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# THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN GUYANA: 2006

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**June, 2007**



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## Acronyms

AFC	Alliance for Change
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBOS	Consecutive Business Outlook Surveys
CC	Carter Centre
CDC	Community Development Council
CIA	Civil Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COG	Commonwealth Observer Group
CRA	Constitutional Reform Act
CRC	Constitutional Reform Commission
CSME	CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CSP	Citizens Security Project
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
EU	European Union
FPTP	First-Pass-the-Post
GBA	Guyana Bar Association
GDF	Guyana Defence Force
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEC	Guyana Electricity Corporation
GECOM	Guyana Elections Commission
GNDI	Gross National Disposable Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GoG	Government of Guyana
GPF	Guyana Police Force
GUYSUCO	Guyana Sugar Corporation
GUYWA	Guyana Water Authority
GHRA	Guyana Human Rights Association
IADB	Inter American Development Bank
ICCPR	International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICESR	International Covenant on Economic Social & Cultural Rights
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IMC	Interim Management Committees
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
LCS	Living Conditions Survey
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NA	National Assembly
NACTA	North American Caribbean Teachers Association
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDS	National Development Strategy

OAS	Organisation of American States
PNC	People's National Congress
PNCR-1G	People's National Congress Reform 1 Guyana
PPP/C	People's Progressive Party Civic
PPS	Probability Proportional to Size
PR	Proportional Representation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSC	Private Sector Commission
RDC	Regional Democratic Council
ROAR	Rise, Organise and Rebuild Party
SARA	St. Augustine Research Associates
TSS	Tactical Special Squad
TUC	Trade Union Congress
TUF	The United Force
UK	United Kingdom
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WCS	World Competitiveness Survey
WPA	Working People's Alliance

## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. Year of first survey The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance are still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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## Prologue

### The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

By Mitchell A. Seligson  
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Vanderbilt University

I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable the study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series

and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behaviour. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviours. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than 0.6, with a preference for 0.7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above 0.7, many reaching above 0.8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of

anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. Is this necessary? This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire was pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were

assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

## General Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles in the Global Bureau of USAID, assisted by Eric Kite, Maria Barrón and Elizabeth Ramirez in the Latin American Bureau, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt’s Dean of Arts and Science, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas has strongly supported the project administratively and financially, and contributed key funding to enable the inclusion of the United States and Canada in this round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Her administrative assistant, Janelle Lees made lots of things happen efficiently. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, Vanderbilt University performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve my special appreciation for their efforts.

At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the

data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

Country	Researchers
Summary Report	Prof. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (Project Director)
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Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, University of Michigan, and Senior Research Analyst at Market Strategies, Inc.</li> <li>●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University</li> <li>●Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> <li>●José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Prof. Manuel Ortega-Hegg, Director of the Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural (CASC) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua, Nicaragua</li> <li>●Marcelina Castillo Venerio, Centro de Análisis Socio-cultural (CASC), Universidad Centroamericana. (UCA)</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP, and Professor at the Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Professor of Political Science at Central Michigan University</li> </ul>
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee</li> <li>●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology Science at Temple University</li> </ul>

Country	Researchers
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Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Yves François Pierre, Groupe de Recherche en Sciences Sociales (GRESS)</li> </ul>
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Ian Boxill, Professor of Comparative Sociology, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> <li>● Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> <li>● Roy Russell, Lecturer in statistics, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> <li>● Arlene Bailey, Information Systems specialist, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.</li> <li>● Dr. Lloyd Waller, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Government, UWI, Mona</li> <li>● Dr Paul Martin, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI,</li> <li>● Lance Gibbs and Caryl James, Lecturers/Research Assistants, Dept. of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work</li> </ul>
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor at the Universidad de los Andes</li> </ul>
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the US, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> <li>● Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Mitchell Seligson Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Abby B. Córdova, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
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Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Denise Pavia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, Brazil</li> <li>● Simon Bohn, York University</li> <li>● Rachael Meneguello, Brazil, Director of the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) and Professor of Political Science, University of Campinas, Brazil</li> <li>● David Samules, University of Minnesota</li> <li>● Luicio Renno, University of Arizona</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
December, 2006

## Specific Acknowledgements

The study that appears on these pages is the first that was conducted in Guyana, representing the largest and most comprehensive effort undertaken to systematically measure the political culture of Guyana. It was carried out by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Guyana and the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This study required a great deal of effort on the part of many people, some of whom we wish to thank here.

The testing of the questionnaire, sample design, training, fieldwork, supervision, information validation, data entry, processing, data file development, and quality control of the project were done by IDS, competently led by Marlon Bristol (Researcher) and Clement Henry (Administrative Assistant). Again we remain deeply impressed by the professionalism, skill and care demonstrated by these individuals throughout each stage of this study.

With the valuable technical assistance of Dominique Zephyr it was possible to perform multiple revisions of the questionnaire to produce a refined final product. As much in the initial phases as in the procurement of questionnaires, sample design, data processing and data analysis, we counted on the experience and technical support of the IDS and Professor Thomas who was in charge of the editing and final revision of this study.

The study was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through a grant to Vanderbilt University. We are especially grateful to Dr. Fenton Sands, Ana Klenicki, and Dhanmattie Sohail of USAID for working closely with us to make this study as useful as possible for the promotion of democratic values in Guyana. Finally, we would like to thank the thousands of Guyanese who gave their time to respond to our questions in order to enable us all to better understand the nature of the democratic beliefs and practices in this country.

Georgetown, September 2007

## Executive Summary

This study, the first comprehensive study that assesses governance and democracy issues in Guyana, was facilitated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington. The research was conducted by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and coordinated by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The data were collected by IDS, with enumerators drawn from those used by the Bureau of Statistics in Guyana for its various surveys. The sample was designed by Dominique Zéphyr and Abby Córdova from the LAPOP central office, to represent all voting-age (non-institutionalized) adults in the country [with the exception of the residents of Regions 7 (Cuyuni-Mazaruni) and 8 (Potaro-Siparuni)].

The data collected is presented in a variety of ways, inclusive of graphs, charts, tables and regression analyses in the nine (9) chapters within this publication. Further, the complete text of the questionnaire utilized is presented as an appendix in this study. Since many of the issues that are analyzed are complex, we have been compelled to include some (seemingly) complex multivariate data analysis in order to support our conclusions. However, this being as it may, most of the key findings are conveyed with graphs and charts that most readers should find easy to comprehend. To further enhance the impact of the work, the results for Guyana are compared with other Latin America and Caribbean countries.

An important objective of this study, therefore, is to stimulate and contribute to the national debate on democracy and the importance of citizen democratic values and behaviors (i.e., the political culture). In the pursuance of that goal, Spanish and English versions of this study can be found at [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org).

Within Chapter 1, the socio-economic and political contexts of Guyana are outlined to ensure that the findings are couched within an overall framework, allowing for better understanding of the results. It also sets out the political challenges that the country has undergone and the current state of its fledgling democracy. Importantly, it indicates that economically, the country, despite having relatively peaceful national elections on the last two (2) occasions, its economic growth rate has remained sluggish, with the country growing at an average annual rate of 0.6% over the period 1998 – 2005, but showed significant growth in 2006.

In Chapter 2, the methodological framework for the conduct of this study is discussed. It was imperative in this study to gather information on the values and perceptions of *all* citizens, inclusive of those considered ‘inactive’, politically insignificant, and those living in rural and hinterland locations. However, being unable to access the census bureau maps was a major challenge in determining the sample design for this study and introduced some level of bias in the dataset.

The sample covered both coastal and hinterland regions of the country and the rural and urban areas. Due to logistical and financial considerations, Regions 7 and 8 were excluded from the sample. However, the hinterland Regions was represented, with samples taken from both Regions 1 (Barima – Waini) and 9 (Upper Takatu – Upper Essequibo).

The study used a stratified random sample method. Guyana was divided into 717 electoral divisions for the 2006 general election. These electoral divisions were therefore stratified into five (5) geographical areas based on the ethnic composition of the regions, as well as by urban and rural areas. As such, the following stratum was determined: (i) Greater Georgetown (Urban area of Region 4), (ii) Region 3 and the rest of Region 4, (iii) Regions 2, 5, and 6, (iv) Region 10, and (v) Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9.

The sample was clustered, in order to reduce travel time and costs. In each sample point or electoral division, 8 households in rural areas and 12 households in urban areas were interviewed. This sample designed produced an overall sample of 1,559, with 456 interviews being conducted in the urban areas and 1,103 in the rural areas.

Within Chapter 3, the study examines the different concepts Guyanese have of the term democracy. The findings reveal that a majority of Guyanese have a normative conception of democracy, such that, the majority of Guyanese have a substantial positive understanding of democracy as a process or a certain set of values. However, the majority of these individuals saw democracy as synonymous with freedom of expression. The results also indicate that wealth, education, sex, and the population size of an area had significant impacts on respondents' conceptions of democracy.

Furthermore, the data set for Guyana seems to suggest that while Guyana has had democratically elected governments over the last four National Elections, the country's democratic institutions are still in their infancy stage. But, the political culture in Guyana appears to be more fully centered on the democratic process. However, it does seem that many Guyanese focus on *elections* as a process crucial to democracy, while some also focus on *freedom of expression*. Both values are consistently being tested in the Guyanese court system, no less notable than the 1997 and 2001 National Elections that resulted in major electoral petitions being taken to the Supreme Court by the main Opposition Party.

An electoral process of increasing credibility in recent years has been put to the test by some of the noteworthy exercises of free expression in a post-election environment. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Guyana would have enjoyed neither close elections nor such boisterous freedom of expression. But democracy is a set of procedures for addressing and resolving conflict. Both contested elections where the process was challenged, freedom of expression remained crucial to the procedures followed. As our survey indicated, Guyanese most frequently define democracy as entailing the presence of this condition. And those beliefs seem to inform their behaviors in recent elections.

However, among other things, wealth appears to still have a heavy bearing on persons' conception of the democratic process. This may be as a result of the other organs of this fledgling democracy appearing to be out of the reach of the masses.

Chapter 4 examines the support to the democratic system and tolerance as variables of importance to the proper functioning of a stable democracy. Comparatively, the values of these variables in Guyana are low. For more than twenty (20) years after political independence, Guyana followed a socialist path to development, where "*paramountcy of the party*" took

precedence over other interests (Griffith, 1997). During this period, the opposition candidates often alleged that the Peoples' National Congress Party sustained its electoral majority by conducting fraudulent national elections.

However, Guyanese citizens have begun enjoying electoral competition and they have come to believe that elections matter. More so, that the 2006 General Elections and its aftermath was one of the most peaceful seen in Guyana since 1968. This chapter demonstrates that out of 100, Guyana had a mean score of 52.7 of those who support the electoral institutions.

Furthermore, the country demonstrates a high level of political tolerance but there is still a significant level of social intolerance present in the society. If the democratic process is to be deepened in the country, it will be necessary to ensure that all rights and civil liberties are protected and treated as sacrosanct.

Within Chapter 5, indicators of corrupt practices, both in terms of being asked for and paying a bribe, were applied. The results generated and analyzed are not encouraging and they seem to support the perception about the pervasiveness of this practice in Guyanese society. Furthermore, corrupt practices appear to be most pronounced in the urban conglomerates, and amongst the young and educated. To the extent that some of these are trends, then corruption abatement must be one of the most urgent national priorities as it compromises public offices, the quality of services received and the returns on investments. For a developing country like Guyana that requires increased levels of investment for continued economic growth and prosperity, this practice must be arrested. In addition, the data suggests that corruption victimization has an impact on perceptions, on trust in political institutions, on justification of this activity, and on the willingness to trust other individuals, which can transform into an erosion of legality in Guyana.

In Chapter 6 the study sought to determine the pervasiveness of crime in Guyana and the types of crimes that respondents had encountered the most in 2006. Additionally, it sought to find out what were the characteristics of the victims and what factor(s) may account for them being 'selected' as victims. Lastly, it investigated the impact on the psyche of victims in terms of adhering to or supporting the rule of law having been victims. The results indicate that crime affecting property was most common, while there was a marginal difference between rural and urban areas. What was striking, however, was the apparent high number of persons that support public officers operating at the margins of the legal system to bring the perpetrators to justice. This finding seems to be as a result of a loss of confidence in the public institutions and organs of justice. But this should not be a justification for extra judicial activities as this will erode the democratic norms on which the society is built. What seems to be urgently needed is a strengthening of the institutions and the reformation of these organs which are expected to be pursued under the Citizen Security and Justice Reform Programmes.

Chapter 7 examined the functioning of the local organs. The findings demonstrate that Guyana has substantial social capital on which it can often draw upon to solve community and local problems. Additionally, there is still some level of cynicism about the level of devolution that has taken place. While this may be a reflection of the greater role of central government in local matters, it may also be a general state of dissatisfaction with the level of local government services being provided by the democratic organs. However, the data clearly indicates that the

main approach to problem solving is to engage the local authorities, rather than seek the assistance of a parliamentarian or a central government official, though the difference between the local and central government was only marginal.

Furthermore, approximately a third of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of service being provided and the how their matters are treated. If public funds are to continue to be effectively spent, there must be system in place to monitor the quality of the services provided and the response time in dealing with complaints and issues raised at meetings.

However, neighborhood and community organizing for self-help efforts do contribute to subsequent attendance at town meetings and to request assistance from local government. It demonstrates that some amount of social capital exists in the country that needs to be better captured and utilized. Though difficult it may be to give meaning to “decentralization” to the citizenry of the country, but the link between strengthening organizations in civil society and enhanced local governance should not be overlooked. Few other levers exist. The challenge is to find ways to support such informal channels without subjecting them to politicization in a way that foments dependence, rather than autonomy.

Within Chapter 8 the electoral behavior of Guyanese is examined. The data indicates that the majority of Guyanese have partisan leanings that are driven mainly by ethnic cleavages and certain socio-demographic factors, such as the state of the economy and the area within which the respondents live.

Party identification for the PPP/C and PNCR-1G determines, to a large extent, not only ideological self-placement, but also opinions about democracy, approval of the sitting president, and influences voting patterns. Since party identification depends on retrospective evaluations of government performance, to the degree that party alternation continues spreading to other levels of government, individuals will have more tools to judge the success or failure of government policies and, therefore, to decide whether they continue to support their party or decide to shift their support to another party. Many political attitudes and opinions will continue to depend on the intensity of the affective links that individuals have toward political parties and the emergence of other parties as worthy candidates to challenge the PPP/C and the PNCR-1G.

Lastly, Chapter 9 demonstrates that there is considerable social capital in the country. Persons are already coming together to solve problems in their communities, more so, as the level of institutional trust is not considered very high. This may be a reflection of the disaffected becoming more self reliant than waiting on their elected officials.



## I. Background and Contextual Framework

This study was encouraged by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington as part of the comparative study undertaken in Latin America and part of the Caribbean Region. Accordingly, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) was approached to conduct the study. After attending the Start-Up Workshop in April 29-30, 2006 in Costa Rica where participants were briefed in relation to the study, it was planned that the study will commence after the General Elections in the country that was scheduled for August 28, 2006. However, due to unforeseen contingencies the training and pre-testing was only done in September 2006. As such, on October 1, 2006 a sample of Guyanese was carried out to canvass their perceptions about democracy and democratic organs in Guyana and how they behave politically. The study was carried out as part of the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The data were collected by IDS, with enumerators drawn from those used by the Bureau of Statistics in Guyana. The sample was designed by Dominique Zéphyr and Abby Córdova from the LAPOP central office, in conjunction with the IDS, to represent all voting-age (non-institutionalized) adults in the country [with the exception of the residents of Regions 7 (Cuyuni-Mazaruni) and 8 (Potaro-Siparuni)].

The data collected is presented in a multiplicity of ways, inclusive of graphs, charts, tables and regression analyses. Further, methodological notes and the complete text of the questionnaire utilized are presented as an appendix in this study. Since many of the issues analyzed are complex, the study utilizes some (seemingly) complex multivariate data analysis in order to support some of the conclusions reached. However, this being as it may, most of the key findings are conveyed with graphs and charts that most readers should find easy to comprehend. To further enhance the impact of the work, the results for Guyana are compared with other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Since this is the first study of its kind in Guyana, time series analysis is precluded.

An important objective of this study therefore is to stimulate and contribute to the national debate on democracy and the importance of citizens' democratic values and behaviors (i.e., the political culture). To help achieve that goal, Spanish and English versions of this study are made available on [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org).

### Physical Geography and Social Evolution

Guyana's geography exercises exceptional influence on its economic development efforts as it remains heavily dependent on natural resources found mainly in the hinterland areas. The country's land area 215,000 km<sup>2</sup> that is divided into four geographical regions: 1) the **coastal plain** or low-lying narrow piece of land along the Atlantic coast, which is approximately 430 km in length and about 2.4 metres below the high tide sea level mark. This area accounts for approximately 10% of the country's landmass (Bernard, 2005). About 10% of this area is cultivated, but it is here that the bulk of agriculture and food production is undertaken, the main trading ports are located and more than 90% of the populace resides; 2) the **hilly sand and clay area** to the south of the coastal plain, occupies approximately 20% of the country combined with an area of intermediate savannahs, which accounts for 2,700 km<sup>2</sup>. This area is known for its

forests and minerals but it is believed that it has potential for large scale livestock rearing and fruit (orchard) cultivation (IADB, 2006), 3) a **highland region**, which occupies 60% of the country and is made up of dense rainforest and 4) the **interior savannahs** situated in the south-west and occupying about 15,540km<sup>2</sup>. This is predominantly a grassland area interspersed with trees, lakes, and rivers. Here some agriculture and cattle rearing occurs.

At the last census the country's population was 751,223 persons (Guyana Census, 2002). Nearly 48% of inhabitants are of East Indian origin, 30% of African descent, 8% of Amerindian descent, and 14% of mixed and other descent. Ninety percent of the population lives on the coast, whereas the remaining part, mostly Amerindians, live in the hard-to-reach hinterlands. The demographic growth is extremely low, because high emigration (1% - 1.7% annually) neutralizes whatever population increase is generated by natural growth. Despite this low level of population growth, the last Living Conditions Survey (LCS) done in 1999 revealed that approximately 35% of the population was still living in absolute poverty (Thomas, 2000), though admittedly this percentage had fallen from 43% in 1992/1993. Poverty was found to be most pronounced in the rural hinterland and rural coastal areas of the country, home to mostly Guyanese of East Indian descent and Guyanese of Amerindian descent respectively.<sup>1</sup> *Appendix I-1* provides some important socio-economic statistics for the country.

The statistics are shown for the period 2002 – 2006. From an economic standpoint, the data indicates that Guyana's growth rate which was sluggish between 2002 and 2005, showed a significant increase in 2006. Concurrently, the GDP per capita increased steadily, from US\$829 per capita in 2002 to US\$975 per capita in 2006, resulting in an annual average increase of 3.5%. With regard to the social statistics, most of these are incomplete for the period. However, for some of the critical variables, such as infant mortality, the statistics indicate that this did not change to any significant degree between 2002 and 2006. At the same time, approximately 15% of persons in the country were considered malnourished (Budget Speech, 2007).


### The Local Government System of Guyana

Driven by the political imperative of shedding its colonial mantle in pursuit of socialism, the character and interrelationships of both central and local government underwent a complete metamorphosis since 1980. Under the Local Democratic Organ Act of 1980, Guyana was divided into 10 Administrative Regions<sup>2</sup> (see *Map 1-1*), which are governed by a local democratic organ called the Regional Democratic Council (RDC). The RDCs are regional organs of the central government and cannot be regarded as decentralised autonomous local government organs.

<sup>1</sup> A new Household Income and Expenditure Survey is being conducted. However, data analysis is currently on-going.

<sup>2</sup> Prior to 1980, Guyana was divided into six (6) Regions.

Table I-1. Map of Guyana Showing the Administrative Regions



Source: Geographic and Environmental Management Solutions Inc (GEMS), 2006

On two occasions, local government elections were held, in 1970 and 1994.<sup>3</sup> At a time when no elections were being held, a massive multi-layered administrative (local government) superstructure was superimposed on the existing system. In 1980, when the concept of ‘local democracy’ was for the first time introduced into the present Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, it was designed to promote the government’s political philosophy of cooperative socialism and to effect the transition of the State from capitalism to socialism. Socialist democracy required the organisation and involvement of as many people as possible in the task of managing and developing the communities in which they live. The country was thereby divided into ten (10) regions, each administered by a Regional Democratic Council (RDC). The land area and populations of the regions are shown in *Table I-1* below.

<sup>3</sup> There has been no local government elections since 1994 though they are constitutionally due every three years.

**Table I-2. Population Figures, Land Areas and Population Densities in the Regions**

Region	Population	Territory Miles <sup>2</sup> (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population Density inh./miles <sup>2</sup> (inh./km <sup>2</sup> )
1 - Barima-Waini	24,275	7,853 (20,339)	3.1 (1.2)
2 - Pomeroon-Supenaam	49,253	2,392 (6,195)	20.6 (8.0)
3 - West Demerara-Essequibo Islands	103,061	1,450 (3,755)	71.1 (27.5)
4 - Demerara-Mahaica	310,320	862 (2,233)	360 (139)
5 - Mahaica-Berbice	52,428	1,610 (4,170)	32.6 (12.6)
6 - East Berbice-Corentyne	123,695	13,998 (36,255)	8.8 (3.4)
7 - Cuyuni-Mazaruni	17,597	18,229 (47,213)	1.0 (0.37)
8 - Potaro-Siparuni	10,095	7,742 (20,052)	1.3 (0.5)
9 - Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo	19,387	22,313 (57,791)	0.87 (0.34)
10 - Upper Demerara – Berbice	41,112	6,595 (17,081)	6.2 (2.4)
<b>Total</b>	751,223	83,012 (215,000)	9.0 (3.5)

*Source:* Population Census 2002

According to the State Paper<sup>4</sup>, the existing system was ‘*too narrow in its conception, too limited in its scope and too archaic in its structures to be accommodated within the bold scheme of local democracy which the new Constitution had put in place*’. As a result, a ‘*re-ordering of existing Local Government arrangements*’ was necessary. The legislation portraying this ‘reordering’ is contained in the Local Democratic Organs Act 1980 (known as Act 12 of 1980).

The guiding principles for the new local government arrangements were perceived as addressing the entire country. Demarcations of their boundaries were to enable economic viability, without depending merely or primarily on rates and taxes but integrated into the national development plan. In demarcating regions, the Minister of Local Government was expected to take into account the population, physical size, geographical characteristics, economic resources and the existing and planned infrastructure of the area, as well as the possibilities of facilitating the most rational management and use of such resources and infrastructure, with a view to ensuring that the area is or has the potential for becoming economically viable [Local Democratic Organs Act (28:09)]. Moreover, Central Government resources were to be allocated on definite principles for financing such development.

Both procedural and substantive functional matters were covered in principle by the Act. For instance, by order the Minister (of Regional Development at the time) was enabled to, and in fact

<sup>4</sup> This was a document, similar in scope to a position paper, that was prepared after a review and evaluation of the existing regional system in place.

did, divide the country into ten regions. On the other hand, authority was provided to divide a region into sub-regions, a sub-region into districts, a district into communities, a community into neighbourhoods and a neighbourhood into people's cooperative units.

However, in many instances the introduction of these principles has been undertaken in an eclectic manner. For example, sub-regions when introduced were done for administrative purposes taking into account distance and terrain from the Regional Office. 19 District Councils and 65 Village Councils continue to function as administrative and local government bodies, as well as 76 Amerindian Village Councils. The Amerindian Village Councils are semi-autonomous bodies that are subject to separate legislation and operated under Chapter 29:01. This allows them, among other things, to collect rates and taxes. There are a number of Community Development Councils (CDCs) that fall outside the Local Government Organs.

This array of the local government system is important for an understanding of democratic participation for decision-making and organisation and management purposes.<sup>5</sup>

Members of each RDC are elected by persons residing in the region and registered as electors to vote at a national election. Once registered to vote, one is entitled to vote simultaneously for the national list for members of parliament, i.e., the National Assembly, and for the regional list, from which regional councillors are selected. The electoral term of a RDC coincides with the electoral term of the National Assembly. Each RDC elects one of its members to serve as member of the National Assembly, thereby ensuring a parliamentary voice from among regional councillors.

The National Assembly is comprised of 65 members with 40 members drawn from the lists of the parties contesting the National Election plus 25 from the Geographic Constituencies [The Geographic Constituencies are the same as the current Regions/Districts]. The distribution of the Geographical Constituencies is shown in Appendix I-3.


In this structure, the prevailing doctrine of paramountcy of the party is used to ensure a convergence of the party structure with the regional system in which the Chairperson of the RDC is normally selected from the list of the Party winning a Region. Within this setting, a distinction between assets of the State and party assets can become blurred with institutions and organs of the State having the potential to become *de facto* subordinate to the goals and interest of the governing party in the region.

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<sup>5</sup> The RDC's primary duties are: (i) to ensure efficient management and development in its area, (ii) to provide leadership by example, (iii) to organise popular cooperation in respect to the political, economic, cultural and social development of its area, (iv) to cooperate with the social organisation of the working people to maintain and protect public property, improve working and living conditions, (v) to promote the social and cultural life of the people, and (vi) to raise the level of civic consciousness, preserve law and order, consolidate socialist legality and safeguard the rights of the Citizens.

Socio-Economic Evolution

Guyana is a small economy endowed with natural resources like gold, diamonds, bauxite, fertile land, and large tropical forests. Despite its natural resources, and well-educated population, Guyana is the fourth poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with a per capita income below 1,000 US\$<sup>6</sup> (see **Graph I-1**). In real terms, inhabitants have not benefited from a significant improvement in their standard of living when compared with the 1970's.



**Graph I-1. GDP Per Capita (1995 – 2006).**

*Source:* Bank of Guyana Statistical Bulletin (2005) and Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, February 2007.

Guyana’s economy has gone through three distinct phases. After political Independence in 1966 Guyana chose a socialist type, centrally controlled economic model that it began following in 1970. This strategy subsequently resulted in a negative growth (**Graph I-2**) as the government of the day moved to nationalise the ‘commanding heights’<sup>7</sup> of the economy, impose price controls, reduce real wages in the public sector, enacted import prohibitions and maintained an overvalued exchange rate. Apart from the domestic issues, the economic situation was aggravated by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74 and the lowering of some primary commodity prices in 1975/76. These situations led to the country accumulating large fiscal deficits, accumulating significant foreign debt that resulted in the country being designated ‘unworthy of credit’ by the international financial institutions (IFIs), and running double digit inflation. As such, in 1987 with assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the country devised a structural adjustment programme (SAP) and in 1988/89 an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). This latter Programme, *inter alia*, sought to create a basis for sustained economic growth, reintegrate the parallel economy, inclusive of the unofficial foreign exchange market, and normalize

<sup>6</sup> For example, it was 975 US\$ in 2006, or 4.16 at PPP.


<sup>7</sup> This was seen as the main productive sectors in the economy.

relations with external creditors. This saw the country reverting to a market-oriented strategy that marked the beginning of the second phase (in 1989).

During this second period many financial intermediaries, utilities and commercial enterprises were privatized or placed under private management, inclusive of the Guyana Telephone and Telegraph (GT&T) Company, Guyana Sugar Corporation (GUYSUCO), the Guyana Water Authority (GUYWA) and the Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC); and public sector staffing was reduced by half. The donor supported Economic Recovery Programme led to almost a decade of unprecedented growth that averaged 7.1% between 1991 and 1997 (*see Graph I-2*), inflation fell to low single digits (*see Graph I-3*) and poverty declined from 43% in 1993 to 35% by 1999. This growth was supported by, *inter alia*, better export performances of rice, sugar and gold that led to improvements in the country's balance of trade and balance of payments, as well as reductions in the country's fiscal deficit.


The high growth slowed at the end of the 1990s, as the benefits that derived from the liberalization of prices, foreign trade, and privatization associated with the ERP, was exhausted (Thomas and Bynoe 2005). Aware of this, the Government elaborated a National Development Strategy (NDS) in wide consultation with the private sector and civil society and sought to transform public institutions and practices. But limited implementation of the recommendations contained in the NDS has meant that growth since that period has remained largely sluggish.

The third phase started in 1998, with a series of negative events: adverse weather conditions (El Nino), floods and deterioration of terms of trade that was approximately -27% between 1998 and 2000, and election-related social unrests and their aftermath in 1997 and 2001. In these circumstances the political directorate did not impose needed reforms and its performance continued to be questioned. For example, the upward adjustment of the electricity price failed, the privatization of the loss-making bauxite mining companies was unsuccessful, and the expenditure for the public sector, instead of decreasing, soared on account of the imposed public sector wage raises in 1999 and 2000 (World Bank, 2004). As a result, fiscal stability collapsed and the economy entered a period of stagnation, combined with high capital spending and an oversized public sector. At the same time, the decrease in the competitiveness of the economy due to the threat of crimes, poor governance and political uncertainty due to the breakdown in the political dialogue between the two main political parties all aided in restricting domestic and foreign direct investment in the country (Staritz, Atoyan and Gold, 2007).



**Graph I-2. Real GDP Growth (1978 – 2006)**

*Source:* International Monetary Fund Statistical Data (2006) and Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, February 2007.



**Graph I-3. Inflation (1978 – 2006).**


*Source:* International Monetary Fund Statistical Data (2006) and Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, February 2007.

A new comprehensive strategy addressing a pro-poor oriented growth was designed with the support of donors. The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) develops the ideas contained in the National Development Strategy. Furthermore, it seeks to address the missing reforms, namely the transformation of public institutions. However, its commencement that was slated for 2002 was slow due to the lack of cooperation between the Government and the opposition that delayed administrative reforms of the public sector, which were conditions for using the debt relief funds.<sup>8</sup> Thus the transfer of external resources was by far lower than projected. The general political insecurity also discouraged the private sector, which reduced its share in investment by nearly a half from 13% in 1998 to 7% in 2004. As result, tax revenues stagnated; growth fell to 1.1% in 2002 and became negative in the following year (-0.6%). However, in 2006 the economy has succeeded in achieving modest growth. Importantly, prices have remained relatively stable and external reserves strong.

Guyana remained under an IMF/World Bank Support Programme as part of the economic reforms undertaken in the late 1980s. It was a beneficiary under both HIPC I (debt relief in May 1999) and HIPC II (debt relief in October 2000 and again 2005). HIPC relief contributed substantially to the reduction of Guyana's external indebtedness. In 1991 it stood at approximately \$2.1 billion, but by 2006 it had been reduced to \$1.2 billion (*see Graph I-4*), with a per capita value of approximately \$1,600. When Guyana reached its HIPC II completion point the net present value of its debt fell by 54% and its future debt payments was reduced by more than one-half of what it was in 1991 (Ministry of Finance, 2007). Due to its achievements the country is no more considered a HIPC nation, but has seen its status raised to that of a developing country.

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<sup>8</sup> Guyana Poverty Reduction Strategy Progress Report, 2004.




**Graph I-4. Total External Debt in Millions of US Dollar.**

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics.

Agriculture remains one of the most dominant sectors in the country (*see Graph I-5*). The sector accounts for 30% of Guyana's GDP and is dominated by two products: sugar and rice. These products aided in boosting the economic growth in the 1990s. In the meantime, the less than efficient infrastructure and the erosion of EU trade privileges, threaten the future of the sector. The rice sub-sector contributes 7% of the GDP and is cultivated on approximately 75,000 ha. About two thirds of production is exported, accounting for 8% of all exports as of 2006. Approximately 30,000 farmers are directly involved in rice production, whereas the entire sector (including processing) employs directly and indirectly at least 100,000 people that represents nearly 25% of the country's labour force (CARIFORUM Study, 2005).

The domestic market absorbs around 60,000 MT of rice equivalent; the remaining 150-250 MT (according to the harvest fluctuation) are exported. About a half of exports are of low priced semi-milled rice (cargo); white rice has a share of one third and the higher priced parboiled rice a share of only one tenth of total rice exports (in 2005). In the long-term, the share of parboiled rice might rise, though modestly, because it requires large investment in processing plants. With an average yield of 4 MT/ha, the yields are lower than in competing countries in the CARIFORUM region. Moreover, wages are reported to be some 4-5 times higher than in low-cost Asian countries (CARIFORUM Study, 2005).



**Graph I-5. Sugar and Rice Exports by Volume (1991 – 2006).**

*Source:* Bank of Guyana, Statistical Bulletin, 2005 and the Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, February 2007.

Sugar contributes 15% of Guyana’s GDP, accounts for 6% of the labour force and is planted on approximately 40,000 ha. About 90% of the production is exported. Two thirds of the exports benefit from preferential access to the EU market, where prices are about 150% above the global level, the remaining part benefits from the protected CARICOM market (40% tariff) and a preferential quota in the USA (Guyana Transport Sector Study, 2006). Despite these special conditions, the Guyana Sugar Corporation (GuySuCo) faces significant challenges in the European Market due to the ‘Everything but Arms’ Agreement.

The immediate challenge for the sub-sector comes from the phasing out of the preferential access to the EU market. Furthermore, the EU in 2004 proposed a reduction of the EU (intervention) price to 329 € /ton (- 37%) by 2007. The first cut of 18% was executed in 2005. Such a measure would reduce the Guyanese revenue by an estimated 4.5 % of the GDP (US\$35 million (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2005). Thus, a reduction of costs at both the field and factory levels remains the main concerns.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> There is a restructuring plan for the sub-sector, which is based on the following pillars: a) development of a new factory at Skeldon while increasing production in Berbice, b) diversifying the sub-sector, inclusive of ethanol production and refining of sugar, c) reduction in labour costs, which represent more than half of the total costs, d) shift of management contracts and wage policy from output oriented to profitability, e) elimination of taxes on

In addition to the demanding context outlined above, Guyana faces substantial new challenges ahead on the trade front. The country faces erosion of its preferential access in the European market over the next few years. While there are plans in the other industries to upgrade production facilities and attract new investment, thus enhancing long-term competitiveness, there is nonetheless a clear need to identify new sources of growth and employment (Bynoe, 2006). In the medium to long term, therefore, growth and diversification of the trade regimes will require substantial improvements to the local investment environment. In the short-term, however, the Guyanese authorities also face the immediate challenge of negotiating a favourable outcome for the country in a series of ongoing trade negotiations. The results of these negotiations and the alliances that are formed will serve to drive the country's future opportunities and economic development. Equally urgent is the effective implementation of existing trade agreements in order to enable the private sector to take full advantage of the market access opportunities inherent in these accords (Bynoe, 2006). The design and implementation of effective trade policies, aimed at facilitating Guyana's successful international insertion, is indeed a necessary condition for improving the local business environment and attracting the investment that is needed for sustained growth.

