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DEMOCRACY AUDIT: ECUADOR 2004

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## I. Introduction: Background and Methods

### The Events in Ecuador, 2000-2004

We begin this study with a brief review of the major political and economic events that transpired in Ecuador between the completion of the 2001 study and the initiation of the 2004 study. It was time, world-wide of earth-shaking events, punctuated by aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. This brief report, however, looks only at Ecuador and events that directly impacted it.

Between 2001 and 2004 Ecuador's political climate was largely shaped by economic forces. Heightened economic instability created pressure for the government to dollarize the country's economy, but this recommendation resulted in public outcry, which, along with the banking crisis and the freezing of bank accounts, eventually ended in the bloodless overthrow of then-President Jamil Mahuad. Despite the controversy of the policy, however, his successor adopted the dollar as Ecuador's official currency. This measure, coupled with an increased emphasis on Ecuador's lucrative oil sector led to slow but steady improvements in Ecuador's economy, including increased GDP and declining inflation.

The pressures of monetary restriction and privatization were met with substantial resistance. Led by the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, the indigenous population became increasingly vocal in rejecting the economic model put forth by the government.

In 2003, Lucio Gutiérrez was elected President on a populist platform, supported by a broad coalition of rather diverse groups. With wide support from the indigenous community, and in spite of his position as an outsider, he won the presidency by a safe margin. But in the first year of his administration Gutierrez made policy choices that were not supported by his mostly indigenous and poor constituency, resulting again in widespread social and political discontent. Labor strikes and protests characterized much of 2003.

In general terms the country's economic indicators improved during the three-year period under discussion, including a substantial decline in inflation and an increase in GDP growth and GDP per capita. However, continued protests over oil production, disputes over the salaries of public employees, the privatization of state-owned corporations and growing concern over living standards obscured that economic progress.



## ***Political and Economic Events prior to 2002***

In 1999 GDP shrank by over six percent in Ecuador and an important portion of the banking sector collapsed, along with the currency, the *sucre*. In January 2000, then-president Jamil Mahuad announced a plan for dollarization of the local currency in order to curb hyperinflation. Days later he was forced out of office in a bloodless military coup backed by local peasant farmers. Mahuad was replaced by his own vice-president, Gustavo Noboa.

Despite the controversy surrounding dollarization and the fears that its impact would be felt disproportionately among Ecuador's substantial poor population, Mr. Noboa pressed ahead with plans to dollarize the country in an effort to stabilize the volatile economy. In February 2000, the dollar was adopted as the official currency. No longer able to print money to make up for a currency shortfall, Ecuador's economy became increasingly dependent on foreign investment.

The stability associated with dollarization, coupled with an increase in international oil prices and an IMF loan package in 2000, increased investor confidence and led to a stabilization of the financial sector. In February 2001 President Noboa signed a U\$1.1 billion contract to build an oil pipeline that would transport oil from the Amazon to the Pacific coast.

The petroleum sector is the driving force of the Ecuadorian economy, representing more than 10 percent of GDP and more than 50 percent of the country's export earnings. It is for this reason that many of the country's economic hopes were placed in the oil pipeline project. The pipeline promised to double Ecuador's oil export capacity, creating 50,000 new jobs and generating 3 billion dollars in foreign investment. According to the plan, GDP growth would be positively affected for two decades.

Noboa's government also proposed several privatization ventures, moving forward with the privatization of public industries such as electricity and water.

In response, both indigenous groups and grassroots movements mobilized, demanding improvements in basic infrastructure, including road repairs and increased access to electricity. Such uprisings and violence reached their climax in 2001 with the bombing of a state bank and the blocking of highways across the country.

Despite such setbacks, Ecuador's macroeconomic situation improved in 2002. GDP grew by three percent, compared with the negative growth of more than -6 percent at the end of the 1990's. This led to a rise in GDP per capita. Official unemployment in the country also decreased in the same period, from slightly more than 15 percent in 1999 to 8.6 percent at the end of 2002. In December, Ecuador's inflation rate had fallen to less than 10%, in comparison to the high double-digit inflation at the end of the 1990's.

Ecuadorian migration to both Europe and the United States increased since the end of the 1990s, with an estimated 400,000 Ecuadorians living abroad in 2001. In that year remittances to



Ecuador from abroad amounted to \$1.4 billion, a figure almost on par with the \$1.7 billion captured from oil exports.

### ***Major political trends of 2002 and 2003***

In 2002, President Noboa's government confronted several political obstacles, including continued protests over the oil pipeline project. Indigenous protestors demanding increased public spending created road blocks and took over oil wells to halt construction on the pipeline in February 2002. These protests stopped virtually all oil-related traffic from the Amazon region. In response, President Noboa declared a state of emergency. The government put the military in charge of the provincial capitals and restricted freedom of expression in an attempt to end the protests and restore oil activity in the area.

Representatives from the UN mediated talks between the government and provincial representatives, resulting in an agreement ensuring increased access to electricity and construction of 200km of new roads. The government also promised increased access to credit for farmers from the Amazon region.

But these measures did not contain mounting discontent. Again, in May 2002 thousands of protestors took to the streets. Indigenous leaders, union workers and politicians protested in Quito and Guayaquil to demand increased salaries, and in July 14,000 health workers went on strike, leaving public hospitals virtually empty of attending staff.

In addition to popular protests, corruption scandals also made the headlines in 2002. In June, Ecuador's Finance Minister and two ministry undersecretaries were accused of skimming upwards of US\$100 million from central government transfers for municipal infrastructure projects. The network of officials accused of corruption included many of Ecuador's municipal governments as well as officials from other government ministries and several congressional representatives.

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2002 ranked Ecuador as the second most corrupt country in Latin America, and the 12<sup>th</sup> most corrupt in the world. Only Paraguay received a worse rating than Ecuador in the Latin American region. The military, whose image the 2001 study showed was very high, especially when compared to other countries in Latin America, suffered a decline, in part a result of a number of scandals that tarnished its image during this period.

While the country reeled from the corruption scandal at the end of 2002, a Presidential campaign provided ample opportunity to demand change. None of Ecuador's traditional political parties won the first round of elections. Instead, two political outsiders vied for the presidency, including Lucio Gutiérrez, a former general who played a key role in the bloodless coup against former President Jamil Mahuad, and Alvaro Noboa, the country's leading grower of bananas, Ecuador's number one export. The runoff between the candidates resulted in a win for Gutiérrez, with 54 percent of the vote, as compared to Noboa's 46 percent.



Gutiérrez' populist platform, promising to reduce corruption, create jobs and increase social spending, was supported by Ecuador's indigenous and poor voters. He received significant political backing from national indigenous movements, including the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). Movimiento Pachakutik, the largest political party representing Ecuador's indigenous population also endorsed his candidacy. Gutiérrez was the first presidential candidate in Ecuador to harness the growing political power of the indigenous community. Upon taking office in January 2003, the new President named four Pachakutik party members to his cabinet.

However, the new President's new administration confronted substantial challenges. While Gutiérrez won the presidency, his Patriotic Society party won few seats in the 100-member National Congress. He also inherited large international debt and limited access to international capital. Furthermore, the legacy of social instability left by the Noboa administration created an investment atmosphere untenable for most international investors.

Shortly after taking office the President began negotiations with the IMF for a US\$205 million stand-by loan. To entice the international community he committed his administration to cutting government investment in the state-owned petroleum company, Petroecuador. He also reaffirmed the commitment made by President Noboa to utilize 70% of the Fondo de Estabilización, Inversión y Reducción del Endeudamiento Público (FEIREP) to pay down public debt, while 20 percent would be used as a financial cushion in the case of falling oil prices and ten percent would be earmarked for social spending. Furthermore, Gutiérrez announced an austerity plan to generate revenue and cut expenditure, including a freeze on public sector salaries. Finally, to quell the fears of the international investor community, Gutiérrez offered concessions for future oil investment.

Growing concern emerged over Gutiérrez' economic policy and his popularity declined steadily during the first year of his administration. In April he opened international bidding for the operation of major oil fields in the Amazon, resulting in protests by oil workers and indigenous groups. Work stoppages led to a slowdown in the oil industry, and the government called for military intervention in order to assure continued petrol production.

Other protests throughout the public sector echoed Ecuadorians' concerns about the economic policy of the Gutiérrez administration. In May the largest teacher's union led a strike of more than 100,000 public school teachers. In September more than 5,000 employees of the state-owned electricity supply companies went on strike in response to the government's push to transfer management of the country's electricity to international management firms. Strikes continued within the public sector throughout most of 2003.

After seven months in office, differences of opinion over Presidential policy also led to a split between Gutiérrez and the Pachakutik party. In June the Vice Minister of the Interior, a prominent Pachakutik member resigned citing internal conflicts of interest. Shortly thereafter, discussions of a bill eliminating subsidies on cooking gas, electricity and diesel exacerbated fractures in the government coalition; the four appointed Pachakutik cabinet members were dismissed.



A few months later, the leading newspaper in Quito published an article alleging that Gutiérrez had accepted a \$30,000 campaign contribution from a former governor arrested for drug trafficking. Although Gutiérrez denied the allegations, parties close the president admitted direct ties to the former governor. By December, Gutiérrez' approval rating fell to 18 percent, from 57 percent at the start of his presidency.

Despite mounting criticism from the public, however, Ecuador's economic prospects at the end of 2003 showed improvement. The country registered the lowest inflation on record since the 1970s, and GDP growth continued to be positive. Furthermore, Gutiérrez managed to balance the public finances. At the same time, though, unemployment climbed to over ten percent, and more than half of Ecuador's population lived below the poverty line.

Politics in Ecuador was increasingly impacted by Colombia's internal conflict as well, as by displaced persons from Colombia sought refuge in Ecuador's border communities. Immigrant populations have strained an already tight resource base. At the same time, the types of violence commonly associated with the Colombian conflict are thought to more common in towns along the Colombian border. Furthermore, the appearance of coca cultivation in Ecuador, perhaps in an attempt to migrate away from the large scale fumigation initiative of the US, led to an increased focus on diplomatic relations between Ecuador and the United States.

## The 2004 Survey

In the context of the economic and political events described above, in early 2004 the University of Pittsburgh undertook to interview a national sample of Ecuadorians to find out what they think about democracy and how they behave politically. The study was carried out as part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project with financial support coming from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ecuador. The data were collected by CEDATOS, the Gallup International affiliate in Ecuador, and were designed to represent all voting-age adults in the country (with the exception of the residents of Galapagos).

To convey our results as clearly as we can, we include numerous graphs, methodological notes, and also include the complete text of our questionnaire as an appendix. Since the issues are complex, we have been compelled to include some (seemingly) complex multivariate data analysis in order to justify our conclusions, most of the key findings are conveyed with graphs that we hope most readers will readily comprehend. To further enhance the impact of the work, we compare our results with other countries of Latin America, drawing on our archive of data at the University of Pittsburgh, as well as to the results from the 2001 national sample carried out in Ecuador in the final months of that year.

An important goal of this study is to stimulate and contribute to the national debate on democracy and the importance of citizen democratic values and behaviors (i.e., the political



culture). This English version of the study will be translated into Spanish and published in Ecuador and will be the subject of several presentations and discussions later this year.

We conclude this introductory chapter with a general discussion of the sample design and include a detailed appendix providing a more technical description of the sample.



## Sample Design

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under represented in the election.<sup>1</sup>

Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

In this study of Ecuador, it was decided to design a sample that covered all non-institutionalized adults<sup>2</sup> with the exception of those living in the Galapagos Islands, who were excluded for cost considerations. Since the sample is of probability design, i.e., it is “random” we wanted to make sure that all major geographic regions of the country were covered, and this meant that we would need to “stratify” the sample into three zones: the coast, the sierra and the Amazon (or oriente). Without stratification, random chance could have resulted in very few interviews in any one of these areas. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample by guaranteeing that the respondents will come from each of the regions of interest.

Beyond the question of dividing the country into these three zones, we had to deal with the problem of the relatively small size of the population in the oriente. Population totals, based on the best census projections were used to determine what percentage of the national population lives in each of those areas. For example, the 1990 census shows that 50.5% of the population lives in the coastal provinces, 45.5% in the Sierra, and 4.0% in the Amazon. This means that we would want the sample to reflect that division of the population, for if it does not, the results would under or over represent one of these geographic areas (but see the discussion on weighting below). Within each of those areas, there is a further breakdown, or stratification, of urban vs. rural, and again, we want the survey to reflect the relevant proportions of the population.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are three high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the three schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the

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<sup>1</sup>This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, recent past President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> That is, we did not include those in hospitals or incarcerated in prisons.



raffle tickets in one bowl, and have three tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup>), then a total of 9 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 3 schools).

In Ecuador it is important to further subdivide the three regions into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each province into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of provinces we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each province by population size. It is common practice in Ecuador to divide the population into strata by population, covering the large cities of Quito and Guayaquil, as well as middle-size cities and smaller areas. Our sample for each of the three major regions of Ecuador has been stratified in this fashion.

How accurate is our sample? We interviewed 2,925 people in 2001 and 3000 in 2004, which means that for the sample as a whole, the accuracy was  $\pm 1.8\%$  in the worst case.<sup>3</sup> A “worst case” arises when the responses are evenly split, 50/50, making it very difficult to judge which response is the most preferred to a given question. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario the survey provides accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 1.8% more or 1.8% less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing in Ecuador. Under more favorable conditions<sup>4</sup> the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 1.1\%$ . Technically, the sampling error of  $\pm 1.8\%$  means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Ecuador, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than  $\pm 1.8\%$ . Of course, factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of  $\pm 1.8\%$  is very good and unprecedented for political culture surveys of Ecuador. Indeed, most of those studies, as noted above, focused only upon the major cities.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the region and within each region by size of city/town, we have what is called a “multi-stage stratified sample design.” But now the question comes as to how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Ecuador. That is because the Amazon region would have such

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<sup>3</sup>But see the technical description of the sample below.

<sup>4</sup>For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.



a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample was very, very large.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a larger sample from the Amazon than the population size residing there would call for, since to draw a sample in proportion to the size of the population there would have resulted in a sample of only about 120 respondents. In order to correct for the over sample, however, we then apply sample weights, which means that the entire sample reflects the actual known distribution of the population between the coast, sierra and oriente.

We decided that a  $\pm 4.5\%$  accuracy of the sample in the oriente region was a reasonable target, considering cost and time factors. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario within the Amazon the survey is an accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 4.5% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 3.5\%$ .

What of the other two regions, the coast and the sierra? In the coast we interviewed 1,293 respondents, which yield a sampling error of  $\pm 2.8\%$ . In the sierra, the sample was 1,154, yielding a confidence interval of  $\pm 2.9\%$ . We can say in rough terms that when we are talking about the results of the sample as a whole our sampling error is less than 2%, and when we are talking about the coast or the sierra it is less than 3% and, finally, we can say that in the Amazon it is no larger than 4.5%.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the 22 provinces. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. According to the careful calculations carried out by CEDATOS, the confidence for the clustered stratified sample design actually implemented was  $\pm 1.86\%$ , a very small increase from the theoretical level of  $\pm 1.8\%$  stated above. For the three main strata, the actual sampling errors were: Coast:  $\pm 2.79\%$ ; Sierra:  $\pm 2.97\%$ ; Oriente:  $\pm 4.54\%$  It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection. The individual respondent within the household was selected and included up to three call-backs per household if the respondent selected was not home.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by CEDATOS, the Gallup affiliate in Ecuador. This firm has had many years of experience, and carried out hundreds of



surveys in the country. A full technical description of the sample is contained as an appendix to this chapter.

### Overview of the Sample

It is best to begin the data presentation in this report with an overview of the characteristics of the sample, comparing the 2001 sample to that of 2004. All of these results, as well as nearly all of the ones presented in the chapters that follow, are based on the weighted sample. Only on occasion, when we want to compare subsets of the sample, might we deviate from that scheme in order to revert to the actual sample size. These weights correct for the over sampling in the Amazon, and also adjust for the distributions within each stratum (e.g., urban/rural) and correct for the inevitable biases that results from strict probability sampling at the household level (e.g., the overrepresentation of females).

The sample is distributed evenly by gender as is shown in Figure I.1. As can be seen, the distribution is identical for both samples.





Figure I.1 Distribution of samples by gender



The distribution of the sample by age is shown in Figure I.2. As can be seen, the bulk of the sample is young, matching the distribution of the population of the country, which has long had a high rate of fertility.<sup>5</sup> Both samples have nearly identical age distributions.




**Figure I.2 Distribution of sample by age**

<sup>5</sup> The World Bank reports a crude birth rate for 2002 of 23 per 1,000, which compares to 17 in Chile and 11 in Finland. At the other extreme would be Ethiopia, with a score of 40 per 1,000. See [www.worldbank.org/data](http://www.worldbank.org/data).



In terms of education, the results show levels higher than those of the census of ten years earlier, an indication that the heavy investment in human capital is paying off. A summary is contained in Figure I.3. In both of these samples, it appears that the survey produced a sample with a level of education above that of the national norm. For example, while the samples produced an average of 10 years of education per respondent, the 2001 national census yields a figure of 7.1 years. Part of the problem, however, is that the national census reports only on those who have 10 or more years of age, while our survey is of those 18 and older. The census, therefore, includes many individuals who were 10-18 years of age at the moment of the census, but who had not yet gone on to finish their educations because they were not yet old enough. Since Ecuador has high fertility rates, the proportion of the population 10-18 is large.<sup>6</sup> The sample, however, includes those 18 years of age and older, and therefore a larger proportion of the sample population did not have the opportunity to complete high school and college. As a result, the mean education level of the census would be expected to be lower than the sample.



Ecuador is a poor country, and the income distribution in the sample reflects this reality. As can be seen, the great bulk of those in the sample have monthly family incomes of lower than

<sup>6</sup> The on-line version of the census shows that those younger than 25 represent 53% of the national population. The web information from INEC does not provide breakdowns by age for the 10-18 year cohort.



\$300. What is also evident is that incomes have risen since 2001, in line with the increase national GNP per capita, as discussed above. With the exception of those with no income (unemployed, students, home makers, etc.) the proportion of the population in the lower income levels is higher in 2004 than in 2001.




Figure I.4 Distribution of sample by income



Income does vary by residence, as is shown in Figure I.5. Quito and Guayaquil have the highest levels of income, but, on the 14-point scale used to measure income (as shown in Figure I.5), the variation is not great. In each location except Guayaquil, the 2004 figures are higher than 2001. One wonders why Guayaquil has not prospered as well as the rest of the nation.



**Figure I.5 Income and residence**

## Conclusions

This chapter has provided background on the study of the political culture of democracy in Ecuador. We have presented the methodology of the study, and demonstrated that the two samples are virtually identical. This means that any differences we find between the results in 2001 and those in 2004 are not a function of differences in the sample, but arise as a result of true differences in opinion and behavior that has occurred over this period of time. As we will see, important differences do emerge. In the pages that follow, different aspects of Ecuador's political culture will be examined. The data set, however, contains much more information, that can be broken down into areas of interest to specific projects (e.g., a study of the sierra region that is interested in the participation of women in local government). Ecuadorians and international agencies are encouraged to make use of this data for their studies and project planning.







## II. Support for Stable Democracy

This chapter seeks to understand the degree to which attitudes in Ecuador support democratic stability, comparing the results from the 2004 survey with those from 2001. Emphasis is placed on *democratic* stability because stability without democracy is clearly not ideal, in that it can lead to long term authoritarian regimes like those of Stroessner, Pinochet, Somoza or Castro.

The chapter first examines the achievements of the political community in Ecuador, showing that now, like three years ago, the great majority of Ecuadorians share a sense of belonging in that community. Then, institutional support and political tolerance are taken into account as democratic values; the degree to which Ecuadorians subscribe to the values and attitudes related to these concepts is varied and tends to fluctuate, although there is a general tendency toward growth. In other words, the conditions for a stable democracy show signs that the country is better off now than it was in 2001.

The chapter presents a model in which support for the political system and support for tolerance are seen as requirements for stable political democracy. The results from Ecuador are compared with those of the other countries included in the Latin American Public Opinion Project database.

### The existence of a political community in Ecuador

A crucial factor in the political stability of any country is that its citizens support the notion of political stability. Support, as has been recently pointed out by Pippa Norris of the JFK School at Harvard, is multidimensional<sup>1</sup>. At its most general level, citizens must believe in the existence and support of the “political community”. According to Norris (p. 10), this supposes “basic adherence to the nation”.


The survey presented a large series of questions in the realm of support for democratic systems; one of those (B43) focused directly on the pride felt in belonging to the political community through the following question: To what degree are you proud to be Ecuadorian? Respondents replied based on a scale from one to seven, from one, indicating no pride, to seven, indicating a high degree of pride.

The results from 2001 showed that an overwhelming majority of the population felt proud to be Ecuadorian. The results in 2004 are very similar. In fact, there is even an increase in the number that expresses pride in being an Ecuadorian. Figure II.1 and Figure II.2 compare the distribution of responses for both years, taking into account the different regions of the country.


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<sup>1</sup>Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.






As can be seen, the pride that Ecuadorians feel is high across all regions in the country. In the three years between the two surveys pride tends to rise in general terms. While the mean for 2001 was 6.31 on the one to seven scale (approx. 88 over 100), the national average was 6.54 for 2004 (92 over 100, a statistically significant difference). The proportion of those who feel very proud rose in all regions except the coast, where it decreased, although not significantly. Figure II.3 illustrates the differences between the two years for all regions.



**Figure II.3 Average pride in being Ecuadorian: by region**

Figure II.4 shows the differences in the average pride in being Ecuadorian according to city size. The major changes occurred in the “rural areas,” “big cities” and “medium cities,” with the other areas exhibiting minor shifts, all insignificant.

**Figure II.4 Pride in being an Ecuadorian, by urbanization**

There is not a significant relationship between age, gender, education, wealth and other socioeconomic indicators and pride in being Ecuadorian. Given that the differences in averages are scant when we take into account the magnitude of the scale, we can say that pride in being Ecuadorian is quite high in the country and that, with the exception of the two principal cities, it tends to increase over time.

## System support

Now we will look at what happens with the other indicators of support for Ecuadorian institutions. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure what is defined as “system support”, which evaluates a general feeling of the legitimacy of the political system. Throughout this publication “system support” and “institutional support” are used as synonymous expressions referring to the same concept.

All the questions were based on the same format and on the same one to seven scale that was used to measure pride in being Ecuadorian, allowing for direct comparison. However, so that the reader can easily compare responses, items have been converted to the familiar one to 100 scale (commonly used to score exams).

Figure II.5, Figure II.6 and Figure II.7 show the differences in mean trust in each of the included institutions. Figure II.5 refers to civil society organizations; Figure II.6 shows average trust in state institutions for the two years; while Figure II.7 shows what we could call institutional systems.






Figure II.5. System support and civil society



All the civil society institutions and organizations included in the survey show higher average support in 2004 than in 2001, except church-based groups and indigenous movements. In the case of church-based groups the difference is minimal and not statistically significant. The case of indigenous movements is, however, significant; the average level of trust declined by three points. This shows that the national image of the organizations that make up this movement has declined in relation to what they had three years ago.




Figure II.6 System support: state institutions

The trust that people have in what we call “state institutions” is shown in Figure II.6. With the exception of the armed forces, all the state institutions included in the survey showed higher levels of trust in 2004 than in 2001. These differences are statistically significant. In the case of the armed forces, the decrease of eight points on the scale is statistically significant and large in absolute terms; it is important to note that, together with indigenous movements, the armed forces played a central role in the events that ended the government of Jamil Muhuad and that, either directly or indirectly, brought Lucio Gutiérrez to power.

The decrease in trust in the armed services and in indigenous movements is of note. It may be that it is related to the decrease in the disapproval of President Gutiérrez in the country (question M1 in the survey), or it may be that the citizens are reacting to various scandals in the military and disapproval of indigenous protests. We note, however, that there is a relatively

strong statistically significant correlation (Pearson correlation of  $r = -.175$ ) between the approval of the government and trust in the armed forces; in the case of indigenous movements, that correlation is much weaker ( $r = -.063$ ), but is also statistically significant. This implies that people still associate president Gutiérrez with the armed forces and to a lesser degree with indigenous movements and that the decrease in trust in these institutions is associated with the worsening public image of the President.




Figure II.7 System support: system results



Ecuadorians trust free elections in 2004 more than in 2001; the same occurs in the case of fair trials (although the increase is not statistically significant) and the guarantee of basic rights; pride in belonging to the Ecuadorian political system and support for the Ecuadorian political system are also higher, as is the total index of system support, as shown in the last two bars in Figure II.7. Despite increases, Ecuadorians in general show low levels of trust that Ecuadorian institutions guarantee basic conditions like citizen's rights and fair trials.

In general terms, system support has increased between the 2001 and 2004 surveys. With the exception of the armed forces and indigenous movements, civil society institutions, the State and the perceptions of Ecuadorians all exhibit higher results than three years ago. This increase in system support may be related to the improvement of the economy after the sharp crisis the country experienced during the 1990s. The decrease, although small, in the trust in indigenous movements and the armed forces may be linked to dissatisfaction of Ecuadorians with these institutions after the 2000 coup.

A full listing of the entire series of trust in institutions is too large to fit into a figure, but it is contained in Table II.1.



**Table II.1** Trust in institutions: full series for 2001 and 2004

How much do you trust.... (0-100 scale)	Year	
	2001	2004
B1R Courts	33.1	33.4
B2R Institutions	48.8	51.4
B3R Basic Rights	36.2	38.3
B4R Pride in Political System	37.1	41.2
B6R Support	41.8	46.1
B11R Election Court	34.6	38.1
B12R Armed Forces	62.8	54.9
B13R Congress	24.7	25.3
B14R National Government	30.5	31.4
B15R Fiscalía	30.1	34.4
B16R Prosecutor	30.8	35.5
B17R Public Defender	46.5	54.3
B18R Police	43.7	45.9
B19R Comptroller General	35.4	39.3
B20R Catholic Church	67.5	69.0
B21R Parties	21.4	22.3
B31R Supreme Court	29.0	31.7
B32R Municipality	46.7	51.4
B33R Provincial. Prefecture	40.0	46.5
B35R Free Elections	47.7	59.1
B37R Mass Media	58.7	62.8
B38R Unions	34.9	38.9
B39R Chambers of Commerce	39.5	40.9
B40R Indigenous movements	46.8	43.9
B41R Junta Parroquial	46.9	46.8
B42R Internal Revenue	37.9	42.2
B43R Pride in being Ecuadoran	88.5	92.3
B44R Constitutional Court	39.8	43.8
B45R Anti-Corruption Commission	37.7	42.2
B46R Relatives	75.2	79.8
B47R Friends	58.9	63.1
B48R Neighbors	52.0	57.7
B49R People of neighborhood	50.5	56.4
B50R Participación Ciudadana	Not asked 2001	55.5

Another way of looking at these same numbers is by listing them, for 2004, in descending order, from highest support to lowest. It should be noted that Participación Ciudadana, which was included for the first time in 2004, was asked as a “filter question.” That is, only those



respondents who said that they had heard of this organization, were asked about their level of trust in it. Therefore, as shown in Table II.2, the sample N is much smaller for that question than the others.




