willingness to Work with the Police by Age

Figure IX.12 depicts the impact of education on willingness to cooperate. More educated individuals more likely to be prepared to work with police. Unfortunately, the more educated do not reside in communities with the serious crime problem. This points a role for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in intervening in these high crime areas through the mobilization of the more educated from surrounding communities to help address the crime problem.




Figure IX.12. Willingness to Work with the Police by Level of Education

### 9.5. The Police-Citizen Rapport Scale

To operationalize the notion of degree of ‘rapport’ between citizens and police, an additive scale was developed which combines these four survey items (JAMPOLICE1-4) into an easily interpretable 10-point measure. All 4 items were recoded in a positive direction (with positive scores indicating higher rapport), and equally weighted, then added together to make a 0 to 10 index of rapport. Average scores on this measure were then compared across other relevant factors (age, gender, economic insecurity measures, psychosocial factors), to determine how ‘police-citizen rapport’ varies according to those, with an eye towards determining what might be useful intervention strategies to improve police citizen cooperation in combating crime. These relationships are summarized in Table IX.3.

## 9.6. Interactions of Police-Citizen “Rapport” with Demographic, Economic Security, and Psychosocial Variables

As can be seen in Table IX.1, among the demographic factors age clearly has a significant effect on perceived police-citizen rapport, with youth viewing the relationship as a more antagonistic one than the older age groups do. As age increases, citizen-police rapport increases, consistently through the four lifecycle categories. Gender, however, apparently makes no discernible difference.

Economic insecurity also is clearly related to levels of rapport, with the most extreme categories in terms of income inadequacy and unemployment anxiety (particularly those who say they “can’t cover basic needs”) reporting substantially lower levels of perceived community rapport with police than is the case for the more economically-comfortable categories.

In terms of psychosocial influences (Stone, 1992), subjective ‘need satisfaction’ and ‘life satisfaction’ levels are significantly related to citizen-police rapport levels, with the least-“satisfied” perceiving lower rapport. There is also apparently a consistent pattern in terms of the degree of perceived ‘control’ one has over one’s life circumstances, however this effect is not significant ( $p < .07$ ), and interpersonal trust also is not a significant predictor.

**Table IX.1. Perceived Police Citizen Rapport Levels, by Demographic, Economic Security and Psychosocial Needs Measures.**

	<i>Mean score on 0-10 police-citizen 'rapport' scale</i>
Total sample	7.63
<b>DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS</b>	
AGE	
< 25	7.21***
26-35	7.44
36-50	7.64
>50	7.94
GENDER	
Males	7.59
Females	7.68
<b>ECONOMIC SECURITY</b>	
INCOME ADEQUACY	
Enough to save	7.67**
Enough, but cannot save	7.75
Not enough to pay bills	7.76
Not enough to cover basic needs	7.21
UNEMPLOYMENT CONCERN	
Not concerned	8.14
A little concerned	7.56
Concerned	7.59
Very concerned	7.60
<b>PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS</b>	
PERCEIVED NEED-SATISFACTION	
Higher (upper half on needs scale)	7.77**
Lower (lower half on needs scale)	7.45
PERCEIVED CONTROL OVER LIFE	
High control	7.70
Some control	7.62
Little control	7.31
None at all	6.79
LIFE SATISFACTION	
Very satisfied	7.63***
Somewhat satisfied	7.83
Somewhat dissatisfied	7.44
Very dissatisfied	6.86
INTERPERSONAL TRUST	
High	7.78
Low	7.54
BLAME FOR POVERTY	
External causes	7.78
Internal causes	7.62
*p<.05. **p<.01 ***p<.001 (Indicates significant difference between means, where groups are compared.)	
<i>n = 1489</i>	

## 9.7. Conclusion

Police-citizen ‘rapport’ is related to all three types of factors – demographic, economic security, and psychosocial. In particular, the pattern that emerges from these findings suggests that police-community rapport is least ‘healthy’ among the youngest segments of the population, and the most economically disadvantaged and need-deprived. Looking at the larger societal picture, the good news is that there is overall majority support for police efforts in Jamaica, accompanied by a general willingness to cooperate with authorities in crime-fighting partnerships if these can be meaningfully developed and implemented within communities. Government programmes that emphasize social capital building efforts, values re-socialization, and community engagement activities among those societal sectors would therefore be the most likely to yield favourable outcomes, as would constabulary public relations efforts targeted at producing ‘friendlier’ community relations with youth and the most disadvantaged sectors.

