

**A Study of the Latin American Public  
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

# **The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2004**

**VI Study on Democratic Values of Guatemalans**



**GUATEMALA**

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- Juan Pablo Pira (Sample Design)
- Max Eduardo Lucas (Field Work)
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Scientific Coordinator and Editor of the Series  
Vanderbilt University



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Asociación de Investigación  
y Estudios Sociales



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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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ASIES	Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales ( <i>Association for Social Studies and Research</i> )
BID	Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo ( <i>Interamerican Development Bank</i> )
DIMS	Democratic Indicators Monitoring System
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales ( <i>Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences</i> )
FRG	Frente Republicano Guatemalteco ( <i>Guatemalan Republican Front</i> )
GAN	Gran Alianza Nacional ( <i>Great National Alliance</i> )
IDH	Indice de Desarrollo Humano ( <i>Human Development Index</i> )
Km	kilometers ( 1 mile= 1.6 km)
MINUGUA	Misión de Naciones Unidas para la Verificación de los Acuerdos de Paz en Guatemala ( <i>United Nations Mission for the Verification of Peace Agreements in Guatemala</i> )
OPAL	Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina ( <i>Latin American Public Opinion Project</i> )
PDH	Procurador de Derechos Humanos ( <i>Human Rights Ombudsman</i> )
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral ( <i>Supreme Electoral Tribunal</i> )
UNE	Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza ( <i>National Union for Hope</i> )
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca ( <i>Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity</i> )
USAID	Agencia Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos ( <i>United States Agency for International Development</i> )



## Executive Summary

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The present study deals with building democracy in Guatemala from the political culture viewpoint. The study is based on a public opinion survey carried out in March 2004, and it is the sixth study on democratic values and attitudes of Guatemalans that has been conducted in the country. Several simultaneous studies were completed in other seven Latin American nations, also in 2004.

Emphasis is placed on the analysis of the results obtained for Guatemala in 2004, and frequent comparisons are made with the results obtained in the other countries where the study was made. Some cross-time comparisons are made regarding results obtained in the past in Guatemala; however, emphasis is made on the analysis of recent results. Some of the main findings presented in the study are the following:

### Support for Stable Democracy

- ❑ As compared with the other Latin American countries included in the 2004 study, Guatemalans show lower support for stable democracy. This is a product of a weaker support to the political system and lower political tolerance.
- ❑ The levels of support for the political system and political tolerance in Guatemala improved significantly in 2004, *vis-à-vis* similar results obtained in 2001. In a 0-100 point scale, in 2001 the average support for the system was 43 points, increasing to 49 points in 2004. Political tolerance, on the other hand, was 40 points in 2001 and it increased to 46 points in 2004.
- ❑ Regarding the five measures that constitute the index for political system support, Guatemalans are more inclined to support the system in general, and to support political institutions, but seem more negative in terms of pride in the political system, the belief that courts will guarantee a fair trial, and the belief that the basic rights of Guatemalan citizens are protected by the country's political system.
- ❑ Variables associated to a lower support for the political system are age, ethnic self-identification, socio-economic level, perception of insecurity, victimization of corruption, perception of the country's economic prospects, the perception of freedom, assessment of the local government and contentment with democracy. It was found that younger Guatemalans tend to support more strongly the political system, as well as those who identify themselves as *ladinos*, those with a higher socio-economic status, those that do not feel insecure by crime, those who consider that good economic prospects lie ahead for the country, those who perceive increased freedom to exercise their rights, those whose assessment of the local government is positive, and those who feel more content with democracy.
- ❑ Regarding the four measures that constitute the index of political tolerance, Guatemalans are more inclined to accept that others participate in demonstrations and exert their right to vote, but show less tolerance to the idea that others can express themselves freely in the radio or television, or can run for public office.

- ❑ The variables related to lower political tolerance are education, ethnic self-identification, the way the economic prospects of the country are perceived, the degree of participation in social organizations, the degree of confidence in political institutions, and the perception of freedom. It was found that Guatemalans who tend to be more tolerance are those Guatemalans with higher education levels, those who self-identify themselves as *ladinos*, those who consider that the country has good economic prospects ahead, those who participate less in social organizations, who have lower confidence in political institutions, and those who have a stronger perception of freedom.
- ❑ In a global analysis of support for stable democracy it was found that younger Guatemalans, those with higher education levels, who feel more secure against crime and who perceive more freedom to exert their political rights are more likely to support stable democracy. Moreover, it was found that those who believe that the vote can be an instrument to improve the country's situation, and those who show more trust in elections, are also more inclined to support a stable democracy.
- ❑ Regarding support to the political community, the factors associated with a stronger pride in being Guatemalan are the perception of general insecurity, support for the political system, degree of political information possessed, and the victimization by crime. It was found that those who feel prouder to be Guatemalan are those who don't perceive that insecurity can be a menace for the country, those who offer more support for the political system, those who have more political information, and those who have not been crime victims in the last 12 months.
- ❑ A comparison between citizen confidence in the various political institutions shows that the Human Rights Ombudsman, the local government, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal are the institutions that generate more trust, with scores of 50 points or more in the 0-100 scale. On the other extreme are the National Civil Police, Congress and political parties, with scores of 39 points or less.
- ❑ The support for democratic institutions was measured through an index of five relevant institutions (the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Congress, political parties, the Supreme Court of Justice and the national government). Those Guatemalans who have more confidence in democratic institutions are those who think that good economic prospects lie ahead for the country, those who trust other people, those who have a positive assessment of their local government, who make a positive assessment of President Oscar Berger, those with a stronger perception of freedom, and those with a smaller degree of political information.

## **Perceptions Regarding Corruption**

- ❑ As compared with other Latin American countries included in this study, Guatemala places itself in a middle ground position in relation to the percentage of its population who has fell victim to corruption during the last year. In the country, 18% of those interviewed reported being victims of corruption.
- ❑ The cross-time analysis shows that the perception of corruption among public officers decreased in 2004, *vis-à-vis* the year 2001, and the levels are similar to those of 1999. In



2004 the average perception of corruption in public officers was 71 points (in the 1-100 scale used for this study).

- ❑ The factors associated with the perception of corruption in Guatemala in 2004 were education, gender, socioeconomic level, civil status and the degree of participation in social organizations. It was found that those who have gone through more corruption experiences have been those Guatemalan who are more educated, men, who have a higher socioeconomic status, who are married, and who participate more in social organizations.
- ❑ Victimization by corruption has an influence in the political values of the citizens. In 2004, those Guatemalans who declared that they had been victims of corruption were less satisfied with the performance of democracy, less supportive towards the political system and showed more justification for an eventual *coup d'état*

## **Rule of Law**

- ❑ Comparison with other countries shows Guatemalans having less confidence in the justice system. The average trust in the justice system in Guatemala in 2004 was 44 points (in a 0-100 scale). The perception of freedom was also lower among Guatemalans than among other Latin Americans. In the year 2004, the average perception of freedom was 71 points.
- ❑ By contrast, the cross-country analysis shows that Guatemalans show more support for a due process. It was found that 76% of Guatemalans consider that in order to seize criminals, authorities must always respect the law.
- ❑ Guatemala is found among those countries with lower levels of victimization by crime in the 12 past months, *vis-à-vis* the other countries studied. In 2004, 13% of the population indicated that they had been direct victims of crime. However, when Guatemalans were asked about their perception of their physical insecurity, Guatemala places itself again among those countries with higher levels of perception of insecurity, with 45 points in 2004, on a scale 0-100.
- ❑ The cross-time analysis shows that perception of freedom in Guatemala improved between the year 2001 and the year 2004, with the more notorious improvement being the issue of freedom to demonstrate.
- ❑ Institutions in the justice sector generally obtain low scores in terms of citizen's trust. The only justice sector institution that obtains a score higher than 50 is the Human Rights Ombudsman.
- ❑ Satisfaction with services provided by some institutions of the justice sector (National Civil Police, courts and the Public Ministry) is greater in the rural areas than in the urban areas.
- ❑ The factors associated to a stronger trust in the justice system are age, victimization by crime, perception of insecurity, perception of corruption, and satisfaction with democracy. It was found that the younger Guatemalans, who have not been victimized by crime, who do not

perceive physical insecurity, and those who have not been victims of corruption, are more inclined to trust in the justice system.

- ❑ Guatemalans perceive more freedom to vote (84 points on 100), and for group participation (78 points on 100), than liberty to demonstrate (52 points) or to be nominated for public office (60 points). The factors associated to a higher general perception of the freedom to exert political rights are gender, the ethnic self-identification, the perception of insecurity, the degree of political information and the extent of the participation in social organizations. It was found that those Guatemalans who have a stronger perception of freedom are men, those who have more education, those who self-identify themselves as *ladinos*, those who do not perceive physical insecurity, who have more political information and those who participate more in social organizations.
- ❑ It was found that Guatemalans accept political actions such as participation in community groups (73 points), participation in demonstrations (59 points), and participation in electoral campaigns (54 points). However, they do not favor actions such as the employment of justice by one's own hand (31 points), road blockades (21 points), toppling an elected government (20 points), occupation of buildings (16 points) and invasion of private property (14 points).
- ❑ Comparatively, Guatemalans place themselves in a middle ground position in relation to the degree of acceptance of the employment of justice by one's own hand, *vis-à-vis* other Latin American countries. The factors that in Guatemala are associated with the approval of self-justice in one's own hands are age, the perception of freedom, the belief in due process and interpersonal trust. It was found that those who support more strongly the employment of justice by one's own hand are younger Guatemalans, those who believe that the law can be broken in order to combat crime, those who perceive a stronger personal insecurity, and those who do not trust others.
- ❑ Guatemalans who live in urban areas are those who perceive more insecurity. Perception of insecurity can affect political values; in 2004 in Guatemala this perception is associated with less perception of freedom, less qualification of local governments, with a preference for a strong hand to solve the country's problems, with less interpersonal trust and with less support towards the political system.
- ❑ The factors associated with a stronger victimization by crime in Guatemala are the socioeconomic status, gender, education and place of residence. It was found that those living in urban areas, those of a higher socioeconomic status and more education, and men, are more inclined to be victimized by crime.
- ❑ A high percentage of Guatemalans in all regions of the country considers that the Police is involved with crime, instead of protecting the people. The highest percentage appears in the capital city, where 73 percent of those interviewed consider that the Police are involved with crime.

- ❑ Roughly a fourth of the inhabitants of urban areas felt that their neighborhood is strongly affected by the problem posed by gangs (*maras*). Percentages are considerably lower in rural areas.

## Local Government

- ❑ As compared with the rest of the countries included in the study, those Guatemalans who live in rural areas participate more in municipal meetings.
- ❑ Guatemalans stand on a middle ground in relation to how they perceive the work of their local government, as compared with other countries in the region.
- ❑ A cross-time analysis shows that the percentage of participation in meetings organized by the local government has not changed significantly in recent years (15-17%). Similarly, perception of the local government has been stable, with an average 50 points in a scale 0-100 (except in 1999, when it grew significantly).
- ❑ Men are more inclined to participate in municipal meetings, as compared with women. In a similar manner, those Guatemalans who identify themselves as indigenous those who showed more participation.
- ❑ Among those interviewed, 34% consider that municipal authorities follow up what people request in meetings organized by the local government. In a related subject, 29% of those interviewed consider that Municipal Council authorities would pay attention to a complaint or problem submitted to them.
- ❑ 31% of the respondents indicated that the services rendered by their Municipality are good (28%) or very good (3%).
- ❑ Around 18% of those interviewed indicated that they had asked for help in an office or to a municipal officer in the last 12 months. However, a high percentage indicated that they had contributed to the solution of community problems during the last year: 41% of men and 27% of women.
- ❑ Lack of drinking water was identified as the most acute problem at the municipal level (40%). Other problems at the municipal level that were mentioned by at least 10% of the inhabitants were lack of street repair (14%), lack of security (13%) and the economy (10%).
- ❑ Those Guatemalans who have a more positive perception of the work of their local government are those who live in rural areas, those who have more education, those who have assisted to municipal meetings and those who participate in social organizations. Furthermore, the work of the local government is more highly valued by those who have less political information, those with less perception of corruption among public officers, those who have a lower perception of insecurity and those who assess favorably the work of the president. It stands out that those who have a better image of the local government are more satisfied with democracy.

- ❑ Among those interviewed, 44% indicated that they would be willing to pay more direct taxes to the Municipality, in order to improve the services rendered. Those more inclined to pay direct taxes are the ones with more education, who perceive less insecurity, who perceive that good economic prospects await the country, those with more perception of freedom, more satisfied with democracy, with more trust in institutions, and those who have a more positive assessment of the work of their local government. 70% of those interviewed consider that the municipal government should invest more in roads and highways.

## **Electoral Behavior**

- ❑ As compared with the other seven countries included in this regional study, Guatemalans show the lowest level of electoral turnout. However, they occupy a third place in the belief that the vote can improve the country's situation (60% of Guatemalans believe that the vote matters). Also in a comparative perspective, Guatemalans occupy a middle position in relation with confidence in elections.
- ❑ A cross-time analysis shows that since 1993 the percentage of those who indicated that they were registered to vote has remained stable, around 75% of the population
- ❑ Predictors associated with voting registration and attendance to the polls are similar: women, those who have less education, who are not parents, and those who are younger, are less inclined to be registered to vote—and in the case of those who are registered, citizens with that profile are less likely to attend the polls to vote.
- ❑ Those registered to vote who indicated that they did not vote in the elections held in November 2003 mentioned the following reasons: lack of the proper identification document (73%), illness (8%), lack of interest (7%), errors in the voting registry (5%), work (3%) and having arrived late to the polls (2%).
- ❑ Regarding the confidence in the electoral institutions or those related with the election process, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the more trusted (50 points in a 1-100 scale). Confidence in elections places itself in a similar average (48% points). In contrast, institutions such as Congress and political parties are the ones who generate less confidence (38 points and 30 points respectively).
- ❑ When asked about the groups that would best represent their interests, Guatemalans mentioned in the first place the Church (whatever denomination), with 62%. In a distant second place were placed the media (7%) followed by business organizations (6%), populist groups (6%) and unions (4%). Political parties were mentioned by only 3% of those interviewed. It should be mentioned that 12% of those interviewed indicated that none of those groups represent their interests.
- ❑ Regarding the assessment of President Oscar Berger's work, he obtained 57 points of approval (in a scale 0-100). This average is similar to the one obtained in the past by ex-Presidents Alvaro Arzú and Jorge Serrano. However, it is considerably higher than the score obtained by Alfonso Portillo, who obtained only 37 points in 2001.

## Social Capital

- ❑ In a comparative perspective, Guatemalans, both men and women, tend to show a high level of participation in social organizations, *vis-à-vis* the citizens of other countries. In 2004 almost a third of Guatemalans indicated participation in some organization (church, school groups, community groups, professional or occupation-related groups, and political parties).
- ❑ Guatemalans, however, show low levels of interpersonal trust, in relation with other countries. In 2004 the average interpersonal trust of Guatemalans was 57% in a scale 0-100.
- ❑ The elements that influence social participation are the place of residence (rural inhabitants participate more), gender (men participate more), ethnic self-identification (indigenous people participate more) and parenthood (those who are parents participate more).
- ❑ Those who participate more tend to have a better image of their local government and to vote more in elections, but they also denote lower degrees of political tolerance.
- ❑ Among those interviewed, 57% consider that people worry about themselves, instead of trying to help others. In the other hand, 65% of Guatemalans consider that people would take advantage of them if they had the opportunity to do so. Both results denote low levels of interpersonal trust.
- ❑ Those Guatemalans who express more confidence in others are those who reside in rural areas, who have less education, lower wealth, who are older, and those who self-identify themselves as *ladinos*.

## Democratic Values and Lingering Authoritarianism

- ❑ As compared with the rest of the countries included in the study, Guatemalans show lower preference for democracy. Similarly, they are the ones who obtain the lower average when asked if they believe that democracy is the best form of government.
- ❑ Notwithstanding, when it comes to satisfaction with democracy, Guatemalans occupy a middle position *vis-à-vis* other countries. Similarly, they are among the countries where an eventual *coup d'état* obtains lower support.
- ❑ A cross-time analysis shows some positives results for Guatemala. In the year 2004, satisfaction of Guatemalans with democracy increased significantly, and the percentage of Guatemalans who prefer a strong-hand government (instead of a government in which all can participate) decreased considerably.
- ❑ The cross-time analysis also shows that regarding preference for democracy or acceptance of an eventual *coup d'état* no significant changes occurred.
- ❑ Indigenous Guatemalans, those who feel secure, who perceive more freedom to exert their rights, and those with more political information are the ones who tend to have a stronger preference for democracy and lower preference for authoritarianism.

- ❑ Those Guatemalans who live in rural areas, men, those with higher levels of education and wealth, are more inclined to believe that, in spite of its defects, democracy is the best form of government.
- ❑ Those who are more satisfied with the performance of democracy in the country are those Guatemalans with lower education, those who perceive more freedom, lower personal insecurity, and who perceive the economic situation of the country as favorable.
- ❑ Guatemalans appear more inclined to accept a *coup d'état* in case of high crime (45%) or rampant corruption (48%), but they appear less inclined in cases of high inflation (36%), frequent social demonstrations (29%) or high levels of unemployment.
- ❑ Predictors of justification for an eventual *coup d'état* are insecurity (those who feel more insecure), perception of freedom (those who perceive less freedom), and lack of satisfaction with democracy (those most dissatisfied). Similarly, those who show preference for a strong leader, those believe that the military should govern again and those who show more confidence in the army are more inclined to accept an eventual *coup d'état*.

## Preface

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Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions – particularly in Latin America – began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG”. Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups—ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

Margaret Sarles  
Division Chief, Strategic Planning and Research  
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## Prologue

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### **Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response**

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The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortunately, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, all too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.<sup>1</sup> As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because it was designed from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal, was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded data bases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subject to protect their identities are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those sureys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately  $\pm 2.5\%$  sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bi-variate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/dsd/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/)).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh have worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
August, 2004

## 1.0 The Context of the Country

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### 1.1 Introduction

After a long history of authoritarianism, Guatemalans began in 1986 a democratic process and the subsequent building of a legal and institutional framework.<sup>2</sup> Another landmark in the unstable political history of the country can be found ten years after that date, with the signature of the Peace Agreements between the guerrilla, unified under the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)* and the government. It is from this moment on that real prospects for a future consolidation of democracy in Guatemala appear for the first time in the country's recent history.

Guatemalan democracy, with its ups and downs, has been able to withstand 18 years, the longest democracy period in its history. The political Constitution that was enforced in 1986 has also been the most lasting. Even though they still show weaknesses, political institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Human Right Ombudsman and a series of innovations—such as the recognition of the multiethnic reality of the country—have been maintained and have allowed the exercise of political liberties to citizens during these years.

In these 18 years, 12 electoral processes have taken place in Guatemala, including two referenda (popular consultation) and five presidential elections. All of them have been considered free and transparent by national and international observers. Even though free elections are important in a country with a long history of electoral fraud and manipulation of elections by the military, it must be remembered that they are only one of the elements in the process to consolidate democracy in the country.

According to democratic theory, juridical and institutional development of representative democracy, albeit fundamental, is not enough to guarantee the stability of democracy in the long term. In the merely political aspect a democratization process must be based on several pillars, whose development must be parallel. Among those pillars are the construction of a Rule of Law that implies access of all citizens to justice, and the conviction that nobody will be above the law. Citizens' participation that goes beyond the elections is also important. Thus, public debate of national interest issues, continuous involvement of the so-called civil society in the decision-making processes, along with the establishment of mechanisms for dialogue between sectors, and between the state and society, have been recognized as key elements for the development of democracy. These aspects are linked to what has been called social capital and deliberative democracy.

There is another aspect that constitutes a fundamental pillar for the construction of a stable democratic system: the development of democratic values and practices in the citizens. Although the importance of this factor is sometimes downplayed, it has been demonstrated through studies made in various countries, that legitimacy (citizens' support for democracy) is essential if

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<sup>2</sup> The date of the beginning of the democratization process changes according to diverse observers. Some place it in the elections for the National Constitutional Assembly in 1994. In this case it is considered that the process begins with the accension to office of Vinicio Cerezo as President elect in January 1986. Some consider that the transition to democracy started in 1982, when the government was toppled after an electoral fraud.

democracy is to be maintained.<sup>3</sup> This legitimacy is closely linked to the social support that citizens of any given country offer to their political system, to its functional rules, to democratic principles and even to the governing authorities.

The issue of the construction of political democracy in Guatemala from the viewpoint of political culture is discussed in this study, based in a public opinion survey carried out in March, 2004. This report begins with a global vision of the recent political, social and economic context in the country and commentaries on similar studies made in Guatemala since 1993. Chapter II explains the quantitative methodology employed in the report and provides a graphic description of the sample.

The following chapters focus on concrete aspects of political democracy. Issues related with citizen support for the political system, political tolerance and support to democratic institutions are dealt with in Chapter III. Chapter IV examines the important subject of corruption, considered as one of the big obstacles for democratic development in emerging democracies. In Chapter V a variety of aspects related with the Rule of Law in Guatemala are examined, including citizens' trust in the institutions in charge of the administration of justice, and the existence or weakness of the democratic principles related with the due process.

Chapter VI analyses local government, an instance with which the citizens identify themselves more than national government, but one that is seldom thoroughly examined. In Chapter VII the electoral behavior of Guatemalans is examined, based on the data provided in the survey. Chapter VIII analyzes the social participation of Guatemalans as well as the issue of interpersonal trust, both important components of the so-called "social capital".

This study is developed in the frame of a regional project that includes not only Guatemala, but seven other countries as well: Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia. In each country a similar methodology for the sample design was employed and a basic questionnaire with the same questions and measuring scales was employed, thus making it possible to obtain a valuable prospect concerning the state of democratic culture in Latin America. Along this lines, the first eight chapters of this report follow a general structure preestablished for the eight countries.

However, there are characteristics and problems peculiar to each country, expressed in the independent variables employed in the statistic analysis and in the resultant predictors. Also, some countries included additional chapters on issues relevant for their political reality. In the case of Guatemala similar studies had already been made, so aside from analyzing data of the year 2004, cross-time results since the year 1993 are also presented. In these studies it has been found that the persistence of authoritarian values in Guatemala is an element that can hinder the efforts to build democracy in the country. This is why Chapter IX discusses the issue of the lingering authoritarianism among Guatemalans; the support for democracy as an alternative to an authoritarian regime is also examined. The report ends with a summary of the elements that, in the different chapters, were found to be associated to the support, or lack of support, towards democracy in Guatemala.

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<sup>3</sup> See Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).



## 1.2 The Economic and Social Context<sup>4</sup>

Guatemala has been called a land of contrasts, and beyond the multicultural issues, they can be found in socioeconomic aspects: it is a society where dramatic contrasts exist between modernity and development in certain social groups and sectors of the economy, on one hand, and high levels of inequality, poverty and social exclusion, on the other.

Unlike what has happened in many Latin American countries, macroeconomic indicators in Guatemala have been relatively stable in recent years, but this has been partly due to policies of low debt contracting, sparse social investment and the reduced size of the state. In fact, the size of the Guatemalan state is the smallest in Latin America. While the average income of central governments in the world is 20.1% of the Gross Internal Product (GIP), in Guatemala it just reaches 10.3% of the GIP.<sup>5</sup> Guatemala's taxation load is still among the lowest of the American continent, and the goal of 12% of the GIP established in the Peace Agreements signed in 1996 has not been achieved.

Guatemala continues to be a mainly rural and agricultural country. As of 2003, 23% of the GIP and 36% of the jobs originated in the agropecuarian sector. 54% of the population lives in the rural area. The crisis for coffee growers, due to the drastic decline of prices in the international markets, brought an increase of the deterioration of living conditions for this population. Extreme poverty in rural areas increased from 24% in the year 2000 to 31% in the year 2002. Remittances sent by workers that live abroad have become the main source of income for many of these homes and it has become also one of the main sources of income for the country. According to the International Organization for Migrations, 60% of those homes that received remittances in the year 2003 live in rural areas.

The social context of Guatemala is highly complex. In the Report "Democracy in Latin America" presented by the United Nations in April 2004 it can be seen that, if compared with other countries in the region, Guatemala has some of the lowest and more troubling social indicators. It is also one of the most unequal countries in the continent. It can be remembered that scholars and international organizations have pointed out the urgent need for Latin America to pair democratic development with improvements in the quality of life of the citizens, and this in the case of Latin American context implies to overcome the acute social inequalities and the existing high levels of poverty

Discussion about Guatemalan structural problems goes beyond the purpose of this study, but some social and economic data presented in Table 1.1 can help to explain the context in which some of the results of this democratic culture research takes place.

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<sup>4</sup> Erick Coyoy, of the Department of Economic Research at ASIES collaborated in this section.

<sup>5</sup> See Mitchell Seligson "Democracy on Ice: The Multiple Paradoxes of Guatemala's Peace Process," in *Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America*, edited by Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

**Table I.1 Social and Economic Indicators for Guatemala**

<b>Economic Indicators</b>	Gross Internal Product per capita in USdollars	\$4,400 (2001)
	Gross Internal Product	US\$24,700 millions (2003)
	Inflation rate	5.9% (2003)
	Economic growth	2.1% (2003)
	Open unemployment	3.4% of the EAP (2003)
	Inequality (Gini's coefficient)	0,558 (1998)
	Taxation load	10.3% of the GIP (2003)
<b>Social Indicators</b>	Population under the poverty line	57% (2002)
	Extreme poverty	22% (2002)
	Mortality in children less than 5 years of age	59 x 1,000 born alive (2002)
	Infant malnutrition (chronic)	49 % (2002)
	Illiteracy	28.5 % (2002)
	Expectancy of life at birth	66 years (2000-2005)
	Net rate of scholarization: Elementary	88% (2002)
	High School	23% (2002)
	Social public expenditure as % of the GIP	6.7% (2003)

Source: National Institute of Statistic, World Bank and United Nations Development Program

In the immediate socioeconomic context at the time of the fieldwork for this study, three clear issues stood out: fiscal deficit and the discussion of a tax package to overcome it;<sup>6</sup> the suscription of a free trade agreement with the United States (Central American Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA); and land problems.

The large budgetary restrictions confronted by the new government that took office in January 2004—that stem mainly from the multiple cases of corruption occurred during the preceding government—configure a panorama tainted by the limited capacity of the state apparatus to meet and respond to the increasing needs of the population.

Based in the data gathered in this survey on democratic culture, it can bee seen in Figure I.1 that, as of March 2004 the majority of Guatemalans, 64%, considered the economic situation of the country as negative.

**Figure I.1 Perception of the Country's Economic Situation**





Figure I.2 shows that 24% of those interviewed consider that the country's economic situation will improve in the next 12 months. 38% consider that the situation will remain the same, and 35% consider that it will worsen.

**Figure I.2 How Will the Economic Situation of the Country be in the Next 12 Months?**



## 1.3 The political Context

### 1.3.1 Key Moments in the Democratic Process

Within the democratic process that has taken place in Guatemala since January 1986, we can point at four key moments; they were decisive because they could have opened the way either to authoritarian regressions or to the strengthening of the democratic process itself. Luckily for the country, in those key moments the direction of the process held a positive course and an authoritarian regression could be avoided.

A through discussion of those key moments goes beyond the purpose of this study, but it is worthwhile mentioning them. The first is the transfer of power by a civilian to another civilian president for the first time in Guatemala's political history. Thus, the elections in 1989 and the subsequent transfer of power from Vinicio Cerezo to Jorge Serrano in January 1990, established the standard of free elections and civilian presidents that has been since then maintained.<sup>7</sup>

A second key moment of the democratic process was the rejection by various social sectors and by the army itself of the executive *coup d'état* attempted by former President Jorge Serrano in May 1993. It was the first convergence of traditionally antagonistic social sectors, in the so-called National Instance for Consensus (*Instancia Nacional de Consenso*), and it was the first time that all sectors came together to support the democratic process that had begun in 1986, and the first

<sup>7</sup> It can be remembered that the Christian-Democrat government of Vinicio Cerezo had to confront several *coup d'état* attempts.

time that the army rejected the command of the President in office and aligned itself with the democratic institutions.

A third key moment and undoubtedly the most significant, took place with the signature of the Peace Agreements in December 1996, twelve years after the beginning of the democratic opening. Even though the democratization process and the process of peace negotiations developed and mutually influenced each other during five years<sup>8</sup>, the search for democratic consolidation could not take place in an environment of armed confrontation, with limited participation options for some sectors and groups. As the United Nations points out in its Report on Democracy in Latin America, it was not until the first elections took place in the postwar period in 1999, that a really wide range of political options opened up for the population, with the participation of the former guerrillas as a legally recognized political party.<sup>9</sup>

The most recent critical moment in the democratization process in Guatemala happened with the elections held in November 2003. Some observers have called these elections “the best” since the democratic opening of 1986.<sup>10</sup> In saying this, reference is not made to the technical organization of the electoral process nor to the transparency of the event, because both aspects had been present in the diverse electoral processes held in the country since the democratic opening.<sup>11</sup> The transcendence of the 2003 elections is related to two elements: more citizen participation *vis-à-vis* previous processes, and the rejection made by Guatemalans, through elections, of an authoritarian government option.

The defeat of General Efraín Ríos Montt’s candidacy in the polls marks a historic break of the until then constant authoritarian temptation: the recourse to hard line governments—especially military government—to solve the country’s problems. Even though the political party headed by Ríos Montt as Secretary General obtained the second place in parliamentary elections<sup>12</sup> and he obtained 17% of the votes nationwide, he occupied a distant third in relation to the two civil candidates who went to the run-off elections held on December 28, 2003.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Dinorah Azpuru, “Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes” in Cynthia Arnson, Editor, *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington and Stanford, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> See United Nations Development Program, *La Democracia en América Latina: hacia una democracia de ciudadanos y ciudadanas*, United Nations, April 2004, p. 77.

<sup>10</sup> See John Graham, “Guatemala: Can Berger Break the Cycle? FOCAL Policy Paper FPP-044, May 2004.

<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, during the first round of elections in 2003, technical problems that had not happened in past elections occurred, even making it impossible for many people to vote because they did not appear in the voting registry.

<sup>12</sup> The general elections that take place in Guatemala every four years include presidential elections, parliamentary (national and district representatives), municipal elections and to the Central American Parliament.