**Table II.2 Trust in institutions, 2004, ranked in order from most to least trusted**

	N	Mean
B43R Pride in being Ecuadoran	2983	92.3
B46R Relatives	2981	79.8
B20R Catholic Church	2957	69.0
B47R Friends	2975	63.1
B37R Mass Media	2925	62.8
B35R Free Elections	2828	59.1
B48R Neighbors	2978	57.7
B49R People of neighborhood	2973	56.4
B50R Participación Ciudadana	1123	55.5
B12R Armed Forces	2944	54.9
B17R Public Defender	2780	54.3
B2R Institutions	2910	51.4
B32R Municipality	2970	51.4
B41R Junta Parroquial	2777	46.8
B33R Prov. Prefecture	2850	46.5
B6R Support	2911	46.1
B18R Police	2964	45.9
B40R Indigenous movements	2892	43.9
B44R Constitutional Court	2660	43.8
B42R Internal Revenue	2663	42.2
B45R Anti-Corruption Commission	2809	42.2
B4R Pride in Political System	2922	41.2
B39R Chambers of Commerce	2710	40.9
B19R Comptroller General	2588	39.3
B38R Unions	2767	38.9
B3R Basic Rights	2881	38.3
B11R Election Court	2889	38.1
B16R Prosecutor	2575	35.5
B15R Fiscalía	2644	34.4
B1R Courts	2866	33.4
B31R Supreme Court	2816	31.7
B14R National Government	2956	31.4
B13R Congress	2945	25.3
B21R Parties	2950	22.3



In comparative terms, the increases in system support in 2004 in Ecuador are still not sufficient to achieve the levels of support of other Latin American countries. Compared with the results of other countries involved in the Latin American Public Opinion Project, Ecuador is the country with the lowest level of support on the part of its citizens. This comparison can be seen in Figure II.8.



**Figure II.8 System support: Ecuador in comparative perspective**

In conclusion, Ecuadorians support almost all institutions now more than they did three years ago, with the exception of the institutions mentioned earlier. However, system support in Ecuador is the lowest among all the countries in the region for which similar data is available.

### **Predictors of System Support**

What are the factors that differentiate Ecuadorians in terms of their system support? In the chapter on corruption, a complete analysis of the impact of corruption victimization is carried out, and for this reason, we do not include that variable here. Through the use of linear regression analysis the 2001 data showed that system support was not influenced by gender, marital status, income or wealth. This same tendency is also emerged for 2004: none of these factors has a statistically significant impact on system support when other variables are controlled. In other words, in the time between the two surveys, the patterns of system support have not changed, at least not in terms of the socioeconomic factors described above.

The factors that in 2001 demonstrated an impact on system support were linked to education, to perceptions of the economic situation and to participation in municipal affairs. Table II.3 shows the coefficients for the relevant variables in both years.



Table II.3 Predictors of system support

Year		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
2001	(Constant)	31.840	1.681		18.942	.000
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.470	.109	-.096	-4.315	<b>.000</b>
	IDIO3R Personal economic situation next year	.067	.012	.127	5.544	<b>.000</b>
	SOCT1R View of economic situation of the country	.115	.022	.119	5.212	<b>.000</b>
	SGL1R Satisfaction with municipal Services	.117	.020	.129	5.756	<b>.000</b>
	NP1R Participated in municipal meeting	.039	.015	.060	2.616	<b>.009</b>
	NP2R Made Demand on municipality	-.034	.012	-.066	-2.874	<b>.004</b>
MUNI5R Participation in municipal budget formulation	-.058	.021	-.062	-2.767	<b>.006</b>	
2004	(Constant)	38.183	1.697		22.505	.000
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.348	.109	-.071	-3.187	<b>.001</b>
	IDIO3R Personal economic situation next year	.034	.012	.063	2.792	<b>.005</b>
	SOCT1R View of economic situation of the country	.091	.022	.090	4.032	<b>.000</b>
	SGL1R Satisfaction with municipal services	.054	.020	.060	2.702	<b>.007</b>
	NP1R Participated in municipal meeting	.019	.017	.025	1.099	.272
	NP2R Made demand on municipality	-.001	.014	-.001	-.051	.959
MUNI5R Participation in municipal budget formulation	.013	.030	.009	.425	.671	

Variable dependiente: PSA5 System support


Comparing the results of the two years, we see that four of the seven variables continue having a statistically significant impact on system support: education, perception of the personal economic situation, perception of the economic situation in the country and satisfaction with



municipal services (see the last column on the right for statistical significance). The other three, participation in municipal meetings, municipal demand-making and participation in municipal budget-making no longer have a relevant impact on system support. As is shown later in this study, there has also been a decline in municipal participation.

The fact that the variables related to municipal participation have lost their explanatory power may be related to the increase registered on the system support index in the country as a whole. Participation in municipal affairs is higher the further away we get from the principal cities. While system support becomes more homogeneous in Ecuador, the difference between regions, and therefore the effect of municipal participation, also decreases.

In the case of education, system support tends to decrease as people become more educated. It would seem that as people learn more about the political system, they like what they know less and less. Figure II.9 shows the relationship between education level and system support for both 2001 and 2004.



**Figure II.9. System support and education**

Although the relationship between education and system support continues to be generally negative, we see that mean support, after falling for intermediate levels of education, rises again for people with higher education in the 2004 sample. This tendency is distinct from that observed in 2001, in which education consistently decreased mean system support. This suggests a positive change in attitude on the part of the better educated sectors of Ecuadorian

society, that now support institutions more than they did three years ago in relation to other groups.

The perception of Ecuadorians about the performance of the economy in the last few years has been negative. Almost half of respondents believe that the economic situation in Ecuador is poor, and only a little more than five percent believe that the economic situation is good or very good. Figure II.10 shows the way Ecuadorians categorize the economy. It is important to note that the results do not differ from those of 2001, and for this reason they are not shown below.





Figure II.10. Evaluation of economic situation in Ecuador




Perceptions of economic performance have an impact on system support, even though, as noted, income and wealth themselves are not predictors. This means that what counts here is not the objective condition of income or wealth, but how Ecuadorians perceive the economy to be doing. This finding might seem puzzling, but it has a simple explanation. Income itself is indeed a strong predictor of system support, and income is strongly related to perception of the national economy (the higher the income, the better the perception of the economy). But when both objective income and perception of the national economy are both entered into a multivariate equation, perception proves to be the stronger predictor and vitiates the significance of the actual level of personal income. The better a person's *perception* of economic performance is, the higher the level of institutional support. Figure II.11 shows the effect of the perception of the economy on system support. The tendency for a flatter line is clear, and this coincides with lower coefficients in the regression, suggesting that system support now shows fewer differences between Ecuadorians based on their perceptions of the Ecuadorian economy.




**Figure II.11 System support and evaluation of national economic situation**

Perceptions about the personal economic situation of individuals are another relevant factor in political attitudes. Figure II.12 and Figure II.13 show that in the case of Ecuador, people’s perceptions of their own economic situations have seen a slight negative change over time. People feel that they are personally worse off than before in economic terms, although the difference is not very large.



As happens with the perception of the economic situation in the country in general, people who believe they have good personal economic circumstances tend to support institutions more, while those who believe their personal economic circumstances to be bad show less system support. Figure II.14 shows this relationship for both 2001 and 2004.






**Figure II.14 System support and respondent's economic situation**



Two important differences can be seen between the two surveys. First, and as we noted earlier, average system support is higher for all groups in 2004. Second, system support seems to be more homogeneous now than three years ago. The green line, corresponding to 2004, not only runs higher than that of 2001, but it also flatter (less difference between groups), suggesting that differences in system support are lower.

The last factor that continues to be relevant is satisfaction with municipal services. Like in 2001, in 2004 people who are more satisfied with municipal services also tend to show levels of system support higher than those who are not satisfied with municipal services. As can be seen in Figure II.15, the tendency remains the same between the two years. While the average for 2004 is higher, the pattern is the same.




**Figure II.15 System support and satisfaction with municipal services**

Finally, the variables for municipal participation (participation in municipal meetings, municipal demand-making and participation in the elaboration of municipal budget) no longer have a negative impact on system support, as they did in 2001. This suggests that citizens have stopped seeing municipal governments as an alternative institutional space to the Ecuadorian State in general; municipalities seem to be getting better at forming part of the fabric of Ecuadorian institutions.

A detailed analysis of municipal indicators is provided in chapter VI of this report. But for the purposes of this chapter, we use two variables (B32 and MUNI6) that show that the



support for municipalities in Ecuador has grown. Variable B32 measures trust in the municipality and MUNI6 measures trust in the management of municipal funds. As can be seen in Figure II.16, the trust that individuals have in both the municipality and the administration of municipal resources has increased (these differences are statistically significant).



**Figure II.16 Trust in municipalities**

In conclusion, system support has a clear tendency to rise among the distinct groups in Ecuadorian society. At the same time, system support is more uniform now than it was in 2001. Higher system support, generalized within distinct groups in Ecuadorian society, is a positive and encouraging sign for Ecuadorian democracy, showing advances in institutional consolidation.

### **Political tolerance**

System support can tell us a great deal about stability, given that without the belief of the population and without legitimacy, the regimen can fall.<sup>2</sup> But an “institutional system” is not necessarily a democratic one; for a system to be stable and democratic, its citizens need not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but they must also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially of those with whom they disagree. When the majority of citizens are intolerant

<sup>2</sup> The section on the theory of political tolerance and its linkages has been taken from an earlier discussion of this theme in earlier reports from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.



toward the rights of others, the rights of minorities are weakened. Concretely, it is difficult, if not impossible, for those who express minority opinions to try to persuade others to accept their beliefs if the majority does not allow them to express themselves publicly. Przeworski has argued that in democracies majorities should agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process.”<sup>3</sup> In short, “democratization is the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In dictatorships there are no uncertainties since all elections, whenever they are called, produce certain and knowable outcomes even under the unlikely circumstances that the dictator does not receive a majority of the votes.

The challenge that social science has is to find a way to effectively measure political tolerance. This is not an easy task. Some researchers have created very general questions, such as, “do you believe in free speech?” However, largely favorable answers to these questions run contrary to more practical attitudes, demonstrating the limitations of such an approach.<sup>4</sup> Another approach has concentrated on specific groups, measuring the degree of support for those groups<sup>5</sup>, but the principal problem with this approach is that respondents often refuse to identify specific groups.<sup>6</sup> A third approach consists in asking questions about a group that is a victim of intolerance in society (like in the case of communists in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century<sup>7</sup>), but this approach depends greatly on the risk that people attribute to that particular group.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project uses a more general approach to the measurement of political tolerance, with particular emphasis on the possibility of making comparisons over time and between countries.<sup>8</sup> The series of four items about tolerance is as follows:

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<sup>3</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22, no. 2 (1960):276-94.

<sup>5</sup> For an application of this methodology to minorities in Israel and Costa Rica see: Mitchell A. Seligson, y Dan Caspi, “Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict,” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson y Dan Caspi, “Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica,” *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in hebrew),” *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53.


<sup>6</sup> J. L. Gibson and A. Gouws, "Social identities and political intolerance: Linkages within the South African mass public," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (2000):278-92.

<sup>7</sup> Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

<sup>8</sup> While this analysis has emphasized the difficulties in measuring tolerance, in practical terms, apart from the exclusion of large numbers of respondents produced by the focus on “least accepted groups”, it does happen that all measurements capture a single underlying dimension. For evidence, see James L. Gibson, “Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be ‘Least-Liked?’,” *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.



The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Ecuador. This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot.



D1. There are people who only say bad things about the form of the governments of Ecuador, not only the current government, but the form of the Ecuadorian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people be allowed to run for public office?


D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of those people appearing on television to make a speech?

This methodology seems to be the best compromise because it does not exclude those who do not select a “least-liked” group, while it also does not tie the response to a specific group (e.g., “communists”), that would have different salience in different countries. Its disadvantage is that it focuses on those who “only say bad things about the Ecuadorian form of government.” Those people who wish to see that form changed might be more tolerant toward critics of the system than they would be toward other forms of protest. But, as noted, no battery of items can overcome all limitations. In addition, we do have other measures of tolerance in the survey (see items NEWTOL4, NEWTOL5 and NEWTOL6), although those items will not be analyzed in the current study. The interested reader should consult the data base.<sup>9</sup>

Now we compare the results for each of the questions that refer to political tolerance in Figure II.17.

<sup>9</sup> The data are available from the author ([m.seligson@vanderbilt.edu](mailto:m.seligson@vanderbilt.edu)) and through a web site that USAID is finalizing with the LAPOP data on it.






**Figure II.17 Political tolerance. Support for those who criticize the system**




It can be seen that, in general, political tolerance of Ecuadorians has increased in the four items considered here (although only in “right to vote” and “free expression” are the differences statistically significant). A salient difference occurs with “right to vote”, which is now situated on the positive side of the scale, whereas in 2001 it was more likely that Ecuadorians rejected the right to vote for people critical of the system. Such rejection does, however, continue for the questions about free expression and the right to run for public office.

Despite the increase, the level of political tolerance of Ecuadorians is one of the lowest in the region. Figure II.18 shows the results of the 2004 survey in Ecuador, comparing them with data from other Latin American countries for the same year (with the exception of Bolivia, for which data are drawn from a 2002 sample). Political tolerance in Ecuador is only greater than that of Guatemala and Bolivia, while it is far below that of Panama.



**Figure II.18 Political tolerance: Ecuador in comparative perspective**


We already established that for 2001, factors such as age, gender, income and wealth did not affect the level of tolerance of Ecuadorians when controlled for other variables. In 2004, that situation has changed in terms of gender, as illustrated in Figure II.19; in this sample, men show an increased level of tolerance compared to women. The four points of difference between women and men are statistically significant, and occur while controlling for education and income, indicating that men are more tolerant than women in Ecuador. This difference existed in 2001, although the differences were not statistically significant.



**Figure II.19 Tolerance by gender: 2001 vs. 2004**

There seems to be a factor that makes women less tolerant than men in Ecuador, independent of their level of education and of income (factors that, as we will see later, do affect tolerance levels). Gender relations in Ecuador produce differences in democratic values like political tolerance; this theme requires special treatment both analytically and in terms of public policy decisions.

The effect of education on tolerance is generally positive (according to the data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project). In Ecuador the situation is no different, although the impact of education on tolerance is less than it was three years ago. Figure II.20 shows the mean tolerance by education of the respondents in the survey for both 2001 and 2004. The 2004 sample shows higher mean tolerance with minimal differences between educational groups.



**Figure II.20 Political tolerance and education**

## Support for stable democracy

We have now examined the two variables, system support and tolerance, that together form our overall measure of support for stable democracy. It is now time to combine these two to be able to determine the proportion of the population that expresses attitudes conducive to stable democracy and those who do not. The theory with which we are working is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of

their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy.

In prior studies emerging from the LAPOP project, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.<sup>10</sup> The framework shown in Table II.4 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

**Table II.4 Theoretical relationship between tolerance and system support in institutionally democratic polities**

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The scale ranges from 0-100, so the most natural cut-point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.



When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.<sup>12</sup>

### **Empirical relationship between tolerance and system support in Ecuador**

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables (see Table II.5). First, it should be noted that system support and tolerance are positively associated with each other in Ecuador, although in reduced proportions; the correlation between the two variables in 2001 was  $r = .11$ , while in 2004

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<sup>12</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson y John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as, "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas and Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO and Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. It also appears as "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua," Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.



that statistic decreased to .06 (sig. < .001). Those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into "high" and "low."<sup>13</sup>

**Table II.5 Empirical relationship between tolerance and system support in Ecuador**


System support		Tolerance			
		High		Low	
High		Stable Democracy		Authoritarian Stability	
		2001	2004	2001	2004
		13%	15%	15%	18%
Low		26%	27%	45%	40%
		Unstable Democracy		Democratic Breakdown	

As can be seen in Table II.5, the evaluation of political attitudes of Ecuadorians during the last three years is encouraging. The percentage of Ecuadorians with high system support and high democratic tolerance has increased from 13% to 15%, while the proportion of those with low system support and low democratic tolerance decreased from 45% to 40% since 2001. However, the proportion of Ecuadorians that are within the authoritarian (low tolerance) and unstable (low system support) zones still comprise the majority.

What happens when we compare these results with those of other countries within the Latin American Public Opinion Project? The proportion of citizens that has a high level of tolerance and system support at the same time is one of the lowest in the region, barely above that of Bolivia (see Figure II.21). It is notable that the proportion of support for democratic stability— measured by these two variables— is, in Ecuador, one-third of that registered in Costa Rica.

<sup>13</sup> If the variables were maintained in their original form from 0-100, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making reading and interpreting it impossible.






**Figure II.21 Support for democracy: Ecuador in comparative perspective**




What factors in the analysis differentiate those in the democratic stability cell from other respondents? To answer this question, we use a logistic regression, because the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (i.e., stable democracy or unstable democracy).

Figure II.22 shows the impact of education on the values that support stable democracy. The lines for each year represent the percentage of each of the three educational levels that showed both high system support and high democratic tolerance at the same time. The figure is instructive: education has become a factor favoring democratic stability. It shows a positive relationship with both variables when they are treated independently (tolerance and support), and this is reflected in a positive, statistically significant coefficient.




**Figure II.22 Impact of education on values of democratic stability**

Region appears to have changed its impact on the proportion of people who support stable democracy. As can be seen in Figure II.23, the proportion of people who have high support and high tolerance has grown in Guayaquil and the big cities, and grown substantially in the medium cities. This is a puzzling finding, but one that should not be considered substantively of note since the sample size (N = 47) for the 2004 study is too small to be considered an especially reliable indicator of opinion in those cities.



**Figure II.23 Urbanization and support for democratic stability**






**Figure II.24 Evaluation of respondent's economic situation and values of democratic stability**

Figure II.24 shows us the impact that perception about personal economic circumstances has on the values that support democratic stability. The question asked referred to the current economic situation of the respondent compared to that of the year prior to the survey. Like in 2001, people who have perceived an improvement in their economic circumstances are also more likely to have high tolerance and system support.

## Ecuadorian Definitions of Democracy

It would help the reader to understand better the perceptions of Ecuadorians on democracy, if we showed the results of a question in which we asked them directly, “In a few words, what does democracy mean to you?” (DEM13). This question is included here because in most of the report, we refer not directly to the term “democracy” but to the various values and behaviors that support democratic rule. The results show that there is considerable variation in definitions. The results are similar for the two years, with small and mainly insignificant

changes from one year to the next. When this item was asked in Costa Rica, over two-thirds defined it in terms of “freedom.”<sup>14</sup>



## Conclusion

This chapter has examined two key variables in the functioning of a stable democracy: system support and political tolerance. While the numbers for these two variables in Ecuador are comparatively low, the tendency for increases between 2001 and 2004 provide an encouraging sign because they suggest a positive change in political values and attitudes among Ecuadorians. A substantial increase in system support was registered in practically all subgroups included in the sample. At the same time, the differences between them have decreased. Political tolerance has also shown a general increase, although for women in Ecuador the values have not experienced any change.

<sup>14</sup> See Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rican Exceptionalism: Why the 'Ticos' Are Different," in *Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Rodieric Ai Camp (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).





### III. Anti-Democratic Values

For a democracy in the process of consolidation, like that of Ecuador, even latent problems represent a risk to national stability in that they can undermine legitimacy and lead to anti-democratic thoughts among citizens. More simply, when things in the country are not going well, people often associate those problems with current democratic regimes; they can think that alternative forms of government, like dictatorship, for example, could solve their problems more easily and swiftly.

In order to be viewed as legitimate, democracy must demonstrate to citizens that the results obtained through democratic means are better than those produced by other forms of government. There are several factors that test the strength of democracy. On the one hand, international political processes have demonstrated that democratic stability depends on economic growth and equitable income distribution.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, extreme political and social circumstances also test a democracy's stability; internal social stability is a desirable element for democracy.

To be sure, no survey can predict the future of a political system, given the numerous factors that influence outcomes, such as the attitudes and interests of the elite, the international context and the distribution of power within a country's borders. However, a survey can show the solidity and consistency of the *political culture* of the citizens of a country, understood as one of the key factors for democratic stability. In a survey like the one conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the most important questions used to measure political culture are those that directly ask respondents about the conditions that would justify a military coup d'état, including high unemployment; social protest; election of a government from the extreme left or right; high crime; social disorder; high inflation and widespread corruption. While these items do not directly measure the degree to which Ecuadorians would actively support a coup d'état, they do provide insight into what people feel are the underlying justifications for government overthrow. Those who respond in a way suggestive of support for government overthrow are not necessarily individuals who would favor a dictatorial regime. Instead, such responses show a degree of willingness to accept a military response as a potential solution to deep national problems. The series is as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael E. Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC7.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC8.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC11.</b> Frente a mucho desorden social	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS

The results of these questions for both 2001 and 2004 are shown below in Figure III.1. A high degree of crime continues to be the factor that would be most likely to justify a coup d'état, with two thirds of the population sharing this perspective. Both corruption and high levels of social disorder are factors that are likely to justify a coup. The remaining elements would justify a coup for a minority of the population.

More important, the figure also demonstrates that the results from 2004 are lower than those from 2001, indicating that Ecuadorians now have fewer reasons to justify a coup than they did three years ago. The coup experience that Ecuadorians lived through in 2000, together with military scandals and the subsequent recovery of democracy, seem to have reduced support for intervention against Ecuador's democratic state.









Figure III.1 Conditions that justify a military coup




The data presented here does not imply that a military coup is imminent in Ecuador; instead what it shows is that although there are circumstances that Ecuadorians still feel justify the takeover of government, the justification for this measure has in fact decreased considerably. This is confirmed by the response to question DEM8, shown below in Figure III.2 and Figure III.3, which asks about civilian supremacy over the military. While in 2001 more than half of the Ecuadorians did not believe that the military should be subordinate to civilians, now the majority of those asked support military subordination (the differences between the two years are statistically significant at the  $<.001$  level). However, it is worrisome to see that more than a fourth of the population prefers military supremacy. This finding is notable because in the future if the situation in Ecuador deteriorates, it is this nucleus of citizens that may support military insubordination.



How are the hypothetical support for a coup d'état and the preference for military supremacy or subordination related? In 2001 we saw that while there were differences between the levels of support for the idea of a military coup between those who believe in military subordination versus military supremacy, these differences were small. In 2004, we see that the differences between the two are larger. However, the general tendency continues to be the same for both groups. This is illustrated in Figure III.4 and Figure III.5 , below.



**Figure III.4 Justification for a coup and preference for military/civilian supremacy: 2001**



**Figure III.5 Justification for a coup and preference for military/civilian supremacy: 2004**

As much in terms of their preference for civil versus military rule as in the perceived justifications for a coup d’etat, Ecuadorians have shown clear signs of progress toward democratic consolidation in the last three years. Even though the statistics for Ecuador are comparatively low on the regional level, the circumstances that would justify a coup d’etat are far fewer for the majority of Ecuadorians. Furthermore, support for each of the considered categories has diminished substantially. At the same time, those who believe that the military should be subordinate to civilians now comprise more than half of those interviewed.



There is strong additional evidence of a decrease in antidemocratic values in Ecuador between 2001 and 2004. In the surveys we asked about the approval of conventional and un-conventional forms of political participation; in an ideal world, we would like the support for the former to be greater than that of the latter. In Ecuador we would also hope to find diminished support for non-conventional, or aggressive, political participation; this is precisely what we find.

Now we will look at the series of questions focused on measuring support for conventional and un-conventional participation (items E5 to E3 in the survey).


Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que UD. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que UD. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza UD. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					(88)

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas.
E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.

The results of these questions in both 2001 and 2004 are shown in Figure III.6. Even though the differences between the two years are not statistically significant in all the variables considered, two forms of conventional participation (community groups looking to resolve community problems and participation in electoral campaigns) saw an increase in support in 2004. Perhaps more important are the differences, also significant, in perceptions about two forms of participation that could be considered aggressive: blocking streets and attempts to overthrow the government. Both variables now demonstrate lower levels of approval than they did three years ago, reinforcing the general pattern found in this study that Ecuadorian democracy is becoming stronger.






**Figure III.6 Approval of conventional and aggressive political participation**



How does Ecuador stand compare to other Latin American countries in support for a coup? As Figure III.7 shows, Ecuadorians are much more supportive of the possibility of a coup than citizens in most of Latin America. Figure III.7 shows that in Ecuador the support for a coup when crime rates are high is the highest in the set of compared countries. This comparatively high support for a coup under this circumstance has particular relevance if we consider that the country is the only one in the series that has undergone a military take over during the last few years. The unexpectedly high score for Costa Rica is in the process of being analyzed by the Costa Rica team. Costa Rica has no army, and there has not been armed rebellion for over half a century. The initial impression is that Costa Ricans may not have understood the term “golpe de estado,” used in the questionnaire, or thought that other countries were being referred to.




**Figure III.7 Justification for a coup under high crime: Ecuador in comparative perspective**

## Predictors of antidemocratic values

We have seen that, for Ecuadorians, today there are fewer reasons that justify a coup d'état and that support for a coup in each of the circumstances presented is lower now than it was three years ago. However, in order to measure the general justification for a coup it is necessary to integrate all the variables into one single factor. The resulting variable, COUPS, shows very high reliability among the factors (with an Alpha of .88). Figure III.8 below shows the results. Placed on a scale of 0 to 100, this scale of justification for coups showed a mean of 52.5 in 2001, suggesting that more than half of Ecuadorians would justify a military coup. In 2004, the mean



decreases to 40, showing that about four out of every ten Ecuadorians would justify a military coup, given the circumstances considered in the survey. Continuing the pattern mentioned before, the sample found Ecuadorians less willing to support a military coup that would work against democracy in the country.



**Figure III.8 Mean justification for coup by year**

The linear regression analysis in Table III.1 shows the impact of factors that could theoretically be related to support for a coup. As can be seen, once we control for other variables, gender, monthly family income, education, urbanization and age are factors that have a relevant, statistically significant impact on the justification for a military coup.

**Table III.1 Predictors of justification for a coup**

		Not standardized		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
2001	(Constant)	71.967	4.974		14.468	<b>.000</b>
	Q1 Gender	3.046	1.399	.043	2.177	<b>.030</b>
	Q10 Monthly family income?	-1.298	.354	-.080	-3.666	<b>.000</b>
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.873	.428	.053	2.041	<b>.041</b>
	MARRIED Marital status	.031	.016	.041	1.943	.052
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-1.114	.194	-.133	-5.753	<b>.000</b>
	ESTRATO Region	-1.601	.583	-.058	-2.747	<b>.006</b>
	Q2 How many years old are you?	-.182	.057	-.078	-3.199	<b>.001</b>
	TAMANO city size	.164	.418	.008	.391	.696
	Q3 What is your religion?	-.122	.742	-.003	-.165	.869
2004	(Constant)	55.122	4.986		11.055	.000
	Q1 Gender	4.005	1.373	.058	2.917	<b>.004</b>
	Q10 Monthly family income?	-1.326	.341	-.087	-3.892	<b>.000</b>
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.137	.377	-.009	-.363	.716
	MARRIED Marital status	.042	.015	.057	2.728	<b>.006</b>
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.849	.191	-.105	-4.438	<b>.000</b>
	ESTRATO Region	-.755	.571	-.028	-1.324	.186
	Q2 How many years old are you?	-.234	.058	-.100	-4.042	<b>.000</b>
	TAMANO city size	1.388	.405	.075	3.430	<b>.001</b>
	Q3 What is your religion?	-.313	.764	-.008	-.409	.682

Dependent Variable: COUPS Scale of justification of a coup d'etat

Marital status and family size have a small impact, but it is negligible (the number of children is not a significant factor in 2004, and the coefficients of marital status are low).



