

# A Study of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

## The Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras, 2004



HONDURAS

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## Executive Summary

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This report is the result of a study of the political culture of Hondurans, which was carried out using a survey of public opinion between February and March 2004. The survey covered a sample of 1,500 adult Hondurans representing the population of Honduras. It was done with a 95% confidence level and a sampling error of approximately 2.5%. The survey is part of a broader study of political culture carried out in the countries of Central America, Colombia and México.

The system support scale seeks to measure the level of support citizens extend to their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent government. In the political science literature, this is referred to as “diffuse support” or “system support.” The scale was constructed by taking the mean of its five constituent questions, after converting each of the five items to a 0-100 range. The individual mean scores for the items were as follows: basic rights (46), courts (48), pride (52), support (54), and institutions (58). The resulting system support scale had a mean of 53.7.

The scale of political tolerance is based on four questions which refer to four basic liberties: the right to vote, the right to conduct peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of expression. The scale is the mean of the four constituent items, each of which was first converted to a 0-100 range. The individual mean scores for the four items were as follows: run for public office (53), give a speech (54), vote (57), conduct peaceful demonstrations (61), and the resulting scale of political tolerance had a mean of 56.1.

In the analysis of support for stable democracy, we have explored the relationship between the system support scale and the tolerance scale by first splitting each of the scales into two levels, low and high, and then combining them to obtain a 2 x 2 table. The distribution of respondents across the four cells of the table is as follows: 30% are in the “stable democracy” cell; 23% are in the “authoritarian stability” cell; 22% are in the “unstable democracy” cell, and 26% are in the “democratic breakdown” cell.

Regarding respondents’ evaluations of democracy, 24% think that the country is very democratic, 42% that it is somewhat democratic, 28% that it is not very democratic, while 6% think that it is undemocratic. In addition, we found that 11% of the respondents are very satisfied with the working of democracy in the country, 53% are satisfied, 30% are dissatisfied, and 6% are very dissatisfied.

The study also finds strong support for democracy as a form of government: 73% of the respondents prefer the current system of government, compared to 27% who favor the return of the military. 78.5% of the respondents prefer electoral democracy compared to 21.5% who favor a strong man; and 56.7% prefer democracy as a form of government compared to 13.7% who prefer an authoritarian government, 12.5% for whom a democratic government is no different from an authoritarian one, and 17.1% who don’t know. On a 0-100 scale measuring the degree of agreement with the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government, the mean score for Hondurans is 67.7.

73.6% of Hondurans see corruption as a somewhat common or very common problem among public officials. On a 0-100 scale measuring the perception of the degree of corruption among public officials, the mean score for Hondurans is 69.5. This perception is one of the lowest in the

region, in comparison with the countries of Central America, Colombia and México. The perception of corruption seems to be determined, to a large extent, by level of political knowledge, educational level, and place of residence within the country.

Priests, teachers and the press are the most honest groups in the opinion of the Honduran citizens that were surveyed, while the groups perceived as least honest are government ministers, political party leaders and congressional deputies.

Almost 19% of Hondurans were victims of an act of corruption during the year preceding the survey. The most common acts of victimization include: the payment of bribes in schools, which affects 11.3% of citizens who have children enrolled in school, and the payment of bribes in the offices of the municipality, which affects 10.2% of those who make use of municipal services.

Overall, victimization by corruption affects those who are more educated, those who have more household capital goods, those who live in large cities, and those who usually participate in meetings of the municipality.

Victimization by corruption seems to affect citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Honduras. Individuals who have been victimized more frequently by corruption tend to be less satisfied with the way democracy functions in the country.

13.7% of the respondents have been victims of a criminal act. The most common acts are robbery without aggression (45% of the victims), assault with aggression or physical threat (39.5%), and burglary at home (10%).

The persons who tend to be victimized more frequently by the types of crime covered by the survey are younger persons, males, those who live in urban areas, and those who have a higher level of education.

Only 32.7% of crime victims report the crimes to the authorities. People who do not report crimes tend not to do so because they think that it serves no purpose (38.9%), because they think it is dangerous (29.8%), because they lack evidence (17.6%), or because they think that the crime was not very serious (11.5%).

The most commonly reported crimes are those that are considered more serious. However, the most frequent crimes, such as thefts, which affect a large percentage of the population, are not reported by more than 30% of the victims.

The study showed that crime victimization affects the levels of trust in national institutions, decreases citizens' satisfaction with the working of democracy, and erodes support for the political system.

Almost a third of all Hondurans feel insecure due to the possibility of becoming a victim of a criminal act. The perception of insecurity depends on the acts of victimization to which the person was exposed, but it also depends on the respondent's attention to the news disseminated by the media.

The perception of insecurity also has a significant impact on trust in national institutions, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, and system support. Individuals who feel more insecure due to crime tend to have less trust in institutions, and tend to be less satisfied with the working of democracy.

The study found greater proximity between citizens and local government, in terms of seeking assistance or cooperation in order to solve their problems.

The data from the survey show low levels of citizen participation in the working of municipal governments, measured by attendance at a “*cabildo abierto*” (15.1%), attendance at a municipal meeting (10.2%), or by the presentation of requests for assistance or petitions to the municipality (12.3%). However, the level of participation is higher in “*patronatos*” (31.7%). Among the respondents, there is a negative assessment of the degree to which municipal officials pay attention to what the people request in such meetings: 3.7% think they pay a lot of attention, 23.5% some attention, 32.5% little attention, 24.1% no attention, while 16.3% do not know.

With respect to attendance at cabildos, we see dissatisfaction among those who attend because the meetings do not achieve their objectives (66.5%), though it is acknowledged that the meetings do allow participants to express their thoughts (77.3%).

Broadly speaking, we see a high level of trust in the municipality. The data indicate satisfaction with municipal services overall, and satisfaction is higher for specific services: sanitation, trash collection and drinking water. Almost half of the respondents think municipalities should be given more responsibilities and funds, while a third of the respondents feel that the national government should accept more responsibilities and municipal services. We also find a low level of trust in how municipal corporations manage their funds.

Respondents expressed a moderate evaluation of the openness of the mayor to citizens’ participation, and most prefer a mayor who consults the municipal corporation and the people before acting.

The main determinants of Hondurans’ intentions to vote are: age, level of political knowledge, region of residence, evaluation of the country’s democratic character, and involvement in electoral campaigns.

The study finds low levels of citizens’ trust in political parties (a mean score of 31.64 on a 0-100 scale), but also in the elections (a mean score of 42.16 on a 0-100 scale). However, it finds that citizens value a free environment for voting in the elections.

Respondents express a high level of support for the two electoral reforms about which they were asked: support for setting a minimum quota in order to increase the participation of women that can be elected to congress (a mean score of 6.79 on a 1-10 scale) and support for redrawing electoral districts (a mean score of 6.40 on a 1-10 scale).

Hondurans show a relatively low level of interpersonal trust, compared to the other countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia. Within the country, the highest levels of trust are found among peasants, and among persons with lower incomes and resources.

The survey found that interpersonal trust is related to citizens' level of satisfaction with the working of democracy. Those who show greater trust in their neighbors and compatriots tend to be more satisfied with the performance of the democratic regime in the country.

With respect to overall trust in national institutions, Hondurans show an intermediate level of trust overall. Trust in institutions tends to be higher in rural areas and among those with low household incomes.

Institutional trust is related to interpersonal trust. The greater people's trust in institutions, the more they trust each other. Trust in institutions also appears to be related to tolerance and system support. Political tolerance and system support increase as citizens' trust in the country's institutions rises.

Men, middle-aged adults, persons with a higher educational level, and those who live in small cities and rural areas tend to show higher levels of civic participation than the rest of the citizens.

The social capital of Honduran citizens, measured by the presence of interpersonal trust, institutional trust and civic participation, appears to be associated with the variables of educational level and region of the country. Those with a low level of education and those who live in the southern and western areas of the country have the highest levels of social capital.

Crime and insecurity have an impact on social capital in the population. Those who have been victims of a criminal act, and those who feel very insecure due to criminal violence tend to present lower levels of social capital on average.

Social capital seems to stimulate support for the political system and satisfaction with the working of democracy in Honduras. Citizens who present higher levels of social capital show greater support for the political system and greater satisfaction with the performance of the democratic regime.

Tolerance is also related to social capital. Levels of political tolerance tend to be higher among those who participate more in organizations, and have greater trust in others and in institutions

The study suggests the importance of social capital for strengthening attitudes favorable to a democratic political culture in Honduras.



## Preface

---

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG.” Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups –ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

Margaret Sarles  
Division Chief, Strategic Planning and Research  
Democracy and Governance Office, DCHA  
US Agency for International Development

## Prologue

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### **Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response**

The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortunately, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.<sup>1</sup> As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subjects to protect their identities are respected.

When readers examine the findings presented in this study, as well as in the other country studies and the synthesis volume, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately  $\pm 2.5\%$  sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an

obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

## **Acknowledgements**

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles, Bruce Kay and Eric Kite in the Office of Democracy and Governance” of USAID, supported by Maria Barrón in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them, as well as to Todd Amani, USAID/Guatemala, who assumed the role of coordinating the project at the USAID end. ARD of Burlington, Vermont, managed the finances of the project and the formatting of the publications. Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. These include, for Mexico, Jorge Buendía and Alejandro Moreno, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM); for Guatemala, Dinorah Azpuru and Juan Pablo Pira, Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES); for El Salvador and Honduras, Ricardo Córdova, Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), José Miguel Cruz, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana, UCA, and Siddhartha Baviskar, University of Pittsburgh; for Nicaragua, Luis Serra and Pedro López Ruiz, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); for Costa Rica, Luis Rosero-Bixby, Universidad de Costa Rica and Jorge Vargas, Programa Estado de la Nación; for Panamá, Marco A. Gandásegui hijo, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA) and Orlando J. Pérez, Central Michigan University; for Colombia, Carlos Lemoine, Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of Pittsburgh. Polibio Córdova, CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, provided excellent guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
August, 2004



## Introduction

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“Democracy requires a culture that sustains it, that is, the acceptance by citizens and political elites of certain principles reflected in the freedom of expression, of information, of worship, and in the rights of opposition parties, in the rule of law and human rights, among others. Such norms, however, do not evolve overnight.”<sup>2</sup>

The above quotation summarizes the importance of political culture for the construction of democracy in a country. This report is the result of research on the political culture of democracy in Honduras in 2004. It is part of a regional effort coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, directed by Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson, and financed by the United States Agency for International Development, with the aim of studying the political culture of the countries of Central America, México and Colombia, given the importance that values, norms and attitudes have in the processes of democratic consolidation in the Meso-American region.

The fieldwork was entrusted to the company Borge and Associates, which designed the sampling frame on the basis of criteria stipulated by Professor Seligson, and implemented the surveys. At a later stage, Professor Seligson invited us to write the report on “The Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras: 2004.”

The present report is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter we review the socio-economic and political context of the country at the time the research was conducted. The second chapter describes the methodology employed. Beginning with chapter three, we present the results of the study, divided into different thematic areas. The third chapter addresses the subject of support for democracy; the fourth deals with corruption; the fifth presents the results on victimization and insecurity in Honduras; the sixth chapter is devoted to examining the results on the subject of local government; the seventh refers to Hondurans’ electoral behavior, and in the eighth chapter we tackle the subject of social capital and citizen participation.

This report is the product of the work of various individuals who made it possible. Siddhartha Baviskar of the University of Pittsburgh collaborated in the preparation of a considerable part of the figures for the report. In IUDOP, Rubí Esmeralda Arana, Patricia Jule y María Santacruz were crucial to the preparation of the research report through their comments, suggestions and contributions. In FUNDAUNGO, Javier Urrea assisted in the preparation of the section on country background, and Loida Pineda in the editing of the document. Finally, we are grateful for the comments and suggestions of Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson.

The authors

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2 Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1996). “Repensando los requisitos sociales de la democracia”. *La Política. Revista de estudios sobre el Estado y la sociedad*, 2, 51-88.





## 1.0 The Country Context

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In this section we present the basic aspects of the country's context during the past few years, focusing on three aspects. First, we address the socio-economic context, for which we review trends in human development and the performance of the Honduran economy. Second, we examine the political context, for which we review the return to democracy, the elections and the topic of electoral reform. Third, we identify recent studies on the subject of political culture in Honduras.

### 1.1 The Socio-Economic Context

In this section we address four topics. First, we present a regional vision of Human Development; second, we analyze Human Development in Honduras; third, we review the evolution of poverty, and fourth, we describe the performance of the Honduran economy.

#### 1.1.1 A Regional Vision of Human Development

For the countries of the Central American region, the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>3</sup> has shown overall improvement in the past ten years, as can be seen in Figure I.1. The region can be divided into two groups: in one group, Costa Rica, which is the only country to achieve a level of high human development; in the other the rest of the countries with a level of medium development (Panamá, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua).


In Costa Rica we find the highest HDI in the region (0.832 in 2001), despite a slight decrease which occurred toward the end of the 1990s and continued into the beginning of 2000. Panamá has shown a sustained increase in its HDI, going from 0.738 in 1990 to 0.788 in 2001, approaching the threshold of the level of high human development, but not quite reaching it still.

However, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua each had an HDI below or near 0.500 for 1990, and showed an improvement for 2001, on achieving an HDI higher than 0.600. The exception was El Salvador, which achieved an HDI higher than 0.700 from 1999 onwards. However, for 2001, Honduras had an HDI of 0.667.

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<sup>3</sup> The HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a specific country or region on three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income. This means enjoying a long and healthy life, having access to education, and having a decent standard of living. Countries have been classified into three categories: low human development (HDI less than 0.500), medium human development (HDI between 0.500 and 0.799), and high human development (HDI greater than 0.800). The indicators for Honduras for measuring human development are: chronic malnutrition during infancy, for health; combined primary and secondary gross enrolment ratio and the rate of adult literacy, for education, and an estimate of the level of per capita income adjusted for PPP, based on the average number of years of education of the heads of households, for income. See PNUD, *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2003*, p. 29.

**Figure I.1 Central America: Human Development Index**



Source: Constructed by the authors with data from UNDP, Human Development Reports: 1993, 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003.

According to the Human Development Report,<sup>4</sup> in 2001 Honduras was ranked 115 out a total of 175 countries. This means that, according to the HDI classification, the country was placed in the category of medium human development. From a sub-regional perspective, Honduras shares with Guatemala and Nicaragua (ranked 119 and 121, respectively) the lowest HDI in the region. El Salvador is placed 105, and Panamá is in 59th place, very close to achieving a high HDI. The only Central American country that has a high HDI is Costa Rica, which occupies position 42 and is one of the best placed Latin American countries.

**Table I.1 Classification of Central American countries on 2001 HDI**

Rank	Country	HDI	HDI value
42	Costa Rica	High	0.832
59	Panamá	Medium	0.788
105	El Salvador	Medium	0.719
<b>115</b>	<b>Honduras</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>0.667</b>
119	Guatemala	Medium	0.652
121	Nicaragua	Medium	0.643

Source: Constructed by the authors with data from UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003*.

### 1.1.2 Human Development in Honduras

Living conditions in Honduras have improved in the past few years. The HDI shows the following performance: it went from 0.472 in 1990 to 0.641 in 1997, and then to 0.653 in 1998; it then fell to 0.634 in 1999 to rise to 0.638 in 2000, and then increased to 0.667 in 2001. The rank that Honduras has held according to the UNDP classification has also changed, as shown in Table I.2.<sup>5</sup> The changes in rank do not necessarily reflect an improvement in the HDI; they are

<sup>4</sup> UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Classification obtained from: PNUD. *Informes sobre Desarrollo Humano*: 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.

mainly a function of the number of countries in which the measurement is carried out. Thus, the notable change in 1999 does not represent considerable variation in the HDI; it is due to the decrease in the number of countries in which the measurement was done for that year's report.

**Table I.2 World Rank of Honduras in Human Development and in the HDI**

Year	Rank	Total no. of countries	HDI
1990	116	173	0.472
1991	NA*	NA	NA
1992	116	174	0.578
1993	114	174	0.576
1994	NA	NA	NA
1995	119	174	0.573
1996	NA	NA	NA
1997	114	174	0.641
1998	113	174	0.653
1999	107	162	0.634
2000	116	173	0.638
2001	115	175	0.667

Source: Constructed by the authors with data from the World Human Development Reports for 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.

\* Note: Information not available.

On the other hand, in spite of the relative improvement of the HDI at a national level, important imbalances, between the different departments and municipalities are apparent in the interior of the country. Table I.3 presents clear evidence of these imbalances.

**Table I.3 Honduras: Indicators of Human Development, by Department.  
1998, 2002 y 2003<sup>6</sup>**

Departament	1998*	2002	2003*
Islas de la Bahía	0.787	0.791	0.811
Francisco Morazán	0.727	0.737	0.748
Cortés	0.697	0.705	0.736
Atlántida	0.678	0.687	0.711
Gracias a Dios	0.669	0.679	0.704
Colón	0.651	0.647	0.657
Olancho	0.612	0.608	0.635
Yoro	0.634	0.636	0.634
Comayagua	0.617	0.604	0.631
Valle	0.638	0.628	0.630
Choluteca	0.614	0.619	0.609
El Paraíso	0.594	0.592	0.605
La Paz	0.546	0.548	0.585
Ocotepeque	0.564	0.554	0.568
Santa Bárbara	0.521	0.516	0.569
Copán	0.510	0.519	0.556
Intibucá	0.499	0.491	0.483
Lempira	0.453	0.447	0.463
<b>Honduras</b>	<b>0.634</b>	<b>0.638</b>	<b>0.657</b>

Fuente: elaboración propia con base en: PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2002, p 12; e Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2003, p 35.

\* Nota: Los años que figuran en el cuadro son los correspondientes a los de los Informes sobre Desarrollo de Honduras consultados.

In Honduras, we can see wide gaps between some regions, which have some departments with standards of living similar to those in some developed countries, and other departments in which living conditions are precarious. For example, we can see values of the index ranging from 0.811 in the case of Islas de la Bahía, which is the department with the highest human development, to 0.463 for Lempira, which represents the lowest level of development at the departmental level. If we compare the values of the HDI for 1998 and 2003, some departments, such as Intibucá, Valle and Choluteca, show a deterioration.

### 1.1.3 Evolution of Poverty

According to data from the World Bank, Honduras progressed in poverty reduction in the past 11 years. Total poverty at the national level went from 74.8% in 1991 to 63.3% in 2002 (a decrease of 11.5 percentage points), while extreme poverty went from 54.2% in 1991 to 45.2% in 2002 (a reduction of 9 points). The reduction in poverty is greater in urban areas, where extreme poverty went from 46.7% to 27.2% (a reduction of 19.5 points) and total poverty from 68.4% to 55.5% (a reduction of 12.9 points). However, in rural areas, extreme poverty increased from 59.9% in 1991 to 62.7% in 2002 (an increase of 2.8 points), although rural total poverty decreased from 79.6% in 1991 to 70.8% in 2002 (a reduction of 8.8 points).

<sup>6</sup> Nótese que los datos del Cuadro I.2 no coinciden con los del Cuadro I.3, debido a que para el primero se utiliza como fuente el Informe sobre Desarrollo Mundial que utiliza para medir el logro en salud la esperanza de vida, mientras que para el Cuadro I.3 nos hemos basado en el Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano de Honduras que utiliza la tasa de desnutrición para medir el mismo logro. Además los años base utilizados varían en el Informe de Honduras.

**Table I.4 Honduras: Percentage of Households in Poverty, 1991-2002**

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002
<b>NATIONAL</b>											
Extreme poverty	54.2	47.4	45.1	47.0	47.4	53.7	48.4	45.6	48.6	47.4	45.2
Total poverty	74.8	69.9	67.5	67.4	67.8	68.7	65.8	63.1	65.9	64.5	63.3
<b>Urban</b>											
Extreme poverty	46.7	39.2	31.6	39.8	40.6	38.7	35.2	35.7	36.5	36.1	27.2
Total poverty	68.4	61.6	55.5	62.6	62.8	61.0	59.0	57.0	57.3	56.3	55.5
<b>Rural</b>											
Extreme poverty	59.9	53.9	55.8	52.9	53.1	66.4	60.0	55.4	60.9	60.5	62.7
Total poverty	79.6	76.5	77.1	71.1	71.9	75.3	71.7	69.2	74.6	73.8	70.8

Source: Constructed by the authors with data from World Bank, *Country Assistance Strategy, 2003*, p. 5.

However, an analysis of the evolution of the levels of poverty presented in the earlier table indicates that while these have tended to fall, there has been a deceleration in the past few years. Between 1999 and 2002, total poverty at the national level was reduced by 2.6%, and extreme poverty by 3.4%. In any case, 6.3 % of Honduran households live in poverty, and 45.2% live in extreme poverty

The UNDP “Human Development Report Honduras 2003” presents other data on poverty. “In Honduras, 71.1% of the population lives in poverty. Of the rural population, 77.7% are poor, and in the urban population this proportion is 63.1% (...).”<sup>7</sup> In addition, it points out the inequality in income distribution in the following manner: “the richest 20% of households receives 54.3% of the total income of the country, while the poorest 20% gets only 3.2% of the income.”<sup>8</sup>

### 1.1.4 Economic Performance


The behavior of the Honduran economy over the last ten years has been characterized by undergrowth of production. Figure I.2 shows the evolution of the annual rate of growth in GDP. In 1995, it grew by 4.1%, in 1996 by 3.6%, and by 5% in 1997, before dropping to 2.9% in 1998. In 1999, the Honduran economy shrank (a -1.9% growth rate), mainly as a result of Hurricane Mitch.<sup>9</sup> It then experienced a high rate of growth in 2000 (5%), and during 2001 and 2002 it experienced lower than expected growth, expanding by 2.6% and 2.7%, respectively. After discounting the rate of population growth, we find that GDP per capita grew by 0.2% in 2001 and by 0.3% in 2002.

<sup>7</sup> PNUD, *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2003*, p. 78.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>9</sup> “The devastation produced by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998 impacted Honduras’ overall economic performance during 1999. Economic activity shrank by 2%.” CEPAL. *Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y El Caribe, 1999*, p. 50.

**Figure I.2 Honduras: Annual Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita and Annual Rate of Growth of GDP, 1992-2002**



Source: Constructed by the authors with data from *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)*, World Bank, 2001, p. 21, and *PRSP First Annual Progress Report*, World Bank, 2004, p. 15.

## 1.2 The Political Context

The holding of elections to elect a National Constituent Assembly in April 1980 marked the beginning of the return to democracy in Honduras. The Constituent Assembly passed the “Ley Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas” through which it called for general elections on 25 November 1981; in addition, a new Constitution was promulgated.

The process of democratization which has developed in Honduras in the past two decades has been characterized by two basic elements: (1) the reactivation of political parties and the periodic holding of free and competitive elections, and (2) a process of demilitarization of the State.

### 1.2.1 Electoral Processes

General elections are held the same day every four years (the last Sunday of the month of November) at four levels: for the presidency, the National Congress,<sup>10</sup> the Central American Parliament, and for the Local Governments.<sup>11</sup> Following the 1980 elections for the Constituent Assembly, general elections were held in 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.

The Honduran electoral system has two variants depending on the level of the election. For the presidency there is a system of relative majority, while for deputies and municipal governments there is a system of proportional representation through the Party List modality: “at the municipal and legislative levels, candidacy is through rigid Party List (closed and blocked), in

<sup>10</sup> The National Congress is unicameral and a fixed number of 128 deputies are elected from the 18 departments.

<sup>11</sup> For an analysis of the electoral system in Honduras, see: Cáliz Rodríguez, José Alvaro. *Caracterización y análisis del sistema electoral en Honduras*. Serie Política e Instituciones, Documento de trabajo No. 4, PNUD-FIDE, April 2001.

which the voter cannot change either the order of the list, or select candidates from different parties (...).”<sup>12 13</sup>

A summary assessment of the process has indicated that “since 1981 six general elections have been held consecutively. This uninterrupted sequence of elections is unprecedented in the country’s political history. The transition from one political regime to another was one of the most difficult things in Honduran political history. In this context, political regimes imposed by the incumbent government, rigged elections, civil war and, more recently, the military coup d’ état were common.”<sup>14</sup>

Table I.5 shows the results of presidential elections held between 1981 and 2001.

**Table I.5 Honduras: Results of elections for the presidency of the Republic, 1981-2001.**

Party	1981		1985		1989	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Liberal Party	<b>636437</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>786771</b>	<b>49.2</b>	776983	43.2
National Party	491089	40.4	701492	43.9	<b>917168</b>	<b>51.0</b>
Innovation and Unity Party	29419	2.4	23721	1.5	33952	1.9
Christian Democratic Party of Honduras	19163	1.6	30303	1.9	25453	1.4
Independents	3997	0.3	-	-	-	-
Total valid votes	1180105	97.1	1542287	96.5	1753556	97.5
Null	17244	1.4	27713	1.7	27107	1.5
Blank	17430	1.4	28247	1.8	18483	1.0
Total votes	1214779	100.0	1598247	100.0	1799146	100.0
Party	1993		1997		2001	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Liberal Party	<b>906793</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>1040403</b>	<b>49.6</b>	964590	42.2
National Party	735123	41.4	844985	40.3	<b>1137734</b>	<b>49.8</b>
Innovation and Unity Party	48471	2.7	41525	2.0	31666	1.4
Christian Democratic Party of Honduras	20350	1.1	24737	1.2	21089	0.9
Democratic Unification Party	-	-	24243	1.2	24102	1.1
Total valid votes	1710737	96.3	1975893	94.2	2179181	95.4
Null	43572	2.5	86617	4.1	81959	3.6
Blank	21895	1.2	34056	1.6	23927	1.0
Total votes	1776204	100.0	2096566	100.0	2285067	100.0

Source: Constructed by the authors with data from the National Elections Tribunal of Honduras.

At present there are five legally registered parties: the National Party (Partido Nacional, PN), the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal, PL), the Innovation and Social Democratic Unity Party (Partido Innovación y Unidad Social Demócrata, PINU-SD), the Christian Democratic Party of Honduras (Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras, PDCH), and the Democratic Unification Party (Partido Unificación Democrática, UD). The first four have participated in the seven elections

<sup>12</sup> Cáliz Rodríguez, José A. Caracterización y análisis del sistema electoral en Honduras. Serie Política e Instituciones. Documento de trabajo No. 4, PNUD-FIDE, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> En las reformas electorales aprobadas en 2004, se introduce una nueva modalidad de voto personalizado que se aplicará para el nivel de diputados en las elecciones generales de 2005.

<sup>14</sup> PNUD, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2002, p. 35.

held since 1981, and the fifth began participating in the 1997 elections. The party system is characterized as two-party<sup>15</sup> owing to the predominance of the majority parties, the Liberal Party and the National Party; these have alternated in government during the past 20 years. The Liberal Party won the presidency in 1981, 1985, 1993 and 1997; and the National Party in 1989 and 2001.

However, if we compare the electoral constituency of the small parties, between the presidential and legislative elections of 1997, “(...) we see that in the executive, the sum of the votes of the three small parties reached 4.3% (90,309 votes), while the sum at the legislative level reached 8.1% (168,721 votes). (...) In this perspective, our assumption is that one of the aspects that influenced this positive difference in favor of the small parties is related to the fact that, once the vote was separated, a section of the electorate – starting from the fact that now the legislative vote was distinct from that at the presidential level – knew that if they did not agree with the lists of the majority parties, or if they liked some candidate from the list of deputies of a small party, voting for the latter no longer meant throwing away the presidential vote (...).”<sup>16</sup>

New possibilities also arose for the small parties in the 2001 elections. “(...) the PINU and, above all, the UD and the PDCH, sent an unusually high number of deputies to the National Congress and a good number of mayors and municipal councilors. In the recently held general elections, the PINU, the UD and the PDCH together managed to obtain 12 seats in the National Congress: 5 for the UD, 4 for the PDCH and 3 for the PINU. The PDCH obtained three municipal mayoralties and 45 councilorships, the UD obtained 27, and the PINU, 21.”<sup>17</sup>

### **1.2.2 The Demilitarization of the State**

The second element that has characterized democratization is a process of demilitarization of the State, focusing on the subordination of the military to the civilian, democratically elected power. This process of re-defining civil-military relations developed along three lines: (a) in 1994 a constitutional reform eliminating compulsory military service and establishing voluntary military service in times of peace was passed; (b) in 1996, the Congress unanimously ratified the constitutional reform separating the functions and institutions charged with national defense, a new National Police was established to take charge of internal security, and in 1998 a new Ministry of Security was created, and (c) in 1999 the constitutional reforms eliminating the figure of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces were passed, and a Secretariat of State was established in the Office of National Defense. The minister in charge of the Office of National Defense would be named by the President of the Republic. In January 1999 the first civilian was named as Minister of Defense.

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<sup>15</sup> According to a recent typology of Central American party systems, Honduras is characterized by a two party system. The functional properties of a two party system are: (a) two parties should be in conditions to compete for the absolute majority of seats; (b) one of the two parties manages to effectively obtain a sufficient parliamentary majority; (c) this party is willing to govern alone, and (d) alternation or rotation in power continues to be a credible expectation. See: Artiga González, Alvaro. *La política y los sistemas de partidos en Centroamérica*. 1st. Ed. San Salvador, El Sal.: FUNDAUNGO, 2000, pp. 23-24.

<sup>16</sup> Cáliz Rodríguez, José A. *Caracterización y análisis del sistema electoral en Honduras*. Serie Política e Instituciones, Tegucigalpa, PNUD-FIDE, 2001, pp. 38-39.

<sup>17</sup> Posas, Mario. *Honduras: una democracia en proceso*. Tegucigalpa, UNDP, 2003, p. 20.



“Since the beginning of the 1980s, Honduras has been going through a long and complicated process of political transition, which began with the end of the military regimes of the period 1963-1980, passed through a phase of power-sharing between civilian politicians and uniformed military in the decade from 1980 to 1990, and, finally, ended in an open and democratic, plural, participative and tolerant society in the 1990s and in these first years of the twenty-first century.”<sup>18</sup>

As a consequence of the process of State demilitarization, civil-military relations have been redefined in the framework of a recent political, institutional and cultural process of construction of democracy. As Leticia Salomón points out: “The construction of democracy begins with important modifications in the area of civil-military relations, which takes us to a process of recovering spaces controlled by the military in the authoritarian past; an institutional restructuring of the Armed Forces and of the Police, and a structuring of new axes in the relationship between Armed Forces and society.”<sup>19</sup>

### 1.2.3 The Electoral Reform

In the past decade important advances have been made in electoral affairs: “(...) the approval of the separate vote for the 1993 elections, followed by the passing of the separate vote on separate ballot for the 1997 elections.”<sup>20</sup> Further, the 1997 elections saw the introduction of the domiciliary vote, which facilitated voters’ access to the ballot box, in contrast to previous elections in which the voter had to travel to his place of birth to vote. In addition, the domiciliary vote gave the citizen greater autonomy in exercising this public duty, because previously transportation on election day was almost all controlled by the majority political parties, which, in some way, put pressure on citizens. Now polling booths are situated in public places – generally educational institutions – in the neighborhood, village or place of residence of each citizen.”<sup>21</sup>

In the pre-electoral context, on 4 September 2001, the candidates for the Presidency of the Republic from the five parties signed the “Manifiesto of the Political Parties to the Honduran People,” which began the current process of electoral reform, which is still continuing and has produced the following results: (1) constitutional reforms for (a) the prohibition of the President of the Congress and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice from running as candidates for the presidency of the republic; (b) the substitution of presidential designees for the post of a vice-president of the republic; and (c) the separation of the National Registry of Persons from the National Elections Tribunal, and the creation of a Supreme Electoral Tribunal; (2) a new electoral law was promulgated in 2003, creating the new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, now separated from the National Registry of Persons.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Meza, Víctor. Honduras: sistema político, crisis y reformas. Monitoreo desde la sociedad civil. Tegucigalpa, CEDOH, 2003, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Salomón, Leticia. *Las relaciones civiles – militares en Honduras*. Tegucigalpa, CEDOH, 1999, p. 85.

