

**Latin American Public Opinion Project**

**LAPPOP**



**Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina**

**DEMOCRACY AUDIT: ECUADOR 2001**

**BY**

**MITCHELL A. SELIGSON**

**WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF  
AGUSTÍN GRIJALVA**

**UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LATIN AMERICAN  
PUBLIC OPINION PROJECT**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
PITTSBURGH, PA 15260  
SELIGSON@PITT.EDU**

**JULY 31, 2003**

**SUPPORTED BY A GRANT FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (511-330-4265)**



Mitchell A. Seligson, is now Centennial Professor of Political Science and Fellow of The Center for the Americas, Vanderbilt University. He is Founder and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, LAPOP. Contact: [m.seligson@vanderbilt.edu](mailto:m.seligson@vanderbilt.edu), Department of Political Science Vanderbilt University, Box 1817 Station B, Nashville, TN 37325, voice: (615) 322-6328; fax (615) 343-6003.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The survey reported on in these pages is the largest, most comprehensive effort to systematically measure the political culture of Ecuador. As such, it required a great deal of effort by many parties, and we would like to thank a number of them here. The sample design, field work and data entry for the project were carried out by CEDATOS, the Gallup International affiliate in Ecuador, ably led by its director, Dr. Polibio Córdova. We have been deeply impressed by the professionalism, skill and care demonstrated by that organization at every step of the way. The pre-testing of the questionnaire and the supervision of interviewer training was carried out by Dr. Orlando Pérez of the University of Central Michigan. With Orlando's expert assistance we were able to move through what turned out to be 19 distinct revisions of the instrument and to produce a polished final product. At the University of Pittsburgh, we owe a great deal to Melanie Weissberger and Rocco Belmonte, our two work-study assistants who helped track down citations and struggle with the formatting of the final document. Mary Malone ably translated key components of the study. Michelle Pupich of the Department of Political Science ably handled all of the financial and logistical details of the project. The study was funded by the United States Agency for International Development with a grant to the University of Pittsburgh. We would like to especially thank Peter Natiello and Lucrecia Tola and Lars Klassen for working closely with us to make this study as useful as possible for the promotion of democratic development in Ecuador. Finally, we would like to thank the over 5,000 Ecuadorians who gave their time to respond to our questions in order to enable us all to better understand the nature of democratic beliefs and practices in that country.



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## CHAPTER I. POLITICAL CULTURE: THEORY AND METHOD

The analysis undertaken in this work attempts to make a significant contribution to the quantitative study of political culture in Ecuador. Utilizing a large national sample carried out in November, 2001, we use public opinion data to examine crucial themes related to support for democracy in Ecuador. The study was carried out as part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project with financial support coming from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ecuador. The data were collected by CEDATOS, the Gallup International affiliate in Ecuador, and were designed to represent all voting-age adults in the country (with the exception of the residents of Galapagos).

This would seem like a particularly opportune moment to carry out such a study. After 17 years of democratic rule, the fall of President Abdala Bucaram initiated a protracted period of political insatiability which hopefully has come to an end after a short-lived coup d'état in which Gustavo Noboa Bejarano (who was elected vice-president) replaced President Jamil Mahuad Witt. Beginning in 1997 and running through 2001, Ecuador experienced the most serious economic crisis of the past 70 years, with a sharp contraction of its GNP, a reduction in investment, heightened unemployment, a spike in inflation, a rapid increase in migration of Ecuadorians to other countries, an increase in poverty, a banking crisis, and widespread charges of corruption. It is time to take stock and determine what it is that Ecuadorians believe about their democracy.

To convey our results as clearly as we can, we include numerous graphs, methodological notes, and also include the complete text of our survey as an appendix. Since the issues are complex, we have been compelled to include some (seemingly) complex multivariate data analysis in order to justify our conclusions, most of the key findings are conveyed with graphs that we hope most readers will readily comprehend. To further enhance the impact of the work, we compare our results with other countries of Latin America, drawing on our archive of data at the University of Pittsburgh.

An important goal of this study is to stimulate and contribute to the national debate on democracy and the importance of citizen democratic values and behaviors (i.e., the political culture). This English version of the study will be translated into Spanish and published in Ecuador and will be the subject of several presentations and discussions later this year.

In the first part of this introductory chapter, we provide a general overview of the literature on political culture. In the second portion, we summarize the main studies of political culture focusing on Ecuador in the past two decades. These studies are primarily qualitative in nature, and have been published both inside and outside the country. We also include a bibliography of recent work focusing on political culture in Ecuador. While this bibliography is not exhaustive, we hope it will prove useful for future studies. We conclude the chapter with a general discussion of the sample design and include a detail appendix providing a more technical description of the sample.

## *The Study of Political Culture*

The most widely cited study of political culture is the pioneering work of Almond and Verba.<sup>1</sup> In this work, political culture is defined as a set of cognitive orientations toward political objects and processes. These cognitive orientations are affective as well as evaluative, and refer to attitudes toward the overall political system and its parts and processes (demands and public policy), and the role of the self inside the political system. However, as Glenda Patrick<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, other conceptualizations of political culture aim for an integration with culture in general,<sup>3</sup> focusing on problems of the relation and aggregation of individuals' political orientations<sup>4</sup> and their relationships to institutions.<sup>5</sup>

Almond and Verba raise two important questions in their publication of the *Civic Culture* (Italicize). First, how can one utilize an empirical methodology, based upon surveys, to measure political culture? Second, how should one evaluate value-laden factors in a comparative macro analysis of various countries?<sup>6</sup> Their work generated an ample and heated debate regarding the pertinence of these concepts and their methodological utility. Following an academic neglect of these studies during the sixties and seventies, studies of political culture are currently experiencing a significant revival amidst the processes of democratic transition and consolidation, as well as the growing sophistication of applied statistics in the social sciences.<sup>7</sup>

This growing sophistication of statistical techniques, together with the increasing number of national survey samples, contributes to the analysis of patterns that are common in some cases, different in others, of diverse social sectors, regions, and ethnicities. This methodology also allows for comparisons among nations and time periods.<sup>8</sup> These novel resources have opened new discussions on methodological and epistemological problems,<sup>9</sup> such as the

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<sup>1</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>2</sup> Glenda M. Patrick, "Political Culture", en *Social Science Concepts* ed. Giovanni Sartori (California: Sage Publications, 1984).

<sup>3</sup> David Easton, *A Framework of Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

<sup>4</sup> Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

<sup>5</sup> Richard Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, C.S.: Stanford University Press, 1969). See also: Robert Tucker C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly*, No. 20: 173-90.

<sup>6</sup> Margaret R. Somers, "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation," *Sociological Theory* 13 (July 1995): 113-44.

<sup>7</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

<sup>8</sup> Frederick C. Turner, "Reassessing Political Culture" in *Latin America in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Smith (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> William Reisinger, "The Renaissance of a Rubric: Political Culture as Concept and Theory," *International Journal of Public Opinion* 7, no. 4 (1995).



relationship between political culture and various political phenomenon: political regime,<sup>10</sup> regional subcultures<sup>11</sup> and democratic transitions.

Studies of political culture have also looked to identify traditions and typologies in historic terms. In the case of Latin America, for example, Wiarda's work<sup>12</sup> explores the fundamental orientations of political thought in the region, detecting two primary tendencies: corporate authoritarianism and liberal authoritarianism. This analysis is framed in the historic mark of ideas and concentrates on the reciprocating influence between the political thought of elites and structural factors in the region, considered as a whole.

Studies of political culture are grounded in a myriad of traditions, ranging from symbolic and structural anthropology to linguistics, social history, and the sociology of culture. Margaret Sommers<sup>13</sup> aims to identify the central axis of these studies in the following terms: "practitioners of the new political culture concept insist, first, that historical actors' practices, activities, and political ideas must be viewed as symbolic systems with their own histories and logics; and, second, that these symbolic logics themselves are modalities of politics and power as much as they are cultural expressions."

### ***Qualitative studies of political culture in Ecuador***

The central axis in qualitative studies of political culture in Ecuador has focused on exploring the relationships between paradigms of political modernity and the informalization of practice and discourse, which finds populism as its main exponent. The second axis, that has recently attracted attention, is ethnic diversity and democracy. We turn to give a brief, yet not exhaustive, description of the treatment of these themes, focusing on specific studies.