## APPENDIX CHAPTER IX.

Table IX.A1. Determinants of Perception of Police Actions and Intentions

Determinants of Perception of Police Actions and Intentions		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Education Level	-0.122	(-1.31)
Female	-0.074	(-0.94)
Age	-0.481*	(-5.40)
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-0.064	(-0.51)
Rural	-0.251	(-1.67)
Crime Victimization	0.287*	(4.55)
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	0.125	(1.18)
Participation in Community Improvement Initiatives	-0.000	(-0.00)
Constant	-1.819*	(-12.00)
F = 7.45		
Number of Observations = 1172		
* p<0.05		

Table IX.A2. Determinants of Willingness to Cooperate with the Police

Determinants of Willingness to Cooperate with the Police		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Education Level	0.403*	(3.64)
Female	0.084	(0.98)
Age	0.564*	(4.60)
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	0.033	(0.23)
Rural	0.421*	(2.99)
Crime Victimization	-0.082	(-0.88)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.148	(-1.31)
Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group	0.060	(0.53)
Participation in Community Improvement Initiatives	-0.239*	(-2.30)
Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association	0.061	(0.45)
Constant	2.563*	(16.21)
F = 5.23		
Number of Observations = 1229		
* p<0.05		



## Appendixes

### Appendix I: The IRB “informed consent” document

Centre for Leadership & Governance,  
University of the West Indies, Mona



Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion survey which is sponsored by Vanderbilt University of the USA and being undertaken by the University of the West Indies at Mona. The aim of this study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of some local and national issues.

If you agree to participate, this survey it will take 30 to 40 minutes to complete.

Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. Your answers will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name and no one will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Balford Lewis whose phone number is 977-3565.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?



## Appendix II: The Questionnaire

Versión # 18Q IRB Approval:060187

 	<p style="text-align: center;">Centre for Leadership &amp; Governance, University of the West Indies, Mona</p>   <p style="text-align: center;">VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>
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Political Culture of Democracy: Jamaica, 2008

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<b>Country:</b> 1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Canada 41. United States	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>IDNUM.</b> Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (2301) KMR      (2302) Surrey ( except Urban St Andrews and Kingston) (2303) Middlesex      (2304) Cornwall	<b>ESTRATOPRI</b>	<b>23</b> □ □
<b>UPM ( ED)</b> _____ <b>Parish</b> (2301) Kingston      (2306) St. Ann      (2311) St. Elizabeth (2302) St. Andrew      (2307) Trelawny      (2312) Manchester (2303) St. Thomas      (2308) St. James      (2313) Clarendon (2304) Portland      (2309) Hanover      (2314) St. Catherine (2305) St. Mary      (2310) Westmoreland	<b>UPM PROV</b>	<b>23</b> □ □
<b>CONSTITUENCY:</b> _____	<b>JMUNICIPIO</b>	<b>23</b> □ □
<b>E.D.</b> _____	<b>JAMSEGMENTO</b>	□ □ □
<b>HOUSEHOLD NUMBER</b> _____	<b>JAMSEC</b>	□ □ □
<b>[CLUSTER]:</b> _____ [A cluster cannot be larger than 8 interviews in urban towns, and 12 in rural areas]	<b>CLUSTER</b>	□ □
<b>UR</b> (1) Urban (2) Rural	<b>UR</b>	
<b>AREA SIZE:</b> (1) Metropolitan area (KMR) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area	<b>TAMANO</b>	
<b>Questionnaire language:</b> (2) English	<b>IDIOMAQ</b>	

Start time: ____:____ [Don't enter]	-----
Date Day: ____ Month:____ Year: 2008	FECHA <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.</b>	

Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female	Q1
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A4 [COA4]. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]	A4	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drug trafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, roadblocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of	22
Forced displacement of persons	32	Kidnappings	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence/Crime	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Population explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88

Now, changing the subject...[After each question, repeat “every day”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely”, or “never” to help the respondent]

How frequently do you ...	Every day [Also accept almost everyday]	Once or twice a week	Rarely	Never	DK	
<b>A1.</b> Listen to the news on the radio	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A1</b>
<b>A2.</b> Watch the news on TV	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A2</b>
<b>A3.</b> Read the news in newspapers	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A3</b>
<b>A4i.</b> Read the news on the Internet	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A4i</b>

<b>SOCT1.</b> How would you describe the <b>country's</b> economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know	<b>SOCT1</b>
<b>SOCT2.</b> Do you think that the <b>country's</b> current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know	<b>SOCT2</b>
<b>IDIO1.</b> How would you describe <b>your</b> overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know	<b>IDIO1</b>
<b>IDIO2.</b> Do you think that <b>your</b> economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn't know	<b>IDIO2</b>

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?	Yes	No	DK/DR	
<b>CP2.</b> A member of parliament	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> A local public official (e.g, caretaker, parish councilor)	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> Any ministry, public institution or state agency	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

Now let's talk about your local government...

