

2012



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Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador and in the Americas

# Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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# The Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador and in the Americas, 2012:

## Towards Equality of Opportunity


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This study was performed with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

March 2013





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## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

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## Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.  
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November 2011, a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the [www.americasbarometer.org](http://www.americasbarometer.org) web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendices for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights Report No. 73*, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.<sup>1</sup> Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.


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<sup>1</sup> The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

<sup>2</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

<b>Caribbean</b>	
<b>Belize</b>	
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div>
<b>Guyana</b>	
<b>Haiti</b>	
<b>Jamaica</b>	
<b>Suriname</b>	
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		CIPPEC <sup>IPD</sup>
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		



Canada and United States	
<b>Canada</b>	
<b>United States</b>	



## Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of many institutions, foremost among them the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. We are very grateful to the Tinker Foundation, and especially to Ms. Rente Rene for ongoing support for the entire LAPOP endeavor. At the UNDP, we thank Heraldo Muñoz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Freddy Justiano for their strong support of the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Fabiana Machado for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. At the World Bank, thanks go to Norbert Feiss for enthusiastic and insightful contributions. We are deeply grateful to Nat Stone at Algonquin College for securing the financing for the Canadian survey, for providing research assistants to help with the production of the Canadian country report, and for helping us with the French translation for Canada. Thanks also to François Gélinau for important help with the translation of the French questionnaire. Great thanks also go to Keith Neuman and the Environics Institute for generous support of and partnership in the 2012 round in Canada. We want to take special note of the support that the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia provided to our Bolivia team, and to thank Daniel Moreno for writing the grant proposal and obtaining the funding.

Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

<b>Country/ Institution</b>	<b>Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)</b>
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA - LAPOP Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Professor of Spanish Linguistics, Department of Spanish and Portuguese</li> <li>●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP, Uruguay</li> <li>●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor, Iowa State University</li> </ul>
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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA</li> <li>●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dr. Orlando J. Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica</li> <li>● Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Orlando J. Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
Belize	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Georgina Pizzolitto, Coordinator of Special Studies, LAPOP Central</li> </ul>
<b>Caribbean Group</b>	
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Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval</li> </ul>
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<b>Country/ Institution</b>	<b>Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)</b>
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Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP</li> <li>●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo</li> </ul>
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Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Germán Lodola, Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella</li> </ul>
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA</li> </ul>
<b>North America Group</b>	
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor of Political Science, Iowa State University</li> </ul>
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Nat Stone, Professor, Marketing and Business Intelligence Research Program, School of Business, Algonquin College</li> <li>●Dr. Simone Bohn, Associate Professor of Political Science, York University</li> <li>●Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval</li> <li>●Dr. Keith Neuman, The Environics Institute</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
Summer 2012

## Executive Summary

This report is the result of a research project on the political culture of Salvadorans based on a public opinion survey carried out from April 18<sup>th</sup> to May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2012 and managed by the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (Fundacion Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo). This survey was executed under the auspice of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report is part of a series of studies on El Salvador, including surveys carried out in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and the present one, in 2012. This research was based on a sample of 1,497 Salvadoran adults, representative of the population over the age of 18 residing in El Salvador. This sample was calculated with a 95% confidence level and a sampling error of  $\pm 2.5\%$ . The survey is part of a broader study on political culture in the countries of the American continent, the AmericasBarometer, directed by Professors Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth Zechmeister.

The report is structured in three parts and consists of eight chapters. In the first part (The Equality of Opportunities and Democracy in the Americas), three chapters are presented: “Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas,” “Equality of Political Participation in the Americas,” and “The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Participation.” In the second part (Governance, Political Engagement, and Civil Society in the Americas) three chapters are presented: “Corruption, Crime, and Democracy”, “Political Legitimacy and Tolerance”, and “Local Government”. In the third part (Beyond Equality of Opportunity) two chapters are addressed: “Citizen Participation and Prevention of Crime” and “Electoral Behavior and Political Parties.” Hereafter the most important results are presented.

The first chapter explores the equality of economic and social opportunities in El Salvador within the context of the countries of the Americas. The results of the report indicate that, despite the fact that the inequalities have been reduced over the past few years in El Salvador and in the region; there are still important differences in the opportunities and the resources for Salvadoran citizens based on certain social and, especially, economic characteristics.

The results of the AmericasBarometer indicate that some forms of inequality are associated with skin color, especially in terms of income and opportunities to access education. Although a mindset of social differences based on skin color or on race does not exist in El Salvador, the results of the 2012 survey suggest that skin color also does have an impact on income possibilities and on receiving a quality education.

Furthermore, the data indicate that inequality or social mobility processes are generated and perpetuated via mothers’ education. The mothers’ educational level plays a fundamental role in the opportunities or lack thereof for the new generation of Salvadorans. A person whose mother has high levels of schooling has a greater probability of ascending his or her levels of life than people whose mothers have little or no schooling.

For example, Salvadorans with mothers with university degrees have on average almost 15 years of academic training while people whose mothers do not have any schooling only have 5 years of academic training on average. Furthermore, only 8.3% of Salvadorans whose mothers have high levels

of education face high levels of food insecurity. On the other hand, this percentage rises to 28.6% among people whose parents do not have any schooling.

In general, in response to levels of inequality, Salvadorans have an attitude of affection with respect to the efforts of the government to reduce inequalities and to provide public assistance to those that need it. For example, on a 0-100 scale, Salvadorans average 83.5 on the opinion that the government should implement policies to reduce income inequality. This locates El Salvador as one of the countries in which government intervention to promote equality is most favored. However, when citizens were asked if they received assistance from the government, only 10.5% responded affirmatively. In fact, when compared with other countries in the region, the results indicate that El Salvador has one of the lowest percentages of participation in conditional cash transfer programs implemented by the governments.

Chapters 2 and 3 address the equality in political participation in the Americas and its impact on attitudes towards politics. On a 0-100 scale, the average of community participation levels of Salvadorans is 31.5; that is to say medium-to-high levels on the continent. However, El Salvador is better positioned in the region regarding participation as community leaders. 23% of Salvadorans that attend community meetings take a leadership role.

Some of the inequalities in the access to opportunities in El Salvador exist despite the fact that the attitudes of the majority of Salvadorans are favorable towards initiatives and processes that promote equality and are against mechanisms of discrimination. For example, the majority of Salvadorans have favorable attitudes towards people of a different race and skin color: 72.8% disagrees with the idea that dark-skinned people would not be good political leaders. However, some discriminatory attitudes persist among older people and people with low levels of education.

There is a significant support towards the participation of women in politics and towards the development of conditions that facilitate gender equality. Women reported having voted in a very similar percentage to that of men in the last election: 67% and 69% respectively. The discriminatory opinions about the participation of women in the job market are rejected by the majority of the population. In fact, more than half of Salvadorans (54.8%) are against the idea that men should have priority for jobs over women.

However, the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey reveals that women, people with little schooling, the inhabitants of rural areas, young people, and in some cases, people with dark skin, in fact, have suffered in one way or another, processes of marginalization and discrimination that puts them at a clear disadvantage position with respect to economic opportunities and political participation. People with low levels of education, women, and those who live in rural areas are suffering high levels of economic segregation not only in diverse areas of social life but also in the attitudes of many Salvadorans.

For example, 43.1% of women with formal income earn less than their partner earns; on the contrary, only 11.5% of men with regular income earn less than their life partners. In turn, personal income reported by women who live in urban areas is substantially less than the income of men in the same areas; however, in rural areas, women earn a little more than men, although people of both sexes earn significantly less than those in urban areas.

Regarding attitudes related to race and skin color, a little-discussed topic in El Salvador, the results show very interesting tendencies. In general there is a favorable attitude towards people of color or dark-skinned people but it is not unanimous and varies in function of some conditions. Young people seem to be more favorable towards the idea of participation of people of color in politics and in public positions, but these attitudes are a little less common among older people and people with lower levels of education which reveals persistent legacies of racial discrimination in certain groups within the country.

On the other hand, there is an attitude of little tolerance towards homosexual people and towards their participation in the social and political life of the country. These attitudes of rejection towards homosexuals are very common in El Salvador in comparison with other countries in the region, especially among people with low levels of education. When it was asked whether or not homosexuals should run for public office in El Salvador, respondents averaged a score of 26.5 on a 0-100 scale; at a difference, in Latin American countries like Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile, the averages in favor of homosexuals running for public office exceeded 60 points.

El Salvador finds itself among the countries in which people usually participate a little more in community activities. This in spite of that citizen participation in community activities is not, in general, very high in the region. On a 0-100 scale, the average of community participation of Salvadorans reached a score of 31.5. On the other hand, when it comes to participation in community leadership, the average in El Salvador on a 0-100 scale is 23.8, which places the country as the nation with the second highest level of participation in community leadership. An interesting phenomenon emerges from that women participate much more than men in community activities, but this difference is not reflected in participation in leadership activities. In other words, women do not find spaces of leadership corresponding to their level of participation in the community.

When we address the quotas for women on political participation, the vast majority of Salvadorans showed agreement. These opinions place El Salvador among the countries in which there exists the most citizen support for gender quota policies to elect public officials.

In the third chapter, we explain that although political participation is, in general, low, citizens' participation in political protests is even more reduced. In accordance with the results of the Barometer, less than 4% of those surveyed have participated in a public protest during the last year and the only variable that appears to be associated with this is that of political interest.

In chapter 4, we examine the topics of corruption, crime, and democracy. In spite of the fact that perception of public corruption in El Salvador is rather high, the country does not enter in on the scale of countries with the highest levels of perception of public corruption. In accordance with the results of the survey, Salvadorans scored an average of 65.6 on a scale of 0 to 100 when asked to evaluate the level of corruption among public officials. These opinions on corruption would have shrunk in comparison to the measurement taken in 2008 when the average was nearly 71 points. This is found to be in relation to the fact that corruption victimization, which is measured via tracking the number of bribes, is not as high as in other countries in the American hemisphere. 11.3% of Salvadorans report having been victims of corruption.

On the other hand, perceptions of insecurity are relatively high in comparison to other countries in the region. When asked about how insecure they feel, 43.8% of Salvadorans said that they feel

insecure. This perception rises among residents of the capital to 61.1%. Insecurity continues to be a serious problem for the majority of Salvadoran citizens. Nonetheless, data show that personal crime victimization and household crime victimization would have dropped with respect to the last several years. According to the results of the survey, a little more than 17% of Salvadorans had been victimized directly by crime over the course of the last year while nearly 28.5% of households have members that would have been victims of any type of crime. One highlight of the study is that a major portion of men have been victimized in public places especially in other municipalities and only 13.1% of them have been victimized in their own home. On the other hand, almost 28% of women have been victimized in their own place of residence. This confirms what other studies have suggested: that the home can turn out to be a place where women are at risk.

The area of the country in which we see the highest levels of victimization by common crime is the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador. The data indicate that almost 41.9% of the homes of adults surveyed have faced with victimization events in the Greater San Salvador Area in comparison to only 19.2% in the eastern zone of the country.

When we compare both personal and household victimization figures with previous surveys, it is clear that national crime figures have diminished in an important way, at least in comparison with the 2010 data. For example, in 2010 the percentage of personal victimization at the national level was 24.2% and this figure reduced to 17.4% in 2012. In the capital, however, the percentage of people victimized over the course of the last year was 25.3. Nonetheless, the problems of insecurity continue to affect the perceptions on support for the rule of law in the country. In fact, in spite of that in comparison with 2010, support for the rule of law has risen from 47.4% to 59.7%, we find that El Salvador has comparatively one of the lowest percentages of support for the rule of law in the region.

However, one of the findings of the study is that both crime and corruption victimization, as well as perception of corruption, negatively affect the support for the political system in the country.

In the fifth chapter, we examine the topic of political legitimacy. The scale of system support aims to measure the level of support that citizens grant their government system without focusing on the current administration. In the political science literature, it is called “diffuse support” or “support for the system”. This scale has been constructed on the basis of the average obtained for each of the five questions utilized and so that these results were more understandable, they were converted to a scale of 0-100. The average support obtained for each one of the questions has been the following: the courts (45.5) and basic rights (47.8) exhibit the lowest levels.

On an intermediate level, we find pride for living under the political system (55.8) and the highest levels are those of support for the system (63.5) and respect for institutions (69.6). The scale for system support showed an average of 56.7.

As we have data from the surveys conducted in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, it is possible to see the evolution of the levels of system support over the period of 2004-2012, system support went on shrinking in a sustained fashion for the 2004-2008 period: an average of 59.5 in 2004, 55.4 in 2006 and 51.8 in 2008. It jumps to 58.7 in 2010 – which is a statistically significant change– and later drops to 56.7 in 2012.

The scale of political tolerance is based on four questions that refer to the approval rating of four basic freedoms: the right to vote, the right to peaceful protest, the right to run for public office, and the right to freedom of expression. This scale has been constructed on the basis of the average obtained for the four questions we utilized and the results were converted to a range of 0-100. The averages obtained for each one of the four questions were: running for public office (36.6) and freedom of expression (38.4) being the lowest levels; and right to vote (46.9) and peaceful protests (52.7) being the highest ones; and the scale of political tolerance has an average of 43.7.

Given that we have survey data for previous years, it is possible to see the evolution in the levels of political tolerance for the 2004-2012 period. Political tolerance rises from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006 and later drops slightly to 54.2 in 2008 and subsequently undergoes an important drop to 45.1 in 2010 – which is statistically significant – and drops slightly to 43.7 in 2012. This drop from 2010 to 2012 would place the level of political tolerance lower than the initial point of measurement in the 2004 survey. Compared with the rest of the hemisphere, El Salvador occupies the third lowest position with respect to political tolerance, only ranking above Honduras and Ecuador. The low levels of political tolerance in the country are an aspect that should be analyzed in greater detail in future analyses.

For the analysis of support for democratic stability, we have explored the relationship between the system support scale and the political tolerance scale which were divided up by low and high levels, which creates four possible combinations. The distribution of those surveyed in 2012 in these four boxes is the following: 22.8% of those interviewed fall into the cell labeled “stable democracy”; 38.9% fall into the cell called “authoritarian stability”, this one being the most populated cell of the table; while 12.1% are located in the cell called “unstable democracy”; and 26.2% fall into the cell labeled “democracy at risk”.

These results can be viewed from a historical perspective. The cell “stable democracy” maintains itself at 32.2% for 2004 and 2006 and later drops to 23.4% in 2008 later to rise to 25.7% in 2010 and dropping again to 22.8% in 2012. The cell “authoritarian stability” drops from 34.6% in 2004 to 27.4% in 2006 and rises to 29.3% in 2008 and rises again to 41.7% in 2010 only to drop to 38.9% in 2012. The cell “unstable democracy” rises from 17.2% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2006, rises to 26.9% in 2008, drops to 10.8% in 2010 and later rises to 12.1% in 2012. Lastly, the cell “democracy at risk” goes from 16% in 2004 to 15.8% in 2006 and rises to 20.5% in 2008 and to 21.8% in 2010 and again to 26.2% in 2012. This last cell (“democracy at risk”) has gone from concentrating five to four of the respondents over the last six years; and comparing the measurements from 2004 and 2012, we observe an alarming jump of ten percentage points. This is contrasted with the reduction of nearly 10 percentage points observed in the cell “stable democracy” upon comparing the measurements of 2004 and 2012. This aspect is owed further monitoring in future studies.

How has support for democracy in El Salvador changed in recent years? It has been reduced from an average of 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006 to later rise to 68.4 in 2008, to drop to 64.1 in 2010 to slightly rise to 65.6 in 2012, and although this difference is not statistically significant, based on what we are able to affirm, the level of support for democracy is stable between 2010 and 2012.

In the study, it has been found that Salvadorans exhibit a strong support for democracy as a form of government: 82% prefers electoral democracy compared to the 18% that supports a strong leader that does not have to be elected; and 72% prefer democracy as a form of government compared

to the 17% who prefer an authoritarian government, and 11% who has no preference between an authoritarian form of government and a democratic government. The slight rise in support for an authoritarian regime is worrisome as it rises from 13.5% in 2004 to 17.1% in 2012; although the support for democracy as the preferred political regime of Salvadorans is still strong.

In this survey it has been found that there is a shrinking in the levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works compared with the 2010 data. In 2012, almost 55% are found to be satisfied with the functioning of democracy in El Salvador while a little more than 44% feel unsatisfied.

In general terms, we consider that the evaluation of democracy as a political regime, the level of satisfaction with democracy, just like the increment on support for the system, all are related to the new political context captured at the moment of the fieldwork of the previous survey in 2010. That new context is linked to the elections in January and March of 2009, the change in the party in control of the executive branch after 20 years of ARENA party governments, the transition with stability that developed between March and June, and the expectations generated around the change with the new government, such as the high approval rating of President Funes. The 2012 survey, taken three years after the change in power, captures elements that have to do with the functioning of the political system after the 2009 presidential alternation. It generated many results set up expectations that were the opposite of what was expected, in particular regarding the political and institutional conflicts of the past few years. For these reasons, we observe a reduction in support for the system, in political tolerance, as well as in the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, but at the same time there is a high value placed on democracy as a political regime.

The sixth chapter discusses the performance of local government. In the different surveys (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012), we address how the municipality is the body to which respondents have mainly been directed to solicit help, followed in second place by institutions of the national government and lastly to the representatives; although in the 2012 survey, almost the same percentage had solicited the help of a representative over the help of an institution of the national government. These data reinforce the hypothesis of a larger proximity of the citizenry to the local government, in terms of having solicited help or cooperation in order to resolve their problems. In 2012, an average of 22.4% had solicited the help of the local government; 6.6% from an institution of the national government; and 6.8% from the representatives.

In the 2012 survey, we observe a significant shrinkage in the average of trust in the national government (58.2), compared with 2010 (67.6); while the trust in the municipality rises slightly in comparison to 2010 (59.2). El Salvador is therefore placed among the countries with the highest levels of trust in local government in the hemisphere.

The survey data show relatively low levels of citizen participation in local governments throughout two mechanisms: attendance to a municipal meeting over the course of the last twelve months (11.5%) or by presenting solicitations for help or petitions (15.8%). These levels of participation practically have not varied in recent years (2008-2012).

With respect to the satisfaction with services provided by local governments, 3.7% consider them to be very good, 32.5% view them to be good. 40.6% look upon them to be neither good nor bad, 18.2% see them to be bad, and 5% think that they are very bad. In accordance with the satisfaction

with services provided by the government scale (0-100 format), there is practically no difference with the previous years (52.9 for both).

As noted in Chapter Seven, insecurity constitutes one of the main problems for the citizens at the local and community level. 38% of the people identified problems of security as the most urgent problems for their community from among an important number of alternatives. For 45.7% of the people, the level of violence in the community has remained equal with for 40.1% of the people, the level is lower than in 2012. Only 14.2% said that the problem of violence in the neighborhood has increased.

However, knowledge of and involvement in violence prevention programs at the level of community is still quite low. 19.4% said that their neighbors had organized themselves in order to implement violence prevention activities; almost 10.8% of the people said that there are other similar preventative initiatives outside of their community. For its part, 20.2% of the citizens recognized having heard about the Municipal Violence Prevention Committees but only 16.1% of those citizens reported having attended a meeting called by those committees during the last year.

Finally, the survey catalogued the type of prevention activities that the police execute in their housing communities. 38% of the people have seen the police talking to the neighbors in their community; meanwhile, 35.4% have seen police collaborate directly in the prevention activities; a little more than 33% have witnessed agents of the police speaking with children and young people from the community; in so far as only 20% have witnessed the police attending community meetings.

In spite of the fact that it was not possible to find indicators of change in the levels of violence and crime in those places in which prevention programs have been implemented, the survey reveals that these programs have had an important impact in bettering the relationship between the police and the community and in raising the level of citizen trust in the institution of the police. These results constitute a possible contribution on the part of the community violence prevention programs to area of institutions and to the governability of the country.

In the eighth chapter, we explore electoral behavior and the evaluations regarding political parties. Three years after the 2009 elections that led to a rotation in the Executive Branch, the local and legislative elections took place on March 11, 2012, with a voter registration consisting of 4,679,069 people. In the legislative elections, there were a total of 2,253,696 valid votes cast which indicates rate of voter participation of 48.16%; meanwhile, in the local elections there were 2,311,316 valid votes cast which indicates a rate of voter participation of 49.39%. In the 2009 presidential elections, there were a total of 2,638,588 valid votes out of a voter registration of 4,226,479 people, with a rate of participation of 62.42%. That is to say, there is a decrease in the participation rates in 2012, although it should be kept in mind that the rates of voter participation tend to be less in legislative and local elections.

Basically there are four statistically significant determinants of voting intention in the legislative and municipal elections of 2012: age, education, interest in politics, and whether or not one supports a political party. Of these four variables, two are related to political factors (interest in politics and whether or not one supports a party), and two are socio-demographic in nature (age and education).

From the 2012 survey data it is possible to analyze voting intention in the 2009 presidential elections and in the legislative elections of 2012 – that is to say to explore the consistency of vote for the same party in both electoral processes. Out of those who voted for the ARENA Party candidate in the 2009 presidential elections, 80.4% maintained their voting intention for the same party; meanwhile, out of those who voted for the FMLN/Funes Party in 2009, that figure shrinks to 70.1% for those who voted for the same party in 2012. It is noteworthy that the GANA Party had captured a similar percentage of voters in the legislative elections as ARENA and the FMLN in the 2009 presidential elections (6.9% and 7.4%, respectively).

In the 2012 survey, 30.9% of those people interviewed said that they identify with a political party. Looking at the figures over time, the rate is 31.3% in 2004 and rises to 40.9% in 2008 – a statistically significant increase – and later drops to 34.4% in 2010 and drops again to 30.9% in 2012. It is possible that the 2008 growth is due to the interest in the 2009 electoral campaign, while the figure for 2012 rather demonstrates that those in El Salvador who identify with a political party is around 30.9%.

A second dimension that the survey explores is citizens' proximity to the party they identify with. Of those that identify with a party, 30.2% say that they are very close to it, 38.2% say that they feel somewhat close, and 25.8%, a little bit close and 5.7% show no closeness at all.

The AmericasBarometer, has included a question regarding trust in political parties. In order to simplify the analysis, the original question has been recoded into a 0-100 scale. Taking the 2004 measurement as a point of reference (39.9), there is a reduction in trust for 2006 (35.1), a slight increase in 2008 (35.6), and later a rise in 2010 (39.1), and it drops significantly in 2012 (34.4), a drop to the lowest level recorded over the 2004-2012 period.

In the 2012 survey, we explore the self-ideological orientation of the people interviewed – that is to say – where they place themselves on the political spectrum in terms of left and right. 25.87% of Salvadorans place themselves on the left of the ideological scale; 33.46% place themselves in the center; and 40.67% place themselves on the right. Compared to the 2010 study, we observe a decrease of 8.56 points on the left (34.4%), a decrease of 5.2 points in the center (38.6%) and an increase of 13.75 points on the right (26.9%).

When we compare the evolution of Salvadorans' ideological orientation during the 2004-2012 period using a self-positioning scale in a 1-10 format, we see that Salvadorans have moved from a predominantly rightist orientation (6.9 in 2004) to a more centrist orientation (5.7 in 2006, 5.3 in 2008 and 5.2 in 2010), reaching their most centrist point in 2010, probably as a consequence of the particular characteristics of the 2009 elections. However, three years after the alternation, with a FMLN/Funes government in place and the precursor of the next presidential race in 2014, we observe a movement toward the right in the 2012 measurement (6.0), which is statistically significant.

The results reveal that politics is of no interest to the majority of Salvadorans. 38.3% have no interest. 33.3% have little interest. 17.7% are somewhat interested and 10.7% have a lot of interest. When we compare the evolution of interest in politics with previous years, using a 0-100 scale, data reveal that political interest rises from 2006 (33.8) to 2008 (37.8); maintains at practically the same level in 2010 (37.7%) and later drops in 2012 (33.4), reaching practically the same level we found in



2006. These data let us see that during recent years, the majority of Salvadorans have not been particularly interested in politics.

Finally, in the 2012 survey we find an important level of citizen support for the topic of electoral reform. 86.9% approve (a lot and somewhat) that there should be a law governing political parties that regulates and controls financing; while 82.9% approve (a lot and somewhat) that they should keep voting directly on the ballot over the name and the photograph of the candidates in the legislative elections. Lastly, an average of 81.4 (on a scale of 0-100) agrees that parties should reserve spaces for women in their list of candidates although in the question we do not specify the number or specific percentage.



## Introduction

This report is the result of a research project on the political culture of democracy in El Salvador in 2012. Political culture is understood in general terms as “the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, behaviors, and shared representations in varying degrees by the members of a society, with respect to power, to the institutions and norms that regulate the functioning of the State, and the way in which the people relate to the latter.”<sup>1</sup> This report represents a regional effort coordinated by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project under the auspices of The Americas Barometer directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson and financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with the purpose of studying political culture in Latin American countries.

In El Salvador, the research has been executed by the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (FUNDAUNGO). Locally, the effort is also represented by a series of studies on political culture initiated in 1991 with the publication of the study *Perspectivas para una democracia estable* and was continued with the publication of six other studies: *El Salvador: de la guerra a la paz. Una cultura política en transición*, in 1995; *Auditoría de la democracia, El Salvador 1999*, published in 2000; *Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2004*, published in 2005; *Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2006*, published in 2007; *Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2008. El impacto de la gobernabilidad, y Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, 2010. Consolidación democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles*. In this way, this report lends continuity to the previous studies and contributes to the visualization of the advances and the impasses in the construction of a favorable political culture within the democratic culture of the country. Under the guidance of Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), there have been various studies completed in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 y now in 2012 which permits the possibility of analyzing the evolution of opinions and attitudes during the period of 2004-2012 across a variety of the questions – as well as the comparison of El Salvador data with other countries on the continent.

This report is structured in three parts and consists of eight chapters. In the first part (Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in Latin America), we present the first three chapters: “Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas,” and “The Effect of Inequality of Opportunities and Discrimination in Political Legitimacy and Participation.” In the second part (Governance, Political Engagement and Civil Society in the Americas) we present the next three chapters: “Corruption, Crime and Democracy,” “Political Legitimacy and Tolerance,” and “Local Governments.” In the third part (Beyond Equality of Opportunity), we address the following the two chapters “Citizen Participation and Prevention of Crime” and “Electoral Behavior and Political Parties.”

This report is the product of the effort of various people from FUNDAUNGO who made this current publication possible. María Elena Rivera and Werner Peña contributed to the preparation and development of the field work. Daniel Flores de Paz contributed to the sample design. José Salguero provided technical assistance for the use of the program Stata. Victor Antonio Tablas provided

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<sup>1</sup> Ricardo Córdova Macías and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2001. *Cultura Política, Gobierno Local y Descentralización*. América Central. San Salvador: FLACSO-Programa El Salvador. p 14.

comments on a preliminary version of the report. Alexis Henríquez took charge of the publication of the document. Finally, we would like to thank Professor Mitchell Seligson for his comments and suggestions; as well as the support of Rubí Arana, Fernanda Boidi and Margarita Corral of LAPOP.

Ricardo Córdova Macías  
José Miguel Cruz



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## Understanding the Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please keep in mind that the data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a previous version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey that was made accessible to the public. Therefore, some results obtained using the database accessed from the LAPOP website could differ slightly. However, the overall tendencies remain the same.

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**Part I:  
Equality of Opportunity and  
Democracy in the Americas**



## Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

*With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith*

### I. Introduction

Practically all the definitions of democracy consider equality of opportunity as something essential for its development. The idea of equality of conditions of access is present in the minds of those who defend democracy in whatever location around the world. Opportunities that people have in life are seen as highly influenced by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, to receive good quality health care or to have access to credit, among other things. In fact, children's opportunities in life depend in large part on the social and economic position of their parents in such a way that their future achievements are often conditioned and can be viewed as limited or expanded according to the circumstances of their youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.<sup>1</sup> More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.<sup>2</sup>

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.<sup>3</sup> Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime.<sup>4</sup>

Income inequality is not only a social or economic problem but rather it is also, fundamentally and for various reasons, a *political* problem. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of

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<sup>1</sup> Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

<sup>2</sup> López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

<sup>3</sup> De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

<sup>4</sup> Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

governments. Research shows that inequality creates public discontent,<sup>5</sup> fosters political instability and violence,<sup>6</sup> and decreases trust in democracy.<sup>7</sup> LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.<sup>8</sup> Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

The extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed. More important still is that inequality reinforces itself. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.<sup>9</sup> What is more, equality of opportunity extends far beyond economic problems and includes political participation and access. These inequalities aggravate the vicious circle in which certain people who are born with better opportunities establish the rules of the game that allows them to maintain themselves and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. In section II we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in El Salvador and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After evaluating the objective disparities in the economic and social results, we analyze public opinion. We explore who perceives that they are being discriminated against. Beyond that, we also examine what citizens think regarding economic and

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<sup>5</sup> De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

<sup>7</sup> Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.


<sup>8</sup> Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

<sup>9</sup> Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

social inequality in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education

## II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

In this section, we examine previous works on inequality in El Salvador and in the Americas basing our study in part on various objective measurements of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure I.1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.<sup>10</sup> The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.



**Figure I. 1. Gini Indices by World Regions.**

Figure I.2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.<sup>11</sup> As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.

<sup>10</sup> See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

<sup>11</sup> The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each




Figure I. 2. Inequality in the Americas.

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure I.3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).<sup>12</sup> The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution.


In El Salvador in 2010, the inequality index (Gini) was 45.4, demonstrating a clear tendency towards a decrease in recent years which places El Salvador below the average for Central America.<sup>13</sup> For this same year, the poorest 20% of the population only earns 50.6% of national income. This constitutes a significant change with respect to previous national tendencies.

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region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

<sup>13</sup> Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Base de datos CEPALSTAT. Cata can be found at: <http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?IdAplicacion=1>.




**Figure I.3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution.**

In fact, levels of inequality in the region are changing and El Salvador is not an exception. At the same time we observe differences throughout the Americas, we also find evidence of convergence in the levels of inequality. A recent report from the Brookings Institute reveals that since the year 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most traditionally unequal countries in the region.<sup>14</sup> Figure I.4 presents time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has decreased in some fashion in Brazil and Honduras, countries historically known for their lack of equality, in the two countries historically with the lowest levels of inequality, inequality has increased (Costa Rica) or has remained the same (Uruguay).

In El Salvador, the inequality of income distribution has undergone a significant reduction in recent years. In 2001, for example, the Gini Inequality Index was 52.5. For 2004, it went to 49.3, decreasing even further in 2009 (47.8). This puts El Salvador in an opposite trend than the one followed by almost all the countries in the region with the exception of Nicaragua. Particularly, in Guatemala and Costa Rica, inequality has grown importantly in recent years. In Guatemala, for example, the inequality index – which was already significantly high – passed 54 in 2002 and 58 in 2006 – one of the highest in Latin America. In Costa Rica, which in the past had maintained one of the lowest indexes of inequality in the region, rose from 45 in 1997 to 48 in 2007 and reached 50 in 2011.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press y United Nations Development Programme.

<sup>15</sup> Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Base de datos CEPALSTAT. Data can be found at: <http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?IdAplicacion=1>.



**Figure I. 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas.**


How will inequality in the Americas evolve during the next decade? This is a difficult question to answer given that changes in inequality are attributable to diverse factors such as: national economic growth, international economic context, and the public policies adopted in each country. Therefore, the changes in inequality in each country depend in part on the national, regional and global economy, including the state of the economy in Europe, China, and the United States.<sup>16</sup> In El Salvador, there is no way to anticipate the economic behavior of the country with certainty, but if it follows the trends of the last decade, with the familiar remittances being one of the main rubrics of the national economy and its redistributive effect, and the growth of the informal sector as a result of the outsourcing of the economy, it is possible to anticipate that the trend of reduction in inequality will continue.

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).<sup>17</sup> Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure I.5 shows the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. In absolute and relative terms, the distance in Latin America and the Caribbean between the HDI and the IHDI is the largest in the world. El Salvador is, in and of itself, a clear example of this. The Human Development Index for the country for 2011 was 0.674, which places El Salvador within the range of countries with medium human development; however, the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index for the same year is

<sup>16</sup> Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forging Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

<sup>17</sup> Human Development Index (HDI) is an index between 0 and 1 that measures the average of achievement of a country on three dimensions of human development: live expectancy, education, and income. The calculation are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).


only 0.495. This causes the country to lose 11 positions in the world ranking of human development for the United Nations Development Program (PNUD).<sup>18</sup>



**Figure I. 5. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions.**

Figure I.6 presents the total loss of human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between the HDI and the IHDI. According to this measurement, the region of Latin America and the Caribbean has lost 26.1% of its potential for human development due to persistent inequality. In El Salvador, the loss of potential is hardly greater: 26.6%. This indicates that the country would be losing more human development potential than the majority of Latin American countries.

<sup>18</sup> Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. 2011. *Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2011*. Nueva York: UNDP, p 153.




**Figure I. 6. Overall loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality.**

However, these measurements of the Human Development Index hide differences in the level of human development in the interior of the country. In spite of being the country with the smallest territory on the American continent, there are very large differences among the municipalities that make up the great urban metropolis and some rural municipalities. For example, the metropolitan municipalities of Antigua Cuscatlán, Santa Tecla, San Salvador and Mejicanos have human development indexes over 0.80 with a life expectancy over 72 years of age; which places them among the municipalities with the highest level of human development, comparable to countries like Malta, Slovakia, or Hungary. However, in the rural municipalities of Cacaopera, Jutiapa or Lislique, the Human Development Index is below 0.60 which represents low levels comparable to African nations like Congo or Cape Verde.

Figure I.7 enables us to discern the differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with disadvantaged (dark green bar) and advantaged (light green bar) family backgrounds in some countries in the Americas.<sup>19</sup>

For example, the figure shows that in Jamaica, a student coming from a disadvantaged family has a more than 80% probability of completing sixth grade on time, while the probability of a student coming from more favorable background only increases slightly (near 90%). However, the figures show that children from disadvantaged families in Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru have less of a chance of finishing their sixth year of studies. At the same time, the majority of countries in Central America, with the exception of El Salvador, stand out as highly unequal. However, in El Salvador, children from disadvantaged families have a 50% probability of completing sixth grade while if they come from families with a greater advantage, the percentage rises to almost 100, which demonstrates a certain level of inequality.

<sup>19</sup> Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.



