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Part I. Introduction

This report presents an analysis of a November, 1998 survey of public opinion in Guatemala conducted by ASIES, with the collaboration of Malcolm Young and Cynthia Hamill of Development Associates, Inc. and Mitchell A. Seligson of the University of Pittsburgh. It is the second of a series of reports, the first having been written on a June 1998 survey.

The Sample

The November 1998 sample was very similar in design to the June 1998 sample. A total of 1,400 Guatemalans were interviewed in a nationally representative sample. For this study of Guatemalan public opinion the sample represented all of the 22 Departments in the country. The sample was structured so that the proportion of respondents per Department closely matched the proportion of the population of the country that resided in that Department. Within each Department, the sample was divided to closely represent the urban/rural population distribution found there. All census data are based on the 1994 national population census. In total, 1,400 Guatemalan voting-aged adults were interviewed. The distribution of the sample is shown in Figure I.1. As can be seen, the Department of Guatemala has the largest number of interviews, reflecting its predominant population size. The sample size per department is printed on each bar when the sample was 40 or larger. The bars were too small to accommodate the actual number of interviews in the Departments of Jalapa through El Progreso (see the figure), but Jalapa through Sacatepéquez had 30 interviews each, while Zacapa through El Progreso had 20. The slight variation in sample size in this sample when compared to the June 1998 survey resulted from the after effects of Hurricane Mitch, which made some areas inaccessible or very difficult to access.

The sample design chosen allows us to talk with considerable precision about public opinion in Guatemala. Specifically, the findings reported here are based on a sample of 1,400, 95% of the time they are no more than $\pm 2.7\%$ different from the results we would have obtained had we interviewed all adult Guatemalans.¹ For example, if we




Figure I.1

report that 50% of Guatemalans believe that the government promotes democracy, then

¹Technically speaking, this means that our confidence interval is no larger than $\pm 2.7\%$ at the 95% level of confidence. This confidence interval is for a 50/50 split. When splits are not even (e.g. 60/40) the confidence interval is even smaller.

interviewing all Guatemalans would produce a result no greater than 52.7% or no less than 47.3%, 95% of the time.

The accuracy of the results is for the sample as a whole, that is, all 1,400 cases. When we talk about subsets of the data, each subset containing fewer than 1,400 cases, the accuracy of the results declines. Understanding this is particularly important for the geographic breakdown of the sample shown in the figure above. Results for Guatemala City, for example, would have a confidence interval of nearly $\pm 5\%$, while those for San Marcos, with a sample of 90 would have a confidence interval of about $\pm 10\%$. Departments with very small samples (reflecting, of course, their contribution to the national population), such as El Progreso with a sample size of only 20, would have confidence intervals as wide as $\pm 25\%$, a result that would be so imprecise as to tell us very little about opinions in El Progreso. The sample design, then, allows us to make very accurate statements about all of Guatemala, and also gives us confidence that all of the departments were represented in that sample. We do not believe, however, it is useful to report results based on the individual departments. Rather, we believe that two other major breakdowns, namely that of rural/urban and by geographic region, would be more useful.

The sample reflects the overall distribution of the population of Guatemala. The respondents are evenly divided between men and women. Figure I.2 shows the distribution of education among the respondents. As can be seen, the majority have primary education or less. Only a little more than one-in-ten respondents have some university education.

Educación: Distribución de la Muestra




Figure I.2

The distribution of age is also what one would expect in this high birth-rate country. The average age is 39.6 years. Figure I.3 shows the overall distribution for age cohorts. Those 30 years of age and younger represent one-third of the sample, whereas those 51 and over only represent one quarter of the sample.




Figure I.3

The sample was geographically distributed to represent the overall patterns found in Guatemala. Figure I.4 shows that about half of the respondents lived in rural areas, with the rest being about evenly divided between Guatemala City and urban areas of other departments.





Figure I.4

The ASIES sample divides the population into five basic regions. Figure I.5 shows the distribution. About one-third of the sample was drawn from the greater metropolitan area of Guatemala City, with the remainder of the sample being divided among four geographic regions.

**Figure I.5**

All of the basic socio-economic and demographic parameters are summarized in the appendix to this report, and the interested reader should consult those.

Part II. View of Current Conditions

Most Serious Problems at the Community Level

The questionnaire begins with questions concerning Guatemala and the respondent's opinions about current conditions in his or her community.

Pregunta 2 asks the respondents their opinion about the most serious problem in their community. Table II.1 presents the responses to this pregunta, by each region and the country overall. Consistently, the most frequent answer to this question is the 'cost of living/poverty,' chosen by almost one-third of all respondents. This is the most frequently given response in every region, varying slightly from 26.1% in the southwest to 37.9% in the northwest.

Besides the category 'other,' which is a combination of different unknown opinions (13.5%), the next most popular answer is common crime (13.2%), with unemployment close behind (12.9%). The common crime response percentages range from 4.3% in the southeast to 21.7% in the Metropolitan Guatemala City area. Unemployment is a much more frequent response in the Northeast and Southeast (18.9% and 18.3%) than elsewhere in the country.