The great majority of qualitative analyses have concentrated on themes related to the identity of political subjects, the dynamics of the consensus and dissent, equality and difference, governability, democracy, the citizenry, and populism. These studies are frequently torn between synchronous and diachronic tensions. On one hand, they search for a general characterization of the political culture and subcultures of Ecuador. On the other, they aim to explain historical periods and particular political phenomenon.

The methodological axes of qualitative studies focus on analyses of discourse, political theorization and historical investigation. The predominant theme has been "velasquismo" and its arrival to the political culture of Ecuador. The theme of cultural diversity, above all the growing indigenous movement, also occupies a notable place. The primary editorial space for academic

<sup>10</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980); John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica," in *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*, ed. E. Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas, and Javier Hurtado (México: FLACSO y la Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>12</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America. The Cultural and Political Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

<sup>13</sup> Somers, 1995, p. 127.



analyses of these themes has been journals such as *Ecuador Debate* and *Iconos*. Also, many diverse articles have been published, directly or indirectly related to this theme, outside of Ecuador.<sup>14</sup>

In essence, the strong presence of populism throughout the greater part of Ecuadorian history in the twentieth century has led social scientists to the study of its discourses and practices, its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and its relationships with modern democratic paradigms such as the citizenry and representative politics. In this vein, more systematic debates have developed towards the character of velasquismo. Also important are the studies of “cefepismo” and “roldosismo.”

These analyses have characterized velasquismo as a purely electoral phenomenon, portraying it as a populist phenomenon that generated widespread social movements and participation, which included many people who did not have the legal capacity to vote<sup>15</sup> and developed politically functional discourses.<sup>16</sup> These studies have spurred characterizations of the Ecuadorian political culture that emphasize the strong historical legacy of velasquismo.

One notable scholar who has focused on the connections between political culture and populism is Carlos de la Torre, who concentrates particularly on the cases of velasquismo and bucamismo.<sup>17</sup> De la Torre studies the social construction and symbolic logic of these populist leaders, identifying them as distinctly Ecuadorian versions of modernity. He also views them as tools of political incorporation and paternalistic control of the masses, which should be viewed as fulfilling an initial condition of a progressive democratization conforming to an Ecuadorian reality.

In the nineties, the experience of more than a decade of relative constitutional stability, and the rupture of that continuity with the election of Abdalá Bucaram, caused some to reflect on the relationships between democracy and the right, democracy and society, democracy and governability, and democracy and populism. Many of these studies include references to political culture.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup>In this study, we include many of these works on political culture in Ecuador in the bibliography.

<sup>15</sup> Juan Maiguashca and Liisa North, “Orígenes y Significado del Velasquismo: lucha de clases y participación política en el Ecuador, 1920-1972” in *La Cuestión Regional y el Poder*, ed. Rafael Quintero (Quito: Corporación Editora, 1991). This essay reinterprets Velasquismo based upon the works of Cueva and Quintero. See: Agustín Cueva, *El Proceso de Dominación Política en Ecuador* (México: Editorial Diógenes, 1974). Rafael Quintero, *El Mito del Populismo en el Ecuador: Análisis de los Fundamentos del Estado ecuatoriano moderno, 1895-1934* (Quito: FLACSO, 1978).

<sup>16</sup> Maria Cristina Cárdenas, *Velasco Ibarra: Ideología, Poder y Democracia* (Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional, 1991).

<sup>17</sup> Carlos De la Torre, *La Seducción Velasquista* (Quito: Libri Mundi, 1993); See also the English edition: Carlos De la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America – The Ecuadorian Experience* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000). Carlos De la Torre, *Un Solo Toque: Populismo y Cultura Política en Ecuador* (Quito: CAAP, 1996); Carlos De la Torre, “Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador” en *Latin American Perspectives*, 24 (Mayo, 1997).

<sup>18</sup> Amparo Menéndez ed, *La Democracia Esquiva* (Quito: ILDIS, 1991).



Felipe Burbano, in his article “Cultura política y Democracia en el Ecuador: una aproximación a nuestros vacíos” analyzes the problematic characteristics of Ecuadorian political culture.<sup>19</sup> Burbano studies political culture in relation to governability and democratic consolidation, finding a deficit in the rules of the game common to political actors, which generates a constant informalization of politics, a permanent *ir más allá de las instituciones*, discussed also by Simón Pachano.<sup>20</sup> In this vein, he examines topics such as the Liberal Revolution, populism, ethnic problems, favoritism and regional conflicts.

In Fernando Bustamante’s article, “La Cultura Política y Ciudadana en Ecuador,”<sup>21</sup> he discusses the suspension of the Ecuadorian political mentality from modern assumptions of rationality, equality and citizens’ rights. This author also examines the relationship between the political culture of the masses and that of the elite, finding a divergence from the paradigms of democratic rationality. The study examines the relationship of this political culture with governability.

Another central theme in the study of Ecuadorian political culture has been the ethnic diversity of Ecuador and the challenge this raises for the right to equality and the right to difference, as in the constitution and the exercise of citizenship.<sup>22</sup> In this vein, numerous studies have emerged, focusing on the multicultural character of society and the state, racism and collective rights. These studies are frequently related both directly and indirectly to political culture.

Also notable is a brief article by Osvaldo Hurtado,<sup>23</sup> included in the *Léxico Político Ecuatoriano*, in which he characterizes Ecuadorian political culture according to four dichotomies: justice and illegality, conflict and consensus, urgency and perseverance, and finally paternalism and responsibility. Hurtado finds Ecuadorian tendencies are rooted in the negative poles of these dichotomies

<sup>19</sup> Felipe Burbano de Lara, "Cultura Política y democracia en el Ecuador: una aproximación a nuestros vacíos," in *Documento de Trabajo No. 10 – Proyecto Cordes- Gobernabilidad*, (Quito: CORDES, 1998). A revised version of this work appears in Felipe Burbano de Lara, “Cultura Política” in Fernando Pachano ed, *La Ruta de la Gobernabilidad*, (Quito: CORDES, s/a). See also: Felipe Burbano de Lara, "Discurso populista, democracia y modernización," *Ecuador Debate*, no. 17 (1989); Felipe Burbano de Lara, *Populismo, democracia y política. El caso de Abdalá Bucaram* (Quito: Instituto latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS-El Duende-Abya Yala, 1992); Felipe Burbano de Lara, "Cultura Política y democracia en el Ecuador: una aproximación a nuestros vacíos," *Documento*, no. 10 (1998); Felipe Burbano de Lara, "El fantasma del populismo. Aproximación a un tema (siempre) actual," *Nueva Sociedad* (1998); Felipe Burbano de Lara, "Límites y alcances del regionalismo," *Iconos* (1998c).

<sup>20</sup> Simón Pachano, *Democracia sin Sociedad*, (Quito, FLACSO, 1996). See also: Simón Pachano, “Valores Ciudadanos” en Luis Mella ed, *Ecuador: los desafíos éticos del presente*. (Quito: Editorial Santillana, 1999).

<sup>21</sup> Fernando Bustamante, "La cultura política y ciudadana en el Ecuador," in *Ecuador: un problema de gobernabilidad* (Quito: CORDES -PNUD, 1997).

<sup>22</sup> Andrés Guerrero, "Ciudadanía, frontera étnica y compulsión binaria," *Iconos*, no. 4 (1998).

<sup>23</sup> Osvaldo Hurtado, "Cultura Política," in *Léxico Político Ecuatoriano*, ed. et al. Alberto Acosta Espinosa (Quito: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS, 1994).



## *Quantitative Empirical Studies*

From March to September of 1978, in the era of return to a constitutional regime in Ecuador, Marcelo Baquero conducted a survey in Quito regarding political orientation and participation and electoral behavior. His study included 120 variables, and was based upon a sample of 921 respondents, with a 4.5% margin of error.<sup>24</sup> He found low levels of support for the political system, as well as negative attitudes towards the political system as a whole, and towards the electoral system in particular. However, significant differences existed among social classes. He also found that quiteños registered low levels of formal and informal political participation, and that this was linked to individual interests. Nevertheless, this study observed positive attitudes towards unconventional activities, which were perceived as legitimate methods of addressing political demands.