**Figure I. 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas.**

### III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in the Dominican Republic: A View from the AmericasBarometer

In the last section, we offered a brief review of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But now it is appropriate to ask who are the most affected by inequality of opportunities in the region. Some questions included in the 2012 round of the Americas Barometer allow us to evaluate to what point certain measurements of opportunity such as the level of income and education vary according to race, gender, and the family background of respondents. Further, we evaluate the opinion of those interviewed in order to know who feels that they have been discriminated against, to what extent they perceive inequalities to be natural or desirable and what public policies they would approve to rectify inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.<sup>20</sup>

Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of “statistical discrimination,” meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.<sup>22</sup>

The first social division that we examine in this study is the one between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.<sup>25</sup> So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Afterwards, we examine the division among racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.<sup>26</sup> Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development. Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the

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<sup>20</sup> For a review see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

<sup>21</sup> Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil.” *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. “Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. “The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach.” *Económica L* (1-2).

<sup>22</sup> Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, y Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. “Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, y Urzúa. 2009b. “An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. “Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan y Máximo Torero. 2009. “Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru.” En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

<sup>23</sup> Abramo, Laís and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. “Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America.” *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

<sup>24</sup> Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 “Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50-82.

<sup>25</sup> Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. “The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean.” SSRN eLibrary (April).

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1820870](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870).

<sup>26</sup> De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

Americas.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.<sup>29</sup>

We begin our analysis of the 2012 Americas Barometer data by examining what Salvadoran citizens of different gender, diverse social classes and diverse racial groups such as those living in urban areas versus those living in rural areas say about their social and economic resources. The questionnaire employed by the AmericasBarometer in 2010 and 2012 contains various questions that allow us to establish to what social groups the interviewees belong. For example, we evaluate interviewees' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.<sup>30</sup> In spite of the fact that identity does not revolve around the issue of race or ethnicity which are not found either at the center of the political debate in El Salvador, the survey in this country included a series of questions with the purpose of comparing and standardizing the discrimination analyses in the region as well as of examining whether or not identification with an ethnic group constitutes an important factor in the configuration of the political opinions and attitudes of Salvadorans. Therefore, the ETID question simply asks interviewees if they identify themselves as white, mixed race, indigenous, of African descent or mulatto. Additionally, since the 2010 Americas Barometer and thanks to the support of Professor Edward Telles of Princeton University, we employ a color palette.<sup>31</sup> At the end of each interview, the survey taker is asked to evaluate discreetly the skin color of the interviewee's face on a scale of 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) according to the color palette. (See Figure I.8). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (See, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Branton, Regina P., y Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

<sup>28</sup> Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>29</sup> See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>30</sup> The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.

<sup>31</sup> Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

<sup>32</sup> In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.



**Figure I. 8. Skin Color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer, 2012.**

In the 2012 questionnaire, we also include some questions on interviewees' social and economic resources. As has been done in previous surveys, we include questions regarding education level, family income, and the existing assets of the household (for example whether or not there is indoor plumbing, flat screen televisions, or vehicles). This last group of questions, found in Series R, was used to create a five-quintile household wealth index which is standardized throughout urban and rural areas in each country.<sup>33</sup>

In the 2012 survey, we also include new questions regarding social and economic resources. For the first time, we asked interviewees that reported having employment at the time of the interview about their personal income (**Q10G**). The question **GEN10** inquires into income inequality within the households of the married interviewees or those that live with their partner.

<sup>33</sup> This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *Americas Barometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

**GEN10.** Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income

Other than the household wealth measurements, the 2012 Americas Barometer also includes various questions related to family background. The question **ED2** asks for information on the interviewee's mother's level of education. Furthermore, the self-identification of social class is measured by question MOV1 which asks the interviewee to identify to what social class he believes he belongs (upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, lower class).<sup>34</sup>

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.<sup>35</sup> Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

	No	Yes
<b>FS2.</b> In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1
<b>FS8.</b> In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1

In the first place, using a linear regression analysis,<sup>36</sup> we evaluate how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect one's level of education in El Salvador. Figure I.9 indicates that those in the oldest age cohort have a lower level of education. The contrast is particularly clear when we compare citizens aged 66 years and above with the rest of the age groups.<sup>37</sup> The results also indicate that skin color appears to be associated with people's level of education: the darker the skin color of the person surveyed, the lower the level of education. As we expected to see in light of other studies, Salvadorans that live in rural areas also have a lower level of schooling than their counterparts in urban areas.


<sup>34</sup> Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *Americas Barometer Insights Series*, 86. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>35</sup> These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

<sup>36</sup> In order to facilitate the interpretation, all of the LAPOP reports present the results of the multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is shown on the vertical axis. The dot represents the variable's impact and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does overlap the vertical line "0", that variable is statistically significant. This means that we can trust that the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is not random.

<sup>37</sup> The 18-25 age group does not appear in the figure because it is the category of reference.

Finally, the figure shows that Salvadoran women have fewer years of schooling on the average than men. This means that women, elderly people, people living in rural areas, and the people with a darker skin tone are less likely to have high levels of education in the country.




**Figure I. 9. Determinants of Education Level in El Salvador, 2012.**

In this analysis, we have evaluated the measure in which family type or family origin affect the level of education in El Salvador. The multivariate regression did not include item ED2 – which measures family origins - given that this question was only asked of half of the sample.<sup>38</sup> Limiting the analysis to half the sample would reduce the inference capacity related to the effects of the rest of variables.

However, Figure I.10, which shows the interviewee’s years of education (Y-axis) according to the level of education that his/her mother obtained (X-axis) indicates that these two conditions are strongly correlated. In other words, the mother’s education level is strongly related to her children’s level of education. In the measurement in which the mother has a higher level of education, her son or daughter (the interviewee) has a much more elevated average of schooling. For example, the average number of years of schooling of an interviewee whose mother reached the primary level of education is almost 9. At a difference, those interviewees whose mothers have a university-level education have, on average, 15 years of schooling.


<sup>38</sup> In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.



**Figure I. 10. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Education Level in en El Salvador, 2012.**

It becomes appropriate, therefore, to ask ourselves if the same factors that are related to the interviewee's level of education are related to his level of income. How does income vary according to age, skin color, gender, urban or rural residency, and family origin in El Salvador? In order to respond to this question, Figure I.11 evaluates, by using a linear regression analysis, the determinants of personal income among the interviewees that reported having a job at the time of the interview.<sup>39</sup> As we can see, the factors associated with the employed Salvadorans' income are similar to those associated with education, although not necessarily the same. Age does not appear to play a particularly important role affecting income – in spite of the fact that people over 66 years of age differ from younger people, gender, place of residence, and skin color do seem to play a role. According to the results of the regression and aligned to what other studies on gender inequality have found, women perceive having less income than men. Much in the same way, people of darker skin tone report receiving less income than people of lighter skin color. This is interesting, given that next to accomplishments that have to do with schooling, it would suggest that inequalities are a function of people's skin color. In spite of the fact that there is not an awareness of racial identity in El Salvador, data indicate important differences in terms of skin color when it comes to salary (and also education level). However, the variable that seems to play a more important role in income levels is the interviewee's area of residence. Data shown by Figure I.11 indicates that the interviewees that live in rural areas have a greater probability of receiving a lower income than the rest of the population.


<sup>39</sup> Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




**Figure I. 11. Determinants of Personal Income in El Salvador, among those respondents who work, 2012.**

Having said that, the previous figure shows that women receive, in general, less personal income than men, but, what happens within the household? Does the same relationship among women and men that are a couple remain the same? As we have previously explained, item GEN10 asks the married interviewees or those who live with their partners about their personal income compared with their partner's income. In Figure I.12, we see the differences in income only among men and women that reported having a job. As we can see, women (43.1%) tend to earn less than their own partner; in contrast, the men (40.2%) usually earn more than their own partner. This indicates the magnitude of income inequality that is found in a large portion of Salvadoran households. However, this is not exclusive to this country. In general, throughout almost all of Latin America, the survey data from the AmericasBarometer report that more than half of women earn less than their respective partners.

In fact, when we compare the levels of personal income in function of gender and area of residence (see Figure I.13), we can see that there do not exist significant differences among women and men that live in rural areas. In this case, both sexes have low levels of personal income, which means a certain level of economic equality in the rural regions of the country. The differences are clearer, however, when we address the comparison within urban areas. In the cities, men tend to earn much more than women, which, considering that the majority of the Salvadoran population lives in urban areas, affects the national gender inequality calculation.




**Figure I. 12. Income of the Respondent Compared to that of his/her Partner in El Salvador, among those who work, 2012.**



**Figure I. 13. Income of the respondent by gender and area of residence, among those who work in El Salvador, 2012.**


These differences among women and men are also perceivable when we cross the data by skin color. Figure I.14, which presents an analysis of the results by gender and skin color, reveals, in the first place, that personal income decreases as the skin tone of the interviewee gets darker, with the exception of those who have the whitest skin.<sup>40</sup> In other words, people with the whitest skin tend to earn more on average than the rest of the population. These tendencies are similar for men and women, but as it could be expected, men tend to earn more than women in almost all categories of skin color in spite of the fact that the differences are more pronounced in skin color categories 2 and 4.



**Figure I. 14. Skin Color and Personal Income in El Salvador, among Respondents who Work, 2012.**

<sup>40</sup> This could be a deceiving effect of the low number of cases within this category. Only 1.2% of the respondents feel within Category 1 – lightest skin color. The majority of the citizens interviewed (almost 90%) are located between Categories 3 and 6, demonstrating the magnitude of mixed-race people in El Salvador (see Figure I.8).

Lastly, we evaluate to what extent family education history affects personal income in El Salvador. Various studies have shown that one of the most important variables determining a person's opportunities is the education history of his or her parents, particularly the mother's. Figure I.15 presents the relationship between the mother's educational attainment and personal income levels. As we are able to observe, in the case of El Salvador there exists a clear association between the mother's degree of schooling and the personal income level of the people surveyed. Respondents whose mothers attended university are concentrated in the highest category for income, while people whose mothers do not have much schooling average out having the lowest level of personal income. The implications of this cannot be clearer: the academic formation of the female population is a fundamental factor in the creation of resources and opportunities for future generations.



**Figure I. 15. Mother's Educational Level as Determinant of Respondent's Income El Salvador, Among Respondents who Work, 2012.**

We could say that the most fundamental resource for any citizen is food. Even though we have observed that personal income is not evenly distributed throughout the country, is it the same with respect to food? In Figure I.16, we perform a linear regression analysis in order to establish the determinants of food insecurity. We add the responses to questions FS2 and FS8 in order to create an index that goes from 0 to 2. High numbers reflect a greater level of food insecurity.<sup>41</sup> Only two variables turn out to be associated with food insecurity among: skin color and the mother's education attainment. As we can see in Figure I.16, the people with darker skin (according to the color palette shown in Figure I.8) tend to experience greater food insecurity than people with lighter skin.

<sup>41</sup> Remember that all these questions were asked of half of the interviewees.

These data reinforce previous results that show that skin color is an unexpectedly important factor in inequality and socioeconomic discrimination processes in the country. The regression also confirms the importance of the mother's educational attainment with regards to food insecurity. In fact, it is the most relevant predictor of food insecurity of all the factors examined.

Figure I.17 shows this in a very clear way. In accordance with the results of the survey, 19.4% of Salvadorans experience high levels of food insecurity. This percentage varies in a significant way in function of the mother's level of educational attainment in a way so that in the case of citizens whose mothers do not have any schooling, that percentage rises to 28.6% while it drops to 8.3% among those people whose mothers attended college.





Figure I. 16. Determinants of Food Insecurity in El Salvador, 2012.



**Figure I. 17. Level of Mother's Education and Food Insecurity in El Salvador, 2012.**

### Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have show that economic and social resources are not evenly distributed among groups defined by gender, skin color, urban or rural residence and family educational history. However, we have not clearly defined the reasons for which these inequalities persist. In particular, we have not even evaluated to what extent we may attribute differences in the socio-economic results to social norms or discriminatory attitudes that exist in society. The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes in its surveys various questions to evaluate in what way economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the role of men and women in the economic and with respect to the economic achievements of different racial groups.

In the first place, we analyze social norms related to the work performed by men compared with work done by women. Many studies suggest that the role of men and women in the workplace is different throughout the Americas.<sup>42</sup> In 2012, we asked interviewees, on a 1-7 scale, if they agreed or not with the following sentence:


**GEN1.** Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure I.18 presents the average of acceptance of this idea in the Americas. We recoded the responses into a 0-100 scale in order to facilitate a comparison with other variables and with other countries. As we observe, El Salvador obtained an average of 37.8 on a 0-100 scale, placing it at the center of regional distribution, much lower than countries like the Dominican Republic, Guyana, or Haiti in which there are more discriminatory attitudes in favor of men, but above countries like Uruguay and Canada, in which there is less discrimination against women. This means that even though El Salvador does appear among the countries with high levels in terms of attitudes of discrimination, the levels of the country are worrisome.<sup>43</sup> If we compare these results with those of El Salvador's Central American neighboring countries, El Salvador turns to show slightly lower attitudes of discrimination with respect to Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, but the differences are not statistically significant. In any case, these findings contribute to providing explanations for some of the previously examined results, which indicate the existence of gender discrimination levels in socio-economic terms.

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<sup>42</sup> Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented in the Conference *Marginalization in the Americas*, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>43</sup> In fact, the national average is above the regional average of 36.5.



**Figure I. 18. Agreement that Men should have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

The use of averages does not allow us to see the marked differences among Salvadorans' responses. In Figure I.19, we evaluate the responses in greater detail and we go back to using the original 1 to 7 scale. A little more than one-third of citizens reported being in disagreement with the idea that men should have priority when it comes to getting a job. This constitutes the most common individual response, especially among women. Women responded this way at a percentage of 43.4%. However, almost 12% of all the respondents were in great agreement with the idea that men should have priority over women when it comes to getting jobs. As we expected, this response is more common among men (14.1%) than among women (10%) although the difference is not very great.




**Figure I. 19. Opinion that men should have Labor Market Priority in El Salvador, 2012.**

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked citizens about their perceptions regarding the reasons for which ethnic and racial inequalities exist. In this round, we asked the following questions in all the countries of the Americas.<sup>44</sup>

**RAC1CA.** According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?  
 [Read alternatives, just one answer]  
 (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly  
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response

A little more than 77% of Salvadorans are of the opinion that people of dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population because they have been treated in an unfair way, while 22.6% said that they are poor because of their culture. In Figure I.20, we can see how those results compare with the rest of the countries in the region. Once again, El Salvador is located in the middle of the distribution of countries. In Central American and Caribbean countries like Guatemala, the Dominican Republic or Costa Rica, the opinions that dark-skinned people held values that drive them into poverty are much more predominant than in El Salvador and the rest of the Latin American region. However, discriminatory opinions towards people of another race are more frequent in this country than in nations like Panama, Venezuela, or Uruguay.

<sup>44</sup> This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.



**Figure I. 20. Percentage agreeing that Poverty is Due to “Culture” in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

In the case of El Salvador, what are the characteristics of the people that tend to think that the poverty of dark-skinned people is due to culture? In order to respond to that question, we run a logistic regression analysis with the most important demographic characteristics: gender, age, educational attainment, personal income, skin color, and area of residence. The results are not shown here because we found that practically no variable is particularly associated with that sort of opinion.

#### IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What actions should the governments of the Americas take, if any, with respect to the wide social and economic inequalities that their citizens face? Providing a response to this question is outside of the scope of this report, and answering it with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions regarding the implicit ideological and normative debates, which concerns the citizens more than the authors of this study. However, we discuss here in broad terms some of the most common public policy proposals and present the public opinions with respect to these policies.


In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens about their opinion on the role of the State in the reduction of inequality. Question ROS4 seeks to know if the interviewees agree or not, on a scale of 1 to 7 points, with the following affirmation:

**ROS4.** The Salvadoran government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The responses to this question show a simple view of to what extent citizens agree, in abstract terms, with the idea that inequality constitutes a problem of public policy that the government should try to resolve. Here we present the average level of agreement with this statement for each country in the region. As we have been doing throughout this report, we recoded the responses into a scale of 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”) in such a way that high scores mean stronger attitudes of support for implementing public policies against inequality.

The data from the AmericasBarometer indicate that there is a strong consensus in the region around the idea that the State government should firmly intervene in order to reduce inequalities. In almost all of the Latin American countries and those of the Caribbean, the majority of citizens report being in strong agreement with this idea. El Salvador finds itself in this group, as we can see in Figure I.21. In reality, there are not significant differences among El Salvador and the majority of the Latin American countries with the highest scores; only Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic would have, in reality, significantly greater levels of approval of this idea. However, in various countries such as Costa Rica, Peru, Guatemala, and others, the opinions regarding government intervention are significantly smaller. What is interesting regarding the data shown in the figure in question is that citizens in the United States possess markedly different opinions to the rest of the people in the hemisphere. In the United States, there is a much more divided opinion with respect to the idea that the government should intervene in order to reduce inequalities.

But returning to El Salvador, a closer examination of the results show that 55% of respondents reported being in strong agreement with the idea that the government should implement strong policies to combat inequality, and a little more than 30% showed certain levels of agreement. Only 4% reported being in strong disagreement with government intervention against income inequality.



**Figure I. 21. Agreement that the State should Implement Policies to Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

## Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

During the last two decades, many governments in the region have transformed their social assistance programs, providing conditional assistance to their most needy citizens in exchange for their participation in public health programs and that their children attend school.<sup>45</sup> The programs of greatest magnitude and the most known are “Oportunidades” in Mexico, “Bolsa Familia” in Brazil, “Familias en Acción” in Colombia, and “Asignación Universal por Hijo” in Argentina. At the same time, many governments in the region have expanded non-conditional public assistance programs. El Salvador is not an exception with programs like “Red Solidaria” and “Comunidades Solidarias” implemented over the last few years. In general, the conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) in Latin America are seen as effective strategies to help the poorest citizens in the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, “CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest.”<sup>46</sup> These social assistance programs and conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) have helped in a major way to reduce inequality and poverty in some of the most unequal contexts in the region. However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and other similar programs depend on large part on how said programs are designed and how they are implemented in specific countries, making clear the necessity of developing well-designed and effective programs.<sup>47</sup>

In 2012, the Americas Barometers measured levels of reception of public assistance and conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) in the region using a new question:

**CCT1NEW.** Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?  
(1) Yes            (2) No


The levels of reception of social assistance and of conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) vary enormously throughout the region. However, in the majority of the countries, the transfers reach less than 20% of the population. In Figure I.22, we present the percentage of respondents that in each country in the region who reported that there was someone in their home receiving public assistance. As we can see, Bolivia has the greatest percentage of people receiving monetary transfers directly from the government, with 55%. Further, the majority of the countries are located under 25%. In the case of El Salvador, a little more than 10% of citizens affirm that someone in their home receives public assistance from the government. This places El Salvador within the lowest group of Central American countries reporting people on public assistance.

<sup>45</sup> Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. “New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. “Social Spending and Political Support: The ‘Lessons’ of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico.” *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, y Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L. y Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America.” *Americas Barometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>46</sup> Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

<sup>47</sup> Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Social Protection Working Paper* #0605. The World Bank.

This is probably due in part to the fact that these kinds of programs are relatively new in El Salvador. Conditional cash transfer programs in El Salvador began during the mid-2000s with the “Red Solidaria” program which focused on, among other things, providing health and education bonus in the 100 poorest communities in the nation. With the change in government in 2009, this program was re-baptized as “Comunidades Solidarias Rurales” and subsequently expanded with the “Comunidades Solidarias Urbanas” program. Aside from providing the traditional bonus for education and health, these programs invest in the improvement of infrastructure and of public services.



**Figure I. 22. Receives Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**


The 2012 AmericasBarometer offers the opportunity to evaluate citizens' opinions on conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) and other public assistance programs. Although the survey does not ask directly about the *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** asks about the attitudes towards those who receive this type of assistance.<sup>48</sup>

**CCT3.** Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

The answers were coded on a scale from 1 to 7 in which 1 represents “strong disagreement” and 7 is “strong agreement.” Figure I.23 presents the levels of agreement with this affirmation in the Americas. The responses were recoded on a 0-100 scale in order to facilitate comparison with other public opinion questions. There is a wide variation on the opinion that people who receive public assistance are lazy. In the countries of the Southern Cone: Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, the majority of citizens share this opinion. Conversely, in some countries in the Caribbean, (Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica) and Brazil, these opinions are much less common. The results of the regional survey place El Salvador closer to this last group with an average score of 40.8; that is to say, the majority of Salvadorans do not think that people who receive state assistance are lazy. In fact, when we analyze the results of percentages for El Salvador in the AmericasBarometer, they indicate that in that Central American nation, only 12% of the respondents reported strongly agreeing that those who receive public assistance are lazy. At a difference, almost 33% of those people who took the survey reported being in strong disagreement with that idea.

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<sup>48</sup> This question was asked to a split sample.




**Figure I. 23. Belief that Recipients of Public Assistance are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

### Affirmative Action

Another possible option for public policy that has awakened interest in some places in Latin America is affirmative action. Although these types of programs have several-decade long histories in the United States, they are a recent phenomenon in Latin America and have only been seriously considered as a policy option in some countries with ethnic diversity. In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about the support for affirmative action among the respondents in each country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was asked among half of the respondents in each country. It asked whether or not they were in agreement or disagreement with the following affirmation, on a scale of 1 to 7:

**RAC2A.** Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?



**Figure I. 24. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

In Figure I.24, we examine the support for affirmative action in the Americas. The responses were recoded on a 0-100 scale in order to facilitate the comparison. In El Salvador, the majority of people disagreed with affirmative action, and, seen from a comparative perspective, El Salvador is one of the countries in which support for this type of policy is the lowest. However, it is important to take these results cautiously for two reasons. In the first place, there is no collective awareness in belonging to ethnic groups in El Salvador, nor is there importance placed on skin color (the identifiable afro-descendent population is less than 0.5%). In second place, given the prior claim that there is no importance placed on skin color, the majority of Salvadorans are not familiar with the concept and policy of affirmative action. At a difference to the United States, where this type of policy has been wide-spread, in El Salvador, the debate on opportunities does not revolve around ethnic or racial identities, rather imminently around socioeconomic resources.

## V. Conclusions

The large differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitutes one of the most serious types of political, social, and economic problems for the governments of the Americas. While inequality has decreased recently in many nations of the Americas that historically had high levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu.

The results of this chapter have revealed three important aspects that have to do with citizens' inequality of social opportunity. In the first place, in spite of the fact that there is not an awareness of ethnic identities in El Salvador and that many citizens think that skin color does not constitute an important factor in the determination of inequalities, the data indicate that skin color does constitute an important predictor in terms of income and level of education, even controlling for other variables, which suggests the existence of discrimination mechanisms related to physical appearance. This aspect should be analyzed in greater detail in future studies. In the second place, the data indicate that one of the most important variables in the determination of social and economic climbing is the mother's level of educational attainment. This constitutes one of the most relevant predictors to determine whether a person has a better level of income and education than the rest of his peers in the same circumstances. Finally, this chapter has reported that there exists a generally favorable attitude toward government intervention to reduce inequalities and to provide public assistance for those who need it. Salvadorans seem to support government conditional cash transfer programs and, although only a relatively small percentage participates, those programs are looked upon with acceptance.


## Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.<sup>52</sup> This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.



<sup>52</sup> The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.


## Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.<sup>1</sup> While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.



<sup>1</sup> The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

## Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage



*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.<sup>1</sup> The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

**Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values**



<sup>1</sup> The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.



## Appendices

### Appendix I.1. Determinants of level of educational attainment in El Salvador, 2012.

	Coef.	t
Rural Population	-0.364*	-9.46
Women	-0.124*	-5.05
Skin Color	-0.119*	-4.21
Age 26-35	-0.068*	-2.73
Age 36-45	-0.196*	-6.81
Age 46-55	-0.255*	-15.10
Age 56-65	-0.301*	-18.14
Age 66+	-0.365*	-16.95
Constant	0.007	0.21
R-squared = 0.344		
Number of Cases = 1454		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix I.2. Determinants of household income in El Salvador, 2012.

	Coef.	t
Rural population	-0.397*	-8.19
Women	-0.134*	-6.29
Skin Color	-0.125*	-4.37
Age 26-35	0.035	1.04
Age 36-45	0.017	0.55
Age 46-55	-0.032	-1.12
Age 56-65	-0.034	-1.42
Age 66+	-0.069*	-2.68
Constant	0.005	0.15
R-squared = 0.207		
Number of Cases = 1268		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix I.3. Determinants of Food Insecurity in El Salvador, 2012.

	Coef.	t
Urban Population	0.045	0.91
Mother's Education	-0.158*	-4.70
Women	0.066	1.80
Skin Color	0.098*	2.2
Age 26-35	-0.006	-0.13
Age 36-45	0.049	1.25
Age 46-55	-0.008	-0.19
Age 56-65	-0.004	-0.12
Age 66+	0.045	0.67
Constant	0.002	0.06
R-squared = 0.058		
Number of Cases = 638		
*p<0.05		



## Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

*With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith*

### I. Introduction

This chapter centers its attention on politics, examining how gender, race and poverty affect participation and political opportunities in the region. The chapter is divided into four sections. First, we review the literature on inequality in participation and indicate why this topic deserves being kept in mind given its impact on democratization and economic development. In the second place, we examine the current levels of electoral participation and participation in civil society groups based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. We aim to know the level of inequality of participation that exists in the Americas. Then, we move on to an analysis of public opinion relative to the participation of disadvantaged groups in politics and public positions. Lastly, we review possible solutions to reduce political inequalities that exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.<sup>1</sup> An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.<sup>2</sup> Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

<sup>2</sup> Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

<sup>3</sup> Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative

Inequality in electoral participation certainly has worrisome implications for democratic representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Unfortunately, biased electoral participation seems to be more of the rule than the exception. It is appropriate to ask what happens with other forms of political participation. Is political participation outside the voting booth also distributed in an unequal way among the different groups within a society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.<sup>4</sup> For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.<sup>5</sup> Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation do not only exist among citizens of different social classes or socioeconomic levels, but also it manifests among genders and ethnic groups. In spite of the fact that turnout has evened off among men and women to the extent that women vote at similar rates to men, women remain under-represented in many other forms of participation.<sup>6</sup> Important gaps in participation persist in other areas such as getting in touch with representatives or working on political campaigns as volunteers.<sup>7</sup> Some academic research has shown that a large part of the inequalities in participation is due, at least in part, to inequalities that exist in the division of labor within the household.<sup>8</sup>

The largest gender inequalities we observe are perhaps in the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate the divide in participation on other levels, given that different studies point out that women's participation is strongly influenced by leadership of other women.<sup>9</sup>

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Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

<sup>4</sup> In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

<sup>5</sup> Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

<sup>7</sup> Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 156-173

<sup>8</sup> Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730.

<sup>9</sup> Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.<sup>10</sup> In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.<sup>12</sup>

Inequality in political participation has important consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are underrepresented at the ballots, it can be expected that their interests will also be underrepresented in public policies that elected officials put into action. The study by Mueller and Stratmann (2003) on participation and equality in various countries reveals that the most participatory societies are also those that have the most equitable income distribution.<sup>13</sup> In other words, although a greater political participation does not necessarily generate welfare, it can affect how wealth in a society is distributed and how public policy priorities are established (for example, education and public welfare programs). In order to express this in a simpler manner, high levels of democratic participation also produce high levels of representation in the interests of citizens in terms of public policies, and, consequently, beget more balanced development processes.<sup>14</sup>

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by

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<sup>10</sup> Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. *Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States.* *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

<sup>11</sup> Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123-1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>12</sup> Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

<sup>13</sup> Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155.

<sup>14</sup> See Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age.* Princeton University Press.

<sup>15</sup> Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

which participation and representation go hand in hand.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

## II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to measure how unequal political participation in El Salvador and throughout the region is using survey data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Although previous studies indicate that there are considerable disparities among different social groups, this analysis is undertaken with an open mind with respect to participation inequality in the Americas. Especially, and given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic for Latin America and the Caribbean up to this date, it is possible that the participation rates are relatively the same among different socio-economic and racial groups and among men and women.

### Turnout

In the first place, we examine inequalities in electoral participation in El Salvador and throughout the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured with item VB2. In countries that have a parliamentary system, we modify the question and ask about the most recent general elections.

**VB2.** Did you vote in the last presidential elections in 2010? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]**  
(1) Voted **[Continue]**                      (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**

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<sup>16</sup> Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.




Figure II. 1. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.

Figure II.1 presents the electoral participation by gender in the Americas. The figure clearly shows two things: in the first place, that there are large inequalities in electoral participation in the countries of the Americas in such a way that participation in countries like Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil is significantly high with turnout rates at about 90% of the adult population. At a difference in countries like Honduras and Paraguay, electoral participation does not exceed 61% of the citizens. El Salvador is located among the countries with relatively low percentages of electoral participation. In spite of the fact that almost 70% of Salvadorans reported having voted in the 2009 presidential election, the majority of American countries have reported high rates of participation in

their recent electoral events. It is important to highlight that voting is obligatory in some countries in the region while it is voluntary in others. These institutional differences certainly contribute in part to explaining the national variation in the vote. In the second place, the data from 26 countries of the AmericasBarometer surveys indicate that women and men participated more or less equally. In fact, electoral participation of women was higher than men's in some countries in the region. In El Salvador, there are practically no statistically significant differences in the levels of participation among men and women. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men.<sup>17</sup>

Now we will examine with greater detail how electoral participation is distributed in function of a few variables in El Salvador. As we can see in Figure II.2, there seem to be no obvious differences in terms of wealth distribution and gender. Salvadorans of both genders vote in very similar proportions and the differences are not statistically significant.<sup>18</sup> The same occurs with the position in quintiles of wealth: the different quintiles voted in almost the same proportion in the 2009 presidential election. Where, on the contrary, there do seem to be certain differences that become statistically significant<sup>18</sup> is regarding the education level of the respondent and the education level of the respondent's mother. In the first case, data indicate that people with secondary level of education vote a little less than the rest of Salvadorans. In the case of the mother's educational attainment, what happened was that people with mothers with a higher level of educational attainment participated a little less in the 2009 election than people whose mothers had lower levels of educational attainment. These results do not agree with what the theory of electoral participation states – that there will be a linear relationship between inequality and participation. In the case of El Salvador, it can be hypothesized that this might be related to the peculiarity of the 2009 election, in which there was one of the lowest levels of participation in Salvadoran history.

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<sup>17</sup> It is worth noting that the United States is an anomalous case, where men report much higher rates of turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies. First, in the last election in the United States, more women voted than men (66% and 62% respectively), and second, in the survey reported turnout rates are much higher than they are in reality. This over-reporting is not rare in recent presidential elections in the United States. See the report from the U.S. Census Bureau: "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," of July 20, 2009 <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, consulted July 21, 2012m and the article by Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," of February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, consulted July 21, 2012.

<sup>18</sup> As some of the confidence intervals do not overlap.




Figure II. 2. Sociodemographics and Turnout in El Salvador, 2012.

### Beyond Turnout

Turnout has not told us much about the political behavior of Salvadorans. There is an unending number of ways in which citizens can get involved in the democratic system besides voting in elections. Participation in various groups of other types of activities may or not follow the same observed tendencies in electoral participation. The AmericasBarometer includes different questions that inquire into citizen participation in political activities beyond voting. Among other things, these questions inquire into how and with what frequency citizens communicate with their representatives and whether or not they participate in certain community organizations. By analyzing whether or not these groups differ in their participation in activities of a political nature, we acquire more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

Over the course of many years, LAPOP's AmericasBarometer has included a series of questions that inquire into the frequency with which citizens participate in different community groups. In 2012, we also included various questions in the survey that inquire as to whether or not the respondent takes a leadership role in the groups. The questions denominated **CP** are worded in the following way:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them... (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never


After each question, the respondents who indicated that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

<b>CP6L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? <b>[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]</b>
<b>CP7L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? <b>[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]</b>
<b>CP8L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? <b>[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]</b>

To what extent do citizens of the Americas participate in community groups? Figure II.3 examines this question. The left side of the figure presents level of community participation for each country in the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average of responses to the questions CP6, CP7, and CP8, adjusted on a 0-100 scale in which 0 means never having participated in any group at all and 100 indicates frequent participation in all groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents for each country that report that they were leaders of one group or another.

In general terms, El Salvador is located among the block of countries with medium-to-high levels of community participation in comparison with the rest of the countries in the region. Community participation in El Salvador is higher than in the majority of the American countries, but it is lower than in Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras. However, and beyond the comparison of the rest of the countries, if we examine the results in function of their maximum scoring possible (100), we can see that level of community participation is not very high throughout the region. Including Haiti, which reflects the lowest levels, the figure indicates that less than half of the people attended community meetings at least once per month. In countries like Uruguay, Canada, or Argentina, citizen participation in community meetings is very low.

However, when we address participation in leadership positions among the citizens that participate, the results place El Salvador in an even better position. 23% of Salvadorans that attend community meetings do so in leadership roles. With the exception of Haiti, El Salvador has the highest level of attendance of community meetings in leadership roles in the Americas.




**Figure II. 3. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**


In Figures II.4 and II.5, we examine the results from El Salvador in greater detail, showing the average in the levels of participation among Salvadoran citizens according to different groups. In the case of community participation (see Figure II.4), participation rises a little in groups of people with greater economic resources; however the differences are not statistically significant. Where it is possible to find a noteworthy difference is among men and women. Females participate much more than men. This coincides with reports from other studies – that women in general participate much more than men when it comes to community activities. The other two variables examined – respondent’s education level and the respondent’s mother’s education level – do not present relevant differences, which means Salvadorans participate in community activities in the same proportion, independently of their individual level of academic attainment or that of their family.

In the case of leadership, or participation as community leaders, the data do not reveal any significant difference relating to the groups explored (see Figure II.5). In spite of that, visually, there seems to be a difference regarding wealth quintiles 1 and 5, the distances are not statistically significant. That is to say, results fall within the confidence intervals and cannot be attributed to a difference in behavior among the richest and poorest. It is interesting to note, however, that in the case of gender, the results do not report important differences among men and women, in spite of the fact that women participate more in the community than men. This could suggest the existence of limits for the exercise of women’s community participation. In other words, in spite of the fact that women participate much more than men in community activities, they do not hold comparatively more

leadership roles than men. Judging by the proportions of community participation, it would be expected that women had more leadership roles in community organizations than men.



**Figure II. 4. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in El Salvador, 2012.**



**Figure II. 5. Sociodemographics and Percent Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in El Salvador, 2012.**

Aside from exercising their right to vote, many citizens also participate in activities on political campaigns. Questions **PP1** and **PP2** are purposed to measure citizen participation in these types of activities.