<sup>13</sup> Efraín Ríos Montt had been the winner in the elections of 1974, that were manipulated by the army: power was handed to the official candidate of the moment, General Kjell Laugerud. Ríos Montt left for Spain as Guatemalan Military Attaché. In 1982 he headed the *coup d’état* that toppled what was a military government with a democratic façade. He named himself Chief of State and governed from March 1982 until August 1983, when he was deposed by another member of the military, General Oscar Mejía Víctores. He has been accused of grave violations of human rights during his governing period. After the democratic opening, Ríos Montt tried twice to be registered as a candidate for the Presidency through the party he created, the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco*. However, his candidature was rejected by the corresponding juridical instances, due to the fact that it contravened the Constitution, which in its Article 186 forbids that *coup d’état* leaders can be proposed as candidates. In the extraordinary legislative elections held in 1999, Ríos Montt was elected as a parliamentarian (*diputado*), and he

### 1.3.2 The period Between the V and VI Study of Democratic Culture

The V Study of Democratic Culture in Guatemalans, published by ASIES at the beginning of the year 2002, offered an overview of the situation of the country after two years of the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)* administration, which who took office on January 15, 2002. Several analysts mentioned that confrontations between the government and several social sectors, absence of dialogue, increasing violations of human rights and intimidation to justice workers and members of non-governmental organizations could be then observed. It was also mentioned that the implementation of the Peace Accords had been relegated to the back burner during those years.<sup>14</sup>

The time passed between that report and the present one corresponds to the two last years of government of the FRG (2002-2003) and to the three first months of the new government of the *Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA)*, presided by Oscar Berger, installed on January 15, 2004. Several analysts consider that the last two years of the Portillo Administration were characterized by an intensification of the patterns that already could be seen during the two first years of that government. To a great extent, the aggravation of tensions on that period was derived by the incumbent party's efforts to register Ríos Montt as a presidential candidate, and once this was achieved, to pursue a triumph in the elections set for November 9, 2004. Practically the whole government apparatus was geared to achieve this end during the last two years of the FRG administration. The media pointed out that the government tried to control democratic institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Public Ministry and the *Contraloría de Cuentas*. They also indicated that during the two last years of FRG government, the independent press was frightened, former members of the civil patrols were manipulated, and the employment of patronage practices increased,<sup>15</sup> activists of opposition political parties and members of civil society were intimidated, and electoral violence re-emerged during the political campaign, even though it had almost disappeared from previous electoral processes. By the time the electoral campaign finished, some 20 activists belonging to non-official political parties had died.

The culmination of this process to prepare the platform for Ríos Montt's candidacy happened on 24 July 2003, when the FRG organized and financed a violent march in the capital; rural workers brought by the official party, armed with clubs, attacked buildings and blocked residential areas for several hours. The march in support for Ríos Montt's candidacy ended with the death of a journalist. It has been considered that this march had, in the end, a counterproductive effect for the interests of the then incumbent party, because it resulted in the unification of diverse opposition sectors that were so far disperse.

On top of all this, the FRG government was marred by corruption scandals on diverse levels. The media brought to light details about corruption acts in which government officials and persons

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presided the Congress during that period. In 1999 he was elected again and his group (*bancada*) with parliamentary majority, elected him President of the Congress during four consecutive years.

<sup>14</sup> See Dinorah Azpuru, *La Cultura Democrática de los Guatemaltecos en el Nuevo Siglo*, ASIES, Guatemala, 2002, pp. 50-51.

<sup>15</sup> Graham points out that "The FRG government did not hesitate to support Ríos Montt's presidential ambitions with state funds". John Graham, op. cit., p. 8. Even though practices such as *clientilism* (purchase of votes and manipulation) have been made by every official party since the democratic opening, it is recognized that never before such extremes as those achieved by FRG in the electoral campaign of 2003 had taken place.

close to them were involved in millionaire frauds against institutions such as the Social Security, the Ministry of the Interior and the Army itself.

On the side of political opposition, the same weaknesses that were apparent since the beginning of the democratic process could be seen: an extreme fragmentation, that resulted in 11 presidential candidates and 16 parties in the elections; the lack of ideological definition in the parties; the absence of clear and concise government plans; and the use of rethoric and personal confrontations between the candidates instead of a serious discussion on national problems. Notwithstanding, two instances for inter-party dialogue, unprecedented in Guatemala, were created in the year 2003 and they contributed to a reduction of the tensions among the contending political parties, and consensus on some issues of national interest was sought.<sup>16</sup>

Civil society was more successful in its attempts to unify criteria and to defend the democratic process. An encounter among leaders as different as the ones of the private sectors and human rights activists, along with scholars, unions and members of the various churches, took place in the *Frente Cívico por la Democracia*. Several social groups organized local missions for the observation of the elections, and they spread throughout the country.

The international community also displayed efforts to underpin the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and to guarantee transparency for elections of November 2003. To that effect international observers were sent to Guatemala several months before the elections, as well as hundreds of electoral observers in the days before and after the electoral process.

Efraín Ríos Montt was defeated at the ballot boxes. The two finalist candidates were Oscar Berger from *Gran Alianza Nacional (GANA)* with 31% of the valid votes, and Alvaro Colom, of the *Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)* who obtained 24% of the valid votes. For the run-off election, it was evident in the country that tensions had diminished. Even though nor Berger nor Colom carried out a high level political campaign, nor were they engaged in a deep debate of government programs, the general perception was that the democratic process had returned to normalcy, regardless who would win. On December 28 Berger obtained 52% of the votes, defeating Colom.<sup>17</sup>

The 2003 elections contributed to strengthen the democratic process in Guatemala. The turnout, especially in the first round election, exceeded the expectations: 57% of the registered voters went to vote; it was the highest percentage in recent years. Guatemalans divided their vote for Congress among several political parties, which resulted in a balanced Congress, with representation of diverse political forces. But it also brought with it difficulties for political negotiation, that were evident since the beginning of the new congressional period in January 2004. Some analysts have pointed out that the lack of political consensus in a divided Congress can result in problems of “lack of governability.”<sup>18</sup> The political parties represented in the

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<sup>16</sup> These instances are the *Foro Permanente de Partidos Políticos*, with the support of the Organization of American States, and the Multiparty Dialogue, supported by the United Nations and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy.

<sup>17</sup> See Dinorah Azpuru “Guatemala's 2003 Elections”, in *Electoral Studies* (forthcoming).

<sup>18</sup> The Congress approved several electoral reforms in March 2003. However, diverse sectors including the Electoral Supreme Court have requested their revision, because they consider that some of the approved reforms can be counterproductive.

Congress signed a “governability” pact at the beginning of the new administration, but it has been affected by the scant flexibility of the political parties.


The first three months of Berger's administration went by without major problems; moreover, a tacit support of several sectors, including the highly critic communications media, seemed to offer a respite to the new government. Berger tried to integrate a balanced Cabinet, inviting some human rights activists and scholars to be part of it. Nevertheless, it is obvious that businessmen are predominant in his government.

At the time of the realization of this survey on democratic culture, in the second half of March, 2004, there had not been social protests in the country. However, the new government confronted a difficult economic situation, derived in a good part from the corruption of the FRG government. Among the most relevant issues during the first months of Berger's government, the imprisonment of several former officers of the past administration, the beginning of a drastic reduction of the army, and the new launching of the Peace Agreements stand out.

Berger has several challenges in front of him, particularly those related with the country's structural problems such as poverty, the explosive situation of the possession of the land, and the scant coverage and low quality of the social services provided by the state. Additionally, it has to confront a problem that, at the end of the day, can become the Achilles heel of either this or any government: the increasing influence of the organized mafias in the country--that became stronger under the FRG government—and the alarming increase of common crime, that has become (as can be seen in Figure I.3—one of the most serious problems for Guatemalans. Even though economic problems (unemployment, poverty, high prices, etc.) still remain as the main concern for 51% of citizens, common crime is considered the main problem in the country by 37% of Guatemalans.




**Figure I.3 Main Problem in the Country**



No less important is the challenge in front of Berger, to bring the Peace Accords back to central stage, so that national priorities can be defined around them. It is no easy task. As several scholars and international organizations have recognized, the Guatemalan peace agreements are the most extensive ever signed. In the next figure it can be seen that, at least, Berger apparently can count with the approval of 65% of Guatemalans, who consider that the Peace Agreements are either very good or good.

**Figure I.4 Do You Consider That the Peace Agreements Have Been....?**



### 1.4 Other Research Studies on Guatemalan Political Culture

Specific research on the democratic culture of Guatemalans has not been frequently done by either Guatemalan or foreign scholars, thus we cannot have studies that could provide a long term perspective. This fact is derived in part of the limitations that were placed until a few years ago for all social sciences, in particular to public opinion surveys in the country, due to repression exerted by authoritarian governments and the armed conflict. The closest to the subject one can get are maybe antropological studies, even though due to the ethnographic nature of the methodology employed, they offer scant basis for generalizations.

After the democratic opening in 1986, and especially with the beginning of the peace negotiations, spaces were open for diverse types of public opinion studies, including those related with democratic culture. The most enduring effort to provide a follow-up to this subject is the series of studies conducted jointly between the University of Pittsburg and ASIES, carried out every two years since 1993. More details on this effort will be mentioned in the next section.

Aside from these studies, the Costa Rican organization PROCESOS has also completed three studies on the political culture in Guatemalans, two of a general nature and one focused on High School level students. In addition, ASIES, with the support of the SOROS Foundation, carried out a study about the democratic culture of youth and teachers in Guatemala in 2002. Within the frame of a project coordinated by FLACSO, "Central America: an institutional network to

support municipalities and political culture related to decentralization”, an overview of political culture in Guatemala was also made.

In more global terms, the number of research studies, analysis and publications related with the subject of democratization in Guatemala has increased in recent years. Many of these studies are related with peace-building issues. A list of selected texts on democracy in Guatemala and other related issues is shown in Table 1.2. This list is not exhaustive, due to space limitations; it mentions some relevant texts published in the last two years, that is, in the period between the last study on democratic culture and the present one.

**Table 1.2 Selected Texts on Democracy in Guatemala 2001-2004**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Author and date</b>
<i>Mujeres y percepciones políticas</i>	Braulia Thillet de Solorzano (2001)
<i>Construyendo la democracia electoral</i>	Edelberto Torres Rivas, et. al. (2001)
<i>Seguridad democrática en Guatemala</i>	Bernardo Arevalo, et. al (2002)
<i>Nadie quiere soñar despierto</i>	René Poitevin (2001)
<i>Democracia en Guatemala: un modelo para armar</i>	Daniel Olascoaga (2003)
<i>Participación social y poder local en Guatemala</i>	Victor Gálvez, et. al (2002)
<i>Guatemala, proyecto inconcluso</i>	Hugo Caysac (2001)
<i>Evaluando la paz y la democratización en Guatemala</i>	Dinorah Azpuru (2001)
<i>Modernización y fortalecimiento del sistema de justicia</i>	Karin Wagner (2003)
<i>Encanto y desencanto con la democracia</i>	Franco Sandoval (2003)
<i>Agenda Nacional 2003-2008: una propuesta</i>	ASIES (2003)
<i>Los partidos políticos en Guatemala</i>	Edmundo Urrutia (2002)
<i>Los difíciles senderos de la paz en Guatemala</i>	Gudrun Molkentin (2001)

## 1.5 Previous Studies on the Democratic Values of Guatemalans

As it was already pointed out, five previous studies on the democratic culture of Guatemalans have been completed to date within the frame of the Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS).<sup>19</sup> All of these studies are based on theories and methodologies developed during several years by experts in the field in the United States and Europe, since the second half of the XX century.

Guatemala has been the Latin American country where these studies have been more periodical. The data collection process of the first study took place in May 1993, some weeks before the Executive coup of Jorge Serrano Elías. The second survey was carried out in 1995, during the administration of Ramiro de León Carpio, who had substituted Jorge Serrano in the Presidency. The third study was made in 1997, at the beginning of the administration of Alvaro Arzú and the first survey of the post-conflict period in the country. Under Alvaro Arzú's administration, but towards its end, a fourth study was completed a few weeks before the elections of late 1999, won by Alfonso Portillo through the FRG, Efraín Ríos Montt's party. All these studies were conducted jointly by the University of Pittsburgh, ASIES and Development Associates, Inc. In September 2001, the fifth study was made, conducted by ASIES only. In this last study several adjustments and modifications were made, in order to allow comparisons between Guatemala

<sup>19</sup> These studies have been sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2004 the regional level studies were comprised under the name of CAM/Colombia Survey.

and similar studies made in recent years in other Latin American countries, within the Public Opinion Project of the University of Pittsburgh.

It can be pointed out that all the studies completed so far have maintained a pattern of basic questions in the questionnaire, similar measuring scales, and similar basal lines in the samples used, in order to conduct cross-time analysis. The type of statistical analysis employed has allowed to establish tendencies in the development of certain democratic values and attitudes among Guatemalans, becoming a valuable source of information. Each study has been published in Spanish and has been widely diffused in the nation.

The series of democratic culture of the DIMS project is maybe the only one among political public opinion studies in Guatemala, that has employed questionnaires in the main four Mayan languages of the country. The team of interviewers has also been totally bilingual in those regions of the country whose cultural characteristics require it.

## 2.0 Methodology

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This chapter contains a synthesis of the sample design methodology employed in this study, along with the general sample description in terms of its socio-demographic composition. More details regarding the sample can be found in the appendix of this report.

### 2.1 Sample Design<sup>20</sup>

A study on democratic values, attitudes and practices must take into account all citizens, not only leaders, citizens who participate, or those who live in the bigger cities. In order to extract conclusions that are valid for all Guatemalans, a relatively small group must be chosen, called the sample, which must have the characteristics similar to those of the whole country. The sample is like a “miniature Guatemala,” and it includes persons belonging to different ethnic groups, gender, age groups, religious beliefs and income, among other characteristics, in proportions as similar as possible to those present in the population as a whole.

The sample employed in this study is designed to include all adult Guatemalans who live in the homes reported in the 2002 Census. In order to avoid slants in the procedure to choose the respondents, a random design was employed; this means that the persons were selected by a raffle-like procedure. Considering that this type of procedure can leave some regions with a representation smaller than the one who would correspond to them, the country is divided in several regions and a sample is made for each one of them. This procedure is known as stratification, and each one of the regions is called a strata. Five strata were employed in this study: Metropolitan area, North-East, South-East, South-West and North-West.<sup>21</sup>

There is a risk within each strata to include more persons from urban areas, due to the fact that they have more population. In order to avoid this problem, within each one of the strata the procedure was repeated, this time in two areas: urban and rural. Then a sample for each one of the areas in each one of the strata was made. This type of design, in which the population is separated in different levels, is known as *stratified design*.

The precision of a sample is usually measured taking into consideration two parameters: reliability and maximum error. Maximum error refers to the extent to which the results of a sample can differ from the ones that would have been obtained if all the persons represented would have been asked. Even though it would be desirable that this number would be zero, it is unavoidable that slight differences in the results will occur when a group smaller than the total population is selected. Also the fact that the persons were selected through a raffle-like process can make possible that, due to “bad luck”, the sample's opinions are different from those of the population. The “reliability” indicates in how many cases the reported result differ from those of the general population, in a number lower than the maximum error. For example, if it is said that a sample has a maximum error of 2.9%, with a trustworthiness of 95%, it is affirmed that one in every twenty of the reported proportions, at the most, has a difference larger than 2.9% in relation with the one that would have been obtained if all the adults in Guatemala would have been asked.

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<sup>20</sup> The following section, on the design of the sample, was written by Juan Pablo Pira.

<sup>21</sup> See Appendix for a complete description of the Municipalities encompassed within each strata.

For the sample in this study, which included 1,708 persons, work is done with different precisions, according to the group that is going to be analyzed. The appendix shows the maximum error for each one of the groups of interest (all of them with a reliability of 95%), as well as the detail of the errors in the design.

## 2.2 Data analysis

This study employs a quantitative methodology to analyze the data obtained in the survey. Descriptive statistics are employed to know the frequency of the answers of those interviewed to the different questions, but inferential statistics are also extensively employed in order to determine, through the multivariable analysis, the factors associated to the given answers.

Dependent variables (what we want to explain) related to the particular theme covered in each section are employed in the diverse chapters; they try to be explained through a lineal regression or a logistical regression in models with diverse independent variables. Among the independent variables employed in the majority of original equations, the following can be found in every chapter:

- *Sociodemographic variables:* age; education; gender; place of residence (urban-rural); religion; wealth (measured by the number of certain goods in the home); civil status; parenthood, and a variable very specific for the case of Guatemala, the ethnic self-identification of the person interviewed.
- *Contextual variables:* perception of the economic situation of the country; the country's economic prospects in the next twelve months; victimization by crime; perception of physical insecurity; victimization by corruption; perception of corruption in public officers.
- *Variables that can influence political behavior:* index of political knowledge; index of attention to the news in the media; index of perception of freedom; index or participation in social organizations; index of extended support for the system (trust in institutions); index of victimization by the armed conflict; assesment of the local government; rating of the President in office; satisfaction with democracy and interpersonal trust.

All the indexes employed in the study, used either as dependent or independent variables, have theoretical and analytical foundations, because aside from being made up by logically connected variables, according to theoretical conceptualizations, they have a high Cronbach alpha, as can be observed in the Annex.

It must be pointed out that some additive indexes were also employed, and in their case the reliability test cannot be applied. One of these indexes is the one that measures the “wealth” or socio-economic status of the person interviewed, by adding the equipment items and the capital goods that the respondent has at home. This is also the case with the index of political knowledge or political information, that measures how much information the person interviewed has about some basic issues such as the duration of the government period in the country, the name of the Presidents of Brazil and the United States, and the number of Departments of the country (its political division). In a similar way, the index of attention to news adds the frequency with which

the person listens to news in the radio, sees then on television or reads them in the written press. Finally, the index of social participation adds the frequency with which the individual attends meetings of five types or organizations: those related with the church, those related with school, organizations for professionals, merchants or producers, community groups and political parties or civic committees.

In each statistical model, the majority of the aforementioned independent variables have been employed; however, to facilitate comprehension and for space reasons, this study shows only the trimmed models, that include those variables that were found to be significantly linked with the dependent variable. This is to say, those variables that really have an effect or relation with what is tried to be explained (see the regression tables in the Annex).

It is important to point out that many of the variables were recoded in a scale of 0-100 points for two reasons: it makes easier to understand the figures presented here, and it allows for comparisons of averages among variables or questions that could not be compared in any other way.


A similar structure is followed for each chapter: it begins with cross-country analysis, which compares the results for Guatemala with results for the same issue in the rest of the countries included in the 2004 study. Thereafter, the relevant dependent variables for the year 2004 and the associated predictors are thoroughly analyzed. Finally, some cross-time comparisons are also made, with the results obtained within Guatemala in previous democratic culture studies.

## **2.3 Characteristics of the 2004 sample**

The distribution of the sample of 1,708 cases in terms of geographic and socio-demographic factors is shown in the following figures.

Figure II.1 shows the geographic distribution; it can be seen that Guatemala is still a country with a high percentage of its population living in rural areas. This division has proved to be, both in past studies and for the electoral results in several elections, one of the most appropriate and relevant variables to help explain social phenomena in Guatemala.


**Figure II.1 Distribution of the Sample by Place of Residence**




This study employed a sample by age and sex quotes, whose distribution is showed in the following two graphics:



**Figure II.2 Distribution of the Sample by Gender**




**Figure II.3 Distribution of the Sample by Age**




The level of education of those interviewed in this study can be seen next. The person interviewed was asked which was the last year of education completed, and not necessarily if he concluded the levels that appear in Figure II.4, which are employed to improve comprehension. It can be noted that within the region included in the study, Guatemala is the country with the highest percentage of population with no education.

**Figure II.4 Distribution of the Sample by Level of Education**




The wealth, or socioeconomic level of those interviewed, was determined through a summatory of the number of capital goods present in the home. The income variable, useful in other countries, does not cover a large sector of the population in Guatemala, who does not have fixed income, or who works in the informal sector. In fact, in this survey, a 30% of the population did not reply to the question regarding the income status. As can be observed, in the year 2004, 72% of those interviewed said they had drinking water at home, while only 10% had a computer.

**Figure II.5 Distribution of the Sample by Socio-Economic Level  
(Measured by the Number of Goods in the Home)**




Other factors that could be associated to the political attitudes and conducts of Guatemalans are to be married and to have or not to have children. The following graphics show that little more than half of those Guatemalans interviewed informed that they were married, or living with a partner. Regarding the number of children, the result shows that a relatively high percentage has many children.

**Figure II.6 Distribution of the Sample by Civil Status**




**Figure II.7 Distribution of the Sample by Parenthood (# of Children)**




A very particular characteristic of Guatemala *vis-à-vis* the rest of the countries included in this regional study is the existence of diverse ethnic groups, especially the existence of the group called in Guatemala *ladino* or non-indigenous, which comprises roughly half of the population, and the group called “indigenous”, which comprises several groups of Mayan origin. Along the years attempts have been made to measure this variable together with other items, but the “self-identification” has proven to be more effective and, in the case of the present survey, it coincides with the data obtained by the National Census in the year 2002.

**Figure II.8 Distribution of the Sample by Ethnic Self-Identification**




Aside of being a multicultural country, Guatemala is also a multilingual country where more than 20 Mayan languages are spoken besides the Spanish, which the language of the majority. In this study, questionnaires in Spanish and in four of the main Mayan languages spoken in the country were employed. In a like manner, personnel bilingual in those languages was employed for the regions that needed it. In Figure II.9 the distribution of the sample by language spoken at the home of the person interviewed since childhood can be observed.

**Figure II.9 Language Spoken at Home Since Childhood**



Finally, Figure II.10 shows the distribution of those interviewed by religion, an increasingly important variable in Guatemala.

**Figure II.10 Distribution of the Sample by Religion of the Respondent**



## 2.4 Cross-time Comparison of Samples

This study includes some data and figures comparing the results of the democratic value surveys over several years. Thus valuable tendencies in the development of democratic culture in Guatemalans can be observed. This comparison demands that a certain similarity exists among the samples of the different years. As can be observed in Table II.5, the general pattern of the different samples is similar.<sup>22</sup>

**Table II.1 Selected Characteristics From the Data, 1993-2004**

VARIABLE	1993	1995	1997	1999	2001	2004
Number of respondents (not weighted)	1,197	1,191	1,200	1,200	1,670	1,708
Average age (years)	40	41	42	43	40	38
Average education (years)	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.6	6.7	5.7
Urban respondents (%)	57	57	51	55	48	46
Male respondents (%)	49	49	48	48	50	48
Catholic respondents (%)	60	61	61	59	57	57
Interviewed in Spanish (%)	97.9	96.2	97.6	95.9	97.6	95.7
Drinking water in the home (%)	74	68	77	82	81	72
Respondents registered to vote (%)	77	77	78	74	77	76
Respondents married or united (%)	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	68	67

<sup>22</sup> It can be noted that in the year 2004 the design of the sample was stricter, and it resulted in a sample more adjusted to the country's reality.





## 3.0 Support for Stable Democracy

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### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the variables of support for the political system and tolerance, which are essential to sustain a stable democracy. The variables of support for the political community and support for diverse institutions are also analyzed.

The expansion of democracy in Latin America does not have precedent in history. The great majority of the countries in the region have been able to maintain during two decades or more democratic regimes that alternate periodically in power. Notwithstanding, events that have taken place in diverse countries in recent years<sup>23</sup> have shown that democracy is far from being considered consolidated and that instability, and even authoritarian regressions, are still a real possibility.

United Nations, in its Report on Democracy in Latin America points out that social crisis, inequality and poverty prevalent in the region can be a detonant that could negatively influence democracy in the 18 Spanish or Portuguese-speaking countries in the region. On the other hand, it indicates that a weak democratic culture can also hinder democracy's stability. In other words, both poverty and the lack of a democratic culture can trigger the emergence of social crisis and, moreover, of individuals or groups of people that based in populism could try to establish regimes that are not totally democratic.<sup>24</sup>

Within the frame of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, a model to predict democratic stability has been developed.<sup>25</sup> According to the theoretical model that orients the discussion in this chapter, democracy has more probability to be stable in the long term in a society where legitimacy of the political system and tolerance towards the rights of minorities are strong. Several combinations of high-low support for the system, and high-low tolerance are possible, as shown in Table III.1.

**Table III.1 Theoretical Relation Between Support for the System and Political Tolerance**

SUPPORT FOR THE SYSTEM	TOLERANCE	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	Democratic breakdown

---

<sup>23</sup> We have the examples of Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, where Presidents have been compelled to shorten their mandates due to social instability. The cases of semi-authoritarian rulers that on arrival to power have manipulated Constitutions and restricted freedoms in order to stay in power (p.e. Peru under Alberto Fujimory and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez) can also be considered as cases of distortion of democracy.

<sup>24</sup> See Dinorah Azpuru, *Democracy at Risk: Citizen's Support for Undemocratic Options*, dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, April 2003.

<sup>25</sup> This frame was initially presented in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Perspectives for a stable democracy in El Salvador* (San Salvador: IDELA, 1993). For a more recent discussion see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America", *Interdisciplinary Studies of Latin America and the Caribbean*, 11, No. 2 (2000). The theory that underlies this discussion has also been discussed in past DIMS studies.

The most important cells in this table are the ones called “stable democracy” and “democratic breakdown”. Stable democracy represents a situation in which a large number of citizens show high levels of tolerance towards the rights of minorities and a high support for the democratic institutions; in this case it is very probable that democracy will endure. In contrast, in a given society where citizens show low levels of political tolerance and a low support towards democratic institutions, a democratic breakdown is more probable. It is obvious that many other factors exist, both local or international, that can play a role in a democratic breakdown, but many prominent scholars have recognized that strong democratic values in a population can help to sustain democracy, especially in difficult times, when it is under pressure.

The “authoritarian stability” cell represents those societies where support for the system is high, but the tolerance is low; in those societies stability is a probable result, because the regime’s institutions have the popular support; but due to the low support towards the rights of minorities, those systems can move towards authoritarianism, with restrictions of democratic rights. Lastly, the cell called “unstable democracy” represents those societies with a high level of tolerance to the rights of others, but a low support to the system. These societies can move in a positive direction, if support for the rights of minorities is translated in more civil liberties; however they can also suffer periods of political violence caused by instability.


Aside from the two basic variables of the stable democracy model (support for the political system and political tolerance), this chapter also explores two other aspects. On one hand, the chapter examines the support for the political community, which is to say basic adherence to the existence of the nation as a whole, regardless of the religious or cultural differences that can exist. In addition, extended support to the system, measured through trust in the basic democratic institutions is examined as well.

Like in the rest of the following chapters, a comparative perspective is presented first, in order to establish where is Guatemala placed in relation to the other seven countries included in the study of the year 2004. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the results for 2004, for which descriptive and inferential statistical analysis was employed. Lastly, some cross-time results based in items similar to those included in the studies carried out since 1993 are presented.

### **3.2 Guatemala in Comparative Perspective**


The three next three figures show the comparison of results obtained in the eight countries included in the 2004 study, regarding three variables: support for the system, political tolerance and support for stable democracy.

**Figure III.1 Support for the Political System in Comparative Perspective**




As it can be observed in Figure III.1, Guatemala obtains 49 points in a scale 0-100, the lowest of the eight countries. This means that, among the countries included in the study, it is the society with lower citizen support for the political system. Differences are not so dramatic if compared with other countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras, but they are certainly so when compared with others, including El Salvador, a neighboring country that is also a post-conflict society. Other countries not shown in this graph, such as Bolivia and Ecuador have even lower results.

**Figure III.2 Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective**



It can be observed in Figure III.2 that also in terms of political tolerance, Guatemala occupies the lowest level of the eight countries studied.

**Figure III.3 Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective**



When results regarding support for the political system and tolerance are combined in order to determine the degree of support for a stable democracy, Guatemala occupies the last place of the eight countries analyzed. In Guatemala only 21% of the citizens support stable democracy. The comparison with Costa Rica is probably inappropriate, not only because it has a longer democracy history than Guatemala, but also because it is a society that has never been affected by an armed conflict. Notwithstanding, comparison with countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua indicate that Guatemala has to travel a long road in order to increase citizen support for stable democracy.

However, the Guatemalan situation has some positive aspects. As it will be shown in the figures that appear at the end of this chapter, both the level of support for the political system and the level of tolerance increased in Guatemala between the date of the last survey, September 2001, and the date of the present survey, March 2004. Neither in a comparative perspective is Guatemala the country that occupies the last place. Similar studies carried out in Bolivia and Ecuador in recent years show that in those countries the situation is even more complex than in Guatemala. Both in Bolivia in 2000 as in Ecuador in 2001, only 13% of the population fell in the stable democracy cell.

### **3.3 Results for the Year 2004**

#### **3.3.1 Support for the Political System**


Support for the system and political tolerance are measured in this Report based on the theoretical assumptions that have been already discussed. The scale for legitimacy or support for

the system is called “Political Support/Alienation” (PSA) and it is based on five central items measured in a scale from 1-7 (in which 1 means none and 7 means very much).

- *To what extent do you believe that Guatemalan courts of justice guarantee a fair trial?*
- *To what extent do you respect political institutions in Guatemala?*
- *To what extent do you believe that the basic rights of the Guatemalan citizen are well protected by the Guatemalan political system?*
- *To what extent are you proud to live under the Guatemalan political system?*
- *To what extent do you consider that the Guatemalan political system must be supported?*

In the first place, Figure III.4 shows the descriptive results for each one of these items in Guatemala for the year 2004. The scale 1-7 was recoded into a 0-100 scale for a better comprehension. The figure shows the average obtained by each item.

**Figure III.4 Support for the Political System by Item**




It can be observed that in the two first items, related with general support for the system and respect for its institutions, Guatemalans show a level of support higher than 50 points, which is considered as the reference line in a scale 0-100 to difference a positive tendency from a negative one. It is evident that the weakest aspects are the ones related with the justice system: few Guatemalans consider that the courts guarantee a fair trial, and even less they believe that the political system protects the basic rights of the citizens. This should not cause surprise, if one bears in mind the long history of state repression against individual citizens and even against whole communities during the armed conflict era, which lasted 36 years.

In order to research the independent variables that are associated to the low support for the political system, it is more convenient to employ as a dependent variable an index of support for the system that unifies the five individual items. Table IV.2 (see Technical Annex) shows the regression with the results employing the scale of support for the system as a dependent variable. As noted before, even though several full models have been tried, with different independent variables, only the trimmed model is presented here, with the independent variables that turned out to be statistically significant.

It can be observed that several sociodemographic and contextual variables influence support for the system in Guatemala. The sociodemographic variables associated to a stronger support for the system are age, socio-economic status and ethnic self-identification. Thus, it can be observed that younger respondents, those with higher wealth and who self-identify as *ladinos* (or non-indigenous) are more likely to support the political system. This can be clearly appreciated in Figure III.5.