While this study is notable, this line of quantitative investigation has had very little continuity in Ecuador. There have been very few quantitative studies since that of Baquero. One recent exception is the *Estudio Sobre la Correlación entre la Existencia de Justicia y la Consolidación de la Democracia en Ecuador*,<sup>25</sup> conducted by Buscaglia, Merino and Jaramillo. This study is based upon a survey of 1600 respondents in 1997. The sample covered Pichincha, Guayas, Azuay, Manabí, Chimborazo, Morona Santiago and Esmeraldas. In this study, the authors uncovered relationships between the economic situation and political legitimacy. In addition, they pointed to the existence of defective rules and laws, which when combined with their poor application, reduced support for the democratic system. This study also found that the lack of effectiveness of the judicial system and the negative perception that the citizens had of political parties also had a negative impact on the legitimacy of the political regime.

CEDATOS, Informe Confidencial y Market, among other agencies (such as those of public communication), have conducted public opinion surveys that have included questions regarding levels of support for political institutions. Generally these studies have detected significantly lower levels of support for political institutions. Additional studies with a quantitative focus have been produced in academic environments; we turn now to discuss this body of research.

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<sup>24</sup> César M. Baquero, *Emerging Patterns of Political Culture in Ecuador* (The Florida State University, PH. D. dissertation, 1979).

<sup>25</sup> Edgardo Buscaglia, Valeria Merino and Ana Lucía Jaramillo, *Estudio sobre la Correlación entre la Existencia de Justicia y la Consolidación de la Democracia en Ecuador* (Quito: Corporación Latinoamericana para el Desarrollo, 2000).



In 1991, following the experience of years of democratic stability, Anita Isaacs published an essay entitled “Problemas de consolidación democrática en Ecuador.” In this essay, she raises doubts regarding the success of democratic consolidation, highlighting the results of a survey conducted by the company Informe Confidencial in Quito and Guayaquil in 1989.<sup>26</sup> These results demonstrate that of the respondents interviewed, 88.5 % in Guayaquil and 79.2 % in Quito believed that political parties were not interested in the problems of the citizenry. In the case of Guayaquil, 34.5 % believed that a dictatorship would solve problems better than a democracy, and 46.2 % responded that democracy is more corrupt than a dictatorship.

A more recent study of political culture by José Sánchez Parag, *Cultura política en la Sociedad Ecuatoriana* also incorporates quantitative results.<sup>27</sup> This study was conducted in September of 1998, consisting of a survey of 60 questions and 550 people in Quito and Guayaquil. The themes of these questions concentrated on familial socialization, rights and obligations, the law and legality, democracy and authoritarianism, politicians and politics, and participation and political corruption.

To these quantitative works, one should add the broader studies of Baquero, Buscaglia, Merino and Jaramillo, mentioned previously in this chapter. As one can see, the studies of political culture in Ecuador, both qualitative and quantitative, have been scarce, although the qualitative trend has been better developed. This present study hopes to contribute to the line of quantitative empirical work.

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<sup>26</sup> Anita Isaacs, “Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Ecuador” in *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 10, no 2 (1991).

<sup>27</sup> José Sánchez Parga, *Cultura Política en la Sociedad Ecuatoriana* (Quito: ILDIS, 1999).



## Sample Design

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under represented in the election.<sup>28</sup>

Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens, are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

In this study of Ecuador, it was decided to design a sample that covered all non-institutionalized adults<sup>29</sup> with the exception of those living in the Galapagos Islands, who were excluded for cost considerations. Since the sample is of probability design, i.e., it is “random” we wanted to make sure that all major geographic regions of the country were covered, and this meant that we would need to “stratify” the sample into three zones: the coast, the sierra and the Amazon (or oriente). Without stratification, random chance could have resulted in very few interviews in any one of these areas. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample by guaranteeing that the respondents will come from each of the regions of interest.

Beyond the question of dividing the country into these three zones, we had to deal with the problem of the relatively small size of the population in the oriente. Population totals, based on the best census projections were used to determine what percentage of the national population lives in each of those areas. For example, the 1990 census shows that 50.5% of the population lives in the coastal provinces, 45.5% in the Sierra, and 4.0% in the Amazon. This means that we would want the sample to reflect that division of the population, for if it does not, the results would under or over represent one of these geographic areas (but see the discussion on weighting below). Within each of those areas, there is a further breakdown, or stratification, of urban vs. rural, and again, we want the survey to reflect the relevant proportions of the population.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are three high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the three schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools

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<sup>28</sup>This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, recent past President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

<sup>29</sup> That is, we did not include those in hospitals or incarcerated in prisons.



would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have three tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup>), then a total of 27 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Ecuador it is important to further subdivide the three regions into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each province into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of provinces we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each province by population size. It is common practice in Ecuador to divide the population into strata by population, covering the large cities of Quito and Guayaquil, as well as middle-size cities and smaller areas. Our sample for each of the three major regions of Ecuador has been stratified in this fashion.

How accurate is our sample? We interviewed 2,925 people, which means that for the sample as a whole, the accuracy was  $\pm 1.8\%$  in the worst case.<sup>30</sup> A “worst case” arises when the responses are evenly split, 50/50, making it very difficult to judge which response is the most preferred to a given question. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario the survey provides accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 1.8% more or 1.8% less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing in Ecuador. Under more favorable conditions<sup>31</sup> the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 3.5\%$ . Technically, the sampling error of  $\pm 1.8\%$  means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Ecuador, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than  $\pm 1.7\%$ . Of course, factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of  $\pm 1.8\%$  is very good and unprecedented for political culture surveys of Ecuador. Indeed, most of those studies, as noted above, focused only upon the major cities.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the region and within each region by size of city/town, we have what is called a Multi-stage stratified sample design.<sup>@</sup> But now the question comes as to how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Ecuador. That is because the Amazon region would have such

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
<sup>30</sup>But see the technical description of the sample below.

<sup>31</sup>For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.



a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample were very, very large.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a larger sample from the Amazon than the population size residing there would call for, since to draw a sample in proportion to the size of the population there would have resulted in a sample of only about 120 respondents. In order to correct for the over sample, however, we then apply sample weights, which means that the entire sample reflects the actual known distribution of the population between the coast, sierra and Amazon. The map in Figure I. 1 below shows the three regions.



**Figure I. 1** Regions of Ecuador to define first level of stratification

We decided that a  $\pm 4.5\%$  accuracy of the sample in the Amazon region of was a reasonable target, considering cost and time factors. With a sample of this size, in the worst case scenario within the Amazon the survey is an accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 4.5% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could have interviewed all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 3.5\%$ .

What of the other two regions, the coast and the sierra? In the coast we interviewed 1,293 respondents, which yield a sampling error of  $\pm 2.8\%$ . In the sierra, the sample was 1,154, yielding a confidence interval of  $\pm 2.9\%$ . We can say in rough terms that when we are talking about the results of the sample as a whole our sampling error is less than 2%, and when we are talking about the coast or the sierra it is less than 3% and, finally, we can say that in the Amazon it is no larger than 4.5%.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a simple random sample of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the nine provinces. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. According to the careful calculations carried out by CEDATOS, the confidence for the clustered stratified sample design actually implemented was  $\pm 1.86\%$ , a very small increase from the theoretical level of  $\pm 1.8\%$  stated above. For the three main strata, the actual sampling errors were: Coast:  $\pm 2.79\%$ ; Sierra:  $\pm 2.97\%$ ; Oriente:  $\pm 4.54\%$  It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection. The individual respondent within the household was selected and included up to three call-backs per household if the respondent selected was not home.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by CEDATOS, the Gallup affiliate in Ecuador. This firm has had many years of experience, and carried out hundreds of surveys in the country. A full technical description of the sample is contained as an appendix to this chapter.



## Overview of the Sample

It is best to begin the data presentation in this report with an overview of the characteristics of the sample. All of these results, as well as the ones presented in the chapters that follow, are based on the weighted sample. These weights correct for the over sampling in the Amazon, and also adjust for the distributions within each stratum (e.g., urban/rural) and correct for the inevitable biases that results from strict probability sampling at the household level (e.g., the overrepresentation of females).

The sample is distributed evenly by gender as is shown in Figure I. 2 below.




Figure I. 2 Distribution of sample by gender



The distribution of the sample by age is shown in Figure I. 3 below. As can be seen, the bulk of the sample is young, matching the distribution of the population of the country, which has long had a high rate of fertility.