<b>NP1.</b> Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember	<b>NP1</b>
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<p><b>NP1B.</b> To what degree do you think parish council officials pay attention to what people request for in such meetings? <b>[Read Options]</b>                  (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Not at all (8) DK</p>	<b>NP1B</b>
<p><b>NP2.</b> Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or parish councillor of the municipality within the past 12 months?                  (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember</p>	<b>NP2</b>
<p><b>SGL1.</b> Would you say that the services the parish council is providing are...?  <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know</p>	<b>SGL1</b>
<p><b>SGL2.</b> How have you or your neighbors been treated when you have had dealings with the parish councils? Have you been treated very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly?                  (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Doesn't know</p>	<b>SGL2</b>
<p><b>LGL2A.</b> Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given <b>more responsibilities</b>? <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) Much more to the central government                  (2) Somewhat more to the central government                  (3) The same amount to the central government and the parish councils                  (4) Somewhat more to the parish councils                  (5) Much more to the parish councils                  (8) DK/DA</p>	<b>LGL2A</b>
<p><b>LGL2B.</b> And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) Much more the central government                  (2) Somewhat more the central government                  (3) The same amount the central government and the parish councils                  (4) Somewhat more the parish councils                  (5) Much more the parish councils                  (8) DK/DA</p>	<b>LGL2B</b>

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	
<p><b>CP5.</b> Now, changing the subject. Over the past year have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never</p>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP5</b>
<p>I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me how often do you attend their meetings : once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. <b>[Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]</b></p>						
<p><b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...</p>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>

<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>	
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>	
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>	
<b>CP10.</b> Meetings of a labor union? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>	
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party or political movement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>	
<b>CP20. [Women only]</b> Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (Male)	<b>CP20</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Changing the subject, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are ..? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat <b>dissatisfied</b> (4) Very <b>dissatisfied</b> (8) DK	<b>LS3</b>	
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<b>IT1.</b> Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK	<b>IT1</b>	
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<b>IT1A.</b> How much do you trust people you meet for the first time? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Totally trust them (2) Somewhat trust them (3) Trust them a little (4) Do not trust them at all (8) DK	<b>IT1A</b>	
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<b>IT1B.</b> Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (1) Most people can be trusted (2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people (8) DK/DR	<b>IT1B</b>	
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**SHOW CARD # 1**

**L1.** (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those who sympathize more with the left and those who sympathize more with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b>
<b>Left</b>									<b>Right</b>	(DK=88)

**[Collect Card # 1]**

<b>PROT2.</b> In the past year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK	(9) Inap	<b>PROT2</b>
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<b>JC15.</b> Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the Prime Minister to shut down the parliament or do you think there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes, there could be sufficient grounds	(2) No, there can never be sufficient grounds	(8)DK	<b>JC15</b>
<b>JC16.</b> Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to dissolve the Supreme Court or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes, there could be sufficient grounds	(2) No, there could never be sufficient grounds	(8)DK	<b>JC16</b>

<b>VIC1.</b> Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR	<b>VIC1</b>
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<b>[ASK TO EVERYONE]:</b> Please, now think on what has happened to you in the past 12 months to respond to the following questions: <b>[If the answer is "YES", ask how many times?, and note down the number of times; If it is " No", note down "0" Zero]</b>	<b>How many times?</b> <b>[Write down the</b> <b>No = 0,</b> <b>DK/DR=88</b>
<b>VIC20.</b> Excluding your car, were you a victim of an armed robbery in the past 12 months? How many times?	<b>VIC20</b>
<b>VIC21.</b> Has your house has been burglarized in the past 12 months? How many times?	<b>VIC21</b>

<b>VIC27.</b> In the past 12 months has any police officer mistreated you verbally, physically or assaulted you? How many times?		<b>VIC27</b>
<b>AOJ8.</b> In order to apprehend criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or occasionally, they can operate at the margin of the law? (1) They should always respect the law (2) Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally (8)DK		<b>AOJ8</b>
<b>AOJ11.</b> Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/DR		<b>AOJ11</b>
<b>AOJ11A.</b> And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR		<b>AOJ11A</b>
<b>AOJ12.</b> If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR		<b>AOJ12</b>
<b>AOJ12a.</b> If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the police would apprehend the guilty? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR		<b>AOJ12a</b>
<b>AOJ18.</b> Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Police protect or (2) Police involved in crime (3) <b>[DON'T READ]</b> Doesn't protect, not involved in crime or protect and involved in crime (8) DK/DR		<b>AOJ18</b>

**[Give card "A" to the respondent]**

Now we will use another card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Not at all</b>				<b>A lot</b>			Doesn't know

Note down a number 1-7, or 8

for those who don't know

<b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?	<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?	<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?	<b>B4</b>
<b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?	<b>B6</b>
<b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the justice system?	<b>B10A</b>
<b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Commission?	<b>B11</b>
<b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?	<b>B12</b>
<b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	<b>B13</b>
<b>B14.</b> To what extent do you trust the national government?	<b>B14</b>
<b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Police?	<b>B18</b>
<b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?	<b>B20</b>
<b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?	<b>B21</b>
<b>B21A.</b> To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?	<b>B21</b>
<b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	<b>B31</b>
<b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust the Parish Council or municipality?	<b>B32</b>
<b>B43.</b> To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?	<b>B43</b>
<b>B16.</b> To what extent do you trust the Attorney General?	<b>B16</b>
<b>B19.</b> To what extent do you trust the Office of the Auditor General?	<b>B19</b>
<b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the media?	<b>B37</b>
<b>B42.</b> To what extent do you trust the tax office?	<b>B42</b>
<b>B47.</b> To what extent do you trust elections?	<b>B47</b>
<b>B48.</b> To what extent do you think that free trade agreements will help improve the economy?	<b>B48</b>