<sup>20</sup> Cáliz Rodríguez, José A. *Caracterización y análisis del sistema electoral en Honduras*. Serie Política e Instituciones, Tegucigalpa, PNUD-FIDE, 2001, p. 21.

<sup>21</sup> PNUD, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2002, p. 35.

<sup>22</sup> For a global vision of the 2001 electoral process and the subject of electoral reform, see: Meza, Víctor. *Proceso electoral 2001. Monitoreo desde la sociedad civil*. Tegucigalpa, CEDOH, 2002.

While the electoral reform which has been undertaken in the past few years is important, there are various topics on which specific proposals have been presented without being followed up by any political agreements, however. In this regard, there are a variety of electoral reform proposals which should form part of the public debate in the near future.

### **1.3 Recent Studies on Political Culture in Honduras**

The study of political culture is relatively recent in Honduras. Four studies were found in the bibliographical review conducted to identify the studies published on the subject:

- 1) *Leticia Salomón. "Desarrollo democrático y cultura política en Honduras". In: Florisabel Rodríguez, Silvia Castro, Rowland Espinosa (editores). El sentir democrático. Estudios sobre la cultura política centroamericana. San José, PROCESO-Editorial Fundación UNA, 1998.*

This study centers on the analysis of data from a survey "which PROCESOS carried out in September 1997 all over Central America, which is complemented, for a qualitative analysis, by the results of another survey carried out in May 1996 for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and published as "Informe Latinobarometro" (1998, p. 203). The study examines the following sections: (a) political culture in present day Honduras, (b) the components of political culture, laying emphasis on democratic values, support for democratic institutions and attitudes and beliefs about the community, (c) political culture and democratic sustainability, and (d) tolerance, system support and political stability.

- 2) *Leticia Salomón. Honduras: Cultura Política y Democracia. Tegucigalpa, CEDOH-PRODECA, 1998.*

This study "(...) constitutes the final product of research carried out between 1996 and 1997, under the title "Honduran Political Culture in the Process of Democratic Construction," sponsored by the Danish Program for Human Rights for Central America (PRODECA)" (p. 1). It analyzes the discourse of different political actors on topics relevant to democracy such as pluralism, tolerance, debate, electoral processes and the vices of the political system during the governments of 1990-1994 and 1994-1998.

The study focused on "the analysis of the speeches of different political actors as recorded in the press during the seven year period of the study, and on an opinion survey carried out on 78 figures from the academic, cultural, social and journalistic world (...)" (1998, p. 2).

- 3) *PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2003.*

In the *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 2003*, the topic of culture is addressed as the central axis for focusing reflections on the country's development: "In this new Report (...) the cultural dimension of development has been selected as the axis of analysis, on the understanding that culture interacts with other dimensions of development (...) That is to say, culture plays the role of a filter or social catalyst with respect to the stimuli that come from the political, economic, technological, educational, ecological and health systems."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Honduras 2003. La cultura: medio y fin del desarrollo. Tegucigalpa, PNUD, 2003, pp. 11-12.

The study is divided into different chapters. The first few chapters deal with trends in human development and social spending as an instrument for reducing inequities in Honduras; later chapters focus on the cultural changes in the country toward the 21<sup>st</sup> century, modernization in present-day society, new processes of urbanization, and the current cultural identity. There is a discussion of certain social phenomena such as HIV/AIDS, juvenile gangs, and corruption from the perspective of cultural links. Other chapters also analyze the relevance of culture and values for the nation's economic development; in addition, they examine the institutional context of culture, focusing on topics related to cultural policies, legal strengthening and cultural heritage.

“Studying the cultural dimension of human development in Honduras is not fortuitous, because it responds to questions arising from the analysis carried out in the first four national reports. The findings and conclusions of these reports indicate that many of the problems and obstacles in development seem to lie in aspects related to the lack of trust between individuals and their institutions, corruption, weak citizen participation, the persistence of a short-term vision, low competitiveness and an inadequate capacity among Hondurans to take the initiative.”<sup>24</sup>

4) *Leticia Salomón. “Honduras: los jóvenes y la cultura política democrática”. In Florisabel Rodríguez, Silvia Castro, Johnny Madrigal (editores). Con la herencia de la paz: cultura política de la juventud centroamericana. Heredia, Costa Rica, Editorial Fundación UNA, 1ª edición, 2003.*

This research is part of a study coordinated at the Central American level by PROCESOS, and based on surveys of youth enrolled in secondary school, carried out in the year 2000. For the case of Honduras, the political culture of the youth is analyzed on the basis of a survey of 2,340 young individuals coming from the first and last years of secondary school in the metropolitan areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The study covers the following topics: the political-cultural context in which young people live, young people's vision of their surroundings, and the central currents of political culture among youth.

Finally, two studies of public opinion focusing on the beliefs and attitudes of Hondurans on the specific subject of corruption have been published recently:

In a report brought out by the National Anti-Corruption Council and the World Bank Institute on the basis of a series of surveys carried out on users and public officials in Honduras, “corruption is seen as the worst problem for companies and the third most serious problem by users and public officials, after crime and the cost of living.”<sup>25</sup> This report is based on three national surveys on governability and anti-corruption carried out in 2001. Its findings are the result of interviewing 200 Honduran businesses, 2000 citizens and 1,403 public officials from 48 public institutions. The objective of this diagnosis is to support “efforts by the government of Honduras and civil society organizations to promote the development of an effective and integral strategy against corruption. This unique study presents the perception and experiences of Hondurans

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>25</sup> World Bank Institute and National Anti-Corruption Council. *Resumen Ejecutivo de Encuestas sobre Corrupción en Honduras*, 2001.

regarding corruption, and also provides makes recommendations on how to tackle the problem.”<sup>26</sup>

The public opinion study by Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson about citizens’ attitudes toward governability and transparency in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch explores Hondurans’ perceptions about the predominance and tolerance of corruption, and its impact on the political system and on democracy. “This report presents the results of a large scale survey on citizens’ attitudes toward governability in Honduras. The devastating impact of Hurricane Mitch has made the entire community acutely aware of the impact of good government, especially in regards to the honesty and integrity of the public sector. The study is based on a random national sample and was carried out in 2001. The study was conducted in the 18 departments of the country, with the samples representing their respective urban/rural compositions.”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Idem.

<sup>27</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. *Gobernabilidad y Transparencia en Honduras después del Huracán Mitch*. Un estudio de Opinión Ciudadana. Informe preparado por CASALS & ASSOCIATES y la Universidad de Pittsburgh, 2001, p. 11.

## 2.0 Methodological Description

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The fieldwork for the survey on the political culture of democracy in Honduras 2004 was conducted between the months of February and March 2004. The fieldwork was entrusted to the company Borge and Associates, which designed the sampling frame and implemented the surveys on the basis of criteria stipulated by Professor Seligson. The methodological details of the survey are as follows:

### 2.1 Sample Design

#### 2.1.1 Universe

The adult population (above 18 years of age) inhabiting the urban and rural areas of the 18 departments and 299 municipalities of the Republic of Honduras was taken as the universe. The country was divided into nine strata for sampling purposes:

1. **Norte A:** Comprising the municipalities of Cortés department.
2. **Norte B:** Comprising the departments of Atlántida, Colón and Yoro
3. **Norte C:** Comprising the department of Islas de la Bahía.
4. **Oriental A:** Comprising the departments of El Paraíso and Olancho
5. **Oriental B:** Comprising the department of Gracias a Dios.
6. **Sur:** Comprising the departments of Choluteca and Valle
7. **Central A:** Comprising the department of Francisco Morazán
8. **Central B:** Comprising the departments of Comayagua and La Paz
9. **Occidental:** Comprising the departments of Copán, Intibucá, Lempira, Ocotepeque, and Santa Bárbara

#### 2.1.2 Population

The units which were the object of the study were persons above 18 years who inhabit the houses reported in the census cartography of 2002 on a permanent basis. The population residing in collective housing, such as hospitals, asylums, orphanages, barracks, convents, monasteries, was excluded from the study. However, private households situated in these places, such as wardens' quarters which were continuously inhabited were included as long as they appeared as housing units on the census maps.

#### 2.1.3 Units of Observation and Final Units of Selection

The study includes variables referring to the respondent, the head of household, its members and the housing unit. For this reason, the household identified in the census was chosen as the unit of observation. Given that every census household is located in a housing unit, the housing unit was selected as the final unit of selection. The housing unit can be easily identified in the countryside and its existence is permanent from the time the census cartography was undertaken, with the exception of localities where natural disasters have occurred recently.

#### 2.1.4 Sampling Method

As part of the contractual requirements, a complex design (stratified and in groups) with selection in stages was selected. It fulfilled the following requirements:

- Represent 100% of the adult population of the Republic of Honduras
- Possess a stratification that permits the utilization of each one of the strata as study domain
- Permit analysis at the urban and rural level
- Be self-weighted within each stratum and at the national level.

The following goals were established to satisfy the above conditions:

- Obtain representative samples for the following strata, levels and study domains:
  1. The whole country
  2. First stage strata (coinciding with the domains of study)
    - a. Norte A.
    - b. Norte B
    - c. Norte C
    - d. Oriental A
    - e. Oriental B
    - f. Sur
    - g. Central A
    - h. Central B
    - i. Occidental
  3. Second stage strata
    - a. Urban
    - b. Rural
- Calculate sampling errors for the estimates obtained at each level.
- Assign interviews in a way that permits a reasonable balance between budget, sample size and degree of error in results.
- Utilize the most up to date sampling frame for each locality.

Under these conditions and goals, probabilistic, multi-stage, stratified sampling in groups was selected. Random selection was used at all stages and quotas were used only in the selection of the adult to be interviewed in the housing unit.

In order to achieve adequate representation of each region, some additional parameters were included, relating to proportions of urbanness and ruralness, small areas which were occasionally heavily populated with characteristics different from those of the surrounding population and the need for self-weighting.

In view of the differences present between and within the municipalities constituting the country, in some cases in which there was no clear urban-rural division we proceeded to define some types of physical criteria, such as the type of services available and the economic activities taking place in each one, in order to reduce the large variations in proportions of ruralness in the municipalities. For this we did a prior classification of urban and rural areas, in order to obtain adequate representation of the urban and rural population of the region, without a need for applying special weights to the data to be obtained.

Considering the possible combinations for the nine study domains (strata) and two areas, we would have a total of 18 divisions in which the population of interest could be classified. It should be noted that the sample for two domains, Norte C and Oriental B, is very small owing to their small size. As a result, the estimates obtained need to be analyzed with caution since they are very vulnerable to measurement error. We assign an adequate number of interviews to each division and then we proceed to select where the secondary sampling units will be located with probabilities proportional to the population of each locality. For practical reasons, we work with blocks of 12 housing units in urban areas and in rural areas. The assignment of a greater or smaller number of cases due to rounding off is adjusted through random procedures.

The sample design is stratified by regions and is multi-stage. In the first stage, the municipalities are selected according to their population; in the second stage the neighborhoods or localities, next the census sectors, and finally the private housing units. In each census sector, from the corresponding map a block of 12 housing units is selected and in each household an adult person is chosen. The resulting design allows us to calculate results by strata, domains, and some aggregates for the main variables being studied.

### **2.1.5 Sampling Frame**

The sampling frame comprises the population registered in the National Censuses of Honduras carried out in 2001, for the first stage, and, later, the Electoral Register, which shows the number of voters registered for each Junta Receptora de Votos. This, in turn, is linked to the neighborhoods or localities for which there are census maps, created by National Institute of Statistics. This information is sufficiently up to date, and allows us to work with confidence in the estimation of the results of interest.

Honduras is divided into 18 departments and 299 municipalities. For each one of the municipalities, the 2001 Census of Population gives us the number of urban inhabitants and the number of rural inhabitants. The Elections Tribunal has divided the country into 5,250 localities, in each one of which there is a Voting Center. In Honduras people vote near their place of residence (domiciliary vote) and, at least in theory, it is compulsory for all adults appear in the Electoral Register.

We have distributed the population of each municipality in localities or Voting Centers, utilizing the proportions in the Electoral Register. Each locality is indicated as urban or rural.

In the national sample frame the urban and rural localities of each one of the 9 regions of study have been clearly identified. We used this to do a random selection of localities. We found the map for each locality and selected a census segment. The group of 8 or 12 housing units was marked in the field by the supervisor.

### **2.1.6 Sample Size**

For contractual reasons and based on previous experience, the sample size was fixed at 1,500 effective interviews, for which the corresponding estimation errors could be calculated with 95% confidence, given the characteristics of the design utilized.

### 2.1.7 Estimation of Design Effect and Sampling Error

The sampling error was estimated using the size of the sample and the design effects typically associated with the questions found in the questionnaire. These effects, understood as the quotient between the variance obtained from a simple random sample and a complex design, differ for each variable, and can be expressed through the following equation:

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

where  $V_{sa}(\theta)$  is the variance for an indicator  $\theta$  using a simple random sample and  $V_{comp}(\theta)$  is the variance for the same indicator using a complex sample. For this particular case, we expect that the effect of stratification produces small design effects in the estimation of the variables of interest. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that it is estimated that the national level data for those variables that are expressed in terms of proportions or percentages have a sampling error of around 2.5%.

### 2.1.8 Sampling Distribution

In the details of the sample, we applied a distribution proportional to the size of each stratum or study domain.

The selection of persons in each household was done through the application of a quota, controlling the variables sex and age, according to the distribution obtained in the 2001 National Population Censuses. Only one person was interviewed per household. The interview was conducted face-to-face, following the acceptance of a letter of notice by the respondent.



**Table II.1 Population and Sample by Regions and Domains**

<b>NORTE A ZONE</b>	<b>POPULATION</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>SAMPLE</b>
San Pedro Sula	483,384	40.2%	111
More than 100,000	126,402	10.5%	29
25-100,000	133,376	11.1%	31
2-25,000	48,899	4.1%	11
Rural area	410,449	34.1%	94
Sub-total	1,202,510	100.0%	276
<b>NORTE B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	126,721	12.0%	29
25-100,000	179,800	17.0%	41
2-25,000	111,009	10.5%	25
Rural area	638,691	60.5%	147
Sub-total	1,056,221	100.0%	242
<b>NORTE C ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	10,560	27.7%	2
Rural area	27,513	72.3%	7
Sub-total	38,073	100.0%	9
<b>CENTRAL A ZONE</b>			
Tegucigalpa	819,867	69.4%	188
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	61,503	5.2%	14
Rural area	299,306	25.4%	69
Sub-total	1,180,676	100.0%	271
<b>CENTRAL B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	102,931	20.2%	24
2-25,000	62,115	12.2%	14
Rural area	344,395	67.6%	79
Sub-total	509,441	100.0%	117


**Table II.1 (continued)**

<b>SUR ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	76,135	14.0%	18
2-25,000	65,481	12.1%	15
Rural area	401,030	73.9%	92
Sub-total	542,646	100.0%	125
<b>ORIENTAL A ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	117,003	15.2%	27
2-25,000	77,239	10.0%	18
Rural area	575,373	74.8%	132
Sub-total	769,615	100.0%	177
<b>ORIENTAL B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	9,217	13.7%	2
Rural area	58,167	86.3%	13
Sub-total	67,384	100.0%	15.0
<b>OCCIDENTAL ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	28,292	2.4%	6
2-25,000	181,546	15.5%	42
Rural area	958,940	82.0%	220
Sub-total	1,168,778	100.0%	268
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,535,344</b>		

## 2.2 Characteristics of the Final Sample

The final sample included 1,500 valid surveys. The margin of error estimated is +/- 0.025 (2.5%). 46.1% of the respondents are males, while 53.1% are female, as is shown in Figure II.1. These data differ only slightly from the gender distribution of the Honduran population according to the data of the XVI Census of Population and V Census of Housing. According to these data, 51% of Hondurans are female and 49% are males.

**Figure II.1 Distribution of Respondents by Gender**




47.7% of the surveyed population inhabits the urban areas of the country, while 52.3 % resides in the rural areas. This distribution differs slightly from the Honduran population distribution according to the Census. According to the Census data, 56.8% of the people live in the countryside, while 43.2% live in the city.

**Table II.2 Urban-Rural Distribution of the Honduras Population and the Sample**


	Population		Sample	
	N	%	N	%
Urban population	2,821,480	43.2	716	47.7
Rural population	3,713,864	56.8	784	52.3
Total population	6,535,344	100.0	1,500	100

With respect to age, the results of the survey reflect the presence of a predominantly young population. Around 46% of the individuals surveyed are below 35 years of age, while 20% is between 36 years and 45 years, and the remaining respondents are above 45 years. Regarding education, around 70% of the respondents have not gone beyond the primary level, 23.9% have received some level of secondary education and only 5.5% have achieved a university or advanced education. The mean years of education of the respondents is 5.78. This average is similar to Census data on the average years of education of the Honduran population.

**Figure II.2 Distribution of Respondents by Age Group**




**Figure II.3 Distribution of Respondents by Educational Level**



Almost 50% of the Hondurans surveyed belong to families that earn an average of 1,800 lempiras monthly (around US\$ 100). 27% belong to families whose incomes vary between 1,800 and 3,600 lempiras, and the remaining 25% have incomes above 3,600 lempiras.

**Figure II.4 Distribution of Respondents by Monthly Family Income**



In order to select the sample, the country was divided into different zones, which are shown in Table II.3. The results of the survey, which represent the final sample, correspond almost exactly to the distribution of the population across these zones.

**Table II.3 Distribution of the Population and the Sample by Zones of the Country**

	Population		Sample	
	N	%	N	%
Norte A Zone	1,202,510	18.4	276	18.4
Norte B Zone	1,056,221	16.2	243	16.2
Norte C Zone	38,073	0.6	8	0.5
Central A Zone	1,180,676	18.1	272	18.1
Central B Zone	509,441	7.8	119	7.9
Sur Zone	542,646	8.3	124	8.3
Oriental A Zone	769,615	11.8	173	11.5
Oriental B Zone	67,384	1.0	16	1.1
Occidental Zone	1,168,778	17.9	269	17.9
	<b>6,535,344</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>100</b>

### 2.3 Processing of the Information

The processing of the information was done in various stages. In the first stage, the questionnaires were reviewed in order to verify that they had been answered completely and that they fulfilled the requisites of sex and age of the respondents according to the stamp that each one carried. Following this, they were coded by placing the appropriate codes (from those indicated for each question) in the box corresponding to each one of the variables in the instrument. In addition, a code book was used for the variables specific to the country which did

not have codes indicated on the questionnaire booklet. 22 persons participated as coders in this stage.

Once the questionnaires had been coded, they were revised again by 17 persons in order to guarantee correct coding. Then they were entered in the computer. We used the package “Census and Survey Processing System (CSPRO)” to enter the data from the booklets. Data from each booklet was entered twice in the same package, as planned, in order to verify the data bases and check the appropriate and correct processing of information. To do this, once two data bases have been obtained with all the booklets processed, a comparison of the data is carried out using CSPRO. This package generates a file containing the disparities found in the data bases and their location, which can then be verified and corrected in order to obtain a data base free of data entry errors. 13 data entry clerks participated in this final stage.

Finally, the data base was exported to the “Statistical Package for Social Science” (SPSS) in order that all the analyses required for the report could be done with the package, including the creation of tables and figures.

### 3.0 Support for Democracy

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In this chapter we address the topic of how Hondurans' political attitudes support democratic political stability. In order to do this, first we discuss the level of support for the political system; in a second section, we discuss the level of political tolerance, an important value which allows democracies to prosper. In the third section, we analyze the relationship between the level of support for the political system and the level of political tolerance, and in the fourth we present our conclusions regarding democracy in Honduras.

#### 3.1 System Support

The stability of a political system and its ability to overcome a crisis without collapsing have been linked directly to the very legitimacy of the political system.<sup>28</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset defined legitimacy as “the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society.”<sup>29</sup> Lipset's hypothesis is that political systems which are seen by their citizens as legitimate can survive even the profound crises of effectiveness, while those with low levels of legitimacy can collapse under the pressure of any economic crisis.

Lipset acknowledged that “once a system achieves a high degree of legitimacy, there was no guarantee that it would not lose it eventually. Just as political systems can go through crises of effectiveness, they can also experience crises of legitimacy.” In fact, Lipset pointed out explicitly that long term crises of effectiveness can erode legitimacy but legitimacy itself depends on the ability of a system “to fulfill expectations of important groups.” Consequently, “a repeated or long term breakdown in effectiveness will endanger stability although one is dealing with a legitimate system.”<sup>30</sup>

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28 For this section we have drawn on the conceptual framework developed in:

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA and FUNDAUNGO, 1995.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua, mimeo, United States Agency for International Development, 1996.

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. “Nicaragua 1991-1995: una cultura política en transición”, in: Ricardo Córdova Macías and Gunther Maihold (compiladores). *Cultura Política y Transición Democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaraguenses and Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la UCA-Managua, December 1995.

Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la Democracia*. El Salvador 1999. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP y FUNDAUNGO, 2000.

Ricardo Córdova M. and Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización*. América Central. Volumen I. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2001. In particular, chapter 2: “Valoraciones sobre la democracia y el sistema político.”

29 In this respect, see:

Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited”, *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994):1-22.

30 Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la democracia*. El Salvador 1999. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, 1999. pp. 55-56.

Until recently, efforts to measure legitimacy were based on the Trust in Government scale developed by the University of Michigan.<sup>31</sup> However, this scale relied heavily on a measure of dissatisfaction with the performance of governments instead of a generalized dissatisfaction with the system of government. Therefore, in order to analyze belief in the legitimacy of the Honduran political system, we are going to use a scale of legitimacy called “Political Support/Alienation,” which has been developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, used internationally in various comparative studies, and has proved to be a better tool for measuring legitimacy.<sup>32</sup>

This scale tries to measure the level of support that citizens give to their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent government. In the political science literature, this phenomenon is called “diffuse support” or “system support.”<sup>33</sup> The scale is based on five items, each of which uses a seven point response format which goes from ‘not at all’ to “a lot.” The five questions were as follows:

- B1. To what extent do you believe the courts of justice in Honduras guarantee a fair trial?
- B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions in Honduras?
- B3. To what extent do you believe that basic citizen rights are well protected by the Honduran political system?
- B4. To what extent are you proud to live under the Honduran political system?
- B6. To what extent do you think one should support the Honduran political system?

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31 Arthur H. Miller, “Political Issues and Trust in Government,” *American Political Science Review* 68 (September 1974): 951-972.

32 On this, see:

Mitchell A. Seligson. “On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from México.” *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983b), pp. 1-24.

Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller. “Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983.” *International Studies Quarterly*, September 1987, pp. 301-326.

Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science* 26, May 1982, pp 240-264.

John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from México, Nicaragua and Costa Rica”, in: Larry Diamond (ed.). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 107-138.

Steven Finkel, Edward Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica.” *British Journal of Political Science* 19, July 1989, pp. 560-551.

Mitchell A. Seligson, Malcom Young, Max Eduardo Lucas and Dinorah Azpuru. *La cultura democrática de los guatemaltecos*. Tercer estudio 1997. Guatemala, ASIES, enero de 1998.

Mitchell A. Seligson. “Cultura política en Paraguay. Lineamientos de un estudio de valores democráticos para el año 1996”. In: *Transición en Paraguay. “Cultura política y valores democráticos 1998”*. Asunción, CIRD, 1998.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *Auditoría de la democracia: Nicaragua, 1999*. University of Pittsburgh, July 2000.

Mitchell A. Seligson, Malcom Young, Cynthia Hamill, Max Eduardo Lucas y Dinorah Azpuru de Cuestas. *La cultura democrática de los guatemaltecos*. Cuarto estudio 1999. Guatemala, ASIES, February 2000.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *La cultura política de la democracia en Bolivia:2000*. La Paz, Universidad de Pittsburgh, Encuestas & Estudios and Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2001

Dinorah Azpuru. *La cultura democrática de los guatemaltecos en el nuevo siglo*. Guatemala, ASIES, 2002.

Mitchell A. Seligson, “Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999”. *Latin American Research Review* 37, No. 1, 2002.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *Auditoría de la democracia: Ecuador*. Quito, Universidad de Piitsburgh and CEDATOS, 2002.


33 David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-457.



The system of coding for these variables was originally based on a 1-7 scale, but to make these results more comprehensible they have been converted to a more familiar metric, with a 0-100 range.<sup>34</sup>

The figure below shows the mean score for each of the questions: basic rights (46) have the lowest level, followed by the courts (48); pride (52) is in the middle of the range, and at the highest level we find support (54) and institutions (58).

**Figure III.1 Mean Scores for Questions Used to Create the System Support Scale**



These five questions were used to construct a scale that measured system support. The scale is an average of the five items shown earlier<sup>35 36</sup>, and in the case of Honduras the mean score is 52.

### 3.1.1 System Support in Comparative Perspective


Owing to the strong impact of the variable measuring the evaluation of the performance of the incumbent government (M1), we decided to control for this variable in the inter-country comparison. On analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we found that Honduras was the country with the fifth highest system support (53.7), placing it below Costa Rica (67.6), México (58.5), El Salvador (57.9) and Panamá (56).

34 1 point was subtracted from each variable to give each of them a 0-6 range. The resulting number was divided by 6 to give the scale a 0-1 range, which was then multiplied by 100 to give it a 0-100 range.

35 In order not to lose a significant number of respondents in the estimation, if three or more of the five items were answered by a respondent, we took the mean of the responses to those items. If a respondent answered fewer than three items, he was eliminated from the analysis.

36 For the 2004 survey, the Alpha reliability score for the system support scale was 0.7811.

**Figure III.2 System Support in Comparative Perspective, Controlling for Evaluation of Presidential Performance**



### 3.1.2 Explaining the Levels of System Support in Honduras

While we have shown the mean system support in Honduras, not all the respondents responded the same way. Some Hondurans expressed much higher support to the system of government than others. What explains these differences in opinion? In the following pages, first we report the statistically significant findings for the the multiple regression analysis, and then the findings from the bivariate analysis of a set of socio-demographic variables and of others on attitudes and evaluations of different aspects of the national reality.

### 3.1.3 Model of System Support


Table III.1 (see Appendix B) presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of system support when each one of the other variables is held constant. There are basically eleven predictors of system support: educational level, evaluation of presidential performance, the size of place of residence, the urban-rural character of the place of residence, satisfaction with democracy, evaluation of the democratic character of the country, assessment of the personal economic condition, the perception of voting efficacy, the frequency with which the respondent has tried to convince others to vote, trust in political parties, and faith that the justice system would punish the guilty. We kept the variables gender, age and household capital assets in the model even though these were not statistically significant.

### 3.1.4 Place of Residence and System Support

The size of the respondent's place of residence was found to be a factor associated with system support. These results can be seen in Figure III.3, which shows that the inhabitants of the most populated municipalities exhibit the lowest levels of support and the tendency is that system

support increases as the size of the population of the municipality gets smaller, and there is a small decrease for rural areas.<sup>37</sup>

**Figure III.3 System Support by Place of Residence**




### 3.1.5 Region of Residence and System Support

In Figure III.4 we can see the different levels of system support, depending on the region of the country one looks at.

<sup>37</sup> In Table III.1, which can be found in Appendix B, we present the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of system support when each one of the other variables is held constant.


**Figure III.4 System Support by Region**



**3.1.6 Urban-Rural Level and System Support**


The urban-rural distinction within the place of residence proved to be related to levels of system support: support is higher in rural areas compared to urban ones.

**Figure III.5 System Support by Urban-Rural Type**




### 3.1.7 Education and System Support

Education was found to be related to system support. More educated Hondurans show less support than those with less formal education. In Figure III.6 we can see that among those without any formal education, system support is highest, and then there is a clear tendency for levels of support to decline with a rise in the level of education.



On controlling for gender, we see in Figure III.7 this decrease in the levels of support as the educational level rises. Women exhibit a higher level of system support than men at all levels of education, with the exception of university or superior education.


**Figure III.7 System Support by Level of Education and Gender**



### 3.1.8 Income Level and System Support

The respondent was given a card showing 9 income ranges and asked: “Q10. Into which of the following ranges does the monthly family income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the adults and children?” For the bivariate analysis, the level of income obtained from these data was re-classified into three categories, low, middle and high. In Figure III.8 we can see that the group with the lowest incomes shows the highest level of system support. Support falls steeply in the middle income group and then rises slightly in the high income group.

**Figure III.8 System Support by Income Level**




### 3.1.9 Access to Information and System Support

The questionnaire included three questions for probing the frequency with which the respondents listened to/read/watched the news.<sup>38</sup> From these three questions, two were selected for constructing a scale of exposure to the news, due to levels of reliability. In Figure III.9 we can see that the group with lowest exposure to the news shows the highest level of support. The level falls for those in the middle level and then rises slightly for those with high exposure to the news.

<sup>38</sup> Questions A1, A2 and A3 in the questionnaire.


**Figure III.9 System Support by Exposure to News**



**3.1.10 Evaluation of the President’s Performance and System Support**

The evaluation of President Maduro’s performance was found to be related to system support. The item in the questionnaire was as follows: “M1. Speaking generally of the current government, would you say that the job that President Maduro is doing is: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) average, (4) bad, (5) very bad, (8) don’t know”. Figure III.10 shows that system support increases as approval of President Maduro’s performance rises.


**Figure III.10 System Support and Evaluation of President’s Performance**





### 3.1.11 Ideology and System Support

Political ideology is often a powerful factor in explaining citizens' behavior and attitudes. In the questionnaire we included a 10 point scale to measure ideology, with 1 representing a position on the left and 10 a position on the right.<sup>39</sup> In Figure III.11 we can see that the left displays the lowest levels of system support and that as the scale moves rightward system support starts rising.




### 3.1.12 Voting Efficacy and System Support

An item in the questionnaire asked: “ABS5. Do you think that voting can lead to an improvement in the future, or do you think no matter how one votes, things won’t change? (1) Voting can change things, (2) Things won’t change, (8) Don’t know”. In Figure III.12 we can see that the respondents that have a positive perception of their voting efficacy tend to support the system more than those who do not.

<sup>39</sup> Item L1 in the questionnaire.


**Figure III.12 System Support by Perception of Voting Efficacy**



### 3.1.13 Evaluation of Democracy and System Support

Continuing with the analysis of political factors, we now turn to the respondents' evaluation of democracy. An item in the questionnaire asked: "PN5. In your opinion is Honduras very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or undemocratic? In Figure III.13 one can see a clear trend: system support increases as the opinion of the democratic character of the country becomes more favorable.


**Figure III.13 System Support by Opinion About Democracy**



### 3.1.14 Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy and System Support

The other dimension explored in the questionnaire is the evaluation of the working of democracy. The question was: “PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in Honduras? (1) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Dissatisfied, (4) Very dissatisfied, (8) Don’t know”. In Figure III.14 we can see that system support increases as satisfaction with the working of democracy increases.

**Figure III.14 System Support by Satisfaction With the Working of Democracy**




### 3.1.15 The Country’s Economic Condition and System Support

In the questionnaire we asked about the evaluation of the country’s economic condition.<sup>40</sup> The Honduran economy has grown slowly in the past few years, and the analysis of the data shows that this situation has affected citizens’ views. In Figure III.15 we can see that almost two thirds of the respondents (69.8%) view the national economic performance as poor, while 23.5% think that it has been average; only 5.7% think that it has been good, and 1% very good.