**Figure III.5 Support for the Political System in Guatemala (By Age and Ethnic Self-Identification)**




It can be observed in the previous figure that young people, both indigenous and *ladino*, are more inclined to support the political system in Guatemala, and this is a positive sign for the improvement of the situation concerning support for the system in Guatemala in the near future; but for it to happen, the system itself must develop civic education programs in the formal level and also in the informal level, the latter through non-government organizations, and in the mass media, in order to consolidate the tendency, so the young people will not change their positive support into a negative one on reaching adulthood.

Table III.2 (annex) shows that most predictors associated with support for the system in Guatemala are linked with particular situations. It is found that those who feel more insecure in front of crime, those who have been victims of government corruption and those who feel limited

in their rights as citizens are less inclined to support the system.<sup>26</sup> Less support for the system is shown by those who perceive that the economic prospects for the country are not favorable.

Finally, those whose assessment of their local government is positive, and who are more content with democracy also appear more favorable towards the political system. The next figure shows how support for the system increases in relation with a better assessment of the way the local government fulfills its task.

**Figure III.6 Support for the Political System in Guatemala and Assessment of the Local Government**




On the other hand, some factors can negatively affect support for the system. Figure III.7 clearly shows that those who have a higher perception of insecurity appear less favorable in their attitude towards the political system.

<sup>26</sup> The index of freedom employed as an independent variable is made up using 4 individual items of liberty: to demonstrate, to run for office, to vote and to participate in community groups.



**Figure III.7 Support for the Political System in Guatemala and Perception of Insecurity**



### 3.3.2 Political Tolerance

Tolerance is a fundamental issue in every society that tries to consolidate democratic processes, but its importance grows in post-conflict societies such as Guatemala, highly polarized after many years of armed confrontation. Additionally, the multiethnic composition of the country makes tolerance a *sine qua non* condition for a peaceful environment.

How to measure political tolerance has been debated in Political Science. Along the years two basic approaches have been used to measure tolerance. One of the is the “least liked group” approach, in which the person interviewed is given a list of groups, normally including extreme right groups, extreme left, homosexual or other controversial groups, and he/she is asked to select the group “they least like.” Then the respondent is asked his/her disposition to accept that some political rights and civil liberties are given to the members of these groups. Under the other approach, the person is asked a series of items referred to the same groups. Both approaches have their strengths and their weaknesses. The “least liked group” approach tends to produce a high number of non responses because people do not know how to answer or refuse to identify any particular group, aside from the limitation posed by the fact that every respondent selects a different “least-liked” group, making it difficult to compare the levels of intolerance.

In the “same group” approach, like the one used in this survey, the participants are asked if some rights should be given to “people that always say bad things about the government system...not only the current one but all.” This can bring contradictory responses in countries with incipient democratization processes, where “the government” is frowned upon and political institutions

are frail and have little social support. In any case, this last approach captures in the best possible way the latent extent of tolerance towards dissenting ideas.


The measure for 2004, as has been already pointed out, was made using the scale developed in the Public Opinion Project of the University of Pittsburgh, with the following four items:

*There are persons who always criticize or oppose whatever the government does, be it the present government, the last one or the next one. I want you to tell me in a scale 1-10, in which 1 means that you do totally disapprove, and 10 means that you totally approve, to what extent do you approve or disapprove that these persons...?*

- *Vote*
- *Participate in demonstrations or peaceful marches*
- *Run for public office (for example, members of the Parliament)*
- *Employ radio or television to vent their expressions*

Figure III.8 presents the averages obtained for each item in Guatemala in 2004.


**Figure III.8 Political Tolerance in Guatemala by Item**



It is observed that Guatemalans tend to be more tolerant with the right to demonstrate and to vote, while they tolerate less that those with whom they disagree can freely express themselves or run for public office. As it happens in the case of support for the system, the best way to find the factors associated with political tolerance is through a regression, using as dependent variable an index of the four tolerance items. The results of the trimmed model can be observed in Table III.3 at the end of this report.

It can be seen that education and ethnic self-identification are socio-demographic determinants of political tolerance in Guatemala. Figure III.9 shows the importance of education, and that no significant divergences appear between the citizens who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas of the country.


**Figure III.9 Political Tolerance in Guatemala by Education and Place of Residence**



Education has a significant influence in a greater degree of tolerance, and this is more strongly evident in the rural areas of Guatemala, where regrettably education levels are generally low.

The next Figure, III.10 also shows the influence of education, but in this case in relation with the ethnic self-identification of the persons interviewed. It can be seen that both the indigenous Guatemalans as the *ladinos* tend to be more tolerant as their education increases.


**Figure III.10 Political Tolerance by Ethnic Self-Identification and Education**



The remaining predictors of political tolerance in Guatemala are related with the context of the country. Those who consider that the country's economy will remain unchanged or will not improve in the next 12 months, appear to be more tolerant. Participation in social organizations is associated with tolerance, but in a different direction to the one theoretically predicted for other countries: those who participate in organizations tend to be less tolerant. This issue will be discussed in depth in Chapter VIII. Trust in institutions also appears to be associated to tolerance. Thus, those who show more confidence in five basic institutions (Supreme Court, Electoral Tribunal, Congress, national government and political parties) are prone to be more tolerant.


Finally, the index of perception of freedom appears again as one of the most significant predictors of tolerance. In other words, when a person feels free (this is to say, less fearful) to participate in activities normal in a democracy, he will tend to be more tolerant. Figure III.11 shows the relation between tolerance and the perception of freedom to demonstrate.

**Figure III.11 Political Tolerance, Gender and Perception of Freedom to Demonstrate**



It is evident that both in men as in women (who overall feel less free), tolerance increases as they feel more free to participate in a demonstration. Figure III.12 shows another perspective on two of the variables that influence political tolerance in Guatemala: education and the perception of freedom to participate in community groups.

**Figure III.12 Tolerance, Education and Perception of Freedom to Participate in Groups**



In the previous figure it can be observed that Guatemalans with lower education, especially those who feel very afraid to participate in community groups, tend to be less tolerant. The same pattern applies to the other freedoms. On the contrary, citizens with more education are prone to be more tolerant, even though those who feel afraid to participate.

### 3.3.3 Stable Democracy: Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System

The theoretical model that supports the measurement of stable democracy in this study was already explained in the introduction to this chapter. Table III.4 shows the results for Guatemala. The two variables, support for the system and political tolerance, were interrelated in order to arrive to these results. Both variables were dicotomized in “high” and “low.”<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> If the original format of the variables in their scale 0-100 was maintained, the table would have 100 cells in each direction, and it would be impossible to understand.


**Table III.4 Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System in Guatemala**

		Tolerancia política	
		Alta	Baja
Apoyo al sistema político	Alto	Democracia estable 21 %	Estabilidad autoritaria 24 %
	Bajo	Democracia inestable 19 %	Rompimiento democrático 36 %

It can be observed that 21% of Guatemalans fall into the stable democracy cell, while 36% are placed in the most worrying cell, the one of democratic breakup. The rest are distributed among the two remaining cells, authoritarian stability and unstable democracy. However, in order to know which are the factors associated to support for stable democracy in Guatemala, a logistic regression is made, as can be observed in Table III.5 at the end of this report.


Two socio-demographic factors, education and age, appear as associated to support for stable democracy. The two following figure shows the relevance of these factors.

**Figure III.13 Support for Stable Democracy in Guatemala by Gender and Education**



The first figure, Figure III.13, shows clearly that Guatemalans with more education are more inclined to support stable democracy. Figure III.4 shows that younger Guatemalans, both in rural and urban areas, are more prone to support stable democracy. It is important to point out that other socio-demographic variables that did appear as individual predictors when measuring support for the system and tolerance—such as the socioeconomic level and the ethnic self-identification—are not associated to support for a more stable democracy.

**Figure III.14 Support to Stable Democracy in Guatemala by Age**



It should be observed that two contextual factors stand out again as predictors of support for a stable democracy: insecurity, and the perception of freedom. Thus, those with a stronger perception of physical insecurity are less prone to support stable democracy. At the same time, those who perceive more freedom to participate in diverse sociopolitical activities, tend to give more support to a stable democracy.

### 3.3.4 Support for the Political Community

Scholars recognize that in order to be able to build a stable democracy in any given society, some basic conditions must be first met. One of those is that the nation-state can be maintained by consensus and not by imposition. In other words, it is the existence of a basic political community what makes it possible to preserve the nation's frontiers, in spite of ethnic, religious or cultural differences. Diverse groups and citizens can coexist in a political community, but all must have a basic adhesion to the nation—that is to say a basic adherence to the country, beyond



government institutions—and a general will to cooperate jointly with other citizens who reside in the same territory.<sup>28</sup>

In many countries, such as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union or some African countries, many citizens adhere in the first place to their ethnic group, tribe or clan, and not to the nation-state, thus generating not only instability, but sometimes civil war.

To measure empirically the aforementioned support for the political community is a complex task, since it cannot be done through anthropological studies dealing with isolated communities; instead, it requires that the general opinion of all the citizens who live in a given country be measured. In survey studies around the world, two basic questions have been generally employed to have a vision of citizens' support to the political community. They have been extensively employed in other countries:<sup>29</sup>

*“How proud are you of being a .....(nationality)?*

*“Of course, we all hope that there will be no other war, but if it happened, would you be ready to fight for your country?”*

The multiethnic and multilingual character of Guatemala renders it more important to understand the support for the political community. The second question could not be applied in Guatemala, because citizens would probably think that it refers to the internal conflict that ended in 1996 after 36 years. Guatemala has not been involved in any important war against other country in its recent history.


This is why in this study the first question has been used: *To what extent are you proud of being a Guatemalan?* Also, for reference purposes, a second question was employed: *In spite of our differences, we Guatemalans have many elements and values that bring us together as a country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?* The descriptive results for both questions can be observed in Figure III.15.

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<sup>28</sup> See Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. She mentions what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan state that agreement on the frontiers of the political community is an essential pre-condition to lay the foundations of any stable nation-state.

<sup>29</sup> For example, it has been used in the World Values Survey.

**Figure III.15 Indicators of Support to the Political Community in Guatemala, by Ethnic Self-Identification**



It can be observed in the previous figure that the differences between both ethnic groups are not major. In order to find out if the ethnic self-identification of those interviewed is a significant predictor for differences, in terms of support for the political community in Guatemala, two regressions were made; each model employed one of the two dependent variables just mentioned. Tables III.6 and III.7 show these regressions, and they can be seen at the end of the report, in a Technical Annex. A similar model appears in both cases, including not only the significant values, because in this case what has to be demonstrated is if ethnicity is a determining factor or not.

In neither case does ethnic self-identification stand out as a determining factor of support for the political community. In both cases, however, two factors are important: the belief that crime is a threat for the country, and the support for the political system. Thus, we can see that those who consider that insecurity is a threat for the country, and those who show more support for the political system, are more inclined to feel proud of being Guatemalans and to consider that, in spite of their differences, Guatemalans have things in common.

In the case of pride to be Guatemalan, other two explicative variables arise: the degree of political information of the respondent, and whether or not the respondent has been (or has not been) victim of common crime. Thus, those who have more political information are more prone to feel proud, whereas those who were victims of crime tend to feel less proud.


Regarding the belief that Guatemalans have values and things in common, education appears as a significant factor that did not appear in the previous equation.

### 3.3.5 Extended System Support: Perspectives Regarding Democratic Institutions

Another dimension that allows to measure the support for the system is known as the extended series of support for the system. This dimension seeks to measure the citizen's support for specific democratic institutions, asking them *to what extent do they trust them*. Citizens with strong democratic values should make a difference between the support for permanent institutions and support for those persons who head the institutions at a given moment. In other words, the institutions are permanent and they must have citizen support if democracy is to be sustained, whereas the elected authorities are temporary, and their mistakes should not impact the support citizens have for institutions themselves.

In the first place, Figure III.16 shows citizen support towards various political institutions in Guatemala:

**Figure III.16 Trust in Institutions in Guatemala**



It can be observed in this figure that only three institutions, namely the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Municipality of the respondent, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, obtain more than 50 points in citizen trust. It must be remembered that in this study, 50 is the imaginary reference line that enables us to determine a high support (beyond 50) or low support (under 50), in a given issue. It can also be observed that the institutions with lower citizens' support are the Civil National Police, the Congress and the political parties.


In order to determine those factors linked with high or low support for the system, an extended index of support for the system is employed: this index measures the support or trust received by

five basic democratic institutions: the Electoral Tribunal, Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, the national government and political parties. The multivariable analysis made with this index as a dependent variable can be seen in Table III.8 (Technical Annex).

Table III.8 shows that socio-demographic variables do not seem to be determinant of a higher or lower support for institutions in Guatemala. Those who think that good economic prospects lie ahead for the country, those with a higher degree of interpersonal trust, those who make a more positive assesment of the local government and of the President in office (Oscar Berger), and those who have a stronger perception of freedom, are the ones who show more support towards the basic political institutions. Additionally, those with lower levels of political information are more inclined to trust institutions.

Figure III.17 presents the relationship between support for institutions, level of political knowledge and perception of the economic prospects for the country in the next 12 months.

**Figure III.17 Extended Support for the Political System in Guatemala, Economic Prospects and Level of Political Information**




It can be observed that those with higher levels of political information, but who consider that the economic prospects for the country are not good, tend to offer less support to the institutions. On the contrary, those with better economic prospects are more inclined to trust in the basic political institutions, notwithstanding their level of political information.

### 3.4. Cross-Time Analysis

Some figures are presented next, showing cross-time results for Guatemala, based in studies made in the last ten years. It must be noted that in the case of the variables of support for the system and tolerance, a different scale of alternatives provided to the respondent was employed in the first four Democratic Culture studies. Therefore, exact comparisons cannot be made between the 2004 results and those studies. In the year 2001 however, the scales of 1-7 to measure support for the system, and 1-10 for political tolerance were employed for the first time, in order to have comparisons between Guatemala and other countries where similar studies had been made.

Figure III-18 shows the comparisons between the general averages regarding support for the system and tolerance obtained by Guatemalans in the year 2001, and those obtained in the year 2004. It can be observed that both the index of support for the system and the tolerance index increased considerably in the country, and a positive tendency can be seen along the years.<sup>30</sup>


**Figure III.18 Political Tolerance and Support for the Political System in Guatemala, (2001-2004)**



Both political tolerance and support or the system grew in the two years and six months that passed between the V and VI studies on democratic culture; as a result, support for stable democracy also increased in Guatemala. The most relevant results are, on one hand, the increase of citizens in the cell for stable democracy, which advances from 19 to 21%, and especially the reduction of the percentage of citizens that fall in democratic breakdown cell. While for the year 2001 near 44% of the citizens fell into that position, for 2004 this percentage was 36%.

<sup>30</sup> In this and in other cases of comparisons in time, the level of significance was calculated using the statistic t from Student, with degrees of freedom by the formula Smith and Satterthwaite.


**Figure III.19 Longitudinal Support for Stable Democracy in Guatemala, 2001 vs. 2004**




Finally, it is worthwhile to make a longitudinal analysis on the trust in political institutions. Like in the previous variables, a different scale was used in Guatemala in the first studies, to measure the extended support for the system. In the year 2001, the scale of 1-7 points was used for the same time. This is why comparative results can be made only between 2001 and 2004.

The modifications in the degree of support for institutions in this period can be observed in Graphic 20 and 21. It is evident that most institutions had an increase in citizen support during this period, and the increase of confidence in the Human Rights Ombudsman should be pointed out. Support for local governments, the Electoral Supreme Court and even the Congress of the Republic grew as well. Support for political parties remained exactly the same in the period. The only institution that lost support was the Civil National Police.

**Figure III.20. Cross-Time Trust in Institutions in Guatemala (1), 2001 vs. 2004**



**Figure III.21 Cross-Time Trust in Institutions (2), 2001 vs. 2004**



An in-depth analysis of the reasons that explain the improvement of almost all the indicators analyzed in this period in Guatemala, between the year 2001 and 2004, goes beyond the scope of this study, that seeks to analyze the results obtained for the year 2004, and compare them to those obtained in other countries.

However, it is worthwhile to offer some considerations. As was pointed out in Chapter I of this study, the political panorama changed radically in Guatemala after the elections that took place in November 2003. The political system deteriorated under the administration of Alfonso Portillo and Efraín Ríos Montt, as could be seen since the year 2001, when the V Study of Democratic Culture was made. The complexity of the panorama grew as elections came close because of the actions taken by the official party, the FRG, in order to consolidate its power and bring Ríos-Montt to power. It was in this environment that the 2003 elections took place

The defeat of the presidential aspirations of the FRG in the electoral process altered the panorama. After the atmosphere of social confrontation that the FRG maintained during the its four years in power, diverse social groups welcomed the arrival of the new government, even though not all of them agreed with the ideological stance of the new President, Oscar Berger.

Maybe this context of dramatic change explains the marked improvement of global indicators for Guatemala between 2001 and 2004.<sup>31</sup> The doubt concerning the factors empirically more associated with this increase for stable democracy arises. Could it be that people are happier with the new President? Could it be that people are satisfied with democracy? Are they satisfied with their elected local government, and this makes them more democratic? The multivariable analysis that appears in Table III.9 (in the Technical Annex) tries to determine which factors could have been influential in this regard.

It can be observed that age is the only sociodemographic factor related with support for the stable democracy, with the younger population more inclined to support it. Additionally, two factors

<sup>31</sup> It is important to note that besides the political context of the country, the effect of the sample can also influence these results. In other words, even though as indicated in Chapter II, samples for 2001 and 2004 are quite similar, some differences exist that could have influenced the results.

associated with the increase in the support for stable democracy are the belief that voting can improve things, and trust in elections. In other words, more than the popularity of the new president, or the general satisfaction with democracy or with the local government, apparently the possibility of defeating an unpopular government through elections was the reason behind the increase in the global confidence of Guatemalans in the democratic system, particularly the young Guatemalans.

These results contribute to strengthen electoral democracy in Guatemala, but it must be remembered that, in general, predictors related to support for the system and tolerance did not change significantly between 2001 and 2004; factors such as poor education and perception of insecurity are still associated with a low support for the system and to the low tolerance that Guatemalans still show, especially when compared with citizens of the rest of the countries included in this study.



## 4.0 Corruption

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### 4.1 Introduction

The chapter analyzes variables related with the way citizens perceive corruption in Guatemala. However, unlike other studies, the experience or victimization by corruption suffered by those interviewed is also analyzed. Corruption has been considered an endemic disease in Latin America, and one of the biggest obstacles for democratic consolidation. A group of prominent Latin Americans interviewed within the frame of the Report on Democracy in Latin America published on April 2004, placed the struggle against corruption on the top of the political agenda to be dealt with in Latin America.<sup>32</sup>

In Guatemala, the National Commission for Transparency, made up by relevant citizens, was created in the year 2003 under the auspices of the World Bank, in order to establish horizontal mechanisms that can favor a stronger social control regarding the government's actions, particularly to avoid acts of corruption. It can be remembered that in Guatemala all the civilian governments in the democratic opening have been accused, without exception, of different acts of corruption, even though some administrations have been less plagued by this illness. During the past FRG government, acts of corruption increased in frequency and magnitude in every level.<sup>33</sup> Thus, this is a recent problem acutely felt by Guatemalans, and a very important one indeed.

Seligson points out that there are several reasons to study corruption, its extent and peculiarities.<sup>34</sup> Its possible impact on the stability of democracy on the long run is among the most important reasons for its study. Several studies carried out by Seligson have demonstrated that citizens who have been victims of corruption show less support towards their political system.

Although measurement of the political impact of corruption is a fairly new issue,<sup>35</sup> for a long time economists have pointed out at the negative impact of corruption in the economies of those countries that suffer it. The majority of the economists who have studied the issue state that corruption reduces investment and inhibits economic growth, due to several reasons. Neither one of the parts involved in illegal transactions provides information about bribes, depriving the state of the income that should come in the form of taxes. This fiscal loss increases because bribes are usually geared to avoid the normal payments imposed by the state to the citizens for various motives (construction permits, property taxes, taxes for imported goods, etc.). In the second place, corruption affects the economy because public services favor those who use bribes, in detriment of those who did not use this practice. The services provided tend to be unequal, and frequently those provided to the majorities are of poor quality. In third place, bribes make it

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<sup>32</sup> See Report on Democracy in Latin America, op.cit., p. 173.

<sup>33</sup> Former President, Alfonso Portillo, lives now in Mexico, where he escaped to avoid being judged for corruption acts. Several former FRG officials and friends of former President Portillo are now in prison, facing judicial processes for corruption.

<sup>34</sup> This section on the impact of corruption is a synthesis of the analysis made in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoría de la Democracia Ecuador*, University of Pittsburgh and CEDATOS Gallup, Quito, July 2002, pp. 132-137.

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Mitchell A. Seligson "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries", *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002).

possible for poorly qualified enterprises to provide services contracted by the state, that many times pays a lot of money in exchange for those services. A study made by the World Bank covering more than 100 countries it was found that when corruption increases 2 points in a scale of 10, a decrease of 5% can be observed in the GIP, and of 4% in investment. Additionally, public investment is affected. It was also found that in those countries where bribery is widespread and unpredictable, the rate of investment is lower than in those countries where it is not such a generalized phenomenon.<sup>36</sup>

Notwithstanding these findings on the negative impact of corruption in economy, some political scientists considered for a long time that corruption fulfilled a functional role in developing countries, as it permitted for the state apparatus to be more active, it promoted a sort of redistribution of income to public officers with low salaries, and it made procedures more agile for normal citizens that otherwise would be far from the state. However, in recent years this vision favorable to corruption has been criticized by several studies. Unfortunately these studies tend to be descriptive, and they usually present little statistical evidence concerning the impact of corruption on democracy.

The most recent evidence that corruption is conducive to lower levels of democratic legitimacy appears in the series edited by Pharr and Putnam.<sup>37</sup> The authors in that series show that in Europe corruption reduces the confidence in the government's ability to face demands posed by the citizens. Also in Latin America studies have been made recently on this issue. Morris, for example, found a strong relation between the perception of corruption and the scarce trust in the government in Mexico.<sup>38</sup> Ai Camp, Coleman and Davis examined the perception of corruption in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico.<sup>39</sup> In the majority of the cases, the Annual Index on the Perception of Corruption made by Transparency International tends to be employed. This Index is elaborated on the perception of experts, not of the citizens of each affected country. In other cases only the issue of perception of corruption is dealt with, but not victimization by it.

Presently only the studies carried out by Seligson in several Latin American countries have been able to prove empirically the link between corruption and the weakness of democratic legitimacy. In this line of research, the present study examines the case of Guatemala, trying in the first place to see corruption from a different standpoint. On one hand, from the viewpoint of the citizens themselves, and not of the one of the experts or the elites, and from the perspective of victimization by corruption, not only its perception.

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<sup>36</sup>See Paulo Mauro, "Why Worry about Corruption?" *Economic Issues*, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997). World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 102-104.

<sup>37</sup>Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., 2000, *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 205.


<sup>38</sup>Stephen D. Morris, *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico*, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1991.

<sup>39</sup>Roderic Ai Camp, Kenneth Coleman and Charles Davis, "Public Opinion about Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico", presented in the annual meeting of the World Association of Public Opinion Research, Portland, Oregon, May 17-18, 2000.

## 4.2 Guatemala in Comparative Perspective

As in the previous chapter—and throughout the whole study—the results obtained in Guatemala are first compared with those obtained in the other seven countries included in the study for the year 2004. In Figure IV.1 we can see the percentages of victimization by corruption, this is, the times that the respondents reported being victims of corruption in the previous 12 months.

**Figure IV.1 Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective: Percentages**



It can be observed that Guatemala places itself in a level similar to the majority of countries in the region. Roughly 18% of the persons interviewed in Guatemala, and almost in the majority of countries, reported that they had been victims of corruption during the previous year. Only Mexico shows a significantly higher percentage of victimization by corruption.

In the following figure the results based on the index of corruption—that is to say, the average times that the victims have experienced corruption—can be observed. Guatemala is again placed in a middle ground position in relation to the other countries.

**Figure IV.2 Index of Corruption in Comparative Perspective**





Figure IV.3 shows a different aspect: not the victimization by corruption, but whether or not the respondents have the perception that corruption in public officers is widespread.

**Figure IV.3 Perception of Corruption in Public Officials: Comparative Perspective**




In this case it can be observed that Guatemala is placed again in a middle ground regarding perception of corruption, with Costa Rica being the country where citizens have the highest perception that their public officials are corrupt. Mexico, which is actually the country with more victimization by corruption, occupies a middle ground position, according with these measurements.

Finally, Figure IV.4 shows the corruption indicators of Transparency International and the World Economic Forum. Unlike the measurements employed previously, in this case a higher punctuation indicates a lower degree of corruption, whereas a low punctuation indicated that the country confronts a serious problem of corruption.

Guatemala comes off badly in both indexes: Guatemala and Honduras are the countries with the highest degree of corruption among the eight included in the graphic. The corruption index of Transparency International has been criticized due to its methodological limitations, but it is still the most widely employed worldwide.

**Figure IV.4 Perception of Corruption by Experts: Comparative Perspective**



Source: Prepared by D. Azpuru with data from organizations. The index of corruption in both cases goes in an upward direction, therefore the countries with the highest numbers are the ones with less corruption. On the contrary, having a low result in both cases International Transparency (TI) and the World Economic Forum (FEM), means having more corruption.

## 4.3 Results for the Year 2004


### 4.3.1 Perceptions Regarding Corruption

The results obtained in Guatemala for 2004 are now more thoroughly analyzed, in terms of the perception of corruption and victimization by it. Figure IV.5 shows the distribution of the perception of corruption. The answers are based in the following question:

According to your experience, to what extent are public officials corrupt?

Table IV.1 (at the end of this report) examines which are the factors associated with the perception of corruption in Guatemala.


**Figure IV.5 Is Corruption Widespread Among Public Officials?**



Through multivariate analysis it can be observed that three socio-demographic factors appear as associated with the perception of corruption. Thus, as education, age and socioeconomic level of those interviewed increases, their perception that corruption is generalized among public officials also increases. The other variable is the index of political information: those citizens who have more information are more inclined to perceive corruption in public officials.

Figure IV. 6 shows that both in the rural and urban areas in Guatemala, citizens who have more education (some high school or university) tend to have a stronger perception of corruption.

**Figure IV.6 Perception of Corruption by Education and Place of Residence**



#### 4.3.2. Victimization by Corruption in 2004

The actual situation of victimization by corruption in Guatemala is now examined. Public opinion studies are not able to measure corruption in the sphere of public administration, because these cases are not accessible to the normal citizens: he can only learn about them through the press, when these acts are revealed. However, surveys are an excellent instrument to measure the extent and the type of corruption that affect citizens in their dealings with middle or low spheres in government offices.

In this study, respondents were asked if they had had corruption experiences in relation with various institutions and persons. These were the questions:

*In the past year, have you been accused by a police agent for an offence that you did not commit?*

*Has any police agent demanded from you a bribe in the past year?*

*Has any public officer demanded from you a bribe in the past year?*

*In the case you had to process some issue at the Municipality during the past year, have you been forced to pay any additional sum, aside from the one established by the law?*

*If you are worker, has somebody at your job demanded any illegal payment during the last year?*

*If you had any dealings with the courts in the last year, did you have to pay any bribe?*


*In the case you used public health services in the last year, did you have to pay any bribe to get attention at the hospital or health center?*

*If any of your children attended school during the past year, did you have to pay any bribe?*



Figure IV.7 shows the percentage of corruption experiences of citizens in the diverse aforementioned instances.


**Figure IV.7 Corruption Experiences**



According to what those interviewed informed, it is at the school, followed by the Municipality, where Guatemalans have endured more frequent cases of corruption. 9% of them (with children attending school) indicated that they had been victims of corruption in that instance, while 8% indicated that they had been victims of corruption in their Municipality. In a decreasing order, the health system, the police and the workplace are placed with 6 and 7% of reported cases of corruption. 5% of those interviewed said that they had to pay a bribe (*mordida*) at the courts, while 4% reported that they have been falsely accused by the police. Finally, only 3% experienced corruption from a public officer during the last years.

Figure IV.8 shows the times that citizens have been victimized by corruption.

**Figure IV.8 Number of Times That You were Victimized by Corruption**




82% of the population informed that they had not suffered any act of corruption during the last year, at least in the institutions mentioned in the questions. 11.2% indicated that they had suffered one experience, 4.6% had suffered two, and only 2.2% experienced three or more cases of corruption. In Table IV.2 it can be observed which factors are associated to a higher or lower victimization by corruption (See Annex at the end of the study).

It is not necessary to try to analyze the different types of corruption one by one, nor the frequency of the victimization in order to find the variables that can explain it. Rather, a corruption index was constructed, taking into account the cases of corruption that the respondent had confronted during the past 12 months.


It can be seen that diverse socio-demographic factors are linked with victimization by corruption. Thus, to be married, to be a man, with more education and with a better socio-economic level increase the possibilities of falling prey to corruption in Guatemala. An additional factor, participation in a group or social organization meetings is also associated with higher victimization. Figure IV.9 shows the relation between victimization by corruption, gender and education.

**Figure IV.9 Victimization by Corruption, by Gender and Education**



It can be clearly observed that people with some university education are more prone to suffer experiences with corruption, both men and women. However, it is clear that at all levels men are the most prone to be victims. In the following figure, the relation between victimization and the socioeconomic level or wealth of the respondent can be seen, with those persons with a higher level more likely to be victims.

**Figure IV.10 Victimization of Corruption by Wealth**




It is frequently believed that corruption is a cultural fact, accepted as normal within many societies. In order to measure if persons justify corruption, they were asked:

*Do you believe that in our society, to pay bribes can be justified, due to the deficient public services, or it cannot be justified?*

The replies given by those interviewed appear in Figure IV.11. A large majority, 93% of respondents objects the payment of bribes, this is to say, corruption in governmental spheres.

**Figure IV.11. Justification of Corruption**




#### **4.3.3. The Impact of Corruption in Democratic Legitimacy**

As explained before, not many studies approach the issue of the impact of corruption in the political sphere, and more specifically, its impact in the support for the democratic system and for its institutions.


Table IV.3 (at the end of the report) shows a multivariate statistic model which associates victimization by corruption with different aspects of support for democracy.

It appears to be clear in the previous equation that those citizens who have been victimized by corruption show less satisfaction with democracy, less support for the political system, and are more inclined to justify an eventual *coup d'état*. In Figures IV.12 and IV.13, citizen satisfaction with democracy, on one hand, and support for the political system, on the other, can be observed. Those who have been victims of more acts of corruption are clearly less satisfied with democratic performance, and show less support for the political system.