On the social front Guyana's education system, for example, once considered one of the best in the Caribbean, deteriorated in the 1980s because of insufficient funding and monitoring. In response to this, expenditure on education has increased significantly since 1997 (*see Appendix I-1*). At the same time, Guyana continues to face severe competition for its teachers from countries in the English speaking Caribbean and wider afield. This situation is believed to be aggravated by the comparatively low salaries paid to teachers in Guyana relative to that received in the countries to which they emigrate. For example, a trained graduate teacher in Guyana receives approximately US\$300 per month as against a reported monthly salary of US\$1,000 in the other locations. Thus, the national salaries compete with those in the richer neighbouring countries. Nonetheless primary and secondary school enrollment levels are relatively high and the Millennium Development Goal is nearly reached (IADB, 2006). Nevertheless, the functional literacy is just over 50%, and significant disparities remain across the income groups and the country (IADB, 2006). Furthermore, a major concern is that a high proportion of the untrained teachers are found in the hinterland areas (PRS 2005 Report, 2006). However, the PRSP is addressing these deficiencies, via teacher training, curricula reviews, and greater involvement of stakeholders at the school level.

About 92% of Guyana's population has access to piped water supply; however, for a number of households, water is only available for a limited number of hours per day. In many cases water quality does not meet international standards (Rose, 2007) due in the main to line leakages that lead to contamination. This has often resulted in the Ministry of Health advising households to take steps to purify their water to reduce the possibility of water-related illnesses. The government is addressing these deficiencies, via funding from the World Bank (WB) and the Department for International Development (DFID) by investing in water treatment schemes and

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windfall profits. Additionally, measures will be taken to increase the value-added of exports (increasing the share of white sugar and packaging), introduce more drought and pest resistant crops; increase mechanization of selected fields to reduce field costs, increase the conversion of state to freehold lands and the dredging of a deep water berth in Berbice.

improving transmission and distribution pipelines. Additionally, attempts are being made to create a realistic cost recovery scheme for water delivery by the GWI.

Unlike many other developing countries, and particularly those in the Caribbean region, Guyana's population has shown negative growth between 1991 and 2002. It is the conjecture that this was mainly due to international migration. However, the unavailability of migration statistics on the country precludes further analysis of this finding. Despite low population numbers relative to the country's landmass, areas within Guyana, such as the capital city of Georgetown, suffers serious housing problems. An estimated 20% of the population of Georgetown is squatting, mainly in the Sophia, Yarrow Dam and parts of Tucville. Insufficient enforcement of the laws, bureaucratic legal procedures, and political expediency contribute to this current state of affairs (NDS, 2001).

### Political Organization

The Constitution of Guyana specifies the "Supreme organs of democratic power," and describes the powers and structure of the related institutions of governance, including the legislative, executive and judicial. Apart from its constitutional role to vet and enact legislation, the legislature also oversees the activities of public agencies, and ensures that public departments operate within their allocated budgets. The Constitution provides for a unicameral legislature (National Assembly) whose sixty-five seats are contested every five years through largely a system of proportional representation and 'top up' seats. All members of the National Assembly are elected. Twenty-five are elected from the ten geographic constituencies, and the remaining forty are elected from a general "top-up" list to ensure proportionality (*see Appendix I-3*). The Constitution was amended to prevent the disproportional allocation of seats, whereby "overhang" seats are awarded to the national top-up to mitigate undue advantage over other parties.<sup>10</sup> Constitutionally, presidential and parliamentary elections are combined under Guyana's electoral system. Under this system, the designated leader and presidential candidate of the party with the largest number of votes following an election becomes president.

Under the Constitution, the President, Cabinet and Government Departments constitute the Executive branch. And while the President is not a member of the National Assembly he has the constitutional power to attend and address the Assembly at any time. The President also has to assent a bill passed by the National Assembly before it becomes law. The President is the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.<sup>11</sup>

The role of the Constitution to provide scope for good governance and place limitations on the powers of the government has been questioned frequently by civil society. One particular concern relates to the doctrine of the separation of powers, which is basic to any liberal constitutionalism. This system of checks and balances begins with the separation of executive

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<sup>10</sup> Overhang seats would be required if a party won a disproportionate of number of constituency seats, thereby giving it an advantage over other parties. See Organization of American States Electoral Observation and Regional Elections, Guyana 2006, *Electoral Observations in the Americas*; pp. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> The armed forces comprise the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) and the Guyana Police Force (GPF).

and legislative powers. The concern is often expressed that the National Assembly given its structure, often gives the impression of not being totally independent of the Executive. In particular, the tight control exercised by the Executive in making budgetary allocations to the Assembly has been regarded by international observers as significantly deviating from acceptable international and Commonwealth standards (Davies, 2005). According to Davies (2005), this level of control does not conform to the constitutional relationship between the two branches of government. Furthermore, the National Assembly has limited discretion over administrative staffing decisions. Such decisions are largely authorized by the Executive through one of its departments. More recently, the Executive issued a proclamation to convene Parliament outside constitutional parameters. This decision was highly criticized by opposing political parties and some members of civil society, who branded the act as a blatant disregard for the separation of powers doctrine and inconsistent with the President's constitutional capacity. Indeed, these realities bring to bear the need for a purer system of checks and balances in relation to the exercise of powers of the executive and legislative arms of government.

Chapter 11 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of a judicial authority that comprises the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is made up of the Court of Appeal, and the High and Magistrates Courts. Additionally, the Caribbean Court of Justice effectively replaced the Privy Council, as the final appellate court in 2004. The Chancellor of the Judiciary is the chief representative of the judicial authority of the country. This branch ensures that legislative enactments are consistent with the country's constitution and is often called upon to intervene on constitutional amendment matters.

Deepening civic distrust in and ineffectiveness of the Country's judicial sector are principal concerns that have proven to be compelling threats to democracy (SARA, 2001). At the same time, delays in the enforcement of judgments and the prolonged prosecution process of criminal cases are commonplace, and result because of institutional weaknesses, alleged acts of bribery, poor monitoring of cases, a slothful and under-resourced police department, and the reported reluctance of some police serving as prosecutors to prosecute their colleagues accused of abuses (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2003; IADB, 2006). The key judicial positions of Chancellor, Chief Justice, Judges, and Chief Magistrate are currently only temporarily filled. At present the posts of Solicitor General is vacant, a condition that further undermines the execution of the judiciary's constitutional duties. The inhumane and generally ineffective penal system, limited access to the justice system by poor and vulnerable groups and allegations of corrupt oversight bodies with investigation power are chronic problems signalling the need for rigorous reform of the sector.

Green (2006) in a recent policy report prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank made a related observation. He noted that: *"90% of criminal prosecution in Magistrates Courts is unsuccessful and 50% (12,700) of the cases in the High Court Trial Docket will never go to trial because cases have been settled or abandoned, those on bail have disappeared or witnesses are no longer available."*

Faced with a mounting list of criticisms made by its citizens, the Government embarked on a program of judicial reform as embodied in its Justice Sector Reform Strategy. Improving the capacity of justice sector institutions, in particular, revamping of the criminal justice and penal

systems; and strengthening linkages between justice institutions are among the key deliverables of the reform process (Guyana Justice Reform Strategy 2006-2010, pp. 3-4). The priority activities to be pursued under each stated deliverable were identified through consultations with relevant stakeholders. The modernization of the legislative framework including the Criminal Law Offences Act, the Summary Law Offences Act and Evidence Act is also identified as a priority. However, some of the proposed institutional changes, including those that relate to enhancing the accountability of judges and magistrates have been slow to take effect, as a result of some of the very issues that motivated the call for reforms.

The Constitution also lays down the Local Government system. There are four layers of Local Government authorities: (i) Municipal Councils, (ii) Regional Democratic Councils (RDCs), (iii) Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs), and (iv) Community Development Councils (CDCs). Of these the Municipal Councils (6) and the Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (65) have not had elections since 1994. In the absence of these elections, the Minister of Local Government has been forced in some instances to appoint Interim Management Committees (IMCs) to manage the affairs of the NDC. Regional Democratic Councils (10) are elected at the same time National Elections are held.

Community Development Councils (CDCs) were initially formed where there were no legal bodies, but over time they have also been established in NDC areas and in some cases run parallel to NDCs. They generally seek to promote greater community-based development, and serve as oversight bodies in matters regarding the appropriation of contracts for physical infrastructural works (Georgetown's Municipal Development Agenda 2004-2008, p. 11). But the CDCs currently do not have any legal status which severely limits their exercise of power. Additionally, there have been several constitutional amendments that relate to the management and structure of Local Government, but these have not been accompanied by the necessary enabling legislation. These amendments include: greater autonomy for local democratic organs, the allocation and garnering of resources by local democratic organs, the establishment of a Local Government Commission, the election of one member from each local democratic organ to serve on the local democratic organ immediately above it, and most importantly, the reform of the electoral system below the RDCs to include representation of individuals and voluntary groups, as well as political parties (Georgetown's Municipal Agenda 2004-2008, p.11). Government has offered its commitment to ensuring that local government elections are kept. However, the Opposition Parties continue to call for, among other things, a verification of the voters list and reform of the electoral system before any local government elections are held. This has further delayed the elections.

While free and fair elections are basic tenets of a democracy, it is not the only measure of democratic strength. Citizens' involvement and participation in policy choice decisions on a continual basis is equally crucial (Griffith 1997). The ability of the ruling administration to provide for and guarantee the exercise of civil rights in an atmosphere free of the instruments of State coercion and judicial independence have been frequently tested and questioned. The Administration efforts towards advancing the calls for inclusive governance have not been without controversy. Nonetheless, this issue is being addressed through the establishment of Parliamentary Sub-Committees that comprise members from the ruling and the Parliamentary Opposition Parties. Other initiatives include representation by Opposition Party members on

various Boards of Public Corporations and the need for the Administration to consult with the Opposition before appointing a Chairperson for the Elections Commission and a Chancellor of the Judiciary.

Additionally, the Administration has supported several initiatives that have led to positive espousals of human and political rights. Many of these initiatives, admittedly, had their genesis in post elections violence of 1997 that led to an accommodation being made between the ruling party and the combined opposition.<sup>12</sup> These initiatives include the amendment of the Constitution to provide for a reduction in the powers of the President, an opposition veto on the appointment of the Chancellor and Chief Justice to the Judiciary, strengthening of the constitutional powers of the Judiciary and Auditor General, expanding the human rights through the establishment of Commissions on Human Rights (that is not yet constituted), Ethnic Relations, Rights of the Child, and Indigenous Peoples (that is also not yet constituted). However, while many of these Commissions have been constituted their effective functioning remains a moot point. Despite the outcomes of the electoral and other reforms as contained in the Constitution the desired benefits were not always evident. Despite this fact, some reforms were crucial to halting the rigging of elections that was commonplace. As in the Costa Rica's case, the late 1990s saw an expansion of the recognition of rights of the Guyanese population and the reinforcing of mechanisms to safeguard them (The Political Study of Democracy in Costa Rica, 2004). This can be seen in the increasing role played by civil society in ensuring the integrity of the electoral process, as well as the Country's expressed support for several human rights instruments including the *International Convention on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), and the *International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESR). The Country's links with several major international organizations and agencies is another gesture of its democratic momentum. A few of these organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) have played crucial roles in the strengthening of political institutions and democratic procedures in Guyana.

Specifically, the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) under the revised Treaty of Chagauramas, has promised trade- and labour-related benefits for all member countries, including Guyana. Against this backdrop, the Government has adopted a number of fiscal measures and policies, as well as set up institutional systems to support the effective functioning of CSME. A notable exemplification of that support can be seen in the Country's enactment of legislation with respect to the jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice as its final Appellate Court. Other important elements of CSME have been supported through other legislative enactments, which are expected to exert significant influence over the Country's governance structure.

As a further attempt to deepen democracy and good governance, the political leaders on behalf of their parties have embarked on an institutionalized dialogue process focused on the resolution of key issues including constitutional reform, local government reform, underprivileged and depressed communities, conflict resolution and crime. Still, interactions between the two major political parties remain strained and often confrontational.

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<sup>12</sup> These accommodations can be found in the Herdmanston Accord and the St. Lucia Agreement.

As another issue of democracy globally, it should be noted that women continue to be relatively absent from positions of power, and politics, which has attributed to their under-representation on certain crucial issues. But importantly, this has not been particularly relevant to Guyana as it has had women in notable positions such as Ministers of Government, Members of Parliament, and the first female Chancellor of Judiciary in the Caribbean. Following the Beijing Summit in 1995, Guyana adopted affirmative action measures that sought to ensure the inclusion and participation of women at every level of the decision-making process (National Democratic Institute, 2003). One such action related to constitutional reform sets a participation target of at least thirty-three percent quota for candidates' lists at the national and regional elections. In other words, at least a third of the candidates validly nominated have to be women. No more than twenty percent of the geographic constituency list of any party can be all male (OAS Report, 2006). Despite these positive actions, rural women in particular seem reluctant to venture into the realm of politics. This may be attributed to, among other things, their view of politics as confrontational and their inability to make a real political impact (NDI 2003).

### Historical Political Evolution

Guyana's transition into a mixed democratic state like some of its Latin American and Commonwealth Caribbean counterparts was long and checkered. In general the country shares a common historical experience with the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean by virtue of its colonial association with Britain, which has contributed to the nature of its political and administrative systems. However, this broad similarity has been counterbalanced by social, political, geographic, demographic and economic peculiarities of each state (Lutchman, 1972).

Guyana was originally a Dutch colonial possession, established over the indigenous Amerindian nobles, settlers and slaves from Africa; by 1815 it was under British rule. Under British imperative, the three original colonies of Essequibo, Berbice and Demerara were merged into British Guiana in 1831. The colony retained the Dutch administrative, legal and legislative system. Under that system, the country was run by a Governor who was advised by Councils of plantation owners. The abolition of slavery led to the former African slaves purchasing previous plantations and establishing villages, such as Victoria and Buxton along the East Coast of the Demerara River, Bagotville on the West Bank of the Demerara River and Belladrum on the West Coast of the Berbice River. This forced the plantation owners to import Portuguese and Chinese to work on the plantations. However, this proved an expensive venture and the plantocracy soon turned to East Indians from India as indentured servants. The East Indians adapted well to the local conditions and represented the greatest number of indentured labourers coming to Guyana. Today, the ethnic composition of the country's population is reflective of this history and has significantly directed the character of its politics.

Even before the country became independent in 1966, politics in Guyana has been polarized along ethnic lines, with the Indo-Guyanese supporting the People's Progressive Party (PPP), and the Afro-Guyanese supporting the People's National Congress (PNC). The first real and only coalition of forces between these two major political parties occurred in the 1950's; a move that was motivated by a mutual quest for independence. This nationalist coalition transcended class and race, and for many symbolized the united purpose of nation building; but it quickly faltered as a result of mounting antagonism between its two leaders Cheddie Jagan (of East Indian

decent) and Forbes Burnham (of African decent) (Ferguson 1999). Burnham later left the coalition to form the People's National Congress. This split of the coalition fostered a division between the two main ethnic groups in Guyana, with Guyanese of Indian decent supporting the PPP in the main and Guyanese of African decent gravitating towards the PNC. This trend, which has persisted throughout the country's political transition from a colony to an independent State, remains largely entrenched today.

In 1953, a new Constitution was introduced in the Colony. It provided for a bicameral legislature and a ministerial system based on elections under universal adult suffrage. At the time, the PPP administration opposed this system of governance. The Constitution was subsequently delayed by the United Kingdom (UK). The immediate pre-independence years were characterized by regular intervention by the UK, whose final decision to provide for a new Constitution with full internal self-government, was prefaced by prolonged deliberations regarding the Country's capability for self-governance (Morrison 1992, Jagan 1997, *see also* Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group August 2006).

With greater numbers of the electorate supporting it, the PPP contested for and retained political power during the period 1953-1964. However, the former leader of the party expressed his intention to establish Guyana as a communist State in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, antagonistic to the United States' government (Ferguson 1999, Morrison 1992). The US's antipathy towards the PPP's political espousal was further aggravated by the party's close ties with Cuba and other socialist states. Constitutional Conferences were held in 1962 and 1963 to settle the terms of independence, but rising political and ethnic strife among the three political parties (PPP, PNC and The United Force [TUF]) stalemated negotiations and prevented a consensus among the leaders on the conditions of the Constitution. Settlement was placed in the hands of the UK whose decisions assisted in extinguishing the PPP's political domination. By UK decree the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system was replaced and the Proportional Representation (PR) system was alternatively instituted.

During this period the United States President, John F. Kennedy resolved to prevent the spread of communism in the region. Kennedy's concerns about the PPP led to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) active involvement in strikes and other measures to destabilize the PPP government (Morrison 1992). Amidst tumultuous and often violent racial confrontations that occurred in 1962-1964, external and domestic forces worked together to bring the PPP government down (Ferguson 1999). Notably during this period was an absence of institutional mechanisms dedicated to the protection of civil rights and liberties. This period saw the effective transplantation of the British Westminster administrative model to Guyana, which would serve as the foundation for the construction of a predominantly native public service, up until independence in 1966 (Ferguson 1995).

Elections were held in 1957 under the PR electoral system; and after seven years of PPP rule, the PNC-TUF coalition government assumed power in December 1964, with leader of the PNC Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham being nominated as Premier. Independence matters were finalized by the new government at another Constitutional Conference, and Guyana became independent from British rule in May 1966. By the 1970's radical socialism was taking its root in Guyana. The PNC had chosen a socialist path and allied itself with several states with a similar

socialist orientation. The years that followed were characterized by considerable civic dislocation and major economic problems as a result of the declining world market prices for major exports, rising oil prices, and mismanagement of nationalized industries. The judiciary and security forces were politicized and party paramountcy reigned over state institutions and organs. Press freedom was stifled. These conditions contributed to an overall oppressive milieu and Guyana's status as one of the poorest, undemocratic countries in the hemisphere (Bissesar, 2001).

By 1984, the Government of Guyana (GoG) had partial or full control over thirty-five enterprises, which included bauxite mining, rice milling and marketing, sugar production, electricity generation, telecommunications, shipping, banking and retail (eighty-five percent of total export revenues were derived from: sugar, rice and bauxite) (Bissesar, 2001).

Several identifiable changes occurred in the 1980's. Executive Presidency and a new Constitution were introduced and a new leader of the PNC emerged following the death of the party's founder in 1985. The PNC remained in power, which it attained through continued manipulation of the electoral process (Giffith, 1997, Commonwealth, 2006). The latter part of the 1980's ushered in an era of structural adjustment, which began with the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) that was introduced by the new PNC administration in 1987. The ERP, in essence supported a shift from a state-driven economy to a market-driven economy, and represented just a part of an intense economic and institutional transformation program that the country undertook under the direction of International Financial Institutions, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

By the early 1990s important political changes began to take place. In 1992, national elections recognised internationally as being democratic were held. The PPP, now the People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/Civic) won the general elections and once again ascended to political power, a position it held between 1957 and 1964. Prior to the 1992 national elections, the PNC (now the People's National Congress Reform- 1 Guyana, or PNCR-1G) administration under intense criticisms instituted reforms and surrendered control of the electoral process (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, 2006).

At the same time, several important electoral changes were enacted by Parliament, with the Carter Centre playing a major facilitating role. These changes were considered necessary to safeguard democratic values of impartiality and transparency of the electoral process. The core reform related to a change in the composition of the Guyana Elections Commission. Parliament increased the number of members of the Commission to reflect a more representative membership from the ruling and opposition political parties. Other crucial reforms mandated the counting of ballots, and the compilation of results at the polling stations. More importantly, under the reforms a new voters list was compiled through a house-to-house registration process (Organisation of American States Report, 2006).

Although the reforms improved the electoral process, the integrity of the 1992 general elections process was questioned as the PNC, after 28 years in power, found it difficult to cede power to the PPP/C. This distrust later deteriorated into violence concentrated in the capital city. Poor communication and logistical problems accounted for a delay in the transmission of the results in

the subsequent general elections in 1997, which contributed to an environment of further distrust. The net effect was that the opposition refused to accept the results and the legitimacy of the PPP/Civic's power (OAS Report 2006). The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was called upon to facilitate negotiations between the two parties. Ensuing negotiations and CARICOM's intervention resulted in the Herdmanston Accord on January 17, 1998. The Accord authorized CARICOM to conduct an audit of the electoral process and the establishment of a Constitutional Reform Commission. This audit culminated into the Constitutional Reform Act 2000, which stipulated the establishment of a permanent Elections Commission charged with the role of managing and administering elections. Additionally, emanating out of the Herdmanston Accord was for the pursuance of a Constitutional Reform process. This process was pursued in wide consultation with stakeholders. The 2001 elections though considered an improvement from 1992 was marred with a similar breakdown in communication, which again resulted in the opposition's refusal to accept the outcomes. What is significant to note is the fact that the proceedings of the 1997 and 2001 elections were monitored by a delegation of the OAS who felt that the elections conformed in a large way to internationally acceptable standards. In their report, the delegation found the administration of the elections to be "adequate" (1997) and "satisfactory" (2001) but wanting in terms of communication and logistical support (OAS Report, 2006).

The PPP/C has won the last four elections, their victories undeniably linked to the ethnic-based voting behaviour of the electorate. During the months that preceded the 2006 election a number of high profile killings and death threats were made against members of the Elections Commission and politicians. The unadulterated and ostensibly baseless violence, according to the security forces linked to drug-trafficking and drug traffic related crimes, are emerging concerns for politicians, and potent threats to democracy in Guyana. Such conditions threaten the country's economic and social development and anecdotal information indicates that these have been responsible for some Guyanese leaving the country permanently.

Through the intervention of members of the diplomatic and business communities, the Guyana Bar Association (GBA), the Private Sector Commission (PSC) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) attempts were made to get parliamentary parties to sign a joint communiqué on crime in 2002. Further, the Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) has been urging the government and the opposition to formulate a widespread national consensus to put an end to all criminal and politically-inspired violence, and appropriately deal with the criminals and racial animosity that sometimes fuel criminal acts (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group 2006, p. 14). Participation of these groups has facilitated a more transparent electoral process and provided thousands of citizens with the opportunity to participate in the democratic process (OAS Report 2006, p. 40). Persistent demands continue to be made by civil society for a more inclusive government committed to departing from the traditional race based politics towards a more sustainable and workable democratic form of governance. They play an indispensable role in promoting democratic practices.

## Recent Political Evolution

The year 1992 is a milestone in Guyana's history, as it represents the period of transition from authoritarian to democratic politics. The PPP, once chastised for its communist ideals re-emerged and succeeded to political power. The changes in political regime, policies and the constitution, as well as the continuity of regime politics created an environment ripe for the pursuit of democracy (Griffith 1997). The major political parties' support for democracy was personified by the inclusion of constitutional reform and participatory governance on their political platforms for the 1992 general and regional elections.

Specifically, in an effort to appeal to non-Indo Guyanese electors and to demonstrate a change from its previous political ideological orientations, the PPP allied with a group of people from the business sector and members of civil society, The PNC underwent a similar revision of their political focus in 2001 and subsequently changed their party title to the People's National Congress/Reform-1 Guyana (PNCR-1G) for the 2006 national and regional elections. Over the fourteen years that Guyana experienced regime change, the composition of its two main political parties for the most part has remained the same. There has been traditionally a number of significant smaller parties including the Working People's Alliance (WPA); Rise, Organize and Rebuild Party (ROAR); the Justice for All Party (JFAP); Guyana Action Party (GAP),<sup>13</sup> and The United Force (TUF), but they have not been able to win substantial support from the electorate. More recently, the Alliance for Change (AFC) emerged. The leading members are former party members of the PNCR-1G, PPP/Civic and the WPA (*see Appendix I-3*).

## Recent Studies in Political Culture

Empirical studies on Guyana's political culture are few and far between. An opinion survey on "Political Attitudes and Party Choices in contemporary Guyana," was conducted in 2000 by the St. Augustine Research Associates (SARA) and sponsored by *The Initiative*, a grouping of Guyanese civil society. In sum, it revealed that a majority (fifty-six percent) of the one thousand persons interviewed were satisfied with the state of democracy in Guyana. While the survey does not confirm the electorate's predisposition to vote along racial lines, the findings do support a strong probability that it occurs. In 2006, several pre-elections public opinions polls were conducted by the North American Caribbean Teachers Association (NACTA). The results of the poll confirmed the electorate's race-based voting behaviour.

Another study that merits mention was done by Roxanne Myers in 2003, through the United Agency for International Development (USAID) Democracy and Governance Program (1999 – 2004). The survey sought to garner the public's perceptions of women in politics, and was undertaken as part of the Institute's work to expand and strengthen democracy worldwide.<sup>14</sup> Two-thirds of the sample population were community activists involved in community development projects who saw themselves as capable of effecting change at the community

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<sup>13</sup> GAP and ROAR eventually merged for the 2006 election.

<sup>14</sup> Myers, Roxanne (2003). *Increasing Women's Political Participation: National Survey on Public Perceptions of Women in Politics*. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. IR 4 – Civil Society Influences Public Policy.

level. The survey revealed several factors that discourage women from community activity, election campaigns and general political participation. It also captured women's views on the way the media treated women-related issues. The survey and the activities that emanated from it represented a very crucial step towards locating and publicizing Guyanese women's issues and their needs as part of the broader pursuit for democracy.

Lastly, a survey on the attitudes of Guyanese towards crime was conducted by Dr. Mark Kirton in 2006, under the auspices of the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, the Ministry never publicly disclosed the results of this study which was used to inform the IADB funded Citizen Security Project.

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Appendix I-1: Socio-Economic Statistics


<b>BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ANALYTIC SUMMARY</b>				
ITEM	ACTUAL 2005	BUDGET 2006	REVISED 2006	BUDGET 2007
<b>A. Current Account</b>	(157.5)	(199.8)	(181.4)	(175.0)
1.0 Merchandise (Net)	(232.7)	(254.3)	(283.7)	(305.0)
1.1 Exports (f.o.b.)	551.0	562.7	601.3	625.0
1.1.1 Bauxite	62.8	95.0	67.3	73.0
1.1.2 Sugar	118.0	145.0	137.0	140.0
1.1.3 Rice	46.2	52.0	54.6	57.0
1.1.4 Gold	111.9	57.7	114.4	120.0
1.1.5 Timber	49.6	53.0	70.3	75.0
1.1.6 Other	147.2	145.0	150.5	152.0
1.1.7 Re-exports	15.3	15.0	7.2	8.0
1.2 Imports (c.i.f)	(783.7)	(817.0)	(885.0)	(930.0)
1.2.1 Fuel & Lubricants	(221.8)	(236.0)	(245.0)	(255.0)
1.2.2 Other	(561.9)	(581.0)	(640.0)	(675.0)
2.0 Services (Net)	(92.0)	(85.5)	(113.8)	(90.0)
2.1 Factor	(39.0)	(30.5)	(43.1)	(30.0)
2.2 Non Factor (Net)	(53.0)	(55.0)	(70.7)	(60.0)
3.0 Transfers	167.2	140.0	216.1	220.0
3.1 Official	-	-	-	-
3.2 Private	167.2	140.0	216.1	220.0
<b>B. Capital Account</b>	180.6	198.0	244.1	235.0
1.0 Capital Transfers	52.1	55.0	89.1	80.0
2.0 Medium and Long Term Capital (Net)	143.5	164.0	170.0	173.0
2.1 Non-Financial Public Sector Capital (Net)	66.7	89.0	70.0	50.0
2.1.1 Disbursement	102.5	117.0	105.0	80.0
2.1.2 Amortization	(35.8)	(28.0)	(35.0)	(30.0)
2.1.3 Other	-	-	-	-
2.2 Private Sector (Net)	76.8	75.0	100.0	123.0
3.0 Short Term Capital	(15.0)	(21.0)	(15.0)	(18.0)
<b>C. Errors and Omissions</b>	(15.0)	(4.9)	(17.8)	(19.0)
<b>D. OVERALL BALANCE</b>	8.1	(6.7)	44.9	41.0
<b>E. Financing</b>	(8.1)	6.7	(44.9)	(41.0)
1.0 Bank of Guyana net foreign assets	(23.9)	(10.0)	(61.8)	(41.0)
2.0 Change in Non- Financial Public Sector Arrears	-	-	-	-
3.0 Exceptional Financing	15.8	16.7	16.9	-
3.1 Debt Relief	-	-	-	-
3.2 Balance of Payments Support	-	-	-	-
3.3 Debt Forgiveness	14.0	14.1	14.1	-
3.4 Debt Stock Restructuring	1.8	2.6	1.7	-

Source: Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, 2007.

SELECTED SOCIO- ECONOMIC INDICATORS					
INDICATORS	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>1.0 NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AGGREGATE</b>					
1.1 Growth Rate of Real GDP	1.1	-0.6	1.6	1.9	4.7
1.2 GDP at factor cost (US\$M)	617.8	631.0	652.7	683.6	741.2
1.3 GNP at factor cost (US\$M)	562.7	588.4	621.1	663.5	698.1
1.4 Per capita GDP (US\$)	829.2	840.2	864.4	902.6	974.9
1.5 Per capita GNP (US\$)	755.4	783.5	822.5	875.6	918.2
1.6 Gross National Disposable Income (US\$M)	705.2	763.7	781.5	931.6	1032.0
1.7 Private Consumption as % of Gross Domestic Expenditure	45.1	44.8	49.2	55.3	47.5
1.8 Public Consumption as % of Gross Domestic Expenditure	21.1	23.7	21.8	20.3	18.2
<b>2.0 EXTERNAL TRADE AND FINANCE (US\$M)</b>					
2.1 BOP Current Account Balance	-106.7	-60.6	-70.0	-167.1	-181.4
2.2 Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services (G&NFS)	-758.9	-743.8	-854.5	-984.5	-1103.2
2.3 Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services (G&NFS)	667.2	669.6	749.9	698.9	748.8
2.4 Resource Balance	-91.7	-74.2	-104.6	-285.7	-354.4
2.5 Imports of G&NFS/GDP(%)	122.8	117.9	130.9	144.0	148.8
2.7 Exports of G&NFS/GDP(%)	108.0	106.1	114.9	103.2	101.0
2.8 Net International Reserves of Bank of Guyana	183.2	176.2	136.6	160.5	222.3
2.9 External Public Debt Outstanding	1246.7	1084.5	1071.1	1094.0	920.6
<b>3.0 PRICES, WAGES &amp; OUTPUT</b>					
3.1 Rate of Inflation (% changed in Urban CPI)	7.1	4.9	7.2	8.3	*4.2
3.2 Public Sector Monthly Minimum Wage in G\$(e.o.p)	21,047.3	22,099.0	23204	24828.3	26069.0
3.3 % Growth Rate	5.0	5.0	5.0	7.0	5.0
3.4 Electricity Generation (in M.W.H)	512.7	488.9	514.9	528.4	534.6
<b>4.0 POPULATION &amp; VITAL STATISTICS</b>					
4.1 Mid-Year Population ('000)	747.7	752.5	755.1	757.6	760.2
4.2 Population Growth Rate (e.o.p)	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
4.3 Net Migration ('000)	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A	N.A
4.4 Visitor Arrivals ('000)	104.3	100.9	121.9	116.6	113.5
4.5 Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 persons)	23.5	25.8	23.1	N.A	N.A
4.6 Crude Death Rate (per 1,000 persons)	7.3	7.3	6.8	N.A	N.A
4.7 Crude Marriage Rate (per 1,000 persons)	7.3	6.4	5.9	4.8	6.1
4.8 Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 persons)	20.3	17.0	20.7	22.8	18.4
4.9 Under 5 mortality Rate (per 1,000 persons)	24.9	21.2	26	N.A	N.A
<b>5.0 HEALTH AND EDUCATION</b>					
5.1 Public Expenditure on:	18.2	14.4	15.5	13.7	13.0
5.1.1 Education as % of National Budget	8.8	8.9	9.5	7.5	9.0
5.1.2 Health as % National Budget	4.6	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.9
5.2 Number of Physicians per Ten Thousand Population	10.5	14.0	34.0	34.0	13.1
5.3 Number of Nurses per Ten Thousand Population	42.4	43.6	43.6	43.5	24.8
5.4 Number of Hospital Beds per Ten Thousand Population	11.5	11.9	11.8	11.8	N.A
5.5 Low birth-weight babies (<2500g.) as a % of live births	0.7	0.6	1.0	0.6	N.A
5.6 Severely Malnourished	9.3	8.8	9.3	7.0	N.A
5.7 Moderately Malnourished	3.9	4.7	5.2	4.7	N.A
5.8 Overweight					
<b>6.0 IMMUNIZATION COVERAGE</b>					
6.1 1 year olds Immunized against DPT/ (Pentavalent) (%)	85	91	92	92	92
6.2 1 year olds Immunized against MMR, Yellow Fever (%)	93	90	90	92	92
6.3 1 year olds Immunized against Polio (%)	93	90	90	93	92
6.4 1 year olds Immunized against TB, BCG (%)	95	94	94	96	96
<b>7.0 CRIME</b>					
7.1 Reported Serious Crimes	3470	2941	3450	2808	2376
7.2 of which: Homicides	142	206	131	125	153


\* 3.1 is the Rate of Inflation (Georgetown)

Appendix I-2: Graphs of Socio-Economic Variables




**Graph Ia-1: Real Minimum Wage Per Day (in Guyana Dollar).**

Source: Public Service Ministry (PSM) and the Ministry of Finance, Budget Speeches (various years).



**Graph Ia-2: Net Remittances as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product.**

Source: Bank of Guyana, Research Unit, 2007



**Real effective exchange rate index (2000 = 100):** Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs.

**Graph Ia-3: Real Effective Exchange Rate (1990 – 2005).**

*Source:* International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics.