<sup>40</sup> Item SOCT1 in the questionnaire.

**Figure III.15 Economic Condition of the Country**



The evaluation of the country's economic condition is strongly related to the level of system support, as can be seen in Figure III.16. On the basis of the data, we can say that there is a link between the perception that one has of the state of the country's economy and the degree of legitimacy given to the political system.

**Figure III.16 System Support by Economic Condition of the Country**




### **3.1.16 Personal Economic Condition and System Support**

Continuing with the analysis of the economic situation, in the questionnaire we included a question for measuring the evaluation of the respondents' personal economic condition.<sup>41</sup> In Figure III.17 we can see that 44.7% of the respondents view their personal economic condition negatively, while 43.3% think it is neither good nor bad, 11.3% think that it is good and 0.7% that it is very good.


<sup>41</sup> Item IDIO1 in the questionnaire.

**Figure III.17 Personal Economic Condition**



Evaluation of the personal economic condition is strongly associated with the level of system support, as can be seen in Figure III.18. On the basis of the data we can say that there is a clear link between the perception one has of the state of one's personal economic condition and the degree of legitimacy given to the political system.


**Figure III.18 System Support by Personal Economic Condition**



### 3.1.17 Crime Victimization and System Support

In the analysis we can now going to focus on the impact of crime on levels of system support. To analyze this aspect, we examined two questions. The item in the questionnaire asked: “VIC1. Have you been a victim of any crime in the past 12 months?” In Figure III.19 we can see that those who have been victims of crime show a lower level of system support.


**Figure III.19 System Support by Crime Victimization**



### 3.1.18 Insecurity and System Support

The other question is: “AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?” In Figure III.20 we can see the following tendency: as the perception of security in the place of residence increases, the level of system support rises.

**Figure III.20 System Support by Perception of Insecurity in Place of Residence**




### 3.1.19 Trust in the Judicial System and System Support

Another question we analyzed is the impact of trust in the judicial system on levels of system support. In the questionnaire, we asked: "AOJ12. If you were victim of a robbery or assault, how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party? (1) A lot, (2) Some, (3) Little, (4) None, (8) Don't know". In Figure III.21 we can see the following trend: the level of system support rises as trust in the judicial system increases.



**Figure III.21 System Support by Trust in Judiciary**




### 3.1.20 Treatment Received at the Municipality and System Support

In other studies done in 1995 and 1999<sup>42</sup> a clear association was found between satisfaction with municipal government and support for the system at the national level. Consequently we decided to explore this hypothesis in the 2004 survey. In the questionnaire we asked: “SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Average, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad, (8) Don’t know”. In Figure III.22 we can see that as satisfaction with services provided by the municipality rises, the level of support to the national system also rises.

<sup>42</sup> Seligson and Córdova, 1995; Seligson, Cruz and Córdova, 1999.


**Figure III.22 System Support by Satisfaction with Municipal Services**



### 3.1.21 Extended Series of Items on System Support

A series of additional items was included as part of the extended series of system support, with the aim of measuring trust in different institutions of the political system. In Figure III.23 we can see the results of the 2004 survey. First, it should be pointed out that the Catholic Church was included among the institutions even though it is not a component of the democratic political system. This was done so that the comparison of the different political institutions would have the Catholic Church as a point of reference because the Church enjoys high levels of trust among the population in Latin America. We grouped the levels of trust in the institutions in descending order: at the highest level we have the Catholic Church (69.5), followed by the Armed Forces (60), the Police (56.7), the municipality (55.5), the National Human Rights Commission (52.6), the public defenders (51.4), the justice system (51.4), the Public Ministry (49.3), the Supreme Court of Justice (47.7), the National Anti-Corruption Council (47.7), the National Elections Tribunal (47), the Office of Audit (46), the National Government (43.7), the elections (42.2), and, at the lowest level, political parties (31.6).

**Figure III.23 Confidence in Institutions**



### 3.2 Tolerance

In this section we explore the topic of political tolerance in Honduras. For this we rely on previous empirical studies carried out in the field of political science.<sup>43</sup> The quantitative study of political tolerance has its roots in research by Stouffer and McClosky on the willingness of American respondents to grant civil rights to those who propose unpopular causes.<sup>44</sup> Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus argue that tolerance is a critical element in a democratic political culture,

<sup>43</sup> This section is based on the conceptual framework developed in:

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA and FUNDAUNGO, 1995.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua, mimeo., United States Agency for International Development, 1996.

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. "Nicaragua 1991-1995: una cultura política en transición", in: Ricardo Córdova Macías and Gunther Maihold (editors). *Cultura Política y Transición Democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses and Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la UCA-Managua, December 1995.

Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO, 2000.

Ricardo Córdova M. and Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2001. In particular, chapter 2: "Valoraciones sobre la democracia y el sistema político."

<sup>44</sup> See:

Samuel A. Stouffer. *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. New York: Doubleday, 1955.

Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", *American Political Science Review*, 1964, 58, pp. 361-382.

Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill. *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983.

because over time intolerant attitudes can produce intolerant behavior which would endanger the targets of the intolerance.<sup>45</sup> Other researchers have extended their studies beyond the United States.<sup>46</sup>

Political tolerance has been measured in many studies which focus on the willingness of individuals to extend civil liberties to specific groups. In other studies, the groups are selected by the researcher, and in other cases, lists of groups are provided and the respondent chooses the group he “prefers the least.”<sup>47</sup> There is some evidence that both methods produce similar results.<sup>48</sup>

On the basis of studies conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University, we included four items in the questionnaire which referred to four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, the right to carry out peaceful demonstrations, the right to seek public office, and the right to freedom of expression. The respondent was handed a card which had a 10 step ladder drawn on it. A 10 point response format was used, which went from strong disapproval (a value of 1) to strong approval (a value of 10). The questions were as follows:

*D1. There are people who speak negatively of the Honduran form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of those people’s **right to vote**?*

*D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people be allowed to conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view?*

*D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people be permitted to **seek public office**?*

*D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of those people going on television to **make speeches**?*

The coding system for these variables was originally based on a 0-10 scale, but in order to make these results more comprehensible they have been converted to a metric with a 0-100 range. In Figure III.24 we can see the mean score obtained by each one of the questions: seeking public office (53), free expression (54), voting (57) and demonstrations (61). It is important to point out that all of them are placed at the positive end, beyond the 50-point of approval.

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<sup>45</sup> John L. Sullivan, James Pierson and George E. Marcus. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.

<sup>46</sup> John L. Sullivan, Michael Shamir, Patrick Walsh and Nigel S. Roberts. *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.


Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, “Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict,” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), pp. 55-66.

Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, “Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica,” *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983), pp. 385-404.

<sup>47</sup> See: John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson and George E. Marcus. “An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s-1970s,” *American Political Science Review* 73 (September 1979), pp. 787-794.

<sup>48</sup> James L. Gibson, “Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be “Least-Liked?,” *American Journal of Political Science* (May 1992), pp. 562-571.

**Figure III.24 Mean Scores of Questions Used to Create the Tolerance Scale**



These four questions were used to construct a scale measuring political tolerance. This scale is an average of the four items shown earlier,<sup>49 50</sup> and for the case of Honduras it has a value of 56.12.


### 3.2.1 Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

On analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of Central America, México and Colombia, we find that Honduras is placed near the average, being the country with the fourth highest level of tolerance (56.1), below Panamá (64.9), Costa Rica (57.8) and México (57.5).

<sup>49</sup> In order to not lose a significant number of respondents in the system of estimation, if two more of the four items were answered by the respondent, a mean score of his responses was calculated. If the respondent answered fewer than two items, he was eliminated from the analysis.

<sup>50</sup> For the 2004 survey, the Alpha reliability score for the tolerance scale was 0.8551.

**Figure III.25 Tolerance in Comparative Perspective**



### 3.2.2 Explaining the Levels of Tolerance in Honduras

While we have indicated the mean score on the tolerance scale for Honduras, not all respondents answered in the same way. What explains these differences in opinion? In the following pages first we report the statistically significant findings from the multiple regression analysis, and then the results of the bivariate analysis of a set of socio-demographic variables and of others on attitudes and evaluations of different aspects of the national reality.


### 3.2.3 Model of Tolerance

In Table III.2 (see Appendix B), we present the results of the multiple regression model with the statistically significant predictors of tolerance when each one of the other variables is held constant. There are basically three predictors of tolerance: the level of information, the evaluation of the personal economic condition and voting efficacy. We have kept the level of education, gender, age and household capital assets in the model even though they are not statistically significant.

### 3.2.4 Region of Residence and Tolerance

The region of residence of the respondents proved to be a factor related to tolerance. In Figure III.26 we can see the different levels of tolerance for each region.


**Figure III.26 Tolerance by Region of the Country**



### 3.2.5 Level of Political Knowledge and Tolerance

Figure III.27 shows that if we take persons with the lowest level of information as a reference, then there is a sharp fall in tolerance for the following group but then the tendency is that tolerance increases as the level of political knowledge rises.

**Figure III.27 Tolerance by Political Knowledge**




### 3.2.6 Ideology and Tolerance

In Figure III.28 we can see that the left exhibits much higher levels of tolerance, and that tolerance tends to decrease as the scale moves toward the center, and then increases for the positions on the right.




**Figure III.28 Tolerance by Ideology**



### 3.2.7 Voting Efficacy and Tolerance


In Figure III.29 we can see that respondents who have a positive perception of their voting efficacy tend to be more tolerant than those who do not.

**Figure III.29 Tolerance by Perception of Voting Efficacy**



### 3.2.8 Satisfaction With the Working of Democracy and Tolerance


In Figure III.30 we can see the following trend between satisfaction with the working of democracy and political tolerance: those who are very satisfied or very dissatisfied display a high level of tolerance, while those who are in the middle (satisfied or dissatisfied) display a lower level of tolerance.



### 3.2.9 Personal Economic Condition and Tolerance

In Figure III.31 we can see that persons with a more negative perception of their personal economic condition show a higher level of tolerance compared to those who have a more positive perception of their condition.

**Figure III.31 Tolerance by Personal Economic Condition**



### 3.3 Support for Stable Democracy

The theoretical frame of reference for this study<sup>51</sup> argues that support for the system of government and tolerance are both necessary for long term democratic stability.<sup>52</sup> In democracy it becomes necessary that citizens should believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions, but at the same time they should be tolerant of the political rights of others; in such a way there can be a regime of majorities which coexists with certain rights for the minorities.

<sup>51</sup> This theoretical framework was presented for the first time in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador*. San Salvador, IDELA, 1993.

<sup>52</sup> This section is based on the conceptual framework developed in:

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una cultura política en transición*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IDELA and FUNDAUNGO, 1995.

Mitchell A. Seligson. *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. Managua, mimeo., United States Agency for International Development, 1996.

Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M. "Nicaragua 1991-1995: una cultura política en transición", in: Ricardo Córdova Macías and Günther Maihold (editors). *Cultura Política y Transición Democrática en Nicaragua*. Managua, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses and Centro de Análisis Socio Cultural de la UCA-Managua, December 1995.

Later, this theoretical framework was revisited in:

Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America", mimeo., undated.

Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO, 2000.

Ricardo Córdova M. and Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2001. In particular, chapter 2: "Valoraciones sobre la democracia y el sistema político."

From a theoretical perspective, we propose to analyze the relationship between system support and tolerance. Consequently, we have to dichotomize both scales into “high” and “low.”<sup>53</sup> For this analysis, “it should be noted that the relations described here are applied only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, systems in which competitive elections are held regularly and in which wide-ranging participation is permitted. The same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have completely different implications.”<sup>54</sup>

Table III.3 shows the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. Political systems which have a predominance of high system support and high tolerance are those which tend to favor democratic stability. This is based on the logic that in non-coercive contexts a high degree of legitimacy is needed for the system to be stable, and tolerance is needed so that it stays democratic.<sup>55</sup>

When system support is high but tolerance is low, the system tends to remain stable (due to high support), even though the democratic government could be endangered in the medium term. This type of system tends to move toward an authoritarian regime.

A situation of low system support is presented in the lower two cells of the table and both are linked to situations of instability. In the low support-high tolerance cell, democratic instability is favored, in the sense that instability could lead to greater democratization in the medium term or it could remain in conditions of instability. On the other hand, the low support-low tolerance cell reflects conditions in which one could expect democratic breakdown as the final outcome. Of course, it is necessary to point out that “using studies of public opinion as the only source, one cannot predict democratic collapse, given that there are many other influential factors, such as the role of elites, the position of the military, and the support/opposition of international actors. Nevertheless, those political systems in which the masses do not support the basic institutions of democracy nor the rights of minorities tend to be more vulnerable to democratic breakdown.”<sup>56</sup>

**Table III.3 Theoretical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Democratic Societies**

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	Democratic breakdown

### 3.3.1 The Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Honduras

Now we will examine in detail how the two variables are empirically related. As we pointed out earlier, to do this both variables were dichotomized into “high” and “low.” The results of the survey done in Honduras are shown in Table III.4. We can see that 30% of the respondents are in

<sup>53</sup> Each one of these scales goes from 0 to 100, so that the mid-point selected is 50.

<sup>54</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO, 1999, p. 89.

<sup>55</sup> On this topic, see: Robert Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1971.

<sup>56</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías. *Auditoría de la Democracia. El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador, Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP and FUNDAUNGO, 1999, p. 89.

the stable democracy cell, that is, they support the system and are tolerant. Clearly, this is most populated cell in the table. 23% support the system but are intolerant, that is, they fall into the authoritarian stability cell. 22% are tolerant but with low system support (the unstable democracy cell), and 26% are in the democratic breakdown cell, that is, low system support and low tolerance.

**Table III.4 Empirical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Honduras**

Support for the institutional system	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy 30%	Authoritarian stability 23%
Low	Unstable democracy 22%	Democratic breakdown 26%

Percentages do not total 100% owing to rounding of decimals.


### 3.3.2 Democratic Stability in Comparative Perspective

In order to analyze the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we need to focus on the “stable democracy” cell. In Figure III.32 we can see that Honduras (29.9) is below the average (32), but is better placed than Guatemala (21.2) and Nicaragua (28.3).<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> A new variable, called “bar 2x2” was created in the database. This variable eliminated the cases for which there were incomplete data on the tolerance scale or on the system support scale. The coding was as follows:

if (psa5r=1 and tolr=1)bar2x2=100.  
 if (psa5r=1 and tolr=2)bar2x2=0.  
 if (psa5r=2 and tolr=1)bar2x2=0.  
 if (psa5r=2 and tolr=2)bar2x2=0.

**Figure III.32 Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**




**3.4 Evaluations of Democracy**

**3.4.1 Evaluation of Liberties, Participation and Protection of Human Rights**

A battery of four questions was included in the questionnaire to obtain citizens’ evaluation of the freedom of the press and of opinion, participation, and the protection of human rights. Respondents were asked: “Do you think that currently in this country we have very little, sufficient, or too much freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, political participation and protection of human rights?”<sup>58</sup> In Figure III.33 we can see that 59.6% of the respondents think that there is very little freedom of the press, 22.1% think it is sufficient, 11.9% that it is too much, and 6.4% don’t know.

<sup>58</sup> Series LIB1, LIB2, LIB3, LIB4 in the questionnaire.

**Figure III.33 Freedom of the Press in Honduras**



In Figure III.34 we can see that 61.5% of the respondents think that there is very little freedom of opinion, 25.6% think that it is sufficient, 8.1% that there is too much, and 4.8% don't know.

**Figure III.34 Freedom of Opinion in Honduras**






Figure III.35 shows that 44.9% of respondents think that there is very little political participation in the country, 21.9% that it is sufficient, 26.7% that there is too much, and 6.6% don't know.

**Figure III.35 Political Participation in Honduras**



In Figure III.36 we can see that a majority, 67.3% think that there is very little human rights protection, 17.7% think that it is sufficient, 8.2% that there is too much, and 6.9% don't know.

**Figure III.36 Protection of Human Rights in Honduras**






### 3.4.2 Evaluation of the Democratic Process


The questionnaire included a battery of three questions related to citizens' evaluations of the democratic process in the country. First they were asked: "PN5. In your opinion, is Honduras very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or undemocratic?" In Figure III.37 we can see that 24% think that it is very democratic, 42% that it is somewhat democratic, 28% that it is not very democratic and 6% that it is undemocratic.

**Figure III.37 Opinion About Democratic Character of Country**




They were then asked about the country's democratic progress: "PN6. Based on your experience in the past few years, has Honduras become more democratic, is it the same, or less democratic?" In Figure III.38 we can see that 58% of the respondents think that the country remains as democratic as before, while 17% think that it is more democratic and 25% that it is less democratic.

**Figure III.38 Evaluation of Country's Democratic Progress**



Third, we asked about the degree of citizens' satisfaction with the working of democracy: "PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in Honduras?" In Figure III.39 we can see that 11% feel very satisfied, 53% satisfied, 30% dissatisfied and 6% very dissatisfied. It is important to point out that almost 4 out of every 10 respondents feel dissatisfied with the working of democracy.


**Figure III.39 Degree of Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy in the Country**



### 3.4.3 Democracy as a Form of Government


The questionnaire included a series of questions to probe support for the democratic system compared to other authoritarian forms of government. One question explored their preferences for the democratic nature of the current government compared to a possible return of military rule. They were asked: “AUT2. Our present system of government isn’t the only one our country has had. Some people think that it would be better for us if the military returned to power. Others think that we should maintain the system as it is now. What do you think?” Figure III.40 shows that a large majority prefer the current system (73%), while 27% favor the return of the military.

**Figure III.40 Preferences Regarding the Nature of Government**




A second question probed their preference for a strong leader compared to the current democratic system. They were asked: “AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected through voting. Others say that even if things don’t function, electoral democracy, that is, the popular vote, is always the best. What do you think? Figure III.41 shows that there is widespread support for electoral democracy (78.5%), compared to 21.5% which favors a strong leader.

**Figure III.41 Support for Electoral Democracy**




A third question probed their preference for a democratic regime over a non-democratic one. They were asked: “DEM2. With which of the following three statements do you agree the most? (1) For people like us, it doesn’t matter whether the regime is democratic or non-democratic, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other type of government, (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, (8) Don’t know.” In Figure III.42 we can see that there is a solid preference for democracy over any other type of government (56.7%), compared to 13.7% who prefer an authoritarian government, 12.5% to whom it doesn’t matter whether it is a democratic government or a non-democratic one, and 17.1% who don’t know.

**Figure III.42 Preference for a Democratic Regime**



A fourth question probed support for the democratic system in spite of its problems, over other forms of government. Respondents were asked: “ING4. Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree?” This question was re-coded into ING4R to give it a 0-100 format. In Figure III.43 we can see a trend favorable to democracy compared to any other form of government.

**Figure III.43 Democracy is Better Than Any Other Form of Government**



### 3.5. Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter, we analyzed support for the system of government in Honduras, a fundamental component of political culture linked to democratic stability. According to the multiple regression analysis, there are eleven predictors of system support: level of educational, evaluation of President Maduro’s performance, size of the area of residence, the urban-rural character of the area of residence, level of satisfaction with the working of democracy, evaluation of the country’s democratic character, evaluation of the respondent’s personal economic condition, perception of voting efficacy, persuading others to vote for a candidate or party, trust in political parties and trust in the justice system to punish the guilty.

In the second section we examined political tolerance. On the basis of the multiple regression analysis, we identified three predictors of tolerance: level of political knowledge, evaluation of personal economic condition, and perception of voting efficacy.

In the third section, we focused on support for stable democracy. Following the theoretical framework, we sought to explore the relationship between system support and tolerance, for which we dichotomized both variables and created four possible combinations. The distribution of respondents across the four cells of the table is as follows: 30% are in the “stable democracy” cell; 23% are in the “authoritarian stability” cell; 22% are in the “unstable democracy” cell, and 26% are in the “democratic breakdown” cell.

In the fourth section, we presented a set of opinions regarding democracy in Honduras. 24% of the respondents think that the country is very democratic, 42% that it is somewhat democratic, 28% that is not very democratic, and 6% that it is undemocratic. In addition, we found that 11% of the respondents are very satisfied with the working of democracy, 53% are satisfied, 30% are dissatisfied and 6% are very dissatisfied. We also found strong support for democracy as a form

of government: 73% prefer the current system of government, compared to 27% who may support the future return of the military; 78.5% prefer electoral democracy while 21.5% would support a strong man; and 56% prefer democracy as a form of government compared to 13.7% who prefer an authoritarian government and 17.1% do not know. On a 0-100 scale measuring the degree of agreement with the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government, the mean score for Hondurans is 67.7.





## 4.0 Corruption and Democracy

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Corruption constitutes one of the most serious problems currently faced by Latin American democracies. In the past few years, public awareness of the importance of this topic has grown, and there are increasing efforts at the political level to confront it. The last General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) focused its debate on this evil. In his opening speech to the Assembly, the president of Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez, underscored that corruption, which he described as a “social pathology,” undermined social development and democracy. After pointing out that this problem diverts resources which should be applied to development and to achieve greater welfare for the people, Gutiérrez called for directing “our maximum efforts to strengthening the hemispheric mechanisms for combating this evil, and if necessary, to create new mechanisms through which all nations should commit themselves to prosecuting the crimes of corruption beyond their borders.”<sup>59</sup>

Honduras is not removed from these trends. According to the index of perception of corruption published by Transparency International, for the year 2003 Honduras had a score of 2.3 on a 1-10 scale, on which 10 indicates the highest level of transparency and 1 the highest level of corruption. This places Honduras in 107th position in the world ranking of transparency, below most Latin American countries, with the exception of Ecuador and Paraguay. A comparison with the index published the previous year (2002) reveals that the perception of corruption worsened notably from 2002 to 2003.<sup>60</sup>

According to Meza et al., corruption has increased in this Central American country in the past few years. They identify three phases in the problem of transparency in Honduras. In first place, the era of military regimes, when corruption had an “artisan character, and derived from the spaces of military autonomy surrounding the military chiefs in their respective political jurisdictions.”<sup>61</sup> In second place is the era of transition to democracy and the rule of law. In this stage, corruption spread and became institutionalized, leading to greater awareness and concern regarding the problem. Finally, Meza and his colleagues identify the period of Hurricane Mitch as the beginning of the third and final stage in the problem of corruption in Honduras. The natural disaster created countless opportunities for corruption in the State to multiply, but at the same time it generated a more formal debate over the implications of corruption for the development of Honduran society. The disaster not only exposed “the social and environmental vulnerability of Honduras, but it also revealed the limitations and lacunae created by its institutional vulnerability, which (...) could not respond with the required efficiency to the urgency of the disaster.”<sup>62</sup> This provoked a response from civil society which demanded not only greater efficiency but also greater transparency in the management of resources at a particularly critical moment.

Corruption is identified by a mixture of procedures, laws and influences that function in a cohesive and coordinated way, linked to networks of people and institutions which favor the reciprocal nature of the product of corruption. Corruption involves the public sector and the

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<sup>59</sup> This can be located in: <http://www.oas.org/main/spanish/>.

<sup>60</sup> This can be located in: <http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.es.html>

<sup>61</sup> Víctor Meza, Julieta Castellanos, Oscar Ávila, Ramón Romero and Leticia Salomón. (2002). *Corrupción y transparencia en Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: CEDOH, p. 10.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

private sector, national and international. In Honduras, there has been some discussion of the magnitude and implications of corruption, but increasingly, fewer persons view it merely as a moral problem and tend to see it as a problem of development.

It is in this line of thought that corruption is identified today as an obstacle to democratic consolidation. Disenchantment with democracy can have different consequences, among them the breakup of the political party system, threats to governability, the imminent return to authoritarianism and a fragile, insecure and violent social milieu. All these outcomes, in one way or another, have made their appearance in the last decade in different countries of Latin America, and they have usually been identified as a product of poverty, underdevelopment, the authoritarian cultural tradition, and socioeconomic inequality. It was not until recently that corruption was discovered as the “other threat” to democracy. It is the aim of this chapter to examine the impact of day-to-day corruption on the development of a political culture that supports democracy. The basic thesis behind this is that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in the political system, both in diffuse terms and in specific terms, and contributes to people’s distancing themselves from the procedures that characterize a democratic regime.

This is not the first study of corruption to be carried out in Honduras. There are already various valuable projects which have addressed the problem of lack of transparency in this Central American country.<sup>63</sup> However, this study is one of the few that attempts to empirically link corruption, measured as victimization by bribes and illegal payments, to democratic stability. It is based on Seligson’s findings using the surveys of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project in various Latin American countries, which found that persons who have been victims of corruption tend to show lower indices of system support.<sup>64</sup>

This chapter presents the results of the survey related to corruption in Honduras in the following manner: first, we examine opinions about corruption in Honduras; second, we establish the levels of corruption in the country as determined by a battery of questions on corruption victimization; third, we identify the characteristics of corruption victims, and, finally, we try to establish the empirical relationship between legitimacy and corruption.

## 4.1 Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

As in most public matters, objective phenomena are one thing and perceptions of these are quite another. It is the same in the case of corruption as a sociopolitical phenomenon. Some Hondurans can have direct experiences with corruption or with the level of probity in the public sphere, and on the basis of this they have their own perceptions of the problem. But this does not imply that they should not have, in any case, their own way of seeing the problem of State transparency in Honduras. In order to address the topic of corruption, citizens were asked about the magnitude of corruption in Honduras through the following question: “Taking into account

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
<sup>63</sup> See, for example: Instituto del Banco Mundial. (2002). *Gobernabilidad y anticorrupción en Honduras: un aporte para la planificación de acciones*. (Mimeo).

Leticia Salomón, Julieta Castellanos and Dora Castillo. (1995). (1995). *Corrupción y democracia en Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: CEDOH and PRODECA.

<sup>64</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson (2002). “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,” *Journal of Politics* 64, 2, 408-433.

your experience, is corruption among public officials very common, common, uncommon, or very uncommon?”


**Figure IV.1 How Common is Corruption Among Public Officials?**



As we can see in Figure IV.1, most Hondurans, 73.6%, think that corruption in Honduras is very common or common, while barely a fourth of the respondents think that corruption is very uncommon or uncommon. In order to compare opinions of how common the perception is in Honduras, a 0 to 100 scale was constructed using the results of the above question, on which 0 meant a perception that corruption was non-existent and 100 meant a high level of corruption as perceived by citizens. The resulting mean score for Honduras was 69.5, which confirmed the result that most Hondurans tend to perceive a lot of corruption in the activities of public officials.


Results were also obtained when asking specifically about municipal officials. The following question was included on the questionnaire: “MUNI6A. According to your experience, corruption of the municipal officials is...(1) Very common, (2) Somewhat common, (3) Rare, (4) Never happens and (8) Don’t know”. In the following graphic, we can observe that 35.8 % have the perception that corruption of municipal officials is very common, 27.4 % somewhat common, 30.1% rare and 6.8% never happens.

**Figure IV.2 Perception of the Corruption of Municipal Officials**



When we place the results regarding the perception of corruption of public officials in general in a comparative perspective in the framework of this study of the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we see that Honduras is among the countries with the lowest levels of perception of corruption. As Figure IV.3 shows, the countries in which citizens perceive most corruption are Costa Rica, Panamá, Colombia and México, while Honduras is the country with the second lowest level of perception of corruption although, as we have pointed out earlier, it has an high average level (69.5).


**Figure IV.3 Perception of Corruption by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



These results reflect citizens' perceptions regarding the phenomenon of corruption in the country, which is, in turn, related to how informed Hondurans are about public matters. A cross tabulation between the scale of perception regarding corruption and the level of political


knowledge revealed that the perception of corruption in Honduras increases in the population as its level of political knowledge rises.

**Figure IV.4 Perception of Corruption by Level of Information**



The same happens when we cross tabulate perception of corruption with the respondents' educational level. The perception of corruption in Honduras is greater among those who have more years of education (for those with university education the mean score is 80.4), and it is lower among persons who have fewer years of formal education (a mean score of 67.4). Thus, the data seem to suggest that the perception of corruption of public officials depends, among other factors, on the degree to which the people follow the public happenings in the country.

**Figure IV.5 Perception of Corruption by Level of Education**




But before we examine the subject of corruption using more objective indicators, such as levels of victimization, it is important to take into account the differences in perception by region of the country and by the size of the population, which would be related to the social complexity of human settlements. In both cases, the data showed that there are significant differences in the perception of corruption depending on the region of the country and the population size of the area in which the respondents reside. The highest level of perceived corruption is found in the largest urban center, that is, in the metropolitan area (mean of 74.3), but the perception declines for those respondents who live among smaller populations, while in rural areas a mean of 66 (on a 0-100 scale) was registered.

This phenomenon could be due to the fact that it is in the large cities, particularly in the capital, where most of the offices of government are concentrated and, therefore, the possibility that citizens become aware of the problems related to corruption increases owing to the greater interaction that they tend to have with government officials. Further, one has to consider that it is in the largest urban centers where there is greater flow of information, which allows inhabitants to be better informed about public affairs.

A variable that was found to be significant for differentiating perceptions of corruption is the geographic area of residence. The data indicate that the residents of the southern zone of the country are those who tend to perceive higher levels of corruption (a mean of 80), much above the national average (69), as are those in more metropolitan areas such as the central and the northern zones (a mean of 70); the regions in which the perception of corruption is lower are the occidental (63) and the oriental (64) (See Figure IV.6).

**Figure IV.6 Perception of Corruption by Region**




The questionnaire included a battery of questions for measuring perceptions of the honesty of various key groups in Honduran society. Respondents were asked the following: “Now I am going to name various public and private institutions. I am interested in knowing the degree to which you think that the representatives of these institutions are honest or corrupt. I am going to ask that you score each one on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is "very corrupt" and 10 is "very honest". Congressional representatives (PC1), government ministers (PC2), mayors (PC3), municipal councilors (PC4), the police (PC5), school teachers (PC8), priests, clergy and pastors (PC9), judges (PC12), the leaders of political parties (PC14), leaders of NGOs (PC15), the press (PC19), and the presidents of the Republic (PC21).”

The results, shown in Figure IV.7, are in descending order of the honesty scores for each group or professional association, where 0 means that they are perceived as very corrupt and 100 as very honest.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the best evaluated groups are priests or pastors (66), teachers (58) and the press (56), with mean scores well above 50 on the scale. They are followed by leaders of NGOs (43), the police (40), judges (39), presidents (38), mayors (37), municipal councilors (34), ministers (31), leaders of political parties (30) and congressional representatives (28).

<sup>65</sup> In the series of items in the questionnaire we used a 0-10 response format, but we later transformed it to a 0-100 format in order to simplify the analysis.

**Figure IV.7 Perception of Honesty in Different Groups**



## 4.2 Levels of Corruption in Honduras

As we have already stated, the corruption perceived in public officials and professional groups is one thing, and the phenomenon in itself – the magnitude of the acts of corruption – is quite another. The survey explored the incidence of the problem of corruption in Honduras through the victimization suffered by citizens from acts of bribery and corruption in their daily lives. It is clear that corruption not only refers to the bribery that citizens suffer daily at the hands of public officials; it also other spheres of the behavior of public officials, politicians, and of citizens which can not easily be described or measured through surveys. But in any case, bribery involving public officials constitutes one of the most common acts of corruption and tends to directly affect the average Honduran.