Table II.1
P02 Cual es el problema mas serio que tienen los habitantes de esta comunidad por region

	Región					Total (n=1171)
	Metro (n=406)	Noreste (n=212)	Sureste (n=92)	Suroeste (n=115)	Noroeste (n=346)	
Costo de la vida / pobreza	27.8%	27.4%	35.9%	26.1%	37.9%	31.2%
Delincuencia común	21.7%	7.1%	13.0%	4.3%	10.1%	13.2%
Desempleo / poco trabajo	9.6%	18.9%	9.8%	18.3%	12.1%	12.9%
Contaminación ambiental	10.6%	7.5%	4.3%	2.6%	1.4%	6.1%
Transporte / caminos	8.4%	3.8%	1.1%	7.8%	3.5%	5.5%
Vivienda escasa / cara	6.2%	4.7%	3.3%	8.7%	3.2%	5.0%
Desnutrición / salud	3.2%	9.4%	5.4%	2.6%	4.6%	4.9%
Mal gobierno municipal	2.7%	5.2%		0.9%	1.7%	2.5%
Bajos salarios / ingresos	1.7%	2.4%		7.0%	1.4%	2.1%
Educación / analfabetismo	1.5%	2.8%			2.9%	1.9%
Alcoholismo	1.0%	0.5%			0.6%	0.6%
Drogadicción	0.7%	0.5%				0.3%
Corrupción		0.9%			0.3%	0.3%
Tráfico de drogas				0.9%		0.1%
Otro	4.9%	9.0%	27.2%	20.9%	20.2%	13.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table II.2 presents responses to pregunta 2 by gender, and shows that the responses were fairly consistent across gender lines: poverty was considered the most serious problem for about a third of the population for both men (29.5%) and women (32.9%). Excluding the 'other' category, common crime is the second highest concern for women (14.3%), while unemployment ranks second for men and third (9.9%) for women.

When the four response categories that most directly reflect the state of the economy are combined (cost of living/poverty, unemployment, cost of housing, and low salaries) the difference between men and women completely disappears (51% versus 51.5%), with over half of both saying this is the most serious problem for people in the community.

Table II.2
**P02 Cual es el problema mas serio que tienen los habitantes de esta comunidad
 por genero**

	Género		Total (n=1171)
	Masc (n=606)	Fem (n=565)	
Costo de la vida / pobreza	29.5%	32.9%	31.2%
Desempleo / poco trabajo	15.7%	9.9%	12.9%
Vivienda escasa / cara	3.8%	6.4%	5.0%
Bajos salarios / ingresos	2.0%	2.3%	2.1%
total of above	51.0%	51.5%	51.2%
Delincuencia común	12.2%	14.3%	13.2%
Contaminación ambiental	4.8%	7.4%	6.1%
Transporte / caminos	6.6%	4.2%	5.5%
Desnutrición / salud	4.5%	5.3%	4.9%
Mal gobierno municipal	2.3%	2.7%	2.5%
Educación / analfabetismo	1.8%	1.9%	1.9%
Alcoholismo	1.0%	0.2%	0.6%
Drogadicción	0.5%	0.2%	0.3%
Corrupción	0.5%		0.3%
Tráfico de drogas	0.2%		0.1%
Otro	14.7%	12.2%	13.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Pregunta 2 by ethnicity can be examined in Appendix B. The indigenous and the Ladino respondents answered similarly for this item. The greatest difference between the two ethnic groups is how many believed environmental pollution is the most serious problem. It is interesting to note that almost three times as many of the Ladino respondents answered that pollution is a problem, as did the indigenous respondents (8.2% vs. 2.6%).

When examined by education, the responses for pregunta 2 are fairly consistent across the Primaria, Basica, Secundaria and Universitaria groups (see Appendix B). It is interesting to note that those who were most likely to respond with 'the cost of living/poverty' are the respondents with a primary school education or less (35.5%). The respondents with a Basica, Secundaria or Universitaria level of education have less concern for that issue (25.2%, 25.0% and 28.0% respectively). The same outcome is found when one totals the economic indicators. The result is that 55.1% of the Primaria responses are economic in nature, as compared to 44.6% of the responses for those who have completed Basica schooling, and 46.4% and 48.9% for the Secundaria and Universitaria graduates.

Figure II.1 presents the 'common crime' responses in terms of education level. Those who responded that common crime is the most serious issue in the community were most likely to be educated. The respondents with less education were less concerned with common crime, but as the number of years of completed education rose, so did concern about common crime. It may be that this simply reflects the relative importance of crime and the economy. That is, as education and wealth decline, basic economic necessities become more of a problem than crime.




Figure II.1

Most Serious Problems in the Country Overall

Pregunta 3 is similar to pregunta 2, but the focus is not on the community, it is on Guatemala as a whole. The complete question is, “De igual manera, sin tomar en cuenta los daños causados por la tormenta Mitch. Cuál cree usted que es el problema más serio que tenemos en toda Guatemala?.” The percentage of the dataset which is suitable for analysis is 89.0% (n=1246). Responses to this item, presented by region, are shown in table II.4.

The problems identified as most serious are largely the same whether respondents are asked to think in terms of their local community (PO2) or the country as a whole (PO3). The two most notable differences are the importance given to economic concerns and the perceived seriousness of education/illiteracy. About 40% of the population believe that ‘cost of living/poverty’ is the most serious problem for all of Guatemala, while this was cited as the most serious community problem by about 31%. Similarly, while only 1.9% of the respondents cited ‘education/illiteracy’ as the most serious community level problem, this was seen by 5% as the most serious problem for the nation overall.