Figure I. 3 Distribution of sample by age



In terms of education, the results show levels higher than those of the census of ten years earlier, an indication that the heavy investment in human capital is paying off. A summary is contained in Figure I. 4 below.



**Figure I. 4** Distribution of sample by education level



Ecuador is a poor country, and the income distribution in the sample reflects this reality. As can be seen, the great bulk of those in the sample have monthly family incomes of lower than \$300.




Figure I. 5 Distribution of sample by income



Income does vary somewhat by residence, as is shown in Figure I. 6 below. Quito and Guayaquil have the highest levels of income, but, on the 14-point scale used to measure income (as shown in Figure I. 5 above), the variation is not great.




Figure I. 6 Income and residence

This chapter has provided background on the study of the political culture of democracy in Ecuador. We have shown that most of the work in the field has been qualitative in nature, and the few empirically based studies have been limited to small, non-national samples. This study deviates from those in that it uses a national sample with a large sample size, divided into the country's three major geographic regions. In the pages that follow, different aspects of Ecuador's political culture will be examined. The data set, however, contains much more information, that can be broken down into areas of interest to specific projects (e.g., a study of the sierra region that is interested in the participation of women in local government). Ecuadorians and international agencies are encouraged to make use of this data for their studies and project planning.



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## CHAPTER II. SUPPORT FOR STABLE DEMOCRACY

The main focus of this chapter is to comprehend the degree to which attitudes in Ecuador support *democratic* political stability. The emphasis is on *democratic* because stability without democracy is clearly not desirable, as the long-term dictatorships of such individuals as Stroessner, Somoza and Castro testify. In order to do this, we will first examine the extent to which Ecuadorians feel that they are part of a larger political community. As we will show, there is widespread support for this feeling. The problems emerge, however, when we examine support for the political system and support for political tolerance, perhaps the single most important value enabling democracies to grow and prosper. Without tolerance, there can be no respect for minority rights, the very essence of the guarantee that makes democratic majority rule possible. The chapter presents a model in which support for the political system and support for political tolerance are seen as requisites for democratic political stability, and compares the results for Ecuador with those of other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base.

### *The Existence of A Political Community in Ecuador*

A crucial factor in the stability of any nation is that its citizens support it. Support, as has recently been pointed out by Pippa Norris of the Harvard Department of Government, is multidimensional.<sup>1</sup> At the most general level, citizens must believe in the existence of, and have support for, the “political community.” According to Norris (p. 10), this involves “a basic attachment to the nation.” It is precisely this attachment that appears to be missing in a number of countries in Africa, where the loyalty is to the clan or tribe and not to the artificially constructed post-colonial national boundaries. Ecuador, of course, has existed as a nation for close to two centuries, so that the problems of national identity in Africa are not in any respect comparable to those found in Ecuador.

Our first question, then, is, “is there a political community in Ecuador?” The answer is a resounding “yes.” The survey asked a long series of questions in the area of system support, but one of them (B43) focused directly on the pride in the political community, and asked “To what degree are you proud of being an Ecuadorian?” The respondents replied with respect to a seven-point scale, that ran from 1 on the low end, indicating no pride, to 7 on the high end, indicating high pride. As can be seen in Figure II. 1 below, an overwhelming majority of Ecuadorians in each of the areas in which the survey was conducted were extremely proud of being an Ecuadorian. On the seven-point scale, for all but two of the regions of the country, three out of four respondents selected a score of “7,” which is the highest possible score, while most of the other respondents selected a score in the positive end of the continuum (5 or 6). This finding clearly suggests that there is a real sense of political community in this country.

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<sup>1</sup> Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.






Figure II. 1 Pride in being an Ecuadorian: by region



We can convert the scale of the question to our already familiar 0-100 measurement system and examine how the sample varies by urbanization. The results are shown in Figure II. 2 below. The initial analysis showed very little difference associated with urbanization, so this figure presents the “confidence intervals of the sample.” That is, it shows us what looks like a flattened letter “I,” the top and bottom lines of which indicate the upper and lower limit of the confidence interval of the sample for each group. The box in the middle of the “I” shows where the mean score is for that group. As can be seen, there is very little variation, so that the correct conclusion to be drawn is that pride in one’s national identity is quite high in Ecuador, and is widespread throughout the country. There is no significant relationship between age, gender, education or wealth on the one hand and pride in being an Ecuadorian on the other, meaning that these feelings of pride are not confined to certain demographic or socio-economic groups.




Figure II. 2 Pride in being an Ecuadorian: Confidence intervals by sample

## System Support

While the results presented above show that Ecuadorians overwhelmingly believe that they form part of a political community, this does not necessarily mean that they are confident in the institutions that govern them. In fact, as we shall shortly see, there is a yawning gap between pride in being an Ecuadorian and pride in Ecuador’s system of government. Support for the political system we consider to be a measure of political legitimacy, and without legitimacy, no



political system can expect to remain stable over long periods of time. Citizens must have confidence in their government's right to rule (which is the essence of the definition of legitimacy). In this section we will analyze the degree of political legitimacy the various institutions of the Ecuadorian system had in 2001, but will also then combine these results with a measure of political tolerance in order to develop a predictive model of democratic political stability.

The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of items that measure what we call "system support" that measure a generalized sense of legitimacy of the political system. In addition, another, longer battery of questions has been developed measuring confidence in the specific institutions of the state. In this chapter we first compare the high levels of national pride that we have already uncovered, with support for various dimensions of the political system. The questions were all based on the same format and the same 1-7 response metric that was used to measure pride in being an Ecuadorian, so the comparisons can be made directly. To make it easier, however, for the reader to compare these responses the items are converted into a familiar 0-100 metric (commonly used in test grades or in Centigrade thermometers). In Table II. 1 below (also shown in Figure II. 3 below) these items are listed by their average score, going from highest (i.e., greatest level of citizen confidence) to lowest (i.e., lowest sense of citizen confidence).<sup>2</sup> Several findings stand out in this table. While trust in the Catholic Church has always been higher than in any other institution in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project series, it is important to note that pride in being an Ecuadorian scores dramatically higher than does the Church. Moreover, it is important to compare pride in being an Ecuadorian (item B43R, the "R" standing for the recoding of 1-7 to the 0-100 metric) to item B4R, which measures pride in the Ecuadorian political system. The reader will note that whereas pride in the former scores 88.5, pride in the latter scores a less than half, at 37.1. This means that Ecuadorians make a clear and sharp distinction between their pride in their national identity and their pride in their political system.

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<sup>2</sup> The conversion is accomplished by subtracting 1 from each score, so that they all have a 0-6 range rather than a 1-7. Then each score is divided by 6, so that they now range from 0-1, and then the scores are multiplied by 100.



<b>System Support Indicators</b>		
	N	Mean
B43R Pride in being Ecuadorian	2,896	88.5
B46R Relatives	2,907	75.2
B20R Catholic Church	2,893	67.5
B12R Armed Forces	2,882	62.8
B47R Friends	2,908	58.9
B37R Mass Media	2,878	58.7
B48R Neighbors	2,902	52.0
B49R People of neighborhood	2,897	50.5
B2R Institutions	2,850	48.8
B35R Free Elections	2,801	47.7
B41R Junta Parroquial	2,756	46.9
B40R Indigenous movements	2,845	46.8
B32R Municipality	2,894	46.7
B17R Public Defender	2,795	46.5
B18R Police	2,911	43.7
B6R Support	2,856	41.8
B33R Prov. Prefecture	2,814	40.0
B44R Constitutional Court	2,789	39.8
B39R Chambers of Commerce	2,727	39.5
B42R Internal Revenue	2,737	37.9
B45R Anti-Corruption Commission	2,827	37.7
B4R Pride in Political System	2,875	37.1
B3R Basic Rights	2,847	36.2
B19R Comptroller General	2,717	35.4
B38R Unions	2,763	34.9
B11R Election Court	2,869	34.6
B1R Courts	2,816	33.1
B16R Prosecutor	2,669	30.8
B14R National Government	2,896	30.5
B15R Fiscalía	2,706	30.1
B31R Supreme Court	2,846	29.0
B13R Congress	2,891	24.7
B21R Parties	2,904	21.4

**Table II. 1 System support indicators**




Figure II. 3 Support for institutions



A final point to be made about the series is to look at the scores that specific institutions receive. For example, it is very important to note here that the institution that scores right behind the Catholic Church are the armed forces, a finding, which, when coupled with the data to be presented below on support for a military coup, will prove very troubling. It is also of note that there is a relatively high regard for the mass media. Municipal government scores considerably higher than other institutions, such as the courts, the national government, the Supreme Court, Congress and parties. Indeed, these last four institutions score at the very bottom of the list, with parties scoring 21.4 compared to the army scoring 62.8.