Appendix I-3: Supplementary Data

**Table Ia-1: The distribution of seats in each of Guyana’s ten geographical constituencies, which coincide with the 10 administrative regions**

	Region	Distribution of seats
1	Barima/Waini	2
2	Pomeroon/Supenaam	2
3	Essequibo Islands/West Demerara	3
4	Demerara/Mahaica	7
5	Mahaica/Berbice	2
6	East Berbice/Corentyne	3
7	Cuyuni/Mazaruni	2
8	Potaro/Siparuni	1
9	Upper Takutu/Upper Essequibo	1
10	Upper Demerara/Berbice	2

Source: Organisation of American States *Electoral Observation and Regional Elections, Guyana 2006, Electoral Observations in the Americas*; pp. 4-5

**Table Ia-2: Guyana’s Employment Status by Sex: 1980 – 2002**

2002			1980	
Both Sexes	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total: 15yrs and over	484,042	100	449,803	100
Labour Force	271,728	56.1	241,934	53.8
Employed	239,965	88.3	201,359	83.2
Unemployed	31,763	11.7	40,575	16.8
Not in Labour Force	212,315	43.9	179,389	39.9
<b>Male</b>				
Total: 15yrs and over	240,342	100	220,784	100
Labour Force	188,652	78.5	184,579	83.6
Employed	169,426	89.8	156,656	84.9
Unemployed	19,227	10.2	27,923	15.1
Not in Labour Force	51,690	21.5	21,927	9.9
<b>Female</b>				
Total: 15yrs and over	243,701	100	229,019	100
Labour Force	83,076	34.1	53,355	25.0
Employed	75,540	84.9	44,703	77.9
Unemployed	12,537	15.1	12,652	22.1
Not in Labour Force	160,624	65.5	157,462	68.8

Source: Bureau of Statistics, Guyana Population and Housing Census 2002

**Table I-3: General Election Results During the Period 1964-2006**

YEAR	NO. OF LISTED ELECTORS	TOTAL VOTES CAST	VALID VOTES FOR EACH LIST OF CANDIDATES										
			AGGG	AFC	DLM	GAP/ROAR	GBG	GDP	GUMP	JFAP	JP	NDF	NIP
1964	247,604	240,120		-	-	-		-	1,194	-	1,334	-	
1968	269,088	314,216		-	-	-		-	899	-	-	-	
1973	431,575	349,590		-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	
1980	493,550	406,265		-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	
1985	399,304	294,801		-	2,167	-		-	-	-	-	156	
1992	384,195	308,852		-	1,557	-		-	-	-	-	68	
1997	461,481	408,057	1,552	-	-	-	314	2,528	-	1,265	-	105	258
2001	440,185	403,734				3,695		1345		2825			
2006		338,839		28,366		4,249	-	-	-	2,571		-	

YEAR	VALID VOTES FOR EACH LIST OF CANDIDATES											TOTAL VALID VOTES	TOTAL REJECTED VOTES
	NLF	NRP	PDM	PEEP	PNC/R	PPP/C	TUF	UGI	URP	UWP	WPA/AFC		
1964	177	-	-	224	96,657	109,332	29,612	-	-	-	-	238,530	1,590
1968	-	-	-	-	174,339	113,991	23,162	-	-	-	-	312,391	1,825
1973	-	-	2,053	-	243,803	92,374	9,580	-	-	-	-	347,810	1,780
1980	-	-	-	-	312,988	78,414	11,612	-	-	-	-	403,014	3,251
1985	-	-	232	-	228,718	45,926	9,820	-	-	-	4,176	291,195	3,606
1992	-	114	270	-	128,286	162,058	3,183	134	1,343	77	6,086	303,186	5,666
1997	-		-	-	161,901	220,667	5,937	-	-	-	6,086	399,310	8,747
2001			-		165,866	210,013	2,904	-	-	-	9,451	396,516	7,218
2006	-	-	-	-	114,608	183,867	2,694	-	-	-	-	336,375	5,051

Sources: Guyana Elections Commission, Reports on the General and Regional Elections of March 19 2001 and of December 15 1997. See *Guyana News and Information*. Online at [http://www.guyana.org/Elections/past\\_results.html](http://www.guyana.org/Elections/past_results.html) Date accessed: February 7 2006.

## II. Methodology of the Study

### Sample Design

It is imperative when conducting a study of this nature that information is gathered on the values and perceptions of *all* citizens, inclusive of those considered ‘inactive’, politically insignificant, and those living in rural and hinterland locations. However, it is often the case that some studies are based on samples that categorically under-represent certain sectors of the population. The most common causes of this under-representation that introduces biases are, in the first instance cost related, and secondly influenced by the spatial distribution of the population over wide areas. Being cognizant of these factors, this study sought to circumvent these biases through pursuing a sample that was representative of the total population.

In conducting this study the survey team encountered many challenges, not least being its inability, despite repeated requests, to access the census bureau maps. In all other countries for the LAPOP 2006 round of surveys, such maps were obtained, and were used in all except Mexico, where the research team demonstrated that the electoral register was a more accurate source of information. In the absence of the census maps, data from the 2002 census was utilized. According to this data, Guyana has a total of 751,223 inhabitants, with twenty eight percent (28%) of this population living in the seven (7) municipalities that constitute the urban areas in this study and the remaining seventy-two (72%) living in rural areas. The country is divided into 10 administrative regions, which are also named electoral districts. This proved convenient for the study, since it afforded us a direct way to link the population data to the electoral district data. In this way, we were able to draw a sample based on the population, and not the population of registered voters which could differ substantially from the population.

Table II-I shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over by region and urban and rural areas. The teams’ inability to access information on those 18 years and over from the Bureau of Statistics forced it to use those who were in the 20 years and over age group, making the reasonable assumption that the distribution of the 18 and 19 year olds does not vary in any significant manner from the 20 years and over population.

In this study, it was decided to design a sample that covered both coastal and hinterland regions of the country and the rural and urban areas. However, due to logistical and financial considerations, Regions 7 and 8 were excluded from the sample. However, the hinterland Regions was still well represented, with both Regions 1 (Barima – Waini) and 9 (Upper Takatu – Upper Essequibo) being included in the study. Furthermore, given that the design was mainly of a probability design, -it is “random”- the study sought to ensure that the most administrative regions of the country was covered. The sample was stratified to make it more efficient. Without stratification, randomness could have resulted in very few interviews being conducted in any one of these areas. Stratification assisted us in increasing the precision of the sample by guaranteeing that the respondents would come from the regions of interest.

**Table II-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region**

Region	Population		Urban area		Rural area	
	total	%		%		%
Region 1 (Barima/Waini)	9845	2.4%	0	0.0%	9845	2.4%
Region 2 (Pomeroon/Supenaam)	25568	6.2%	7131	1.7%	18437	4.5%
Region 3 (West Demerara/Essequibo Island)	58215	14.2%	0	0.0%	58215	14.2%
Region 4 (Demerara/Mahaica)	176812	43.0%	80874	19.7%	95938	23.4%
Region 5 (Mahaica/West Berbice)	28620	7.0%	0	0.0%	28620	7.0%
Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne)	68972	16.8%	18523	4.5%	50449	12.3%
Region 7 (Cuyuni/Mazaruni)	8483	2.1%	0	0.0%	8483	2.1%
Region 8 (Siparuni/Potaro)	5028	1.2%	0	0.0%	5028	1.2%
Region 9 (Upper Takatu/UpperEssequibo)	8375	2.0%	0	0.0%	8375	2.0%
Region 10 (Upper Demerara/Berbice)	20948	5.1%	15587	3.8%	5361	1.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>410866</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>122115</b>	<b>29.7%</b>	<b>288751</b>	<b>70.3%</b>

*Source:* Guyana Census (2002)

The country was divided into 717 electoral divisions for the 2006 general election. We therefore stratified these electoral divisions into five (5) geographical areas based on the ethnic composition of the regions, as well as by urban and rural areas. As such, the following stratum was determined: (i) Greater Georgetown (Urban area of Region 4), (ii) Region 3 and the rest of Region 4, (iii) Regions 2, 5 and 6, (iv) Region 10, and (v) Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9. Table II-2 shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over across strata and rural and urban areas.

**Table II-2. Distribution of the Population 20 years old and over Across Strata and Area**

Strata	Total Population		Urban		Rural	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1 Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	80874	19.7%	80874	19.7%		0.0%
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	154153	37.5%		0.0%	154153	37.5%
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	123160	30.0%	25654	6.2%	97506	23.7%
4 Region 10	20948	5.1%	15587	3.8%	5361	1.3%
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	31731	7.7%		0.0%	31731	7.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>410866</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>122115</b>	<b>29.7%</b>	<b>288751</b>	<b>70.3%</b>

*Source:* Guyana Census (2002)

A total of 172 sampling points or electoral divisions were selected in a systematic manner. It was decided before the survey commenced that 8 households would be interviewed in the urban areas and 12 in the rural areas. The total number of sampling points was therefore determined using this quantification and the distribution of the population in each stratum. Within each stratum, the electoral divisions were listed from larger to smaller according to the total number of registered voters and then the divisions were selected using the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. Table II-3 presents the distribution of the electoral divisions by stratum and by urban and rural areas, which was estimated proportionally to the population size in each stratum

reported by the 2002 census. Thus, the sample strata reflect the population size (20 years and over) rather than the election rolls.

**Table II-3. Distribution of the Electoral Divisions by Stratum and Area**

Strata	Distribution of population across strata		Number of Electoral divisions Selected		
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Total
1 Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	66.2%	0.0%	44	0	44
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	0.0%	53.4%	0	56	56
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	21.0%	33.8%	14	35	49
4 Region 10	12.8%	1.9%	9	2	11
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	0.0%	11.0%	0	12	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>172</b>

*Source:* Guyana Census (2002)

The sample was clustered, in order to reduce travel time and costs. Small clusters are cost effective, and have been shown, generally, to limit the impact of intra-class correlation. A total of 12 and 8 interviews were conducted in each electoral division in rural and urban areas, respectively, for a total sample size of 1,559. A total of 456 interviews were conducted in the urban areas and 1,103 in the rural areas. Table II-4 shows the final distribution of the sample by urban and rural areas.

**Table II-4. Distribution of the Population to be Sampled by Area**

	Number of Selected Electoral Divisions	Number of Clusters or Polling Places in each Electoral Division	Cluster Size	Total Number of Interviews
Urban area	67	1	8	536
Rural Area	105	1	12	1260
<b>Total</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1796</b>

*Source:* LAPOP Survey (2006)

One cluster in each sampling point in urban areas and one cluster in each sampling point in rural areas was chosen. In cases where an electoral division in urban areas had more than one polling place, the polling place was drawn using PPS. In rural areas, we used both the PPS method, as well as the “linking” strategy so that two contiguous electoral divisions were surveyed. The “linking” strategy was useful in the case of Guyana because of the country’s size and the difficulty accessing parts of its rural areas because of their remoteness, especially in the hinterland regions. Table II-5 shows the total number of interviews conducted in each stratum by urban and rural areas.

**Table II-5. Actual Population Sampled Conducted in Each Stratum**

	Total	Urban	Rural
Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	298	298	0
Areas of High Density (Region 3 and rest of region 4)	571	0	571
Areas of Moderate Density (Regions 2 & 5)	215	18	197
Areas of Low Density (Region 6 & 10)	353	140	213
Areas of Very Low Density (Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9)	122	0	122
<b>Total</b>	<b>1559</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>1103</b>


*Source:* LAPOP Survey (2006)

A single respondent was selected in each household, following the quota to be sampled based on sex and age. The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2002 census. If there were two or more people of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire was applied to the person with the next birthday.

As indicated earlier, we interviewed 1,559 households. This number was defined as a function of the theoretical margin of error desired to obtain a reliable inference of nationwide results. In this case, the margin of theoretical error is  $\pm 2.5\%$  in the worst case scenario, with a confidence level of 95%. A “worst case” arises when the responses are evenly split, 50/50; making it very difficult to judge which response is the most preferred to a given question. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario the survey provides accurate representation of citizens views, erring by no more than 2.5% more or 2.5% less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing in Guyana.


### Overview of the Sample

This section of the report provides an overview of the sampled population and examines *inter alia*, the gender spread, income distribution, and educational level of the respondents. From Graph II-1 it can be deduced that the sample was fairly evenly distributed between males and females. Thus, it can be concluded that there is no gender bias in the sample.




Graph II-1. Distribution of the Sample by Gender. Guyana 2006

Furthermore, the sample demonstrates a pattern similar to the population distribution of the country, indicating a population structure where the majority of persons are within the working age group (Graph II-2). This distribution played a role in the sample where respondents in the age range 18 – 45 represented approximately 75% of the sampled population, with the largest group sampled being in the age range 26-35 years.




Graph II-2. Distribution of the Sample by Age Groups. Guyana 2006

Graph II-3 indicates that educational attainment in the sampled areas is extremely high, with 61% of respondents having attained at least a secondary or vocational education and 99.5% of respondents having attained at least a primary education. In the case of primary education, this may be reflective of government’s policy in making primary education compulsory. This suggests that there is a direct link between educational attainment and government policy that offered education free of charge to all Guyanese from Nursery to University during the period 1976 to 1995. This demonstrates the heavy investment that respective governments have made in human capital (see *Appendix I-1* in Chapter I). While it is true that access has a significant effect on rates of educational attainment, primary education is universally available in Guyana. However, the low rates of University attainment may be, among other things, a reflection of difficulty in accessing this service as there is a single University in Guyana with two campuses, one in Berbice and one in Demerara. There is a distance education program, but this is still largely inaccessible to many hinterland communities.



Graph II-3. Distribution of the Sample by Education Level. Guyana 2006

Guyana is a poor developing country with a per capita GDP of US\$975 (in 2006) and approximately 35% of the population being in absolute poverty as at 1999 (Thomas 2000). The country's poor state has been occasioned by inappropriate development policies, mismanagement of the country's substantial natural resources, and external shocks (National Development Strategy 2000). The country has been a beneficiary under the highly indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative. From the sample, reported monthly family income was relatively low. For example, approximately 76% of the respondents indicated that their monthly income was in the range of US\$25 and G\$225. While it is true that some of these figures might have been under reported, with a minimum wage within the public sector of US\$130, this reported figure is not unsurprising. More in-depth analyses of these issues are discussed in the subsequent chapters of this report.




Graph II-4. Distribution of the Sampled Population by Household Income. Guyana 2006

Lastly, given the ethnic composition of Guyana as discussed in Chapter 1, a study of democracy and governance must be cognizant of this fact and examine how democratic norms and the impact of governance might be influenced by ethnicity. The sampled population, as shown in Graph II- 5, is generally reflective of the ethnic composition in the country. The one caveat is that Guyanese of Indian decent were slightly under-sampled as they, according to the Guyana Census, 2002, account for approximately 42% of the total population of the country.

The data accessed for Guyana in this study was compared with those of some other countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region that took part in the LAPOP survey. This comparison allowed us to assess Guyana’s relative position with regard to the variables applied in the study. This comparative analysis is consistently reflected in succeeding chapters where the pooled sample is “weighted.” The weighting was necessary since in some of the countries the sample sizes were much larger than others and because in Ecuador and Bolivia in particular, the samples were in excess of 3,000 individuals, while in the other countries the samples were about half that size. The pooled sample produced a weighted file in which each country has a sample of 1,500. These weights do not affect in any way the means reported in the studies, but they do, however, affect the confidence intervals reported. In almost every case the weighted sample is smaller than the actual sample, thus the confidence intervals reported are wider than they would have been without the weighting. This means that our results are actually a bit more precise than is displayed in these charts for nearly all of the countries, except for Bolivia and Ecuador, where

the actual data are far more precise than shown here. In effect, the report uses a conservative estimate of confidence intervals for the pooled data set.



Graph II-5. Distribution of the Sampled Population by Ethnic Group. Guyana 2006

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### III. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy and Different Analytical Dimensions of Democracy

While political regimes the world over have been self-described as democracies, the commitment to democracy is only a recently emerging phenomenon (Held, 1996). The history and idea of democracy are characterised by conflicting conceptions and disagreements, as well as fundamentally varied opinions about what the term means. It was therefore important that the LAPOP survey instrument be designed to capture variations in people's conceptualizations of democracy. The results do reveal different and interesting conceptions of democracy among Guyanese.

In an attempt to determine the alternative conceptions of democracy held by Guyanese, the survey posed the following question:


**DEM 13:** *In a few words, what does democracy mean for you?*

Individuals who indicated multiple responses to this question were asked to give their opinion on the most important meaning of the term 'democracy'. Single responses were treated as the presumptive "most important" answers (Seligson and Sarsfield, 2006).

The LAPOP Central Office identified four overarching conceptualizations of democracy, namely: (i) **utilitarian definitions of democracy**, which are based heavily on assessments of less likely political outcomes and focuses more attention on economic results; (ii) **normative or axiomatic definitions of democracy**, which are based on a substantive understanding of processes and/or values associated with democracy, but which do not depend on satisfaction with immediate outcomes; (iii) **pejorative or negative understandings of democracy**, which is a conceptualization by citizens who think democracy is a bad idea; and (iv) **empty conceptualizations of democracy**, which characterize those citizens who cannot attribute a substantive interpretation to the concept or contend that democracy has no meaning.

As presented in Graph III-1 52.2% of Guyanese have a normative conception of democracy, which indicates that a majority of Guyanese have a positive understanding of democracy as a process or a certain set of values. Additionally, 34.3% have an empty conception of democracy. This latter view shows that practically a third of Guyanese may be uncertain about what democracy means to them, or may have unconventional views of democracy.

The above findings indicate, *inter alia*, that very few Guyanese have a pejorative view of democracy, while interestingly, only a few Guyanese indicated a utilitarian view of democracy thereby affirming a general tendency of the population to see democracy in terms of the liberty of expression and associating it with an effective system that lends itself to the propagation of free and fair elections.



**Graph III-1. Alternative Conception of Democracy. Guyana 2006**

It was also important for us to determine the kinds of factors that influenced the “normative understanding category” in Guyana. The results indicate that three in ten of the 52% of Guyanese with a normative understanding of democracy equated this concept with the freedom of expression, while approximately 10% of respondents indicated that democracy equals “free elections” and 8% understood it as “voting” and as the “power of the people.”


To establish what socio-economic and demographic factors in the study had an impact on the different conceptions of democracy, a multinomial logistic regression was done. The multinomial logistic regression assumes in this case that variables can be used to predict how three categories of democracy will compare with a fourth baseline category. In this case the 52% of Guyanese that indicated a normative understanding of the concept of democracy was used as the baseline, while the predictor addressed those who conceptualized democracy as “instrumental,” “negative” or “empty”. We entered six predictors into the multinomial logistic model seeking to distinguish each of three conceptualizations from the baseline normative conceptualization: sex, age, education, wealth (measured in terms of possessions of goods), urban/rural status, and city size.

The results revealed that wealth, education, sex and the size of an area had significant impacts on respondents’ conceptions of democracy (Regression III-1 in *Appendix III*). However, these impacts only relate to those who expressed an empty or normative type of conception about

democracy. For example, respondents who fell in the lower income brackets are more likely to indicate an empty view of democracy, than those who fell into a higher income categories.

Looking at Graph III-2 and comparing those in the lower income group in the empty conceptualization with those in the middle and lower income groups of the negative conceptualization of democracy, the ratio is approximately 8:1 and 7:1 respectively. Thus the significance of wealth as a factor distinguishing the probability of holding an empty conception versus a negative conception of democracy is evident.


This would seem to suggest that those at the lower income levels feel unaffected by the move of Guyana from an autocratic society during the period 1980 to 1992 towards the establishment of democratic principles after this period. Thus, while the institutions, such as the Judicial Commission, Ethnic Relations Commission, and the Police Complaints Authority are present, the accessing of these institutions seems to be a function of one's wealth, possibly influenced by spatial factors. Hence, many Guyanese can attribute no meaning to the concept of democracy.



Graph III-2. Alternative Concepts of Democracy, by Wealth. Guyana 2006


As mentioned above, education was also found to be an important explanatory variable in the empty and normative conceptualization of democracy in the study. However, it is important to note from Graph III-3 that there was a tendency of those who had higher education to also have a greater normative concept of democracy than an empty conception of democracy. Hence, university-educated Guyanese are more likely to hold a normative conception of democracy than have an empty conceptualization. However, in comparing those with a secondary education, it was found that, although the ratio is less stark, a normative conceptualization of democracy is

still more common among this group than an empty conception of democracy. The net effect of education therefore is to increase the “bias toward” a normative understanding of democracy. Lastly, approximately 30% of Guyanese who do not have a tertiary level education have a negative concept of democracy compared to less than 5% of Guyanese with some basic formal education. This finding indicates that education is pivotal to persons’ conceptualization of democracy. It may also be linked to their confidence level in the democratic process and institutions within Guyana. This level of confidence may be linked to their overall perceptions of the system of governance that exists in the country (*this will be discussed in chapter 4*). However, it is important to note that these tendencies noted were only for those respondents indicating a normative or empty conception of democracy and therefore must be treated with some degree of caution.



Graph III-3. Alternative Conception of Democracy, by Education. Guyana 2006

Additionally, the size of the area, in terms of population as defined in Chapter 2, was found to be a good predictor for persons’ conception of democracy under the empty conceptualization category. With reference to Graph III-4 it is evident that the conditions most favorable to normative conceptions of democracy over empty conceptions are in rural areas and small towns. Conversely, those least favorable to normative conceptions over empty conceptions are in large areas (almost a 1:1 ratio).




Graph III-4. Alternative Conception of Democracy, by Area Size. Guyana 2006

Lastly, the study examined the effect of sex on explaining the empty conceptualization of democracy found in the study. However, it is important to note that while the earlier discussed variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level this variable was significant at the 0.05 level. By comparing the ratios across categories women, while still more likely to hold normative conceptions of democracy than empty conceptions (1.5 to 1) they exhibit a lower ratio favoring normative conceptualizations than men (1.8 to 1).

Guyana had a long history of state domination and the country was labeled as being under autocratic rule during the 1970s and 1980s when the government began nationalizing the main industries in the country (World Bank 2002). This autocratic rule became more severe after the revision of the country’s Constitution in 1980. However, since 1992 the country has been touted as having been returned to democratic norms with the first free and fair elections since 1964. It was therefore not surprising to find that, according to Graph III-5, Guyanese are amongst the least advanced in the region in acquiring normative conceptions of democracy. Guyanese rank only above El Salvador, and are nine places below Jamaica (63.9%), seven places below Haiti (60.9%) and two places below the Dominican Republic (52.9%) for Caribbean countries. Chile and Costa Rica are found to be the most advanced at 76% normative conceptions. This is one

among a number of indications in this study that Guyana’s democratic political culture is indeed quite young and has some appreciable way to go to enhance its fledgling democracy.



Graph III-5. Comparative Conceptions of Democracy by Country. LAPOP 2006

### Conclusions

The data set for Guyana seems to suggest that while Guyana has had democratically elected governments over the past four National Elections, the country’s democratic institutions are still in their infancy stage. But despite this, the political culture in Guyana appears to be more fully centered on the democratic process. However, it does seem that most Guyanese focus on *elections* as a process crucial to democracy, while many others focus on *freedom of expression*. Both values are consistently being tested in the Guyanese court system, no less notable than after the 1997 and 2001 National Elections that resulted in electoral petitions being lodge with the Supreme Court by the main Opposition Party.

An electoral process of increasing credibility in recent years has been put to the test by some of the most vociferous exercises of free expressions in a post-election environment. Some years

ago, Guyana would have enjoyed neither close elections nor such boisterous freedom of expression. But democracy is more than the holding of free and fair elections and freedom of expression. Integral to the process are: (i) the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life, (ii) protection of the human rights of all citizens, and (iii) the establishment of a rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

Both contested elections where the process was challenged, freedom of expression remained crucial to the procedures followed. As our survey indicated, Guyanese most frequently define democracy as entailing the presence of this condition. And those beliefs seem to inform their behaviors in recent elections.

However, among other things, wealth appears to have a heavy bearing on persons' conceptualization of democracy. This may be due to the fact that some other organs of a well functioning democracy still seem to be out of the reach of the masses. These issues are explored further in this study.

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Annex

**Regression III-I: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Predictors of Conceptions of Democracy. Guyana 2006.**

Alternative concepts of democracy(a)		B	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Utilitarian	Intercept	-.001	.710	.999		
	Sex	-.284	.196	.148	.513	1.106
	Age	-.007	.008	.399	.978	1.009
	Education	-.047	.034	.171	.892	1.020
	Wealth	-.030	.051	.551	.877	1.072
	UR	-.673	.356	.058	.254	1.024
Empty	Intercept	1.510	.443	.001		
	Sex	.244	.117	.036	1.016	1.605
	Age	-.006	.005	.229	.985	1.004
	Education	-.117	.020	.000	.855	.926
	Wealth	-.138	.031	.000	.819	.926
	UR	.387	.269	.150	.869	2.498
Negative	Intercept	-1.498	.875	.087		
	Sex	.165	.234	.481	.746	1.866
	Age	-.004	.009	.682	.978	1.015
	Education	-.026	.042	.529	.897	1.057
	Wealth	-.025	.062	.683	.863	1.101
	UR	-.446	.446	.317	.267	1.533
	SIZE	.058	.138	.674	.808	1.389

a The reference category is: Normative.

## IV. Support for a Stable Democracy

This chapter focuses on two attitudinal factors as explanatory variables to elucidate the emergence of a political culture supportive of a stable democracy. Those two factors are: (i) the support provided to institutions and processes of governance in times of stability or change, (ii) tolerance, which remains crucial for the interaction of citizens in an atmosphere of democratic equality and the preservation of those rights of minorities which are essential to making democratic rule indeterminate.

According to Linz and Stepan (1996) it is imperative that ‘politicians’<sup>15</sup> and citizens reach a stage of understanding that demonstrates that electoral competition is vital for the democratic health of a State. The role of citizens in this process should not be underestimated as they are consistently involved in the electoral review process and exercising their choices between competing political parties. However, in a state where democratic institutions are performing below a minimum acceptable level and continue to do so, the temptation is often to reach decisions and govern via non-electoral mechanisms or non-institutional/ non-procedural mechanisms. Under such conditions democratic institutions cannot be sustained over the long term (Linz and Stepan, 1996). It is necessary that in a democracy results are not predetermined and losers accept the results of the electoral machinery as a demonstration of their commitment to the democratic system.

Additionally, within the above scenario, tolerance and respect for the democratic institutions remain critical for the propagation of democratic values. In the absence of these two core values, i.e., tolerance and respect for the rule of law, conflict resolution becomes a fleeting goal. It is for these reasons that democratic values remain so critical for the advancement of human development.

An important tenet of the democratic system is that some decisions are provisional. Hence, winners today may become losers tomorrow and vice versa. Thus, it is necessary that certain basic rights remain sacrosanct, inclusive of freedom of speech, expression, assembly and association for all peoples. These rights are particularly important for minorities so that they do not have their interests ignored. Furthermore, without widespread tolerance and respect for the unconventional, non-conformist, and unpopular of today, advancement of human values and different perspectives, vital for human advancement, constructive dialogue and engagement, and critical review of policies, programs and plans will be stifled.


Also, confidence in an institution and/or system is one of the factors determining the support given to that system and is often an indication of the perspectives of political stability. As such, this chapter has two objectives. First, we examine the importance that tolerance and the support to the system have in a politically stable system. Tolerance in the first section of the chapter is viewed as the dependent variable and is influenced by a variety of socio-demographic and geographical factors. The second objective of this chapter is to observe the empirical relationship that exists between tolerance and the support of the political system of the country.

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<sup>15</sup> In this context the term may be loosely defined as those contesting for political power.

Political Tolerance

In this section of the study we attempt to assess the extent of perception regarding political tolerance in Guyana. As such, four questions were used to create a scale of political tolerance, with each question introduced by a common background reference to a hypothetical person who criticizes not only a given government in Guyana, but also the system of government. Subsequently, respondents were asked about whether such persons should be allowed to engage in a variety of political acts, using a ten-point scale expressing their agreement or disagreement with extending political rights to such a group. The ten-point scale is shown below:



Thereafter, questions were asked about allowing such people to vote (D1), participate in political demonstrations (D2), run for office (D3) and give televised speeches (D4). The specific text of these questions is as follows:

*D1. There are people who speak negatively of the Guyanese form of government, not just the incumbent government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**?*

*D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views?*


*D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to seek public office**?*

*D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people going on television **to make speeches**?*

This methodology seemed generally acceptable, despite its short-comings. In the first instance, it does not exclude those respondents who did not select a “less acceptable” group. Furthermore, it does not link the answer to a specific group or person, thus maintaining some degree of anonymity. But what its strength can also be viewed as a weakness in that this approach concentrates on those who generally speak unflatteringly about the form of government in Guyana. As such, one is prone to find that these persons are likely to be more tolerant of those who think similarly. Nonetheless, this group of questions seemed the most appropriate way to measure political tolerance in the country.

Using a scale of 1 to 100, Guyanese demonstrated a high level of tolerance with an average of 64.3, second only to Jamaica with 72.7 (Graph IV-1). Guyana’s relatively high ranking on political tolerance is significant given the fact that there were older democracies in the region in the sample, i.e., Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Moreover, given Guyana’s period of


State domination, when for the latter part of this period, opposition to the political machinery was often rejected, one can question whether Guyanese are too tolerant or intolerant? This issue will be further ventilated later in this study. However, even before answering the question posed, clearly a balance is needed as a society that is too tolerant can degenerate into a *lassiez faire* status, while one that is too intolerant is not accommodating of other peoples views and opinions leading to a situation of autocratic rule. What we needed to determine though were the factors that define the level of tolerance found in Guyana?



Graph IV-1. Comparative Analysis of Political Tolerance, Guyana 2006

In the Graph IV-2, we note that in the main, there is above average support for all four types of political participation for those who are critical of the political system. For example, the mean scores exceeded 60 in all four instances, with the greatest level of support being for those who wished to conduct peaceful demonstrations and for their right to vote. In the case of the former this may be a reflection of the lack of trust persons place in the democratic organs in Guyana, hence indicating that to bring about changes it is necessary to have acts like peaceful demonstrations that can be viewed as indication of ones' level of social dissatisfaction. This is healthy for a democracy in ensuring that different views are accommodated. Affected or aggrieved parties are also provided an opportunity in the revision of the system via the ballot box

by choosing a candidate that they perceive is able to better deal with the issues confronting society. However, it is informative that the least tolerance is for such persons running for public offices.




Graph IV-2. Support to the Rights of Those Who Criticize the Political System

To further strengthen the analysis, a linear regression model was constructed to predict variation in levels of political tolerance in Guyana. A variety of socio-demographic data was used as control variables. The results are presented in *Appendix IV-1* that demonstrates which factors best explain the levels of political tolerance observed in Guyana. As is evident, three variables, mainly of the geographical type, were significant predictors of political tolerance in Guyana at the conventional  $p < 0.05$  level. These variables are (i) the size of an area denoted by number of persons living in that area, with smaller areas being more tolerant than larger areas, (ii) the urban-rural divide, with people in urban areas being more tolerant than those in rural areas, and (iii) educational attainment, where the study found that persons with higher educational level tended to be less parochial and more tolerant as one would expect, since education is often seen as a means of broadening one’s objectivity. These relationships are further graphed below in Graphs IV-3 through IV-5.


Some political scientists have indicated the importance of education as a factor determining tolerance (Ryan 2000, Ferguson 1999). In this particular instance this *a priori* expectation is confirmed. Graph IV-3 establishes an association between the level of education and political

tolerance. There exists a noticeable difference between the level of tolerance of the people with a tertiary education and those with lower education.




Graph IV-3. Educational Attainment and Political Tolerance, Guyana 2006

Hence, through graphing the bivariate relationships of the variables that were statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level in the multivariate regression model further strengthened the contention that geographical factors and education are main determining factors of political tolerance in the Guyana.



Graph IV-4. The Influence of the Urban-Rural Divide on Political Tolerance, Guyana 2006




Graph IV-5. The Influence of the Urban-Rural Divide on Political Tolerance, Guyana 2006

Social Tolerance


In the previous section, the study sought to analyze the factors that influence the political tolerance in Guyana, that is to say, the acceptance of the political rights of those people who are not in agreement with the form of government in the country. Within this section of the report, we examine those factors that determine social tolerance, such as respect for persons’ decisions and lifestyles. To assess this issue, a question on homosexuality was included in the questionnaire. Guyana is still a highly religious, conventional and reserved society hence one can expect that it will be an appropriate measure of how accepting the society is to ‘alternative’ life styles and social choices. In fact, the Sexual Orientation Bill (#9) of 2003 brought to the Guyana Parliament while being passed in the National Assembly based on what was termed a ‘conscience vote’, has not received Presidential assent due in large part based on representation made by religious organizations. Respondents were asked the following question:

*D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office?*

Having analyzed the factors that affect political tolerance, we found that the urban-rural divide and size of the area were the most important predictors. Thus we graphed these two variables for social tolerance as well and reflect them in Graphs IV-6 and IV-7 respectively. Graph IV-6 indicates that urban areas are more tolerant as well as those in larger areas. However, the error bars in these graphs are quite large, possibly due to the finite number of individuals who are in agreement of protecting the rights of all Guyanese. This being as it may, the general substance of the findings is expected to hold constant.



Graph IV-6. Social Tolerance by Urban-Rural Divide, Guyana 2006




Graph IV-7. Social Tolerance by Size of Area, Guyana 2006

Finally, a multivariate linear regression model was designed and many of the variables that were applied to assess social tolerance were also utilized in this model. The analysis indicates that the best predictors of social tolerance with regards to the acceptance of non-discrimination based on one's sexual orientation at the  $p < 0.05$  level are geographical in nature, in the form of the urban-rural divide, size of the area in which people live, and wealth (see Appendix IV-I Regression 2). In the case of the urban-rural divide our data indicates that persons in urban areas tend to be more socially tolerant, possibly due to their greater exposure to different cultures and lifestyles. Similarly, as area size declines the less socially tolerant are people. Lastly, our multivariate regression analysis indicates that wealth is a good predictor of social tolerance. Surprisingly, religion measured as attendance at religious gatherings at faith-based organizations, was insignificant even though it had the *a priori* sign, i.e., a positive relationship between religion and social tolerance.

### Comparative Analysis of Social Tolerance

However, the general average of people's acceptance is relatively low as the average level of respect for the rights of persons with alternative lifestyles to take a public position is approximately 21 on a scale of 100, falling well below the median score (Graph IV-8). Comparatively, Guyana finds itself at the lower end of countries in the study with regard to social tolerance, with Chile and Mexico being the most socially tolerant. The least socially tolerant societies were all found in the Caribbean, with Haiti (9.4) and Jamaica (19.8) falling below Guyana as regards approving of homosexuals running for public office, while the

Dominican Republic was marginally above with a score of 24.6. This indicates that the Guyanese society remains fairly reserved and conventional.



Graph IV-8. Comparative Statistics on Social Tolerance

Thus, one can conclude that the most important factors in the creation of a culture of tolerance in Guyana are geographical in the form of the size of the area and where people live. This, among other things it can be argued, is why the government, having invested in decentralization, is also investing in the democratic stability of Guyana. This is seen through, among other things, the encouragement of community policing groups, the retooling of the Guyana Police Force, the rehabilitation of the places of justice, and pursuance of Justice Reform and Citizen Security Programs.

### Support for the Political System

Political scientists over the years have sought to explain the concept of diffuse regime support, starting with the Easton's (1965) seminal paper. The general perception has been that stable

democracies cannot emerge and be sustained unless there is citizen support that transcends satisfaction or dissatisfaction with immediate political outcomes. The basic thinking and fundamental argument is that citizens in democratic societies would often confront dissatisfaction with political decisions or outcomes on most occasions, such as decisions made at the time of voting. But a critical ingredient as well is that where there is a system based on the consent of the government, there must be procedures by which decision-makers are selected and the processes by which governance occurs. However, since it is possible that specific outcomes of the political process can coexist with discontent and specific outcomes, it was denoted initially as *diffuse regime support*, with the concept of “regime” referring to a set of operating rules and procedures (which might be formal or informal) (Seligson, 1983; Muller, Seligson and Turan, 1987).