**PP1.** During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**  
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

**PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?  
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure II.6 shows participation in activities related to political campaigns in the Americas. On the left side of the figure, we present the percentage of citizens that indicate having attempted to persuade others “frequently” or “occasionally”. The right side presents the percentage of people who report having worked on a political campaign. In general, the level of citizen participation in political campaigns is relatively low, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. Only in the United States does almost half the population report having tried to convince others to vote for a party or a specific candidate. In El Salvador, the results report an average of 13.7 on a 0-100 scale. This means a lower level of involvement compared to the majority of countries in the Americas. Only in Paraguay, Mexico, and Bolivia people’s involvement is lower than in El Salvador.

A similar result is seen with the responses to the question on whether or not the respondent worked for a specific candidate or political party. In El Salvador, 7.5% of the respondents reported having worked for a candidate or a political party in during the 2009 presidential election. This places El Salvador in a higher position than countries like Honduras, Mexico, or Chile, but lower than neighboring countries like Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In general, it is possible to state that citizen political participation is reduced even for the low standards of the hemisphere.

Now, we analyze El Salvador’s results in a more detailed manner, that is to say, in function of the variables that appear to be associated with Salvadorans’ political participation. In order to accomplish this, we recoded as positives all of the respondents’ answers that indicated that they tried to persuade others “frequently” or “occasionally” (see Figure II.7). The results do not indicate important differences in terms of wealth quintiles, respondent’s level of educational attainment, or the level of educational attainment of the respondent’s mother. The only variable that appears to be strongly related to the behavior of persuading others to participate politically is gender: men have attempted to convince others to vote for a specific candidate or party with much greater frequency than women. This means that in El Salvador, males demonstrate a much more assertive behavior when it comes to trying to promote their own political preferences than women.






Figure II. 6. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.



**Figure II. 7. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in El Salvador, 2012.**


What happens when it is regarding a voluntary job for a political party during an electoral campaign? In Figure II.8, we present the percentage of respondents from different groups that report having worked for a political party or on a candidate's campaign during the most recent elections. Again, the results reveal that the only important (statistically significant) variable associated with political participation behavior on electoral campaigns is gender: Salvadoran men participate much more than Salvadoran women, in a proportion of two to one. Another variable that seems to be associated is the respondent's level of educational attainment: the greater the level of educational attainment, more participation in electoral campaigns. However, given the low percentage of cases, the confidence intervals are substantially wide which makes the results statistically insignificant.



**Figure II. 8. Sociodemographics and Campaign Participation in El Salvador, 2012.**

The previous analyses show the existence of some inequalities in participation according to gender. Nevertheless, it is probable that the indexes of participation vary according to women’s position on the job market and in the family<sup>19</sup>. Figure II.9 presents the levels of participation by gender and in the case of women, according to status in the family and in the job market. As we can see in the figure, there are no differences in the majority of cases of political participation in women who are home makers without income and the rest of women. In the only situations in which there are statistically significant differences is in the behavior guiding involvement in political campaigns, as much in the cases of people who attempted to convince others to vote for a specific candidate, as in the cases of people who have worked on electoral campaigns. In both cases, female home makers show lower levels of proselytizing behavior than the rest of women in general and men. This means that married women who do not have a salaried position and are fundamentally home markers tend to proselytize less than the rest of the population. When it comes to political participation of a more formal nature, such as voting in elections or community participation, the results do not reveal important differences.

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



**Figure II. 9. Gender Roles and Participation in El Salvador, 2012.**

These results do not tell us much about the relationship among race and participation in El Salvador. For that, we attempted an analysis of political participation in function of respondents' skin color. Figure II.10 presents the levels of each type of participation according to skin color. However, judging by the results, skin color is not related to Salvadorans' political participation. A look at the figure in question does not reveal a clear trend in the forms of participation. In the case of turnout, the line that marks the trend seems to increase as skin color gets darker. However, this result can be deceiving, given that the number of people who fall into the extreme categories is low, increasing the margin of error in these figures. The same can be said for community participation and community leadership – which show an increase among people with darkest skin tones. As we saw in the last chapter, the majority of Salvadorans have a skin color of between 2 and 6 on the color palette and data show very little variation among these groups.




Figure II. 10. Skin Color and Participation in El Salvador, 2012.

### III. Public Opinion Towards Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

To what extent does the majority or society in general support equality of opportunity for minority groups? The support for equality of opportunity has important and evident consequences. Citizens who believe that a woman’s place is in the home or that members of certain groups are not good political leaders are less likely to tolerate these groups’ participation in public life or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results of various questions that aimed to quantify the extent to which certain populations were potentially discriminated against.

It should be pointed out that it is probable that the answers to these questions are the object of what those who study public opinion call “the bias of social desirability.” That is to say it is less probable that citizens show open support towards discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudices are a social taboo.<sup>20</sup> This means that even though certain respondents in private harbor discriminatory attitudes, they are going to give the survey a “socially acceptable” (non-discriminatory) answer in order to avoid leaving a bad impression with the interviewer. As a result, the level of support towards discriminatory attitudes presented in this report based on survey questions are probably less than it is in reality.

<sup>20</sup> Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments. See, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.

## Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership


The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked three questions in order to measure attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**<sup>21</sup>. The questions are as follows:

<b>VB50.</b> Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?		
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	
(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree	
<b>VB51.</b> Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same
<b>VB52.</b> If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter

A little more than 75% of Salvadoran said that they disagree or strongly disagree with the idea that men are better political leaders than women. This opinion, although overwhelmingly in favor of women, is not as unanimous as in other countries in the region. Upon comparing these results with the rest of the Americas, we can see that in countries like Peru, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the opinions in favor of women's equality are still more frequent than in El Salvador. Only in the Spanish-speaking countries of Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Venezuela are the attitudes in favor of men the highest. Survey data show that in spite of the fact there is a majoritarian attitude in favor of equality for women in El Salvador, there is a more solid position in favor of women over a large part of the Americas (see Figure II.11).

However, women are seen in general terms as less corrupt than men. To the question of who would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, only 1.5% responded that it would be a woman. 78% responded that they are both equally capable of being corrupt and 20.5% said that it would be a man. Much in the same way, when asked about who would be more capable to manage the national economy, 73.7% of Salvadorans said that gender did not matter to them, that a man and woman would have an equal capacity for managing the economy. 16.7% indicated that women are more capable than men and only 9.5% mentioned men.

<sup>21</sup> Questions VB51 and VB52 were asked to a split sample, that is to say, only to half of respondents.



**Figure II. 11. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

## Public Opinion towards Leadership by Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups


The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked the respondents about their attitudes towards people of dark skin tones in positions of political leadership. The question below, VB53, was redacted in the following way:<sup>22</sup>

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.  
**VB53.** Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?  
**[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, indigenous, “non-whites” in general]**  
 (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree  
 (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree

In El Salvador, the great majority of citizens, that is 87.7%, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the opinion that dark-skinned people are not good political leaders. In order to compare these results with the rest of the countries in the Americas, we converted the answers to a 0-100 scale where the highest average means a greater level of agreement with the opinion that people of dark skin tone are not good leaders. As we can see in Figure II.12, the predominant opinion in the majority of the countries is that of disagreement. The majority of citizens in the Americas are against the notion that people of color do not make good political leaders; however there are important variations from country to country. In countries like Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, and Guatemala, these opinions are more frequent than in the majority of countries including El Salvador. While in Brazil, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, very few people think that people with dark skin do not make good leaders.


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<sup>22</sup> This question was administered among a divided sample – that is to say – to only half of the respondents.



**Figure II. 12. Belief that Dark-skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

When we cross these opinions in function of age in El Salvador, we see that the attitudes towards dark-skinned people vary in function of the age of the respondent. The oldest Salvadorans tend to demonstrate the most rejection toward the leadership of people of color (see Figure II.1.3).




**Figure II. 13. Belief that Dark-skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders by age, 2012.**

### Public Opinion Towards the Political Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer includes question D5 regarding attitudes towards homosexuals that run for public office. This question explores a dimension that has become an important point in the debate on discrimination and equality of opportunity.


**D5.** And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

We show the results once again on a 0-100 scale where 100 represents the highest approval rating for homosexuals running for public office. Data indicate a wide variation in citizens' opinions in the nations of the Americas. The largest levels of approval of homosexuals' participation in politics are found in countries with the most stable democracies in the hemisphere: Canada, Uruguay, and the United States. On the other side of the ranking and with very low levels of approval, we find various countries that make up the Caribbean territory: Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Honduras. El Salvador is found closer to this last group than to the rest of the countries of the Americas, which indicates that there is very little acceptance towards the involvement of homosexuals in public office. In fact, when we examine the direct responses that Salvadoran respondents gave to this question, we find that 50% of the total number of people interviewed showed that they were in complete disagreement with homosexuals running for public office, while only 7.8% were located on the other extreme of complete approval.



**Figure II. 14. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

The results in El Salvador do not vary in function of gender: men and women maintain very similar attitudes towards homosexuals, but attitudes do vary significantly in function of age and level of educational attainment. In the case of age, the youngest people show the most favorable attitudes towards homosexuals running for public positions. These attitudes decrease as people get older. In the case of education, results show that attitudes of approval towards the involvement of homosexuals in politics increases according to the level of educational attainment, especially among citizens with a university-level education, in spite of the fact that the average for those in this group does not exceed 50 points (see Figure II.15).



**Figure II. 15. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office by educational level in El Salvador, 2012**

### Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on whether or not people with disabilities should run for public office.<sup>23</sup>

**D7.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office

In this case, a little more than 35% of Salvadorans strongly agree with the idea, while the rest are distributed in a more or less even way in the other categories of responses. This means that citizens of this country are more in favor of people with disabilities participating in politics than other social groups like homosexuals. Seen in a comparative way, on a 0-100 scale, results place El Salvador on an average level with respect to the rest of the countries in the hemisphere as we can see in Figure II.16.

<sup>23</sup> This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure II. 16. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.

#### IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, at least in some of the indicators related to political participation, it appears that there are important differences in the rate of participation between men and women, among different racial groups, and different social classes. Although these results are a reason for concern, there are also reasons to feel optimistic because democracies have advanced in terms of political equality. Furthermore, the differences do not exist in all places, which means that it is possible to learn from the

countries in which inequality in participation is not as marked. Further down the line and based on the results of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, we examine public opinion regarding various potential solutions commonly employed in order to reduce inequality of political participation.

## Gender Quotas

One possible solution to the problem of inequality in participation and representation among women is the adoption of gender quotas, which have been considered an effective measure to incorporate women into politics.<sup>24</sup> The general idea is that more members of marginalized groups see people similar to them on the ballot and in performing the responsibilities of public office, they become more motivated to participate in politics. In Latin America, various countries have adopted gender quotas, by way of legislation that requires that women occupy a determined percentage of seats in the national Legislative Body. Unfortunately, as we show in the Special Report in Box 5, evidence regarding whether or not gender quotas reduce inequality in participation is mixed.


The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes question GEN6 that allow us to measure support for gender quotas throughout the Americas.<sup>25</sup>

**GEN6.** The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure II.17 shows the support for the adoption of gender quotas in the nations of the Americas. As we can see, El Salvador is found among the countries with the highest level of approval for gender quotas in the hemisphere, very far above the majority of the countries and significantly higher than the Dominican Republic, which also has a high level of acceptance for gender quotas. Specifically, in the case of El Salvador, more than half of the respondents reported being in strong agreement (7 on the original scale of 1 to 7) with parties reserving some places for women on their lists of candidates; an average of 81.3 places El Salvador among the group of countries with the largest levels of support.

<sup>24</sup> Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., y Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> This question was asked to a split sample.



**Figure II. 17. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

### Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.<sup>26</sup> While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly

<sup>26</sup> Lijphart, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.<sup>27</sup> In accordance with existing legislation, it is possible to identify three main ways of understanding the vote in Latin America. First, in countries like Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, the vote essentially constitutes a right. Second, in other countries, the vote is obligatory but there is no sanction against not exercising that right. Among those countries lies El Salvador in the company of Mexico and Colombia, among others. Finally, in countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, citizens have the obligation to vote with a sanction in the case of breach of this obligation.<sup>28</sup>

One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

### Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.<sup>29</sup>

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.<sup>30</sup> While the relationship with socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,<sup>31</sup> material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

## V. Conclusions

In spite of the decrease in inequality in recent decades, this chapter has shown that there certain attitudes associated with inequalities persist in the Americas in some important aspects of political participation. For example, in spite of the fact that there is a majority opinion regarding the importance of women's participation in politics and including the fact that Salvadorans bluntly support policies of equality such as gender quotas, in practice, women register low levels of participation in positions of political leadership at all levels.

<sup>27</sup> Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

<sup>28</sup> Mario Fernández and José Thompson. "El voto obligatorio." In: *Treatise on Compared Electoral Law of Latin America*. Estocolmo: International IDEA.

<sup>29</sup> Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid*.; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

<sup>30</sup> Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

<sup>31</sup> Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

In so far as attitudes related to race and skin color, a little-discussed topic in El Salvador, the results show very interesting trends. In general, there is a favorable attitude towards dark-skinned people, but it is not unanimous and it varies in function of certain conditions. Young people are the most favorable towards the idea of dark-skinned people participating in politics and in public office, but these attitudes are a little less common among older people and with lower levels of educational attainment, which reveals legacies of racial discrimination persistent in certain groups. One area where discrimination seems to be more clear in El Salvador is with respect to homosexual people. A solid portion of respondents roundly rejected the idea of homosexuals running for public office, which places El Salvador among one of the nations in which there is the least tolerance towards homosexuals on the American continent. These attitudes are not only common, but rather represent the majority among all social groups, but especially among people with low levels of educational attainment and the elderly. The new generation and education seem to play an important role in the transformation of these attitudes among the Salvadoran population.

## Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender


*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.<sup>1</sup> In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?


The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

**Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles**



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

<sup>1</sup> To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.


## Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Participation

*This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwandt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.*

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women’s group meetings.<sup>1</sup>

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation<sup>2</sup>. The



only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

<sup>1</sup> The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women’s group meetings, CP20.

<sup>2</sup> In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

## Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.


Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

### The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



## Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

### I. Introduction

As we have seen in this report, the resources and economic, social, and political opportunities are not evenly distributed in the Americas. Furthermore, important groups of citizens tend to report social and political attitudes that work against the participation of other groups. Such attitudes may reinforce inequality of opportunity and resources. In this chapter, we examine the consequences of having these attitudes for democracy in the Americas. We also evaluate how political and social inequalities affect citizens' perception towards their own capabilities. Additionally, we explore how those inequalities affect the perception towards the political system and towards the democratic regime and whether or not there are other consequences for the stability of political systems in the region.

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination can also affect the so-called "external efficacy", meaning, the perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizens' opinions. There are two ways in which the advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Throughout society, citizens or their friends and family members have channels of communication with politicians. It is possible that these citizens form their opinions towards the receptivity of politicians in general based on their personal experiences with specific politicians, whether favorable or not.<sup>3</sup> If the politicians treat some groups better than others, the same citizens that have had contact with the politicians will draw their own conclusions based on their own experiences, which leads to an association among the group members and external efficacy. Furthermore, citizens with a sense of collective identity, that is to say,

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<sup>1</sup> Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

<sup>2</sup> Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>3</sup> Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

those that believe that their destiny is the same as the other members of their group, may well base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics.<sup>4</sup>

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.<sup>5</sup> Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.<sup>6</sup> When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.<sup>7</sup>

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.<sup>8</sup> However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we

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<sup>4</sup> Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, y Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

<sup>5</sup> Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

<sup>7</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

<sup>8</sup> Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

<sup>9</sup> Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.<sup>10</sup> However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.<sup>11</sup>

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.<sup>12</sup> And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,<sup>13</sup> and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”<sup>14</sup> It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.<sup>15</sup>

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

## II. Inequality, Efficacy and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included some questions that aim to evaluate citizens’ perception regarding internal and external efficacy, such as the questions regarding the representation of political parties. The following questions are part of the AmericasBarometer’s core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

**EFF1.** Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**EFF2.** You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

<sup>10</sup> Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>12</sup> Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

<sup>14</sup> Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

<sup>15</sup> Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“A lot”). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.<sup>16</sup>


**EPP3.** To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

The questions that evaluate group characteristics and equality of opportunity were detailed in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, household wealth, gender inequalities within the household. We begin the analysis with a description of the results related to internal efficacy, question **EFF2**, in the countries of the Americas.

In El Salvador, citizen responses averaged a score of almost 47 on a 0-100 scale which means that the level of internal political efficacy is intermediate. This can be seen in a clearer way in Figure III.1, which displays the averages for all the countries in the western hemisphere. The United States has the highest level of internal political efficacy, followed by Canada and Venezuela. El Salvador is located among the group of countries with medium-to-low levels of internal political efficacy, next to Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, but above neighboring countries of Guatemala and Honduras. This means that Salvadorans’ perceptions regarding their capacities for influencing national politics are quite low, especially in comparison with countries like Nicaragua, Chile, and Uruguay.

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<sup>16</sup> This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.



**Figure III. 1. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

So, how do social inequalities and experiences with discrimination affect the internal efficacy of Salvadorans? Figure III.2, by means of a linear regression analysis, shows an association between perception of internal efficacy and personal characteristics. As we can see, the variables that are associated to internal efficacy are gender, level of educational attainment, and political interest. Women, in general, have a lower perception of political efficacy than men. As we may have expected, Salvadorans with a higher level of educational attainment tend to perceive more internal efficacy, meaning that they feel more capable of comprehending and following the most important political issues in the country. The same happens with those who have more political interest; in other words, the people who demonstrate interest in politics have a stronger sense of national political events.




Figure III. 2. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in El Salvador, 2012.





Figure III. 3. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in El Salvador, 2012.

Figure III.3 represents the relationships described earlier with greater clarity – that is to say – how personal characteristics are related to citizens’ belief in their ability to understand the political system in El Salvador. In the figure, we have added the relationship with respect to the size of place of residency. This does not appear to be statistically associated with political efficacy, but by appreciating the bivaried relationships figure, we can see a tendency towards a higher level of political efficacy in the cities than in the smaller cities or in rural areas.

Further down, we examine two variables that reflect citizens’ perceptions regarding whether or not the political system listens to them and represents them. The variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** appear described at the beginning of this section and constitute the external dimension of political efficacy – that is to say – the perception that the system is responsive in some way to citizens. Figure III.4 shows the distribution of these two variables throughout the countries of the Americas.




**Figure III. 4. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

In general, the perception of external political efficacy is not very high in the region, and El Salvador is not an exception. For example, regarding the opinions of the leaders who are interested in what the people think, a little more than 53% of respondents reported being in disagreement, while 12.4% reported that they are not in agreement or disagreement; in contrast, only 34.5% reported perceiving that the leaders are interested in what the people think. In the case of opinions regarding political parties (EPP3), the results are similar: close to 61% of Salvadorans demonstrated some level

of disagreement with the idea that political parties listen to the citizens, while a little more than 25% said the opposite, that the parties do in fact listen to the citizens; the rest of respondents landed on the center of the scale.

In both questions, El Salvador is located in the medium-high group in comparison with other countries in the hemisphere, above the majority of Central American nations, but below its neighbor Nicaragua and other Latin American countries like Uruguay and Venezuela. In countries like Venezuela, Uruguay, and Nicaragua, citizens think that politicians are interested in them with greater frequency.

Having said that, who believes that Salvadoran public officials are interested in what people like them think? And, who agrees with the idea that political parties represent them? In Figures III.5 and III.6, we use linear regressions to examine the personal characteristics and the experiences that citizens undergo when reporting a high external efficacy and a positive perception towards parties' responsiveness.




**Figure III. 5. Determinants of External Efficacy in El Salvador, 2012.**

Four variables turn out to be important in the association with external political efficacy in El Salvador (see Figure III.5): age of the respondents, interest in politics, the condition of being of African descent and being victimized by crime.

As we can see in Figure III.5, other variables like gender, level of educational attainment, level of wealth, and belonging to other ethnic groups do not reflect association with the opinion that political leaders are interested in the people.

In the regression regarding the perception of political parties as responsive, the results do not show significantly associated variables, with the exception of interest in politics. In other words, the opinion that political parties do not listen to the people is basically generalized and does not substantially change in function of social groups, life experiences, or personal characteristics.



**Figure III. 6. Determinants of the Belief That Parties are Representative in El Salvador, 2012.**

For a better understanding of the factors associated with these two attitudes, in Figures III.7 and III.8, we present the results in a bivaried form. That is to say, how some of the variables that turned out to be relevant in the regression analysis are related to external efficacy and perceptions of the representation of political parties. The results of Figure III.7 were already mentioned previously, but it is important to call attention to the impact that crime victimization has on the perception of external political efficacy. In fact, judging by the difference in scores among persons who have been victims of crime and those who have not, the fact that they have been confronted with a crime noticeably erodes their perception in the efficacy of Salvadoran. In the case of representation of political parties in El Salvador, as we have seen, the regression showed that only interest in politics is associated with the belief that political parties listen to people. This variable is the only one that appears to be strongly related to all the items of political efficacy.




Figure III. 7. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in El Salvador, 2012.





Figure III. 8. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in El Salvador, 2012.

### III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy


The experiences with marginalization and discrimination can also affect citizens' abstract political attitudes. As we previously described, discrimination can be considered a flaw of the political system and could decrease support for the system in general. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we analyzed the general attitudes of the citizenry, the most important being support for the political system and support for democracy in abstract terms. In Chapter 5, we describe in detail what measurements of these attitudes were and also the variation across time in El Salvador. In this section, we examine how personal characteristics and experiences with discrimination affect these extremely important attitudes for the stability of democracy.

In Figure III.9, we execute a linear regression analysis that examines characteristics and experiences reported by the respondents in order to help establish their levels of support for the political system in El Salvador. As we can see in the results of the regression, the following variables are associated with support for the Salvadoran political system: size of place of residency, that is, whether it is in a rural area, a small city, or a metropolis; respondents' age; respondents' level of educational attainment; their interest in politics and the condition of being of mixed-race. In Figure III.10, we describe the way in which these variables appear to be associated with support for the system; it is only important to mention that certain factors usually connected to processes of inequality and discrimination do not appear as important predictors of support for the system in this case. These factors are: being a woman; level of wealth; and self-identification as indigenous or of being of African descent.




**Figure III. 9. Determinants of Support for the Political System in El Salvador, 2012.**

Figure III.10 shows the variables that appear to be connected significantly to support for the system, with the exception of respondent's size of place of residency. The results tell us that as people's level of educational attainment rises, their support for the political system diminishes. These results go against what was expected in light of certain literature on discrimination. According to that literature, people who find themselves in a disadvantaged social position, in this case, Salvadorans with a low level of educational attainment would show a low level of support for the system. The results shown here indicate the opposite and point more towards the arguments of importance of education on the formation of critical attitudes towards the political system. Age also appears to be linked to support for the system, but the results in Figure III.10 suggest that the relationship is not linear, but rather curved: the highest levels of support are found among the youngest and oldest people, again changing the expectation regarding the effect of political marginalization on young people. Actually, young Salvadorans would show more support for the political system than middle-aged adults. The interest in politics variable behaves in the expected way: more interest means more system support and in this sense the data highlight the importance of political participation for the stability of the system. A surprising result is that which indicates that those of mixed-races (mestizos) – that is the great majority of Salvadorans – show less support for the political system than the people of European origin or whites. This data would indicate the need to deepen the analysis of race and of ethnic identity in El Salvador.



**Figure III. 10. Factors Associated with System Support in El Salvador, 2012.**

Having experienced marginalization and discrimination can affect, in abstract terms, support for democracy. In spite of the fact that the Salvadoran survey does not include some of the questions that were asked in other countries given the length of the questionnaire, for this report we used a linear regression analysis with the variables that could be associated with processes of marginalization and discrimination in order to determine whether or not the personal characteristics previously pointed out are related to the belief that “democracy, even with its flaws, is better than any other system of government” (see Figure III.11).



**Figure III. 11. Determinants of Support for Democracy in El Salvador, 2012.**

In accordance with the results, men, elderly people, respondents with high levels of educational attainment, and those who possess great interest in politics show the strongest support for democracy in El Salvador. In other words, people who usually do not find themselves in conditions of marginalization or discrimination support democracy more than the rest of the population. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that other factors, such as place of residence, level of wealth, and especially, belonging to ethnic groups do seem to be statistically significant factors explaining support for democracy.

Figure III.12 examines with greater detail the variables that have been identified as significant in the previous regression analysis. As we can see, men show more support for democracy than women, which goes in line with the expectation that people who suffer more discrimination will support the system less. The same happens with age. We usually recognize that the youngest people are marginalized by the system and therefore it may be expected that they show less support for democracy. The data confirm this expectation. However, when we analyze education, the results generate a different trend to the one hoped for: people with less educational attainment support the

democratic system more, with the exception of those who have higher education. It is not clear why this finding is true and therefore it becomes important to continue to explore the relationship among discrimination and support for democracy in El Salvador. Finally, the data show that support for democracy increases as interest in politics increases.




Figure III. 12. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in El Salvador, 2012.


#### IV. Protest Participation

Lastly, and as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups - at least those that are highly politicized, to join social movements and to participate in political protests. Previous studies of LAPOP have presented evidence that at least in some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest”.<sup>17</sup> The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked a series of questions to participants regarding their participation in political protests, the most important of this being **PROT3**.

**PROT3.** In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?  
 (1) Yes [Continue]                      (2) No [Go to PROT6]


<sup>17</sup> Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Figure III.13 presents the levels of participation among protests in various countries in the Americas. As we have reported in previous years, the AmericasBarometer reveals that the percentage of Salvadorans that participate in public protests is very low. Less than 4% of the respondents reported having formed part of a public protest during the year before the survey. This places El Salvador as the American country in which there are comparatively lower levels of public protests, with the exception of Jamaica. On the contrary, in the countries of South America, the rates of participation are much more elevated, above 10% in Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile. In previous AmericasBarometer reports, we have argued that one of the reasons that could explain the low percentage of participation in public protests in El Salvador is the prolonged civil war and the history of politics of suppression of social movements. However, this is another area that merits deeper examination.




**Figure III. 13. Protest Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

Who are the people that protest with greatest frequency in El Salvador? Is protest behavior related to discrimination? In Figure III.14, we used a logistic regression analysis in order to determine the effect of marginalization and discrimination in participation in protests; in the analysis we added the question on insecurity, given the effect that this can have on popular mobilization in the country. The results suggest that participation in public protests is not related to the majority of axes of discrimination, at least according to the responses given by Salvadorans in the AmericasBarometer. In other words, there are not important differences in terms of involvement in public protests by gender, age, level of educational attainment, level of wealth, or skin color. Men and women protest in similar proportions, the same as people in different age groups, education, place of residence, or skin color. There are also no differences in function of perception of insecurity. The only condition that turns out to be associated with participation in protests is interest in politics: people that have a lot of interest in politics tend to participate with greater frequency in public protests.



**Figure III. 14. Determinants of protest participation in El Salvador, 2012.**

The previous relationships can be seen in a very clear way in Figure III.15. It illustrates how interest in politics and participation in protests are related. In accordance with the results, participation in public protests goes from a little more than 1% among those who have no interest in politics up to almost 13% among those that follow political events with great interest. This suggests that the Salvadoran citizen involvement in public protests in 2012 would not arise as a result of a response to processes of direct discrimination but rather as a direct result of the interest and participation in politics.



**Figure III. 15. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in El Salvador, 2012.**

## V. Conclusions

In this chapter, we analyzed the relationship between marginalization and attitudes towards the political system. The results indicate various things, but above all, the need to explore this topic in a more profound and extensive way in El Salvador. In the first place, because up to today there is no broad study on groups or sectors that are discriminated against. Despite the fact that some important efforts have been made in the sphere of gender, socioeconomic stratus, and rural sectors, we still need to explore topics that have to do with race, ethnicity, and persons with disabilities and how these affect the dynamics and the national political culture. The discussion on equality of opportunity for indigenous groups, groups of African descent, and people with disabilities has not really taken place within El Salvador and it is important to dedicate some academic resources to those topics. In second place, it is crucial to deal with those topics in a deeper way because the results shown here reveal that there may be mechanisms of discrimination and limitations on equality of opportunity for certain nearly invisible groups in El Salvador. Women, people with low levels of educational attainment, the inhabitants of rural areas, young people, and in some cases, people with dark skin have suffered in one way or another processes of marginalization and discrimination that puts them at a clear disadvantage with respect to economic opportunities and political participation.

The preliminary results shown in this chapter reveal that in spite of the importance that is usually placed on marginalization and economic inequalities, these variables did not appear to be significant in the analysis. In their place, education, gender, and the area of residence appeared to be important factors explaining political efficacy, support for the political system, and democracy.

Without a doubt, at the root of educational attainment and place of residence we find economic status and wealth, but the results of the survey suggest that economic inequalities have created strong processes of cultural and social segregation that are expressed in a clearer way in the survey and in diverse areas of social life, including in the Salvadoran citizens' skin color.

Over the course of many years, it has been assumed that given the strong level of demographic homogeneity in El Salvador and the lack of ethnic identities throughout a large part of the population, the study on the effect of possible racial differences would not make sense for this country. The results shown in the first three chapters of this report cast a shadow of doubt on this supposition and indicate the necessity of examining this topic in a more systematic way.


## Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.*

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?<sup>1</sup>

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



<sup>1</sup> For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

## Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



*This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.*

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.<sup>1</sup> The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.<sup>2</sup> Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

### Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



<sup>1</sup> The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

<sup>2</sup> The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.


## Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information

*This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.*

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.

The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.<sup>1</sup> As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.



<sup>1</sup> This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

## Appendices

### Appendix III. 1. Determinants of Perception that One Understands the More Important Issues in the Country, 2012

	Coef.	t
Size of Place of Residence	0.061	1.84
Women	0.190*	5.89
Homemaker women	0.056	2.06
Age	0.023	0.77
Level of Education	0.204*	7.84
Wealth Quintiles	0.006	0.22
Interest in Politics	0.191*	5.31
Skin Color	-0.018	-0.95
Constant	-0.017	-0.50
R-Squared = 0.140		
Number of cases = 1396		
*p<0.05 - *p<0.05		

### Appendix III. 2. Determinants of the Opinion that Leaders are Interested in what the People Think, 2012

	Coef.	t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.032	-1.24
Women	0.006	0.14
Homemaker women	0.036	0.65
Age	0.063*	2.25
Level of Education	-0.054	-1.40
Wealth Quintiles	0.020	0.81
Interest in Politics	0.070*	2.59
Indigenous	0.035	1.22
Of African Descent	0.061*	2.40
Mixed Race	0.014	0.58
Victimized by crime	-0.079*	-3.22
Constant	0.008	0.42
R-squared = 0.032		
Number of cases = 1368		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix III. 3. Determinants of the Opinion that Political Parties Listen to the People, 2012

	Coef.	t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.036	-0.81
Woman	-0.036	-0.75
Homemaker women	-0.003	-0.04
Age	-0.003	-0.07
Level of Education	-0.078	-1.61
Wealth Quintiles	-0.036	-0.94
Political Interest	0.126*	4.13
Indigenous	-0.060	-1.57
Of African Descent	0.070	1.33
Mixed Race	0.049	1.26
Vicimized by Crime	-0.024	-0.89
Perception of insecurity	-0.049	-1.37
Constant	0.010	0.24
R-squared = 0.039		
Number of Cases = 675		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix III. 4. Determinants of System Support, 2012

	Coef.	t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.108*	-4.34
Woman	0.018	0.52
Homemaker woman	0.003	0.10
Age	-0.054*	-2.16
Level of Education	-0.148*	-4.28
Wealth Quintiles	-0.070	-2.01
Interest in Politics	0.128*	3.68
Indigenous	-0.000	-0.03
Of African Descent	-0.001	-0.02
Mixed Race	-0.050*	-2.47
Constant	0.009	0.43
R-squared = 0.071		
Number of Cases = 1374		
*p<0.05		

**Appendix III. 5. Determinants of Support for Democracy 2012**

	Coef.	t
Size of Place of Residence	-0.015	-0.63
Woman	-0.094*	-2.36
Homemaker woman	0.009	0.25
Age	0.181*	7.15
Level of Education	0.095*	4.28
Wealth Quintiles	0.017	0.79
Interest in Politics	0.095*	4.64
Indigenous	0.013	0.64
Of African Descent	-0.007	-0.30
Mixed Race	-0.007	-0.29
Constant	0.004	0.15
R-squared = 0.052		
Number of Cases = 1333		
*p<0.05		

**Appendix III. 6. Determinants of Participation in a Protest 2012**

	Coef.	T
Participated in a Protest		
Size of Place of Residence	-0.058	-0.33
Woman	-0.044	-0.26
Homemaker woman	-0.334	-1.15
Level of Education	0.060	0.46
Wealth Quintiles	-0.136	-1.06
Interest in Politics	0.702*	5.16
Skin Color	0.016	0.10
Perception of insecurity	-0.027	-0.17
Constant	-3.616*	-13.84
F = 8.49		
Number of cases = 1460		
*p<0.05		

**Part II:  
Governance, Political Engagement, and  
Civil Society in the Americas**



## Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime and Democracy

*With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith*

### I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, there was an increase in the number of studies on corruption and on the implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices.<sup>1</sup> Corruption, defined frequently as the use of public resources for private benefit, was a common characteristic among the old authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas. However, given widespread media censorship and the personal danger for those people who, in those days, would dare to report corruption, it was impossible to determine with exactitude the exact magnitude of corruption and in what public spheres it occurred with greatest frequency.

Studies realized by economists have demonstrated the adverse effect that corruption has on economic growth and on distribution of wealth. Corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them into private hands which often results in an inefficient expenditure of resources and an inferior quality of public service. Among academics there is a growing consensus regarding the pernicious effects of corruption on the economy of nations, such as regarding the challenges that corruption presents for democratic governability, especially for egalitarian administration of justice.<sup>2</sup>

At the level of public opinion, there is ample evidence indicating that victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and in the political actors of their nations, and these effects can be seen throughout the region.<sup>3</sup> However, other authors indicate that opinions on corruption do not necessarily impact other attitudes towards democracy in general. Some suggest that corruption sometimes simply makes citizens disconnect from politics, or it might even *help* some governments

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>2</sup> Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. En *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume y Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

<sup>3</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth y Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

maintain public support.<sup>4</sup> Others suggest that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those that experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, academics have paid more attention to the topic of perception of corruption. Two recent studies that used data from the AmericasBarometer showed that a high perception of corruption is related to a decrease in the levels of trust in institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.<sup>5</sup> However, direct experience with corruption does not have a particularly strong relationship with a high perception of corruption, and therefore, LAPOP normally prefers to compile both, that is to day, data on victimization by corruption and also data on perception of corruption.