A series of questions was included in the survey to measure the direct personal experience with certain acts of corruption:


Now we want to talk about your personal experiences with things that happen in life.	No	Yes	DK	NA	
<b>EXC1.</b> Have you been accused within the past two years by a police officer for any infraction which you did not commit?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC1</b>
<b>EXC2.</b> Did any agent of the police ask you for a bribe during the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> Has any public employee asked you for a bribe during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC6</b>



<b>EXC11.</b> Have you done business in the municipality in the past year? <b>(If no, mark “9”; if yes, ask the following question)</b> To conduct business in the municipality (such as to get a license, for instance) during the past year, have you had to pay additional money above what is required by the law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13. Do you work? (If no, mark “9”; if yes, ask the following question)</b> In your work, have you been asked for an inappropriate payment within the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> In the last year have you had dealings with the court system? <b>(If no, mark “9”; if yes, ask the following question)</b> Have you had to pay a bribe in the courts during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you used public medical services in the last year? <b>(If no, mark “9”; if yes, ask the following question)</b> To be attended in a hospital or other health facility have you had to pay fees above what is stipulated by law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> Have you had children enrolled in school during the last year? <b>(If no, mark “9”; if yes, ask the following question)</b> At school have you been asked for a payment above that required by law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC16</b>

As we can see, all the questions refer to acts of bribery which the respondents might have faced in the year prior to the survey. However, with the exception of the first three items, which were asked to all the respondents, most of the questions (EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, EXC16) were asked only to the persons who had had some contact with certain offices and who had utilized certain government services. In this sense, the results of such items and the real incidence of those acts of corruption depend, in part, on the degree of contact that the persons have with those government representatives. In this sense, it is necessary to take the results from items EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15 and EXC16 with caution. In fact, such data only reflects the percentage of people who have experienced those events having had contact with the institutions. Thus, the real incidence on the total population would be smaller, but it would not make sense to present the percentage of the total population as not everyone is exposed to such particular events.

**Figure IV.8 Experiences With Corruption in Honduras**



The results indicate that in spite of widespread perceptions regarding corruption, experiences of victimization by corruption are not so common, at least not at the level of expectations generated by the perceptions described at the beginning of this chapter. The most common experiences with bribery take place in schools (11.3%), in the municipalities (10.2%), and in the respondents' workplace (9.9%). In all these cases, however, the percentages indicate the incidence of corruption among those citizens that have made use of such services or who have jobs, suggesting that the incidence in the total adult population would be lower. In any case, these results indicate the dimension of the problem for those who are exposed to this.


The above discussion would mean that a significant percentage of the population which uses the educational system, which interacts with the municipalities, and which is employed, in some cases has to make illegal or unauthorized payments in order to gain access to certain benefits which should probably be supplied through institutional channels. Thus, for example, the data could reflect parents who have to pay additional installments so that their children can continue at school; or citizens who have to make additional payments when doing the paperwork at the municipality in order to obtain a document or a service. However, in the case of schools one should treat this interpretation very carefully because the lines separating those payments that, although not covered by the law, cannot necessarily be considered acts of corruption are very blurred. Many schools resort to extra-legal payments not as a form of corruption that benefits school officials, but as an alternative for maintaining the functioning of schools whose budget allocations from the ministry is not enough to cover the basic operating costs. This a subject that should be addressed in future studies.

On the other hand, the lowest percentages of victimization from bribery are found in the actions of public employees and of the police; in these cases, victimization does not exceed 5.3% of the

total Honduran adult population. Thus, it would appear that corruption involving the police and public officials in general is not so high.

In sum, all the events of victimization by bribery affected almost 19% of the population during the period of a year. That is, almost one in every five Hondurans fell victim to at least one act of bribery in the year prior to the survey. Of the total number of citizens, 12.2% were victims of two acts of bribery in the same period and 2.4% of Hondurans were victims of three or more acts of corruption during the year.


**Figure IV.9 Crime Victimization by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



However, in order to have a clearer idea of the magnitude of corruption in Honduras, it is important to place this data within the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, Mexico and Colombia. In Figure IV.7, we can observe that Mexico has the highest average (33.5), while Honduras (18.9) is in a second group of countries, followed closely by Nicaragua (18.2), Guatemala (18), Panama (17.9) and El Salvador (17.9). The lowest levels belong to Costa Rica (15.4) and Colombia (15.3)

However, on comparing the countries in terms of type of victimization, in general, Honduras is found at an intermediate level in most types of bribes. Furthermore, the percentages of victimization by bribery involving public officials or police accusations place this Central American country as one of those with the lowest incidence of such types of corruption. But the type of bribery that, in general, is more common in Honduras than in most of the countries of the region occurs in schools. As Figure IV.10 shows, with the exception of México, illegal demands for money are made more frequently in Honduras than in the other countries, at least during the year prior to the survey. This type of act represents more than half (11.3%) of the total cases of bribery reported in the Honduran survey (18.9%), which underscores the magnitude of this problem in the educational system.

**Figure IV.10 Victimization by Bribery at School: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**




### 4.3 The Victims of Corruption

Who are the most frequent victims of corruption in Honduras? Given that the problem of corruption affects a large percentage of the population of this country (around 20%), it is important to determine the characteristics which make them more vulnerable to corruption. To do this, we constructed an index of direct experience with corruption, which includes all the victimization items and represents the number of times that the persons had been victimized in any circumstances throughout the year. The overall mean for victimization was 0.2907.<sup>66</sup>

The results indicate that, on average, persons living in the central, oriental and north regions of the country have been victims of acts of corruption with greater frequency than in the rest of the country. This is probably because in those regions, especially in the central zone, the major part of the country's economic activity and the biggest cities are concentrated.

<sup>66</sup> The mean is below 1 because in most cases the value is 0, given that almost 80% of the citizens did not report having been a victim of any case of corruption or bribery.


**Figure IV.11 Corruption Victimization by Region**



In fact, victimization by bribery appears also to be associated with the size of the city in which the respondent resides. The highest averages of acts of corruption are found in the urban metropolitan zone of Honduras, that is, Tegucigalpa, with a mean of 0.57. The lowest levels are found in the rural areas, with a mean of 0.20. Further, judging by the results of the survey (not shown here), acts of corruption in general are linked to the size of the city in which the victims reside. With the exception of large cities, where the level of corruption victimization is quite low and below the national average (0.27), corruption decreases as population size shrinks. So in a medium-size city, the average of corruption victimization is 0.40, while in small cities or villages, the average is 0.29.

A more detailed examination of corruption victimization following the type of bribe by city size provides interesting results. For example, the frequency of police bribery is proportionally related to city size: as city size increases citizens tend to become targets for bribes from police with greater frequency. In contrast, when it comes to bribery in municipalities, although most of the bribery occurs in the capital, medium-size and small cities also exhibit percentages above the national average. Another interesting case is found in the bribery within the workplace. The survey found that this is a significantly large problem in the country's capital, and moderately serious in the small and medium size cities, but it is almost non-existent in the large cities (mainly San Pedro Sula) and in the rural areas.


**Figure IV.12 Victimization by Some Types of Corruption by City Size**



Another variable that, in individual terms, proved to be related to overall corruption victimization was gender. Males obtained a victimization mean score of 0.36, in contrast to the mean score of 0.22 obtained by the female respondents in the survey. This means that men in general tend to be more victimized by acts of corruption than their compatriots of the opposite sex. However, when we examined the differences between men and women across different types of corruption, we found that the disparities are found basically in the cases of corruption related to the police. Men are much more accused and targeted for bribes by police agents than are women. In contrast, in the other cases of corruption, bribes at the municipality, workplace, in the health system and at school, the differences are not statistically significant. That is, men and women are victims of corruption with the same frequency. Women even report more cases of bribery victimization at the workplace than men.

Educational level also proved to be individually associated with corruption victimization. The results indicate that as the years of education of the respondents increase, they tend to be corruption victims with greater frequency overall. This is especially true for persons who have university education; in these cases the index of victimization is practically double that for the rest of the Honduran population. This is probably due to a factor associated with education: the fact that those with a higher level of education also tend to have higher incomes and are in an economic position that makes them vulnerable to bribery and corruption with greater frequency than those who do not have those means.


**Figure IV.13 Corruption Victimization by Level of Education**



In fact, the results show that precisely those persons who have more resources, measured by the level of household capital goods, tend to be corruption victims with greater frequency than those with fewer resources. Hence, corruption in Honduras, at least that which occurred in the last year prior to the survey and which takes the form of bribes to different State employees, affects more those persons who have greater resources than those with fewer ones. This is logical if one considers that corruption as a crime is concentrated where it is possible to obtain wealth. However, when the same exercise was done with respect to the respondents' family income levels, the data indicate that while there is a tendency for persons with higher incomes to be victimized more frequently, the differences are not statistically significant, which implies that in terms of basic income, Hondurans are equally exposed to victimization.


The above discussion refers to the relationship between income and resources and corruption victimization in general. But an examination of the relationship of specific events of corruption with variables of socioeconomic status reveals an interesting phenomenon. When the types of corruption refer to police agents (EXC1 and EXC2) or when they refer to public employees in general (EXC6), the relationship between victimization and socioeconomic condition – measured as the level of household capital assets or as the level of income – is directly proportional: the greater the resources, the greater the number of acts of corruption experienced. In contrast, when the types of corruption refers to other spheres, for example, judges, the health system or the municipality, the linear relationship disappears and, in some cases, becomes totally reversed, as in the case of bribery in the educational system.

**Figure IV.14 Corruption Victimization by Level of Household Capital Goods**



As we can see in Figure IV.15, low income individuals experienced more events of bribery victimization within the educational system in the past year than the rest of the population. The same is the case when this type of bribery is related to the level of household capital assets (not shown here): persons with fewer assets were more affected by “school corruption” than those who had more assets.

**Figure IV.15 Victimization by Bribery at School by Monthly Family Income**





The above is probably due to the type of persons who utilize the educational system, as well as other social services of the Honduran State. Citizens who make use of the educational system are usually poorer and with fewer social benefits. Although they have too few resources to be frequent victims of other government agencies, the use of the school system makes them vulnerable to the abuses committed by some school employees.

The earlier results suggest that the incidence of the problem of corruption is very complex. Judging by those results, it is not possible to conclude that all types of victimization affect citizens in a similar way. Although there are general characteristics that mark the most important tendencies due to their magnitude in society, the bribe that occurs on the street over a traffic infraction or bureaucratic paperwork in a government office does not seem to be the same as the bribes often disguised as payments or voluntary contributions that take place throughout the school year or in hospitals and public health units.

But to respond to the question of who in general are more frequent victims of corruption in Honduras, and having seen the special relationships that exists between some personal variables and acts of corruption, we proceeded to do a linear regression analysis, including all the personal variables described earlier, in addition to others which have proved to be significant in other studies on the subject.<sup>67</sup>

As Table IV.1 shows (see Appendix B), the main predictors of general victimization by corruption are the respondent's gender, the condition of employment, the size of the population in the place of residence, participation in community affairs, attendance at meetings of the "patronato," and at meetings of professionals. Other variables which were significant in the bivariate analysis, such as educational level, monthly family income, household capital assets, were not significant in the multivariate analysis. However, other conditions which were found to be related to bribery victimization in previous studies, such as civil status or the number of children were found to be unrelated to corruption victimization in Honduras, at least according to the results of the survey.

The regression indicates that a male, who was employed at the time of the survey, lives in large cities, participates actively in municipal affairs, and who tends to attend the meetings of the municipal patronato and professional meetings is more likely to be a victim of an act of corruption or bribery in general than other persons.

The statistical significance of the variables of participation in municipal affairs, attendance at patronato meetings and at professional meetings is very interesting. A sample of this relationship is shown in Figure IV.16. It indicates that the probability of falling victim to an act of corruption increases the more a person participates in matters related to the municipality. One explanation of this could be that persons who participate more in municipal affairs, in general, are those who have greater contact with public officials and, consequently, have greater chances of being affected by corruption as that participation rises.

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<sup>67</sup> See: Mitchell Seligson, and Polibio Córdova. (2002). *Auditoría de la democracia Ecuador*. Quito: Ediciones CEDATOS.

Mitchell Seligson, José Miguel Cruz, and Ricardo Córdova Macías. (2000). *Auditoría de la democracia El Salvador 1999*. San Salvador: Universidad de Pittsburgh, IUDOP-UCA and FUNDAUNGO.

**Figure IV.16 Corruption Victimization by Attendance at Patronato Meetings**



#### 4.4 Corruption and Democracy

In the past few years, the topic of corruption has become very relevant for the comprehension of the working of democracy, above all in those countries that are in processes of democratization. Corruption is no longer understood merely as a moral problem but is seen as a problem that has serious implications for different facets of social development. The impact of corruption that has been most explored is the economic one. Without a doubt, the harm caused by corruption is directly linked to the economic sphere, and is manifested in the diversion of funds, the private appropriation of collective resources, and the deprivation suffered by those sectors to whom state resources were directed for specific projects.

Usually, the linkage between democracy and corruption has been made theoretically, and when it has been made empirically, it has been made more in terms of examining the levels of corruption perceived in countries – usually through the Transparency International indices – and the greater or lesser quality of democracy in those countries. Further, attempts to link the issue of corruption at a more individual level to the support given by citizens to political regimes have focused more on indicators of perception of corruption than on the events of corruption in themselves.


In response to these weaknesses, Seligson developed a way of measuring the impact of corruption on democracy by linking a direct measure of corruption victimization with the index of support for the political system at the individual level. Seligson starts from the assumption that system support, that is, legitimacy, constitutes a basic requisite for democratic stability, especially in Latin America, where there is a long history of political instability. The

fundamental hypothesis is that persons who have been more victimized will be less likely to support the political system than those who have not been victimized.

In practise, this linkage has been supported by studies conducted by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador and Ecuador<sup>68</sup>. However, on testing this hypothesis with the data for Honduras from this survey, we found no statistically significant relationship between frequency of general victimization by corruption and the system support index. Although the results indicate that system support is a little higher among those who have not been of acts of corruption compared to those who have, the tests of statistical significance indicate that such differences are not directly attributable to the effect of having been a victim or not. This is probably due to the low percentage of persons who reported repeated events of victimization; in these situations, the bivariate analyses do not have a sufficient number of cases to draw conclusions.

In addition, more than the direct events of victimization, what it did reveal to be associated with the system support index was the perception of how honest or corrupt are the different social groups. We constructed a scale of perception of honesty of employees with the items of perception of honesty of officials and social groups (PC1 – PC21).<sup>69</sup>

**Figure IV.17 System Support by Perception of Honesty of Public Officials**



The results indicate that the level of system support depends, in part, on how honest or corrupt the different officials in the country are perceived to be. If the perception of honesty is medium

<sup>68</sup> Mitchell Seligson and Polibio Córdova. (2002) *Auditoría de la democracia*. Ecuador. Quito: Ediciones CEDATOS.

<sup>69</sup> The scale has a reliability of 0.8960 (Cronbach's Alpha).


or high, system support tends to be above the mean for the country; in contrast, if the perception of officials' transparency is very low, system support is well below the national average.

This suggests that system support is not completely unrelated to the issue of corruption. Although the direct incidence of cases of corruption does not seem to change system support, it does change the general perception of the honesty of officials or professional association members, suggesting that the link between corruption and democracy exists at other empirical levels.

In fact – and by contrast – the results do show that victimization by corruption can affect the level of citizen satisfaction with democracy (PN4: *In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Honduras?*) Satisfaction with the working of democracy constitutes a more specific element of support for democracy, according to the classification done by Pippa Norris.<sup>70</sup> The system support scale used in most of this report is based on the most diffuse and all-encompassing level of system support; in contrast, satisfaction with the working of democracy refers to a more concrete level of support.

In any case, the results show that direct corruption has an impact – slight but significant – on Hondurans' satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country. As persons are more frequently victimized by bribery, the level of satisfaction with democracy is lowered. The performance of democracy, in contrast, is better evaluated among persons who have not directly experienced corruption.

**Figure IV.18 Satisfaction With the Working of Democracy by Corruption Victimization**



<sup>70</sup> Pippa Norris. (1999). *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## 4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that corruption experienced in the form of bribery is relatively high in Honduras, in comparison with other countries of the region. However, the perception of corruption is not as high in this country as in the rest. Among the forms of corruption explored here, the payment of bribes in the educational system is most prominent. This type of corruption is much more common in Honduras than in any other country of the region, with the exception of México. Generally speaking, the most frequent victims of corruption are men, employed persons, those who live in large metropolitan areas and those who participate actively in municipal affairs. Finally, although the results do not indicate a statistically significant relationship between the frequency of victimization by acts of corruption and diffuse system support, they do show that perception of honesty among public employees is associated with system support. They also show that victimization has an impact on the level of satisfaction with the working of democracy in Honduras.



## 5.0 Crime and Democracy

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According to the World Health Organization, currently Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the most criminal and social violence in the world. Unlike other regions of the globe such as Africa or the Middle East where the prevailing violence has roots in ethnic and political conflicts, and, therefore, the exercise of violence occurs under conditions of civil or quasi-civil war, in Latin America violence originates essentially from acts of criminality and from diffuse social conflicts which have been on the increase for years. The WHO data indicate that in Latin America the homicide rate was 27.5 deaths for every 100,000 inhabitants in the year 2000; the same data indicate that the world average was 8.8 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants.

However, violence in Latin America differs considerably between and within the countries. For many years, Colombia has been considered the most violent country in the region, with homicide rates above 80 deaths for every 100,000 inhabitants, while Chile and Uruguay have rates below 5 deaths for every 100,000 persons.<sup>71</sup> A study financed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the mid-1990s found that El Salvador had homicide rates above 100 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>72</sup> Another publication by the Bank reported that in the years following the Peace Accords, Guatemala achieved rates of almost 150 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>73</sup> The recent report of the United Nations Development Program on democracy in Latin America reported that the homicide rate in Honduras for 1999 reached 154 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.<sup>74</sup> In 2003 a publication of the Pan-American Health Organization showed that in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador had the highest homicide rates of the entire Latin American region, with levels above 40 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

However, the problem of high levels of violence and crime is not unique to Honduras; all of northern Central America is especially violent, with the exception of Belize, but in this Central American country the incidence of certain phenomena such as juvenile gangs, organized crime, drug trafficking and social violence have made it particularly violent and unsafe.

This violence expresses itself in a variety of ways. Thus, the problem of the violence in Honduras not only involves the high rate of homicides and physical violence, what was originally called “social violence,” but also by the high number of crimes against the property and other acts that are generally known as common delinquency. In reality, most acts of violence can be considered criminal acts, but in practice when one speaks of delinquency, one usually refers to crimes linked to assaults, robberies, and economically motivated crimes.

As early as 1996, a survey promoted by the Human Rights Commissioner found that the the Honduran population considered crime to be the country’s most important problem.<sup>75</sup> According to Castellanos, between 1988 and 1998, “crime reports went from 9,964 crimes to 46,200, which

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<sup>71</sup> Paulo De Mesquita Neto (2002). “Crime, Violence, and Democracy in Latin America”. Paper presented in the Conference Integration in the Americas. Albuquerque, New México: April 5, 2002.

<sup>72</sup> José Miguel Cruz and Luis Armando González. (1997). “Magnitud de la violencia en El Salvador”. *Estudios Centroamericanos (ECA)*, 588, 953-966.

<sup>73</sup> Mayra Buvinic, Andrew Morrison and Shifter, Michael. (1999). *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Framework for Action*. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

<sup>74</sup> Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2004). *La democracia en América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos*. Buenos Aires: PNUD.

<sup>75</sup> Véase: [http://www.ciprodeh.org/hn/derechos\\_humanos/cero\\_tol.htm](http://www.ciprodeh.org/hn/derechos_humanos/cero_tol.htm).

means an increase of 469% in a period of 10 years.”<sup>76</sup> The same report indicates that, till 1998, 12.1% of crimes were directed against life (homicides, wounds, aggression, threats, etc.), 43.22% were against private property (robbery and theft), while 44.7% consisted of various other crimes. Other studies have shown that in Honduras the major incidence of crime is in the largest population settlements, in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, especially in the latter.<sup>77</sup> In fact, these two urban centers account for 65 % of the crimes against life reported in 1999.

The rise in crime has deeply marked Honduran society. The violence has led to a notable increase in the levels of citizen insecurity. Hondurans are not very different from the other countries of the region in terms of the spiraling growth of private security agencies and arms sales. The insecurity has also caused the appearance of vigilante groups. The organization Casa Alianza, for example, reported the execution of 302 street children between January 1998 and May 2000, a third of them at the hands of members of the police or the military.

Therefore, the problem of violence is, without a doubt, a serious problem in Honduras. It affects the overall health of the population; it has a large economic impact by reducing the productivity of the population, increasing the operating costs of businesses and affecting the economic investment climate, which ultimately affects the country’s potential for development. In addition to all this, it also erodes the conditions conducive to democratic consolidation.

Traditionally, the study of factors influencing processes of democratic consolidation have focused on the modes of transition and on the level of economic growth and development of a country. In the past few years, however, new voices have appeared, drawing attention to other factors such as corruption within the State or violence and insecurity in democratic consolidation.<sup>78</sup> These conditions, widespread corruption and high levels of violence and insecurity, affect democracies, above all developing ones, by eroding the political culture that supports them. Under such problems, on one hand, many people feel tempted to support authoritarian and repressive alternatives which endanger the fundamental principles of liberties and rights of a democracy. On the other, citizens lose trust in the institutions forming the political system, both in specific as well as diffuse terms, following Easton’s terminology.

In fact, two independent studies published simultaneously in different academic journals using the data base of the Latin American Public Opinion Project of the University of Pittsburgh<sup>79</sup> found that direct victimization by crime and feelings of insecurity affect the level of support to political systems in Guatemala and El Salvador. The study by Cruz also incorporated analysis of

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<sup>76</sup> Julieta Castellanos. (2001). “Honduras: Armamentismo y violencia,” in: Fundación Arias (ed.). *El arsenal invisible. Armas livianas y seguridad en la posguerra centroamericana*. San José: Fundación Arias para la Paz y el Progreso Humano, p. 272.

<sup>77</sup> Leticia Salomón. (1999). “Honduras: Transición policial, retos democráticos e inseguridad ciudadana,” In CRIES (ed.), *Violencia social en Centroamérica. Ensayos sobre gobernabilidad y seguridad ciudadana*. Managua: CRIES.

<sup>78</sup> James Holston and Teresa P.R. Caldeira (1998). “Democracy, Law, and Violence. Disjunctures on Brazilian Citizenship,” in: Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.) *Fault Lines of democracy in Post-transition Latin America*. Miami: North-South Center Press.

<sup>79</sup> Orlando Pérez. (2003). “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala.” *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4). Winter 2003-2004.

José Miguel Cruz. (2003). “Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra.” *América Latina Hoy* 35, 19-59.



data from Nicaragua, but in this Central American country – which does not have the same levels of violence as its northern neighbors – the impact of system support only came directly from the fact of having been affected by a crime.

Therefore, in the same way that corruption has become a fundamental issue for the governability of countries in the region, violence and insecurity have also become a phenomenon that cannot be avoided in the study of democratic stability. This chapter presents the results from the part of the questionnaire on victimization and seeks to measure the impact of violence – measured as victimization by a criminal act – and insecurity on democracy. It is very important to clarify here that the measurement of crime has been done using a series of items which record events of victimization that a person has suffered directly and which he has survived. In addition, one has to consider that there are numerous acts of victimization that cannot be adequately covered by a survey such as the one used here, for example, sexual assaults. Therefore, we should keep in mind that this measurement of victimization by crime only taps some acts of criminal violence, usually those linked to economically motivated crime, and not all possible forms of victimization by violence. All the results and all the references to criminal violence in this chapter should be understood under these terms.

In the first section, we present the results of victimization by crime; in the second section, we elaborate on the topic of crime reporting; next, we analyze the link between crime victimization and trust in the system, and finally, we discuss the subject of insecurity and its relationship with the variables of system support.


## **5.1 The Problem of Violence in Honduras: Victimization by Crime**

In the question regarding the most serious problem that Honduras is currently facing (HA4: *To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem the country is facing?*), more than 18% of the respondents answered by indicating problems related to public insecurity and violence (delinquency, crime, violence, drug trafficking and gangs). This shows that, unlike the problem of corruption, crime constitutes a problem that is present in Honduran public opinion. The survey registered the level of victimization of Honduran citizens by acts of aggression or crime of any type. In order to do so, it asked respondents a concrete question using the following item: “VIC1: Have you been the victim of a crime in the past 12 months?” 13.7% of Hondurans had been victims of a criminal act of some type during the year preceding the survey. This does not mean that the remaining Hondurans did not suffer from crime in the past. In fact, other surveys done in previous years have shown that up to 37 % of households in Honduras have been victims of some type of violent event.<sup>80</sup> A comparison of the results of crime victimization in Honduras with the other countries in the region using the data base of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project reveals that Honduras has the second lowest percentage of crime victimization in the entire region. Only Guatemala has a lower percentage.

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<sup>80</sup> Alejandro Gaviria and Carmen Pagés. (1999). “Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America.” Working Paper No. 408. Washington, D.C: Interamerican Development Bank. The differences in the results of these surveys are due to the methodology used to probe victimization. While Gaviria and Pagés’ survey includes data from all household members, the one we are using in this report refers only to the respondent.

**Figure V.1 Crime Victimization by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



These results, in particular those that refer to Honduras' position in the region in terms of levels of victimization, do not appear to match the data available on the degree of violence that exists in that Central American country relative to its neighbors. As we have seen in the preceding pages, the available statistics on violence in the region tend to describe Honduras as one of the most violent in the area. However, we should keep in mind that such statistics basically refer to acts of homicide and crimes against life, which are without a doubt the most serious, but not the only type of violence in the area. Hence, the differences with regional statistics are probably because this survey covers victimization not ending in homicide and concentrates on crimes of an economic nature. Some authors have indicated that crimes against life are not always related to crimes against property or those of an economic nature.<sup>81</sup> A study of violent crime carried out in El Salvador found that crime against life and violence against property had dissimilar geographical distributions across the country. While economic crime was concentrated usually in urban areas, violence against persons was a more serious problem in the rural areas of the country.<sup>82</sup>

In this survey, when respondents were asked about the type of crime that they had experienced (VIC2: What type of crime did you experience?), almost 45% of the victims said that they had been victims of robbery without aggression or physical threat, 39.5% said that they had been victims of robbery with aggression, almost 10% indicated that they were victims of a robbery in their own homes, and the remaining cases of victimization referred to aggressions, sexual assault and unlawful retention of assets, among other things. Therefore, the type of criminal acts which is most picked up by this survey is that which refers to crimes against property. It is important to


<sup>81</sup> Luis Ratinoff. (1996). "Delincuencia y paz ciudadana," in: *Hacia un enfoque de desarrollo: ética, violencia y seguridad ciudadana*. Washington, D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

<sup>82</sup> José Miguel Cruz, Álvaro Trigueros and Francisco González. (2000). *El crimen violento en El Salvador. Factores sociales y económicos asociados*. San Salvador: IUDOP-UCA/Banco Mundial.

keep in mind this characteristic of the data in order to recognize their range and limitations for this analysis.

The impact of different types of victimization is not the same. For example, the impact of robbery without aggression on the victim is very different from the impact of a rape or sexual assault. Keeping this in mind, we did a reclassification of victimization on the basis of the crime experienced. We classified the respondents into three groups. The first consisted of all citizens who did not report being crime victims in the past year; the second included victims of crimes which can be classified as moderate because they did not result in physical harm to the person (robbery without aggression, robbery of the home, damage to property and unlawful retention of assets), and the third included victims of acts that can be considered serious (assault with aggression, direct aggression and sexual assault). The first group covers 86% of the respondents, the second, which covers moderate victimization, almost 8% of the respondents, while the third, that of severe victimization, consists of 5.7%. These categories will be used in subsequent analyses in the chapter.

**Figure V.2 Crime Victimization by Age**




The results of the study reveal that the levels of crime victimization are not the same for all persons, and that the impact of violence varies across citizens. For example, men reported being a little more victimized (16%) than their compatriots of the opposite sex (11%). But the most striking data are those that refer to differences in victimization by age and by educational level. The results of the survey show that the persons who were most victimized by crime in the year preceding the survey were the youngest respondents, who accounted for almost 20% (see Figure V.2). Victimization is reduced significantly as the age of the respondents rises: 15% among those who are between the ages of 26 and 35 years, 11.4% among those between 36 and 45, and less than 11% among persons above the age of 46 years. These results match those of most

criminological studies, which show that the youngest persons are the most likely to suffer from acts of criminal violence.<sup>83</sup>

In the case of the educational level, the differences are even more pronounced. The highest levels of victimization occur among persons who have higher education (technical or university); a little more than 30% of such individuals have been victims of crime. In contrast, the lowest levels of criminal violence registered by the survey are found among Honduran citizens who have little or no formal education; among these groups, at least 11% have been victims of crime. This suggests that education is an important variable in the determination of victims of violence. This is probably related to the level of resources that people have: citizens with more education would be more frequent victims of crime because they tend to have more resources, which make them more prone to experiencing robbery or assault. In contrast, people who have little education and, consequently, fewer resources have, in turn, very few assets to offer those who seek to commit a crime.

**Figure V.3 Crime Victimization by Education**




This is also why family income and the level of household capital assets of the respondent are associated with crime victimization. Although the difference in terms of crimes experienced among those who have more and those who have less is as great as that due to level of education, it is clear that the probability of becoming a victim of common violence increases with family income and the availability of assets within the household – which is an indirect measure of economic well-being. Furthermore, the survey revealed that persons who receive remittances from abroad tend to be victims with greater frequency (21.6 %), than those who do not (12 %).

<sup>83</sup> Albert Reiss and Jeffrey Roth. (1993). *Understanding and Preventing Violence*. Washington: National Academy Press.

Individuals in better economic conditions are the most frequent victims of economically motivated crime. These results also support the findings reported in the literature on the incidence of economic crime.<sup>84</sup> They indicate that economically motivated crime is concentrated most where there are most targets of such crime, which evidently implies that the persons most affected by this type of violence are those who have the greatest wealth. A different profile is found when victimization is a product of violence against physical well-being; in such cases, the profiles are more diffuse and the relevance of economic variables tends to be less.


**Figure V.4 Crime Victimization by Victim's Family Income**



All the preceding results are consistent with the survey finding that the highest levels of crime victimization are found in the country's largest cities, that is, in the metropolitan and most urbanized areas of Honduras. As Figure V.5 shows, in the country's capital, Tegucigalpa, the percentage of victimization by criminal violence reaches 27%, followed by the large cities, which in this case refers mainly to San Pedro Sula, with 21%. It is interesting to note that the localities that exhibit the lowest degree of crime victimization are the rural ones. There, the percentage of violence suffered by the peasants is only 7%, almost four times less than the percentage of victimization in the capital region.


<sup>84</sup> Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner. (1994). *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Figure V.5 Crime Victimization by City Size**



The results of the survey indicate that the distribution of crime across the regions of Honduras follows the same pattern established for the population size of human settlements. Regions with a higher percentage of cases of victimization (above 16%) are the center (19%) and the north (17%) of the country, precisely those in which the two main metropolises are to be found. In contrast, in the occidental zone, where a large part of the population is rural, the rate of crime victimization does not exceed 4% of the inhabitants.

**Figure V.6 Crime Victimization by Region of the Country**



After identifying the variables which appeared to be associated individually with crime victimization, we proceeded to do a binary logistic regression in order to obtain a better profile of the persons who tend to be victims of criminal violence in Honduras. The results are presented in Table V.1 (see Appendix B). It shows that men, city dwellers, persons with a higher level of education, and younger Hondurans have a greater probability of being victimized by crime in Honduras. It is worth pointing out that the city variables – which constitute the different values of the city size variable (HTAMANO) – are significant because they are being compared to the rural area. In other words, the true meaning of this information is that persons who live in urban areas have greater chances of becoming crime victims than those who live in rural areas. In addition, judging by the coefficients of the regression analysis, the city size group of variables, constitutes the most important condition for predicting the occurrence of victimization.