Table II.4
P03 ¿Cuál cree que es el problema más serio de toda Guatemala?
por region

	Región					Total (n=1246)
	Metro (n=439)	Noreste (n=222)	Sureste (n=101)	Suroeste (n=125)	Noroeste (n=359)	
Costo de la vida / pobreza	44.0%	31.5%	42.6%	33.6%	42.1%	40.0%
Delincuencia común	22.8%	26.6%	29.7%	16.8%	23.7%	23.7%
Desempleo / poco trabajo	9.1%	16.2%	5.9%	15.2%	10.6%	11.2%
Educación / analfabetismo	6.2%	8.1%	1.0%	0.8%	4.2%	5.0%
Bajos salarios / ingresos	2.7%	4.5%	4.0%	10.4%	3.9%	4.3%
Vivienda escasa / cara	4.3%	1.8%	5.9%	10.4%	2.5%	4.1%
Desnutrición / salud	2.7%	1.8%	5.0%	8.0%	4.7%	3.9%
Contaminación ambiental	2.7%	3.2%			0.6%	1.7%
Corrupción	0.9%	1.8%	3.0%	0.8%		1.0%
Transporte / caminos	0.9%	0.5%		0.8%	1.1%	0.8%
Mal gobierno nacional	0.7%	1.4%		0.8%	0.6%	0.7%
Drogadicción	0.2%	0.9%	1.0%		0.3%	0.4%
Alcoholismo		0.5%			0.3%	0.2%
Tráfico de drogas				1.6%	0.3%	0.2%
Otro	2.7%	1.4%	2.0%	0.8%	5.3%	3.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The same question as P03 was asked in the June 1998 study. The three most frequently cited problems in both the June and December 1998 surveys were 'cost of living/poverty,' 'unemployment' and 'crime'. However, in June the most frequently cited problem was 'crime', given by 39.4% of respondents, while in December 1998 the respondents were more concerned with the 'cost of living/poverty' (cited as the most serious problem by 40.0%).

Current Conditions

Figure II.2 presents the responses from pregunta 4, which asks, "En general, como ve usted la situacion actual de Guatemala? Diria usted que esta muy buena...buena...mala...muy mala?" Only 4.9% of the responses were 'Don't know / no response' (n=68) which means that 95.1% (n=1332) of the responses are used in the analysis. The pie chart shows that 60.1% of the responses are 'Mala' and 13.6 are 'Muy mala'. That is, almost three quarters of the responses show a negative view of current




Figure II.2

conditions in Guatemala.

Pregunta 5 goes one step farther and asks, "Como cree usted que estara la situacion del pais dentro de un año? Cree usted que estara mejor que ahora...igual que ahora...o peor que ahora?" The percent of the data suitable for analysis is 85.5% (n=1197) of the 1400 observations.

Figure II.3 shows the responses of pregunta 5. The percentage of respondents who believe that conditions in Guatemala are headed in a positive direction is much lower (18.6%) than those which indicate that the situation in Guatemala is getting worse (54.4%) or will stay the same (27.0%). This view of the future differs somewhat according to how the current situation is perceived. That is, 59.1% of those who see the current situation as 'Mala' or 'Muy Mala' believe the situation in a year will be even worse, while 39.6% of those who see the current situation as 'buena' or 'muy buena' also think that conditions will deteriorate during the year ahead.




Figure II.3

Part III. The Peace Process

Knowledge of the Peace Process

Perhaps no event in modern Guatemalan history has been of greater importance than the signing of the Peace Accords. We asked the respondents how they felt about the accords. We first wanted to know how well informed the population felt it was about the accords. As can be seen in Figure III.1, very few Guatemalans feel well informed about the process.




Figure IV.1

There is a direct association between knowledge of the peace process and education, as is shown in Figure III.2.



Figure III.2

Education is not the only factor that helps explain knowledge of the peace process. Gender is important as well. As can be seen in Figure III.3, Guatemalan females are far less likely to have knowledge of the peace process for each level of education except at the level of university education. There, females are less knowledgeable than males, but the difference is much smaller.




Figure III.3

Differences in gender are widespread, but not universal. For example, when we examine the five different regions of the country, as shown in Figure III.4, the male/female gap emerges in each region except the South-Western one. There, females actually are slightly more knowledgeable of the peace process than men.




Figure III.4

Part of the difference observed is a function of regional differences in education. As can be seen in Figure III.5, females have lower average levels of education in most regions, except for the South-East. In the South-West and Metropolitan, males are only slightly more educated than females.





Figure III.5

Age has an important and predictable influence on knowledge. Among those who are the youngest and the oldest in the survey, knowledge is lower than it is among those who are in the middle years. Young people are more interested in sports and members of the opposite sex, while old people are often no longer interested in the media. Figure III.6 shows the results.

**Figure III.6**

Education, gender and, to a lesser extent, age, have an impact on familiarity with the peace process. Table III.1 shows the multivariate analysis. All three variables are statistically significant, even when controlling for the others.

Table III.1
Predictors of Knowledge of the Peace Process

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	33.092	3.730			8.873	.000
EDAD Edad del entrevistado	.114	.052	.060	2.181	.029	
EDUC ¿Cuál fue el último grado de estudios que usted aprobó?	1.438	.172	.229	8.353	.000	
SEXO Género	-6.893	1.535	-.120	-4.490	.000	

a Dependent Variable: P13R--Conocimiento de proceso de paz

Beyond these socio-economic and demographic factors, there is the very important issue of ethnic identity. It could be argued that in many ways the peace treaties were written to respond to the long-standing claims of the indigenous population. For that reason, greater awareness of the process should be found among those who identify as indigena rather than Ladino. As can be seen in Figure III.7, this is not the case. For both men and women, there is lower awareness of the peace processes among the indigenous population versus the Ladino. This may be a function of the lower level of education among the indigenous population, a thesis that will be explored in the following section.




Figure III.7

Impact of the Peace Process on Democracy

Preguntas 14-18 concerned the impact of the peace process. The responses are all strongly associated with each other.² Each of these items will be analyzed separately, but the patterns are very similar.

²The correlates range from .28 to .55.

Respondents were first asked if, in their view, the peace process has been helpful in strengthening democracy in Guatemala. In effect, this is a measure of the evaluation of the peace process itself. Figure III.8 shows the results. Only about one-third of the respondents felt that the process has been a very positive one for democracy. These results are disappointing given the apparent importance of the process for democratic stability in Guatemala.






Figure III.8

Education is a major factor in determining this evaluation of the peace process. Figure III.9 shows that those with higher levels of education are much more likely to see a positive connection between the peace process and democracy. This view is identical for males and females.