Crime is another serious problem that is increasing in many countries in the Americas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the homicide rate on the American continent was 15.5 for every 100,000 inhabitants in 2011, more than double the global rate of 6.9 for every 100,000 inhabitants, and almost five times more than the European rate of 3.5 for every 100,000.<sup>6</sup> However, within the hemisphere there are important differences in so far as levels of violence. Central America, for example, up until 2011, had a rate of 25 deaths for every 100,000 citizens, that is, 10 points above the average for the Americas; while South America registered a rate that was a little smaller, around 22. Notwithstanding, while in the south the homicide rates have followed the global trend of shrinkage, the rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been climbing. In El Salvador, before the truce called for by the gangs in the beginning of 2012, had one of the highest rates in the entire hemisphere, including in comparison to Central America. In accordance with the same data from the 2011 Global Study on Homicides, El Salvador had a rate of 72 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants in 2011, more than double the regional rate. However, this rate would have been reduced in 2012 as a direct consequence of the agreement among gangs and the government.

Given the context of extremely high crime rates, it is essential that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and fear of insecurity associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to understand how crime victimization could negatively influence support for the political system and even more so support for democracy, given that it is possible to blame the system for not providing security to the citizenry.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore,

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<sup>4</sup> Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, y Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, y Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, y Jorge I. Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

<sup>5</sup> Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo y John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

<sup>6</sup> Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

<sup>7</sup> Cruz, José Miguel. 2008. "The Impact of Violent Crime on the Political Culture of Latin America: The Special Case of Central America." In: *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Evidence from the Americas Barometer 2007-2007*, ed. M. A. Seligson. Nashville: LAPOP; Cruz, José Miguel. 2000. "Violencia, democracia y cultura política." *Nueva Sociedad* 167:132-46; Córdova Macías, Ricardo. 2012. "Crimen, Inseguridad y Democracia en Centroamérica". En Francisco Javier Díaz and Patricio Meller (eds.). *Violencia y Cohesión Social en América Latina*. Santiago de Chile, CIEPLAN; and Pérez, Orlando J. 2003. "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala " *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (4):627-44.

citizens may lose trust and potentially tolerance towards their fellow citizens if they have been victims of crime or if they fear it, which undermines social capital and causes a decrease in support for civil liberties and for the institutions of liberal democracy. Crime victimization could also lead citizens to emigrate to other nations.<sup>8</sup> Fear of crime or direct experiences with crime could also lead to a decrease in support for and trust in certain key political institutions, in particular, the police, but also the institutions of the justice system.

As with corruption, it has not been clarified what has greater effect on the formation of attitudes towards the democratic system: whether it is individuals' perceptions of crime or experiencing crime directly. Various studies conducted on the topic suggest that the impacts of insecurity and direct victimization depend on the context. In certain places, certain types of crime will have an impact on democratic attitudes; while in other places, and more frequently certain types of insecurity will have an impact.<sup>9</sup> Including in places where crime rates are high compared with global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or will fall victim to violent crime is low in the majority of the countries, although the rates in Central America are alarming. However, people may read about violent crime in the newspapers, see images on television, or know people who have been victims of crime. The fear of being a victim – which could happen to any person independently of their past experiences with crime – may therefore have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a victim of crime.

This chapter analyzes the levels of corruption and crime in the Americas and aims to clarify the effects of each on democratic attitudes and opinions towards the rule of law in El Salvador and throughout the entire region.

## II. Corruption

LAPOP has created a series of questions that measure corruption victimization that are used in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996, the questions were refined and improved.<sup>10</sup> Given that the definitions of corruption may change from one country to the next, we avoid ambiguity by formulating questions such as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings.<sup>11</sup> The series has two strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting

<sup>8</sup> Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. “Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>9</sup> Cruz, José Miguel. 2003. “Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: El impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de la posguerra.” *América Latina Hoy* 35:19-59; y Córdova Macías, Ricardo. 2012. Percepciones sobre la delincuencia y la inseguridad en Centroamérica. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, *Temas de Actualidad* No. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, y Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates.

<sup>11</sup> Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. It is understood that, as in the case of crime, having been a victim on more than one occasion may have diverse implications.

	<b>N/A Did not try or did not have contact</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>DA</b>
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC6.</b> In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]</b> <b>EXC20.</b> In the last twelve months, did any <b>soldier or military officer</b> ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC11.</b> In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipal government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC13.</b> Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC14.</b> In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC16.</b> Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Another question that deals with corruption perception more than with personal experiences with corruption is included in the questionnaire. The question is the following:


**EXC7.** Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]**

(1) Very common      (2) Common      (3) Uncommon      or      (4) Very uncommon?

This variable has been recoded on a 0-100 scale, in which 0 represents the perception that corruption among public employees is not very common and 100 means that it very common.

### Perceptions of Corruption

Figure IV.1 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas, but that there are important differences from country to country. The Latin American countries that have the highest reported levels of corruption perception are Colombia, Argentina, and Panama with average corruption levels about 75 (one a 0-100 scale); on the contrary, the Latin American countries with the lowest levels are Uruguay and Nicaragua con levels under 65 points. Other countries in the region, such as Canada and Surinam have the lowest levels of corruption perception, lower than the majority of countries including the United States. These data seem to suggest that corruption perception is not very high in El Salvador, but actually, as we have previously mentioned, perceptions on corruption are very common throughout the entire American hemisphere.




**Figure IV. 1. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas, 2012**

What have the trends of corruption perception been in El Salvador in recent years? As with other indicators in this report, we present the changes in corruption perception over time. Figure IV.2 shows the trends in perceptions of corruption since 2004. As we can see, there have not been very drastic changes in corruption perception in El Salvador. Between 2004 and 2008, the data indicate a gradual but sensible growth from 65.5 to 70.7. This trend stops in 2010 and the data indicate that it has remained practically the same since then.

It is important to highlight that high levels of corruption perception do not always correspond to elevated (or growing) levels of corruption. It is possible that, given government attempts to increase awareness campaigns on the problem of corruption and the attention of the media regarding scandals of corruption, that citizens' perceptions do not line up with the actual trends for corruption in the country. Therefore, although corruption perception may be high, it could be that victimization is low.

Additionally, the opposite may occur: that corruption perception is low according to regional standards, but in reality, real corruption is quite high. In the following section we will analyze respondents' experience with corruption.




**Figure IV. 2. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in El Salvador, 2012.**

### Corruption Victimization


In this section, we analyze to what extent Salvadoran citizens and those of the Americas have been victims of corruption. To this end, in Figure IV.3, we show the percentage of respondents who report in the survey that they have been demanded to give a bribe in at least one place and on one occasion during the last year. The data generate some interesting results. At a difference to other responses in the AmericasBarometer survey, in this case, there is a very wide variation among countries in the region when corruption victimization happens.

As Figure IV.3 shows, in Haiti, almost 70% of the adult population has been victimized in the past year. This constitutes the highest percentage in the entire hemisphere. Other countries with notable high percentages are Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico. In these countries, more than 30% of citizens have been victims of bribery on the part of a public official. In one important group of countries, including nations as dissimilar as Honduras, Costa Rica, and Argentina, the rates of bribery victimization oscillate between 15% and 30%. El Salvador finds itself among the group of Latin American countries with relatively low levels of corruption (in comparison with the rest of the region), with a rate of 11.3%, but it is the countries in the northern part of the hemisphere and Chile that register the most reduced rates.




**Figure IV. 3. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

Some citizens have been asked to pay a bribe in more than one instance, while others received requests in one or none. Further on, we will evaluate the number of instances in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption in El Salvador in 2012. This information is presented in Figure IV.4. We are able to observe that nearly 89% reported not having experienced corruption over the course of the last 12 months, 8.9% experienced corruption in only one instance, and 2.4% reported being victims of corruption in two or more instances. It is appropriate to remember that these data only refer to the experiences of bribery described above and they do not include all of the possible forms of corruption that Salvadorans confront in public spaces.



**Figure IV. 4. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in El Salvador, 2012.**


How have the levels of corruption victimization varied over time in El Salvador? Figure IV.5 shows the percentage of citizens that reported any type of corruption victimization in different years. The results indicate an important decrease in the percentage of people that have been victimized by corruption in 2010; since then, bribery victimization has remained stable in the country.



**Figure IV. 5. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time El Salvador, 2012.**


### Who Are the Most Likely To Be Victims of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model in order to be able to identify the socioeconomic characteristics and demographics that are positively and negatively associated with corruption. Figure IV.6 shows results of that regression. As we may observe, three variables turn out to be statistically significant: the type of area or city in which the respondent lives, gender and age. The number of children has an important coefficient but it is not statistically significant. On the contrary, factors such as the level of educational attainment, level of wealth, skin color, or the fact that they receive government assistance does not show an important association with corruption victimization.



**Figure IV. 6. Determinants of corruption victimization in El Salvador, 2012.**

To better observe the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in Figure IV.7. Men have been victimized by bribery in a greater proportion than women; in fact almost 14% of men have encountered some kind of street corruption in comparison with 9% of the women. Additionally, the data indicate that people between 26 and 55 years of age have been victims of corruption in a larger proportion than people aged 56 years and over and especially those whose age is greater than 66 years of age. Finally, based on the data of the figure in question, we can say that the people living in urban zones, especially in the capital, have a greater probability of being victimized by corruption than people who live in rural areas.



**Figure IV. 7. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in El Salvador, 2012.**

### III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization<sup>12</sup>


As in years past, the AmericasBarometer Ahmed to measure the citizens' level of insecurity perception by way of the following question:

**AOJ11.** Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **unsafe**?  
 (1) Very safe      (2) Somewhat safe      (3) Somewhat unsafe      (4) Very unsafe

Following the practices of the AmericasBarometer, the responses were recoded on a 0-100 scale where the highest values mean a greater insecurity perception. Figure IV.8 shows the results for all of the countries included in the 2012 survey. The data reflected in the figure are very eloquent. They show that there is an important level of insecurity perception in El Salvador. In comparative terms, this places the country above the majority of nations in the hemisphere, only significantly below Venezuela and Peru. We should remember that these data reflect insecurity perceptions and not the incidence of direct crime – that will be seen later. Whatever the case, it is interesting to see that the

<sup>12</sup> The fieldwork for this survey began approximately three weeks after learning of the first news reports regarding the ceasefire among the gangs. In that moment, the media had already begun to report a drastic reduction in the number of homicides. A reading of this paragraph should take into account this phenomenon, which was not anticipated during the preparation of the survey questionnaire.

Salvadoran feels less secure than Hondurans, Jamaicans, or Guatemalans where crime rates are also high. Finally, regarding the database of results shown here, we can pose that in the majority of Latin American countries there are important levels of insecurity generated by crime common violence.




**Figure IV. 8. Perceptions of Insecurity in the countries of the Americas, 2012.**

On the other hand, given that a large part of the criminal acts take place in urban areas and especially in the capitals of the nations, we decided to also present the crime victimization data for the capitals of 24 countries of the sampling (we do not include the United States and Canada due to

reasons of sampling). The results can be seen in Figure IV.9 and differ slightly from the national data on insecurity perception.

For example, San Salvador always finds itself among the cities with the highest levels of insecurity, but in comparison with the distribution by country, the capitals of Mexico, Guatemala, La Paz, and Uruguay appear with much higher levels of insecurity than the national averages. In the case of the country, San Salvador also appears with the highest insecurity score over the national average, which reinforces the idea that insecurity concentrates itself in an important way in the capital.



**Figure IV. 9. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Capital Cities of the Americas, 2012.**

How have the levels of insecurity varied in El Salvador? Figure IV.10 shows the changes over time in the levels of perception of insecurity, using data from the previous AmericasBarometer surveys

in which the same question was asked to respondents. Judging by the results, it may be possible to say that insecurity levels have been in constant variation during recent years and that they do not follow a consistent lineal tendency. In 2006, perceptions of insecurity rose to an average of 48.1 to later drop in a significant way to 2008. In 2008, during the first year of Mauricio Funes' government, insecurity reached its highest levels in recent years then to decrease later in a notable way. What explains these changes in perception of insecurity? As we have said previously, perceptions do not necessarily coincide with the actual levels of crime, but in this case it is possible to put forward that the decrease of 2012 could be associated with the ceasefire called by the gangs and to the drastic reduction in murders.





Figure IV. 10. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in El Salvador

In what regions of the country do we have the largest perceptions of insecurity? The data do not show significant differences when we compare insecurity levels in function of the different areas of the country. However, when we classify the respondents by their area of residency, that is to say in function of whether or not they live in rural areas, in small towns, or in the capital, we do find some differences. In Figure IV.11, we examine this question. As one can see, the people living in big cities (although not in the capital city) feel more insecure than those who live in rural areas or in small cities.



**Figure IV. 11. Perceptions of Insecurity by area of residence in El Salvador, 2012.**

Once more, it is important to remember that as we pointed out in the case of corruption; one must keep in mind that the high levels of insecurity perception do not necessarily correspond to high levels of crime. It can be that insecurity perception may be high at the same time actual victimization is relatively low. Now, it is also important to keep in mind that the victimization reports that are presented here are based on a survey that has the capacity to gather only a portion of the possible crimes committed in El Salvador. Furthermore, the majority of acts of victimization recorded herein correspond to acts that the victims survived and feel comfortable reporting to the survey taker. Many times we commit the error of attempting to match these results with the homicide rates that are officially reported. These attempts, aside from being unfruitful, cause confusion and to the supposition that these data possible some kind of bias. In reality, the data on victimization that is reported in the AmericasBarometer surveys gather common crimes whose primary motivation is economic more than personal. In the next section, we deal with the topic of crime victimization.

## IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare with citizens' actual experience of insecurity? In 2010, the AmericasBarometer modified their questions in order to measure crime victimization. The questions were formulated in the following way:

**VIC1EXT.** Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue]      (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]


**VIC2AA.** Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[**Read options**]

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality
- (4) In another municipality
- (5) In another country

**VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes      (2) No


Figure IV.12 combines the answers to questions **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. 17.6% of respondents in the Americas reported having been victims of some type of crime during the course of 12 months before being surveyed, while 28.1% of the American citizens indicated that somebody in their household was victimized by crime. It is important to point out, however, that the survey was administered only to adults that have come of age. Therefore, it is possible that the victimization of minors is not always reported due to the fact that family members may not be aware of what happened. Also, it must be kept in mind that the respondents self-identify as victims of crime. In some contexts, certain criminal acts (especially those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against marginalized groups) may have been normalized and therefore are not reported with the same frequency with which they occur. One example of this type of act is violence directed against women in the home. A large part of this type of violence is not reported because for many of the victims, such acts of aggression do not constitute criminal acts.



**Figure IV. 12. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**


Compared with other countries in the Americas, El Salvador is located precisely in the intermediate levels of victimization for the region. For this case, 17.4% of Salvadorans surveyed were direct victims of crime, while 28.5% of households reported some person who was victimized within the past year. This suggests, at least in terms of common victimization, predominantly with economic motivation, that Salvadorans are victimized in a very similar proportion to the average citizen of the Americas.

Once again, Figure IV.13 presents the victimization data from the capitals of Latin American countries and the Caribbean. In this case, we present personal victimization data and the victimization data for the rest of the people in the household. As we can see, San Salvador is situated in the middle of the distribution of all capitals in terms of crime in both respects: personal direct victimization and victimization for the rest of the people in the household.




**Figure IV. 13. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the capitals of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012.**

Figure IV.13 shows places in which the majority of crimes perpetrated in El Salvador occur according to the respondents' answers. Almost 38% of the crimes occur in a city different from the one in which the respondent lives while 28.6% occurs in the respondents' city of residence. Almost 19.3% of crimes occur in the victims' homes while 14.3% happens in the victims' neighborhood.




**Figure IV. 14. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in El Salvador, 2012.**



**Figure IV. 15. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization by gender in El Salvador, 2012**

We can see an interesting pattern when we look at these responses by gender. As Figure IV.15 shows, women suffer almost double the victimization as men do within their own homes as men while men suffer larger levels of victimization than women in other cities or in cities that are different from their place of residence.


In what regions of the country do the majority of criminal acts occur? Figure IV.16 shows regional crime patterns. The metropolitan area of San Salvador registers the highest levels of general crime victimization with nearly 42% of homes reporting some incidence of crime, followed by the paracentral zone with 28.6%. It is interesting to note that the furthest zones from the capital and those that register the largest rural populations are the ones with the lower percentages of crime victimization in the entire country.



**Figure IV. 16. Crime Victimization by Region in El Salvador, 2012.**

Finally, it could be interesting to see the way in which personal experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure IV.17 shows the trends of general victimization by crime from 2010 to 2012. These data refer to any type of crime that has affected a member of a household. As we can see in the figure in question, the percentages of homes victimized by crime have decreased from 38.5% in 2010 and 28.5% in 2012. Given that the questions regarding victimization of any household member were not done in past years, it is not possible to compare the data from 2004 to the data from 2008. However, since 2004, we have included a question on personal victimization that does permit a certain comparison. It must be pointed out, however, that in 2010 the directives of LAPOP in Vanderbilt changed the formulation of the questions that measure crime victimization. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used question VIC1 that states: “Have you been a victim of some type of criminal act in the past 12 months?” In 2010 and 2012, that question was substituted with question VIC1EXT. Therefore, the data must be treated with care, given that the change in formulation of the question could explain

the differences in the rates of personal victimization since 2010. The results are shown in Table IV.1. As we can see, personal victimization had experienced an increase between 2006 and 2010, when it reached 24.2% of respondents, only to decrease later to 17.4% in 2012. It is difficult to know the reasons for this change in the trends with any certainty, especially with the exception, as we have explained, of the change in formulation of the question. Whatever the case, the victimization trends merit a closer examination which will be provided in future studies.



**Figure IV. 17. Total Crime Victimization Over Time in El Salvador, 2010 -2012.**


**Table IV. 1. Personal Victimization by Crime in El Salvador, 2004-2012.**

Año	Porcentaje
2004	17.1
2006	15.6
2008	19.0
2010	24.2
2012	17.4

### Who is Most Likely to be a Crime Victim?

Figure IV.18 illustrates the results of the logistic regression model that evaluates who is more likely to be a victim of crime in El Salvador. In this figure and in other regression figures, all the variables have been standardized. As is the same with the rest of the regression figures, the coefficients that measure the effect of each variable are represented by dots and the confidence intervals with

horizontal lines that extend to the right and left of each dot. If the confidence interval does not cross the center line at 0.0, this means that the variable has a statistically significant effect (at a level of  $p < 0.05$ ). The coefficients whose confidence intervals fall completely to the right side of the zero line indicate a net positive effect in the dependent variable. On the other hand, a coefficient whose confidence interval falls to the left side of the zero line indicates an effect that is negative and statistically significant.




**Figure IV. 18. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in El Salvador, 2012.**

According to the regression results, among the variables included in the model, only the level of educational attainment and the size of place of residence appear to be associated with personal crime victimization. Other factors such as age, gender, and level of wealth do not appear to be associated with the probability of being a victim of crime in spite of the fact that in previous reports, they did appear to be significant. This is probably due to the ever-changing nature of victimization. The data suggest that there had already been a substantial decrease in levels of victimization, at least since 2010, and this could be affecting the distribution of prevalence of crime.

In order to better understand the effect of each independent variable on crime victimization in El Salvador, Figure IV.19 shows the bivaried relationships between some of the independent variables and crime victimization. As we can see, the probability that a person will be victim of a crime increases in a notable way to the extent that this person has a higher level of educational attainment. Only 5% of people with no educational attainment have been victimized in the past year; while among Salvadorans with upper-level education, this percentage rises to 37.3%. In the same way, victimization increases in function of the size and the nature of the community in which the respondent resides. In

rural areas, the percentage of victimization is less than 9%; at a difference in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, this percentage is almost 26%.



**Figure IV. 19. Sociodemographic Factors and Crime Victimization in El Salvador, 2012.**

## V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high levels of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in El Salvador? In order to determine this, we performed a multivariate linear regression that calculates the impact that victimization and perceptions of crime and corruption have on support for the political system. Figure IV.20 shows the impact of perception and experiences with crime and insecurity on support for the system.<sup>13</sup>

The variables capturing corruption and crime victimization appear to be negative and significantly associated with support for the political system in El Salvador. So do the perceptions regarding corruption within the country. This means that the extent to which people have been victims

<sup>13</sup> System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.

of crime and bribery leads them to have a lower probability of supporting the Salvadoran political system. Level of educational attainment also turned out to be negatively associated with institutional support: people with the highest levels of educational attainment exhibit lower levels of trust in the legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system than people with low levels of educational attainment.





Figure IV. 20. Determinants of System Support in El Salvador, 2012.

These relationships can be observed clearer in the following figure. Figure IV.21 delve further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, presenting the bivariate relationships between system support and corruption and crime perceptions and experiences. Despite the fact that perceptions of insecurity were not statistically significant in the previous regression, when we look at the relationship between those perceptions and system support, there is some sort of effect between these two variables.

But one of the most important variables in this analysis is corruption. People who have been victims of bribery have an average score for system support of 48.3, while those who have not been victims of corruption show an average score of nearly 58.



**Figure IV. 21. Delincuencia, corrupción y apoyo al sistema en El Salvador, 2012.**

## VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

Finally, an important aspect of the discussion on democracy, crime, and corruption is the rule of law. This section deals with the topic of citizen support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is normally conceived of as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.<sup>14</sup> A key indicator of the observance of rule of law is that citizens reject illegal actions on the part of the state as long as it fulfills their objectives. Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. According to the threat hypothesis, those that perceive that the crime levels are high and those that have been victims of crime would be more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.<sup>15</sup> In order to measure support for the rule of law, we use an item that captures to what extent it is believed that the authorities should respect the laws while they aim to combat crime.

**AOJ8.** In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

(1) Should always abide by the law      (2) Occasionally can cross the line

<sup>14</sup> See O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

<sup>15</sup> Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *Americas Barometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Figure IV.22 shows the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas that express their support for the rule of law versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act as if they were above the law. The highest level of support for the rule of law is found in the Caribbean, Jamaica, Venezuela, Panama, and the Dominican Republic with percentages over 72%; while the lowest levels are found in Trinidad y Tobago and in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador with percentages lower than 58. El Salvador is found to be among the American nations with the comparatively lowest percentages, in the company of countries paradoxically characterized by strong institutions, like Canada and Uruguay. Whatever the case, the data indicate that six out of ten Salvadorans support the rule of law.





Figure IV. 22. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.


These levels of support for the rule of law, however, constitute a substantial improvement with respect to the levels recorded in 2010. Figure IV.23 shows the levels of support for rule of law over time, and, as you can see, in 2010, less than half of Salvadoran adults held opinions of support towards the rule of law (47.4%). The 2012 results indicate a recuperation to the previous 2010 levels (around 56%), but some of those are lower than the results recorded in 2004.




**Figure IV. 23. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in El Salvador, 2012.**

Finally, what makes citizens support institutions in their country? In countries marred by violence such as the Central American countries, it becomes important to understand the factors that are associated with support that citizens have towards rule of law. This section concludes with an analysis of the determinants of support for the rule of law in El Salvador. Figure IV.24 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis that was used to identify these factors.

Among all the factors that were evaluated, four appear to be statistically significant and associated to support for the rule of law: interpersonal trust, perception of insecurity, level of educational attainment, and being a woman. Figure IV.25 shows these independent variables related to the rule of law in greater detail. Women support the rule of law more than men; people with low levels of educational attainment support it more than people with certain levels of educational attainment, people who do not feel insecure as a result of criminal activity support it more than people who feel very insecure and, finally, citizens who have a great deal of trust in others support it more than those who do not.



**Figure IV. 24. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in El Salvador, 2012.**



**Figure IV. 25. Factors related to Support for the Rule of Law in El Salvador, 2012.**

## VII. Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the magnitude and the impact of crime and corruption victimization as well as the perception of insecurity and corruption regarding support for the political system and the rule of law in El Salvador.

In spite of the fact that perceptions of public corruption in El Salvador are rather high, the country does not count as one of the countries with the highest levels of perception of corruption. This is apparently related to the fact that corruption victimization, comparatively, which is measured by the number of occurrences of bribery, is not as high as in other countries within the American hemisphere. On the other hand, perceptions of insecurity are relatively high in comparison with other countries in the region. However, the data show that both personal and household crime victimization had lowered, especially in 2010.

Whatever the case, corruption victimization and crime victimization both seem to play an important role in the erosion of support for the political system in El Salvador. This could be related to the fact that the support for rule of law is relatively low in comparison with other countries in the region. Although support for the rule of law does not seem to be directly affected by victimization events, the data indicate that insecurity perceptions have a negative influence on the rule of law.

## Appendices

### Appendix IV.1. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in El Salvador, 2012

	Coef.	t
Corruption Victimization		
Level of Education	0.044	0.48
Size of Place of Residency	0.367*	4.23
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.138	-1.55
Woman	-0.266*	-4.88
Age	-0.259*	-2.69
Wealth Quintiles	0.110	1.05
Skin Color	0.007	0.09
Number of Children	0.226	2.00
Receives public assistance	-0.015	-0.15
Constant	-2.143*	-21.64
F = 4.82		
Number of Cases = 1421		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix IV. 2. Determinants of Crime Victimization in El Salvador, 2012

	Coef.	t
Crime Victimization		
Education Level	0.398*	4.34
Age	-0.146	-1.47
Size of Place of Residency	0.350*	4.94
Woman	-0.100	-1.45
Wealth Quintiles	0.107	1.50
Skin Color	-0.044	-0.66
Constant	-1.706*	-15.34
F = 15.46		
Number of cases = 1448		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix IV. 3. Determinants for System Support in El Salvador, 2012

	Coef.	t
Woman	0.019	0.72
Educational Attainment	-0.128*	-3.53
Size of Place	0.120*	4.21
Skin Color	0.012	0.46
Age	-0.059	-2.04
Insecurity Perception	-0.014	-0.42
Crime Victimization	-0.051*	-3.10
Perception of Corruption	-0.094*	-2.52
Corruption Victimization	-0.111*	-4.71
Constant	0.019	0.87
R-squared = 0.085		
Number of cases = 1291		
*p<0.05		

**Appendix IV. 4. Determinants for Support for the Rule of Law in El Salvador, 2012**

	Coef.	t
Support for the Rule of Law		
Woman	0.109*	2.26
Educational Attainment	-0.271*	-2.91
Age	0.032	0.37
Corruption Victimization	0.007	0.09
Crime Victimization	-0.103	-1.80
Size of place of residence	0.096	1.27
Skin color	-0.079	-0.82
PErception of insecurity	-0.128*	-2.11
Ideology	-0.000	-0.01
Interpersonal Trust	0.134*	2.27
Constant	0.410*	4.82
F = 3.55		
N. of cases = 1214		
*p<0.05		



## Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

### I. Introduction

At least since the time of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked themselves what makes a democracy function. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures<sup>1</sup>, others have shown that citizen attitudes and their values play an important role, highlighting that legitimacy is key for democratic consolidation.<sup>2</sup> Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and the State institutions, a central concept in the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.<sup>3</sup>

In LAPOP studies using data from the AmericasBarometer, political legitimacy is defined in terms of citizen support towards the political system, tolerance to political rights, and the participation of others. Furthermore, support for the system has two main dimensions: diffuse support and specific support.<sup>4</sup> While specific support can be measured with questions on the authorities currently in power, diffuse support refers to the generalized nexus with a more abstract object represented by the political system and the same public positions. Although many of the existing measurements tend to confuse the two dimensions of legitimacy, the measurement created by LAPOP (and operationalized throughout the data of the AmericasBarometer surveys) captures the dimension of diffuse support that is indispensable for the survival of democracy.<sup>5</sup> In this chapter, we examine political legitimacy throughout the Americas with the purpose of determining and understanding the factors that explain the variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians' proximity to citizens' policy preferences have an important effect on citizens' attitudes about the political system.<sup>6</sup> Institutional variables have also been

<sup>1</sup> Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. Harper Perennial Publishers; Przeworski, Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, ed. Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub. The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press.

<sup>2</sup> Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability. Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Also see Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Sage Publications, Inc.

<sup>4</sup> Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

<sup>5</sup> Booth, John A. y Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America. Democracy and Political Support in Eight Nations*. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al.,

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.<sup>7</sup>

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.<sup>9</sup>

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."<sup>10</sup> Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.<sup>11</sup> Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,<sup>12</sup> authoritarian personality,<sup>13</sup> and religion.<sup>14</sup> At the

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2008. "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. "Public support for liberal democracy," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

<sup>7</sup> Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

<sup>8</sup> Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 20*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 2*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 36*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>9</sup> Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 4*: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights, 19*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights, 63*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

<sup>10</sup> Seligson, Mitchell. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11(2): 5-29.

<sup>11</sup> Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599..

<sup>12</sup> Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk*:

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.<sup>15</sup> Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.<sup>16</sup> LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.<sup>17</sup>

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.<sup>18</sup> It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

Support for the system and political tolerance has important effects on the consolidation of democracy. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens that tolerate and respect the rights of others. In Table V.1, we summarize the manner in which tolerance and political legitimacy may affect stable democracy, in accordance with previous AmericasBarometer studies. If the majority of citizens demonstrate high levels of support for the system and a high tolerance, it can be hoped for that democracy will remain stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority of citizens are intolerant and show distrust in their institutions, the democratic regime could be in danger. There is a third possibility that could be called high instability – where the majority demonstrates high levels of tolerance towards other citizens but concedes little legitimacy to political institutions. Lastly, it is not a good sign for democracy if citizens of a society have high support for the political system but low levels of tolerance, and in the extreme case, this could give way to a regime change towards a more authoritarian model.

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*How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al. 2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

<sup>13</sup> Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

<sup>14</sup> Postic, Robert K. 2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest); Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc.).

<sup>15</sup> Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>16</sup> Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257..

<sup>17</sup> Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>18</sup> Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

**Table V.1. The Relationship Between Support for the System and Political Tolerance.**

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy At Risk

It is worth pointing out that this conceptualization has found empirical support. With the AmericasBarometer data from 2008, Booth and Seligson found serious signs of the possibility of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled President Zelaya to Costa Rica.<sup>19</sup>

## II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP’s “system support” index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:


I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
<b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in El Salvador guarantee a fair trial? ( <b>Read:</b> If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
<b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of El Salvador?
<b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of El Salvador?
<b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of El Salvador?
<b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of El Salvador?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

<sup>19</sup> Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Véase también Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. *The Honduran Catharsis. Americas Barometer Insights 48*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

## How Does The Political System Vary Throughout The Countries of the Americas?


Figure V.1 presents the levels of support for the political system for countries in the Americas in 2012. Data for El Salvador shows how our country is located in a relatively high position in comparison to other countries in the study. Of the 26 countries, El Salvador is located below Belice, Surinam, Nicaragua, Canadá, Uruguay, and Guyana.



**Figure V. 1. Support for the Political System in Comparative Perspective, 2012.**

Support for the political system is normally higher in some of the individual dimensions of the index than in others. In Figure V.2, we present the average obtained for each of the dimensions: the courts (45.5) and basic rights (47.8) exhibit the lowest levels.

On an intermediate level, we find pride of living under the political system (55.8), and the highest levels are support for the system (63.5) and respect for institutions (69.6).



**Figure V. 2. Components for Support of the Political System in El Salvador, 2012.**

Thanks to the fact that we can count on data from the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 rounds, it is possible to see the evolution of levels of support for the period of 2004-2012. In Figure V.3, we can observe the evolution of the five questions. In general terms for the 2004-2008 period, we can identify a decreasing tendency for four questions (courts, basic rights, pride, and support), while they rise in 2010; later they decrease in 2012 for support and pride and they remain practically the same for courts and basic rights. Respect for institutions rises in 2004 to 2006 and later shrinks in 2008, but later rises in 2010 and drops in 2012; but if we take into consideration the confidence interval, we can conclude that it has remained relatively stable.





Figure V. 3. Components for System Support by Year, El Salvador 2004-2012.

From the five questions, we have constructed a scale that measures support for the system. The scale is an average of the five items shown previously.<sup>20</sup> In Figure V.4, we present the results of the surveys conducted for the 2004-2012 period. As we can see, support for the system was decreasing in a sustained fashion for the 2004-2008 period: an average of 59.5 on a 0-100 scale in 2004, 55.4 in 2006 and 51.8 in 2008; later we observe an statistically significant increase to 58.7 in 2010 and then it decreases to 56.7 in 2012.




**Figure V. 4. Support for the Political System Over Time in El Salvador, 2004-2012.**

<sup>20</sup> In 2012, the Cronbach Alpha for the scale of system support is 0.7853.

In Chapter IV, we showed the results of a first analysis to identify the impact of the variables of violence and corruption associated with support for the political system. With the purpose of providing a broader explanation of these differences on system support levels over time, we perform a multiple regression analysis in this chapter that included more and varied predictors for support for the system. In Appendix V.1 (at the end of the chapter), we present the coefficients. Basically, there are six statistically significant predictors among those included in this regression: ideology, perception of the national economic situation, approval of the job the President is doing, level of educational attainment, area of residence, and victimization by corruption.

It is important to note that upon including the variables for personal economic situation and evaluation of the job the President is doing, the variable for crime victimization loses its statistical significance. This would suggest the importance of opinions regarding personal economic situations and the job the President is doing regarding support for the political system.



**Figure V. 5. Determinants of Support for the Political System in El Salvador, 2012.**

Of these, we are only going to present two in their bivariate relationship – one that refers to a particularly political factor and the other to the effect of corruption victimization. In the following figure, we present the level of support for the system by the self-positions on the left-right ideological scale. In Figure V.6, we observe that the level of support for the system is strong on the left pole, that later decreases for center positions and increases for positions on the right. In the measurements taken in previous years, we reported a lower level of support for the system for left and center positions in comparison to positions on the right. Due to the fact that since 2009, the country has elected a leftist government, it is possible that this explains the important increase in levels of support for positions on the left.





Figure V. 6. Support for the System by Ideology, 2012.

In Figure V.7, we present the level of support for the system with respect to corruption victimization. Here, we observe that support for the system is higher among those who have not been victims of corruption, in comparison to those who have.



**Figure V. 7. Support for the System by Corruption Victimization, 2012.**


### III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the Salvadoran form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Salvadoran form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?


As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance.

When we analyze the data obtained for El Salvador in 2012 in comparison with other countries in this study (Figure V.8), our country is located in the lowest positions on the continent, only above Honduras and Ecuador.