How does Ecuador compare to other nations in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base? To answer this question we focus on the generalized measure of system support that has been used in all of the studies conducted in the region, encompassing items B1-B6.<sup>3</sup> These items form a reliable scale.<sup>4</sup> In this analysis we focus exclusively on the national sample of Ecuador to be able to compare it to the national samples of the other countries in the data base. As can be seen in Figure II. 4 below, although Ecuador scores higher than did Peru in the period before the fall of President Fujimori, it does not fare as well as a number of other countries in the region.

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<sup>3</sup> Item B5 does not exist in this series, having been deleted many years ago because of reliability problems. The series, then, consists of five items.

<sup>4</sup> The Standardized Cronbach Alpha = .73.






Figure II. 4 System Support: Ecuador in Comparative Perspective



### *Predictors of System Support*

What factors distinguish among Ecuadorians in terms of their level of system support? Using multiple regression analysis, we find that gender, age, marital status, income and wealth are not significantly related, when other variables are controlled for, and we also found that system support did not vary by the size of the location in which the interview took place. The variables that did matter are shown in Table II. 2 below. There it is shown that respondents with higher levels of education express *lower* system support, whereas those with a more positive economic outlook for the personal situation as well as the national situation, and those who are more satisfied with local government, have higher system support. It is also found that those who attend municipal meetings have higher system support. But, we also note that those who make demands on municipal government and those who participate in municipal budget formation express *lower* system support. We need to examine each of these relationships.



**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**


Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	31.840	1.681		18.942	.000
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-.470	.109	-.096	-4.315	.000
	IDIO3R Personal economic situation next year	.067	.012	.127	5.544	.000
	SOCT1R View of economic situation of the country	.115	.022	.119	5.212	.000
	SGL1R Satisfaction with municipal services	.117	.020	.129	5.756	.000
	NP1R Attended Municipal Meeting in Last Year	.039	.015	.060	2.616	.009
	NP2R Made Demand on Municipality	-.034	.012	-.066	-2.874	.004
	MUNI5R Participation in Municipal Budget Formulation	-.058	.021	-.062	-2.767	.006

a. Dependent Variable: PSA5 System support

**Table II. 2 Predictors of System Support**



Looking first at the impact of education on system support, the results are shown in Figure II. 5 below. As can be seen, as education increases, and as people know more about their political system, they like it less and less. This is a finding that is not unique to Ecuador, but has been detected in other Latin American systems with low system support. In places like Costa Rica, this relationship has not traditionally be found, although with the recent increasing alienation being expressed in that country, perhaps this will become a pattern there as well.<sup>5</sup>



**Figure II. 5 System support and education**

<sup>5</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999," *Latin America Research Review* 37, no. 1 (2002).



The performance of the Ecuadorian economy has been disappointing in recent years, and the analysis of the data shows that this has had an impact on the views of its citizens. As shown in Figure II. 6 below, over three-fifths of respondents view the economy as doing poorly.





Figure II. 6 Evaluation of nation's economy




The evaluation of the economy has a far stronger impact on system support than does education, as is shown in Figure II. 7 below. It seems clear from this evidence that there is a clear and strong linkage between the state of the economy, as experienced by Ecuador's citizens, and the degree of legitimacy accorded to the political system.



**Figure II. 7 Evaluation of the economy and system support**




A more favorable picture of the economy is given when we asked about the respondent's own situation. The results are shown in Figure II. 8 below.



**Figure II. 8 Evaluation of the respondent's economic situation**




Although the evaluations are not as bad, the impact of these evaluations on system support follow a very similar pattern to what we observed in Figure II. 8 above, as can be seen from examining Figure II. 9 below.



**Figure II. 9 Respondent's own economic situation and system support**



The remaining predictor of system support to be examined here is satisfaction with municipal services, which we already looked at in detail in the chapter on municipal government. The results are shown in Figure II. 10 below. The clear linkage between satisfaction with local level services and system support at the national level is made here. This suggests that one important way to help build the legitimacy of the political system is to strengthen local government.<sup>6</sup>




**Figure II. 10 Satisfaction with municipal services and system support**

<sup>6</sup> The causal direction of this linkage has been studied by the University of Pittsburgh for data sets from both El Salvador and Bolivia using two-stage least squares analysis. In both cases, the dominant pattern was for support to run from local to national. See, Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdoba Macías, *El Salvador: De la guerra a la paz, una cultura política en transición* (San Salvador: IDELA y FUNDANGO, 1995).




Attendance at a municipal meeting also translates into increased system support, even when controlled for the other factors in Table II. 2 above. The results are shown in Figure II. 11 below. The difference is not great, yet it is significant.



**Figure II. 11 Attendance at municipal meetings and system support**



Demand-making on municipal government is associated with lower system support, as found in the regression analysis. This relationship is shown in Figure II. 12 below. Presumably, those who make demands are the “squeaky wheels,” since they are the ones who have complaints. We did not follow up this question to determine if the respondent received a positive reply to the demand made. In Ecuador, municipal governments have very limited budgets and find it difficult to satisfy such demands. Thus, what we seem to be seeing here is that while satisfaction with municipal services is linked to national-level system support, those who make demands are the discontented. Once again, however, it should be noted that the impact, while significant is not especially strong.



**Figure II. 12 Demand-making on local government and system support**

More disturbing is the finding that participation in local budget-making is also negatively associated with system support (see regression analysis above). We should be quick to mention that only 4.6% of the respondents participated in budget-making, a proportion so small that it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions from the relationship uncovered. Overall, these findings suggest that citizens in Ecuador increase their system support based on satisfaction with services more than through participation in municipal government. This finding, then, should serve as a cautionary warning to municipal development programs that focus entirely increasing participation without first finding ways to increase citizen satisfaction with local government. Indeed, participation without demand-satisfaction might be a recipe for lowering system support.



Pent-up demands in Ecuador for a large number of unmet demands will make any effort to increase participation one that would not necessarily be rewarded with immediate citizen gratitude. Many years ago Huntington argued that increased participation without first establishing the institutional channels to absorb the participation is a recipe for protest.<sup>7</sup>

### *Political Tolerance*

System support can tell us a lot about the prospects of political stability since without support, without the belief of the population in the legitimacy of the government, the regime may fall, as it did most recently in Argentina.<sup>8</sup> But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim, indeed. Concretely, it is difficult if not impossible for those who hold minority points of view to aspire to persuade others to accept those views, if the majority will not allow them to express themselves publicly. Przeworski has argued that in democracies, majorities must agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process.”<sup>9</sup> In short, “democratization is the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In dictatorships there are no uncertainties since all elections, whenever they are called, produce certain and knowable outcomes even under the unlikely circumstances that the dictator does not receive a majority of the votes.

The challenge that social science has is to find a way to effectively measure political tolerance. This is not an easy task. Some researchers have created very general questions, such as, “do you believe in free speech?” Others have focused on specific groups and measured the degree of tolerance toward those groups. As will be noted in a moment, neither of those approaches is without serious limitations.

The political science literature on political tolerance is vast, and while it was initially concentrated on the United States the studies have now been broadened to include many democratizing countries around the world. The initial efforts to measure tolerance, looking exclusively at support for general principles of democracy, has shown not to work because it produces artificially high levels of tolerant responses.<sup>10</sup> When respondents to surveys are asked if they believe in free speech, the right of public assembly, the right to vote, overwhelming majorities state that they do so. But, when they are asked, as they were in the United States in the late 1950s, if such rights should be given to “communists,” most stated they should not be. It

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<sup>7</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>8</sup> The section of the theory of political tolerance and its link to stable democracy is drawn from earlier discussion of this topic in prior reports on other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

<sup>9</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

<sup>10</sup> James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement,” *Journal of Politics* 22, no. 2 (1960).



was realized that support for basic rights did not guarantee that the respondent would be tolerant when those rights were to be applied in concrete situation.