In this study a five-item sequence of questions, each of which uses the following seven-point scale was applied, where 1 indicates NOT AT ALL and 7 A LOT. Hereafter, the six questions were asked as listed below.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all				A lot			Don't know

- B1.** *To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Guyana guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2.** *To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guyana?*
- B3.** *To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Guyana?*
- B4.** *To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Guyana?*
- B6.** *To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Guyana?*


To have a better understanding of the relationship between the support for the political system, the previous questions were combined into a single index of “*support to the political system.*” This was important for an understanding of the magnitude of the support to the political system. Obviously, there are advantages and disadvantages to supporting the political system. Extreme and blind support, without any avenue for constructive dialogue, can lead to complacency by the political directorate or may eventually yield authoritarianism, restriction in freedom and liberties, or even breakdown in the democratic values of society (Miller, 1974). Conversely, unjustified opposition to the political system can lead to disrespect for the political institutions in place, questioning of a government’s legitimacy, and political instability, with a possible breakdown in the rule of law. Questioning the government’s legitimacy has plagued Guyana since the 1997 general elections, though admittedly, the 2006 election was the first since 1997 whose results were not challenged in the courts of Guyana. Thus, in a democracy it is important for the citizens to maintain a balance in terms of what is just to enhance the democratic process as against what can be viewed as political expediency. Being cognizant of the above issues, B1 – B6 was analyzed.

Measured on a scale from 1 [where all citizens would be giving the most negative assessments] to 100 [where all citizens would be giving the most positive evaluations], the average level of support given to the Guyanese political system by the citizenry was 52.7. The distribution of mean support scores to each of these questions is shown in Graph IV-9. It is important to note that for three of the measures, the mean is above the 50 point mark: B1 (guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect the political institutions), B6 (support the political system). One believes that these measures, while above the 50 point mark level, are still relatively low and may be due to the fact that many feel disillusioned by the democratic organs in the country. For example, it is estimated that cases in the high courts can take on average five (5) years to be resolved (IADB, 2006). Furthermore, given the fact that Guyana is one of the richest countries in the region with regards to natural resources, the level of poverty that persists in the country is disappointing. Additionally, as will be shown later in this publication it would appear that some Guyanese are understandably discontented with the performance of certain political and social institutions. For example, it will be shown later in this study that Guyana ranks above most of the countries in this study in terms of corruption according to Transparency International (2006). Additionally, of the five (5) HIPC countries in the region, i.e., Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guyana, only Nicaragua had a rate of corruption higher than Guyana between 1996 and 2004 according to the Kaufmann Index (World Bank, 2005).



Graph IV-9. Indicators of System Support, Guyana, 2006

Support for the political system in Guyana is fair from a historical perspective given the tragic political disturbances of 1963/4 and again in 1997 and 2001 that resulted in the loss of lives and property, mainly in the Demerara/Mahaica and Upper Demerara/Upper Berbice Administrative Regions. Furthermore, it is interesting from a comparative perspective as well. In fact, from a comparative perspective, Guyana ranked 8<sup>th</sup> in the 17 country sample with a mean score of 52.7, coming behind some countries that have had a longer history of democratic practices, such as Costa Rica (65.8), Mexico (59.6) and Dominican Republic (57.6) (Graph IV-10). But Guyana's score is considerably higher than those of the other CARICOM countries. In fact, both Jamaica and Haiti have mean scores in the 40s.



Graph IV-10. System Support in Comparative Perspective, Guyana, 2006

To understand better the factors responsible for the support to the political system in Guyana, a multiple regression model was constructed. In this model, like in the analysis of tolerance, a variety of socio-demographic and geographical factors were analyzed (*Appendix IV-I Regression 3*). The results indicate that there are six statistically significant predictive correlates of the level of political support in Guyana at the  $p < 0.05$  level. These factors are: (i) national pride, where pride in being a Guyanese seem to result in unstinting support for the political system, which can

be dangerous as outlined above, as it can lead to complacency by the political directorate; (ii) size of the area in which people live, where persons in smaller areas appear to be more supportive of the system than those living in larger areas; (iii) perception about the national economy, where the more persons perceive that the country is experiencing an upward swing in economic development, the more they are likely to support the political system in place; (iv) prevalence of bribes which is an important variable as it indicated that the more bribes persons perceive are being taken, the less they are likely to support the political system; (v) index of civic participation where the more involved citizens are the more inclined they are to support the system; and (vi) evaluation of the performance of the President, where once it is perceived that the President is doing a good job, the domestic populace indicated their willingness to offer the system their support.

### Institutional Trust

The support for the political system can also be a function of trust in the system. As such, the desire of citizens to question the *status quo* is often embedded in the trust they place in a democratic system and the confidence they have in the institutions present that should promote democratic values. This is tautological as the support citizens are willing to offer their government and the political system that they operate within are generally a function of the belief they have in those institutions and systems to perform, and to do so in accordance with democratic norms. Various LAPOP studies indicate that the confidence citizens have in the political institutions of their country is a good indicator of the support they will provide to that system.

Furthermore, studies have indicated that if citizens have confidence and trust in the institutions and instruments of the State they are likely to be more willing to accept the regulations and legislation originating from the system. This is so since, if citizens' trust in the institutions and instruments applied to promote democratic norms, they generally tend to perceive the decisions of the State as more legitimate (Weatherford 1992).

As such, confidence in the political system often originates from an evaluation of the politicians and political institutions compared to the expectations placed on the political system (Easton 1975). This evaluation, while not automatically generating a political response, can translate into an attitude of confidence or one of distrust (Easton 1975). This attitude of confidence influences the support that the citizens give to the institutions, which can potentially be changed into action.

It can therefore be contended that the degree of confidence in the political and social institutions of democratic norms provide a justification for political action. Confidence in political and social institutions helps to consolidate and deepen the democratic process. Furthermore, confidence creates 'collective power' that allows a government to make decisions and invest resources without resorting to coercion and without needing to obtain the permission of the citizenship for every decision (Mishler and Rose, 1997)

The main objectives of this section are to investigate the factors and/or characteristics of the political and social systems in Guyana that influence the perceptions of its citizens, gaining their

trust or losing their confidence in these institutions. A study of the confidence in the political and social institutions of Guyana is especially important in light of the political conflicts and economic problems that the country has been facing, as described in Chapter I.

Writers have consistently noted that confidence in political and social systems vary by sector, experiences and time (Hetherington 2005; Moore 2002; Seligson 1998; Seligson 1999; Seligson, et al. 2004). These factors are also examined in this study. Studies carried out by LAPOP in the previous years in Latin and Central America countries demonstrate that the confidence that citizens have in the political institutions of their country is a good indicator of the support they have for the system. The degree to which confidence in a politically and/or socially democratic system will often affect the level of support the populace is willing to give to that system, is also reflected in the energy and time they are willing to invest in that system


The confidence level in the institutions was measured directly by asking the interviewees how much trust they had in each of the institutions in the study on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 means that the interviewee does not trust the institution and 7 means that they have complete trust in the institution. Later in the analysis, the 7 point scale was transformed into a scale from 1 to 100 for ease and better interpretation of the institutional evaluations, as well as to facilitate better comparative analyses. In this new scale, a score closer to 1 represents a smaller confidence level, while a score closer to 100 represents the highest level of confidence for the institution.

All of those interviewed were given the opportunity to omit the score of any institution that they did not know or if they preferred not to express an opinion. The questions used to measure the confidence in the institutions are the following:

<i><b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the system of justice?</i>
<i><b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Court of Appeal)?</i>
<i><b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?</i>
<i><b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Congress (Parliament)?</i>
<i><b>B14.</b> To what extent do you trust the Central Government?</i>
<i><b>B15.</b> To what extent do you trust the Public Ministry?</i>
<i><b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Police?</i>
<i><b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?</i>
<i><b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?</i>
<i><b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?</i>
<i><b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your municipality?</i>
<i><b>B43.</b> To what extent are you proud of being a Guyanese?</i>
<i><b>B16.</b> To what extent do you trust the Attorney General?</i>
<i><b>B17.</b> To what extent do you trust the Public Defender's Office (Director of Public Prosecution)?</i>
<i><b>B19.</b> To what extent do you trust the Office of the Auditor General?</i>
<i><b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the mass media?</i>
<i><b>B40.</b> To what extent do you trust the indigenous movements?</i>
<i><b>B42.</b> To what extent do you trust the Guyana Revenue Authority</i>

*B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the Integrity Commission?*

*B47. To what extent do you trust the elections?*



Graph IV-11. Trust in Public and Social Institutions, Guyana 2006

As indicated in Graph IV-11 Guyanese demonstrated the greatest trust in the social organizations is in the religious organizations. This is possibly based on the fact that these are places that are founded on the principles of morality. Most of the other institutions came in the mid-way range. However, it is informative that persons had the least trust in the quality of the electoral process. The lack of trust, however, does not seem to be an issue associated level against the Guyana Elections Commission as this institution had a score of 50.9. As such, it would appear that there remains some suspicion about the electoral process which scored the lowest (45.7) of all the categories surveyed in this section.

### Support for a Stable Democracy

There is ample reason for Guyanese to be discontented with specific instances of the public institutions performing inefficiently and with specific policy outcomes. For example, in Chapter 5 it will be seen that Guyana leads most other LAPOP countries in 2006 in terms of exposure to

corrupt acts – the soliciting of bribes – by public officials in the past year. However, Guyana ranks low in this multi-country survey in terms of the percentage of citizens reporting that they have been subjected to a crime in the past twelve months. With government unable to guarantee the sanctity of property and person in Guyana, and with a significant number of Guyanese citizens having been exposed to the solicitation of a bribe by a public official in the past year, it is remarkable that so many Guyanese exhibit political tolerance and support the political system.

The combination of high political tolerance and a high degree of political support are the conditions most conducive to stable democracy (Seligson, 2000). The survey indicates that the percentage of Guyanese who exhibit those two traits concurrently is 31.5%. Indeed, while exposure to both corruption and crime are arguably high on a per capita basis in Guyana, system support was marginally above average at 52.7%.

Further, Table IV-1 illustrates that those who are high on tolerance, but low on system support (the “unstable democracy” cell) was 32%, while those who are high on system support but low on tolerance (the “authoritarian stability” cell) was 21%. Lastly, we looked at those respondents who fell into the low support for the political system and low tolerance that can place the democracy at risk in Guyana. We found that this group is in the minority at 15.5%.

**Table IV-1. Relationship between the support to the institutional system and tolerance in Guyana**


	Tolerance	
Support for the Political System	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 31.5%	Authoritarian Stability 21%
Low	Unstable Democracy 32%	Democracy At Risk 15.5%

Source: LAPOP Survey (2006)

Given the incidence of certain negative outcomes in Guyana over the past five (5) years, such as the 2002 jailbreak that exposed the country to a rein of terror from which it has not recovered fully, the persistence of drug-trafficking in the country with several well documented drug busts at the National airport and wharves in the country, and the constant allegations of corrupt public officers (World Economic Forum, 2006), it was somewhat surprising that only 31.5% of Guyanese citizens were supportive of a system that is conducive to a stable democracy (*see* Table IV-1) above. This finding may be reflective of the fact that other issues, such as the length of time it takes to conclude matters in the High Court, and perceptions of rising unemployment and insufficient enforcement in the rule of law may also be influencing factors (Investment Climate Survey, 2006).

What factor(s) in the analysis differentiate those who characterize themselves within the boxes of democratic stability from other interviewees? We sought to answer this question of the tolerance and support to the system by controlling for: perception of the President’s performance. In Graph IV-12, it is possible to observe the impact of the perception of the President’s performance on the values of support to a stable democracy. The line represents the percentage of people from


each group ranging from very good to very bad. Clearly, the more persons perceive the President as performing well, the more they are supportive of stable democracy.



Graph IV-12. Support to a Stable Democracy according to the Perception of President's Performance, Guyana, 2006

### Comparative Perspective on Support for a Stable Democracy

From the discussion above, a number of negative outcomes (exposure to crime) and negative experiences (exposure to corrupt public officials) have placed Guyana's democracy under threat. It is seemingly remarkable that out of a mean score of 100 Guyana scored as many as 31.4. This represents Guyanese citizens who exhibit attitudes consistent with a stable democracy. Even more remarkable is where that proportion places Guyana in comparative terms (see Graph IV-13). This places Guyana sixth in the group of countries in the survey, behind Costa Rica (50.2), Mexico (41.3), Dominican Republic (38.3), Jamaica (36.2), and El Salvador (32.2).



Graph IV-13. Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Supportive of a Stable Democracy

### Conclusion

This chapter has examined the support for the system and tolerance as variables of importance to the proper functioning of a stable democracy. Comparatively, the values of these variables in Guyana are low. For more than twenty (20) years after political Independence, Guyana followed a socialist path to development, where “*paramountcy of the party*” took precedence over other interests (Griffith, 1997). During this period the opposition candidates often alleged that the ruling Party at the time sustained its electoral majority by conducting fraudulent national elections and hence, a sense of powerlessness and apathy tended to pervade the nation.

However, it appears that Guyanese citizens no longer feel powerless in electoral competition and they have come to believe that elections matter. Moreover, given that the 2006 General

Elections was one of the most peaceful seen in Guyana since 1964 would seem to suggest that the country's democratic institutions are gradually maturing and there is an increasing level of trust in their ability to hold fulfill their mandates. As seen in this chapter, Guyana had a score of 52.7 of those who support the political institutions.

Furthermore, the country demonstrates a high level of political tolerance but there is still a significant level of social intolerance present in the society. If the democratic process is to be deepened in the country, it will be necessary to ensure that all rights and civil liberties are protected and treated as sacrosanct.

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Annex

Regression IV-1: Model of Political Tolerance in Guyana, 2006

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t-test	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	43.642	9.861		4.426	.000
Perception of National economy	-1.216	1.069	-.040	-1.138	.255
Perception of personal economic situation	-.365	1.100	-.011	-.332	.740
Evaluation of President	-1.691	.990	-.055	-1.707	.088
Total Index of Civic Participation	.332	.355	.027	.935	.350
Individual, per person, Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.611	.446	.045	1.371	.171
How common are bribes?	.057	.034	.049	1.684	.092
Pride in nationality	.060	.033	.053	1.847	.065
Urban-Rural	8.280	3.273	.138	2.530	.012
Area Size	-4.717	.979	-.267	-4.816	.000
Sex	2.782	1.598	.050	1.741	.082
What is your age?	.094	.064	.043	1.458	.145
What was the last year of education you completed?	.878	.291	.098	3.023	.003
Indo-Guyanese	4.051	6.363	.069	.637	.525
Afro-Guyanese	8.671	6.388	.145	1.357	.175
Amerindians	11.459	7.100	.097	1.614	.107
Mixed	8.441	6.412	.131	1.317	.188
<b>R-Square</b>	0.088				
<b>F-Test</b>	6.862 ( $p < 0.01$ )				

a Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance

**Regression IV-2: Model of Social Tolerance in Guyana, 2006**

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t-test	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	13.035	6.158		2.117	.034
Urban-Rural	13.934	3.518	.204	3.961	.000
Area Size	-5.827	1.041	-.289	-5.600	.000
Sex	.944	1.672	.015	.565	.572
Church Attendance	.038	.022	.045	1.694	.091
What was the last year of education you completed?	.429	.285	.043	1.502	.133
What is your age?	.117	.066	.048	1.778	.076
Individual, per person, Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.853	.435	-.057	-1.959	.050
<b>R-Square</b>	0.029				
<b>F-Test</b>	6.035 ( $p < 0.01$ )				

a Dependent Variable: Social Tolerance

**Regression IV-3: Model of Support for the Political System in Guyana**


Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t-ratio	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-6.787	7.152		-.949	.343
Perception of National economy	4.012	.764	.155	5.253	.000
Perception of personal economic situation	1.167	.786	.042	1.485	.138
Evaluation of President	8.922	.711	.342	12.543	.000
Total Index of Civic Participation	.528	.255	.051	2.075	.038
Individual, per person, Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.448	.320	-.039	-1.400	.162
How common are bribes?	-.087	.024	-.088	-3.587	.000
Pride in nationality	.150	.024	.154	6.358	.000
Urban-Rural	-.713	2.356	-.014	-.303	.762
Area Size	2.360	.703	.157	3.356	.001
Sex	.894	1.146	.019	.780	.436
What is your age?	-.066	.046	-.035	-1.414	.158
What was the last year of education you completed?	.175	.209	.023	.837	.403
Indo-Guyanese	4.542	4.545	.091	.999	.318
Afro-Guyanese	-.425	4.573	-.008	-.093	.926
Amerindians	4.572	5.103	.045	.896	.371
Mixed	.510	4.589	.009	.111	.911
<b>R-Square</b>	0.359				
<b>F-Test</b>	39.643 ( $p < 0.01$ )				

a Dependent Variable: System support

## V. Corruption and Democracy in Guyana

Some academics have interpreted corruption, particularly as it exists in the Third World, as a necessary corrective to bad policies and functional for political development (Huntington, 1968, 1990; La Guerre 2006, and Seligson 2002). No doubt the existence of bad policies, resource shortages, low levels of respect for and trust in politicians and the rule of law, and changing values have created an environment that is conducive for corruption to thrive (La Guerre 2006, Seligson, 2006). Despite different views on the causes of corruption, there is concurrence based on evidence that corruption undermines the public's confidence and support for the political system (Seligson, 2002). Furthermore, corruption carries a very high political cost and tends to exacerbate poverty (Seligson 2002; Seligson and Recanatini 2003). Most scholars concur that corruption is perilous to a country's economic and political development.

According to the Transparency International Index (2006) that measured the perception of corruption, Guyana was found to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The Index ranges from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten low levels of perceived corruption. Guyana was ranked 121 out of 163 countries that were surveyed, where Haiti held the single position of being the most corrupt country in the LAPOP sample (Graph V-1). Jamaica, with a score of 3.7 scored better than the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Haiti for Caribbean countries.



**Graph V-1. Perception of Corruption - Latin America and the Caribbean Jamaica?**  
*Source: Transparency International*

The perception about the level of corruption in Guyana found some support by the latest edition of the governance indicators compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). They found that in Guyana the governance indicators demonstrated a worsening in the area of corruption between 1998 (-0.26) through 2002 (-0.48), with a marginal improvement in 2004 (-0.35). Furthermore, businesses identified corruption as the third most important factor affecting the conduct of business operations in Guyana, after ‘crime and theft’ and ‘access to finance’ (World Competitiveness Report 2006).

High levels of corruption in Guyana, it is argued, have led to deficiencies in the delivery of public services and undermined the overall effectiveness of the systems of governance and rule of law (US State Department 2007). The weaknesses of these vital systems have undermined anti-corruption efforts and further perpetuate corrupt practices. Transparency International reports that countries are corrupt on account of the presence of systems that allow facilitators of corruption to aid political elites to profit from illegitimately acquired wealth (Transparency International, 2006). In Guyana several allegations of corruption have been levelled against public officials and prominent business personalities. These charges and allegations are usually

publicized by the local media, and while admittedly some of these persons have been investigated, there have been few prosecutions.

In some cases, such as, the importing of duty free vehicle scam or persons having large sums outstanding for the municipalities<sup>16</sup> or State-owned utilities, the offending parties are invited into the public offices to rectify their malfeasances or discuss their outstanding balances. This may be a reflection of the weaknesses in the law enforcement agencies to conduct proper investigations, impeding the judiciary's ability to prosecute these cases.

This chapter takes examines corruption based on the perceptions of Guyanese as captured in the LAPOP 2006 survey. People's perceptions of the pervasiveness of corruption and the areas most affected by corruption have been found to be important measures of the success of current anti-corruption initiatives (Transparency International, 2006). Moreover, information on the character of corruption, based on the public's perceptions can be used to develop appropriate anti-corruption measures and initiatives.

### Justification in the Paying of Bribes

Respondents were asked a series of questions on corruption victimization,<sup>17</sup> which were analyzed individually and as overall indices. In the case of corruption victimization, it takes us away from the realm of perception and deals with actualities. Hence, it is a much stronger measure of corrupt practices occurring in a society as the data discussed so far have major limitations in that they measure only perceptions/impressions. Furthermore, some of the indicators examined thus far on corruption suffer from problems of endogeneity<sup>18</sup> (Seligson 2006). The study commenced by examining the perceived justification for corruption by Guyanese. There is a general perception in Guyana that to get things done one has to pay bribes, and therefore, paying bribes is seen as justifiable. What was necessary to determine was the pervasiveness of this view. Respondents were therefore asked the following question:


*EXC18. Do you think that the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?*

The degree to which Guyanese perceive paying a bribe is justified may help in explaining why corruption may be perceived as a common place occurrence. The survey reveals that almost half of the respondents were of the view that paying a bribe is justified (Graph V-2). This finding illustrates that the condition for corrupt practices in Guyana is fairly substantial. This may help to explain the high perception of corruption found also in other studies.

<sup>16</sup> At one time the municipalities and NDCs followed Parate execution which basically allowed the authorities to follow a debt recovery process outside the normal law. However, Parate Execution has not been followed recently.

<sup>17</sup> This is a generic term used in the LAPOP surveys that involve persons who have been 'victims' of corrupt practices.


<sup>18</sup> Endogenous variables in causal modeling are the variables with causal links (arrows) leading to them from other variables in the model. In other words, endogenous variables have explicit causes within the model.



Graph V-2. Justification for Paying a Bribe, Guyana 2006

The study sought to determine the factors that were responsible for nearly one in two Guyanese believing that paying a bribe was justified. A variety of demographic and socio-economic variables were regressed on the dependent variable. In order to make this determination, a logistic regression model was applied, using justification for paying a bribe as the dependent variable for which the results are contained in *Appendix V-1 Regression V-1* below.


Using the conventional level of statistical significance of  $p < 0.05$  the results show that the variables used are relatively strong explanatory variables. For example, education and wealth – understood as the possession of material goods–, two variables that are often associated with attitudes, have significant impacts on the willingness of respondents to justify bribery. One noticeable finding was that education was positively associated with people who felt that paying a bribe is justified. This may be a reflection as was discussed in Chapter IV of persons resigning themselves to what they see as human frailties and an indication of the popular Guyanese parlance “*this is Guyana, so what are we to do?*” Furthermore, to the extent that this is so, it may carry severe implications for the country as persons often view education as a catalyst for change, not perpetuation of an existing system. In addition, the urban variable, which was a binary variable also showed strong explanatory powers in justifying corruption; with urban dwellers being more likely to justify bribery than people living in rural areas (Graph V-3).



Graph V-3. Justification of Bribery by Area, Guyana 2006


This may be a reflection, *inter alia*, of the less than efficient performance of the local government system. With no local government elections held since 1994, it may be that some local government officials have become complacent, hence leading to the perception that to get anything done one has to offer a bribe. Additionally, it may also be a reflection that residents in urban areas are more exposed to the pervasiveness of corrupt practices and have become more accepting of these acts than their rural counterparts.

In terms of the sex distribution Graph V-4 below, indicates that men are more willing to justify the act of offering a bribe to a public official than women.




Graph V-4. Justification of Bribes by Sex, Guyana 2006

Finally, the study revealed that in Guyana younger persons are more likely to find bribing justifiable, which could be an indicator of changing values and attitudes with age. This finding is revealed in Graph V-5 below. This is an important finding as, to the extent this becomes pervasive it would imply that young Guyanese are growing up more used to seeing bribery as a justifiable practice to get things done.



Graph V-5. Justification of Bribes by Age, Guyana 2006



Graph V-6. Justification for Bribes by Education, Guyana 2006


This section of the study looked at the justification for paying bribes. It revealed both graphically and in our regression model, that the more educated persons are the more they are likely to justify the taking of bribes by public officials.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, persons who were younger were more likely to justify bribe taking than older respondents. Both these findings are disturbing as these are two categories of personnel often viewed as change agents.

### Corruption Victimization

Our next step in this analysis was to examine who are the individuals that have been most exposed to corrupt practices and situations in Guyana. In order to determine this, the study moved away from the realm of perception and into the arena of self reported instances of corrupt practices being perpetuated or, as referred to in the study, corruption victimization. This section commenced by asking a range of questions that assisted in demonstrating the pervasiveness, or lack thereof, of corruption in Guyana, and more specifically, in government institutions. This approach was important to add robustness to the analysis undertaken.

The analysis looked at encounters with corrupt practices within seven different public office settings (Graph V-7). A scale of 0 (was not a victim) to 100 (was always a victim) was utilized.

<sup>19</sup> This category of workers generally include persons holding public offices and may not be exclusive to the government services alone.



Graph V-7. Experience with Corruption in Different Settings, Guyana 2006


It was found that the paying of bribes at work, with a score of approximately 17 was the most significant of the categories selected for this study. This finding weakly supports the notion that in some cases to get things done persons are inclined to pay a bribe. Also of note was the fact that paying a bribe to a public employee<sup>20</sup> had the lowest score with 6.4. However, Graph V-7 indicates that the problem of persons being asked to pay a bribe was noticeable in the health and education sectors though the error bars are much larger than most of the other graphs constructed. Nonetheless, there are at least two ways in which these findings can be interpreted. The first is that while corruption may be high in Guyana, this seems to be encouraged more by patrons than by officials. Secondly, it may be an indication that corruption is not only present in the public sector, but is also in the private sector, though the evidence available for this is at best anecdotal.

To further strengthen the analysis a linear regression model of the factors that help explain corruption victimization was constructed. At a  $p < 0.05$  level of significance, it was found that the significant variables are: (i) women are more likely to be asked for a bribe than men, (ii) perception of personal economic situation, in which case those who see themselves as being less economically secure are more likely to be victims, and (iii) wealth being a strong indicator of those who were the main victims of corrupt practices. However, this may also be an indication that the wealthy, not necessarily wanting to follow established norms, may be more inclined to pay a bribe. Furthermore, it may also be an indication that the wealthy also tend to have the means to pay a bribe.

<sup>20</sup> This category excluded those in the health and education sectors but included all other categories of public servants.

Interestingly, and going against the perception in some quarters that corruption in Guyana may be ethnically related, this survey found no such relationship as the ethnicity variables were all insignificant at the accepted levels of significance in this study (*Regression Table V-2 in Appendix V-1*).

From a comparative standpoint, the LAPOP survey results indicate that Guyana suffers from a not insignificant level of corruption and victimization when compared to most of the other Latin American and Caribbean States that undertook the survey (Graph V-8). From the information generated, approximately 25.2% of the respondents indicated that they had suffered from at least one form of corruption within the last year. As stated before this figure is not as high as the reported proportion in the other two CARICOM nations of Haiti and Jamaica; but is higher than that of the Dominican Republic. Also, when compared to countries such as Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile, it represents a significant percentage as shown in Graph V-8. It is important to note that the ordering of Graphs V-7 and V-8 are different, in that while the former deals with whether the respondent paid a bribe, the latter measures whether the informant was a victim of corruption in the past year. It is the general belief that the index of victimization is a more valid indicator because it is generally more acceptable for respondents to admit having been a victim than to confess having paid a bribe.




Graph V-8. Corruption Victimization - Cross country Comparison

The survey also found that the wealthy are more at risk of falling prey to corruption than those persons who fall within lower-income brackets, and to a lesser extent, middle-income persons. This finding is consistent with global figures, which show that there is a link between income level and the extent to which respondents feel that corruption affects their lives (Transparency International, 2006). While lower income respondents seem less susceptible to corruption victimization, they are certain to be more harshly affected by such acts, than respondents with middle and higher incomes. It can be reasonably assumed that individuals with low incomes will tend to have more negative views of the effect that corruption has on their lives than those persons with middle and higher level incomes. According to Transparency International this is expected since poorer families have fewer resources at their disposal to buffer them from the effects of corruption. Furthermore, Seligson and Recanatini (2003) confirm that corruption perpetuates poverty, given that it acts as a regressive tax. They make reference to data collected from surveys conducted in several countries which paints a common picture, that is, corruption serves to punish the poorest and most vulnerable groups.

Corruption also contributes to discrimination in terms of access to public services. Access to certain services is sometimes limited to those who can afford to pay a bribe for it. Results show that bribery is most common in a work setting. In other words, 30.4% of participants reported that they have been asked for an inappropriate payment in their work environment within the past year. 17.4% of Guyanese were asked for bribes in their child/children's schools, and a similar proportion indicated having to pay a bribe to access health services. The Transparency International found that bribes are most commonly paid to the police, indicating an overall high corruption level in law enforcement, with the judiciary ranked the third most corrupt institution (Transparency International 2006). The LAPOP survey shows that approximately 14.1% of respondents indicated that the police officials have requested bribes from them. Smaller percentages of persons reported having to pay a bribe to public employees, in municipal institutions and in the courts during the past year. Overall the data indicate that there is some level of corruption present in public sector organisations. Seligson and Recanatini (2003) writing in the context of Ecuador noted that the likelihood of having to pay a bribe varies based on the public organisation. Drawing from data from the World Bank, they cited public education and health care services among the more common public services for which households will most likely have to pay bribes (Seligson and Recanatini, 2003). Survey results for Guyana are consistent with those found by the World Bank in their World Competitiveness Report of 2005.

### Corruption Victimization and its Impact on Justification of Corruption


Having determined the proportion of the population that are willing to justify the paying of a bribe and the socio-economic and demographic factors that may be responsible for this attitude, the study sought to ascertain whether being a victim of corruption played a role in determining Guyanese willingness to justify such acts. If it does, the study would have uncovered a vicious circle where increased corruption encourages its acceptance, and this acceptance perpetuates further corrupt practices.



Graph V-9. Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Justification of Bribery


The findings shown in Graph V-9 are informative and demonstrate a strong association between corruption victimization and respondents' willingness to justify such acts. Respondents who were not victims of corruption indicated that the act is unjustifiable. However, the more exposed persons were to the modalities of bribery the more 'accepting' they appear to be of the practice. It may be an indication therefore, that corrupt acts are eroding the legitimacy of the public institutions and trust in the systems that have been established to serve their interests. This finding seems to confirm an earlier exposition that corruption can become a vicious cycle.

We also examined corruption victimization by gender and found, as Graph V-10 shows, that while there was very little difference between males and females, in the main, males tended to be more willing to justify corrupt acts than females. A remarkable finding was that the more females were exposed to corrupt acts the less likely they were to justify these practices, while for males the converse was true. One explanation may be that with more than a quarter of the female respondents being housewives on a fixed allowance they are more opposed to paying bribes as it reduces the 'income' they have to cater for their household. It may also reflect the fact that women are less likely to be the ones paying the bills and as a result are less likely to be exposed to corruptions.




Graph V-10. Corruption Victimization by Sex

While it seems that rural residents are ambivalent in justifying corrupt practices based on the number of such acts that they have been exposed to, it is clear (see Graph V-11) that this is not the case for urban dwellers. In fact, urban dwellers are more “eager” to justify the act of bribe-paying to get things done. This is informative as most of the political and social institutions are present in these urban centres. As such, it may be an indication that these institutions are not working as well in the urban centres as they are in the rural areas or that the social capital and community spirit is more vibrant in the rural areas. As such, persons are more likely to pool their resources to execute a function rather than determine that it is the ‘government’s job’ (Mott MacDonald, 2004). As such, they are less likely to be susceptible to corrupt practices. Additionally, it may be that the value system in the urban areas is appreciably different from those in rural areas. Lastly, our finding may also be reflecting the fact that since urban centres offer most of the social and other services, corruption may appear more pervasive. But the mere fact that these facilities are more present in urban centres also lends themselves to more corrupt acts being perpetuated as due to logistical issues persons from rural areas may not wish to travel to the urban centres more than once a week, for example, to conduct a business transaction.



Graph V-11. Corruption Victimization and Bribe Paying by Area of Residence

Finally, the study examined the impact of residence on the relation between corruption victimization and its justification. The results in Graph V-12 below indicate that for the urban areas, both the capital city and other urban areas, the justification of corrupt practices is more pronounced than in rural areas.



Graph V-12. Corruption Victimization and Justification of Bribe-Paying by Area Size

### Conclusions

Guyana has been continually affected by allegations of corrupt practices in various forms. In the past, this has been mainly based on respondents perception of such practices as conducted by Transparency International and like-minded entities. However, in this survey, actual indicators of corrupt practices were applied, both in terms of being asked for a bribe and paying a bribe. The results generated and analyzed indicate the presence of corrupt practices being carried out in Guyana, with approximately a quarter of respondents indicating being a victim of such corrupt practices. These corrupt practices appear to be most pronounced in the urban centres, and amongst the young and educated. This finding is significant and indicates the need for further corruption abatement measures to be implemented. This must be a national priority as corruption compromises public offices, the quality of services received and the returns one gets on ones investments. For a poor developing country like Guyana that requires increased levels of investment for continued economic growth and prosperity, it will be imperative that every effort is made to alleviate this scourge and that all segments of society support the government in its efforts. In addition, the data suggests that corruption victimization has an impact on perceptions, on trust in political institutions, on justification of this activity, and on the willingness to trust other individuals, which may transform into an erosion of legality in Guyanese society.

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Annex

**Regression Table V-1: Predictors of Justification of Bribery**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban/Rural	-.435	.121	12.923	.000	.648
Sex	-.276	.108	6.586	.010	.759
Age (years)	-.011	.004	6.941	.008	.989
Wealth	.022	.028	.585	.444	1.022
Education	.049	.019	6.847	.009	1.050
Constant	.742	.399	3.460	.063	2.101

Variable(s) entered on step 1: urban, sex, age, wealth and education.

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1951.433(a)	.031	.041

a Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

**Regression Table V-2: Factors Explaining Corruption Victimization**

Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t-Ratio	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.424	.250		1.700	.089
Area Size	-.003	.029	-.004	-.085	.932
Urban-Rural	.044	.099	.022	.444	.657
Sex	-.146	.047	-.080	-3.142	<b>.002</b>
Perception of personal economic situation	-.064	.027	-.062	-2.375	<b>.018</b>
What is your age?	-.001	.002	-.014	-.561	.575
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.051	.012	.117	4.182	<b>.000</b>
Indo-Guyanese	.237	.178	.125	1.333	.183
Afro-Guyanese	.197	.179	.100	1.102	.271
Amerindians	.188	.199	.052	.947	.344
Mixed	.232	.180	.110	1.290	.197
<b>R-Square</b>			0.11		

Dependent Variable: Number of persons victimized by corruption

## VI. Crime Victimization and the Rule of Law

Countries as they strive to pursue their development agendas and improve the welfare of their people often find that without a strong distribution network resources tend to be skewed towards urban areas (Lipton, 1977). This skewed distribution tends to encourage rural to urban migration and the emergence of slums as some of these migrants find themselves occupying structures close to the city centre that they cannot afford on their own, often leading to sub-letting arrangements. At the same time, urban areas begin to develop increasing incidence of violence and crime, prostitution, drug use, fear and insecurity amongst its dwellers (Moser and MacIlwaine, 2005).

But issues of crime in Guyana may also be linked with governance and politics more than with geographic location (Thomas, 2006). In fact, since the late 1990s, Guyana's crime and violence problems have increased alarmingly, to the point where many believe that the rule of law, and the security and judicial systems have almost completely collapsed (World Bank, 2005). While overall levels appear to have largely stabilized since 2003, confidence in the army (Guyana Defence Force), the police (Guyana Police Force), and the judiciary are very low (World Bank, 2005) as we shall see in Chapter 7. To this end, the government is receiving assistance under an IADB US\$22 million project on the Citizens Security Project.