Respondents' religion does not seem to have an impact, and urbanization shows a larger impact than that of region alone.

Figure III.9 shows the effect of gender on the scale of justification for a coup d'etat.<sup>2</sup> The mean on the scale has decreased among both men and women, (which is an encouraging sign), but the differences between genders continue to be important and statistically significant. This reinforces our perception of a tendency for Ecuadorian women to show lower results on the indicators of democratic values utilized in the survey.





Figure III.9 Justification for military coup by gender

<sup>2</sup> A transcription error in the 2001 study produced a small error in the results. The results presented here are correct.



The relationship between income and justification for a coup is the same in 2004 as it was in 2001: individuals with larger family incomes showed less willingness to justify a military coup than poorer people, independent of their level of education, their age and other factors considered in Table III.1. Following the general pattern we have seen in this study, the line that corresponds to justification for a coup d'état in 2004 is below that of 2001, demonstrating diminished support for the idea of a coup. Figure III.10 illustrates this relationship.



**Figure III.10 Justification for military coup by income**

Education is another factor that has an important impact for the level of justification of a military coup. The more education a person has, he or she finds fewer reasons for military overthrow of a democratic government. In Figure III.11, the line corresponding to 2004 runs below that of 2001, showing that the proportion of those who find a coup d'état justifiable has decreased at all three educational levels. In the chapter on system support, we found the opposite relationship; more education led to less system support. This apparent paradox highlights a distinction in our dependent variable. In chapter II, we focused on system support, or legitimacy. When legitimacy is low, the political system lacks popular support and could be overthrown by a military coup, executive coup or even a popular uprising. Thus, political stability is difficult to retain in the absence of widespread legitimacy. In this chapter we refer not to legitimacy, but to direct justification of one means of overthrowing democracy, namely the military coup. Our findings here show that those with higher levels of education are *less* supportive of such coups. This means that while those with higher levels of education in Ecuador may be alienated from their political system, and thus express low trust in it, this does not mean that they would support



a military overthrow. They might support other means of changing the system, or might passively accept an anti-democratic overthrow by the military, even though they personally would not find it justifiable.




Figure III.11 Justification for a military coup by education

There are also differences in the level of support for a military coup between the different regions of Ecuador, although these are much less substantial than the factors just mentioned. As can be seen in Figure III.12, support for coups has decreased in almost all regions of the country, with the exception of the Southern Oriente, where support was already low in 2001. In 2004 the Oriente seems the less likely to justify a coup than either the Sierra or the Coast, a pattern that was not clear in 2001. At the same time, as the figure suggests, urbanization seems to have an effect on the justification scale of the 2004 sample, with urban zones less supportive of a military coup.






Figure III.12 Justification for military coup by region

The impact of urbanization, however, is not completely clear. Figure III.13 shows the mean justification for a coup in each year of the study. Clearly, the pattern for 2001 is irregular; however, in 2004 justification for a coup grows the farther we get from the big cities in Ecuador, although the highest point is in medium cities and then justification decreases again both in small cities and rural areas. It is possible that more frequent political socialization in urban areas leads to a reduction in support for the idea of a coup d'état in these places versus other regions.



**Figure III.13 Justification for a military coup by urbanization**

In both 2001 and 2004, age has a generally negative impact on justification for military coups (the older the individual, the less acceptance of motives that justify a coup). In this way, age is a positive factor for democracy in Ecuador, at least in terms of decreased support for military overthrow. Figure III.14 shows the effect of age on acceptance of a military coup for both 2001 and 2004.




**Figure III.14 Justification for military coup and age**

This section has reviewed the various demographic and socio-economic explanations of support for a coup. We have found a variety of factors, including education, income, gender, urbanization, etc. that help distinguish among those who would justify a coup and those who would not. We next turn to political factors that might be of importance.

## Political factors involved in support for a coup d'etat

Now we will look at the political elements that could affect the level of support for a military coup in Ecuador. One is the degree of trust in the armed forces. It is not surprising that increased trust in the armed forces is related to increased justification for military takeover of the national government. As can be seen in Figure III.15, the mean level of trust in the military has decreased in the last three years.



**Figure III.15 Mean trust in armed forces by year**

Figure III.16 corroborates the relationship between trust in the armed forces and support for a coup, and it shows two important differences for 2004: first, the mean level of support for coups is less in 2004 than it was in 2001. Second, justification for a coup seems to grow much more at a high level of trust on the scale. In other words, growth of one point in high levels of trust on the scale (for example from 4 to 5) has a bigger impact on justification for coups than at the extreme low end of the scale (for example, from 2 to 3).





Figure III.16 Justification for coup and trust in armed forces



Individual's ideological self-identification has some impact on willingness to justify forceful military takeover. In the survey, respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale moving from extreme left (with a value of one on the scale) to extreme right (with a value of ten on the scale). Controlling for other variables, like education and income, if we consider ideological identification as a measure of willingness to accept military coups, we see a pattern in which the two extreme ends of the scale tend to justify military intervention more than the middle range of the scale. Although the differences are not statistically significant for 2004, the pattern shown in Figure III.17 suggests that moderate ideological positions are less dangerous for democracy than extreme positions, independent of whether those positions are on the right or the left. It is also important to note that the extreme right has higher support for a coup than the extreme left.




**Figure III.17 Justification for military coup by ideology**

A political variable that has received considerable attention in the last few years is the idea of social capital, advanced by Robert Putnam.<sup>3</sup> We deal with this variable in greater detail in Chapter VII. According to Putnam, interpersonal trust appears as a key factor for the birth and

<sup>3</sup> Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*; Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's 'Making Democracy Work'," *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996).



consolidation of democracy in a country (although not all studies agree on this view point).<sup>4</sup> Although in 2001 there was a clear relationship between interpersonal trust and justification for military coups in Ecuador, in 2004 that relationship was no longer as clear-cut. This can be seen in Figure III.18 below, where the linear trend of 2001 is now somewhat altered by the slight decline at the highest levels of trust. The result is that for 2004, the overall relationship is no longer statistically significant.



**Figure III.18 Justification for military coup: impact of interpersonal trust**


<sup>4</sup> Amber L. Seligson, "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis," *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999):342-52.



Finally, it is not surprising that political tolerance, given its positive value for democracy, is related to low support for coups. This is exactly what we find in Ecuador. Although the relationship is not completely linear, there is a tendency that people who are less tolerant are also more likely to justify a military coup. Figure III.19 shows this relationship, based on the following survey question:

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta B. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

**D33.** ¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político ecuatoriano? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba esta prohibición?



**Figure III.19 Justification for political coup: impact of political tolerance**

This section has explored some predictors of those who would justify a military coup in Ecuador vs. those who would not. Not surprisingly, it was found that attitudes toward the military itself play an important role. But it was also found that other variables, such as political tolerance and interpersonal trust make a difference.

### Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Ecuadorians are much less willing to justify a military coup in 2004 than they were in 2001. Justification for coups has decreased across each of the extreme



circumstances considered in the survey; however, in comparative terms Ecuadorians are more supportive of the possibility of a coup than most other Latin Americans. The decrease in relation to 2001 is encouraging because it reinforces the perception that Ecuadorian democracy is becoming more consolidated. Education and income continue to be factors that, as they rise, reduce the acceptance of a military coup in the country. Urbanization also has an impact in the reduction of justification of military coups, although this relationship is a little weaker than that mentioned above. This study also demonstrated that women are less likely to reject a military coup than men, which coincides with earlier findings of women to be less democratically-inclined than men, even when education and income are controlled.



## IV. Local Government and Democracy

The 2004 survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, contains an extensive series of questions that allow us to measure both attitudes toward and participation in local government. The reader should consult the questionnaire, beginning with questions NP1 and ending with question MUNI11A to see the entire series.

This report does not examine all of the items; however, the responses to all of the questions in the survey are available for analysis in the full database. This allows for comparison with future studies or with studies carried out in specific regions or municipalities in Ecuador. The data presented here gives a picture of attitudes and behaviors at the local level as regards local government.

### Citizen views of municipal problems

In both 2001 and 2004 surveys we asked our respondents to describe the most serious problem currently facing their municipality (item *MUNI2*). The results of this question are shown below in Table IV.1.<sup>1</sup> As can be seen, there is no consensus about problems in Ecuador, with Ecuadorians listing a variety of issues. “Lack of services” is mentioned by about 14 percent of respondents, while “lack of funds/aid” and “poor road maintenance” are both mentioned by about ten percent. Most of these figures are fairly consistent with the results of the same question from 2001.

For both years, the most frequently mentioned problem is “poor administration,” at 15 percent of respondents in 2001 and almost 20 percent in 2004. At the same time, another item, “corruption,” experienced a significant jump. In 2001 1.3 percent of respondents viewed corruption as a problem, while in 2004 that figure increased to 9.3 percent, a leap of 8 percentage points. However, it is important to mention that these increases could be due to heightened public awareness of corruption as a result of several publicized corruption scandals on the national level between 2001 and 2004 rather than a reflection of people’s *experiences* with corruption.

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to note (in this and in most tables) that the data refer only to those people who answered the question.

**Table IV.1 What is the biggest problem in your municipality?**

	Year		Average both years
	2001	2004	
MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?			
0 None	5.1%	4.5%	4.8%
1 Lack of water	10.8%	9.2%	10.0%
2 Road maintenance	14.3%	10.5%	12.4%
3 Lack of security, delinquency	13.4%	9.0%	11.2%
4 Clean up of public places	3.8%	4.8%	4.3%
5 Lack of services	11.2%	13.7%	12.5%
6 The economic situation	10.5%	7.8%	9.1%
7 Lack of funds, help	9.9%	10.8%	10.3%
10 Poor administration	15.0%	19.1%	17.1%
11 Lack of environmental care	1.9%	1.4%	1.6%
12 Corruption	1.3%	9.3%	5.3%
13 Lack of machinery and equipment	.2%		.1%
14 High taxes	.5%		.3%
15 Abuse of authority of Mayor	.3%		.1%
16 Others	1.7%		.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Problems in both years concentrate on the areas of local services. The one major change is the dramatic increase in the mentioning of corruption as a problem. Back in 2001, only 1.3% of the respondents noted this problem, compared to 9.3% in 2004. This ranks corruption on a level similar to other, service-related problems. A catch-all category, “poor administration” also increased from 2001; some respondents used that term when they were really just using a euphemism for corruption.

Only 7.8 percent of respondents in 2004 signal “economic problems” as severe problems at the level of the municipality. This is an interesting finding when compared to the response to a similar question for national level problems (question A4), in which 41 percent of respondents indicated economic problems as the most serious problems in the country as a whole as shown below in Table IV.2. Additionally, more than two-thirds of respondents indicated “economic problems”, “unemployment” and “poverty” as urgent problems at the national level. This information suggests that citizens view economic problems as out of the hands of local government; instead, they attribute economic problems to government at the national level. This is an important finding, as it may suggest that citizens understand who to hold accountable for the problems they perceive as most pressing. That is, they view the national government as responsible for the economy, while the local government is largely responsible for local services.



The results for the “national problem” question are very similar to those we found in 2001. We do see a slight decline in the largest category, economic problems, but a nearly matching increase in the mentioning of unemployment. We think it appropriate to combine these two categories since they are both directly related to the economy. Indeed, other problems such as credit, lack of land, inflation, etc. are all directly linked to the economy.

**Table IV.2 Most Serious problem faced by country**

		Year		
		2001	2004	Average both years
A4 In your opinion, What is the most severe problem being faced by your country?	1 Economic problems	44.0%	41.3%	42.6%
	2 Inflation, high prices	3.7%	3.5%	3.6%
	3 Unemployment	12.1%	16.6%	14.4%
	4 Poverty	13.1%	9.1%	11.1%
	5 Delinquency, crime, violence	4.8%	6.3%	5.6%
	6 Popular protests	.5%	.7%	.6%
	7 Lack of land to cultivate	.3%	.2%	.3%
	8 Lack of credit	.2%	.6%	.4%
	9 Environmental problems	.2%	.9%	.6%
	10 Drugs	.1%	.3%	.2%
	11 Drug trafficking	.4%	.3%	.4%
	12 Corruption	11.5%	10.9%	11.2%
	13 Gangs, problematic youth	.3%	.1%	.2%
	14 Poor government	4.2%	6.6%	5.4%
	15 Migration	.6%	1.1%	.8%
	16 War against terrorism	2.1%	.1%	1.1%
	17 Dollarization	.9%	1.4%	1.2%
	18 Lack of education	.1%		.0%
	19 External Debt	.0%		.0%
	20 Closure of banks	.1%		.0%
	21 Lack of energy sources	.0%		.0%
	22 Foreign Commerce	.0%		.0%
	23 Lack of justice	.1%		.1%
	24 Others	.5%		.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Given this chapter’s focus on local government, the analysis will concentrate on local problems. In that context, we will examine the differences in perceptions of municipal problems according to region. Recall that the data is divided into three main strata: the coast, the sierra and the oriente, with the first divided into urban and rural and the third divided into Northern and Southern regions. The results of a cross tabulation of specific problems by region reveals that



respondents of different regions do signal different problems. The results are shown in Table IV.3 below.

In 2001, road maintenance was a significant problem for all regions, although it was more serious in the rural Sierra than anywhere else. In the urban Sierra, both delinquency and poor administration were more serious problems than elsewhere in the country. In the rural sierra, lack of water was a primary concern for respondents.

In 2004, lack of services was indicated as a major problem on the coast, both in urban and rural areas, while poor administration was indicated as the most pressing problem in both the sierra and the oriente regions of the country. Lack of security continued to be one of the most common problems in the urban Sierra, although it experienced a substantial decline between 2001 and 2004. It is noteworthy that across all regions people increasingly viewed corruption as a municipal problem.



Table IV.3 Most serious problems faced by municipality: by region

YEAR			Region						Total	
			1 Urban Coast	2 Rural Coast	3 Urban Sierra	4 Rural Sierra	5 North Oriente	6 South Oriente		
2001	MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	0 None	7.1%	6.0%	4.5%	.3%	4.8%	2.1%	5.1%	
		1 Lack of water	10.5%	14.9%	7.2%	17.8%	11.9%	10.6%	10.8%	
		2 Road maintenance	14.0%	13.7%	13.1%	20.2%	7.1%	10.6%	14.3%	
		3 Lack of security, delinquency	12.0%	8.1%	20.8%	5.5%	4.8%	2.1%	13.4%	
		4 Clean up of public places	7.1%	2.0%	2.1%	.3%	.0%	2.1%	3.8%	
		5 Lack of services	12.5%	14.1%	7.4%	14.7%	11.9%	10.6%	11.2%	
		6 The economic situation	11.2%	8.1%	8.6%	11.7%	19.0%	23.4%	10.5%	
		7 Lack of funds, help	8.0%	18.1%	8.9%	9.8%	16.7%	19.1%	9.9%	
		10 Poor administration	11.3%	12.1%	21.1%	13.5%	14.3%	12.8%	15.0%	
		11 Lack of environmental care	1.4%	1.6%	2.4%	1.8%	2.4%	4.3%	1.9%	
		12 Corruption	1.8%	.0%	.6%	2.8%	2.4%		1.3%	
		13 Lack of machinery and equipment	.1%	.4%		.3%	2.4%	.0%	.2%	
		14 High taxes	.7%		.7%				.5%	
		15 Abuse of authority of Mayor	.4%		.1%	.3%		.0%	.2%	
		16 Others	1.7%	.8%	2.4%	.9%	2.4%	2.1%	1.8%	
		Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		2004	MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	0 None	8.0%	7.5%	1.3%	1.2%		.0%
1 Lack of water	6.5%			10.1%	9.5%	10.6%	25.5%	28.3%	9.2%	
2 Road maintenance	11.8%			12.7%	8.4%	8.8%	13.7%	15.1%	10.5%	
3 Lack of security, delinquency	8.9%			.4%	12.9%	6.7%	3.9%	1.9%	9.0%	
4 Clean up of public places	5.0%			1.3%	6.1%	4.0%	2.0%	3.8%	4.8%	
5 Lack of services	18.9%			20.6%	8.3%	7.9%	9.8%	9.4%	13.7%	
6 The economic situation	5.6%			8.8%	7.5%	15.2%	7.8%	3.8%	7.8%	
7 Lack of funds, help	9.4%			15.8%	10.0%	14.3%	7.8%	7.5%	10.7%	
10 Poor administration	13.9%			15.4%	24.6%	22.8%	21.6%	22.6%	19.1%	
11 Lack of environmental care	2.2%			.0%	1.2%	.6%	2.0%	1.9%	1.4%	
12 Corruption	9.7%			7.5%	10.3%	7.9%	5.9%	5.7%	9.3%	
13 Lack of machinery and equipment										
14 High taxes										
15 Abuse of authority of Mayor										
16 Others										
Total				100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



We can also examine problems in Ecuador by looking at the differences between urban and rural areas. These results are shown below, in Table IV.4. As can be seen, in 2001, two major differences exist between urban and rural areas in terms of perceived municipal problems: urban areas are more concerned with crime and delinquency, while rural areas are more concerned with access to water. In 2004, these differences seem to have decreased; the gap between urban and rural areas in terms of both crime and access to water closed in both cases.

Most striking in 2004 are the *similarities* between urban and rural areas in their perceptions of two problems: poor administration and corruption. In 2004 both of these problems experienced parallel increases between urban and rural areas, indicating the generalization of concerns, regardless of whether respondents are residents of urban or rural areas. Whereas in 2001 corruption was one of the least-cited municipal problems in both rural and urban areas, it was indicated as one of the most common across the rural-urban divide in 2004. Increased media attention to corruption perhaps explains this increase; in this study we present direct evidence on corruption victimization and show that it has declined since 2001.



Table IV.4 Most serious problem faced by municipality: urban vs. rural

YEAR			Area		Total	
			1 Urban	2 Rural		
2001	MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	0 None	5.9%	2.7%	5.1%	
		1 Lack of water	9.1%	16.1%	10.9%	
		2 Road maintenance	13.5%	16.7%	14.4%	
		3 Lack of security, delinquency	15.8%	6.4%	13.4%	
		4 Clean up of public places	4.7%	1.0%	3.8%	
		5 Lack of services	10.3%	14.2%	11.3%	
		6 The economic situation	10.1%	11.5%	10.4%	
		7 Lack of funds, help	8.6%	14.0%	10.0%	
		10 Poor administration	15.7%	12.9%	15.0%	
		11 Lack of environmental care	1.9%	1.8%	1.9%	
		12 Corruption	1.2%	1.4%	1.3%	
		13 Lack of machinery and equipment	.1%	.3%	.2%	
		14 High taxes	.7%		.5%	
		15 Abuse of authority of Mayor	.3%	.2%	.3%	
		16 Others	2.1%	.8%	1.7%	
		Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		2004	MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	0 None	4.8%	3.4%
1 Lack of water	8.4%			11.6%	9.2%	
2 Road maintenance	10.4%			10.7%	10.5%	
3 Lack of security, delinquency	10.5%			4.2%	9.0%	
4 Clean up of public places	5.4%			2.8%	4.8%	
5 Lack of services	14.0%			12.7%	13.7%	
6 The economic situation	6.4%			12.1%	7.8%	
7 Lack of funds, help	9.6%			14.5%	10.8%	
10 Poor administration	18.8%			20.0%	19.1%	
11 Lack of environmental care	1.7%			.3%	1.4%	
12 Corruption	9.8%			7.7%	9.3%	
13 Lack of machinery and equipment						
14 High taxes						
15 Abuse of authority of Mayor						
16 Others						
Total				100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




## Perceived Responsiveness of Mayors to Problems

The survey found a disjuncture between the direction of Ecuadorian attitudes toward their local mayor and their attitudes toward local government in general. While there was a decline in favorable views toward the former between 2001 and 2004, there was an increase toward the latter in that same time frame. We look first at the mayors. The question about the most serious municipal problem was followed by a question aimed at determining how well Ecuador's mayors are perceived to respond to the problems signaled by their constituents.

**MUNI3.** ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde de este municipio por resolver ese problema? [leer respuestas] (1)  
Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada(8) NS

The national results from both 2001 and 2004 are presented in Figure IV.1 and Figure IV.2, below. As can be seen, in 2004 52 percent of respondents answered negatively (e.g., “nothing” or “a little”) when asked how mayors respond to community problems, while about 25% answered that the mayor had done either “a lot” or “some” to resolve the municipality's problems. Comparing the results of the two years, we can see a slight decrease in perceptions about the efficacy of municipal government between 2001 and 2004.



Difference of means sig.<.001

Figure IV.3 shows that there are wide differences between regions in terms of satisfaction with the way municipal governments handle problems. In 2001, satisfaction in the rural Sierra was low compared to other regions of the country. In 2004, the disparities between regions are much less stark. In general, satisfaction decreased across regions, with the exception of the Sierra, where satisfaction increased in both the urban and rural areas.




Figure IV.3 How much has mayor done to solve most serious problem? By region



Figure IV.4 below shows that, with few exceptions, people perceive that mayors have done less to solve local problems in 2004 than they did in 2001.<sup>2</sup> It is also notable that respondents believe that in 2004 the mayor was about half as likely to solve the problem of corruption as it did in 2001. This represents the most substantial decrease between the two years.




Figure IV.4 How much has mayor done to solve most serious problem? By specific problem

### Satisfaction with Municipal Government

In both 2001 and 2004 the survey asked a series of questions attempting to measure overall satisfaction with local government services. The key item is as follows:


**SGL1.** ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...?  
 (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni Buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (8) No sabe

Figure IV.5 and Figure IV.6 below show the responses for both years on the above question. As can be seen, overall satisfaction in municipal services rose between 2001 and 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Some of the responses for 2001 were so infrequent that they were not included in 2004. For example, “lack of machinery and equipment” was mentioned by only 4 respondents out of 2,923. The same low response frequency emerged for the categories “high taxes,” and “abuse of authority.”



In 2001, 34 percent of respondents answered that municipal services were either “good” or “excellent”, as compared with 45 percent in the 2004 sample. These differences are significant at the .001 level.



Differences between means are sig. <.001

This same item has been asked in several surveys within the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, making it possible to compare Ecuador to other cases in Latin America. The results of such a comparison are included below in Figure IV.7. Ecuador presents a very strong showing in this list; by 2004 it had increased to the *highest* in the region (for the countries from which we have 2004 data). This is a very important finding since it shows a great divide between the legitimacy of the national institutions, as discussed in Chapter II, in which Ecuador fared poorly compared to its neighbors in the region, and local government, where it does very well. This suggests that efforts to build democracy from below, building on the strength of satisfaction for local government, would be a reasonable public policy focus.






Figure IV.7 Evaluation of municipal services: Ecuador in comparative perspective, 2004



Multivariate analysis was used to determine the factors that contribute to respondents' evaluation of municipal services. The analysis tested the impact of gender, age, family size, level of education, geographic location and marital status on the evaluation of municipal services. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table IV.5, below.

As can be seen in the "Sig." column, in 2001 family size, education and location all had an impact on respondents' evaluation of municipal services. In 2004, education no longer plays a role while family size and location have become even more significant determinants in the evaluation of municipal services. We will look more closely at both family size and location below.

**Table IV.5 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services**


YEAR	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Coefficients		
2001	1	(Constant)	52.392	2.804		18.685	.000
		Q1 Gender	1.585	.899	.034	1.763	.078
		Q2 How many years old are you?	-.018	.036	-.012	-.495	.621
		Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.576	.271	.055	2.127	.034
		ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.320	.118	.059	2.715	.007
		TAMANO city size	-.780	.247	-.062	-3.158	.002
		MARRIED Marital Status	-.019	.010	-.039	-1.915	.056
2004	1	(Constant)	64.823	2.728		23.763	.000
		Q1 Gender	.935	.847	.020	1.104	.270
		Q2 How many years old are you?	.066	.036	.043	1.861	.063
		Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.900	.231	-.094	-3.895	.000
		ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.088	.109	.016	.801	.423
		TAMANO city size	-2.604	.235	-.207	-11.091	.000
		MARRIED Marital Status	-.016	.009	-.033	-1.693	.091

a Dependent Variable: SGL1R Satisfaction with Municipal Services

In both 2001 and 2004 location is an important explanatory variable. But in 2004, location increased in significance. As Figure IV.8 below shows, satisfaction increased in both




Guayaquil and Quito in 2004, while levels of satisfaction in other cities of varying sizes as well as in rural areas remained the same. This may account for the increase in significance of city size as an influence on satisfaction. As in 2001, satisfaction is much higher in Guayaquil than in other parts of the country in 2004.



**Figure IV.8 Satisfaction with municipal services and location**



As Figure IV.9 shows, satisfaction with municipal services declines as family size increases. One possible explanation is that larger families display less satisfaction because basic services like education cost more for larger families than for smaller ones. We see this trend in the graph below.




**Figure IV.9 Satisfaction with municipal services and number of children**

## Citizen Participation in Municipal Matters

The essence of democracy is participation, and virtually all programs seeking to strengthen local government look to expand citizen participation as a key mechanism for doing so. However, in Latin America there has been a tradition of exclusionary leadership at all levels of government; citizens are often viewed as intruders once elections are over. This study seeks to establish baseline data about levels of participation.

The surveys from 2001 and 2004 ask about citizen participation in municipal meetings in the 12 months prior to the survey (NP1). The results are shown in Figure IV.10 and Figure IV.11 below. In 2004, about 8 percent of respondents participated in a municipal meeting during the year. The figures show a slight *decrease* in participation between the two years.



Difference of means sig. <.001

But how does this compare with other countries in the region? The results shown in Figure IV.12 below provides data from other countries included in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. As can be seen, in marked contrast to the satisfaction levels, participation levels in Ecuador are low. Ironically, Bolivia [using data from 2002], which was last on satisfaction, is first on participation. This presents policy makers with a real dilemma, since more participation seems to translate into lower satisfaction, at least at the national level.






Figure IV.12 Attendance at municipal meetings in comparative perspective

Municipal participation is influenced by several factors. In order to determine those variables that have the most significant impact on municipal meeting attendance, multivariate analysis is used. The result of that analysis is summarized in Table IV.6 below. In both 2001 and 2004, age, education level and location area all associated with municipal participation. Significant results are in bold. In 2001, family size shows a slight association, while in 2004 that association seems to have disappeared. In 2004, the results show that gender has a strong impact on municipal participation.

**Table IV.6 Predictors of attendance at municipal meetings**

YEAR		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
<b>2001</b>	(Constant)	-12.835	4.219		-3.042	.002
	Q1 Gender	-2.262	1.267	-.036	-1.786	.074
	Q2 How many years old are you?	.111	.051	.054	2.160	<b>.031</b>
	MARRIED Marital Status	-.011	.014	-.017	-.796	.426
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.767	.386	.053	1.989	<b>.047</b>
	Q10 Monthly family income?	.385	.351	.027	1.094	.274
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	.053	.304	.004	.174	.862
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.931	.180	.126	5.161	<b>.000</b>
	TAMANO city size	3.026	.354	.178	8.539	<b>.000</b>
<b>2004</b>	(Constant)	-9.011	3.673		-2.453	<b>.014</b>
	Q1 Gender	-2.519	1.068	-.047	-2.359	<b>.018</b>
	Q2 How many years old are you?	.099	.046	.055	2.176	<b>.030</b>
	MARRIED Marital Status	.014	.012	.024	1.144	.253
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.363	.291	.032	1.249	.212
	Q10 Monthly family income?	.436	.289	.037	1.506	.132
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	-.036	.246	-.004	-.146	.884
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.615	.156	.098	3.938	<b>.000</b>
	TAMANO city size	1.846	.300	.127	6.163	<b>.000</b>


Dependent Variable: NPIR Participated in Municipal Meeting

Figure IV.13 and Figure IV.14 below examines gender and education as they relate to municipal participation. As would be expected, participation in municipal affairs increases as education levels increase. While this is true for both men and women, the results show that males and females participate at differing levels. First, at all levels of education for both 2001 and 2004, men participate more than women do. Second, although women with higher education



participate more than women with lower education levels, women with higher education participate at levels comparable to those of men with primary education.