**Figure V. 8. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

In Figure V.9, we present the average obtained by each of the questions in the 2012 survey: running for public office (36.6) and freedom of expression (38.4) with the lowest levels; and right to vote (46.9) and peaceful protests (52.7) with the highest levels.



**Figure V. 9. Components of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2012.**


How has political tolerance in El Salvador evolved over time? Figure V.10 shows the evolution of average levels for the four questions used to construct the political tolerance scale in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. In general terms, in 2010, we observe an important and statistically significant decrease in the four questions with respect to the data for 2004-2006-2008; in 2012, the levels from 2010 remain the same.



**Figure V. 10. Components of Political Tolerance in El Salvador by Year, 2004-2012.**


From the four questions, we have constructed a scale that measures political tolerance. This scale is an average of the four questions shown previously.<sup>21</sup> In Figure V.11, we present the results for the surveys conducted in the 2004-2012 period. As we can see, tolerance rises from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006, later decreases slightly to 54.2 in 2008, experiences an important drop to 45.1 in 2010, and then decreases to 43.7 in 2012. This drop would place the level of political tolerance in 2012 on an even lower scale than was registered in 2004, the first year of measurement for the survey. The implication that this finding has is that it proposes the necessity of efforts to increase the levels of political tolerance in the country.

<sup>21</sup> The Cronbach Alpha for the political tolerance scale is 0.7564 in 2012.




**Figure V. 11. Average of Political Tolerance By Year, 2012.**

What factors affect the levels of political tolerance in El Salvador? In Figure V.12, we compute a multiple regression model in order to respond to this question. In Appendix V.2 (at the end of the chapter), we present the coefficients. It is surprising that for the low level of tolerance that we have found, we only obtain one statistically significant predictor: gender. The low levels of political tolerance in the country are an aspect that should be analyzed in greater detail in future analyses.



**Figure V. 12. Determinants of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2012.**

In Figure V.13, we present the level of political tolerance by gender. Here, we may observe that men are more tolerant than women.




**Figure V. 13. Political Tolerance by Gender, 2012.**

In previous studies, it had been reported that an important political variable to explain the differences in the levels of political tolerance has been the respondents’ political preferences. Thus, in previous waves, those who voted for ARENA exhibited a lower level of political tolerance, while those who voted for other parties exhibited an intermediate level and those close to the FMLN party exhibited the highest level of political tolerance.<sup>22</sup> The argument that has been discussed is whether or not these differences are due to the party that was in power and to those who were in opposition. With this idea in mind, we put forth the hypothesis with the 2010 data due to alternation, now the partisan supporters of the ARENA party should have a higher level of tolerance, while levels of tolerance should decrease for partisan supporters of President Funes and the FMLN Party. However, upon analyzing the data from the 2010 survey, we see that for the ARENA partisan supporters, levels of tolerance have practically not varied (going from 45.8 in 2008 to 45.2 in 2010); but for the partisan supporters of the FMLN/Funes Party, there has been an important decrease (going from 69.1 in 2008 to 46.3 in 2010). As a consequence, in the 2010 measurement, there are no statistically significant differences in the levels of political tolerance among the partisan supporters of ARENA (45.2) and of the FMLN/Funes Party (46.3).

<sup>22</sup> Córdova Macías, Ricardo; José Miguel Cruz and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2008. *Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2008. El impacto de la gobernabilidad*. San Salvador, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University y USAID; Córdova Macías, Ricardo; José Miguel Cruz and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2006. *La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2006*. San Salvador, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University y USAID.

However, when we analyze the 2012 data, we find that these differences do have a relationship with the previous party preferences, above all now that three years have past since the alternation in the Executive Body. On this occasion, the political tolerance of ARENA partisan supporters has decreased (going from 45.2 in 2010 to 39.7 in 2012); while partisan supporters of the FMLN/Funes party have maintained the same level (46.3 in 2010 and 47 in 2012).



**Figure V. 14. Political Tolerance by vote in the 2009 Presidential Elections, 2012 Survey.**

#### IV. Democratic Stability

Just as we outline in the introduction to this chapter, support for the system and political tolerance are equally vital for the stability of democracy. In Table V.2, we may observe that 22.8% of respondents fall in the stable democracy cell; 38.9%, in the authoritarian stability cell - this being the most populated cell on the table; while 12.1% are located in the unstable democracy cell; and 26.2% in the democracy at risk cell.

**Table V. 2. Empirical Relationship Between Support for the Political System and Political Tolerance in El Salvador.**


Support for the System	Political Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
	22.8%	38.9%
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy At Risk
	12.1%	26.2%

These results can be placed in a historical perspective, because they have the data from surveys conducted in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Table V.3 shows the evolution of the four cells. The "stable democracy" remains at 32.2% for 2004 and 2006, decreased to 23.4% in 2008, increased to 25.7% in 2010 and decreased to 22.8% in 2012. The cell "authoritarian stability" decreases from 34.6% in 2004 to 27.4% in 2006, increased to 29.3% in 2008, then increased to 41.7% in 2010 and decreased to 38.9% in 2012. The cell "unstable democracy" increases from 17.2% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2006, increased to 26.9% in 2008, decreased to 10.8% in 2010 and then increased to 12.1% in 2012. Finally, the cell "democracy at risk" goes from 16% in 2004 to 15.8% in 2006, increased to 20.5% in 2008 and 21.8% in 2010 and increased to 26.2% in 2012. This last cell ("democracy at risk") has moved from concentrating a fifth to a quarter of responses in the past six years, and comparing measurements from 2004 and 2012, there is a worrisome increase of 10 percentage points. And this contrasts with the observed reduction of nearly 10 percentage points in the cell of "stable democracy" when comparing the 2004 and 2012 measurements. This is an aspect that should be given a future follow-up measurement.

**Table V. 3. Empirical Relationship Among Support for the Political System and Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2004-2012.**


Support for the System	Political Tolerance									
	High					Low				
High	Stable Democracy					Authoritarian Stability				
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
	32.2%	32.2%	23.4%	25.7%	22.8%	34.6%	27.4%	29.3%	41.7%	38.9%
Low	Unstable Democracy					Democracy At Risk				
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
	17.2%	24.6%	26.9%	10.8%	12.1%	16.0%	15.8%	20.5%	21.8%	26.2%

Figure V.15 shows the extent to which citizens of the Americas have this combination of attitudes (high system support and high tolerance). Upon analyzing the data obtained for the case of El Salvador in the 2012 survey compared with the other countries in this study, we have found that our country is in a low position, ranking above Honduras, Haiti, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, Paraguay, Ecuador and Brazil.



**Figure V. 15. Support for Stable Democracy in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**


In the following figures, we can see the positioning of El Salvador in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 measurements in terms of the average for the two variables analyzed (system support and political tolerance), compared with the rest of the countries considered in this study. In 2008, our country is located in the box of "stable democracy".



**Figure V. 16. Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas, 2008.**

Source: Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Universidad de los Andes (University of the Andes)/LAPOP.


In the following figure, we can see the positioning of El Salvador in 2010, compared with the rest of the countries considered in this study. Now our country would have moved to settle in "authoritarian stability" section. The level of support for the system has remained above the average of 50 (on a scale of 0 to 100) for the 2006-2010 period, and this shift to the "authoritarian stability" cell is explained from the reduction in political tolerance in the 2010 measurement, falling below the average of 50 (on a scale of 0 to 100).



**Figure V. 17. Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas, 2010.**


Source: Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Universidad de los Andes (University of the Andes)/LAPOP.

In the following figure, we can see the positioning of El Salvador in 2012. Now our country remains in the "authoritarian stability" box. In 2012, there has been a slight decrease in the level of system support and political tolerance.



**Figure V. 18. Support for the System and Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

How has the percentage of citizens of El Salvador with attitudes that are more favorable to stable democracy evolved over time? Figure V.19 shows the percentage of citizens who expressed high levels of system support and high tolerance from 2004-2012. Over time, these levels have gone from 32.2 in 2004 and 2006, decreased to 23.4 in 2008, increased to 25.6 in 2010 and then decreased to 22.8 in 2012. Upon considering the trust interval, attitudes favorable to stable democracy after the fall of 2008 would have stabilized for the period of 2008-2012.



**Figure V. 19. Attitudes of Stable Democracy in El Salvador By Year, 2004-2012.**

What are the factors that influence citizens in El Salvador to have attitudes conducive towards a stable democracy? Figure V.20 presents the results of a multiple regression analysis with the predictors of a stable democracy (high support and high tolerance) when each of the other variables remains the same. In Appendix V.3 (at the end of the chapter), we present the coefficients. Basically, there are three statistically significant predictors: perception of the national economic situation, age, and evaluation of the job the President is doing.




Figure V. 20. Determinants of Stable Democracy in El Salvador, 2012.

In order to explore more deeply the determinants for support of the political system, we generated Figure V.21 with the most important bivaried relationship of the regression analysis: age. Support for stable democracy broadly reflects a "U" curve to the extent to which it decreases with age (up to age 55), then increases for the group aged 56-65 years and decreases again for the group aged 66 years and older.





Figure V. 21. Support For Stable Democracy According to Age, 2012.

## V. The Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in El Salvador support the main political institutions? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer survey, we asked respondents about their attitudes towards several specific institutions along with asking them general questions on support for the political system. We included the Catholic Church, as well as the media, which while not democratic political system institutions, they are reference institutions in Latin America and enjoy high levels of trust among the population. We used a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means "none" and 7 "a lot."

<b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the justice system?
<b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Court?
<b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
<b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the Legislative Assembly?
<b>B14</b> To what extent do you trust the National Government?
<b>B17.</b> To what extent do you trust the Attorney General's Office For The Defense of Human Rights?
<b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Civil Police?
<b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
<b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust Political Parties?
<b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?
<b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust your local government?
<b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the media?
<b>B47A.</b> To what extent do you trust elections in your country?

Figure V.22 presents the levels of support for each of these institutions for the survey conducted in 2012. As is customary in the analysis of the Barometer of the Americas, responses are transformed to a scale of 0 to 100. First, we see that the group of institutions that enjoy higher levels of trust are the Armed Forces (67.4), the Catholic Church (62.2), media (61.9) and the local government (60.9). In the second group, we found trust in the Attorney General's Office for the Defense of Human Rights (59.6), the Government (58.2), elections (54.1), the National Civil Police (54.0), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (53.2), the Supreme Court of justice (51.3) and confidence in the justice system (50.1). In the third group we find the Legislative Assembly (49.3) and political parties (34.4), which have the lowest levels of trust of all institutions.



**Figure V. 22. Trust in Institutions in El Salvador, 2012.**

How do these results compare to previous years in El Salvador? Figure V. 23 presents the results of trust in institutions in El Salvador since 2004. The main item to note is that in the period from 2004-2008, there was a general decline of trust in institutions, although with some differences: between 2004 and 2006 trust remained at practically the same level for the Attorney General’s Office For the Defense of Human Rights and for the Attorney General of the Republic, but decreases for both in 2008, and the only institution that increases in 2008 with respect to 2006 is the Catholic Church. A second point worth noting is in 2010 compared to 2008 shows a reversal in this trend, as there is an increase in trust in various institutions, although with some variations. Only in the case of the national government is there an increase that exceeds the highest point of previous measurements, and this is statistically significant. In five institutions the data for 2010 reached almost the same level as the previous higher measurement (in 2004). These are the cases of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Attorney General’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights, the Legislature and political parties. In a few cases, the increase is significant but does not reach the highest levels of 2004 (Supreme Electoral Tribunal and trust in elections). In three cases there is a slight increase or it remains the same as in 2010, but it is still lower than in 2004 (Catholic Church, the media and the municipality). And in the case of the PNC, the increase is very small, remaining at almost the same level as in 2008, lower than in 2006 and even lower than in 2004. A third element to note is that in 2012 trust levels remain the same as they were 2010 for eight institutions (Catholic Church, City Hall, Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the justice system, Supreme Court, Legislature, armed forces and the media). In the case of the National Civil Police (PNC), trust increased (from 49.3 in 2010 to 54 in 2012). And in three institutions there is a decrease in the levels of trust in 2012 when compared to 2010: in the case of national government, it passes from 67.6 to 58.2, the Attorney General’s Office for the Defense of Human Rights goes from 65.4 to 59.6 and in the case of political parties, it decreases from 39.1 to 34.4.




Figure V. 23. Trust in Institutions in El Salvador, 2004-2012.

## VI. Support For Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation. The AmericasBarometer assesses the support for democracy by asking respondents their opinion on a modified quote from Winston Churchill<sup>23</sup> - a question inspired by the study of Rose and Mishler on the subject.<sup>24</sup>


<sup>23</sup> Churchill's words make reference to democracy as "the worst form of government with the exception of all others."

<sup>24</sup> Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.

The answers to the question ING4 use a 7-point scale, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 "strongly agree," however, to make the results more understandable, they have been converted into a 0-100 scale.


**ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure V.24 shows averages levels of agreement with this affirmation in the countries of the Americas. El Salvador is located in a low position, placing itself only above Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.



**Figure V. 24. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

How has support for democracy changed in recent years in El Salvador? Figure V.25 presents an overview of changes in the support for democracy since 2004, from an average of 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006, to increase to 68.4 in 2008, reduced to 64.1 in 2010 and then increase to 65.6 in 2012, although this difference is not statistically significant, it could be argued that the level of support for democracy is stable for the 2010 and 2012 measurements.



**Figure V. 25. Support for Democracy in El Salvador Over Time, 2004-2012.**

## VII. Support for Democracy as a Political Regime

The survey also explored the opinions of Salvadorans regarding the type of political regime. This included two questions. The first was made to measure the preference for a democratic regime<sup>25</sup> and the second was aimed at measuring support for electoral democracy when faced with the choice of a strong leader who did not have to be elected.<sup>26</sup>

The results of the first question show that mostly the type of regime that is preferred by Salvadorans is democracy. 72% of respondents answered the question this way, while 17% said that an

<sup>25</sup> DEM2. With which of the following statements do you most agree. (1) For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or undemocratic, (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic, (8) Do not know / no answer "

<sup>26</sup> AUT1. Some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected through the vote. Others say that even if things do not work, electoral democracy, or popular vote, is always best. What do you think? (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected, or (2) Electoral democracy is best, (8) Do not know / no answer "

authoritarian government can be preferable and 11% expressed indifference, indicating that it does not matter whether the government is authoritarian or democratic.

These results become more interesting when compared with previous measurements. In Table V.4, we can see majority support for a democratic regime: it decreases from 75.4% in 2004 to 72.7% in 2006, then increases to 78.4% in 2008 and then decreased to 74.5% in 2010 and 72% in 2012. While responses of indifference received relatively low percentages: the indifference level goes from 11% in 2004 to 14.9% in 2006, decreasing to 12% in 2008 and then to 11% in 2010 and 2012. While support for an authoritarian government went from 13.5% in 2004, it decreases to 12.4% in 2006, then drops to 9.7% in 2008, and increases to 14.6% in 2010, and then reaches 17.1% in 2012. The latter is an aspect that should be explored in future studies, as the level of support for an authoritarian government showed a downward trend between 2004 and 2008, and in 2010 and 2012 has had a statistically significant increase.

**Table V. 4. Type of Regime Preferred In El Salvador By Year, 2004-2012.**

Type of Regime Preferred	Years				
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
It does not matter whether it is a democratic regime and a non-democratic regime	11.0%	14.9%	12.0%	11.0%	11.0%
Democracy is preferable to every other form of government	75.4%	72.7%	78.4%	74.5%	72.0%
In some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic government	13.5%	12.4%	9.7%	14.6%	17.1%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


The second question asked respondents to indicate their preference for a strong leader who does not have to be elected by popular vote or electoral democracy. The results show (Table V.5) that majority of Salvadorans continue to support electoral democracy: 82% believe that electoral democracy is best, compared to 18% who think we need a strong leader who does not have to be chosen. In the period 2004-2008 there was a decrease in the levels of support for electoral democracy, from 94.5% in 2004 to 87.6% in 2006 which later reduced to 84.5% in 2008, then increased to 87.8% in 2010 and reduced to 82% in 2012.

**Table V. 5. Preference for a Strong Leader or Electoral Democracy by Year, El Salvador, 2004-2012.**

Preference for a Strong Leader or Electoral Democracy	Years				
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
It does not matter whether it is a democratic regime or a non-democratic regime	5.6%	12.4%	15.5%	12.2%	18.1%
Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	94.5%	87.6%	84.5%	87.8%	82.0%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

### VIII. Satisfaction With Democracy


The survey asked how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy works in the country.<sup>27</sup> The results reveal that only 4.5% of the population said they were very satisfied with the performance of democracy, while 51.4% said they were satisfied, 38% said they were dissatisfied with democracy, and 6.2% said they were very dissatisfied (Figure V.26).



**Figure V. 26. Satisfaction With Democracy In El Salvador, 2012.**

<sup>27</sup> The question wording is the following: “PN4. In general, ¿would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the way democracy works in El Salvador? (1) Very Satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Unsatisfied, (4) Very Unsatisfied, (8) Don’t Know/No Reponse”.


In order to facilitate a comparison of the results with previous surveys, from the response options, we created a scale on a 0-100 format. A comparison with the previous measurement data shows that the average satisfaction with democracy in 2004 was 54.5, which gets reduced to 46.4 in 2006, then to 44.5 in 2008, then increases significantly and in a statistically significant way to 54.7 in 2010 and then reduces to 50.9% in 2012 (Figure V.27). We believe the recovery in the level of satisfaction with democracy in 2010 is related to the elections in January and March of 2009, the transition to stability that developed between March and June, as well as to the evaluations and expectations for the new administration, while the decrease in 2012 has to do with the functioning of the political system after the 2009 presidential alternation.



**Figure V. 27. Average of Satisfaction with Democracy in El Salvador By Year, 2004-2012.**


Furthermore, we asked citizens about how democratic they consider the country to be.<sup>28</sup> The results reveal that 13.6% is of the opinion that the country is very democratic, 46.2% believes that the country is somewhat democratic, 33% think that it is slightly democratic, and 7.3% show that the country is not democratic at all (Figure V.28).

<sup>28</sup> “PN5. In your opinion, ¿Is El Salvador a very democratic country, somewhat democratic, slightly democratic o not democratic at all? (1) Very Democratic, (2) Somewhat Democratic, (3) Slightly Democratic, (4) Not Democratic At All, (8) Don’t Know/No Response.”



**Figure V. 28. Opinion Regarding the Level of Democracy in El Salvador, 2012.**

In order to facilitate a comparison of the results with previous surveys, we created a 0-100 scale from the response options. A comparison with the previous measurement data shows that the average assessment of the level of democracy in 2004 was 56.8, which drops to 51.2 in 2006, then to 49.4 in 2008, then increases significantly and in a statistically significant way to 57.3 in 2010 and then decreases to 54.9 in 2012 (Figure V.29). The recovery in 2010 from the assessment of the level of democracy believe that is related to the elections in January and March in 2009, the transition to stability that developed between March and June, as well as to the evaluations and expectations for the new administration; and its decrease in 2012 reflects the assessment after three years of the presidential alternation in 2009.



**Figure V. 29. Opinion Regarding the Level of Democracy in El Salvador By Year, 2004-2012.**

## IX. Conclusions

In this chapter, we have shown that support for the system, a fundamental component of political legitimacy, decreased in a sustained way from 2004 to 2008, significantly increasing in 2010 – reaching an average close to what it obtained in 2004 – to later decrease slightly in 2012. Taking the trust interval into consideration, the data show a stabilization in the levels of support for the system in the 2010 and 2012 measurements, in the upper part of the scale (above the average of 50).

While political tolerance, another component of political legitimacy, increased between 2004 and 2006, dropped slightly in 2008, decreased significantly in 2010, and then decreased slightly in 2012. This decline would place the political tolerance level lower than the initial point of measurement in the 2004 survey. Considering trust intervals, the data show stabilization in the levels of political tolerance in 2010 and 2012 in the bottom of the scale (below the average of 50).

In 2010 and 2012, we observe two trends that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, there is a reverse in the decline in support for the system, and on the other, political tolerance is reduced. How do we explain this paradox? Previous studies have reported that a major political variable to explain differences in levels of system support and political tolerance has been the political preferences of the respondents. Thus, in previous measurements, ARENA voters exhibit a higher level of system support and lower levels of political tolerance, while the FMLN exhibit the opposite.<sup>29</sup> An argument that has

<sup>29</sup> Córdova Macías, Ricardo; José Miguel Cruz and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2008. *Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2008. El impacto de la gobernabilidad*. San Salvador, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University y USAID

been discussed is precisely whether or not these differences had less to do with attributes or characteristics of the parties, or if they could be explained in terms of the party that was in government and those who were in the opposition. That is, the supporters of the ruling party would identify themselves further with the system and government policies on the one hand, and on the other they would be less tolerant, because that would imply recognizing the basic rights of the opposition (minority); and on the contrary, supporters of the main opposition party most strongly supported the basic rights of minorities, because that would benefit them, while at the same time supporting less institutional and government policies.<sup>30</sup>

When we analyze the data we observe that in the case of ARENA partisan supporters, there are virtually unchanged levels of system support between 2008 and 2010 (from 59.4 to 59.6), which drops slightly in 2012 (to 55.3), while there has been a significant increase in the levels of system support for supporters of Funes / FMLN party between 2008 and 2010 (from 40 to 58.3), and which decreases slightly in 2012 (to 57.1). As a result of the changes outlined in the 2010 and 2012 measurements, there are no statistically significant differences between ARENA and Funes / FMLN parties because they obtained almost the same average (for example in 2012, the average for ARENA / Ávila is 55.3 and FMLN / Funes 57.1).

While for the ARENA party, we see virtually unchanged levels of political tolerance between 2008 and 2010 (from 45.8 to 45.2), those levels do significantly drop in 2012 (39.7), levels of political tolerance for supporters of the Funes / FMLN party, have significantly decreased between 2008 and 2010 (from 69.1 to 46.3), which later increase slightly for 2012 (47). In 2010, there are no statistically significant differences between ARENA / Ávila (45.2) and Funes / FMLN (46.3), but in 2012 there are indeed statistically significant differences between ARENA / Ávila (39.7) and Funes / FMLN (47).

To sum up, we show that the data operates in the direction presented in the argument, with one exception. On the one hand, going from an ARENA party government to an opposition party, partisan supporters exhibit a slight reduction in 2012 in levels of system support, and a significant decrease in political tolerance. The latter does not match the original argument. On the other hand, going from the FMLN / Funes opposition party to the ruling party, its supporters exhibit a significant increase in the levels of system support for 2010 and stabilize in 2012, and a significant decreased tolerance in measuring policy 2010 which is stabilized in 2012.

How do we explain these changes between 2010 and 2012? In order to explore a possible explanation to this question, we hypothesize that we possibly capture the peculiarities under which the presidential elections of March 2009 took place: (a) the withdrawal or non-registration of the candidates of the PCN, PDC, and CD, parties, leaving the competition among only two political parties, and therefore both parties captured support beyond their traditional voters, and (b) the candidacy of Mauricio Funes attracted voters beyond hardline FMLN voters. From this perspective, those who voted for and supported President Funes, gather a broader spectrum than the traditionally leftist sectors who voted for

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Córdova Macías, Ricardo; José Miguel Cruz and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2006. *La cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2006*. San Salvador, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University y USAID.

<sup>30</sup> Córdova Macías, Ricardo; José Miguel Cruz y Mitchell A. Seligson, 2010. *Cultura política de la democracia en El Salvador, 2010. Consolidación democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles*. San Salvador, IUDOP, FUNDAUNGO, Vanderbilt University y USAID.

the FMLN party in the past. In addition, the 2010 measurement includes the phenomenon of alternation in the executive branch, which redefines the positioning of the political parties.

A second hypothesis is that possibly the 2012 measurement includes the positive and negative assessments of citizenship that have occurred in the three years since the 2009 presidential alternation.

In so far as the analysis of political legitimacy in the 2012 measurement, crossing the data for system support and political tolerance indicates that 22.8% of respondents fall into the stable democracy cell, 38.9% fall into the authoritarian stability cell, while 12.1% are located in unstable democracy cell, and 26.2%, in the democracy at risk cell.

These results can be placed in a historical perspective, because they have the data from surveys conducted in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. There are two points on which we would call attention. First, is towards the cell "democracy at risk" (low support for the system and low tolerance) has moved from concentrating one-fifth to one-quarter of the responses in the past six years  $\neg$ , and comparing measurements from 2004 and 2012, there was a worrisome increase of 10 percentage points. Second, this contrasts with the observed reduction of nearly 10 percentage points in the "stable democracy" cell (high support and high tolerance) when comparing 2004 and 2012. This is an aspect that deserves a follow-up in future studies.

The data presented show that the average system support and political tolerance in the 2008 measurement cause our country to be located "stable democracy" box, but from 2010 and 2012, due to decreased tolerance, the country's positions has moved and settled in the "authoritarian stability" box.

This chapter has reported that overall, Salvadorans exhibit a high level of support for democracy as a political regime in 2012 (72), although it should be noted that there was a slight increase in support for an authoritarian government (from 13.5 in 2004 to 17 in 2012).

It has also been reported that at the same time Salvadorans in 2012 prefer electoral democracy (82) to a strong leader who does not have to be elected (18), however, there was an increase in support for the strong leader (going from 5.6 in 2004 to 18 in 2012).

Furthermore, Salvadorans are satisfied with democracy: 55.9% of the population said they were very pleased and satisfied with the performance of democracy, while 44.2% said they were dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy. A comparison with the results of previous measurements shows that the average satisfaction with democracy in 2004 was 54.5, which drops to 46.4 in 2006, then to 44.5 in 2008, then increases significantly and in a statistically significant way to 54.7 in 2010 and then drops again to 50.9 in 2012. We believe that the reduction in 2012 has to do with the functioning of the political system after the 2009 presidential alternation.

Overall, the assessment of democracy as a political regime, the level of satisfaction with democracy, and the increase in system support and institutional trust, we believe is related to the new political context that is captured at the time held that they fieldwork of the 2010 survey was conducted. This new context is linked to the elections in January and March 2009.

It is also related to the alternation in the party in control of the Executive Branch of government after 20 years of ARENA party governance, the stability transition which took place between March and



June, the expectations generated around change with the new government, as well as President Funes' high approval rating. The 2012 data, three years after the alternation, capture elements that have to do with the functioning of the political system after the presidential alternation in 2009, against expectations that it generated, and in particular political and institutional conflicts of recent years, which is why there is a reduction in system support, political tolerance, as well as satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, but at the same time there remains a high value on democracy as a political regime.

## Appendices

**Appendix V.1 Determinants for System Support in El Salvador, 2012.** <sup>31</sup>

	Coef.	t
Corruption Victimization	-0.090*	-3.67
Urban	-0.071*	-2.24
Wealth Quintiles	-0.063	-2.01
Years of Education	-0.144*	-3.99
Male	-0.03	-1.07
Age	-0.23	-1.55
Age Squared	0.186	1.22
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.119*	4.02
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.038	1.2
Crime Victimization	-0.042	-1.81
Ideology	0.063*	2.44
Approval of the Job the President is Doing	0.196*	6.24
Constant	0.036	1.41
R-squared = 0.153		
Number of Cases = 1218		
*p<0.05		

<sup>31</sup> In order to simplify the interpretation of the results of the multiple regression model, we recoded some questions: Q1R [*gender recoded*] with the value of 0 for women and 1 for men, the variable *ur* [*urban / rural*] became Urbanor [*urban recoded*] with the value of 0 for rural and 1 for urban. To facilitate the interpretation, IDIO1 and SOCT1 respectively became SOCT1R [*perception of the national economic situation recoded*] and IDIO1R [*perception of personal economic situation recoded*] with the value of 5 for "very good", 4 for "good", 3 for "neither good nor bad", 2 for "bad" and, finally, 1 for "very bad". The variable *m1* became M1R [*president's job evaluation recoded*], with the value of 0 for "very bad", 50 for "neither good nor bad", 75 for "good" and 100 for "very good". VICIEXT became *vicIextr* [*recoded crime victimization*] with a range of 0-100.

**Appendix V.2. Determinants of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2012.**

	Coef.	t
Corruption Victimization	0.037	1.26
Urban	-0.02	-0.50
Wealth Quintiles	0.017	0.58
Years of Education	0.057	1.24
Male	0.074*	2.58
Age	-0.292	-1.84
Age Squared	0.224	1.42
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.009	0.27
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.047	-1.30
Crime Victimization	0.03	1.2
Ideology	-0.003	-0.11
Evaluation of the Job the President is Doing	0.003	0.09
Constant	0.018	0.63
R-squared = 0.025		
Number of Cases = 1194		
*p<0.05		

**Appendix V.3 Determinants of Stable Democracy in El Salvador, 2012.**

	Coef.	t
Corruption Victimization	-0.002	-0.07
Urban	-0.018	-0.48
Wealth Quintiles	-0.022	-0.82
Years of Education	-0.06	-1.46
Male	0.049	1.74
Age	-0.359*	-2.19
Age Squared	0.274	1.62
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.083*	2.51
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.01	-0.28
Crime Victimization	-0.018	-0.66
Ideology	0.007	0.29
Evaluation of the Job the President is Doing	0.098*	3.91
Constant	0.014	0.52
R-squared = 0.038		
Number of Cases = 1176		
*p<0.05		



## Chapter Six: Local Governments

*With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith*

### I. Introduction

This chapter investigates the relationship between the citizens' views on local governments and their experiences with them, and their orientations toward democracy. To what extent do citizens in Latin American and the Caribbean relate to local authorities? Do they favorably evaluate these interactions? Do local politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies from country to country and works in different ways depending on the political system. In some places, the citizens' interaction with the government does not go beyond local authorities. Some authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy while others have more. Moreover, the management of local government is more democratic in some places than others. Therefore, the level of efficiency of local governments could affect citizens' attitudes toward democracy in general.

For several years, to varying degrees, a process of decentralization has been occurring in developing countries, and this is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> This process has occurred in parallel with the "third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> Citizens throughout Latin America and the Caribbean experienced not only a strengthening of their local governments, but also have seen the adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.<sup>3</sup> Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Rondinelli, Dennis, John Nellis and Shabbir Cheema. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

<sup>3</sup> Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

<sup>4</sup> Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

<sup>5</sup> Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.<sup>6</sup> Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.<sup>7</sup> Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.<sup>8</sup>

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.<sup>9</sup> Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.<sup>10</sup> Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities. Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.<sup>13</sup> So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

<sup>7</sup> Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

<sup>8</sup> Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

<sup>9</sup> Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

<sup>10</sup> Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

<sup>11</sup> West, Karleen. 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America*. Papers from the AmericasBarometer. Vanderbilt University.

<sup>12</sup> Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

<sup>13</sup> Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

<sup>14</sup> West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.<sup>15</sup> Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.<sup>16</sup> West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.<sup>17</sup> In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region.

This chapter will examine the extent to which citizens of the Americas participate in local politics and how they evaluate local political institutions. We look closely at the indicators of two types of participation: *attending municipal meetings and presenting petitions to the local government offices*. It compares the extent to which citizens of different countries participate in local politics through these institutional channels and furthermore compares the results of all countries in 2012 with the results of previous surveys (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). It also aims to understand the main determinants of both types of involvement with particular attention to the relationship between gender inequality and participation of citizens in local politics. Finally, it assesses the extent to which citizens throughout the Americas are satisfied with their local governments focusing on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and support for the political system.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.<sup>18</sup> Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.<sup>19</sup> In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.<sup>20</sup> Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.<sup>21</sup>

This chapter addresses the issue of attitudes and evaluations that Salvadorans make about their local governments. The first section examines the citizens' relationship with different levels of government, the second discusses participation in municipal government management. In the third section, we examine satisfaction with municipal services. In the fourth section, we present the impact of satisfaction with local services on support for the system. Finally, we present our conclusions.

<sup>15</sup> West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "‘This is Not a Meeting for Women’: The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women’s Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

<sup>16</sup> Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal’s Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

<sup>17</sup> West, *ibid*.

<sup>18</sup> Montalvo, Daniel 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>19</sup> Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Montalvo, Daniel 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

<sup>21</sup> Montalvo, Daniel 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).


## II. Citizens' Relationship With Different Levels of Government

In this section, we will explore the closeness of local government with citizens from a battery of questions that were included in the questionnaire for the purpose of exploring the relationship or eventual contact of respondents with the national government, representatives and municipalities. We asked:

In order to resolve your problems, have you ever asked the assistance or cooperation of...? <b>[Read each option and note the response]</b>
<b>CP2.</b> A representative of the Legislative Assembly?
<b>CP4A.</b> A local authority like a mayor or a city counsellperson?
<b>CP4.</b> A minister/secretary, public institution or office of the State?

In order to simplify the analysis, we recoded the response options to a 0-100 format. These questions were included in the f 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 surveys, so that the following figure shows the results for the five measurements. Overall, for the period 2004-2008, we observe a downward trend in aid solicited from representatives, municipalities and national government institutions, while in 2010, there is an increase for three but there only turns out to be a statistically significant change in the request for assistance to the institutions of national government. In 2012, there is a decrease in applications to national government institutions (Figure VI.1).

Moreover, for the five waves, the municipality is the place to which the respondents have been directed for help, followed in second place by an institution of national government, and finally representatives. These data reinforce the hypothesis of a greater proximity between citizens and local government, in terms of seeking help or cooperation to resolve their problems. In 2012, on average, 22.4% have requested help from the municipality, 6.8% from representatives and 6.6% from an institution of national government.




**Figure VI. 1. From Whom Has Help or Cooperation Been Solicited? El Salvador 2004-2012.**

The survey included questions to measure the level of trust in different institutions, and in this section we present the results comparing the national government and local government.<sup>22</sup> The answers were recoded on a 0-100 scale. In Figure VI.2, we present the average trust in local government (60.9) and the national government (58.2) for 2012, observing a higher level of confidence in the trust in local government. Compared with the 2010 measurement, there was a significant decline in trust in the national government and a slight increase in trust in the municipal government.<sup>23</sup>


<sup>22</sup> Question B14 measures trust in the national government and question B32 measures trust in the municipality.

<sup>23</sup> In 2010, the average trust in the national government was 67.6, and in local government it was 59.2.




**Figure VI. 2. Comparison Between Trust in the Local Government and the National Government, El Salvador 2012.**

In Figure VI.3, we can see the evolution of trust in municipal government for the period of 2004 to 2012 as a "U" curve, and basically it has not changed, since the differences are not statistically significant: 62.9 in 2004, 59.6 in 2006, 57.1 in 2008, 59.2 in 2010 and 60.9 in 2012 (with the exception of 2008). In the case of trust in the national government, there is a downward trend for the period 2004-2008, following a significant increase in 2010 and a fall in 2012, these differences were statistically significant.