Complicating the security situation is the fact that various interest groups view the crime situation through ethnic or political lenses. In the past, the GPF, which traditionally drew close to 90% of its recruits from the Afro-Guyanese population, was feared by the Indo-Guyanese. Most of the complaints about police brutality and "extra-judicial killings" (people being shot by the police or dying while held in custody) now emanate from the Afro-Guyanese population, which accuses the GPF of creating an elite Tactical Special Squad (TSS) within the Force, engaged in using excessive force and often not adhering to the rule of law (Guyana Human Rights Association, 2006). The Indo-Guyanese, for their part, claim that they are the ones who are robbed, beaten, kidnapped and killed [*Guyana Development Policy Review*, World Bank (2003)].

The problem of crime is complex and multi-dimensional and different explanations are offered, including: the deportation of criminals from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States; Afro-Guyanese Resistance and other 'ideological' fighters; para-military elements; rival drug gangs and the increased drug trade to the United States and Europe; and 'social bandits' and petty criminals who get involve in crime because of marginalization and lack of income-earning opportunities. It is widely recognized that the crime problem is extremely critical and has served to destabilize society and the political system in general, and the economy in particular. It generates fear and anxiety, fuels migration, discourages long-term investment, and severely compromises good governance (World Bank, 2005).

Furthermore, for businesses, one of the worst results of the poisonous, racially divided, anti-cooperative political climate is simply a perception of physical risk, from more of the riots and arson seen in the capital city that accompanies the General Elections that are constitutionally due once every five years. Consecutive Business Outlook Surveys in 2004 through 2006 identified the crime rate in the country as one of the most serious impediments to business and life in

Guyana. These findings are supported by the World Competitiveness Survey that was done in Guyana for the first time in 2006. This report found that crime and theft were the main concerns of business entities in Guyana.

One of the major concerns for Guyanese is the increasing rate of crime in society. Though comparatively, only 1 in every 10 Guyanese has been victims of crime, and comparatively the country has a per capita crime rate only higher than Panama and Jamaica, the viciousness of some of the crimes perpetuated has shocked Guyanese both locally and abroad (GINA, 2004). There can be no doubt that many Guyanese continue to be uneasy about the situation and distress about their own exposure and that of family and friends.

In addition to the psychic distress this causes families, as well as the actual losses of property that occur and the physical and psychological harm that result from the most violent crimes, there may well be negative consequences for democracy and the due process of law. Social science theory and prior research via the LAPOP studies both suggest that citizens who have been victimized by criminals are more willing to violate the rule of law in seeking to punish criminals. Additionally, communities where the incidence of crime is higher may also provide a supportive cultural context in which departures from the due process of law will be socially approved.

This chapter, among other things, utilizes the LAPOP data to identify the main types of crimes persons are exposed to, evaluate losses suffered by Guyanese due to criminal activities (theft, robbery, vandalism or arson), and determine the main victims of these crimes.

### Victims of Crime: A Comparative Perspective

One of the first issues the survey sought to determine comparatively was the extent to which citizens have been exposed to crime in the sampled countries, and to assess the nature of these crimes. These two questions allowed the study to quantify the exposure and the tools for the comparative analysis. As such, respondents were asked:

*VIC1: "Have you been a victim of some act of criminality<sup>21</sup> in the last twelve months? And if Yes,*


*VIC2: To what type of criminal act were you subject?*

In comparative terms, exposure to crime in Guyana is relatively low with 11% of the population having reported being victimized in 2006 (Graph VI-1). This figure is only higher than that of Jamaica and Panama. In fact, many other countries like Chile (23.1%) and Peru (26.2%), much older democracies than Guyana, had crime rates that more than doubled those found in this country. The relatively low rate in Guyana may be an indication that Government's anti-crime measures are beginning to take effect since the escalation in serious crimes that accompanied the 2002 jailbreak that saw five notorious criminals, and many 'sympathizers and followers' waging

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<sup>21</sup> For the purposes of this study the criminal act is viewed as an act that violates a political, religious, or moral command considered important in protecting the interests of the State or the welfare of its citizens or subjects.

spate of terror on many innocent and law abiding citizens (GINA, 2004, 2005). But this low reported level of crime may also be a reflection of reportedly slow and, often insufficient follow up by the GPF, many cases go un-reported (Guyana Justice Reform Strategy, 2006). This is particularly the case with petty thefts and spousal abuse cases. In the case of the latter, the victim often requests of the GPF not to pursue further action, hence such cases are not always treated with the same level of dispatch that they deserve (Guyana Human Rights Authority, 2006).




Graph VI-1. Victims of Crime in 2006 – A Comparative Analysis

### Types of Crime Victimization that Occurred in Guyana in 2006


The nature of the crimes committed in Guyana is shown in Graph VI-2 below. Crimes committed included home burglary (26.8%), robbery without physical violence or threat (24.4%), robbery with violence and threat (19.6%), and damage to property (14.3%). Less common are crimes of violence, such as physical aggression without robbery (9.5%), rape or sexual assault (4.2%) and

kidnapping (0.6%). While most of the misdemeanors committed fell in the category of the of crime to property, it is still disturbing that robbery using physical aggression and sexual assaults accounted for a combined total of 23.8%. Without any other year to compare with, this level of physical crime still appears high.




Graph VI-2. Type of Crimes to which Victims were Exposed, Guyana 2006

But the analysis above is fairly general. As such, we sought to determine whether there was any distinction of exposure to crime by area, through comparing the impact in urban vis-à-vis rural areas. It is often contended that, as urbanization increases, so does crime (Galvin, 2002:130; Gaviria and Pagés, 2002:190). In other words, as urban areas become larger, the rate of crime in these areas increases. There are many theories that have been developed in the social sciences literature to explain criminal behavior. Since most of the crimes take place in urban areas, residents of urban areas fear being a crime victim. Thus the study analyzed the information by area. However, the analysis showed no significant difference by area, with virtually 11% of respondents in both rural and urban areas indicating they have been victims of crimes (Graph VI-3).



Graph VI-3. Crime by Area, Guyana 2006

As indicated above, relationship between crime and urbanization in the case of Guyana may be uncertain. Masih and Masih (2002) stated that at low levels of urbanization, crime may be high because of sparsely located residents; a further increase in urbanization may lead to decrease in crime because of closer proximity of residents; and finally, with even further increase in urbanization, crime may rise because individuals may not identify whether they are engaged in a legal or illegal activity. Indeed, Gaviria and Pagés, (2002:193) found a positive relationship between city size and victimization. Thus, we can say that the size of area of residence seems to have an impact on crime. As such, the study also sought to disaggregate the Guyana data by size of area. Graph VI-4 shows that crime in the national capital (11.9%) is marginally higher than that in rural areas (11.1%) and small urban areas (9.3%). Although, this finding seems to add some level of credence to the Masih and Masih hypothesis, the differences are not statistically significant.



Graph VI-4. Crime by Size of Area, Guyana 2006

To further strengthen our analysis we conducted a linear regression model of the factors that help to explain victimization by crime. Using the  $p < 0.05$  level of significance we note that the significant variables are: (i) perception of one's personal economic situation, such that people who consider themselves as having a bad economic situation are less likely to be victims of crime. Thus, the more persons perceive their economic status to be improving, the more they are likely to take measures to insulate themselves against criminal activities, and (ii) ethnicity in the sense that Guyanese of East Indian descent and mixed Guyanese are more likely to be the victims of crime than any other race. This is interesting and significant as it confirms a long held perception that Indo-Guyanese in particular were more likely to be the victims of crimes (*Regression Table VI-1 in Appendix VI*).

With a lower level of statistical significance ( $p < 0.10$ ), four other variables become significant predictors of crime victimization. These are: (i) sex, with females being more likely to be victims, (ii) age with young people more likely to be victims, (iii) wealth, with the wealthier persons being more likely to be victims, and (iv) Guyanese of African descent.


Trust in Institutions of the Justice System

According to Becker (1968), every society has its own value system and as such, crime is defined by mainly these systems. Another school of thought sees crime as a reflection of the breakdown in the rule of law, as it is argued that where the law operates in an effective manner, this would often lead to the perpetrator of crimes being caught and prosecuted (Gumus, 2004). According to SARA (2000), a country’s institutional integrity is largely determined by how the people view the judiciary and the organs of justice. These institutions are generally thought of as being neutral and the arbiter of justice and are expected to hold the scales of justice between perpetrator and victim. To the extent that one lacks faith and trust to have their matters adjudicated by the justice institutions, they are likely to take matters into their own hands. Taking these various views on board the survey sought to determine what confidence and trust Guyanese had in a number of social and judicial organs. Responses received were calculated using the following scale.


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Not at all</b>				<b>A lot</b>			<b>Doesn't know</b>

Graph VI-5 indicates how the institutions involved in the administration of law and order compared to other institutions in Guyana. The study focused on five institutions: (i) the Supreme Court, (ii) the Solicitor General, represented by the deputy Solicitor General, (iii) the Justice System, (iv) the Guyana Police Force and (v) the Guyana Defense Force. The mean score received for all the institutions ranged between 50 (The Solicitor General) and 69.2 (Guyana Defense Force) - while that for the Justice System was 51.7. These mean scores indicate that in the main the majority of the institutions in Guyana received an average score, with the exception being the GDF. The greatest trust shown in the GDF may be due to the fact that this entity has less contact with the civilian population than the others. As such, it is more a reflection of perception than actual encounter.

Amongst the institutions rated in the figure, the Supreme Court received the highest rating of any of the other justice institutions, at 55. At the same time, the Justice System and the Solicitor General itself received scores of 51.7 and 50.3 respectively, while the Guyana Police Force received the second lowest level of trust at 51.1 This finding differs from the World Competitiveness Survey (2006) which indicated that Guyana ranked last out of 125 countries in terms of the reliability of its police services. However, Graph VI-6 indicates that trust in Guyana’s Police Force is slightly above average at 51.1 and results in Guyana being ranked 7<sup>th</sup> among countries in the sample. This level of trust was the highest of any of the three Caribbean countries in the study and well above the trust in the police force in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.



Graph VI-5. Trust in Institutions of the Judicial System, Guyana 2006




Graph VI-6. Comparative Analysis of Trust in the Police Force, Guyana 2006

These overall findings indicate that Guyanese generally have an average level of trust and confidence in the judiciary and other institutions vital for maintaining the rule of law in the country. These findings are an improvement over those found by the SARA (2000) study where 28% of Guyanese indicated they did not trust the judiciary at all and 25% indicated they had little trust, while in this study 18% indicated they did not trust the judiciary at all and 22% had little trust in this institution of justice.

Given the level of trust shown in the institutions of justice in Guyana it was felt necessary to determine how respondents felt about criminals being punished for crimes they may have committed. From Graph VI-7 we note that approximately 56% of respondents indicated that they had little or no confidence that the judicial system would punish the guilty. Thus, personalizing the issue of the responsiveness of the judicial system does little to enhance the confidence of Guyanese citizens that justice will be done by the court system.

Under the donor sponsored Program for the Modernization of the Justice Administration System some of the issues discussed above will be addressed, such as improved capacity building in terms of training of police prosecutors and ensuring more cases are prosecuted. These will hopefully enhance the performance of the judicial system and increase confidence in this organ of justice.


Related to the generally low ratings accorded to institutions associated with the justice system it should be recalled from Chapter V that approximately 14.1% of Guyanese citizens who had some interaction with the justice system claimed they had to pay a bribe to a Police officer, who is empowered by the laws of Guyana to, *inter alia*, document complaints, serve as witnesses, and prosecute cases. Additionally, 6.2% of respondents reported paying a bribe to an employee of the Courts. Such experiences may help to explain why public opinion holds these institutions in relatively low regard.



Graph VI-7. Confidence that Criminals Would be Punished, Guyana 2006

### Trust in the Justice system in Comparative Perspective

Further, the study sought to determine how the trust Guyanese showed in the Judicial system compared to other countries in the sample. From Graph VI-8 Guyana ranks second in terms of trust that persons have in the justice system. With a mean score of 51.7 on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, only Costa Rica with 52.9 was better. It is noteworthy that the country is ranked in this category above much older democracies, such as Mexico (50.6) and Panama (44.7), with Ecuador having the poorest record. From a comparative standpoint Guyana ranks exceedingly well, with all the Caribbean countries having a lower level of trust in their judiciary, with Haiti being the worse performer for the Caribbean nations.




Graph VI-8. Comparative Analysis of the Justice System, Guyana 2006

Preoccupation with Personal Security in Neighborhood

As previously mentioned crime remains a major concern for many Guyanese. This concern seems to be fuelled by the frequency with which crimes are committed and the coverage of them in the local media. One survey item asked about the sense of security that citizens feel at the local level, i.e., in their own neighborhood:

*AOJ11: Speaking of the place or neighbourhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of falling victim to an assault or a robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?*

Graph VI-9 illustrates that despite the crime situation only 30% of respondents indicated that they felt somewhat or totally unsafe in their own neighborhood. This finding may be partly explained by the fact that crime is not widespread in the country. At the same time, and as will be seen later in this publication, there is a substantial social capital and community spirit still present in Guyana.




Graph VI-9. Level of Safety Persons Feel in Their Neighborhood

Crime as a Threat to Future Well-Being in Guyana

As a follow up to the issue above, the survey was concerned with the possible effects crime can have on peoples’ well-being in the future. Various studies have indicated both direct and indirect effects on Guyana as a result of the perceived threat to welfare (Citizens Security Project, 2006, Guyana Competitiveness Strategy, 2006, and the World Competitiveness Report, 2006). Many of these effects are viewed through the deleterious effects on domestic and foreign direct investment and what these mean for employment creation, income generation and migration. As such, the degree to which crime occupies the minds of Guyanese was captured in the survey by asking the following question:

*AOJ11A: And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being?*

Graph VI-10 reveals that 53% of respondents were “very concerned” and 29.7% had “some concern” that crime would have significant effects on Guyana. These findings corroborate the Business Outlook Surveys of 2005 and 2006 that indicated crime as one of the most serious issues affecting the country. It also supports the finding by the World Competitiveness Report (2006) that the business costs of crime and violence was affecting business prospects in Guyana.




Graph VI-10. Threat of Crime to Future Well-Being, Guyana 2006

### Effects of Victimization and Respect for Due Process

It is often useful in a survey of this nature to determine how victims of crime perceive the judiciary and what confidence they have in the systems of justice. As such, from the approximately 25% of respondents who indicated that they were victims of crimes were asked to indicate whether they felt that in order to capture criminals the authorities should always respect the law or that on occasion they can operate on the margins of the law. As was indicated earlier, almost half of the respondents indicated that they had little trust in Guyana's justice system. Notable reasons for the lack of trust are the perception that the judiciary is not an independent body, and hence, there is not a clear separation of politics from the rule of law (Justice Sector Reform Strategy 2006). Furthermore, the delays resolving a cases in the courts exacerbates the lack of trust shown in the system (ibid). It is also instructive that the World Competitiveness Report (2006) ranked Guyana at 93 out of 125 countries in terms of its judicial independence. However, this must be balanced with the finding that 51.7% of respondents indicated that they had absolute trust in the judicial system, indicating that at least half of the country believes the system still works.


It was therefore encouraging to find that 62.1% of the victims of crime indicated that they felt public officials should *always* respect the law, even when pursuing criminals. On the other hand, approximately 37.9% of respondents were willing to see the law enforcement officers work on the margins of the law to bring the perpetrators to justice (Graph VI-11). This situation indicates that apart from having little faith in the judicial system, more than a third of victims support the perception that working outside the confines of the law are sanctioned by some members of the Guyanese society. Clearly, being a victim often lead to persons lending support to extra-judicial measures to be pursued and does not help the consolidation of democratic values in a fledgling democracy like Guyana. Providing support for public officers to pursue extra judicial measures will leading to a circumventing of the democratic institutions and a weakening of their authority.



Graph VI-11. Agreement for the Authorities to Act on the Margins of the Law

In addition to the level of support for public officials operating at the margin of the law, few institutions in charge of delivering justice are believed to be very effective in fulfilling their mandates. It may be recalled that the Supreme Court had a mean score of 53.5 and the Guyana Police Force 51. Both of these mean scores are mid-range indicating that respondents felt that these institutions are somewhat effective, but more needs to be done.

Furthermore, it was important to assess respondents' views with regard to their trust in the social institutions present. According to Graph VI-12 where a scale was applied that had a range of 0 (very ineffective) to 100 (very effective) respondents demonstrated their greatest level of trust in the religious institutions, while the Elections Commission had the lowest mean score. Guyana's long history of questionable elections may be partly responsible for the latter receiving the score it did.



Graph VI-12. Effectiveness of Social Institution, Guyana 2006

### Do Conceptualizations of Democracy Affect Respect for Due Process?

In Chapter 3 the study considered a variety of alternative conceptualizations of democracy. It is often the contention that persons with a normative conceptualization of democracy may be more inclined to hold public officials to the rule of law and ensure that they respect that which they swore to uphold, even when pursuing criminals. In a democracy there is no place for extra judicial measures to be used. The other three groups – those with negative, empty or utilitarian conceptualizations - might be more inclined to assert that public officials could, on occasion, act at the margins of the law when seeking to hold guilty parties accountable.

In the analysis of the various conceptualizations of democracy and its impact on due process, there was very little variation amongst the definitions (Table VI-1). The percentages ranged from 65.6% among those with an empty conception of democracy arguing that public officials should always respect the law to 62.8% of those with a utilitarian conceptualization agreeing with due process, to 56.6% of those with a negative conception of democracy.

**Table VI-1. Alternative concepts of democracy \* Respect for rule of law Cross-tabulation**

			Respect for rule of law		Total
			Respect the law	Violate rule law	
Alternative concepts of democracy	Negative	Count	43	33	76
		Expected Count	47.2	28.8	76.0
		% within Alternative concepts of democracy	56.6%	43.4%	100.0%
	Empty	Count	337	177	514
		Expected Count	319.4	194.6	514.0
		% within Alternative concepts of democracy	65.6%	34.4%	100.0%
	Utilitarian	Count	81	48	129
		Expected Count	80.2	48.8	129.0
		% within Alternative concepts of democracy	62.8%	37.2%	100.0%
	Normative	Count	481	316	797
		Expected Count	495.2	301.8	797.0
		% within Alternative concepts of democracy	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
Total	Count	942	574	1516	
	Expected Count	942.0	574.0	1516.0	
	% within Alternative concepts of democracy	62.1%	37.9%	100.0%	

In concluding, it would appear that the finding confirms, to some degree, the assumption that those who have a normative conception of democracy are more likely to be supportive of due process than those who have a negative conception of democracy for example.

## Conclusions

In this chapter the study sought to determine the pervasiveness of crime in Guyana and the types of crimes that respondents had encountered the most in 2006. Additionally, the study sought to find out what were the characteristics of the victims and what factor(s) accounted for them being ‘selected’ as victims. Lastly, the study investigated the impact on the psyche of victims in terms of adhering to or supporting the rule of law having been victims.

The results indicate that crime affecting property was most common, while there was a marginal difference between rural and urban areas. What was striking, however, was the apparent high level of persons who were victims of crimes that support public officers operating at the margins of the legal system to bring perpetrators to justice. This finding seems to be as a result of a loss of confidence in the public institutions and organs of justice. But this should not be a justification for extra judicial activities as this will erode the democratic norms on which the society is built. What seems to be urgently needed is a strengthening of the institutions and the reformation of some of the democratic organs. Encouragingly, these issues are being addressed under the

Citizen Security Program and the Program for the Modernization of the Justice Administration System.

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## Annex

Regression Table VI-1: Factors Explaining Corruption Victimization

Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	11.317	8.758		1.292	.197
Area Size	-.737	1.035	-.036	-.712	.476
Urban-Rural	2.655	3.527	.039	.753	.452
Sex	-3.184	1.633	-.051	-1.950	<b>.051</b>
Perception of personal economic situation	-2.507	.957	-.069	-2.620	<b>.009</b>
What is your age?	-.114	.064	-.047	-1.796	<b>.073</b>
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	.827	.426	.055	1.940	<b>.053</b>
Indo-Guyanese	12.695	6.203	.193	2.047	<b>.041</b>
Afro-Guyanese	10.910	6.221	.161	1.754	<b>.080</b>
Amerindians	10.401	6.936	.082	1.500	.134
Mixed	12.913	6.262	.177	2.062	<b>.039</b>

Dependent Variable: Respondent victimized by crime



## VII. Local Government

Guyana has a rich history of local government systems that dates back to the period before Independence from the British in 1966. However, after Independence the country was first divided into six (6) administrative regions in 1973. Later, the 1980 constitution divided Guyana into ten (10) Administrative regions as discussed in Chapter I, with each Region having a Regional Democratic Council led by a Regional Chairman. Elections for councillors are held simultaneously with National elections. The Regions are further divided into NDCs which are responsible in the main, for operation in coastal regions. Elections for NDC councillors are held separately from the National Elections. The structure caters for a Chairman and 12–18 councillors, who will then form the Council.

The rationale for the system of local government introduced in 1980 was to devolve power from central government to the people. Hence, there have been amendments to the Constitution on various issues to allow for greater efficiency and the delivery of services of the local government system. These amendments emerged out of the Hermandston Accord. Some of these amendments are shown below:

*Article 71 – (1) Local Government is a vital aspect of democracy and shall be organized so as to involve as many people as possible in the task of managing and developing the communities in which they live.*

*Article 72 – (3) Municipalities, Neighbourhood Democratic Councils and such other subdivisions shall be provided for under paragraph (1) including Village and Community Councils, where there is the need for such Councils and where the people request their establishment, shall be vital organs of local democratic power.*

*Article 74 (3) It shall be the duty of local democratic organs to maintain and protect public property, improve working and living conditions, promote the social and cultural life of the people, raise the level of civic consciousness, preserve law and order, consolidate the rule of law and safeguard the rights of citizens.*

*Article 75 – Parliament shall provide that local democratic organs shall be autonomous and take decisions which are binding upon their agencies and institutions, and upon the communities and citizens of their areas.*

*Article 77A – Parliament shall by law provide for the formulation and implementation of objective criteria for the allocation of resources to, and the garnering of resources by local democratic organs.*

But these amendments are still to be operationalised. Thus, given the structure of the current local government system, control still rests largely with the Central Government with most of the financial resources for works to be undertaken by the Local Organs being provided by the Central Government via subventions. In fact, most of the wealth generated in the regions are not

retained within the Regions but are controlled centrally. Thus, the Regional system is viewed in some quarters as an extension of Central Government. It is a moot point whether the limited autonomy enjoyed by the Regions has restricted their development potential. The same argument can be made for the six (6) municipalities where municipal officials are somewhat constrained except in the area to carry out routine municipal duties.

The municipalities are supposed to be governed by two pieces of legislation: the Municipal and District Councils Act of 1969, and the Local Democratic Organs Act of 1980. These Acts give very wide powers, as well as responsibilities, to the Municipal Councils. Through them the municipalities are responsible for water supply, sanitation, street paving, drainage, solid waste management, street lighting, environmental matters, recreation, markets and abattoirs. They may also take grants, accept loans, and issue bonds, all with the approval of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (MLGRD). However, although the Municipal Councils possess wide powers, they are subject to a set of bye-laws.

The Municipal Councils, in addition to being liable to the direct supervision of the MLGRAD, are required, by law, to follow the various policies of the Central Government. Often, therefore, there is an overlap of functions and authority, and much obfuscation.

Allied to the problem of administrative and managerial responsibility, is the fact that the Municipal councils themselves are either under-staffed, or possess staff of relatively poor quality (NDS 2000). Furthermore, they are, in general, severely under-funded. They are supposed to obtain the financial resources to undertake their manifold tasks through the collection of rates and taxes, rents, and a plethora of fees, and through subventions from the Central Government. However, the existing rates, taxes and fees are based on parameters which have been established a long time ago and are now woefully out-of-date, especially as they have not, over the years, taken account of inflation, increased property values, and, most importantly, greater demands on the cities' coffers. For example, while a not very successful attempt was made by the Georgetown municipality to revalue the property in Georgetown in the early 1990s, the other municipalities still use valuations which were undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

To aggravate an already tenuous situation, the country has not had a Local Government Election since 1994 and political tensions between the two major parties have brought about a call for deepening of the constitutional reform process and electoral and local government reforms.

Managing from the centre is not the most efficient means for administrative purposes. Furthermore, getting communities involved can reduce the volume of resources spent on managing specific development projects, while building a sense of ownership of the project at the community level. Furthermore, the implementation of a ward or constituency system is viewed as more efficient than that which currently obtains. As such, these and other factors have been responsible for increasing calls for local government reforms from local organizations, the donor community, and international non-governmental organizations like the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Carter Centre (CC), and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

Interestingly a Joint Task Force comprising members of the People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) and the People's National Congress Reform One Guyana (PNCR-1G) was established in 2001 to deal with the affairs of the Local Government Reform process. The Task Force was set up to undertake the responsibility of implementing the provisions of the Local Government Reform Legislation. However, they are still to implement the recommendations that emanating from the consultation and agreement process.

Two key issues still to be addressed raised by the Task Force are: (i) to advise on modalities to widen the revenue base of various local government organs and central government transfers to local government; and (ii) paying particular attention to electoral system to be used in a local government election.

It is the expectation that these local government reforms will transfer greater self-sufficiency to local government bodies and encourage a bottom up approach, where possible, to development objectives.

But throughout the period after Independence, decision making in Guyana has remained fairly centralized and successive governments have done little to cede power from the centre. This is no more evident in that in the absence of local government elections for over a decade that has led, in some circumstances as prescribed by the Laws of Guyana, to the Ministry of Local Government disbanding the NDCs due to reported non-performance and establishing Interim Management Committees.

The 2006 LAPOP study in Guyana therefore provided an opportunity to 'test' the confidence Guyanese have in the local government systems in place. It sought to get from Guyanese the confidence they have that local government affords them an opportunity to make their preferences known on matters of public policy and the extent to which they see local institutions as being responsive to their needs and interests.

### Requests for Help from Various Levels of Government

It was the a priori conjecture that the better functioning an institution is the more requests it is likely to receive for assistance. As such, the study sought to determine whether persons sought assistance from any governmental or local organization to solve problems that they may have encountered. The questions posed were of the following form:

*“In order to resolve a problem, have you ever asked for help or cooperation from...”*


*CP2: Any member of parliament?*

*CP4: Any local authorities?*

*CP4a: Any ministry, public institution or state agency?*

More than a tenth of respondents had sought assistance from their local government institutions according to Graph VII-1. This finding may indicate: (i) that the system is working fairly well, (ii) respondents had no reason to contact the local government, or (iii) that the level of assistance often received from this organ has been encouraging to disaffected residents.


Further analysis demonstrates that persons are approximately 2.5 times more likely to approach their local government (12.3%) than parliamentarians for assistance (5.9%). The results indicate that Guyanese do not have a culture of approaching their parliamentarian. This is because Parliamentarians are assigned constituents but the constituency is not often aware of the Parliamentarian representing their constituency! One reason may be that parliamentarians, having been selected by the political parties that have won seats in the National Assembly tend to be more ‘faithful’ to their party than their constituency. Hence, it may be the case that the Party’s doctrine or goals are promoted above those of the citizens. But it may also be an indication that the local government system, as is often touted, is indeed closer to the people than central government.



Graph VII-1. Respondents seeking assistance from various agencies, Guyana 2006


But this last point seems to be contradicted by the finding in Graph VII-1 which reveals that there was little distinction between those who will go to their local government and those who will seek redress via central government institutions. This may be a reflection of the local government system failing to perform as intended or it can be also that there are distinctions between the central and local government responsibilities which may also explain why persons do not always go to their local government organs. But at the same time, since no local government elections has been held since 1994, it may also be a reflection of the growing dominance of central government in local government matters and the gradual extension of central government at the grassroots level. It is hoped that with time as these variables continue to be monitored we will be in a better position to pronounce on this finding. From the graph we note that people are more likely to seek help from central government (11.4%) than that of parliamentarians (5.9%).

However, what must not elude us is the relatively low number of persons, i.e., 11.2% seeking assistance from any form of government over the past year. Coming in an election year this is surprising as one would expect the populace to make greater demands on their elected officials. But it may be a reflection of the depressive state of the local government system, hence forcing persons to address their own concerns. It is this latter point that seems to find the most support in the statistics as Graph VII-5 indicates. Clearly, more persons feel obliged to assist in addressing issues pertaining to them as the local government organs may not be performing as expected. Approximately 33.4% of persons contributed money or material to solve some problem in their community, i.e., drainage and irrigation facilities, farm to market roads, or repairing of an access bridge. From a positive standpoint though, with approximately a third of respondents indicating that they had assisted in solving a problem in their neighborhood, some degree of social capital exists in these communities which can be build upon for problem solving.



Graph VII-2. Respondents who assisted in solving a problem in their neighborhood

From a comparative standpoint Guyana falls below the median score (Graph VII-6), coming in eleventh out of the seventeen countries in the sample. Guyana’s score of those assisting to solve a problem in their neighbourhood was below that in the other two Caribbean countries in Jamaica (38.7%) and Haiti (37.1%). Those countries that demonstrated the highest level of social capital in terms of persons assisting to address a problem in their neighbourhood were Paraguay (67%), Peru (43.6%) and Dominican Republic (43.6%).



Graph VII-3. Comparative Statistics of those who came together to solve a problem in their neighbourhood, Guyana 2006

*Determinants of Citizens’ Request for Help from the Local Government*

To have a better understanding in relation to factors affecting persons seeking assistance from any form of government, we ran a multivariate logistic regression model. Estimation of the model terminated at iteration number 5 because the parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001. The results indicate that at the  $p < 0.05$  there were four (4) significant predictors of citizens’ request for assistance in the last 12 months (see *Regression Table VII-1 in Appendix VII*). These are: (i) persons who listen to the news on the radio are most unlikely to seek the assistance of the local or central government, though this may be a reflection of the area that persons live as well. For most persons in the rural hinterland and rural coastal areas, radio communication is the main form of contact with the centre of administration; (ii) the more


persons watched the news on the television the more they are likely to seek assistance from the government possibly due to greater edification in terms of what forms of assistance may be accessible from government; (iii) the more the respondents are politically affiliated the more they are likely to seek assistance. To the extent that is indeed the case, it would seem to suggest that party paramountcy takes precedence over the operations of democratic organs; and lastly; (iv) the more persons respect the rule of law, the more they are likely to seek assistance than take matters into their own hands. This would seem to suggest that there is a positive relationship between the adherence to the rule of law and persons seeking assistance via official channels. Thus, for the promulgation and deepening of the democratic process it would seem that a necessity is for the encouragement of the local populace to observe the rule of law. With a level of significance relaxed to  $p < 0.10$ , the *urban* variable, *gender*, and *Guyanese of African decent* are also significant variables that assist in explaining why persons do not often seek the assistance of authorities with problems they may be having. In the case of the first variable, persons residing in urban areas are more likely to seek assistance from governmental sources; similarly Guyanese of African-decent are more likely to seek assistance than take efforts to solve problems in their neighbourhood. Conversely, men rather than women are less likely to seek assistance from governmental sources.

### Participation in Local Government

The study assessed citizens' participation in local government over the past year. Through limiting the time of participation to one year, it is likely to increase the accuracy of the responses as it is easier for persons to recall, rather than if we had used a longer time period. The survey question was:


*NPI: "Have you attended an open town meeting or a municipal or district session during the last twelve months?"*

Respondents were expected to provide a "yes" or "no" response. From Graph VII-7 it is clear that few respondents have been to meetings called by the local or municipal government departments. This low level of participation in municipal meetings may be a reflection of the lack of awareness of when such meetings are held, even though they are statutory. Further, while the legislation allows for members of the public to attend statutory meetings they can only speak if they provide prior notice and an agreement is reached for them to do so. In short, there are channels of communication to allow for such engagement. However, when a public meeting is arranged by the local or municipal government members of the public are allowed to attend and speak freely. But the figures shown in Graph VII-7 may also be an indication that members of the communities are reluctant to attend what they see as "*another talk shop*." There are two issues involved: i) awareness ii) participation in decision making processes/public fora.



Graph VII-4. Persons Who Attended a Meeting in the Past 12 months, Guyana 2006


But these figures appear to be comparable with those of most countries in the survey. Furthermore, Guyana actually occupied fourth position of persons attending local or municipal meetings in the last twelve months, being above both Haiti (12.9%) and Jamaica (9.4) and following the Dominican Republic (22.9%), Honduras (16.5%), and Peru (14.7%) (14.1%) (see Graph VII-8). At the same time, these comparable statistics for Guyana may go some way in explaining the reported percentage of persons seeking assistance from local government (Graph VII-4). Furthermore, these findings may help to explain the perception that still pervades sections of the society that “*government should do it*” if there is a problem or an issue to be addressed.



Graph VII-5. Comparative statistics of persons who attended a meeting in the past 12 months, Guyana 2006

*Comparative Analysis of Local Participation Elaborate*

In this section focus is placed, comparatively, on the frequency of making requests or of presenting petitions to local government officials in the last year. The results, calculated using a scale of 0 (no requests) to 100 (frequent requests), are shown in Graph VII-9. The Guyanese requests for assistance with a mean score of 13.9 were below that of six other countries, inclusive of Peru (21.2), Chile (20.2), and Costa Rica (19.5), but it was above that of Haiti (10.2) and Jamaica (12.6). But while being among the mid-point range in the sampled territories a third of the respondents indicated taking matters into their own hands to address a problem rather than seeking the assistance of the local government. This is an important finding as it indicates substantial social capital present within the country. It is also an indication that better organized, these are resources which the local government bodies may be able to tap for assistance.



Graph VII-6. Comparative Analysis of Demands on Local Government in the Past Year, Guyana 2006

### *Determinants of Citizens Participation in Local Government Meetings*

In an effort to understand the factors responsible for the participation of citizens at local government elections, a multivariate logistic analysis was conducted. The results are reflected in *Regression Table VII-2 in Appendix VII*. At the  $p < 0.05$  level of significance we found that there are five (5) predictors of citizens' participation at local government meetings. The predictors are: (i) living in an urban area where urban dwellers are more likely to attend meetings than rural dwellers; (ii) persons who listen to the news on the radio are less likely to attend meetings possibly a reflection of meetings being used as a source of information gathering; (iii) persons who perceive their economic situation to be better than those of their counterparts are less likely to attend meetings; (iv) respect for the rule of law though is shown to be a major influencing factor in terms of persons attending meetings, as those who respect the rule of law

are more likely to attend meetings; while (v) if they are politically affiliated they are less likely to participate at local government meetings. However, some of the demographic and economic variables, such as age, education, and wealth do not influence attendance at local government, nor does city size when the effects of other variables are taken into account.