In order to overcome this problem, two basic approaches to the measurement of political tolerance have been used in these studies. One of these is called the “least-liked-group” approach.<sup>11</sup> In this method, respondents are given a list of groups, normally including extremist groups of the left and right, as well as other potentially unpopular groups such as homosexuals. The respondent selects the group that he/she likes the least, and then is asked a series of questions about his/her willingness to extend a variety of political rights and civil liberties to members of that group.<sup>12</sup> The primary limitation of this approach, however, is that in many countries significant portions of the respondents refuse to select any group. This occurs for many reasons, but the net result is that for those respondents, no tolerance information is obtained. For example, in a recent study of South Africa, only 59% of the respondents were willing to name a group.<sup>13</sup> In Nicaragua, a study conducted for USAID found over half of respondents failing to select a group. In both of those countries, therefore, the researcher knows nothing about the level of tolerance of those who did not give name to a least-liked group. There is another important limitation to this approach and that is since each respondent can select a different group, it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across individuals. For example, in a country like Germany, where fascist parties have been outlawed since Germany redemocratized after World War II, it would be difficult to compare intolerance responses to those who selected the Nazi Party with those who selected a feminist organization. That is, we would tend to accept a high level of intolerance for the civil liberties of a banned political group, than for a reformist, legally recognized social organization. A final complication with this methodology is that it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across countries since the groups that are salient in one country would likely be different in another. For example, asking about tolerating members of the Sandinista Party would make considerable sense in Nicaragua, but make no sense in Ecuador. It is difficult to find groups that have the equivalent “resonance” in each country.

The other main method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance towards communism.<sup>14</sup> This approach worked well, so long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lowered levels of intolerance toward communists were an indication of a general decline of intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. That is the

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<sup>11</sup> John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982).

<sup>12</sup>For an application of this methodology to minorities in Israel and Costa Rica see: Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict,” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Toward and Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica,” *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew),” *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53.


<sup>13</sup>J. L. Gibson and A. Gouws, “Social identities and political intolerance: Linkages within the South African mass public,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2 (2000).

<sup>14</sup>Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).



approach developed over many years by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.<sup>15</sup> The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:

*The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Ecuador. This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot.*



D1. There are people who only say bad things about the form of the governments of Ecuador, not only the current government, but the form of the Ecuadorian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people be allowed to run for public office?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of those people appearing on television to make a speech?

This methodology seems to be the best compromise because it does not exclude those who do not select a “least-liked” group, while it also does not tie the response to a specific group (e.g., “communists”), that would have different salience in different countries. Its disadvantage is that it focuses on those who “only say bad things about the Ecuadorian form of government.” Those people who wish to see that form changed might be more tolerant toward critics of the system

<sup>15</sup>While this discussion has emphasized the difficulties in measuring tolerance, in practical terms, other than the serious exclusion of large numbers of respondents produced by the “least-liked approach,” it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, “Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be ‘Least-Liked?’,” *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.



than they would be toward other forms of protest. But, as noted, no battery of items can overcome all limitations. In addition, we do have other measures of tolerance in the survey (see items NEWTOL4 and NEWTOL5), although those items will not be analyzed in the current study. The interested reader should consult the data base.

The results for the national sample are shown in Figure II. 13 below. On the 0-100 scale basis, only the mean of the right protest falls into the positive end of the continuum. This means that the rights of critics of the political system to vote, exercise free speech and run for office are more likely to be rejected than supported.




Figure II. 13 Political tolerance in Ecuador: Support for the right to...



We can make more sense of these scores if we place them in comparative perspective. That is easiest to do by forming an overall index of the four items, and calibrating them in the familiar 0-100 format used throughout this study. The results, showing the averages for several countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project are shown in Figure II. 14 below. As can be seen, Ecuador's level of tolerance is not as low as that found in Bolivia, but lower than the other countries in the data base.




Figure II. 14 Political tolerance: Ecuador in comparative perspective



These findings do not augur well for the future of democracy in Ecuador because they suggest a high level of intolerance toward basic rights. If Ecuadorians are not willing to tolerate basic civil liberties, such as the right to vote and run for office, then it is difficult to see how responsible opposition groups can expect to have a reasonable chance of having an influence on politics.

What factors are there that make some Ecuadorians more tolerant than others? Learning the answer to this question should help those who wish to promote tolerance as a task of social engineering. The findings of the multiple regression analysis are that demographic factors such as gender and age make no difference (when controlled for the other variables in the equation), nor does income or wealth. The major impacts on tolerance are education and location. The results are shown in Table II. 3 below.

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	38.053	1.599		23.803	.000
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.408	.114	.067	3.576	.000
	ESTRATO Region	1.697	.377	.084	4.502	.000

a. Dependent Variable: TOL Tolerance

**Table II. 3 Predictors of tolerance**



The impact of region on tolerance emerges clearly, as shown in Figure II. 15 below. The sierra, both urban and rural areas, emerge as more tolerant than the other regions of the country.




Figure II. 15 Tolerance: by region



The impact of education is noted among university educated respondents, as is shown in Figure II. 16 below. This is a common finding, suggesting that only when students get to university level studies do they learn to empathize with the rights of others.




Figure II. 16 Tolerance and education



## *Support for Stable Democracy*

We have now examined the two variables, system support and tolerance, that together form our overall measure of support for stable democracy. It is now time to combine these two to be able to determine the proportion of the population that expresses attitudes conducive to stable democracy and those who do not. The theory with which we are working is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy.

In prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh project, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.<sup>11</sup> The framework shown in Table II. 4 below represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.<sup>12</sup>

**Table II. 4** Theoretical relationship between tolerance and system support  
in institutionally democratic polities

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the

<sup>11</sup>This framework was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29.

<sup>12</sup>The scale ranges from 0-100, so the most natural cut-point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.



eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.<sup>16</sup>

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

<sup>17</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO y



### ***Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Ecuador***

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. First, it should be noted that system support and tolerance are positively associated with each other in Ecuador ( $r = .11$ , sig.  $< .001$ ). This means that those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into "high" and "low."<sup>18</sup> The overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way, and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low.

The results for the Ecuador 2001 survey is shown in Table II. 5 below. As can be seen, only a little more than one-in-ten Ecuadorians are both supportive of their political system and express political tolerance. On the other hand, the largest cell by far is the democratic breakdown cell, in which nearly one half of all Ecuadorians fall. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Finally, between about a fifth and a quarter of Ecuadorians fall into the "unstable democracy" or "authoritarian stability" cells.

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Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. Also appears as "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua," Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.

<sup>18</sup> If the variables were left in their original 0-100 format, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making it impossible to read and interpret.



	Tolerance	
System support	High	Low
High	<b>Stable Democracy</b> 13%	<b>Authoritarian Stability</b> 15%
Low	<b>Unstable Democracy</b> 26%	<b>Democratic Breakdown</b> 45%

Percentages do not total 100% because of rounding.

**Table II. 5 Empirical relationship between tolerance and system support in Ecuador**

How do the Ecuadorian results compare with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base?<sup>19</sup> Not well, as is shown in Figure II. 17 below. As can be seen, Ecuador is among the countries that cluster at the low end of the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but only a little more than one fourth the level of support for stable democracy found in Costa Rica.

<sup>19</sup>In order to create this chart, a new variable, called "bar2x2" was created in the data base. It eliminates cases in which missing data are found on either the tolerance or the system support measure. The coding was:

if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1)democ = 100.

if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.

if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.

if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 1)democ = 0.






Figure II. 17 Support for democracy: Ecuador in comparative perspective



What factors distinguish between those who are characterized as being in the “stable democracy” cell of the analysis versus the other respondents in the survey? To answer this question we first need to use logistic regression, since the dependent variable is a dichotomy (i.e., stable democracy or not-stable democracy). The results of the regression are shown in Table II. 6 below. As can be seen, the following variables are significant: education, the stratum of the sample, the item “SOCT1R,” which is the respondent’s evaluation of the state of the economy and “IDIO2R,” which is the respondents evaluation of his/her own economic situation compared to the year before the survey.