**Figure VI. 3. Comparison Between Trust in Local and National Government by Year, El Salvador, 2004-2012.**

When comparing the levels of trust in local government with the other countries included in the 2012 survey, we can see that our country gets the highest trust in municipal government average.



**Figure VI. 4. Trust in Local Governments in the Americas, 2012.**

### III. Participation on the Local Level

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions that assess citizen engagement with local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...

**NP1.** Have you attended a town meeting, a municipal council meeting, or another meeting called by the local government during the last 12 months?

(1) Sí (2) No

**NP2.** Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official, or municipal councilperson in the past 12 months?


(1) Sí [**Siga**] (2) No [**Pase a SGL1**]

**MUNI10.** Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Sí (0) No


#### Local Meeting Attendance

Figure VI.5 shows the percentage of citizens in each country in the Americas who reported having attended a municipal meeting during the last year. When placed in a comparative perspective with other countries included in the 2012 survey, we see that El Salvador is among the countries with intermediate rates of participation in municipal meetings.



**Figure VI. 5. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**


How has the participation of citizens in municipal meetings changed in recent years? In Figure VI.6 we observe levels of local participation since 2004 in El Salvador. It can be seen that the percentage of Salvadorans who attended town meetings is 12.6% in 2004, which decreased to 10.7% in 2006, and later increases to 12% in 2008, and rises again to 13.2% in 2010 only to drop to 11.5% in 2012. However, these differences are not statistically significant, so we can conclude that the percentage of citizens who participate in municipal meetings has not changed in the period 2004-2012, revolving around an average of 12%.



**Figure VI. 6. Participation in Municipal Meetings over Time in El Salvador, 2004-2012.**


### **Demand-making on Local Government**

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows not only an examination of who attend municipal meetings but also who submit requests or demands to their local governments. Figure VI.7 analyzes responses from question NP2 and shows the percentage of people in the Americas who have filed applications or petitions to an official of a local government agency in the past year. When placed in a comparative perspective with other countries included in the 2012 survey, we see that El Salvador is among the countries with the highest rates with regard to the submission of applications or petitions to the municipality, only below Haiti and Uruguay.




**Figure VI. 7. Demand-making on Local Government  
in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

How has the practice of submitting applications to local governments changed over time? In Figure VI.8 we examine the evolution of the percentage of citizens who make requests to local governments: 12.2% in 2004, then there is a significant increase to 20% in 2006 but later it drops to 15.6% in 2008, 14.5% in 2010 and then increases slightly to 15.8% in 2012. However, the differences for the last measurements are not statistically significant, so we can conclude that the percentage of citizens who submit applications to local governments has not changed in the period 2008-2012, revolving around an average of 15.3 %.




**Figure VI. 8. Demand-making on Local Government over Time, El Salvador 2004-2012.**

Finally the AmericasBarometer also asked respondents if their demands and requests were resolved. Note that this question only was only asked to citizens who reported having made a demand or request (15.8% in 2012). These responses may provide an important opinion on the quality of municipal services, at least from the point of view of citizens. Figure VI.9 presents the answers to the question MUNI10 in El Salvador: 30.6% reported that they did resolve your issue or request.




**Figure VI. 9. Resolution of Demands Placed on Local Governments in El Salvador, 2012.**

What are the determinants of the petitions made of local governments? Figure VI.10 presents a multiple regression model to determine the factors that may affect the presentation of claims to local governments in El Salvador. In Appendix VI.1 (at the end of the chapter) are the coefficients. Basically there are two statistically significant predictors: the size of the place of residence and if you attended municipal meetings.




**Figure VI. 10. Determinants of Demand-making on Local Government in El Salvador, 2012.**

In Figure VI.11 we can observe the bivariate relationship between requests made to local governments and size of place of residence. As the size of the city decreases, the number of requests increases, but then decreases for rural areas compared to small towns.



**Figure VI. 11. Demand-making on Local Government by Size of Place of Residency, El Salvador, 2012.**

In Figure VI.12 we can observe the bivariate relationship between requests made to local governments and municipal meeting attendance. Demand-making is higher among those who participate in municipal meetings.



**Figure VI. 12 Demand-making and local meeting attendance, El Salvador, 2012.**

#### IV. Satisfaction With Municipal Services


The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

**SGL1.** Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular basic services that may be delivered by local or national governments: roads, public schools, and public health or medical services. Given that in El Salvador education and health are not provided by local governments, we only analyze the first question of his new series.


<b>SD2NEW2.</b> And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?				
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied		
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA	
<b>SD3NEW2.</b> And the quality of public schools? <b>[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]</b>				
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied		
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA	
<b>SD6NEW2.</b> And the quality of public medical and health services? <b>[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]</b>				
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied		
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA	

Figure VI.13 shows the average levels of citizen satisfaction with local government services in the Americas derived from answers to the question SGL1. Following the standard of the AmericasBarometer, the answers were recoded to a 0-100 scale in which 0 represents the lowest level of satisfaction and 100 the highest level of satisfaction.




**Figure VI. 13. Satisfaction With Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2012.**

Figure VI.14 shows levels of citizens' satisfaction with the services provided by local governments in El Salvador. 3.7% considers that they are very good, 32.5% good, el 40.6% neither good nor bad, 18.2% bad and 5% very bad.




**Figure VI. 14. Evaluation of Local Government Services in El Salvador 2012.**

How has satisfaction with local government services changed in recent years? In Figure VI.15, we can observe the trend regarding satisfaction with local government services since 2004. To simplify the analysis we have used the average for each year in the form of a 0-100 scale. It goes from 57.3 in 2004 to 54.5 in 2006, 53.5 in 2008 and 52.9 in 2010 and 2012. However, the differences for the most recent measurements are not statistically significant, so we can conclude that the average of citizens satisfied with the services of local governments has not changed in the period of 2006-2012, centering around an average of 53.5.




**Figure VI. 15. Average of Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Year, El Salvador 2004-2012.**

Citizens may evaluate the provision of local services more positively than others. In Figure VI.16, we show the levels of satisfaction with the condition of streets and highways as the answers to the question SD2NEW2, although this is a shared competence between the central and local level. 6.4% are very satisfied, 54.2% are satisfied, 31.9% are dissatisfied and 7.5% are very dissatisfied.



**Figure VI. 16. Satisfaction with the Roads, El Salvador 2012.**


As usual in this report, responses were recoded into a 0 to 100 scale format, with 0 being very little satisfaction and 100 very high satisfaction. Figure VI.17 presents the average of citizens in the Americas who are satisfied with the state of the roads. When placed in a comparative perspective with other countries included in the 2012 survey, we see that El Salvador is among the countries with above average rates in regard to satisfaction with the state of the roads.



**Figure VI. 17. Satisfaction with the Roads, El Salvador 2012.**


## V. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As argued earlier in this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government, except for the local government. Therefore, perceptions of local governments can significantly impact attitudes toward the political system in general. In Figure VI.18, we present a multiple regression model to determine if satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in El Salvador, while controlling for other factors that can affect system support. In Appendix VI.2 (at the end of chapter) are the coefficients. Basically there are five statistically significant predictors: satisfaction with municipal services, geographic area of residence (urban), educational attainment, age and the perception of the national economic situation.



**Figure VI. 18. Satisfaction With Local Services As A Determinant of System Support in El Salvador, 2012.**

Of these, we are only going to present one in their bivariate relationship. In Figure VI.19, we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and system support.



**Figure VI. 19. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in El Salvador, 2012.**

## VI. Conclusions

In this chapter, we have examined the attitudes and evaluations that Salvadorans make about their local governments. The data provide evidence for a greater closeness between citizens and local government, in terms of seeking help or cooperation to resolve their problems during the measurements performed in the 2004-2012 period.

The local government had, in previous measurements, higher levels of public trust when compared with the national government, and this level was stable for the 2004-2008 period. However, due to the significant increase in confidence in the national government in 2010, something that we believe is linked to the alternation in 2009 and President Funes' high approval ratings, local government is, for the first time, below the national government in public trust. However, data for 2012 show a significant drop in trust in the national government, which leads to local government express a higher level of citizen trust. In 2012 El Salvador is the country in the Americas with the highest level of citizen trust.

Also, relatively low levels of citizen participation were reported on two aspects considered in the survey: attendance at a local meeting or council meeting (11.5%) and the submission of requests for assistance or petitions (15.8%). These levels do not reflect statistically significant differences, so we can conclude that the percentage of citizens who participate in local meetings stabilized in the 2004-2012 measurements. The percentage of citizens who participate in town meetings (an average of 12% for the period), and the percentage of citizens who submit applications to municipal governments (an average of 15.3%) has not changed throughout the 2008-2012 period.

We also found relatively low levels of citizen satisfaction with the services provided by local governments in El Salvador: 3.7% say they are very good, 32.5% claim they are good, 40.6% say that they are neither good nor bad, 18.2% say they are bad 5% state that they are very bad. In addition, the average satisfaction (on a scale with a 0-100 format) goes from 57.3 in 2004 to 54.5 in 2006, 53.5 in 2008 and 52.9 in 2010 and 2012, but the differences in the latest waves are not statistically significant, so we can conclude that the average of citizens satisfied with the services of local governments has not changed during the 2006-2012 period (centering around an average of 53.5).

Finally, we have identified five predictors of system support that were statistically significant: satisfaction with municipal services, living in an urban setting, educational attainment, age and the perception of the national economic situation. That is, in the case of El Salvador, we have found evidence that satisfaction with municipal services is associated with system support.



## Appendices

### Appendix VI. 1. Determinants of Demand-making on Local Government in El Salvador, 2012

	Coefficient	t
Male	0.081	1.03
Age	-0.032	-0.32
Years of Education	0.089	0.9
Size of Place	0.281*	3.24
Has Attended a Nuncipal Meeting	0.539*	8.51
Trust in Local Government	-0.154	-1.96
Constant	-1.771*	-27.60
F = 14.62		
Number of Cases = 1392		
* p<0.05		

### Appendix VI.2. Satisfaction With Local Services as a Determinant of System Support, El Salvador, 2012.

	Coef.	t
Urban	-0.085*	-3.23
Wealth Quintiles	-0.063	-1.91
Years of Education	-0.153*	-4.51
Male	-0.025	-0.95
Age	-0.291*	-2.18
Age Squared	0.26	1.88
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.112*	3.46
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.022	0.63
Evaluation of the Job the President Is Doing	0.180*	6.2
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.114*	-3.20
Constant	0.018	0.75
R-squared = 0.138		
Number of Cases = 1218		
* p<0.05		



**Part III:  
Beyond Equality of Opportunity**



## Chapter Seven: Citizen Participation and Crime Prevention

### I. Introduction

This chapter explores the relationship between citizens' opinions about the problem of public insecurity and responses of citizen and institutional participation to address this problem. For several years, the problem of communal violence and insecurity has occupied the political and social agenda of the country. According to international reports and official figures, El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the Americas, though the region itself is considered one of the most violent in the world.<sup>1</sup> The problem of insecurity is not limited to homicide rates, but also includes other violence-related problems such as the existence of gangs, drug trafficking and domestic violence.

In recent years, the various governments of El Salvador have made efforts to address the problem of violence. Many of these initiatives have focused on strengthening the enforcement and prosecution of suspects, criminals and youth linked to gangs. As part of these efforts, attempts have also been made to strengthen community responses to prevent crime and increase public safety. Several aid agencies have supported the Salvadoran institutions in the search for alternative models that can contribute to the reduction of crime in the country. Many of these initiatives have focused their attention on citizen participation as an essential tool in the prevention of violence, as well as relations between the safety institutions, specifically between police and citizens.

In previous chapters, we have examined both the impact of violence on the Salvadoran political system, and the importance of community participation in the country's political processes. This chapter aims to show the link and the importance of citizen participation and community-based responses to the problem of security. For years, scholars have debated the role to be played by communities in public security policies. Some studies have shown evidence that seems contradictory with regard to the relationship between participation and violence victimization. Some experts have hypothesized which distance the citizenry from community participation, since they create insecurity and mechanisms of social paralysis. However, evidence from several studies shows that victimization in fact promotes higher levels of civic and political participation. For example, Bateson found that although crime victimization often creates authoritarian attitudes, dissatisfaction with democracy, vigilantism and support for policies of repression also generates political and community participation.<sup>2</sup> Other studies in Latin America have also shown this strong association between

<sup>1</sup> See: FUNDAUNGO. 2012. *Atlas de la Violencia en El Salvador (2005-2011)*. San Salvador, El Salvador, FUNDAUNGO.

<sup>2</sup> Arias, Enrique D., and Mark Ungar. 2009. "Community Policing and Latin America's Citizen Security Crisis." *Comparative Politics* 41 (4):409-29; Cruz, José Miguel. 2006. *Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Las respuestas de la sociedad civil organizada*. Vol. IV. San Salvador: UCA Editores; Dammert, Lucía. 2007. "Seguridad pública en América Latina: ¿qué pueden hacer los gobiernos locales?" *Nueva Sociedad* (212):67-81; McIlwaine, Cathy, and Caroline Moser. 2001. "Violence and social capital in urban poor communities: perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala." *Journal of International Development* 13 (7):965-84.; Moser, Caroline, Ailsa Winton, and Annalise Moser. 2005. "Violence, Fear, and Insecurity among the Urban Poor in Latin America." In *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. M. Fay. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Ungar, Mark 2011. *Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

participation and violence. However, the great majority of studies have highlighted the importance of community participation factors in policies and local initiatives to control crime and reduce violence rates.<sup>3</sup> In fact, there is now widespread agreement among donor agencies, government institutions and civil society organizations involved in public policy that in order to reduce levels of insecurity, it is important to strengthen prevention mechanisms through the involvement of citizens.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter examines the participation levels around community prevention programs, the role of the police in this type of program and the impact that they have on perceptions of insecurity and other opinions related to crime and violence in the country. It is necessary to remind the reader that the results of the survey were obtained several weeks after learning the first news of the truce between the gangs.

## II. The Problem of Insecurity

In Chapter Four, we analyzed the relationship between crime victimization and democracy and system support. Further on, we analyze the importance or impact of the problem of public insecurity on public opinion both nationally and locally. Respondents were asked the following two questions about the problems they face at both the national and neighborhood level:


**A4.** In your opinion, what the **most serious** problem that is facing this country?

**A4C.** In your opinion, what the the **most serious** problem facing this municipality?

For purposes of presentation of the data in this chapter, the results were recoded and problems related to insecurity were grouped separately from other problems. The answers related to the problem of insecurity are: crime, drug abuse, drug trafficking, gangs, kidnappings, shootings, violence and lack of security; all other responses were coded under the category of other types of problems. The results show that almost 23.8% of Salvadorans see problems related to insecurity as the most important in the country. In other words, almost one in four Salvadorans mentioned issues such as lack of security, crime, kidnapping or gangs, as the country's main problem. This question was asked not only in El Salvador but also in all countries of the region and this allows a comparison with most countries in the hemisphere. As we can see in FigureVII.1, El Salvador ranks as one of the countries where citizens are most concerned about insecurity when compared to the rest of the region; only in Venezuela, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago are concern for issues of insecurity higher than in El Salvador. By contrast, concerns about insecurity are virtually nonexistent in the United States and Canada. Only in Nicaragua, among Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, citizens showed low concern for insecurity issues as national problem.

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<sup>3</sup> Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS). 2012. Draft hemispheric plan of action to follow up on the Declaration of San Salvador on citizen security in the Americas. Washington, D.C.: Committee on Hemispheric Security.



**Figure VII. 1. Violence and Insecurity as a National Problem in the Americas, 2012.**


How do we compare these views regarding the national problem with the views on the problem that most affects the neighborhood where the respondent lives? Table VII.1 shows the overall results to the question on the main problem affecting the neighborhood where the respondent lives. Common crime is, by a good margin, the main problem identified by the citizens at the neighborhood level, with 27.3% of responses. From this follows the problems of unemployment and poverty, gangs, of the general economy and the lack of access to public services. To reclassify these results in terms of the problems associated with insecurity issues (crime, gangs, violence, lack of security and others), we have that 38% identified security issues and violence as major at the neighborhood level.

**Table VII. 1. Opinion Regarding Problems that Affect the Respondent's Neighborhood of Residency, 2012.<sup>4</sup>**


What is the Most Serious Problem Facing This Municipality?	Frequency	%
Crime	379	27.3
Unemployment / Lack of Employment	181	13.0
Poverty	144	10.4
Gangs	116	8.4
Problems with the Economy / Economic Crisis	102	7.3
Roads/Highways in Poor Condition	90	6.5
Lack of Water	76	5.5
There Are No Problems	52	3.8
Violence	47	3.5
Lack of Safety/Security	28	2.0
Poor Governance	24	1.7
Environment / Trash in the Streets	21	1.5
Other Problems Identified	82	6.0
Other Problems Not Identified	47	3.4
Total	1,389	100.00

This means that even though a significant percentage of Salvadorans view insecurity as a national problem, even more citizens see it as a local problem. Figure VII.2 compares the percentages of insecurity as a national problem and as a local problem. As we can see, the difference is remarkable and indicates that the problems of violence and insecurity have significant resonance in the community, and prevailed over issues having to do with the quality of life locally, such as infrastructure, lack of water or garbage in the streets.

<sup>4</sup> The total percentage of the problems associated with insecurity differs slightly from the one shown in Figure VII.2 because when calculating the opinions on national issues and local problems in the same figure, some cases reported as missing in the views on the national problem modify the total N of surveys used to calculate both figures.



**Figure VII. 2. Violence and Insecurity as a National Problem and as a Neighborhood Problem in El Salvador, 2012.**




**Figure VII. 3. Violence and Insecurity as a Neighborhood Problem According to Size of Residency in El Salvador, 2012.**

Identifying security problems as the most important at the level of neighborhood or community is closely related to the place where citizens live. Almost 60% of Salvadorans living in the metropolitan area of San Salvador mentioned insecurity as the main problem in the neighborhood; this rate is slightly reduced among people who live in cities halfway between San Salvador and rural areas, but is definitely lower among citizens who live in small towns and rural areas of the country (17.5% and 19% respectively). In these areas of the country, people increasingly focus on economic issues, infrastructure and public services as the main local difficulties.

In the survey, more specifically, we asked the respondents their views on whether the current level of violence is higher or lower than 12 months ago. We used the following question:

**PESE2.** Do you think that the actual level of violence in this neighborhood is **greater, equal, or less** than it was 12 months ago?  
(1) Higher (2) Equal (3) Lower (88) Don't Know (98) No Response

The results are shown in Figure VII.4. As we can see, for 45.7% of the population, the level of violence in the neighborhood has remained the same over the year prior to the survey; on the contrary, however, 40.1% said that levels have declined and only 14.2% of people said that levels of violence are higher.




**Figure VII. 4. Opinion Regarding the Level of Violence in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

How do you distribute these opinions with respect to the geographical areas of the country? In Figure VII.5, we show the distribution of these opinions based on the region of the country. In the central and eastern parts of country, we find the highest percentage of people who think that violence has declined in their neighborhood within the past twelve months. By contrast, in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador we find the highest percentage of people (a little more than 20%) who think that



violence has increased in the last twelve months. In most parts of the country, especially in the paracentral area (Cabañas, Cuscatlan, La Paz and San Vicente), the prevailing view is that the violence in the neighborhood has remained the same.




**Figure VII. 5. Opinion Regarding the Level of Violence in the Community by Region of the Country in El Salvador, 2012.**

### III. Citizen Participation in the Prevention of Violence

In Chapter Six, we examined the community-level participation in general; in this section we review the existence of community initiatives that are intended to prevent crime locally. For this, the AmericasBarometer survey in El Salvador asked the following question to the people who said they had a neighborhood association or community board of directors:


<b>CP25.</b> In the last three months, has your neighborhood association or board of neighbors sponsored activities for the prevention of crime such as taking security measures for your neighborhood or other activities?	Yes	No
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The results are shown in Figure VII.6. The data indicate that only 19.4% of people are living in communities where their neighborhood association has promoted crime prevention activities. In other words, in the vast majority of communities in El Salvador there are no initiatives within the community to promote violence prevention programs.



**Figure VII. 6. Community Association Is Promoting Prevention Programs Within the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

When we look at demographic variables we do not find significant differences in the local promotion of crime prevention activities in function of urban or rural areas, or depending on the size of the cities where respondents live. However, when comparing the data in virtue of the region of the country, the results show that in the central region (La Libertad, northern Chalatenango and San Salvador) and paracentral region (Cabañas, Cuscatlán, La Paz and San Vicente) the communities have promoted more prevention than the rest of the country, especially in comparison to the west of the country (Ahuachapán, Santa Ana and Sonsonate).



**Figure VII. 7. Promotion of Community Prevention Programs by Region of the Country, El Salvador, 2012.**

On the other hand, the existence of prevention programs initiated by the community itself does not appear to be linked significantly with levels of crime victimization. The data show no significant differences in the reporting of community prevention programs based on the history of family and personal victimization of respondents. Does this mean there are no other community prevention programs in El Salvador? No. The survey also directly asked about other prevention programs promoted by institutions or organizations outside the community. For this, we asked the following question:

**CP26.** Is there any other association or institution that is promoting crime prevention programs in this neighborhood?

Yes

No

According to the results, which are presented in Figure VII.8, only 10.8% of people said that were other organizations working on violence prevention programs in the respondents' district of residence. This constitutes an even smaller percentage than that of the community's own initiatives. When crossed these data with socio-demographic variables, such as region of the country, the results showed no significant differences from region to region or between urban and rural communities.




**Figure VII. 8. Promotion of Prevention Programs by other associations, 2012.**

Several months ago the Municipal Committees for the Prevention of Violence were implemented in El Salvador. Similar programs have been implemented in several Latin and Central American countries. One objective of this program is to help reduce risk factors associated with violence in the community. In order to assess the scope of the program on public opinion, the AmericasBarometer included a couple of questions about it. The questions were the following:

<b>ESCP27.</b> Have you Heard of the Committee for the Prevention of Violence in this neighborhood? <b>[If the answer is NO, Don't Know, or No Response, go to L1]</b>	Yes	No
<b>ESCP28.</b> In the last three months, have you attended a meeting called by the Committee for the Prevention of Violence in this city?	Yes	No


Twenty-two percent of Salvadorans surveyed said they have heard of the Municipal Committees of Violence Prevention. Again, the results show no significant difference in terms of geographical area of residence zone of the country, therefore the coverage of the face of public opinion seems to be quite homogeneous. However, those who have heard of these committees were asked about their participation in the same, in other words, they were asked if they had attended a meeting called by the committees in the last three months. Only 16% of those who have heard of the committee attended a meeting in the last three months of the survey. This means that only a small fraction of Salvadorans participated directly in these committees.



**Figure VII. 9. Attendance To Meeting of the City Committee on Prevention of Violence in El Salvador, 2012.**

Who are the people who have participated in these meetings? What are their characteristics? The results do not show significant differences between the demographic variables of gender, age, educational level or type of community in which people live. There are also no differences in terms of the experiences related to crime victimization or perceptions of insecurity. Apparently, people who have attended the violence prevention committee meetings are distributed evenly over the various social groups.

An interesting result arises from looking at the relationship between the knowledge about the existence of the Municipal Violence Prevention Councils and the opinion on the level of violence in the neighborhood from the previous year. As shown in Figure VII.10, in communities where people think that violence has declined in the past year, residents' knowledge on prevention tips and activities is greater. In fact, there is a linear trend in knowledge about Prevention Councils corresponding to the views on the level of violence. Does this mean that municipal programs to prevent violence have had an effect on crime rates in the respondents' neighborhood of residence? These results point to a possible effect of such programs, but since that relationship is not reflected in the same way with victimization data, it is difficult to establish with certainty. Furthermore, the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that not all differences are statistically significant. In any case, these results suggest the possibility of some kind of effect of such programs, but this should be discussed more in depth in future studies.



**Figure VII. 10. Knowledge Of Violence Prevention Councils by Opinion Regarding the Level of Violence in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

#### IV. Trust in the Community and Social Capital

At the basis of citizen participation in prevention efforts is the trust that citizens have in their neighbors and members of their community. The mobilization of a community requires a certain level of belief that others are reliable and support collective efforts. Some authors have named this condition “social capital”. In this section, we explore the levels of community social capital and initiatives related to crime prevention.

The questions to establish the respondents' degree of trust in the residents of their community were formulated as follows:

Now, I am going to read some statements about things that people in this neighborhood can or cannot do. For each of these statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. [Repeat after each question "strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree" to help the respondent]				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
<b>SOCO1.</b> The first sentence says ... when there is a problem in this neighborhood, neighbors are organizing to address it. Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?	1	2	3	4
<b>SOCO4.</b> Generally, the residents of this neighborhood get along well with each other. Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?	1	2	3	4
<b>SOCO6.</b> Your neighbors usually keep an eye on your house when no one is around. Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?	1	2	3	4
<b>SOCO8.</b> You can trust the residents of this neighborhood. Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement?	1	2	3	4

As done with the results of other questions, to facilitate reading and comparing the results, the answers were recoded to a 0-100 scale, where 0 is the lowest level of trust and 100 is the highest. The results can be seen in Figure VII.11.

In general terms, it can be said that Salvadorans are in the medium-high levels of interpersonal trust. The most frequent responses to the questions were that respondents agree with the ideas that their neighbors are reliable, help monitor the home and have good relationships with each other: between 70% and 85% of Salvadorans responded that way for all questions. It is interesting, however, that the opinion that states that neighbors organize to solve the problems of the community was the least high percentage. Apparently, the perception is that people do not organize much as expected. This can be seen more clearly when examining averages in Figure VII.11: the opinion that the neighbors get along well received an average score of 67.1, while the claim that neighbors help monitor one another's houses earned an average of 66.2, for its part the opinion that the neighbors are reliable is a bit lower than the others (64.1) and the perception that neighbors organize to solve problems received a score of 61.2 on the 0-100 scale.




Figure VII. 11. Trust in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.

These results were combined into a single variable or indicator, which in this case has been called “community trust”. The four questions formed a scale, which internally has an acceptable degree of consistency (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.724), indicating that all questions are measuring a similar factor. This scale was subjected to linear regression analysis to establish the factors that are associated with the community trust in El Salvador. The results are shown in the following figure.





Figure VII. 12. Determinants of Community Trust in El Salvador, 2012.

There are two types of factors associated with levels of community trust in the country: sociodemographic factors and experiences of insecurity. Regarding sociodemographic factors, the results show that age, wealth and size of respondent's area of residence are strongly associated with community trust, but not respondents' gender, educational level or skin color. On the other hand, the figure of the regression reveals that both crime victimization and the perception of insecurity have an impact on community trust. The relationship between these factors and community trust can be seen more clearly in Figures VII.13 and VII.14. In the figure that shows demographic factors, we also included the relationship with the region of the country (Metropolitan Area, Western, Central, and Paracentral, and Eastern). As shown in Figure VII.13, trust in the community is higher among people between ages 36 and 45, especially among people over 66 years old. Also, trust in the community is particularly low among residents of the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador and is higher among residents of the western part of the country. Finally, the demographic results indicate that people with higher incomes tend to show more trust in the community than people with lower incomes, although the confidence intervals appear to overlap at some points, the regression shown in Figure VII. 12 indicates that the relationship is significant.




**Figure VII. 13. Demographic Factors Associated With Trust in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

But the conditions that have a significant impact on community trust are those having to do with public insecurity. Figure VII.14 shows that trust in the community drops among people who perceive a lot of insecurity and who have been victimized by crime. In the case of perceptions of insecurity, the community trust average went from almost 70 points to less than 58 on average, while

people who have been victimized directly scored an average of 61.2, compared with a little over 65 points among those who were not victimized in the past year.

The results of community trust also were crossed with the questions that explore initiatives to reduce violence in the community. The data indicate that communities with neighborhood committees to reduce crime show averages of slightly higher trust in the community. In other words, in those communities where there are organized neighborhood committees to prevent crime, there are higher levels of community trust. These differences were not found when the data intersect with communities where initiatives come from outside or in cases where there is knowledge of the existence of the Municipal Councils of Violence Prevention or Violence Prevention Committees. In any case, the implications of these findings are clear: building trust between the residents of the community can be an essential support for the development of local initiatives for the prevention of violence.



**Figure VII. 14. Insecurity Factors Associated with Trust in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**


## V. The Role of the Police in the Community

In this round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a series of questions that address the work that the police performs in communities and in preventing violence. The violence prevention work involves not only the community itself but also the government institutions who must work with the community to strengthen prevention processes. The police are, therefore, a fundamental actors.

In order to measure the involvement of police in the community, we used the following questions:

In the last 12 months, which of the following activities have you seen the National Civil Police (PNC) perform in this neighborhood:	Yes	No
<b>CPOL1.</b> Converse with the residents of this neighborhood		
<b>CPOL2.</b> Attend neighborhood meetings		
<b>CPOL3.</b> You have seen the National Civil Police (PNC) execute violence prevention activities in this neighborhood		
<b>CPOL4.</b> Relate to children and young people in this neighborhood by way of recreational and school activities		


The percentages of respondents who have seen the police doing different types of activities in the community are shown in Figure VII.15 and show that in most cases, the police's relationship with the community is very variable. For example, 38% of respondents saw the police talking to people in the community, while 35.4% have seen them to contribute to prevention activities in the neighborhood, and one-third said they saw the police interact with children and youth in the community, but only 20.4% had witnessed police participation in community meetings.



**Figure VII. 15. Activities That The Police Have Been Witnessed Performing in the Neighborhood in El Salvador, 2012.**


These items were integrated into a single indicator that measures the level of police involvement in the respondent's community of residence. Again, this indicator was constructed on a 0-100 scale, where 100 represents the highest level of police involvement. To identify factors associated

with police participation in community prevention activities, we carried out a linear regression, the results of which are presented in Figure VII.16.




**Figure VII. 16. Determinants of the Police Involvement in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

Demographic variables were not significantly associated with the involvement of the police in prevention activities in the community. However, we kept the regression model as a control. Nevertheless, the variable that appears strongly related to the involvement of police in community prevention activities is the size of the place where the respondent lives. In other words, whether or not one lives in a big city or in a rural area. People living in villages and rural areas have seen a lot more police activity supporting prevention activities in the community than people living in medium-sized cities and metropolitan areas. This indicates that the police involvement in the community is related to the dynamics imposed by the type of community. In large cities, the police are seen as less involved in tasks associated with prevention. This also explains the fact that the police appear to be more active in central and paracentral areas of the country, which are home to the largest percentage of rural population (see Figure VII. 17).




**Figure VII. 17. Police Involvement in the Community by Area of Residency in El Salvador, 2012.**

But the conditions that seem more strongly to determine police involvement in the community is the existence of prevention programs, whether driven by the community itself or as part of government initiatives to prevent violence. As shown in Figure VII.18, where there are programs or initiatives to prevent violence, the police are recognized as being much more active in the community in places where there are no prevention programs. This strengthens the case for the importance of prevention programs to ensure that the police have a more visible role in the community.



**Figure VII. 18. Police Involvement in the Community According to Existence of Prevention Programs in El Salvador, 2012.**

What is the impact of the police involvement in prevention activities on other indicators related to insecurity? The results show that these differences are not statistically significant. Something similar happens with the perceptions of insecurity. Police activity in preventive tasks somewhat lowers feelings of insecurity, but this reduction is not significant in statistical terms. However, police involvement in community tasks of a preventative nature does have a clear impact on institutional trust in the police and political system support. As shown in Figure VII.19, as the perception of police involvement increases in the community, that is, to the extent to which people perceive that the police formed relationships with the youth of the community, attended community meetings and talked to the neighbors - to that extent do people's trust in both the police and the political system increase dramatically. This suggests the importance of the involvement of the police in the community life of the country's institutional life, and indirectly also points out the potential contribution of prevention programs that facilitate and encourage interaction between the police and the community in prevention programs and initiatives.




**Figure VII. 19. Trust in the Police and in the Political System According to Police Involvement in the Community in El Salvador, 2012.**

## VI. Other Opinions Regarding the Battle against Insecurity

Finally, the AmericasBarometer in El Salvador also explored views on the presence of the army in the streets to reduce crime and the effectiveness of the the new anti-gang law implemented in the country under the government of Mauricio Funes. The questions designed to collect these opinions are:

**SEG1.** How much do you believe the presence of the army in the streets has reduced crime: a lot, somewhat, a little bit, or not at all? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A little bit (4) Not at all (88) No Response (98) No Response


**SEG2.** How much do you believe the new Anti-Gang Law has contributed to reducing crime produced by gangs in the country: a lot, somewhat, a little bit, or not at all? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A little bit (4) Not at all (88) No Response (98) No Response



**Figure VII. 20. Opinion Regarding the Impact of the Army's Presence in the Streets to Reduce Crime in El Salvador, 2012.**

The results are shown in Figures VII.20 and VII.21. In general, Salvadorans favor army presence on the streets more than the implementation of the anti-gang law in El Salvador.<sup>5</sup> For example, 30.2% of respondents said that with the presence of the military in the streets, crime has declined significantly, while slightly more than 29.7% said that it has been somewhat reduced, in contrast, nearly 40% said they military involvement has reduced crime little or not at all. Regarding the anti-gang law, only 16.8% of Salvadorans said the law has helped reduce crime a lot, 25.7% said it has reduced somewhat and nearly 57% said the anti-gang law has reduced the incidence of crime by a little or not at all.

<sup>5</sup> The survey was conducted in the first half of 2012, but the design of the questionnaire was completed before the announcement of the truce between the gangs. Unfortunately, we could not include any questions about the truce in the 2012 questionnaire.



**Figure VII. 21. Opinion Regarding the Impact of the Anti-Gang Law on the Reduction of Crime in El Salvador, 2012.**

## VII. Conclusions

In this chapter we have explored the views on citizen involvement related to the problem of insecurity. Although the problems of insecurity do not occupy most of the concerns of Salvadorans in 2012, they are a major source of concern for many citizens. In fact, people are more concerned about insecurity locally than nationally. The problems of insecurity in the neighborhood affect almost 40% of the population and crime is the single most important issue for the largest group of Salvadorans, over unemployment, poverty and the existence of an economic crisis.

For the majority of Salvadorans, the problem of violence in 2012 remained the same or worse, but there is a significant percentage of citizens for whom violence has reduced. As discussed in Chapter 4, Salvadorans still feel unsafe, although to a lesser extent than in the past.