Now, using the same scale, ( <i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i> )	Note down 1-7, 8 = DK
<b>N1.</b> To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?	<b>N1</b>
<b>N3.</b> To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects democratic principles?	<b>N3</b>

Now, using the same scale, ( <i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i> )	Note down 1-7, 8 = DK
<b>N9.</b> To what extent would you say the current government fights government corruption?	<b>N9</b>
<b>N10.</b> To what extent would you say the current government protects human rights?	<b>N10</b>
<b>N11.</b> To what extent would you say the current government improves the security of citizens?	<b>N11</b>
<b>N12.</b> To what extent would you say the current government fights unemployment?	<b>N12</b>

Now, I am going to read a set of statements about - the political parties and I will ask your opinion. Let's use the same card A with a 1-7 point scale where 1 means not at all and 7 means a lot.

[Take back card A]

	Note down 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
<b>EPP1.</b> Thinking about political parties in general, To what extent do Jamaican political parties represent their voters well?	<b>EPP1</b>
<b>EPP2.</b> How much corruption is there in Jamaican political parties?	<b>EPP2</b>
<b>EPP3.</b> How much do political parties listen to people like you?	<b>EPP3</b>
<b>EC1.</b> And now, thinking of the Parliament. To what extent does the Parliament obstruct the job of the Prime Minister?	<b>EC1</b>
<b>EC2.</b> And how much do Members of Parliament waste time discussing and debating?	<b>EC2</b>
<b>EC3.</b> How important for the country are the laws approved by the Parliament?	<b>EC3</b>
<b>EC4.</b> To what extent does the Parliament live up to your expectations?	<b>EC4</b>

<b>M1.</b> Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of the current government of the Jamaica Labour Party...?: <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR	<b>M1</b>
<b>M2.</b> Now speaking of Parliament without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the Members of Parliament are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR	<b>M2</b>

**[Give card B]:** Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score. I am going to read various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.

**Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>		<b>Doesn't know</b>

<p>Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements, again using card B:</p> <p><b>POP101.</b> It is necessary for the progress of this country that our prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP101</b>	
<p><b>POP102.</b> When the Parliament obstructs the work of our government, our prime ministers should govern without the Parliament. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP102</b>	
<p><b>POP103.</b> When the Supreme Court obstructs the work of our government, it should be ignored by our prime ministers. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP103</b>	
<p><b>POP106.</b> Our prime ministers must follow the will of the people because what the people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP106</b>	
<p><b>POP107.</b> The people should govern directly and <b>not</b> through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP107</b>	
<p><b>POP109.</b> In today's world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of them. How much do you agree or disagree that such battle between good and evil exists? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP109</b>	
<p><b>POP110.</b> Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent a minority from opposing them. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP110</b>	
<p><b>POP112.</b> The <b>largest</b> obstacle to progress in our country is the ruling class or oligarchy taking advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP112</b>	
<p><b>POP113.</b> Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>POP113</b>	

<b>EFF1.</b> Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree?	<b>EFF1</b>	
<b>EFF2.</b> You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree?	<b>EFF2</b>	

<b>JAMINDIV1.</b> A person should feel free to live one's own life in one's own way, without worrying too much about how others might be affected. How much do you agree or disagree?	<b>JAMINDIV1</b>	
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**Don't take back Card B**

<b>Write a number 1-7, or</b>		
<b>8 for those who don't know</b>		
<b>ING4.</b> Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>ING4</b>	
<b>PN2.</b> Despite our differences, we Jamaicans have many things that unite us as a country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>PN2</b>	
<b>DEM23.</b> Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree or disagree with this statement?	<b>DEM23</b>	

<b>JAMINDIV2.</b> One must avoid dependence upon persons and things; the center of life should be found in oneself. How much do you agree or disagree or disagree with this statement?	<b>JAMINDIV2</b>	
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Now I am going to read various statements about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements. We will continue using the same scale from 1 to 7.

<b>ROS1.</b> The national government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>ROS1</b>	
<b>ROS2.</b> The national government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>ROS2</b>	
<b>ROS3.</b> The national government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>ROS3</b>	
<b>ROS4.</b> The national government should implement <b>strong</b> policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>ROS4</b>	

<b>JAMINDIV3.</b> In life, an individual should for the most part "go it alone," having much time to oneself, attempting to control one's own life. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<b>JAMINDIV3</b>	
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**[Take back Card "B"]**

<p><b>PN4.</b> In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in Jamaica?                  (1) Very satisfied      (2) Satisfied      (3) Dissatisfied      (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>PN4</b>	
<p><b>PN5.</b> In your opinion, is Jamaica very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?                  (1) Very democratic      (2) Somewhat democratic      (3) Not very democratic                  (4) Not at all democratic      (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>PN5</b>	

**[Give the respondent card "C"]**

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Strongly disapprove</b>							<b>Strongly approve</b>			<b>Doesn't know</b>