**Figure IV.12 Impact of Corruption in the Satisfaction With Democracy**



**Figure IV.13 Impact of Victimization by Corruption in the Support for the Political System**




Finally, a possible negative impact of the perception of corruption on the level of support for the system must also be studied. In the equation that appears in Table IV.4 (see Annex) it can be observed that those who perceive more corruption have a more negative assesment of the local government. Also, they show lower levels of trust in the judicial system. A peculiar finding must be pointed out. Those who perceive more corruption, consider that voting can improve things in the country. This is probably related with the particular situation that arose in Guatemala during the past elections: a man perceived as honest was elected, as opposed to the previous government, linked to many corruption scandals.

#### 4.4 Cross-National Analysis of the Results

In previous studies on democratic culture, a series of questions related with corruption was not included, and this is why a comparison in time cannot be made. However, one of the questions about perception of corruption in public officials was included since the study of 1999. In Figure IV.14 can be observed that the perception of corruption increased notably during the year 2001, under the government of Alfonso Portillo. In the year 2004, notwithstanding that the new government had been in office only three months, the population already had a lower perception of corruption in public administration, similar to the one that it showed in 1999, during the government of Alvaro Arzú.

**Figure IV.14 Perception of Corruption in Guatemala, 1999-2004**







## 5.0 Rule of Law

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### 5.1 Introduction

Several variables related with the perceptions and attitudes of citizens concerning the rule of law are analyzed in this chapter. The rule of law can be considered as the backbone of any democratic system. Periodical elections, citizens representation in diverse formal and informal instance, national debate on relevant issues and many more, are all important components of a democracy. However, without a rule of law that can protect citizens, allow the free exercise of their rights and insure that nobody is above the law, democracy cannot yet consolidated.

Although it is the state's responsibility to strive to consolidate the rule of law, it is also true that if the citizens despise and do not comply with the law, the efforts of the authorities can be weakened. In any case, a parallel development of institutions that support the rule of law, and of conscious citizens who are determined to comply with the established principles and rules is necessary.

Both in the academia and in international organizations it is recognized that one of the biggest obstacles for a fully democratic Latin America is precisely the frailty of the rule of law. Cameron points out that the continuous and systematic violations to the rule of law carried out by many governments are one of the menaces to democratic stability in Latin America.<sup>40</sup> Laws and institutions exist in the region, including sound political Constitutions that formally enshrine the essence of the rule of law, but that often they do not function properly in practice and law enforcement is weak and unequal. Guatemala is no exception, and one of the main challenges for the country is to build a strong rule of law, capable of providing rapid and effective justice to citizens, of protecting them from crime, and allowing a full exercise of their civic and political rights and liberties.

Several aspects related with the rule of law are explored in this study. In this chapter, we analyze citizens' trust in the justice system and the perception of freedom to participate. We also explore an issue that has become one of the major concerns at the current time in Guatemala: crime and citizen insecurity.

As was the case with the other chapters, this one begins with a comparative analysis of the results obtained in the rest of the countries that were studied. Afterwards, the results obtained for the year 2004 in Guatemala are thoroughly discussed. Finally, a cross-time analysis of some variables that have been included in past studies on democratic culture is presented.


### 5.2 Guatemala in a Comparative Perspective

Figure V.1 show the answers obtained in the different countries to a question that ask the interviewees to indicate *how much they trust the justice system*. As can be seen, Guatemalans are the ones who show less trust in their justice system.

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<sup>40</sup> See Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democracy and the Separation of Powers: Threats, Dilemmas and Opportunities in Latin America", *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 2002, Vol. 27, No. 53, pp. 133-159.

**Figure V.1 Trust in the Justice System in Comparative Perspective**



The next figure shows citizen support for the due process, measured through a question that asks the person interviewed to choose one of two options:

*In order to be able to capture criminals, do you believe that the authorities always have to respect the law, or they could sometimes ignore the law?*

In this aspect, Guatemalans score more favorably, since they occupy the first place in the belief in the due process. 76% of Guatemalans consider that authorities must always respect the law, as compared with other countries like Costa Rica, where only 56% of the population answered on the positive side. It is probably due to the constant human rights violations endured by Guatemalans during the years of the armed conflict that they value more highly due process rights.

**Figure V.2 Support for Due Process in Comparative Perspective**




Figure V.3 shows the results obtained in each country in the index of perception of freedom. The index is a composite measure that is formed by citizens' perception of freedom to vote, to demonstrate, to run for public office and to participate in community groups to solve local problems. As can be seen, again the results are unfavorable for Guatemala, that occupies the last place. It must be noted that El Salvador, another post-conflict society in the region, also obtains a relatively low score as compared with the rest of the countries. It is probable the environment of armed confrontation and repression that affected both countries until recent years is still influencing the citizens. It could also be that the system is not yet completely open, and that full participation is still hampered by restrictions. Colombia, a country that has an internal war, is also placed in the lower part of the figure.

**Figure V.3 Index of Perception of Freedom**





Figure V.4 show the percentages of crime victimization in the different countries. The respondents were asked *whether they had been victims of crime in the last 12 months*. Guatemala appears in a favorable position, with the lowest percentage of victimization, while Mexico and El Salvador occupy the opposite position. It must be remembered that crime in Guatemala affects mainly the urban areas.

**Figure V.4 Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective**




It has been found that, aside from victimization by crime, the perception of crime or the fear of being a victim can make an impact on the democratic attitudes of citizens. Figure V.5 compares the answers to the following question:

*Speaking of the place or the vicinity where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being victim of a robbery or an assault, do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure or very insecure?*

It can be seen that Guatemala occupies the second place in regard of the perception of physical insecurity.

**Figure V.5 Perception of Physical Insecurity in a Comparative Perspective**



## **5.3 Results for the Year 2004**


### **5.3.1 Trust in the Justice System**

It was already mentioned that Guatemala is the country with lower trust in the justice system. The issue will be discussed in depth here. Figure V.6 shows the average support to the various institutions that conform the justice sector in the country. The Human Rights Ombudsman is the institution that citizens trust more. It can be remembered that in the year 2002 the Congress elected a new Ombudsman, who had been proposed by diverse social organizations.


All the other institutions obtain around 40, which is under the 50 points reference line that divides the positive and the negative results in the scale of 0-100 that is being employed. The Civil National Police is the justice sector institution least trusted by citizens, and this can be due to the complaints made in recent months regarding corruption in the Police and the involvement of some of its member in criminal actions.

Figure V.7 shows the satisfaction of those citizens who employed the services of the aforementioned institutions. It can be seen that satisfaction with the services rendered is larger in the rural areas than in the urban areas in Guatemala. It is interesting to observe that similar results were obtained by the institutions mentioned in this question, both for the rural and the urban areas.

**Figure V.6 Trust in Justice Sector Institutions**



**Figure V.7 Satisfaction With Services Rendered by Justice Sector Institutions**



We now examine which are the factors associated with trust in the justice system in Guatemala. An index of trust in the system was made to this effect, comprising the six institutions that appear in Figure V.6. Table V.7 (at the end of this report) allows to observe which are the predictors of trust in the justice system in Guatemala. It can be observed that younger Guatemalans, those who have not been victimized by crime, and who do not perceive physical

insecurity in their place of residence nor corruption in public officials, tend to trust more in the justice system. Also, it is found that those who trust justice institutions are more inclined to be content with the way democracy is working.

The interrelation that exists between trust in the justice system, victimization by crime and perception of insecurity is shown in Figure V.8. It is clear that those who have not been victims of crime trust the system more. However, both among those who have not been victims, and among those victimized, those who feel more secure tend to trust more in the system.

**Figure V.8 Trust in the Justice System, Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity**





Figure V.9 shows the link between satisfaction with democracy and trust in the justice system. It can be noted that Guatemalans between 18 and 25 years old have the highest levels of trust in the justice system. However, the difference related to age starts to be sharply marked in Guatemalans older than 25 years: a steep reduction in the justice system is seen in those who are not satisfied with democracy.



**Figure V.9 Trust in the Justice System by Age and Satisfaction With Democracy**



### 5.3.2 Freedom, Due Process and Participation

Other aspects related with the rule of law will be now discussed. As mentioned earlier, even though the state has the main responsibility in the construction of an efficient rule of law, and although it has to safeguard an environment where freedoms and rights can be exerted, citizens have to respect the law and comply fully with it.

We will examine whether an environment of freedom is perceived by citizens. In order to do it, a direct question is posed to them (series DER 1 to DER 4 in the questionnaire):<sup>41</sup>

*If you decided to participat in the activities that I will mention next, would you do it without fear, somewhat fearful or very fearful?*

- *Participate in order to solve problems of your community*
- *Participate in a peaceful demonstration*
- *Vote in a national election*
- *Run for elections to a public service position*

In Figure V.10 the results for Guatemala in 2004 can be observed. The two political rights, namely to vote and to run for office, and the two other rights, to participate in groups and in demonstrations, have been unified in this graphic. It has been divided by place of residence (urban-rural). It can be observed that freedom to vote is the most strongly perceived by

<sup>41</sup> The most widely employed alternative is the freedom index elaborated by Freedom House, which is founded in the opinion of experts, not in the opinion of the citizens.

Guatemalans, both in rural and in urban areas. Freedom to run for office obtains the lowest scores in both areas. It can also be observed that freedom to participate in groups obtains almost exactly the same scores in the rural and in the urban areas, while freedom to demonstrate is more strongly perceived by the urban population.

**Figure V.10 Perception of Freedom by Item**





Table V.2 (see Annex) shows the predictors associated to the perception of freedom. To this effect, an index of perception of freedom was constructed with the four previously mentioned items, to be utilized as a dependent variable. It can be observed that three independent sociodemographic variables—gender, ethnic self-identification and education—are found to be linked to the perception of freedom: women, indigenous Guatemalans and those with less education feel more restricted in their freedoms.

Also, three contextual variables relate with a stronger or weaker perception of liberty. Those who feel less insecure, who have more political information, and those who participate in social groups tend to feel more freedom.


Figure V.11 allows us to observe the marked differences in the way men and women perceive freedom in Guatemala. Both in the case of the *ladinos* (non-indians), as in the case of the indigenous population, men feel more freedom to participate. Indigenous men even score higher than *ladino* women. On the contrary, indigenous women obtained the lower scores, indicating low levels of perception of freedom.

**Figure V.11 Index of Freedom by Gender and Ethnicity**



The rule of law is now explored from other perspective, the attitudes of the citizens regarding the due process, and regarding the participation of others in certain political activities and actions. Figure V.12. shows that a majority of Guatemalans believe in due process rights. Both men and women obtain high scores in regards to the belief that a search warrant is always necessary; in addition, a majority believes that the law must always be respected, even though when trying to capture criminals.

**Figure V.12 Belief in the Due Process by Gender**



The following figures examine the acceptance that Guatemalans have towards the participation of others in certain activities. Respondents were asked to state to what extent, in a scale from 1-10, *they either approved or disapproved some actions that people do to achieve their political goals and objectives.*

Figure V.13 shows the level of acceptance of participation in political actions. It can be seen that the most accepted action is participation in community groups, with a high score. However, a lower level of acceptance is conferred to actions such as participating in demonstrations or in political campaigns.

**Figure V.13 Acceptance of Participation in Legal Political Actions**





Figure V. 14 examines the degree of acceptance towards certain actions that imply civil disobedience or even actions deemed illegal under Guatemalan law. It can be observed that actions implying taking justice by one's own hand obtain a relatively high score; in Guatemala this is linked to the lynchings of alleged criminals that have occurred in recent years. A third of the population is inclined to accept these actions. A smaller proportion of citizens approves actions such as toppling an elected government, blocking roads and occupying buildings. However, a fifth of the population approves them. The least accepted action is the invasion of private property.

**Figure V.14 Acceptance of Civil Disobedience and Illegal Actions**




In the V Report of Democratic Culture, in 2001, a section was dedicated to the issue of lynchings and taking justice in one's own hands in Guatemala. It was then found that more or less 40% of the population was inclined to the idea of self-justice. In the study carried out in 2004, the question employed in 2001 was not included but the similar question mentioned above was used. It can be observed in Figure V.14 that a relatively high percentage of Guatemalans accept the idea of taking justice in one's own hands. In the Table V.3, the predictors of support for this idea can be seen. (see Annex at the end of the report).

It is interesting to observe that some predictors such as residence in a rural area and ethnic self-identification do not appear as significant. In order to demonstrate this, the complete regression model has been included in Table V.3. It can be seen that other factors do appear linked to a stronger support towards taking justice in one's own hand. Thus, younger Guatemalans, those with lower scores related to the belief that the law must be always respected, those with less perception of freedom, and those that have less trust in others, are more prone to support the idea of self-justice.

The problem of lynchings of alleged criminals occurred in recent years has been particularly grave in Guatemala. However, as can be seen in Figure V.15, a comparison between the answers provided by those interviewed in the eight countries included in the study regarding the acceptance of taking justice in one's own hand when the state fails to punish the criminals, places Guatemala in a middle ground position.

**Figure V.15 Acceptance of Self-Justice Actions**




### 5.3.3 Common Crime: Dimensions and Impact

Always within the frame of the analysis of the rule of law, we proceed now to study some aspects related with one of the problems more acutely felt by Guatemalans in recent years, namely common crime.

Figure V.16 shows the percentages of the population affected in some way by this problem. It can be observed that 86% of the respondents considers that *the present levels of crime constitutes a menace for the future*. This means that the perception of global insecurity is widely extended among Guatemalans, and this can have important consequences in the political attitudes. Luckily Guatemala does not suffer the danger of international terrorism, but crime can be considered an equivalent "social threat" due to its possible impact.

In the same figure it can be observed that almost half of Guatemalans feel somewhat insecure or very insecure in their vicinity or community, while only 13% have actually been direct victims of crime in the past year.

**Figure V.16 Dimensions of Crime and Citizen Insecurity**



The following tables examine the variables that can be associated to the three previous items. In the first place, in Table V.4 (Annex) it can be seen that there are three factors associated to the belief that crime does represent a threat for the country's future. Non-indigenous Guatemalans, those who perceive the economic situation of the country as unfavorable, and those who have more political information are the most fearful of the threat constituted by crime in the national level.

The factors associated with the perception of personal insecurity in the vicinity or community where the respondent lives is analyzed next. The results can be seen in Table V.5 (see Annex at the end). It is found that those who reside in urban areas have a stronger perception of insecurity. It must be noted that victimization by crime is also larger in urban areas.

Among the factors, other than the sociodemographic ones, a lower perception of freedom appears to be also associated to a stronger feeling of insecurity. The rest of the variables that appear in the equation, more than explicative elements, can be considered as factors that suffer an impact due to the perception of insecurity. The way the local government is assessed, the support for the political system, the preference for a strong hand government as opposed to participation, and the index of interpersonal trust can be mentioned among them. Those who feel insecure give less support to their local government and to the political system in general. They also tend to prefer a strong-hand government, and to have less interpersonal trust.

Several figures that illustrate the impact of insecurity on certain political values and attitudes have been shown in other chapters of this study. Figure V.17 indicates how a stronger perception of insecurity has an impact on the preference for a "strong hand" government.



**Figure V.17 Perception of Insecurity and Preference for a Hard Line Government**




Table V.6 at the end of the report shows the predictors of victimization by crime. It can be observed that men, those with more education, higher socioeconomic level, and those who live in urban areas, are more prone to be victims. In Figure V.18, this can be seen more clearly; it is evident that Guatemalan men who live in urban areas the ones more affected by common crime.

**Figure V.18 Perception of Insecurity by Place of Residence and Gender**






Figure V. 19 shows the type of criminal act suffered by those who reported to have been victims. Theft was the most common criminal act (with or without physical aggression).

**Figure V.19 Type of Crime Suffered**




In the following figure, V.20, it can be seen that only 37% of the victims reported the criminal action to the authorities. The reasons for this failure to denounce the crime appear in Figure V.21. The majority (61%) of those interviewed said it was useless to denounce the criminal action.

**Figure V.20 Did You Denounce the Incident in Any Institution? (Only Victims of Crime)**



**Figure V.21 Why Did You Not Denounce the Incident? (Only Victims of Crime)**




Regarding this issue, it is important to show the percentages of satisfaction with the services rendered by certain justice sector institutions. Table V.7 shows the percentage of citizens who are satisfied or not satisfied with each institution. In order to facilitate comprehension, the answers were dichotomized in very or somewhat satisfied, on one hand, and somewhat or very dissatisfied, on the other.

**Table V.7 Satisfaction with Services Rendered by Justice Institutions**

Satisfaction	POLICIA NACIONAL	JUZGADOS	MINISTERIO PUBLICO
Very or somewhat satisfied	60 %	62 %	58 %
Not satisfied or very unsatisfied	40 %	28 %	42 %
Percentage of total population that used services	30 %	20 %	18 %


In the next two figures we can see the results of two issues related to crime. First, in Figure V.22 it can be seen that a high number of Guatemalans consider that the Police is involved with common crime. This finding is particularly dramatic in the metropolitan area, where only 25% of citizens believes that the police is there to protect them. This findings are worrisome for the justice system.

**Figure V.22 Is the Police Involved With Common Crime?**



Finally, Figure V.23 shows that it is in urban areas where the problem of “maras” (gangs) is greater. In fact, 42% of the urban respondents considered that his or her neighborhood was affected by gang problems. By contrast, in rural areas only 21% of the respondents said that his or her community was affected by this problem.


**Figure V.23 Is Your Neighborhood Affected by Gangs?**



## 5.4 Cross-time Analysis


Using the data of the previous studies of democratic culture in Guatemala we can make cross-time comparisons. In Figure V.24 it can be observed the change that has occurred in the belief that a search warrant is necessary to enter a suspect’s home. This is a right that apparently has a lot of citizens’ support, given that through the years.

**Figure V.24 Belief in Due Process**



Finally, in Figure V.25 we can see the evolution since 1993, of the perception of liberty in Guatemala. It is important to remember that in 1993 and 1995 the country was still having an internal conflict.

**Figure V.25 Perception of Freedom in Guatemala, 1993-2004**



It can be seen that the freedom that more advance has had in one decade is the freedom to vote, given that more than 80% of Guatemalans said they feel free to vote. Next we have the freedom to participate in groups that seek to solve community problems. The tendency has not varied very much in Guatemala throughout the years, which can be considered as a good symptom, although the ideal thing would be to improve in this area.

The last two freedoms are the ones that Guatemalans perceive less. Differently from the above cases however, in these cases the changes between years are more notable. It was found, for instance, that the freedom to demonstrate and the freedom of speech both suffered a decline in 2001, under the government of the FRG. By 2004 things seem to be a little better, but never as high as those of 1999.

## 6.0 Local Government

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### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines some aspects related with the way Guatemalans interact with their local government and the way they perceive it. The local government is an instance that is closer to the citizens, allowing for a stronger identification than with the national government.

Some studies on local governments, particularly in Latin America, have been done by political science scholars and researches. In recent years the subject has been explored by international organizations within the framework of development projects. A relevant issue related with local governments is decentralization. As Casafranco and Patiño point out, within the Central American region, decentralization is a project under practical and conceptual construction, comprising diverse actors and sub-themes.<sup>42</sup>

The issue of local governments is very important in Guatemala. The 1985 Constitution recognized the need for decentralization, and through the years different efforts have been made in the country in order to create mechanisms that can promote dialogue and interaction between the citizens and their Municipality. In the year 2002, within the frame of the Peace Agreements, a package of laws oriented to strengthen even more decentralization and municipal authority was approved.

As in the previous chapters, in this one a series of comparisons between Guatemala and the rest of the countries included in the study of democratic culture in the year 2004 is presented. The findings obtained in 2004 are analyzed in-depth, and finally a brief longitudinal analysis is made, using results obtained in similar studies made in Guatemala in the last decade.


### 6.2 Guatemala in Comparative Perspective

The attendance of citizens to meetings called for by their Municipality or local government can help to reinforce democracy, because through this participation citizens feel closer to the decision-making processes. Figure VI.1 shows that Guatemala has one of the highest percentages regarding attendance to municipal meetings for 2004, both in urban and in rural areas.

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
<sup>42</sup> See M.V. Casafranco and F. Patiño Millán, "Participación Ciudadana en el Nivel Local en Centroamérica: Tendencias Actuales y Perspectivas", en Córdova, Maihold and Kurtenbach, Comp., *Pasos Hacia una Nueva Convivencia: Democracia y Participación en Centroamérica* (Fundaungo, Institute for Iberoamerican Studies and Ibero-American Institute of Berlin, San Salvador, 2001).

**Figure VI.1 Attendance to Municipal Meetings in a Comparative Perspective by Place of Residence (in the Past 12 Months)**



In Figure VI.2 it can be observed how citizens evaluate the services provided by their Municipality. In this case, Guatemala stands on a middle ground, with 52 of the possible 100 points.

**Figure VI.2 Assessment of the Local Government in Comparative Perspective**






## 6.3 Results for the Year 2004

### 6.3.1 Citizens' Participation in Municipal Activities


In the first place some aspects related with the participation of Guatemalans in municipal activities is examined. It was already mentioned that 17% of those interviewed reported to have attended meetings with their local government. Table VI.1 (found in the Annex at the end of this report) explores the factors associated to that participation. Notwithstanding the fact that several models were tried, only two variables appear to be associated to the attendance to municipal meetings: gender and ethnic self-identification. Indigenous men, who live mainly in rural areas or urban-rural areas in the country are the ones who attend the most to municipal meetings.

In Figure VI.3 it can be clearly observed that while 22% of men reported that they had attended meetings, only 13% of women participated. Figure VI.4 shows that the indigenous population attended more.

**Figure VI.3 Attendance to Municipal Meetings by Gender**




**Figure VI.4 Attendance to Municipal Meetings by Ethnic Auto-Identification**



In Figure VI.5 it can be seen that the majority of those who attended municipal meetings heard about it through an invitation made by the Mayor, or through public advertisements.


**Figure VI.5 How Did You Find Out About the Meeting at the Municipality? (Only Those Who Attended Meetings)**




The following figures show some aspects related with that participation. It is found that 34% of those interviewed believes that the petitions made in those meetings will be solved by the Mayor and by municipal authorities.

It is also observed in another figure that a percentage similar to the one of those attending meetings, 18% in this case, has made use of their right to petition, this is to say, has asked for help in some municipal office or to some official of the Municipality in the last 12 months.

**Figure VI.6 To What Extent do Municipal Authorities Pay Attention to What People Request at Those Meetings?**




**Figure VI.7 Have You Ever Asked for Help in a Municipal Office or to a Local Official? (in the Past 12 Months)**



It can be observed in Figure VI.8 that 30% of the respondents consider that the Municipal Council would pay attention to him/her if he/she would submit a complaint about some local problem.

**Figure VI.8. Would the Municipal Council Pay Attention if You Submit a Complaint About Some Local Problem?**



The issue of citizen participation in the solution of community problems is now discussed. A relatively high percentage of men, 41%, stated that they had collaborated somehow solving local problems in the last 12 months. On the women's side, 27% of the respondents indicated that they had collaborated to solve problems. These results can be seen in Figure VI.9.

**Figure VI.9 Contribution to the Solution of Community Problems (in the Past Year)**




Table VI.2 presents the distribution of the type of contribution provided by the citizens. It must be taken into account that only those who indicated that they had collaborated in any way are included here. The question regarding the type of collaboration was not made to all the respondents.

**Table VI.2 Type of Contribution for the Solution of Local Problems**

TYPE OF CONTRIBUTION	PERCENTAGE
Donations of money or materials	61
One's own work - Participation with labor force	75
Attendance to community meetings	69
Organization of a new group	45
Organization of a group to combat crime	28

It stands out in the previous table that the contribution through one own's work and is the most frequent one. 75% of those respondents who indicated that they had contributed said that they did so with their own work. Another aspect that stands out is that, even though in a lower proportion, the percentage of those people who indicated that they organized themselves to combat crime is relatively high, an indication of the degree of impact of this issue in the population.

### 6.3.2 Perceptions About the Local Government

From the analysis of the interrelations between the citizen and his/her local government, we proceed now to analyze the way citizens perceive their local government. Three different things can be appreciated in Figure VI.10. In relation to the first column it is found that among those

who carried on processes with their Municipality the satisfaction average is relatively high, 69 of a total of 100 possible points. Bearing in mind the low scores obtained by Guatemalans in other aspects, this can be considered as an acceptable result. The second column shows how much trust do citizens have in their local government. Although the average here drops to 59 points, it is still over the referential line of 50 used in this study. Lastly, in the third column it can be observed how the citizens assess the way in which the municipal government fulfills its duties. Municipalities—in general, because due to the size of the sample specific municipalities cannot be specified—obtain 54 points, an evaluation probably high for the Guatemalan context.

**Figure VI.10 Perspectives About the Local Government**





Figure VI.11 shows the results obtained when those interviewed were asked to indicate which was the most serious problem in their Municipality. At the beginning of this study we presented a graphic showing which were the most serious problems in the country, according to Guatemalans. In this case, however, the question is posed in regard to the Municipality. It can be observed that an important percentage, 40% of the respondents, mention the lack of water as the most serious problem in the Municipality. This is followed from afar (with 14% and 13% respectively) by the lack of street repairs and the lack of security. The issue of the water is analyzed specifically in Figure VI.12, where it can be observed that only 32% of those interviewed consider that the water service is good or very good.

**Figure VI.11 The Most Serious Problems for the Municipality**



**Figure VI.12. Assesment of Municipal Water Services**





Figure VI.13 shows the distribution of answers to the following question:



*Would you affirm that the services provided by the Municipality to the people are...?*

In one extreme, 31% of the respondents considered that municipal services are good or very good. On the opposite side, 20% considered that they were bad or very bad. The majority of the people, 49%, considered them to be of average quality.


**Figure VI.13 Assessment of the Performance of the Local Government**




Among the predictors of the local government assessment some stand out, as shown in Table VI.3 at the end of the report. Those citizens who reside in rural areas, and those with more education are more prone to give a positive assessment to their local government. On the other side, a series of contextual factors also appear as variables to explain a favorable assesment. Perception of insecurity and the perception of corruption influence negatively in the way citizens consider that their local government is fulfilling its duties. The index of information or political knowledge is also negatively associated: those who has less information are more inclined to give a positive assessment to their local governments.

On the other hand, those who participate in social organizations and attend municipal meetings seem more prone to make a favorable assessment of the municipal government. General satisfaction with democracy and a positive assessment of the current President, Oscar Berger, are also associated with a better assessment of the local government. These associations among factors can be clearly appreciated in Figures VI.14 and VI.15.

**Figure VI.14 Assessment of the Performance of Local Government, by Place of Residence and Attendance to Municipal Meetings**



**Figure VI.15 Assesment of the Local Government and Perception of Insecurity**




### 6.3.3 Attitudes Toward Tax Payment

As indicated in the introduction of this report, the issues of low tax collection and the tax system reform have been debated in recent months. This report examines the disposition of those interviewed to pay more municipal taxes. In Figure VI.16 it can be seen that even though 56% of the respondents stated that they were not willing to pay more taxes in order to receive better municipal services, a high percentage, 44%, stated that they were willing to do so.


Table VI.4 (see Annex) shows that among the predictors or variables related with the willingness to pay more taxes, education is the only sociodemographic factor. The more educated the person is, the more willing to pay. On the other hand, contextual variables influence this issue. Those with more political information, with a stronger perception of freedom, more trust in political institutions, those who consider that the economic prospects for the country are good, who feel satisfied with democracy and who have a good image of their local government, are more prone to accept an increase in the payment of municipal taxes. The only variable negatively associated to the disposition to pay more municipal taxes in order to receive better services is insecurity. Thus, those who feel more insecure are less willing to pay taxes to their local government.

**Figure VI.16 Willingness to Pay More Municipal Taxes in Order to Receive Better Services**




It was also asked in what areas did the respondents consider that the municipal government should increase its expenditures. Responses can be seen in Graphic VI.17. The vast majority of respondents consider that the municipal government should spend more in roads and highways. The next category was health and education, with 19%.

**Figure VI.17 In What Areas Should Municipal Government Spend More?**




An specific question regarding the trust of the respondent for the way the municipality handles public funds was also made. In Figure VI.18 it can be observed that the majority of Guatemalans, both indigenous and non-indigenous, have little confidence in the way the local government handles its funds.

**Figure VI.18 Trust in the Way Municipal Funds are Handled**



In another section of the questionnaire, those interviewed were asked which was the most important condition that would have to be met in order for them to be willing to pay taxes. This question did not refer to municipal taxes, but to a national level. It can be observed in Figure VI.19, that the responses were rather balanced.

**Figure VI.19 Most Important Condition to Pay Taxes (National Level)**




#### **6.4. Cross-Time Analysis of the Results**


Figure VI.20 shows the percentage of attendance to municipal meetings during the past years. It can be observed that the percentage has not changed much, and that some 15% of Guatemalans attend them. In the year 2004 this percentage increased slightly, to reach 17%.

Also in a longitudinal perspective, it can be observed in Figure VI.21 that, except in 1997, when the assesment for local governments increased, a pattern of around 50 points has been maintained. The increase in 1997 could be related to the signature of the Peace Agreements that year.

**Figure VI.20 Attendance to Municipal Meetings in Guatemala, 1995-2004**



**Figure VI.21 Assesment of the Local Government in Guatemala, 1995-2004**







## **7.0 Electoral Behavior of Guatemalans**

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### **7.1 Introduction**

Various aspects related with political participation of Guatemalans in electoral processes are discussed in this chapter. In order to do so, not only the issue of the way Guatemalans vote, but also related aspects such as levels of registration, degree of credibility that the Electoral Tribunal and political parties merit among the population, and the participation of citizens in activities such as promoting the vote for a specific party or candidate are analyzed..

It can be remembered that representative democracy is based on free, fair, plural and periodical elections. The various theoretical conceptions of democracy, even those that defend a social democracy, accept that elections are the starting point for any democracy. Aside of fair and periodical electoral processes, representative democracy as known throughout the world requires autonomous courts or electoral commissions, political parties that can link the citizens with the state, and the participation of citizens, not only in the very act of voting but in the whole electoral process. The exercise of the free and universal suffrage can be considered as the most important action in a representative democracy.


Representative democracy was inaugurated in Guatemala two decades ago, with the election in 1984 of the National Constituent Assembly that drafted the present Political Constitution. Since then, several electoral processes of different types have taken place, and they have been considered free and fair by national and international observers.

As was the case in previous chapters, a comparative perspective with the rest of the countries where the study was made is presented first. The results obtained in the year 2004 are examined next and finally some tendencies in time are analyzed.

### **7.2 Guatemala in comparative perspective**


Two variables are examined in Figure VII.1: attendance to the ballots and the belief that the vote can improve things. It can be observed that Guatemalans are the ones with lower attendance to the ballots. However, Guatemala is placed among those countries where the belief that the vote can help to improve things is higher, and this is an important finding.

