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Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas, 2014:

Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

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Table of Contents

List of Figures	vii
List of Maps.....	xi
List of Tables.....	xi
Preface	xiii
Prologue: Background to the Study.....	xv
Acknowledgements	xxv
Introduction.....	xxix
Understanding Figures in this Study	xxxv
Part I: Crime, Violence, and Perceptions of the Role of the State in the Americas	1
Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas	3
I. Introduction.....	3
II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas	5
<i>Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries</i>	5
<i>Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics.....</i>	9
III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas	11
IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer.....	15
<i>Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas.....</i>	15
<i>Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?</i>	25
V. Conclusion.....	27
Appendix	28
Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas	29
I. Introduction.....	29
II. Main Findings.....	30
III. The Evolution of Household Wealth.....	31
IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet	36
V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?.....	39
VI. Conclusion	44
Appendix	46
Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas	49
I. Introduction.....	49
II. Main Findings.....	50
III. Personal Experiences with Corruption.....	51
IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?	58

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?.....	63
VI. Conclusion	66
Appendix	68
Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas.....	71
I. Introduction.....	71
II. Main Findings of this Chapter	71
III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy	72
IV. Local Level Participation	74
<i>Local Meeting Attendance.....</i>	75
<i>Demand Making on Local Government</i>	76
V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government	81
<i>Satisfaction with Local Services.....</i>	82
<i>Trust in Local Government</i>	92
VI. Conclusion	95
Appendix	97
Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas	103
I. Introduction.....	103
II. Main Findings.....	104
III. Support for Democracy	105
IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions.....	106
V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability	115
<i>Support for the Political System.....</i>	116
<i>Political Tolerance.....</i>	120
<i>Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability</i>	124
VI. Conclusion	128
Appendix	130
Part II: Governance, Political Participation and Civil Society in the Americas	137
Chapter 6. Haitians and Human Development	139
I. Introduction.....	139
II. Economic Well-being	140
III. Indoor Plumbing and Bathrooms	143
IV. Popular Perceptions of Public Goods Delivery	146
V. Crime and Insecurity	148
VI. Corruption	154
VII. Conclusion	162
Appendix	163

Chapter 7. Haitians and Democratic Values	167
I. Introduction.....	167
II. Political Tolerance.....	168
III. Trust and System Support Among Haitians.....	172
IV. Is democracy at risk in Haiti?	178
V. Community Involvement and Political Participation	184
VI. Conclusion	192
Appendix	194
Chapter 8. Haitian Voters in Action.....	195
I. Introduction.....	195
II. Ideology and party identification.....	196
III. Issue Performance	203
IV. Approval and Incumbent Support.....	206
V. Conclusion.....	210
Appendix	212
References.....	213
Appendices.....	227
Appendix A. Key Comparisons by Gender and Area of Residence	229
Appendix B. Letter of Informed Consent	245
Appendix C. Sample Design	247
Appendix D. Questionnaire.....	257



List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012	6
Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time.....	6
Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012.....	8
Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time.....	12
Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014	13
Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time	16
Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014	17
Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014	18
Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time.....	19
Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014	20
Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014	21
Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014	22
Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014.....	23
Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014	24
Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014	26
Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014.....	27
Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014.....	32
Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index	34
Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014	35
Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014.....	37
Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014.....	37
Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time.....	38
Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014	39
Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014	40
Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time	40
Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014.....	42
Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014.....	44
Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014.....	53
Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014 ..	54
Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time.....	55
Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014	56
Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014	58
Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014	59

Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time.....	60
Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014.....	61
Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014	62
Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Goverment Corruption, 2014	63
Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014.....	65
Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014. 65	
Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014 . 66	
Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014	75
Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	76
Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014	77
Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014.....	78
Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014	79
Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014	80
Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014	81
Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014	84
Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category	85
Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	86
Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014.....	87
Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014	88
Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services.....	89
Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014....	90
Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014	91
Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time.....	92
Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014	94
Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time	106
Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	108
Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014	109
Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014	110
Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014	111
Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014	113
Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014.....	114
Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014.....	115
Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014.....	117
Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014.....	119
Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	121
Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014.....	123
Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014.....	125
Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014	126

Figure 6.1. Ownership of Household Goods in Haiti, 2014	141
Figure 6.2. Average Wealth Over Time in Haiti, 2006-2014	142
Figure 6.3. Perception of Household Economic Situation and Government Assistance in Haiti, 2014	143
Figure 6.4. Percent with Indoor Plumbing and Bathrooms, Haiti 2006-2014	144
Figure 6.5. Percent Connected to Sewage System, Haiti 2014	145
Figure 6.6. Socioeconomic Characteristics Associated with Access to Indoor Bathrooms, Haiti 2014	146
Figure 6.7. Satisfaction with Roads, Health Services, and Public Schools	147
Figure 6.8. Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	148
Figure 6.9. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity in Haiti	149
Figure 6.10. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity Relative to Other Neighborhoods and to the Previous Year, Haiti 2014	150
Figure 6.11. Perceptions of Gangs in the Neighborhood in Haiti, 2010-2014	151
Figure 6.12. Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2010-2014	152
Figure 6.13. Location of Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2012-2014	153
Figure 6.14. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2014	154
Figure 6.15. Victimization by Corruption in Haiti	155
Figure 6.16. Types of Victimized by Corruption in Haiti, 2014	156
Figure 6.17. Determinants of Victimization by Corruption in Haiti	157
Figure 6.18. Perception of Corruption	158
Figure 6.19. Corruption Victimization, Governmental Assistance, and Crime, 2014	159
Figure 6.20. Factors Associated with Perception of Corruption in Haiti	160
Figure 6.21. Perception of Corruption and Victimization by Corruption in the Americas, 2014	161
Figure 6.22. Paying a Bribe is Justified and Corruption Victimization	162
Figure 7.1. Political Tolerance in the Americas and Haiti, 2006-2014	169
Figure 7.2. Breakdown of Political Tolerance Index, Haiti 2006-2014	170
Figure 7.3. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in the Americas, 2014	171
Figure 7.4. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in Haiti, 2010-2014	171
Figure 7.5. Tolerance of Undemocratic Behaviors, Haiti 2006-2014	172
Figure 7.6. Interpersonal Trust in the Americas, 2014	173
Figure 7.7. Interpersonal Trust, Haiti 2006-2014	174
Figure 7.8. Trust in Political Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014	175
Figure 7.9. Trust in Judicial Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014	176
Figure 7.10. Trust in Non-Political Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014	177
Figure 7.11. System Support in Haiti, 2006-2014	178
Figure 7.12. Attitudes Conducive to Democracy at Risk in the Americas, 2014	179
Figure 7.13. Democratic Attitudinal Profiles in Haiti, 2006-2014	180
Figure 7.14. Other Democratic Attitudes in Haiti, 2006-2014	181
Figure 7.15. Support for Democracy in Haiti, 2006-2014	182
Figure 7.16. Preference for Democracy Over Authoritarianism in Haiti, 2006-2014	183
Figure 7.17. Preference for Democracy Over Authoritarianism in the Americas, 2014	183
Figure 7.18. Components of Community Participation in Comparative Perspective, 2006-2014	185

Figure 7.19. Community Engagement in Haiti, 2006-2014	186
Figure 7.20. Community Participation and Engagement in Comparative Perspective, 2006-2014	186
Figure 7.21. Types of Community Participation in the Americas, 2014.....	187
Figure 7.22. Participated in a Protest in Haiti, 2010-2014	188
Figure 7.23. Reasons for Protesting Haiti, 2010 and 2014.....	189
Figure 7.24. Percent Intending to Vote in the Americas, 2014	190
Figure 7.25. Intentions to Vote and Reported Vote in Haiti, 2006-2014	191
Figure 7.26. Some Determinants of Intentions to Vote, Haiti 2012-2014.....	192
Figure 8.1. Haitians and ideology in comparative perspective, 2014.....	197
Figure 8.2. Percentage of Haitians who self-identify on the left-right axis, 2008-2014	198
Figure 8.3. Position on the left-right axis, Haiti 2014	199
Figure 8.4. Mean position on the left-right axis, Haiti 2006-2014	200
Figure 8.5. Percentage of Respondents who Identify with a Political Party in the Americas, 2014	201
Figure 8.6. Party Identification in Haiti, 2006-2014	202
Figure 8.7. Evolution of Party Identification in Haiti, 2006-2014	203
Figure 8.8. Most Important Problem Facing Haiti, 2006-2010	204
Figure 8.9. Perceptions of the National Economy	205
Figure 8.10. Evaluations of Government Performance, Haiti 2012-2014.....	206
Figure 8.11. Percentage of those that think the President is doing a “good” or “very good” job, Haiti 2012-2014	207
Figure 8.12. Percentage of those that think the President is doing a “good” or “very good” job by Region, Haiti 2014.....	208
Figure 8.13. Vote Intention in Haiti, 2012-2014	209
Figure 8.14. Determinants of Incumbent Support in Haiti, 2012-2014.....	210



List of Maps

Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country	14
Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014	41
Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014	83
Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014	93
Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014	118
Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014	122
Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014	127

List of Tables

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance	116
Table 7.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance	178

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

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Prologue: Background to the Study

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “informed consent” form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO[®] (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the “Adgys”[®] questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency between the coding in the

questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed “Rapid Response Report,” based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team’s or donor’s priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.


This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.

This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

Country	Institutions		
Mexico and Central America			
Costa Rica			
El Salvador			
Guatemala		Universidad Rafael Landívar <small>Tradición Jesuita en Guatemala</small>	
Honduras	 FOPRIDEH <small>Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras</small>		
Mexico	 <small>Opinión Pública y Mercados</small>	 <small>INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO</small>	
Nicaragua			
Panama		 <small>Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas</small>	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		
Bolivia		 EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru		
Uruguay		 Universidad Católica del Uruguay
Venezuela		

Caribbean	
Bahamas	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i>
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	 Your one-stop shop for fieldwork.
Trinidad & Tobago	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	  



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Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

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We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marenco, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts. Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

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Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014

Introduction

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago*. In Part I, we devote the first chapter to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity in the region. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters of Part I to address topics that are considered "core" to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends for the region, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses in large part on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, we highlight the position of Jamaica in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

The first chapter demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in Part I is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond the personal finances of citizens of the Americas and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 3 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels

increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens in the Americas interact with their government is local. In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures

of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Chapter 6 examines the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Five years after the earthquake, 79,000 people continue to live in one of the temporary camps set up in the days/weeks following January 12, 2010. With a GDP per capita under 1,500\$US, a growth rate well under the regional mean, and an unemployment rate above 40%, it is clear that the earthquake could not have hit at a worst place. Human development is important for democracy to flourish. There is a strong correlation between high levels of economic development and democratic rule.

The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which material conditions, infrastructures, and government services have improved since the earthquake hit the island. Since 2010, material conditions of Haitians have undoubtedly improved, but have not fully recovered to the levels observed in 2006. In 2014, 39.4% of Haitians were in the lower quintile of wealth, compared to 45% in 2010 and 24.7% in 2006. Additionally, only 2% of respondents have access to the sewage system in their house. Further analysis of this reality suggests that access to basic sanitary infrastructure is highly dependent on the socioeconomic status of the respondents.

Satisfaction with government services, such as road infrastructure, public healthcare, and public schools, has remained fairly stable in comparison with 2012. In 2014, 34.0% of Haitians were satisfied with roads, 36.4% with public schools, and 45.1% with public health services. Satisfaction with local governments has improved, even exceeding levels observed before the earthquake. Between 2006 and 2014 the level of satisfaction shifted from about 37 to about 47 on a 0-100 scale.

Despite high levels of preoccupation with crimes and insecurity, most respondents find that insecurity is lower in their own neighborhood than elsewhere and is lower relative to one year ago. A key finding of the chapter is that victimization by corruption remains high in Haiti and perceptions of corruption continue to be surprisingly low. In 2014, Haiti ranks next to last in perceptions of corruption, just before Canada, but ranks first in victimization, surpassing Bolivia by almost 40%.

Even though some improvement has been observed with regards to different dimensions of human development in Haiti, much remains to be done. For democracy to flourish in Haiti, many more efforts at increasing the material well-being of its citizens must be deployed. These have to include access to basic sanitary infrastructure, roads, and other public services. Efforts also have to target crime and corruption.

Chapter 7 looks at attitudes in Haiti central to democracy: political tolerance and system support. In contexts in which citizens display high levels of tolerance and high level of system support, we can expect stable democracies. On the contrary, where citizens have low tolerance and low support, democracy can be said to be at risk.

Findings show that political tolerance was at a peak in 2006 then declined rapidly until 2010, when the earthquake hit, and thereafter it improved to catch up with the regional average in 2014. However, Haitians remain quite socially conservative compared to the region as a whole.

The earthquake may have influenced the evolution of interpersonal trust. The year 2010 marked a low point in trust over the past decade. Yet, as the living conditions improved thereafter, the levels of trust have risen to higher levels than before the natural disaster at 47.98 on a 0-100 scale. However, Haitians still rank at the bottom of the region for trusting each other. The regional average is about 61.

Haitians also seem to be suspicious of governmental institutions. They have higher levels of trust in non-political institutions, such as churches or the media. However, they come in fifth in the overall ranking of trust in the National Police across the Americas.

The percentage of Haitians that display both high levels of tolerance and system support declined in 2010 to 3.7%, but increased to levels comparable to those observed before the earthquake in 2012 and

2014. Despite this, Haiti ranks fourth in the region for the countries where democracy can be said to be at risk.

Haiti ranks among the countries in which citizens display the lowest intention to vote during a future election at 61.1%, compared to a high of 96.7% in Uruguay. However, Haitians rank consistently high in the Americas with regards to their attendance in municipal meetings. Haitians generally became more likely than citizens of the other countries of the region to engage in their community, after 2010. Overall, we saw that Haiti lags behind most countries of the hemisphere on these democratic attitudes. However, on several fronts, the outlook for the development of a sustainable democratic political culture seems to be improving. Haitians have to build on their successes.

Chapter 8 explores Haitians' actions in elections, by looking at ideology, party attachment, short-term issues and their influence on incumbent support. In Haiti, electoral processes do complete their course, but questions still remain. How are citizens behaving in elections? To what extent are Haitians driven by the same motivations as citizens of other countries when deciding for whom to vote?

For ideology, Haitians tend to place themselves more to the left of the continuum (4.0 on a 0-10 scale in 2014) than citizens of other countries of the Americas (5.8 in 2014), especially so in the most recent waves of the AmericasBarometer. For party attachment, most Haitians who identify with a party rally with the political formation of the sitting president (59.2% in 2014). The number of Haitians that identify with a political party has oscillated between 2006 and 2010 but has followed an upward trend after 2010.

As for the issues, since 2008, around 70% of Haitians have identified the economy as their number one concern, leaving little space for other issues. Interestingly, Haitians are more satisfied with the economy, contrary to the trend of other countries in the region. In 2014, 15.7% of them feel the economy has gotten better, compared to 4.4% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2008. However, they are more critical of how the governments manage the economy, at 37.49 on a 0-100 scale in 2014. On the governmental efforts to fight crime or corruption, Haitians have become more satisfied in the recent past, at 47.27 on a 0-100 scale, compared to 25.21 in 2002.

Incumbent support among Haitian is mostly defined by party identification, but also by short-term consideration such as perceptions of the economy. Haitians who have a positive appreciation of the economy have a higher probability of supporting the government candidate in elections. Haitians mostly rely on short-term considerations in order to guide their voting decision. Such a behavior is consistent with the absence of a stable party system. However, political parties are important for democracy to take roots. Strengthening the Haitian party system should be a priority in the coming years.



Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable’s estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

Part I:

Crime, Violence, and Perceptions of the

Role of the State in the Americas

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

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with
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I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a “security trap,” where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, “The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy.”

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.¹ First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime’s ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities

¹ Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, “crime and violence carry staggering economic costs” that consume approximately 8% of the region’s GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care” (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.² Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.³
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

² The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

³ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,⁴ Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,⁵ some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.⁶ We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa⁷ (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

⁴ The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

⁵ Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

⁶ Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

⁷ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.




Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012⁸

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.⁹ Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁰




Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

⁸ Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.

⁹ The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.

¹⁰ Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/>. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.

Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).




Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording incidents of

robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.¹¹ The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).¹²

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and

¹¹ There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

¹² An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates*. According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions¹³ not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these

¹³ In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.

varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.¹⁴

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:¹⁵

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.¹⁶ Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,¹⁷ the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

¹⁴ InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Texis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

¹⁵ Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

¹⁶ Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

¹⁷ It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.¹⁸ The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.¹⁹ However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.




Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

¹⁸ Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

¹⁹ As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.



Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.





Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Map 1.1 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana (shaded with the darkest color in Map 1.1) is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure 1.5

demonstrates, it still ranks low in comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.²⁰



Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country²¹

²⁰ It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

²¹ Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are

IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:²²

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]
 (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]

Figure 1.6 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.²³ We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.6 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5 adults living in an urban area

categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.

²² LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because no changes were introduced within those periods.

²³ Figure 1.6 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).²⁴




Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.7 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.7 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate “security” as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).

²⁴ See also Figure 1.15.




Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?			
[fill in number] _____	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.8, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.




Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent's household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.9 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.²⁵ We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

²⁵ This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.




Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality/canton/parish
- (4) In another municipality/canton/parish
- (5) In another country
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Figure 1.10 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).




Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these “VICBAR” questions:

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]

Figure 1.11 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;



and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.²⁶




Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.12 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When comparing the

²⁶ When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country across the board (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.²⁷




Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

Next, Figure 1.13 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents

²⁷ Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).



in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.²⁸




Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

Finally, Figure 1.14 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest

²⁸ When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series – burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.²⁹




Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁹ When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.³⁰ In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.³¹ The results in Figure 1.15 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

³⁰ Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

³¹ Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.16 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.³² The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

³² The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.




Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

**Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014
(Figure 1.16)**

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
66 years or older	-0.094*	(-5.09)
56-65 years	-0.069*	(-3.82)
46-55 years	-0.026	(-1.45)
26-35 years	0.004	-0.23
16-25 years	0.022	-1.18
Skin Tone	-0.033	(-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.076*	-4.35
Years of Schooling	0.199*	-10.73
Woman	-0.071*	(-4.70)
Urban	0.212*	-10.61
Guatemala	-0.03	(-1.32)
El Salvador	-0.040*	(-1.98)
Honduras	-0.027	(-1.18)
Nicaragua	-0.050*	(-2.27)
Costa Rica	-0.135*	(-5.67)
Panama	-0.268*	(-8.69)
Colombia	-0.055*	(-2.74)
Ecuador	0.055*	-2.05
Bolivia	-0.024	(-0.92)
Peru	0.055*	(-3)
Paraguay	-0.125*	(-6.11)
Chile	-0.183*	(-6.84)
Uruguay	-0.014	(-0.70)
Brazil	-0.082*	(-3.93)
Venezuela	-0.016	(-0.87)
Argentina	-0.003	(-0.19)
Dominican Republic	0.004	(-0.17)
Haiti	-0.065*	(-2.89)
Jamaica	-0.253*	(-10.09)
Guyana	-0.225*	(-8.28)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.207*	(-8.87)
Belize	-0.073*	(-3.93)
Constant	-1.604*	(-85.00)
F	37.2	
Number of cases	38102	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		

Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).¹ Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than \$2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on \$10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious \$4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.² Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.³ So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if delegated sufficient political

¹ Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of "Latin America and the Caribbean" in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

²<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp>

³<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life>

authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we documents are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No		(1) Yes	DK 88	DA 98
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88 98
R6. Washing machine	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R15. Computer	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R18. Internet	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98
R1. Television	(0) No [Skip to R26]		(1) Yes [Continue]	88	98
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98 99 INAP

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown slightly since

2006 (when it was 89%).⁴ Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.




Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014⁵

⁴ In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

⁵ This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.

Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common; roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.⁶ We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.⁷ For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

⁶ This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. *AmericasBarometer Insight Report* 2008, no. 6. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf>. The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

⁷ Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer.⁸





Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.⁹

⁸ If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.



Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.¹¹ Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).¹² It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:¹³ the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities, being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from their

¹⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

¹¹ In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

¹² In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

¹³ The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.¹⁴ Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide the sample by quintiles of household wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than

¹⁴ See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173> and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf

6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile, 3 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the median wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.




Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014




Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6). More importantly, the relative stability of respondents' perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.




Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time




Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).




Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014





Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Map 2.1). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have

the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Map 2.1 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.



Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014¹⁵

¹⁵ The estimated economic perceptions score for each country in Map 2.1 is available in Appendix 2.2. For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity* (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF's April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF's projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent's views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.10).¹⁶




Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one

¹⁶ Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year's growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.

might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.11 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood¹⁷ and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.¹⁸ Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.¹⁹

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educated individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing. Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

¹⁷ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

¹⁸ See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

¹⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,²⁰ 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both prevent money

²⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.

from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.


Appendix

Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.175*	(-22.82)
Man in a Couple	0.035*	(5.57)
Woman in a Couple	-0.014*	(-2.25)
Woman Living Alone	-0.042*	(-7.43)
Level of Education	0.346*	(59.08)
Skin Tone	-0.134*	(-19.55)
16-25 Years	-0.003	(-0.49)
26-35 Years	-0.018*	(-3.18)
46-55 Years	0.008	(1.55)
56-65 Years	0.020*	(3.79)
66 Years or Older	0.004	(0.74)
Guatemala	-0.060*	(-6.21)
El Salvador	-0.083*	(-9.45)
Honduras	-0.034*	(-3.04)
Nicaragua	-0.142*	(-15.57)
Costa Rica	0.119*	(13.25)
Panama	0.033*	(3.29)
Colombia	-0.012	(-1.18)
Ecuador	-0.039*	(-3.12)
Bolivia	-0.130*	(-8.53)
Peru	-0.077*	(-9.08)
Paraguay	0.022*	(2.83)
Chile	0.076*	(8.88)
Brazil	0.093*	(10.67)
Venezuela	0.052*	(5.38)
Argentina	0.058*	(8.11)
Dominican Republic	-0.010	(-0.86)
Haiti	-0.162*	(-11.86)
Jamaica	0.024*	(2.39)
Guyana	0.017	(1.38)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.143*	(18.17)
Belize	0.010	(1.23)
Constant	-0.102*	(-11.69)
Number of observations	33769	
Population size	29411.22	
Design df	1912	
F(32, 1881)	413.07*	
R ²	0.3952	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Appendix 2.2. Estimated Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014. Empirical Basis for Map 2.1



Appendix 2.3. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(Z Statistic)
GDP Growth Rate (Estimated)	0.178*	(2.19)
Rural	0.018*	(2.82)
Woman	-0.060*	(-10.48)
Wealth Quintile	0.041*	(6.65)
Level of Education	0.037*	(5.16)
Skin Tone	-0.015*	(-2.18)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.035*	(6.13)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	-0.031*	(-5.32)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	-0.023*	(-3.92)
16-25 Years	0.038*	(5.23)
26-35 Years	0.020*	(2.79)
46-55 Years	0.000	(-0.03)
56-65 Years	0.003	(0.43)
66 Years or Older	-0.008	(-1.30)
Constant	-0.094	(-0.50)
var(Country-Level)	0.104	
var(Individual-Level)	0.901	
Number of groups	23	
Wald $\chi^2(14)$	385.25*	
Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses.		
* p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank¹ finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).² Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vichny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silversen and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007; Donchev and

¹ The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.

² Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.
- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.

- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following:	99				

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.³ Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.5% of the overall sample reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 14% were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 2.9% of respondents reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.5% were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals with children in school were asked for a bribe related to education while nearly 8% of respondents who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.

³ As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada




Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.⁴ In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure

⁴ The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

3.2).⁵ This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).⁶




Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

⁵ The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

⁶ While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences than any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.




Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.⁷ Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.⁸ Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

⁷ For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

⁸ Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.




Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.⁹ Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to occur in places where the rule of

⁹ Measured from the question WF1: “Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No”

law is objectively weaker.¹⁰ As we model these differences, we include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.¹¹

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.¹² In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.¹³ This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

¹⁰ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.

¹¹ The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

¹² As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

¹³ We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.




Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.¹⁴ Specifically, respondents are asked:

¹⁴ This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]

(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is “very uncommon” and 100 represents the perception that corruption is “very common.”

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.




Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014




Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to “the government” even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.




Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014




Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.¹⁵

¹⁵ The coefficients are standardized—the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.




Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the

Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.¹⁶

	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	88	98

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.¹⁷

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.¹⁸ All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

¹⁶ This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

¹⁷ Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).

¹⁸ In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect—the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p < 0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.




Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014




Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014




Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this concern, Chapter

4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

**Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014
(Figure 3.5)**

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.097*	(-4.51)
Woman	-0.262*	(-16.57)
Level of Education	0.081*	(3.88)
Wealth Quintile	0.132*	(6.68)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.081*	(4.77)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.326*	(17.12)
Skin Tone	-0.040	(-1.80)
16-25 Years	-0.090*	(-4.47)
26-35 Years	0.006	(0.28)
46-55 Years	-0.037	(-2.02)
56-65 Years	-0.089*	(-4.54)
66 Years or Older	-0.189*	(-8.57)
Guatemala	-0.056*	(-2.46)
El Salvador	-0.254*	(-9.39)
Honduras	-0.041	(-1.59)
Nicaragua	-0.177*	(-7.73)
Costa Rica	-0.166*	(-5.94)
Panama	-0.102*	(-3.11)
Colombia	-0.223*	(-8.68)
Ecuador	-0.065*	(-2.04)
Bolivia	0.029	0.89)
Peru	-0.032	(-1.49)
Paraguay	0.005	(0.29)
Chile	-0.364*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	-0.307*	(-12.16)
Brazil	-0.203*	(-7.15)
Venezuela	-0.049*	(-2.03)
Argentina	-0.120*	(-5.27)
Dominican Republic	-0.082*	(-3.22)
Haiti	0.393*	(15.17)
Jamaica	-0.237*	(-10.32)
Guyana	-0.124*	(-4.80)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.225*	(-9.03)
Belize	-0.059*	(-3.46)
Constant	-1.448*	(-63.98)
Number of observations	29123	
Population size	25866.08	
Design df	1969	
F(34, 1936)	55.79*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.

Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014
(Figure 3.10)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	0.076*	(5.00)
Rural	-0.083*	(-4.72)
Woman	-0.044*	(-3.51)
Level of Education	0.128*	(7.68)
Wealth Quintile	0.083*	(5.60)
Received Assistance From the Government	-0.034*	(-2.40)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.123*	(8.58)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.27)
16-25 Years	-0.103*	(-6.55)
26-35 Years	-0.003	(-0.17)
46-55 Years	0.007	(0.45)
56-65 Years	0.024	(1.51)
66 Years or Older	0.054*	(3.69)
Guatemala	-0.043*	(-1.99)
El Salvador	-0.070*	(-3.45)
Honduras	-0.082*	(-3.69)
Nicaragua	-0.094*	(-4.52)
Panama	-0.095*	(-4.67)
Colombia	0.082*	(3.35)
Ecuador	-0.175*	(-6.03)
Bolivia	-0.136*	(-4.38)
Peru	0.035	(1.79)
Paraguay	0.062*	(3.07)
Uruguay	-0.151*	(-7.92)
Venezuela	0.040	(1.93)
Argentina	0.028	(1.58)
Dominican Republic	0.052*	(2.10)
Haiti	-0.156*	(-6.50)
Jamaica	0.047*	(2.27)
Guyana	0.055*	(2.32)
Belize	0.005	(0.27)
Cut1	-3.212	(-74.48)
Cut2	-1.429	(-50.13)
Cut3	0.404	(15.59)
Number of Interviews	22124	
Population size	20675.9	
Design df	1354	
F(31, 1324)	32.32*	
Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses.		
* p<0.05		

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.

Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as “neither good, nor bad.”
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens’ evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the “third wave” of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization’s influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet’s study of Bolivia’s 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata’s findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti’s cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in

government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falleti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of system support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.¹ The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.²




Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the 2014 AmericasBarometer – there

¹ Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.

² Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

is no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.




Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level since

2006. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.




Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated with political federalism.³ Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.

³ We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.




Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).

Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with age until

people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.




Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014⁴

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruption are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.

⁴ For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.




Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?

(1) Once a week	(2) Once or twice a month
(3) Once or twice a year	(4) Never
(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning “never” and 100 meaning “once a week.”

Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.




Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA


Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Map 4.1⁵ we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti’s rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.

⁵ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix.



Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.8, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region.




Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.9 we further explore citizens' evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding "Good" or "Very Good" views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.




Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.⁶ Figure 4.10 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

⁶ We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.11 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries uncovers some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one of the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela's decline. Compared to 2012, Venezuelans rated



schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political and social instability in the country.




Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.12 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has declined dramatically

in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services ($r = .44$) than the quality of roads ($r = .33$) and health services is also more weakly correlated ($r = .29$) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.




Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.13). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas in 2014 rated them slightly higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level ($r = .26$).




Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.⁷ Figure 4.14 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts. Chileans appear to be

⁷ A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.

quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is $r=.30$. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.




Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations

Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.15 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest. Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this is a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government's services are failing them.

We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.




Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.16, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. The public now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.





Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time



Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Map 4.2 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale.⁸ Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Map 4.2 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally high levels

⁸ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix

of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated ($r = .39$).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.




Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.⁹ People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin tone) these findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have similar levels

⁹ Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.

of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.17 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	0.196*	-11.05
Perception of Insecurity	0.027	-1.5
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.117*	-6.16
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.551*	-39.67
Perception of the National Economy	0.033	-1.75
66 years or older	0.02	-1.08
56-65 years	0.059*	-3.14
46-55 years	0.050*	-2.52
26-35 years	-0.043	-1.96
16-25 years	-0.179*	-7.42
Skin Tone	0.033	-1.52
Wealth Quintiles	-0.064*	-3.2
Years of Schooling	0.078*	-3.53
Women	0.068*	-3.99
Urban/Rural	0.127*	-5.89
Guatemala	-0.105*	-4.56
El Salvador	-0.073*	-3.32
Honduras	-0.073*	-3.24
Nicaragua	0.067*	-3.12
Costa Rica	-0.112*	-4.26
Panama	-0.123*	-4.56
Colombia	-0.059*	-2.71
Ecuador	-0.073*	-3.08
Bolivia	-0.174*	-4.79
Peru	0.002	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.053*	-2.46
Chile	0.03	-1.17
Uruguay	0.100*	-4.48
Brazil	-0.031	-1.35
Venezuela	-0.105*	-5.14
Argentina	-0.003	-0.15
Dominican Republic	-0.027	-1.21
Haiti	-0.215*	-9.69
Jamaica	-0.091*	-3.77
Guyana	-0.186*	-7.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.073	-1.91
Belize	-0.063*	-2.4
Constant	-1.966*	-87.78
F	60.11	
Number of cases	35412	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		


Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.034*	-5.36
Perception of Insecurity	-0.113*	-16.73
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.056*	-8.68
Requested Help from Municipal Office	-0.041*	-6.24
Perception of the National Economy	0.141*	-20.49
66 years or older	0	-0.02
56-65 years	-0.004	-0.64
46-55 years	0.001	-0.13
26-35 years	0.016*	-2.21
16-25 years	0.055*	-8.1
Skin Tone	-0.018*	-2.31
Wealth Quintiles	0.039*	-5.5
Years of Schooling	-0.016*	-2.09
Women	0.039*	-7.37
Urban/Rural	-0.034*	-3.8
Guatemala	0.01	-1.2
El Salvador	0.026*	-2.34
Honduras	0.025*	-2.73
Nicaragua	0.044*	-5.28
Costa Rica	0.009	-0.82
Panama	0.047*	-4.9
Colombia	0.009	-1.03
Ecuador	-0.005	-0.44
Bolivia	-0.008	-0.57
Peru	-0.026*	-3.05
Paraguay	0.009	-0.85
Chile	0.019	-1.91
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.17
Brazil	-0.073*	-6.78
Venezuela	-0.013	-1.36
Argentina	0.039*	-3.62
Dominican Republic	-0.049*	-3.75
Haiti	-0.026	-1.92
Jamaica	-0.093*	-8.95
Guyana	-0.046*	-4.45
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.016	-0.96
Belize	-0.005	-0.48
Constant	-0.002; -0.26	
F	47.69	
Number of cases	35412	
R-Squared	0.08	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		


Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.049*	-8.45
Perception of Insecurity	-0.086*	-14.6
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.361*	-57.08
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.043*	-7.96
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.014*	-2.5
Perception of the National Economy	0.068*	-11.08
66 years or older	0.021*	-3.36
56-65 years	0.009	-1.41
46-55 years	0.000	-0.05
26-35 years	-0.014*	-2.16
16-25 years	0.004	-0.57
Skin Tone	0.004	-0.57
Wealth Quintiles	-0.009	-1.53
Years of Schooling	-0.040*	-5.93
Women	0.010*	-2
Urban/Rural	0.027*	-3.76
Guatemala	-0.060*	-6.87
El Salvador	-0.002	-0.18
Honduras	-0.009	-1.01
Nicaragua	-0.020*	-2.12
Costa Rica	-0.020*	-2.33
Panama	-0.088*	-8.98
Colombia	-0.068*	-7.24
Ecuador	-0.040*	-4.47
Bolivia	-0.062*	-5.29
Peru	-0.089*	-10.56
Paraguay	-0.003	-0.31
Chile	0.006	-0.57
Uruguay	-0.026*	-2.9
Brazil	-0.080*	-8.03
Venezuela	0.017	-1.62
Argentina	-0.048*	-4.54
Dominican Republic	-0.052*	-5.78
Haiti	-0.071*	-7.57
Jamaica	-0.092*	-11.32
Guyana	-0.040*	-4.13
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.133*	-9.93
Belize	-0.070*	-7.48
Constant	0.004; -0.51	
F	177.14	
Number of cases	35011	
R-Squared	0.2	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		

Appendix 4.4. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014



Appendix 4.5. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas



Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004-2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in hard

times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.

Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for “democracy” as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V’s goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill¹ and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The “Churchillian” question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average² is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has included

¹ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

² As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.

since 2006³ and by sub-region.⁴ Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.




Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” citizens responded to the following questions:

- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B12.** To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
- B18.** To what extent do you trust the National Police?
- B20.** To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
- B20A.** To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
- B21.** To what extent do you trust the political parties?
- B21A.** To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?
- B47A.** To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

³ Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.

⁴ Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.

As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.⁵ The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.⁶ A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

⁵ This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

⁶ Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).




Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country's average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust

in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the “pacification” of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).




Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.⁷ Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this concept.

⁷ Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

Responses were recoded 1 (“yes” the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 (“no” it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.⁸

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.⁹ These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

⁸ These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach’s α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.

⁹ Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.




Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trusting of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.




Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.¹⁰ Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or “consolidation.” The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance,

¹⁰ Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces ($r = .34$), the national police ($r = .67$), and the justice system ($r = .50$). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, $r = .44$, $r = .69$, and $r = .45$.

the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an increase

of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.¹¹ Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.





Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Map 5.1 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system.

¹¹ However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously surveyed by the AmericasBarometer 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.



Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables, presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.¹² As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a

¹² Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the Americas' newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.10, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.¹³




Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

¹³ When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

<p>D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: [Probe: To what degree?]</p>
<p>D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.</p>
<p>D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p>
<p>D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</p>

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.¹⁴

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.¹⁵ Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

¹⁴ The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

¹⁵ These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).

How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.11 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.





Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Map 5.2, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).



Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.¹⁶ The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.12. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.¹⁷ And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to “their” executive.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education

¹⁶ Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

¹⁷ When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy's champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.




Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.13. Alarmingly, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.13, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.14.





Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Map 5.3 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.



Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the

economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix


Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.047*	(-6.24)
Sex	0.014*	(-2.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031*	(-4.42)
Years of Schooling	-0.005	(-0.69)
Skin Tone	0.002	(-0.34)
16-25 years	-0.009	(-1.26)
26-35 years	-0.011	(-1.62)
46-55 years	0.021*	(-3.24)
56-65 years	0.022*	(-3.46)
66 years or older	0.042*	(-6.84)
Presidential Job Approval	0.199*	(-28.64)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.120*	(-19.79)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.007	(-1.28)
Corruption Victimization	-0.082*	(-13.34)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.043*	(-6.57)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.107*	(-15.58)
Guatemala	-0.038*	(-3.96)
El Salvador	0.017	(-1.80)
Honduras	-0.003	(-0.27)
Nicaragua	0.058*	(-5.96)
Costa Rica	0.047*	(-4.80)
Panama	0.046*	(-4.73)
Colombia	0.042*	(-4.36)
Ecuador	0.064*	(-6.70)
Bolivia	-0.082*	(-6.54)
Peru	-0.014	(-1.40)
Paraguay	-0.019*	(-2.07)
Chile	0.095*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	0.051*	(-5.17)
Brazil	0.041*	(-4.24)
Venezuela	0.019	(-1.90)
Argentina	0.033*	(-3.37)
Dominican Republic	-0.067*	(-6.58)
Haiti	0.082*	(-8.09)
Jamaica	-0.017	(-1.92)
Guyana	-0.047*	(-4.87)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.003	(-0.20)
Belize	-0.041*	(-3.95)
Constant	-0.007; (-1.04)	
F	135.06	
Number of cases	32152	
R-Squared	0.17	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		

Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.059*	(-8.49)
Sex	0.013*	(-2.31)
Years of Schooling	-0.022*	(-3.07)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.030*	(-4.73)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.70)
16-25 years	0.026*	(-3.74)
26-35 years	-0.001	(-0.09)
46-55 years	0.01	(-1.46)
56-65 years	-0.001	(-0.17)
66 years or older	0.011	(-1.72)
Presidential Job Approval	0.235*	(-31.81)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.111*	(-18.21)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.017*	(-2.86)
Corruption Victimization	-0.050*	(-7.85)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.046*	(-6.86)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.075*	(-11.27)
Guatemala	-0.022*	(-2.44)
El Salvador	-0.029*	(-3.48)
Honduras	-0.026*	(-3.02)
Nicaragua	0.018*	(-2.04)
Costa Rica	0.074*	(-9.18)
Panama	-0.004	(-0.43)
Colombia	-0.013	(-1.55)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.105*	(-8.89)
Peru	-0.068*	(-8.48)
Paraguay	-0.078*	(-8.91)
Chile	-0.071*	(-8.02)
Uruguay	0.008	(-0.85)
Brazil	-0.041*	(-4.71)
Venezuela	-0.004	(-0.43)
Argentina	0.006	(-0.76)
Dominican Republic	-0.079*	(-8.79)
Haiti	-0.041*	(-4.30)
Jamaica	-0.018*	(-2.20)
Guyana	-0.040*	(-5.09)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.006	(-0.48)
Belize	-0.038*	(-4.31)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	103.2	
Number of cases	31909	
R-Squared	0.13	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


Appendix 5.3. Estimated System Support by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.1



Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.10, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.054*	(7.26)
Sex	0.017*	(3.29)
Years of Schooling	-0.015*	(-2.14)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.014*	(-2.18)
Skin Tone	-0.002	(-0.31)
16-25 years	0.042*	(6.25)
26-35 years	0.003	(0.49)
46-55 years	0.012	(1.87)
56-65 years	0.020*	(3.11)
66 years or older	0.038*	(5.95)
Presidential Job Approval	0.315*	(43.58)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.110*	(17.62)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.013*	(2.43)
Corruption Victimization	-0.064*	(-10.56)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.076*	(11.90)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.066*	(-9.72)
Guatemala	-0.064*	(-6.93)
El Salvador	-0.055*	(-6.69)
Honduras	-0.063*	(-6.81)
Nicaragua	0.005	(0.55)
Costa Rica	0.099*	(11.16)
Panama	-0.052*	(-5.61)
Colombia	-0.048*	(-5.36)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.107*	(-8.93)
Peru	-0.082*	(-8.59)
Paraguay	-0.122*	(-13.23)
Chile	-0.070*	(-7.04)
Uruguay	-0.006	(-0.60)
Brazil	-0.149*	(-13.80)
Venezuela	-0.039*	(-3.61)
Argentina	0.021*	(2.41)
Dominican Republic	-0.098*	(-10.67)
Haiti	-0.134*	(-12.55)
Jamaica	-0.091*	(-11.60)
Guyana	-0.069*	(-7.71)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.019	(-1.29)
Belize	-0.054*	(-6.00)
Constant	0.011; (1.45)	
F	155.91	
Number of cases	31976	
R-Squared	0.23	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		


**Appendix 5.5. Estimated Political Tolerance by Country, 2014;
Empirical Basis for Map 5.2**



Appendix 5.6. Coefficients for Figure 5.12, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	-0.006	(-0.61)
Sex	-0.047*	(-8.75)
Years of Schooling	0.114*	(-15.05)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037*	(-5.21)
Skin Tone	0.022*	(-2.63)
16-25 years	0.009	(-1.28)
26-35 years	-0.012	(-1.63)
46-55 years	-0.013*	(-1.98)
56-65 years	-0.014*	(-2.06)
66 years or older	-0.016*	(-2.39)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.086*	(-10.97)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	-0.022*	(-3.31)
Attended Municipal Meeting	-0.007	(-1.08)
Corruption Victimization	-0.008	(-1.27)
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.005	(-0.80)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	0.046*	(-6.10)
Guatemala	-0.113*	(-11.22)
El Salvador	-0.019	(-1.91)
Honduras	-0.009	(-0.84)
Nicaragua	0.026*	(-2.25)
Costa Rica	0.002	(-0.14)
Panama	-0.095*	(-9.21)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.14)
Ecuador	-0.037*	(-2.99)
Bolivia	-0.053*	(-3.60)
Peru	-0.042*	(-3.69)
Paraguay	0.021	(-1.80)
Chile	0.050*	(-3.93)
Uruguay	0.090*	(-7.10)
Brazil	0.035*	(-2.99)
Venezuela	0.068*	(-5.10)
Argentina	0.040*	(-3.29)
Dominican Republic	0.041*	(-4.07)
Haiti	0.041*	(-4.03)
Jamaica	0.050*	(-3.80)
Guyana	0.040*	(-3.42)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.131*	(-6.71)
Belize	0.032*	(-2.65)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	55.94	
Number of cases	31853	
R-Squared	0.12	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.		
* p<0.05		

**Appendix 5.7. Estimated Stable Democracy Attitudes by Country, 2014;
Empirical Basis for Map 5.3**



Part II:
Governance, Political Participation and
Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter 6. Haitians and Human Development

François Gélineau

I. Introduction

The earthquake that hit the island on January 12, 2010 left the country in an unprecedented state of destruction. Millions of Haitians found themselves without a home and without access to basic public services such as water and electricity. Houses were brought to the ground, depriving Haitians of a roof and sanitary facilities. The 2010 earthquake was preceded by a few years during which tropical storms had already caused important physical damages to the land. Five years after earthquake, one wonders to what extent Haitians have access to basic services such as water supply or electricity has been reestablished.

Sadly, Haiti is often cited has the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. With a GDP per capita under 1,500\$US, a growth rate well under the regional mean, and an unemployment rate above 40%, it is clear that the earthquake could not have hit at a worst place. The country was already in need of major assistance in order to improve its precarious economic situation.

In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, donor countries rallied around Haiti to offer support in rebuilding the country. Up to 9 billion US\$ were gathered by public and private donations in the weeks that followed the event. An additional 13 billion US\$ were promised in bilateral and multilateral aid.¹ Five years after the earthquake, much has been done. Yet, over 79,000 people still live in one of the temporary camps set up in the days/weeks following January 12, 2010.² Needless to say, the rebuilding efforts did not have the immediate effect some were expecting.

Human development is important for democracy to flourish. Many scholars concerned with the conditions needed for democracy to emerge have highlighted the importance of economic development (Rostow 1970; Moore 1966; Lipset 1959). Although many dimensions of what has become known as the Modernization Theory have been challenged over time, its basic foundations still find evidence in the world. There is a strong correlation between high levels of economic development and democratic rule.

According to Lipset (1970), modernization is the result of a social restructuration that allows for democratic culture to flourish. According to the author, since Aristotle, it is clear that those rich societies in which there is little poverty will provide the bases for citizen participation and will limit demagogical abuses. Citizens of more developed countries are more receptive of democratic values and less tolerant of hostile ideologies. In Lipset's model, it is economic development that allows for the emergence of a middle class that conveys these values. According to him, economic development is the result of industrialization, urbanization, accumulation of wealth, and schooling. Hence, economic development and human development are not only required to insure the basic dignity of citizens, they are central to democracy. This theme is central to the endeavor of the AmericasBarometer.

¹<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/haiti-earthquake-where-did-money-go> (consulted on March 18, 2015)

²<http://ici.radio-canada.ca/sujet/haiti-cinq-ans-plus-tard/2015/01/08/001-haiti-cinq-ans-apres-le-seisme-reconstruction-aide-internationale.shtml> (consulted on March 18, 2015)

The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which material conditions, infrastructures, and government services have improved since the earthquake hit the island in 2010. Beyond basic economic conditions, we are interested in exploring the broader characteristics of human development. We chose to focus on the extent to which the Haitian State delivers the conditions in which Haitians can succeed in their economic and human development.

The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- Since 2010, material conditions of Haitians have undoubtedly improved, but have not fully recovered to the levels observed in 2006. In 2014, 39.4% of Haitians for the lower quintile of wealth, compared to 45% in 2010 and 24.7% in 2006.
- Satisfaction with government services, such as road infrastructure, public healthcare, and public schools, has remained fairly stable in comparison with 2012. In 2014, 34.0% of Haitians are satisfied with roads, 36.4% with public schools, and 45.1 with public health services.
- Satisfaction with local governments has improved, even exceeding levels observed before the earthquake. Between 2006 and 2014 the level of satisfaction shifted from about 37 to about 47 on a 0-100 scale.
- Despite high levels of preoccupation with crimes and insecurity, most respondents (58.8%) find that insecurity is lower in their own neighborhood than elsewhere.
- Victimization by corruption remains high in Haiti and perceptions of corruption continue to be surprisingly low. In 2014, Haiti ranks next to last in perceptions of corruption, just before Canada, but ranks first in victimization, surpassing Bolivia by almost 40%.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section II evaluates the overall economic wellbeing of Haitians. Section III looks at basic housing infrastructure. Given the limited number of questions covering that dimension in the AmericasBarometer over time, we focus our analysis on indoor plumbing and indoor bathrooms. Section IV focuses on public services delivered by the state. Here, we are interested in how Haitians perceive the state of road infrastructures, the quality of public healthcare, and the quality of the public school system. Section V provides an overview of how Haitians perceive and experience crime and insecurity. Section VI explores corruption.

II. Economic Well-being

Economic security is the first dimension of human development that we explore in this chapter. As we saw in Chapter 2, the AmericasBarometer suggests that many citizens of the Americas are struggling on the economic front. Despite the fact that the average level of household wealth is found to be increasing over time, respondents are overwhelmingly pessimistic with regard to their personal finances and with the national economic trend. Haitians have been through catastrophic times in the recent past. Hence, there are many reasons to believe that their economic mood will be similar to (if not worse than) that of other citizens of the Americas.

The AmericasBarometer included a battery of question to measure household wealth. These questions asked respondents to report ownership of different consumer items (see Chapter 2 for exact question wording). A first look at Figure 6.1 suggests that Haitians are more deprived of material goods than other citizens of the Americas. Just like everyone in the region, a vast majority of Haitians report owning a phone (80.5%) – compared to 91.9% for the entire region. Yet, only about half of them own a television (compared to 91.8% in the region), about 1 in 4 owns a refrigerator (compared to 81.7% in the region), 1 in 5 owns a TV (compared to 91.8% in the region), and less than 10% of Haitians own a computer (compared to 42.2%), a car (compared to 30.2%), a microwave (compared to 42.9%), or a washing machine (compared to 58.0%). The picture is clear. In light of this comparison, Haitians are clearly facing economic struggle.




Figure 6.1. Ownership of Household Goods in Haiti, 2014

As illustrated by Figure 6.2, the earthquake has contributed to worsening the economic wellbeing of Haitians. The figure plots the composite index of wealth that uses different elements from the list of household goods. The index value is reported by quintile. The percentage of Haitian in the inferior quintile more than doubled from 2008 to 2010. In 2012 and 2014, the number of Haitians in the lower quintile was reduced, but not quite to levels observed before the earthquake.

This trend is quite different from what the rest of the region has experienced. In Figure 2.2, we report that, since 2006, household access to basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer. This is obviously not the case for Haiti. Interestingly, in both 2006 and 2008, Haiti ranked slightly above the regional mean on the index. After the earthquake Haiti is now well below the mean.




Figure 6.2. Average Wealth Over Time in Haiti, 2006-2014

Another way of assessing the extent to which Haitians are economically well-off is by asking them if their level of income is sufficient to meet their needs. In Chapter 2, we saw that just about half of the respondents in the region report having enough income to meet their needs, or even save from it (see Figure 2.4). Using a 0-100 scale, citizens of the Americas have consistently ranked just below the half-point of the scale since 2006. As Figure 6.3 shows, the same cannot be said of Haitians. The perception of their household finances has ranked below the regional average consistently. It started the 2006-2014 period at just below 40 points, and dropped almost constantly ever since; with a small upward bump in 2010. That upward bump can probably be explained by the state of catastrophe in which the earthquake left the country. Respondents may simply relativize their own financial situation with that of so many who lost so much during the natural disaster. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to confirm that hypothesis.

In order to examine if Haitians resort to government assistance in the face of difficult economic circumstances, the AmericasBarometer included a question about governmental assistance. Findings are also shown in Figure 6.3.

WF1. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

In 2014, only 9.0% of Haitians report receiving governmental assistance, only a few percentage points below the regional mean. This might come as a surprise to many. However, as most post-earthquake relief efforts were handled by non-governmental organization (foreign or local), the figure could actually reflect the reality of the source of Haitians economic assistance.




Figure 6.3. Perception of Household Economic Situation and Government Assistance in Haiti, 2014

III. Indoor Plumbing and Bathrooms

While the 2014 AmericasBarometer did not include specific questions about reconstruction, many of the items found in the core questionnaire can shed light on these questions. For example, the following questions allow us to assess levels of access to plumbing and indoor sanitary facility:

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98

Figure 6.4 illustrates the presence of indoor plumbing and indoor bathrooms for the 2006-2014 period. The trend is clear. The 2006-2010 period displays a devastating trend on access to these basic services. While in 2006 about 30% of the respondents claimed to have both indoor plumbing and bathrooms, this percentage dropped continuously in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, about 20% of the respondents claimed to have access to indoor plumbing and 15% had indoor bathrooms. Access to both dropped to levels below 10% after the 2010 earthquake.

Since 2010, access to these services has undoubtedly improved. Access to indoor plumbing increased from a little over 5% in 2010 to about 10% in 2012, and almost 25% in 2014. The proportion of respondents claiming to have indoor bathrooms in their house went from under 10% in 2010 to about 12% in 2012, and around 20% in 2014.




Figure 6.4. Percent with Indoor Plumbing and Bathrooms, Haiti 2006-2014

Despite this rather encouraging trend, the situation remains critical. In the 2014 questionnaire, respondents were also asked whether their home was connected to the sewage system:

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98
--	--------	---------	----	----

Figure 6.5 shows that the situation is overwhelmingly precarious with respect to sanitary facilities. In Haiti, access to the sewage system is clearly a luxury as only 2% of the respondents can enjoy it. The vast majority of homes in Haiti are not connected to the sewage system.




Figure 6.5. Percent Connected to Sewage System, Haiti 2014

Further analysis of this reality suggests that access to basic sanitary infrastructure is highly dependent on the socioeconomic status of the respondents. Figure 6.6 offers strong evidence of the gap that exists across socioeconomic class. While almost 60% of the wealthier quintile of the respondents claims to have a bathroom in their home, only about 6% of the remaining respondents (which represent 80% of the population) can say the same. Not surprisingly, the more educated are also more likely to have indoor bathrooms. Another interesting fact is that households with indoor bathrooms are mostly located in larger cities, especially in the national capital. Of course, this might have to do with the fact that sewage systems are more present in larger urban agglomerations.




Figure 6.6. Socioeconomic Characteristics Associated with Access to Indoor Bathrooms, Haiti 2014

IV. Popular Perceptions of Public Goods Delivery

Beyond access to basic sanitary infrastructure, many reconstruction efforts have been aimed at improving the road network, hospitals, and public schools. The 2014 AmericasBarometer included three items aimed at measuring the level of satisfaction with the condition of the road system, public schools, and health services. These questions were also asked in 2012.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied , or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? Are you... [Read alternatives]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you... [Read alternatives]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

Figure 6.7 suggests that satisfaction with health services remained fairly stable between 2012 and 2014. It also indicates that respondents are less satisfied with public schools, but equally so in 2012 and 2014. However, the level of satisfaction with the road systems seemed to have declined between the 2012 and 2014.




Figure 6.7. Satisfaction with Roads, Health Services, and Public Schools

Beyond specific public services delivery, the AmericasBarometer also asked respondents to evaluate the services offered by their local government using the following question:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [\[Read options\]](#)

(1) Very good	(2) Good	(3) Neither good nor bad (fair)	(4) Bad	(5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't answer			

In Figure 6.8, we plotted the average level of satisfaction with services of local government for the entire 2006-2014 period. The trend suggests the presence of a sizeable improvement between 2012 and 2014, with the level of satisfaction shifting from about 37 to about 47 on a 0-100 scale. That being said, the results also point to high levels of dissatisfaction, as most respondents do not have a positive appreciation of the services provided by their municipality.




Figure 6.8. Satisfaction with Services of Local Government

V. Crime and Insecurity

Not living in fear of being burglarized or attacked is another public good that is determinant in human development. The AmericasBarometer included a wide battery of questions exploring crime and insecurity, including:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe ? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA
PESE1. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher , about the same , or lower than in other neighborhoods? (1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA
PESE2. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher , about the same , or lower than 12 months ago? (1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA

We saw in Chapter 1 that insecurity is not the most salient issue in Haiti. Figure 1.5 reported that only 4.5% of Haitians identify security as the most important problem, the lowest value in all of the Americas. Of course, this does not mean that security is not an issue at all. Even if security does not rank first in Haiti's most important problems, its severity can still be higher than in other countries of the region.

When using other measures to assess the extent to which insecurity affects the life of Haitians, one can conclude that security has some clear implication for most citizens of the country. Although the presence of burglaries (Figure 1.11) and drugs trafficking (Figure 1.12) in the neighborhood are not often reported by respondents, at least compared with other countries of the region, murders (Figure 1.14) and extortion (Figure 1.13) are much more frequent sources of concern. All in all, the overall perception of insecurity in Haiti ranks about at the median in the Americas (Appendix 6.1).

Figure 6.9 explores the perceptions of neighborhood security further. In the left quadrant, we observe a long-term improvement, yet limited, in the situation. Between 2006 and 2014, the average position on the 0-100 scale declined from about 50 to about 40. The year 2010 marked a low-point, probably because the consequences of the January earthquake brought other concerns to the forefront.