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>E5.</b> Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E5</b>	
<b>E8.</b> Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E8</b>	
<b>E11.</b> Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E11</b>	
<b>E15.</b> Of people creating road blocks. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E15</b>	
<b>E14.</b> Of people squatting on private property or land. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E14</b>	
<b>E2.</b> Of people taking control over factories, offices and other buildings. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E2</b>	
<b>E3.</b> Of people participating in a group wanting to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E3</b>	
<b>E16.</b> Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<b>E16</b>	

**[Don't take back card "C"]**

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Jamaica. We will continue using the 10 point scale [card C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve			Doesn't know

	1-10, 88
<b>D1.</b> There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's <b>right to vote</b> ? Please read me the number from the scale: <b>[Probe: To what degree?]</b>	<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to <b>carry out peaceful demonstrations</b> in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to <b>run for public office</b> ?	<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to <b>make speeches</b> ?	<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being <b>permitted to run for public office</b> ?	<b>D5</b>

**[COLLECT CARD "C"]**

**Now changing the subject...**

<b>DEM2.</b> With which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (8) DK/DR	<b>DEM2</b>
<b>DEM11.</b> Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or instead that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) DK/DR	<b>DEM11</b>

<b>AUT1.</b> There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? <b>[Read]</b> (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (8) DK/DR	<b>AUT1</b>
<b>AUT2.</b> With which of the following statements do you agree the most: <b>[Read options]</b> (1) As citizens we should be more active in questioning our leaders or (2) As citizens we should show more respect for the authority of our leaders (8) DK/DR	<b>AUT2</b>

<p><b>PP1.</b> During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>PP1</b>
<p><b>PP2.</b> There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2007?                  (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>PP2</b>

Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as:  
 1) Corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or 3) not corrupt.

<p><b>DC10.</b> A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays the government clerk \$1000. Do you think that what the woman did is... <b>[Read the options]:</b>                  (1) Corrupt and should be punished                  (2) Corrupt but justified                  (3) Not corrupt                  (8) DK</p>	<b>DC10</b>
<p><b>DC13.</b> An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is.. <b>[Read the options]:</b>                  (1) Corrupt and should be punished                  (2) Corrupt but justified                  (3) Not corrupt                  (8) DK</p>	<b>DC13</b>

	No	Yes	DK	N/A	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during the past year?	0	1	8		<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?	0	1	8		<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> During the past year did you have any official dealings in the parish council office? <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> Are you currently employed? <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an appropriate payment during the last year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>

	No	Yes	DK	N/A	
<b>EXC14.</b> During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? <b>If the answer is No → note down 9</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you use any public health services during the past year? <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> Did you have a child in school during the past year? <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Did you have to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?	0	1	8		<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	8		<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is <b>[Read]</b> (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon? (8) DK/DR		<b>EXC7</b>
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Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country are known by the people... <b>GI1.</b> What is the name of the current president of the United States? <b>[Don't read, George Bush]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer		<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> What is the name of the Prime Minister of Jamaica? <b>[Don't read, Bruce Golding]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer		<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> How many constituencies does Jamaica have? <b>[Don't read, 60]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer		<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> How long is the government's term of office in Jamaica? <b>[Don't read, 5 years]</b> ((1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer		<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> What is the name of the current president of Brazil? <b>[Don't read, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, also accept "Lula"]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer		<b>GI5</b>

<p><b>VB1.</b> Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (8) DK</p>		<p><b>VB1</b></p>
<p><b>VB2.</b> Did you vote in the last general elections? (1) Voted <b>[Continue]</b> (2) Did not vote <b>[Go to VB50]</b> (8) DK <b>[Go to VB50]</b></p>		<p><b>VB2</b></p>
<p><b>VB3 .</b> Who did you vote for in the last general elections? <b>[DON'T READ THE LIST]</b> (0)None (Blank ballot or vote canceled) (2301) PNP (2302) JLP (2303) NDP (77) Other (88) DK/DR (99) INAP (Did not vote)</p>		<p><b>VB3</b></p>
<p><b>VB50. [Ask to everybody]</b> In general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? (1) Completely agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Completely disagree (8) DK/DR</p>		<p><b>VB50</b></p>
<p><b>VB10.</b> Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to POL1]</b> (8) DK <b>[Go to POL1]</b></p>		<p><b>VB10</b></p>
<p><b>VB11.</b> Which political party do you identify with? <b>[Don't read the list]</b> (2301) PNP (2302) JLP (2303) NDP (77) Other (88) DK/DR (99) INAP (Did not vote)</p>		<p><b>VB11</b></p>
<p><b>VB12.</b> Would you say that your identification with that party <b>[the party mentioned in VB11]</b> is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong? (1) Very weak (2) Weak (3) Not weak, or strong (4) Strong (5) Very strong</p>		<p><b>VB12</b></p>