**Figure VII.1 Electoral Behavior in Comparative Perspective**



The next figure shows the average trust in elections in the different countries. Here Guatemala is placed among the three last countries, though not in the last place. The citizens from Honduras are the ones who score lower both in the belief that the vote can improve things, as regarding trust in elections.

**Figure VII.2 Trust in Elections in Comparative Perspective**



## 7.3 Results for the Year 2004

### 7.3.1 Electoral Behavior Patterns

The reported data concerning the registration to vote shown in this survey coincides exactly with the data regarding the electoral registry that the UNDP Report on Democracy in Latin America shows for Guatemala: an average of 78 for the period 1990-2000.<sup>43</sup> In that Report, Guatemala along with Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay report the lowest levels of registration to vote.


Several reasons can be mentioned in order to explain why Guatemalans have low levels of registration to vote, among them technical problems such as the lack of a single identity document. However, discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this report.

Table VII.1 found at the end of this report, explores through a multivariate analysis, which are the factors associated with the low levels of registration to vote in Guatemala, where only 77% of the population is registered. It can be observed that gender, education, age and parenthood are factors that appear to be associated to the registration to vote. Those citizens with a higher inclination to register are men, adults, those who have more education and those who have children.

Figure VII.3 shows clearly that men have higher levels of registration to vote than women.


<sup>43</sup> See Report on Democracy in Latin America, op.cit. p. 87. Data mentioned by the United Nations was taken from different sources.

**Figure VII.3 Registration to Vote (by Gender)**



The next figure shows the relation between age, education and the level of registration to vote of those interviewed. It stands out that within the younger population some differences appear, since those with some degree of university education show higher levels of registration. It can also be seen that in all age categories, those without any education are the ones who tend to register less.

**Figure VII.4 Registration to vote by education and age**



The participation in elections, this is to say the actual attendance to the ballots, will be now examined. It can be pointed out that surveys are also limited in their endeavor to measure participations in elections, since—as it has been found in the United States, Mexico and other countries—surveys tend to over-represent electoral participation. The respondents over-report their attendance to the ballots due to several reasons. On one hand, because they believe that non-attendance would bring some sort of penalty, as they are convinced that the vote is compulsory. In fact in Guatemala the vote was compulsory until the 1985 Constitution, but it is no longer so.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, it is socially desirable that the person casts his/her vote, and many persons who did not attend, state the contrary when asked.

In the survey carried out in March 2004, 66% of the citizens who reported that they were registered to vote, indicated that they went to vote in the first round of the General Elections that took place on November 9, 2003. The official report of the Electoral Tribunal (TSE) states that 58% of the registered citizens actually voted. Regarding another aspect, for the 2004 survey a 29% of overall votes were reported for the winner party, the GANA alliance, which is close to the 31% of votes obtained by that party in the first round of elections.


Table VII.2 (see Annex) examines which are the predictors of turnout in Guatemala. It is observed that gender, age, education and having children are again the determining factors. Men, adults, those with more education and who have more children are more inclined to vote in elections.

Figure VII.5 shows that ethnic self-identification, frequently considered a factor that can influence the attendance to the ballots in Guatemala, is not a statistically significant variable. In

<sup>44</sup> The United Nations Report on Democracy in Latin America presents an erroneous fact: in p. 87 it states that in Guatemala the vote is compulsory, when actually this is not the case.

fact, in some of the education categories the indigenous population has higher levels of attendance to the ballots than non-indigenous or *ladino* Guatemalans.

**Figure VII.5 Turnout in 2003 in Guatemala: By Ethnic Self-Identification and Education**



In the next figure turnout is analyzed, taking into consideration the relation between variables such as gender and age. It can be noted that both among men and women, turnout falls when they are young, and also when they are older than 60 years of age.

**Figure VII.6 Turnout for the 2003 Elections: By Age and Gender**





Figure VII.7 shows the distribution of the answers of those who, in spite of being registered, did not vote in November 2003. Almost three fourths of the respondents reported that they did not have *cédula de vecindad*, which would be the identity document equivalent to the identity card in other countries. An additional 5% reported problems with the election registry, problem more common for this elections than in the past.<sup>45</sup> Generally speaking, a very small percentage, only 8%, indicated that they did not vote due of lack of interest or because they do not believe in the system.

<sup>45</sup> The Supreme Electoral Tribunal set up a system of residential voting in order to facilitate the vote to those persons in certain municipalities, and this was a positive experience. Nevertheless, it generated some organizational problems.

**Figure VII.7 Why Didn't You Vote in the Elections 2003? (Only Registered Respondents)**




## 7.4 Citizen Confidence in Elections and in Electoral Institutions

Beyond the electoral behavior of Guatemalans, other aspects related with representative democracy must be analyzed as well. One of them is the confidence that citizens have in the fact that elections will take place in a free and transparent way, and confidence in the electoral institutions. It is also important to know the degree of citizen confidence in two of the basic institutions in a representative democracy, namely the Congress and political parties.

Figure VII.8 shows that both the Congress and the political parties have a relatively low levels of trust or support among the population. Comparatively, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) generates more trust, as well as the elections themselves. These results are favorable, although it must be noted that neither the Electoral Tribunal nor the elections obtained more than 50 points.



**Figure VII.8 Confidence in Electoral Institutions**



The predictors for confidence in elections in Guatemala (Table VII.3 in the Annex) are the index of acceptance for the actions of political participation of others, the assessment made of the local government, the participation in social organizations, and the belief that voting can improve things. Those who accept the participation of others in activities such as demonstrations and participation in electoral campaigns, those who participate more in social organizations, those whose assessment for the local government is favorable, and those who believe that voting can improve things, are more inclined to trust in the elections.

Figure VII.9 shows the relation between confidence in the elections and the acceptance of the participation of others in political activities. Those who have a strong confidence in elections tend to have a higher degree of acceptance of the participation of others in electoral campaigns and demonstrations, as well as acceptance of participation of others in community groups to solve local problems.

**Figure VII.9 Confidence in Elections and Acceptance of the Participation of Others in Political Activities**





Figure VII.10 shows that more than half of the respondents, almost 60%, believe that voting in elections can improve things in the country.


**Figure VII.10 Belief That Voting Can Improve Things**



The predictors of confidence in political parties in Guatemala, which are the institutions that receive least support—getting only 30 points in a scale from 0-100—are explored now. Table VII-4, at the end of this report, shows that the assessment of the local government appears again as a predictor; those who trust more their local government and have a better assessment of it, tend to trust more the political parties. Other factors associated to a stronger support for the parties are the socioeconomic level of the respondent and his perception of the economic prospects for the country. It is found that those citizens with a lower socio-economic level, and those who expect that the country's economy will be better within 12 months, tend to have a better image of the parties.

Finally, a higher degree of tolerance and a stronger satisfaction with democracy are also associated with a better image of the parties. In Figure VII.11 it can be seen that those who consider that economic prospects for the country are favorable and who at the same time are more satisfied with democracy, tend to trust more in the parties.


**Figure VII.11 Confidence in Political Parties**



#### **7.4.1 Citizens and Political Representation**


Political parties are the driving force in a representative democracy, and it is important that they receive the confidence and support of citizens. Notwithstanding, in the case of Guatemala—as in other countries in Latin America—parties have not been able to consolidate their standing as entities that represent the population. In order to explore with which institutions Guatemalans identified themselves more, the respondents in this survey were asked which group they considered that could better represent their interests. The answers can be seen in Figure VII.12, where it can be observed that the churches obtain the highest percentage, with 62% of the total. The mass media follows from afar with 7%, and popular groups with 6%. It can be noted that 12% of those interviewed stated that they did not feel represented by any of them.

**Figure VII.12 Which Group Represents Your Interests Better?**



We explore now what is the degree of participation of Guatemalans in various types of political activities. Figure VII.13 shows that 10% mentioned that they participated in electoral campaigns, 12% indicated that they attended meetings organized by political parties, and 28% tried to convince others to vote, or how to vote in the past elections.


**Figure VII.13 Active Political Participation**




One of the biggest weaknesses of Guatemalan political parties is their lack of ideological and programatic definition. The majority tend to be what is usually called in Political Science “personalistic” parties that lack stability in time. However, the issue of political ideology is present in the minds of Guatemalans due to the armed conflict that afflicted the country—which stemmed from the Cold War and the ideological confrontation between Communism and Liberalism. In Guatemala there was a marked polarization during the 36 years of conflict, and it persists today in large sectors of the population, especially among the country’s elites.

This study explores how Guatemalans score when asked to what political ideology they adscribe. It can be observed in Figure VII.14 that 29% of those interviewed did not know how to answer the question. Among those that did answer, the majority (35% of the total) placed themselves in the middle point of the political spectrum. Figure VII.15 shows that no big differences exist between Guatemalan men and women regarding ideological issues.

**Figure VII.14 Political Ideology in Guatemala**




**Figure VII.15 Ideological Self-Positioning and Gender**



Finally, this chapter explores what are the perceptions of the Guatemalan citizens regarding the main elected official in the country, President Oscar Berger. It must be remembered that when the survey was made the new leader had been in office only two months; this is why the answers provided by those interviewed are relative. What can be certain is that these results reflect the views that Guatemalans had in regards to Berger when they elected him as President, and the prospects of what issues should be tackled under his government. The global assesment of the way the President carries out his duties is favorable, with 57 points in a scale from 0-100. Concerning specific areas of action, it is evident that the struggle against corruption is the area that obtains higher scores from the citizens whereas the combat against poverty is the area with the least points.

**Figure VII.16 Perceptions Regarding President Oscar Berger**




## 7.5. Cross-Time Analysis of the Results

The two following graphics show some of the tendencies in time. In the first one, we can see that the levels of registration to vote have remained relatively stable along the years; this is not a positive trait because the level should have increased. What in fact increased, albeit in a small percentage, is the participation in political parties, getting to 12% for the years 2001 and 2004.




**Figure VII.17 Registration to Vote and Participation in Political Parties, 1993-2004**



In the next figure it can be observed how did Guatemalans assess the President in office at the time the survey was made. Exactly the same question was posed year after year: *Generally speaking about the present government, would you say that the work that the President (Berger) is carrying out is: very good, good, nor good nor bad, bad, very bad.* The answers were recoded in a scale from 0-100 to provide a better comprehension. In Figure VII.8, the general average that each president obtained is shown.

In 1993, Jorge Serrano Elías was President; in 1995, Ramiro de León Carpio; in 1997 the President was Alvaro Arzú, and he was still president in 1999, but the survey was at the end of his term; in 2001 the President was Alfonso Portillo, and in 2004 Oscar Berger. It can be observed that Ramiro de León, who replaced Jorge Serrano in the Presidency after his executive *coup d'état*, has been the President that has obtained the highest scores since the democratic process began. On the contrary, the lowest scores go to Alfonso Portillo of the FRG (who governed from 2000-2003).

**Figure VII.18 Assessment of the way the President fulfills his duties, 1993-2004**  
(promedio en escala 0-100)





## 8.0 Social Capital

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### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the issue of participation of Guatemalan citizens in diverse instances of civil society, and tries to establish participation patterns and factors that influence it. The issue of the so-called “social capital” is also explored, given the fact that interpersonal trust is one of its important elements.

An essential component in modern definitions of democracy is citizen participation. If a democracy is to consolidate, participation must not be limited to casting a vote every certain number of years, participating in electoral campaigns or in political parties. Participation must be permanent, in such a way that organized citizens can affect the decision-making process.

It is evident that individually it is difficult for citizens to participate in the various mechanisms and instances that exist both in a vertical level (between the state and the citizens) and in a horizontal level (among civil society’s organizations). In fact, the social fabric is made up by a series of different organizations that, aside from fulfilling the diverse specific roles that stem from their very nature, are able to give cohesion to diverse interests and help to build social consensus related to issues relevant for society. It is not a matter of replacing the role of the political parties in a representative democracy, but rather to supplement the efforts made by the various social sectors, including the political society, in the search for the common good.

However, the importance of participation is not limited to those organizations that seek to affect the decision-making process. Robert Putnam has pointed out the importance of every type of participation in democracy. The social capital of a nation is made of the network of existing organizations, not only political organizations. Social capital can be defined as the sum of all social networks, the norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance and interpersonal trust that exist among the members of a society.<sup>46</sup>

In those countries with high levels of social capital, citizens trust more their government and their countrymen.<sup>47</sup> Thus, in societies with high levels of social participation and a high degree of interpersonal trust among its members, democracy tends to be more stable.

In the first place, the figures presented provide a compared vision of participation and interpersonal confidence in Guatemala and in the rest of the countries in this study. The existing situation for Guatemala in 2004 is then analyzed, and finally cross-time data from past studies is presented.

### 8.2 Guatemala in Comparative Perspective

In order to examine the situation of participation in Guatemala *vis-à-vis* other Latin American countries, an index of participation was built based on citizen participation in five types of

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<sup>46</sup> Robert Putnam and Lewis Feldstein, *Better Together: Restoring the American Community* (New York, Simon and Schuster)

<sup>47</sup> The original work that made the issue relevant is Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*

organizations: religious organizations, associations linked to schools, committees for local development, professional or occupation related associations, and political parties.

Figure VIII.1 shows the average participation in these organizations taken as a whole. Guatemala obtains one of the highest indexes for participation, both for men and women. Social participation increased significantly in Guatemala in the wake of the peace negotiations process, and especially after the Peace Agreements were signed in 1996.

**Figure VIII.1 Index of Participation in Organizations by Gender: Comparative Perspective**





Figure VIII.2 shows another perspective. Regarding interpersonal trust, Guatemala does not obtain such positive results, and it is placed among those countries with lower levels of confidence among society members. This result was obtained through the average, within a scale from 0-100 of the answers received when the respondents were asked to indicate *how trustworthy are the people in their community*.

**Figure VIII.2 Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective**




## 8.3 Results for the Year 2004

### 8.3.1 Participation in Social Organizations

The question employed to measure the degree of participation reads as follows: *Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never.* In Figure VIII.3 the percentage of those who indicated that they participated and the frequency of their participation can be observed. There is no doubt that religious organizations or churches, and groups related to them, are the ones that generate more participation: 52% of the respondents indicated that they participated once a week, and 16% once or twice a month. From there on, participation decreases, with political parties showing the weakest participation (only 7% of the population participates frequently).

**Figure VIII.3 Participation in Social Organizations in Guatemala in 2004**




As was the case in other chapters, in order to establish which are the predictors for social participation in Guatemala, an additive index was constructed, using the participation in the different types of organizations, instead of analyzing each item of participation individually. In Guatemala, the five types of organizations are grouped within one single component in the factor analysis.

When the aforementioned index of participation is employed as a dependent variable in a linear regression (see Table VIII.1 in the Annex) several socio-demographic predictors of participation in Guatemala stand out: to reside in a rural area, to be a man, to self-identify as indigenous, and to have children. In this case the whole model is presented, not only the trimmed model, in order to point out that other socio-demographic factors do not appear to be associated to social participation.

Figure VIII.4 shows the participation in diverse organizations by one of the predictors, gender. Guatemalan women tend to participate more than men in religious organizations and those related to school, but the differences are not important. On the contrary, men participate more in development committees, professional associations, and political parties, and these differences do appear as statistically significant. The most marked difference happens in the local committees for development, as can be observed in the figure.


**Figure VIII.4 Social Participation in Guatemala by Gender**



The differences regarding participation between rural and urban areas in Guatemala can be observed in the next figure. The level of participation in church organizations, school groups,

professional groups and political parties are similar, but again, participation in committees for local development increases considerably in rural areas.<sup>48</sup>


**Figure VIII.5 Social Participation in Guatemala by Residence**



Another predictor for social participation in Guatemala is the ethnic self-identification of the respondent. Figure VIII.6 shows that the indigenous population in the country participates more than the *ladino* (non-indigenous) in all organizations included in this study. Again, the difference between *ladinos* and indigenous peoples is particularly marked in regard of the local committees for development, an instance that exists mainly in the rural areas of Guatemala.

<sup>48</sup> It must be remembered that during the armed conflict, thousands of men who lived in rural areas were organized by the Army in the so-called *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil* (Civil Patrols for Self-Defense). After they disappeared in 1996, many of them went on to the local development committees. Additionally, it must be held into consideration that the FRG government in the year 2003 promoted the informal reorganization of the former civil patrolers, promising them the payment of a financial compensation for the services rendered during the armed conflict. Several media pointed out that this strategy of the FRG was geared to obtain votes for the official candidate of that party, Efraín Ríos Montt. It can be noted that this type of social participation is not necessarily positive for democracy; on the contrary, the manipulation and intimidation that these groups can make to groups and individuals within the community can be very negative.


**Figure VIII.6 Social Participation in Guatemala by Ethnic Self-Identification**



Finally, in Figure VIII.7 the differences of participation among those who reported that they did not have children, and those who reported having one or more can be observed. Those with children participate more in all types of organization, although as could be expected, this difference is especially marked in regards to participation in school-related organizations.



**Figure VIII.7 Social Participation in Guatemala by Parenthood**



Two more figures are now presented, whereby two independent variables cross with the dependent variable. In the first one of them, it can be observed that participation in religious groups is larger among women, and that, in both cases the younger population tends to participate less.

**Figure VIII.8 Participation in Church Groups by Age and Gender**





Figure VIII.9 shows that the indigenous population tends to participate more in professional, commerce or producer's groups (occupation-related groups). Notwithstanding, this is reverted when the high school and university level of education is reached.

**Figure VIII.9 Participation in Occupation-Related Groups by Ethnicity and Education**




Aside from the sociodemographic predictors for social participation in Guatemala, it is important to analyze which is the impact or the relation of participation in regards to democracy. In Table VIII.2 at the end of the report, it can be seen that there are several aspects of democracy linked to the participation of the respondents in social organizations.


On the positive side, it can be observed that participation is related with a higher voting turnout during the last elections, and also to a good assessment for the local government. However, a negative association also appears: those who participate seem to have lower political tolerance.

Figure VIII.10 shows that those who participate more frequently in religious activities show less political tolerance, and Figure VIII.11 indicates the level of tolerance of those who participate in professional, commercial or business groups.

**Figure VIII.10 Participation in Church Groups and Political Tolerance**




**Figure VIII.11 Participation in Occupation-related Organizations and Political Tolerance**



On a more positive note, Figure VIII.12 shows the positive impact of social participation in the voting turnout in the 2003 elections.

**Figure VIII.12 Social Participation and Vote in the 2003 Elections**




## 8.4 Interpersonal Trust Among Guatemalans


As was already explained in this chapter, interpersonal trust among the members of any given society is an important element of the social capital. This study measured interpersonal trust through the three following items. In Figure VIII.13 it can be observed in the first place that 44% of Guatemalans consider that the other persons are not trustworthy, or only somewhat trustworthy, which represents a high percentage of the population.

In Figures VIII.14 and VIII.15 another perspective on the same issue is shown. It is observed that 57% of those interviewed consider that the other persons are concerned about themselves and not about others, while also a high percentage (65%) consider that other people would take advantage of them if they had the opportunity to do so.

**Figure VIII.13 Belief that People are Trustworthy**



**Figure VIII.14 Other Indicators of Interpersonal Trust, 2004 (A)**



**Figure VIII.15 Other Indicators of Interpersonal Trust, 2004 (B)**





Figure VIII.16 shows the general averages of the three measures of interpersonal trust.

**Figure VIII.16 Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, General Averages**




An index with the three individual trust issues was not employed to determine the predictors of interpersonal trust in Guatemala, because the scale is not reliable. Instead, different equations were tried, in which the confidence items were employed separately as dependent variables. The

item with more predictive power was the one that asks the respondents if they think that people would take advantage of them.

The results of the equation can be seen in Table VIII.3 (see Annex), where the complete model with all the socio-demographic variables is presented. It can be observed that those who reside in urban areas, who have a higher socioeconomic level, who self-identify themselves as *ladinos* and who are younger, are more inclined to believe that people would take advantage of them if given the opportunity. Figure VIII.7 shows, for example, that *ladinos*, both in the rural and urban areas, tend to be more distrustful. This is particularly evident for urban areas.

**Figure VIII.17 Would People Take Advantage of You if They Could?**




## 8.5. Cross-Time Analysis of the Results

Cross-time data regarding the measures for interpersonal trust are not available, because in past studies made in Guatemala the questions were formulated differently. However, it is possible to have a perspective concerning how social participation has changed in the country. Figure VIII.17 shows that participation in school-related groups has remained almost unchanged in these years. An increase in participation in local development committees can be observed, particularly for the year 2004. A marked increase in the participation in religious organizations or churches in this period can also be observed.



**Figure VIII.18 Participation in Organizations in Guatemala, 1993-2004**





## 9.0 Democratic Values and Lingering Authoritarianism

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### 9.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have dealt with diverse issues related with the democratic culture of Guatemalans and relevant elements for the construction of a democratic system, such as participation and the rule of law. A common structure in terms of the name of the chapters has been maintained up to this point in the reports of all seven Latin American countries included in this project. However, this last chapter deals with some issues that are especially important for Guatemala, and that have been analyzed in one way or another in the previous reports on democratic culture.

Given the long history of authoritarianism in the country, it is deemed necessary to tackle this issue from the perspective of the democratic culture, in order to know if Guatemalan society is advancing in the positive direction, leaving behind anti-democratic or authoritarian values that, as seen in previous reports, have been embedded in the mind of Guatemalans. The strengthening of democratic convictions has to take root and consolidate itself day by day. The chapter also explores several aspects related with this issue.

Even though the chapter refers to Guatemala, a structure similar to the one employed in the previous ones is followed: presentation of the situation in Guatemala, *vis-à-vis* the other countries included in the 2004 study; the analysis of the results for 2004 and, finally a longitudinal analysis, related to the findings of previous studies.

### 9.2 Guatemala in Comparative Perspective


The first issue examined is the preference for democracy instead of preference for other government system. A standard question is employed, one that is almost always included in this type of survey.

*With which of the following statements do you agree more.*

- a. *Democracy is to preferable over any other form of government.*
- b. *For people like me, it does not matter to have or not to have a democratic government.*
- c. *Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be better than a democratic one.*

Figure IX.1 shows the results for each one of the countries included in this study. Guatemala appears as the country with the lowest percentage of citizens who prefer democracy, with the highest percentage of indifferent citizens—those who think it does not matter—and with the highest percentage of authoritarian citizens.

**Figure IX.1 Preference for Democracy in Comparative Perspective**




Several studies have indicated that a distinction must be made between the preference that people have towards democracy, and their satisfaction with the way that it works in practice. Even if a citizen is not satisfied with the way democracy works in his country, he/she is not necessarily authoritarian, and he can even collaborate in the multiple tasks implied in the construction of a democracy, providing that he considers democracy as the best possible system. In other words, a democrat convinced that democracy is the best possible system is conscious that it is perfectible, and therefore he can feel dissatisfied in a given moment with the way in which democracy is working in his country.

Figure IX.2 shows the results for a question that reads as follows:

*Generally speaking, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Latin America?*

Regarding this question, Guatemala falls on the middle-ground *vis-à-vis* other countries. A little more than half of the Guatemalans feel either very satisfied or satisfied with the way democracy works in the country, at least as of March 2004, when the survey was conducted.


**Figure IX.2 Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective**



A question that approaches the same issues, even though it is posed in a different way, asks the respondent to indicate if he/she believes that, in spite of its problems, democracy is the best possible system of government.


It can be observed in Figure IX.3 that Guatemalans again fall at the end of the list, with an average belief that democracy is the best possible form of government considerably lower than the rest of the countries.

**Figure IX.3 Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government in Comparative Perspective**



The following figure examines the other side of the coin, the belief in the idea that a military *coup d'état* can be justifiable under some circumstances. In this regard, Guatemala occupies a rather favorable position, since it is among the three countries where support for an eventual coup is lower, even though almost half of the citizens consider that it could be justifiable.

**Figure IX.4 Acceptance of an Eventual Coup D'État in Comparative Perspective**




## 9.3 Results for the Year 2004

### 9.3.1 Perspectives Regarding Democracy

The results obtained in Guatemala are hereby further analyzed, in order to be able to determine which are the reasons that explain why Guatemala is still one of the countries less supportive of democracy, at least among those countries included in this project.

In the first place, averages of support for the different items on democracy included in the study are presented. Figure IX.5 shows that in a scale of 0-100, preference for democracy gets the highest score with 74 points. The assessment on how democratic is Guatemala comes next, with 58 points, and finally satisfaction with democracy, with 54 points.

**Figure IX.5 Perspectives on Democracy in Guatemala**



The predictors of preference for democracy in Guatemala are shown in Table IX.1. It can be observed that indigenous Guatemalans, those with more political information, and those with a stronger perception of freedom are more prone to prefer democracy. One rather strange finding, that can be explained by the situation that Guatemala went through until the new government took office in January 2004: those who have a stronger perception of corruption seem to prefer democracy. This makes sense if one considers that in the FRG government several corruption scandals took place. Presently, diverse officials of the FRG are imprisoned and facing judicial processes. Probably, Guatemalan citizens associate democracy with the possibility of having liberated the country from the former government's corruption.

A last predictor of the preference for democracy is the perception of insecurity. It is found that those Guatemalans that feel more insecure show less preference for democracy. Or, seen from another angle, those Guatemalans who feel secure tend to prefer democracy.

Figure IX.6 and Table IX.1 (in the Annex) show the association that exists between ethnic self-identification and preference for democracy. It is observed that both in the rural and the urban areas, indigenous Guatemalans are more inclined to prefer democracy.

**Figure IX.6 Preference for Democracy by Ethnic Self-Identification and Residence**





Table IX.2 shows the predictors of the satisfaction with democracy in Guatemala in the year 2004. Again, perception of freedom in the positive direction, and perception of insecurity in the negative direction, are found to be predictors. Thus, those who feel more insecure are less satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. The perception of the economic situation in the country also affects satisfaction with democracy: those who perceive that the country's situation has improved, feel more satisfied. The only socio-demographic factor found to be associated to a stronger satisfaction with democracy is education, but in a negative sense; those with less education are the ones who tend to feel more satisfied.

In Figure IX.7 it appears clearly the influence of the contextual factors in the satisfaction with democracy in Guatemala.



**Figure IX.7 Satisfaction with Democracy in Guatemala by Contextual Factors**




The predictors that of the evaluation of how democratic is Guatemala (see Table IX.3 in the Annex) are again insecurity, in a reverse relation; the perception of freedom, and the economic prospects for the country, these in a positive direction: the stronger the perception of freedom and the better prospects are seen for the country's economy, the better is the assessment about how democratic is Guatemala.

Finally, the predictors for the belief that democracy is the best form of government are explored. It can be observed in Table IX.4 (Annex) that those who believe that democracy is the best form of government are men, those with a higher education level and better socio-economic status. The place of residence is also an explanatory factor, with Guatemalans living in rural areas being more likely to believe in democracy as the best system of government.

In Figure IX.8 the differences among men and women, according to their levels of education can be observed. It is seen that in all levels of education, men are more inclined that democracy is the best form of government.

**Figure IX.8 Belief That Democracy is the Best Type of Government by Gender**



### 9.3.2 Support for Authoritarian Options

Support for authoritarian options is examined now. One thing is not to have a marked preference for democracy, and a different one is to consider that a *coup d'état* can be justified. This is maybe the most extreme action against democracy, and it indicates lingering traces of authoritarianism.

First, we can see in Figure IX.9 what is the support for a military *coup* due to some particular reasons. While just 28% of those interviewed indicated that they would justify a *coup d'état* in the case of high unemployment, 45% stated that a *coup* would be justifiable in the presence of too much corruption or too much common crime.

When an index with the individual items of support for a *coup* is made, it is possible to make multivariate analysis. In this analysis it is found that urban Guatemalans, those who are younger, and those who do not have children, are more inclined to support a *coup* for specific reasons. This results appear in Table IX.5 (see Annex).

**Figure IX.9 Justification of a Coup D'État by Item**






Figure IX.10 shows more clearly that the younger population living in urban areas has more support for a *coup* in the case of specific reasons. Figure IX.11, on the other hand, shows that those respondents who have children show a significantly lower support towards the possibility of a *coup*, especially those Guatemalans with university-level education

**Figure IX.10 Support for a Coup D'État Under Certain Circumstances by Place of Residence and Age**



**Figure IX.11 Support for a Coup Under Certain Circumstances by Education and Children**




In the study for the year 2004, like in past years, a general question to measure support for *coups d'état* was included. This is a general question, where the respondent is asked to indicate if he believes that *there can ever be reason enough for a military coup, or if he believes that there is never reason enough for a coup*.

Table IX.6 (see end of the Report) shows the predictors of approval for an eventual *coup d'état*: age (younger people tend to justify it more), insecurity (those who feel more insecure justify it more), the index of freedom (those who feel more free justify it more), preference for a strong non-elected leader (those who prefer this type of leader justify more a coup), to believe that the military should govern again (those who believe this show more support for an eventual coup), confidence in the army (those who trust more the army are more inclined to support a coup), and finally satisfaction with democracy (those who feel more dissatisfied are more inclined to accept an eventual coup).

Maybe one of the most worrying findings of this study is to see that younger Guatemalans are more inclined than adults to accept an eventual coup. This population was born when the country was already democratic, so this position seems contradictory and reflects the failure of the education system to transmit democratic values to the younger generations. In other previous studies it has been found that the younger Guatemalans do not know the recent history of the country, and that they even ignore the basic terminology that every citizen should know, for example the concept of democracy as opposed to dictatorship.


Figure IX.12 shows that both young men and young women in Guatemala have a stronger support for an eventual coup.

**Figure IX.12 General Justification of a Coup D'État by Age and Gender**




We will now examine some explicit anti-democratic values, that show to what extent there are still traces of authoritarianism in Guatemalan society. Figure IX 13 shows that the authoritarian measure that gets the most support in Guatemala is a possible coup, with 46% of the population. This is followed by the preference for a strong-hand government, instead of one that allows participation: 36% of Guatemalans favor strong-hand. The possibility of the return of military governments gets less support, but still 20% of the population favors this option. Finally, the preference for a strong, non-elected leader, is the option that receives less support, with only 18% of the population.

**Figure IX.13 Lingering Authoritarian Values**




In the three regression tables (IX.7, IX.8 and IX.9 in the Annex) the same model is used (with the same independent variables) to predict which are the factors associated to the traces of authoritarianism in Guatemala. It is found that in all the cases, education and the ethnic self-identification appear as important predictors. *Ladino* Guatemalans (non-indigenous) and those with less education, are the ones who support more the authoritarian actions. This can be clearly seen in the two figures that follow.