These results demonstrate huge disparities between the sexes in terms of participation. There may be several reasons for this, including the time at which meetings occur and the degree to which women are encouraged to participate. Greater understanding of the reasons for low female participation could lead to interventions aimed at rectifying this situation.



Both education and gender are sig. <.05

The relationship between age and political participation is illustrated in Figure IV.15 below. In both 2001 and 2004, participation and age have a curvilinear relationship. This is consistent with general trends in participation that demonstrate that those in the middle exhibit the highest levels of participation, while the young and the old participate less. In 2001 participation increases as age increases until the 55-65 bracket, at which point participation drops off starkly. However, in 2004 participation drops off at a much younger age bracket. Overall levels of participation decreased at all age levels between 2001 and 2004.







Figure IV.15 Municipal meeting participation and age



While Figure IV.16 shows a substantial decline in participation in small cities and rural areas from 2001 to 2004, the general trend still seems to suggest that smaller locations can expect more participation than larger ones. Participation in smaller cities and rural areas in 2004 is almost twice as high as that of larger cities, like Quito. However, as we have seen throughout this section, overall levels of participation in municipal meetings are low.



**Figure IV.16 Attendance at municipal meetings by geographical area**

## Demand-Making on Municipal Government


While attendance at meetings may give some indication of citizen participation, it is not the purest measure because it does not necessarily mean that citizens are interacting with or making demands upon local government. Attendance may be little more than symbolic, or it may be a “spectator sport” in which citizens show up to hear what is going on. However, demand-making is far more active, and provides a true measure of participation. In the survey demand-making is measured by the variable NP2:

**NP2:** ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/no recuerda

The results in Figure IV.17 and Figure IV.18 show demand-making in both 2001 and 2004. As can be seen below, the level demand-making is higher than that of meeting attendance for both years. However, notice that there was a statistically significant 6 percent drop in



demand-making between 2001 and 2004. This is consistent with the drop in meeting participation that we saw above.



Difference of means sig. <.001

Comparative perspective is shown in Figure IV.9 below. Once again we see the sharp contrast between satisfaction and active participation; Ecuador has high satisfaction levels but low levels of demand-making. Bolivia, in contrast has the highest level of demand-making but the lowest level of satisfaction. These results powerfully suggest a linkage between the high levels of expectations generated by the Bolivian decentralization program and the reality of delivery of services to citizens. Perhaps such programs will face that paradox for some time to come. In Ecuador, if decentralization increases participation and demands, it may also lower satisfaction, at least for a time.




Figure IV.19 Demand-making on municipal government: Ecuador in comparative perspective



As Table IV.7 indicates, gender, education level and city size all have a strong impact on demand-making at the municipal level. Age has an impact, but to a lesser degree.

**Table IV.7 Predictors of demand-making on municipality**


YEAR		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
<b>2001</b>	(Constant)	2.013	.044		45.617	.000
	Q1 Gender	.061	.014	.079	4.246	<b>.000</b>
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.008	.004	-.044	-1.900	.058
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.011	.002	-.116	-5.226	<b>.000</b>
	TAMANO city size	-.023	.004	-.109	-5.741	<b>.000</b>
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	-.008	.003	-.050	-2.391	<b>.017</b>
	AGE Age	-.012	.006	-.047	-2.041	<b>.041</b>
<b>2004</b>	(Constant)	2.070	.039		52.960	.000
	Q1 Gender	.034	.012	.051	2.769	<b>.006</b>
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.008	.003	-.057	-2.440	<b>.015</b>
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.012	.002	-.154	-6.788	<b>.000</b>
	TAMANO city size	-.013	.003	-.072	-3.713	<b>.000</b>
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	-.004	.003	-.034	-1.578	.115
	AGE Age	-.010	.005	-.047	-2.002	<b>.045</b>

Dependent Variable: NP2 Have you ever required help or presented a petition to some office, official, councilor, or 'sindico' of the municipality during the last twelve months?


First, we examine the impact of gender and education on demand-making. The results of Figure IV.20 below show that in general terms men make more demands on local government than women do. In 2001 demand-making differed between men and women at each educational level; however, in 2004 (Figure IV.21) men and women with a primary school education made demands at about the same level. This is an interesting finding because it shows a sharp decline in men's participation at low levels of education between 2001 and 2004. Almost 20 percent fewer men with a primary education made a demand on their local governments in 2004 than men of the same educational level in 2001.



However, the figure also shows that the major trend of divergence between men’s and women’s demand-making remained fairly constant at the secondary and higher education levels.




**Figure IV.20 Demand making on municipality: Impact of education and gender 2001**



**Figure IV.21 Demand making on municipality: Impact of education and gender 2004**

In Figure IV.22 we see that demand-making varied among locations, with low levels being reported in Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador’s largest urban areas. This pattern is common as citizens in such larger agglomerations simply find it difficult to make their way downtown to the city hall. More troubling, however, is that with the exception of Quito, participation *decreased* in all geographic locations in Ecuador between 2001 and 2004.






**Figure IV.22 Demand-making on municipality: impact of location**




Figure IV.23 demonstrates sharp declines in male demand-making across locations in Ecuador; men made half as many demands on local government in big, medium and small-sized cities in 2004 (Figure IV.24) than they did in 2001. In general terms female participation also declined between 2001 and 2004, but those declines have been much less drastic. In medium-sized cities women’s demand-making on local government has remained the same since 2001. Due to declines in demand-making among males in cities of medium size, women’s demand-making was greater in those areas in 2004 than that of men. This finding is one that calls for further exploration and explanation.



### Participation in the Budget-Making Process

In recent years citizens have been involved in the formulation of municipal budgets throughout Latin America. This represents an important shift in local governance in the region. In Ecuador we saw a small degree of participation in the budget-making process in 2001; however, in 2004 participation in municipal budget-making *decreased* significantly. The results are shown below in Figure IV.25 and Figure IV.26.





Difference of means sig. <.001

## The “Junta Parroquial”

In the 2004 survey we included a new set of questions to measure participation in the most local of all forms of government in Ecuador, the “*junta parroquial*,” or neighborhood council. These are true grass roots organizations that have sprouted in Ecuador in recent years. We asked respondents if they attend meetings of such organization. We review the results here. What emerges in Figure IV.27 is a dramatic contrast with what we have seen thus far in this chapter. Participation in the neighborhood councils is *twice* as high as it is in municipal government (“*cabildos abiertos*”). This finding strongly suggests increased study of the local juntas and the ways in which citizens interact with them.





Figure IV.27 Local government participation: municipality vs. junta parroquial, 2004




One way of looking at this form of participation is to examine it by region. As we see in Figure IV.28, junta participation is much higher in rural areas than in urban, although Quito has a high level of participation as well.



**Figure IV.28 Attendance at junta parroquial meetings by city size, 2004**

One final analysis is on the impact of gender in these junta meetings. As shown in Figure IV.29, in several areas of Ecuador, the gender gap largely disappears, although in rural areas it is very large. Nonetheless, rural women are far more active in these juntas than we found them to be at the level of the municipality.




**Figure IV.29 Attendance at junta parroquial meetings by city size and gender**





## Local vs. National Government

We asked respondents which level of government they view as more successful at resolving local problems (LGL1). The results are shown in Figure IV.30 and Figure IV.31 below, where we can see that a substantial majority of respondents view municipal government as most effective at solving local problems in both 2001 and 2004. Ecuadorians recognize the difference between different levels of government, and as such they are able to distinguish between the services provided by local versus national government bodies. The responses are very similar for both years.



Difference of means sig. <.05

When this question is analyzed according to region, the pattern shown in Figure IV.32 emerges. The regional pattern follows that of the nation in that confidence in municipal government is higher. In both 2001 and 2004 (Figure IV.33), Guayaquil exhibits the highest degree of confidence in local government of all regions. It is noteworthy that between 2001 and 2004, confidence in local government decreased by 10 percent in small cities.




Another way of looking at the local/national issue is by asking whether Ecuadorians would be willing to give increased responsibility and funding for municipalities to local or national government. Item LGL2 asked:


**LGL2** En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma [NO LEER (3) No cambiar nada] [NO LEER (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios] (8) No sabe/no contesta

The results are shown below in Figure IV.34 and Figure IV.35. Clearly, the majority favors increased funding and responsibility to local government, although a significant minority believes that national government should be the recipient of such increases.






**Figure IV.34 Willingness to give more responsibility and funding to local government. Year 2001**




**Figure IV.35 Willingness to give more responsibility and funding to local government. Year 2004**

Difference of means sig. <.005

One problem facing local government in Ecuador is the inadequacy of budgets to carry out their many responsibilities. We asked our respondents if they would be willing to pay more taxes in order to get better services. Figure IV.36 and Figure IV.37, show the responses to the question for both the 2001 and 2004 surveys. In both cases, the response was overwhelmingly negative. However, the percentage of Ecuadorians responding positively dipped by about 5 percentage points, from 23 percent in 2001 to about 18 percent in 2004. Fewer Ecuadorians would be willing to pay more taxes in 2004 than in 2001.



**Figure IV.36 Would you be willing to pay more municipal taxes to get better service. Year 2001**



**Figure IV.37 Would you be willing to pay more municipal taxes to get better service. Year 2004**

Difference of means sig. <.001



## Conclusions

This chapter has presented a wealth of information about the views of Ecuadorians regarding their local governments. In general the findings show relatively strong support for local government. In comparative terms, Ecuador proves to be high in satisfaction, but low in demand-making. It is troubling, however, to find that participation in local affairs, in terms of both attendance at municipal meetings and municipal demand-making, has seen a general decline since 2001. Notable differences in participation exist between men and women, and across educational levels. Regional differences are also evident between smaller cities and rural areas on the one hand, and larger cities, such as Quito, on the other.



## V. The Rule of Law

Rule of Law is a term used frequently, and many people have a general sense of what it requires: a system of just laws that are applied equally and effectively through legal institutions. Often, it has the connotation of describing a society where law-abiding behavior is a commonly-shared norm. A more formal definition that these studies rely upon considers rule of law as characterized by law having “preeminence” and that law is the means by which the basic rights of equal citizens are protected.<sup>27</sup>

Why is rule of law regarded as so important? For two main reasons: first, it ensures the security of individuals within the state. Without such security, other state functions become largely pointless. Even an equal social distribution of rights and goods is of no use where the rule of law is not enforced to prevent some from taking rights and goods from others. The second reason, is that rule of law is an essential element of democratic rule. People feel that democratic participation is valuable because it confers legitimacy to laws. Without the rule to law that ensures such laws are followed, the legitimacy of democratic government is lost—even if laws are generated in democratic institutions such as parliaments and congresses. So we see that rule of law is a crucial element of democracy.

In this democracy audit, rule of law is tough to measure directly. There is no question that directly asks if rule of law is desirable. Instead, a more complex route is necessary. Instead of asking directly about rule of law, we have data on trust in various institutions—many of which are involved in securing rule of law. The prior democracy audit of Ecuador has shown that such trust assessments are important elements of effective rule of law.<sup>28</sup> This study continues the prior work, with a look at changes in trust from 2001 to 2004.

### Levels of Trust for Specific Institutions

Six institutions are most important when considering rule of law. These institutions can be considered under the category of institutions for protection of rights. The following questions were used to measure trust in these six institutions:

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<sup>27</sup> Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1985.

<sup>28</sup> See Seligson, Mitchell. *Democracy Audit: Ecuador 2001*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Latin American Opinion Project. pg. 114.

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a UD. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho UD. elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a UD. ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	No sabe

Ahora, usando **la tarjeta “A”**, por favor conteste estas preguntas.

<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? ( <i>Sondee: Si UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i> )		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		<b>B15</b>	
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		<b>B17</b>	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Policía?		<b>B18</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>	
<b>B44.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?		<b>B44</b>	

These six are the courts, attorney general, ombudsmen, the police, the supreme court, and the constitutional court. All of these link with the rule of law in different, but important ways. What needs to be stressed is that they all share a single dimension when analyzed by a factor analysis.<sup>29</sup> This tells us that all six are getting at the same notion—trust in institutions that protect rights and ensure fairness and rule of law. As can be seen in Figure V.1 below shows the mean level of trust for each of the six judicial/rule of law institutions considered. Note that in all six cases, trust in the institution has risen from 2001 to 2004. This itself is an important point: in general, trust in rule of law institutions has risen in the past three years among Ecuadorians.

<sup>29</sup> Factor analysis displayed in prior democracy audit. These six institutions were selected and justified as elements of rule of law and protection of rights in this prior report. See Seligson, Mitchell. *Democracy Audit: Ecuador 2001*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Latin American Opinion Project. pg. 122. The alpha standardized reliability of these items for 2004 is .78.





Figure V.1 Trust in judicial institutions: 2001 vs. 2004

Having a sense of how judicial institutions compare to each other, what about similarities and differences with other social and political institutions? Figure V.2 below displays the previous graph of trust in judicial institutions, but adds five other major institutions in Ecuador: the armed forces, congress, the catholic church, political parties, and the mass media. Notice that trust parts in two ways. Trust for the six rights-protecting institutions is higher than more partisan institutions—congress and political parties. However, armed forces, the catholic church, and the mass media all display higher levels of trust. This pattern indicates that while the institutions of rule of law are important, non-governmental (mass media and church) institutions are considered more trustworthy. Also, within the government, armed forces appears as the most trusted element. Yet, it is important to add that, as shown in Chapter II, trust in that institution has decline notably since 2001.




**Figure V.2 Trust in judicial and other institutions: 2001 vs. 2004**

Given this comparison, we see further reason to believe that these six institutions form a concrete category of institutions. This category is considered in the following section as trust in rule of law institutions.

### Predicting Trust

Although looking at trust for specific institutions is revealing, this chapter concerns the general beliefs of Ecuadorians regarding the rule of law. Thus, we must consider trust of the six

judicial institutions highlighted above as a single entity—trust in rule of law institutions.<sup>30</sup> This index variable (LEGINST) is useful because it is a single variable that can be examined for its links to other variables of interest.<sup>31</sup> First, we consider the patterns of trust in rule of law institutions itself—see Figure V.3 below. Most notably, 2004 shows an increase in trust of rule of law institutions over 2001.



**Figure V.3** Trust in legal institutions, overall scale: 2001 vs. 2004

<sup>30</sup> Note that all elements of trust in judicial institutions were shown to be related enough to form a reliable scale (alpha = .75) as shown in the 2001 version of this report and .78 in 2004. The same method of creating LEGINST was followed for the 2004 data. See Seligson, Mitchell. *Democracy Audit: Ecuador 2001*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. pg. 121.

<sup>31</sup> Another variable (LEGINSTR) was created from LEGINST as an ordinal measure of trust in rule of law grouping levels of low trust (means of 0 to 33), medium trust (means 33.1 to 66) and high trust (66.1 to 100). This variable will be useful for graphical presentations of trust over other categories.

So how do we explain this change in trust of rule of law institutions from year to year? Demographics may play some role; categories like age, gender, education, income, and city size may have important effects. Also, one's attitude towards crime and safety may be important in predicting how trustworthy rule of law institutions appear. Variables covering victimization and neighborhood safety will get at these factors. And finally, levels of corruption in government may also influence trust assessments, so these must be examined as well.

The results of the analysis for the 2004 data are shown in Table V.1. In 2004, all variables are significant predictors of trust in rule of law institutions.

**Table V.1 Predictors of trust in rule of law institutions**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
1	(Constant)	62.038	2.542		24.404	.000
	Q1 Gender	-2.534	.751	-.064	-3.376	.001
	Q2 How many years old are you?	-.082	.025	-.062	-3.281	.001
	TAMANO city size	-.944	.217	-.087	-4.356	.000
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	-.649	.147	-.086	-4.402	.000
	AOJ11 Fear of crime	-2.293	.410	-.107	-5.592	.000
	EXCTOT Total index of corruption victimization	-1.591	.348	-.087	-4.568	.000

a. Dependent Variable: ROLINST Trust in rule of law institutions

Given this consideration of important variables, the following sections will consider them in three broad groups: demographic and economic, crime-related, and corruption-based predictors of trust in rule of law institutions.

### **Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Rule of Law Institutions**

Having looked at a variety of predictors of trust in rule of law institutions, this section examines those predictors that are demographic and socio-economic variables. This will give us a sense of what categories of people are most or least likely to have certain levels of trust for rule of law institutions.

Age has an interesting relationship with rule of law institutions. In Figure V.4 below, we see a display of this relationship. First we note that in 2004 there is higher trust in rule of law institutions over all age groups. However, certain age groups display higher levels of trust than others. In both samples, the young and the old seem to display higher levels of trust than middle-aged individuals. The young (18-25 and 26-35) are the particularly highest trusting demographics.





Figure V.4 Age and trust in the rule of law institutions: 2001 vs. 2004


How do we explain this pattern? We suspect that when young people enter the political system they may be carrying with them socialization from their schooling. However, confrontations with reality of the system may well erode that confidence. Finally, at the older age cohorts, it may be that individuals have fewer experiences with the legal system than do the youth or that a more conservative (and thus more pro-law) political bias begins to emerge. It would be interesting to explore these patterns in depth.

The next graph considers the impact of location upon trust in rule of law institutions. The relationship between city size and trust for the 2004 sample is displayed in Figure V.5 below. Note that the Guayaquil and medium cities categories display higher levels trust than the other areas of Ecuador.



**Figure V.5** Trust in rule of law institutions and city size, 2004

Gender has a significant impact on trust in the rule of law institutions in 2004. The results are shown in Figure V.6, in which we control for education. What is noticeable here is that higher educated groups show the least trust in rule of law institutions for both genders. As we can see at all levels of education, females express lower trust than males. This may well be a reaction to the male-dominated nature of those institutions.




**Figure V.6** Trust in Rule of law institutions and education by gender (2004)

Having considered the basic demographic and socio-economic indicators of trust in rule of law institutions, it is clear that the story is incomplete. While such indicators are important, so are individual experiences with crime and perceptions of corruption. These two categories are examined in turn in the following section.

### **Crime-Related Predictors of Trust in Rule of Law Institutions**

When Ecuadorian citizens perceived to be in an area of high crime, they showed significantly less trust in rule of law institutions. This relationship is shown in Figure V.7. There is a strong relationship; those who fear crime more are far less trusting in their rule of law institutions, both in 2001 and 2004. The safer one feels about one's neighborhood, the more likely one is to display higher levels of trust in rule of law institutions. This may be a function of assigning safety conditions to the performance of judicial institutions. The safer the

neighborhood, the more likely its residents feel the police and courts are doing a proper job. Thus, the more likely they are to assign trust to those institutions that are promoting rule of law.



**Figure V.7** Trust in rule of law institutions by fear of crime, 2001 vs. 2004


This section has looked at trust for institutions when one's surroundings may be influenced by criminal activity. In all cases, trust in rule of law institutions is higher when rule of law institutions are taken to be working properly. Thus, it is important to consider perceptions of rule of law when such institutions are not believed to be functional or fair. This is the subject of the final section of this chapter.

### **Corruption-Based Predictors of Trust in Rule of Law Institutions**

This section considers the overall index of corruption (discussed elsewhere in this report) and how it links to trust in the rule of law institutions. As mentioned in earlier sections, people's assessments of whether institutions charged with protecting the rule of law and individual rights are worthy of trust also depend on their assessments of those institutions as free from corruption. As this final section will demonstrate, trust for rule of law institutions significantly declines among those who feel that some of those institutions are corrupt.

Figure V.8 below shows trust in rule of law institutions and its link to corruption. Remember that trust in police forms a significant part of the index of trust in rule of law

institutions. Not surprisingly, we see that people who are highly impacted by corruption have a very low mean value of trust in rule of law. But those who experience little corruption have higher means of trust.




**Figure V.8 Impact of corruption victimization on trust in rule of law institutions: 2001 vs. 2004**

This shows that battling corruption is a crucial element to spreading acceptance and trust for rule of law institutions. But corruption is not alone. Without low levels of corruption and low levels of crime, trust in rule of law will be diminished. Thus, a free, just, and effective police force and court system seem to be crucial elements for promoting acceptance and trust in rule of law.

### **Trust in Rule of Law Institutions and System Support**

We conclude this analysis by examining the impact of trust in rule of law institutions and overall support for the political system. Obviously, the two are related, since one important component of system support is belief in the legitimacy of the legal system. A simple correlation between the two measures shows a very high coefficient of .64 (sig. < .001). The pattern is shown in Figure V.9. In this graph, system support is divided into high and low. As can be seen, those with high system support score far higher on trust in rule of law institutions.



**Figure V.9 Relationship between system support and trust in rule of law institutions**

## Conclusions

This chapter has explored attitudes toward the rule of law institutions in Ecuador. It did so by first examining the socio-economic and demographic factors related to trust. It then explored the key predictors of trust in rule of law: fear of crime and corruption victimization (a subject that will be dealt with in detail below in Chapter VI). The chapter found that fear of crime and corruption victimization both serve to lower support for the rule of law in Ecuador.

## VI. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY

One of the most serious problems that Ecuador has confronted in the last few years has been corruption. Recall that in the last several years numerous well publicized scandals involving both government officials and members of the private sector made national and international headlines. In 1999, Ecuador formed the *Comisión de Control Cívico de la Corrupción* in an attempt to fight corruption in the country.


Increasingly, the methodology used by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been used to measure corruption at the level of the citizen. In the latest Transparency International annual *Global Corruption Report*, some results employing this method are presented.<sup>32</sup> Surveys of public opinion are not, however, a good instrument for measuring high-level corruption because those acts take place relatively rarely and under great secrecy. Most of what the public knows about such corruption comes from the local media. However, surveys do provide an excellent tool for measuring the corruption that affects citizens in their daily lives, such as bribery and other quotidian victimization. The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has carried several corruption studies focusing specifically on the magnitude of corruption experienced by citizens; on citizen perceptions of dishonesty and on the impact of corruption on democracy. This chapter focuses on the experience of Ecuadorians, making comparisons with other countries in the database where appropriate.

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<sup>32</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project's Corruption Victimization Scale," in *Global Corruption Report, 2004: Focus-- Political Corruption*, ed. Transparency International (London: Pluto Press, 2004).


### Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption

There is a perception of widespread public corruption in Ecuador. We asked respondents (EXC7), “Taking into account your experience, or what you have heard, the payment of bribes to officials is: very common, somewhat common, little common, or not at all common?” The results are shown in Figure VI.1 and Figure VI.2 below. In both 2001 and 2004, a full three quarters of respondents believes that corruption is either very or somewhat common. By 2004, however, those who believe that bribery is very common have increased substantially. This does not mean that corruption itself has increased, a subject will examine below, but that the *perception* of corruption has increased. Increased media attention on corruption could well have produced that impact, even if the actual level of corruption had declined between 2001 and 2004.



Difference of means sig. <.001

We can compare the overall levels of perception of corruption by converting the item into a 0-100 scale, as shown in Figure VI.3. There is a significant increase from 2001 to 2004, but the level was already very high in 2001, with not much more room to go up on our scale. Yet, as we shall see, this perception is at variance with the experience of corruption, suggesting that media attention may be a factor at work.



**Figure VI.3 Perception of corruption: 2001 vs. 2004**

There is significant variation in perceptions of corruption according to region, as can be seen in Figure VI.4. Again using the conversion to a 0-100 scale, we find that there are indeed significant differences between Quito and all other regions of Ecuador. It is interesting to note that in 2001 corruption was perceived to be much more widespread in Quito than in other places, while in 2004 that trend seems to have been reversed. All other regions show a substantial increase in the perception that corruption is widespread, while in Quito that perception has decreased by 10 points on the 0-100 scale.





Figure VI.4 How common is corruption? By region

We can place these findings in comparative perspective by looking at other countries in the Latin American Public Opinion database. We first do so by looking at perception of corruption. Ecuador scores as the country in which the citizens say that public officials are more corrupt (Figure VI.5). Yet, the linkage between perception of corruption and the fact of it is weak. Prior work has shown, for example, high levels of corruption in Bolivia, but the perception there is the lowest of the series.



**Figure VI.5** Perception of magnitude of corruption: Ecuador in comparative perspective, 2004

## Magnitude of Individual Acts of Corruption

In this section, we shift the focus from perception to actual experience with corruption. That has been the central focus of the LAPOP; we have argued that corruption experience is more important to measure than perception of corruption. We asked a series of items to measure both individual and vicarious experience with corruption. The survey questions appear below.

<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	No	Sí	NS	INAP
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que UD. no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC4.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando coimas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC5.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]? Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente]? En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar, preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC14A.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los fiscales? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los fiscales en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9, si dice “sí” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Le han exigido pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguna gente le pidió una coima para evitar el pago de la luz eléctrica?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?	(0)	(1)	(8)	

It is important to mention here that items EXC11-EXC16 differ from the rest of the set because they only account for those who use the service about which we asked. For example, in EXC15 we ask about public medical services. Only those who have actually used the services are included in the percentages of victimization.

The results of the series measuring experience with bribery are included in Figure VI.6, below. Again, this graph demonstrates that, in general, experiences with corruption have

decreased in Ecuador. That said, despite general decreases between 2001 and 2004, it is clear that corruption remains widespread in Ecuador.

The most common form of corruption occurs with the police. In both 2001 and 2004 nearly two-fifths of respondents saw the police solicit a bribe in the year prior to the survey. While substantially lower in 2004, more than a third of respondents saw a public employee solicit a bribe in the year prior to the 2004 survey, representing the second most common experience with corruption in 2004. At the same time, 15 percent of respondents were personal victims of bribery demands from public employees in 2004. This means that more than one out of every ten Ecuadorians was victimized by public employees in the year prior to the 2004 study.

Notice the substantial decreases in both school bribes and bribes in health services, among those who used public school and public health services. These were two of the sectors most affected by corruption in the 2001 survey, and while these figures are still high, this is encouraging news for Ecuadorians who send their children to school and who attend public health facilities. Similarly, between 2001 and 2004 the number of bribes in the courts fell by seven percent.




Figure VI.6 Corruption experiences in Ecuador: 2001 vs. 2004

How do these levels of experience with corruption compare with other countries in the region? Figure VI.7 shows Ecuador compared to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh

Latin American Public Opinion Project database. Ecuador is in second place, right after Bolivia, but far higher than many other countries in the region.