### Responsiveness, Respect and Quality of Local Services

But the amount of participation in local government function, whether through input-oriented participation in terms of offering views on policy choices or extractive participation in terms of requesting help with a specific need is only part of a complex system of management. More importantly, is the quality of the participation and service provided and the responsiveness of this service to the needs and requests of the constituency. Good participatory experiences and inclusiveness may often deepen the commitment of people to democratic institutions and encourage even further cooperation. Conversely, a number of unsatisfactory interactions with local officials may erode confidence in the democratic institutions of governance and cause persons to seek redress by either forming their own social groups, or take matters into their own hands. Being cognizant of these issues, the survey sought to determine the extent to which persons concerns are addressed by asking the following question:

*NP1B: “To what extent do you think that officials of the local government (or district councils) pay attention to what people ask in public meetings?”*


In responding to the above question, respondents were allowed to indicate whether they felt: (i) much attention was paid to their issues, (ii) some attention was paid, (iii) little attention was paid, and (iv) no attention was paid. Even though the study showed above that comparatively the number of respondents indicating they attended a municipal meeting in the past year was relatively low, this question remained critical as the perception that much is not often done when issues are raised may result in persons seeking alternatives, while the reverse is likely to be true. Such meetings are expected to be fora via which feedback between policy-makers and their constituents is provided, while providing an opportunity for issues to be ventilated.

From the data gathered, it appears that one influencing factor of respondents’ attendance at municipal meetings was the degree to which persons perceived the likelihood of their issue being addressed in the near future. As Graph VII-10 indicates, nearly 33% of respondents who attended meetings were of the view that very little attention was paid to their issues. However, encouragingly, 61.7% felt that some attention is paid to their issues. While admittedly, some of the issues raised may be outside the purview of the NDCs or these entities are constrained by their resource availability to deal with the issues raised, it may indicate a greater need for public education and awareness building in terms of the operation of the local government system in Guyana. Additionally, if it is an indication that NDCs are slothful or inefficient in executing their functions, then there is clearly substantial room for improvement.




Graph VII-7. Perception of Issues Being Dealt With at Local Government Meetings, Guyana 2006

To complement the efforts of the local government, solve problems in their area, and enhance the welfare of community members 47% of respondents indicated they sought to establish some social grouping to address issues affecting their community (Graph VII-11). This is substantial and is an indication that substantial social capital exists in the community. To be in a better position to determine how Guyana compared to other countries in the survey with regards to this finding a comparative analysis was carried out. Guyana ranked first in this grouping (Graph VII-12). However, the main challenge seems to be to keep these groups functional as they appear to come together mainly for problem solving, i.e. cleaning a drain, or repairing a street or bridge.



Graph VII-8. Respondents That Have Sought To Form A Group To Solve a Neighbourhood Problem, Guyana 2006




Graph VII-9. Comparative Statistics of Respondents That Have Sought To Form A Group To Solve a Neighbourhood Problem, Guyana 2006

The study also aimed to determine the quality of the services provided, based on respondents experiences via the following question:

*SGL1: Would you say that the services the municipality or NDC is providing are...?*  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know

From Graph VII-13 it can be seen that 45% of the respondents viewed the services provided by the local government as “neither good nor poor”, with only 4.2% of respondents indicating that the services were “very good” and 21.8% indicating that they were “good”. However, nearly 30% of respondents indicated that the services were either “poor” or “very poor” with the majority being in the former category. This would indicate that more persons felt that the services provided were “poor” or “very poor” than those who felt they were “very good” or “good”. Thus, given the findings in this survey where the majority of respondents indicating that services are “neither good nor poor” would seem to suggest that Guyanese citizens are unlikely to argue for more resources for the local government organs to implement their programmes as the solution to their community problems. Rather, more community groupings and social organizations are likely to emerge.




Graph VII-10. Assessment of the Quality of Local Government Services Provided, Guyana 2006

According to the theory of political support it is often argued that there can be a difference between diffuse support, which is directed toward institutions and processes, and specific support, which is a result of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with immediate or recent governmental policies. One potential determinant of diffuse support would be a sense that one is treated with respect by government agents in their interactions. Certainly, one might hope that the facilitation for interaction through established procedures between a local government official and his/her constituency might lead to actual interactions that are of a mutually respectful and beneficial nature. The study, therefore, looked at whether the residence of the local government official impacted on the quality of services provided. Respondents were asked the following question:

**SGL2:** *How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the municipality? Have they treated you very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Doesn't know*

The kind of treatment received was seen as synonymous with the quality of service received by the constituencies. Furthermore, the question was modified slightly when dealing with rural areas to ask about the specific local government organ rather than the municipality. Graph VII-11 indicates that the modal response was that citizens are treated “neither well nor badly” (51%) upon visiting local government offices. What is encouraging is that nearly a third of respondents (32.2%) indicated that they or their neighbors are generally treated “well” (24.6%) or “very well” (7.6%). On the downside, less than one in six persons indicate that they are treated badly (12.4%)


or very badly (4.4%). Hence, in this instance the balance is skewed towards the right in terms of a positive assessment of the treatment provided by the local authorities based on the location of the respondent.



**Graph VII-11. An Assessment of Treatment Received from the Local Government Institutions, Guyana 2006**

*Guyanese Views of Municipal Service Quality in Comparative Terms*

The scores for Guyanese citizens that are satisfied with of the quality of services received from the local government organs was noticeably lower than the best performers in the survey, i.e., Dominican Republic (Graph VII-12). The standardized scores (such that 100 would be equivalent to all citizens saying that services received from local government are “very good” while 0 would be when all citizens hold local government services to be “very bad”) range from 32.6 in Haiti to 57.7 in the Dominican Republic, with Guyana ranking above both Jamaica and Haiti. This, ranking is modest at best.



Graph VII-12. Comparative Statistics of Level of Satisfaction with the Quality of Service Provided by the Local Government, Guyana 2006


### Citizens' Views of Decentralization

Guyana has for decades been seeking to improve the local government system and devolve more power away from the centre to the periphery. This process was given some impetus in 1973 via the Regional Administrative system and subsequent modifications along the way, such as the expansion of the Administrative regions from 6 initially to 10 subsequently. The decentralization effort was, among other things, predicated upon the notion that citizens would like to be closer to government and have the functions performed by such bodies executed within their constituency as far as possible. However, rather than making this assumption, it was critical for us to determine whether the above postulate was accurate in the Guyanese context. As such, survey respondents were asked the following question, with two of the response alternatives were not read to respondents, but were recorded only if volunteered.

**LGL2.** *In your opinion, should the municipality or NDC be given more money and more responsibility or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide municipal services?*

- (1) *More for the municipality*
- (2) *National government should assume greater responsibility*
- (3) *Nothing should change [do not read]*
- (4) *More to the municipality if it provides better services [do not read]*
- (8) *Does not know/Does not respond*

The statistics from our survey are revealed in Graph VII-16. It is important to note that the difference between bars 2 and 3 in the diagram is that we sought to determine whether municipalities should be given more resources without conditions as the perception is that they are under-funded (bar 3), or whether they should be given more resources based on performance (bar 2).



Graph VII-13. Perception about Assistance to Municipalities, Guyana 2006

It would appear from Graph VII-13 that a significant number of Guyanese are yet to be convinced about the success of the decentralization process. In fact, approximately 38% of respondents are of the view that the national government should assume greater responsibility of the six (6) municipalities in the country. This may be a reflection of the dissatisfaction some respondents have with the performance of some municipalities and the services they provide. Additionally, it may also be a reflection of the greater visibility of central government in these areas than the municipal authorities. However, another 34% of respondents were of the view that money should be given to the municipalities to conduct their functions, while another 22.2%

provided a qualified opinion by indicating that more support should be given to the municipality if they provide better services. Clearly then, the larger proportion of respondents are of the view that decentralization of functions and devolution of authority is the best way for the provision of municipal services in Guyana. Approximately 6% indicated that nothing should change.

But for improved services it is often necessary to raise the rates and taxes paid by residents.<sup>22</sup> As such, the litmus test is often to determine, via contingent valuation methods, whether persons would be willing to pay more taxes to their municipality for improved. The survey addressed this item by asking the following question:

***LGL3.** Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality or NDC so that it could provide better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so?  
(1) Willing to pay more (2) Not worth it (8) Does not know*

In an effort to allow respondents to provide appropriate responses we applied a bidding-game approach to the contingent valuation<sup>23</sup> method used in the study. The scenarios that emerge after persons have expressed their preferences are used as an indication of a respondent's willingness to pay for a good or service.


From this exercise, Graph VII-14 above indicates that three quarters of Guyanese (75%) reject the proposed tradeoff of paying higher taxes for improved services, while 25% indicate that they would be willing to pay higher taxes.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> It is important to note that improved management practices, better accounting and monitoring of financial and physical works are also vital ingredients to improve the quality of services provided by the municipalities.

<sup>23</sup> Kindly see Robert Stavins (2005) *Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings (Fifth Edition)*, W. W. Norton & Company, Cambridge, and Thomas Tietenberg (2002) *Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (Sixth Edition)* Addison Wesley, New York for a discussion on Contingent Valuation Methods.

<sup>24</sup> Persons were prompted to provide a response, hence, there were no "don't know" responses.



Graph VII-14. Willingness to Pay for Increased Taxes to Improve the Municipal Services, Guyana 2006

### *Determinants of Citizens Views on Decentralization*

Within economic analysis the willingness to pay variable is used as the dependent variable and regressed upon a variety of predictors. In this case, the willingness to pay for improved municipal services was used as the dependent variable through the application of a multivariate logit model (see *Regression Table VII-3 in Appendix VII*). However, when we applied our conventional method of statistical significance, i.e.,  $p < 0.05$ , only wealth was a significant predictor of willingness to pay for improved quality of municipal services (wealthier persons were more willing to pay increased taxes for improved services, probably a reflection of affordability). However, when we relax the statistical significance restriction to  $p < 0.10$ , another two predictors in the form of gender and whether a person was employed became significant predictors. However, surprisingly, persons who were employed are less willing to pay increases in their rates and taxes. But this may be a reflection of unemployed merely indicating that they will be willing to pay, knowing that they will not be held to that position (see Tietenberg, 2002). Interestingly, type of area, size of area, age and educational attainment do not affect respondents' willingness to pay for improved services.

### Conclusions

The 2006 LAPOP survey in Guyana indicates some positive virtues of the local government system, but it also demonstrates the level of dissatisfaction respondents have the services rendered by the local and municipal authorities. It demonstrates the conditions under which the

local populace get together to solve problems affecting their communities. At the same time, there appears to be some level of cynicism that pervades the country with regard to the effectiveness of the decentralization efforts. While this may be a reflection of the greater role of central government in local matters, it may also be a general state of dissatisfaction with the level of local government services being provided by the democratic organs. However, the data clearly indicates that the overwhelming approach to problem solving in the communities is to engage the local authorities, rather than seek the assistance of a parliamentarian or a central government official.

Furthermore, approximately a third of respondents seemed dissatisfied with the quality of service being provided and how their matters are often handled. If public funds are to be effectively spent, there must be system in place to monitor the quality of the services provided and the response time in dealing with complaints and issues raised at meetings.

However, neighborhood and community organizing for self-help efforts do contribute to subsequent attendance at town meetings, to request assistance from local government, and even to a willingness to pay higher taxes. It demonstrates that some amount of social capital exists in the country that needs to be better captured and utilized. Though difficult it may be to give meaning to “decentralization” to the citizenry of the country, the link between strengthening organizations in civil society and enhanced local governance should not be overlooked. Few other levers exist. The challenge is to find ways to support such informal channels without subjecting them to politicization in a way that foments dependence, rather than autonomy.

## References

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Annex

**Regression Table VII-1: Determinants of Persons Seeking Assistance from Government in the Past Year**

Variable	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban	.856	.501	.087	2.354
Size of the area	-.143	.143	.317	.867
Gender	-.366	.197	.063	.694
Guyanese of Amerindian Decent	.113	.394	.774	1.120
Guyanese of African Decent	.448	.257	.082	1.564
Guyanese of East Indian Decent	.250	.259	.333	1.285
Wealth	-.049	.055	.369	.952
Educational Attainment	-.016	.034	.636	.984
Age	-.003	.009	.737	.997
Listen to the news on radio	-.189	.095	.047	.828
Watch the news on TV	.249	.112	.026	1.283
Read the news in the newspaper	.008	.110	.943	1.008
Currently employed	.138	.247	.576	1.148
Identify with a political party	.773	.209	.000	.462
Respect for the rule of law	.601	.189	.001	1.824
Constant	-2.054	1.099	.062	.128

Dependent Variable: Citizens Seeking Assistance

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
778.686(a)	.047	.085

a Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

**Regression Table VII-2: Determinants of Respondents Participating in Local Government Meetings**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Civil State	.123	.239	.266	1	.606	1.131
Number of Children	.149	.300	.246	1	.620	1.161
Urban Area	1.635	.644	6.442	1	.011	5.129
Size of Area	-.083	.186	.198	1	.656	.921
Gender	-.097	.201	.232	1	.630	.908
Listen to the News on the Radio	-.339	.101	11.252	1	.001	.713
Watch the news on TV	-.041	.123	.113	1	.737	.960
Read the news in the newspaper	-.013	.115	.012	1	.912	.987
Perception of personal economic situation	-.357	.120	8.838	1	.003	.700
Respect for the rule of law	.382	.195	3.832	1	.050	1.465
Political Affiliation	-.516	.220	5.503	1	.019	.597
Education	.025	.035	.504	1	.478	1.025
Age	-.002	.010	.052	1	.819	.998
Household Income	.094	.060	2.486	1	.115	1.098
Currently Employed	-.251	.309	.660	1	.417	.778
Wealth	-.025	.059	.182	1	.669	.975
Constant	-2.446	1.222	4.007	1	.045	.087

Dependent Variable: Attendance at Local Government Meetings

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
713.812(a)	.079	.138

a Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

**Regression Table VII-3: Determinants of Willingness to Pay for Improved Services**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban	-.292	.284	1.058	1	.304	.747
Size of area	.099	.084	1.390	1	.238	1.104
Gender	.257	.132	3.776	1	.052	1.293
Perception of personal economic situation	.035	.076	.213	1	.645	1.036
Respect for the rule of law	-.008	.134	.004	1	.952	.992
Political affiliation	-.255	.164	2.420	1	.120	.775
Educational attainment	-.031	.023	1.813	1	.178	.969
Age	-.005	.006	.672	1	.412	.995
Employed	-.307	.177	3.005	1	.083	.736
Wealth	.098	.035	7.890	1	.005	1.103
Civic participation	.046	.028	2.611	1	.106	1.047
Constant	.160	.702	.052	1	.820	1.173

Dependent Variable: Willingness to pay for improved services

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1281.424(a)	.023	.031

a Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.




## VIII. Electoral Behavior

The transition to democratic norms has been slow in Guyana. From 1992, the first year of democratic elections in the country since 1964, to the present there has been the creation of institutions such as the Integrity Commission and the Ethnic Relations Commission to propagate democratic values. Additionally, academics have underscored the importance of the electorate as one of the main players in the drive to return the country to a democratic State (Thomas, 2005). For others, the emergence of more private media houses, television stations and changes among power-holders at all levels of government is testimony to the democratic advances the country has achieved (Carter Centre, 2002; NDI, 2005). The evolution of democracy in Guyana therefore, has implied new experiences with political life and customs for a broad segment of the electorate.


### Political Identification

Despite the ever-increasing presence of alternation in power and, therefore, of the spread of the policy proposals and achievements of the governing party, Guyana continues to be a country that has carried the scourge of severe ethnic divisions that become pronounced in an election year (Carter Centre, 2005). The two main political parties the PPP/C and the PNCR-1G have been accused of practicing partisan politics that has seen them aligning themselves with Guyanese of Indian descent and Guyanese of African descent respectively. In this chapter we sought to determine the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of voters in the last election, assess the level of support for the incumbent government, and their effectiveness in fighting a number of social ills that plague the Guyanese society. For example, education has often been positively associated with an enhanced knowledge of politics and with greater political sophistication (Nie et al., 1996). In other words, the greater an individual's education, the more interest in politics the person is likely to exhibit, the more resources available to the individual to analyze political information, and the greater the readiness of an individual to participate in political life. However, before investigating these issues the study sought to determine respondents that identified with a specific political Party. Graph VIII-1 indicates that only 19.4% of the respondents identified themselves with some political party.




**Graph VIII-1. Respondents who have identified themselves with a Political Party, Guyana 2006**

Of the 19.4% of respondents that indicated they were associated with a particular political party, the majority identified themselves with one of the two major political parties, i.e., the PPP/C with 42.6% and the PNCR-1G with 39.5%. The AFC as the ‘Third Force’ in Guyana’s politics was evident in this area, where 12.4% of the politically affiliated respondents indicating their connection to this Party.




Graph VIII-2. Political Identification by Party, Guyana 2006

But apart from understanding possible political ‘affiliations’, it was also useful for us to distinguish this ‘affiliation’ by certain socio-economic factors. The PPP/C is constantly being referred to as the ‘grassroots’ party having its main support at the local level amongst the agricultural, community groups, and rural sub-sectors. In fact, the President of the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers Union (GAWU), one of the largest Unions in the country, was also a Member of Parliament for this party while occupying the position of General Secretary. As such, one would expect that the level of identification to be greater in the rural areas than in the urban areas. Conversely, the PNCR-1G and, more recently the AFC, have been seen as the parties representing the urban middle class with most of their support coming from the urban areas. Graph VIII-3 indicates that the greatest ‘affiliation’ to the PPP/C was indeed within the rural areas, while the PNCR-1G’s was in the urban areas confirming our *a priori* expectation. However, as regards the AFC, there was virtually no differentiation in terms of those ‘affiliated’ to this party by rural and urban areas.



Graph VIII-3. Political Identification by Area of Residence, Guyana 2006

As was discussed above, the two major parties have often been accused of pursuing policies that are politically expedient. To the extent that this is true, one would expect to find that there would be a significant skewness in the political sympathizer amongst each party. The study therefore sought to investigate the relationship between ethnicity and political identification.



Graph VIII-4. Political Identification by Ethnic Group, Guyana 2006


Clearly, from Graph VIII-4 those who identified with the governing PPP/C were mostly from the Indo-Guyanese ethnic grouping, while the majority of those identified with the PNCR-1G was Afro-Guyanese. It is useful to observe though that both parties had support from other ethnic groups, i.e., from Guyana’s indigenous peoples and Guyanese of mixed decent, demonstrating that their support base was broader than a single ethnic group.

However, it is informative that those associated with the PPP/C had the lowest sympathizers from Guyanese of African decent, while the PNCR-1G had their lowest group of sympathizers from Guyanese of Indian decent. This finding would seem to add some level of credence to the contention that the two major ethnic groups stand solidly behind the two major political parties in the country, with Indo-Guyanese identifying more with the PPP/C and Afro-Guyanese with the PNCR-1G.

At the same time, the newest Party in the form of the AFC showed that their support base in 2006 cut across all ethnic groups, though the lowest support came from Guyanese of Indian decent. It would appear therefore that Guyanese of Indian decent remain firmly behind the PPP/C Party.

Another finding in this section of the chapter is the differences that exist in the level of education amongst those who indicated they were affiliated to a particular political Party. Of the three

major parties in 2006, for example, the PPP/C, PNCR-1G and AFC, the PPP/C had its greatest support from persons who had mainly a primary level of education, with the Party's level of support. Conversely, the PNCR-1G and the AFC have more sympathizers who had attained a secondary or tertiary level education. Such differences in support most probably respond to Party contact strategies with their potential electors. Additionally, the content of platforms and the focus of diverse government programs may be the determining factors in party preferences.




Graph VIII-5. Political Identification and Educational Attainment, Guyana 2006

To the extent that persons perceive that a particular political party's policies are likely to enhance their material well-being, then they are more likely to be more supportive of that party. At the same time, political parties may find that they are supported by wealthy individuals/businesses given that financing a campaign remains critical if Parties are to get their messages across to the masses. In order to assess the wealth of the respondents supporting the various political Parties the study sought to determine the amount of capital assets they owned as an indication of their wealth.

Graph VIII-6 illustrates that the PPP/C had roughly a bi-modal distribution with the largest grouping of respondents considered poor and wealthy in terms of capital goods ownership. However, this finding must be treated with caution given the large error bars indicating that the results may suffer in significant swings upwards or downwards, making the results unstable. Furthermore, it is evident that the Party's support cuts across all wealth groupings.

The PNCR-1G support came mainly from wealthy and middle income respondents based on the criteria used in this study, and the AFC's mainly from the poor. In the case of the latter, given that as a political party they are still relatively new persons may be waiting to see what they have to offer before committing to the Party.<sup>25</sup> However, some of the respondents in the lower wealth class, it would appear from Graph VIII-6, who may have been seeking a change in policy and had become disillusioned with the two main political parties, were willing to pool their resources behind the AFC.



Graph VIII-6. The Relationship between Political Identification and Wealth, Guyana 2006

### Ideology and Political Party Identification

It is often argued that electorates' party identification will define their ideology<sup>26</sup> (Popkin, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Individuals choose their party and once they find that the ideology espoused is in conformity with their own they tend to become entrenched in that party. Furthermore, ideology is an informative short-cut that aids in reducing the costs of acquiring information about party proposals and candidates, while helping to orient individuals' political attitudes. Sadly though, Guyanese politics does not have a culture of debates on issues of national interest. Rather, it is customary that meetings are held within specified locations, and mainly amongst the parties' constituency through whipping up popular sentiments and hoping

<sup>25</sup> The party is no more than 2 years old and contested the National and Regional Elections for the first time in 2006.


<sup>26</sup> This is a set of beliefs and goals of a social or political group that explain or justify the group's decisions and behavior

that such momentum will encourage undecided voters or disillusioned supporters of other parties to join them.

The general absence of political debate amongst the political parties contesting the National and Regional Elections in Guyana has meant that Guyanese are generally unsure about the ideological doctrine of the parties. While the 2006 elections attempted some panel discussions, these were held with individual parties on different days, rather than having them all responding to specific questions at a single forum. Hence, this would seem to strengthen the claim that the Guyanese electorate votes more on ethnic grounds rather than on political ideology and policies. To have some clarity on this issue the survey asked the following question:

*L1. Today, when we speak of political tendencies, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political tendency, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.*


Graph VIII-7 indicates that most Guyanese do not have strong ideological leanings as 41.7% of respondents fell on the scale between 5 and 6, while ideological extremes were relatively low. This lack of ideological extremism can be a good thing for Guyana as it allows for more tolerance, as we discussed in Chapter 4 and greater involvement of the masses. Further, this finding may be a reflection of the fact that both major political parties emerged out of a setting of socialism and many have argued that they have not dropped those teachings (Griffith, 1997; Hintzen, 2002). Thus, there is little from an ideological standpoint that separates one from the other apart from race. The smaller parties, such as, the Alliance for Change (AFC) and The United Force (TUF) have argued that they are to the 'right' as conservative, free market-oriented parties. However, the latter is no longer a major political force in Guyana and has lost considerable ground since 1964, with its current head being a Minister of the government for the past five (5) years, while the former is no more than 2 years old and is yet to be seriously tested on ideological grounds.



Graph VIII-7. Political Ideology, Guyana 2006

It was also useful to determine how the ideological underpinnings affected the voting pattern amongst the electorate. Thus, respondents were asked to indicate how they voted and for which candidate via the following question:

*VB3: For which candidate did you vote for President in last presidential elections?*



Graph VIII-8. Candidate Voted for in the 2006 Presidential Elections, Guyana 2006

From Graph VIII-8 we note that 42.3% of respondents voted for the presidential candidate associated with the PPP/C in the 2006 general elections, while 33.6% voted for the PNCR-1G candidate and 16.5% for the Alliance for Change. It is important to note that while a party nominates a candidate for the position of President, the electoral system is so structured that one votes for the Party and not the Candidate. While it may be tempting to conclude that from these findings that the majority of Guyanese are in favor of parties espousing socialist doctrines (as reflected in the votes cast for the PPP/C and the PNCR-1G) than those promoting free-market principles (reflected in the votes cast for the AFC and the TUF), this may be an erroneous conclusion, as other factors such as ethnicity, age of the party, and voting strategically<sup>27</sup> may have played a role as well.


#### Presidential Approval<sup>28</sup>/ Approval of Presidential Candidate/Performance of President

Often, presidential approval, or lack thereof, can determine how persons vote in an election (Key, 1966). For a well informed and educated populace, one can measure such approval using an *ex post* evaluation of the economy (Kinder and Keiwiet, 1981). The PNCR-IG administration that ruled the country from 1964 to 1992 has often been accused of mis-managing the country's resources, pursuing policies that were not in the best interest of the country, and governed over a

<sup>27</sup> Some people may vote for a party they think has an actual chance of winning, rather than for any particular ideology.

<sup>28</sup> This section of the study deals exclusively with the performance of the President, and by extension the Government, as assessed by the respondents.

country that was not creditworthy. At the same time, the PPP/C has been credited with restoring the country to democratic norms and returning the country to positive growth, though admittedly, this has been sluggish in the past eight years. But presidential approval is often strongly related to party identification (Franklin and Jackson, 1983). From the time President Bharrat Jagdeo took over the reigns of power in 2001 he has remained a fairly popular president with nearly 30% of the respondents indicating that he was doing a very good job or a good job (21.3%) (Graph VIII-9).




Graph VIII-9. Approval Rating for the President, Guyana 2006

Furthermore, it is important to note that those who gave the President a positive rating (29.6%) outweighed those who indicated that he was doing a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ job (19.6%). However, the majority of respondents (50.6%) gave the President a fair rating. This large segment of persons who fell in the middle may be an indication of persons who are still undecided about the President’s performance but this contention will be elaborated further in the chapter.

Of importance was to determine areas in which the respondents felt the Government was performing well. In this regard the survey asked the following questions:

- N1. To what extent would you say the current Government combats poverty?*
- N3. To what extent would you say the current Government promotes and protects democratic principles?*
- N9. To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?*
- N10. To what extent would you say the current Government protects human rights?*
- N11. To what extent would you say the current Government improves citizen security?*
- N12. To what extent would you say the current Government combats unemployment?*

The answer to these questions was scored on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating very well and 7 very badly. This scale was then translated into a 0 – 100 scale for ease of reference and comparability purposes. The results to this question are shown below in Graph VIII-10.



Graph VIII-10. Effectiveness of the Government, Guyana 2006

The results indicate that respondents felt the government was performing best in protecting human rights (44.9), promoting democratic principles (44.1), and improving the security of citizens (43.7). Conversely, they felt that the government was performing worse in the areas of unemployment (28.5) and combating corruption (35.8).


These findings would seem to confirm some of the perceptions expressed above with persons crediting the present administration (though not necessary the current President alone as the PPP/C has been in power since 1992 and has had three (3) other Presidents within that time) with returning the country to democracy. At the same time, the Administration has consistently been plagued with allegations of corruption though the evidence for this is anecdotal at best. Furthermore, the less than conducive environment for investment (World Bank, 2006), the exhaustion of the Omai Gold Mine concession, high levels of competition in the bauxite sector, and loss of preferences in Europe for rice and sugar, (Transport Sector Study, 2005) as was discussed in some of the earlier chapters, may be contributing to unemployment,<sup>29</sup> which respondents perceive are not being adequately addressed by the current administration (28.5).

But it is quite possible that the ratings given to the government are conditioned by socio-economic and demographic factors. Being cognizant of this fact, the study assessed how persons viewed the President's performance relative to their overall economic situation, as well as where they live.

As reflected in Graph VIII-11, where a score of 0 – 100 was once again applied there seems to be some correlation between the perception of Presidential performance and the economic situation of respondents. As such, the President received his lowest rating from those who indicated that their economic situation was 'bad', i.e., 45.3. Additionally, those who indicated that their economic situation was 'very good' or 'good' gave the President his highest rating, i.e., 69.4 and 62.1 respectively.


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<sup>29</sup> The study, despite efforts was unable to obtain the latest labour survey information and unemployment statistics are not routinely published by the Statistical Bureau of Guyana.



Graph VIII-11. The Relationship between Economic Situation of Respondent and Presidential Approval, Guyana 2006


Graph VIII-12 shows little variation amongst respondents in the various income groups with regards to the performance of the President. For example, the President’s performance received a rating of ‘very good’ or ‘good’ from a substantial number of persons in the low income category. One possibility is that this variable may be closely correlated with the area and education variables, and as such, is picking up the influence of these other variables.



Graph VIII-12. Relationship between Presidential Approval and Wealth, Guyana 2006

Furthermore, the study examined the relationship between the area in which persons live and views on presidential performance as traditionally the ruling Party has enjoyed substantial support amongst agricultural workers and grassroots organizations.


It is therefore interesting to see (Graph VIII-13) that the majority of those who gave the President a positive rating came from the rural constituencies. This finding is consistent with the previous finding that the PPP/C receives more support from rural dwellers. Furthermore, the minority who felt the President was doing a 'bad' or 'very bad' job was found in the urban areas. Thus, the President appears to remain most popular amongst the respondents in the rural areas where the party's political base remains strong. On the other hand, the negative approval of the minority of respondents from urban areas may be reflective of more opposition party affiliates indicating this negative rating or greater level of political sophistication and understanding of political issues and their relevance to development, rather than Party identification.



Graph VIII-13. Relationship between Presidential Approval and Area, Guyana 2006

To determine whether education played a role in the approval rating of the President’s performance, the study cross-referenced the education variable with that of the presidential approval. The results of this analysis are shown below in Graph VIII-14.


As can be observed, and in a manner consistent with the findings in other parts of this chapter, those with a low level of formal educational attainment gave the President the most favorable ratings, though it is important to note that difference in ratings between those with low and higher levels of education was not significant. This indicates that the President enjoyed significant approval ratings amongst persons at all educational levels.



Graph VIII-14. Presidential Approval by Education, Guyana 2006

### Comparative Analysis of the Satisfaction/Approval of Presidential Performance


It was also useful to analyze comparatively the President’s approval ratings with those of other leaders in the sample. President Jagdeo occupies the median range in Graph VIII-15 with an average of 39.6 points, being above the lowest score in the sample (Ecuador at 21.5) and above the leaders in the other two (2) CARICOM countries in the sample, i.e., Haiti (31.8) and Jamaica (37.5).



Graph VIII-15. Comparative Analysis of Presidential Approval, Guyana 2006

### Satisfaction with Democracy

According to Griffith (1997) for the party faithful, it is often of importance that their candidate, or Party, is given a mandate to manage the economy (Griffith, 1997). To the extent that this argument is true, then one would expect to find that those citizens who are backing a Party that has governed or is governing would tend to feel more satisfied that the rudiments of democratic norms are being practiced than those opposed to that Party. Graph VIII-16 shows the relationship between the levels of satisfaction with Guyanese democracy and party identification.



Graph VIII-16. Relationship between Satisfaction with Democracy and Party Identification, Guyana 2006


It is clear from the graph that respondents in support of the ruling PPP/C are mostly ‘satisfied’ with democracy in Guyana, while those most closely affiliated with the PNC-1G, the AFC and the smaller opposition Parties are the ones that are most ‘dissatisfied’ with the lack of democratic practices in the country. From this finding it can be inferred that alternation in power, as well as having the opportunity to pursue the specific objectives and platforms of one’s preferred political party, might be determining factors in the level of satisfaction that citizens exhibit as regards democracy in Guyana. If the Party that one supports is in power that person is more likely to defend their Party’s efforts at promulgating democratic norms than someone opposed to the Party.

### Election Reform and Voting Patterns

Voting behavior in Guyana has been argued as following an ethnic pattern, with the ruling PPP/C aligning itself with Guyanese of Indian decent and the PNC-1G being closely affiliated with Guyanese of African decent (Hintzen, 2002). But both parties have rejected this contention and have often indicated that their support comes from a much broader base. This survey provided us the opportunity to examine the forgoing arguments and determine whether there was any credence to these contentions. Furthermore, coming just after a general election, the results are likely to be more accurate as sufficient time would not have elapsed for persons to have forgotten the candidate they supported.

The survey sought to ascertain the percentage of respondents that voted, on what issue or platform did they vote and for those who did not vote, what were the mitigating circumstances that precluded them from exercising their franchise.

As Graph VIII-17 indicates, more than 78.1% of respondents responded that they had voted in the General Elections of 2006. To the extent that this is reflection of the general population, it is a relatively high percentage turnout and does indicate that Guyanese at the last elections took the opportunity to exercise their democratic right. For larger and older democracies like the USA and the United Kingdom, their turnout is usually just below 50%.




Graph VIII-17. Persons that Voted in the Last Election, Guyana 2006

It was also important to find out what were the reasons responsible for the 21.9% of persons not voting. In this regard, persons were asked the following question, where only a single response was noted:

*VB4: If you did not vote, why did you not vote in the last presidential elections?*

The majority of respondents (35.1%) of those who did not vote indicated that they had no interest in voting for any of the candidates. This reflected a general apathy amongst this segment of the voting population and may be a reflection that the policies espoused by the political parties could not elicit a response from the voting population. Additionally, a quarter of those who did not vote indicated that they could not find their name on the list of voters (12.8%) or lacked an

identification card (11.5%), which was a prerequisite for voting; while another 10.4% indicated that they had lost confidence in the electoral system. This finding supports earlier findings discussed in Chapter 4 where the Elections Commission received the lowest score of social institutions respondents trusted. It would appear that this entity that is so critical for the promotion of democracy in Guyana has a problem with its image and a vibrant public education program on the roles and functions of the entity, along with what are respondents civic responsibilities may be in order.




Graph VIII-18. Why did you not vote in the last presidential elections?

The survey also sought to find out reasons that caused people who voted to cast their ballot in a particular fashion. In this regard, respondents were asked the following question:

*VB8. When you voted, which of the following reason was the most important reason of your vote?*

(1) *The qualities of the candidate,* (2) *The political party of the candidate,* and (3) *The plan of government of the candidate?*

Graph VIII-19 reveals that the majority of persons (35.5%) voted based on the platform of the candidate and the perceived quality of the candidate (35.2%). However, a significant proportion of the respondents voted for the Party (29.2%), with little or no relation to the first two issues raised. This indicates that for some respondents, the policies and plans for the country did not seem to matter. Rather, Party identification took precedence over all other concerns.



Graph VIII-19. Basis on which Respondents Voted in the 2006 Presidential Elections

Lastly, the study conducted a multivariate logistic regression analysis, using a variety of demographic and socio-economic data to help the researchers determine how people voted in the last election and what factors influenced the voting pattern. This analysis was conducted for the three main political parties, i.e., PPP/C, PNCR-IG, and the AFC. The results are shown in *Appendix VIII* to this chapter. For the PPP/C it was noted that at the  $p < 0.05$  level of significance: (i) support from the rural area is a significant explanatory variable with most of the rural coastal areas, which are largely agriculturally based, supporting the PPP/C; (ii) ethnicity of the respondent's parents is also a strong explanatory variable, though it is not immediately apparent why this should be so; (iii) to the extent that persons perceive their economic situation to be improving the more likely they are to vote for the ruling party since this party has been in power for the last 14 years and the improvement in the respondent's quality of life is likely to be attributed to the policies followed by the Party. As such, respondents would like the improvement to continue and thus vote for the Party; (iv) persons who perceived the condition in the country worsening were less likely to vote for the PPP/C; (v) Guyanese of Amerindian descent are less likely to vote for the PPP/C, possibly picking up the influence of the other

smaller parties like The United Force (TUF) and the Guyana Action Party/Rise Organise and Rebuild (GAP/ROAR) that had noticeable showing of support of Amerindians in Region 9; but (vi) Guyanese of East Indian descent strongly support the Party.