Salvadorans' involvement in or knowledge of prevention of violence in the community are still relatively low. 20% of respondents said the neighborhood association has implemented community prevention activities; this percentage drops to 10% in the case of initiatives that come from outside the municipality. For its part, the City Councils of the Prevention of Violence are known by 20% and only 16% of people who know about it have attended a meeting convened by it. This means that, in total, less than 4% of adult Salvadorans have participated in this program directly. Therefore, it is impossible to measure the direct effect of these programs on levels of violence nationwide, but the contribution of these councils is noticeable in other areas, such as increased trust in the police.

An important aspect of violence prevention is the trust that citizens have in their neighbors and the community in general. The results shown in this chapter demonstrate that there are relatively high

levels of trust among neighbors and that they usually facilitate certain activities of mutual support. However, these trust levels are not reflected in the degree of involvement of people in prevention efforts.

Moreover, prevention programs do have a significant impact on facilitating the involvement of the police with the community. Although the level of involvement of police in prevention of violence is still low, especially in large cities and in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador, police involvement has a significant effect on peoples' trust in safety institutions and political institutions. This marks a possible indirect contribution of community prevention programs of violence on institutions and governance.

## Appendices

### Appendix VII.1. Determinants of Trust in the Community in El Salvador, 2012

	Coef.	t
Woman	-0.025	-0.96
Age	0.098*	3.45
Educational Attainment	0.054	1.41
Skin Color	-0.023	-0.88
Wealth Quintiles	0.056*	2.42
Size of Place of Residency	-0.078*	-3.92
Crime Victimization	-0.062*	-2.76
Insecurity Perception	-0.194*	-5.96
Constant	0.008	0.30
R-squared = 0.066		
Number of Cases= 1430		
*p<0.05		

### Appendix VII.2. Determinants of Police Involvement in the Community, El Salvador, 2012

	Coef.	t
Woman	-0.012	-0.33
Age	0.087	1.71
Educational Attainment	0.033	0.74
Wealth Quintiles	-0.057	-1.40
Skin Color	0.001	0.02
Size of place	0.161*	3.44
Has Sponsored a Neighborhood Association	0.189*	4.34
Has Heard of the Council for the Prevention of Violence	0.173*	6.63
Constant	0.140*	3.70
R-squared = 0.119		
Number of Cases = 643		
*p<0.05		



## Chapter Eight: Electoral Behavior and Political Parties

In this chapter, we explore Salvadorans' voting behavior and the basics aspects of their political participation. First, we analyze their voting behavior in the recent legislative and municipal elections of March 2012, then the analysis focuses on a comparison of the intention to vote in the 2009 and 2012 elections. Additionally, we present assessments on political parties. We also analyze Salvadoran political orientations, and then focus on the interest in politics. Finally, we present the citizen valuations on electoral reforms.

### I. Determinants of the Vote in the 2012 Legislative Elections

The 2009 elections showed three novel elements. First, is that while it was performing the presidential, legislative and municipal elections, the TSE decided to separate the legislative and municipal elections, holding the former in January and the presidential elections in March. In the second place, it was a fairly long period of election campaign, since it began in November 2007 with the proclamation of the FMLN presidential ticket. Third, there was a very competitive process between the two main political forces that produced the alternation in the executive branch, after twenty years of ARENA government. In the presidential election, there were only two parties involved: ARENA and the FMLN, with the latter winning the presidency by a narrow margin of votes: 51.3% to 48.7%.<sup>1</sup> The victory of Mauricio Funes and the FMLN in the presidential election closes a policy cycle begun with the 1994 general elections, the first since the signing of the Peace Accords.<sup>2</sup>

Three years after the 2009 elections, on March 11, 2012, legislative and municipal elections were held, with an electoral roll comprised 4,679,069 people registered. In the legislative elections, there were a total of 2,253,696 valid votes cast, which means a voter turnout rate of 48.16%. In the municipal elections, a total of 2,311,316 valid votes were issued, which means a voter turnout rate of 49.39%. While in the presidential elections of 2009, a total of 2,638,588 valid votes were cast in an electoral roll of 4,226,479 people registered, with a voter turnout rate of 62.42%.<sup>3</sup>

In the following pages, we analyze voting behavior with respect to the March 2012 legislative elections. According to the survey, 69.8% of respondents said they voted in legislative elections, which is slightly higher than the population that actually exercised the vote (48.16%). In several studies on voting behavior, it has been found that after an election there is a tendency on the part of respondents to over-report their voting intention due to social desirability.


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<sup>1</sup> For more information on the 2009 electoral process, see: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Nayelly Loya Marín y Neil Nevitte. 2009. *Los salvadoreños frente a las elecciones 2009*. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO-NDI.

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis on the demand for a change in power and on the new political cycle, see: PNUD. 2011. *El Salvador: Entre la demanda y la gestión del cambio. Escenarios de gobernabilidad 2010-2014*. Proyecto de Análisis Político y Escenarios Prospectivos (PAPEP). Segundo informe. San Salvador: PNUD.

<sup>3</sup> Electoral Supreme Court. 2009. *Memoria especial elecciones 2009: Elecciones de presidente y vicepresidente de la república, diputados al Parlamento Centroamericano, diputados a la Asamblea Legislativa y Concejos Municipales*. San Salvador, TSE.

Given that our dependent variable is dichotomous (whether or not they voted in the 2012 legislative and municipal elections), we used logistic regression to examine the determinants of the vote. In Figure VIII.1, we present the results of logistic regression analysis of predictors of the intention to vote when each of the other variables are held constant. In Appendix VIII.1 (see end of chapter), we present the coefficients. Basically, there are four statistically significant predictors: age, interest in politics, education and identification with a political party.




**Figure VIII. 1. Determinants of Legislative and Municipal Electoral Participation, El Salvador, 2012.**

Of these four variables, two are specifically political factors (interest in politics<sup>4</sup> and identification with a political party<sup>5</sup>), and two are socio-demographic factors (age and education). In VIII.2 Figure, we may observe the relationship between voting intention and interest in politics. As interest in politics decreases (from a lot to nothing), voting intention is reduced.


<sup>4</sup> Question POL1 in the questionnaire: “How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, a little o nothing? (1) A lot (2) Some, (3) A little, (4) Nothing, (88) Don’t Know, (98) No Response.”

<sup>5</sup> Question: “VB10. ¿Do you prefer one poltical party over the other right now? (1) Yes, (2) No, (88) Don’t Know, (98) No Response.”




**Figure VIII. 2. Participation in Legislative and Municipal Elections by levels of Interest in Politics, El Salvador, 2012.**

In Figure VIII.3, we may observe the relationship between having voted in the last election and identification with a political party. Those who identify with a political party exhibit greater levels of turnout than those who do not.




**Figure VIII. 3. Participation in Legislative and Municipal Elections by Party Identification, 2012.**

In VIII.4 Figure, we can see the relationship between having voted and education attainment level. Levels of participation are higher for those with some level of educational attainment, compared with those with no education.



**Figure VIII. 4. Participation in Legislative and Municipal Elections by Level of Educational Attainment, 2012.**

In VIII.5 Figure, we can see the relationship between voting intention and age - it looks like a concave curve. The 18-25 age group exhibits the lowest levels of participation which increases until the age of 56-65 and then decreased slightly for the group aged 66 years and above.



**Figure VIII. 5. Participation in Legislative and Municipal Elections by Age, 2012.**

## II. Comparison of Voting Behavior in the 2009 and 2012 Elections

From the 2012 survey data, it is possible to analyze voting behavior in the 2009 presidential elections and the 2012 legislative elections, that is to say, to explore the consistency of the vote for the same party in different elections. Of those who voted for the ARENA party candidate in the 2009 presidential elections, 80.4% maintained their vote for the same party, while for those who voted for the FMLN / Funes in 2009, this figure drops to 70.1% in 2012. This could be explained partly from the fact that Funes' candidacy in 2009 reached other voters beyond the traditional FMLN supporters. A curious fact is that the GANA party would have captured a similar percentage of voters from the ARENA and FMLN parties in the 2009 presidential elections (6.9 and 7.4, respectively).

**Table VIII. 1. Split Vote Between the 2009 Presidential Elections and the 2012 Legislative Elections.**

Vote for Representative, 2012	Vote for President, 2009		Total
	Ávila/ARENA	Funes/FMLN	
ARENA	152	50	202
[%]	[80.42]	[16.08]	[40.4]
FMLN	15	218	233
[%]	[7.94]	[70.1]	[46.6]
CN	9	20	29
[%]	[4.76]	[6.43]	[5.8]
GANA	13	23	36
[%]	[6.88]	[7.4]	[7.2]
Total	189	311	500
[%]	[100]	[100]	[100]


The survey data also allow us to analyze whether there was "split vote" in the same election process in March 2012, between the vote for representative and for mayor. In this case, the FMLN and ARENA maintained a high percentage of voters for both elections (87.4% and 86.1%, respectively), followed by a slightly lower level for the CN party (83.3%) and an even slightly lower for the GANA party (72.5%).

**Table VIII. 2. Voting Behavior in the Legislative and Municipal Elections of March 2012.**

Vote for Mayor in the March 2012 Elections	Vote for Representatives in the March 2012 Elections				
	ARENA	FMLN	CN	GANA	Total
ARENA	237	25	4	8	274
[%]	[86.18]	[8.74]	[8.33]	[12.9]	[40.83]
FMLN	23	250	3	8	284
[%]	[8.36]	[87.41]	[6.25]	[12.9]	[42.32]
CN	10	3	40	1	54
[%]	[3.64]	[1.05]	[83.33]	[1.61]	[8.05]
GANA	5	8	1	45	59
[%]	[1.82]	[2.8]	[2.08]	[72.58]	[8.79]
Total	275	286	48	62	671
[%]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]


### III. Evaluations of Political Parties

In the 2012 round of AmericasBarometer, we included three questions to ascertain the citizens' evaluations of political parties. The first explores whether citizens identify with any political party. We asked: "VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) Don't Know [Skip to POL1] (98) No Response [Skip to POL1] ". In the 2012 round, 30.9% said they identify with a political party.




**Figure VIII. 6. Identify with a Political Party, El Salvador, 2012.**

Thirty-one percent of citizens said they identify with a political party. These results contrast with the high level of turnout we saw in the first section and suggest that in fact only one-third of the population identify with any political party. Placing the data in a temporal perspective, the results indicate that there was a statistically significant increase between 2006 and 2008, but then there is a decrease in 2010 and indicate a fall-back for the year 2012 to about the same level as in 2006. It is possible that the 2008 growth was due to the interest in the 2009 election campaign, while the survey conducted in 2010 and 2012 reflects a decline in the particular interest of that campaign and shows, rather, about 30.9% - the percentage of those in El Salvador today who identify with a political party.




**Figure VIII. 7. Identification with a Political Party, El Salvador, 2006-2012.**

Identification with a political party places El Salvador in the group of countries with intermediate levels of political identification. However, compared with other countries, the levels of identification among Salvadorans are above those for Costa Rica, Panama and Guatemala in Central America (Figure VIII.8).



**Figure VIII. 8. Identification with a Political Party in Comparative Perspective, 2012.**

A second dimension explored in the survey is the party with which one identifies. We asked with which party does one identify: 48.70% went with the FMLN party, 41.55% with ARENA, 4.11% with CN, 3.38% with the GANA party, 1.45% and 0.72% choose the PES and CD parties respectively. To those who identified with a party, we asked, "VB12. How close do you feel to the party with which you identify? (1) Very Close, (2) Somewhat Close, (3) A Little Close (a), (4) Do Not Feel Close, (88) Don't Know (98) No Response (99) INAP. 30.2% report feeling very close, 38.2% somewhat close, 25.8% a little close and 5.7% did not feel close. The following table shows the relationship between the party with which one identifies and assessments of the level of closeness with that political party.




**Figure VIII. 9. Closeness to Political Party, El Salvador 2012.**

**Table VIII. 3. Relationship between the Party citizens identify with and levels of closeness, El Salvador 2012.**

Level of Closeness to that Party	Identifies with a Political Party						
	ARENA	FMLN	CN	PES	CD	GANA	Total
Very Close	57	60	8	2	2	3	132
[%]	[33.14]	[29.85]	[47.06]	[33.33]	[66.67]	[21.43]	[31.96]
Somewhat Close	67	76	6	2	1	5	157
[%]	[38.95]	[37.81]	[35.29]	[33.33]	[33.33]	[35.71]	[38.01]
A Little Close	36	53	3	2	0	6	100
[%]	[20.93]	[26.37]	[17.65]	[33.33]	[0]	[42.86]	[24.21]
Not At All Close	12	12	0	0	0	0	24
[%]	[6.98]	[5.97]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[0]	[5.81]
Total	172	201	17	6	3	14	413
[%]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]	[100]


Table VIII.3 shows that the level of identification is stronger among ARENA supporters, followed by the FMLN supporters. Data for the other parties should be taken with caution because of the small number of cases.

Finally, in this section we report the question that has been included in the AmericasBarometer from the 2004 measurement regarding trust in political parties. To simplify the analysis, the original question was recoded to a 0-100 scale. According to Figure VIII.10, taking the 2004 wave as a reference, there is a reduction in trust for 2006 and 2008, which later increases in 2010. In 2012 there is a drop to the lowest level in the period of analysis.



**Figure VIII. 10. Trust in Political Parties  
by Year, El Salvador, 2004-2012.**

In Figure VIII.11, we can see the trust in political parties in 2012 by ideological self-placement on the left-right scale (question L1). Those that place themselves at both extremes of the ideological spectrum have higher levels of trust.




**Figure VIII. 11. Trust in Political Parties by Ideology, El Salvador, 2012.**

#### IV. Political Orientations


In this section, we analyze Salvadoran political preferences. This has two dimensions. On the one hand, there is the issue of party preferences, that is, for which party citizens voted, which has been discussed in a previous section. On the other hand, we have ideological orientation, that is, where they are located on the political spectrum in terms of Left and Right.

Figure VIII.12 shows the distribution of Salvadorans in terms of their ideology. 25.87% of Salvadorans are positioned on the left of the ideological scale (between points 1 and 4), 33.46% were located in the center (between points 5 and 6), and 40.67% were located to the right (between points 7 and 10). Compared to the 2010 study, there was a reduction of 8.56 points on the left (34.4%), a reduction of 5.2 points in the center (38.6%) and an increase of 13.75 points on the right (26.9%).




**Figure VIII. 12. Salvadorans' Ideological Orientation, 2012.**

How does Salvadorans' ideological orientation in 2012 compare with previous years? The answer lies in Figure VIII.13. According to the figure, Salvadorans would have initially moved to a predominantly rightist orientation (6.9 in 2004) to a more centrist orientation (5.7 in 2006, 5.3 in 2008 and 5.2 in 2010), reaching the most centrist point in 2010, probably as product voter preferences for the leftist candidate in 2009, leading to the alternation in the presidency of the republic. Three years after the alternation, with a President Funes / FMLN government in power and the prelude to an upcoming presidential election campaign in 2014, we observe a movement to the right (6.0) in the 2012 survey.



**Figure VIII. 13. Salvadorans' Average Ideological Orientation, 2004-2012.**

How do these 2012 ideological orientations relate to voting preferences? According to the AmericasBarometer data, they relate very clearly in terms of ideological probably programmatic postures. In the figure below, we show a vertical line with the average ideology scale (6.03), and in the same figure, we observe the ideology average for each one of the parties for whom one voted. FMLN voters in the legislative elections of 2012 are located definitively to the left of the political spectrum (4.0) as expected, while the ARENA party voters are placed to the right of the scale (7.7).




**Figure VIII. 14. Voters Ideological Self-Identification and Electoral Preferences, El Salvador, 2012.**

In a study of presidential elections in March 2009, we have created a report about the distribution of voters for the two contending parties along the ideological self-placement spectrum that "each of the two parties has its main base of voters on one pole, the left for the FMLN and the right for ARENA, but they managed to attract the identification of those who align with ideologically-defined center positions."<sup>6</sup> In a sense, the dispute between the two contending forces in the last presidential election centered around who was going to win over the voter in the "center".

In the March 2012 legislative elections compared to the 2009 legislative elections, we observe a decrease of 116,414 votes in voting for the FMLN party while ARENA increased its number of votes by 42,488 votes and the GANA party debuted with a significant level of voting (217,447 votes). In this context, in order to better understand the positioning of the three main political parties in the recent elections, Figure VIII.16 shows the distribution of party political preference on the ideological self-placement scale. The FMLN party has a strong position on the left, but with a significant segment of voters in the center, while the ARENA party has its main positioning on the right, but also with a significant segment of voters in the middle. The GANA party, in its first election, has its main positioning around the center, and then experiences a shift in voters towards the right. It is interesting to see the dispute of the three political forces around the political center (values 5 and 6).


<sup>6</sup> Córdova Macías, Ricardo and Nayelly Loya Marín. 2009. "Comportamiento electoral en las elecciones 2009: una mirada comparada entre jóvenes y adultos". In: Ricardo Córdova Macías, Nayelly Loya Marín y Neil Nevitte. Los salvadoreños frente a las elecciones 2009. San Salvador: FUNDAUNGO, NDI, p.133.



**Figure VIII. 15. Ideological Scale and voting Intention in the 2012 Legislative Elections.**


## V. Interest in Politics

Interest in politics was measured by the following question: "**POL1**. How interested are you in politics: a lot, somewhat, a little bit or not at all? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A Little Bit (4) Not At All (88) Don't Know (98) No Response ". The results reveal that the majority of Salvadorans are not interested in politics. In fact, 71.6% said they had little or no interest in politics and only 10.7% expressed high interest (Figure VIII.16).




**Figure VIII. 16. Interest in Politics in El Salvador, 2012.**

In order to compare this current level of interest in politics to that of previous years, we proceeded to create a 0-100 scale, ranging from no (0) to a lot (100) of interest in politics. The results shown in Figure VIII.17 reveal a decline in interest in politics, practically reaching 2006 levels. These data reveal that in recent years, most Salvadorans have not been particularly interested in political affairs.



**Figure VIII. 17. Interest in Politics in El Salvador, By Year.**

Compared with other countries in the region, interest in politics by Salvadorans is found to be at intermediate levels, over Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala in Central America (see Figure VIII.18).




**Figure VIII. 18. Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective, 2012.**

Citizens' involvement in politics also has a much more active dimension when they not only vote in elections and express their voting preferences but also when they actively participate in campaigns to convince others to vote for certain candidates or directly support a candidate of their choice. In 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, two questions were included to measure this level of involvement. The wording of the questions is shown in the box below:

**PP1.** During the elections, some people tried to convince others to vote for some party or candidate. With what frequency did you try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read alternatives]** (1) Frequently (2) Once in a while (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) Don't Know (98) No Response

**PP2.** There are people who work with some political party or candidate during the electoral campaigns. Did you work for a candidate or party during the 2009 presidential elections? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Don't Know (98) No Reponse

On the one hand, the results indicate that 21.8% of respondents have tried to convince others to vote for a specific party or candidate (Figure VIII.19). The majority of the population, 78.2% never did this, 8.1% rarely did this, 9.4% tried to convince once in a while and 4.3% did so frequently. On the other hand, almost one in ten people have worked for a candidate or party in an election campaign, while the vast majority of the population never has.



**Figure VIII. 19. Political Activism in El Salvador, 2012.**

## VI. Electoral Reforms

In 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included three questions to measure public support for relevant issues on electoral reforms. On one hand, one of the questions explored support for the enactment of a law on political parties, and other to support continuing to vote directly on the ballot above the candidate's name and photograph. The wording of the questions can be seen in the box below:


**EREF5.** To what extent do you approve or disapprove of the passage of a law to control and report funding that political parties receive? You... **[Read Alternatives]**

(1) Highly Approve (2) Somewhat Approve (3) Somewhat Disapprove  
 (4) Highly Disapprove (88) Don't Know (98) No Response

**EREF6.** To what extent do you approve or disapprove of in legislative elections, continuing to vote directly on the ballot over the candidate's name and photograph? **[Read Alternatives]**

(1) Highly Approve (2) Somewhat Approve (3) Somewhat Disapprove  
 (4) Highly Disapprove (88) Don't Know (98) No Response

On the one hand, the results indicate a broad citizen support for the issuance of a political party law to regulate and monitor the funding (51.9% highly approve and 35% somewhat approve), as well as to continue voting directly on the ballot above the candidate's name and photograph in the legislative elections (51% highly approve and 31.9% somewhat approve) (Figure VIII.20).



**Figure VIII. 20. Approval for Electoral Reforms, El Salvador 2012.**

Another question is focused on support for gender quotas. On a 1-7 scale we asked if people strongly agree or disagree with the following statement: "GEN6. The state should require political parties to reserve certain spaces for women on their candidate lists, but have to leave out some men. To what extent do you agree or disagree?" For ease of interpretation, this question was recoded on a 0-100 format, where on average 81.4 agrees with the parties reserve some spaces for women in their lists of candidates, although the question was not specifically a specific number or percentage.

## VII. Conclusions

In this chapter, we have shown that there are four main determinants of voting intention in the recent municipal elections of March 2012: age, educational level, interest in politics and whether or not one identifies with a political party.

Comparing voter intention in the 2009 and 2012 legislative elections, it appears that the two major parties retain a significant percentage of voters, and upon analyzing whether there was "split vote" in the March 2012 election, the finding is that political parties maintained a high percentage of voters for the legislative and municipal elections.

30.9% of citizens identified with a political party, and of these, 30.2% feel very close, 38.2% feel somewhat close to that party, 25.8% feel a little bit close and 5.7% did not feel close to their party at all.

In terms of the ideological orientations, 25.9% were located in the left, 33.4% in the center and 36.7% were located on the right. As for the trend, from 2004 to 2010 there was a process of orientation towards the center, moving the average (scale: 1 being left - 10 being right) from 6.9 in 2004 to 5.7 in

2006, to 5.3 in 2008 and to 5.2 in 2010, but the 2012 measurement, we find a movement to the right (6.0).

We found a low interest in politics: 10.7% show a lot, 17.7% show some interest, 33.3% demonstrate a little interest and 38.3% show no interest in politics whatsoever. Also there has been a decline in interest in politics, according to a 0-100 format scale, from 37.7 in 2010 to 33.4 in 2012.

The survey data show a low level of trust in political parties and this has decreased between 2010 and 2012, from 39.1 to 34.4 (on a 0-100 scale).

In the 2012 survey, we found a high level of public support for the issues of electoral reforms. 86.9% approve (highly and somewhat) of the passage of a law to regulate and monitor political parties' funding, while 82.9% approve (highly and somewhat) to continue to vote directly on the ballot above the candidate's name and photograph in legislative elections. Finally, an average of 81.4 (on a scale of 0-100) agrees that the parties should reserve some spaces for women on their candidate lists.



## Appendices

### Appendix VIII.1. Electoral, Legislative, and Municipal Predictors of Participation, El Salvador 2012.

	Coef.	t
Interest in Politics	0.170*	2.29
He/She Tried to Convince Someone to Vote for a Party	-0.126	-1.89
Identifies with a Political Party	0.298*	4.27
Wealth Quintiles	-0.074	-1.08
Size of Place of Residency	-0.041	-0.66
Years of Education	0.274*	3.34
Man	0.025	0.35
Age	4.161*	13.22
Age Squared	-3.359*	-10.65
Constant	0.983*	13.65
F = 43.95		
Number of Cases = 1391		
*p<0.05		



# Appendices



## Appendix A. Informed Consent Form

### Carta de consentimiento



VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY

Enero, 2012

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de la Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO) para solicitarle una entrevista que durará alrededor de 45 minutos. El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de El Salvador.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a la Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), a los teléfonos 2243-0406 ó 2243-7816, o al correo [me.rivera@fundaungo.org.sv](mailto:me.rivera@fundaungo.org.sv) con la Mtra. María Elena Rivera Sarmiento. El número IRB del estudio es 110627.

¿Desea participar?

Atentamente,

José Guillermo Compte  
Presidente  
FUNDAUNGO



## Appendix B. Sampling Design

### Methodological Description of Study in El Salvador

#### 1. Total Population

El total de habitantes del país de acuerdo con las proyecciones de población para el año 2012, obtenidas a partir del VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda de la Dirección General de Estadística y Censos de El Salvador (DIGESTYC) realizado en el año 2007, es de 6,236,182.

The total population of the country according to population projections for 2012, obtained from the VI Census of Population and the V Housing Census of the General Directorate of Statistics and Census of El Salvador (DIGESTYC) conducted in 2007, is 6,236,182.

#### 2. Target Population

The target population was all that equal to or greater than 18 years living in private households in the 14 departments in El Salvador, which distribution by department and gender is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Population Projections For Those 18 Years or Older; Distribution by Department and Gender, 2012.**

Departament	Total	Men	Women
Ahuachapán	197,567	90,661	106,906
Santa Ana	363,400	165,858	197,542
Sonsonate	278,345	123,203	155,142
Chalatenango	119,509	53,665	65,844
La Libertad	469,201	212,817	256,384
San Salvador	1,148,151	499,771	648,380
Cuscatlán	151,953	70,953	81,000
La Paz	205,315	93,883	111,432
Cabañas	93,473	40,696	52,777
San Vicente	109,522	50,302	59,220
Usulután	228,355	103,126	125,229
San Miguel	295,299	131,376	163,923
Morazán	115,288	51,259	64,029
La Unión	160,040	70,275	89,765
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,935,418</b>	<b>1,757,845</b>	<b>2,177,573</b>

### 3. Sampling Design

In the population referenced, we distinguish two types of populations:

- Urban Population

Population residing in the urban áreas recognized by the DIGESTYC in the VI Population Census and V Census of Households.

- Rural Population

Population residing in the rural áreas recognized by the DIGESTYC, in the VI Population Census and the V Census of Households.

In regard to census mapping used, this corresponds to the surveys conducted by DIGESTYC in the 1990s. Such mapping includes urban and rural areas of the country. It was not possible to use census maps from the the VI Population Census and the V Census of Households conducted in 2007, given that they are not available at the housing level which precluded obtaining census segments. It would have been necessary to conduct a survey at the household level, but for reasons of cost and time it was not feasible.

### 4. Sample Size

The sample size was established within the guidelines for the "Design of sample surveys of the 2012 Round of the Americas Barometer" (Guidelines for the 2012 Round), with 1,500 surveys. However, we chose to make a total of 1512 surveys in order to get some margin considering the possible errors that could occur in the phase of data processing.

The sampling error was estimated from the formula for simple random sampling for infinite populations. Thus, the maximum permissible error for the whole country was + / - 2.5%.

$$E = \frac{\sqrt{k^2 pq}}{n}$$

Where:

k = 1.96

95% confidence

p = q = 0.5

Value that Provides the Largest Sample Size

n = 1500

Sample Size

The sample size was distributed by department, municipality and area. According to the 2012 Round Guidelines, segments were allocated proportionately to the size of the large municipalities<sup>1</sup>. We also selected four segments in the remaining municipalities (medium and small).

---

<sup>1</sup> Large municipalities are those with a population greater than 100,000; medium-sized cities have between 25,000-100,000; and small cities have less than 25,000.

## 5. Sampling Method

The sampling method used was Systematic Sampling with Probability Proportional to Size (PPS). This included four stages:

- First Stage:

In the first sampling stage municipalities were considered as primary sampling units (PSUs), they are ordered according to their size and grouped into large, medium and small. Large municipalities are those municipalities that population projections for 2012 of DIGESTYC have a resident population of 100,000; medium-sized municipalities are those municipalities that according to population projections for 2012 from DIGESTYC have a resident population between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, and small municipalities are those municipalities that according to population projections for 2012 from DIGESTYC have a resident population of less than 25,000 inhabitants. A distribution of the number of cities in each of these conceptions and their corresponding population is presented in Table 2.

**Table 2. Number of Cities by Size and their Population**

Size	Cities	Population
Large	12	2,124,200
Medium	50	2,285,772
Small	200	1,826,210
<b>Total</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>6,236,182</b>

We decided to consider large municipalities as self-represented. This is to say that they were selected to be part of the sample automatically. These are presented, along with their population, in Table 3.

**Table 3. Population of Self-Represented Cities**

Departament	City	Population
Ahuachapán	Ahuachapán	115,788
Santa Ana	Santa Ana	262,853
La Libertad	Santa Tecla	133,255
La Libertad	Colón	115,107
San Salvador	San Salvador	298,988
San Salvador	Soyapango	274,163
San Salvador	Apopa	160,263
San Salvador	Mejicanos	149,491
San Salvador	Ciudad Delgado	129,821
San Salvador	Ilopango	121,976
San Salvador	Tonacatepeque	117,857
San Miguel	San Miguel	244,638
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,124,200</b>

The selection of medium and small municipalities was conducted in each stratum with probability proportional to size (PPS) of the city's population age 18 years and older. According to the guidelines for the "Design of sample surveys of the 2012 Round of the Americas Barometer" (Guidelines 2012 Round), we determined a fixed number of 24 surveys per municipality (medium and small), which was considered as a reasonable number of surveys in the sample.

The allocation of surveys within each municipality took into account the distribution of the population living in each geographic area (urban and rural) with the following results.

**Table 4. Stratification of Municipalities and Selected Segments**

Size of Municipality	Households in Sampling		
	Rural	Urban	Total
Large	48	504	552
Medium	216	312	528
Small	288	144	432
<b>Total</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>1,512</b>

- Second Stage:

Census segments were considered as Secondary Sampling Units (USM). The census segments are geographic areas with approximately 100 occupied homes. In the second stage of sampling, census blocks were arranged within municipalities. First, they were ordered by geographical area (urban and rural) and within the geographic area by segment number. Previously, these segments were numbered in a "serpentine" way in order to get a better geographic distribution. In each municipality, depending on their size, segments were selected that corresponded proportionally to their geographic area and their selection was made in a systematic way<sup>2</sup>, the results by municipality stratification of the selected segments are presented in Table 5.

**Table 5. Types of Municipalities and Segments in the Sampling**

Size of Municipality	Segments in the Sampling			Municipalities in the Sampling
	Rural	Urban	Total	
Large	8	84	92	12
Medium	36	52	88	22
Small	48	24	72	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>52</b>

<sup>2</sup> The Systematic Sampling is a procedure that requires the use of a list of sampling units in the population, selecting a unit at intervals or every K-th unit in the list ( $K = N / n$ ). To choose the first unit using a table of random numbers and then added K to the first unit, that is, if "a" is the first unit, the entire series would be: a, a + k, a + 2k, to + 3k, ..., a + (n-1) k.

- Third Stage:

The Tertiary Sampling Units (UTM) were the houses. In the third stage of the sampling, we formed censal blocks with two households each.<sup>3</sup> After forming the blocks, we proceeded to select 3 of them in a systematic way to obtain the 6 homes for each selected segment.

Being in each selected segment and having selected the 6 homes, we proceeded to locate the northwest point of the segment and began a count of houses along the route of the blocks in a clockwise direction. The housing unit was located on the selection sheet designed for the selection of housing.

- Fourth Stage:

In the fourth stage of the sampling, we produced a list of household members 18 and over. From this, we proceeded to select a household member according to who had the nearest birthday that answered the questionnaire, taking care that the age and gender structure of the country to remain in the sample. This household member became the Final Sampling Unit (FSU).

To control for this aspect, each segment was determined by the number of persons by gender and age to be interviewed, according to Table 6.

**Table 6. Distribution of People to be Interviewed in Each Segment, by Age and Gender**

Age Groups	Total Population		
	Total	Men	Women
18 - 29	2	1	1
30 - 45	2	1	1
45+	2	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

Given that the ballots were coded as odd and even (with the end of collecting the same information from different questions), if the first interview was conducted using an odd / even questionnaire, the following surveys were conducted with an alternate questionnaire. This procedure was followed to locate all people interviewed in the segment.

---

<sup>3</sup> The number of blocks in the segment is the number of housing units divided by 2, for example, if the number of housing units is 80, we have 40 blocks.

## 6. Estimation of Sampling Errors

The domains of estimation that we defined were the following:

- Total of 14 departments (the entire country)
- Population of large, medium-sized, and small cities (the entire country)
- Urban population and Rural population (the entire country)

From this distribution of domains, we obtained the following approximate errors for each of them:

**Table 7. Domains by Department, Size of City, and Area with Its Respective Approximate Errors**

City or Area	Approximate Error
Total of the 14 Departments	2.50%
Large Cities	4.20%
Medium-Sized Cities	4.30%
Small Cities	4.70%
Urban Area	3.20%
Rural Area	4.20%

Although we did not initially consider, the five geographic regions into which the country can be divided as domains of estimation,<sup>4</sup> the use of sample design Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) provided reliable estimates at the level of regions – in this measurement, the approximate errors are presented in Table 8.

**Table 8. Surveys By Region, Area, and Their Approximate Errors**

Region	Number of Interviews by Area			Approximate Error
	Rural	Urban	Total	
Western Region	144	162	306	5.6%
Central Region I	108	168	276	5.9%
Central Region II	108	84	192	7.1%
Eastern Region	180	132	312	5.5%
AMSS	12	414	426	4.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>1,512</b>	<b>2.5%</b>
Approximate Error	4.2%	3.2%	2.5%	

<sup>4</sup> The regions are the following: Western region: Ahuachapán, Santa Ana, Sonsonate. Central REgion I (also called Central): Chalatenango, La Libertad, San Salvador, Cuscatlán. Central Region II (also called Paracentral): La Paz, Cabañas, San Vicente. Región Oriental: Usulután, San Miguel, Morazán, La Unión. Región Área Metropolitana de San Salvador (AMSS): La Libertad, Santa Tecla, Antiguo Cuscatlán, San Salvador, Soyapango, Apopa, Mejicanos, Ciudad Delgado, Ilopango, Tonacatepeque, San Martín, Cuscatancingo, San Marcos, Ayutuxtepeque y Nejapa.

## **7. Fieldwork**

For the development of the field work, we contracted out through a competitive process the UNIMER Market Research Company SA de CV. The monitoring of the various stages of UNIMER fieldwork was conducted by FUNDAUNGO staff.

First we developed a pilot test aimed at assessing the instrument. This was conducted in both rural and urban areas on the 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of March. Secondly, training was conducted by supervisors and enumerators on March 30<sup>th</sup>, and April 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>, which was delivered by an envoy of LAPOP Central and FUNDAUNGO staff.