Figure VI.7 Public official solicited bribe from respondent in last year


### Who Are the Victims of Corruption in Ecuador?

Having looked at both perceptions and experience with corruption, we will now look more closely at the specific victims of corruption using a scale of corruption victimization. This allows us to draw general conclusions without requiring that we analyze each variable individually. Remember, here we analyze *direct personal experience* with corruption and not observed or vicarious corruption. Therefore all variables that ask about observations of corruption, like EXC4 and EXC5, are eliminated. With the exception of variable EXC1 (accused by police), the rest of the questions in the series deal with bribery. Therefore, in order to provide consistent measures, EXC1 is eliminated as well. The remaining variables, EXC2 (police bribe); EXC6 (public employee bribe); EXC11 (municipal bribe); EXC13 (bribe at work); EXC14 (bribe in court); EXC15 (bribe in public health services); EXC16 (bribe in schools) and EXC17 (bribe for electric service) comprise the index we use in this analysis.

In most instances where indices have been used in this study, the items have been averaged. However, since many of the variables included here only count those individuals actually using the service asked about, this index instead counts the instances of corruption

confronted by respondents. This allows for differentiation between those who never had an experience and those who may have had repeated incidents. In short, it allows for a more precise analysis of corruption experiences.

According to Figure VI.8 and Figure VI.9 below, a large number of Ecuadorians have been the victims of at least one experience with corruption. However, it is noteworthy that while people's perceptions of corruption have increased significantly between 2001 and 2004, actual experiences with corruption have decreased between the two years. In 2001 about 45 percent of respondents had at least one direct experience with corruption, while in 2004 that number had decreased to about 36 percent, *a decline of almost ten percent*.



Difference of means sig. <.001


In Table VI.1 below, multivariate analysis is used to provide answers to the question “who are the victims of corruption?” According to the table, gender, education, marital status, family size and location are all important factors in both 2001 and 2004. In 2004, age also exerts an influence on experiences with corruption. The analysis also shows that the amount of money a family makes *does not* affect corruption victimization; people from all income levels are equally likely to be victims of corruption.

**Table VI.1** Predictors of corruption victimization in Ecuador: 2001 vs. 2004

YEAR	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Coefficients		
2001	1	(Constant)	.964	.141		6.821	.000
		Q1 Gender	-.302	.047	-.124	-6.484	.000
		MARRIED Marital Status	.003	.001	.123	6.094	.000
		Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.039	.014	.068	2.748	.006
		Q10 Monthly family income?	.018	.012	.033	1.538	.124
		ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.026	.006	.091	4.036	.000
		TAMANO city size	-.042	.013	-.064	-3.245	.001
		AGE Age	-.029	.019	-.035	-1.491	.136
2004	1	(Constant)	.670	.132		5.072	.000
		Q1 Gender	-.244	.042	-.111	-5.757	.000
		MARRIED Marital Status	.001	.000	.046	2.269	.023
		Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.053	.012	.115	4.611	.000
		Q10 Monthly family income?	.007	.011	.014	.635	.526
		ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.040	.006	.156	6.742	.000
		TAMANO city size	-.035	.012	-.059	-2.954	.003
		AGE Age	-.055	.018	-.073	-3.039	.002


Dependent Variable: EXCTOT Total index of corruption victimization

Figure VI.10 below shows that women are less likely to be victims of corruption; for both years women's level of victimization is lower than that of men. This may be largely due to cultural factors that inhibit women's participation in public life, therefore reducing their likelihood to be in situations that would victimize them. However, as we have seen already in this chapter, overall experiences with corruption decreased between 2001 and 2004 for both men and women.




**Figure VI.10** Corruption victimization and gender: 2001 vs. 2004

Education is associated with corruption victimization. This relationship is highlighted below in Figure VI.11. The graphs for both 2001 and 2004 demonstrate that corruption victimization increases as the level of education increases. This relationship is true for both men and women. However, this finding presents a puzzle given what we have already seen as regards the relationship between income and corruption victimization. Why would the highly educated be more likely to be victimized than those with lower levels of education? Two possibilities may explain this question. First, more educated people are more likely to engage in public affairs and heightened participation leads to increased exposure to potential victimization. Second, more educated people may be more likely to report acts of victimization than less well educated people.



**Figure VI.11** Education and corruption victimization: by gender: 2001



**Figure VI.12** Education and corruption victimization: by gender: 2004

As Figure VI.13 shows, married people are more likely to be victims of corruption than single people. No doubt this has to do with the far greater involvement in institutions (schools, public health for children, etc.) among the married than the single.






Figure VI.13 Corruption victimization and marital status

Since marital status affects corruption victimization, we need to look directly at the impact of having children. In 2001 it was found that an increased number of children resulted in more corruption victimization, but we also found a slight decline in this pattern among those with the most children. We see that pattern to an even greater degree in 2004, as shown in Figure VI.14.



**Figure VI.14** Corruption victimization and number of children


These results may be an artifact of the relationship between education, and also possibly of wealth. A multivariate analysis did find a strong impact of education, but only a slight one of wealth.<sup>33</sup> As can be seen in Figure VI.15, the reduction of corruption victimization for those with the largest families is attenuated. The overall pattern seems quite clear; more children, more opportunities for corruption. But, among those with the largest families, even when controlling for the impact of education (higher educated respondents report more victimization), the impact is not as great. The overall pattern remains clear; in Ecuador, larger families expose citizens to greater opportunities for corruption.



**Figure VI.15** Corruption victimization and family size

<sup>33</sup> This analysis was carried out by using education, wealth and income as covariates in an ANOVA run.

As can be seen in Figure VI.16 below, our regression analysis shows that age does have an impact on corruption victimization in 2004. Younger and older people are less likely to be victims of corruption than people in middle age brackets. As people become adults they engage more in public affairs. They do this directly, through petitioning public offices and interacting with public officials, or indirectly, by paying the electric bill and bringing their children to the local health municipal center. Such increased participation in public life makes them more likely to confront situations in which they can be victimized.



**Figure VI.16** Corruption victimization and age: 2004

Finally, this chapter looks at the impact of location on corruption victimization. Figure VI.17 shows that for both 2001 and 2004 corruption has tended to be higher in Quito than in other parts of the country, while it has tended to be lower in rural areas. As we have seen throughout the chapter, experience with corruption has decreased across and within groups. The most substantial decreases have occurred in Quito, big cities and small cities.





Figure VI.17 Corruption victimization and city size

## Corruption and Political Legitimacy

In many ways, the most important long-term reason to study corruption is the possible impact that it may have on democratic stability. There has been much speculation as to the effect of corruption on democratic countries. The thesis is that countries with high levels of corruption cannot expect to hold onto the loyalty of their citizens over the long run. Such countries are likely to be faced with political instability that could ultimately lead to their overthrow. Until recently, however, that speculation was not supported by empirical findings. As part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, however, studies have been carried out in a number of Latin American countries in which it has been shown empirically that citizens who have been victims of corruption are less supportive of their political systems than those who have not. That research began with a study of Nicaragua, the results of which have been published in two reports and a recent article in an academic journal that focuses on issues of

public integrity and transparency.<sup>34</sup> Since then, these findings have been replicated with data from Bolivia, Paraguay and El Salvador, suggesting that the Nicaragua findings are not idiosyncratic but form part of a larger pattern. This has resulted in another academic publication.<sup>35</sup> In the 2001 study, a full discussion of the impact of corruption on legitimacy was undertaken, but that will not be repeated here.

When we use the system support measure developed earlier in this report and examine the impact of corruption, the findings are very clear, as is shown in Figure VI.18. Respondents in our national survey who have not been victims of corruption in the year prior to the survey scored above the national mean on system support, but the more corrupt acts suffered by a respondent, the lower support tends to fall.<sup>36</sup> The results hold even when controls are introduced for gender, age, education, income, marital status and city size. In addition, the analysis was run to examine political party effects, in order to check if voters for the incumbent party were less likely to report corruption victimization. No such effect one was found. The results presented here show a dramatic confirmation of the importance of reducing corruption in Ecuador; given that the lower the corruption the higher the system support.



**Figure VI.18 Corruption and system support: 2004**

<sup>34</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. A Report to USAID, Nicaragua. Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study* (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates).

<sup>35</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries," *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002):408-33.

<sup>36</sup> The slight increase at the highest levels is statistically insignificant.

## VII. Civil Society Participation

There are two main reasons why a consideration of civil society participation in Ecuador merits its own chapter. First, given existing data from 2001, to leave out a comparison with 2004 would miss crucial information about the nature of public life in Ecuador over the past three years. Knowing how people are participating in their communities through time gives us a sense of the Ecuadorian ethic of civil society itself, and the ability of civil society groups to flourish or fade in the country.

A second reason, perhaps more important, is that many people cite civil society as an important element of a properly functioning democracy. The main thrust in democratic theory regarding this comes from two tracks. One is classic notions of democracy, republicanism, and civil participation. Alexis de Toqueville's classic study of democracy in the early years of the United States has crucially shaped many political observers' notions of democracy even up to today. His notion of democratic spirit, reflected in the republican writers of his period, had a key place for participation in civil society. The notion is that not just formal participation in government affairs is important for democracy and the flourishing of democratic values among citizens. Also, participation in extra-governmental organizations is thought to shape democratic values. School associations, churches, professional organizations, unions, political parties, and cooperatives are all said to be important spaces where people "learn" democracy.

The importance of civil society is not confined to the early modern thinkers, however. The modern thrust of civil society interest is inspired by Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*. In this book, he uses a systematic approach to get at the same notions that de Toqueville and others were expressing years ago—the link between civil society and democracy. The notion here is that the "learning" of democracy is actually an increase in what Putnam and others describe as "social capital."<sup>37</sup> Social capital is similar to the older notions of democratic spirit, but focuses more upon trust in government fostered by experience with democracy in smaller formal and informal formats. The notion is that civil society fosters key democratic values like tolerance and attribution of legitimacy to procedures rather than to outcomes.

Because democracy is largely regarded as a desirable thing (both within Ecuador and without), civil society becomes important to evaluate if the theoretical foundation is indeed correct. This chapter will look at participation in civil society in Ecuador, and decompose the categories and types of participation in civil society. No single civic institution is the same, but there may be enough similarities to talk about civil society more broadly. The chapter will end with a glimpse of how the democratic values of Ecuadorians are impacted by their levels of participation.

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<sup>37</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

## Levels of Participation

The survey contains a block of items to measure people's involvement in groups that serve as indicators of participation in civil society. Respondents were asked if they participated weekly, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. This is the format of the questions on the 2001 democracy audit of Ecuador, and thus data from the two time periods is comparable. The block of civil society questions in the 2001/2004 Ecuador surveys appears below:

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si UD. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de algún comité o sociedad de la Iglesia o templo?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP11.</b> ¿Reuniones de una cooperativa?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP12.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna asociación cívica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

The percentage breakdown of these results appears in Table VII.1 below. The table includes the data from the 2004 democracy audit, as well as the information on the same questions asked in 2001.

Year		Community							
		Church committee	Parent-teacher organization	Community development association	Professional association	Union	Cooperative	Civic association	Political party
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
2001	Once a week	24.6%	6.8%	5.0%	3.9%	1.4%	2.1%	1.8%	1.8%
	Once a month	17.1%	30.8%	14.8%	6.6%	4.7%	6.2%	3.6%	2.5%
	Once a year	10.3%	15.8%	14.0%	7.3%	4.6%	7.5%	4.1%	5.3%
	Never	48.0%	46.7%	66.2%	82.1%	89.4%	84.3%	90.5%	90.4%
2004	Once a week	25.7%	4.2%	3.8%	2.6%	.8%	1.2%	.8%	.9%
	Once a month	13.4%	26.1%	13.0%	7.0%	2.4%	3.5%	2.0%	1.8%
	Once a year	8.3%	18.4%	11.7%	6.2%	2.6%	4.7%	2.7%	3.4%
	Never	52.5%	51.3%	71.6%	84.3%	94.2%	90.6%	94.5%	93.9%

**Table VII.1** Frequencies of civil society participation

Another look at the data for 2004 is provided in Figure VII.1 below. The most noticeable factor is the lack of participation in all of the groups. The percentage of respondents who said that they never attend an organization’s meetings was above 50 percent for all eight organizations in the survey. On the other hand, the graph is comparing percentages within each group. The same respondent who never attends church committees, parent-teacher meetings, or community-development activities may be in the once-a-week group for political party involvement. We can begin to construct a story about such a person by looking at demographic trends in the data. A later section of this chapter will do this type of analysis.





Figure VII.1 Participation in civic organizations: 2004

Looking more closely at the breakdowns, public-sphere organizations display the lowest levels of participation. Community participation organizations are a different story; church committees, parent-teacher organizations, and community-development groups show a large difference from formal and political organizations.<sup>38</sup> The percentage of people who have some involvement, however sporadic, rises to respectable levels for the community participation variables. However, the political organizations show only between five and ten percent of the population participating, even at a once-a-year basis.

The proceeding graph gives us a sense of the breakdowns of the elements of participation. One looming question remains: has participation in Ecuadorian civil society changed from 2001 to 2004? A simple comparison of means can shed a great deal of light on this question. Figure VII.2 below displays the means of each partition of civil society. A simple glance at means shows that in all cases but political party participation, levels of activity in civil society are lower in 2004 than in 2001.



**Figure VII.2 Participation in civil society: 2001 vs. 2004**

Are these differences significant changes, or just the effect of differing samples from the two years? Table VII.2 below looks at whether there is a statistically significant difference

<sup>38</sup> Note that for the following analysis, the splitting of participatory organizations into community and formal/political will be continued. These two dimensions of participations were analyzed for distinctness in the prior democracy audit. They were shown to be a meaningful categorization of the modes of participation. See Seligson, Mitchell. *Democracy Audit: Ecuador 2001*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Latin American Opinion Project. pg. 176-177.

between 2001 and 2004 for each of the variables of civil society participation. Note that for all the variables, the difference between the two years is significant with the exception of church participation. This means that not only have levels of participation dropped in the three-year interim between surveys, but that the drops represent significant declines in participation.

			df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
CP6R Church * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	5858.815	3.227	.072
	Within Groups		5888	1815.440		
	Total		5889			
CP7R School * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	33746.075	31.447	.000
	Within Groups		5856	1073.123		
	Total		5857			
CP8R Community development * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	14881.620	17.210	.000
	Within Groups		5832	864.714		
	Total		5833			
CP9R Prof. Association * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	3225.012	5.424	.020
	Within Groups		5818	594.561		
	Total		5819			
CP10R Union * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	10654.743	38.419	.000
	Within Groups		5810	277.332		
	Total		5811			
CP11R Cooperative * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	18284.189	46.915	.000
	Within Groups		5827	389.728		
	Total		5828			
CP12R Civic association * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	8910.367	32.952	.000
	Within Groups		5804	270.405		
	Total		5805			
CP13R Political party * YEAR Year	Between Groups	(Combined)	1	5.035	21.747	.000
	Within Groups		5824	.232		
	Total		5825			

**Table VII.2** Testing for significant differences between year means

Given the reasoning for looking at participation, the data above paint a rather concerning picture. If levels of participation are down, are democratic values also lower? Or is the civil society argument of less importance in Ecuador than in other places? The next two sections examine the variables of participation more closely, to get a sense of what is really going on in the case of Ecuador.

## Predictors of Communal Participation

The next step in analysis is a look at what demographic factors predict communal and formal/political participation. This section considers the first of these; formal/political predictors

are considered in a subsequent section. The results of a regression analysis are displayed in Table VII.3 below.


Year	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Beta		
2001	1	(Constant)	23.589	3.450		6.838	.000
		Gender	2.224	.967	.044	2.301	.021
		How many years old are you?	-.080	.039	-.049	-2.044	.041
		Monthly family income?	-1.050	.241	-.092	-4.361	.000
		Education	1.808	.771	.052	2.346	.019
		Marital Status	.062	.011	.115	5.675	.000
		How many sons or daughters do you have?	.632	.292	.054	2.164	.031
		city size	1.489	.272	.109	5.478	.000
		Victim of a crime in last year	.038	.012	.062	3.178	.001
		Speaking about the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-1.096	.509	-.041	-2.151	.032
2004	1	(Constant)	-.658	3.474		-.189	.850
		Gender	3.296	.925	.070	3.562	.000
		How many years old are you?	.108	.039	.067	2.758	.006
		Monthly family income?	.804	.227	.076	3.539	.000
		Education	2.092	.744	.064	2.812	.005
		Marital Status	.069	.010	.138	6.694	.000
		How many sons or daughters do you have?	.640	.250	.064	2.561	.010
		city size	1.219	.265	.096	4.607	.000
		Victim of a crime in last year	.033	.012	.055	2.770	.006
		Speaking about the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-.149	.507	-.006	-.293	.769

a. Dependent Variable: Communal participation

**Table VII.3 Predictors of communal participation**


Since we see that the demographic variables of gender and age have an impact on participation, the joint effects of these are displayed in Figure VII.3 and Figure VII.4 below. For both years we see an inverted U-curve pattern. While the youth participate less, as Ecuadorians grow into full adulthood, marry and build families, their participation increases. This should hardly be surprising. The lifestyle of younger people provides little incentive to participate in community activities. However, at older ages, when more people are engaged in child-rearing and tend to have more durable residence in communities, participation is higher. As Ecuadorians

move into older age cohorts, their participation again declines, when the incentives (especially related to child-rearing) for involvement with community organizations fade. Note that the line for males drops more sharply at the very late ages in the survey—most probably reflective of men’s likelihood of having age-related infirmities earlier than women.




Notice also the change in gender participation trends. The 2001 figure shows that for most ages, women participate more than men in community organizations. However, the 2004 figure shows that women around and below 40 participate more than men, but men around and above 40 actually participate more. This 2004 pattern still reflects unequal distribution of gender roles—the earlier years are where people are most likely to be motivated to participation by concerns about their children. Thus, in a gendered society, women are more participatory at these ages.

To explore these gender differences more closely, consider participation rates by gender in the three categories that make up the measure of community participation—presented in Figure VII.5 below. Notice that, predictably, gender disparity appears most distinct in parent teacher organization participation—a space where women may be more likely to participate than men due to the influence of gender norms.




**Figure VII.5 Participation in community organizations by gender: 2004**

An overall summary of the relationship between gender and communal participation, comparing 2001 with 2004 is contained in Figure VII.6.



**Figure VII.6 Gender and communal participation: 2001 vs. 2004**

Married individuals in Ecuador appear much more likely to participate in communal organizations than single individuals, displayed in Figure VII.7 below. This relates to the factor of children on community participation— married individuals are more likely to have children than single individuals.



**Figure VII.7 Communal participation by marital status**

We have examined the role of children in communal participation through indirect routes. Figure VII.8 below displays a direct connection between number of children and communal participation. Notice the rise in participation from no children to one child. The rate climbs for more children, but levels off. While there is a bit of a decline for participation with many children in 2001, the 2004 data suggests that parents of many children make the time to participate as much as parents of one or a few children.






Figure VII.8 Communal participation by number of children: 2001 vs. 2004

City size certainly affects the available opportunities to participate (see Figure VII.9) below. Notice the disparity between Quito and Guayaquil. Also, notice that while Quito does have a lot of participation, rural areas display an equal mean of participation. Perhaps we are seeing two dynamics at work. In Quito, the size and circumstance of the city contribute to participation. In the rural areas, the needs of rural life match a higher level of participation. The story in 2004 is very different from the story in 2001. The year 2004 shows a reversal of the participation rate of Quito; it has gained almost 10 percentage points from 2001. The other “big cities,” in Ecuador, however, are declining in 2004. We observe relatively high levels of participation in 2001 dropping nine points to their 2004 level.




**Figure VII.9 Communal participation and city size: 2001 vs. 2004**

The experience of crime and its effect upon community participation is displayed in Figure VII.10 below. Notice that again, participation levels seem to be lower in both categories in the year 2004. Victims of crime seem to be more inclined to participate in community organizations. This may be due to a self-defense factor. Victims may be acting to make their neighborhood secure.



**Figure VII.10 Communal participation and victimization**

Concerns about the safety of one's community do not seem to play a particularly strong role in predicting community participation in the regression. Figure VII.11 below may explain why. People who feel very safe participate much more than less secure individuals.



**Figure VII.11 Communal participation and neighborhood safety assessment**

Having considered what impacts community participation, the next section looks at what fosters or limits more formal and professional forms of participation.

## Predictors of Formal/Political Participation

This section looks at the other half of participation—activity and attendance of meetings of formal and political organizations. This includes professional organizations, unions, cooperatives, civic associations, and political parties. This participation is measured by the variable *professional participation* in the following analysis. The regression in Table VII.4 explores the predictors of professional participation.

Year	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
			B	Std. Error	Coefficients		
2001	1	(Constant)	5.829	1.720		3.388	.001
		Gender	-2.602	.482	-.105	-5.398	.000
		How many years old are you?	.041	.020	.051	2.070	.039
		Monthly family income?	.184	.120	.033	1.538	.124
		Education	1.739	.383	.102	4.542	.000
		What is your marital status?	-.035	.223	-.003	-.157	.876
		How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.225	.140	-.039	-1.611	.107
		city size	.445	.135	.066	3.309	.001
		Victim of a crime in last year	.020	.006	.066	3.360	.001
		Speaking about the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-.845	.252	-.064	-3.348	.001
2004	1	(Constant)	.671	1.462		.459	.646
		Gender	-2.339	.392	-.118	-5.971	.000
		How many years old are you?	.057	.017	.085	3.412	.001
		Monthly family income?	.427	.095	.097	4.515	.000
		Education	1.827	.313	.134	5.837	.000
		What is your marital status?	-.173	.190	-.019	-.912	.362
		How many sons or daughters do you have?	.164	.103	.039	1.597	.110
		city size	.241	.111	.045	2.182	.029
		Victim of a crime in last year	.012	.005	.046	2.309	.021
		Speaking about the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-.568	.213	-.053	-2.665	.008

<sup>a</sup>. Dependent Variable: Professional participation

**Table VII.4 Predictors of professional participation**

Notice that many of the same predictors that seemed important to communal participation are relevant here. Education, age, gender, income, and city size are all theoretically important and significant predictors. The two safety questions also appear to be significant predictors.

The notable exception is that number of children is not significant for professional participation, but was significant in communal participation. This is most likely because parent teacher organizations form a significant part of communal participation—having more children would on the surface seem to motivate parents to play a more active role in school organizations. But having a large number of children would seem to detract from time available to participate in more institutionalized outlets of participation. Marriage is the other category that is not a significant predictor, perhaps because marriage at different stages in life has different effects upon ability and time to participate in civil society.

Marriage and number of children proved to be insignificant predictors. Therefore no further analysis is included of these variables as they relate to professional participation. However, gender and age do have an impact on professional participation. Figure VII.12 below shows the relationship between these variables.

Notice that there is a split in professional participation between the sexes for all ages, but that split is most pronounced later in life. The line of women's participation falls off, leaving men participating more and more until retirement age. This dynamic may be indication of professional advancement opportunities and their impact on participation. Men are more likely to be in the Ecuadorian workforce. Couple that with glass ceiling effects on women that can keep them from promotions and the social status of those positions. This may have an effect of discouraging participation in such groups as professional organizations and political parties.





Figure VII.12 Gender difference in professional participation by age, 2004

Education levels also showed a significant effect on professional participation. Figure VII.13 below shows participation percentages over different levels of education for each of the elements of professional participation. Two things stand out. First, professional participation increases with better educated segments of the population, though not too drastically. Second, four of the five types of participation cluster together—but professional association participation varies a great deal from the other types. This may occur because more professional associations actively focus on the more-educated and degreed classes of society. Combine that with the more personal benefits that professional associations can provide, and the line makes sense to rise so far above the rest.



**Figure VII.13 Professional participation by group: impact of education, 2004**

City size also plays an important predictive role in the regression of professional participation. Figure VII.14 below shows participation levels for each of the five parts of professional participation grouped by metro-area and/or size. Notice again that professional association participation runs highest for all sizes of cities. More interesting, though, are some of the differences in the other groups between city sizes. Unions show weak participation in all places, except for medium-sized cities, where they come in second to participation after professional associations. Cooperatives also have an interesting pattern, being participated in to a great deal in Quito, but also in small cities and rural areas. Recalling back to the earlier discussions of city size, there are factors about city sizes that make for particular favorable or non-favorable conditions for certain types of groups. Rural areas are not prime locales for Unions, but Cooperatives work rather well in agrarian surroundings. What is important to note from this graph is that professional participation works differently in different places in

Ecuador—thus programs to encourage participation need to keep context in account when looking at what sorts of organizations to target.




Figure VII.14 Professional participation by group over different city sizes (2004)

The change in participation by city size is a rather different picture than from 2001—displayed in Figure VII.15 below. Cooperatives are especially worthy of notice. In 2001, participation in cooperatives was (relatively) flourishing through many parts of Ecuador. But in 2004, cooperatives drop a great deal in all places. While many professional groups’ participation levels dropped in 2004, none are as notable as the change in cooperative involvement. Perhaps changing economic conditions are behind this change, or perhaps an overall depression of participation in professional organizations simply hit cooperatives harder than some other types of professional participation.





Figure VII.15 Professional participation by group over different city sizes (2001)


Finally, we turn to professional participation and its relationship to crime victimization and people's perceptions of the safety of their immediate surroundings. Figure VII.16 below shows the first—a look at how personal victimization and participation interact.<sup>39</sup> It appears that more victims of crime tend to participate in professional organizations. Again, this may be due to actual motivation to participate due to victimization, or because groups that are victimized are more likely to be demographically inclined to participation in the first place.



**Figure VII.16 Professional participation and victimization**

<sup>39</sup> Here there is no important difference in 2004 from 2001 in terms of the relationship between the two groups.

A final cut at professional participation is to view it in relation to feelings of safety in one's neighborhood—often a rough estimate of fear of crime. Figure VII.17 below displays this relationship. Notice that for all levels of safety, professional participation in 2004 falls below participation in 2001. Also, as pointed out before, individuals who feel safe actually participate more than individuals who feel unsafe. Perhaps people feel that their participation improves the safety of their neighborhood, or that only safe individuals are inclined to participate at all—the non-safe may be too busy worrying about their safety to join a cooperative, union, or political party.




**Figure VII.17 Professional participation by neighborhood safety assessment**

Having gained a sense of how professional participation works through different groups, contexts, and perceptions of the world around individuals, this chapter will now turn to the crucial idea. Does participation affect levels of support for democracy in Ecuador? If civil society participation does not impact democracy in some way, we may have to re-think notions that participation in civil society are important for fostering and maintaining a democratic system.

### Does Participation in Civil Society Impact Democracy?

Having gained a sense of how participation is characterized and caused in Ecuador, what remains is whether participation in the kinds of civil society organizations we have examined in this chapter is related to other forms of democratic activism.

An examination of Figure VII.18 shows a very powerful connection between participation in community development organizations and attendance at meetings of the *junta parroquial*, an organization we studied earlier in Chapter IV. Ecuadorians who are active in their communities in such community development organizations are very likely to also be participating in the *juntas*.



**Figure VII.18** Impact of civil society participation on junta parroquial attendance

## Conclusion

In concluding this section, an important notion to keep in mind is that the aspect of a group in which people participate matters. The administrative and bureaucratic elements of participation are not necessarily democracy related. It is the democratic aspects of participation that are crucial. This is not only a pattern in the data, but it makes sense theoretically. We expect participation to matter for democracy when that participation serves as a school to teach democratic norms and values. Experience doing democracy in smaller settings is the crucial element. Thus, it is the medium participation category that seems most important to focus efforts upon.