Figure 6.9 also indicates that feelings of insecurity are more often observed in Port-au-Prince (right quadrant). Although the average feeling of insecurity by region is within the margins of error, the fact that the confidence interval is much smaller in the capital city strongly suggest that insecurity is more consistently a source of concern there than anywhere else.

The good news is that, according to Figure 6.10, most respondents find that insecurity is lower (58.8%) in their neighborhood than elsewhere (left quadrant). They also tend to think that insecurity is lower (57.3%), relative to one year ago (right quadrant).




Figure 6.9. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity in Haiti




Figure 6.10. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity Relative to Other Neighborhoods and to the Previous Year, Haiti 2014

Gangs are often presumed to bear the responsibility for insecurity, at least in part. In Haiti, gangs are part of the story. As displayed in Figure 6.11, in 2014, about 1 out of 4 Haitians believe that his/her neighborhood is affected by gangs (upper left quadrant). In 2012, it was almost 1 out of 3. As for the differences by region in perceptions of gang presence in the neighborhood, residents of Port-au-Prince report the largest concern with 37.58% of the respondents claiming that gangs disturb peace in their neighborhood (upper right quadrant). Yet, an overall majority of respondent still feels safe enough to walk in their neighborhood, even in Port-au-Prince, where 37.1% of respondents claim to avoid walking in the streets of their neighborhood.




Figure 6.11. Perceptions of Gangs in the Neighborhood in Haiti, 2010-2014

Beyond the perception of insecurity, the AmericasBarometer allows us to measure the extent to which respondents have been victimized by crime. As we saw in Figure 1.7, 15.7% of Haitians claim to have been a crime victim. This puts the country a little below the regional average for 2014 (17.3%).

Figure 6.8 further explores crime victimization in Haiti. Since 2006, crime victimization has hovered between 14 and 17%, with a high point at over 19% in 2010 and 2012. If we break down the variable by regions, and take the margins of error into consideration, we observe that crime victimization rates are fairly homogenous across the country. However, the areas of Port-au-Prince and the North do display higher rates of crime victimization than the south.




Figure 6.12. Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2010-2014

As was the case in 2012, those respondents that report having been victims of crime indicate that the crime occurred overwhelmingly in their municipality in 2014 (Figure 6.13). In 2012, 61.9% of the reported crimes occurred within the municipality (in home: 11.2%, in neighborhood: 23.9%, and in municipality: 26.8%), compared to 64% in 2014 (in home: 19.5%, in neighborhood: 22.0%, and in municipality: 22.5%). The major difference is the 8.3 percentage point increase in crime occurring in the home between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 6.13. Location of Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2012-2014

To further assess the factors associated with crime victimization in Haiti, Figure 6.10 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis. The figure shows the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. Figure 6.10 suggests that the only two factors that clearly affect crime victimization are household wealth (measured in quintiles) and age. The figure indicates that people with more wealth are more prone to be victimized by crime. Haitians in the wealthier 60% (quintiles 2, 3, and 5) have a higher likelihood of reporting having been a victim of crime in comparison to those belonging to the poorest quintile. As for age, the figure suggests that older citizens (56 and older) are less likely to be victims of crime than those between 36 and 45 years of age. Of course, it is possible that these people are simply more often at home.




Figure 6.14. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2014

VI. Corruption

Citizens of democratic regimes normally expect state to deliver public goods universally. That is, some public services are generally provided to every citizen without discrimination. Examples of these public goods often include public education, healthcare, access to courts of justice, police services, etc. When citizens are asked to pay a bribe to access these public services, they are being asked to pay for a service that should be provided free of charge. This is especially problematic since the financial incentive being asked normally goes to an individual, not to the system to improve the public good. What we just described is a clear form of corruption.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a battery of questions documenting perceptions of corruption and victimization by corruption. As we saw in Chapter 3, corruption is present throughout the region, but is relatively limited, affecting about 1 out of 5 citizens. Haiti offers a clear contrast to the broad regional picture. As a matter of fact, over 2 out of 3 Haitians report having been asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months prior to the survey.

As illustrated by Figure 6.15, corruption is not entirely a new phenomenon in the country. Close to half of the interviewees have reported having been asked to pay a bribe ever since the AmericasBarometer has been carried out in Haiti. While this rate hovered around 50% between 2006 and 2010, it showed a steep increase in 2012. The 2014 level remains unchanged from 2012, with over two thirds of Haitians being victimized by corruption. What is more, 74.6% of those victimized by corruption in 2014 have had to pay a bribe once (45.1%) or twice (29.5%). Corruption is thus a reality that affects the daily life of a majority of Haitians.




Figure 6.15. Victimization by Corruption in Haiti

When we dig further into the public services for which Haitians are being asked to pay a bribe in Figure 6.16, we find that healthcare and public schools are the most frequent sources of corruption, both in 2012 and 2014. Interestingly, at 7.3%, Haitians are rarely asked to pay a bribe by a police officer. As reported in Chapter 3, this is slightly lower than the regional average (including Haiti). In the Americas, about 10% of the respondents who reported having been asked to pay a bribe had to pay a police officer (see Figure 3.1). While police corruption happens less frequently in Haiti, it comes first in the region in terms of overall rates of corruption victimization.





Figure 6.16. Types of Victimized by Corruption in Haiti, 2014

Among Haitians, which citizens are more likely to be victims of corruption? This question can be answered with the help of multivariate regression analysis. To do so, we replicated the model presented in Chapter 3 for the entire region (Figure 3.5). To do so, we ran the model on the entire period for which Haitian data is available (2006-2014). The model includes a standard set of sociodemographic variables. Because the variables skin tone and government assistance are not available for the entire period, we omit them from the model.³

The Haitian results differ from the regional analysis in several ways. First, it appears that living in a rural or urban area, being a woman, or having reported the incidence of a crime in their neighborhood makes no difference in Haiti when we try to explain variations in victimization by corruption. In the region as a whole, it was found that females and those living in rural areas were less likely to report having been asked to pay a bribe in the past. We also found that in the Americas as a whole, crime in the neighborhood was associated with greater likelihood of victimization by corruption. For the region, we also found that victims of corruption were mostly middle-aged citizens. In Haiti, however, the age divide seems to be between two groups: those below 36, and the others; older citizens being more prone to be victimized by corruption.

The only real similarity between Haiti and the rest of the Americas lies in the relationship between wealth, education, and victimization by corruption. Just like their peers across the region, wealthier and more educated Haitians are more likely to report having been asked to pay a bribe in the past.

³ We did try to include these variables in reduced samples and found no significant effect for either.



Beyond asking respondents about their personal experience with corruption, the AmericasBarometer also asked respondents about their perception of corruption. In Haiti, respondents on average scored the issue of corruption among public officials at about 60 on a 0-100 scale (100 representing the highest level of perceived corruption). As we saw in Figure 3.8, Haitians are much less prone to perceive corruption than their peers from other countries of the Americas.

As illustrated by Figure 6.18, perceptions have not fluctuated a lot over the past eight years. Interestingly, these responses have not followed the same trend as victimization by corruption (Figure 6.15), which increased abruptly in 2012.




Figure 6.18. Perception of Corruption

In Chapter 3, we explored the determinants of perceived government corruption (Figure 3.10). Three attitudinal factors stood out: corruption victimization, governmental assistance, and crime in neighborhood. In all three cases, the relationship with perceptions of corruption was statistically significant. While having been asked to pay a bribe and having reported crime in the neighborhood increased the likelihood of perceiving corruption in government, having received governmental assistance had the opposite effect.

In Haiti, these three factors do not seem to be associated with perception of corruption. Figure 6.19 presents the simple bivariate relationships between perception of corruption and the three factors presented in the previous paragraph, but for the 2014 wave only. While perception of corruption increases very slightly with victimization, the average perception of corruption is the same whether respondents received governmental assistance or reported crime in their neighborhood.




Figure 6.19. Corruption Victimization, Governmental Assistance, and Crime, 2014

Of course, it is possible that the lack of relationship observed in Figure 6.19 be due to other variables. For example, the lack of a relationship between perception of corruption and governmental assistance may be due to the fact that most recipients of governmental assistance are also from lower socioeconomic status, and lack the tools to properly detect corruption. The only way to assess the impact of these factors on perceived corruption is through multivariate regression analysis, in which we can include many controls for other possibly intervening factors.

Figure 6.20 presents the results of a multivariate regression analysis in which we predict perception of corruption with the same model used in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.10). The regression analysis uses data from all five waves of the survey (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014).

The results of the regression analysis for Haiti are in some ways similar to the results for the whole region. Just like citizens of other countries of the region, Haitians who have been asked to pay a bribe in the past, those who reached higher levels of education, as well as older Haitians are more likely to perceive higher levels of corruption in government. However, the similarities stop there. Unlike in the rest of the region, perception of corruption in Haiti does not vary along wealth, sex, or urban/rural location.




Figure 6.20. Factors Associated with Perception of Corruption in Haiti

A striking pattern emerges when we compare Haitians to citizens of other countries in the region on the issue of corruption in 2014 (Figure 6.21). While Haiti ranks next to last in the region in terms of perception of public corruption, it clearly leads the region as far as victimization by corruption is concerned. There thus seems to be a wide gap between how Haitians perceive and experience corruption, at least when compared to the other countries in the region. It is as if Haitians had come to consider corruption as part of the normal course of public service delivery.




Figure 6.21. Perception of Corruption and Victimization by Corruption in the Americas, 2014

This possible internalization of corruption among Haitians is further illustrated by Figure 6.22. Compared to other citizens of the Americas, Haitians are more than twice as likely to believe that paying a bribe is sometimes justified. While 43% of Haitians share that idea in 2014, only 16.4% of citizens of the region as a whole do so as well (see Figure 3.11). Just like other citizens of the Americas, however, Haitians who were victimized by corruption are more likely to think paying a bribe can be justified at times. The number of Haitians who were asked to pay a bribe that justify corruption is over 35 percentage points higher (54.4%) than those who did not experience corruption (17.4%).




Figure 6.22. Paying a Bribe is Justified and Corruption Victimization

VII. Conclusion


We argued in the introduction that human development is important for democracy. This chapter examines various dimensions that we believe are essential foundations of human development. We explore the extent to which Haitians have access to public goods such as public services (including sanitary and road infrastructure, healthcare, and education). We also explore how Haitians perceive crime and insecurity, and corruption.

Even though some improvement has been observed with regards to different dimensions of human development in Haiti, much remains to be done. Overall, material wealth has moved beyond the 2010 low-point, but has not yet regained the pre-earthquake levels. Access to in-home sanitary facilities has increased, but access to sewage systems remains extremely low. Crime continues to be an issue, especially in Port-au-Prince, but Haitians have begun to feel safer at home. Corruption might be the only dimension for which no improvement has been observed over the recent period. On the contrary, things have continued to deteriorate on this front.

For democracy to flourish in Haiti, many more efforts at increasing the material well-being of its citizens must be deployed. These have to include access to basic sanitary infrastructure, roads, and other public services. Efforts also have to target crime and corruption. Haitians have a right live in a safe environment, and they have a right to access public services, such as education and basic healthcare, without having to pay a bribe.

Appendix

Appendix 6.1. Perception of Insecurity in the Americas, 2014



**Appendix 6.2. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Haiti,
2014**

	Coefficient	(t)
56-65 Years	-.2132108	-2.02
46-55 Year	-.3642444	-2.83
36-45 Year	-.0861994	-0.93
26-35 Year	.1152372	1.41
16-25 Years	-.0010931	-0.01
Skin Tone	.0441678	0.66
Wealth Quintile 5	.2909669	3.34
Wealth Quintile 4	.179339	1.92
Wealth Quintile 3	.2419751	2.71
Wealth Quintile 2	.0461534	0.57
Level of Education	-.0211637	-0.23
Female	.0234843	0.29
Urban	.0229885	0.25
Constant	-1.793738	-4.66
Number of observations	1425	
Design df	57	
F(13, 45)	2.53*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

**Appendix 6.3: Determinants of Corruption Victimization
in Haiti, 2006-2014**

	Coefficient	(t)
56-65 Years	.0469787	1.71
46-55 Year	.0823617	2.74
36-45 Year	.1045825	2.92
26-35 Year	-.10229535	-3.27
16-25 Years	-.2346922	-8.44
Wealth Quintile	.2007584	5.49
Level of Education	.1349389	3.95
Female	.023305	0.96
Rural	.0090473	0.26
2008	-.0063917	-0.12
2010	.1217814	2.49
2012	.289491	5.48
2014	.3285148	6.94
Constant	.3571038	9.09
Number of observations	7977	
Design df	372	
F(13, 45)	16.58*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

**Appendix 6.4: Determinants of Perceptions of Corruption
in Haiti, 2006-2014**

	Coefficients	(t)
56-65 Years	-.0549293	-1.34
46-55 Year	.048855	0.97
36-45 Year	.014515	0.23
26-35 Year	.0944065	1.49
16-25 Years	-.2669145	-4.69
Wealth Quintile	-.0362848	-0.60
Level of Education	.157306	3.14
Female	.0693556	1.75
Rural	.0179314	0.30
Victimization by Corruption	.1077914	2.34
2008	-.2301182	-2.77
2010	-.0055875	-0.08
2012	.1934036	2.37
2014	.0831057	1.08
Constant	1.825372	35.90
Number of observations	7383	
Design df	372	
F(13, 45)	8.80	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

Chapter 7. Haitians and Democratic Values

François Gélineau

I. Introduction

Democratic rule is often associated with a political culture in which citizens that share a number of attitudes and behaviors conducive to democratic governance. Several authors in the social sciences have exposed how important certain shared beliefs and values are fundamental to the functioning of democracies (Almond and Verba 1963; Booth and Seligson 2009; Putnam 1994, 2001). In Chapter 5, we identify two of those that are central to democracy: political tolerance and system support. While political tolerance refers to the respect for the political rights of others, notwithstanding the political position they adopt, system support has to do with the overall respect individuals have for political institutions, i.e., legitimacy. In contexts in which citizens display high levels of tolerance and high level of system support, we can expect stable democracies. On the contrary, where citizens have low tolerance and low support, democracy can be said to be at risk.

In the region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to determine that on both dimensions (political tolerance and system support), citizens of the Americas have grown less supportive of institutions and more intolerant. Is it also the case for Haiti? Drawing on the previous chapter, the outlook for Haiti is gloomy. We know from the literature that economic development is highly correlated with democratic values (Booth and Seligson 2009; Carlin 2006; Carlin and Singer 2011). By extrapolating from the results presented in Chapter 6, one can conclude that Haitians ought to display low levels of system support and low levels of tolerance. Yet, catastrophic events such as the earthquake that hit the island on January 12, 2010 can have surprising consequences. With such a level of destruction and disorganization of the state, Haitians had to find ways to provide for themselves. These last resort behaviors may as well have had the effect of making Haitians work together in order to improve their living conditions. In doing so, they might have started to weave the social fabric so important for democracy to flourish (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). The question remains unanswered.

This chapter explores the democratic values of Haitians, with a specific focus on political tolerance and system support. It also looks at how Haitians get involved in their community and in the political life of the country. The main findings of the chapter can be summarized as follows:

- From a peak in 2006, political tolerance declined rapidly until 2010, the year the country was hit by the devastating earthquake. It improved thereafter to 50.0 on a 0-100 scale to catch up with the regional average in 2014.
- Similarly, the earthquake may have influenced the evolution of interpersonal trust. The year 2010 also marks a low point in trust over the past decade. Yet, as the living conditions improved thereafter, the levels of trust have risen to higher levels than before the natural disaster at 47.98 on a 0-100 scale, compared to a regional average of about 61.
- Haitians seem to be suspicious of governmental institutions. They have higher levels of trust in non-political institutions.

- The percentage of Haitians that display both high levels of tolerance and system support declined in 2010 to 3.7%, but increased to levels comparable to those observed before the earthquake in 2012 and 2014.
- Haiti ranks among the countries in which citizens display the lowest intention to vote during a future election at 61.1%, compared to a high of 96.7% in Uruguay.
- Haitians rank consistently high in the Americas with regards to their attendance in municipal meetings.

The remainder chapter is organized in the following way. Section II explores the different dimensions of political tolerance as they exist in Haiti. In section III, we discuss the results relating to citizens' trust in democratic institutions and system support. In Section IV, we combine the two dimensions of political tolerance and system support in order to assess how they have affected the stability of democracy in Haiti since 2006. Finally, in section V, we explore the different ways in which Haitians participate in the community and in the political life of the country.

II. Political Tolerance

Political tolerance can be measured in several ways. The AmericasBarometer includes a battery of questions exploring different dimensions of the phenomenon. As explained in Chapter 5, the AmericasBarometer uses an index based on four questions measuring how much respondents support the right to vote, to protest, to run for public office, and to make public speeches for citizens who object to the political system.

Figure 7.1 comparatively illustrates the trend in political tolerance since 2006 in Haiti and the Americas. While in the region as a whole we can observe a slow but steady decline in tolerance over the period, Haiti offers a different story. From a high point in 2006, tolerance declined rapidly until 2010, the year the country was hit by the devastating earthquake, to reach a low point of 43.4 on a scale of 0 to 100. Tolerance improved thereafter to catch up with the regional average in 2014, at 50.




Figure 7.1. Political Tolerance in the Americas and Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 7.2 breaks down the tolerance index into its four dimensions. The four variables offer a pattern consistent with the index as a whole. One aspect is worth underscoring, however. On the one hand, Haitians seem more tolerant of critics having the right to vote and to peacefully demonstrate. The right to demonstrate seems especially important for Haitians. On the other hand, they are less tolerant of regime critics running for office or making speeches.




Figure 7.2. Breakdown of Political Tolerance Index, Haiti 2006-2014

Another dimension of tolerance is openness to people who are different from the mainstream. The 2014 Americas Barometer also asked respondents about their political tolerance for same-sex couples' right to marry and homosexuals' the right to run for office. The question wording for these survey items is as follows:

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

When compared to the region as a whole, Haitians appear to be quite socially conservative. In both dimensions, they rank at the very bottom of the region in their acceptance of homosexuals. Yet, the recent trend is more encouraging. Even though Figure 7.3 shows that Haitians are comparatively not very supportive of homosexuals running for office (left quadrant) or of gay marriage (right quadrant), Figure 7.4 shows that these attitudes seem to be slowly changing. There is a slight and steady increase in both dimensions, with a clearer trend in upward support for homosexuals being permitted to run for office.