**Figure III.9**

We have already seen that the indigenous population is less aware of the peace process than the Ladino population. But is their evaluation of the process more or less favorable? In Figure III.10, it can be seen that the indigenous population, male and female alike, is far less positive on the peace process compared to the Ladino population.

**Figure III.10**

There is also a strong relationship between wealth (as measured by artifacts in the home) and a belief that the peace process helps democracy. Figure III.11 shows the results.






Figure III.11

Other variables, such as age, have no significant impact on the evaluation of the peace process. But, we know that the indigenous population of Guatemala is poorer and less educated than the Ladino population. So, we want to control for these factors and then explore how the peace process relates to ethnicity.

Figure III.12 shows that the Ladino population averages 8 years of education, whereas the indigenous population averages only 5.



Latinos are also much wealthier than Indians, as is shown in Figure III.13. There we are measuring wealth on a 0-100 point scale based on 11 artifacts in the home.

**Figure III.13**

The multivariate model is very revealing (Table III.2). The single most important predictor of the evaluation of the impact of the peace process on democracy is ethnicity. This is shown by the column labeled "Beta," in which the highest coefficient is for the variable P44, ethnic identification. Independent of its higher level of education and wealth, the Ladino population is far more positive about the impact of the peace process on democracy than is the indigenous population. This finding is very important since it highlights the importance of ethnic identification in Guatemala, but also is troubling because the primary target of the peace accords see less value in them than the rest of the population. It is also notable that neither wealth nor age are significant predictors, once the other variables in the model are incorporated. Finally, although

not appearing in the multivariate model, victimization (as measured by P6) had no influence on perception of the impact of the peace accords on democracy. Those who were victims of a crime were no more likely to be negative on the impact of the peace accords than those who were not victims.

Table III.2
Predictors of Evaluation of Impact of Peace Process on Democracy

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	45.992	5.654		8.134	.000
WEALTH	.097	.096	.038	1.015	.310
SEXO Género	-4.360	2.188	-.061	-1.993	.047
EDAD Edad del entrevistado	-.110	.077	-.046	-1.423	.155
EDUC Educación	.756	.305	.096	2.479	.013
P44 ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?	11.420	2.383	.157	4.792	.000

a Dependent Variable: P14R, evaluation of impact of peace process on democracy

The Impact of the Peace Accords on Women

The peace accords are perceived as having a positive impact on the situation of Guatemalan women by over two-fifths of the population. Figure III.14 shows the results.

Impacto del Proceso de Paz Sobre la Mujer






Figure III.14


As we have already seen, the more educated view the peace accords more positively than those with less education. One would have expected that gender would also affect the impact of the accords on women, but this is not the case. Figure III.15 shows that education has a positive impact, independent of gender. Indeed, the male and female lines almost overlap completely, with the exception being those with a primary education, where women are less favorable towards the peace process than men.

**Figure III.15**

There is some variation in the national pattern by region, as is shown in Figure III.16. While men are more favorable towards the peace process than women in most of Guatemala, this not the case in the North-East. On the other hand, in the South-East, compared to women, the men are extremely positive towards the peace process.

**Figure III.16**

Ethnicity plays a role, with the ladino population more positive than the indigenous population. For each group, men are more positive towards the peace process than women. These findings are shown in Figure III.17.

**Figure III.17**

The multivariate model (Table III.3) for the evaluation of the impact of the peace process on women produces a similar model to the one we have already seen. In this case, ethnicity is somewhat less important than education, although it remains a significant predictor. As can be seen, age is not a significant predictor.

Table III.3
Predictors of Impact of the Peace Process on Women

		Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	52.208	5.307		9.838	.000
WEALTH	.146	.090	.058	1.619	.106
SEXO Género	-2.654	2.053	-.038	-1.293	.196
EDAD Edad del entrevistado	-6.132E-02	.072	-.026	-.846	.397
EDUC Education	1.021	.286	.132	3.571	.000
P44 ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?	8.733	2.238	.123	3.903	.000

a Dependent Variable: P16R

Impact of Peace Process on The Indigenous Population

Because much of the peace process was directed at solving problems of the indigenous population, it is appropriate to ask what impact Guatemalans feel that the process has had on this population. Figure III.18 shows that fully half think that it has had a positive effect on the indigenous population.

Impacto del Proceso de Paz Sobre la Población Indígena




Figure III.18

Education and gender are once again related to these evaluations. Figure III.19 shows the results. Gender does not affect this evaluation.





Figure III.19

Although gender has little impact on this variable, ethnic self-identification does. Figure III.20 shows that the Ladino population is more positive towards the peace process than the indigenous population.

**Figure III.20**

Region also has an impact, as is shown in Figure III.21. The South-Eastern region is the most positive towards the peace process.




Figure III.21

The multiple regression analysis is similar, with once again education and ethnicity being the most important factors. Age plays no role. The table is not given here because it repeats the prior analyses.

Impact of the Peace Process on Land Scarcity

The respondents were asked (P17) if they believed that the peace process would help resolve the problem faced by Guatemalan farmers of the lack of land. Figure III.22 shows the results. As can be seen, there is more negativism here, with

less than one-third of the respondents believing that the peace process is helping to resolve the land problem.

Impacto del Proceso de Paz Sobre La Tenencia de la Tierra




Figure III.22

Age and gender play no role in determining attitudes towards the effect the peace process is having on the land question. However, education and ethnicity do vary in ways very different from what we have seen thus far. Figure III.23 shows the overall results. There one can see that those with more education are less optimistic about the impact of the peace process. Moreover, the ethnic gap is wide, as the most well educated indigena express highly negative views.