Another interesting result of the multivariate analysis is that the importance of the variables measuring the respondent's economic condition disappeared after other conditions were included, especially those referring to city size – which basically measures urbanization as already indicated – and education. Therefore, in order to determine if persons are vulnerable to crime victimization or not, more important than their economic condition is the nature of the place where they live: urban or rural.

## **5.2 Crime Reporting**

Only 32.7 % of the persons who were victims of a crime reported it to the authorities. Most people who were victims of violence did not report it. However, the rate of reporting is not the same for all types of crime, that is, there are crimes that are more reported than others. Figure V.6 shows the rates of reporting for each one of the acts of violence collected by this study. As we can see, only sexual assault and unlawful retention of assets were reported in their totality by the victims; however, these crimes are not the most common, and therefore they do not have great impact on the reporting rate. On the other hand, there is damage to property. The survey indicates that none of the victims of this type of crime reported it to the appropriate authorities. In contrast, the most common crimes, robberies, are those that determine the overall reporting rate; but not more than 40% of such crimes are reported.


Most of the reports, when they occur, are made to the police or to the DIC (85.1%); 9% are reported to the Public Prosecutor's Office and 4.5% are registered in the courts; the rest are taken to the media.

But the most interesting information regarding the reporting of crimes refers to the people who, having been victims of a criminal act, decided not to report them. Such persons, who constitute the majority of those who experienced an act of violence, defended their decision not to report saying that it made no difference (38.9%), that it was dangerous and could put them at risk (29.8%), that they did not have evidence (17.6%), or that it was not serious enough to be reported (11.5 %). Only a small percentage of victims (2.3 %) stated that they did not report the act of violence because they did not know where to do it.

Most of the reasons for not reporting victimization basically reflect an attitude of mistrust in the authorities charged with preventing and eradicating crime. The fact that more than 70% of the victims stated that "it makes no difference" or that "it is dangerous," indicates that many

Hondurans remain unconvinced that the institutions will do anything to pursue the guilty and to protect the victims.

**Figure V.7 Rate of Crime Reporting by Type of Crime Experienced**



### 5.3 Victimization and Trust in the System

The above finding fits with the fact that 57.2% of citizens have little or no faith that “the judicial system will punish the guilty” in case of being victimized; 18% stated that they had “some faith,” and 24% reported having “a lot of faith.”<sup>85</sup> But the truth is that having been a victim of a crime modifies citizens’ perceptions and attitudes toward the justice system. The results of the survey showed that having been a victim of a criminal act or not has an impact on the levels of trust that citizens have in the performance of institutions. Table V.2 presents the results of associating the victimization variable with faith that the judicial system will punish the guilty; but it also shows the results of associating victimization with overall trust in the justice system and overall trust in all the institutions in the country, not only the judicial system. The results are very interesting.

**Table V.2 Trust in Institutions by Crime Victimization**

Have you been a victim?	Means		
	Trust in the system to punish the guilty	Trust in the justice system	Trust in institutions
No	48.1	52.5	51.4
Yes	40.7	44.2	43.4
All	47.0	51.3	50.3

<sup>85</sup> The question was asked in item AOJ12 and was worded in the following way: “If you were a victim of assault or robbery...how much faith would you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party?” The advantage this question has over data on crime reporting is that it involves the entire population, not just those who have been victims, and offers the possibility of making an independent comparison of the impact of victimization on trust in systems.




Having been a victim of crime not only lowers the level of faith that the judicial system will punish the guilty party, but it also reduces, even more sharply, citizens' trust in the justice system in general and their trust in the country's institutions in general. In other words, victimization has a direct impact on the credibility of the working of institutions in Honduras and, in that sense, affects the level of specific support for the system.

But, going a little further, an analysis of crime victimization and diffuse system support reveals that the impact of victimization is not limited only to the specifically institutional level or to the level of performance of the agencies of the system. It also affects the degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy in Honduras (PN4) and the degree of diffuse support to the system (PSA5). In this case, in order to show that the impact of victimization is important not only due to the fact of being a victim but also due to the magnitude of victimization, we used the measure of the seriousness of victimization which was described in the preceding pages.

These results, which are shown in Figure V.8, indicate that as persons are victimized and more seriously victimized, their levels of satisfaction with democratic performance are lowered and the level of diffuse system support is reduced significantly. Hence, individuals who have been affected by violence will tend not only to believe less in Honduran institutions, but they will also tend to devalue the working of democracy in Honduras, and to withdraw support from the political system. This obviously has implications for democratic stability. If, as the statistics of multilateral development agencies indicate, Honduras has an acute problem of criminal violence, this implies that there is an inexhaustible source of political illegitimacy in the country with those levels of criminal violence.

**Figure V.8 Satisfaction with Democracy and System Support by Degree of Victimization**



We also attempted the same exercise with the indicators of tolerance. That is, we tried to measure the impact of victimization in the indices of tolerance of Hondurans. The results, however, did not reveal any significant impact.

#### **5.4 The Feeling of Insecurity Due to Crime**

But in the issue of public security, not only direct crime victimization but perceptions of insecurity also play an important role in the relationship between the problem of crime and insecurity. There has been a growing focus on perceptions of insecurity and fear of crime in criminological debates on crime. At present, there appears to be little doubt that in tackling the problem of crime, it is imperative to consider not only the crime itself and the objective facts of violence, but also the perceptions of insecurity among the population.<sup>86</sup>


The survey tapped the feeling of insecurity among Hondurans as a result of crime or from the possibility of being victimized by it through the following item: “AOJ11: Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and considering the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery...do you feel very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?”

The results indicate that almost two thirds of Hondurans (63.4 %) said they felt safe (very safe and safe), while remaining 36.6 % said they felt unsafe. A comparison of these data with those obtained from the surveys of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project in other countries of the region the same year, reveal that Honduras shows lower levels of insecurity due to crime. In the rest of the Central American countries, México and Colombia, the manifestations of insecurity are above the mean of 40 (on a 0 to 100 scale), while in Honduras the level of insecurity using the same scale is 39.1.

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<sup>86</sup> Fernando Carrión (ed.) (2002). *Seguridad ciudadana, ¿espejismo o realidad?* Quito: FLACSO Ecuador-OPS/OMS.


**Figure V.9 Sense of Insecurity by Degree of Victimization**



On associating these figures to the degree of victimization, the data show that the fact of being a victim clearly increases the feeling of insecurity of an individual. However, this relationship is not linear when we consider the seriousness of the crime experienced, that is, it is not the case that persons who experience more severe acts of violence become more insecure. According to the data, it is sufficient for a person to become a victim of an act of violence, albeit moderate, for the levels of perceived insecurity to rise. This can be seen more clearly in Figure V.10.

Citizens who have experienced moderate victimization, that is, crimes in which their physical well-being was not harmed, are those who exhibit the highest levels of insecurity (51), even above those of persons who have been victims of more serious crimes (45). In any case, what is clear is that, logically, victims tend to feel more insecure than persons who have not been victimized.


**Figure V.10 Feeling of Insecurity by Degree of Victimization**



But the sources of insecurity are not limited only to victimization. Other conditions related to the citizens' surroundings are also relevant. For example, the survey found that the persons who stated that they had witnessed the sale of drugs in their neighborhood (AOJ16A: Have you seen anybody selling drugs in your neighborhood in the past year?) showed higher indices of insecurity than those who did not.

The above points to the current impact of the media on the generation of insecurity among Honduran citizens. The citizens not only feel unsafe because they are victims of violence or because they directly perceive dangerous and problematic surroundings, but also because through the news the media transmit the image of a hostile and violent environment, which generates insecurity. Another variable that was found to be linked to insecurity was city size. As the following figure shows, persons who live in large cities and in the Tegucigalpa Metropolitan Area manifest the highest levels of insecurity (46 and 44, respectively). In contrast, insecurity does not seem to be as high among citizens inhabiting smaller cities (38) and the rural areas of the country (36).

**Figure V.11. Feeling of Insecurity by Size of the City of Residence**




The survey also found a relationship between exposure to news in the media and perception of insecurity.<sup>87</sup> The results indicate that the persons who show higher levels of insecurity are those who follow news in the media with greater frequency (42). In contrast, persons who do not watch nor read the news in the media tend to have lower average levels of feelings of insecurity.

The above suggests the current impact of the media on citizens' perceptions of insecurity in Honduras. Citizens not only feel insecure because they are victims of violence or because they directly perceive dangerous and problematic surroundings; they also feel insecure because the media propagate an image of the surrounding environment in the news that generates insecurity.


<sup>87</sup> We created a variable with the items A2 (Watch news on TV) and A3 (Read news in the papers), which summarizes the extent to which citizens inform themselves through the news in the media. The variable was divided into four categories: those that neither watch nor read the news in the media (20.1%), those who do so with a low frequency (21.5%), those who do so at a moderate rate (37.1%), and those who watch and read the news very frequently (21.2%). The variable was labeled "Exposure to news in the media."

**Figure V.12 Feeling of Insecurity by Exposure to News in the Media**



Insecurity, similar to direct victimization by crime, has an important impact on different levels of system support, both in terms of institutional trust and in terms of satisfaction with the working of democracy and diffuse support for the system. In other words, the perception of insecurity in the population due to crime erodes attitudes of support for the political system, not only in terms of specific institutions but also in terms of the legitimacy of democracy.


**Figure V.13 Institutional Trust, Satisfaction With Democracy, and System Support by Feeling of Insecurity**



In fact, when we included the variables of victimization by crime and feeling of insecurity in the multivariate analysis of the predictors of system support, both turned out to be very significant, more so than other variables such as sex, age, family income and ideological orientation. Therefore, it is possible to say that, similar to the conclusions arrived at independently by Pérez and Cruz for the other countries of the area, violence and insecurity affect the legitimacy of the Honduran political system.

We conducted the same exercise with the index of tolerance, with quite curious results. According to the data, there is no linear relationship between the feeling of insecurity and the level of tolerance of persons. Instead, persons who feel very safe and those who feel very unsafe, both tend to exhibit higher levels of tolerance than persons who place themselves toward the center of the scale (see Figure V.14). It is not possible to explain this phenomenon with the help of theory, which suggests that it would be necessary to do a more in-depth treatment of the subject of tolerance in order to explain why tolerance is equally high among those who feel insecure and among those who do not.

**Figure V.14 Tolerance by Feeling of Insecurity**



## 5.5 Conclusions

This chapter offers some evidence that violence in the form of direct victimization, and public insecurity due to crime affect the legitimacy of the political system at different levels in Honduras. However, the results of the Honduras survey do not seem to confirm the magnitude of the problem of violence that is reported by other sources. One reason for this could be the fact that most acts of violence recorded by the survey refer to economically motivated crime, which is concentrated in the most populated urban areas of the country, while most of the more serious crimes against the physical well-being of persons are neglected.

The persons who tend to experience greater victimization as measured by the survey are younger men, those who live in urban areas and those who have higher levels of education.

The data indicate violence in Honduras does have an impact on the institutional systems: crime victims and those who live in fear of crime tend to have less faith in the judicial system and in institutions in general, tend to offer less support to the existing political system, and tend to be more skeptical about the benefits of democracy. In addition, the results indicate that victimization and insecurity stimulate attitudes favorable to coups d' Etat, authoritarian attitudes, and attitudes favoring institutional responses that are outside the legal framework.



## 6.0 Local Government

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While Latin America has a long history of governmental centralism and, as a consequence, local governments have languished for a long time,<sup>88</sup> in the past few decades there has been a re-evaluation of the local sphere, and processes of decentralization have been initiated within the framework of the processes of State reform.<sup>89</sup> In the opinion of Tim Campbell, there has been a “silent revolution” in Latin America, in the area of “the transfer of decision-making and spending power from central to local governments”.<sup>90</sup>

However, this process has had its own dynamic and characteristics in the Central American region. In the framework of democratization processes, during the 1980s, new constitutions, which set the legal foundations of municipal autonomy, were passed in Honduras (1982), El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1986) and Nicaragua (1987). Later, new municipal legislation was passed in El Salvador (1986), Nicaragua (1988), Guatemala (1988) and Honduras (1990),<sup>91</sup> and Costa Rica promoted a reform of the municipal regime in 1998, which led to the direct election of mayors in 2002. The legislation of the new Central American municipal regime provided for the direct election of the mayor and municipal councilors, and created specific posts to promote citizen participation in each one of the countries.<sup>92</sup>

Although the Central American legislation has provided for municipal autonomy, “both the National Assemblies and the Executive try to maintain strict control over municipal governments through laws, decrees, and the revision of municipal codes. In many cases, such actions violate the constitutional mandates and produce internal inconsistencies, contradictions and a substantial reduction of municipal autonomy.”<sup>93</sup>

In the past few years, there has been a positive re-evaluation of the local sphere in the Central American region,<sup>94</sup> mainly due to two factors. In the first place, it is a space that has greater

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<sup>88</sup> See: R. Andrew Nickson. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

<sup>89</sup> See: Fernando Carrión M. “Descentralización en América Latina: una perspectiva comparada.” In: Marta Eugenia González, Katharine Andrade Eekhoff and Carlos G. Ramos (editores). *Una mirada a los procesos de descentralización y desarrollo local en América Latina*. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2003.

<sup>90</sup> Tim Campbell. *The Quiet Revolution. Decentralization and the Rise of Political Participation in Latin American Cities*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.

<sup>91</sup> See: Ricardo Córdova Macías. “La participación ciudadana en el gobierno local centroamericano.” In: *Centroamérica: gobierno local y participación ciudadana en El Salvador*. Volumen 4. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador and FUNDAUNGO, 1996.

<sup>92</sup> For a broader vision on the theme of citizen participation in the local sphere, see: Ricardo Córdova Macías and Leslie Quiñónez Basagoitia (editors). *Participación Ciudadana y Desarrollo Local en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, 2003.

<sup>93</sup> Sandra Wheaton-Bettger. *Temas: un desafío par la democracia centroamericana: una agenda municipal*. Washington DC, PADCO, 1992.

<sup>94</sup> See:

Carlos Umaña Cerna. *Tendencias y Actores del Desarrollo Local en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, 2002.

María Virginia Casasfranco and Fernando Patiño Millán. “Participación ciudadana en el nivel local en Centroamérica: tendencias actuales y perspectivas.” In: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Günther Maihold and Sabine Kurtenbach (editors). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo and Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín, 2001.

potential for deepening democracy because local governments are closer to the population, and public opinion studies show that citizens trust and have a positive perception of local governments. Further, the municipality is perceived as the institution that best responds to community problems. In second place, municipal government is acknowledged as a space that allows one to raise the levels of citizen participation. However, in spite of this positive image and the potential of local governments, adverse conditions persist: the resistance of central governments, the weakness of their capacity for institutional management, the narrowness of legal frameworks, budgetary limitations, and hierarchial and clientelist political cultures.<sup>95</sup>

With regard to the process of decentralization in Central America, in spite of the numerous proposals that have been formulated in the past few decades, very little progress has been made.<sup>96</sup> “The process of decentralization of competencies, responsibilities and resources of the State at the central level toward the municipalities of Central America is a process which we would describe as being more at a stage of discussion and even of experimentation, than of real wide-ranging execution. In Costa Rica, the process is still at the stage of proposal and debate; in the case of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, they have moved on to pilot experiments, which the governments consider to be decentralizing, but which in reality in most cases correspond to experiences of administrative deconcentration and even of privatization. (...) Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the issue of decentralization is present in the public agenda of the region, in some cases more than in others, and that there has been progress, albeit slow.”<sup>97</sup>

In any case, on drawing an assessment of this process, it has been pointed out that “there is no doubt that in the past few years significant steps have been taken to grant greater authority and specific responsibility to the municipalities. As a consequence, these have tended to recover some levels of administrative and political autonomy, although the necessary consistency with respect to financial and economic autonomy and the development of their technical capacity for management is still to be achieved.”<sup>98</sup>

In this chapter we address, over eight sections, the subject of the attitudes and evaluations of Hondurans with respect to their local governments. In the first section, we examine citizens’ relationship with the different levels of government; in the second, we analyze citizens’ participation in the work of municipal government; in the third, we examine satisfaction with municipal services; in the fourth, we explore the opinion regarding who has responded best to the problems of the community; in the fifth we look at the opinions regarding the management of

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<sup>95</sup> We have developed this in: Günther Maihold and Ricardo Córdova Macías. “Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica.” In: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Günther Maihold and Sabine Kurtenbach (editors). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo and Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín, 2001, pp. 417-418.

<sup>96</sup> For a historic and global vision of the subject, see: Ricardo Córdova Macías (editor). *Políticas y Propuestas de Descentralización en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FLACSO Programa El Salvador, 1997.

<sup>97</sup> Manuel Ortega Hegg and Guadalupe Wallace. “La marcha del proceso descentralizador en Centroamérica.” In: Marta Eugenia González, Katharine Andrade Eekhoff and Carlos G. Ramos (editors). *Una mirada a los procesos de descentralización y desarrollo local en América Latina*. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2003.

<sup>98</sup> Daniel García González. *La cuestión municipal en Centroamérica: un desafío para la consolidación democrática y la modernización del Estado*. San José, Fundación DEMUCA, 2001.

resources; in the sixth, trust in municipalities; in the seventh, we present a set of evaluations of local government, and in the eighth we examine municipal problems.

## 6.1 Citizens' Relationship With the Different Levels of Government

An earlier study for the Central American region on citizens' relationship with the national and local levels of government noted the proximity of local government to the citizenry (76% in Nicaragua, 69% in Guatemala and 51% in El Salvador) on the basis of respondents' knowledge of the mayor's name.<sup>99</sup> This contrasts, for example, in the case of El Salvador, where "only 20.1% of the respondents knew the duration of the presidential term, and only 18.1% of respondents knew the number of deputies in the Legislative Assembly."<sup>100</sup>

Because these questions were not included in the questionnaire for this study, we are going to re-examine the hypothesis of the proximity of local government to citizens by using a battery of three questions which were included in the questionnaire, with the aim of exploring the respondents' relationship or future contact with national government, deputies and the municipalities. Respondents were asked:

*"In order to resolve a problem, have you ever asked for help or cooperation..."*

*CP2. From a member of the National Congress*

*CP4. From a ministry, public office or government agency*

*CP4A. From a local authority (mayor, municipality)*

*(1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don't know."*

In order to simplify the analysis, we recoded the response alternatives into a 0-100 format.<sup>101</sup> In Figure VI.1 we can see that, on average, while 6% of the respondents have sought help from the national government, 11% have done so from deputies, and 16% from municipalities. These data show a greater proximity between citizens and local government in terms of having requested help or cooperation for resolving their problems.


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<sup>99</sup> Ricardo Córdova Macías and Mitchell A. Seligson. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización. América Central. Volumen I*. San Salvador, FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2001, p. 64.

<sup>100</sup> Ricardo Córdova Macías and Víctor Antonio Orellana. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización*. El Salvador. Volumen III. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO y FLACSO-Programa El Salvador, 2001, p 39.


<sup>101</sup> Each one of the questions was converted into a different one. Thus, CP2 became CP2RR and CP4A became CP4ARR. The new questions were recoded in the following way: 1=100 and 2=0, and the "Don't know" response option was eliminated. The resulting response format is 0-100.

**Figure VI.1 From Who Have You Requested Help or Cooperation?**



The population's place of residence proved to be associated with the request for help from a local authority. In Figure VI.2 we can see the different regions of the country arranged in ascending order of the percentage of the population which sought help: Norte (11%), Central (12%), Sur (15%), Occidental (23%) y Oriental (26%).


**Figure VI.2 Request to Municipality for Help: by Region**



**6.1.1 Request for Help From the Municipality in Comparative Perspective**

After analyzing the data obtained for the Honduran case in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, in Figure IV.3 we can see that Honduras (15.8) is below the average, placed only above Panamá (10.2).

**Figure VI.3 Request to Municipality for Help in Comparative Perspective**



## 6.2 Citizen Participation in the Work of Municipal Government

In this section we examine citizen participation in different mechanisms related to local government.


### 6.2.1. Attendance at a “*cabildo abierto*” (Town Council Meeting)

The “*cabildo abierto*” is one of the main mechanisms of citizen participation, and in the Honduran case it is institutionalized in the “Law of Municipalities,” which states that at least five sessions should be held per year.

Respondents were asked: “NP1. In the past 12 months have you attended a town council meeting or any other meeting convened by the municipality/mayor? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t know/ Don’t remember.”

The wording of the question probes the levels of citizen participation through this traditional mechanism (the *cabildo abierto*), but it also seeks to cover the other meetings convened by the mayor (the *cabildo ampliado*). In Figure VI.4 we can see that 15.1% have attended one, while 84.9% have not done so.


**Figure VI.4 Attendance at a “*cabildo abierto*” (Meetings Convened by Mayor) During the Past 12 Months**



#### 6.2.1.1 Place of Residence and Attendance at cabildos

Consistent with other studies of citizen participation at the local level in Central America, in Figure VI.5 we can see that as the population size of the municipality decreases, attendance at cabildos rises, especially in small and medium-size cities; however, there is a small decline among residents of rural areas.


**Figure VI.5 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Place of Residence**



**6.2.1.2 Region and Attendance at cabildos**

The geographical region of residence is another variable related to attendance at cabildos abiertos. In Figure VI.6 we placed the different regions in ascending order of the percentages of attendance at sessions of the *cabildo abierto*: Norte (12), Central (13), Sur (15), Occidental (17) and Oriental (25).


**Figure VI.6 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Region**



### 6.2.1.3 Educational Level and Attendance at cabildos

Educational level was found to be related to attendance at *cabildo abierto* meetings. In Figure VI we can see that for those with primary education there is a fall in the levels of attendance compared to those who have no formal education, but then attendance increases as the level of education rises.

**Figure VI.7 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Educational Level**




### 6.2.1.4 Gender and Attendance at cabildos

Gender is another factor related to attendance at cabildos. In Figure IV.8 we can see that men participate more than women.




**Figure VI.8 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Gender**



#### 6.2.1.5 Age and Attendance at cabildos

Age was also found to be related to participation in cabildos. In Figure VI.9 we can see that attendance at cabildos increases as age rises till the 46-55 years age group, then there is a fall for the 56-65 years age group, followed by an increase for the above 66 years age group.


**Figure VI.9 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Age Group**



### 6.2.1.6 Level of Information and Attendance at cabildos

In Figure VI.10 we can see that persons with a lower level of information attend *cabildos* less, and the tendency is that as the level of information rises, so does participation in *cabildos*.

**Figure VI.10 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” by Level of Information**




### 6.2.1.7 Determinants of Attendance at a cabildo abierto

Since our dependent variable is dichotomous – whether respondents attended or not – we used logistic regression to examine the determinants of attendance at *cabildos*. Table VI.1 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of attendance at a *cabildo abierto* when each one of the other variables is held constant. There are basically eight predictors of attendance at a cabildo, including educational level, gender, age, level of information, size of place of residence, evaluation of municipal services and if the person worked for any candidate or party in the last elections. We kept the variable household capital goods in the model even though it was not statistically significant.

### 6.2.1.8 Attendance at a cabildo or Municipal Meeting in Comparative Perspective


After analyzing the data obtained for the Honduran case in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, in Figure VI.11 we can see that Honduras (15.1) is placed in third position in terms of mean attendance at a *cabildo* or meeting convened by the mayor in comparative perspective, below Guatemala (16.4) and Nicaragua (17.3).

**Figure VI.11 Attendance at a “cabildo abierto” or Other Meeting in Comparative Perspective**



The questionnaire probed two other aspects related to attendance at cabildos: the evaluation of the realization of objectives and the evaluation of their effectiveness in allowing participants to express themselves. First, respondents were asked: “NP1E. Did the cabildos abiertos you attended last year achieve their objectives or not? (1) Yes, they achieved their objectives, (2) No, they did not achieve their objectives, (8) Don’t know, (9) Inapplicable (didn’t attend).” In Figure VI.12 we can see strong dissatisfaction among those who attended *cabildos*: 66.5% thought that their objectives were not achieved, while 33.5% thought that they were.

**Figure VI.12 Did the *cabildos abiertos* You Attended Fulfill Their Objectives?**



With respect to the second aspect, respondents were asked: “NP1D. In the cabildos abiertos, were there adequate opportunities to express one’s opinion? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know, (9) Inapplicable (did not attend).” In Figure VI.13 we can see a very positive assessment of the effectiveness of the *cabildo* in allowing participants to express themselves: 77.3% stated that there were adequate opportunities, while 22.7% said there were not.

**Figure VI.13 Are There Adequate Opportunities to Express One’s Opinions in the “cabildos abiertos”?**




Table VI.2 presents the results of the cross-tabulation between the participants’ assessments regarding the achievement of objectives, and the assessment of opportunities to express opinions. The positive evaluation of the achievement of objectives is closely related to the positive evaluation of opportunities to express opinions (88.6%), while the negative evaluation of the fulfillment of objectives is more strongly related to the negative evaluation of the opportunities to express opinions (27.9%).

**Table VI.2 Opinion Regarding Fulfilment of Objectives and About Adequate Opportunities for Presenting Views**


			NP1E		Total
			Fulfilment of objectives		
			Yes	No	
NP1D Adequate opportunities for presenting views	for	Yes	62 (88.6%)	101 72.1%	163 77.6%
		No	8 (11.4%)	39 27.9%	47 22.4%
Total			70 (100.0%)	140 100.0%	210 100.0%

Sig <.01

### 6.2.2. Attendance at a Session of the Municipal Corporation

The questionnaire also asked about other mechanisms of citizen participation in the local sphere. First, it asked: “NP1A. Have you attended a municipal session in the past 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know/ Don’t remember.” The wording of this question is aimed at measuring the attendance at a session of the municipal corporation. In Figure VI.14 we can see an even lower level of attendance at municipal sessions: only 10.2% had attended one while 89.8% had not done so.

**Figure VI.14 Attendance at a Session of the Municipality**




**6.2.2.1 Determinants of Attendance at a Session of the Municipal Corporation**

Since our dependent variable is dichotomous – whether respondents attended or not – we used logistic regression to examine the determinants of attendance at a session of the municipal corporation. Table VI.3 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of attendance at a session of the municipal corporation when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are eight predictors of attendance at a municipal meeting, including educational level, gender, age, region of the country, size of the place of residence, urban-rural character of the place of residence and if the person has worked for a candidate or party in the last elections. We kept the variable household capital goods in the model even though it was not statistically significant.


With the aim of exploring the receptiveness of municipal employees to what the population requests in those meetings, respondents were asked the following: “NP1B. To what extent do you think municipal officials take notice of people’s requests in these meetings? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (5) Don’t know/Don’t answer.” In Figure VI.15 we can see a negative evaluation with respect to the respondents’ perception of the degree to which municipal officials take notice of what people request in those meetings: 3.7% think a lot, 23.5% think somewhat, 32.5% little, 24.1% not at all, and 16.3% don’t know/don’t answer.

**Figure VI.15 To What Extent Do Municipal Officials Pay Attention to What People Request in Those Meetings?**



In addition, the questionnaire asked: “PN1C. If you had a complaint about a local problem and took it to a municipal official, how much do you think he would listen to you? (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) Not at all (5) Don’t know.” In Figure VI.16 we can see a negative evaluation with respect to how much a member of the municipal council would listen to a complaint: 5.2% think very much, 17.8% think somewhat, 39.1% think little, 31.3% think not at all, and 6.6% don’t know.

**Figure VI.16 How Much Attention Would They Pay If You Complained About a Local Problem to a Municipal Official?**




### 6.2.3. Presentation of Requests for Help

Attending meetings is frequently considered a passive form of political participation, therefore we included a question meant to measure a more direct of participation, through the presentation of requests for help. Respondents were asked: “NP2. Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t know.” In Figure VI.17 we can see that only 12.3% of the respondents had presented a petition to the municipality, while 87.7% had not done so.



**Figure VI.17 Have You Ever Requested Help from the Municipality?**




#### ***6.2.3.1 Determinants of the Presentation of a Request for Help***

Since our dependent variable is dichotomous – whether a request was presented or not – we used logistic regression to examine the determinants of the presentation of a petition for help. Table VI.4 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of attendance at a session of the municipal corporation when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are four predictors of a petition for help, including educational level, size of the place of residence, urban-rural character of the place of residence, and if the person has worked for a candidate or party in the last elections. We kept the variables gender, age and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

#### ***6.2.3.2 Presentation of Requests for Help in Comparative Perspective***

After analyzing the data obtained for the Honduran case in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, in Figure VI.18 we can see that Honduras (12.3) is placed in the second lowest position of all the countries in terms of the presentation of a request for help to the municipality.

**Figure VI.18 Presentations of Request for Help in Comparative Perspective**




#### **6.2.4. Neighborhood Groups for Community Improvement (“patronatos”)**

Honduran legislation stipulates that neighbors have the right to form groups (“patronatos”) in order to bring about improvement in their respective communities. The municipality grants patronatos juridical status.


Respondents were asked: “NPIF. Have you attended a meeting of your patronato in the past 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know/doesn’t remember.” In Figure VI.19 we can see that there is a higher level of participation in patronatos: 31.7% of respondents had attended a patronato meeting, while 68.3% had not done so.

**Figure VI.19 Have You Ever Attended a Meeting of Your “patronato”?**




In addition, we included the following question: “NP2A. Have you requested help from or presented a petition to the *patronato* during the past 12 months? (1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t know/doesn’t remember.” In Figure VI.20 we can see that 9% of the respondents had requested help from the patronato, while 91% had not done so.

**Figure VI.20 Have You Ever Requested Help From the “patronato”?**



We also wanted to evaluate the patronato's contribution toward solving problems. We asked: "NP2B. In your opinion does the patronato help to solve community problems a lot, somewhat, little or not at all? (1) A lot, (2) Somewhat, (3) Little, (4) Not at all, (8) Don't know." For clear presentation, in Figure VI.21 we have excluded the missing cases, and we are left with 1,316 valid responses. We can see a slightly negative evaluation of the patronatos' contribution toward solving community problems: 16% of the respondents thought that they contributed a lot, 28.3% somewhat, 31.4% little and 24.45 not at all.


**Figure VI.21 To What Extent Does the *patronato* Help to Resolve Problems?**



### 6.3 Satisfaction with Municipal Services

In order to measure citizens' satisfaction with municipal services as a whole, we included the following item in the questionnaire: "SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing are... (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Average (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Don't know." In Figure we can see a slightly positive evaluation of the services provided by the municipality: 3% thought they were very good, 34% good, 39% average, 19% bad and 6% very bad."


**Figure VI.22 Evaluation of Municipal Services**



### **6.3.1 Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition and Satisfaction with Municipal Services**

The evaluation of personal economic condition was found to be related to respondents' evaluation of municipal services. In Figure VI.23 we can see that the evaluation of municipal services improves as the evaluation of respondents' personal economic conditions becomes more positive.


**Figure VI.23 Quality of Municipal Services by Evaluation of Personal Economic Condition**



### 6.3.2 Possession of Material Assets and Satisfaction With Municipal Services

In Figure VI.24 we can see that satisfaction with municipal services rises as the possession of material goods (a proxy for wealth) increases.

**Figure VI.24 Quality of Municipal Services by Possession of Material Assets**




### 6.3.3 Determinants of Satisfaction With Municipal Services

Table VI.5 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of satisfaction with municipal services when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are six predictors of satisfaction, including household capital goods, evaluation of the president's performance, level of incomes, degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy, evaluation of the economic condition of the country and evaluation of the respondent's personal economic condition. We kept the variables educational level, gender, and age in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

### 6.3.4 Satisfaction With Specific Municipal Services

We complemented the overall evaluation of municipal services with a battery of questions designed to measure the levels of satisfaction with three specific municipal services: drinking, water, sanitation, and waste collection. Regarding the first service, respondents were asked: "SGL1A. And speaking of the municipal provision of drinking water, would you say that the service is...1) Very good (2) Good (3) Average (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Don't know." Figure VI.25 shows a positive evaluation of drinking water services.<sup>102</sup>

**Figure VI.25 Evaluation of Municipal Drinking Water Service**




Regarding the second specific service, respondents were asked: "SGL1B. And the sanitation services the municipality is providing? 1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Average, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad (8) Don't know." In Figure VI.26 we can see that sanitation services receive the least favorable, though still positive, evaluation from the respondents.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>102</sup> If the municipality did not offer drinking water services, the question was considered inapplicable; in addition, we eliminated the "Don't know" responses, leaving 1,212 valid cases.