Figure 7.3. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in the Americas, 2014




Figure 7.4. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in Haiti, 2010-2014

Beyond asking about tolerance of dissidence and openness to homosexuality, both truly desirable attitudes under democratic rule, the AmericasBarometer also asked respondents to react to more extreme forms of protest. Three questions specifically asked respondents to react to roadblocks, government overthrow, and vigilante justice:

E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?

E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?

Figure 7.5 shows that tolerance for these more extreme forms of protest have increased since 2010. At the same time, one has to recognize that support for these forms of protest remain fairly limited, with values lingering within the lower third of the 100-point scale.




Figure 7.5. Tolerance of Undemocratic Behaviors, Haiti 2006-2014

III. Trust and System Support Among Haitians

In democratic regimes, trust is another central attitude to ensure political stability. As argued in Chapter 5, trust provides legitimacy to the institutions of a political system. Interpersonal trust has also been found to be a very important ingredient for a well-functioning democratic society (Tocqueville 1835; Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Here, we first examine Haitian's levels of interpersonal trust using the following question from the AmericasBarometer:

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**

(1) Very trustworthy	(2) Somewhat trustworthy	(3) Not very trustworthy
(4) Untrustworthy	(88) DK	(98) DA

When compared to the rest of the region, Haiti ranks at the bottom in terms of the interpersonal trust scale that is recoded from 0 to 100 (Figure 7.6). That is, Haitians are the least trusting of their fellow citizens. It could be said that Haitians are rather suspicious of each other. That being said, this dimension alone cannot be used to assess the quality of democratic life in the country. The observed variation in levels of personal trust across the region suggests that other factors have to be accounted for to have a more complete understanding of the quality of democracy. For example, Paraguay ranks first despite its fairly high level of political instability in the recent years. Also, despite its striving democratic life, Brazil is near the bottom of the graph.¹




Figure 7.6. Interpersonal Trust in the Americas, 2014

¹ Admittedly, Brazil has been the theater of important political turmoil over the course of the past few years. These events may contribute to explain Brazil's position in the graph.

In Haiti, interpersonal trust has fluctuated over time. As Figure 7.7 illustrates, the earthquake has influenced the evolution of interpersonal trust. This would be consistent with Carlin et al. (2014), who argue that disasters, combined with low state capacity, can result in significant drop in interpersonal trust. As a matter of fact, the year 2010 marks a low point in trust over the past decade. Yet, after 2010, the levels of trust have risen to levels higher than before the earthquake.




Figure 7.7. Interpersonal Trust, Haiti 2006-2014

In addition to interpersonal trust, the AmericasBarometer included a large battery of questions that measure trust in different institutions. These include political institutions such as political parties, the national legislature, the executive, the prime minister, the local government, the kaseks, and elections more broadly. The questionnaire also included trust items on the judicial system and the national police. Lastly, the AmericasBarometer includes items measuring trust in non-governmental institutions such as the Catholic Church, the Evangelical/Protestant church, the media, and the US military. The question wording for these items is as follows:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?

B18. To what extent do you trust the Police (PNH)?

B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?

B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?

HAIB21B. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

HAIB32. To what extent do you trust the KASEK?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?

Figure 7.8 reports the levels of trust in political institutions among Haitians for the 2006-2014 period. One general observation emerges of the graph: overall trust in political institutions is fairly low among Haitians across all survey years. Yet, Haitians are not much different from other citizens in the Americas. The levels of trust reported in Figure 7.8 are fairly similar to the regional mean (including Haiti) reported in Figure 5.2. One noticeable trend involves the substantial increase in the level of trust Haitians have for the executive, particularly after the earthquake.

In 2014, Haitians seem more trusting of the president (65.4) than the prime minister (51.2), the national legislature (42.6), their local government (38.7), political parties (36.8%), or the kaseks (35.5). Haitians are also quite suspicious of elections and of the national electoral institutions, with an average position of about 29.8 and 31.4, respectively on a 0-100 scale.




Figure 7.8. Trust in Political Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014

Trust in judicial institutions is overall fairly low amongst Haitians. As illustrated by Figure 7.9, Haitians have been consistently distrustful of their judicial system and, even more so, of the Supreme Court. Somewhat surprisingly, Haitians are very trusting of their National Police. While trust in the National Police oscillated in the lower 50s (on the 0-100 scale) before the earthquake, it reached 61.8 and 57.9, respectively, in 2012 and 2014.

All in all, Haitians are among those who have the highest level of trust in their National Police across the Americas. They come fifth in the overall ranking, just after Canada, Chile, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (see Figure 5.4). This finding is consistent with the results from the 2012 wave of the AmericasBarometer (Smith, Gélineau and Seligson 2012).




Figure 7.9. Trust in Judicial Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014

While Haitians seem to be suspicious of governmental institutions, they exhibit higher levels of trust in non-political institutions. Figure 7.10 reports the levels of trust for the Catholic Church, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, the media and the U.S. Military. Aside from the media, the levels of trust for the other three institutions included in the graph are above the 50-point mark on the 0-100 scale for the 2006-2014 period.




Figure 7.10. Trust in Non-Political Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014

In Chapter 5, we presented an index of System Support. It was described as “a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized.” It goes beyond trust in specific institutions and provides a broader measure of how citizens perceive their political institutions. The system support index is constructed on the basis of the following questions:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Figure 7.11 shows how Haiti compares with other countries of the Hemisphere in 2014 and how system support evolved over time within the country. From the left-side graph of Figure 7.11, it is clear that Haiti ranks among those countries of the continent with low levels of system support. However, the right-side graph suggest that system support has reached higher levels in recent year, after falling to an historical low-point in 2010.




Figure 7.11. System Support in Haiti, 2006-2014

IV. Is democracy at risk in Haiti?

In Chapter 5, we argued that for stable democracies to flourish, countries require citizens who support their institutions and who have high levels of tolerance for those who hold differing political opinions. Table 7.1 is a copy of Table 5.1, in which we showed that the combination of these two attributes led to democratic stability, while the lack of either or both put pressure on democracy. If a majority of citizens display high system support as well as high levels of tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the opposite, where citizens lack tolerance and have low levels of system support, democracy is said to be at risk.

Table 7.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Over the previous pages, we saw that Haitians rank fairly low on both dimensions, at least when compared to the citizens of other countries in the Americas. Yet, how does Haiti compare to other countries when combining the two attributes? How have these attitudes evolved over the past decade? What are the implications for Haitian democracy?

Figure 7.12 compares the different countries of the region in terms of the percentage of citizens who lack system support and have low levels of tolerance. In Haiti, 39.5% of respondents fall in that category. With such a high number of people in that category, Haiti ranks fourth in the region, among the countries in which democracy can be said to be at risk.




Figure 7.12. Attitudes Conducive to Democracy at Risk in the Americas, 2014

At first sight, the results reported in Figure 7.12 could be seen as a major source of worries, especially on the eve of a major electoral year in Haiti (i.e., 2015). Yet, if we look at the evolution of these attitudes over the past decade, we clearly see that democratic political culture among Haitians has improved and stabilized. Figure 7.13 displays the distribution of Haitian respondents from 2006 to 2014 along the four different attitudinal profiles that can be created by combining attitudes regarding system support and political tolerance. Let us recall that, in the Americas as a whole, no clear trend could be

detected over time. The Haitian story is much different. If we only focus on the category “democracy at risk,” the results for Haiti clearly show that democratic attitudes deteriorated steadily between 2006 and 2010, reaching a point at which 61.6% of Haitian lacked system support and had low levels of tolerance. Not surprisingly, the electoral cycle of 2010-2011 was particularly tense. Yet, since then, the situation has largely improved. Between 2012 and 2014 the percentage of Haitians holding attitudes that can place democracy at risk dropped to 40%. Furthermore, if we focus on examining the combination of attitudes that are associated with “stable democracy” (high system support, high political tolerance), the evidence provides further optimism. While the percentage of those displaying high levels of tolerance and system support declined from 23.5% in 2006 to a low 3.7% in 2010, the proportion of Haitians with attitudes conducive to stable democracy has increased since then to 10.7% in 2012 and 16.1% in 2014.




Figure 7.13. Democratic Attitudinal Profiles in Haiti, 2006-2014

Despite the recent decrease in the percentage of Haitians with attitudes that could place democracy at risk, other measures of democratic attitudes offer evidence of the fragile state of Haitian democracy. In addition to the variables used to measure system support and tolerance, the AmericasBarometer contains more questions that assess the extent to which Haitians are proud of their political system, whether Haitians should support the political system, if they believe that parties represent voters well, and whether they think that parties listen to people like them. The wording of these questions is as follows:

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Haiti?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Haiti?
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Haitian political parties represent their voters well?
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Figure 7.14 illustrates the responses to these four questions over time in Haiti. One again, the graphs contained in the upper quadrants suggest that these political attitudes deteriorated until 2010, and improved thereafter. This is true for pride of living under the Haitian political system and for the believed necessity to support the political system. That being said, the overall level of agreement with these dimensions remains low, at around 40 points on a 0-100 scale in 2014. Appreciations of the political parties' capacity to represent voters and to listen to voters are not too encouraging either, with values in the mid- to low-30s on the same 0-100 scale in 2014.




Figure 7.14. Other Democratic Attitudes in Haiti, 2006-2014

Beyond looking at attitudes towards specific institutional features of the Haitian democratic system, the AmericasBarometer also includes questions tapping into the broad concept of democracy. In 2012, the AmericasBarometer revealed that overall support for democracy is fairly high in the region and relatively stable over time (Smith et al. 2012). In Haiti, support for democracy is generally lower than in the region as a whole.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Interestingly, the trend regarding support for democracy in Haiti seems to follow the nature of the electoral cycle. As Figure 7.15 illustrates, support is high after election years. Support for democracy among Haitians peaked in 2006 at 70.5 and in 2012 at 70.4. In 2006, the survey was administered several months after the presidential election. The 2012 survey followed the long 2010-2011 electoral cycle. Between elections, support for democracy is consistently lower. In sum, in the aftermath of elections support for democracy is at about 70 on the 0-100 scale, and in the mid-60s between elections.




Figure 7.15. Support for Democracy in Haiti, 2006-2014

Another way of measuring support for democracy is with the use of a question in which we offer alternative scenarios that respondents can choose from. This type of question also allows respondents to claim that the form of government does not make any difference for them. The question wording used is as follows:

Figure 7.16 presents the percentage of Haitian respondents who responded that democracy is preferable to any other form of government (left-hand side) and those who responded that authoritarian government is sometimes justified (right-hand side). It is worth noting that the percentage of respondents who answered that the form of government doesn't matter is stable over time at about 10%.

Overall, support for democracy over another form of government remains high throughout the 2008-2014 period in Haiti, with no less than 69% of the respondents preferring that option. However, there is some variation over time. The percentage of respondents who prefer democracy starts low in 2008, reaches a high point in 2010, and declines thereafter. Support for dictatorship under certain circumstances follows the inverse relationship. From 12.1% in 2008 that prefer an authoritarian government, this percentage declines to 7.8% in 2010, and climbs to 20.9% in 2014. With such results in 2014, Haiti ranks third in the Americas (see Figure 7.17), after Paraguay and Peru, as far as the percentage of respondents who support non-democratic forms of government is concerned.




Figure 7.16. Preference for Democracy Over Authoritarianism in Haiti, 2006-2014




Figure 7.17. Preference for Democracy Over Authoritarianism in the Americas, 2014

V. Community Involvement and Political Participation

So far, the current chapter has drawn a rather pessimistic picture of democratic political culture in Haiti. According to the analyses presented in the previous pages, Haitians have a low level of tolerance towards dissention, they lack confidence in their institutions, and they are less attached to the principle of democracy than many of the citizens from other countries in the region. Yet, it is possible that despite these attitudes, Haitians are active citizens, getting involved in their community and playing their part in a democratic society. In Chapter 4, we saw that Haitians were more inclined than other citizens of the Americas to participate in municipal meetings (Figure 4.2). This is true for both the 2012 and 2014 waves of the survey. In previous years (2006, 2008, and 2010), Haiti ranked among the top third of the countries in which citizens are most likely to participate in municipal meetings.

Beyond asking about participation in municipal meetings, the AmericasBarometer contains several questions that measure how Haitians participate in the political life of their country. The following questions asked respondents different types of participation in local politics:

As discussed earlier, Haitians have ranked consistently high in the Americas with regards to their attendance in municipal meetings. Figure 7.18 display the evolution of their participation in different types of community organizations. As one can see, Haitians are consistently more active in the different organization than the citizens of the other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is especially true of their participation in religions organizations. One interesting observation is that Haitians have been very active in their community in the years that followed the earthquake.




Figure 7.18. Components of Community Participation in Comparative Perspective, 2006-2014

The pattern is quite similar when we ask them whether they requested help from their municipal or local office (Figure 7.19). While in 2008 Haitians displayed participation rates below the level observed in other countries of the region, participation levels found surpassed regional rates in 2010 and 2012, and then returned to slightly below the regional average in 2014. Nevertheless, when asked if they contributed to resolving a community problem, Haitians consistently ranked above the regional average.




Figure 7.19. Community Engagement in Haiti, 2006-2014

All in all, if we combine all four forms of community participation and community engagement into a single index (Figure 7.20), we can see that, after 2010, Haitians generally became more likely than citizens of the other countries of the region to engage in their community.




Figure 7.20. Community Participation and Engagement in Comparative Perspective, 2006-2014



Now that we have seen that Haitians get involved in their community to a greater extent than other citizens of the Americas, it seems relevant to explore the nature of their community participation. Figure 7.21 does just that. Interestingly, Haitians are more likely to take part in meetings organized by religious organizations than their peers from other countries of the Americas. That being said, religious meetings are the most common type of community participation in both Haiti and elsewhere in the region. After participation in religious meetings, participation rates in other types of community organizations ranks as follows: attendance to meetings of parent associations, community improvement associations, political parties, and women's organizations.




Figure 7.21. Types of Community Participation in the Americas, 2014

Beyond community participation, the AmericasBarometer also included measures of less conventional types of political participation:

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to JC10] (88) DK [Go to JC10]
 (98) DA [Go to JC10]

In both 2010 and 2012, Haitians were almost twice as many respondents reported having participated in a protest than citizens of the other countries of the region. However, their protest participation rates diminished to the regional average in 2014.




Figure 7.22. Participated in a Protest in Haiti, 2010-2014

Why would Haitians protest more than other citizens of the Americas? The AmericasBarometer included a question that ask respondent to identify their individual motivation”

Y4. What was the purpose of the demonstration or protest? [DON'T READ OPTIONS. ONLY MARK ONE ANSWER. If the respondent participated in more than one, ask about the most recent protest. If the protest had more than one purpose, ask for the most important.]

- (1) Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities)
- (2) Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy)
- (3) Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption)
- (4) Security problems (crime, militias, gangs)
- (5) Human rights
- (6) Environmental themes
- (7) Lack of public services
- (8) Other
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Figure 7.23 reports the answers to this question for the years in which it was asked (2010 and 2014). Surprisingly, almost half of Haitians point to economic factors. Politics ranks a distant second, almost 40 points behind, just decimals above education. If Haitians protests, it is mostly because they are dissatisfied with economic considerations. Politics, education, public services, the environment, human rights, and security lag far behind.




Figure 7.23. Reasons for Protesting Haiti, 2010 and 2014

Beyond participating in protests, the AmericasBarometer includes further questions regarding conventional forms of political participation. The questionnaire includes a question in which the respondents are asked to declare whether they would support the incumbent if elections were held in the near future. Among the options to that question is the possibility for the respondent to declare that s/he would not vote.

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [\[Read options\]](#)

- (1) Wouldn't vote
- (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
- (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration
- (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
- (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 7.24 reports the percentage of respondents who answered that they would vote if elections were held in the coming days. All those who selected options (2), (3) or (4) of variable VB20 were coded as having the intention to vote. As in most public opinion surveys, voter turnout is greatly overestimated. That is why the average level of participation is so high throughout the region at 79.5%, with a range going from a low of 42.3% in Jamaica to a high of 96.7% in Uruguay. Haiti ranks among the countries in which citizens display the lowest intention to vote during a future election.




Figure 7.24. Percent Intending to Vote in the Americas, 2014

In addition to asking respondents about their behavior given hypothetical elections, the AmericasBarometer also ask them if they voted in the previous presidential election. Figure 7.25 shows the results to both questions. The graph in the upper-left quadrant shows the reported intentions to vote using the 2012 and 2014 surveys. This graph suggests that intentions to vote are fairly stable over time, at 64.5% in 2012 and 61.1% in 2014. The graph located in the upper-right quadrant plots the evolution of reported vote since 2006. With an overall average (not shown) of 70.2%, Haitians who report having voted in the last elections range from 59.3% in 2010 to 78.0% in 2006. The closer the survey is to the previous election, the higher the reported voting turnout. This is why we can observe peaks in 2006 and 2012. Finally, the last graph combines both questions. It reports the intention to vote for those who reported having voted in the last election for 2012 and 2014 only. Almost 82% of Haitians who reported voting in the last election claim they would vote again if elections were held in the near future.




Figure 7.25. Intentions to Vote and Reported Vote in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 7.26 presents the result of a regression analysis in which we predict intentions to vote with the help of several variables (including age, household wealth, education, gender, rural residence, presidential approval, satisfaction with local government, local meeting attendance, corruption victimization, and perception of the economy), while controlling for past voting participation. The results suggest that perceptions of the economy, corruption victimization, presidential approval, and more education are all significantly associated with voter turnout among Haitians. Those that have a more favorable perception of the economy, those that positively evaluate the president's job performance, and those that were victimized by corruption are all more likely to vote if elections were held in the near future.




Figure 7.26. Some Determinants of Intentions to Vote, Haiti 2012-2014

VI. Conclusion

Since Haiti adopted its 1987 political constitution, the country has had seven presidential elections. While the 1987 election was cancelled, the 1988 process was boycotted by most. Only five elections have completed their course (1990, 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2010), and only twice has the president managed to complete his term. Indeed, René Préval is the only post-Duvalier president to have completed his mandates, in 1996-2001 and 2006-2011. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had to interrupt both of his presidencies, the first in 1991 and the second in 2004. In 2015, Michel Martelly entered the final year of his tenure as president. New presidential elections should be held by year's end. Martelly will thus become the third president to complete his mandate since the adoption of the 1987 constitution.