All Ecuadorians could not be expected, of course, to be participating on a daily basis with the business of community and professional groups. Instead, they should be participating to a degree—being involved in the moments when those groups are engaging in democratic decision-making and norm-building. Instead of a goal to move all people to the high participation category, a better goal would be to eliminate the no participation category, which, as we have seen, is quite large. This strategy of getting all people to participate to some degree in multiple elements of civil society seems to be the most profitable when it comes to encouraging democratic values amongst the people of Ecuador.

## VIII. Appendix A. Questionnaire in Spanish

Versión # 14 19 diciembre, 2003



Latin American  
Public Opinion  
Project

### UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Ecuador, 2004

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Provincia:		<b>PROV</b>	
Cantón:		<b>CANTON</b>	
Parroquia:		<b>PAROQ</b>	
Zona		<b>ZONA</b>	
Sector		<b>SEC</b>	
Manzana (o Segmento)		<b>MANZANA</b>	
Estrato: 1. Costa Urbana 2. Costa Rural 3. Sierra Urbana 4. Sierra Rural 5. Oriente Norte 6. Oriente Sur 8. Frontera norte 9. Frontera sur		<b>ESTRATO</b>	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Quichua		<b>IDIOMAQ</b>	
Número de visitas a la casa: 1 2 3		<b>CALLBACK</b>	

Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Q1. ANOTE:</b> Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	<b>Q1</b>	
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<p><b>A4.</b> Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema <b>más grave</b> que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios  (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza  (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)  (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (08) Falta de crédito  (09) Problemas del medio ambiente (10) Drogadicción  (11) Narcotráfico (12) Corrupción  (13) Pandillas (14) Mal gobierno  (15) Migración (16) La guerra contra terrorismo  (17) Educación</p> <p>(88) No sabe</p> <p>Anotar si no existe código:</p>	<b>A4</b>	
--	-----------	--

<i>Con qué frecuencia ...</i>	<b>Todos los días</b>	<b>Una o dos veces por semana</b>	<b>Rara vez</b>	<b>Nunca</b>	
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A1</b>
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A2</b>
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A3</b>

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica del país? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT2</b>	
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT3</b>	
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO1</b>	
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO2</b>	
<b>IDIO3.</b> Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree Ud. que su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO3</b>	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

<i>¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido UD. ayuda o cooperación ... ?</i>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>CP1.</b> Al presidente de la República	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP1</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP2</b>	
<b>CP3.</b> Al alcalde	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP3</b>	
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4</b>	
<b>CP4A.</b> A la CONAIE ó a otro movimiento indígena	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4A</b>	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	<b>CP5</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En los últimos dos años usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [ <i>sigá</i> ] (2) No [ <i>Pase a CP6</i> ] (8) NS		

<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado UD. Dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5A</b>
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido UD. con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5B</b>
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo UD. a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5C</b>
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar UD. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5D</b>

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si UD. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de algún comité o grupo de la Iglesia o templo?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP11.</b> ¿Reuniones de una cooperativa?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP11</b>
<b>CP12.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna asociación cívica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP12</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP13</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría UD. que se encuentra ...? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	<b>LS3</b>
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<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de la comunidad o de su barrio en general es ...? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	<b>IT1</b>
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree UD. que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	<b>IT2</b>
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree UD. que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, tratarían de aprovecharse de UD., o cree que no se aprovecharían de Usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	<b>IT3</b>

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría UD. en esta escala? Ponga una X en la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b> (NS=88)
<b>Izquierda</b>										<b>Derecha</b>

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto [reuniones convocadas por el alcalde] durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1</b>
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<p><b>NP1B.</b> ¿Ha asistido a alguna reunión de la junta parroquial durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda.</p>	<p><b>NP1B</b></p>
<p><b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<p><b>NP2</b></p>
<p><b>NP2A.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a la junta parroquial durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>	<p><b>NP2A</b></p>
<p><b>NP2B.</b> ¿En su opinión la junta parroquial ayuda mucho, algo, poco o nada a solucionar los problemas de su comunidad? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>NP2B</b></p>
<p><b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son ... ? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe</p>	<p><b>SGL1</b></p>
<p><b>SGL2.</b> ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al municipio para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mala, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe</p>	<p><b>SGL2</b></p>
<p><b>LGL1.</b> En su opinión, ¿Entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados, o el municipio quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? O ¿El municipio? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) El municipio [<b>NO LEER</b> (4) Ninguno] [<b>NO LEER</b> (5) Todos igual] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	<p><b>LGL1</b></p>
<p><b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma [<b>NO LEER</b> (3) No cambiar nada] [<b>NO LEER</b> (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>	<p><b>LGL2</b></p>
<p><b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>	<p><b>LGL3</b></p>
<p><b>LGL4.</b> ¿Cree usted que el alcalde y el concejo municipal responden a lo que el pueblo quiere siempre, la mayoría de veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca? (1) Siempre (2) La mayoría de veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) No sabe/NR</p>	<p><b>LGL4</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual Alcalde de este municipio? Anotar Nombre: _____ [<b>revisar lista de alcaldes</b>] (1) Correcto (0) Incorrecto (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI1</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI2.</b> En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? [<b>No leer respuestas</b>] [<b>aceptar una sola respuesta</b>] (01)Ninguno [<b>pase a MUNI5</b>] (02) Falta de agua (03) Falta de arreglo de calles (04) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (05) Falta de Aseo público (06) Falta de servicios (07) La situación económica (08) Falta de fondos y ayuda (09) Mala administración (10) Descuido del medio ambiente (11) Corrupción (88) NS/NR [<b>pase a MUNI5</b>] Otros [anotar]: _____</p>	<p><b>MUNI2</b></p>

<p><b>MUNI3.</b> ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde de este municipio por resolver ese problema? <b>[leer respuestas]</b></p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS</p>	<p><b>MUNI3</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5.</b> ¿Ha participado Ud. en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?</p> <p>(1) Sí, ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5A.</b> ¿En su opinión, los gastos de la municipalidad en mayor parte se utilizan en que cosa? <b>[No Leer]</b></p> <p>1. Aseo público  2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, canchas de fútbol, u otros obras públicas  3. Salud, educación  4. Corrupción  5. Sueldos  6. Nada  Otro</p> <p style="text-align: right;">88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio?</p> <p>(3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI6</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI7.</b> En su opinión, ¿los proyectos que ejecuta el municipio benefician o no benefician a personas como Ud. y a su familia?</p> <p>(1) Sí benefician (0) No benefician (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI7</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI8.</b> ¿Ha realizado UD. algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante el último año?</p> <p>(1) Sí <i>[siga]</i> (0) No <i>[pase a MUNI11]</i> (8) NS/NR <i>[Pase a MUNI11]</i></p>	<p><b>MUNI8</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI9.</b> ¿Cómo fue atendido? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.</p>	<p><b>MUNI9</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI10.</b> ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>MUNI10</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI11.</b> ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia?</p> <p>1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8, NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI11</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI11A.</b> ¿Quién cree que influye más en las decisiones que se toman en el municipio? <b>[lea las alternativas]</b>  <b>[aceptar solo una respuesta]</b></p> <p>(01) El alcalde [presidente del concejo municipal] (02) El partido del alcalde (03) El Concejo Municipal  (04) El Gobierno Nacional (05) Las Organizaciones comunitarias  (06) Las Organizaciones No-gubernamentales (ONG's) (07) Los empresarios privados  (77) Otros: [solo si mencionan] _____ (88) No sabe</p>	<p><b>MUNI11A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI15.</b> ¿Qué tan interesado cree Ud. que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI15</b></p>

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS	<b>JC4</b>	
<b>JC7.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC7</b>	
<b>JC8.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC8</b>	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC11.</b> Frente a mucho desorden social	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC11</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS	<b>JC13</b>	
<b>GBMIL1.</b> Alguna gente dice que estaríamos mejor si el país fuese gobernado de manera diferente. Algunos dicen que los militares deberían gobernar el país, mientras otros dicen que únicamente deberían gobernar los civiles. ¿Qué piensa Ud.?	(1) Los militares deben gobernar	(2) Los civiles deben gobernar	(8) NS	<b>GBMIL1</b>	

<b>GBRE7.</b> Si el Congreso se cerrara y los partidos se prohibieran, usted lo ¿aprobaría fuertemente, aprobaría de alguna manera, desaprobaría de alguna manera o definitivamente lo desaprobaría?	1. aprobaría fuertemente	2. probaría de alguna manera	3. desaprobaría de alguna manera	4. definitivamente lo desaprobaría	8. NS	<b>GBRE7</b>	
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<b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido UD. víctima de una agresión física o de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pasar a AOJIC]	<b>VIC1</b>	
<b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de agresión o acto delincencial sufrió UD.? [Lea las alternativas][Si es más de un crimen, marque aquí el más reciente y llene VIC3B y VIC3C] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)	<b>VIC2</b>	

<b>VIC3B.</b> Crimen # 2 _____ (usar código de VIC2)	<b>VIC3B</b>	
<b>VIC3C.</b> Crimen # 3 _____ (usar código de VIC2)	<b>VIC3C</b>	
<b>AOJ1. [Si ha sido víctima]</b> ¿Denunció UD. el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [ <i>sigla</i> ] (2) No lo denunció [ <i>Pasar a AOJIB</i> ] (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1</b>	
<b>AOJ1A.</b> ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció UD. el hecho? [ <i>marcar una sola alternativa y pase a AOJIC</i> ] (1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)	<b>AOJ1A</b>	
<b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [ <i>no leer alternativas</i> ] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe dónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	<b>AOJ1B</b>	
<b>AOJ1C. [se hace a TODOS]</b> ¿Si Ud. observa a alguien cometiendo un delito en su barrio, que haría? 1. Llamaría a la policía 2. Llamaría a los vecinos 3. No haría nada 4. Los detendría usted mismo para entregarlos a la policía 5. Tomaría la justicia en sus manos 6. Llamaría familiares 8. NS/NR	<b>AOJ1C</b>	
<b>AOJ2.</b> ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ2</b>	
<b>AOJ3.</b> Cuándo tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, ¿cómo lo atienden? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ3</b>	
<b>AOJ4.</b> Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas de la Fiscalía, ¿cómo lo atienden? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ4</b>	
<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS	<b>AOJ8</b>	
<b>AOJ9.</b> Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿Cree usted que: Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar a su domicilio o la policía puede entrar a la casa sin necesidad de una orden judicial? (1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (2) La policía puede entrar sin una orden judicial (8) NS	<b>AOJ9</b>	
<b>AOJ10.</b> ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunos derechos y libertades o respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden. (1) Vivir en sociedad ordenada (2) Respetar derechos y libertades (8) NS	<b>AOJ10</b>	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde UD. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente UD. muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Más o menos seguro (3) Algo inseguro(4) Muy Inseguro (8) NS	<b>AOJ11</b>	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si UD. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>	
<b>AOJ13.</b> ¿Ha oído hablar sobre el nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ13</b>	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a UD.

no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho UD. elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a UD. ver televisión? Léame el número. *[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta “A”, por favor conteste estas preguntas.

	Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe		
<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? <i>(Sondee: Si UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio )</i>		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene UD. respeto por las instituciones políticas del Ecuador?		<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente UD. orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa UD. que se debe apoyar el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B6</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		<b>B11</b>	
<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en las Fuerza Armadas?		<b>B12</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		<b>B15</b>	
<b>B16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Procuraduría General del Estado?		<b>B16</b>	
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		<b>B17</b>	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Policía?		<b>B18</b>	
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Contraloría?		<b>B19</b>	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Iglesia Católica?		<b>B20</b>	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en los partidos políticos?		<b>B21</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su Municipio?		<b>B32</b>	
<b>B33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?		<b>B33</b>	
<b>B35.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las últimas elecciones Presidenciales (2002) fueron libres, o sea que la gente pudo votar por el candidato que prefería?		<b>B35</b>	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		<b>B37</b>	

	<b>Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe</b>		
<b>B38.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los sindicatos?		<b>B38</b>	
<b>B39.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las cámaras de los empresarios privados?		<b>B39</b>	
<b>B40.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?		<b>B40</b>	
<b>B41.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la junta parroquial?		<b>B41</b>	
<b>B42.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?		<b>B42</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser ecuatoriano?		<b>B43</b>	
<b>B44.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?		<b>B44</b>	
<b>B45.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión Anticorrupción?		<b>B45</b>	
<b>B46.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus parientes?		<b>B46</b>	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus amigos?		<b>B47</b>	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus vecinos?		<b>B48</b>	
<b>B49.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gente de su barrio?		<b>B49</b>	
<b>B50.</b> ¿Hay oído nombrar a “Participación Ciudadana? (Si dice “no” marcar 9 y pasar a N1. Si dice “sí” pregunta: ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la “Participación Ciudadana”?)		<b>B50</b>	

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría Ud. Que el Gobierno actual (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	<b>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe</b>		
<b>N1.</b> Combate la pobreza.		<b>N1</b>	
<b>N3.</b> Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		<b>N3</b>	
<b>N9.</b> Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.		<b>N9</b>	

**[Recoja tarjeta A]**

**[ENTREGUE TARJETA B]:** Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo.” Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta que punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Muy en desacuerdo</b>					<b>Muy de acuerdo</b>		<b>No sabe</b>

	<b>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe</b>		
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	<b>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que no sabe</b>		
<b>ING1.</b> En una democracia casi siempre el sistema económico funciona mal. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		<b>ING1</b>	
<b>ING2.</b> En los países democráticos hay muchos conflictos y cuesta mucho tomar decisiones. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?		<b>ING2</b>	
<b>ING3.</b> A las democracias les cuesta mucho mantener el orden en el país. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?		<b>ING3</b>	
<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?		<b>ING4</b>	
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los ecuatorianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?		<b>PN2</b>	
<b>PN2A.</b> Los políticos buscan el poder para su propio beneficio, y no se preocupan por ayudar al pueblo ¿Hasta que punto esta de acuerdo?		<b>PN2 A</b>	
<b>RECOGER TARJETA B</b>			

<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿Ud. diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Ecuador?  (1) muy satisfecho    (2) satisfecho    (3) insatisfecho    (4) muy insatisfecho    (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>	
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión ¿Ecuador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?  (1) muy democrático    (2) algo democrático    (3) poco democrático    (4) nada democrático    (8) NS	<b>PN5</b>	

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que UD. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que UD. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza UD. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>							<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>			No sabe

	<b>1-10, 88</b>		
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		<b>E5</b>	
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		<b>E8</b>	
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		<b>E1 1</b>	
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.		<b>E1 5</b>	
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas.		<b>E1 4</b>	
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas u otros edificios.		<b>E2</b>	
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		<b>E3</b>	
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		<b>E1 6</b>	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			No sabe

										1-10, 88		
D32.	¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal ley?										D3 2	
D33.	¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político ecuatoriano? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba esta prohibición?										D3 3	
D34.	¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure programas de televisión? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?										D3 4	
D35.	¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure películas en los cines? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?										D3 5	
D36.	¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?										D3 6	
D37.	¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure la propaganda de personas que critican nuestro país? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?										D3 7	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Ecuador. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			No sabe

										1-10, 88		
D1.	Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Ecuador, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]										D1	
D2.	¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.										D2	
D3.	¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?										D3	
D4.	¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?										D4	

[Recoja tarjeta "C"]

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está UD. más de acuerdo? <b>NEWTOL4.</b> (1) El Estado debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea que pueda dañar a nuestra nación <b>o...</b> (2) El Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello. (8) NS											NEWTOL 4	
(1) Prohibir la expresión												
(2) No prohibir la expresión												

<b>NEWTOL5.</b> (1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran o... (2) Los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestra sociedad y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno. (1) Tienen derecho (2) Deberían ser controlados (8) NS	<b>NEWTOL</b> <b>5</b>	
<b>NEWTOL6.</b> (1) Los pueblos indígenas deberían tratar de mantener sus valores, cultura y lenguaje o... (2) Sería mejor para el país que exista una sola cultura nacional para todos. (1) mantener sus valores, culturas y lenguaje o (2) una sola cultura nacional (8) NS	<b>NEWTOL</b> <b>6</b>	
<b>NEWTOL7.</b> (1) Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o... (2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes y el país debería dividirse. (1) Permanecer unido (2) Dividirse (8) NS	<b>NEWTOL</b> <b>7</b>	

Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos: (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado		
<b>LIB1.</b> Libertad de prensa (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	<b>LIB1</b>	
<b>LIB2.</b> Libertad de opinión (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	<b>LIB2</b>	
<b>LIB3.</b> Participación política (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	<b>LIB3</b>	
<b>LIB4.</b> Derechos humanos (1) Muy poco (2) Suficiente (3) Demasiado (8) NS	<b>LIB4</b>	

<b>ACR1.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios. (8) NS/NR	<b>ACR1</b>	
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<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>DEM2</b>	
<b>DEM6.</b> Ahora le voy a leer un par de frases sobre la democracia. Por favor, dígame con cual está más de acuerdo: (1) En general, y a pesar de algunos problemas, la democracia es la mejor forma de gobierno (2) Hay otras formas de gobierno que pueden ser tan buenas o mejores que la democracia (8) No sabe	<b>DEM6</b>	
<b>DEM8.</b> ¿Cree UD. que los militares deben estar subordinados al poder civil? ¿o el poder civil debe estar subordinado a los militares? (1) Militares subordinados (2) Civiles subordinados (8) NS	<b>DEM8</b>	
<b>DEM9.</b> ¿Considera UD. que en nuestro país los militares son los que mandan o son los civiles los que mandan? (1) Militares mandan (2) Civiles mandan (8) NS	<b>DEM9</b>	
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura [siga] (2) Participación de todos [pase a DEM13] (8) No responde [pase a DEM13]	<b>DEM11</b>	

<p><b>DEM12.</b> Dígame por favor, ¿qué significa para UD. un gobierno de mano dura? [No leer respuestas] [anotar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>1 Gobierno militar  2 Que haga respetar la ley  3 Que haga leyes más duras  4 Que imponga su decisión  5 Que respete la ley  6 Que ponga orden  7 Ser fuerte con los delincuentes  8 Que vele por la ciudadanía  Otras respuestas _____ 88 NS</p>	<p><b>DEM12</b></p>	
<p><b>DEM13.</b> En pocas palabras, ¿que significa para UD. la democracia? [No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Libertad (2) Igualdad (3) Bienestar, progreso económico (4) Capitalismo (5) Gobierno no militar (6) Libre comercio, libre negocio (7) Elecciones, voto (10) Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley  Otro (anotar) _____  (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>DEM13</b></p>	
<p><b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa UD.?</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ver con elecciones  (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AUT1</b></p>	
<p><b>AUT2.</b> El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa UD.?</p> <p>(1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora [(0) Ninguna]</p>	<p><b>AUT2</b></p>	

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted de acuerdo?

<p><b>AUT3</b></p>	<p>(1) Lo que el Ecuador necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, o</p>	<p>(2) Lo que el país necesita es un hombre que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la población (8) NS</p>	<p><b>AUT3</b></p>	
<p><b>AUT4</b></p>	<p>(1) La única forma de sacar al país adelante es eliminar con mano dura a los que causan problemas, o</p>	<p>(2) Para que el país salga adelante es necesario tomar en cuenta a todas las personas inclusive aquellas que causan problemas (8) NS</p>	<p><b>AUT4</b></p>	
<p><b>AUT5</b></p>	<p>(1) Los derechos humanos son más importantes que el orden y la seguridad, o</p>	<p>(2) En lugar de derechos humanos lo que nuestro país necesita es mucho orden y seguridad (8) NS</p>	<p><b>AUT5</b></p>	

<b>UT6.</b> ¿Qué tipo de gobierno necesita este país...? (1) Uno que sepa tomar decisiones rápidas o eficientes aunque no tome en cuenta a todos los sectores (2) Uno que tome en cuenta a todos los sectores aunque tarde más en sus decisiones (8) NS	<b>AUT6</b>	
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<b>D26.</b> De los dos gobiernos que voy a describir, para UD. cuál es más democrático... ¿Un sistema en que todos tengamos garantizado un nivel básico de vida? O ¿Un sistema en que las cosas se decidan por mayoría? 1. Nivel básico 2. Mayoría 8. NS	<b>D26</b>	
<b>D43.</b> ¿Qué tipo de Presidente de la República prefiere usted más? Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o... Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evitando el Congreso si fuera necesario. 1. Leyes aprobadas por el Congreso 2. Rápidamente, evitando el Congreso 8.NS/NR	<b>D43</b>	
<b>D46.</b> Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno: Mantener el orden en la sociedad, o respetar la libertad del individuo 1. Mantener orden 2. Respetar la libertad 8. NS	<b>D46</b>	
<b>D47.</b> En las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por cuál de estos dos tipos de gobiernos votaría usted: 1. ¿Un gobierno que garantice la seguridad económica y la posibilidad de un buen ingreso? 2. ¿Un gobierno que garantice las elecciones libres, la libertad de expresión y de prensa? 8. No sabe/ No responde	<b>D47</b>	

<b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? [ <b>lea las alternativas</b> ] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	<b>PP1</b>	
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó UD. para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	<b>PP2</b>	
<b>ABS5.</b> ¿Cree UD. que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) No importa como vote (8) NS/NR	<b>ABS5</b>	

<b>M1.</b> Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría UD. que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Lucio Gutiérrez es: (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>	
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<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	<b>No</b>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>INAP</b>		
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que UD. no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC1</b>	
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC2</b>	
<b>EXC4.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando coimas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC4</b>	
<b>EXC5.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC5</b>	

<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]? Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿UD. trabaja [Si dice no marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente]? En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar, preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC14A.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los fiscales? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los fiscales en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC14A</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9, si dice “si” preguntar lo siguiente] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Le han exigido pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguna gente le pidió una coima para evitar el pago de la luz eléctrica?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?	(0)	(1)	(8)		<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada(4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	<b>EXC 7</b>
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**[Usar tarjeta “D”]**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree UD. que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)
<b>Muy corruptos</b>									<b>Muy honrados</b>	No sabe

**Grado de corrupción**

**INSTITUCIONES**

	Grado de corrupción										NS		
	Muy corruptos					Muy honrados							
<b>PC1.</b> Los diputados	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC1</b>	
<b>PC2.</b> Los ministros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC2</b>	
<b>PC3.</b> Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC3</b>	
<b>PC4.</b> Los concejales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC4</b>	
<b>PC5.</b> Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC5</b>	
<b>PC8.</b> Los profesores universitarios	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC8</b>	
<b>PC9.</b> Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC9</b>	
<b>PC12.</b> Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC12</b>	
<b>PC13.</b> Los militares	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>	
<b>PC14.</b> Los líderes de los partidos políticos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>	
<b>PC16.</b> Los fiscales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC16</b>	
<b>PC17.</b> Los Prefectos Provinciales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC17</b>	
<b>PC18.</b> Los Consejeros provinciales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC18</b>	
<b>PC19.</b> La prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC19</b>	
<b>PC20.</b> Los líderes de las organizaciones indígenas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC20</b>	
<b>PC21.</b> Los Presidentes de la República	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC21</b>	
<b>PC22.</b> Los funcionarios de la contraloría	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC21</b>	

**Recoja Tarjeta D**

<b>Ahora me puede decir...</b> <b>GI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [ <b>No leer, George Bush</b> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	<b>GI1</b>	
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Ecuador? [ <b>No leer, Guillermo Landázuri</b> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI2</b>	
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuántas provincias tiene el Ecuador? [ <b>No leer, 22</b> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI3</b>	
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Ecuador? [ <b>No leer, cuatro años</b> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI4</b>	
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Chile? [ <b>No leer, Ricardo Lagos</b> ] (1) Correcto(2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI5</b>	

<b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene UD. cédula de identidad? NS	(1) Sí	(2) No	(3) En trámite	(8)	<b>VB1</b>	
<b>VB2.</b> ¿Voto UD. en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? (1) Sí votó [ <i>signa</i> ] (2) No votó [ <i>pasar a VB4</i> ]					<b>VB2</b>	

<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las elecciones pasadas de 2002?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua</b> (Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero / Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País)</li> <li>2. <b>Alvaro Noboa Pontón (PRIAN)</b></li> <li>3. <b>León Roldós Aguilera</b> (Partido Socialista Ecuatoriana)</li> <li>4. <b>Rodrigo Borja Cevallos</b> (Izquierda Democrática)</li> <li>5. <b>Antonio Xavier Neira Menendez</b> (Partido Social Cristiano)</li> <li>6. <b>Jacobo Bucaram Ortiz</b> (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana)</li> <li>7. <b>Jacinto Velazquez Herrera</b> (Movimiento Transformación Social Independiente)</li> <li>8. <b>Ivonne Leyla Juez Abuchakra</b> (Partido Liberal Radical Ecuatoriana)</li> <li>9. <b>Cesar Augusto Alarcon Costa</b> (Partido Libertad)</li> <li>10. <b>Oswaldo Hurtado Larrea</b> (Movimiento Patria Solidaria)</li> <li>11. <b>Carlos Antonio Vargas Guatatuca</b> (Movimiento Indígena Amauta Jatari)</li> <li>12. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco</li> </ol> <p>Otro _____</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. Inap (No votó)</p>	<p><b>VB3</b></p>
<p><b>VB7.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado provincial (para el Congreso Nacional) en las elecciones pasadas del 2002?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Partido Conservador</li> <li>2. Democracia Popular</li> <li>3. Partido Social Cristiano</li> <li>4. Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano</li> <li>5. Izquierda Democrática</li> <li>6. Frente Radical Alfarista</li> <li>7. Movimiento Popular Democrático</li> <li>8. Partido Socialista Frente Amplio</li> <li>9. Pachakutic</li> <li>10. Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de enero</li> <li>11. PRIAN</li> <li>12. Varios _____</li> <li>13. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco</li> </ol> <p>Otro _____</p> <p>(88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no votó)</p>	
<p><b>VB4.</b> Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [<b>anotar una sola respuesta</b>]</p> <p>(01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato  (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07) No se encontró en el padrón electoral</p> <p>Otro _____ (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB4</b></p>

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que UD. aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

Ninguno	(00)						<b>ED</b>
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	
No sabe/no responde	(88)						

<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	<b>Q2</b>	
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (practicante) (2) Católica (no practicante) (3) Evangélica (4) Ninguna (5) Otra: _____ (8) No	<b>Q3</b>	
<b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran sus ingresos <b>familiares</b> mensuales? [ <i>Incluir remesas del exterior</i> ] [Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E ] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$25 (02) Entre \$26- \$50 (03) \$51-\$100 (04) \$101-\$150 (05) \$151-\$200 (06) \$201-\$300 (07) \$301-\$400 (08) \$401-500 (09) \$501-\$750 (10) \$751-\$1,000 (11) \$1,001- \$1,500 (12) \$1,501-\$2,000 (13) \$2,000 y más (88) NS/NR	<b>Q10</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [ <i>no leer alternativas</i> ] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)	<b>Q12</b>	

<b>ETID.</b> ¿Cómo se considera: indígena, negro (afro-ecuatoriano), mestizo, mulato, blanco u otro? (1) Blanco (2) Mestizo (3) Indígena (4) Negro o Afro-Ecuatoriano (5) Mulato (6) Otro _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>	
<b>LENG1.</b> ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa) (1) Castellano (2) Quichua (3) Otro (nativo) _____ (4) Otro (extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>LENG1</b>	

De las siguientes posibilidades, con cuál se identifica usted más:

<b>ETID2.</b> En términos Regionales se identifica: (1) Costeño (2) Serrano (3) Del Oriente (Amazonia) (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID2</b>	
<b>ETID4.</b> En términos de clase social se identifica: (1) Alta (2) Media (3) Media baja (4) Baja (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID4</b>	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: *[leer todos]*

<b>R1.</b> Televisor a color	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R2.</b> Televisor en blanco y negro	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R2</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora [nevera]	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono (convencional)	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>	
<b>R10.</b> Número de focos y lámparas en la casa	_____ (00) No hay focos				<b>R10</b>	
<b>R11.</b> Radio	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R11</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>	
<b>R13.</b> Electricidad	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R13</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Baño interno	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>	

**OCUP1. ¿En qué trabaja UD? (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)**

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración		OCUP1
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	7	Amas de Casa	13	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	8	Estudiantes	14	
Agricultores dueños, partidarios o arrendatarios de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de planta	9	Jubilados y Rentistas	15	
Ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros y trabajadores	10	Trabajadores ocasionales	16	
Profesionales independientes	5	Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	11			
Artesanos independientes	6	Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	12			

<b>OCUP1A.</b> ¿Es dueño o alquila tierras de cultivo? (1) Dueño [ <b>sig a OCUP2</b> ] (2) Alquila [ <b>sig a OCUP4</b> ] (3) No [ <b>sig a TI</b> ][ <b>para la frontera sur, sig a POV1</b> ]	<b>OCUP1 A</b>
<b>OCUP2.</b> ¿Cuántas hectáreas mide en total la tierra de cultivo que UD. es dueño(a)? ____ . ____ (enteros . decimales) [ <b>si la respuesta no es en hectáreas, anotar textualmente</b> _____ ] (anote fracciones: 1/4 = .25; 1/3= .33; 1/2 =.50 2/3=.66; 3/4=.75) 00.00=Inap (no tiene tierra)	<b>OCUP2</b>
<b>OCUP3.</b> ¿Tiene título de propiedad o escritura de toda, alguna parte o nada de esta tierra? 1. Toda 2. Alguna parte 3. Nada 8. NS 9. Inap (no tiene tierra)	<b>OCUP3</b>
<b>OCUP4.</b> ¿Cuántas hectáreas mide en total la tierra que UD. alquila? ____ . ____ (enteros . decimales) (anote fracciones: 1/4 = .25; 1/3= .33; 1/2=.50 2/3=.66; 3/4=.75) 00.00=Inap (no alquila tierra)	<b>OCUP4</b>

<b>DESOC1. PARA TODOS =&gt; ¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?</b> (1) Sí <b>[PASE A DESOC2]</b>  (2) No <b>[PASE A T1] [para la frontera sur, siga a POV1]</b>  (3) Actualmente desocupado/pensionado/rentista <b>[PASE A DESOC2]</b>	<b>DESOC 1</b>	
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<b>DESOC2. SI RESPONDE Sí O ES DESOCUPADO =&gt;¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?</b>  _____ semanas (8) NS (9) Inap (Pensionado o rentista)	<b>DESOC 2</b>	
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**(FRONTERA SUR, SIGA) (RESTO DE PAIS, PASE A T1)**

**[POV1-FROSUR9] ESTAS PREGUNTAS SOLO SE HACEN EN LA FRONTERA SUR**

<b>POV1.</b> Debido a la crisis económica ¿Ha tenido que sacar algún hijo de la escuela o colegio?  1. Sí 2. No. 8 NS/NR 9 No tiene hijos en la escuela/colegio	<b>POV1</b>	
<b>POV2.</b> ¿Recibe algún miembro de su familia el Bono Solidario 1. Sí 2. No. 8NS/NR	<b>POV2</b>	
<b>POV7.</b> Si tuviera problemas económicos serios, ¿a dónde acudiría Ud.? <b>[No leer lista]</b> (1) A la iglesia (2) A la escuela (3) A la Municipalidad (4) A las ONGs (5) A Un Chulquero (6) A una asociación comunitaria (7) Al Ministerio de Bienestar Social (8) A un amigo (9) A La familia Otro _____ 88 NS/NR	<b>POV7</b>	
<b>POV8.</b> Si busca Ud. un préstamo, ¿a dónde acudiría Ud.? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> 1. Un banco 2. Un Chulquero 3. Un amigo 4. Una cooperativa 5. Una ONG 6. La familia Otro _____ 88. NS/NR	<b>POV8</b>	
<b>POV9.</b> ¿Debido a la situación económica del país, ha tenido su familia que dejar de comer algunas cosas que comía antes? 1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR	<b>POV9</b>	

<b>FROSUR1.</b> ¿Conoce Ud. el Programa de Desarrollo de la Frontera Sur (PSUR) que lleva acabo CARE? (1) Si <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[pase a FROSUR3]</b> (8) No sabe	<b>FROSUR1</b>	
<b>FROSUR2.</b> ¿De donde cree Ud. que recibe los fondos este programa? <b>[no leer alternativas] [aceptar solo una respuesta]</b> (1) Gobierno de los Estados Unidos (USAID, Embajada de los Estados Unidos) (2) CARE (3) Gobierno nacional (4) Gobierno municipal (5) Gobierno provincial (6) Sector privado (7) ONGs (8) Otros donantes internacionales Otro: _____ (88) NS/NR	<b>FROSUR2</b>	
<b>FROSUR2A.</b> ¿Piensa Ud. que el trabajo que realiza el Programa de Desarrollo de la Frontera Sur, es? (1) muy bueno (2) bueno (3) ni bueno, ni malo (3) malo (4) muy malo (8) No sabe	<b>FROSUR2 A</b>	
<b>FROSUR3.</b> ¿Conoce Ud. de algún otro programa del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América? (1) Si <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[pase a FROSUR4]</b> (8) NS	<b>FROSUR3</b>	

<b>FROSUR3A.</b> ¿Piensa Ud. que el trabajo que realiza el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, es? (1) muy bueno (2) bueno (3) ni bueno, ni malo (3) malo (4) muy malo (8) No sabe	<b>FROSUR3 A</b>	
<b>FROSUR4.</b> ¿Cuál es el problema <b>más grave</b> que está enfrentando esta comunidad? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (01) Problemas económicos (02) Inflación, altos precios (03) Desempleo (04) Pobreza (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros) (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar (08) Falta de crédito (09) Problemas del medio ambiente (10) Drogadicción (11) Narcotráfico (12) Corrupción (13) Pandillas (14) Mal gobierno (15) Migración (16) La guerra contra terrorismo (17) Educación (88) No sabe Anotar si no existe código: _____	<b>FROSUR4</b>	
Ahora vamos hablar de la gente de su comunidad. Quisiera que me diga hasta que punto cree Ud. que los ingresos de la gente de su comunidad dependen del:		
<b>FROSUR5.</b> Contrabando de productos para procesar drogas (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>FROSUR5</b>	
<b>FROSUR6.</b> Narcotráfico (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>FROSUR6</b>	
<b>FROSUR7.</b> Contrabando en general no relacionado a drogas (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>FROSUR7</b>	
<b>FROSUR8.</b> Contrabando de armas (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS	<b>FROSUR8</b>	
<b>FORSUR9.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que el problema de contrabando es muy grave, algo grave, poco grave o nada grave? (1) muy grave (2) algo grave (3) poco grave (4) nada grave (8) NS	<b>FROSUR9</b>	

<b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____	<b>TI</b>	
<b>TI.</b> Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		

*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*

*Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.*

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_ Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios: \_\_\_\_\_


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_


Tarjeta "A"

<b>Mucho</b>	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
<b>Nada</b>	1


Tarjeta "B"



Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"



Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$25
- (02) Entre \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) \$751-\$1,000
  
- (11) \$1,001- \$1,500
  
- (12) \$1,501-\$2,000
  
- (13) \$ 2,000 y más



**IX. Appendix B: Technical Description of the Sample**

- **SAMPLE DESIGN, FIELD WORK, AND ARCHIVE PROCEDURES.**
- **COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES.**

**BY: A. Polibio Córdova C.  
Executive President of  
CEDATOS / GALLUP International**

**Marcy, 2004.**

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### II. Comments on the work assigned to CEDATSOS/GALLUP. Point 4 of the “deliverables” indicated by the contract.

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3. Sample
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6. Validation of information.
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9. Communications.

# DEMOCRACY AUDIT

- **SAMPLE DESIGN, FIELD WORK, AND ARCHIVE PROCEDURES**
- **COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES**

By: A. Polibio Córdova C.  
Executive President of CEDATOS / GALLUP International

The University of Pittsburgh, under the auspices of USAID /Ecuador, conducted an exhaustive evaluation of the Ecuadorian institutions dedicated to the investigation of markets and public opinion. The objective of this evaluation was to contract one of these institutions to design a sample, conduct field work, and process the resulting data for the “Democracy Audit.” Following this evaluation, CEDATOS / GALLUP International was selected as the most capable firm in terms of professionalism, experience, and infrastructure in the country.

## I. Sample Design

### II. 1. UNIVERSE

The survey provided national coverage, focusing on the three principal regions: sierra, costa and amazonía (with the exception of the insular region of Galápagos) and on urban and rural areas. In addition, we conducted an independent survey in the border provinces. While this survey was independent from the national survey, similar instruments were used in both cases.

### 2. POPULATION

This study includes members of the civil population that are not institutionalized. We excluded residents of hospitals, orphanages schools, military barracks etc. Nevertheless, the particular households located in these places are included in the population of the sample.

### 3. UNIT OF OBSERVATION – FINAL UNIT OF SELECTION

This study contains topics referring not only to the individual (adults of at least 18 years of age, eligible to vote, who speak Spanish or Quechua but no other monolingual language), but also to the head of the household and its other members. Thus, **the statistical unit of observation is the household**, due to the fact that all these people belong to only one household.

At the same time, all households live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. The dwelling is a unit that is easily identified in geographical terms. In addition, dwellings display more permanence over time. These two elements make the dwelling particularly well-suited as the **final unit of selection**, identified on a block in urban areas or a “parceled out” segment in rural areas).

### 4. SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

The sampling method is the means by which one determines the size of the sample, the construction of the domains of the study, the definition of selection stages of sample units, the

population estimations from the sample data and the calculation of errors implicit in these estimations.<sup>40</sup>

To select the appropriate sample methodology, we considered the following factors:

- a) Obtaining a representative sample for the following levels, strata and domains of study
  - The entire country
  - Strata of the first stage:
    - 1. Sierra
    - 2. Costa
    - 3. Oriente
  - Strata of the second stage:
    - 1. Urban areas
    - 2. Rural areas
  - Domains of study:
    - 1. Quito
    - 2. Guayaquil
    - 3. Cities with 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion
    - 4. Cities with 25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants
    - 5. Cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants
    - 6. Rural parishes<sup>41</sup>
- b) The calculation of the sampling errors that correspond to these estimations.
- c) Facilitating the execution of the survey.
- d) Optimal assignment to permit a reasonable equilibrium between the budget, sample size and the precision of the results.
- e) Utilizing the best and most accurate sampling frame available for each city (census, maps, and recent lists of dwellings).

Based upon these considerations, the method utilized in this study is a probabilistic sampling at all stages. It is stratified, multistaged, and clustered, with a random selection of units in each stage, including the final selection of adults to be interviewed within each household.

This sample is stratified by region (Costa, Sierra and Oriente) and by area (urban and rural), and is multistaged. First, Primary Sampling Units (PSU, cantons) were selected. Following the identification of these Primary Sampling Units, Secondary Units were selected from each PSU, conforming to census sectors. Then, Units of the Third Stage (blocks or segments) were selected, followed by the selection of Final Sampling Units (FSU). The Final Sampling Units were clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas, and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each dwelling unit of these clusters, we selected one single household as a Unit of Observation.

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<sup>40</sup>CORDOVA, P.: "Introducción a la Investigación por Muestreo". Edit. DGEA/México, 1972. Presentation by Leslie Kish, Edition 2000. Ecuador.

<sup>41</sup> In our treatment of rural areas, we relied upon parish centers (populated centers) with “parceled out” dwellings or upon “segments” similar to blocks, when the dwelling of the population center was not structured according to standard physical units.

Finally, we selected and interviewed one adult of voting age, according to a random process (Kish / Córdova System).<sup>42</sup> Following a norm of probabilistic selection, we did not allow for a substitution or a replacement of the selected units. (See pertinent procedures discussed further in the text).

To ensure the consistency, sufficiency, and efficiency of the sample, we assigned particular sample sizes to each strata and total aggregation level. The interior of the sampling stratum is auto-weighted, but requires weighting for the aggregation of strata (Sierra, Costa and Oriente) due to the smaller size of the Oriental region. In each stratum, the selection of the sample is determined by proportional probability for the size of each domain.

This design allows for the ready calculation of results by strata, domain, and total population. Using versatile and simple procedures, one can readily engage in calculations of the principle variables and socio-demographic characteristics considered in this study.<sup>43 44</sup>

## **5. SAMPLING FRAME**

The sampling frame was constructed through maps and lists of city and parish dwellings, obtained through the information provided by the Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda of 1990. To update this information, we relied upon the cartographic updates and new counts of constructions and dwellings conducted by CEDATOS in the year 2001.

To ensure that the sampling frame was appropriate for each city, we used the following sources of information:

1. Updated maps with information obtained by public and private institutions involved in housing programs. This information provided the means by which to verify the cartographic limits of cities, and to create maps in areas with new developments, with the aim of registering the creation or elimination of blocks and rural segments.
2. Counts of constructions, dwellings, and residential populations by age, processing these lists with the directions and identification of the dwellings by blocks, for all the cartographic sections of the sample in each selected city and parish. This is a job in which CEDATOS has engaged for 27 years in its direct study of cities and rural areas.

## **6. SAMPLE SIZE**

To determine the size of the sample we rely upon the following criteria: we utilize a sampling procedure of final clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. This last factor is the explanatory variable of the design and the function of its variance.<sup>45</sup> The

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<sup>42</sup> CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

<sup>43</sup> KISH, L.: "Survey Sampling": John Wiley & Sons. 1965.

<sup>44</sup> RAJ, D.: "Sampling Theory". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Chapters 4-5 provide an extensive example of these methods of selection.

resulting design effect of the sample of clusters (DEF) is estimated on average at 1.022, in the case of three strata, with cluster sizes of 6 to 12.

The adjustment of the sample size from a simple random sample to a clustered sample, is derived from the following formula:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ(DEF)}{n}}$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ (DEF)}{E^2}$$

Where:

E = Band of probable error (+/- 0.05)

P = Percentage of population with a given attribute of 50%.

Q = (1-P) Percentage of population without the attribute considered in P. Q= 50%.

DEF = Design effect. Relation of variances between the clustered sample we utilize to that of a simple random sample. This value fluctuates between 1.0 and 2.0. The clustered sample and the simple random sample tend to conform less when the size of the cluster is smaller and there is real variance from the stratified sample.<sup>46</sup> There is a direct trade-off between the rise of real variance due to clustered sample effects and the diminishing of the real variance by stratification with the assignment of proportional sizes to the size of the stratum. With this base and according to the tables of DEF, we estimate that in the present design DEF= 1.022.<sup>47</sup> for the regions of Costa and Sierra and DEF= 1.011 for the region Oriente.

Z = Value of the normal distribution. For a confidence level of 95%, this value is 1.965.

n = Sample size

## 7. CALCULATION OF SIZE BY STRATA, DOMAIN, PSU, AND SAMPLING UNITS

The sample design considered assigning selection units for the 22 provinces of the country, while the sample is not sufficient to represent the respective provinces, it is sufficient for the regions of Costa, Sierra and Oriente. In the first stage, in which we select Primary Sampling Units (PSU),

<sup>45</sup> Ver: KISH, L.: "Statistical Design For Research".- John Wiley. 1987. For a discussion of design effects, see Chapters 2 and 7 and "Survey Sampling" Chapters 2 y 11.

<sup>46</sup> FRANKEL, M. "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". ISR; The University of Michigan. 1971.

<sup>47</sup> FRANKEL, M: Op. Cit. Tablas de DEF y discusión.

the PSUs are characterized by the urban and rural populations, to assign sample sizes with proportional probability to their actual size. In the region of Oriente we used the divisions of Oriente Norte and Oriente Sur.

In its totality, the sample consists of 434 sampling units: 296 urban and 138 rural, distributed in 60 cantons of the 21 continental provinces.

The aggregations of the sizes (nh), produce sizes (nd) by domain (1. Quito, 2. Guayaquil, 3. cities of 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion, probability 1; 4. cities of 25,000 to 100,000 inhabitants; 5. cities of less than 25,000 inhabitants, and 6. rural parishes). This is sufficient for estimations of total results and for results disaggregated by age groups and other socio-demographic variables.<sup>48</sup>

$$nd = \sum_h n_{hd}$$

## 8. SAMPLE SIZE, CONFIDENCE LEVES, AND MARGINS OF ERROR

The anticipated confidence level for this national sample was 95% ( $Z_{.95} = 1.965$ ) with a margin of error of +/- 2%, assuming a proportion of 50/50 ( $P = 0.50$ ;  $Q = 1 - P$ ); for dichotomous variables, in the worst case scenario. We assume a DEF of 1.022 through the system of cluster sampling for the regions Sierra and Costa and of 1.011 for the region Oriente, which was stratified into northern and southern zones.

With this backdrop, the probable margins of error by stratum for a simple random sample and the clustered sample we utilized are as follows:

### SAMPLE SIZE AND MARGINS OF ERROR 95% Confidence Level

Strata	Sample Size	Margin of Error (%)	
		S.R.S.	C.S.
<b>REGIONS</b>			
Sierra	1.145	2.90	2.97
Costa	1.293	2.70	2.79
Oriente	478	4.49	4.54

### BY AREA

<sup>48</sup> GUENTHER, W.: "Introducción a la Inferencia Estadística". McGraw-Hill. 1968.  
See Chapters 3-5, for exercises on these applications.

<b>Urbana</b>	<b>1.785</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>2.38</b>
<b>Rural</b>	<b>1.131</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>2.99</b>
<b>COUNTRY TOTAL</b>	<b>2.916</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>1.86</b>

## 9. ADJUSTMENTS FOR NONCOVERAGE

To ensure efficiency, sufficiency and precision of the sample, we adopted a sampling system with “Adjustment for noncoverage.” This guarantees the execution of the sample with the estimated size as minimums within the confidence level and maximum permissible error. Additionally, the system assured the elimination of bias resulting from the substitution or replacement of units that could not be objects of an interview. This system estimates an important cost for CEDATOS, but also guarantees the quality of the information. The method is based upon CEDATOS’s knowledge of “noncoverage” it observed in similar studies of the nation as a whole, urban and rural.

The system consists of applying the sample size (n) estimated for each stratum, domain, and PSU a factor of coverage (t), with which we calculate the operative size of final selection (n\*), expressed as:

$$n^* = (1 + t) n$$

t = Rate of no interview. This rate considers situations of noncoverage (no interview, refusal, unoccupied dwellings, absence of adults, or impossibility of interviewing after 3rd visit, among other possible events). According to the experience of CEDATOS and the information available from its studies, the rate (t) varies by province, region, size of city, socio-economic level of the household, urbanization, etc.

n\* = Final sample size to be selected:  $n^* = (1 + t) n$

The average rate of t for the national sample was 0.18, in which:

$$n^* = (1 + 0.18) 2.916 = 3.441 \text{ adults to be interviewed.}$$

***The actual size obtained at the end of the survey was 2,925 adults; 6 more than the estimations for the national sample. By strata and by rural and urban areas, the sample was optimal.***

## 10. SURVEY PERSONNEL

CEDATOS invested all of its energy to ensure that this study would be successful. CEDATOS fulfilled the requirements set by the anticipated size of the sample, without having to resort to posterior weighting due to incomplete sample sizes. This posterior weighting introduces considerable non-sampling errors. The confidence levels and margins of error are more or less as anticipated, and have the additional guarantee of sample sufficiency in terms of size and quality of the survey

CEDATOS assigned 422 people to work on this study. These workers can be classified as follows:

### PERSONNEL ASSIGNED BY CEDATOS FOR THE STUDY "DEMOCRACY AUDIT"

<b>FUNCTIONS</b>	<b>Total People</b>
1. Field Coordinators	35
2. Field Supervisors	65
3. Spanish-speaking Interviewers	195
4. Bilingual Interviewers (Quechua/Spanish)	5
5. Bilingual Supervisors (Quechua/Spanish)	2
6. Quality control in the field	28
7. Critics / codifiers	40
8. Data Entry	28
9. Quality control of data entry	8
<b>TOTAL IN FIELD AND DATA ENTRY</b>	<b>406</b>
<b>10. DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL</b>	<b>12</b>
11. Administrative Personnel	4
<b>TOTAL PERSONNEL</b>	<b>422</b>

**11. UNIVERSE, POPULATION TOTALS, REGIONS (COSTA, SIERRA AND ORIENTE), URBANIZATION, AND DOMAINS OF THE STUDY.**

**ECUADOR: TOTAL POPULATION, PROJECTED FOR 2001**  
Thousands of Inhabitants

	<b>Country Total</b>	<b>Sierra</b>	<b>Costa</b>	<b>Oriente</b>
Total	12,778	5,701	6,442	635
Urban	8,261	3,447	4,586	228
Rural	4,517	2,254	1,856	407

**Percentage Distribution (%)**

	<b>Country Total</b>	<b>Sierra</b>	<b>Costa</b>	<b>Oriente</b>
Total	100.0%	44.6%	50.4%	5.0%
Urban	100.0%	41.7%	55.5%	2.8%
	64.7%	60.5%	71.2%	35.9%
Rural	100.0%	49.9%	41.1%	9.0%
	35.3%	39.5%	28.8%	64.1%

**SIERRA AND COSTA DIVISIONS**  
Thousands of inhabitants

	<b>Sierra and Costa Total</b>	<b>SIERRA</b>	<b>COSTA</b>
Total	12,143	5,701	6,442
Urban	8,033	3,447	4,586
Rural	4,110	2,254	1,856

**Percentage Distribution (%)**

	<b>Sierra and Costa Total</b>	<b>SIERRA</b>	<b>COSTA</b>
Total	100.0%	46.9%	53.1%
Urban	100.0%	43.0%	57.0%
	66.2%	60.5%	71.2%
Rural	100.0%	54.8%	45.2%
	33.8%	39.5%	28.8%

**Source:** INEC. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Projections  
**Processed by:** CEDATOS. Departamento de Investigaciones  
September 24, 2001

**SIERRA****Urban****Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

<b>Province</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Population</b>		<b>Sample</b>	<b>PSU</b>	<b>Points of Sample</b>
1. Pichincha	Quito	1,648,448	60.5%	336	12	50
2. Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	216,390	7.9%	42	2	7
3. Imbabura	Ibarra	139,316	5.1%	27	1	5
4. Tungurahua	Ambato	177,781	6.5%	34	1	5
5. Chimborazo	Riobamba	128,648	4.7%	26	1	4
6. Azuay	Cuenca	283,652	10.4%	56	2	9
7. Loja	Loja	129,770	4.8%	27	1	4
			100.0%			
TOTAL	100,000+	2,724,005	79.0%	548	20	84
INHABITANTS		390,476	11.3%	48	5	11
REMAINDER	OF URBAN					
SIERRA						
(25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		332,385	9.6%	96	12	24
REMAINDER	OF URBAN					
SIERRA		<b>3,446,866</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>119</b>
(Less than 25,000 inhabitants)						
<b>TOTAL URBAN SIERRA</b>						
<b>RURAL</b>						
CANTONS WITH	100,000+	724,398	32.1%	146	20	16
INHABITANTS						
REMAINDER	OF RURAL	725,775	32.2%	104	5	11
SIERRA						
(25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		803,739	35.7%	203	12	26
REMAINDER	OF RURAL					
SIERRA		<b>2,253,912</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>53</b>
(Less than 25,000 inhabitants)						
<b>TOTAL RURAL SIERRA</b>						
<b>TOTAL SIERRA SAMPLE</b>				<b>1,145</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>172</b>

**COSTA**  
**Urban**  
**Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample	
1. Guayas	Guayaquil	2,163,060	65.5%	432	15	64	
2. Guayas	Milagro	129,150	3.9%	24	1	4	
3. Guayas	Durán	164,997	5.0%	32	1	5	
4. Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	128,646	3.9%	24	1	4	
5. Manabí	Portoviejo	172,302	5.2%	32	1	5	
6. Manabí	Manta	184,561	5.6%	40	1	6	
7. Los Ríos	Quevedo	136,679	4.1%	32	1	5	
8. El Oro	Machala	221,608	6.7%	48	2	8	
		100.0%					
TOTAL INHABITANTS		100,000+	3,301,003	72.0%	664	23	101
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)			937,694	20.4%	161	10	30
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)			347,301	7.6%	96	8	20
			<b>4,585,998</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>921</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>TOTAL URBAN COSTA</b>							
<b>RURAL</b>							
CANTONS WITH 100,000+ INHABITANTS			353,783	19.1%	80	23	9
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)			1,006,487	54.2%	196	10	27
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)			495,732	26.7%	96	8	15
			<b>1,856,002</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>TOTAL RURAL COSTA</b>							
<b>TOTAL COSTA SAMPLE</b>				<b>1,293</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>202</b>	

**TOTAL SIERRA AND COSTA**

Urban		1,613	78	270
Rural		825	78	104
<b>TOTAL ORIENTE</b>		<b>2,438</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>374</b>

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample
<b>NORTH ZONE</b>						
	URBAN	106,484	33.7%	80	5	10
	RURAL	209,784	66.3%	158	5	17
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>316,268</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>SOUTH ZONE</b>						
	URBAN	121,631	38.2%	92	5	16
	RURAL	196,784	61.8%	148	5	17
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>318,415</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>ORIENTE</b>						
	URBAN	228,115	35.9%	172	10	26
	RURAL	406,568	64.1%	306	10	34
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>634,683</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>478</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>60</b>

**12. SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA.  
GENERAL SUMMARY**

**CEDATOS / GALLUP INTERNATIONAL**

**SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA**

	<b>URBAN Total</b>	<b>RURAL Total</b>	<b>TOTAL Total</b>
<b>SIERRA</b>			
100,000+	548	146	694
25,000 – 100,000	48	104	152
Less than 25,000	96	203	299
Total Sierra	692	453	1,145
<b>COSTA</b>			
100,000+	664	80	744
25,000 – 100,000	161	196	357
Less than 25,000	96	96	192
Total Costa	921	372	1,293
Total Sierra and Costa	1,613	825	2,438
<b>ORIENTE</b>			
North Zone	80	158	238
South Zone	92	148	240
Total Oriente	172	306	478
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,785</b>	<b>1,131</b>	<b>2,916</b>

**GENERAL SUMMARY**

<b>COUNTRY TOTAL</b>	<b>SAMPLE</b>	<b>PSU</b>	<b>Points of Sample</b>
<b>BY REGION</b>			
SIERRA	1,145	37	172
COSTA	1,293	41	202
ORIENTE	478	10	60

TOTAL	2,916	88	434
<b><u>BY AREA</u></b>			
URBAN	1,785	88	296
RURAL	1,131	88	138
TOTAL	2,916	88	434

### 13. SAMPLE SELECTION BY STRATA AND AREA. CITIES AND PARISHES

#### NATIONAL SURVEY: SAMPLE SELECTION

1. BY STRATA (REGIONS COSTA, SIERRA, AND ORIENTE)
2. BY AREA (URBAN AND RURAL)
3. BY PSU'S
4. BY CANTON, PROBABILITY OF SELECTION PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)
5. POINTS OF SAMPLE AND FINAL SIZE, PROBABILITY PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)