<sup>103</sup> If the municipality did not offer sanitary services, the question was considered inapplicable; in addition, we eliminated the "Don't know" responses, leaving 920 valid cases.

**Figure VI.26 Evaluation of Municipal Sanitary Service**




Regarding the third specific service, we asked: “SGL1C. And the trash collection service the municipality is providing is...? 1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Average, (4) Bad, (5) Very bad (8) Don’t know.” In Figure VI.27 we can see an overall positive evaluation of municipal trash collection services.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>104</sup> If the municipality did not offer trash collection services, the question was considered inapplicable; in addition, we eliminated the “Don’t know” responses, leaving 789 valid cases.




**Figure VI.27 Evaluation of Municipal Trash Collection Service**



In order to be able to compare levels of satisfaction with the different municipal services, we recoded the variables into a 0-100 scale. In Figure VI.28 we can see the following levels of satisfaction with municipal services: the question on overall services receives the lowest average score (52), following by sanitary services (54) and trash collection (60), while the drinking water services receive the highest mean score (63).


**Figure VI.28 Comparison of Evaluation of Municipal Services**



### **6.3.5 Satisfaction With the Services Provided by the Municipality in Comparative Perspective**

After analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we find that Honduras (52.1) is at the regional average, below Colombia (57.6), El Salvador (57.3) and Costa Rica (52.9).

**Figure VI.29 Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Comparative Perspective**




#### **6.4 Who Has Responded Best to the Problems of the Community?**

In the questionnaire we included a question with the aim of probing respondents' opinion about which institutional actor had responded best to resolve the problems of their communities: "LGL1. In your opinion, between the national government, the congressional representatives or the municipality, who has responded best to help resolve the problems of your community or neighborhood? (1) The national government, (2) congressional representatives, (3) the municipality."

In Figure VI.30 we can see that 48.8% identifies the municipality as the actor that has responded best to resolve community problems, followed by 27.7% who state that none of the actors has responded; 7.5% identify the national government; 7.4% don't know/don't answer; 6.4% identify congressional representative, and 2.2% state that they all responded equally well.


**Figure VI.30 Who Has Responded Best in Aid of Your Community?**



#### **6.4.1 To Whom Should Greater Responsibilities and Funds Be Given?**

In the questionnaire we included a question with the aim of probing the respondents' opinion of the level of government to which more responsibilities and resources should be given. We asked: "LGL2. In your opinion, should the municipality be given more responsibility and more money or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide municipal services?" In Figure VI.31 we can see that 35.2% of the respondents were of the view that the national government should taken on more responsibilities and provide municipal services, while 47% thought that the municipality should be given more responsibilities and money. There were also 2.7% who thought that more resources and responsibilities should be given to the municipality provided it offered better services. Altogether, this means that 49.7% had a favorable opinion toward local government. In addition, 12.7% did not know/did not respond and 2.4% were in favor of not making any change.


**Figure VI.31 Who Should Get More Responsibility and Funding?**



### 6.4.2 Management of Resources

Usually, few persons wish to pay more taxes so it is understandable that, when respondents were asked if they were willing to pay more taxes to the municipality, most responded “no.” The question was: “LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality so that it can provide better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so?” In Figure VI.32 we can see that 75.3% thought that paying more taxes was not worth it, 19.7% were willing to pay more taxes, and 5% didn’t know.

**Figure VI.32 Willingness to Pay More Taxes to the Municipality**




### **6.5 Confidence in the Management of Resources**

The questionnaire included a question designed to measure confidence in the management of resources. Respondents were asked: “MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the municipality manages funds well? (3) A lot, (2) Some, (1) Little, (0) None, (8) Don’t know.”

Figure VI.33 shows a low level of confidence in the management of resources by the municipalities: 29.35 express no confidence, 40.2% little confidence, 23.9% some confidence and 6.5% a lot of confidence.<sup>105</sup> If we sum the “none” and “little” responses, we find that 69.5% of the respondents display a low level of confidence in the municipalities’ management of resources.

<sup>105</sup> After excluding the missing observations from the analysis, we are left with 1,377 valid cases.

**Figure VI.33 Trust in the Correct Use of Funds by the Municipality**



### 6.5.1 Investment of Resources

In order to find out respondents' opinion of how the municipality invests its financial resources, we asked: MUNI5A. "On what does the municipality spend most of its budget?" In Table VI.6 we can see the respondents' opinions of the things on which the municipality spends its budget: roads and other infrastructure (32%), salaries (18.8%), corruption (17.6%), nothing (15.6%), publicity (4.1%), public cleaning (4%), health and education (3.9%), followed by other responses with very low frequencies.

**Table VI.6 On What Does the Municipality Spend Its Budget?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Roads, highways, bridges, soccer fields, other public works	290	19.3	31.0	31.0
Salaries	176	11.7	18.8	49.8
Corruption	165	11.0	17.6	67.5
Nothing	146	9.7	15.6	83.1
Publicity	38	2.5	4.1	87.2
Public cleaning	37	2.5	4.0	91.1
Health, education	36	2.4	3.9	95.0
Politics	21	1.4	2.2	97.2
Wastage	10	.7	1.1	98.3
Allowances	6	.4	.6	98.9
Doesn't notice on what it spends	2	.1	.2	99.1
On unnecessary personnel	2	.1	.2	99.4
Assistance to communities	2	.1	.2	99.6
Gift lands to people	1	.1	.1	99.7
Parties	1	.1	.1	99.8
Micro-projects	1	.1	.1	99.9
Creation of mega-posts (police stations)	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	935	62.3	100.0	
Missing	565	37.7		
Total	1500	100.0		

In addition, we asked: “MUNI5B. In your opinion, on what should the municipal government spend more?” Table VI.7 shows that 55.4% chose roads and other infrastructure, 27.2% health and education, 8.8% public employment, 2.7% help to the poor, followed by other responses with very low frequencies.



**Table VI.7 On What Should the Municipal Government Spend More?**


		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Roads, highways, bridges	745	49.7	55.4	55.4
	Health, education	366	24.4	27.2	82.7
	Public employment	118	7.9	8.8	91.4
	Help to the poor	36	2.4	2.7	94.1
	Public cleaning	26	1.7	1.9	96.1
	Wages	14	.9	1.0	97.1
	Help to children	7	.5	.5	97.6
	Nothing	6	.4	.4	98.1
	Fighting crime	4	.3	.3	98.4
	Basic services	4	.3	.3	98.7
	Housing	3	.2	.2	98.9
	Help to abandoned women	2	.1	.1	99.0
	Fighting poverty	2	.1	.1	99.2
	Help to senior citizens	2	.1	.1	99.3
	Lowering cost of basket of basic necessities	2	.1	.1	99.5
	Laying telephone lines	1	.1	.1	99.6
	Lowering fuel prices	1	.1	.1	99.6
	Training workshops	1	.1	.1	99.7
	Financial assistance to traders	1	.1	.1	99.8
	Agriculture	1	.1	.1	99.9
	On politics	1	.1	.1	99.9
	Construction of dam wall	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1344	89.6	100.0	
Missing		156	10.4		
Total		1500	100.0		

## 6.6 Trust in the Municipality

Question B32 tries to measure the level of trust in municipalities, and has been converted to a 0-100 response format.<sup>106</sup> Figure VI.34 shows a slightly positive level of trust in the municipality, reflected in a mean score of 55.51.

<sup>106</sup> We asked: To what extent do you trust your municipality? Item B32 has a 7 point response format.

**Figure VI.34 Trust in the Municipality**




### 6.6.1 Determinants of Trust in the Municipality

Table VI.8 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of trust in the municipality when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are six predictors of trust in the municipality: ideology (left-right scale), region of the country, the evaluation of how democratic the country is, voting efficacy, satisfaction with municipal services, and trust in political parties. We kept the variables educational level, gender, age and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

### 6.6.2 Trust in the Municipality in Comparative Perspective

After analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study for the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, in Figure VI.35 we can see that Honduras (55.5) is placed third, below El Salvador (62.9) and Costa Rica (56.9) in terms of trust in the municipality.


**Figure VI.35 Trust in the Municipality in Comparative Perspective**



## 6.7 Evaluations of Local Government


In this section we address four topics: the receptiveness of local government, the perception of benefits from the works carried out, openness to citizen participation, and the perception of the mayor's performance. First, respondents were asked: LGL4. Do you believe that the mayor and the municipality respond to what the people want... always, most of the time, sometimes, almost never, or never ?” Figure VI.36 shows that 2.6% think that the mayor and the municipality always respond to what the people want, 9% think most of the time, 55.8% sometimes, 23.8% almost never, and 8.8% never.

**Figure VI.36 Do the Mayor and the Municipality Respond to What the People Want?**




Regarding the second aspect, we asked: “MUNI7. In your opinion, do the projects of the municipality benefit people like you and your family? (1) Yes, they do, (2) No, they don’t, (8) Don’t know.” In Figure VI.37 we can see that 57.8% thinks that they do benefit the people, while 42.2% think that they do not.

**Figure VI.37 Do the Projects of the Municipality Benefit People Like You?**




Regarding the third aspect, we asked: “MUNI5. To what extent does the mayor accept popular participation in the work of the municipality? (3) A lot, (2) Somewhat, (1) Little, (0) Not at all, (8) Don’t know.” Figure VI.38 shows that there is an overall moderate evaluation of the mayor’s openness to citizen participation: 13.1% thinks a lot, 32.7% somewhat, 41.1% little and 13% not at all.

**Figure VI.38 To What Extent Does the Mayor Accept the People’s Participation in the Work of the Municipality?**




With respect to the fourth aspect, we asked: “MUNI16. What type of mayor do you believe is better? (1) A mayor who, in order to be efficient, acts quickly and based on his own judgement, or (2) A mayor who, despite being less efficient, always consults the municipal corporation and the people before acting?, (8) Don’t know.” Figure VI.39 shows that a majority of the respondents (78.2%) prefer a mayor who consults the municipal corporation and the people before acting, while 21.7% prefer a mayor who relies on his own judgement.

**Figure VI.39 What Kind of Mayor is Better: One Who Uses His Own Judgment or One Who Consults the People?**



We included an item in the questionnaire to probe knowledge of the function of the municipal commissioner, who serves as a bridge between the municipality and the community. Respondents were asked: “MUNI6C. Do you know what the function of the municipal commissioner is? (1) Yes (bridge between the municipality and the community) (2) Don’t know”. In Figure VI.40, we can see that 96.3% of the respondents do not know what the function of the municipal commissioner is, while 3.7% do know.

**Figure VI.40 Knowledge of the Function of the Municipal Commissioner**



### **6.8 The Problems of the Municipality**

In the questionnaire we included a battery of three questions for tapping opinions about the municipality's problems: the identification of the main problem, the evaluation of the respondent's own contribution toward resolving it, and the probability that the people's efforts would be able to resolve it. First, we asked: "MUNI2: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem in this municipality at present?" In Table VI.9 we can see the five main problems of the municipality: lack of street repair (20.6%), the economic situation (17.5%), the lack of water (15.7%), the lack of security (14%) and the lack of services (12.5%). These are followed by a list of problems with very low frequency.


**Table VI.9 The Most Serious Problem in the Municipality**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Lack of street repair	294	19.6	20.6	20.6
The economic situation	250	16.7	17.5	38.1
Lack of water	224	14.9	15.7	53.8
Lack of security	200	13.3	14.0	67.8
Lack of services	179	11.9	12.5	80.4
None	65	4.3	4.6	84.9
Unemployment	61	4.1	4.3	89.2
Poor administration	37	2.5	2.6	91.8
Environmental neglect	31	2.1	2.2	94.0
Lack of public cleanliness	11	.7	.8	94.7
Lack of drains	9	.6	.6	95.4
Lack of funds and assistance	8	.5	.6	95.9
Lack of health centers	7	.5	.5	96.4
Lack of housing	6	.4	.4	96.8
Flooding of rivers	6	.4	.4	97.3
Lack of schools	5	.3	.4	97.6
Lack of citizens' participation	4	.3	.3	97.9
Lack of transport	4	.3	.3	98.2
High taxes	3	.2	.2	98.4
Lack of medicines	2	.1	.1	98.5
Lack of bridges	2	.1	.1	98.7
Corruption	2	.1	.1	98.8
Planning of the city	2	.1	.1	98.9
The mayor	2	.1	.1	99.1
Lack of laws	2	.1	.1	99.2
Lack of education	2	.1	.1	99.4
Construction of flood wall	2	.1	.1	99.5
Lack of assistance to youth	1	.1	.1	99.6
Rise in fuel prices	1	.1	.1	99.6
Lack of a community center	1	.1	.1	99.7
Many problems	1	.1	.1	99.8
Legalization of landholdings	1	.1	.1	99.9
Alcoholism	1	.1	.1	99.9
Drug addiction	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1427	95.1	100.0	
Missing	73	4.9		
<b>Total</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

With respect to the second aspect, we asked: “EFF3. Do you think you can help to solve this problem?” In Figure VI.41 we can see that 65% of the respondents think that they cannot help to solve the most serious problem of the municipality, while 35% think that they can.




**Figure VI.41 Do You Think That You Can Help to Resolve the Most Serious Problem of the Municipality?**



We addressed the third aspect, by asking “EFF6. How probable is it that the efforts of the community can help to resolve the problems in this municipality? Would you say there is... (1) Very high probability (2) High probability (3) Little probability (4) Very little probability (8) Don’t know.” In Figure VI.42 we can see a positive evaluation of the probability that the community’s efforts can help to resolve the municipality’s problems: 32% think there is a very high probability, 30% high, 30% little, and 8% very little.

**Figure VI.42 Probability That The Community's Efforts Can Serve to Resolve the Municipality's Problems**



## 6.9. Conclusions

In this chapter we have shown a greater proximity of the citizens to local government, in terms of having requested assistance or cooperation to solve their problems.

The survey data show low levels of citizens' participation in the performance of municipal governments, measured by attendance at a *cabildo abierto*, at a session of the municipal corporation, or by the presentation of requests for assistance. However, we do find an increase in participation in *patronatos*. With respect to attendance at *cabildos*, we see a strong dissatisfaction among participants because the objectives of these meetings were not achieved. However, participants acknowledge that such meetings did permit them to express their opinions freely.

Generally speaking, we see a moderate level of trust in the municipality. The data show satisfaction with municipal services overall, which increases for specific services: sanitation, trash collection and drinking water. Almost half the respondents think that municipalities should be given more responsibilities and money, while a third state that the national government should accept more responsibilities and municipal services. At the same time, we find a low level of trust in the management of funds by municipal corporations.

Finally, the data indicate a moderate evaluation of the receptiveness of the mayor to citizens' participation, and that most respondents prefer a mayor who consults the corporation and the people before taking action.

## 7.0 Electoral Behavior

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In this chapter we will address the subject of Honduras' electoral participation. In the first section we examine the characteristics of the persons who voted and of those who did not vote in the last elections. In the second, we analyze trust in the political parties, in the third trust in the elections, in the fourth evaluations of the incumbent government, and in the fifth we analyze opinions about the electoral reforms.

### 7.1 The Honduran Voter

In the framework of the peace processes and the democratization processes which have taken place in the Central American region, free, open and competitive elections have gradually become institutionalized.<sup>107</sup> Further, they are held regularly on the pre-established dates.<sup>108</sup> In the elections which have been held in Central America in the past decade, no longer has anyone claimed electoral fraud and the losers have acknowledged their defeat, and there have been peaceful transfers of government, although there still persist some technical problems which need to be eliminated.

It is quite curious, and in a certain sense ironic, that while significant progress has been made in the processes of democratic construction in the region, and above all in the holding of free and competitive elections, this progress has taken place in a context of low electoral participation. A recent study identified the following tendencies in electoral abstentionism for the 1989-1999 period: "First of all, a rising tendency in the levels of abstentionism can be observed in the region. In Guatemala it went from 30.7% in 1985 to 63.1% by 1996; in El Salvador it went from 54.9% in 1989 to 61.4% by 1999; in Honduras it grew from 22% (1981) to 35% in 1993 and then dropped to 27.7% by 1997; in Costa Rica it rose from 21.4% in 1982 to 30% in 1998. Only in the cases of Nicaragua and Panamá has it been relatively stable. Second, when we rank the countries of the Central American region by the level of abstentionism, we find that the countries with a lower level of abstentionism are Nicaragua, Panamá and Costa Rica, with around 20-25%. At an intermediate level we have Honduras with around 30%, and then we have the countries with a higher level of abstentionism: Guatemala and El Salvador, which fluctuate between 55% and 60%."<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Competitive elections are those which fulfill at least three requisites: "universal adult suffrage; fair voting, guaranteed by procedures such as the secret ballot, public scrutiny, and the absence of electoral fraud, violence or intimidation; and the right to organize political parties and propose candidates, which gives voters the possibility of choosing between different candidates, not to mention between clearly distinguishable public policy manifestos." See: Ergun Ozbudun. "Studies on Comparative Elections," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2, January 1989, p. 238.

<sup>108</sup> For one view of the democratization process in the Central American region, see:

Günther Maihold and Ricardo Córdova Macías. "Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica." In: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Günther Maihold and Sabine Kurtenbach (editors). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo and Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín. February 2001.

Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth (eds.). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

<sup>109</sup> Günther Maihold and Ricardo Córdova Macías. "Democracia y ciudadanía en Centroamérica." In: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Günther Maihold and Sabine Kurtenbach (editors). *Pasos hacia una nueva convivencia: democracia y participación en Centroamérica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hamburgo and Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlín. February 2001, p. 396.

In the case of Honduras, since the return to democracy six general elections have been held (in 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001), one every four years, as established by the Constitution.

In Table VII.1 we can see that in comparison to the 1980s, abstentionism in Honduras has been increasing over the past two elections, to reach its highest levels in the elections of 1993 and 2001, at 35.03% and 33.73%, respectively. During the past six electoral processes, electoral abstention has been around 27.8% on average. In the last elections in 2001, electoral abstention was at the second highest level in the period 1981-2001.

**Table VII.1 Honduras: abstentionism in general elections, 1981-2001**

	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	Average 1981-2001
Electoral census	1558316	1901757	2366448	2734000	2901743	3448280	2485091
Total votes cast	1214726	1597841	1799056	1776204	2092988	2285067	1794314
Percentage of abstentionism	22.05%	16%	24%	35%	27.9%	33.73%	27.80%

Source: Created by the authors with data from José Álvaro Cáliz Rodríguez. *Caracterización y análisis del sistema electoral en Honduras*. FIDE-PNUD, Serie Política e Instituciones, documento de trabajo No. 4, April 2001. For 2001, data from the Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones were used.

We can summarize the evolution of electoral abstentionism in Honduras in the following manner: 22.05% in 1981, 16% in 1985, 24% in 1989, 35% in 1993, 27.9% in the presidential elections of 1997; and 33.73% in the presidential elections of 2001.

In the following pages we analyze electoral participation in the general elections of 2001, since they are of great relevance for democracy.<sup>110</sup> According to the data from our 2004 survey, there has been an over-reporting of the intention to vote: 72.9% of the 1,500 respondents stated having voted in the presidential elections of 2001, in contrast to the 66.27% who actually exercised their suffrage. However, this phenomenon of over-reporting of the intention to vote has also been found in similar studies carried out in the United States by the University of Michigan, and in the Central American region.<sup>111</sup>

### 7.1.1 An Explanation of the Non-Voters

In the questionnaire we included an item for probing the reasons due to which Hondurans did not vote in the last elections. Respondents were asked: HVB4. If you did not vote, why did you not vote in the last elections in 2001?" In Table VII.2 we can see the reasons respondents gave for not having voted.<sup>112</sup> Of the factors mentioned, not being of voting age (21.8%) stands out in first

<sup>110</sup> For a broader perspective on the subject of electoral abstentionism, see: Martin P. Wattenberg. *Where have all the voters gone?*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2002.

<sup>111</sup> See:

Mitchell A. Seligson, et al. "Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis," in Mitchell A. Seligson and John Booth (eds.). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1995.

Russell J. Dalton. *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Chatham, New Jersey, Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1996.

<sup>112</sup> We report the data only for those who stated not having voted in the 2001 elections: 407 persons, from which we have to subtract 21 who answered "Don't know," leaving us with 386 cases.

place, followed by lack of an identity document (20.7%), lack of interest (17.6%), not having liked any candidate (8.5%), ill health (7%), lack of transport (5.7%), not believing in the system (5.2%), not being found in the electoral rolls (4.4%), not being present in the city (3.9%), having to work (3.1%), followed by other factors mentioned less frequently.

**Table VII.2 Reasons Why the Respondent Did Not Vote**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Valid	Under-age	84	5.6	21.8	21.8
	Lack of identity document	80	5.3	20.7	42.5
	Lack of interest	68	4.5	17.6	60.1
	Didn't like any candidate	33	2.2	8.5	68.7
	Sickness	27	1.8	7.0	75.6
	Lack of transportation	22	1.5	5.7	81.3
	Doesn't believe in the system	20	1.3	5.2	86.5
	Wasn't registered in the electoral rolls	17	1.1	4.4	90.9
	Wasn't in the city	15	1.0	3.9	94.8
	Had to work	12	.8	3.1	97.9
	Arrived too late at the voting station/it was closed	5	.3	1.3	99.2
	Family problems	1	.1	.3	99.5
	Because Maduro is Panamánian	1	.1	.3	99.7
	Because of respondent's religion	1	.1	.3	100.0
	Total	386	25.7	100.0	
Missing	Not applicable	1093	72.9		
	Doesn't know	21	1.4		
	Total	1114	74.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>1500</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

### 7.1.2 Determinants of Voting


Since our dependent variable is dichotomous – if the respondent voted or not – we have used logistic regression to examine the determinants of voting.<sup>113</sup> Table VII.3 (shown in Appendix B) presents the results of the model with the statistically significant predictors of voting intention when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically there are six predictors of the intention to vote, including age, level of information, region of residence, evaluation of the democratic nature of the country and involvement in electoral campaigns. We included the variables educational level, gender and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

### 7.1.3 Socio-Demographic Explanations

According to a number of studies on electoral behavior in the United States, education, sex and age are the most important characteristics for predicting voting. In the literature it is pointed out that the citizens who vote least are the youngest and the oldest. The relationship between voting and age is like an inverted “U” curve: those who have recently become of voting age have the lowest level of voting, this rises as they grow older till they become mature, and then interest in

<sup>113</sup> For this chapter we recoded the variable HVB2 such that those who did not vote were assigned a value of 0 and those who did a value of 100. The new variable is HVB2R.

voting starts to decline.<sup>114</sup> The data from the 2004 Honduras survey<sup>115</sup> follow this pattern, as can be seen in Figure VII.1, with the difference that the decline is less pronounced for the groups above the age of 56 years.




In Figure VII.2 we can see that males vote slightly more than females.

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<sup>114</sup> See: Mitchell A. Seligson, et al. “Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis,” in Mitchell A. Seligson and John Booth (eds.). *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1995.


<sup>115</sup> For this chapter we recoded the variable HVB2 such that those who did not vote were assigned a value of 0 and those who did a value of 100. The new variable is HVB2R.

**Figure VII.2 Voting by Gender**




In the case of educational level (see Figure VII.3), those who do not have any formal education exhibit a higher intention to vote, which decreases as the educational level rises till the secondary level. The intention to vote then rises among those with a university or technical education.

**Figure VII.3 Voting by Level of Education**



In Figure VII.4 we can see that males vote more than females from the level of no formal education till secondary education, but at the level of university education, females vote more than males.

**Figure VII.4 Voting by Level of Education and Gender**




#### 7.1.4 Contextual Factors

The size of the respondents' place of residence proved to be related to the intention to vote. This result can be seen in Figure VII.5. If we start with the intention to vote in the metropolitan area, the intention drops for large cities, rises steeply for medium-size cities and then falls slightly for small cities and rural areas.




**Figure VII.5 Voting by Place of Residence**




In Figure VII.6 we can see the variations in intention to vote for the different regions of the country.

**Figure VII.6 Voting by Region of the Country**



### 7.1.5 Income Level and Intention to Vote


Instead of utilizing the variable income level as a continuous variable, we split the distribution into three ranges: low, middle and high. In Figure VII.7 we can see a high intention to vote in low income sectors. The level fall for the middle income sector and then rises for those with high incomes.



### 7.1.6 Level of Information and Intention to Vote

Figure VII.8 shows that persons with a lower level of information exhibit a lower intention to vote, and the tendency is that the intention to vote increases as the level of information rises.

**Figure VII.8 Voting by Level of Political Knowledge**




### 7.1.7 Political Factors

In the literature it has been pointed out that there is a relationship between intention to vote, on one hand, and interest in and evaluation of political activity, on the other. In the following pages we explore the relationship between intention to vote and different political variables.


The evaluation of President Maduro's performance was found to be related to the intention to vote, as can be seen in Figure VII.9. Those with a more positive evaluation (good and very good) have a higher intention to vote. It decreases for those who have an average or a very bad assessment, and is lower still for those with a bad evaluation.

**Figure VII.9 Voting by Evaluation of the President's Performance**




The respondents' evaluation of democracy is also related to intention to vote, therefore we explore two dimensions: opinion of democracy and preference for a democratic regime. With respect to the first dimension, respondents were asked: "PN5. In your opinion, is Honduras very democratic, somewhat democratic, little democratic or undemocratic?" Figure VII.10 shows that the intention to vote rises as the opinion regarding the democratic character of the country becomes more favorable.

**Figure VII.10 Voting by Opinion of Democracy**




Respondents were also asked: “DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: 1) For people like us, it doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic, 2) Democracy is preferable to any other type of government, 3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, 8) Don’t know.” In Figure VII.11 we can see that the intention to vote is highest among those who think that democracy is preferable to any other type of government, followed by those to whom the type of regime doesn’t matter and, almost at the same level, those who think that in some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable.

**Figure VII.11 Voting by Preference for a Democratic Regime**



Respondents’ experience in the area of electoral participation is also associated with the intention to vote, so we explored this involvement. They were asked: “PP2. There are people who work for a party or candidate during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections in 2004?” In Figure VII.12 we can see that those who have participated in political activity show a higher intention to vote. In this case, those who have worked for a candidate or party have a much greater intention to vote compared to those who have not done so.


**Figure VII.12 Voting by Involvement in Campaigns**



### 7.1.8 Victimization and Intention to Vote

Figure VII.13 shows that those who have been victims of crime express a lower intention to vote than those who have not.


**Figure VII.13 Voting by Crime Victimization**



## 7.2 Trust in political parties

The questionnaire included an item for measuring trust in the political parties on a 1-7 point scale, which has been explained previously. To simplify the analysis, the original question (B21) was converted to a 0-100 format (B21R). In Figure VII.14 we can see the distribution of citizens' trust in political parties. The average level of trust is low: 31.64 on a 0-100 scale.

**Figure VII.14 Trust in Political Parties**




### 7.2.1 Determinants of Trust in Parties

Table VII.4 (as seen in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of trust in political parties when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are seven predictors of trust in parties: age, evaluation of the president's performance, degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy, the perception of voting efficacy, persuading others to vote for a candidate or party, the perception of insecurity in the place of residence, and the perception of insecurity in the country. We kept the variables educational level, gender, and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

The questionnaire included the following item: "PN2A. Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't care about helping the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree?" This question was converted to a 0-100 format (PN2AR). Figure VII.15 shows a high degree of agreement with this statement (a mean score of 63.6), meaning that there is a negative perception of politicians, in the sense that they tend to seek to benefit themselves and do not care about helping the people.


**Figure VII.15 Degree of Agreement With the Statement: “Politicians Seek Power for Their Own Benefit”**



### 7.2.2 Trust in Political Parties in Comparative Perspective

After analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study of the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we found that Honduras is placed below the average, and is the country with the third lowest level of trust in political parties overall (31.6), above Nicaragua (29) and Guatemala (29.4).

**Figure VII.15 Trust in political parties in comparative perspective**






### 7.3 Trust in Elections

The questionnaire included an item to measure trust in elections on a 1-7 point format, which has been explained previously. In order to simplify the analysis, the original question (B47) was converted to a 0-100 scale (B47R). Figure VII.17 shows the distribution of citizens' trust in elections. The average is low: 42.16.

**Figure VII.17 Trust in Elections**




#### 7.3.1 Determinants of Trust in the Elections

Table VII.5 (shown in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of trust in elections when each of the other variables is held constant. Basically, there are six predictors of trust in elections: evaluation of the president's performance, perception of the economic condition of the country, perception of voting efficacy, interpersonal trust, trust in political parties, and support for electoral democracy (AUT1R). We kept the variables educational level, gender, age and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.


The questionnaire included a battery of two questions to measure some aspects related to the holding of elections. First, respondents were asked: "If you decided to participate in one of the activities I'm going to mention, would you do it with complete freedom, a little fear or great fear?" and then the following two activities were mentioned: "DER2. Voting in a national election?" and "DER4. Running for public office?" With respect to the first question, Figure VII.18 shows that most respondents (72.9%) thought that they would vote freely, 3.6% with great fear, 16.5% with a little fear, and 7.1% didn't know.

**Figure VII.18 Would You Vote Freely or With Fear in a National Election?**



With respect to the second question, Figure VII.19 shows that 43.9% thought that they would do so completely freely, 13.8% with great fear, 24.2% with a little fear, and 18.1% didn't know.


**Figure VII.19 Would You Run for Public Office Freely or With Fear?**



### 7.3.2. Trust in the Elections in Comparative Perspective

After analyzing the data obtained for the case of Honduras in the framework of this comparative study of the countries of the Central American region, México and Colombia, we found that Honduras was the country with the lowest level of trust in the elections (42.2).


Figure VII.20 Trust in the Elections in Comparative Perspective



### 7.4 Evaluations of the government

The questionnaire also included an item to measure the respondents' evaluation of the performance of President Maduro's government. They were asked: "M1. Speaking generally of the current government, would you say that the job President Maduro is doing is: (1) very good, (2) good, (3) average, (4) bad, (5) very bad, (6) don't know." In Figure VII.21 we can see that 3% of the respondents thought it was very good, 19% good, 49% average, 18% bad and 11% very bad.

**Figure VII.21 Evaluation of President Maduro's Performance**




## 7.5 The Electoral Reforms

In Honduras there have been discussions in the past few years about the need to initiate an electoral reform, and political parties have reached an agreement to promote a broad agenda for such reform. In the questionnaire, we included a series of two questions on the subject of the electoral reforms. The first measured support for setting a minimum quota in order to increase the participation of women who can be elected deputies to congress, and the second tapped support for the reconfiguration of electoral districts. Both questions had a 1-10 response format, and the first had a mean of 6.97 and the second a mean of 6.40.

With respect to the first, we asked: "EREF1. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of fixing a minimum quota to increase the number of women that can be elected deputies to Congress?" In Figure VII.22 we can see a high level of support for this electoral reform, with a mean of 6.97 out of 10.