**Figure IX.14 Support for Authoritarian Options by Ethnic Self-Identification**



**Figure IX.15 Support for Authoritarian Options and Education**





## 9.4 Cross-Time Analysis of the Results

Even though the results shown in this chapter are, until now, not very positive, this final section of the study presents some longitudinal analysis that can offer hope. It can be observed in the following figures that the preference for democracy and support for a *coup d'état* have remained stable throughout the years in Guatemala. Ideally, the preference for democracy would have had to increase, and support for an eventual *coup* should have diminished, but it is not so, and this means that these are areas that call for urgent consideration by the Guatemalan education system.


However, two of these cross-time figures are very positive indeed. It can be observed that satisfaction with democracy in the country increased considerably between the year 2001 and the year 2004. While in 2001, 75% of Guatemalans felt dissatisfied with democracy, in the year 2004 only 41% were dissatisfied. This can be a result of diverse factors, including the elections that were held in the end of the year 2003, that were already discussed.

The other figure that allows for hope is the one related with preference for a "strong-hand government." The preference for a strong-hand government (instead of one that offers participation) in Guatemala had remained stable, in an average of 50 points, being the country in the region where the highest number of citizens favored that option as opposed to the participation option. Preference for a strong-hand government found its peak in the year 1999, weeks before the election of Alfonso Portillo and Efraín Ríos Montt, when the average support for a strong-hand government reached 63 points.


Notwithstanding, for the year 2004 preference for strong-hand decreased significantly, getting down to 40 points in the 0-100 scale. It is probable that the dissatisfaction with the FRG government, which was a "strong-hand" government, convinced Guatemalans that this is not a good option.

In any case, the increased satisfaction with democracy and the decrease regarding the preference for hard line governments are important findings, as they open a window of opportunity to improve the democratic culture in Guatemalans.


**Figure IX.16 What Type of Government Do You Consider Preferable? 1999-2004**




**Figure IX.17 Satisfaction With Democracy in Guatemala, 2001 vs. 2004**



**Figure IX.18 Preference for a Strong-Hand Government in Guatemala, 1993-2004**



**Figure IX.19 Justification of a Coup D'État in Guatemala, 1993-2004**



## 10.0 Conclusions

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An analysis has been made throughout this report about the state of democratic culture in Guatemala. The diagnosis presented in the report is in some ways positive, yet unfavorable in other aspects. If the analysis is circumscribed to Guatemalan reality and particularly if the cross-time results are taken into account, positive and hopeful findings appear in some cases. However, if the numbers are observed with more detachment, it appears that in spite of the improvement achieved in some aspects of the democratic culture of Guatemalans, issues like the support for the system, political tolerance, preference for democracy, confidence in political institutions and in the justice system, among others, still present serious deficits. These weaknesses turn critical when the results for Guatemala are compared with those obtained in the other Latin American countries included in the 2004 study.

The next table, comprising several pages, shows a detailed view of the factors that are related the democratic culture of Guatemalans, either for good or for bad. As can be observed, some predictors appear repeatedly as factors associated with democratic or anti-democratic values. The most constant predictor for Guatemala is undoubtedly education, appearing as an explanatory variable 17 times. In the majority of the cases, education is positively associated with democratic values; this means that more support for democracy comes with more education. Given the low education indexes in Guatemala, as compared with other Latin American countries, it is probable that this is the source of the weaknesses of the democratic culture in Guatemala. In other words, it is not the multiethnic reality of the country, nor the fact of having a high percentage of rural population, but rather the low level of education of the population what makes Guatemala less democratic than other Latin American countries

There are other factors that also stand out as explanatory variables for democratic culture in Guatemala. One of them is the perception of physical insecurity, which appeared 13 times as a predictor. In all the cases, those citizens who perceive insecurity in their vicinity or community, tend to provide less support to the democratic system and its basic values.

Even though other factors associated to democratic culture in Guatemala do exist, as can be seen in Table X.1, it is worthwhile mentioning another factor, one of the most frequent: the perception of freedom. In several occasions throughout this study, citizens who have fear to participate in community groups, fear to participate in a demonstration, to run for public office, and even fear to vote in elections, are the ones who tended to obtain lower scores regarding the support for democracy.

As it happens in the case of democratic institutions, the construction of a democratic culture must be seen as a long term process, one that requires more attention than the one it presently receives. It is a process that pertains to all those interested in the consolidation of democracy in Guatemala.

**Table X.1 Predictors of Democratic Culture in Guatemala 2004**

Independent Variables		Support for Stable Democracy					
		Index of Support for the System	Index of Tolerance	Support for Stable Democracy	Support for the Political Community		Index of Extended Support
					pride	unity	
Socio-Demographic	Education		+	+	+		
	Age	—		—			
	Socio-economic level (by goods)	+					
	Residence(urban)						
	Gender (man)						
	Ethnic self-identification (indigenous)	—	—				
	Civil status (married)						
	Has children						
	Religion (Catholic)						
Contextual	Perception of the economy						
	Economic prospects	+	—				+
	Victimization by crime				—		
	Believes crime is a threat for the future				+	+	
	Perception of personal insecurity	—		—			
	Victimization by corruption	+					
	Perception of corruption						
Indexes	Index of political information				+		+
	Index of attention to news	+					
	Index of perception of freedom	+	+				+
	Index of social participation		—				
	Interpersonal trust						+
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy	+					
	Assessment President						+
	Assessment local government	+					+
	Index of support for the system				+	+	
	Index of tolerance						
	Extended support for the system		+				

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

Independent Variables		Rule of Law				
		Confidence in the Justice System	Perception of Freedom	Crime Threat for future	Perception of Insecurity	Victim of Crime
Socio-Demographic	Education		+			+
	Age	—				
	Socio-economic level (by goods)					+
	Residence (urban)				+	+
	Gender (man)		+			+
	Ethnic Self-id (Indigenous)		—	—		
	Civil status (married)					
	Has children					
	Religion (Catholic)					
Contextual	Perception of the Economy			—		
	Economic Prospects					
	Victimization by crime	—				
	Believes that crime is threat for future					
	Perception of personal insecurity	—	—			
	Victimization by corruption					
	Perception of corruption	—				
Indexes	Index of political information		+	+		
	Index of attention to news					
	Index of perception of freedom				—	
	Index of social participation					
	Interpersonal trust				—	
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy	+				
	Assessment President					
	Assessment local government				—	
	Index of support for the system	+			—	
	Index of tolerance					
	Extended support for the system					
	Prefer strong-hand				+	

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

Independent Variables		Local Government and Corruption				
		Attendance to Municipal Meetings	Assesment of Local Gov't	Tax payment	Victim of Corruption	Perception of Corruption
Socio-Demographic	Education		+	+	+	+
	Age					+
	Socio-economic level				+	+
	Residence (urban)		—			
	Gender (man)	+			+	
	Ethnic Self-id (Indigenous)	+				
	Civil status (married)				+	
	Has children					
	Religion (Catholic)					
Contextual	Perception economy					
	Economic prospects			+		
	Victim crime					
	Believes crime is threat for future					
	Perception of personal insecurity		—	—		
	Victim corruption					
	Perception corruption		—			
Indexes	Index political info.		—	+		+
	Index attention news					
	Index perception of freedom			+		
	Index social participacion		+		+	
	Interpersonal trust					
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy		+	+	—	
	Assessment President		+			
	Assessment local government			+		—
	Index of support for the system				—	
	Index of tolerance					
	Extended support for the system			+		
	Attendance to municipal meetings		+			
	Vote can improve things					+
	Confidence in the justice system					—
	Justification for <i>coup</i>				+	

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

Independent Variables		Electoral Behavior			
		Electoral Registry	Vote in 2003 Elections	Confidence in Elections	Confidence in Political Parties
Socio-Demographic	Education	+	+		
	Age	+	+		
	Socio-economic level (by goods)				—
	Residence (urban)				
	Gender (man)	+	+		
	Ethnic Self-Id (Indigenous)				
	Civil status (married)				
	Has children	+	+		
	Religion (Catholic)				
Contextual	Perception of the Economy				
	Economic Prospects				+
	Victimization by crime				
	Believes crime is threat for future				
	Perception of personal insecurity				
	Victimization by corruption				
	Perception of corruption				
Indexes	Index of political information				
	Index of attention to news				
	Index of perception of freedom				
	Index of social participation			+	
	Interpersonal trust				
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy				+
	Assessment of President				
	Assessment of local government			+	+
	Index of support for the system				
	Index of tolerance				+
	Extended support for the system				
	Believes the vote can improve things			+	

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

Independent Variables		Democracy			
		Preference for democracy	Believes that democracy is better	Assessment of how democratic is Guatemala	Satisfaction with democracy
Socio-Demographic	Education		+		—
	Age				
	Socio-economic level (by goods)		+		
	Residence (urban)		—		
	Gender (man)		+		
	Ethnic Self-id (Indigenous)	+			
	Civil status (married)				
	Has children				
	Religion (Catholic)				
Contextual	Perception economy				—
	Economic prospects			+	
	Victimization by crime				
	Believes crime is threat for future				
	Perception of personal insecurity	—		—	—
	Victimization by corruption				
	Perception of corruption	+			
Indexes	Index of political information	+			
	Index of attention to news				
	Index of perception of freedom	+		+	+
	Index of social participation				
	Interpersonal confidence				
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy				
	Assesment of the President				
	Assessment of the local government				
	Index of support for the system				
	Index of tolerance				
	Extended support for the system				

+ positive relationship — negative relationship



Independent Variables		Support for Authoritarian Options				
		Index of Support for <i>Coup d'état</i>	General support for a <i>coup</i>	Prefers strong-hand	Prefers return of the military	Prefers Non-Elected Leader
Socio-Demographic	Education	—		—	—	—
	Age	—	—			
	Socio-economic level (by goods)					
	Residence (urban)	+		+		
	Gender (man)					
	Ethnic Self-id (Indigenous)			—	—	—
	Civil status (married)					
	Has children	—				
	Religion (Catholic)				—	
Contextual	Perception economy					
	Economic prospects					
	Victimization by crime					
	Believes that crime is threat for future					
	Perception of personal insecurity		+			
	Victim corruption					
	Perception of corruption					
Indexes	Index of political info					
	Index attention to news					
	Index of perception of Freedom		—			
	Index of Social Participation					
	Interpersonal trust					
Related Variables	Satisfaction with Democracy		+			
	Assessment President					
	Assessment of Local Government					
	Index of Support for the System					
	Index of Tolerance					
	Extended Support for the System					

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

Cont. 7

Independent Variables		Social Capital	
		Participation in Social Organizations	Interpersonal Trust (measured by the belief that people would take advantage)
Socio-Demographic	Education		—
	Age		—
	Socio-economic level (by goods)		+
	Residence (urban)	—	—
	Gender (man)	+	
	Ethnic Self-id (indigenous)	+	—
	Civil status (married)		
	Has children	+	
	Religion (Catholic)		
Contextual	Perception of the Economy		
	Economic Prospects		
	Victimization by crime		
	Believes that crime is threat for future		
	Perception of personal insecurity		
	Victimization by corruption		
	Perception of corruption		
Indexes	Index of political information		
	Index of attention to news		
	Index of perception of freedom		
	Index of social participation		
	Interpersonal trust	+	
Related Variables	Satisfaction with democracy		
	Assessment President		
	Assessment of the local government	+	
	Index of support for the system		
	Index of tolerance	—	
	Extended support for the system		
	Vote in 2003	+	

+ positive relationship — negative relationship

## **Annexes**

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ANNEX A: Sample Design

ANNEX B: Technical Note and Regression Tables

ANNEX C: IRB Approval and Questionnaire



## **Annex A: Sample Design for Guatemala CAM Democracy Audit ARD-USAID-ASIES**

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### **Sample Design**

This sample is based on a stratified design, explained in Chapter II. As is well known, even after the stratification is made, it is possible to have a sample with individuals whose places of residence are far away from each other. In order to avoid this problem, which would result in very high costs for the sampling process, relatively compact areas are chosen. This selection is made once the sample is stratified; these selected compact areas are called conglomerates. For the present sample, Census tracts (combinations of “sector” and “sección censal” sections and sectors made for the Census were used. The census sections and sectors are geographic divisions of the country carried out by the National Institute for Statistics in order to apply the census; census tracts normally contain between 100 and 200 households. Within each census section, the households that would be visited were selected, and finally, the persons who would provide the information. As several selections were needed, the sample aside from stratified it multi-stage, and it is called by conglomerations, because it chose compact areas. Complex samples reduce the cost of fieldwork, although they slightly reduce precision, as compared with simple random samples.

The margin of error for this sample by region can be seen in the next table:

**Margin of Error for Relevant Subgroups**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Interviews</b>	<b>Maximum error (Confidence 95%)</b>
Metropolitan	411	5.9%
Northwest	534	5.2%
Northeast	317	6.7%
Southeast	194	8.6%
Southwest	252	7.6%
Urban area	790	4.3%
Rural area	918	4.0%
Total population	1708	2.9%

Every survey by sampling is affected by two type of error: non-sampling and sampling errors. Both are important and affect accuracy in the results, but only the sampling errors can be quantified. Non-sampling errors, even though their magnitude is unknown, can be controlled through an orderly and careful process that is applied in every stage of the work.

Non-sampling errors are those that are made during the collection and processing of data. The control for non-sampling errors is made in every stage of the work. For example, the construction of an adequate measuring instrument guarantees the better comprehension of the question by the interviewee. Similarly, intensive training provided to the interviewers favors the correct application of the instrument, and uniformity in the way that the answers are approached and dealt with. Supervision of fieldwork reduces non-sampling error, as it guarantees that all the interviews are carried out according to the standards established by the researchers. A detail-

oriented codification guarantees that the information gathered in the field reaches the database in its intended form. In order to guarantee a clean database, data entry specific programs with appropriate checks to identify typographic mistakes and lack of logical sequence in the questions was used. Double entry by different data entry clerks was used to maintain the quality of the information.

Sampling errors are caused by chance, and stem from the fact that just a sample is interviewed, not the whole population. In this regard, problems can arise both due to the sample that was selected -among many possible samples- and due to the techniques employed to obtain it. Sampling error is the measure of variability among all the possible samples that could be employed using the same technique. As it is impossible to know all possible samples, this datum is estimated from the variance. Contrary to popular belief, the sampling error does not depend only on the number of cases, but also in the technique that was employed to choose them.

The sampling error differs for each ratio or proportion estimated within a study, and the error that is reported for a sample is the error estimated for a statistic known as sampling variable. The sampling error for a particular statistic is calculated as the square root of the population variance of the statistic.

In order to estimate this error it is necessary to consider the way in which the sample was designed. In order to compare, a simple random sample is used (SRS). A simple random sample is the one that would be obtained if the interviewees were to be chosen from a roster with the names of all the available adults. Since SRS samples have extremely high costs, and they are very seldom employed. It should be noted that the formulas that can be found in Statistics manuals usually presume an SRS.

A stratified sample is usually more accurate than a SRS. This is to say, a stratified sample allows for more precision than the one that would be obtained with an unrestricted alleatory sample.

On the other side, a clustered sample is considerably cheaper than an SRS, but it is also less accurate. In the case of this study, a complex sample that combined the characteristics of a stratified sample and of a clustered sample was employed. In this way, the loss of accuracy that occurs when costs are reduced by the use of a clustered, is slightly compensated by the better view provided by a stratified sample. The measure that expresses the way in which a complex sample compares with an SRS is known as design effect, DEF. DEF being the quotient of the variance obtained by a complex sampling, divided into the variance obtained by an IAS.

The design effect compares the accuracy of a complex sample with that of a simple random sample design (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the variance obtained by using the complex sample is the same as that obtained by the SRS. In those cases in which the complex sample appears to be more efficient, this is to say, when the characteristics of the stratified sampling predominate, a value inferior to 1 is obtained for DEF. If the value of DEF is higher than 1, which is what happens in most cases, the complex sampling is less efficient than the SRS, as the effects of clustering reduce the accuracy. Usually, it is considered adequate to have values for DEF between 1 and 2, although occasionally there are some indicators in which the value of DEF can exceed 4. The high values for DEF suggest variables which are very similar within each community, but vary considerably among communities.

The presence of very high design effects would suggest the need to employ techniques that acknowledge them for the significance tests. This techniques are not available in the majority of statistical packages as SPSS, and very high DEF values would have compelled to avoid their use and to search other options. In the case of this study, as can be seen in the following table, the majority of the the design effects for variables of interest were found between 1 and 2, and this suggests that the use of SPSS does not have a significant impact in the quality of the conclusions. For those questions with responses expressed in scales, a value of 0 was given to the most negative value, and a value of 100 to the most positive. In order to estimate DEF, Epi Info (version 6 for DOS) a package designed and maintained by the *Center for Disease Control*, was used. This package estimates DEF through an approximation with a Taylor series.<sup>49</sup>

### Design Effects for Selected Variables and Indexes

Urban Area					
	Statistic	N	EE (SRS)	EE (CS)	Deff
Has contributed or tried to contribute to solve any problem in the community	32.8	784	1.68	1.96	1.4
According to how you understand the terms "left and right", where do you place yourself (1 left 10 right)	6.0	581	0.10	0.11	1.3
Index of support for the system	49.5	722	0.76	0.82	1.1
Index of Tolerance	47.6	740	0.96	1.07	1.2
Do you consider that the people in your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, somewhat not trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy?	53.9	756	1.13	1.26	1.2
Do you believe that most of the time people are concerned only about themselves, or do you think they are willing to help others?	36.5	743	1.77	2.08	1.4
Do you believe that most people, if given the opportunity would take advantage of you?	28.1	707	1.69	1.91	1.3
Wealth measured by number of capital goods	5.6	790	0.11	0.16	2.4
Percentage of masculine population	47.8	790	1.78	0.94	0.3
Which was the last year of study that you completed?	7.5	783	0.17	0.23	1.9
Index of victimization by corruption	0.3	790	0.03	0.03	1.4
Have you been victim of violence in the last two years?	18.1	790	1.37	1.46	1.1
Are you registered to vote?	79.4	790	1.44	1.64	1.3
Age	38.3	790	0.54	0.35	0.4

<sup>49</sup> The model of design effect was incorporated in this study based in the one carried out by Luis Rosero, of the Costa Rican research team.

Rural Area					
	Statistic	N	EE (MAI)	EE (MC)	Deff
Has contributed or tried to contribute to solve any problem in the community?	35.0	912	1.58	1.96	1.5
According to how you understand the terms "left and right", where do you place yourself (1 left 10 right)	5.8	629	0.09	0.12	1.6
Index of support for the system	48.5	776	0.75	0.95	1.6
Index of Tolerance	44.9	797	0.87	1.06	1.5
Do you consider that the people in your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, somewhat not trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy?	60.1	869	1.10	1.39	1.6
Do you believe that most of the time people are concerned only about themselves, or do you think they are willing to help others?	49.3	867	1.70	2.11	1.5
Do you believe that most people, if given the opportunity would take advantage of you?	40.3	814	1.72	2.12	1.5
Wealth measured by number of capital goods	2.7	918	0.07	0.15	4.8
Percentage of male population	49.0	918	1.65	0.78	0.2
Which was the last year of study that you completed?	4.3	913	0.13	0.20	2.3
Index of victimization by corruption	0.2	918	0.02	0.03	2.0
Have you been victim of violence in the last two years?	8.2	918	0.90	0.89	1.0
Are you registered to vote	72.9	918	1.47	1.51	1.1
Age	37.2	918	0.49	0.29	0.4

Total Republic					
	Media	N	EE (MAI)	EE (MC)	Deff
Has contributed or tried to contribute to solve any problem in the community?	34.0	1696	1.15	1.36	1.4
According to how you understand the terms "left and right", where do you place yourself (1 left 10 right)	5.9	1210	0.07	0.08	1.5
Index of support for the system	49.0	1498	0.54	0.63	1.4
Index of Tolerance	46.2	1537	0.65	0.75	1.3
Do you consider that the people in your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, somewhat not trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy?	57.2	1625	0.79	0.93	1.4
Do you believe that most of the time people are concerned only about themselves, or do you think they are willing to help others?	43.4	1610	1.24	1.51	1.5
Do you believe that most people, if given the opportunity would take advantage of you	34.6	1521	1.22	1.46	1.4
Wealth measured by the number of capital goods	4.0	1708	0.07	0.14	4.0
Percentage of masculine population	48.5	1708	1.21	0.60	0.2
Which was the last year of study that you completed?	5.8	1696	0.11	0.18	2.7
Index of victimization by corruption	0.3	1708	0.02	0.02	1.8
Have you been a victim of violence in the last two years?	12.8	1708	0.81	0.84	1.1
Are you registered to vote?	75.9	1708	1.04	1.14	1.2
Age	37.7	1708	0.36	0.23	0.4



## Survey Universe

The survey universe, is the population or geographic units for which inferences may be made from the survey data. For this study, the survey universe includes all citizens (people aged 18 and over) in urban and rural areas in all 331 municipalities in the republic of Guatemala. In order to overcome linguistic barriers, questionnaires have been translated into Kaqchikel, Q'eqchi', K'iche', Mam and Ixil.

## Regions and other domains of study

A domain of study is a specific region or group for which a separate estimate is desired. For this study, five regions, which can also be used as domains of study have been defined.


1. **Metropolitana:** Which includes the municipalities in the department of Guatemala.
2. **Suroccidente:** Including all municipalities in Escuintla, Suchitepéquez, Retalhuleu as well as selected municipalities in San Marcos, and Quetzaltenango.<sup>50</sup>
3. **Noroccidente:** including all municipalities in the departments of Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Sololá, Totonicapán, Huehuetenango as well as the municipalities of San Marcos and Quetzaltenango not included in the above region.
4. **Nororiente:** Including the municipalities of the Departments of Petén, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, El Progreso, Izabal, and Zacapa.
5. **Suroriente:** Including the departments of Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa, and Chiquimula.

These regions are presented in the following figure.

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<sup>50</sup> The municipalities in the department of Quetzaltenango included in this region are: Colomba, El Palmar, Coatepeque, Flores Costa Cuca, and Génova. The municipalities from the department of San Marcos included in this region are El Quetzal, El Rodeo, El Tumbador, La Reforma, San Pablo, Malacatán, Catarina, Nuevo Progreso, Pajapita, Ayutla y Ocos.

## Regionalización para el proyecto CAM



Map: ASIES, 2003

### Measurement Units and Respondents

Measurement units are the persons or objects to whom the information refers. Measurement units are the population living in dwelling units reported in the National Census maps for the 2002 Census. People living in hospitals, asylums, army barracks, boarding schools, monasteries, convents and similar institutions are specifically not included in this study.

### Observation Units, Respondents, and Final Sampling Units

This study includes variables that refer to the respondent, the household head and the dwelling unit. Therefore, it is convenient to define the observation units for this study as the household.

Since all households reported in the 2002 census are located in a dwelling unit, it is deemed convenient to use the dwelling as the final sampling unit. These units are easily located on the field and more or less permanent, with the exception of those located in places recently struck by natural disasters.

### Sampling Method

As part off the contract requirements, a complex sample was devised. A contract sample is one that combines the characteristics of stratified and clustered samples. The following requirements were observed:

- 100% of Guatemalan citizens were to be represented.
- A minimum of five and a maximum of eight strata were defined
- Each stratum should be usable as a domain of study
- Urban and rural areas should be usable as domains of study
- Sample should be self-weighted both at a national and stratum-level.

With these requirements in mind, the following goals were set:

- To obtain representative samples for the following domains of study:
  1. Guatemala as a whole
  2. First stage strata (domains of study)
    - a. Metropolitana
    - b. Nororiental
    - c. Noroccidente
    - d. Suroccidente
    - e. Suroriental
  3. Other domains of study
    - a. Urban
    - b. Rural
- To estimate sample errors for indicators obtained at each level.
- To allocate interviews in a manner consistent with the budget, sample size and margin of error required for the studies' results.
- To use the most recently updated sample frame for each city.

Under these conditions and with the above-mentioned goals in mind, a multi-stage complex sample was devised. Random selection is used in all stages and quotas by age and sex are used only in the final respondent selection.

Obtaining an adequate representation within each region proved to be a challenging task. Besides the usual urban and rural considerations, special attention was given to small, but sometimes heavily populated, areas with different characteristics from the surrounding population. In many cases, representing these communities while maintaining the required self-weighting sample presented special difficulties.

Guatemala's municipal division is extremely varied regarding area and population. Additionally, urban and rural considerations are obscured by the way Guatemalan law assigns a particular community to rural or urban area. This assignment is not done with regards to population, economic activities or the availability of basic services. Rural and urban areas are defined according to a law that states that all communities classified as *Pueblo*, *Villa* or *Ciudad* are urban, whereas all communities classified as *aldea*, *caserío*, *paraje*, *finca* and others are rural.

Under these circumstances, it was considered more appropriate to separate a whole region into its urban and rural communities and then choose the communities.

This procedure differs from the method suggested at the beginning of the project. The originally proposed method required that municipalities be chosen in a region and then those chosen be partitioned into rural and urban areas. A final selection step was proposed to choose the communities within each of these areas. By using the above described method rather than the proposed method, one selection stage was eliminated and complying with the self-weighting requirement was achieved more easily.

A number of problems still had to be solved. For different reasons, mainly historical, a number of municipalities show different characteristics from their immediate neighbors. Such is the case of Zaragoza in Chimaltenango and Pachalum in Quiché which have mainly “Ladino” (mestizo) populations even though the surrounding municipalities are mainly indigenous. In a similar but opposite case, in Chiquimula the municipalities of Camotán, Jocotán and Olopa have a large indigenous populations and their immediate neighbors are almost exclusively “Ladino.” Choosing municipalities and then communities is likely to affect the ratio of ladino to indigenous in case one of these municipalities is chosen.

In order to avoid these problems, a different division of Guatemala was required. This division was achieved by grouping together municipalities with similar characteristics regardless of their proximity within a region. After this division was produced, it was combined with the strata division required in the sample. Finally, the number of interviews was allocated in a manner proportional to population.


The procedure used to construct homogeneous groups of municipalities was as follows: A large number of variables was obtained at a municipality level. These data included indicators related to education, election turnout, poverty, gender and rurality.<sup>51</sup> These values were normalized and clusters were produced using a Euclidean norm. Different divisions from one to ten groups were tried out. A division with six different groups was chosen because increasing the number of groups beyond this number resulted in one-municipality groups. Three municipalities could not be placed in any of the six groups due to a large number of missing variables. These municipalities are Quesada in Jutiapa, Santa Lucía Milpas Altas in Sacatepéquez and San Bartolo in Totonicapán. These municipalities were assigned to special groups. Quesada was assigned to Especial 2 the other two to Especial 1. This division is shown in Figure 2.

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<sup>51</sup> The following variables were used: Total population 2002, dwelling units 2002, percentage of indigenous population, percentage of rural population, percentage of male population, literacy of men and women over 15, educational efficiency indicators, municipal government budget, percentage of poverty, index of vulnerability, chronic malnutrition, human development index and percentage of registered voters..

# Clasificación de Municipios

REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA



Elaboración: ASIES, 2003

If all possible combinations of six homogeneous groups, five domains of study and two areas are considered, a total of seventy divisions would be needed. However, only thirty four are non-empty. The number of interviews in each of this divisions was allocated proportional to population. In the next step, communities were chosen proportional to population. Finally, the required number of Census tracts (*sector* and *sección censal*) were chosen with proportional to population probability. Twelve interviews were used in each rural tract and eight in each urban. The resultant sample was aggregated to check if all requirements had been met.

The resulting sample was a three stage sample with thirty four strata. The first stage was choosing the communities, the second the census tracts and the third stage was choosing the household. In some households, more than one adult could meet the gender and age quotas so a fourth stage, using a table of random numbers, was implemented to choose the respondent.

## Sample Frame

The sample frame used was the community and Census tract lists produced by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) for the 2002 census. Census maps produced by INE were used during fieldwork.

## Sample Size

In order to meet contract requirements, sample size was set to be at least 1500 effective interviews. Error estimations for each domain of study are presented in section 1.9.

## Design Effects and Sampling Error

Sampling error is estimated using sample size and design effects typical for similar studies. Sample effects, which are defined as the quotient of the variance obtained with a simple random sample divided by the variance of the complex sample. These effects can be different for each variable. The following equation is usually quoted to illustrate this points:

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

Where  $V_{sa}(\theta)$  is the variance for indicator  $\theta$  using a simple random sample and  $V_{comp}(\theta)$  is the variance for the same indicator using a complex sample.

In order to estimate typical sample effects, data from the DIMS 2001 study was used. Since many of the DIMS summative scales were included in this study, sample effects can be used for reference. A number of variables, presented in Table 1 were studied in order to estimate design effects. To calculate the actual numbers, the CSAMPLE module of Epi Info was used. This program uses a second order Taylor approximation for variances.

**Design Effects for Selected DIMS 2001 Variables**

Question	Design effect	Question	Design effect	Question	Design effect
P40	1.635	P58B	1.398	P74I	1.081
P41	1.101	P60A	1.241	P74J	1.423
P42	1.363	P60C	1.343	P74K	1.158
P43	1.340	P60C1	1.117	P74L	1.873
P44A	2.608	P61	1.071	P74M	1.888
P45A	1.459	P74A	3.588	P74N	1.586
P46A	1.928	P74B	2.114	P74Ñ	1.123
P48A	1.624	P74C	2.315	P74O	2.791
P49A	1.767	P74D	1.180	P74P	1.271
P50A	4.933	P74E	1.376	P99	1.865
P51	1.526	P74F	1.366	P100	0.959
P52	2.173	P74G	2.023	P101	1.193
P58	1.499	P74H	1.179	P102	1.508

The average Design effect was 1.692. Since DIMS 2001 had non-proportional assignation, close to 10% of this effect could be attributed to the need for sample weights. Therefore, it was considered reasonable to estimate a 1.523 design effect due to clustering. Since DIMS used 10 interviews per cluster in urban areas and 15 in rural, mean cluster size was estimated a 13.33.

Applying the usual formula for design effects due to clustering, namely

$$Deff = 1 + \rho(k - 1)$$

Where  $\rho$  is intra-cluster correlation and  $k$  the average cluster size, average intra-cluster correlation was estimated at 0.042. Since this correlation is usually very similar for different applications of the same questionnaire, we can assume that similar values are expected for CAMS 2004. With an average of 9.20 cases per cluster, sample effects are expected to be around 1.348 for CAMS 2004.

Additionally, a slight oversample was considered for each region based on estimated rejection rates. This rate was different for each stratum. Even though rejection rates were lower than expected in some areas, the resulting sample produces very similar information at a national level either with or without weights. Therefore, it is recommended that it be treated as self-weighted. Relevant information is presented in tables ahead.