**Table II. 6 Predictors of stable democracy in Ecuador**

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 <sup>a</sup>	ED	-.026	.013	3.668	1	.055	.975
	ESTRATO	.096	.043	4.951	1	.026	1.101
	SOCT1R	.006	.003	5.441	1	.020	1.006
	IDIO2R	.006	.002	15.281	1	.000	1.006
	Constant	-2.309	.210	120.930	1	.000	.099

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: ED, ESTRATO, SOCT1R, IDIO2R.



The impact of education on support for stable democracy is the lowest in the group, with the results shown in Figure II. 18 below. Among those with university-level education, about 11.5% of the respondents have those values of high system support and high tolerance, whereas among those with primary education this percentage rises to over 14%. Since education is associated with higher tolerance, the main factor influencing this relationship is the lower level of system support among the more highly educated.



**Figure II. 18** The impact of education on values supporting stable democracy



Region makes a difference in support, even when education and other variables are controlled. The results are shown in Figure II. 19 below. The major difference, is in the northern region of the oriente area, where democracy is more strongly supported than in other regions. It is not clear why this should be so.




Figure II. 19 The impact of religion and values on supporting stable democracy



It is important to note that urbanization is not a factor in support for democracy, as is shown in Figure II. 20 below. For example, we see much higher support for democracy in Quito than in Guayaquil, but also high support in small towns and rural areas.





Figure II. 20 The impact of urbanization on values supportive of democracy



Finally, once again the economy matters. As shown in Figure II. 21 below, among those who believe that their personal economic situation was better at the time of the interview than one year earlier, are far more likely to have the values supportive of stable democracy than the other respondents in the survey.



**Figure II. 21 The impact of personal economic situation and values supporting stable democracy**

## *Conclusions*

This chapter has examined key variables for democratic stability: system support and tolerance. It has shown that in both cases there is reason to be concerned. Average levels of support for the Ecuadorian system of government are low, and tolerance for basic civil liberties is also low. In combination, these two values can help predict the future of democratic stability, but we find that in relative terms, Ecuador has low levels of these values.



### CHAPTER III. ANTI-DEMOCRATIC VALUES

In the previous chapter we examined the combination of values, system support and tolerance, that we have argued can provide a firm basis for stable democracy. We found that, at least in 2001, for most of the population of Ecuador that basis is lacking, as only a small minority of respondents have both high system support and high levels of tolerance. What are the implications for those findings? Do they make the country more vulnerable to backsliding, democratic erosion and increase the chances of a return to authoritarian rule?

No survey can predict the future of a nation's political system since many factors beyond public opinion influence politics. Among the most important factors are the condition of the economy, the nature of the distribution of income and international factors, such as the level of external support for democracy. When the economy is strong and key foreign actors strongly oppose a return to authoritarian rule, democracy would seem to be safe. But, as Przeworski and his colleagues have shown,<sup>1</sup> the survival of democracy depends heavily upon the economic growth and, to a lesser extent, on progress toward income equality. As they report (p. 109), "Democracies appear to be more sensitive [than dictatorships] to growth performance. When they face a decline in income, they die at the rate of 0.0512, so that about one in twenty of them dies, but when incomes are growing, they die at the rate of 0.0152, one in sixty-six." Przeworski *et. al.* (p. 98) have also found that when countries become rich, with PPP GNP (1985 dollars) of over \$6,055 they never break down. Ecuador, with a PPP GNP of \$2,605 in 1999 is among the poorer countries in the world and therefore is far from immune from democratic breakdown. Przeworski *et. al.* (p. 120) also report that "democracy is more stable in more egalitarian societies." Ecuador, however, has anything but an egalitarian distribution of income.<sup>2</sup> Thus, what Ecuador can rely upon for democratic stability is neither economic growth nor relative income equality, and for that reason, the political culture of its citizens becomes especially important. That, coupled with strong international support for continued democracy, may be *the* vital elements for democratic survival in Ecuador.

What, then, do we find when we look at Ecuadorian views toward a return to military rule? We have already seen in the preceding chapter that the military is the most highly regarded political institution in the country. This by itself does not mean that Ecuadorians would want to see the military back in power. But, in light of these findings it would seem especially appropriate to examine support for anti-democratic measures such as a coup d'état. Fortunately, the survey contains a number of items to allow us to gauge support for a return of the military.

Perhaps the most important series of items tapping into support for anti-democratic measures is the one that asks respondents directly about various conditions that might justify a coup, including high unemployment, a lot of social protest, a victor of the extreme left or the

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael E. Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> Luis Jacome Hidalgo, Carlos Larrera, and Rob Vos, "Políticas macroeconómicas, distribución y pobreza en el Ecuador," in *Política macroeconómica y pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe*, ed. Enrique Ganuza, Lance Taylor, and Samuel Morley (Madrid: United Nations Development Programme, 1998).

extreme right in elections, a lot of crime, a lot of social disorder, high inflation and a great deal of corruption. These items do not directly measure the extent to which Ecuadorians might actively support a coup, but rather attempt to get at underlying justifications for one. Moreover, those who respond to the questions in a way that would indicate that they would justify a coup, are not necessarily individuals who would favor dictatorial rule. What the responses to these items do show is a willingness to accept a military solution to serious national problems. The series of questions is as follows:

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC7.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC8.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC11.</b> Frente a mucho desorden social	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS

The results are shown in Figure III. 1 below. Majorities of the Ecuadorian population would justify a coup under conditions of high levels of inflation, considerable social disorder, and high levels of corruption and crime. It is of course disturbing to recognize that these have been the very same conditions under which Ecuador has been living for the past several years. There would be far less support for a military take-over when parties of the extreme left or right are elected to office. It is particularly noteworthy that high unemployment, which has been a persistent problem in Ecuador, would motivate 45% of the population to justify a military take-over.







Figure III. 1 Conditions that would justify a coup



It is important to reiterate these findings on justification for a military take-over do not imply that a coup is imminent. Not at all. Moreover, scandals related to the military that occurred after the November 2001 survey on which this study is based, may have weakened support for a military coup. Yet, they do suggest, in combination with the high levels of confidence for the military shown in the previous chapter, that the military could well have *cart blanc* from broad sectors of the Ecuadorian public should it decide to terminate democracy. These are disturbing conclusions, but when placed within comparative perspective, become even more so. The data set from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project with the most directly comparable series is that of a national sample of El Salvador carried out in 1999 with some 3,000 respondents.<sup>3</sup> The results are shown in Figure III. 2 below. There it is seen that Ecuadorians are much more likely to be willing to justify a coup than Salvadorans. It is also of note that we asked the coup justification question under conditions of high unemployment, in Nicaragua, Paraguay and Bolivia in 1998. In those countries, 25%, 27% and 29%, respectively, of the respondents justified a coup, compared to 45% of Ecuadorians. We may conclude, therefore, that in both absolute and relative terms, public support for military solutions to public problems is very high in Ecuador.



**Figure III. 2 Justification for a coup: Ecuador vs. El Salvador**

<sup>3</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Auditoria de la Democracia: El Salvador, 1999* (San Salvador, El Salvador: IUDOP, FundaUngo and the University of Pittsburgh, 2000).



There is further evidence in the survey that there is an unfortunately high preference for military rule. We asked our respondents the following question:

**DEM8.** ¿Cree UD. que los militares deben estar subordinados al poder civil?  
¿o el poder civil debe estar subordinado a los militares?

The results are shown in Figure III. 3 below. Only a little less than half of the respondents believe that the military should be subordinated to civilian rule. A surprisingly larger proportion did not give an opinion on this matter, which would seem to be a clear-cut definition of democracy versus dictatorship.




Figure III. 3 Who should be subordinate?



Moreover, there is a significant association between support for military rule and those who would justify a coup (as described above). As can be seen in Figure III. 4 below, those who believe that the military should be subordinate to civilian rule are much less likely to support a coup than those who believe that the civilians should be subordinate to the military. Even so, under conditions of high crime and high corruption, there is strong support for a coup irrespective of views on civilian supremacy.




Figure III. 4 Justification for a coup: Preference for military/civilian supremacy



Finally, we asked a series of questions on support for conventional and aggressive political participation (questions E5-E3 in appendix).

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que UD. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que UD. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza UD. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>					<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>					(88)

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas.
E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.

The results, shown in Figure III. 5 below, at first blush do not seem surprising; there is far more support for conventional political participation, such as participating in a group that is trying to resolve community problems or participating in a group that works for a political party, than there is for violent forms of political participation. What is notable, however, is that there is considerably more support for overthrowing an elected government by violent means than there is for some other common forms of protest, such as property invasions or taking over buildings.