Although this brief account of aborted elections and unfinished electoral mandates draws a somewhat poor picture of Haitian politics, it helps contextualize the results presented in this chapter. The analyses presented in the chapter explored attitudes and behaviors that are commonly associated with democracy. In doing so, we focused on variables measuring political tolerance and system support. We saw that Haiti lags behind most countries of the hemisphere on these democratic attitudes. However, on several fronts, the outlook for the development of a sustainable democratic political culture seems to be improving. This is especially the case with most dimensions of political tolerance, which have improved over the past few years. In the chapter, we also saw that Haitians are participating more in their community than elsewhere in the Americas. Yet, they tend to vote less. Just like their recent political history, Haitians have attitudes and behaviors that offer a mixed balance sheet for democracy.

That being said, democracy takes time to consolidate. The attitudes and behaviors that were explored in this chapter do not change from one day to another. In reflecting on the results presented in this chapter, it is important to focus on long-term trends, and not only on how Haiti compares to the other countries

of the region. Democracy takes times to take develop. Several findings of this chapter point in the right direction. Haitians have to build on their successes.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1: Determinants of Intention to Vote in Haiti, 2012-2014

	Coefficients	(t)
65+ Years	-.0306055	-0.58
56-65 Years	-.0061425	-0.09
46-55 Year	-.0959167	-2.03
26-35 Year	-.0257209	-0.41
16-25 Years	-.0094474	-0.15
Wealth Quintile	-.0533229	-1.03
Level of Education	.0972929	2.02
Female	-.0882154	-1.84
Rural	.0435783	0.75
Presidential Approval	.3326343	5.49
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-.0479676	-0.92
Attended Municipal Meeting	.0752004	1.42
Victimization by Corruption	.120746	2.35
Perception of National Economic Situation	.1652099	2.91
Voted in Last Presidential Election	.3807874	7.49
2014	-.0717685	-1.15
Constant	.6592336	10.19
Number of observations	2444	
Design df	116	
F(13, 45)	8.96*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

Chapter 8. Haitian Voters in Action

François Gélineau

I. Introduction

Every election since the adoption of the 1987 Haitian Constitution has been a theater for political turmoil. The outcome of each electoral process has been questioned by the losers. On every occasion, the process has been marked by protesters taking on the streets. Many elections have been resolved by para-constitutional arrangements. Elections in Haiti are a complicated affair. In light of what we learned in the previous chapters regarding the state of human development (Chapter 6) and the democratic culture (Chapter 7) in Haiti, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, in Haiti, electoral processes do complete their course, especially the most recent ones. How are citizens behaving in elections? To what extent are Haitians driven by the same motivations as citizens of other countries when deciding for whom to vote?

Beyond standard demographic and socioeconomic variables, most models of vote choice rely on two additional sets of variables to explain how voters make their decision. The first has to do with ideology and party attachment. The second relates to issues such as short-term considerations related to governmental performance.

Ideology and party attachment are different forms of political psychological identification. Ideology is a form of identification with ideas about how the world should be organized. The convention has the different conceptions placed on a left-right continuum. In the political world, it has been suggested that the left-right continuum synthesizes the different party policy positions on many issues (Downs 1957). Using this conception of political ideology, it has been conceived that the continuum opposes the idea of state intervention in the economy on the left-end, and free market principles on the right-end. Intermediate positions would represent any combinations of both ideas in different degrees. Prior work on this phenomenon has provided support for its usefulness in understanding voter behavior in countries of the region (Zechmeister 2006; Colomer 2005).

Party attachment is another form of political psychological identification, but one that has to do less with ideas or ideals, and more with political parties that represent those ideas. It is one's affective orientation to a specific political party. In the US literature, authors are careful to dissociate party attachment from voting behavior. "Thus we do not define a Republican as someone who always voted Republican, or an Independent as someone who does not consistently vote for the same party" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, 112). In this form, party attachment is an attitude. For example, party attachment with the President's party might be highly correlated with incumbent support, but this may not always be the case.

Policy issues are also central in understanding how voters behave. Put simply, citizens are more likely to support political parties or candidates that share their preferences on specific issues. Similarly, they are more likely to give their support to an incumbent government that performed well with regards to a particular issue. This form of simple retrospective voting (V.O. Key 1966) has mostly been explored in the economic domain, but can certainly be applied to other issues that arise. In Latin America, as much as in Haiti, beyond the economy, we can think of two additional issues that have the potential to affect how incumbents are evaluated: crime and corruption.


The current chapter explores how party attachment, ideology, and short-term issues affect incumbent support in Haiti. The main findings of the chapters are as follows.

- Overall, Haitians tend to place themselves more to the left of the continuum (4.0 on a 0-10 scale in 2014) than citizens of other countries of the Americas (5.8 in 2014), especially so in the most recent waves of the AmericasBarometer.
- Most Haitians who identify with a party rally with the political formation of the sitting president (59.2% in 2014).
- Since 2008, around 70% of Haitians have identified the economy as their number one concern, leaving little space for other issues.
- Contrary to the trend followed by other countries of the region, in recent years, Haitians are more satisfied with the economy. In 2014, 15.7% of them feel the economy has gotten better, compared to 4.4% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2008.
- On the governmental efforts to fight crime or corruption, Haitians have become more satisfied in the recent past, at 47.27 on a 0-100 scale, compared to 25.21 in 2002.
- On how governments manage the economy, Haitians are more critical, at 37.49 on a 0-100 scale in 2014.
- Incumbent support among Haitian is mostly defined by party identification, but also by short-term consideration such as perceptions of the economy.

II. Ideology and party identification

It is very common to document respondents' ideological position in studies that explore public opinion and electoral behavior. The AmericasBarometer includes the following question to measure that concept:

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.



All in all, most citizens of the Americas are able to locate themselves on the left-right axis. The left-side graph of Figure 8.1 indicates the percentage of respondent per country that provided a valid response to question L1. The rates of identification in 2014 range from a low of 66.3% in Chile to a high of 94.8% in Haiti. Figure 8.1 suggests that Haiti is the country in which most citizens accept to answer that question, with 94.8% of Haitians self-positing on the left-right scale. Compared to the citizens of

the other countries of the region, Haitians are among those that self-identify with the political left to the greatest extent. With a mean score of 4.0 on a 1-10 scale, Haiti is the country that ranks furthest on the left side of the axis in 2014.




Figure 8.1. Haitians and ideology in comparative perspective, 2014

The fact that Haitians are more willing to self-position on the left-right axis is nothing new. As Figure 8.2 indicates, Haitians have outnumbered citizens of the other countries in answering that question every year since 2008. Also, as is the case for citizens of the other countries of the Americas, since 2008, the number of Haitians accepting to self-position on the left-right axis has been consistently increasing.




Figure 8.2. Percentage of Haitians who self-identify on the left-right axis, 2008-2014

The distribution of responses presented in Figure 8.3 clearly indicates that the question is measuring something relevant in the political attitudes of Haitians. If respondents did not understand the concept at all, no clear pattern would emerge in Figure 8.3. A second indication that the left-right ideology question is measuring something real is that the distribution has remained fairly similar over time, at least since 2010 (not shown).




Figure 8.3. Position on the left-right axis, Haiti 2014

While the mean position on the left-right axis has leaned toward the left since 2010, Figure 8.4 suggests this has not always been the case. Before the earthquake, the left-right distribution was more centered, with an average position on the 1-10 scale located at around 5.




Figure 8.4. Mean position on the left-right axis, Haiti 2006-2014

Another dimension of ideology and partisanship measured by the AmericasBarometer is respondents' attachment to political parties. Two questions specifically address that concept.

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]		
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (2201) Fwon Lespwa (2202) RDNP (2203) Respè (2204) Repons Peyizan (2205) MPH (2206) Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne (2207) Organizasyon Pèp Kap Lité (2208) Alyans/Alliance Démocratique (2209) Renmen Ayiti (2210) Ansanm nou Fo (2211) Lavalas (2212) Unité (2213) PHTK (Pati Tèt Kale) (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A		



As illustrated by Figure 8.5, Haiti does not stand out as an outlier with regard to party identification in the Americas. With 34.3% of Haitians claiming that they identify with a political party, the country is very close to the regional rate of identification (34.05%).




Figure 8.5. Percentage of Respondents who Identify with a Political Party in the Americas, 2014

Over time, the number of Haitians that identify with a political party has oscillated between a low of 27.8% in 2010 to a high of 37.9% in 2006. Figure 8.6 (left-side graph) shows a decline from 2006 to 2010, followed by an upward trend since 2010. This might coincide with some transformations of the party system that will be explored further in the chapter.

In 2014, 59.2% of those who identify with a party rally with the political formation of the sitting president. Only three other political parties receive more than 5% of identifiers. These are RDNP (14.2%), Fanmi Lavalas (7.9%), and Respe (5.1%). This distribution is quite similar to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, in which the incumbent party received the overwhelming majority of responses for party identification.




Figure 8.6. Party Identification in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 8.7 exemplifies this over time pattern further. In 2006 and 2008, Rene Preval's Lespwa party received over 70% of identifiers, leaving very little for the opposition parties. In 2012 and 2014, the same is true for Michel Martelly's political formation. In 2010, with the sitting president not a candidate in the upcoming election, party identification was much more scattered. This might help explain the u-shape curve observed in the previous figure with regards to the number of Haitians who identify with a party across time. With political parties appearing and disappearing along with presidents, Haitians may find it harder to discern their party affiliations during transitions, such as in 2010, an election in which the incumbent president was not allowed to run for his own reelection, given the term limit imposed by the Haitian Constitution. In the absence of a strong presidential figure, Haitians are less numerous to rally behind any political party.




Figure 8.7. Evolution of Party Identification in Haiti, 2006-2014

III. Issue Performance

As explained in the introduction of the current chapter, another set of variables is usually included in electoral studies. When we try to understand the roots of governmental support, we regularly turn to examining the implication so short-term performance factors. Evaluations of the economy are generally at the top of the list for voters. In the Latin American context, these short-term issues could also include assessments of how the government combats corruption and crime.

The AmericasBarometer regularly asks respondents to identify the most important problem facing their country. Figure 8.8 plots the responses over time for Haiti. What is striking is that, the economy has consistently been the dominating issue. Since 2008, around 70% of Haitians have identified the economy as their number one concern, leaving little space for other issues. In the two most recent waves of the survey, the delivery of basic services has come second as a source of concern, getting the attention of about 20% of Haitians. Not surprisingly, politics has received some attention around election years, in 2006 and in 2010.




Figure 8.8. Most Important Problem Facing Haiti, 2006-2010

We saw in Chapter 2 that overall perceptions of the economy in the Americas deteriorated in 2014, at least in comparison to previous survey years. Haiti has followed a slightly different course. Figure 8.9 plots average national economic perceptions for each survey since 2006. From the figure, it is easy to conclude that Haitians were quite unhappy with the economy in 2008 and 2010. Contrary to the trend followed by other countries of the region, in Haiti, 2012 and 2014 show signs of improvement. The number of Haitians that think the economy has improved more than tripled between 2010 (4.4%) and 2014 (15.7%). The percentage of those who believe the national economic situation has remained the same has increased from 24.6% in 2010 to 41.4% in 2014. Lastly, Haitians who think the economy has worsened declined from 81.8% in 2008 to 42.9% in 2014.




Figure 8.9. Perceptions of the National Economy

Now, whether these issue concerns translate into support for the government depends on how individuals assess the efforts deployed by the authorities to address the issues. This applies to the economy, but also to other issues such as corruption or crime. Figure 8.10 shows how these assessments have evolved between 2006 and 2014 in Haiti. With regards to corruption and crime, the trend is definitely positive. Over this time period, Haitians' evaluations of how the government has been dealing with corruption and crime have improved, with the exception of 2010. In 2014, Haitians rank the government's effort at about midpoint on the 0-100 scale for both combatting corruption and crime. As for the economy, the question was only asked in 2012 and 2014. On that issue, Figure 8.10 is consistent with the results from Figure 8.9. That is, Haitians are a bit more critical of the government's overall efforts in 2014, compared to 2012.




Figure 8.10. Evaluations of Government Performance, Haiti 2012-2014

IV. Approval and Incumbent Support

Although the AmericasBarometer is not an electoral study, it contains many questions allowing us to document the electoral behavior of its respondents. Two key variables are of interest here: presidential approval and vote intention. While the first gives us a general sense of how respondents feel about the broad performance of the current executive, the second requires the respondents to make a choice given the eventuality of an election.

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Michel Martelly? **[Read the options]**

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) DK (98) DA

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read the options]**

(1) Wouldn't vote
 (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
 (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration
 (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
 (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 8.11 reports the percentage of Haitians who rate the job performance of the president as "good" or "very good" for each survey since 2006. In 2006, 2008, and 2010, the president was René



Préval. In the 2012 and 2014 waves of the survey, the president was Michel Martelly. What is striking is that on average, Michel Martelly has benefited from a level of support that René Préval did not have during his last mandate (2006-2010) as president. Only months after the 2006 election, the percentage of Haitians that though René Préval was doing a good or very good job was already very low, at 17.74%. About a year into his mandate, this same metric for Michel Martelly's approval was at 38.28%. The percentage of Haitians that though Martelly was doing a good or very good job even improved between 2012 and 2014 to reach 60.85%. The fact that René Préval's approval was so poor in 2008 and 2010 may be due to the deteriorating life conditions that accompanied the natural disasters that hit the country during those years.




Figure 8.11. Percentage of those that think the President is doing a “good” or “very good” job, Haiti 2012-2014

Michel Martelly's high approval ratings for 2014 clash with news reports that have depicted Haitians as very unhappy with their president. Many news agencies have reported regular anti-government protests. These started in late 2013 and continued throughout most of 2014 and 2015. One could suggest that the high level of approval found in the 2014 wave of the AmericasBarometer could be due to the fact that the survey was administered before the end of Martelly's political honeymoon, before protesters began to take the streets. However, this is not the case. The 2014 survey responses were gathered between February 18th and March 8th 2014. Reports of anti-government protests started to appear as early as December 2013.

Another possible explanation could be that Michel Martelly's opposition is concentrated in Port-au-Prince, where most of the protest occurred. Figure 8.12 plots percentage of respondents that though the president was doing a good or very good job by region. The graph shows no indication that the president's popularity follows any strong regional patterns. All the differences reported in the figure are within the margin of error. Another possibility is that the protests are not representative of what most Haitians think about Michel Martelly.




Figure 8.12. Percentage of those that think the President is doing a “good” or “very good” job by Region, Haiti 2014

If we now turn our focus to vote intention, we find some evidence of the deterioration in support for president Martelly between 2012 and 2014. As Figure 8.13 illustrates, the rate of vote intention for the incumbent has declined by almost 5 percentage points, while support for opposition has increased by about the same amount. Yet, these are very small differences. What is more, over two thirds of Haitians who would cast a vote indicate they would support the incumbent president.




Figure 8.13. Vote Intention in Haiti, 2012-2014

In order to identify the correlates of incumbent support, we run a regression analysis in which we predict vote intention for the incumbent president using demographic and socio-economic variables and ideology, as well as perceptions of how the government combats corruption, improves security, and how the government handles the national economy. For the exercise, we recoded the dependent variable into a dichotomous measure of incumbent support, excluding respondents that would leave their ballot blank. In order to have sufficient observations to perform the analysis, we pooled the 2012 and 2014 surveys. We thus included a dummy variable to control for variation in support between the two years. The three issue variables were recoded into a 0-100 scale.

N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats (fights) government corruption?

N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

Figure 8.14 reports the results of the regression analysis. The variable that has the most impact on incumbent support is identification with the party of the president. In a country with a rather fragile party system, identification with parties is rather weak. In such a context, during off-election years, the opposition parties are not always well structured and often deprived of leading personalities. It is therefore not surprising to observe a certain rally behind the president. Also, it looks like none of the demographic and socio-economic variables have a significant impact on vote intention for the incumbent

government.. The regression also suggests that Haitians who self-place on the left of the left-right continuum would be less likely to vote for the candidate of the incumbent government. Finally, only one of the issue variables that were included in the model has the expected effect. Haitians who have a positive appreciation of the economy have a higher probability of supporting the government candidate in elections.

In light of these results, Haitian voters are arguably mostly driven by short-term considerations. They tend to rally behind a president when they believe the economy is improving.




Figure 8.14. Determinants of Incumbent Support in Haiti, 2012-2014

V. Conclusion

By many standards, Haitians are no different than any other voters. Haitians are able to locate themselves on a left-right continuum, they identify with political parties, and they have opinions about policy issues such as crime, corruption, and the economy. When asked for which party/candidate they would vote for in a future election, they use some of these heuristics to make their decision.

However, Haitians are different from other voters in the region in a few ways. We normally expect vote preferences to be shaped by demographic and socioeconomic variables. For example, we expect older¹ or wealthier² citizens to be more supportive of right-leaning incumbents. In Haiti, these variables do not seem to matter much in terms of presidential vote intention.

¹ In the US context, it has been found that young adults are generally more critical of politics and society and tend to identify in larger proportions with the center and center-left (Yankelovic 1974).

² It has been observed that lower-income groups tend to vote for left-leaning parties, while higher-income groups tend to vote for parties of the right (Lipset 1960).

We also expect voter behavior to be shaped by ideology and partisanship. Citizens who identify with the left should be more likely to support left-leaning incumbents, and vice-versa. In Haiti, those who locate themselves on the left are less likely to vote for the incumbent. The results reported in this chapter also indicate that party identification shapes vote intentions. Yet, as we saw in Figure 8.7, identification with the incumbent party rises and falls along with the coming and going of presidents. Individuals consequently identify with the party that represent the individual occupying the presidency, and not necessarily with the political party.

In the end, the current chapter provided evidence that Haitians mostly rely on short-term considerations in order to guide their voting decision. Such a behavior is consistent with the absence of a stable party system. Yet, political parties are important for democracy to take roots. This is widely recognized. Almost every new Haitian president since 1987 has been elected on the basis of a newly created political formation. Strengthening the Haitian party system should be a priority in the coming years.