In the case of the PNCR-1G party, the significant predictors were: (i) perception of economic situation of the country with persons indicating that they believe the party is likely to improve the economic situation in the country, (ii) Guyanese of African descent voted solidly for the party, and (iii) age being a significant explanatory, with the younger respondents indicating that they voted for the party. However, in the case of the AFC the only significant predictor was level of educational attainment, where persons with higher levels of education were more likely to vote for the Party.

From the above findings there can be no doubt that perception of personal welfare conditions played a significant role in the voting pattern exhibited at the last National and Regional Elections. However, even more significant is the confirmation that there was racial voting taking place in Guyana, with the two major parties getting the majority of their support from the ethnic groups that they tend to identify with in the main, i.e., the PPP/C with Guyanese of Indian decent and the PNCR-1G with Guyanese of African decent. This pattern of voting is clearly unhealthy for the development of the country, but even more importantly, is the need to reform the electoral system to allow elected officials to be more accountable to their constituencies.

## Conclusions

The electoral behavior of Guyanese is related to their partisan leanings and is driven mainly by ethnic cleavages and certain socio-demographic factors, mainly the state of the economy and the area within which the respondents live.

Party identification<sup>30</sup> for the PPP/C and PNCR-1G determines, to a large extent, not only ideological self-placement, but also opinions about democracy, approval of the sitting President, and thus influences voting patterns. Since Party identification depends on retrospective evaluations of government performance, to the degree that party alternation continues spreading to other levels of government, individuals will have more tools to judge the success or failure of government policies and, therefore, to decide whether they continue to support their Party or decide to shift their support to another Party. Many political attitudes and opinions will continue to depend on the intensity of the affective links that individuals have toward political parties and the emergence of other parties as worthy candidates to challenge the PPP/C and the PNCR-1G.

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<sup>30</sup> **Party identification** is a political term to describe a voter's underlying allegiance to a political party. It is a psychological attachment toward a political party that tends to influence a person's decisions on social, economic and political issues.

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Annex: Regression Results

**Factors Influencing the Vote for a PPP/C Candidate at the 2006 Presidential Elections**

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban/Rural	1.007	.231	19.024	1	.000	2.737
Gender	.252	.177	2.023	1	.155	1.287
Perception of personal Economic situation	-.365	.128	8.059	1	.005	.695
Perception of the economic situation in the country	.245	.118	4.302	1	.038	.782
Ethnicity of parent	.423	.187	5.098	1	.024	1.527
Mixed Guyanese	-.277	.691	.160	1	.689	.758
Afro-Guyanese	.271	.736	.136	1	.713	1.311
Amerindians	-1.998	.751	7.072	1	.008	.136
Indo-Guyanese	1.418	.676	4.393	1	.036	4.128
Wealth	.074	.047	2.477	1	.115	1.077
Age	.012	.008	2.050	1	.152	1.012
Educational attainment	-.048	.030	2.492	1	.114	.953
Employed	-.358	.240	2.233	1	.135	.699
Constant	-2.283	1.102	4.294	1	.038	.102

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
836.587(a)	.279	.416

Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

**Factors Influencing the Vote for a PNCR-IG Candidate at the 2006 Presidential Elections**

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban/rural area	-.231	.181	1.630	1	.202	.794
Gender	.203	.169	1.436	1	.231	1.225
Perception of personal Economic situation	.180	.111	2.616	1	.106	1.197
Perception of the economic situation in the country	.221	.108	4.213	1	.040	1.248
Ethnicity of parent	.155	.178	.761	1	.383	1.168
Mixed Guyanese	1.321	1.053	1.573	1	.210	3.748
Afro-Guyanese	2.485	1.050	5.601	1	.018	11.998
Amerindians	.429	1.122	.146	1	.702	1.536
Indo-Guyanese	-.293	1.073	.075	1	.785	.746
Wealth	-.083	.047	3.160	1	.075	.920
Age	.021	.008	7.287	1	.007	1.021
Educational attainment	.045	.032	1.958	1	.162	1.046
Employed	.144	.217	.443	1	.506	1.155
Constant	-5.143	1.328	14.989	1	.000	.006

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
906.557(a)	.194	.295

Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

**Factors Influencing the Vote for an AFC Candidate at the 2006 Presidential Elections**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban/rural area	-.160	.219	.536	1	.464	.852
Gender	.115	.200	.328	1	.567	1.122
Perception of personal Economic situation	.068	.134	.257	1	.612	1.070
Perception of the economic situation in the country	.123	.131	.889	1	.346	1.131
Ethnicity of parent	.192	.215	.798	1	.372	1.211
Mixed Guyanese	.960	1.054	.830	1	.362	2.611
Afro-Guyanese	.624	1.123	.309	1	.578	1.867
Amerindians	.459	1.056	.189	1	.664	1.582
Indo-Guyanese	-.187	1.065	.031	1	.860	.829
Wealth	.041	.056	.545	1	.460	1.042
Age	-.014	.010	1.944	1	.163	.986
Educational attainment	.118	.040	8.845	1	.003	1.126
Employed	.001	.268	.000	1	.998	1.001
Constant	-4.214	1.423	8.766	1	.003	.015

**Model Summary**

-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
711.190(a)	.043	.084

Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

## IX. Social Capital

Social capital links are moral ties that are important in cementing bonds between people towards a common purpose. If members of social grouping therefore can place the common good above individual objectives, then there is an increased chance that such an organization or association will function in a democratic and transparent way. In the context of this survey it also encompasses the active political participation of civil society in the operation of a democracy (Putnam, 1993 & 2000). Furthermore, Coleman (1994) argues that social capital helps to explain cooperative behavior between individuals.

In the absence of a universally-accepted definition of the concept of social capital, there is consensus that it encompasses two main dimensions of social interaction: the cognitive and the structural. The *cognitive* focuses mainly on trust (among individuals and toward institutions) and the level of reciprocity existing in a society. The *structural* focuses on collective organization and participation. Taking this into account, we define social capital as the “norms and values permitting cooperative behavior in groups” (Fukuyama 1997) and “any aspect of informal [or formal] social organization that constitutes a productive resource for one or more actors” (Coleman 1994: 170). This definition allows us to place our emphasis on participation in civil society, in addition to qualifying the concept as productive.

The LAPOP 2006 survey provided us the opportunity to measure the social capital present in Guyana as it included questions referring to institutional and interpersonal trust and on formal and informal social participation. In addition, it permitted an evaluation of the motivation behind the patterns of participation. The research, therefore, sought to determine the factors that best explain the presence of civil society in the political life of Guyana before concluding with an examination of the factors that cause people to move away from the traditional methods of participation to other less traditional methods such as protests, walkouts or marches.

### Cognitive Dimension of Social Capital


According to Tway (1994), trust can be viewed as the capacity to interact with something or someone without requiring being on one’s guard. Hence, in measuring trust, a useful starting point is often to measure the trust that an individual has in another person(s) and institution(s) with which they interact on a regular basis. Trust can be classified into four types: family, social (generalized and/or toward strangers), institutional and civic (Stone 2001). The LAPOP survey provided the opportunity to measure the first three types, for which the results are discussed below.

### Interpersonal Trust

The LAPOP survey of 2006 measured interpersonal trust using a scale from 1 (no trust) to 7 (a very high level of trust). The survey posed the following question to respondents:

*“Now, speaking of people from around here, would you say that the people in your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, a little trustworthy or not trustworthy?”*


The responses to this question are shown below in Graph IX-1. What it demonstrates is that nearly one in seven Guyanese (16%) indicated that their neighbours were very trustworthy, while approximately 55% felt they were somewhat trustworthy, and 24% felt that they are a little trustworthy. It is interesting to find that only 5.5% felt that their neighbours were totally untrustworthy.



Graph IX-1. Level of Interpersonal Trust amongst Guyanese, Guyana 2006

The research then examined how Guyanese compared with the other territories in the survey. However, with only a single measure of trust, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions in terms of Guyanese trustworthiness or lack thereof, but for comparability purposes with the other studies, this measure was applied. The study explored this question from a comparative perspective using a scale of 0 to 100 of an indication of generalized trust. From Graph IX-2 it was noted that for the Caribbean region Guyanese with a mean interpersonal trust score of 59.9 have a level of trust that is above that of both the Jamaicans 58.9 and Haitians 42.1, though it is

very slightly below that of Dominican Republicans 60.4. It is however lower than the best performers in the sample, inclusive of Hondurans 67.2, Costa Ricans 67.0 and Paraguayans 65.6.



Graph IX-2. Comparable Statistics of Mean Interpersonal Trust, Guyana 2006

From the graph above, it was imperative to determine the factors responsible for the level of interpersonal trust found in Guyana. As such, a linear regression model was executed, using the overall index of trust and a level of significance of  $p < 0.05$ .

The results are shown in Regression Table IX-1 in Appendix IX. These results indicate that at the prescribed level of significance, only persons' perception of their economic situation was significant. In fact, it appears that persons are more trusting the poorer they perceive their economic situation to be. At the  $p < 0.10$  level of significance, only the respondents' perception of the economic situation of the country was significant, with a declining economic situation tending to make persons more trusting of each other. This may be an indication of poor

economic conditions, both at the individual level and nationally, forcing persons to work together and hence, develop a greater degree of trust amongst individuals.

### Level of Participation

In an effort to analyze the level of participation in different organizations as an indication of peoples’ willingness to participate in different settings associated with the democratic process in Guyana the following sets of questions were posed to respondents. A scale of “0” (signifying once a week) to “4” (signifying never) was used as an indication of participation at various fora. This was then converted to a scale of 0 to 100. The questions were as follows:


*Now I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the respondent]*

	<i>Once a week</i>	<i>Once or twice a month</i>	<i>Once or twice a year</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>DK</i>	
<i>CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<i>CP7. Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them....</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<i>CP8. Meetings of a committee or association for community improvements? Do you attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<i>CP9. The meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? You attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<i>CP10. Meetings of a labor union? Do you attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<i>CP13. Meetings of a political party or Political movement? Do you attend them...</i>	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>

The responses to the above questions facilitated the organization of the level of participation into *formal* (through an organization formally constituted) and *informal* participation. Both forms of participation provide a good overview of civil participation. However, the level, quality and direction of the said participation respond largely to the structural characteristics in which participation develops. For example, a particular structure can trigger or facilitate participation, by it placing within the reach of citizens (and motivating) formal channels of participation (Krishna 2002). Conversely, in the absence of sufficient or accessible formal channels of participation, informal channels of participation may emerge.

From the results shown in Graph IX-3 it is clear that the level of civic participation in Guyana is relatively low, with the highest level of participation being at religious meetings and parent/teachers associations. However, the apparent low trend may also be a reflection of the fact

that some of these organizations do not hold regular meetings, hence, the low ratings for labor unions and professional organizations for example, may not be a reflection of lethargy, but to the infrequency with which such meetings are held. Additionally, it may be a reflection of many of the respondents not being a member of some of these organizations, such as a labor union or professional organization. Also, it was not surprising that respondents in the main did not attend meetings of political parties as these are often held mainly at National Elections time (constitutionally due once every 5 years) and some times party congresses that are held bi-annually.



Graph IX-3. Civic Participation, Guyana 2006

To understand better the factors influencing the level of civic participation in Guyana, we regressed a number of demographic and socio-economic variables on the index of civic participation.


At conventional levels of significance, the regression results shown in Table IX-2 in *Appendix IX*, indicate that the significant predictors of civic participation are: (i) age, with young people being more likely to participate in civic activities, (ii) Amerindians was the only ethnic group

that was significant, which may be a reflection of the tradition of Guyana's indigenous peoples to pursue certain activities affecting their community in a communal manner and may have overlapped into this area; (iii) those who listen to the news on the radio and (iv) those who read the news are more likely to participate in civic activities, possibly due to the fact that these media both inform and build awareness about the necessity to participate in such activities, (v) civil state with persons that are married being more likely to participate in civic activities, (vi) those with a greater number of children participate more than those with no or fewer children, and (vii) the area where people are resident, with people in urban areas participating more than their rural counterparts.

The preceding findings are generally not unexpected when account is taken of the type of organization measured in LAPOP survey that can often over-represent the participation of some groups and under-represent that of others. For example, measuring participation in schools would likely result in a higher representation of certain groups, such as married people with children. Insofar as substantive variables are concerned, it is interesting to observe that two such variables, i.e., civil state and the presence of children, which have a statistically significant impact on levels of participation.


The researchers further examined the demand made on the municipal government in the last year from a comparative perspective. However, we did not seek to replicate additional graphs on social capital, such as how often persons participated or if they came together to solve a problem, as these were already captured in Chapter VII of this report.

From a comparative perspective and once again applying the 0 (never) to 100 (always) scale, Graph IX-4 indicates that Guyana scored 13.9. The graph indicates that those who sought help from their municipality were low. This placed the country just below the Dominican Republic, but above both Jamaica and Haiti. One interpretation of this finding is that ineffective municipal execution of functions tends to force some persons to become self-reliant.



Graph IX-4. Comparative Analysis of Demand Making on Municipality in the last Year


But to the extent that persons are dissatisfied with the level of service they are receiving even after participating at civic gatherings they may still be encouraged to join other forms of participation, such as protesting. The survey sought to capture this particular variable in the following manner.



Graph IX-5. Participation in Protests Based on Perception of the President’s Performance, Guyana 2006


Graph IX-5 indicates that one of the main reasons for protesting is due to persons’ perception about the President’s performance. Using a scale of 0 (totally ineffective) to 100 (very effective) it was found that respondents who felt the President was doing a bad or very bad job were more inclined to join in a protest (32.4%), while those who felt the President was doing a good job was less likely to protest (19.9%). While this finding may also be picking up the influence of political expediency in that protestations may also be motivated by factors outside of those explicitly stated as the reason for the protest, it nonetheless indicates that nearly a third of respondents who view the President as being ‘ineffective’ perceive the ‘solution’ to bring about a change is via protesting. But protests in Guyana have often led to social disorder, vandalism and injuries to innocent victims.

What the survey results indicate is that there is very little distinction between the disaffected by age, with older people being just as likely to protest as younger ones (Graph IX-6). But the error bars in this particular instance are quite large, with those in the age group 66+ being significant.




Graph IX-6. Participation in Protests by Age, Guyana 2006

Similarly, as Graph IX-7 indicates there is very little differentiation amongst those who would normally protest by educational attainment, though there is a positive correlation between the percentage of those protesting and the level of education. This latter finding deviates from conventional thinking and research that has generally concluded that less educated people object more to activism and protest than do highly educated people (Verba et al, 2000; Schussman and Soule, 2005). Based on previous discussions in this chapter and research, it may be that: (i) factors other than disaffection, and (ii) insufficient confidence in the democratic institutions, are responsible for this finding.




Graph IX-7. Participation in Protests by Educational Attainment, Guyana 2006

With regard to informal participation, respondents were asked whether they had contributed to the solution of some problems in their locality or neighborhood during the past year. Approximately a third of Guyanese indicated that they had (33.4%) as was discussed in Chapter 5. This third of the population seems fairly active with 59.4% indicating that they contributed money or material to help solve a problem in their community (Graph IX-8). This is fairly substantial and indicates that Guyana has significant access to social capital. To determine how the country performed relative to other countries in the sample, a comparative analysis was conducted. The results are reflected in Graph IX-9. The graphs shows that Guyana is mid-range in the sample, but falling below the other CARICOM States of Jamaica (62.6%) and Haiti (62.5%), and the best performer in Honduras (71.6%).




Graph IX-8. Respondents who Donated Money or Material to Address a Problem in their Community, Guyana 2006




Graph IX-9. Comparative Analysis of Respondents who Donated Money or Material to Address a Problem in their Community

But there are also those who may not have financial resources to contribute but provide their labour power to solve a problem in their community. Taking this a priori position, the survey sought to find out what percentage of manual labour was contributed to solve a problem in their community. Respondents were allowed to provide more than one response to this question. The survey found that 78.1% had contributed manual labour (Graph IX-10). This finding complements a similar finding in 2004 by Mott MacDonald in nine (9) agricultural areas. How do we reconcile “59.4% indicating that they have contributed money or material to help solve a problem in their community” with “78.1% had contributed manual labour” (respondents could have given more than one response).

Further, as in the case of those contributing money or other material to solve community related problems, this section of the analysis examined the presence of social capital in Guyana relative to other countries in the sample. The results indicate that Guyana occupied the top position in this particular category with Ecuador where 78.1% of respondents indicated donating time and labour power to solving a problem in their community (Graph IX-11). This is a significant finding and indicates that there is substantial social capital present in Guyana.



Graph IX-10. Respondents who Contributed with work or Manual Labour to Address a Problem in their Community, Guyana 2006



Graph IX-11. Comparative Analysis of Respondents who Donated time or Labour Power to Address a Problem in their Community

### Conclusions

The information collected in the LAPOP survey conducted in Guyana demonstrated that there is considerable social capital in the country. Persons are coming together to solve problems in their communities and looking over each others homes, for example, even though there is still some level of distrust, particularly amongst those in the higher income bracket. This finding may be a reflection of the affected parties becoming more self-reliant rather than wait on their elected officials to address the problem/issue in their communities.

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Annex

**Regression Table IX-1: Factors Explaining Interpersonal Trust**

Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1684.382	462.128		3.645	.000
Urban-Rural	77.345	63.973	.099	1.209	.229
Sex	-55.663	58.133	-.075	-.958	.340
How would you describe the country's economic situation?	-66.871	36.602	-.187	-1.827	.070
How would you describe your overall economic situation?	-85.247	39.803	-.220	-2.142	.034
Political Affiliation	14.100	41.657	.031	.338	.736
Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	13.269	15.249	.078	.870	.386
Afro-Guyanese	-443.701	335.617	-.590	-1.322	.189
Indo-Guyanese	-203.485	340.467	-.265	-.598	.551
Amerindians	-200.418	347.261	-.152	-.577	.565
Mixed	-504.216	343.298	-.496	-1.469	.145
What is your age?	-2.504	2.426	-.081	-1.032	.304
What was the last year of education you completed?	3.894	9.682	.034	.402	.688
R-Square	0.09				

Dependent Variable: Overall Index of Trust

**Regression Table IX-2: Factors Explaining Civic Participation**

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-.926	.746		-1.241	.215
Sex	-.095	.126	-.021	-.759	.448
What is your age?	-.013	.006	-.073	-2.267	.024
What was the last year of education you completed?	.036	.023	.050	1.568	.117
Individual, per person, Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership	-.028	.037	-.025	-.744	.457
Perception of country	.034	.085	.014	.406	.685
Perception of personal economic situation	.025	.086	.009	.286	.775
Evaluation of President	.116	.078	.047	1.490	.136
Indo-Guyanese	.102	.492	.021	.206	.837
Afro-Guyanese	.267	.494	.054	.541	.589
Amerindians	1.162	.551	.124	2.108	.035
Mixed	.242	.495	.047	.489	.625
News by Radio	.254	.060	.125	4.196	.000
News by TV	-.077	.078	-.033	-.990	.322
News by Newspaper	.163	.071	.071	2.284	.023
Civil State	.389	.151	.085	2.573	.010
Children	.727	.193	.137	3.766	.000
Urban-Rural	.485	.142	.100	3.429	.001
<b>R-Square</b>	<b>0.084</b>				


a Dependent Variable: Total Index of Civic Participation

## Annex A: Technical Description of the Sample

### Population

Carrying out a survey in Guyana is difficult because we were unable to obtain access to the most basic source of data, namely the census bureau maps. In all other countries for the LAPOP 2006 round of surveys, such maps were obtained, and were used in all except in Haiti and Mexico. In Mexico, in fact, the research team demonstrated that the electoral register was a more accurate source of information.

According to the 2002 census data, Guyana had a total of 741,773 inhabitants. Twenty eight percent of the population lived in the six municipalities that constitute what is categorized as the urban area and the remaining 72% live in what is categorized as rural areas. The country is divided into 10 Administrative regions, which are also named electoral districts. This is fortunate, since it provided us a direct way to link the population data to the electoral district data. In this regard then, a sample based on the population, not the population of registered voters (which could differ substantially from the population) was taken.



Source: Guyana Census 2002

Table I shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over by region and urban and rural areas. The Bureau of Statistics estimates the population for Guyana using the age cohorts by five year intervals, i.e., 0-5, 6-10, etc. As such, information on those 18 and 19 years old was not readily available for this study to utilize. As such, we had no choice but to use the 20

and over, making the reasonable assumption that the distribution of the 18 and 19 year olds does not vary from the 20 and over population.

Table I. Guyana: Distribution of the Population by Administrative Regions and Urban and Rural areas

Region	Population total	%	Urban area	%	Rural area	%
Region 1 (Barima/Waini)	9845	2.4%	0	0.0%	9845	2.4%
Region 2 (Pomeroon/Supenaam)	25568	6.2%	7131	1.7%	18437	4.5%
Region 3 (West Demerara/Essequibo Island)	58215	14.2%	0	0.0%	58215	14.2%
Region 4 (Demerara/Mahaica)	176812	43.0%	80874	19.7%	95938	23.4%
Region 5 (Mahaica/West Berbice)	28620	7.0%	0	0.0%	28620	7.0%
Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne)	68972	16.8%	18523	4.5%	50449	12.3%
Region 7 (Cuyuni/Mazaruni)	8483	2.1%	0	0.0%	8483	2.1%
Region 8 (Siparuni/Potaro)	5028	1.2%	0	0.0%	5028	1.2%
Region 9 (Upper Takatu/UpperEssequibo)	8375	2.0%	0	0.0%	8375	2.0%
Region 10 (Upper Demerara/Berbice)	20948	5.1%	15587	3.8%	5361	1.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>410866</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>122115</b>	<b>29.7%</b>	<b>288751</b>	<b>70.3%</b>

Source: Guyana Census 2002

## Stratification

In order to improve the efficiency of the sample it was stratified. This is the standard practice in area probability samples. Our main goal was to have a sample that is representative at the national level, and at the same time reflect important characteristics of the country.

Guyana is a country shared by several ethnicities, with some of these ethnic groups clustered in specific geographical areas. Based on this characteristic of Guyana, we decided to stratify the country into five geographical areas according to the ethnic composition of the regions, as well as by urban and rural areas. Table II shows the predominant ethnic groups within the 5 strata according to the census data. In strata 1 and 4, the majority of the population is made up of Guyanese of African decent (60.7% and 54.0%, respectively); in strata 2 and 3, the majority of the population is Guyanese of East Indian extract (59.4% and 61.2%, respectively), and in strata 5, 66.2% of the population is Amerindian, Guyana's indigenous peoples.

Table II. Distribution of the Total Population within Stratum by Ethnic Background

Ethnicity	<b>Stratum 1</b> Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	<b>Stratum 2</b> Region 3 and rest of region 4	<b>Stratum 3</b> Regions 2, 5, and 6	<b>Stratum 4</b> Region 4	<b>Stratum 5</b> Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	Total
African/Black	<b>60.7%</b>	29.6%	22.0%	<b>54.0%</b>	4.8%	31.3%
Amerindian	1.2%	2.2%	4.9%	7.0%	<b>66.2%</b>	9.5%
East Indian	22.7%	<b>59.4%</b>	<b>61.2%</b>	3.0%	3.0%	45.1%
Chinese	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%	0.2%
Mixed	27.3%	13.4%	11.1%	33.8%	24.5%	17.3%
Portuguese	0.6%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%
White	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Other	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NS/DK	2.0%	0.8%	0.6%	1.8%	1.1%	1.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: LAPOP calculations based on Guyana Census 2002

Table III shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over across strata and urban and rural areas. As mentioned before, the urban area of Guyana is made up of 6 towns or municipalities; however, about 66% percent of the urban population of Guyana or 19.7% of the total population is concentrated in the Georgetown and its sub-urbs. The large population size of the Georgetown was also a reason why we decided to leave Georgetown as a single stratum. Table III also shows that 70.3% of the total population lives in rural areas, mainly concentrated in stratum 2 along the coastline (37.5%).

Table III. Distribution of the population across strata and urban and rural areas

Strata	Total Population		Urban		Rural	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1 Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	80874	19.7%	80874	19.7%	0.0	0.0%
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	154153	37.5%	0.0%	0.0%	154153	37.5%
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	123160	30.0%	25654	6.2%	97506	23.7%
4 Region 10	20948	5.1%	15587	3.8%	5361	1.3%
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	31731	7.7%		0.0%	31731	7.7%
Total	410866	100.0%	122115	29.7%	288751	70.3%

Source: LAPOP calculations based on Guyana Census 2002

## The Sample

Guyana was divided into 717 electoral divisions for the 2006 general election. From them, a total of 172 sampling points or electoral divisions were selected in a systematic manner for the purpose of this survey. The total number of sampling points was estimated based on 8 interviews in urban areas and 12 interviews in rural areas taking into account the distribution of the population in each stratum. Within each stratum, the electoral divisions were listed from larger to smaller according to the total number of registered voters and then the divisions were

selected using the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. Table IV presents the distribution of the electoral divisions by stratum and by urban and rural areas, which was estimated proportionally to the population size in each stratum reported by the 2002 census. Thus, the sample strata reflect the population size (age 20 and over) rather than the election rolls.

Table IV. Guyana: Selection of Electoral Divisions by Strata and Urban/Rural Areas					
Strata	Distribution of population across strata		Number of Electoral divisions selected		
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Total
1 Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	66.2%	0.0%	44	0	44
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	0.0%	53.4%	0	56	56
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	21.0%	33.8%	14	35	49
4 Region 10	12.8%	1.9%	9	2	11
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	0.0%	11.0%	0	12	12
Total	100.0%	100.0%	67	105	172

Our sample was also clustered, in order to reduce travel time and costs. Small clusters are cost effective, and have been shown, generally, to limit the impact of intra-class correlation. A total of 12 and 8 interviews will be conducted in each sampling point or electoral division in rural and urban areas, respectively, for an estimated sample size of 1,796 interviews. Our ultimate goal was a sample of 1,500, but catering for non-responses requires a greater initial sample size. This sample size was estimated using a non-response rate of 19.7 percent. A total of 536 interviews was supposed to be conducted in the urban areas and 1,260 in the rural areas. Table V shows the final distribution of the sample by urban and rural areas.

Table V. Guyana: Final Sample Distribution by Area				
	Number of Selected Electoral Divisions	Number of Clusters or Polling Places in each Electoral Division	Cluster Size	Total Number of Interviews
Urban area	67	1	8	536
Rural Area	105	1	12	1260
Total	172			1796

We took one cluster in each sample point in urban areas and one cluster in each sample point in rural areas, but the number of clusters selected were, of course, proportional to the urban/rural breakdown. In the case that an electoral division in urban areas had more than one polling place, the polling place was drawn using PPS. In rural areas, we used the PPS method, but also a “linking” strategy so that two contiguous electoral divisions were surveyed. The “linking” strategy was very useful in the case of Guyana because of the extension and difficult access to its rural areas, especially in the inland regions. Moreover, only 2 out of the 4 regions in stratum 5 were selected, again, due to cost considerations. Regions 1 (Venezuelan border) and 9 (Brazilian border) were selected, because of their high concentration of Amerindian population.

Table VI shows the total number of interviews to be conducted in each stratum by urban and rural areas.

Table VI. Selected Sample Size: Number of interviews to be conducted in each stratum			
	Total	Urban	Rural
1 Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	352	352	0
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	672	0	672
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	532	112	420
4 Region 10	96	72	24
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	144	0	144
Total	1796	536	1260

It is important to mention that in order to draw our sample, we took into account the distribution of the population within each stratum based on the census data. For stratum 1 we took account of the distribution of the population between Georgetown and the Suburbs of Georgetown, and for the four remaining strata we took into account the distribution of the population in each region within stratum. In addition, we carefully drew the sample in a way to reflect the distribution of the population in each city or municipality so that all of them are represented in the sample. Additional tables showing the distribution of the sample by cities, rural areas, and regions can be found in Annex I of this document.

### Selection of the Households

This stage of selection commenced once interviewers found the address for a specific polling place, which often was a local school. Each interviewer selected a number of households in a systematic way, using the serpentine method. The selection of households was done as follow:

In urban areas:

- A maximum of 2 interviews was conducted in each block.
- Once the interviewer had located the polling place, he or she went to the next block and completed the first 2 interviews.
- Then, the interviewer moved to the next block on his or her right and complete the next 2 interviews.
- For the following 2 interviews, the interviewer looked for the block on his/her left.
- The last two interviews were conducted on the following block on his/her right.

The diagram in Annex II illustrates the pattern here explained.

In rural areas:

- Once the interviewer located the polling place, he/she went back in the same street to the third household before the polling place and conducted the first interview.
- Then, the interviewer looked for the third household in the following road or trail on his/her right. If there was no response in the selected household, the interviewer went to the next dwelling and completed the interview.

- For the third interview, the interviewer looked for the third household in the following road or trail on his/her left.
- For the remaining interviews, the same routine was followed: selecting the third household in the road or trail on the right and the following on the left.

In cases where the interviewer reached the end of the town or village, he/she went back to the polling place, continued the interviews taking the opposite side, and follow the same routine.

### Selection of the respondent

A single respondent was selected in each household, following the quota sampling based on sex and age. The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2002 census. If there were two or more people of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire was applied to the person with the next birthday.

Category	Male				Female			
	18-34 years	35-49 years	50 years and over	Total	18-34 years	35-49 years	50 years and over	18-34 years
Urban Quota	2	1	1	4	2	1	1	4
Rural Quota	3	2	1	6	3	2	1	6

### Estimated Precision of the Survey

In order to accurately estimate the precision of the survey, we needed to take into account the complex sample design, namely the stratification and clustering of the sample. However, since this is the first time this sample design is going to be used in Guyana, it was not possible to estimate a priori the precision of the sample. Given this constraint, we estimated the sampling error assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design, and a 50-50 distribution for a dichotomous variable (a maximum possible variation) and a 95% confidence interval ( $z=1.96$ ). The expected sampling error is equal to  $\pm 2.5\%$ . The following table shows the estimated sampling error by strata and urban and rural areas.

<i>Strata</i>	<i>Estimated Sampling Error*</i>
1 Greater Georgetown (Urban Area Region 4)	5.7%
2 Region 3 and rest of region 4	4.1%
3 Regions 2, 5, and 6	4.6%
4 Region 10	11.1
5 Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	9.1%
Urban	4.6%
Rural	3.0%
Total	2.5%
<b>*Sampling error assuming a SRS LAPOP calculations</b>	


**ANNEX I**  
**FINAL SAMPLE DESIGN BY REGIONS, URBAN, AND RURAL AREAS**

A.1 Distribution of Urban Sample Across Strata						
Municipality/Stratum	Polling Places			Number of interviews		
	1	3	4	1	3	4
Anna Regina	0	4	0	0	32	0
City of Georgetown	11	0	0	88	0	0
Corriverton	0	3	0	0	24	0
Linden	0	0	8	0	0	72
New Amsterdam	0	5	0	0	40	0
Rose Hall	0	2	0	0	16	0
Suburbs of Georgetown	33	0	0	264	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>72</b>

A2. Distribution of the Rural Sample Across Regions and Strata								
Regions/Stratum	Polling Places				Number of Interviews			
	2	3	4	5	2	3	4	5
1	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	72
2	0	7	0	0	0	84	0	0
3	21	0	0	0	252	0	0	0
4	35	0	0	0	420	0	0	0
5	0	10	0	0	0	120	0	0
6	0	18	0	0	0	216	0	0
9	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	72
10	0	0	2	0	0	0	24	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>144</b>

A3. Distribution of the Sample Across Regions						
	Urban sample		Rural sample		Total Sample	
	Polling Places	Number of Interviews	Polling Places	Number of Interviews	Polling Places	Number of Interviews
Region 1	0	0	6	72	6	72
Region 2	4	32	7	84	11	116
Region 3	0	0	21	252	21	252
Region 4	44	352	35	420	79	772
Region 5	0	0	10	120	10	120
Region 6	10	80	18	216	28	296
Region 9	0	0	6	72	6	72
Region 10	9	72	2	24	11	96
Total	67	536	105	1260	172	1796

**Annex II. Diagram Illustrating the Household Selection in Urban Areas**



## Annex B: Questionnaire

Version # 23 IRB Approval: 060187

 <p><b>USAID</b> DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	 <p><b>UNIVERSITY OF GUYANA</b></p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p><b>LAPOP</b> Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p><b>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</b></p>

The Political Culture of Democracy: Guyana, 2006  
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<p><b>Country:</b> 1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil. 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica <b>24. Guyana</b> 25. Trinidad</p>	<p><b>COUNTRY</b></p>	<p><b>24</b></p>
<p><b>IDNUM.</b> Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]</p>	<p><b>IDNUM</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Estratopri:</b> 2401. Greater Georgetown 2402. Region 3 and rest of region 4 2403. Region 2, 5, and 6 2404. Region 10 2405. Region 1, 7, 8, and 9</p>	<p><b>Estratopri:</b></p>	<p><b>24</b> <input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>PSU (Electoral Division)</b> _____</p>	<p><b>PSU</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Regions :</b> 1. Barima/Waini 2. Pomeroon/Supenaam 3. West Demerara/Essequibo Island 4. Demerara/Mahaica 5. Mahaica/West Berbice 6. East Berbice/Corentyne 9. Upper Takatu/UpperEssequibo 10. Upper Demerara/Berbice</p>	<p><b>GUYREGION</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Municipalities:</b> 1. Georgetown 2. Suburbs of Georgetown 3. Ana Regina 4. New Amsterdam 5. Rose Hall 6. Corriverton 7. Linden 8. Rural areas</p>	<p><b>GUYMUNICIPALITY</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>[CLUSTER or Electoral Division]:</b> _____ [A cluster cannot be larger than 8 interviews in urban towns, and 12 in rural areas]</p>	<p><b>Cluster</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>UR</b> 1. Urban 2. Rural</p>	<p><b>UR</b></p>	
<p><b>Area Size:</b> 1. National Capital (Metropolitan area) 2. Large City 3. Medium City 4. Small City 5. Rural Area</p>	<p><b>SIZE</b></p>	
<p><b>Questionnaire language:</b> (1) English</p>	<p><b>GUYIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]</b></p>	
<p><b>Start time:</b> _____:_____ [Don't enter]</p>		<p>-----</p>
<p><b>Date Day:</b> _____ Month: _____ Year: 2006</p>	<p><b>DATE</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>



**NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED  
CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.**

Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female

Q1

A4 [COA4]. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem the country faces?  
 [DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]

A4

Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Narcotrafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, road blocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of provision	22
Forced displacement	32	Kidnapping	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Demographic explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88

**DEM13.** In few words, what does democracy mean for you? [NOTICE: Do not read choices. After the first and second response, ask “does it mean something else?”] . Accept up to three answers.