SIERRA													
SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
1	Imbabura	Ibarra	La Esperanza	1	1	5	2	27	20	47	32	24	55
2	Pichincha	Quito	Puambo	12	1	50	4	336	41	377	396	48	445
3	Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	Alluriquin	2	1	7	2	42	20	62	50	24	73
4	Tungurahua	Ambato	Quizapincha	1	1	5	2	34	20	54	40	24	64
5	Chimborazo	Riobamba	Cubijiles	1	1	4	2	26	13	39	31	15	46
6	Azuay	Cuenca	San Joaquín	2	1	9	2	56	20	76	66	24	90
7	Loja	Loja	Taquil	1	1	4	2	27	12	39	32	14	46
TOTAL						84	16	548	146	694	647	172	819
REMAINDER OF SIERRA													
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)													
8	Imbabura	Otavalo	San Pablo	1	73.4/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
9	Pichincha	Rumiñahui	Cotogchoa	1	74.4/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
10	Cotopaxi	Latacunga	Belisario Quevedo	1	116.7/125.4	3	2	16	20	36	19	24	42
11	Bolívar	Cuaranda	Guanujo	1	73.1/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
12	Cañar	Azogues	Cojitambo	1	67.8/125.4	2	3	8	24	32	9	28	38
TOTAL						11	11	48	104	152	57	123	179
REMAINDER OF SIERRA													
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
13	Carchi	Montúfar	La Paz	1	32.6/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
14	Imbabura	Cotacachi	Imantag	1	36.2/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
15	Pichincha	Mejía	Tandapi	1	60.6/125.4	2	3	8	26	34	9	31	40
16	Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	Canchagua	1	15.8/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
17	Tungurahua	Baños	Lligua	1	17.2/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
18	Chimborazo	Guano	San Gerardo	1	40.5/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
19	Chimborazo	Guamote	Palmira	1	33.9/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	24	33
20	Cañar	Biblián	Turupamba	1	23.8/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
21	Azuay	Santa Isabel	Abdón Calderón	1	21.3/125.4	2	3	9	24	33	10	28	38
22	Azuay	Chordeleg	San Martín de Puzhí	1	9.9/125.4	2	2	7	13	20	9	15	24
23	Loja	Calvas	El Lucero	1	31.0/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24

24	Loja	Catamayo	San Pedro de la Ben	1	24.5/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
TOTAL						24	26	96	203	299	113	240	353

COSTA													
SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
25	Guayas	Guayaquil	Chongón	15	1	64	1	432	10	442	510	12	522
26	Guayas	Milagro	Chobo	1	1	4	1	24	10	34	28	12	40
27	Guayas	Durán	Tarifa	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	11	48
28	Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	Tabiazo	1	1	4	1	24	9	33	28	11	39
29	Manabí	Portoviejo	Río Chico	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	11	48
30	Manabí	Manta	Santa Marianita	1	1	6	1	40	9	49	47	11	58
31	Los Ríos	Quevedo	San Carlos	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	11	48
32	El Oro	Machala	El Cambio	2	1	8	2	48	15	63	57	18	74
TOTAL						101	9	664	80	744	784	94	878
REMAINDER OF COSTA													
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)													
33	Esmeraldas	Quinindé	La Unión	1	93.4/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
34	Manabí	Jipijapa	América	1	98.1/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
35	Manabí	Sucre	San vicente	1	100.5/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
36	Manabí	Chone	Canuto	1	126.2/152.6	3	3	17	22	39	20	26	46
37	Guayas	Daute	Limal	1	88.4/152.6	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
38	Guayas	Santa Elena	Atahualpa	1	104.8/152.6	3	3	16	22	38	19	26	45
39	Guayas	El Empalme	El Rosario	1	65.9/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	27	46
40	Los Ríos	Ventancas	Zapotal	1	72.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
41	El Oro	Huaquillas	Hualtaco	1	41.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
42	El Oro	Santa Rosa	La Avanzada	1	65.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
TOTAL						30	27	161	196	357	190	231	421
REMAINDER OF COSTA													
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)													
43	Esmeraldas	Atacames	Tonchigue	1	22.8/152.6	3	2	16	14	30	19	17	35
44	Manabí	Bolívar	Quiroga	1	43.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
45	Manabí	Rocafuerte	Resbalón	1	29.2/152.6	3	1	16	10	26	19	12	31
46	Guayas	Colimes	General Vernaza	1	21.6/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
47	Guayas	Yaguachi	Virgen de Fátima	1	56.0/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
48	Los Ríos	Urdaneta	Ricaurte	1	28.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
49	Los Ríos	Buena Fe	Patricia Pilar	1	34.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	14	24
50	El Oro	El Guabo	Borbones	1	41.4/328.3	3	2	16	12	28	19	14	33
TOTAL						20	15	96	96	192	113	113	227

<b>ORIENTE (ZONA NORTE)</b>													
<b>SELECTION (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)</b>													
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
51	Sucumbíos	Lago Agrio	El Eno	1	65.5/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	47	66
52	Scumbíos	Cascales	Sevilla	1	16.3/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
53	Napo	Tena	Puerto Misahuallí	1	56.9/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	47	66
54	Napo	Quijos	Cosanga	1	6.7/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
55	Orellana	Orellana	San Luis	1	32.7/60.9	3	3	16	30	46	19	35	54
TOTAL						15	17	80	158	238	94	186	281
<b>ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)</b>													
<b>SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)</b>													
56	Pastaza	Pastaza	10 de Agosto	1	49.6/60.9	4	5	24	48	72	28	57	85
57	Morona	Morona	Río Blanco	1	67.6/60.9	3	4	20	32	52	24	38	61
TOTAL						7	9	44	80	124	52	94	146
<b>REMAINDER OF ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)</b>													
<b>Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)</b>													
58	Morona	Sucúa	Huambí	1	19.6/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
59	Zamora	Zamora	Timbara	1	41.9/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	28	47
60	Zamora	Zumbí	Paquisha	1	6.6/60.9	3	2	16	20	36	19	24	42
TOTAL						9	8	48	68	116	57	80	137

By Region	Number of Cantons	Points of Sample				Sample Size			Size Selected	
GENERAL SUMMARY		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	
SIERRA	24	119	53	692	453	1145	817	535	1351	
COSTA	26	151	51	921	372	1293	1087	439	1526	
ORIENTE	10	26	34	172	306	478	203	361	564	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>1131</b>	<b>2916</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>	<b>3441</b>	
<b>BY REGION</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>1131</b>	<b>2916</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>	<b>3441</b>	

#### 14. REGIONAL SAMPLE (BORDERS). ANTICIPATED SIZE

##### REGIONAL SAMPLE (INCLUDING ADJUSTMENT FOR NONCOVERAGE)

##### NORTHERN PROVINCES

BORDER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
SAN LORENZO	29,433		500			
URBAN	16,200	55.0%	275	34	1	San Lorenzo
RURAL	13,233	45.0%	225	20	3	Alto Tambo, Sta. Rita, Tululbí
<b>CARACHI</b>						
TULCAN	87,896		500			
URBAN	52,169	59.4%	297	37	1	Tulcán
RURAL	35,727	40.6%	203	18	3	Julio Andrade, El Carmelo, Maldonado
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NUEVA LOJA	64,549		500			
URBAN	23,874	37.0%	185	23	1	Nueva Loja
RURAL	40,675	63.0%	315	26	4	Gral. Farfán, Pacayacu, Dureno, Sta. Cecilia
<b>TOTAL</b>	181,878		757			
<b>URBAN</b>	92,243	50.7%	743	94	3	
<b>RURAL</b>	89,635	49.3%	1500	94	10	

OTHER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	386,839					
URBAN	185,374	47.9%	170	21	3	Quinindé, Río Verde, Muisne
RURAL	201,465	52.1%	184	16	3	Viche, Rocafuerte, Galera
<b>CARACHI</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	79,279					
URBAN	24,704	31.2%	23	3	1	Espejo - El Angel
RURAL	54,575	68.8%	50	4	1	San Isidro
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	80,225					
URBAN	20,403	25.4%	19	3	1	Lumbaquí
RURAL	59,822	74.6%	55	5	1	Gonzalo Pizarro
<b>TOTAL</b>	546,343		500			
<b>URBAN</b>	230,481	42.2%	210	27	5	
<b>RURAL</b>	315,862	57.8%	290	25	5	

##### TOTAL Border and Non-Border

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes
URBAN	322,724	44.3%	967	121	8
RURAL	405,497	55.7%	1,033	89	15
<b>TOTAL</b>	728,221		2,000		

##### SOUTHERN BORDER

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
LOJA (TOTAL PROVINCE)	436,928					
URBAN	217,649	49.8%				
RURAL	219,279	50.2%				

**15. REGIONAL SAMPLE (INCLUDING ADJUSTMENT FOR NON-COVERAGE)**

**REGIONAL SAMPLE (ANTICIPATED SIZE)**

**NORTHERN PROVINCES**

BORDER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
SAN LORENZO	29,433		590			
URBAN	16,200	55.0%	325	41	1	San Lorenzo
RURAL	13,233	45.0%	265	26	3	Alto Tambo, Sta. Rita, Tululbí
<b>CARACHI</b>						
TULCAN	87,896		590			
URBAN	52,169	59.4%	350	45	1	Tulcán
RURAL	35,727	40.6%	240	24	3	Julio Andrade, El Carmelo, Maldonado
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NUEVA LOJA	64,549		590			
URBAN	23,874	37.0%	218	28	1	Nueva Loja
RURAL	40,675	63.0%	372	37	4	Gral. Farfán, Pacayacu, Dureno, Sta. Cecilia
<b>TOTAL</b>	181,878		893			
<b>URBAN</b>	92,243	50.7%	877	114	3	
<b>RURAL</b>	89,635	49.3%	1770	87	10	

OTHER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	386,839					
URBAN	185,374	47.9%	200	26	3	Quinindé, Río Verde, Muisne
RURAL	201,465	52.1%	218	21	3	Viche, Rocafuerte, Galera
<b>CARACHI</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	79,279					
URBAN	24,704	31.2%	27	4	1	Espejo - El Angel
RURAL	54,575	68.8%	59	6	1	San Isidro
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	80,225					
URBAN	20,403	25.4%	22	4	1	Lumbaquí
RURAL	59,822	74.6%	65	6	1	Gonzalo Pizarro

<b>TOTAL</b>	546,343		590			
<b>URBAN</b>	230,481	42.2%	249	34	5	
<b>RURAL</b>	315,862	57.8%	341	33	5	

### TOTAL Border and Non-Border

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes
URBAN	322,724	44.3%	1,142	148	8
RURAL	405,497	55.7%	1,218	120	15
TOTAL	728,221		2,360		

### SOUTHERN BORDER

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
LOJA (TOTAL PROVINCE)	436,928					
URBAN	217,649	49.8%				
RURAL	219,279	50.2%				

### 16. MAP OF ECUADOR. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE SAMPLE.

**ECUADOR  
DEMOCRACY AUDIT  
Geographical Distribution of the Sample**



**Produced by: CEDATOS - Gallup International Ecuador**

**17. DETAILS OF THE DESIGN: SAMPLE FRACTIONS**

To determine the fractions for the sample (f) one should consider the distinct stages of selection:<sup>49</sup>

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

<sup>49</sup> CORDOVA, P.: Op. Cit. Also "Metodología de la Encuesta Nacional de hogares". Edit. DANE, Colombia, 1972-1984.

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

- $f_i$  = Fraction of the sample in stage i.
- $n_i$  = Sample size of stage i
- $N_i$  = Total dwellings in stage i

For each stage of selection the fraction is:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (stages 1, 2, 3 y 4)}$$

Where:

- $f_1$  = Probability of selection in stage 1: PSU
- $f_2$  = Probability of selection in stage 2: sectors
- $f_3$  = Probability of selection in stage 3: (blocks or segments)
- $f_4$  = Probability of selection of the cluster within each block or segment

Given that we take clusters of dwellings by blocks of the sample, the fraction converts into:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVM}$$

Where:

TVM = is the total number of dwellings in the block or segment

The global fraction of the sample (probability of selection within each PSU) should satisfy the following condition:

$$PU = \frac{TVS}{TVU} \times \frac{TVM}{TVS} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVM}$$

- TVU = total dwellings in the PSU
- TVS = number of dwellings in each sector
- TVM = number of dwellings in each block
- NH = number of households in each dwelling of the selected cluster

$h$  =  $h$  households to be selected in each cluster and 1 person in each one of these households

### Probability of final selection

The final probability of selection of the cluster ( $g$ ) is expressed as:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_s}{T_T} \times \frac{T_m}{T_s} \times \frac{T_g}{T_m} = \frac{T_g}{T_T} = \frac{1}{T_T}$$

Where:

$T_T$  = Total number of dwellings in the city (PSU)

$T_s$  = Total number of dwellings in the sector

$T_m$  = Total number of dwellings in the selected block

$T_g$  = Total number of clusters of  $h$  dwellings by block

In general, the probability of selection of a cluster in a given city is expressed as:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{n_c}{N_c} = f_c$$

Where:

$P_c$  = Probability of selection of a cluster of  $h$  dwellings in city  $c$ .

$T_{Mc}$  = Number of blocks to be selected in the city and in these  $h$  final dwellings

$T_{Tc}$  = Total number of dwellings in the city

$n_c$  = Size of the sample in city  $c$

$N_c$  = Size of the population in area  $c$

$f_c$  = Global fraction of the sample for city  $c$  (PSU)

## 18. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES FROM THE SAMPLE

The results of the sample should be treated at the level of each PSU to produce the total population estimates.<sup>50</sup> The restitution factor to be applied to each selected PSU is defined as the product of:

- Basic weight ( $F$ ). The basic weight is equal to the “interval of selection” of the PSU.
- Adjustment of coverage for nonresponse: ( $R_{hj}$ ). The adjustment for nonresponse is calculated for each block (cluster) and is applied to each interviewed household (with completed interviews) within each cluster.
- This results in dividing the number of selected and interviewed households (with complete interviews) on the block. The final restitution factor ( $W_{hj}$ ) to be applied to each block is the

<sup>50</sup> KAJ, D.: Op. Cit. See Chapter 9 for methods of calculating errors for various types of samples.

product of the two previous factors.<sup>51</sup> The estimation of the total for characteristic X of the population is expressed as:

$$X' = \sum_{h=1}^d \sum_{j=1}^{n_h} X_{hj} W_{hj}$$

$$W_{hj} = (F) \cdot (R_{hj})$$

Where:

- h = 1,2, ..... domain units h
- j = 1, 2,..... selected blocks for the sample in city h.
- n<sub>h</sub> = Total number of blocks in the sample of city h.
- W<sub>hj</sub> = Restitution factor of block j in city hj
- X = Statistic X for block j of city h.

$$X = \sum_{k=j}^{T_{hj}} X_{hjk}$$

- X<sub>hjk</sub> = Statistic X for the household, block j, of city h.
- k = 1,2,..... households with completed interviews on block j of city h
- T<sub>hj</sub> = Total households with interviews completed on block j of city h
- F = Basic weight
- R<sub>hj</sub> = Factor adjustment for nonresponse of block j in city h.

The above formula compares the sample information with that of its appropriate sampling frame. As this frame can have deficiencies or imperfections, it is convenient to take the sample results with an estimator independent of the population, as a projection of the population. The corresponding factor is:

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<sup>51</sup> DANE: op. cit.  
CORDOVA P.: Op. cit.

$$L = \frac{\text{Projected population at the date of the survey}}{\text{Población restituida al marco}}$$

Finally, the estimation of the population is expressed as:

$$X = X' \cdot L$$

## 19. PRECISION OF RESULTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

The population characteristics are estimations that are calculated from the elements included through the sample. This estimation depends upon the design of the sample and the particular combination of elements that are selected.

While these estimations are based upon a probabilistic sample, the statistics can still contain two types of errors.

- a) Errors outside of the sample that result due to procedures of observation, interview, field work, processing, data entry. Thus, the data cannot be perfect. These errors are common in all types of statistical analysis.
- b) Errors due to sampling, that can occur when the procedure is probabilistic and results because one studies only a fraction of the total population. In this way, the selected sample is one of the combinations of N elements, taken in groups of n, that could have been selected through the random process. The variation in the results due to chance that could have been obtained through these NCn samples,<sup>52</sup> forms the sampling error.

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<sup>52</sup> Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.

Our primary interest is in the calculation of sampling errors due to its theoretical and practical importance. This importance resides in the fact that by acknowledging the sample error, one can estimate the real value of a statistic between the limits of a confidence interval.

The standard deviation of the sample distribution of a given estimation is known as the standard error, and is the root of the variance of this distribution.

To calculate the variance of a rate, ratio, or proportion (r) in sampling clusters, we utilize the following formula:<sup>53 54</sup>

$$\text{Var}(r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[ \text{var}(y) + r \text{vr}(x) - 2 \text{cov}(x,y) \right]$$

Where:

$$r_x = \frac{y}{x} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^a y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^a x_i}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, a$$

- a = Total of segments or clusters in the sample
- y<sub>i</sub> = Sum of the values of variable x in the i<sup>th</sup> cluster
- x<sub>i</sub> = Sum of the values of variable x in the i<sup>th</sup> cluster
- y = Total sum of the values of variable y, in the sample
- x = Total sum of the values of variable x, in the sample

To facilitate the calculation, one can abbreviate the formula as follows:

$$\text{Var}(r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[ \frac{a}{a-1} \sum Z_i^2 \right]$$

Where:

$$Z_i = (y_i - rx_i)$$

The Standard Error (SE) of r is:

$$\text{SE}(r) = \sqrt{\text{var}(r)}$$

And the coefficient of variation in percentage terms is:

<sup>53</sup> Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.  
 The variance of an estimator can be obtained with the product of X var (r).  
<sup>54</sup> KISH, L.: Op. cit. 1965. Chapter. 6. Op. cit. 1987. Chapter. 4

$$C.V. (r) = \frac{SE (r)}{r} \times 100$$

According to the design of the sample, as we noted in a previous section, it is useful to calculate DEF as a means of determining the efficiency of the sample design utilized.<sup>55</sup> DEF is the reason for the variance of a sample of clusters, with respect to the variance of an unrestricted random sample of the same number of elements. That is:

$$DEF = \frac{S^2 \text{ cluster.}}{S^2 \text{ msa}}$$

A design effect equal to one indicates that the sample is as efficient as a simple random sample, and a value greater than one indicates that there are losses in efficiency due to clustering. In this case, we found that DEF= 1.022 for the regions of Costa and Sierra, and DEF = 1.011 for the region Oriente.

The confidence intervals calculated after completion of the survey, according to the sizes of the sample effectively observed, indicated an error of + / - 1.86% for a 95% confidence level for the national sample, and a confidence interval of + / - 2.97% for the Sierra, + / - 2.79 % for the Costa, and + / - 4.54% for Oriente. For these areas, the margins of error are: + / - 2.38% for urban areas and + / - 2.99% for rural areas.

## 20. WEIGHTS FOR AGGREGATION OF DOMAINS AND STRATA

The sampling method utilized in this study considered a distribution of sample sizes self-weighted at the internal level for the strata of sierra y costa; however not in the oriental region, due to the notable difference in population when compared to the other two regions. In addition, as a consequence of the random selection at the level of each household, the sample in its totality does not project the population by sex, which necessitates the introduction of weights to ensure that the sample corresponds to the census distribution by sex. Finally, while the PSU selection resulted from a probabilistic proportion of set size for urban and rural areas, this introduces variance that needs adjustment. This adjustment relies upon weights, which are derived from the urban/rural distribution as well as the sample proportion by PSU in light of the real proportion of the population, also by PSU.

With these above considerations in mind, we calculated weight values by sample point, including urban and rural areas, which results in a chain of components, as follows:

$W_{pi}$  = Weight for each sample point i according to its population in light of the population of its region.

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<sup>55</sup> FRANKEL, M.: "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". Edit. ISR, U. Of Michigan. 1971. In particular, see Appendix E.

$W_{mi}$  = Weight of each sample point of sample  $i$  according to the sample size assigned to it, according to the size of the sample of the whole region.

$W_{gi}$  = Ratio of men/women observed in the sample at sample point  $i$

$W_{Gi}$  = Ratio of men/women observed in sample unit  $i$  according to the last population census and INEC projections for 2001.

$W_{ai}$  = Urban/rural distribution observed by the survey in sample point  $i$ .

$W_{Ai}$  = Urban/rural distribution observed in sample point  $i$ , according to the population census of 1990 and INEC projections for 2001.

With the previous values from these calculations, we proceed to calculate the following values:

$$F_{1i} = W_{pi} / W_{mi};$$

$$F_{2i} = W_{gi} / W_{Gi};$$

$$F_{3i} = W_{ai} / W_{Ai}$$

With these partial factors ( $F_{ji}$ ;  $j = 1, 2, 3$ ;  $i = 1, \dots, 436$ ), we estimated a final factor to weight by locality:

$$F_{fi} = F_{1i} \cdot F_{2i} \cdot F_{3i}$$

This  $F_{fi}$  is incorporated into the dataset for each point of sample  $i$ .

### **III. COMMENTS ON THE WORK ASSIGNED TO CEDATOS / GALLUP International.**

**(Includes suggestions regarding “unusual” aspects observed during the study; point 4 of the "deliverables" indicated by the contract).**

#### **1. INICIAL PLANNING OF THE STUDY**

The meeting with Prof. Mitchell Seligson in Ecuador was very positive. Prof. Seligson traveled to Ecuador to evaluate the institutions capable of conducting this study. Nevertheless, CEDATOS would have been capable of constructing a plan that would have been more conclusive and that would have satisfied to a greater degree the objectives of the University and USAID, had CEDATOS been provided with more detailed information in terms of the final objectives of the study. It is understandable that the experts advisors could not provide more

information than that given, the information was very valuable and came from individuals well-versed in the material. Nevertheless, for the following studies, it would be worthwhile to structure a reference document that indicates particular aspects, such as the scope of the study, topics, interview environment, modalities, etc. that would render the project more efficient in terms of cost, time, and precision. This is now possible after this first experience.

## 2. QUESTIONNAIRE

While the questionnaire is fairly large, but it did not present any serious difficulties; it is dynamic, clear, fluid, and awakens an interest in the respondent. With this adjustment, the average time of the interview would drop to 40 minutes, in contrast to the present average of 50 minutes. This could be an objective of future endeavors. The use of auxiliary cards was appropriate; however we observed some difficulties that were overcome with the necessary instruction of the interviewer in rural areas that are less developed than the national average.

The version in Quechua was utilized. Still, some selected native speakers of Quechua expressed a reluctance to continue the interview in that language; they preferred Spanish, even though there were delays in understanding and answering the question. This occurred not only in rural areas, but also in urban areas, among residents who had arrived to these urban areas recently. The indigenous that live in cities and know and speak Spanish only on a rudimentary level still do not prefer to speak in Quechua. In the future, it would be useful to include questions that, avoiding this difficulty, allows the indigenous respondent to be registered as such.

The questionnaire passed through various revisions before being finalized. We found various questions that should be restructured and adapted to the language and common expressions of Ecuador.

## 3. THE SAMPLE

Neither the design nor the sampling presented significant problems for CEDATOS, given that CEDATOS possesses the information, cartography, knowledge and experience necessary for this type of work. The sizes appeared to be appropriate for the survey; perhaps in the future it would be best to classify urban areas in terms of sizes of 100,000 or more; 40,000 – 100,000, and less than 40,000, with a pertinent distribution in the sample. In rural areas, for an insignificant additional cost one could include the scattered area that goes farther than the parish. The last census of the population will include important information on this human and geographical segment.

The census cartography utilized in this survey was recent, and was updated for various new urban and rural sectors. We took into account the possibility of conducting new studies in the future with similar segments.

## 4. QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

The training received by interviewers and supervisors contributed heavily to the success of the work. The new system of training seminars for interviewers had positive results. The

participation of Prof. Orlando Pérez was very valuable; he was forthcoming with suggestions and instructions, and could authenticate and observe the training and the beginning of field work in various cities of the country, with the personnel assigned to urban and rural areas.

The interviewers and supervisors had sufficient practice in identifying sampling units, the final selection of households, and the adults in the households of the sample. They handled with skill the random tables at the level of the household (Kish / Córdova method).

## 5. FIELD WORK, INTERVIEWS; REACTIONS

The interviews were conducted according to the previously established schedule, with only a few minor changes. The first change was caused by a national holiday in the first week of November, which lasted four days. Another inconvenience resulted in the Northern frontier, in the sector of San Lorenzo, Esmeraldas, when a guerilla incursion in the zone resulted in the death of various residents. Due to this incursion, we had to organize new work groups with more experienced interviewers and people from the area.

The majority of the population received the survey very well and collaborated with the project. In urban areas, as has occurred on other occasions, we observed a certain resistance and lack of interest on the part of individuals of high socio-economic status, especially due to the extent of the questionnaire. In the northern frontier, above all Carchi and Sucumbíos, some people were afraid to answer certain questions, as “they could come to the knowledge of the Colombian guerrillas and narcotraffic agents.”

A good number of respondents were interested in learning of the results of the survey; “always you ask us, but you do not tell us the opinions of the others,” said some. Others demonstrated a lack of interest in political matters, even if they commented on the distrust in various institutions and the fight against corruption. It would be worthwhile to communicate the results to the diverse levels that were consulted, both urban and rural.

## 6. VALIDATION OF INFORMATION

The supervision of 100% of the places of the survey (confirming that the interview was conducted in the proper household with the person that was randomly selected) contributed substantially to the quality of the information. The selection of the survey with previous setting of the rate of noncoverage is a procedure that makes it possible to complete the anticipated sample; 18% of noncoverage was fulfilled. The majority of non-responses occurred in large cities, and in middle and upper middle socio-economic levels.

The validation of information, with second interviews and corroboration, was conducted for up to 40% of the sample. The requirement of 1 supervisor for every 3 interviewers was fulfilled.

## 7. CRITIQUES, CODIFICATION, AND DATA ENTRY

In the second week of field work, critiques of the questionnaire arose (in terms of evaluations and revision), prior to the data entry. The work parties were satisfied to take three daily turns (8

am to 1 pm; 1 pm to 6pm and from 6pm to 11pm). All of the questionnaires were processed and the quality control functioned completely.

#### 8. PROCESSING OF ARCHIVES, QUALITY CONTROL, AND THE AUDIT FROM PITTSBURGH

As the survey progressed, the technical team of the Centro de Cómputo of CEDATOS worked in parallel to input the data and file preparation in SPSS format. This work complied with the requirements of the University of Pittsburgh and all information was sent as soon as it was available

As indicated by the contract, the questionnaires were sent to the University of Pittsburgh to be audited. Profesor Seligson's answer was completely satisfactory. The key to this satisfactory result was the quality control applied to each and every stage of the study.

#### 9. COMUNICATIONS

Regular communication was maintained between the University of Pittsburgh and CEDATOS to coordinate the ongoing study. Profesor Seligson's responses were very positive, and he was always collaborating with CEDATOS. At the same time, he fulfilled all of his requirements and observations from the United States. Email was the system of communication that was utilized extensively and intensively.