<p><b>POL1.</b> How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 1) A lot 2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POL1</b></p>
<p><b>POL2.</b> How often do you discuss politics with other people? <b>[Read the options]</b> 1) Daily 2) A few times a week 3) A few times a month 4) Rarely 5) Never 8) DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POL2</b></p>

<p><b>JAMPOV3.</b> Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. How much choice and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out: <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) A great deal of control (2) Some control (3) Very little control (4) None at all (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JAMPOV3</b></p>
<p><b>JAMFAIR1.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (1) Taxing those with high incomes to help the poor is only fair. –OR-                  (2) Taxing those with high incomes to help the poor only punishes those who have worked the hardest.                  (8) DK/DR</p>	<p><b>JAMFAIR1</b></p>
<p><b>JAMFAIR2.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  1) In a “fair” economic system, all people would earn about the same for their work. –OR-                  (2) In a “fair” economic system, people with more ability would earn higher incomes.                  (8) DK/DR</p>	<p><b>JAMFAIR2</b></p>
<p><b>JAMTRUST1.</b> Which of these two statements do you agree with the most:                  (2) Most people are essentially good and can be trusted. –OR-                  (2) Most people are not essentially good and cannot be trusted.                  (8) DK/DR</p>	<p><b>JAMTRUST1</b></p>

**[ Show card “JAM1” to the respondent ]**

Now I am going to read you a list of things people typically need at different stages of their lives. For each item, indicate whether you feel the GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it to all as a basic citizen benefit, or you feel INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it for themselves. As shown on this card, you can use any number between 1 and 10 to indicate your views.

**(Note down a number 1-10, or 88 for those who don’t know. Make sure respondent understands s/he can use any number between 1 and 10.)**

<p><b>JAMINGV1.</b> The first item is . . . “Adequate health and medical care” . . .                  Should the individual or the government be responsible for providing this?</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV1</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV2.</b> The next item is . . . “An adequate retirement income in old age” . . .                  Should the individual or the government be responsible for providing this?</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV2</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV3.</b> Employment training and retraining</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV3</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV4.</b> Financial assistance to the disabled</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV4</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV5.</b> Financial assistance during periods of unemployment</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV5</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV6.</b> Adequate housing, a decent place to live</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV6</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV7.</b> Financial assistance to poor families</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV7</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV8.</b> Adequate health and medical care for the elderly</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV8</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV9.</b> Employment, a decent job</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV9</b></p>
<p><b>JAMINGV10.</b> Adequate health and medical care for the poor</p>	<p><b>JAMINGV10</b></p>

<b>JAMINGV11</b> Financial assistance to tertiary (university-level) students	<b>JAMINGV11</b>
<b>JAMINGV12</b> Replacement of income lost due to accidental injury at work	<b>JAMINGV12</b>
<b>JAMINGV13</b> Adequate nutrition for school-age children	<b>JAMINGV13</b>
<b>JAMINGV14</b> Child-care assistance for working parents	<b>JAMINGV14</b>

[ Collect card "JAM1" ]

[ Show card "JAM2" to the respondent ]

Now I am going to show you five different "ladders of life". On each "ladder", please indicate the "step" or the "rung" that best reflects how you truly feel about your present life circumstances. The "top" of the ladder is 10, and the "bottom" of the ladder is 0, however you may use any number between 0 and 10 to describe how you feel about your life.

**(Note down a number 0-10, or 88 for those who don't know. Make sure respondent understands they can use any number between 0 and 10.)**

<b>JAMNEED1.</b> On the first ladder, "0" is "often feel worried about the state of my health", and "10" is "feel completely secure about the state of my health". Where would you place yourself on this ladder?	<b>JAMNEED1</b>
<b>JAMNEED2</b> On the next ladder, "0" is "worry constantly about being able to provide basic necessities", and "10" is "feel completely secure about being able to afford basic necessities". Where would you place yourself on this ladder?	<b>JAMNEED2</b>
<b>JAMNEED3.</b> On the next ladder, "0" is "a life without love, friends, and warmth", and "10" is "a life full of love, warm friendships, and good family relations". Where would you place yourself on this ladder?	<b>JAMNEED3</b>
<b>JAMNEED4.</b> On the next ladder, "0" is "completely ignored by others", and "10" is "complete recognition and respect from others". Where would you place yourself on this ladder?	<b>JAMNEED4</b>
<b>JAMNEED5</b> On the final ladder, "0" is "just about given up hope I'll ever get to do anything important or worthwhile", and "10" is "satisfied that I'm realizing my fullest potential in life". Where would you place yourself on this ladder?	<b>JAMNEED5</b>

[ Collect card "JAM2" ]

**Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...**

<b>JAMPOLICE1.</b> When the police come into your neighborhood do you usually feel that they are there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you? (1) help (2) abuse (8) NS/NR	<b>JAMPOLICE1</b>
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<b>JAMPOLICE2.</b> Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighborhood are basically <u>opposed</u> , or that you have a lot <u>in common</u> with the police--that you share similar interests? (1) interests opposed (2) a lot in common, share similar interests (8) NS/NR	<b>JAMPOLICE2</b>
<b>JAMPOLICE3.</b> Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Yes, would help a lot (2) Yes, would help somewhat (3) No, would not help, make no difference (8) NS/NR	<b>JAMPOLICE3</b>
<b>JAMPOLICE4.</b> Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be <u>willing</u> to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel <u>hesitant</u> to do that? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) very willing (2) willing (3) somewhat hesitant (4) very hesitant (8) NS/NR	<b>JAMPOLICE4</b>