Impacto del Proceso de Paz

Sobre La Tenencia de la Tierra

Por Educación y Etnia




Figure III.23

Overall Impact on Guatemala of the Peace Process

The questionnaire included an overall assessment of the impact of the peace process (P18). The results show mixed feelings, as shown in Figure III.24. However, less than one-fifth were openly negative about the process.

Impacto General del Proceso de Paz




Figure III.24

An overall multivariate analysis on this item reinforces the point made earlier regarding the importance of ethnicity. Indeed, that is the only variable that remains significant in the regression presented in Table III.4.

Table III.4
P18 Predictors of Overall Evaluation of Peace Process

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	42.566	5.967		7.133	.000
WEALTH	-6.084E-03	.101	-.002	-.061	.952
SEXO Género	-2.612	2.317	-.034	-1.127	.260
EDAD Edad del entrevistado	5.412E-02	.081	.022	.668	.504
EDUC Education	.480	.320	.058	1.499	.134
P44 ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?	9.984	2.524	.129	3.955	.000

a Dependent Variable: P18R

Strengths of the Peace Process

Respondents were asked to note the most positive aspect of the peace process. On this item, only 44.6% of the respondents gave an answer. Among those who did respond, the results, broken down by ethnic self-identification, are found in Table III.5. As can be seen, the end of the armed conflict was overwhelmingly seen as the most positive benefit. The differences by ethnic identity were small.

Table III. 5
¿Cuál cree que es el cambio más positivo que ha traído la firma de la paz?
por ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?

	P44 ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?		Total
	1 Indígena	2 Ladino	
1 Fin del conflicto armado	70.5%	63.6%	66.4%
4 Mayor seguridad	6.4%	7.8%	7.2%
6 Libertad de participación y organización	6.4%	7.0%	6.7%
3 Apoyo financiero para la Paz	4.4%	7.5%	6.2%
2 Retorno de los refugiados	4.4%	6.1%	5.4%
5 Incorporación legal/participativa de los sectores indígenas	3.6%	2.1%	2.7%
10 Combate a la pobreza	2.0%	2.1%	2.1%
7 Cumplimiento de los acuerdos	1.6%	1.3%	1.4%
8 Tierras para los afectados	.4%	1.3%	1.0%
9 Reformas a la constitución	.4%	1.1%	.8%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Respondents were also asked which specific accord contributed most to the construction of peace. Only 30.8% gave a response to this item. The overall results

are presented in Table III.6. Among those who did reply, about one-quarter said 'none'. The accord on human rights was by far the most popular of all, as nearly one-quarter of the respondents chose this item. Little difference emerged by ethnicity.

Table III.6
¿Cuál accord de paz cree que ayuda más a la construcción y logro de La Paz?
por ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?

	P44 ¿Se considera usted ladino o indígena?		Total
	1 Indígena	2 Ladino	
1 Accord sobre los Derechos Humanos	23.4%	23.8%	23.7%
6 Accord sobre el cese al fuego	13.5%	13.8%	13.7%
3 Accord de identidad y derechos de los pueblos indígenas	10.5%	6.2%	7.9%
5 El fortalecimiento del poder civil/función del Ejército	5.3%	9.2%	7.7%
4 Accord sobre aspectos socioeconómicos y situación agraria	4.7%	7.3%	6.3%
2 Accord para reasentamiento de las poblaciones desarrraigadas	5.8%	3.8%	4.6%
11 Comisión de la verdad	1.8%	2.3%	2.1%
9 Accord sobre cronograma para la implementación...	1.2%	2.3%	1.9%
8 Accord sobre las bases para incorporar a la URNG a...		1.2%	.7%
7 Accord sobre las reformas constitucionales...	.6%	.4%	.5%
12 Todos	6.4%	7.7%	7.2%
10 Ninguno	26.9%	21.9%	23.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Part IV. Opinions on the Electoral System

Registration

A series of items (P19-22) was included in the questionnaire to measure attitudes toward the electoral system. Respondents were first asked if they were registered to vote. Figure IV.1 shows that three-quarters of Guatemalans are registered to vote.




Figure IV.1

Wealth and ethnicity have little impact on the probability of a Guatemalan registering to vote. Opinion on the peace process also has no effect on the likelihood of registering to vote. Education and gender do affect whether a citizen registers to vote. Figure IV.2 shows that men are more likely to be registered than women, even when their educational level is the same. However, the gap is widest among those with the lowest levels of education. Moreover, education has a stronger impact on women than men as to whether they will register to vote.




Figure IV.2

Age also has a very strong impact on the probability of registration. Figure IV.3 shows the results. Only 20% of young women are registered, compared to 40% of

young men. Registration rates increase sharply in the 20's, but decline slightly, as middle age is reached.




Figure IV.3

Registration to vote varies by region, as well as gender. Figure IV.4 shows that while in each region majorities are registered, the North-West has only 55% of its females registered to vote.




Figure IV.4

Party Registration

Only a very small percentage of Guatemalans register themselves with a political party as Figure IV.5 demonstrates.

¿Está Inscrito en Algún Partido?





Figure IV.5

The only variables related to party registration are education and gender, as can be seen in Figure IV.6. Those with low levels of education are less likely to be registered with a party than those with higher levels. At all levels, females are less likely to be registered with a party than males.

**Figure IV.6**


The respondents were asked why citizens registered to vote sometimes choose not to vote (P20). The results of this question are presented in Table IV.1. As can be seen, lack of confidence in the elections and in political leaders are the most common replies, comprising two-thirds of the responses. Fraud, violence and technical problems are much less important according to the respondents.