#### Interviews and Expected and Real Rejection Rate by Region

Region	Required interviews	Estimated rejection rate	Estimated number of interviews (including rejection)	Actual number of interviews	Rejection rate (actual)
Guatemala	340	25%	425	411	4%
Noroccidente	499	25%	624	534	16%
Nororient	269	20%	324	317	2%
Surorient	165	18%	195	194	1%
Suroccidente	227	20%	272	252	8%
TOTAL	1500	23%	1840	1708	7%

#### Sampling Errors for Each Domain of Study

##### Expected Sample Size and Maximum Errors

	Interviews	Maximum error (95% confidence)	
		Simple random sample	Complex sample
Guatemala	340	5.4%	6.3%
Noroccidente	499	4.5%	5.2%
Nororient	269	6.1%	7.1%
Surorient	165	7.8%	9.0%
Suroccidente	227	6.6%	7.7%
Urban	696	3.8%	4.4%
Rural	804	3.5%	4.1%
TOTAL	1500	2.6%	3.0%

After the interviews were conducted, the preceding table was updated with actual sample sizes and design effects.

### Actual Sample Size and Maximum Errors (95% Confidence)

	Interviews	Maximum error (95% confidence)	
		Simple Random Sample	Complex ample
Metropolitana	411	4.9%	5.9%
Noroccidente	534	4.3%	5.2%
Nororiente	317	5.6%	6.7%
Suroriente	194	7.2%	8.6%
Suroccidente	252	6.3%	7.6%
Urban	790	3.6%	4.3%
Rural	918	3.3%	4.0%
TOTAL	1708	2.4%	2.9%

## Sample and Population Comparison

### By Region

	Population	Percent	Actual Interviews	Percent
Metropolitana	2541581	22.6%	411	24.1%
Noroccidente	3742407	33.3%	534	31.3%
Nororiente	2012859	17.9%	317	18.5%
Suroriente	1235866	11.0%	194	11.3%
Suroccidente	1704486	15.2%	252	14.8%
TOTAL	11237199		1708	

### By Rural and Urban Area

	Urban population	Rural population	Percent urban	Urban Interviews	Rural Interviews	Percent rural (actual)
Metropolitana	2186669	354912	86.0%	334	77	81.3%
Noroccidente	1424190	2318217	38.1%	227	307	42.5%
Nororiente	590006	1422853	29.3%	72	245	22.7%
Suroriente	366029	869837	29.6%	58	136	29.8%
Suroccidente	667120	1037366	39.1%	99	153	39.2%
TOTAL			46.1%	790	918	46.3%

## Sample points listing

### Región 1, Guatemala

	Department	Municipality	Community	Area	Interviews
1	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 1 No colonias	Urbana	8
2	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia 10 de Mayo Zona 1	Urbana	8
3	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 2 No colonias	Urbana	8
4	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 3 No colonias	Urbana	8
5	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 5 No colonias	Urbana	8
6	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Arrivillaga Zona 5	Urbana	8
7	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 6 No colonias	Urbana	8



8	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia El Martinico I Zona 6	Urbana	8
9	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Los Angeles Zona 6	Urbana	8
10	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Castillo Lara Zona 7	Urbana	8
11	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia 4 de Febrero Zona 7	Urbana	8
12	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Kaminal Juyú I Zona 7	Urbana	8
13	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 10 No colonias	Urbana	8
14	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Concepción Zona 10	Urbana	8
15	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Valle de Almería Zona 11	Urbana	8
16	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Miraflores Zona 11	Urbana	8
17	Guatemala	Guatemala	Zona 13 No colonias	Urbana	8
18	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Vista Hermosa 1 Zona 15	Urbana	8
19	Guatemala	Guatemala	Aldea Lavarreda Zona 18	Urbana	8
20	Guatemala	Guatemala	Finca La Pascua Zona 18	Urbana	8
21	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia La Florida Zona 19	Urbana	8
22	Guatemala	Guatemala	Colonia Venezuela Zona 21	Urbana	8
23	Guatemala	Chinautla	Caserío San Antonio Las Flores	Rural	11
24	Guatemala	Chinautla	Colonia Santa Isabel 1 y 2	Urbana	8
25	Guatemala	Mixco	Aldea El Rodeo	Rural	11
26	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Colinas de Minerva	Urbana	8
27	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia La Brigada	Urbana	8
28	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Montserrat 2	Urbana	8
29	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Lomas del Rodeo	Urbana	8
30	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Pérez Guisasola	Urbana	8
31	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia San Francisco 1	Urbana	8
32	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Río Escondido	Urbana	8
33	Guatemala	Mixco	Colonia Molino de Las Flores 1	Urbana	8
34	Guatemala	Mixco	Mixco	Urbana	8
35	Guatemala	Palencia	Caserío El Bejucal	Rural	11
36	Guatemala	Petapa	Colonia Villa Hermosa 1 y 2	Urbana	8
37	Guatemala	San José Pinula	Lotificación Santa Sofía	Urbana	8
38	Guatemala	San José Pinula	Colonia Santa Elena	Urbana	8
39	Guatemala	San José Pinula	San José Pinula	Urbana	8
40	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez	Caserío San Juaneritos	Rural	10
41	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez	Ciudad Quetzal	Urbana	8
42	Guatemala	San Pedro Ayampuc	Colonia Villas de San Pedro	Urbana	8
43	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Aldea El Carmen	Rural	11
44	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Colonia Loma Real	Urbana	8
45	Guatemala	Santa Catarina Pinula	Santa Catarina Pinula	Urbana	8
46	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Aldea Bárcenas	Rural	11
47	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Asentamiento Tres Banderas	Urbana	8
48	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Castañás	Urbana	8
49	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Renacimiento	Urbana	8
50	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Colonia Santa Teresita	Urbana	8
51	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Prados de Monte María	Urbana	8
	<i>Total de la región</i>				425
<b>Región 2</b>		<b>Suroccidente</b>			
52	Escuintla	Escuinta	Colonia Magnolias	Urbana	7

53	Escuintla	Escuintla	Caserío Los Portales	Rural	12
54	Escuintla	Escuintla	Colonia Independencia	Urbana	7
55	Escuintla	Escuintla	Escuintla	Urbana	8
56	Escuintla	La Democracia	La Democracia	Urbana	7
57	Escuintla	La Gomera	Lotificación San Rafael	Urbana	8
58	Escuintla	La Gomera	Parcelamiento Los Chatos	Rural	11
59	Escuintla	Masagua	Aldea Obero	Rural	12
60	Escuintla	Masagua	Caserío Málaga	Rural	11
61	Escuintla	Nueva Concepción	Trocha 5	Rural	12
62	Escuintla	San José	Puerto San José	Urbana	7
63	Escuintla	Siquinalá	Finca San Vicente	Rural	12
64	Escuintla	Tiquisate	Tiquisate	Urbana	7
65	Quetzaltenango	Coatepeque	Coatepeque	Urbana	8
66	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar	El Palmar	Urbana	7
67	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar	El Rosario Palajunoj	Rural	12
68	Retalhuleu	Champerico	Caserío Santa Ana La Selva	Rural	11
69	Retalhuleu	El Asintal	Lotificación San Rafael	Urbana	8
70	San Marcos	El Tumbador	Aldea Las Cruces	Rural	11
71	San Marcos	Ocós	Caserío Villa Angela	Rural	12
72	Suchitepéquez	Chicacao	Finca Washington	Rural	11
73	Suchitepéquez	Mazatenango	Mazatenango	Urbana	8
74	Suchitepéquez	Patulul	Colonia Santa Luisa	Urbana	7
75	Suchitepéquez	Río Bravo	Comunidad Agraria Campesina	Rural	12
76	Suchitepéquez	Samayac	Samayac	Urbana	7
77	Suchitepéquez	San Francisco Zapotitlán	Finca Las Margaritas	Rural	12
78	Suchitepéquez	Santa Bárbara	Santa Bárbara	Urbana	7
79	Suchitepéquez	Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez	Parcelamiento El Japón Nacional	Rural	11
80	Suchitepéquez	Santo Tomás La Unión	Santo Tomás La Unión	Urbana	7
	Total de la región				272
	<b>Región 3</b>	<b>Noroccidente</b>			
81	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Aldea Buena Vista	Rural	12
82	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango	Urbana	8
83	Chimaltenango	Patzún	Aldea Cojobal	Rural	12
84	Chimaltenango	Patzún	Patzún	Urbana	8
85	Chimaltenango	San Martín Jilotepeque	Caserío El Sargento	Rural	12
86	Chimaltenango	San Martín Jilotepeque	San Martín Jilotepeque	Urbana	8
87	Chimaltenango	Tecpán Guatemala	Caserío Xetoxox	Rural	12
88	Chimaltenango	Tecpán Guatemala	Tecpán Guatemala	Urbana	8
89	Huehuetenango	Aguacatán	Aguacatán	Urbana	8
90	Huehuetenango	Aguacatán	Aldea El Pericón	Rural	12
91	Huehuetenango	Cuilco	Aldea El Rodeo	Rural	12
92	Huehuetenango	Jacaltenango	Aldea Jajliná	Rural	12
93	Huehuetenango	Jacaltenango	Jacaltenango	Urbana	8
94	Huehuetenango	La Libertad	Aldea El Trapichillo	Rural	12
95	Huehuetenango	Nentón	Nentón	Urbana	8
96	Huehuetenango	San Juan Atitán	Aldea Camul	Rural	12

97	Huehuetenango	Todos Santos Cuchumatán	Todos Santos Cuchumatán	Urbana	8
98	Quetzaltenango	Cabricán	Caserío Grandeza	Rural	12
99	Quetzaltenango	Flores Costa Cuca	Aldea Gálvez	Rural	12
100	Quetzaltenango	Huitán	Aldea Paxoj	Rural	12
101	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango	Zona 2	Urbana	8
102	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango	Zona 4	Urbana	8
103	Quetzaltenango	San Martín Sacatepéquez	San Martín Sacatepéquez	Urbana	8
104	Quiché	Chajul	Chajul	Urbana	8
105	Quiché	Chichicastenango	Caserío Chuabaj	Rural	12
106	Quiché	Chichicastenango	Chichicastenango	Urbana	8
107	Quiché	Cunén	Finca El Rancho	Rural	12
108	Quiché	Ixcán	Cooperativa La Resurrección	Rural	12
109	Quiché	Ixcán	Playa Grande	Urbana	8
110	Quiché	Ixcán	Victoria 20 de Enero	Rural	12
111	Quiché	San Juan Cotzal	Finca San Francisco	Rural	12
112	Quiché	Uspantán	Caserío Sicaché	Rural	12
113	Quiché	Uspantán	Uspantán	Urbana	8
114	Sacatepéquez	Alotenango	Alotenango	Urbana	8
115	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala	Aldea San Juan del Obispo	Rural	12
116	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala	Antigua Guatemala	Urbana	8
117	Sacatepéquez	Jocotenango	Colonia Los Llanos	Urbana	8
118	Sacatepéquez	San Lucas	San Lucas	Urbana	8
119	Sacatepéquez	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Urbana	8
120	Sacatepéquez	Santa Lucía Milpas Altas	Santo Tomás Milpas Altas	Rural	12
121	San Marcos	Comitancillo	Aldea Chicalaj	Rural	11
122	San Marcos	Comitancillo	Comitancillo	Urbana	8
123	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Aldea Talhuito	Rural	12
124	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Aldea Tuichuná	Rural	12
125	San Marcos	Concepción Tutuapa	Concepción Tutuapa	Urbana	8
126	San Marcos	San Cristóbal Cucho	Aldea Barranca Grande El Calvario	Rural	12
127	San Marcos	San Marcos	San Marcos	Urbana	8
128	San Marcos	San Miguel Ixtahuacán	Aldea Sicabé Buena Vista	Rural	12
129	San Marcos	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	Aldea San Andrés Chapil	Rural	12
130	San Marcos	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	San Pedro Sacatepéquez	Urbana	8
131	San Marcos	Tajumulco	Caserío Piedra Redonda	Rural	12
132	San Marcos	Tajumulco	Tajumulco	Urbana	7
133	Sololá	Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán	Caserío Chui Santo Tomás	Rural	11
134	Sololá	Santa Clara La Laguna	Santa Clara La Laguna	Urbana	8
135	Sololá	Santa Lucía Utatlán	Caserío Chuitzam	Rural	12
136	Sololá	Santiago Atitlán	Santiago Atitlán	Urbana	8
137	Sololá	Sololá	Santa María El Tablón	Rural	8
138	Sololá	Sololá	Sololá	Urbana	8
139	Totonicapán	Momostenango	Caserío Chonimatux	Rural	12
140	Totonicapán	San Bartolo	San Bartolo	Urbana	8
141	Totonicapán	San Francisco El Alto	Aldea San Antonio Sija	Rural	11
142	Totonicapán	San Francisco El Alto	San Francisco El Alto	Urbana	8
143	Totonicapán	Totonicapán	Totonicapán	Urbana	8
	Total de la región				624

	Región 4	Suroriente			
144	Chiquimula	Chiquimula	Chiquimula	Urbana	7
145	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Aldea Las Flores	Rural	11
146	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Caserío Barbasco	Rural	11
147	Chiquimula	Jocotán	Jocotán	Urbana	7
148	Jalapa	Jalapa	Aldea Taco Arriba	Rural	11
149	Jalapa	Jalapa	Caserío El Poxte	Rural	11
150	Jalapa	Monjas	Caserío Las Vegas	Rural	11
151	Jalapa	San Carlos Alzatate	San Carlos Alzatate	Urbana	7
152	Jalapa	San Pedro Pinula	Aldea Aguamecate	Rural	11
153	Jutiapa	Jalpatagua	Aldea Aceituno	Rural	11
154	Jutiapa	Jalpatagua	Jalpatagua	Urbana	7
155	Jutiapa	Jutiapa	Jutiapa	Urbana	7
156	Jutiapa	Santa Catarina Mita	Aldea El Quebracho	Rural	11
157	Jutiapa	Santa Catarina Mita	Santa Catarina Mita	Urbana	8
158	Jutiapa	Yupiltepeque	Caserío Monzones	Rural	12
159	Santa Rosa	Cuilapa	Aldea San Juan de Arana	Rural	12
160	Santa Rosa	Cuilapa	Cuilapa	Urbana	8
161	Santa Rosa	Oratorio	Aldea Las Cabezas	Rural	12
162	Santa Rosa	San Juan Tecuaco	Aldea El Tanque	Rural	12
163	Santa Rosa	San Juan Tecuaco	San Juan Tecuaco	Urbana	8
	<i>Total de la región</i>				195
	Región 5	Nororiente			
164	Alta Verapaz	Cahabón	Caserío Pinares	Rural	12
165	Alta Verapaz	Cobán	Cobán	Urbana	8
166	Alta Verapaz	Panzós	Finca La Amistad	Rural	12
167	Alta Verapaz	Panzós	Panzós	Urbana	8
168	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	Aldea Chitap	Rural	12
169	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	Aldea Chiyux	Rural	12
170	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá	San Pedro Carchá	Urbana	8
171	Alta Verapaz	Senahú	Finca El Volcán	Rural	12
172	Alta Verapaz	Viejo Chahal	Viejo Chahal	Urbana	8
173	Baja Verapaz	Granados	Aldea Llano Grande	Rural	12
174	Baja Verapaz	Salamá	Aldea Ixcayán	Rural	12
175	Baja Verapaz	Salamá	Salamá	Urbana	8
176	Baja Verapaz	San Miguel Chicaj	Aldea Chixolop	Rural	12
177	Baja Verapaz	San Miguel Chicaj	Aldea San Gabriel	Rural	12
178	El Progreso	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	Aldea Estancia de La Virgen	Rural	12
179	El Progreso	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	San Cristóbal Acasaguastlán	Urbana	8
180	El Progreso	Sanarate	Aldea Agua Dulce	Rural	12
181	El Progreso	Sanarate	Aldea Montepeque	Rural	12
182	El Progreso	Sansare	Aldea Buena Vista	Rural	12
183	Izabal	Los Amates	Finca El Pilar	Rural	12
184	Izabal	Morales	Caserío El Mitchal	Rural	12

185	Izabal	Morales	Finca Arapahoe Nuevo	Rural	12
186	Izabal	Puerto Barrios	Aldea Milla 5	Rural	12
187	Izabal	Puerto Barrios	Puerto Barrios	Urbana	7
188	Petén	La Libertad	Caserío San José La Bendición	Rural	11
189	Petén	Melchor de Mencos	Caserío Puerta del Cielo	Rural	11
190	Petén	Melchor de Mencos	Melchor de Mencos	Urbana	7
191	Petén	San Benito	San Benito	Urbana	7
192	Zacapa	Cabañas	Aldea Santo Tomás	Rural	11
193	Zacapa	San Diego	Aldea El Triunfo	Rural	11
194	Zacapa	Zacapa	Zacapa	Urbana	7
	<i>Total de la región</i>				<i>324</i>



## **Annex B: Technical Note and Regression Tables**

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### **Technical Note**

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In

order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for and audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there "in black and white," but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.



After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced., A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself ([www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/democracy\\_and\\_governance/dsd/](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/)) .

## Regression Tables

**Table III.2 Predictors of Support for the Political System in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	38,487	3,538		10,879	,000
Edad	-,157	,043	-,108	-3,634	,000
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,038	,013	-,091	-2,875	,004
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	,552	,218	,082	2,534	,011
Percepción de inseguridad	-,044	,019	-,070	-2,324	,020
Índice victimización corrupción	,038	,019	,059	2,007	,045
Perspectivas económicas del país	,064	,016	,119	3,948	,000
Índice de percepción de libertad	,079	,025	,097	3,221	,001
Evaluación del gobierno local	,102	,029	,105	3,457	,001
Satisfacción con democracia	,062	,027	,069	2,260	,024

**Table III.3 Predictors of Political Tolerance in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	36,460	3,039		11,999	,000
Educación	,471	,168	,086	2,810	,005
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,030	,015	-,059	-1,958	,050
Perspectivas económicas del país	-,041	,020	-,063	-2,096	,036
Índice de participación en organizaciones	-,077	,039	-,059	-1,980	,048
Índice confianza extendida(5 instituciones)	,122	,036	,100	3,408	,001
Índice de percepción de libertad	,100	,029	,100	3,420	,001

**Table III.5 Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy in Guatemala**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Edad	-,013	,005	6,459	1	<b>,011</b>	,987
Educación	,043	,016	6,914	1	<b>,009</b>	1,044
Autoid. étnica	-,001	,001	,510	1	,475	,999
Inseguridad	-,005	,002	5,760	1	<b>,016</b>	,995
Indice libertad	,006	,003	4,020	1	<b>,045</b>	1,006
Constant	-1,277	,348	13,424	1	,000	,279

a. Variable dependiente: apoyo a la democracia estable

**Table III.6 Predictors of Pride in Being a Guatemalan**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	82,666	2,143		38,576	,000
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,009	,009	-,027	-,972	,331
Percepción de situación económica del país	-,033	,020	-,045	-1,614	,107
Inseguridad amenaza el país	,050	,017	,083	2,879	<b>,004</b>
Indice de apoyo al sistema (PSA)	,125	,022	,156	5,683	<b>,000</b>
Educación	-,191	,116	-,053	-1,653	,099
Indice de información política	,017	,005	,110	3,470	<b>,001</b>
Víctima delincuencia	-,027	,013	-,056	-2,013	<b>,044</b>

**Table III.7 Predictors on the Belief That as Guatemalans We Have Some Things That Unite Us**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	40,405	3,671		11,006	,000
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,023	,016	-,041	-1,450	,147
Percepción de situación económica del país	-,052	,034	-,042	-1,524	,128
Inseguridad amenaza el país	,078	,030	,075	2,611	<b>,009</b>
Indice de apoyo al sistema (PSA)	,315	,037	,232	8,411	<b>,000</b>
Educación	,832	,194	,137	4,298	<b>,000</b>
Indice de información política	,006	,008	,025	,805	,421
Víctima delincuencia	,022	,022	,027	,982	,327

**Table III.8 Predictors of Support to Institutions in Guatemala (Support Extended to the Political System)**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	19,777	2,821		7,011	,000
Perspectivas económicas del país	,052	,016	,098	3,201	<b>,001</b>
Confianza interpersonal	,069	,019	,105	3,631	<b>,000</b>
Evaluación del gobierno local	,147	,029	,150	5,071	<b>,000</b>
Evaluación del presidente	,136	,032	,130	4,224	<b>,000</b>
Indice de información política	-,046	,022	-,061	-2,094	<b>,037</b>
Indice de percepción de libertad	,059	,024	,072	2,503	<b>,012</b>

**Table III.9 Factors Associated to Support for Stable Democracy in Guatemala in 2004**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Edad	-,017	,006	7,899	1	<b>,005</b>	,983
Educación	,032	,018	2,976	1	,085	1,032
Inseguridad	-,004	,002	2,227	1	,136	,996
Indice libertad	,006	,003	3,080	1	,079	1,006
Votó en 2003	-,001	,002	,774	1	,379	,999
Votar mejora cosas	,004	,002	5,621	1	<b>,018</b>	1,004
Satisfacción democracia	,003	,004	,699	1	,403	1,003
Evaluación presidente	-,004	,004	1,093	1	,296	,996
Satisfacción gob. local	,002	,004	,355	1	,552	1,002
Confianza en elecciones	,017	,002	44,683	1	<b>,000</b>	1,017
Constant	-2,199	,468	22,048	1	,000	,111

**Table IV.1 Predictors of the Perception of Corruption in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	49,482	3,154		15,687	,000
Educación	,596	,264	,082	2,257	<b>,024</b>
Edad	,181	,064	,079	2,835	<b>,005</b>
Indice de información política	,133	,037	,110	3,615	<b>,000</b>
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	,923	,364	,082	2,538	<b>,011</b>

**Table IV.2 Predictors of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-,064	,053		-1,202	,230
Educación	,011	,005	,073	2,334	<b>,020</b>
Género	,001	,000	,057	2,345	<b>,019</b>
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	,028	,007	,123	4,103	<b>,000</b>
Estado civil (casado)	,001	,000	,073	2,214	<b>,027</b>
Tiene hijos	-,001	,001	-,060	-1,779	,075
Indice de participación en organizaciones	,005	,001	,127	5,162	<b>,000</b>

**Table IV.3 Impact of Corruption in Democracy**  
(Dependent Variable: Index of Victimization by Corruption)

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	,444	,071		6,302	,000
Satisfacción con democracia	-,002	,001	-,055	-1,904	,057
Justificación de golpe de Estado	,001	,000	,080	2,803	,005
Indice de apoyo al sistema (PSA)	-,002	,001	-,058	-2,038	,042

**Table IV.4 Impact of the Perception of Corruption in Democracy**  
(Dependent Variable: Perception of Corruption in Public Officials)

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	71,840	4,197		17,118	,000
Votó en las últimas elecciones	,034	,021	,047	1,589	,112
Voto puede mejorar las cosas	,045	,021	,065	2,098	,036
Evaluación del presidente	,063	,053	,037	1,192	,234
Evaluación del gobierno local	-,100	,047	-,064	-2,123	,034
Indice de confianza en sistema de justicia (6 instituciones)	-,120	,047	-,077	-2,539	,011

**Table V.1 Predictors of Confidence in the Justice System in Guatemala**  
(Dependent Variable: Index of Confidence in the Justice System)

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	51,377	2,684		19,142	,000
Edad	-,139	,042	-,091	-3,289	,001
Víctima de delincuencia	-,036	,017	-,059	-2,098	,036
Percepción de inseguridad	-,042	,019	-,064	-2,255	,024
Percepción de corrupción	-,040	,018	-,062	-2,221	,027
Satisfacción con la democracia	,105	,026	,111	3,971	,000

**Table V.2 Predictors of Perception of Freedom in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	66,365	2,184		30,385	,000
Género (hombre)	,070	,014	,134	5,072	,000
Educación	,449	,174	,078	2,582	,010
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,046	,014	-,087	-3,236	,001
Percepción de inseguridad	-,072	,021	-,089	-3,448	,001
Indice de información política	,061	,029	,064	2,117	,034
Indice de participación en organizaciones	,065	,036	,048	1,814	,070

**Table V.3. Predictors of Approval to Justice Taken in One's Own Hands**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	61,350	5,748		10,673	,000
Residencia	-,013	,022	-,020	-,604	,546
Género	,001	,020	,002	,071	,944
Educación	-,214	,277	-,029	-,772	,440
Edad	-,283	,073	-,119	-3,900	,000
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	,170	,440	,015	,386	,699
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,008	,021	-,011	-,369	,712
Percepción de inseguridad	,042	,031	,039	1,355	,176
Ley debe respetarse siempre	-,079	,023	-,099	-3,479	,001
Indice de percepción de libertad	-,138	,039	-,103	-3,562	,000
Gente es confiable	-,102	,032	-,092	-3,185	,001
Indice en sistema de justicia (6 ítems)	,024	,045	,015	,526	,599

**Table V.4 Predictors of Belief That Crime is Threatening the Future of the Country**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	85,968	1,907		45,072	,000
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,061	,014	-,110	-4,317	,000
Percepción de situación económica del país	-,227	,030	-,187	-7,430	,000
Indice de información política	,199	,025	,199	7,809	,000

**Table V.5 Predictors of Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	63,309	3,991		15,861	,000
Residencia	,076	,018	,118	4,281	,000
Indice de percepción de libertad	-,108	,035	-,085	-3,077	,002
Evaluación del gobierno local	-,101	,042	-,067	-2,414	,016
Preferencia por mano dura	,035	,018	,052	1,913	,056
Confianza interpersonal	-,112	,029	-,109	-3,895	,000
Indice de apoyo al sistema (PSA)	-,091	,043	-,059	-2,110	,035

**Table V.6 Predictors of Victimization by Crime in Guatemala**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Nivel socioeconómico	,081	,031	6,987	1	,008	1,084
Género (hombre)	,006	,002	13,388	1	,000	1,006
Educación	,065	,019	11,397	1	,001	1,067
Residencia (urbana)	,005	,002	7,781	1	,005	1,005
Constant	-3,303	,182	330,500	1	,000	,037

<sup>a</sup>. Variable dependiente: victimización de la delincuencia



**Table VI.1 Predictors of Attendance to Municipal Meetings in Guatemala**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
<sup>a</sup> Género	,006	,001	21,591	1	<b>,000</b>	1,007
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	,003	,001	4,710	1	<b>,030</b>	1,003
Constant	-2,058	,131	246,609	1	<b>,000</b>	,128

a. Variable dependiente: asistencia a reunión municipal en los últimos 12 meses

**Table VI.3 Predictors of Assessment of the Local Government in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	41,310	3,133		13,185	<b>,000</b>
Residencia	-,037	,014	-,084	-2,707	<b>,007</b>
Educación	,579	,167	,121	3,470	<b>,001</b>
Satisfacción con democracia	,112	,029	,118	3,919	<b>,000</b>
Evaluación del presidente	,147	,033	,134	4,445	<b>,000</b>
Asistencia a reunión municipal	,034	,017	,060	2,020	<b>,044</b>
Indice de participación	,115	,035	,099	3,306	<b>,001</b>
Indice de información política	-,078	,027	-,098	-2,931	<b>,003</b>
Percepción de corrupción	-,040	,019	-,062	-2,083	<b>,037</b>
Percepción de inseguridad	-,052	,020	-,078	-2,648	<b>,008</b>

**Table VI.4 Predictors of the Disposition to Pay Municipal Taxes**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
<sup>a</sup> Educación	,037	,016	5,169	1	<b>,023</b>	1,038
Inseguridad	-,005	,002	4,750	1	<b>,029</b>	,995
Perspectivas económicas país	,004	,002	4,424	1	<b>,035</b>	1,004
Indice de informacion política	,008	,003	7,904	1	<b>,005</b>	1,008
Indice de libertad	,007	,003	5,710	1	<b>,017</b>	1,007
Satisfacción con democracia	,006	,003	4,026	1	<b>,045</b>	1,006
Confianza extendida en instituciones	,008	,003	6,616	1	<b>,010</b>	1,009
Evaluación del gobierno local	,020	,003	35,168	1	<b>,000</b>	1,020
Constant	-2,989	,368	66,063	1	<b>,000</b>	,050

a. Variable dependiente: disposición a pagar impuestos a la municipalidad

**Table VII.1 Predictors of Being Registered to Vote (Electoral Registry)**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Género	,009	,001	46,432	1	<b>,000</b>	1,009
Educación	,141	,017	72,680	1	<b>,000</b>	1,151
Edad	,035	,005	44,422	1	<b>,000</b>	1,036
Tiene hijos	,006	,002	12,236	1	<b>,000</b>	1,006
Constant	-1,631	,235	48,169	1	<b>,000</b>	,196

a. Variable dependiente: está empadronado

**Table VII.2 Predictors of Attendance to Elections (Vote) in Guatemala**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Género	,006	,001	31,483	1	<b>,000</b>	1,006
Educación	,110	,014	65,311	1	<b>,000</b>	1,117
Edad	,017	,004	16,552	1	<b>,000</b>	1,017
Tiene hijos	,004	,001	9,533	1	<b>,002</b>	1,004
Constant	-1,251	,202	38,418	1	<b>,000</b>	,286

a. Variable dependiente: votó en elecciones 2003

**Table VII.3 Predictors of Confidence in Elections in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	14,871	3,320		4,480	<b>,000</b>
Indice de aceptación de participación política	,258	,035	,195	7,394	<b>,000</b>
Voto puede mejorar las cosas	,116	,018	,171	6,483	<b>,000</b>
Evaluación del gobierno local	,159	,041	,102	3,865	<b>,000</b>
Indice de participación en organizaciones	,098	,046	,056	2,136	<b>,033</b>

**Table VII.4 Predictors of Confidence in Political Parties in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	9,456	3,355		2,819	<b>,005</b>
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	-,657	,270	-,073	-2,430	<b>,015</b>
Perspectivas económicas del país	,085	,021	,119	3,981	<b>,000</b>
Evaluación del gobierno local	,149	,038	,116	3,899	<b>,000</b>
Índice de tolerancia	,099	,032	,092	3,120	<b>,002</b>
Satisfacción con democracia	,130	,036	,108	3,613	<b>,000</b>

**Table VIII.1 Predictors of Social Participation**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	71,490	10,091		7,085	,000
Residencia	-,128	,055	-,067	-2,325	<b>,020</b>
Género	,165	,048	,087	3,452	<b>,001</b>
Educación	1,117	,703	,054	1,588	,113
Edad	,236	,191	,037	1,236	,217
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	-1,153	1,125	-,036	-1,025	,306
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	,371	,051	,196	7,307	<b>,000</b>
Religión (católico)	,052	,048	,027	1,098	,272
Estado civil (casado)	,051	,071	,025	,723	,470
Tiene hijos	,370	,083	,170	4,480	<b>,000</b>