Now thinking of persons who are poor in Jamaica... I'm going to read to you some possible reasons or causes why people are poor in Jamaica. For each cause, Indicate how important you feel that cause is in holding people back, in keeping them poor. For each item, indicate whether you think it is a very important cause of poverty, or it is somewhat important, or it is not an important cause of poverty at all...

How important is this cause as a reason why people are poor in Jamaica?	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not important cause</b>	<b>DK</b>	
<b>JAMPOV4A.</b> Laziness, little or no ambition	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4A</b>
<b>JAMPOV4B.</b> Lack of equal opportunity in Jamaican society					<b>JAMPOV4B</b>
<b>JAMPOV4C.</b> Lack of access to credit	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4C</b>
<b>JAMPOV4D.</b> Failed to take advantage of educational and training opportunities available to them	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4D</b>
<b>JAMPOV4E.</b> Low wages in some businesses and industries	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4E</b>
<b>JAMPOV4F.</b> Lack of thrift and proper money management	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4F</b>
<b>JAMPOV4G.</b> Lack of character and will power	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4G</b>
<b>JAMPOV4H.</b> Failure of private industry to provide enough jobs	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4H</b>
<b>JAMPOV4I.</b> Prejudice and discrimination against persons because of their colour or race	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4I</b>
<b>JAMPOV4J.</b> Lack of intelligence, ability, and talent	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4J</b>

<b>JAMPOV4K.</b> Being taken advantage of by persons who are better off than themselves	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4K</b>
<b>JAMPOV4L.</b> Failure of society to provide good schools for many Jamaicans	1	2	3	8	<b>JAMPOV4L</b>

And now to finish up, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.

**ED.** What was the last year of education you completed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ (primary, secondary, university) = \_\_\_\_\_ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
None	0						<b>ED</b>
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
University/Tertiary	12	13	14	15	17+		
Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	88						

<b>Q2.</b> How old are you? _____ years	<b>Q2</b>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<b>Q3.</b> Which is your religion? [Probe: What is your denomination?] <b>[Do not read options]</b> (1) Catholic (2) Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Adventist, Baptist, Calvinist, The Salvation Army, Lutheran, Methodist, Nazarene, Presbyterian). (3) Non-Christian Religions (Jewish, Muslims, Buddhists, Hinduisms, Taoists). (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Pentecostals, Charismatic non-Catholics, Light of World). (6) Mormons, Jehovah's Witness, Spiritualists and Seventh-Day Adventists. (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion). (4) None, secularist or atheist (Do not believe in God) (8) DK/DR	<b>Q3</b>		
<b>Q5A.</b> How often do you attend religious services? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once monthly (4) Once or twice yearly (5) Never (8) DK/DR	<b>Q5A</b>		

<p><b>[Show the list of ranges on Card E ]</b>  <b>Q10.</b> Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?                  (00) No income                  (01) Less than \$5,000                  (02) \$5,001- \$10,000                  (03) \$10,001- \$20,000                  (04) \$20,001- \$30,000                  (05) \$30,001- \$45,000                  (06) \$45,001- \$60,000                  (07) \$60,001 - \$80,000                  (08) \$80,001 - \$150,000                  (09) \$150,001-\$250,000                  (10) \$250,001 and above                  (88) DK/DR  <b>COLLECT CARD E</b></p>	<p><b>Q10</b></p>	
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<p><b>Q10A.</b> Do you or someone who lives with you receive remittances from abroad?                  (1) Yes (2) No <b>[Skip to 10C]</b> (8) DK/DR <b>[Skip to 10C]</b></p>	<p><b>Q10A</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10A1. [Only for those who receive remittances]</b> How do you generally use the remittances? <b>[Do not read]</b>                  (1) Consumption (food, clothing)                  (2) Housing (construction, repair)                  (3) Education                  (4) Community (schools repairs, reconstruction of churches/temples, community parties)                  (5) Health care                  (6) Savings/ Investments                  (7) Other                  (8) DK/DR                  (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10A1</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10B. [Only for those who receive remittances]</b> To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) DK/NA (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10B</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10C. [Ask to everybody]</b> Do you have close relatives who use to live in this household and are now living abroad? <b>[If answer “Yes”, Ask where]</b>  <b>[Do not read options]</b>                  (1) Yes, in the United States only                  (2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries                  (3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States)                  (4) No <b>[Go to Q14]</b>                  (8) DK/NA <b>[Go to Q14]</b></p>	<p><b>Q10C</b></p>	