	<i>Probe: Does it mean something else?</i>		<i>Probe: Does it mean something else?</i>
	1 <sup>st</sup> Response DEM13A	2 <sup>nd</sup> Response DEM13B	3 <sup>rd</sup> Response DEM13C
<b>It does not have any meaning</b>	0	0	0
<b>Liberty:</b>			
Liberty (without specifying what type)	1	1	1
Economic Liberty	2	2	2
Liberty of expression, voting, choice, and human rights	3	3	3
Liberty of movement	4	4	4
Liberty, lack of	5	5	5
Being independent	6	6	6
<b>Economy:</b>			
Well being, economic progress, growth	7	7	7
Well being, Lack of, no economic progress	8	8	8
Capitalism	9	9	9
Free trade, free business	10	10	10
Employment, more opportunities of	11	11	11
Employment, lack of	12	12	12
<b>Voting:</b>			
Right to choose leaders	13	13	13
Elections, voting	14	14	14
Free elections	15	15	15
Fraudulent elections	16	16	16
<b>Equality:</b>			
Equality (without specifying)	17	17	17
Economic equality, or equality of classes	18	18	18
Gender equality	19	19	19
Equality before the laws	20	20	20
Racial or ethnic equality	21	21	21
Equality, Lack of, inequality	22	22	22
<b>Participation:</b>			
Limitations of participation	23	23	23
Participation (without saying which type)	24	24	24
Participation of minorities	25	25	25
Power of the people	26	26	26
<b>Rule of Law:</b>			
Human Rights, respect to	27	27	27
Disorder, Lack of justice, corruption	28	28	28
Justice	29	29	29
Obey the law, Less corruption	30	30	30
<b>Non-military government</b>	31	31	31
<b>Live in peace, without war</b>	32	32	32
<b>War, invasions</b>	33	33	33
<b>Other answer</b>	80	80	80
<b>DK/NA</b>	88	88	88
<b>Code (if he gives only an answer, 13B is codified and 13C with 0. If he gives two answers, 13C with 0 is codified.)</b>	<b>DEM13A</b>	<b>DEM13B</b>	<b>DEM13C</b>
<b>[If he gives only one answer, Mark it and Go to A1]</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>



**DEM13D.** Of these meanings of democracy you have said, in your opinion which is the most important? [Ask only if gave two or three answers to the previous question. Write answer code.] 88. DK 99. INAP [One or no answer]

**DEM13D**

Now, changing the subject...[After each question, repeat “every day”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely”, or “never” to help the respondent]

How frequently do you ...	Every day	Once or twice a week	Rarely	Never	DK	
<b>A1.</b> Listen to the news on the radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
<b>A2.</b> Watch the news on TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
<b>A3.</b> Read the news in newspapers	1	2	3	4	8	A3
<b>A4i.</b> Read the news on the Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

**SOCT1.** . Now, speaking of the economy... How would you describe **the country’s economic situation**? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know

**SOCT1**

**SOCT2.** Do you think that the **country’s current economic situation** is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn’t know

**SOCT2**

**IDIO1.** How would you describe **your overall economic situation**? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know

**IDIO1**

**IDIO2.** Do you think that **your economic situation** is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn’t know

**IDIO2**

Now, moving on to a different topic, sometimes the people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?

	Yes	No	DK/DR	
<b>CP2.</b> A member of parliament	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> Some local authorities (mayor, municipality representative , Neighbourhood Democratic Council)	1	2	8	<b>CP3</b>
<b>CP4.</b> Any ministry, public institution or state agency	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

**PROT1.** Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never? [If he answered “Never” or “DK”, Mark 9 in PROT2 and Go to CP5]

(1) Sometimes (2) Almost never (3) Never (8) DK

**PROT1**

**PROT2.** And now thinking about the past year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?

(1) Sometimes (2) Almost never (3) Never (8) DK (9) Inap

**PROT2**

<i>Now I am going to ask you a few questions about your community and the problems it faces.</i>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>DK/DR</b>	<b>INAP</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> Over the past year have you contributed or tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [Go to CP6] (8) DK/DA [Go to CP6]	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5</b>
<b>CP5A.</b> Have you donated money or goods to help address a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5A</b>
<b>CP5B.</b> Have you donated your own work or manual labor?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5B</b>
<b>CP5C.</b> Have you attended community meetings about some problem or some improvement?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5C</b>
<b>CP5D.</b> Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighborhood problem or to bring about some improvement?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5D</b>

Now I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the respondent]

	<b>Once a week</b>	<b>Once or twice a month</b>	<b>Once or twice a year</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>DK</b>	
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents association at school? Do you attend them....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a committee or association for community improvements? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> The meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> Meetings of a labor union? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party or Political movement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Changing the subject, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are ..? (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat <b>dissatisfied</b> (4) Very <b>dissatisfied</b> (8) DK	<b>LS3</b>
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<b>IT1.</b> Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy ..? (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK	<b>IT1</b>
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**SHOW CARD # 1**

**L1.** (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b>
<b>Left</b>									<b>Right</b>	(DK=88)

**Collect Card # 1**

Now let's talk about your local municipal government...	
<b>NP1.</b> Have you attended a town meeting or city council meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor or NDC chairman in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember	<b>NP1</b>
<b>NP1B.</b> To what degree do you think municipal or NDC officials pay attention to what people ask for in such meetings? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Not at all (8) DK	<b>NP1B</b>
<b>NP2.</b> Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality or NDC within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember	<b>NP2</b>
<b>SGL1.</b> Would you say that the services the municipality or NDC is providing are...? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know	<b>SGL1</b>
<b>SGL2.</b> How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the municipality or the NDC? Have they treated you very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Doesn't know	<b>SGL2</b>
<b>LGL2.</b> In your opinion, should the municipal government or NDC be given more money and more responsibility or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide municipal services? (1) More for the municipal government or NDC (2) National government should assume greater responsibility (3) Nothing should change <b>[do not read]</b> (4) More to the municipality or NDC if it provides better services <b>[do not read]</b> (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	<b>LGL2</b>
<b>LGL3.</b> Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipal government or NDC so that it could provide better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so? (1) Willing to pay more (2) Not worth it (8) Doesn't know	<b>LGL3</b>
<b>MUNI2.</b> In your opinion what is the most serious problem at present in this municipality or NDC? <b>NOTE:[DON'T READ THE RESPONSES] [ACCEPT ONLY A SINGLE RESPONSE]</b> (00) None <b>[go to MUNI5]</b> (01) Lack of water (02) Lack of road repair (03) Lack of security, delinquency (04) Lack of public sanitation (Poor drainage) (05) Lack of services (06) The economic situation, lack of funds, aid (10) Poor administration (11) Neglect of the environment (77) Other (88) DK/DR	<b>MUNI2</b>

<b>MUNI3.</b> How much has the municipality or NDC done to solve this problem? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (8) DK (9) NA	<b>MUNI3</b>
<b>MUNI5.</b> Have you ever participated in drafting the municipal government's or NDC's budget? (1) Yes, has participated (0) Has not participated (8) DK/DR	<b>MUNI5</b>
<b>MUNI6.</b> How much confidence do you have that the Mayor's or NDC's office manages funds well? <b>[Read the options]</b> (3) A lot (2) Some (1) A little (0) None (8) DK/DR	<b>MUNI6</b>
<b>MUNI8.</b> Have you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the municipal government or NDC in the past year? (1) Yes <b>[continue]</b> (0) No <b>[Go to MUNI11]</b> (8) DK/DR <b>[Go to MUNI11]</b>	<b>MUNI8</b>
<b>MUNI9.</b> How were you treated? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	<b>MUNI9</b>
<b>MUNI10.</b> Did they address your problem or request? (1) Yes (0) No (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	<b>MUNI10</b>
<b>MUNI11.</b> How much influence do you think you have on what the municipality or NDC does? Would you say a lot, some, little, or no influence? (1). A lot (2). Some (3). A little (4). None (8). DK/DR	<b>MUN11</b>
<b>MUNI15.</b> How interested do you think the Mayor or NDC is in the people's participation in the work of the municipality or NDC? <b>[Read options]</b> (3) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (1) Little interested (0) Not at all interested (8) DK/DR	<b>MUNI15</b>

Now let's change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over through a coup d'état would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

<b>JC1.</b> When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	<b>JC1</b>
<b>JC4.</b> When there are a lot of social protests.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	<b>JC4</b>
<b>JC10.</b> When there is a lot of crime.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	<b>JC10</b>
<b>JC12.</b> When there is high inflation, with excessive prices increases.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	<b>JC12</b>
<b>JC13.</b> When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	<b>JC13</b>

<b>JC15.</b> Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the President to close down the Parliament or do you think there can never be a sufficient reason to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8) DK	<b>JC15</b>
<b>JC16.</b> Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to dissolve the Supreme Court, or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8) DK	<b>JC16</b>

<p>I am going to read out several pairs of statements. Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me with which of the two following statements you agree with the most?</p> <p><b>POP1. [Read the options]</b></p> <p>1. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties [or, on the contrary]</p> <p>2. Even if they slow the progress of this country, our presidents should not limit the voice and vote of opposition parties.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POP1</b></p>	
<p><b>POP2. [Read the options]</b></p> <p>1. The Parliament hinders the work of our presidents, and should be ignored [or, on the contrary]</p> <p>2. Even when it hinders the work of the president, our presidents should not bypass the parliament</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POP2</b></p>	
<p><b>POP3. [Read the options]</b></p> <p>1. Judges frequently hinder the work of our presidents, and they should be ignored. [or, on the contrary]</p> <p>2. Even when the judges sometimes hinder the work of our presidents, their decisions should always be obeyed.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POP3</b></p>	
<p><b>POP4. [Read the options]</b></p> <p>1. Our presidents should have the necessary power so that they can act in the national interest. [or, on the contrary]</p> <p>2. The power of our presidents should be limited so that they do not endanger our liberties</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POP4</b></p>	
<p><b>POP5. [Read the options]</b></p> <p>1. Our presidents should do what the people want even when laws prevent them for doing so. [or, on the contrary]</p> <p>2. Our presidents should obey the laws even when the people don't want them to.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>POP5</b></p>	

<p><b>VIC1.</b> Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to AOJ8] (8) DK [go to AOJ8]</p>	<p><b>VIC1</b></p>
<p><b>VIC2.</b> What kind of crime were you the victim of? <i>[Read the options]</i></p> <p>(1) Robbery without physical aggression or threat          (2) Robbery with physical aggression or threat          (3) Physical aggression without robbery          (4) Rape or sexual assault          (5) Kidnapping          (6) Damage to property          (7) Home burglary          Other (Be specific) _____          (88) DK          (99) N/A (was not a victim)</p>	<p><b>VIC2</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ1.</b> Did you report the incident to any institution? (1) Yes [Go to AOJ8] (2) Did not report it [Continue] (8) DK/DR [Go to AOJ8] (9) Inap (was not a victim) [Go to AOJ8]</p>	<p><b>AOJ1</b></p>
<p><b>AOJ1B.</b> Why didn't you report the incident? <i>[don't read the options]</i></p> <p>(1) It doesn't serve any purpose          (2) It is dangerous and for fear of reprisal          (3) Didn't have any evidence          (4) It wasn't serious          (5) Didn't know where to lodge a report          (8) DK/DR          (9) INAP (Was not a victim)</p>	<p><b>AOJ1B</b></p>

<b>AOJ8.</b> In order to capture criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or that on occasion they can operate on the margins of the law? (1) They should always respect the law (2) Can act on the margins occasionally (8)DK	<b>AOJ8</b>
<b>AOJ11.</b> Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of falling victim to an assault or a robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK	<b>AOJ11</b>
<b>AOJ11A.</b> And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11A</b>
<b>AOJ12.</b> If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR	<b>AOJ12</b>
<b>AOJ16A.</b> In your neighborhood, have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past year? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK	<b>AOJ16A</b>
<b>AOJ17.</b> To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, little or none? (1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK	<b>AOJ17</b>
<b>AOJ18.</b> Some people say that the police in this neighborhood (village) protects people from criminals, while others say that it is the police that is involved in crime. What do you think? (1) Police protects (2) Police involved in crime (8) DK	<b>AOJ18</b>

Regarding the formal dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the following institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? **(REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION)**

	<b>Very satisfied</b>	<b>Somewhat satisfied</b>	<b>Somewhat dissatisfied</b>	<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>[Don't read] Didn't have any official dealings</b>	<b>DK/DR</b>	
<b>ST1.</b> The Guyana police force	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>
<b>ST2.</b> The courts or justice tribunals	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>
<b>ST3.</b> The office of the Director of Public Prosecution	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST3</b>
<b>GUYST4A.</b> The Regional Democratic Council (RDC)	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>GUYST4 A</b>
<b>ST4.</b> The city/ municipal government (mayor's office) or NDC	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>

**[Give card "A" to the respondent]**

Now we will use a card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Ensure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all						A lot	Doesn't know

	Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know
<b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in Guyana guarantee a fair trial? ( <b>Probe:</b> If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose the number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose the number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	<b>B1</b>
<b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guyana?	<b>B2</b>
<b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Guyana?	<b>B3</b>
<b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Guyana?	<b>B4</b>
<b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Guyana?	<b>B6</b>
<b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the justice system?	<b>B10A</b>
<b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the Guyana Electoral Commission (GECOM)?	<b>B11</b>
<b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Guyana Defense Force?	<b>B12</b>
<b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	<b>B13</b>
<b>B14.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Government?	<b>B14</b>
<b>B15.</b> To what extent do you trust the State Solicitor?	<b>B15</b>
<b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the Guyana Police Force?	<b>B18</b>
<b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Church?	<b>B20</b>
<b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?	<b>B21</b>
<b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	<b>B31</b>
<b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your municipality or NDC chairman's office?	<b>B32</b>
<b>B43.</b> To what extent are you proud of being a Guyanese?	<b>B43</b>
<b>B33.</b> To what extent do you trust the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)?	<b>B33</b>
<b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the mass media?	<b>B37</b>
<b>B40.</b> To what extent do you trust the indigenous or Amerindian movements?	<b>B40</b>
<b>B42.</b> To what extent do you trust the Guyana Revenue Authority?	<b>B42</b>
<b>B46 [b45].</b> To what extent do you trust the Integrity Commission?	<b>B46</b>
<b>B47.</b> To what extent do you trust the elections?	<b>B47</b>

Now, again using card "A", please answer the following questions

Now, on the same scale, to what extent would you say the current government ( <i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i> )	<b>Note down 1-7, 8 = DK</b>
<b>N1.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>fights poverty</b> ?	<b>N1</b>
<b>N3.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>promotes and protects democratic principles</b> ?	<b>N3</b>
<b>N9.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>fights government corruption</b> ?	<b>N9</b>
<b>N10.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>protects human rights</b> ?	<b>N10</b>
<b>N11.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>improves the security of our citizens</b> ?	<b>N11</b>
<b>N12.</b> To what extent would you say the current government <b>fights unemployment</b> ?	<b>N12</b>

**[TAKE BACK CARD A]**

<b>M1.</b> Speaking in general of the current government, would you say that the job being done by President Jagdeo is: <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR	<b>M1</b>
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**[Give card B]:** Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." I am going to read various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Strongly disagree			Strongly agree			Doesn't know	

**Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know**

<b>ING4.</b> Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?	<b>ING4</b>
<b>PN2.</b> Despite our differences, we Guyanese have many things that unite us as a country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?	<b>PN2</b>
<b>DEM23.</b> Democracy can exist without political parties. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements?	<b>DEM23</b>

**TAKE BACK CARD B**

<b>PN4.</b> In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in Guyana? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR	<b>PN4</b>
<b>PN5.</b> In your opinion, is Guyana very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (8) DK/DR	<b>PN5</b>

**[Give the respondent card "C"]**

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10 point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					Doesn't know

	1-10, 88
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations.	E5
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems.	E8
E11. Of people working on electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.	E11
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads.	E15
E14. Of people squatting private property or land.	E14
E2. Of people taking control over factories, offices and other buildings.	E2
E3. Of people participating in a group wanting to carry out a violent overthrow of an elected government.	E3
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals.	E16

**[Don't take back card "C"]**

**Now we are going to talk about some actions the government can take. We will continue using a 1-10 scale. Please use card C again. On this scale, 1 means strongly disapprove and 10 means strongly approve.**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					Doesn't know

	1-10, 88
D32. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting public protests?	D32
D33. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that criticizes the Guyanese political system?	D33
D34. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored television programs?	D34
D36. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored books in public school libraries?	D36
D37. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored any media that criticized it?	D37

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Guyana. Please continue using the 10 point scale [card C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve			Doesn't know

	<b>1-10, 88</b>	
<b>D1.</b> There are people who speak negatively of the Guyanese form of government, not just the current government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's <b>right to vote</b> ? Please read me the number from the scale: <i>[Probe: To what degree?]</i>		<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to <b>conduct peaceful demonstrations</b> in order to express their views? Please read me the number.		<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to <b>run for public office</b> ?		<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to <b>make speeches</b> ?		<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?		<b>D5</b>

**TAKE BACK CARD "C"**

<b>DEM2.</b> With which of the following statements are you in most agreement: (1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. (8) DK/DR		<b>DEM2</b>
<b>DEM11.</b> Do you think that Guyana needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) Doesn't respond		<b>DEM11</b>

<b>AUT1.</b> There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always the best. What do you think? <b>[Read]</b> (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (8) DK/DR		<b>AUT1</b>
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<b>PP1.</b> At election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR		<b>PP1</b>
<b>PP2.</b> There are persons who work for some party or candidate during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2006? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR		<b>PP2</b>

Please tell me if you consider the following actions as 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.

<b>DC1.</b> For example: A parliamentarian accepts a bribe of two hundred thousand Guyanese dollars from a company. Do you think that what the deputy did is <b>[Read the options]</b> : 1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK=8		<b>DC1</b>
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<p><b>DC10.</b> A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays the municipal or NDC official G\$1000. Do you think that what the woman did is <b>[Read the options]</b>:</p> <p>1) Corrupt and should be punished                  2) Corrupt but justified                  3) Not corrupt DK=8</p>	<p><b>DC10</b></p>	
<p><b>DC13.</b> An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is <b>[Read the options]</b>:</p> <p>1) Corrupt and should be punished                  2) Corrupt but justified                  3) Not corrupt DK=8</p>	<p><b>DC13</b></p>	

	No	Yes	DK	N/A		
<p>Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...</p>						
<p><b>EXC2.</b> Has a police official ask you for bribe during the past year?</p>	0	1	8		<b>EXC2</b>	
<p><b>EXC6.</b> During the past year did any public official ask you for a bribe?</p>	0	1	8		<b>EXC6</b>	
<p><b>EXC11.</b> During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality or NDC?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                  During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?</p>	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC11</b>	
<p><b>EXC13.</b> Are you currently employed?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                  At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an inappropriate payment during the past year?</p>	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>	
<p><b>EXC14.</b> During the past year, did you have any dealings with the courts?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                  Did you have to pay a bribe at the courts during the past year?</p>	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>	
<p><b>EXC15.</b> Did you use the public health services during the past year? <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                  In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?</p>	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>	
<p><b>EXC16.</b> Did you have a child in school during the past year?  <b>If the answer is No → mark 9</b>  <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b>                  Did you have to pay a bribe at school during the past year?</p>	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>	
<p><b>EXC17.</b> Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?</p>	0	1	8		<b>EXC17</b>	
<p><b>EXC18.</b> Do you think that the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?</p>	0	1	8		<b>EXC18</b>	

	No	Yes	DK	N/A	
<b>EXC19.</b> Do you think that in our society paying bribes is justified because of poor quality of public services, or do you think it is not justified?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC19</b>
<b>EXC7.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is <b>[Read]</b> (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon? (8) DK/DR					<b>EXC7</b>
<b>Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is transmitted to the people...</b>					
<b>GI1.</b> What is the name of the current president of the United States? <b>[Don't read, George Bush]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> What is the name of Speaker of the Parliament in Guyana? <b>[Don't read, Ralph Ramkawan]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> How many Administrative Regions does Guyana have? <b>[Don't read, 10 regions]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> How long is the government's term of office in Guyana? <b>[Don't read: 5 years]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					<b>GI4</b>
<b>GI5.</b> What is the name of the president of Brazil? <b>[Don't read, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, also accept "Lula"]</b> (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					<b>GI5</b>

<p><b>VB1.</b> Now, changing the topic. Are you registered to vote?          (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (8) DK</p>	<p><b>VB1</b></p>	
<p><b>VB2.</b> Did you vote in the last general elections?          (1) Voted [<b>Continue</b>] (2) Did not vote [<b>Go to VB4</b>] (8) DK [<b>Go to VB6</b>]</p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>	
<p><b>GUYVB3.</b> [ For which candidate did you vote for President in the last general elections? [<b>DON'T READ THE LIST</b>]          0.None (Blank ballot or null vote)          1. Bharrat Jagdeo, People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)          2. Robert Corbin, People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)          3. Raphael Trotman, Alliance for Change (AFC)          4. Paul Hardy, Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)          5. Manzoor Nadir, The United Force (TUF)          6. Chandra Narine Sharma, Justice For All Party (JFAP)          77.Other          88. DK/DR          99. INAP (Did not vote)  <b>(After this question, Go to VB8)</b></p>	<p><b>GUYVB3</b></p>	
<p><b>VB4.</b> [<b>Only for those who DID NOT voted</b>] [<b>Do not read the options</b>]          If you did not vote, why did you not vote in the last presidential elections? [<b>Note down only a single response</b>]          1. Lack of transport          2. Sickness          3. Lack of interest          4. Did like any candidate          5. Doesn't believe in the system          6. Lack of an identity card          7. Name not found on registration lists          10. Was younger than the voting age          11. Arrived late and polling station was closed          12. Had to work/lack of time          13. Physical incapacity or handicap          88. DK/DR          99. Inap (Did not vote)  <b>[After this question, go toVB6]</b></p>	<p><b>VB4</b></p>	
<p><b>VB8.</b> [<b>For those who voted</b>] When you voted, which of the following two reasons was the most important reason for your vote? [<b>Read all</b>] [<b>Only accept one answer</b>]          1. The qualities of the candidate          2. The political party of the candidate          3. The platform of the candidate          8. DK          9. NA (Didn't vote)</p>	<p><b>VB8</b></p>	
<p><b>VB6.</b> Did you vote in the NDC elections?          1. Yes [<b>Continue</b>] 2. No. [<b>Go to VB10</b>] 8. DK [<b>Go to VB10</b>]</p>	<p><b>VB6</b></p>	

<p><b>GUYVB7.</b> For which party did you vote for NDC in the last elections?                  0.None (Blank ballot or null vote )                  1.People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)                  2. People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)                  3. Alliance for Change (AFC)                  4. Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)                  5. The United Force (TUF)                  6. Justice For All Party (JFAP)                  7. GNC                  8. LD                  9. PRP                  10. National Democratic Font (NDF)                  77.Other                  88. DK/DR                  99. INAP (Did not vote)</p>	<p><b>GUYVB7</b></p>	
<p><b>VB10.</b> Do you currently associate yourself with a political party?                  (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to POL1]</b> (8) DK/DR <b>[Go to POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB10</b></p>	
<p><b>GUYVB11.</b> Which political party do you identify with? <b>[Don't read the list]</b>                  0.None (Blank ballot or null vote )                  1.People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)                  2. People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)                  3. Alliance for Change (AFC)                  4. Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)                  5. The United Force (TUF)                  6. Justice For All Party (JFAP)                  7. GNC                  8. LD                  9. PRP                  10. National Democratic Font (NDF)                  77.Other                  88. DK/DR                  99. INAP</p>	<p><b>GUYVB10</b></p>	

<p><b>POL1.</b> How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, a little or none?                  1) A lot 2) Some 3) A little 4) None 8) DK</p>	<p><b>POL1</b></p>	
<p><b>POL2.</b> How often do you discuss politics with other people? <b>(Read the options)</b>                  1) Daily 2) A few times a week 3) A few times a month 4) Rarely 5) Never 8) DK</p>	<p><b>POL2</b></p>	

**USE CARD "B" AGAIN.**

Now we are going to talk about some attitudes that people have. On a scale from 1 to 7, where <b>1 means strongly disagree</b> and <b>7 means strongly agree</b> , to what extent do you agree with the following statements?	Scale							DK/DR		
	Strongly Disagree	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
<p><b>AA1.</b> A very effective way of correcting employees' mistakes is to criticize them in front of other employees. To what extent do you agree with this practice?</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>AA1</b>	
<p><b>AA2.</b> The person who contributes the most money to the home is the one who should have the final word in household decisions. To what extent do you agree?</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>AA2</b>	
<p><b>AA3.</b> At school, children should ask questions only when the teacher allows it. To what extent do you agree?</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>AA3</b>	
<p><b>AA4.</b> When children behave badly, parents are justified in occasionally giving them a spanking. To what extent do you agree?</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	<b>AA4</b>	

**TAKE BACK CARD "B"**

Have you ever felt discriminated against or treated in an unjust manner because of your physical appearance or the way you talk in any of the following places?

<b>DIS2:</b> In governmental offices (courts, ministries, city halls, NDC offices) (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/NA	<b>DIS2</b>
<b>DIS3:</b> When you looked for a job at a company or business (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/NA (9) Inap ( Did not look for a job)	<b>DIS3</b>
<b>DIS4:</b> In meetings or social events (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/NA	<b>DIS4</b>
<b>DIS5:</b> In public places (on the street, market) (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/NA	<b>DIS5</b>

And now to finish up, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.

**ED.** What was the highest grade or year in a school you completed? **[Interviewer, please ask for the level of education and the highest year completed within that level]**

\_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ (primary, secondary, university) = \_\_\_\_\_ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
None	0							<b>ED</b>
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secondary/Vocational	7	8	9	10	11			
"A" Level	12	13						
University/tertiary	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	88							

<b>Q2.</b> How old are you? _____ years	<b>Q2</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Q3.</b> What is your religion? <b>[don't read options]</b> (1) Catholic (2) Non-Catholic Christian ( including the Jehovah Witnesses) (3) Other non-Christian (6) Hindus (7) Muslims (5) Evangelical (4) None (8) Doesn't know or doesn't want to say	<b>Q3</b>		

**[Show the list of ranges on Card E ]**

**Q10.** Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 10,000
- (02) 10,001- 20,000
- (03) 20,001-40,000
- (04) 40,001-60,000
- (05) 60,001-90,000
- (06) 90,001-120,000
- (07) 120,001-150,000
- (08) 150,001-200,000
- (09) 200,001-250,000
- (10) Above 250,000
- (88) DK/DR

**COLLECT CARD E**

**Q10A.** Does your family receive remittances from abroad?

If "No" → Mark 99, Go to Q10C      **99. INAP**

If "Yes" → Ask:

How much per month? **[use the codes of question Q10 if answer the amount in national currency; if answer the amount in foreign currency, write down the amount and specify the currency]**

**Q10B.** To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad?

- (1) A lot   (2) Some   (3) A little   (4) Nothing   (8) DK/NA   (9) Inap

**Q10C.** Do you have close relatives who lived before in this household and are now living abroad? **[If answer "Yes", Ask where]**

- (1) Yes, in the United States only
- (2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries
- (3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States)
- (4) No
- (8) DK/NA

**Q14.** Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

- 1) Yes   2) No   8) DK/DR

**Q10D.** The salary that you receive and total of family income : **[ Read the options]**

- 1. Is enough, so that you can save
- 2. Is just enough, but you can not save
- 3. Is not enough, you can not pay your bills
- 4. Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs

**8. [Don't read] DK/DR**

**Q11.** What is your marital status? **[Don't read options]**

- (1) Single   (2) Married   (3) Common law marriage   (4) Divorced   (5) Separated   (6) Widowed   (8) DK/DR

**Q12.** How many children do you have? \_\_\_\_\_ (00 = none)   DK.....88

**GUYETID.** Do you consider yourself white, Amerindian, Afro-Guyanese (black), Indo-Guyanese, mixed, Chinese, or Portuguese?

- (1) White   (3) Amerindian   (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese   (5) Mixed   (6) Indo-Guyanese
- (7) Chinese   (9) Portuguese   (10) Other   (8) DK/DR

<b>GUYETIDA.</b> Do you think your mother is or was white, amerindian, black , mixed, indian, Chinese, or Portuguese? (1) White (3) Amerindian (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese (5) Mixed (6) Indo-Guyanese (7) Chinese 9) Portuguese 10) Other (8) DK/DR	<b>GUYETIDA</b>	
<b>GUYLENG1.</b> What language have you spoken at home since childhood? <b>(accept only one option)</b> (1) English (2) Indigenous or Amerindian language (3) Chinese (4) Other foreign (8) DK/DR	<b>GUYLENG1</b>	

To end, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **(read out all items)**

<b>R1.</b> Television set	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R1</b>
<b>R3.</b> Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R3</b>
<b>R4.</b> Conventional telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R4</b>
<b>R4A.</b> Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R4A</b>
<b>R5.</b> Vehicle	(0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more		<b>R5</b>
<b>R6.</b> Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R6</b>
<b>R7.</b> Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R7</b>
<b>R8.</b> Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R8</b>
<b>R12.</b> Drinking water indoors	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R12</b>
<b>R14.</b> Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R14</b>
<b>R15.</b> Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	<b>R15</b>

<b>OCUP1.</b> What is your main occupation? [ Don't read the options; if answer that doesn't have a job or unemployed, ask what was his/her prior job (note code) and mark "No" in the following question (OCUP4)] 1. Professional, manager 2. Technician 3. Office worker 4. Sales person 5. Farmer 6. Farmhand 7. Handicraft worker 8. Domestic servant 9. Other services 10. Skilled worker 11. Unskilled worker 12. Student <b>[Go to MIG1]</b> 13. Housewife <b>[Go to MIG1]</b> 14. Retired/with independent means <b>[Go to MIG1]</b> 88. DK	<b>OCUP1</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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<p><b>OCUP4. Are you currently working?</b>                  1. Yes [Continue]                  2. No [Go to DESOC2]                  8. DK/DR [Go to MIG1]                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP4</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</b>                  1. A salaried employee of the government?                  2. A salaried employee in the private sector?                  3. Owner or partner in a business                  4. Self-employed                  5. Unpaid worker                  8. DK/DR                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1B1. Besides you, how many employees are there in the place where you work? [Read the options]</b>                  (1) Less than 5 employees                  (2) 5 to 9 employees                  (3) 10 to 19 employees                  (4) 20 to 100 employees                  (5) More than 100 employees                  (8) DK/DR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1B1</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1C. Do you have NIS?</b>                  1. Yes                  2. No                  8. DK/DR                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>	
<p><b>DESOC2. [ ONLY IF ANSWERED NO TO OCUP4] =&gt;For how many weeks during the past year were you unemployed?</b>                  _____ weeks (88) DK (99) Inap</p>	<p><b>DESOC2</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>MIG1. During your childhood, where did you live mainly? In the country? In a town? Or in a city?</b>                  1. In the country 2. In a town 3. In a city 8. DK/DR</p>	<p><b>MIG1</b></p>	
<p><b>MIG2. Five years ago, where did you live? [Read options]</b>                  1. In the same municipality [Go to TI] 2. In another municipality in the country [Continue]                  3. In another country [Go to TI] 8. DK/DR [Go to TI]</p>	<p><b>MIG2</b></p>	
<p><b>MIG3. The place where you lived 5 years ago was: [Read options]</b>                  (1) A town or city smaller than this one                  (2) A town or city larger than this one                  (3) A town or city like this one                  (8) DK                  (9) NA (did not migrate)</p>	<p><b>MIG4</b></p>	
<p><b>Time interview ended _____ : _____</b>  <b>TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____</b></p>	<p><b>TI</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>

*These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.*



**RI. [To be answered by the interviewer]** Do you consider yourself white, Amerindian, Afro-Guyanese (black), Indo-Guyanese, mixed, Chinese, or Portuguese?  
(1) White (3) Amerindian (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese (5) Mixed (6) Indo-Guyanese (7) Chinese 9) Portuguese 10) Other

<b>RI</b>	
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*I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.*

*Interviewer's signature* \_\_\_\_\_ *Date* \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

*Field supervisor's signature* \_\_\_\_\_

*Comments:*


\_\_\_\_\_

*Signature of the person who entered the data* \_\_\_\_\_

*Signature of the person who verified the data* \_\_\_\_\_




## Card # 1






### Card "A"






## Card "B"





## Card "C"



## Card E

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 10,000
- (02) 10,001- 20,000
- (03) 20,001-40,000
- (04) 40,001-60,000
- (05) 60,001-90,000
- (06) 90,001-120,000
- (07) 120,001-150,000
- (08) 150,001-200,000
- (09) 200,001-250,000
- (10) Above 250,000



## Annex C: Design Effects

### Accuracy of the Findings

Two types of errors affect all surveys: non-sampling errors and sampling ones. Non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the data collection and processing. These can be controlled using a good measuring instrument, adequately training the surveyors, supervising the fieldwork, and with appropriate data collection programs. These errors can be controlled but not quantified. However, comparing the sample results with those of the population gives us an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that reduce the representativeness of the sample. The use of handheld computers (palm pilots) probably reduced these errors by carrying out consistency checks of the responses and flow of the interview at the same time and place that it was done. Additionally, by eliminating the process of data entry, we eliminated the errors that this activity generates. With the traditional procedures of paper-based questionnaires, processes of coding and critiquing the data must be carried out in the office (eliminated by using palm pilots), which can also generate errors. With paper questionnaires, computer-based consistency checks can only be run several weeks after the data was collected. Correcting errors detected in the office during the critique or by programs that detect inconsistencies is difficult or impossible given the separation in time and space between the moment of the interview on paper and the detection of these errors.

Sampling errors are a product of chance and from surveying a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, this sample is one of many possible samples that could be selected from the population. The variability that exists between all these possible samples is the sampling error, which we could measure if all these samples were available, obviously an impossible situation. In practice, what is done is to estimate this over the variance obtained from the sample itself.

To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (average, percentage, or ratio), we calculate the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This allows us to measure how close the statistic is to the result that would have been obtained if the entire population were interviewed under the same conditions. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design with which the sample was selected. The design effect (DEF – above is DEF) indicates the efficiency of the design used in relation to a unrestricted random sampling design (URS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error (SE) obtained for both designs (the complex and the URS) is equal; that is, the complex sampling is as efficient as the URS with the same-sized sample. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sampling produces a SE greater than that obtained with a URS.

$$DEF = SE_{complex} / SE_{URS}$$

The table shows the 95% confidence intervals (1.96 times the SE) and the design effects (DEF). The table also shows the value of the statistic in question (average or percentage). The SE were estimated with the Stata 9 computational package. Extreme values come from a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socioeconomic condition, which reduces the efficiency of cluster sampling to measure these characteristics.

It is worth stating that sampling error is usually 10% to 40% greater than that which would have been obtained with unrestricted random sampling. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important index of support for democracy (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. This means that the 95% confidence interval (1.96 times the SE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEF of the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained with a URS.

Country	Average	Std. Error	DEft	Average	Std. Error.	DEF	Average	Std. Error	DEF
	Wealth			it1r			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican R.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84
Guyana	3.87	0.11	3.93	59.88	1.04	2.46	25.21	1.68	2.33

Country	Average	Std. Error	Defit	Average	Std. Error	Defit	Average	Std. Error	Defit
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican R.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53
Guyana	52.70	1.19	3.75	64.32	1.33	3.39	39.58	1.32	3.79