Table IV. 1
¿Por qué cree que deja de votar la gente?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1 No creen en las elecciones	433	30.9	36.3	36.3
	4 Porque los políticos no cumplen	380	27.1	31.9	68.1
	7 Por falta de educación cívica	125	8.9	10.5	78.6
	6 Por que no confían en el gobierno	113	8.1	9.5	88.1
	5 Porque los políticos son corruptos	81	5.8	6.8	94.9
	3 Por que creen que hubo fraude	26	1.9	2.2	97.1
	8 Porque perdieron sus documentos	24	1.7	2.0	99.1
	2 Violencia e inseguridad	11	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	1193	85.2	100.0	
Missing	88 No sabe / no responde	207	14.8		
	Total	1400	100.0		

Voting Intention

What about the future? Given the high rate of abstensionism in recent Guatemalan elections, how large a turnout can we expect? One way to measure that is to determine the degree of interest the 1999 elections (P21). Figure IV.7 shows the results.

**Figure IV.7**

Women are slightly less likely to express interest in the elections than men, and those with higher levels of education are slightly more interested than those with lower levels of education. There is, however, a very strong relationship between the evaluation of the peace process (P18) and interest in the upcoming elections. Figure IV.8 shows the results. Those with a strong interest in the elections are far more positive about the peace proses than those who have a low level of interest.




Figure IV.8

Part V. Image of Guatemalan Public Figures and Potential Candidates

The survey instrument also contains items which measure attitudes concerning Guatemalan public figures as well as potential candidates in the 1999 elections. These questions were similar to questions that were asked in the June 1998 survey, with minor differences. The list of prominent individuals has been updated and expanded.

Prominent Guatemalan Figures

In the current questionnaire, respondents were asked if they had a favorable or unfavorable opinion regarding each of the fifteen Guatemalan public figures listed (p.28 -- p.42). Table V.1 shows the responses to these questions. In this table, responses which indicate that the respondent did not recognize the public figure are grouped in the same category as 'no response' or 'don't know' responses.

As table V.1 shows, the current president, Alvaro Arzú, received the most favorable rating (60.0%), the former president, Ramiro de Leon Carpio, was close behind (58.1%), and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Rigoberta Menchú, had the third highest rating (48.9%). The highest unfavorable response was received by former president General Efraín Ríos Montt, (33.6%), who also received a fairly high favorable rating (42.7%).

It is interesting to examine the third category, which demonstrates the prominence or the awareness of the public figures by the respondents. The smaller the percentage in the 'don't know of/no response' category, the more well known the public figure. For example, the percentage of 'don't know of/no response' for Alvaro Arzú is 15.8%. As president of Guatemala, Alvaro Arzú is well known — only 15.8% of the respondents either did not have an opinion about him or know of him. Indeed, when the 'don't know of/no response' categories are split apart, it is revealed that only 7.5% of the population answered that they did not know of Alvaro Arzú (the remaining 8.3% were not sure how to answer, or would not answer).

Table V.1
Preguntas 28 — 42

Ud. Tiene un opinion favorable o desfavorable sobre cada uno, o si no le conoce

	Favorable	Desfavorable	No lo conoce o no sabe	Total
Alvaro Arzú	60.0%	24.2%	15.8%	100.0%
Ramiro de Leon Carpio	58.1%	15.0%	26.9%	100.0%
Rigoberta Menchú	48.9%	23.6%	27.4%	100.0%
Oscar Berger	48.0%	16.1%	35.9%	100.0%
Efraín Rios Montt	42.7%	33.6%	23.6%	100.0%
Roberto Carpio Nicolle	39.4%	16.4%	44.2%	100.0%
Alfonso Portillo	34.3%	26.9%	38.9%	100.0%
Acisclo Valladares	26.7%	22.4%	50.9%	100.0%
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)	12.5%	15.8%	71.7%	100.0%
Oscar Recinos	11.9%	13.9%	74.1%	100.0%
Fritz Garcia Gallont	10.0%	9.6%	80.4%	100.0%
Rodolfo Paiz Andrade	9.9%	12.7%	77.4%	100.0%
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)	8.9%	14.6%	76.5%	100.0%
Jorge Briz	6.1%	8.0%	85.9%	100.0%
Danilo Roca	4.9%	12.8%	82.4%	100.0%

Table V.2 shows the percentage of the population which indicated that they knew enough about the public figures to provide a favorable or unfavorable rating, presented by region and gender. As seen here, residents of the metropolitan Guatemala City area have a greater knowledge of the public figures than do residents of any other region. Overall, the male respondents show a greater familiarity with the public figures than do the female respondents.

According to the responses to this series of questions, the most well-known figure in Guatemala is Alvaro Arzú, 84.2% of the responses indicated that they knew of him (either the favorable or unfavorable categories). Table V.2 shows that in every region, and by both males and females, he has the highest familiarity rating. The individuals with the next highest rating were: Efraín Rios Montt, Ramiro de Leon Carpio and Rigoberta Menchú (76.4%, 73.1%, 72.6% respectively).