Data collection began on April 18 and ended on May 12, 2012. The personnel assigned to this task were 9 supervisors and 31 UNIMER enumerators and 2 FUNDAUNGO supervisors. The interviews were conducted in the homes of each of the respondents. No telephone interviews were conducted.

## **8. Information Processing**

To collect the data, we combined the use of paper and electronic questionnaires contained in the equipment denominated PDA (Personal Digital Assistant). Of the 1,497 surveys, 1,448 were done on paper and 49 on PDA.

The processing of information in the case of surveys completed on paper comprising double entry of each ballot using the SimQuest capture program the day after its completion, meaning that throughout all the fieldwork, we worked with two databases which were fed with the same information. This approach allowed us, at the end of fieldwork, to identify typing errors as we compared the information from both databases in order to detect discrepancies between them. When there was an inconsistency we proceeded to review the paper ballot and compare the two databases to identify and correct the error.

Also, during the fieldwork, we conducted two audits of paper ballots according to the percentage of completion of data collection. The audits included the selection of a random sample of complete and total ballots cast in both databases at the time of the audit, and then compare the information contained in each report with the information recorded in both databases in order to correct any discrepancy. Having a single database, we proceeded to make crossings questions and results in order to identify inconsistencies with the original design of the questionnaire.

Regarding the questionnaires captured on PDA, the information processing is performed automatically. The information collected in these electronic devices is discharged through a synchronization of the device with the computer and then be transferred, automatically, to the SPSS statistical program. Finally we proceeded to join the refined database containing information collected by paper ballots information dumped from the PDA devices.

## **9. Statistical Analysis**

We used relatively simple methods of statistical analysis. In order to establish the association between two numeric variables, we used the Pearson correlation coefficient. This has values from 0 to 1. When there is perfect correspondence between two values, the coefficient is equal to 1. While establishing the association between a continuous variable and categorical variable we use variance analysis. In order to establish whether or not there is a statistically significant relationship between two categorical variables, we used the chi-square test. To integrate information from several questions on the same topic, we also constructed scales and used the Cronbach alpha coefficient. Coefficients of 0.70 or more are considered reliable and consistent, but in some cases we used scales whose ratio was below these values. We also used factor analysis to determine the number of dimensions or factors involved in a series of questions on the same subject.

On repeated occasions, we estimated multiple linear regression models using ordinary least squares. Usually the dependent variable in these models is an index constructed with various questions. The regression coefficients of these models (and their significance) allow concisely evaluate the co-factors that "explain" these indexes. Although we sometimes refer to these co-factors as "determinants", in fact, with the information available it is not possible to establish causal relationships. We only have "associations". In the regression models also presents the standardized regression coefficients "Beta". These are useful in assessing the relative importance of the different explanatory factors in the model, for measuring the effects of standard units. As an indicator of the goodness of fit of the model as a whole we used the coefficient of determination "R squared". This coefficient reports the proportion of variance explained by the model as a whole, compared with the explanation you would get a "null" model (dependent variable estimated simply by their average). Also, we used binary logistic regression models when the dependent variable takes dichotomous values.

For statistical analyses in this report, we used Stata, Version 12.

## **10. Precision of the Results**

All sample surveys are affected by two types of errors: sampling errors and non-sampling errors. Non-sampling errors are those that are made for the collection and processing of information, the latter can be controlled by constructing a suitable measuring instrument, training the interviewers on the correct application of the instrument, supervising field work, creating an efficient data capture program, revising the questionnaire and providing adequate coding such as file cleaning, among others. These errors can be controlled but can not be quantified. However, a comparison of the results of the sample with the population gives an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that taint the representativity of the sample.

Sampling errors, on the other hand, are the product of chance and come from interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When selecting a sample, this is one of many possible samples selected from the population. The variability among all these possible samples is the sampling error, which could be measured if one dispusiese of all these samples, obviously unreal situation. In practice, what is done is to estimate this error on the variance obtained from the same sample. To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (mean, percentages, differences and total), we calculate the standard error is the square root of the sample variance under the same conditions. To calculate this error is very important to consider the design that the sample was selected. The design effect (DE), indicates the

efficiency of the design used in relation to a simple random sample design (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the variance obtained for both designs (complex and SRS) is the same, ie the complex sample is as efficient as a SRS with the same sample size. If the value is less than 1, indicating that the variance obtained with the complex sample is less than that obtained with the SRS.

## 11. Final Sample

Below, we present a chart detailing the final result obtained by department and area (rural-urban).

**Table 9. Total Valid Surveys by Area of Residency**

<b>Departament</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Total</b>
Ahuachapán	48	50	98
Santa Ana	65	65	130
Sonsonate	48	24	72
Chalatenango	24	23	47
La Libertad	114	36	150
San Salvador	410	18	428
Cuscatlán	30	41	71
La Paz	25	47	72
Cabañas	30	18	48
San Vicente	30	42	72
Usulután	36	36	72
San Miguel	71	48	119
Morazán	12	36	48
La Unión	24	46	70
<b>Total</b>	<b>967</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>1,497</b>



## Appendix C. Questionnaire

LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 Master Core Version # 10.0 IRB Approval: 110627



### AmericasBarometer: El Salvador, 2012

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<b>PAIS. Country:</b>					
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	_ _ _
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
<b>IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]</b>					_ _ _ _
<b>ESTRATOPRI. Insert the names of the strata here</b>					_ _
<b>ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality:</b> (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000)					_
<b>UPM (Primary Sampling Unit)</b> _____					_ _ _
<b>PROV. Province (or department) :</b> _____					_ _
<b>MUNICIPIO. County (or municipality):</b> _____					_ _
<b>XXXDISTRITO. District (or parish, etc.):</b> _____					_ _
<b>XXXSEGMENTO. Census Segment</b> _____					_ _ _
<b>XXXSEC. Sector</b> _____					_ _ _
<b>CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]:</b> _____ [A cluster must have 6 interviews]					
<b>UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use country's definition]</b>					
<b>TAMANO. Size of place:</b> (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area					
<b>IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language:</b> (11) English INSERT OTHER LANGUAGES					
<b>Start time:</b> ____:____					_ _ _ _
<b>FECHA. Date Day:</b> ____ <b>Month:</b> ____ <b>Year:</b> 2012					_ _ _ _
<b>Do you live in this home?</b> Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview					
<b>Are you a [country] citizen or permanent resident of [country]?</b> Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview					
<b>Are you at least 18 years old [in Ecuador and Nicaragua: 16 years]?</b>					

**Yes → continue**

**No → Thank the respondent and end the interview**

**NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.**

**Q1. [Note down; do not ask] Sex:** (1) Male (2) Female

**LS3.** To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are...  
**[Read options]?**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied  
 (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]**

**A4.** In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**

Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

**SOCT1.** How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad  
 (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

**SOCT2.** Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

<p><b>IDIO1.</b> How would you describe <b>your</b> overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?                  (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad                  (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>	
<p><b>IDIO2.</b> Do you think that <b>your</b> economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?                  (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>	

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? <b>[Read the options and mark the response]</b>	Yes	No	DK	DA
<b>CP2.</b> A member of Congress/Parliament	1	2	88	98
<b>CP4A.</b> A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman, provincial official, civil governor or governor)	1	2	88	98
<b>CP4.</b> Any ministry or minister (federal), state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98

Now let's talk about your local municipality...

<p><b>NP1.</b> Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?                  (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer</p>	
<p><b>NP2.</b> Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?                  (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to SGL1]</b> (88) Doesn't know <b>[Go to SGL1]</b>                  (98) Doesn't answer <b>[Go to SGL1]</b></p>	
<p><b>MUNI10.</b> Did they resolve your issue or request?                  (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>SGL1.</b> Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? <b>[Read options]</b>                  (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer</p>	

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
<p><b>CP5.</b> Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]									
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Attend/member	Leader/Board member	DK	DA	INAP
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP7]			88	98	
<b>CP6L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP8]			88	98	
<b>CP7L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP9]			88	98	
<b>CP8L.</b> And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
<b>CP20. [Women only]</b> Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
<b>CP21.</b> Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

<b>IT1.</b> And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options]
(1) Very trustworthy                      (2) Somewhat trustworthy                      (3) Not very trustworthy
(4) Untrustworthy                      (88) DK                      (98) DA

<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]</b>	
<b>MIL6.</b> Now, changing the subject, how proud are you of the Armed Forces of [country]? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Extremely proud    (2) Very proud    (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud    or    (5) Do you not care?    (88) DK    (98) DA	
<b>MIL5.</b> How proud do you feel to be [nationality] when you hear the national anthem? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Extremely proud    (2) Very proud    (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud or    (5) Do you not care?    (88) DK    (98) DA	

**[GIVE CARD A]**

**L1. [Use L1B in United States, Canada, and Guyana]** Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98
<b>Left</b>										<b>Right</b>	

**[TAKE BACK CARD A]**

**[Give Card A]**

**L1B. [For the United States, Canada, and Guyana]** (Liberal-Conservative Scale) Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. One means liberal and 10 means conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of liberals and conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the liberals and others with the conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "liberals" and "conservatives" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98
<b>Liberal</b>										<b>Conservative</b>	

**[Take back Card A]**

<b>PROT3.</b> In the <b>last 12 months</b> , have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to PROT6]</b> (88) DK <b>[Go to PROT6]</b> (98) DA <b>[Go to PROT6]</b>
<b>PROT4.</b> How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in <b>the last 12 months</b> ? _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
<b>PROT7.</b> And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest? (1) Yes, participated    (2) No, did not participate (88) DK    (98)    DA (99) N/A

<b>PROT6.</b> In the <b>last 12 months</b> have you signed any petition?	
(1) Yes, signed	(2) No, has not signed
(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>PROT8.</b> And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut?	
(1) Yes, has done	(2) No, has not done
(88) DK	(98) DA

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]: [Customize for Costa Rica (Fuerza Pública), Panama (Fuerza Pública de Panamá), and Haiti (Police Nationale d'Haïti) ]**

<b>JC1.</b> When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>JC10.</b> When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>JC13.</b> When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

<b>JC15A.</b> Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
<b>JC16A.</b> Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal and govern without the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

<b>VIC1EXT.</b> Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or <b>any other type</b> of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]</b> (88) DK <b>[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]</b> (98) DA <b>[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]</b>
<b>VIC1EXTA.</b> How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number]      (88) DK      (98) DA      (99) N/A

<p><b>VIC2.</b> Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? <b>[Read the options]</b></p> <p>(01) Unarmed robbery, <b>no</b> assault or physical threats  (02) Unarmed robbery <b>with</b> assault or physical threats  (03) Armed robbery  (04) Assault but not robbery  (05) Rape or sexual assault  (06) Kidnapping  (07) Vandalism  (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there)  (10) Extortion  (11) Other  (88) DK            (98)DA            (99) N/A (was not a victim)</p>	
<p><b>VIC2AA.</b> Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?<b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) In your home  (2) In this neighborhood  (3) In this municipality/canton  (4) In another municipality/canton  (5) In another country  (88) DK            (98) DA            (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>VIC1HOGAR.</b> Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or <b>any other type</b> of crime in the past 12 months?</p> <p>(1) Yes            (2) No            (88) DK            (98) DA            (99) N/A (Lives alone)</p>	

<p><b>ARM2.</b> If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection?</p> <p>(1) Yes            (2) No            (88) DK            (98) DA</p>	
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Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the <b>last 12 months</b> ....					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
<b>VIC40.</b> Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)Yes	(0) No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
<b>VIC41.</b> Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
<b>VIC43.</b> Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
<b>VIC44.</b> Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
<b>VIC45. In the last twelve months, have you changed your job out of fear of crime?</b> <b>[If does not work mark 99]</b>	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	(99) INAP

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime...						
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	DA
<b>VIC101.</b> is to create prevention programs. Do you: <b>[Read Alternatives]</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Agree</b>	<b>Somewhat Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>DA</b>	
<b>VIC102.</b> The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
<b>VIC103.</b> The best way to fight crime is to contract private security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand.							
	<b>Would approve</b>	<b>Would not approve, but would understand</b>	<b>Would not approve or understand</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>DA</b>		
<b>VOL207.</b> Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)		
<b>VOL206.</b> Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)		
<b>VOL202.</b> Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)		
<b>VOL203.</b> If a person frightens his community and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)		
<b>VOL204.</b> If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)		

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA
<b>VOL205.</b> If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, <b>or</b> would you not approve but understand, <b>or</b> would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
<b>AOJ8.</b> In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line		(88) DK	(98) DA		
<b>AOJ11.</b> Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very <b>unsafe</b> ? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA					
<b>AOJ12.</b> If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA					
<b>AOJ17.</b> To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA					
<b>AOJ18.</b> Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime (3) <b>[Don't Read]</b> Neither, or both (88) DK (98) DA					
<b>AOJ20.</b> And thinking about your and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago? (1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA					
<b>AOJ21.</b> I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: <b>[READ ALTERNATIVES. MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE]</b> (1) People from your neighborhood or community (2) Gangs (3) The police or military (4) Organized crime and drug traffickers (5) People in your family (6) Common criminals (7) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> Other (8) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> None (88) DK (98) DA					

<p><b>AOJ22.</b> In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: <b>[read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Implement preventive measures                  (2) Increase punishment of criminals                  (3) <b>[Don't read]</b> Both                  (88) DK                  (98) DA</p>	
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**[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]**

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
<b>Not at all</b>						<b>A lot</b>	<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't Answer</b>

**Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA**

<p>I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.</p> <p><b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (<b>Read:</b> If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u>, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)</p> <p><b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?</p> <p><b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?</p> <p><b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?</p> <p><b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?</p> <p><b>B10A.</b> To what extent do you trust the justice system?</p> <p><b>B11.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?</p> <p><b>B12.</b> To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? <b>[Not in Costa Rica or Haiti; ; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]</b></p> <p><b>B13.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Legislature?</p> <p><b>B18.</b> To what extent do you trust the National Police?</p> <p><b>B20.</b> To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?</p> <p><b>B20A.</b> To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church <b>[use the most common name in your country]</b>?</p> <p><b>B21.</b> To what extent do you trust the political parties?</p> <p><b>B21A.</b> To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?</p> <p><b>B31.</b> To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?</p> <p><b>B32.</b> To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?</p> <p><b>B43.</b> To what extent are you proud of being (nationality corresponding to country)?</p> <p><b>B37.</b> To what extent do you trust the mass media?</p> <p><b>B47A.</b> To what extent do you trust elections in this country?</p>	
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Now, using the same ladder, <i>[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]</i> <b>NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT</b>	<b>Note</b> 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
<b>N1.</b> To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?	
<b>N3.</b> To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	
<b>N9.</b> To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?	
<b>N11.</b> To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	
<b>N15.</b> To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?	

<b>ODD QUESTIONNAIRES</b>	<b>Note</b>
<b>[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]</b>	1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA, 99 = N/A
And continuing to use the same card, <b>NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT</b>	
<b>EPP1.</b> Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do [nationality] political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A	
<b>EPP3.</b> To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A	

Now, using the same ladder, <i>[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]</i> <b>NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT</b>	<b>Note</b> 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
<b>MIL1. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> To what extent do you believe that the (nationality) Armed Forces are well trained and organized?	
<b>MIL2. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in (country) have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters?	
<b>B3MILX. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> To what extent do you believe that the [nationality] Armed Forces respect [nationality’s] human rights nowadays?	
<b>MIL3.</b> Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
<b>MIL4. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of [country] to improve national security? <b>[Take Back Card B]</b>	

<b>M1.</b> Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? <b>[Read the options]</b> (1) Very good                      (2) Good                      (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)                      (4) Bad (5) Very bad                      (88) DK                      (98) DA	
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**M2.** Now speaking of Congress/Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?  
 (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly  
 (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA

**SD2NEW2.** And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?  
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied  
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

**SD3NEW2.** And the quality of public schools? [**Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?**]  
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied  
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

**SD6NEW2.** And the quality of public medical and health services? [**Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?**]  
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied  
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

**Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>		<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Doesn't answer</b>

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements

**POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?

**POP107.** The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

**POP113.** Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

**We are going to continue using the same ladder.** Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

**EFF1.** Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**EFF2.** You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA**

**ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

**DEM23.** Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. <b>(88) DK (98)DA</b>	
<b>ROS1.</b> The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS2.</b> The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS3.</b> The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS4.</b> The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>ROS6.</b> The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, HAITI, OR PANAMA]</b>	
<b>MIL7.</b> The Armed Forces ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in [country]. How much do you agree or disagree?	

#### ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

**[QUESTIONS CCT3-RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**

**CCT3.** Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

**GEN1.** Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**

**GEN6.** The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

**RAC2A.** Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

**[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]**

#### [Take Back Card C]

#### ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

**[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**

**W14A.** And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?

(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**PN4.** And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

**PN5.** In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

(1) Very democratic                      (2) Somewhat democratic                      (3) Not very democratic  
 (4) Not at all democratic                      (88) DK                      (98) DA                      (99) N/A

**[Give the respondent Card D]**

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
Strongly disapprove										Strongly approve	

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
<b>E5.</b> Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E8.</b> Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E11.</b> Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E15.</b> Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E14.</b> Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E3.</b> Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
<b>E16.</b> Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in country. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
<b>D1.</b> There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's <b>right to vote</b> ? Please read me the number from the scale: <b>[Probe: To what degree?]</b>	
<b>D2.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to <b>conduct peaceful demonstrations</b> in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
<b>D3.</b> Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to <b>run for public office</b> ?	
<b>D4.</b> How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to <b>make speeches</b> ?	
<b>D5.</b> And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to <b>run for public office</b> ?	

## ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99) N/A

## ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A

D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A

## [Take back Card D]

[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY]

I'm going to read you a list of several groups of people. Can you tell me if there are some groups that **you wouldn't like** to have as neighbors?

	Mentions [Does not want as neighbors]	Does not mention [Does not mind with having as neighbors]	DK	DA
DIS35A. Gays. Would you mind having them as neighbors?	1	0	88	98
DIS35B. Poor people	1	0	88	98
DIS35C. People from other countries	1	0	88	98
DIS35D. Afro-country/blacks	1	0	88	98
DIS35E. Indigenous/Native (country)/First Peoples	1	0	88	98

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

(1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or

(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or

(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.

(88) DK (98) DA

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

(1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read the options]

(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected

(2) Electoral democracy is the best

(88) DK (98) DA

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC6.</b> In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> <b>EXC20.</b> In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC11.</b> In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99				
		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC13.</b> Do you work? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC14.</b> In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99				
		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC16.</b> Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC18.</b> Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98

<b>EXC7.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is <b>[Read]</b> (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”]</b> <b>EXC7MIL.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the <b>Armed Forces</b> is <b>[Read options]</b> (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>[QUESTIONS DIS2-DIS5 ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY.]</b>	
Now, changing the subject, and thinking <b>about your experiences in the past year</b> , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?	
	<b>Yes No DK DA INAP</b>
<b>DIS2.</b> In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1 2 88 98 99
<b>DIS3.</b> At work or school or when you have looked for work	1 2 88 98 99
<b>DIS5.</b> In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1 2 88 98
<b>VB1.</b> Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru: Do you have an Identity Card?] (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, PANAMÁ, PERÚ, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, AND EL SALVADOR]</b> <b>INF1.</b> Do you have a national identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	
<b>VB2.</b> Did you vote in the last <b>presidential elections</b> of (year of last presidential elections)? <b>[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]</b> (1) Voted <b>[Continue]</b> (2) Did not vote <b>[Go to VB10]</b> (88) DK <b>[Go to VB10]</b> (98) DA <b>[Go to VB10]</b>	
<b>VB3.</b> Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? <b>[DON'T READ THE LIST] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]</b> (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot) (X01) INSERT NAMES AND PARTIES (X02) (X03) <b>Replace X with Country Code</b> (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)	
<b>VB10.</b> Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes <b>[Continue]</b> (2) No <b>[Go to POL1]</b> (88) DK <b>[Skip to POL1]</b> (98) DA <b>[Skip to POL1]</b>	
<b>VB11.</b> Which political party do you identify with? <b>[DON'T READ THE LIST]</b> (X01) <b>WRITE DOWN THE NAMES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PARTIES</b> (X02) (X03) <b>Replace X with Country Code</b> (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA	
<b>POL1.</b> How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	

<p><b>VB20.</b> If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Wouldn't vote                  (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party                  (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration                  (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote                  (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>PP1.</b> During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? <b>[Read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>PP2.</b> There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?</p> <p>(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>VB50.</b> Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?</p> <p>(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree                  (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

<b>ODD QUESTIONNAIRES</b> <b>[QUESTIONS VB51-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]</b>	
<p><b>VB51.</b> Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?</p> <p>(1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>VB52.</b> If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?</p> <p>(1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p>Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.</p>	
<p><b>VB53.</b> Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?</p> <p><b>[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]</b></p> <p>(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>RAC1CA.</b> According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?</p> <p><b>[Read alternatives, just one answer]</b></p> <p>(1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly                  (3) <b>[Do not read]</b> Another response (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p>Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:</p>	
<p><b>AB1.</b> (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) <b>[Don't read]</b> Both                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>AB2.</b> (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself)                  (3) <b>[Don't read]</b> Both (88) DK (98) DA                  (99) N/A</p>	
<p><b>AB5.</b> (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) <b>[Don't read]</b> Both                  (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	

<b>ONLY IN BRAZIL: SOC1-SOC12B SHOULD BE ASKED OF THE ENTIRE BRAZILIAN SAMPLE</b>	
<b>SOC1.</b> For every 100 [local currency of country] that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) The rich person should pay 50 [currency], and the poor person 20 [currency]. (2) The rich person should pay 40 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]. (3) The rich person should pay 30 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]. (4) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> Another combination (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC2A.</b> Tell me, please, in which of the following areas the government should invest more money? <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage) (3) Housing (4) Retirement (5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment (7) Health (8) Security (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC2B.</b> And in second place? <b>[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE OPTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION]</b>	
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage) (3) Housing (4) Retirement (5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment (7) Health (8) Security (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC3.</b> Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? Is it: <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC4.</b> In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on education, or (2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or (3) Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC5.</b> Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?	
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC6.</b> In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Schools (2) Local governments (3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments (4) The central government (5) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC7.</b> Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
<b>SOC8.</b> In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? <b>[READ OPTIONS]</b>	
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on health, or (2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or (3) Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	



### ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

**[ASK ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” “9”)]**

**SOC3.** Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? **[READ OPTIONS]**

- |          |          |         |          |
|----------|----------|---------|----------|
| (1) Good | (2) Fair |         |          |
| (3) Poor | (88) DK  | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

**SOC4.** In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**

- |  |         |          |  |
|--|---------|----------|--|
| (1) Use better the money that it’s currently spending on education, or |         |          |  |
| (2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or   |         |          |  |
| (3) Both   |         |          |  |
| (88) DK  | (98) DA | (99) N/A |  |

**SOC5.** Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?

- |         |        |         |         |          |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| (1) Yes | (2) No | (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|

**SOC6.** In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? **[READ OPTIONS]**

- |   |                            |         |          |
|---|----------------------------|---------|----------|
| (1) Schools                                 | (2) Local governments      |         |          |
| (3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments | (4) The central government |         |          |
| (5) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> Other              | (88) DK                    | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

**SOC7.** Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]**

- |          |          |         |          |
|----------|----------|---------|----------|
| (1) Good | (2) Fair |         |          |
| (3) Poor | (88) DK  | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

**SOC8.** In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**

- |   |         |         |          |
|---|---------|---------|----------|
| (1) Use better the money that it’s currently spending on health, or |         |         |          |
| (2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or   |         |         |          |
| (3) Both  | (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

**SOC9.** Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services?

- |         |        |         |         |          |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| (1) Yes | (2) No | (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|

**SOC10.** In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty and inequality in [country]? **[DO NOT READ]**

- |  |   |         |          |
|--|---|---------|----------|
| (1) Create jobs/improve the economy                  | (2) Promote agrarian reform             |         |          |
| (3) Improve public education services                | (4) Offer public assistance to the poor |         |          |
| (5) Increase taxes on the rich                       |   |         |          |
| (6) Improve infrastructure (highways, water, sewage) |   |         |          |
| (9) <b>[DO NOT READ]</b> Other                       | (88) DK                                 | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

**SOC11.** Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on [income transfer program specific to the country]?

[If there is no specific program, ask about the creation of a program of income transfer]

- |         |        |         |         |          |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| (1) Yes | (2) No | (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A |
|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|

**[GIVE THE INTERVIEWEE CARD “E”]**

**SOC12A.** On this scale from 1 to10 where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**

**SOC12B.** And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where **would you like** [country] politicians to be located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**

**[TAKE BACK CARD “E”]**

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[QUESTIONS VB22-MIL11E SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” OR “8”)]**

**[VB22 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, ECUADOR, PARAGUAY, AND PERU] VB22.** How likely is it that you will be penalized by the government if you do not vote in the next national election?

- (1) Very likely                      (2) Somewhat likely                      (3) Not very likely                      (4) Unlikely  
 (88) NS                                  (98) NR                                      (99) N/A

**SNW1A.** Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national, state/departmental or local elections?

- (1) Yes    (2) No **[Go to FOR1]**  
 (88) DK **[Go to FOR1]**                      (98) DA **[Go to FOR1]**                      (99) N/A

**SNW1B.** And is this position at the local, state/departmental or national level?

- (1) Local    (2) State/departmental                      (3) National  
 (4) Candidates at more than one level                      (88) DK                                      (98) DA                      (99) N/A

**FOR1.** Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about “China” in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People’s Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the **most influence in Latin America/the Caribbean?** **[READ CHOICES]**

- (1) China    (2) Japan  
 (3) India    (4) United States  
 (5) Brazil    (6) Venezuela  
 (7) Mexico    (10) Spain  
 (11) **[Don’t read ]** Another country, or                      (12) **[Don’t read ]** None **[Go to FOR4]**  
 (88) **[Don’t read ]** DK **[Go to FOR4]**                      (98) **[Do not read]** DA **[Go to FOR4]**  
 (99) N/A

**FOR2.** And thinking of **[country mentioned in FOR1]** do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?

- (1) Very positive    (2) Positive  
 (3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative                      (4) Negative  
 (5) Very negative    (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence  
 (88) **[Do not read ]** DK                                      (98) **[Do not read]** DA  
 (99) N/A

**FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China]**

And thinking of China and the influence it has in **Latin America/the Caribbean**, do you think that this influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?

- (1) Very positive    (2) Positive  
 (3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative                      (4) Negative  
 (5) Very negative    (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence  
 (88) DK    (98) DA  
 (99) N/A

**FOR4.** And **within 10 years**, in your opinion, which of the following countries will have most influence in **Latin America/the Caribbean?**

**[Read options]**

- (1) China    (2) Japan  
 (3) India    (4) United States  
 (5) Brazil    (6) Venezuela  
 (7) Mexico    (10) Spain  
 (11) **[Don’t read ]** Another country, or                      (12) **[Don’t read ]** None  
 (88) DK    (98) DA  
 (99) N/A

<b>EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES</b>					
<b>[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]</b>					
<b>FOR5.</b> In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of <b>our country</b> ? <b>[Read options]</b>					
(1) China	(2) Japan	(3) India	(4) United States	(5) Singapore	(6) Russia
(7) South Korea	(10) <b>[Exclude in Brazil]</b> Brazil	(11) <b>[Exclude in Venezuela]</b> Venezuela, or	(12) <b>[Exclude in Mexico]</b> Mexico	(13) <b>[Do not read]</b> None/We ought to follow our own model	(88) DK
(14) <b>[Do not read]</b> Other	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A		
<b>FOR6.</b> And thinking now <b>only of our country</b> , how much influence do you think that China has in <b>our country</b> ? <b>[Read options]</b>					
(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) A little	(4) None <b>[Go to FOR8]</b>	(88) DK <b>[Go to FOR8]</b>	(98) DA <b>[Go to FOR8]</b>
				(88) DK	(99) N/A
<b>FOR7.</b> In general, the influence that China has on our country is <b>[Read alternatives]</b>					
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	(3) <b>[Do not read]</b> Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	(5) Very negative	(6) <b>[Do not read]</b> Has no influence
(88) DK	(98) DA				
<b>FOR8.</b> How much do you agree with the following statement: “Chinese business contributes to the economic development of [country]”? Do you <b>[Read alternatives]</b> ...					
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A
According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in [country] suffer from any of the following problems? <b>[Read alternatives.]</b>					
	<b>It is a problem</b>	<b>It is not a problem</b>	<b>No opinion/DK</b>	<b>DA</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>FOR9A.</b> Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter?	1	2	88	98	99
<b>FOR9B.</b> Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of [country].	1	2	88	98	99
<b>FOR9C.</b> Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and rules in [country].	1	2	88	98	99
<b>FOR9D.</b> Lack of communication with the media and residents.	1	2	88	98	99

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]**

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A
<b>MIL10A.</b> The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
<b>MIL10B.</b> That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
<b>MIL10C.</b> Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
<b>MIL10D.</b> Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
<b>MIL10E.</b> United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion	DA	N/A
<b>MIL11A.</b> China.	1	2	3	88	98	99
<b>MIL11B.</b> And our country's relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]**

**MIL11C.** And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

1	2	3	88	98	99
---	---	---	----	----	----

**MIL11D.** And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

1	2	3	88	98	99
---	---	---	----	----	----

**MIL11E.** Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

1	2	3	88	98	99
---	---	---	----	----	----

On a different subject...

**CCT1NEW.** Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?

(1) Yes      (2) No      (88) DK      (98) DA

**EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” OR “8”), AND ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, MEXICO, AND PERU]**

**CCT1B.** Now, talking specifically about the [Conditional Cash Transfers], are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this program?

(1) Yes      (2) No      (88) DK      (98) DA      (99) N/A

**ED.** How many years of schooling have you completed?

\_\_\_\_\_ Year \_\_\_\_\_ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = \_\_\_\_\_ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1 <sup>0</sup>	2 <sup>0</sup>	3 <sup>0</sup>	4 <sup>0</sup>	5 <sup>0</sup>	6 <sup>0</sup>
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12
University	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15			
Doesn't know	88					
Doesn't respond	98					

**ODD QUESTIONNAIRES**

**[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” “9”)]**

**ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]**

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor’s degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor’s degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

**MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the ...? [READ OPTIONS]**

- (1) Upper class
- (2) Upper middle class
- (3) Middle class
- (4) Lower middle class, or
- (5) Lower class?
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

**Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? [If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]**

\_\_\_\_\_ Day \_\_\_\_\_ Month (01 = January) \_\_\_\_\_ Year  
 (For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR)  
 (For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)

\_|\_|Q2D  
 Day  
 |\_|\_|Q2M  
 Month  
 |\_|\_|\_|Q2Y  
 Year

**Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options]**

**[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]**

- (1) Catholic
- (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).
- (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha’i).
- (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)
- (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).
- (6) LDS (Mormon).
- (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
- (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).
- (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).
- (12) Jehovah’s Witness.
- (88) DK
- (98) DA



**[GIVE CARD “F”]**

**Q10NEW.** Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

**[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: “Which is the total monthly income in your household?”]**

[17 categories based on the currency and distribution of the country]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$25
- (02) \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) More than \$751
- (11) xxxx
- (12) xxxx
- (13) xxxx
- (14) xxxx
- (15) xxxx
- (16) xxxx
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

**[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]**

**Q10G.** How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension? **[If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]**

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$25
- (02) \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) More than \$750
- (11) xxxx
- (12) xxxx
- (13) xxxx
- (14) xxxx
- (15) xxxx
- (16) xxxx
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

**[TAKE BACK CARD “F”]**

<p><b>Q10A.</b> Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?</p> <p>(1) Yes                      (2) No                      (88) DK                      (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q14.</b> Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?</p> <p>(1) Yes                      (2) No                      (88) DK                      (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q10D.</b> The salary that you receive and total household income: <b>[Read the options]</b></p> <p>(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it  (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems  (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched  (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time  (88) <b>[Don't read]</b> DK                      (98) <b>[Don't read]</b> DA</p>	
<p><b>Q10E.</b> Over the past two years, has the income of your household: <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Increased?  (2) Remained the same?  (3) Decreased?  (88) DK                      (98) DA</p>	

<b>EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES</b>					
<b>[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]</b>					
Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
<b>FS2.</b> In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
<b>FS8.</b> In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

<p><b>Q11.</b> What is your marital status? <b>[Read options]</b></p> <p>(1) Single <b>[Go to Q12C]</b>                      (2) Married <b>[CONTINUE]</b>  (3) Common law marriage <b>[CONTINUE]</b>                      (4) Divorced <b>[Go to Q12C]</b>  (5) Separated <b>[Go to Q12C]</b>                      (6) Widowed <b>[Go to Q12C]</b>  (88) DK <b>[Go to Q12C]</b>                      (98) DA <b>[Go to Q12C]</b></p>	
<p><b>GEN10.</b> Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries <b>[Read alternatives]</b></p> <p>(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;  (2) You earn less than your spouse;  (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;  (4) You earn more than your spouse;  (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.  (6) <b>[DON'T READ]</b> No salary income  (88) DK  (98) DA  (99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>Q12C.</b> How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____</p> <p>(88) DK                      (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> Do you have children? How many? _____</p> <p><b>(00 = none → Skip to ETID)</b>                      (88) DK                      (98) DA</p>	
<p><b>Q12B.</b> How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household?</p> <p>_____</p> <p><b>00 = none,</b>                      (88) DK                      (98) DA                      (99) INAP (no children)</p>	



R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more
R6. Washing machine		(0) No		(1) Yes
R7. Microwave oven		(0) No		(1) Yes
R8. Motorcycle		(0) No		(1) Yes
R12. Indoor plumbing		(0) No		(1) Yes
R14. Indoor bathroom		(0) No		(1) Yes
R15. Computer		(0) No [GO TO R16]		(1) Yes
R18. Internet	(0) No		(1) Yes	(99) N/A
R16. Flat panel TV		(0) No		(1) Yes
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?		(0) No		(1) Yes

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

<b>COLORR.</b> [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____ (97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]	_ _ _
Time interview ended _____ : _____ <b>TI.</b> Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____	_ _ _
<b>INTID.</b> Interviewer ID number: _____	_ _ _
<b>SEXI.</b> Note your own sex: (1) Male (2) Female	
<b>COLORI.</b> Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	_ _ _

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Field supervisor's signature \_\_\_\_\_


Comments:

[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data \_\_\_\_\_


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**Card A (L1)**




**Card A (L1B)**






# Card B






# Card C






## Card D





# **Card E**





## Card F

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$25
- (02) \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) More than \$751
- (11) Xxxx
- (12) Xxxx
- (13) Xxxx
- (14) Xxxx
- (15) Xxxx
- (16) Xxxx

## Color Palette



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## The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org). In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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