<p><b>Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C]</b> How often do you communicate with them? <b>[Read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Everyday                  (2) Once or twice per week                  (3) Rarely                  (4) Never                  (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>		
<p><b>Q14. [Ask to everybody]</b> Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?</p> <p>1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/DR</p>	<b>Q14</b>	
<p><b>Q10D. [Ask to everybody]</b> The salary that you receive and total family income : <b>[ Read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Is enough, so that you can save                  (2) Is just enough, but you cannot save                  (3) Is not enough, you cannot pay your bills                  (4) Is not enough, you cannot cover your basic needs                  (8) <b>[Don't read]</b> DK/DR</p>	<b>Q10D</b>	
<p><b>Q11.</b> What is your marital status? <b>[Don't read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>Q11</b>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> How many children do you have? _____ (00 = none)                  DK.....(88)</p>	<b>Q12</b>	
<p><b>Q12A.</b> [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time?                  _____(00)=none, doesn't have children.</p>	<b>Q12A</b>	

<p><b>ETID.</b> Do you consider yourself black, indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race?</p> <p>(4) Black (6) Indian (1) White (9) Chinese (5) Mixed (7) Other (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>ETID</b>	
<p><b>LENG1.</b> What language have you spoken at home since childhood?  <b>[ACCEPT ONLY ONE OPTION]</b></p> <p>(2201) English only (2202) Patois only (2303) Both English and Patois (2204) Other (8) DK/DR</p>	<b>LENG1</b>	

<p><b>WWW1.</b> Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet?  <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Everyday or almost everyday                  (2) At least once per week                  (3) At least once per month                  (5) Rarely                  (6) Never                  (8) DK/DR <b>[Don't read]</b></p>	<b>WWW1</b>	
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To end, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **(read out all items)**

<b>R1.</b> Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R1</b>
<b>R3.</b> Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R3</b>

<b>R4.</b> Conventional/landline telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R4</b>
<b>R4A.</b> Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R4A</b>
<b>R5.</b> Vehicle	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6.</b> Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R6</b>
<b>R7.</b> Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R7</b>
<b>R8.</b> Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R8</b>
<b>R12.</b> Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R12</b>
<b>R14.</b> Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R14</b>
<b>R15.</b> Computer	(0) No			(1) Yes	<b>R15</b>

<p><b>OCUP4A.</b> How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently...</p> <p>(1) Working? <b>[Continue]</b></p> <p>(2) Is not working, but has a job? <b>[Continue]</b></p> <p>(3) Is actively looking for a job? <b>[END]</b></p> <p>(4) Is a student? <b>[END]</b></p> <p>(5) Does house work? <b>[END]</b></p> <p>(6) Is retired, pensioner or permanently disable to work <b>[END]</b></p> <p>(7) Doesn't work and is not looking for a job? <b>[END]</b></p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p>	<b>OCUP4A</b>	
<p><b>OCUP1.</b> What is your main occupation or type of work? <b>[Probe: what is your job about? ] [ Don't read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Manager</p> <p>(3) Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial branches, or other government employee)</p> <p>(6) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Food vendor</p> <p>(9) Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Farmer</p> <p>(11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land)</p> <p>(12) Artisan</p> <p>(13) Domestic servant</p> <p>(14) Servant</p> <p>(15) Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, firefighters, etc.)</p> <p>(88) DK (99) INAP</p>	<b>OCUP1</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

<p><b>OCUP1A.</b> In this job are you: <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?                  (2) A salaried employee in the private sector?                  (3) Owner or partner in a business                  (4) Self-employed                  (5) Unpaid worker                  (8) DK/DR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
<p><b>JAMPOV2.</b> How concerned would you say you are that you will be left without work or unemployed during the next 12 months? <b>[Read the options]</b>                  (1) Very concerned (2) Concerned (3) A little concerned (4) Not at all concerned (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>JAMPOV2</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> Do you have health insurance through your employer?                  (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>	

<p><b>Time interview ended</b> _____ : _____  <b>TI.</b> Duration of interview <i>[minutes, see page # 1]</i> _____</p>	<p><b>TI</b></p>	<p><input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/></p>
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
*These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.*

*I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.*  
 Interviewer's signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_  
 Field supervisor's signature \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comments: \_\_\_\_\_ ? \_\_\_\_\_


*Card # 1*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Left</b>					<b>Right</b>				

*Card "A"*



*Card "B"*



*Card “C”*

**Strongly  
approve**

**10**

**9**

**8**

**7**

**6**

**5**

**4**

**3**

**2**






**Strongly  
disapprove**

**1**

*Card “JAM1”*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b><u>INDIVIDUAL</u></b> should be responsible for providing							<b><u>GOVERNMENT</u></b> should be responsible for providing		

Card "JAM2"



*Card E*

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$5,000
- (02) \$5,001- \$10,000
- (03) \$10,001-\$20,000
- (04) \$20,001-\$30,000
- (05) \$30,001-\$45,000
- (06) \$45,001-\$60,000
- (07) \$60,001-\$80,000
- (08) \$80,001-150,000
- (09) \$150,001-\$250,000
- (10) \$250,000 and above



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