**Table VIII.2 Impact of Social Participation in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	58,780	11,898		4,940	,000
Residencia	-,159	,051	-,084	-3,093	,002
Género	,128	,051	,068	2,498	,013
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	,356	,052	,187	6,885	,000
Tiene hijos	,362	,058	,169	6,295	,000
Votó en las últimas elecciones	,308	,054	,153	5,682	,000
Evaluación del gobierno local	,576	,119	,131	4,850	,000
Indice de apoyo al sistema (PSA)	-,079	,126	-,017	-,624	,533
Indice de tolerancia	-,248	,102	-,066	-2,432	,015

**Table VIII.3 Predictors of Lack of Trust in Other People in Guatemala**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
<sup>a</sup> Residencia (urbana)	,003	,001	5,668	1	,017	1,003
Nivel socioeconómico	,095	,029	11.18	1	,001	1,100
Educación	-,038	,017	4,843	1	,028	,962
Género (hombre)	,001	,001	,467	1	,495	1,001
Edad	-,011	,005	5,739	1	,017	,989
Religión (católica)	,000	,001	,081	1	,776	1,000
Identificación étnica (indígena)	-,003	,001	6,386	1	,012	,997
Estado civil (casado)	,000	,002	,080	1	,777	1,000
Tiene hijos	,002	,002	1,107	1	,293	1,002
Constante	,655	,246	7,101	1	,008	1,926

<sup>a</sup> Variable dependiente: si pudiera, la gente se aprovecharía de usted

**Table IX.1 Predictors of Preference for Democracy in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	49,253	5,215		9,445	,000
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	,068	,024	,088	2,849	,004
Percepción de inseguridad	-,070	,037	-,059	-1,901	,058
Percepción de corrupción	,091	,036	,079	2,508	,012
Índice de información política	,109	,045	,076	2,408	,016
Índice de percepción de libertad	,164	,049	,106	3,380	,001

**Table IX.2 Predictors of Satisfaction With Democracy in Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	49,656	2,300		21,593	,000
Percepción de inseguridad	-,040	,019	-,057	-2,127	,034
Índice de percepción de libertad	,103	,024	,116	4,318	,000
Educación	-,778	,132	-,157	-5,896	,000
Percepción de situación económica del país	,093	,027	,092	3,476	,001

**Table IX.3 Predictors of How Democratic is Guatemala**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	54,545	2,381		22,906	,000
Percepción de inseguridad	-,065	,020	-,098	-3,266	,001
Índice de percepción de libertad	,054	,025	,063	2,110	,035
Perspectivas económicas del país	,040	,016	,072	2,436	,015

**Table IX.4 Predictors of Belief That Democracy is the Best Form of Government**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	47,943	3,564		13,452	,000
Residencia (urbana)	-,056	,019	-,091	-2,864	,004
Nivel socioeconómico (por bienes)	,866	,383	,086	2,259	,024
Género	,038	,017	,063	2,250	,025
Educación	,535	,245	,080	2,179	,030
Edad	,099	,069	,048	1,443	,149
Religión (católico)	,015	,017	,024	,869	,385
Autoidentificación étnica (indígena)	-,027	,018	-,044	-1,501	,134
Estado civil (casado)	,015	,025	,024	,607	,544
Tiene hijos	-,019	,029	-,028	-,654	,513

**Table IX.5 Sociodemographic Predictors of Support for a Coup D'État**

	Coeficientes no estandarizados		Coeficientes estandarizados	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	54,435	3,779		14,405	,000
Residencia	,059	,022	,075	2,663	,000
Educación	-,671	,258	-,078	-2,602	,008
Edad	-,292	,081	-,109	-3,592	,009
Tiene hijos	-,058	,028	-,064	-2,114	,000

**Table IX.6 Predictors of General Justification of a Coup D'État**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
<sup>a</sup> Edad	-,024	,005	26,649	1	,000	,976
Inseguridad	,007	,002	10,349	1	,001	1,007
Índice libertad	-,006	,003	4,675	1	,031	,994
Prefiere líder fuerte	,010	,002	27,145	1	,000	1,010
Militares deben gobernar	,006	,002	13,833	1	,000	1,006
Satisfacción con democracia	-,008	,003	7,122	1	,008	,992
Confianza en ejército	,004	,002	5,008	1	,025	1,004
Constant	,781	,338	5,343	1	,021	2,183

a. Variable dependiente: justificación de golpe de estado

**Table IX.7 Predictors of Preference for Strong-Hand Government**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Residencia	,003	,001	3,874	1	<b>,049</b>	1,003
Nivel socioeconómico	,019	,026	,534	1	,465	1,019
Género (hombre)	,000	,001	,045	1	,833	1,000
Educación	-,075	,017	19,569	1	<b>,000</b>	,928
Edad	-,002	,004	,217	1	,642	,998
Religión (católica)	,002	,001	2,192	1	,139	1,002
Identificación étnica (indígena)	-,005	,001	17,958	1	<b>,000</b>	,995
Estado civil	-,001	,002	,276	1	,600	,999
Tiene hijos	,003	,002	3,244	1	,072	1,003
Constant	-,174	,238	,531	1	,466	,840

a. Variable dependiente: preferencia por mano dura

**Table IX.8 Predictors of Preference for a Non-Elected Leader**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Residencia	,003	,002	2,483	1	,115	1,003
Nivel socioeconómico	-,005	,034	,023	1	,879	,995
Género	,000	,001	,059	1	,809	1,000
Educación	-,075	,022	11,618	1	<b>,001</b>	,928
Edad	-,009	,006	2,386	1	,122	,991
Religión (católica)	,000	,001	,040	1	,842	1,000
Identificación étnica	-,004	,002	5,330	1	<b>,021</b>	,996
Estado civil (casado)	,002	,002	1,127	1	,289	1,002
Tiene hijos	,001	,003	,215	1	,643	1,001
Constant	-,932	,308	9,138	1	,003	,394

a. Variable dependiente: preferencia por líder fuerte

**Table IX.9 Predictores of Belief That the Military Should Come Back to Government**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
<sup>a</sup> Residencia	,001	,002	,239	1	,625	1,001
Nivel socioeconómico	-,046	,033	1,910	1	,167	,955
Género	-,001	,001	,242	1	,623	,999
Educación	-,055	,021	6,532	1	<b>,011</b>	,947
Edad	-,006	,006	1,127	1	,288	,994
Religión (católica)	-,003	,001	5,384	1	<b>,020</b>	,997
Identificación étnica (indígena)	-,004	,001	9,000	1	<b>,003</b>	,996
Estado civil	,001	,002	,271	1	,603	1,001
Tiene hijos	,000	,002	,013	1	,911	1,000
Constant	-,318	,292	1,193	1	,275	,727

<sup>a</sup>. Variable dependiente: cree que militares deberían retornar a gobernar



## Annex C: IRB Approval and Questionnaire

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### University of Pittsburgh *Institutional Review Board* Exempt and Expedited Reviews

Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair  
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TO: Mitchell Seligson, Ph.D.

FROM: Christopher M. Ryan, Ph.D., Vice Chair

DATE: January 14, 2004

PROTOCOL: Democratic Values in Mexico, Central America and Colombia

**IRB Number: 0401036**

The above-referenced protocol has been reviewed by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. Based on the information provided in the IRB protocol, this project meets all the necessary criteria for an exemption, and is hereby designated as "exempt" under section 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

The regulations of the University of Pittsburgh IRB require that exempt protocols be rereviewed every three years. If you wish to continue the research after that time, a new application must be submitted.

- If any modifications are made to this project, please submit an 'exempt modification' form to the IRB.
- Please advise the IRB when your project has been completed so that it may be officially terminated in the IRB database.
- This research study may be audited by the University of Pittsburgh Research Conduct and Compliance Office.

**Approval Date:** 01/12/2004

**Renewal Date:** 01/12/2007

CR:ky



Asociación de Investigación  
y Estudios Sociales

**CUESTIONARIO DE GUATEMALA**  
(1/0304 Final)

**UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH Y ASIES**

**AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Centroamérica, México y Colombia 2004**

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**ENCUESTA  
DOR:  
NUNCA USE  
ESTA  
COLUMNA**



País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	<b>PAIS</b>	
(Número de entrevista [asignado en la oficina no en campo]): _____	<b>IDNUM</b>	
Departamento: _____  (01) Guatemala (08) Totonicapán (15) Baja Verapaz (02) El Progreso (09) Quetzaltenango (16) Alta Verapaz (03) Sacatepéquez (10) Suchitepéquez (17) Petén (04) Chimaltenango (11) Retalhuleu (18) Izabal (05) Escuintla (12) San Marcos (19) Zacapa (06) Santa Rosa (13) Huehuetenango (20) Chiquimula (07) Sololá (14) Quiché (21) Jalapa (22) Jutiapa	<b>GPROV</b>	
Municipio: _____	<b>GCANT</b>	

Lugar poblado: _____	<b>GPAROQ</b>	
Zona: _____	<b>GZONA</b>	
Sector o sección _____	<b>GSEC</b>	
Segmento _____	<b>GMANZ</b>	
Ur: 1. Urbana 2. Rural	<b>UR</b>	
Estrato: 1. Zona metropolitana 2. Suroccidente 3. Noroccidente 4. Suroriente 5. Nororiente	<b>GESTRAT</b>	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	<b>TAMANO</b>	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Achí (7) Ixil	<b>IDIOMAQ</b>	

Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Q1. ANOTE:</b> Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	<b>Q1</b>	
<b>GA4.</b> Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema <b>más grave</b> que está enfrentando el país? [ <i>no leer alternativas</i> ] (01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (09) Falta de crédito (10) Problemas del medio ambiente (11) Drogadicción (12) Narcotráfico (13) Corrupción (14) Pandillas (15) Mal gobierno (16) Migración (17) La guerra contra terrorismo (88) No sabe	<b>GA4</b>	
Anotar si no existe código: _____		

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	NS/NR	
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>A3</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT3</b>	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...				<b>CP5</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?					
(1) Sí [Seguir con CP5A] (2) No [Pasar a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a CP6]					
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5A</b>	
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5B</b>	
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5C</b>	
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5D</b>	
<b>CP5E.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar a organizar algún grupo para combatir la delincuencia en su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5E</b>	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR		
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP6</b>	
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP7</b>	
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? ¿Asiste...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP8</b>	
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP9</b>	
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP13</b>	
<b>PROT1.</b> ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	<b>PROT1</b>		

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP2</b>	
<b>CP4A.</b> A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, concejal o alcalde auxiliar)	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4A</b>	

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>LS3</b>	
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<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	<b>IT1</b>	
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS/NR	<b>IT2</b>	
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, trataría de aprovecharse de	<b>IT3</b>	

usted, o cree que no se aprovecharía de usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS/NR		
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Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipalidad

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto u otra reunion convocada por el alcalde durante los últimos 12 meses? <i>(si responde no, ir a NPIB. Si responde sí seguir a GMUNIFA)</i>  (1) sí (2) no (8) no sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>GMUNIFA.</b> ¿Cómo se enteró de esa reunión? <i>(no leer opciones)</i> (1) por radio (2) por TV (3) por periódico (4) avisos públicos, carteles (5) un amigo o familiar (6) invitación del alcalde o concejo; otro _____ (8) NS (9) Inap (no se enteró)	<b>GMUNIFA</b>	
<b>NP1B.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que las autoridades municipales hagan caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR	<b>NP1B</b>	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) sí (2) no (8) no sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP2</b>	
<b>NP1C.</b> Si usted tuviera una queja sobre algún problema local, y lo llevara a algún miembro del Concejo municipal, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que le haría caso?  (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco o (4) nada? (8)NS/NR	<b>NP1C</b>	
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son...?  (1) muy buenos (2) buenos (3) ni buenos, ni malos (4) malos (5) muy malos (8) NS/NR	<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>GSGL1A.</b> Y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable, ¿diría que el servicio es?  (1) muy bueno (2) bueno (3) ni bueno, ni malo (4) malo (5) muy malo (8) NS/NR	<b>GSGL1A</b>	
<b>GLGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar impuestos directos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio?  (1) Dispuesto a pagar impuestos directos (2) No vale la pena pagar impuestos directos (8) NS/NR	<b>GLGL3</b>	

<p><b>GMUNI2.</b> En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? (<b>No leer respuestas</b>) (<b>Aceptar una sola respuesta</b>)</p> <p>(00) Ninguno</p> <p>(01) Falta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (04) Falta de aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica (07) Falta de fondos y ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR</p> <p>Otros : _____</p>	<p><b>GMUNI2</b></p>	
<p><b>GGOL1.</b> ¿Qué es lo más importante que cree que podría hacer usted para ayudar a solucionar este problema? (<b>leer opciones, solo seleccionar una</b>)</p> <p>(1) Pagar más impuestos (2) Donar materiales (3) Contribuir con su mano de obra o trabajo (4) Asistir a reuniones comunitarias o municipales (5) Ayudar a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver ese problema (6) No puede hacer nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>GGOL1</b></p>	
<p><b>GMUNI5B.</b> ¿En su opinión, en qué debería gastar más el gobierno municipal? [<b>no leer opciones</b>] [<b>Si menciona más de uno, anotar el más importante</b>]</p> <p>1. Aseo público 2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, agua potable, desagües, desechos sólidos, canchas de fútbol, u otras obras públicas 3. Salud, educación 4. Empleo público 5. Sueldos 6. Nada Otro _____ <b>88. NS/NR</b></p>	<p><b>GMUNI5B</b></p>	
<p><b>GMUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la municipalidad?</p> <p>(0) ninguna confianza (1) poca confianza (2) algo de confianza (3) mucha confianza ) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>GMUNI6</b></p>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC4</b>	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>JC13A.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	(1) Si podría haber	(2) Nunca habría razón	(8)NS	<b>JC13A</b>	

<p><b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí [<b>sigá</b>] (2) No [<b>Pasar a ST1</b>]</p>	<p><b>VIC1</b></p>	
<p><b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? [<b>No lea las alternativas</b>]</p> <p>(1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)</p>	<p><b>VIC2</b></p>	

<b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí <b>[pasar a AOJ1A]</b> . (2) No lo denunció <b>[Pasar a AOJ1B]</b> (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1</b>	
<b>AOJ1A.</b> ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? <b>[Marcar una sola alternativa y pasar a ST1]</b> (1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (PDH) (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1A</b>	
<b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) No víctima	<b>AOJ1B</b>	

De los trámites que Ud. ha hecho con las siguientes entidades. ¿Se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(repetir las opciones de respuesta en cada pregunta)**

	<b>MUY SATISFECH O</b>	<b>ALGO SATISFECH O</b>	<b>ALGO INSATISFECH O</b>	<b>MUY INSATISFECH O</b>	<b>NO HIZO TRAMITES</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>ST1.</b> La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST1</b>	
<b>ST2.</b> Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST2</b>	
<b>ST3.</b> El Ministerio Público	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST3</b>	
<b>ST4.</b> La municipalidad (alcaldía)	1	2	3	4	9	8	<b>ST4</b>	

<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delinquentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ8</b>	
<b>AOJ9.</b> Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿Cree usted que: Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar al domicilio del sospechoso o la policía puede entrar a la casa del sospechoso sin necesidad de una orden judicial? (1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (2) La policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ9</b>	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11</b>	
<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11A</b>	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>	
<b>AOJ16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto teme Ud. violencia por parte de miembros de su propia familia? ¿Diría que tiene mucho, algo, poco o nada de miedo? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ16</b>	
<b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ17</b>	
<b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de esta comunidad o barrio (pueblo) protegen a la gente frente a los delinquentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que esta involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? (1) Policía protegen gente (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ18</b>	

<b>WC1.</b> ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufrió el país? <i>(aplica si tiene familiares desaparecidos)</i>  1. Sí 2. No 8.NS/NR	<b>WC1</b>	
<b>WC2.</b> ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufrió el país?  1. Sí 2. No 8.NS/NR	<b>WC2</b>	
<b>WC3.</b> ¿Por razones de conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?  1. Sí 2. No 8.NS/NR	<b>WC3</b>	

<b>PAZ1.</b> ¿Considera Ud. que los acuerdos de paz han sido muy buenos, buenos, malos o muy malos para el país? (1) muy buenos (2) buenos (3) malos (4) muy malos (8) NS/NR	<b>PAZ1</b>	
<b>PAZ2.</b> ¿Qué esperaba Ud. de los acuerdos de paz? <i>[leer alternativas]</i> (1) menos violencia política (2) más empleo (3) más programas sociales (4) nada en especial Otro: _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>PAZ2</b>	



<b>PAZ3.</b> ¿Dígame cual ha sido el principal cambio en su comunidad después de la firma de la paz? <i>(no leer alternativas)</i> (1) no hay guerra o violencia política (2) no hay persecución (3) no hay temor (4) hay mejoras sociales (5) hay mejoras de infraestructura (6) no ha habido cambios Otro: _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>PAZ3</b>	
<b>PAZ4.</b> ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación política del país luego de la firma de los acuerdos de paz? <i>(leer alternativas)</i> (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR	<b>PAZ4</b>	
<b>PAZ5.</b> ¿Cuánto cree Ud. que ha mejorado la situación socioeconómica del país luego de la firma de los acuerdos de paz? <i>(leer alternativas)</i> (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR	<b>PAZ5</b>	

**[Dele la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión, si usted no confía nada, escogería el puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario confía mucho, escogería el puntaje 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto confía en las noticias que da a conocer la televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<b>Nada</b>		<b>Mucho</b>					(8) NS/NR

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS</b>		
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<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? <i>Si cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio.</i>		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?		<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político guatemalteco?		<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?		<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político guatemalteco?		<b>B6</b>	
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		<b>B10A</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		<b>B11</b>	
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ejército?		<b>B12</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público?		<b>B15</b>	

<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía Nacional Civil?		<b>B18</b>	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?		<b>B20</b>	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos?		<b>B21</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		<b>B32</b>	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		<b>B37</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser guatemalteco?		<b>B43</b>	
<b>B45.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos?		<b>B45</b>	
<b>GB45A.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte de Constitucionalidad?		<b>GB45A</b>	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		<b>B47</b>	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los acuerdos de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía nacional?		<b>B48</b>	

**[no recojer tarjeta "A"]**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<b>Nada</b>			<b>Mucho</b>				(8) NS/NR

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual, o sea el gobierno del Presidente Oscar Berger... (Seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	<b>Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS</b>		
<b>N1.</b> Combate la pobreza.		<b>N1</b>	
<b>N3.</b> Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		<b>N3</b>	
<b>N9.</b> Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.		<b>N9</b>	
<b>GN10.</b> Mejora la seguridad ciudadana		<b>GN10</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta "A"]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<b>Muy en desacuerdo</b>				<b>Muy de acuerdo</b>			(8) NS/NR

	<b>Anotar 1-7, NS=8</b>		
<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>ING4</b>	
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los guatemaltecos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen		<b>PN2</b>	

como país. ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
<b>PN2A.</b> Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>PN2A</b>	

**[recoger tarjeta "B"]**

**[Entreguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora le voy a entregar otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que **desaprueba firmemente** y el 10 indicando que **aprueba firmemente**. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					NS/NR

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS		
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		<b>E5</b>	
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		<b>E8</b>	
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		<b>E11</b>	
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		<b>E15</b>	
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		<b>E14</b>	
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		<b>E2</b>	
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		<b>E3</b>	
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		<b>E16</b>	

**[No recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					No sabe

	Anotar 1-10, 88= NS		
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[sigue tarjeta C]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					NS/NR

	<b>Anotar 1-10, NS=88</b>		
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>	
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>	
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>	
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>	
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?		<b>D5</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada...		
<b>LIB1.</b> Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB1</b>	
<b>LIB2.</b> Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB2</b>	
<b>LIB3.</b> Participación política (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB3</b>	
<b>LIB4.</b> Protección a derechos humanos (1) Muy poca (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiada (8) NS	<b>LIB4</b>	

<b>ACR1.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios. (8) NS/NR	<b>ACR1</b>	
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<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) muy satisfecho (2) satisfecho (3) insatisfecho (4) muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión Guatemala es ¿muy democrática, algo democrática, poco democrática, o nada democrática? (1) muy democrática (2) algo democrática (3) poco democrática (4) nada democrática (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>	
<b>PN6.</b> Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años Guatemala se ha vuelto más democrática, igual de democrática o menos democrática? (1) muy democrática (2) igual de democrática (3) menos democrática (8) NS/NR	<b>PN6</b>	

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático. (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático. (8) NS/NR	<b>DEM2</b>	
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR	<b>DEM11</b>	

<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen bien, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	<b>AUT1</b>	
<b>AUT2.</b> El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa? (1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora (8) NS/NR	<b>AUT2</b>	
<b>PP1.</b> Ahora para cambiar el tema...Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras personas para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[lea las alternativas]</b> (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	<b>PP1</b>	
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2003? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	<b>PP2</b>	

<b>ABS5.</b> ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) Las cosas no van a mejorar (8) NS/NR	<b>ABS5</b>
<b>M1.</b> Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Berger es: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>

<b>GGOG1.</b> Algunas personas dicen que los funcionarios públicos no deberían tener inmunidad porque esto les permite librarse de la persecución penal, sobre todo por actos de corrupción.... sin embargo otras personas dicen que la inmunidad ayuda a que los funcionarios puedan trabajar adecuadamente sin tener que estar enfrentando juicios políticos de personas que no están de acuerdo con sus ideas. ¿Con cuál opinión está usted más de acuerdo?  1. Los funcionarios públicos no deberían tener inmunidad bajo ninguna circunstancia. 2. Es necesario que los funcionarios públicos tengan inmunidad para que puedan hacer bien su trabajo. 8. NS/NR	<b>GGOG1</b>
<b>GGOG2.</b> ¿Cuál es la condición más importante para que usted esté más dispuesto a pagar impuestos? (leer opciones, anote solo una, la más importante)  1. Que haya transparencia en el gasto público. 2. Que los fondos se utilicen para combatir la pobreza en el país. 3. Que se le den mejores servicios a la población 4. Que sea más fácil pagar los impuestos 5. Que hubiera más castigos para los que no pagan 8. NS/NR	<b>GGOG2</b>
<b>GGOG3.</b> ¿Cuál de estos grupos representa mejor sus intereses? (leer opciones, anote solo una)  1. Iglesias 2. Medios de comunicación 3. Grupos populares 4. Organizaciones empresariales 5. Sindicatos 6. Partidos Políticos 7. Otros _____ 9. Ninguno 8. NS/NR	<b>GGOG3</b>

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	No	Sí	NS	INAP	
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC1</b>
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]  Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC11</b>

<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Ud. trabaja? [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] En su trabajo ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC13</b>	
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC14</b>	
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC15</b>	

<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? <b>[Si dice “no” marcar 9 si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]</b>  En la escuela o colegio durante el último año ¿Tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC16</b>	
<b>EXC19.</b> ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad, el pagar mordidas es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC19</b>	
<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					<b>EXC7</b>	

**[Ahora vamos a usar tarjeta “D”] Entregar tarjeta “D”**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias personas o instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

Grado de corrupción													
INSTITUCIONES	Muy corruptos						Muy honrados				NS		
PC1. Los diputados	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC1	
PC3. Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC3	
PC5. Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC5	
PC12. Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC12	
PC13. Los militares	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC13	

**Recoja Tarjeta D**

<b>Ahora me puede decir...</b> <b>GI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[No leer, George W. Bush; aceptar “Bush” o “George Bush”]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI1</b>	
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuántos departamentos tiene Guatemala? <b>[No leer, 22]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI3</b>	
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? <b>[No leer, cuatro años]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI4</b>	
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[No leer, Luís Ignacio Lula da Silva; aceptar “Lula”]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI5</b>	

**L1. MOSTRAR TARJETA “E”:** Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos “izquierda” y “derecha” cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88)	L1	
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Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted <b>sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?</b> [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
<b>DER1.</b> ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER1</b>
<b>DER2.</b> ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER2</b>
<b>DER3.</b> ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER3</b>
<b>DER4.</b> ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	8	<b>DER4</b>

<b>VB1.</b> ¿Está Ud. empadronado? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>VB1</b>	
<b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2003? (1) Sí votó <b>[siga]</b> (2) No votó <b>[pasar a GVB4]</b>	<b>VB2</b>	
<b>GVB3.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para Presidente [en la primera vuelta] de las elecciones pasadas de 2003? <b>[Si no votó, seguir con GVB4. Si votó, pasar a GVB6]</b>  1. FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO - F R G (Rios Montt) 2. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA –URNG (Asturias) 3. DIA (Suger) 4. GANA: PATRIOTA, MOVIMIENTO REFORMADOR, PARTIDO SOLIDARIDAD NACIONAL (PP-MR-PSN) (Berger) 5. PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - P A N (López Rodas) 6. PARTIDO UNIONISTA - P U (Fritz García) 7. UNIDAD NACIONAL DE LA ESPERANZA – UNE (Colom) 8. DEMOCRACIA SOCIAL PARTICIPATIVA – DSP (Lee) 9. DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA - D C G (Arbenz) 10. MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL Y POLITICO CAMBIO NACIONAL – MSPCN (Conde Orellana) 11. UNION NACIONAL - U N (Arredondo)  15. Otro _____ 16. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR 99. No aplicable Inap (No votó)	<b>GVB3</b>	
<b>GVB4.</b> Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? <b>[anotar una sola respuesta]</b>  01. Falta de transporte 02. Enfermedad 03. Falta de interés 04. No le gustó ningún candidato/partido 05. No cree en el sistema 06. No está empadronado 07. No se encontró su nombre en el padrón electoral 10. No tener edad 11. Llegó tarde a votar/estaba cerrado 12. Por tener que trabajar  Otro _____ 88. NS/NR	<b>GVB4</b>	
<b>GVB6.</b> ¿Por cuál partido o comité votó para Alcalde en las elecciones del 2003?  1. Partido o comité _____ 2. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco 88. NS/NR 99. Inap (No votó)	<b>GVB6</b>	

**GVB7.** ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado de lista nacional en las elecciones pasadas del 2003?

**GVB7**

1. FRENTE REPUBLICANO GUATEMALTECO - F R G
2. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA –URNG
3. DIA
4. GANA: PATRIOTA, MOVIMIENTO REFORMADOR, PARTIDO SOLIDARIDAD NACIONAL (PP-MR-PSN)
5. PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - P A N
6. PARTIDO UNIONISTA - P U
7. UNIDAD NACIONAL DE LA ESPERANZA – UNE
8. DEMOCRACIA SOCIAL PARTICIPATIVA – DSP
9. DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA GUATEMALTECA - D C G
10. MOVIMIENTO SOCIAL Y POLITICO CAMBIO NACIONAL – MSPCN
11. UNION NACIONAL - U N
12. UNION DEMOCRATICA – UD
13. ALIANZA NUEVA NACION – ANN
14. TRANSPARENCIA
15. Otro \_\_\_\_\_
16. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco
88. NS/NR
99. Inap (no votó)

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

**[Encuestador: llenar:]** \_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un círculo alrededor del número que corresponde]**

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de..	Segundo año de..	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	ED	
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		_ _
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) o mas		
No sabe/no responde	(88)							

		<b>Q2</b>	_ _
<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años			
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (2) Cristiana no católica (3) Otra no cristiana (4) Ninguna (8) No sabe o no quiere mencionar		<b>Q3</b>	
<b>Q4.</b> ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido Ud. a la iglesia (culto, templo) durante el mes pasado? (1) Todas las semanas (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca		<b>Q4</b>	
<b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos <b>familiares mensuales</b> de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? <b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta F]</b>  (00) Q 0-700 (01) Q701-1000 (02) Q1001-1300 (03) Q1301-1600 (04) Q1601-2000 (05) Q2001-2500 (06) Q2501-3000 (07) Q3001-3500 (08) Q3501-5000 (09) Q5001-7500 (10) Q7,501 en adelante (88) NS/NR		<b>Q10</b>	
<b>Q10A.</b> ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior? (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[saltar a Q11]</b> (8) NS/NR		<b>Q10A</b>	
<b>Q10B.</b> ¿Hasta que punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS/NR		<b>Q10B</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR		<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)		<b>Q12</b>	
<b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		<b>Q14</b>	

<b>ETID.</b> ¿Usted se considera ...? (1) Indígena (2) Ladino (3) Garifuna (4) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>	
<b>GLENG1.</b> ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? <i>(acepte más de una alternativa).</i> (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Otro (nacional o extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>GLENG1</b>	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional no celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R12</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R14</b>	
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No		(1) Sí		<b>R15</b>	

<b>OCUP1.</b> Cuál es su ocupación principal?  1. Profesional, directivo 2. Oficinista 3. Vendedor 4. Campesino 5. Peon agrícola 6. Servicio doméstico 7. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializado 11. Obrero no especializado 12. Estudiante 13. Ama de casa 14. Pensionado rentista 88. NS/NR	<b>OCUP1</b>	
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<p><b>OCUP1A</b> En esta ocupación usted es:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Asalariado del gobierno o entidad autónoma?</li> <li>2. Asalariado del sector privado?</li> <li>3. Patrono o socio de empresa de menos de 5 empleados?</li> <li>4. Patrono o socio de empresa de 5 o más empleados?</li> <li>5. Trabajador por cuenta propia?</li> <li>6. Trabajador no remunerado?</li> <li>8. NS/NR</li> </ol>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
<p><b>DESOC1.</b> ¿Ha estado desocupado (desempleado) durante el último año?</p> <p>(1) Sí</p> <p>(2) No</p> <p>(3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista</p>	<p><b>DESOC1</b></p>	

<b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____ <b>TI. Duración de la entrevista</b> <i>[minutos, ver página # 1]</i> _____	<b>TI</b>
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Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

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Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ /04 Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Firma del codificador \_\_\_\_\_


Comentarios: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_.

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_


---

## ***Tarjeta “A”***



---


## ***Tarjeta “B”***






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## ***Tarjeta “C”***



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## ***Tarjeta “D”***



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## ***Tarjeta “E”***

<b><i>1</i></b>	<b><i>2</i></b>	<b><i>3</i></b>	<b><i>4</i></b>	<b><i>5</i></b>	<b><i>6</i></b>	<b><i>7</i></b>	<b><i>8</i></b>	<b><i>9</i></b>	<b><i>10</i></b>
<b><i>Izquierda</i></b>									<b><i>Derecha</i></b>

---

## ***Tarjeta “F”***

**Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:**

- (00) 0-Q700**
- (01) Q701-1000**
- (02) Q1001-1300**
- (03) Q1301-1600**
- (04) Q1601-2000**
- (05) Q2001-2500**
- (06) Q2501-3000**
- (07) Q3001-3500**
- (08) Q3501-5000**
- (09) Q5001-7500**
- (10) Q7501 en adelante**
- (88) NS/NR**

## **The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004**

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public  
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**