Table V.2
Percent who know prominent individuals
by region and gender

	Región					Género		Total
	Metro	Noreste	Sureste	Suroeste	Noroeste	Masc	Fem	
Alvaro Arzú	90.0%	87.6%	91.8%	87.3%	72.2%	86.0%	82.4%	84.2%
Efraín Rios Montt	87.7%	79.2%	80.0%	75.3%	60.7%	81.5%	71.2%	76.4%
Ramiro de Leon Carpio	88.5%	66.0%	67.3%	74.0%	60.5%	78.3%	67.8%	73.1%
Rigoberta Menchú	86.3%	68.4%	55.5%	75.3%	62.7%	75.9%	69.2%	72.6%
Oscar Berger	88.5%	56.4%	58.2%	62.7%	42.4%	68.9%	59.4%	64.1%
Alfonso Portillo	77.9%	62.4%	70.9%	54.7%	40.5%	68.0%	54.2%	61.1%
Roberto Carpio Nicolle	71.7%	50.0%	53.6%	54.7%	41.7%	60.1%	51.5%	55.8%
Acisclo Valladares	72.1%	44.8%	36.4%	46.0%	29.5%	53.2%	45.1%	49.1%
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)	46.0%	25.2%	20.9%	23.3%	13.2%	35.4%	21.2%	28.3%
Oscar Recinos	46.7%	16.4%	17.3%	21.3%	11.2%	32.2%	19.5%	25.9%
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)	36.9%	21.2%	17.3%	17.3%	13.2%	30.7%	16.3%	23.5%
Rodolfo Paiz Andrade	38.3%	18.8%	18.2%	16.0%	10.2%	28.1%	17.2%	22.6%
Fritz Garcia Gallont	34.6%	17.2%	12.7%	12.7%	7.8%	25.7%	13.4%	19.6%
Danilo Roca	34.6%	11.2%	10.9%	10.7%	6.1%	24.0%	11.3%	17.6%
Jorge Briz	25.0%	12.4%	6.4%	9.3%	6.3%	19.8%	8.4%	14.1%

Table V.3 presents the responses from those who felt they knew enough about an individual to provide a favorable or unfavorable rating. The table shows the percentage of favorable and unfavorable ratings, as well as the ratio of positive to negative responses. This ratio demonstrates that Ramiro de Leon Carpio has the highest rating in this group of prominent individuals (3.88), Guatemala City Mayor Oscar Berger has the second highest rating (2.97), and Alvaro Arzú had the third highest rating (2.47). These ratings are a sharp contrast to that of Danilo Roca (0.38).

Table V.3
Percepcion de figuras publicas: grado de favorabilidad

	Favorable	Desfavorable	Grado
Ramiro de Leon Carpio	79.5%	20.5%	3.88
Oscar Berger	74.8%	25.2%	2.97
Alvaro Arzú	71.2%	28.8%	2.47
Roberto Carpio Nicolle	70.6%	29.4%	2.40
Rigoberta Menchú	67.4%	32.6%	2.07
Alfonso Portillo	56.1%	43.9%	1.28
Efraín Rios Montt	55.9%	44.1%	1.27
Acisclo Valladares	54.4%	45.6%	1.19
Garcia Gallont	51.1%	48.9%	1.05
Oscar Recinos	46.1%	53.9%	0.86
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)	44.2%	55.8%	0.79
Rodolfo Paiz Andrade	43.8%	56.2%	0.78
Jorge Briz	43.4%	56.6%	0.77
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)	38.0%	62.0%	0.61
Danilo Roca	27.5%	72.5%	0.38

Potential Candidates

Table V.4 presents the responses to pregunta 27. This question asks who the respondent would vote for president if the elections were today. The question was open-ended and the respondent filled in the name of the person for whom they would vote, indicated they would choose not to vote, or did not respond at all. The list of potential 'candidates' does not include Alvaro Arzú or Ramiro de Leon Carpio³, who were favored in the above mentioned results (p. 28 -- p. 42). A large number of respondents chose not to respond to this question (n=844 or 60.0%), leaving only 40.0% of the potential respondents for analysis.

Overall, the percentage of respondents who answered that they would vote for no one is 45.9% — this is the most frequent response. The 'candidate' that the most respondents professed they would vote for is Oscar Berger (22.1%), with Efraín Rios Montt as the second most popular (15.3%).

³ Both have served a term in the office of President and cannot be re-elected.

The suroeste region had the highest percentage of respondents that said they would vote for 'no one' (58.8%), and also had the highest percentage of potential votes for Efraín Ríos Montt (26.5%).

Over half (52.1%) of the female respondents answered that they would vote for 'no one' if the elections were held today; the percentage of male respondents that answered 'no one' to this question was lower (40.1%).

Table V.4
Prognostico de votacion por region y sexo:
P27 Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿Por quién votaría?

	Región					Género		Total
	Metro (n=269)	Noreste (n=103)	Sureste (n=23)	Suroeste (n=68)	Noroeste (n=93)	Masc (n=289)	Fem (n=267)	
Oscar Berger	25.3%	28.2%	30.4%	7.4%	15.1%	24.2%	19.9%	22.1%
Efraín Ríos Montt	12.6%	17.5%	4.3%	26.5%	15.1%	17.0%	13.5%	15.3%
Alfonso Portillo	7.1%	8.7%	8.7%	2.9%	8.6%	8.7%	5.6%	7.2%
Jorge Briz	1.1%	1.0%	4.3%		1.1%	0.7%	1.5%	1.1%
Roberto Carpio N.	0.7%	1.9%		1.5%		0.3%	1.5%	0.9%
Acisclo Valladares	1.1%		4.3%		1.1%	1.4%	0.4%	0.9%
Rigoberta Menchú	0.7%	1.0%				0.7%	0.4%	0.5%
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)		1.0%	4.3%			0.7%		0.4%
Fritz García Gallont	0.7%					0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
Oscar Clemente Marroquín	0.4%					0.3%		0.2%
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)	0.4%						0.4%	0.2%
Jorge Mario García Laguardia				1.5%		0.3%		0.2%
Oscar Recinos	0.4%					0.3%		0.2%
Otro	4.1%	1.9%	4.3%	1.5%	11.8%	4.8%	4.5%	4.7%
Por ninguno	45.4%	38.8%	39.1%	58.8%	47.3%	40.1%	52.1%	45.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table V.5 presents the results of pregunta 27 broken by ethnic self identification. Because of non response, this represents only 36.5% of all potential respondents (n=511). As the table shows, the highest percentage of respondents, both indigena and Ladino, answered that they would vote for 'no one' if the elections were today (52.3%, 43.4%, respectively).