Appendix

Appendix 8.1: Determinants of Incumbent Support in Haiti, 2012-2014

	Coefficients	(t)
Age	.0088574	0.12
Wealth Quintile	.0082596	0.09
Level of Education	-.0971164	-1.63
Woman	.1039834	1.63
Rural	.0654072	0.88
Left-Right Self-Placement	-.1600556	-2.43
Identification with Incumbent Party	.7838781	8.60
National Economy Situation	.1791327	2.37
Government Combats Corruption	-.0079967	-0.09
Government Improves Security	.0671108	-2.41
y2012	.2682535	0.90
Constant	1.25992	16.35
Number of observations	1514	
Design df	111	
F(13, 45)	10.15*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

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
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
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
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





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





















































Appendix B. Letter of Informed Consent



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

February 24, 2014

Dear Sir/Madam:

You are being asked to participate in a research study. This research involves a survey of public opinion on behalf of Vanderbilt University and Borge y Asociados.

The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the local and national situation. The study is being conducted so that we can better understand what people think about their country, although we cannot offer you any specific benefit. We plan to conduct a series of lectures based on the results of what people say. We will never disclose your individual opinion.

You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey in a kind of lottery system. You will not be paid for your participation, but your participation will not cause you to incur any expenses.

This survey is completely voluntary and it will take approximately 45 minutes to complete.

Your answers will be kept confidential. Your address will not be recorded. We will not ask for your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Borge y Asociados at the phone number 3891 - 4529.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it. The study IRB Approval number is: 110627

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix C. Sample Design

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey provides national coverage of voting age adults, focusing on the standard five principal regions of the country: Metropolitan region, North, Center, Rest of West, and South. In the past, these have been our strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Haiti and will remain our strata for 2012. The universe is comprised of adults (18 years old and over) living in urban and rural areas in all the 140 municipalities registered in the 2003 census in Haiti¹.

Population: The survey is designed to collect information from a nationally representative sample of the entire voting age adult population. Only non-institutionalized adults are eligible to participate in the survey. Therefore, the sample excludes people in boarding schools, hospitals, police academies, military barracks, and inmates of the country's jails.

Unit of Observation: The study contains topics that refer not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider the dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in the surveyed country. This means that every eligible person in the country has an equal and known chance of being included in the survey sample. It also means that no particular ethnic group or geographical areas are excluded from the sampling frame.

In this sample design, as a sampling frame, we used the list of municipalities, localities and census segments, and maps in Haiti from the 2003 by the Institut Haitien de statistiques et d'Informatique (IHSI).

Haiti is divided into 10 departments and sub-divided into about 140 municipalities. Within each municipality, the Institut Haitien de statistiques et d'Informatique established the census segments and within them the constituent dwellings.

According to the 2002 census data, Haiti has a total of 5,639,026 voting-age adults. Forty nine percent of the population was living in urban areas and the remaining 51% live in what is categorized as rural areas. Table 1 shows the distribution of the population 18 years old and over by department, and urban and rural areas.

¹ The next population census will not be conducted until 2012.

Table 1. Distribution of the Population 18 Years old and over by Department, Sex, and Urban and Rural areas.

Departments	Urban	Rural	Total
Artibonite	351,908	534,967	886,875
Centre	65,569	284,948	350,517
Grande-Anse	50,225	182,493	232,718
Nippes	29,415	146,411	175,826
Nord	254,735	282,613	537,348
Nord-Est	84,608	102,668	187,276
Nord-Ouest	93,561	258,286	351,847
Ouest	1,715,286	498,217	2,213,503
Sud	84,031	309,495	393,526
Sud-Est	45,473	264,117	309,590
Total	2,774,811	2,864,215	5,639,026

III. Sampling Method

The sampling method chosen takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the design of the sample were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

Size of the Municipalities

1. Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants
2. Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
3. Municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants

Strata for the first stage

1. Metropolitan region
2. North
3. Center
4. Rest of West
5. South

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban Area
2. Rural Area

(b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.

(c) Minimize travel time in survey operations.

(d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.

(e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.

(f) Expectation of 24 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU) or municipality, allowing a multi-level analysis

(g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas

On the basis of these requirements, the method that is used in Haiti corresponds to a **stratified multi-stage cluster sampling**. The sample will be stratified based on three factors:

- 1) Size of the Municipalities
- 2) Region: Metropolitan region/North/Center/ Rest of West/South
- 3) Level of Urbanization: Urban/Rural Areas

The stratified sampling ensures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the strata in combination cover the total population. Stratification also enables us to ensure the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions in the country and sample dispersion.

The survey design for Haiti follows a multi-stage process as shown in the table 2 below:

1. The first stage, which corresponds to the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), involves the selection of municipalities within each of the strata defined above with probability proportional to the voting age adult population (PPS) of the country. Each PSU consists of 24 interviews.

Table 2. Multi-Stage Stratified Cluster Sampling

Strata	Size of the Municipalities, Regions, Level of Urbanization
Primary sampling Unit (PSU)	Municipalities
Secondary sampling Unit (SSU)	Census segments or Enumeration areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (TSU)	Blocks or Manzanas
Quaternary Unit (EU)	Households
Final Unit	Respondent

2. The second stage of the sample design consists of the selection of census segments or enumeration areas within each PSU using PPS.
3. In the third stage blocks or “manzanas” within the census segments are selected.
4. In the fourth stage, clusters of households are randomly selected within each PSU. A total of 6 interviews are to be carried out in each sampling point in both rural and urban areas. Sampling points represent clusters of interviews, and the clusters are kept relatively small in order not to increase the “design effect” of the sample, but are also designed to reduce transportation costs by allowing some concentration in a given geographic point.
5. Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota sample by gender and age is employed for selecting *a single respondent in each household*. The objective of the quota sample is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey matches the country’s official population statistics or those reported by the Census Bureau. Fully random selection within the household would have required extensive recalls, thus dramatically increasing costs with no assurances that a correct balance by gender and age would be thus achieved².

² The team in Chile uses random selection at the household level because of an exceptional level of what we might term “professional dogmatism” by various researchers and professionals in that country, whose strong and vocal stances against the use of quotas run the danger of reducing the credibility of our work in that country. The Ecuador survey has also used random selection, and we are recommending the use of quotas for 2012.

IV. Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. In an extreme case, samples that are not stratified can, by chance, exclude the nation's capital or largest city. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance within strata and not between them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis.

The Haiti sample is stratified by population size of the municipalities, regions (Metropolitan region/North/Center/ Rest of West/South), level of urbanization (urban, rural). Table 3 displays the distribution of the interviews within each region by size of the municipalities for Haiti. Appendix I shows the distribution of the sample by urban and rural areas. A total of 750 interviews are conducted in the urban areas and 762 in the rural areas. It will be recalled that Haiti has an approximately 50-50 split urban/rural according to the census. Our sample design reflects this split.

Table 3. Distribution of the Sample by Region and Size of the Municipalities

Population	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan		72,651	1,351,799	1,424,450
Northern	402,979	426,543	246,949	1,076,471
Central	221,861	687,685	327,846	1,237,392
Rest of West	52,682	417,633	318,738	789,053
Southern	566,355	545,305		1,111,660
Total	1,243,877	2,149,817	2,245,332	5,639,026
% of respondents	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan	0.0%	3.4%	60.2%	25.3%
Northern	32.4%	19.8%	11.0%	19.1%
Central	17.8%	32.0%	14.6%	21.9%
Rest of West	4.2%	19.4%	14.2%	14.0%
Southern	45.5%	25.4%	0.0%	19.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Number of interviews	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan	0	24	354	378
Northern	24	192	72	288
Central	24	216	96	336
Rest of West	0	120	102	222
Southern	72	216	0	288
Total	120	768	624	1512

V. Sample Selection

First Stage: Primary Sampling Units

At the first stage, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are selected within each of the four regions (i.e., strata, with allocation proportional to stratum size). The PSU are the country's 140 municipalities that we have classified by size following the LAPOP Central guidelines:

Large: Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants;

Medium-sized: Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants;

Small: Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants.

The municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants are self-selected, which is the same thing as saying that they are selected with probability equal to 1. Small and medium-sized municipalities are selected within each stratum, with probability proportional to the population size (PPS) of the municipality (population 18 years of age or older), on a systematic basis, with a random starting point. Table 4 shows the number of municipalities that were selected in the four large regions in Haiti. A fixed number of 24 interviews are conducted in each municipality except for the 11 large municipalities. How those are selected is explained below.

Table 4. Municipalities Selected by Regions

Number of municipalities in Haiti	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan	0	1	5	6
Northern	29	11	2	42
Central	12	13	2	27
Rest of West	5	10	2	17
Southern	40	11	0	51
Total	86	46	11	143
Number of interviews	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan	0	24	360	384
Northern	24	96	72	288
Central	24	192	96	336
Rest of West	0	120	72	216
Southern	72	144	0	288
Total	120	768	624	1512
Number of selected municipalities	Fewer than 25 thousand inhabitants	Between 25 and 100 thousand inhabitants	More than 100 thousand inhabitants	Total
Metropolitan	0	1	5	6
Northern	5	4	2	11
Central	2	8	2	12
Rest of West	1	5	2	8
Southern	6	6	0	12
Total	14	24	11	49

For the eleven large municipalities, the primary sampling units (PSU) correspond to the next lower sub-divisions in the census. In Haiti, these sub-divisions are defined as “localities” or “areas.” Table 5 shows the number of PSUs to be selected in each of the large municipalities.

Table 5. Primary Sampling Units within the Large Municipalities.

Municipality	Freq.	Percent	Number of interviews	PSUs
Port-de-Paix	101079	4.6%	36	1
Léogane	107738	4.9%	36	1
la Croix des Bouquets	133564	6.1%	36	1
Saint Marc	140553	6.5%	48	1
Cité Soleil	140730	6.5%	36	1
Cap-Haïtien	145870	6.7%	48	2
Pétion-Ville	182348	8.4%	48	2
Gonaïves	187293	8.6%	48	2
Delmas	222511	10.2%	60	2
Carrefour	261773	12.0%	72	3
Port-au-Prince	555239	25.5%	168	6
Total	2,178,698	100.0%	624	22

In sum, a total of 60 PSUs of 24 interviews each is selected. The PSUs correspond to 14 small municipalities, 24 medium-sized municipalities and 22 PSUs within the three large municipalities.

Second Stage: Selection of Census Segments

In a second stage of the sample selection process, after stratification by urban and rural, segments or enumeration areas are selected in each PSU with allocation proportional to population size. The census segments are selected with probability proportional to size (PPS) on a systematic basis with a random starting point within each PSU. The number of segments to be selected in each PSU was set taking into account the LAPOP Central requirement of establishing final sampling units of size 6 in both urban areas and rural areas. Table 6 shows the number of segments selected within each stratum. A total of 252 sampling points were selected: 125 in the urban areas and 127 rural ones, distributed across the 54 selected municipalities.

Table 6. Distribution of Sampling Points by Regions and Size of the Municipalities

Region	Number of interviews			Number of selected census segments		
	Urban	Rural	total	Urban	Rural	total
Metropolitan						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	24	0	24	4	0	4
More than 100k inhab.	354	0	354	59	0	59
Total Metropolitan	378	0	378	63	0	63
Northern						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	6	18	24	1	3	4
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	54	138	192	9	23	32
More than 100k inhab.	60	12	72	10	2	12
Total Northern	120	168	288	20	28	48
Central						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	6	18	24	1	3	4
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	48	168	216	8	28	36
More than 100k inhab.	60	36	96	10	6	16
Total Central	114	222	336	19	37	56
Rest of West						
Fewer than 25k inhab.			0	0	0	0
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	54	66	120	9	11	20
More than 100k inhab.	30	72	102	5	12	17
Total Rest of West	84	138	222	14	23	37
Southern						
Fewer than 25k inhab.	18	54	72	3	9	12
Between 25 and 100k inhab.	36	180	216	6	30	36
More than 100k inhab.			0	0	0	0
Total Southern	54	234	288	9	39	48
Total Country	750	762	1512	125	127	252

Third Stage: Selection of Blocks or Manzanas

In the third stage, blocks or “manzanas” within the census segments are selected. Each country team is expected to obtain the appropriate maps of the selected census segments or enumeration districts from their own census bureaus. Each selected census segment will be divided into three or more manzanas or blocks. One manzana or block will be selected randomly in each census segment. The selected manzana will constitute the sampling point or cluster within the census segment. The interviewer is required to interview 6 persons in each selected manzana/block or cluster.

Fourth Stage: Selection of Households

This stage of selection begins once interviewers locate the starting point of the block or manzana. Each interviewer will select a number of households in a systematic way. Specifically, interviews should be carried out every three households. In other words, each time an interview is completed, the next interview cannot be carried out in the following two households.

In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or nobody at home, the interviewer selects the adjacent dwelling. In those cases in which the interviewer reaches the end of the manzana without completing the quota of six interviews, he or she can proceed to the next manzana follow the same routine as in the first block.

Fifth Stage: Selection of the Respondents

A single respondent will be selected in each household, following a quota sampling based on sex and age (as shown in Table 7 below). The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2002 census. The respondent should be a permanent household member- neither a domestic employee nor a visitor. If there are two or more people of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire should be applied to the person with the next birthday.

Table 7. Quota by Sex and Age Group

Sex/Age group	18- 29	30- 45	45 and over	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

VI. Confidence Level, and Margins of Error


The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in dichotomous variables (in any other proportion, the sampling error is lower). The margins of error for a confidence level of 95 percent assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design are:

Sample Size and Margin of Error (Confidence Level 95%)		
Region	Sample size	Margin of error
Metropolitan Area	378	5.00
Northern	288	5.77
Central	336	5.35
Rest of West	222	6.67
Southern	288	5.77
Areas		
Urban	750	3.59
Rural	762	3.54
Total Country	1,512	2.52

Since the sample is stratified and clustered (Kish 1995), we have to take into account the complex sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the sample. It is not possible to determine the sampling error a priori. We recommend including the sampling error taking into account the design effect for a set of variables once the survey is completed.

Appendix D. Questionnaire

Haiti 2014, Version # 15.2.3.1 IRB Approval: 110627



LAPOP: Haiti, 2014

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PAIS. Country:	01. Mexico 02. Guatemala 03. El Salvador 04. Honduras 05. Nicaragua 06. Costa Rica 07. Panama 08. Colombia 09. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dom. Rep. 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad & Tobago 26. Belize 40. United States 41. Canada 27. Suriname 28. Bahamas 29. Barbados	22
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]	_____	
ESTRATOPRI: (2201) Metropolitan Area (2202) Region 1 (North-Northwest-Northeast) (2003) Region 2 (Center-Artibonite) (2204) Region 3 (West) (2205) Region 4 (South-Southeast-Grand-Anse/Nippes)	_____	
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality [voting age population according to the census; modify for each country, using the appropriate number of strata and population ranges]: (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (between 25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000)	_____	
CORRIDOR: (1) North (2) Port-au-Prince (3) Saint-Marc (4) Other regions	_____	
UPM [Primary Sampling Unit, normally identical to "MUNICIPIO"]	_____	
PROV. Department:	_____	22
MUNICIPIO. Commune:	_____	22
HAISEKSYON. Communal Section:	_____	
HAISEC. Sector [optional]	_____	
HAISEGMENTO. Census Segment [official census code]	_____	
CLUSTER. [Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: [Every cluster must have 6 interviews; assigned key-code by field supervisor]	_____	
UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use country's census definition]	_____	
TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area	_____	
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (14) Creole	_____	
Start time: _____	_____	

FECHA. Date Day: _____ Month: _____ Year: 2014 | | | | |

Do you live in this home?

Yes → continue

No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

Are you a Haitian citizen or permanent resident of Haiti?

Yes → continue

No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

How old are you? [Only continue if they are at least 18 years old]

Yes → continue

No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT AND RECEIVE CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.

Q1. Sex [Record but do not ask]:	(1) Male	(2) Female	
Q2Y. In what year were you born? _____ year	(8888) DK	(9888) DA	
LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are: [Read options]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Somewhat satisfied	(3) Somewhat dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer	

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]			
Armed conflict	30	Inequality	58
Bad government	15	Inflation, high prices	02
Corruption	13	Kidnapping	31
Credit, lack of	09	Land to farm, lack of	07
Crime	05	Malnutrition	23
Discrimination	25	Migration	16
Drug addiction; consumption of drugs	11	Politicians	59
Drug trafficking	12	Popular protests (strikes, blocking roads, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Population explosion	20
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Poverty	04
Electricity, lack of	24	Roads in poor condition	18
Environment	10	Security (lack of)	27
External debt	26	Terrorism	33
Forced displacement of persons	32	Transportation, problems of	60
Gangs	14	Unemployment	03
Health services, lack of	22	Violence	57
Housing	55	War against terrorism	17
Human rights, violations of	56	Water, lack of	19
Impunity	61	Other	70
DK	88	DA	98

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago?**

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer | | |

IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		

Now, let's talk about your local municipality...

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options]	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

CP4A. In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a local public official or local government: for example, a mayor, municipal council, or councilman?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		
CP5m. In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a Haitian living outside of this country or an organization led by Haitians living abroad?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer		

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?							
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year (4) Never (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer							

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	INAP
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	


CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
--	---	---	---	---	----	----	--

CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
--	---	---	---	---	----	----	----

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?				
(1) Very trustworthy Untrustworthy	(2) Somewhat trustworthy (88) DK	(3) Not very trustworthy (98) DA		

[GIVE CARD A TO THE RESPONDENT]

L1. Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.			
--	--	--	--



[TAKE BACK CARD A]

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?			
(1) Yes [Continue] (98) DA [Go to JC10]	(2) No [Go to JC10] (88) DK [Go to JC10]		

Y4. What was the purpose of the demonstration or protest? [DON'T READ OPTIONS. ONLY MARK ONE ANSWER. If the respondent participated in more than one, ask about the most recent protest. If the protest had more than one purpose, ask for the most important.]			
(1) Economic factors (work, prices, inflation, lack of opportunities) (2) Education (lack of opportunities, high tuition, poor quality, education policy) (3) Political topics (protest against laws, parties or political candidates, exclusion, corruption) (4) Security problems (crime, militias, gangs) (5) Human rights (6) Environmental themes (7) Lack of public services (8) Other (88) DK (98) DA	(99) N/A		

BOLPROT3. And the demonstrations or protests that you participated in were in favor or against the National Government?