**Figure VII.22 Support for Increasing the Number of Female Deputies**




### **7.5.1 Determinants of Support for Fixing a Minimum Quota Which Would Permit an Increase in the Number of Women That Can be Elected Deputies to Congress**

Table VII.6 (shown in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of support for fixing a minimum quota which would permit an increase in the number of women who can be elected deputies to congress. Basically, there are four predictors: ideology (left-right scale), evaluation of the president’s performance, urban-rural character of the place of residence, and the tolerance scale. We kept the variables educational level, gender, age and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

With respect to the second, we asked: “EREF2. To what extent do you approve or disapprove the reconfiguration of electoral districts so that you can vote for one representative per district instead of a list of representatives per party?” Figure VII.23 shows a high level of support for this electoral reform, with a mean score of 6.40 out of 10.

**Figure VII.23 Support for Re-Drawing Electoral Districts**



### **7.5.2 Determinants of Support for Re-Drawing Electoral Districts**

Table VII.7 (shown in Appendix B) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis with the statistically significant predictors of support for reconfiguring electoral districts so that one can vote for one representative per district instead of a list of representatives per party. Basically, there are five predictors: educational level, age, ideology (left-right scale), voting efficacy, and the tolerance scale. We kept the variables gender and household capital goods in the model even though they were not statistically significant.

### **7.6 Conclusions**

In this chapter we have shown that the main determinants of voting intention are: age, level of political knowledge, region of residence, evaluation of the country's democratic character, and involvement in electoral campaigns.

The survey data show low levels of citizens' trust in political parties and also in elections. However, they indicate appreciation of a free environment for voting in elections.

Finally, the data suggest a high level of support for the two electoral reforms about which respondents were asked: fixing a minimum quota for increasing the participation of women who can be elected as congressional representatives, and for re-drawing the electoral districts.

## 8.0 Social Capital and Democracy

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The concept of social capital comes from the universe of economic conceptualizations. As “capital” it is considered an asset that resides not in a physical object, nor exclusively in any specific entity or actor but in the relationship of some persons with others, of some actors with others. As “social” it can exist only in the dimension of social relationships, which are fundamental to the functioning of organizations, communities and of society. Unlike other forms of capital, such as “human” capital, “social” capital is generated in spaces of interaction and is rarely possessed by anyone: it is generated in a community and is modified and reproduced within it.

In reality, there are many definitions of social capital, and despite its current popularity there is no solid consensus about all that the concept implies. Most definitions of social capital are quite broad and include aspects related to political institutions, civil society and a facility for establishing market relationships.<sup>116</sup> But it was not until Coleman’s work on education that the concept of social capital began to be used more widely in the academic world. He defined social capital broadly as the relationship between persons, which enables them to cooperate in order to achieve common goals.<sup>117</sup>

Based on Coleman’s theoretical framework and the theoretical debate that preceded it, Narayan defined social capital as the “rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social structures and social institutions, which allow their members to achieve their common individual and collective goals.”<sup>118</sup>

In 1993, with the goal of studying the contribution of institutions to the working of democracy in Italy, Robert Putnam proposed a useful definition to highlight the importance of this construct for the maintenance of a political system. In Putnam’s view, social capital can be understood as “aspects of social organization such as trust, norms and networks, which can improve a society’s efficiency by facilitating coordinated actions.”<sup>119</sup> This definition lays even greater emphasis on social aspects and refers to society as the basic unit of analysis. With this concept, Putnam underscored the importance of this type of social variables in the configuration of dynamics on a more institutional scale. But he also laid emphasis on the role played by associative activity in bringing about interaction between strangers, thereby inculcating habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public service, which ultimately generate interpersonal trust and social reciprocity.

Putnam’s conceptualization is probably the one that has had the greatest influence on the development of the concept by researchers in multilateral cooperation agencies and in the offices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) charged with formulating aid policies. According to the World Bank, social capital “refers to the institutions, relations and norms that constitute the quality and quantity of social interactions in a society.” The Bank adds that the importance of social capital is that “numerous studies show that social

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<sup>116</sup> This is derived from the economist origin of the concept.

<sup>117</sup> J.Coleman (1988/2000). “Social capital in the creation of human capital,” in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.). *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

<sup>118</sup> D. Narayan (1997). “Voices of the poor: Poverty and social capital in Tanzania.” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, p. 50.

<sup>119</sup> R.D. Putnam (1993). *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 167.

cohesion is a critical factor for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable” (see World Bank, undated, website). Countless programs of cooperation and aid in the poorest countries have been initiated based on these conceptualizations, with a view to strengthening community networks and linkages in the places where the projects are being implemented.<sup>120</sup> For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has initiated a program called “Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics and Development” through which it proposes to strengthen ethical values and social capital in the region. And the World Bank has a page on its web site on poverty devoted to the subject of social capital,<sup>121</sup> in addition to approaching many of its programs from the theoretical framework from which the notion of social capital emerged.

The lack of agreement over the conceptualization of social capital has not prevented the concept from being used widely, not only as a way of understanding, in academic terms, what makes some communities or societies more or less successful in economic and social terms, but also for designing public policies.<sup>122</sup>

But returning to the subject of the definition, even though a general consensus on a basic concept still appears somewhat remote, many researchers and academics makes references to social capital, emphasizing the conditions of trust between citizens, people’s participation in different spheres of social life, and trust in institutions. Interpersonal trust, trust in institutions and participation in organizations are the aspects we will discuss in this study of Honduran political culture.

Social or interpersonal trust is probably the aspect of social capital that has been studied most frequently as a synonym of the latter. In fact, much of Putnam’s and Fukuyama’s work is in this direction, although they are careful in using the notion of trust as a synonym of social capital.<sup>123</sup> Others have been more direct and have almost equated the two terms.<sup>124</sup> According to some authors this is due to the need for an indicator that easily operationalizes the concept, and which captures with the required precision people’s attitudes toward interacting with others and forming social networks. This itself seems to be the advantage of using participation in organizations as an easily operationalized partial indicator when designing studies. In fact, in his most ambitious work on the subject, Putnam assesses the state of social capital in the United States by measuring levels of citizens’ participation in organizations, clubs, and community associations, and makes such surprising findings as the fact that the action of a person of joining a group reduces by half the probability of his dying the following year.

The above discussion reveals the complexity involved in empirically evaluating a concept over which there is still much debate and little agreement. A number of methodological problems and

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<sup>120</sup> See: <http://www.iadb.org/etica>

<sup>121</sup> See: <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/index.htm>

<sup>122</sup> B. Kliksberg (1999). “Capital social y cultura, claves esenciales del desarrollo.” *Revista de la CEPAL* 69, pp. 85- 102. Policy Research Initiative (PRI Project). (2003). “Social Capital Workshop. Concepts, Measurement and Policy Implications.” (Mimeo).

<sup>123</sup> R.D. Putnam (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon and Schuster; F.Fukuyama (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity.* New York: Free Press.

<sup>124</sup> R.La Porta, F.Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (2000). “Trust in Large Organizations,” in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.). *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective.* Washington D.C.: The World Bank.



those related to operationalization have appeared when measuring the manifestations of the construct. This has laid in doubt even its empirical relevance, because some academics are of the view that the concept has not been sufficiently developed to be useful in research, especially when different studies have thrown up contradictory results.<sup>125</sup> As Portela and Neira point out,<sup>126</sup> when all is said and done, all research efforts on social capital have to be made with proxy variables, with the added complication that there is no unanimity that those indicators are the most appropriate.

One of the operational problems that arises most frequently in empirical studies is that the elements which form a part of the universe of social capital are not isolated elements but ones that interact with each other and with other conditions of the environment and society. From Coleman's proposal it is clear the concept of social capital is related both to behaviors as well as to attitudes, and the indicators that are designed to measure social capital in reality measure those behavioral and attitudinal aspects rather than the concept itself.

In spite of this, few researchers have questioned the importance of the factors that make up the construct or notion of social capital in explaining why some societies or human communities are more successful at achieving their goals than others. Setting aside the question of whether social capital is restricted to interpersonal trust, or if it includes participation in organizations and social networks or norms of social control, it is clear that for a community to function it needs certain minimum levels of trust among its members and it seems evident that for many purposes, it is much better if a community is organized and its members participating actively than if it is disorganized and there is no coordination in its members' activities.

In Honduras, to the best of our knowledge, there are two studies on social capital. Both have been carried out under the aegis of the United Nations Programme for Development (UNDP), and study the impact of social capital on human development. The first study is part of the "Human Development Report Honduras 2003" and is an investigation of the social capital of ethnic groups which inhabit the department of Gracias a Dios, situated in the north-eastern region of Honduras. The study employs different methodologies and measures social capital as an aggregate of indicators of participation in formal associations, institutional trust, interpersonal trust, an index of informal networks and communal solidarity. The results showed that the levels of social capital varied across the ethnic groups studied. For example, the garifunas showed the highest levels of social capital while the ladinos had the lowest levels.<sup>127</sup>

The second study deals with the role of social capital with respect to local democracy and the processes of municipal decentralization. The project relied on a series of case studies of social capital and local development in six Honduran municipalities and used various instruments to collect data on indicators of democracy, local development and social capital.<sup>128</sup> The results of the study are that "the low levels of social and political capital suggest that there is no foundation

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<sup>125</sup> A. Krishna and E. Shrader (2000). "Social capital assessment tool." The World Bank. (Mimeo).

<sup>126</sup> M. Portela and I. Neira (undated). *Capital social: las relaciones sociales afectan al desarrollo*. [It can be found in: <http://www.iigov.org/documentos>]

<sup>127</sup> Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (2003). "Capítulo 5. Desarrollo humano y capital social en Gracias a Dios: la necesidad de una perspectiva multicultural," in: *Informe sobre desarrollo humano Honduras 2003. La cultura: medio y fin del desarrollo*. San José: PNUD, pp. 101-133.

<sup>128</sup> These case studies were carried out for the preparation of the 2002 report on human development in Honduras.

for deepening the processing of decentralization.” The results also indicate that although there is a certain level of citizen participation in local spheres, “overall there is a reluctance to accept responsibilities, and attitudes of conformism and apathy.”<sup>129</sup>

But why is it important to study social capital, linking it to democracy? The best answer comes from Lundwall’s work on social capital in Honduras: “societies in which citizens trust and cooperate with each other have more responsible and efficient governments, leading to an increased capacity for providing public goods of better quality, thereby creating better conditions for an inclusive democracy and faster development of society.”<sup>130</sup>

In this chapter we will explore social capital in Honduras, taking this to mean the construct comprising interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and citizen participation. We will examine the results of the survey which link social capital to the variables of political culture that are important for sustaining a democracy.

## 8.1 Interpersonal Trust in Honduras

Three items were used to create the variable of interpersonal trust in Honduras. Each tapped the subject of trust between individuals in a different way:

**IT1.** Now, speaking in general of the people from here, would you say that people in your community are generally

(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (8) DK

**IT2.** Do you believe that in most instances people only care about themselves or do you believe that most times people try to help others?

(1) They care only about themselves (2) They try to help others (3) DK

**IT3.** Do you believe that most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance, or do you believe they wouldn't take advantage?


1) Yes, they would take advantage (2) No, they wouldn't take advantage (3) DK

These items were converted to a 0-100 scale and combined to form a single variable. The mean score of interpersonal trust in Honduras as measured by this variable was 42.4 on a 0-100 scale, putting it at an intermediate level in comparison with the rest of the countries in the region. Figure VIII.1 shows that Honduras is situated near the middle, below Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colombia and Guatemala, but above México, Panamá and Nicaragua. However, we should add that, setting aside these comparisons, the level of trust between persons overall is low in Honduras, given that the regional average is also low, below 50.

<sup>129</sup> Jonna María Lundwall. (2003). El capital social y su relación con el desempeño de la democracia local y la descentralización exitosa: el caso de Honduras. Tegucigalpa: PNUD.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p. 25.


**Figure VIII.1 Interpersonal Trust by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



Who exhibits more interpersonal trust? The results do not indicate significant differences in interpersonal trust across gender, age or educational level. That is, men and women exhibit the same levels of interpersonal trust; the same applies to young people relative to those who are older, and to persons with more education relative to those who have less. Where there are notable differences in levels of trust is in terms of the size of the municipalities where the respondents reside, and the different income levels of the population.

The data show that trust between Hondurans is greater among those who live in rural areas of the country than among those in urban areas. But even within the urban areas there are notable differences in interpersonal trust: trust seems to decrease as the population size of a settlement decreases, such that in villages, trust among neighbors reaches its lowest level. These results are interesting from any perspective because they run counter to the widely held view that larger cities, with their complex urban dynamics, tend to erode the mutual trust between individuals. The data presented here, however, suggest that it is the areas with the lowest population concentrations that tend to generate greater mistrust. This is probably because the patterns of reference in large cities and smaller cities are different. In large cities, interpersonal trust between the closest neighbors is a fundamental element for confronting the complexity of urban life; in contrast, in smaller cities, with less competitive dynamics, people tend to assess trust in others based on all the inhabitants of the village. This brings to the fore old conflicts and disagreements that exist between the different inhabitants.

**Figure VIII.2 Interpersonal Trust by City Size**



The other condition that divides people's levels of trust is the average monthly family income. The data show that persons whose families have an higher average monthly income tend to show less trust compared to the rest of the population. In contrast, persons whose family incomes are lower exhibit levels of interpersonal trust well above the national average, setting them apart from the rest of the country's citizens. A similar tendency was revealed when we cross-tabulated interpersonal trust with the respondent's level of household capital goods. Persons who have more goods within the household – an indirect measure of economic status – showed lower levels of interpersonal trust (40.8), at almost the same level as those who possess a medium level of household goods (39.3); in contrast, persons with few household capital goods – those that have the fewest resources – exhibited a higher mean level of interpersonal trust (almost 45).


**Figure VIII.3 Interpersonal Trust by Monthly Family Income**



What could cause this relationship? One possible answer is to consider the indirect effect of place of residence. People with the most resources, and usually with higher levels of income, reside in the city. The relationship between economic status and trust can be explained, in part, by the fact that the persons with the least resources live in the rural areas of the country and not in the urban areas. Therefore, the relationship between interpersonal trust, on one hand, and family income and household capital goods, on the other, would be mediated by the place in which the persons reside. However, we have to keep in mind that the data also showed that in the larger cities there is greater interpersonal trust than in the smaller cities. This suggests that the relationship between these variables requires a much deeper analysis, which is not possible, for reasons of space, in these pages.

Is there any relationship between interpersonal trust, on one hand, and system support, the working of democracy, and tolerance, on the other? The results do not indicate a statistically significant relationship with citizens' support for the system, nor with their levels of tolerance. However, they do suggest that individuals who have greater trust in others tend to be more satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Honduras than those who have little or no interpersonal trust (see Figure VIII.4).

**Figure VIII.4 Satisfaction With the Working of Democracy by Interpersonal Trust**



## 8.2 Trust in Institutions

The other component of social capital which will be operationalized here is trust in the country's institutions, with a view to measuring the extent to which citizens trust specific national institutions. We included this variable because some authors include institutional trust as an important element of a country's social capital<sup>131</sup> and because it denotes one type of vertical relationship between citizens and their social surroundings, unlike horizontal relationships which exist in the networks that are created among ordinary citizens. The variable tapping institutional trust is an aggregate of all the items that refer to trust in specific institutions, which included the following:<sup>132</sup>

**B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?

**B11.** To what extent do you trust the National Elections Tribunal?

**B12.** To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?

**B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?

<sup>131</sup> See: B. Rothstein and D. Stolle (2002). "How political institutions create and destroy social capital : an institutional theory of generalized trust." [Paper presented at the 98<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA, August 29-September 2, 2002].

<sup>132</sup> This should not be confused with the system support variable. The items referring to system support are those tapping diffuse trust or support for Honduran institutions. In contrast, the questions with which the variable of institutional trust was constructed refer to specific Honduran institutions. This is why it refers to specific support for the country's institutions.


<b>B14.</b> To what extent do you trust the Central Government?
<b>B15.</b> To what extent do you trust the Prosecutor General of the Republic?
<b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the police?
<b>B19.</b> To what extent do you trust the Auditor General?
<b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
<b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?
<b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
<b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust your municipality?
<b>B44.</b> To what extent do you trust the public defenders?
<b>B45.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Human Rights Commission?
<b>B46.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Anti-corruption Council?

The results of all the questions were converted to a 0-100 scale, and the institutional trust variable is the mean of all those items.<sup>133</sup> The results indicate that citizens' trust in national institutions is overall moderate (51 on a 0-100 scale). Honduras is among a group of countries which are situated on the bottom half of the scale: El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia and México, and below it lie Panamá, Nicaragua and Guatemala.

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<sup>133</sup> The coefficient of reliability of the scale was 0.9148.

**Figure VIII.5 Trust in Institutions by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**




Who tends to have greater trust in institutions in Honduras? Variables such as gender and age did not appear to be related to the level of trust that Honduras have in their national institutions. However, the results indicate that respondents' educational level and economic resources do have an impact on trust. As the educational level rises, trust in institutions tends to decline. Something similar occurs with the variables tapping the economic status of the respondents: those with fewer resources, measured as average monthly household income or as the level of household capital goods, seem to have greater trust in institutions.

In sum, the data indicate that Hondurans who are at a socioeconomic disadvantage, either because they have little education or because they have very low incomes and very few resources, tend to place greater trust in national institutions, compared to those who have a high socioeconomic status. What causes this phenomenon? Shouldn't the relationship be reverse considering that the lack of resources of many Hondurans may be a result of the indifference with which the institutions have treated a section of the population? One answer could be that persons with more education and those who have more resources tend to make greater use of national institutions and that their very contact with these institutions leaves them dissatisfied. However, a cross-tabulation of the level of institutional trust with the items measuring contact and satisfaction with some institutions such as the police, the courts, the prosecutor and the municipality (ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4) – precisely those with which citizens tend to have most contact – did not reveal any association between these conditions. That is, up to this point, trust does not depend upon how much direct contact Hondurans have with the institutions. This leads us to think that the low credibility that institutions have among the more educated persons and those with more resources may be due to a more critical attitude with which these citizens tend to view these institutions. One source of such an attitude could be the media.




**Figure VII.6 Institutional Trust by Educational Level**




As we had thought, citizens' exposure to news in the media appears to have a slight, but significant, impact on their levels of trust in national institutions. For example, persons who do not follow the news in the media have an overall level of institutional trust of 54 on a 0-100 scale, which is above the national mean. However, persons who follow the news in the media somewhat regularly exhibit a level of trust of 48. As we have already seen above, citizens who have had more education and have higher incomes tend to stay informed through the media more frequently than those who do not have sufficient education to read the newspaper, nor the resources to watch the news on television. Hence, it is likely that the low trust in institutions among those who have more resources is partly due to their interaction with the media.

**Figure VIII.7 Institutional Trust by Exposure to News in the Media**



Another condition which was found to be associated with institutional credibility was the size of the city in which the respondent resided. As we have already seen for other variables, the fact that citizens live in a small city, large city or a rural area, causes differences in their political attitudes. In this case, the data indicate once again that confidence in institutions tends to be higher in rural areas than in urban ones; further, within urban areas, trust tends to be higher in smaller cities than in large ones (see Figure VIII.8). This could be a result either of the type of population that inhabits these areas, or of the type of dynamics that develops between citizens and institutions within each population structure.

**Figure VIII.8 Institutional Trust by City Size**




On the other hand, having seen that trust in institutions varies similarly to trust in persons, above all in terms of relationships with other variables, this raises the question whether both these variables are related to each other. Putnam's classic work on Italy suggests that trust between persons also affects the functioning of, and trust in, institutions.<sup>134</sup> The results of the survey in Honduras seem to confirm this relationship: Hondurans who exhibit greater trust in their neighbors and compatriots tend to show greater trust in national institutions, and vice versa.

Could it be that citizens' trust in institutions is associated with system support? We should recall that institutional trust constitutes a level of specific support to the system according to Norris' categorization on the subject of support for the political system.<sup>135</sup> This means that support for certain specific institutions does not necessarily imply support for the political system as a whole. A individual can have very little confidence in institutions owing to the way in which these have functioned during a government's term, but this does not imply that he will not trust the political system as a whole, nor that he would be unwilling to support it in times of crisis. Therefore, it is worth measuring the extent to which these two types of support are related.

<sup>134</sup> Robert Putnam. (1993). Op. cit.

<sup>135</sup> Pippa Norris. (2001). *Critical citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Figure VIII.9 Institutional Trust by Level of Interpersonal Trust**



The results suggest that greater institutional trust is indeed associated with more diffuse support for the political system. This association is found at a high level of statistical significance ( $p < .0001$ ). Thus, for example, Hondurans who have little faith in institutions tend to average 33.7 in terms of level of system support, while those who have greater trust in specific national institutions tend to have a mean level of system support of 68.7.

One result that drew a lot of attention revealed that tolerance is linked to trust in institutions. Unlike the case of interpersonal trust, which was not linked significantly to tolerance, the data show that the greater the trust in specific national institutions, the higher the tolerance, and the lower the institutional trust, the lower the tolerance. These data only serve to underscore the importance of institutional trust in political culture, and for the attitudes favoring political stability and democratic development. This makes trust in institutions an important component of social capital, which a country needs for its democratic development.

**Figure VIII.10 Tolerance by Level of Trust in Institutions**



### 8.3 Civic Participation

The discussion of social capital would be incomplete if we included only attitudinal variables related to trust in others and in institutions. It is true that the attitudinal-cognitive dimension has a lot of importance in social capital, but so does the structural dimension, which refers to behavior, in particular that which is a manifestation of the relationships promoted by attitudes.<sup>136</sup> Citizens' participation in organizations or in the public life of the community is an objective manifestation of social capital.

By civic participation we refer here to the result of combining various items that measure participation, organization, and citizens' attendance in various social, political and community activities. These items had a high internal consistency, with a coefficient of reliability of 0.732 (Cronbach's Alpha), and cover very diverse aspects of citizen participation. The items are as follows:

**CP5.** In the past year, have you ever worked or tried to resolve some community or neighborhood problem? (1) Yes [Continue with CP5A] (2) No [Go on to CP6] (3) Don't know [Go on to CP6]


Now I am going to read to you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

<sup>136</sup> See: N.Uphoff (2000). "Understanding social capital: learning from the analysis and experience of participation." In: Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.). *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a committee or group for community improvement?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants or manufacturers?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
In order to resolve a problem, have you ever asked for help or cooperation...	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>DK/DR</b>		
<b>CP2.</b> From a member of the legislative assembly	(1)	(2)	(8)		
<b>CP4.</b> From a ministry, public office or government agency	(1)	(2)	(8)		
<b>CP4A.</b> From a local authority (mayor, municipality)	(1)	(2)	(8)		
<b>NP1.</b> In the past 12 months have you had an opportunity to attend a town council meeting or any other meeting convened by the municipality/mayor?					
(1)Yes (2) No (3) Doesn't know/ doesn't remember					
<b>NP1A.</b> Have you attended a municipal session in the past 12 months?					
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Doesn't know/ doesn't remember					
<b>NP2.</b> Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality in the past 12 months?					
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Doesn't know/ doesn't remember					

Just as we did with earlier indicators, in order to construct the civic participation variable we aggregated the results on a 0-100 scale, and then we obtained the mean scores of all the items taken together. The results indicate that civic participation is very low, not only in Honduras but also in all the countries in the region. In fact, Honduras seems to be one of the countries in which civic participation is highest (20.8). Only Guatemala and Colombia are above Honduras in terms of citizens' participation.

**Figure VIII.11 Civic Participation by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



Civic participation is not the same for all Hondurans. Some seem to participate more than others. The cross-tabulations obtained from the survey, shown in Table VIII.1, reveal that men participate more than women; adults between 36-55 years participate more than other age groups, and participation increases as the level of education rises. Finally, city size proved once again to be an important variable for distinguishing people's civic behavior: the highest frequencies of civic participation were found in rural areas and in small cities; persons living in such localities tend to attend community meetings, participate in municipal events, and attend meetings of certain organizations more frequently than those in the rest of the country.

In this case, neither average monthly family income nor the level of household capital goods made any difference to people's civic participation. That is, individuals with few resources and those with many resources participate equally frequently in social and political matters.

**Table VIII.1 Civic Participation by Variables**

Variable	Mean civic participation
<b>Gender</b>	
Male	22.1483
Female	19.6580
<b>Age in years</b>	
16-25	15.5696
26-35	20.9315
36-45	23.1120
46-55	24.4345
56-65	21.6525
66 and higher	21.1146
<b>Educational level</b>	
None	19.3954
Primary	20.1502
Secondary	22.4456
University	24.0993
<b>City size</b>	
National capital (metropolitan area)	18.6597
Large city	14.7608
Medium-size city	21.2500
Small city	22.3006
Rural area	22.2587
* All the variables included here show a significance of less than 0.05	

Civic participation did not appear to be related to support for the political system or to tolerance. Although the data show that mean scores of system support and tolerance increase slightly as people's level of civic participation rises, the statistical analyses indicated that such differences were not significant and probably due to chance. In other words, people's support for the political system is not affected by the degree to which they participate.

#### **8.4 Social Capital and Democracy**


All the variables studied in this chapter, interpersonal trust, trust in institutions and civic participation, were combined into a single variable. To this we also added an indicator created from the items DER1, DER2, DER3 and DER4, which measure the willingness of citizens to participate without fear in certain types of activities that have political implications. Thus, the variable of social capital which will be used in subsequent analyses is the result of combining interpersonal trust, civic participation and the willingness to participate without fear in political activities.

The mean score for social capital in Honduras is 47 on a 0-100 scale. That means a level of social capital below the mid-point on the scale. However, that does not mean that this Central American country has the lowest level of social capital. In truth, and similar to other related variables, the level of social capital places Honduras in the middle of the countries in the region, as can be seen in Figure VIII.12. The countries with more social capital, measured as an




aggregate of interpersonal trust, trust in institutions, civic participation and willingness to participate without fear, are Costa Rica, Colombia and México. With the exception of México, the countries with more social capital are those that have a relatively long history of democracy.

**Figure VIII.12 Social Capital by Country: Honduras in Comparative Perspective**



What groups exhibit higher levels of social capital? According to the survey results, men exhibit more social capital than women; persons above the age of 36 years have more social capital than their younger compatriots; persons with little education tend to exhibit a higher level of social capital than the rest of the population, and the persons who have lower family incomes and fewer household capital goods have higher levels of social capital. In addition, we find once again that people who live in rural areas exhibit more social capital than those in the rest of the country, in particular those living in large cities (mainly San Pedro Sula). In fact, more than indicating that rural inhabitants are distinguished from their compatriots by a high level of social capital, it is more accurate to say that the data suggest that inhabitants of large cities are distinguished from the inhabitants of the rest of the country by their low level of social capital.

**Figure VIII.13 Social Capital by Educational Level**




Men tend to have more social capital probably because they have more active public participation in the affairs of society, in contrast to Honduran women who continue to be confined to a more private life, which implies the household and the family. The fact that social capital is higher among people of middle age or higher is probably related to the fact that such persons tend to have better established social networks of participation, reciprocity and trust than younger persons. The differences with respect to social capital compared to persons with less education, less income and fewer household goods are still intriguing. That people with fewer social advantages and living in poverty have more social capital contradicts what some theoreticians say on the subject: that there are usually people with more education and higher socioeconomic status in contexts in which there is more social capital.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless, in the Honduran case, and in Latin America in general, one has to consider that traditionally it is among the poorest and least socially advantaged groups that one tends to construct social networks, promote participation and build interpersonal trust with greater intensity, given that these constitute a useful resource for confronting economic marginalization.<sup>138</sup> In other words, social capital would be more present among the poorest and most vulnerable groups because in such conditions it becomes a very useful resource for survival.

The above is probably related to the fact that the country is very well differentiated with respect to levels of social capital. A cross-tabulation of the levels of social capital with the regions of the country showed that the western zone and the southern zone are the areas in which the inhabitants have more trust in others, and participate with greater frequency, probably forming more networks of cooperation than in the rest of the country. In contrast, in the northern region of the country, dominated by the metropolis of San Pedro Sula, the levels of capital are really low.

<sup>137</sup> D.R. Rose and T.R. Clear (1996). "Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory". [Presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association].

<sup>138</sup> See the classic study by Larissa Lomnitz (1973). *¿Cómo sobreviven los marginados?* México: Siglo XXI.

**Figure VIII.14 Social Capital by Region of the Country**



An exploration of the impact of other variables on social capital raised interesting questions. In first place, social capital does not appear to be associated with respondents' ethnic self-identification in Honduras. That is, defining oneself as mestizo, indigenous, or a person of color does not make any difference in terms of the level of social capital exhibited. Nor does the condition of having been the victim of an act of corruption: there are no differences in social capital between citizens exposed to bribes and those who were not.

But the variables that were found to be related to social capital are linked to violence and insecurity.<sup>139</sup> As can be seen in Figure VII.15 and Figure VII.16 of this chapter, the individuals who have been victimized and those who live with more acute feelings of insecurity due to crime tend to exhibit less social capital than those who have not been victims of crime and who live with less feelings of insecurity due to crime.


A very similar phenomenon occurred with the items tapping respondents' fear of becoming victims of violence in their own homes. Basically, the persons who claimed to have a lot of fear of becoming victims of intrafamilial violence showed a lower level of social capital. We also found that in the neighborhoods where the respondents identified more drug problems, the

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<sup>139</sup> In this type of associations, one has to consider and acknowledge that we are not dealing with relationships of unidirectional causality. Both crime and insecurity due to crime can affect and erode the social capital of a community, in the same way that it affects system support. At the same time, the existence of positive social capital can prevent and lower crime levels in the community and make its members feel more secure.

degree of social capital was much lower than in neighborhoods in which citizens did not perceive the trafficking of banned substances.<sup>140</sup>


**Figure VII.15 Social Capital by Crime Victimization**



This has strong implications for a country like Honduras which is experiencing a serious problem of violence and crime. The possibility that people will construct networks of reciprocity and cooperation which will contribute to their own development will be seriously limited by the existence of phenomena such as violence.

<sup>140</sup> This is similar to the results of a study on social capital and gangs in Honduras. See: Marlon Carranza, Misael Castro and Nicolás Domínguez. (2004). "Honduras, pobreza, desconfianza social y crimen". In: *Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Vol. II. Pandillas y capital social*. San Salvador: UCA Editores.

**Figure VIII.16 Social Capital by Feeling of Insecurity**




The results of the survey showed that social capital has a significant impact on the variables measuring the stability of the political system. In sum, we can say that the existence of social capital contributes to people's satisfaction with the working of democracy in Honduras and to their support to the political system. As can be seen in the following figures, the greater the social capital, the higher the satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Honduras and the higher the support for the political system. At the same time, the existence of social capital is associated with the idea that democracy is the best political regime: persons that have a high level of social capital are more likely to state that democracy is the best (77.1%) than persons who have a low level of social capital (62%).<sup>141</sup>

<sup>141</sup> We are referring to the item DEM2: With which of the following phrases do you agree the most:


- (1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other type of government
- (3) In some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.
- (8) DK/DR

**Figure VIII.17 System Support and Satisfaction With the Working of Democracy by Social Capital**



But social capital affects not only system support, the evaluation of the working of democracy or the preference for democracy as a political regime; it also affects the levels of tolerance in the population. A community with a stronger presence of social capital, with participative citizens who trust each other and who trust their institutions, is more likely to have greater tolerance among its members and for society as a whole.

**Figure VIII.18 Tolerance by Level of Social Capital**



## 8.5 Conclusions

The results of this chapter have shown that social capital is very important for the legitimacy and stability of the political system. But social capital depends on many factors, particularly those that are related to the places in which people live, their educational level and the resources they have. Contrary to what we had expected, it is the poorest and the most socially marginalized citizens who exhibit greater social capital. This probably helps them to compensate with networks of support and participation what economic resources cannot provide. Social capital and the variables of interpersonal trust, trust in institutions and participation in Honduras are relatively low, though not the lowest in the region. But, in any case, the data allow us to conclude that it is necessary to raise the levels of civic participation in Honduras as well as the mutual trust among persons, as a means of consolidating democracy.