The top three candidates for both ethnic groups were Oscar Berger, Efraín Rios Montt and Alfonso Portillo⁴. Over one quarter (25.7%) of the Ladino respondents answered that they would vote for Oscar Berger, while 14.5% of the indigenous respondents would. The majority of the indigenous 'votes' went to Efraín Rios Montt (18.0%) who garnered 13.9% of the Ladino respondents. A lesser percentage of indigenous and Ladino respondents indicated they would cast their votes for Alfonso Portillo (6.4% and 7.4%, respectively).

⁴ Alfonso Portillo ran for president in 1995 with the support of Efraín Rios Montt.

Table V.5
Prognostico de votacion por etnicidad:
P27 Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿Por quien votaria para presidente?

	Etnicidad		Total
	Indigena (n=172)	Ladino (n=339)	
Oscar Berger	14.5%	25.7%	21.9%
Efraín Rios Montt	18.0%	13.9%	15.3%
Alfonso Portillo	6.4%	7.4%	7.0%
Acisclo Valladares	1.2%	0.9%	1.0%
Jorge Briz	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%
Roberto Carpio N.	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%
Rigoberta Menchú		0.9%	0.6%
Fritz Garcia Gallont		0.6%	0.4%
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)	1.2%		0.4%
Oscar Clemente Marroquin		0.3%	0.2%
Oscar Recinos		0.3%	0.2%
Jorge Mario Garcia Laguardia	0.6%		0.2%
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)		0.3%	0.2%
Otro	4.7%	4.7%	4.7%
Por ninguno	52.3%	43.4%	46.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table V.6 presents the results of the candidate question in terms of education. The education question categories have been collapsed to represent the respondents who completed at most: Primary School, Basica, Secondary School, and the University. Because of non-response, this represents 40.0% of the potential respondents (n=554). The highest percentage in every education category answered that they would vote for no one.

As above, the same three candidates dominate this analysis. Oscar Berger received the highest percentage of 'votes' overall, and the highest in every education category except the primary school category. Efraín Rios Montt received the most 'votes' from those with less education (primary school) (20.1%), and over all the categories, he was the second place candidate. Alfonso Portillo was the third place candidate. It is interesting to note that Rios Montt garnered more votes from the least educated (those who completed primary school), while Berger and Portillo acquired more of their votes from the respondents who completed at least Basica.

Table V.6
Prognostico de votacion por educacion:
P27 Si las elecciones fueran hoy, ¿Por quién votaría para presidente?

	Educacion				Total
	Primaria (n=254)	Basica (n=80)	Secundaria (n=123)	Univ. (n=97)	
Oscar Berger	13.4%	31.3%	25.2%	34.0%	22.2%
Efraín Rios Montt	20.1%	15.0%	12.2%	7.2%	15.3%
Alfonso Portillo	4.7%	12.5%	4.9%	12.4%	7.2%
Jorge Briz	1.6%	1.3%		1.0%	1.1%
Roberto Carpio N.	1.2%			2.1%	0.9%
Acisclo Valladares	0.8%	1.3%		2.1%	0.9%
Rigoberta Menchú	0.8%		0.8%		0.5%
Rodrigo Asturias (Gaspar Ilom)	0.4%			1.0%	0.4%
Fritz Garcia Gallont			0.8%	1.0%	0.4%
Oscar Clemente Marroquin				1.0%	0.2%
Jorge Ismael Soto (Pablo Monsanto)		1.3%			0.2%
Oscar Recinos			0.8%		0.2%
Jorge Mario Garcia Laguardia	0.4%				0.2%
Otro	3.9%	6.3%	5.7%	3.1%	4.5%
Por ninguno	52.8%	31.3%	49.6%	35.1%	45.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


Part VI. Constitutional Reforms

The survey included a short series of items (P23-26) on the pending constitutional reforms. Figure VI.1 shows that most Guatemalans say that they know very little about their constitution.




Figure VI.1

In terms of the desirability of reforming the constitution, over one-third do not have any opinion, while a slim majority favors reform, as is shown in Figure VI.2.

**Figure VI.2**

Yet, most people are not familiar with the reforms that are to be voted upon, as is shown in Figure VI.3. Only 6% say that they are familiar with these reforms.

**Figure VI.3**

Finally, we look at the propensity of voting for or against the reforms. Figure VI.4 shows the results. A bit more than one-third of the respondents plan to vote in favor of the reforms, while only 6% plan to vote against these reforms. Yet, most of the electorate has either not decided or will not vote.

Votará En Favor o En Contra Reformas




Figure VI.4

What factors predict a favorable vote on the constitutional reforms? To analyze this question, we must first recode the many responses to P.26 into favorable or unfavorable responses. This has been done by collapsing all of the 'non-decided' and 'don't know' into missing data, and recoding the no's and the non-voters into 'no'. After eliminating the 'not-decided' and the 'don't know', the results are much more favorable towards the reforms, as shown in Figure VI.5.

Voto para las Reformas

Sólo los con opinión y intención a votar





Figure VI.5

Now, we examine the predictors of the probable vote on the constitutional reforms. Some of the key variables examined thus far in this report are not relevant. For example, gender, ethnicity and education play no role in the intention to vote on the reforms (as the variable was recoded above). On the other hand, a very strong predictor is P24, a belief that the constitution should be reformed. Figure VI.6 shows that 85% of those who believe that the constitution should be reformed are likely to vote for the reforms.

**Figure VI.6**

The other factors related to a vote in favor of reform are wealth, age, and the evaluation of the peace process. However, wealth shows no clear-cut pattern. On the other hand, Figure VI.7 shows the importance of age as the young are much more likely to vote in favor of the reforms than the old.




Figure VI.7

The peace process also has an important effect on the intention to support the constitutional reforms. Figure VI.8 shows that those who have the most positive evaluation of the peace process are most likely to support the reforms.




Figure VI.8