(1) In favor of the National Government
 (2) Against the National Government
 (3) [Don't Read] Not in favor nor against the Government
 (4) [Don't Read] Sometimes in favor and sometimes against
 (88) DK
 (98) DA
 (99) N/A

| | |

HAIPROT1. In recent years and thinking about your participation in a demonstration or protest march, has someone offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your participation? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?

(1) Often
 (2) Sometimes
 (3) Never
 (88) DK
 (98) DA
 (99) N/A

| | |

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the Police Nationale d'Haïti to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a coup by the police be justified under the following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]:

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A take-over by the police of the state would be justified	(2) A take-over by the police of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A take-over by the police of the state would be justified	(2) A take-over by the police of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
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VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]
 (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]

| | |

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?

[fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

| | |

<p>VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? [Read the options]</p> <p>(01) Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) [Don't read] Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)</p>	
<p>VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/Section communale (4) In another municipality/Section communale (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p>VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)</p>	
<p>POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighborhood?</p> <p>[If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"]</p> <p>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?</p> <p>(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PESE1. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher, about the same, or lower than in other neighborhoods?</p> <p>(1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PESE2. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher, about the same, or lower than 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: Implement preventive measures or increase punishment of criminals?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1) Implement preventive measures		
(2) Increase punishment of criminals		
(3) [Don't read] Both		
(88) DK		
(98) DA		

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all				A lot		Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer	

Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Haiti guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Haiti?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Haiti?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Haiti?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Haiti?

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?

B18. To what extent do you trust the Police (PNH)?

B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?

B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?

HAIB21B. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

HAIB32. To what extent do you trust the KASEK?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

And continuing to use the same card,

NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT

**Note 1-7,
88 = DK,
98 = DA**

EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Haitian political parties represent their voters well?

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT								Note down 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats (fights) government corruption?								<input type="text"/>
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?								<input type="text"/>
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?								<input type="text"/>
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT								Note down 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?								<input type="text"/>
Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is "Not at all" and 7 is "A lot," how likely is it that people in your neighborhood would be punished by authorities for....								(88) DK (98) DA
PR3A. Buying pirated (bootleg) DVDs. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?								<input type="text"/>
PR3B. And for obtaining electricity (bypassing the meter) without paying? How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?								<input type="text"/>
PR3C. And for occupying or invading a vacant lot. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?								<input type="text"/>
PR4. To what degree do you feel that the Haitian government respects the private property of its citizens? Please use the same scale from 1 is "not at all" to 7 is "a lot."								<input type="text"/>
[TAKE BACK CARD B]								
PR5. Do you believe that the Haitian government has the right to seize private property from a person on behalf of the "national interest," even if that person does not agree with it, or do you believe that the government does not have that right? (1) The government has the right to seize private property (2) The government does not have that right (88) DK (98) DA								
M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Michel Martelly? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA								<input type="text"/>
HAIM1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of Prime Minister Lamothe? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA								<input type="text"/>
HAIM2. Now speaking of the National Assembly, and thinking of senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, how would you rate the job performance of senators and representatives of the National Assembly? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA								<input type="text"/>

HAIBLAME1. Who is the most to blame for the political difficulties in our country: [READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]		_____
(1) The President (2) The National Assembly (3) Politicians in general (4) The Haitian people in general (5) The international community (6) [Don't read] Other (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA		_____

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?		_____
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA		_____

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? Are you... [Read alternatives]		_____
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA		_____

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you... [Read alternatives]		_____
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA		_____

INFRAZ. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? [READ ALTERNATIVES]		_____
(1) Less than 10 minutes (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour (4) More than an hour and up to three hours (5) More than three hours (6) [DON'T READ] There are no police/they would never arrive (88) DK (98) DA		_____

[GIVE CARD C TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Strongly disagree							Strongly agree	Doesn't know	Doesn't answer

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.		
ROS1. The Haitian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		_____
ROS4. The Haitian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?		_____

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="text"/>
EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="text"/>
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	<input type="text"/>

[TAKE BACK CARD C]

ENV1. In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: protecting the environment, or promoting economic growth?	<input type="text"/>		
(1) Protect the environment			
(2) Promoting economic growth			
(3) [Don't read] Both			
(88) DK			
(98) DA			
PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Haiti?	<input type="text"/>		
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	(4) Very dissatisfied
(88) DK	(98) DA		
W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?	<input type="text"/>		
(1) Yes, justified	(2) No, not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

[Give Card D TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you *strongly disapprove* and 10 means that you *strongly approve*. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Strongly disapprove										Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
Strongly approve											

1-10,
88=DK,
98=DA

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<input type="text"/>
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	<input type="text"/>
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<input type="text"/>
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	<input type="text"/>

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in Haiti. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.	<input type="text"/>
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Haiti form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]	<input type="text"/>

1-10,
88=DK,
98=DA

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	_____
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Haiti form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	_____
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	_____
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	_____
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?	_____

[TAKE BACK CARD D]

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or
- (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one

(88) DK (98) DA

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

(1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of the following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.	Yes	No	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	DK	DA	N/A
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR3]				88	98	
						[Skip to VICBAR3]		
VICBAR1F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR4]				88	98	
						[Skip to VICBAR4]		
VICBAR3F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR7]				88	98	

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of the following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.	Yes	No	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	DK	DA	N/A
								[Skip to VICBAR7]
VICBAR4F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in the last 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to FEAR10]				88	98	
								[Skip to FEAR10]
VICBAR7F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3	88	98	99

	Yes	No	DK	DA	
FEAR10. In order to protect yourself from crime, in the last 12 months, have you taken any measures such as avoiding walking through some areas in your neighborhood because they are dangerous?	1	0	88	98	
VIC44. In the last 12 months, out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	1	0	88	98	

VB1. Do you have a national identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	_____
VB2. Did you vote in the first round of the last presidential elections of 2010? (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB4NEW] (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10]	_____

<p>VB3n. Who did you vote for in the first round of the last presidential election of 2010? [DON'T READ THE LIST]</p> <p>(00) None (Blank ballot) [Go to VB10] (97) None (null ballot) [Go to VB10]</p> <p>(2201) Mirlande Marigat (RDPN) [Go to VB10] (2202) Michel Joseph Martelly (Repons Peyizan) [Go to VB10] (2203) Jude Celestin (INITE) [Go to VB10] (2204) Jean Henry Céant (Renmen Ayiti) [Go to VB10] (2205) Jacques Edouard Alexis (MPH) [Go to VB10] (2206) Charles Henry Baker (RESPE) [Go to VB10] (2207) Jeune Jean Chavannes (ACCRHA) [Go to VB10] (2208) Yves Cristalin (LAVNI) [Go to VB10] (2209) Lesly Voltaire (Ansanm Nou Fo) [Go to VB10] (2210) Josette Bijou (INDEPENDENT [Go to VB10] (2277) Other [Go to VB10]</p> <p>(88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10] (99) INAP (Didn't vote) [Go to VB4NEW]</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB4NEW. [ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN'T VOTE. DON'T READ ALTERNATIVES] [If respondent says "I didn't vote because I didn't want", ask why did not he/she want] Why did you not vote in the first round of the last presidential election? [Only allow one response]</p> <p>(1) Was confused (2) Didn't like any of the candidates, didn't like the campaign (3) Do not believe in elections/electoral authorities (4) Do not believe in democracy (5) Bureaucratic matters (voter registry) (6) Age-related matters (too young, too old) (7) Not in the district/away from home (8) Not interested in politics (77) Another reason (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (voted) [AFTER THIS QUESTION GO TO VB10]</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB101. [ONLY FOR THOSE WHO RESPONDED "NONE (BLANK OR NULL)" ON VB3n] Why did you cast a null or blank ballot in the first round of the last presidential election? [DON'T READ ALTERNATIVES]</p> <p>(1) Was confused (2) Wanted to express their discontent with all of the candidates; didn't like any of the candidates (3) Do not believe in democracy, wanted to protest against the political system (4) Do not believe in elections/electoral authorities (5) Not interested in politics (6) My vote does not make any difference (7) Another reason (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]</p>	

VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST]

(2201) Fwon Lespwa
 (2202) RDNP
 (2203) Respè
 (2204) Repons Peyizan
 (2205) MPH
 (2206) Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne
 (2207) Organizasyon Pèp Kap Lité
 (2208) Alyans/Alliance Démocratique
 (2209) Renmen Ayiti
 (2210) Ansanm nou Fo
 (2211) Lavalas
 (2212) Unité
 (2213) PHTK (Pati Tèt Kale)
 (77) Other

(88) DK
 (98) DA
 (99) N/A

| | |

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

| | |

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read options]

(1) Wouldn't vote
 (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
 (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration
 (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
 (88) DK (98) DA

| | |

CLien1n. Thinking of the last national elections, any candidate or political party offered a favor, gift, or other benefit to a person whom you know in exchange for that person's support or vote?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

| | |

CLien1na. And thinking about the last presidential elections of 2010, did someone offer you something, like a favor, gift or any other benefit in return for your vote or support?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

| | |

[GIVE CARD G TO THE RESPONDENT]		
FOR1n. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. Which of the following countries has the most influence in the Caribbean? [READ CHOICES]		
(1) China, that is mainland China and not Taiwan	(2) Japan	
(3) India	(4) United States	
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela	
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain	
(11) [Don't read] Another country, or	(12) [Don't read] None	
(88) [Don't read] DK	(98) [Don't read] DA	
FOR4. And within 10 years , in your opinion which of the following countries will have most influence in the Caribbean? [Read options]		
(1) China	(2) Japan	
(3) India	(4) United States	
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela	
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain	
(11) [Don't read] Another country	(12) [Don't read] None	
(88) [Don't read] DK	(98) [Don't read] DA	
[TAKE CARD G. HAND OUT CARD H]		
FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be the model for the future development of our country? [Read options]		
(1) China	(2) Japan	
(3) India	(4) United States	
(5) Singapore	(6) Russia	
(7) South Korea	(10) Brazil	
(11) Venezuela, or	(12) Mexico	
(13) [Don't read] None/we ought to follow our own model		
(14) [Don't read] Other	(88) DK	
	(98) DA	
[TAKE CARD "H"]		
FOR6. And thinking now only of our country , how much influence do you think that China has in our country? [Read options]		
(1) A lot [Continue]	(2) Some [Continue]	
(3) A little [Continue]	(4) None [Go to FOR6b]	
(88) DK [Go to FOR6b]	(98) DA [Go to FOR6b]	
FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is very positive, positive, negative, or very negative?		
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence	
(88) DK	(98) DA	
	(99) N/A	
FOR6b. Again thinking about only our country , how much influence does the United States have in our country? [Read alternatives]		
(1) A lot [Continue]	(2) Some [Continue]	
(3) A little [Continue]	(4) None [Go to MIL10A]	
(88) DK [Go to MIL10A]	(98) DA [Go to MIL10A]	
FOR7b. The influence that the United States has on our country is very positive, positive, negative, or very negative?		
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence	
(88) DK	(98) DA	
	(99) N/A	

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust **the governments** of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworth y	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworth y	Don't know/No opinion	DA	
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	

WF1. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years
[Use the table below for the code]

00. None

Primary	Secondary	University
01 Pre-School	08 Sixième / 7 A.F.	15 University 1
02 Preparatory1 / 1 A.F.	09 Cinquième / 8 A.F.	16 University 2
03 Preparatory 2 / 2 A.F.	10 Quatrième / 9 A.F.	17 University 3
04 Elementary 1 / 3 A.F.	11 Troisième	18+ University 4 and more
05 Elementary 2 / 4 A.F.	12 Seconde	
06 Intermediate 1 / 5 A.F.	13 Rhéto	
07 Intermediate 2 / 6 A.F.	14 Philo	
(88) DK	(98) DA	

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options]

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

Q5B. Could you please tell me how important is religion in your life? **[Read options]**

(1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important
(88) DK (98) DA

OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently **[Read options]**

- (1) Working? **[Continue]**
- (2) Not working, but have a job? **[Continue]**
- (3) Actively looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (4) A student? **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (5) Taking care of the home? **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (7) Not working and not looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (88) DK **[Go to Q10NEW]**
- (98) DA **[Go to Q10NEW]**

OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]

Q33. What is this job are you. [read the options]

- (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?
- (2) A salaried employee in the private sector?
- (3) Owner or partner in a business
- (4) Self-employed
- (5) Unpaid worker
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

[GIVE CARD F TO THE RESPONDENT]

Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 1050 gourdes
- (02) 1050-1500 gourdes
- (03) 1501-1850 gourdes
- (04) 1851-2150 gourdes
- (05) 2151-2400 gourdes
- (06) 2401-2750 gourdes
- (07) 2751-3150 gourdes
- (08) 3151-3550 gourdes
- (09) 3551-3950 gourdes
- (10) 3951-4300 gourdes
- (11) 4301-4850 gourdes
- (12) 4851-5350 gourdes
- (13) 5351-5950 gourdes
- (14) 5951-6850 gourdes
- (15) 6851 – 9300 gourdes
- (16) More than 9300 gourdes
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]

Q10G. How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension? **[If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]**

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 1050 gourdes
- (02) 1050-1500 gourdes
- (03) 1501-1850 gourdes
- (04) 1851-2150 gourdes
- (05) 2151-2400 gourdes
- (06) 2401-2750 gourdes
- (07) 2751-3150 gourdes
- (08) 3151-3550 gourdes
- (09) 3551-3950 gourdes
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- (12) 4851-5350 gourdes
- (13) 5351-5950 gourdes
- (14) 5951-6850 gourdes
- (15) 6851 – 9300 gourdes
- (16) More than 9300 gourdes
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

[TAKE BACK CARD F]

<p>Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances (financial support), that is, economic assistance from abroad?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to HAIQ10C] (88) DK [Go to HAIQ10C] (98) DA [Go to HAIQ10C]</p>							
<p>Q10B. [Only if respondent receives economic assistance from abroad] To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? [Read Options]</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>							
<p>Q10C1. [Only for those who response “yes” to Q10A] Who sends the majority of remittances to this household? Is this person a... [Read Options] [Note: Only one option allowed]</p> <p>(1) Spouse (2) Parent (3) Child (4) Other relative (5) Friend (6) Other person (88) DK (98) DA (99) Inap</p>							
<p>HAIQ10C. [Ask everyone] Do you have relatives that used to live in this household who are now living in another country? If respondent says YES, ask where? [DON’T Read Options]</p> <p>(1) Yes, in the United States only [Continue] (2) Yes, in the Dominican Republic only [Continue] (3) Yes, in the United States, Dominican Republic and other countries [Continue] (4) Yes, in other countries (no in the United States nor in the Dominican Republic) [Continue] (5) No [Go to Q14] (88) DK [Go to Q14] (98) DA [Go to Q14]</p>							
<p>Q16. [Only for those who respond “yes” to Q10C] How often do you communicate with them? [Read Options]</p> <p>(1) Everyday (2) Once or twice a week (3) Once or twice a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>							
<p>Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>							
<p>Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time (88) [Don’t read] DK (98) [Don’t read] DA</p>							
<p>Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased? (88) DK (98) DA</p>							
<p>Q11n. What is your marital status? [Read options]</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>(1) Single (3) Common law marriage (Living together) (5) Separated (88) DK</p> </td><td style="width: 50%; border: none;"> <p>(2) Married (4) Divorced (6) Widowed (98) DA</p> </td></tr> </table>						<p>(1) Single (3) Common law marriage (Living together) (5) Separated (88) DK</p>	<p>(2) Married (4) Divorced (6) Widowed (98) DA</p>
<p>(1) Single (3) Common law marriage (Living together) (5) Separated (88) DK</p>	<p>(2) Married (4) Divorced (6) Widowed (98) DA</p>						

Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____	
(88) DK	(98) DA
Q12Bn. How many children under the age of 13 live in this household? _____	
00 = none,	(88) DK (98) DA

Q12. Do you have children? How many? [Include all respondent's children] _____			
(00 = none)	(88) DK (98) DA		
ETID. Do you consider yourself white, black, mulatto, or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-Haitian, mark (4) Black]			
(1) White	(4) Black		
(88) DK	(98) DA		
LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]			
(2201) Creole	(2202) French	(2206) Creole and French	(2203) Spanish
(2204) English	(2205) Other	(88) DK (98) DA	

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options]	
(1) Daily	
(2) A few times a week	
(3) A few times a month	
(4) Rarely	
(5) Never	
(88) [Don't read] DK	(98) [Don't read] DA

GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]:	
(1) Daily	(2) A few times a week
(5) Never	(3) A few times a month (4) Rarely
(88) DK	(98) DA
For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...	Correct Incorrect Don't know Don't answer
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? [Don't read: Barack Obama, accept Obama]	1 2 88 98
GIX4. In which continent is Nigeria? [Don't read: Africa]	1 2 88 98
GI4. How long is the presidential term of office in Haiti? [Don't read: 5 years]	1 2 88 98
GI7. How many members does the Chamber of Deputies have?	Number: _____
[WRITE DOWN THE EXACT NUMBER STATED. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]	8888 9888

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: [read out all items]				
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	88	98

R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88	98
R6. Washing machine	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R15. Computer	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R18. Internet	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	
R1. Television	(0) No	[Skip to R26]	(1) Yes [Continue]	88	98	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	(99) INAP
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No		(1) Yes	88	98	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

FORMATQ. Please indicate the format in which **THIS** specific questionnaire was completed.

1. Paper
2. Android
3. Windows PDA

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____

(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]

Time interview ended _____ : _____

T1. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____

INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____

SEXI. Note interviewer's sex: (1) Male (2) Female

COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____ / ____ / ____

Field supervisor's signature _____


Comments:

[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____


[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who verified the data _____



Card A (L1)




Card B






Card C



Card D





Card G

Brazil

China

Spain

United States

India

Japan

Mexico

Venezuela

Card H

Brazil

China

South Korea

United States

India

Japan

Mexico

Russia

Singapore

Venezuela

Card F

- (00) No income**
- (01) Less than 1050 gourdes**
- (02) 1050-1500 gourdes**
- (03) 1501-1850 gourdes**
- (04) 1851-2150 gourdes**
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- (15) 6851 – 9300 gourdes**
- (16) More than 9300 gourdes**

Color Palette



The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP's efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer's duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by Internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our "data repositories" and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas

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