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## Appendices

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Appendix A: Technical Note and Regression Tables

Appendix B: IRB Official Approval

Appendix C: Questionnaire



## **Appendix A: Technical Note and Regression Tables**

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We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which

there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for an audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/dsd/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/)).

**Table III.1 Predictors of System Support**

	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. error	Beta		
(Constant)	26.596	3.847		6.913	.000
ED What was the last year of education you passed?	-.619	.199	-.110	-3.106	<b>.002</b>
Q1R Gender	-.909	1.215	-.019	-.748	.454
Q2 What is your age in years completed?	-.039	.043	-.026	-.905	.366
WEALTH Wealth measured by capital goods ownership	.277	.286	.034	.970	.332
M1R Evaluation of Pres. Maduro's work (recoded)	.097	.027	.097	3.563	<b>.000</b>
HTAMANO Size of place	2.859	.757	.184	3.779	<b>.000</b>
HUR Urban/rural	-5.400	2.256	-.114	-2.394	<b>.017</b>
PN4R Degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy (recoded)	.058	.028	.060	2.064	<b>.039</b>
PN5R Opinion about democracy in the country (recoded)	.098	.024	.120	4.149	<b>.000</b>
IDIO1R Personal economic situation recoded	.074	.029	.069	2.515	<b>.012</b>
ABS5R Do you think voting can improve things (recoded)	6.772	1.471	.121	4.604	<b>.000</b>
PP1R Frequency with which you have tried to persuade others that they should vote (recoded)	-.045	.021	-.057	-2.196	<b>.028</b>
B21R Trust in political parties (recoded)	.222	.021	.285	10.525	<b>.000</b>
AOJ12R Trust in judiciary's ability to punish the guilty (recoded)	.068	.017	.107	4.096	<b>.000</b>

a Dependent variable: PSA5 System support scale.

R squared = .252.

Adjusted R squared = .243; sig. = <.001.



**Table III.2 Predictors of Tolerance**

	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. error	Beta		
(Constant)	55.075	3.495		15.757	.000
ED What was the last year of education that you passed?	-.034	.258	-.005	-.130	.896
Q1R Gender	1.554	1.551	.028	1.002	.317
Q2 What is your age in years?	-.037	.053	-.022	-.692	.489
WEALTH Wealth measured by capital goods ownership	.070	.334	.007	.209	.835
INFORM Information scale	.110	.035	.100	3.126	<b>.002</b>
IDIO1R Personal economic condition (recoded)	-.159	.035	-.129	-4.492	<b>.000</b>
ABS5R Do you think that voting can improve things (recoded)?	6.420	1.759	.102	3.650	<b>.000</b>

Dependent variable: TOL Tolerance scale

R squared = .038

Adjusted R squared = .032; sig. = <.001

**Table IV.1 Predictors of Corruption by Type of Victim**

	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.670	.205		8.137	.000
Q1 Gender	-.161	.041	-.111	-3.960	.000
Q2 Age	-.002	.001	-.049	-1.682	.093
ED Educational level	.002	.006	.011	.311	.755
Q10 Monthly family income	-.014	.011	-.044	-1.268	.205
DESOC1R Have you been unemployed?	-.088	.041	-.061	-2.160	.031
HTAMANO Size of place	.098	.015	.204	6.734	.000
PAMUNI Participation in municipal affairs	.004	.001	.123	3.984	.000
CP8 Do you attend the meetings of a patronato?	-.055	.022	-.076	-2.457	.014
CP9 Do you attend the meetings of a professional association?	-.100	.033	-.083	-2.999	.003

Dependent variable: EXCTOT Total index of corruption victimization.

**Table V.1 Binary Logistic Regression: Predictors of Crime Victimization**

		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>
Step 1(a)	Gender	-.486	.163	8.879	1	.003	.615
	Size of place			30.464	4	.000	
	National capital	1.293	.239	29.184	1	.000	3.645
	Large city	.872	.274	10.165	1	.001	2.393
	Medium-size city	.831	.262	10.074	1	.002	2.296
	Small city	.766	.267	8.210	1	.004	2.152
	Educational level	.055	.025	4.877	1	.027	1.057
	Age	-.014	.006	5.923	1	.015	.986
	Monthly family income	.078	.050	2.394	1	.122	1.081
	Household capital goods	-.033	.039	.684	1	.408	.968
	Constant	-1.661	.403	16.952	1	.000	.190

a Variables included en step 1: Q1, HTAMANO, ED, Q2, Q10, WEALTH.

**Table VI.1 Predictors of Attendance at a *cabildo abierto***

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>
ED	.059	.026	4.992	1	<b>.025</b>	1.061
Q1R	.313	.160	3.853	1	<b>.050</b>	1.368
Q2	.013	.005	5.848	1	<b>.016</b>	1.013
WEALTH	-.012	.038	.105	1	.746	.988
INFORM	.009	.004	5.045	1	<b>.025</b>	1.009
HTAMANO	.327	.068	23.356	1	<b>.000</b>	1.387
SGL1	-.276	.086	10.186	1	<b>.001</b>	.759
PP2R	1.237	.179	47.810	1	<b>.000</b>	3.444
Constant	-3.976	.535	55.221	1	<b>.000</b>	.019

Variables included: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTH, INFORM, HTAMANO, SGL1, PP2R.

Dependent variable: NP1R.

Nagelkerke R squared=.133; sig. <.001

**Table VI.3 Predictors of Attendance at a Session of the Municipality**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>
ED	.069	.029	5.639	1	<b>.018</b>	1.072
Q1R	.466	.184	6.404	1	<b>.011</b>	1.594
Q2	.016	.006	6.791	1	<b>.009</b>	1.016
WEALTH	.005	.044	.013	1	.909	1.005
REGION	.306	.061	25.019	1	<b>.000</b>	1.358
HTAMANO	.526	.132	15.812	1	<b>.000</b>	1.692
HUR	-.875	.331	6.993	1	<b>.008</b>	.417
PP2R	1.157	.204	32.065	1	<b>.000</b>	3.180
Constant	-5.361	.584	84.385	1	<b>.000</b>	.005

Variables included: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTH, REGION, HTAMANO, HUR, PP2R.

Dependent variable: NP1AR.

Nagelkerke R squared =.135; sig. <.001

**Table VI.4 Predictors of the Presentation of a Request for Assistance**

	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>
ED	.067	.026	6.784	1	<b>.009</b>	1.070
Q1R	.088	.165	.289	1	.591	1.092
Q2	.010	.006	3.073	1	.080	1.010
WEALTH	-.032	.039	.688	1	.407	.968
HTAMANO	.259	.105	6.119	1	<b>.013</b>	1.295
HUR	-.666	.288	5.329	1	<b>.021</b>	.514
PP2R	1.067	.187	32.436	1	<b>.000</b>	2.907
Constant	-2.912	.472	38.145	1	.000	.054

Variables included: ED, Q1R, Q2, WEALTH, HTAMANO, HUR, PP2R.

Dependent variable: NP2R.

Nagelkerke R squared=.068; sig. <.001

**Table VI.5 Predictors of Satisfaction With Municipal Services**

	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. error	Beta		
(Constant)	35.295	3.061		11.531	.000
ED What was the last year of education you passed?	.196	.207	.036	.947	.344
Q1R Gender	-1.510	1.256	-.033	-1.202	.229
Q2 What is your age in years?	-.052	.043	-.037	-1.200	.231
WEALTH Wealth measured by capital goods ownership	1.127	.317	.141	3.552	<b>.000</b>
M1RR Eval. of Pres. Maduro's performance recoded	.141	.027	.147	5.209	<b>.000</b>
Q10 Monthly family income	-1.226	.396	-.122	-3.098	<b>.002</b>
PN4R Degree of satisfaction with the working of democracy recoded	.056	.026	.060	2.133	<b>.033</b>
SOCT1R Country's economic condition recoded	.119	.031	.116	3.858	<b>.000</b>
IDIO1R Personal economic condition recoded	.139	.032	.133	4.327	<b>.000</b>

Dependent variable: SGL1R Evaluation of municipal services recoded.

R squared = .113.

Adjusted R squared = .106; sig. = <.001.

**Table VI.8 Predictors of Trust in the Municipality**

	Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. error	Beta		
(Constant)	49.938	6.518		7.661	.000
ED What was the last year of education you passed?	-.146	.309	-.019	-.473	.636
Q1R Gender	-1.793	1.968	-.028	-.911	.362
Q2 What is your age in years?	.002	.068	.001	.036	.971
WEALTH Wealth measured by capital goods ownership	-.155	.412	-.014	-.377	.706
L1 Left-right scale	1.651	.434	.119	3.803	<b>.000</b>
REGION Region of the country	2.020	.742	.085	2.722	<b>.007</b>
PN5R Opinion of democracy recoded	.156	.035	.136	4.391	<b>.000</b>
ABS5R Do you think voting can improve things recoded	6.600	2.300	.088	2.869	<b>.004</b>
SGL1 Evaluation of municipal services recoded	-9.070	1.083	-.258	-8.372	<b>.000</b>
B21R	.221	.034	.201	6.415	<b>.000</b>

Dependent variable: B32R.

R squared = .202.

Adjusted R squared = .193; sig. = <.001.



## Appendix B. IRB Official Approval

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### University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board

Exempt and Expedited Reviews  
Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

Multiple Project Assurance: M-1259

3500 Fifth Avenue  
Suite 105  
Pittsburgh, PA 15213  
Phone: 412.383.1480  
Fax: 412.383.1146  
e-mail: irbexempt@msx.upmc.edu

TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.  
FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair *Chris*  
DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

IRB Number: 0401036

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be re-reviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.


**Approval Date:** 01/12/2004  
**Renewal Date:** 01/12/2007

CR:ky

## Appendix C. Questionnaire

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Versión # 9.3 Miércoles, 25 de Febrero de 2004; IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



**UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH**

**Honduras, 2004**

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	<b>PAIS</b>	<b>4</b>
Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]: _____ Región: _____	<b>HIDNUM</b>	
Departamento: _____	<b>HDEPA</b>	
Municipio: _____	<b>HMUNI</b>	
Caserío _____	<b>HCASER</b>	
Sector: _____	<b>HSEC</b>	
Segmento _____	<b>HSEGME</b>	
Estrato ( <b>Muestra Nacional</b> ): 1. Norte A (Cortés) 2. Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón) 3. Norte C (Islas de la Bahía) 4. Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso) 5. Oriental B (Gracias a Dios) 6. Sur (Choluteca y Valle) 7. Central A (Francisco Morazán) 8. Central B (Comayagua /La Paz) 9. Occidental (Ocotepeque/Copán/Santa Bárbara/Lempira/Intibucá); <b>Muestra municipal especial:</b> 11. Lempira: Gualcinse; 12. Copán: Santa Rita; 13. Copán: Santa Rosa de Copán, 14. Atlántida:Tela; 15. Choluteca: Apacilagua	<b>HESTRATO</b>	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	<b>HTAMANO</b>	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Inglés	<b>HIDIOMA</b>	

**Hora de inicio:** \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</b>						<b>Q1</b>	
<b>HA4. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b>						<b>HA4</b>	
(01) Problemas económicos		(02) Inflación, altos precios					
(03) Desempleo		(04) Pobreza					
(05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia		(06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)					
(07) Falta de tierra para cultivar		(09) Falta de crédito					
(10) Problemas del medio ambiente		(11) Drogadicción					
(12) Narcotráfico		(13) Corrupción					
(14) Pandillas		(15) Mal gobierno					
(16) Migración		(17) La guerra contra terrorismo					
(88) No sabe							
Anotar si no existe código: _____							

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A3</b>	
<b>A4.</b> Lee noticias vía Internet	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A4</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT1</b>
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT3</b>
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO1</b>
<b>IDIO4.</b> Comparado con sus padres, ¿cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría que es mucho mejor que la de ellos, algo mejor, igual, algo peor de o mucho peor que la de ellos? (1) Mucho mejor (2) Algo mejor (3) Igual (4) Algo peor (5) Mucho peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO4</b>

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...					<b>CP5</b>
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [ <b>Seguir con CP5A</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pasar a CP6</b> ] (8) NS [ <b>Pasar a CP6</b> ]					
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5A</b>	
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5B</b>	
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5C</b>	
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5D</b>	
<b>CP5E.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo para combatir la delincuencia en su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5E</b>	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP6</b>	
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP7</b>	
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un patronato? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP8</b>	
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP9</b>	
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP13</b>	

<b>PROT1.</b> ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) Algunas veces	(2) Casi nunca	(3) Nunca	(8) NS	<b>PROT1</b>	
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Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ...?	Sí	No	NS/NR		
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso Nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP2</b>	
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4</b>	
<b>CP4A.</b> A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad)	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4A</b>	

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ...? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	<b>LS3</b>	
---	------------	--

<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ...? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	<b>IT1</b>	
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	<b>IT2</b>	
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharía (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	<b>IT3</b>	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o cabildo ampliado [reuniones convocadas por el alcalde] durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No [ <b>Pasar a NP1A</b> ] (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP1E.</b> ¿De los cabildos abiertos que asistió en el último año, cumplieron sus objetivos o no cumplieron sus objetivos? (1) Sí cumplieron (2) No cumplieron (8) NS (9) INAP (no asistió)	<b>NP1E</b>	

<p><b>NP1D.</b> En los cabildos abiertos, ¿hubo oportunidades suficientes para opinar? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS (9) Inap (no asistió)</p>	<b>NP1D</b>	
<p><b>NP1A.</b> ¿Ha asistido a una sesión de la corporación municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<b>NP1A</b>	
<p><b>NP1B.</b> ¿Hasta que punto cree Ud. que los oficiales del municipio hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS</p>	<b>NP1B</b>	
<p><b>NP1F.</b> ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión de su patronato durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda.</p>	<b>NP1F</b>	
<p><b>NP1C.</b> Si Ud. tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro de la corporación municipal, ¿Que tanto cree Ud. que le haría caso, mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS</p>	<b>NP1C</b>	
<p><b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, o regidor de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<b>NP2</b>	
<p><b>NP2A.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición al patronato durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<b>NP2A</b>	
<p><b>NP2B.</b> ¿En su opinión el patronato ayuda a solucionar los problemas de la comunidad mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<b>NP2B</b>	
<p><b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (8) No sabe</p>	<b>SGL1</b>	
<p><b>SGL1A.</b> Y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable, ¿diría que el servicio es... (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) No sabe <b>[Si el municipio no ofrece el servicio de agua potable marque (9) Inap.</b></p>	<b>SGL1A</b>	
<p><b>SGL1B.</b> Y el servicio de saneamiento ambiental que el municipio está dando? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) No sabe <b>[Si el municipio no ofrece el servicio de saneamiento ambiental marque (9) Inap.</b></p>	<b>SGL1B</b>	
<p><b>SGL1C.</b> Y el servicio de recolección de basura que el municipio está dando a la gente es...? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) No sabe <b>[Si el municipio no ofrece el servicio de recolección de basura marque (9) Inap.</b></p>	<b>SGL1C</b>	
<p><b>LGL1.</b> En su opinión, ¿entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados, o la municipalidad quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? o ¿La municipalidad? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) La municipalidad (4) <b>[NO LEER] Ninguno</b> (5) <b>[NO LEER] Todos igual</b> (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	<b>LGL1</b>	
<p><b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (3) <b>[NO LEER] No cambiar nada</b> (4) <b>[NO LEER] Más al municipio si da mejores servicios</b> (5) No sabe / no contesta</p>	<b>LGL2</b>	
<p><b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>	<b>LGL3</b>	
<p><b>LGL4.</b> ¿Cree usted que el alcalde y la corporación municipal responden a lo que el pueblo quiere: siempre, la mayoría de veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca? (1) Siempre (2) La mayoría de veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca</p>	<b>LGL4</b>	

<p><b>MUNI2.</b> En su opinión, ¿cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? <b>[No leer alternativas y aceptar una sola respuesta]</b> (00) Ninguno <b>[pase a EFF6]</b>  (01) Falta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia  (04) Falta de Aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica  (07) Falta de fondos y ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR  <b>[pase a EFF6]</b> Otros [anotar]: _____</p>	<p><b>MUNI2</b></p>
<p><b>EFF3.</b> ¿Cree que Ud. pueda ayudar a solucionar este problema?  (1) Sí <b>[siga con EFF5]</b> (2) No <b>[pasar a EFF6]</b> (8) No sabe <b>[pasar a EFF6]</b> (9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)</p>	<p><b>EFF3</b></p>
<p><b>EFF5.</b> ¿Ha hecho algún esfuerzo alguna vez solo o en grupo para resolver este problema?  (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS (9) Inap (no mencionó problemas)</p>	<p><b>EFF5</b></p>
<p><b>EFF6. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Qué tan probable cree Ud. que el esfuerzo del pueblo pueda servir para resolver los problemas de este municipio? ¿Diría que hay mucha probabilidad de resolverlo, alguna probabilidad, poca probabilidad o casi ninguna probabilidad? (1) Mucha (2) Alguna (3) Poca (4) Casi ninguna (8) NS</p>	<p><b>EFF6</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5D.</b> ¿Sabe en qué mes se presenta el presupuesto municipal al Ministerio de Finanzas.  (1) Sí sabe <b>[Noviembre]</b> (0) No sabe</p>	<p><b>MUNI5D</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5A.</b> ¿En qué cosa gasta la municipalidad la mayor parte de su presupuesto? <b>[No leer opciones]</b>  <b>[Si menciona más de uno, anotar el más importante]</b>  1. Aseo público  2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, canchas de fútbol, u otras obras públicas  3. Salud, educación  4. Corrupción  5. Sueldos  6. Nada  Otro _____ 88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5B.</b> ¿En su opinión, en qué debería gastar más el gobierno municipal? <b>[NO LEER OPCIONES]</b>  <b>[Si menciona más de uno, anotar el más importante]</b>  1. Aseo público  2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, agua potable, desagües, desechos sólidos, canchas de fútbol, u otras obras públicas  3. Salud, educación  4. Empleo público  5. Sueldos  6. Nada  Otro _____ 88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5B</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Ud. en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la municipalidad?  (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI6</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6A.</b> ¿Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios municipales esta...?  (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI6A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6C.</b> ¿Sabe Ud. cuál es la función del comisionado municipal?  (1) Correcto (puente entre municipalidad y la comunidad) (2) No sabe</p>	<p><b>MUNI6C</b></p>

<b>MUNI7.</b> En su opinión, ¿los proyectos que ejecuta la municipalidad benefician o no benefician a personas como Ud. y a su familia? (1) Sí benefician (0) No benefician (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI7</b>	
<b>MUNI11A.</b> ¿Quién cree que influye más en las decisiones que se toman en el municipio? <i>[lea las alternativas] [aceptar solo una respuesta]</i> (01) El alcalde [presidente del concejo municipal] (02) El partido del alcalde (03) El Concejo Municipal (04) El diputado de su departamento (05) El Gobierno Nacional (06) Las organizaciones comunitarias (07) Las organizaciones no-gubernamentales (ONG´s) (10) Los empresarios privados (77) Otros: [solo si mencionan] _____ (88) No sabe	<b>MUNI11A</b>	
<b>MUNI15.</b> ¿Qué tanto acepta el alcalde la participación de la gente en el trabajo de la municipalidad? <b>[LEER OPCIONES]</b> (3) Acepta mucho (2) Acepta algo (1) Acepta poco (0) No lo acepta (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI15</b>	
<b>MUNI16.</b> ¿Qué tipo de alcalde cree Ud. que es mejor: 1. Un alcalde, que para ser eficiente, actúe rápidamente basado en su propio criterio, ó 2. Un alcalde, que a pesar de ser menos eficiente, siempre consulte a su corporación y a la gente antes de actuar? 8. NS	<b>MUNI16</b>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC4</b>	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>JC13A.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	(1) Si podría haber razón	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8) NS	<b>JC13A</b>	

<b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pasar a ST]</b> (8) NS	<b>VIC1</b>	
<b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? <b>[No lea las alternativas]</b> (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (asalto) (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)	<b>VIC2</b>	
<b>AOJ1.</b> <b>[Si responde "Sí" a VIC1]</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No lo denunció <b>[Pasar a AOJ1B]</b> (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1</b>	
<b>AOJ1A.</b> ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? <b>[marcar una sola alternativa y pase a ST]</b> (1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (o DIC) (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima) (8) NS	<b>AOJ1A</b>	
<b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	<b>AOJ1B</b>	

De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	MUY SATISFECHO	ALGO SATISFECHO	ALGO INSATISFECHO	MUY INSATISFECHO	NO HIZO TRAMITES	NS/NR	
<b>ST1.</b> La policía [se refiere a cualquiera de las policías].	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>
<b>ST2.</b> Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>
<b>ST3.</b> La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST3</b>
<b>ST4.</b> La municipalidad (alcaldía)	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>

<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS	<b>AOJ8</b>
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	<b>AOJ11</b>
<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro, mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11A</b>
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>
<b>AOJ16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS	<b>AOJ16</b>
<b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS	<b>AOJ16A</b>
<b>AOJ19.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que los trámites en los tribunales toman el tiempo apropiado o cree que demoran demasiado? (1) Tiempo apropiado (2) Demoran demasiado (8) NS	<b>AOJ19</b>

**[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada escogería el puntaje 1, y si, por el contrario, confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Nada						Mucho	(8) No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS	
<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Honduras garantizan un juicio justo? Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.		<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Honduras?		<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político hondureño?		<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político hondureño?		<b>B4</b>



	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS</b>		
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político hondureño?		<b>B6</b>	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		<b>B10A</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones?		<b>B11</b>	
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Fuerzas Armadas?		<b>B12</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público?		<b>B15</b>	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las policías?		<b>B18</b>	
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?		<b>B19</b>	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		<b>B20</b>	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		<b>B21</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		<b>B32</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser hondureño?		<b>B43</b>	
<b>B44.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los defensores públicos?		<b>B44</b>	
<b>B45.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos?		<b>B45</b>	
<b>B46.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Nacional Anti-Corrupción?		<b>B46</b>	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		<b>B47</b>	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		<b>B48</b>	

**[NO RECOJER TARJETA "A"]**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(8) No sabe
Nada						Mucho	

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del <b>Presidente Ricardo Maduro</b> (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS		
<b>N1.</b> Combate la pobreza.		<b>N1</b>	
<b>N3.</b> Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		<b>N3</b>	
<b>N9.</b> Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.		<b>N9</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta "A"]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	(8) No sabe

	Anotar 1-7, NS=8		
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los hondureños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2	
PN2A. Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		PN2A	

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente	No sabe			

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales.		E16	

**[No recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente	No sabe			

	Anotar 1-10, 88= NS		
D32. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?		D32	

	Anotar 1-10, 88= NS		
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político hondureño?		<b>D33</b>	
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?		<b>D34</b>	
<b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?		<b>D36</b>	
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Honduras. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>									<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>	No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, NS=88		
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>	
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>	
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>	
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>	
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los <b>homosexuales</b> , ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada...		
<b>LIB1.</b> Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB1</b>	
<b>LIB2.</b> Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB2</b>	
<b>LIB3.</b> Participación política (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB3</b>	
<b>LIB4.</b> Protección a derechos humanos (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB4</b>	

<b>ACR1.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios. (8) No sabe, no responde.	<b>ACR1</b>	
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<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Honduras? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión Honduras es ¿muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS	<b>PN5</b>	

<b>PN6.</b> Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, ¿Honduras se ha vuelto más democrática, igual de democrática o menos democrática? (1) Muy democrática (2) Igual de democrática (3) Menos democrática (8) NS/NR	<b>PN6</b>				
<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. (8) NS/NR.	<b>DEM2</b>				
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde	<b>DEM11</b>				
<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	<b>AUT1</b>				
<b>AUT2.</b> El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo sistema que tenemos ahora (8) NS	<b>AUT2</b>				
<b>PP1.</b> Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [lea las alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	<b>PP1</b>				
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2001? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	<b>PP2</b>				
<b>ABS5.</b> ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR	<b>ABS5</b>				
<b>M1.</b> Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Maduro es: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>				
Me gustaría que me indique si Ud. considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corrupta y debe ser castigada; 2) corrupta pero justificada bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corrupta.					
<b>DC10.</b> Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 20 Lempiras de más al empleado público municipal. Cree Ud. que el empleado público es: (1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado (2) Corrupto pero justificada (3) No corrupto (8) No sabe	<b>DC10</b>				
<b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Ud. Cree que el político es: (1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado (2) Corrupto pero justificado (3) No corrupto (8) No sabe	<b>DC13</b>				
<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	<b>No</b>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>INAP</b>	
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC1</b>
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC6</b>

<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? <b>[Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja? <b>[Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>[Si dice “no”, marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (soborno) en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? <b>[Si dice “no”, marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (soborno)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? <b>[Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (soborno)?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					<b>EXC7</b>

**[Ahora vamos a usar tarjeta “D”] Entregar tarjeta “D”**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

<b>INSTITUCIONES</b>	<b>Grado de corrupción</b>												
	<b>Muy corruptos</b>					<b>Muy honrados</b>					<b>NS</b>		
<b>PC1.</b> Los diputados	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC1</b>	
<b>PC2.</b> Los ministros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC2</b>	
<b>PC3.</b> Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC3</b>	
<b>PC4.</b> Los regidores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC4</b>	
<b>PC5.</b> Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC5</b>	
<b>PC8.</b> Los maestros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC8</b>	
<b>PC9.</b> Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC9</b>	
<b>PC12.</b> Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC12</b>	
<b>PC14.</b> Los líderes de los partidos políticos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>	
<b>PC15.</b> Los líderes de las ONG's	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC15</b>	
<b>PC19.</b> La prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC19</b>	
<b>PC21.</b> Los Presidentes de la República	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC21</b>	

**Recoja Tarjeta D**

<b>Ahora me puede decir...</b> <b>G11.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[No leer, George W. Bush; acepta "Bush" o "George Bush"]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	<b>G11</b>	
<b>G13.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuántos departamentos tiene Honduras? <b>[No leer, 18]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>G13</b>	
<b>G14.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Honduras? <b>[No leer, cuatro años]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>G14</b>	
<b>G15.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[No leer, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva; acepta "Lula"]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>G15</b>	

**L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA "E":** Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1 (NS=88)	
<b>Izquierda</b> <span style="float: right;"><b>Derecha</b></span>											

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted <b>sin temor, un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?</b> <b>[VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]</b>	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS		
<b>DER1.</b> ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER1</b>	
<b>DER2.</b> ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER2</b>	
<b>DER3.</b> ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER3</b>	
<b>DER4.</b> ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER4</b>	

<b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene usted su tarjeta de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS	<b>VB1</b>	
<b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó en las pasadas elecciones generales de 2001? (1) Sí votó <b>[siga]</b> (2) No votó <b>[pasar a HVB4]</b> (8) NS	<b>VB2</b>	
<b>HVB3.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para Presidente de las elecciones pasadas de 2001? <b>[Si no votó, seguir con HVB4. Si votó, pasar a HVB5]</b> (1) Partido Nacional, (2) Partido Liberal, (3) PINU, (4) Democracia Cristiana, (5)Unificación Democrática (6) Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (No votó)	<b>HVB3</b>	
<b>HVB4.</b> Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las elecciones pasadas de 2001? <b>[NO LEER y anotar una sola respuesta]</b> (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato/partido (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07)No se encontró en el padrón electoral (10) No tener edad (11) Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado (12) Tener que trabajar Otro _____ (88) NS/NR	<b>HVB4</b>	

<b>HVB6.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para Alcalde en las elecciones pasadas del 2001? (1) Partido Nacional, (2) Partido Liberal, (3) PINU, (4) Democracia Cristiana, (5) Unificación Democrática (6) Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (No votó)	<b>HVB6</b>	
<b>HVB7.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado al Congreso Nacional en las elecciones pasadas del 2001? (1) Partido Nacional, (2) Partido Liberal, (3) PINU, (4) Democracia Cristiana, (5) Unificación Democrática (6) Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no votó)	<b>HVB7</b>	

Hoy en día se habla mucho sobre reformas electorales. Me interesa conocer sus opiniones sobre las siguientes reformas. Vamos a usar otra vez la tarjeta "C". **[Entregue la tarjeta "C"]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>						<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>				No sabe

<b>EREF1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba el fijar una cuota mínima para aumentar el número de mujeres que puedan ser electas diputadas? [Léame el número]	<b>EREF1</b>	
<b>EREF2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba reconfigurar los distritos electorales para poder votar por un diputado por distrito en lugar de una lista de diputados por partido?	<b>EREF2</b>	
<b>EREF3.</b> ¿Poner en manos de los diputados el derecho de financiar obras públicas y servicios públicos en sus departamentos? ¿Hasta que punto aprobaría o desaprobaría?	<b>EREF3</b>	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

**[Encuestador: llenar:]** \_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un círculo alrededor del número que corresponde]**

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de...	Segundo año de...	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de...	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	<b>ED</b>	_ _ _
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o más		
No sabe/no responde	(88)							

<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	<b>Q2</b>	_ _
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar	<b>Q3</b>	
<b>Q4.</b> ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado)? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca	<b>Q4</b>	



<p><b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos <b>familiares mensuales</b> de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?  <b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F]</b></p> <p>(0) Ningún ingreso  (1) Menos de L. 900  (2) L.901 – L.1,800  (3) L.1,801 – L.2,700  (4) L.2,701 – L. 3,600  (5) L.3,601 – L. 5,400  (6) L.5,401 – L.7,200  (7) L.7,201 – L.9,000  (8) L.9,001 – L.13,500  (9) Más de L.13,501  (88) NS</p>	<b>Q10</b>	
<p><b>Q10A.</b> ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?  (1) Si <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[saltar a Q11]</b> (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>Q10A</b>	
<p><b>Q10B.</b> ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>Q10B</b>	
<p><b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b>  (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>Q11</b>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)</p>	<b>Q12</b>	
<p><b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?  (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS</p>	<b>Q14</b>	
<p><b>Q15.</b> ¿Vivió Ud. en los EEUU en los últimos tres años?  (1) Si (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>Q15</b>	

<p><b>HETID.</b> ¿Se considera blanco, mestizo, indígena o negro? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena  (4) Negra (5) Otra _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>HETID</b>	
<p><b>HLENG1.</b> ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa)  (1) Castellano (2) Inglés  (4) Otro (indígena, extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>HLENG1</b>	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[leer todos]**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora [nevera]		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional no celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>	
<b>R15.</b> Computadora		(0) No		(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>	

<b>OCUP1.</b> Cuál es su ocupación principal? 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Empleado 3. Vendedor 4. Campesino 5. Peon agricola 6. Servicio Domestico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante 13. Ama de casa 14. Pensionado rentista 88. NS	<b>OCUP1</b>	
<b>OCUP1A</b> En esta ocupación Usted es: 1. Asalariado del gobierno o autonoma? 2. Asalariado sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio empresa menos de 5 empleados? 4. Patrono o socio empresa 5 o más empleados? 5. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 6. Trabajador no remunerado 8. NS	<b>OCUP1A</b>	
<b>DESOC1.</b> ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año? (1) Sí (2) No (3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista (8) No sabe	<b>DESOC1</b>	
<b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____ <b>TI.</b> Duración de la entrevista [ <i>minutos, ver página # 1</i> ] _____	<b>TI</b>	

*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*

*Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.*

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Firma del codificador \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_.

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

## **The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004**

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public  
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**