Figure III. 5 Approval of conventional and aggressive political participation

### *Predictors of Anti-Democratic Values*

What factors cause some Ecuadorians to justify a military take-over? To do this we form a scale of justification for coups as the eight items in the series all form one factor<sup>4</sup> and the reliability of the items is high (Standardized item Alpha = .86). The overall scale average 52.5 on the 0-100 basis. This means that for the entire series of questions, 52.5% of the respondents, on average, would justify a military take-over. We know that 95% of the time this figure varies by only about  $\pm 1.8\%$  from the results that we would have obtained by interviewing all voting aged adults in Ecuador (minus Galapagos), so it is reasonable to state that at a minimum, over half of the population in the country could justify a military take-over under the various circumstances described by the questions in the survey (e.g., high crime, high corruption, etc.). The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table III. 1 below. The results are very interesting as they show a set of factors that distinguish those who would justify a military take-over from those who would not.

<sup>4</sup> A principle components analysis produces one clear factor with an eigenvalue over 4.0 and a second factor with an eigenvalue just over 1.0. The loadings on this second factor are distributed, however, and do not give us a clear second-factor interpretation.




<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	67.986	4.487		15.153	.000
Q1 Gender	3.301	1.382	.047	2.388	.017
Q2 How many years old are you?	-.152	.057	-.065	-2.673	.008
MARRIED Marital Status	3.003	1.566	.040	1.917	.055
Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.923	.425	.056	2.168	.030
Q10 Into which of the following ranges does your family income	-1.271	.382	-.078	-3.325	.001
WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	-.173	.332	-.012	-.521	.602
ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	-1.029	.198	-.123	-5.191	.000
ESTRATO Region	-1.119	.546	-.041	-2.051	.040
PROTEST Protestant	-.060	2.736	.000	-.022	.982
CATHNPRA Non-practicing Catholic	4.866	1.509	.065	3.225	.001

a. Dependent Variable: COUPS Index of justification of a coup d'etat

**Table III. 1 Predictors of Justification for a coup**




Let us review these findings. We first see that gender makes a difference, with women being more willing to justify coups than men, even when all other variables in the equation are controlled for. The results comparing men vs. women without controlling for other factors are shown in Figure III. 6 below.



**Figure III. 6 Justify a military takeover: by gender**



Age also has an impact on justifying a military take-over, but upon inspection it was determined that there is no regular pattern, and the relationship, when controlled for other factors was not strong. Similarly, marital status has an impact, but it is not significant. There is also a weak relationship between the number of children an individual has and support for a coup. Those with larger families are more supportive, but again, the relationship is weak. When we look at income and wealth, we see that they both have the same relationship to coups, with those who are poorer giving far stronger support for them, but the inclusion of both variables in the equation, which are measuring similar concepts, leaves income alone as the significant predictor. The results for monthly family income and justification for a military take-over are shown in Figure III. 7 below. The wealthiest respondents, as a group, express far lower support for this anti-democratic action. Wealth and higher incomes often go together, but the regression analysis demonstrates the independent impact of each in the analysis.



**Figure III. 7 Justification for a military takeover: by income**

An even stronger prophylaxis against justifying a coup than income is education. The results shown in Figure III. 8 below reveal that among those with primary education, close to 60% of men and women in Ecuador would justify a coup, with the gender difference being small. Among university educated males, however, this proportion drops to about 40%. It is of note that female support also drops among the university-educated, but not nearly as sharply as it does for males. Thus, these results show that the high level of justification of a military take-over



among females persists even when the impact of education is taken into account. Another way of looking at these results is to puzzle over the still high level of support for military rule among university Ecuadorians. One would think that a university education would help immunize citizens against this anti-democratic value, but it does not do so for two-fifths of that population in Ecuador.




Figure III. 8 Justification for a military takeover: by education and gender



The regression analysis also revealed that region plays a role, although a weak one, in explaining justification for a military take-over. The results are shown in Figure III. 9 below. As can be seen, the level of justification is nearly identical in all regions of the country except the south oriente, where it is much lower. Perhaps there are important historical reasons why this is so in that part of the country.





Figure III. 9 Justification of a military takeover: by region



The final variable that has a significant impact on justification of a military take-over is religion. To test this connection a series of two “dummy variables” was created from question Q3 (see appendix at end of study). Since 53% of the respondents stated that they were “practicing Catholics” this category was used as the base line. Non-practicing Catholics (33% of the sample) and protestants (including Jehovah’s Witness affiliates) comprise the other large group (7%). The remaining groups were left uncategorized. The results show that protestants are no more likely to justify a military coup than practicing Catholics, whereas the non-practicing Catholics were significantly more likely to justify it. The results for all of the religious groupings in the study are shown in Figure III. 10 below. The “other” category contains only .5% of the sample. Overall, the impact of religion, while significant, is very small compared to, for example, education.



**Figure III. 10 Justification for military take over and religion**

### *Political Factors in Support of a Coup*

Thus far in the analysis, no political factors have been considered with respect to justification for a military take-over. Perhaps the major influence on support for the notion of a coup is trust in the military as an institution. These results are shown in Figure III. 11 below. The higher the trust in the armed forces, the higher the support for a coup. This finding, while entirely expected, demonstrates the coherence and consistency of the data set as a whole. It



means that respondents are listening to the questions that they are being asked and responding substantively.




Figure III. 11 Justification for a military takeover and trust in the armed forces

Less obviously linked to justifying a coup is ideology. One could suppose that those on the political right might be more supportive of a coup. When ideology, measured on a left-right scale is inserted into the equation, it proves to be significant. Ideology was measured in the survey with the following question:

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría UD. en esta escala? Ponga una X en la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1 NS=88
Izquierda									Derecha	

The results of the analysis are shown in Figure III. 12 below. In this chart, the impact of education and income have been removed.<sup>5</sup> The results show two things. First, those on the

<sup>5</sup> This was done through an analysis of covariance, with education and income introduced as covariates.




political right are more likely to justify a military take-over. Second, those on the extreme left are also more likely to do so. This finding may be surprising, but it also conforms to the notion that the extreme left may be attracted to authoritarian solutions.



**Figure III. 12 Justification of a military take-over: by ideology**



Perhaps the most talked-about political variable in recent years has been Putnam's "social capital," which focuses on the role of interpersonal trust as a key factor in building democracy.<sup>6</sup> According to this view, not accepted by all those who have studied the subject,<sup>7</sup> high levels of interpersonal trust are vital for the survival and growth of democratic regimes. As can be seen in Figure III. 13 below, trust is closely related to support for a military take-over, with those who express lower trust also having higher support for a take-over.



**Figure III. 13** The impact of interpersonal trust on justification for a military take-over

<sup>6</sup> Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*; Sidney Tarrow, "Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Rober Putnam's 'Making Democracy Work'," *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996).

<sup>7</sup> Amber L. Seligson, "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis," *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999).




Finally, there is some evidence linking political tolerance to justification for a coup. Respondents who believe that the government should prohibit meetings or censor various expressions of public opinion are more likely to justify a coup (see the questionnaire series D32-D37). For example, the following question was asked:

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta B. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

**D33.** ¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político ecuatoriano? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba esta prohibición?

The results are shown in Figure III. 14 below. Although the relationship is not entirely linear, the clear tendency for those who express greater intolerance to express higher justification for a coup is evident.



**Figure III. 14** Impact of political tolerance on justification for a coup

### *Conclusions*

This chapter has demonstrated that a strong majority of Ecuadorians can justify a military take-over. It has also shown that those with lower levels of education and income are more likely to justify such an action and that females are more supportive of a military take-over than are males. It has also shown that ideology, interpersonal trust and tolerance are important factors



in explaining this high level of justification for a military take-over. It needs to be stressed again that this chapter is *not* arguing that a military coup is imminent or even likely in the foreseeable future. Rather, it does suggest that in theory at least conditions of high levels of crime and corruption are those that justify, in the minds of most Ecuadorians, a military take-over. Those who cherish democracy will want to see those views changed, and a healthy public debate on the subject is perhaps the best way to effectuate such changes.

### ***Appendix: The Latin Barometer Item on Democracy***

Before closing this section on anti-democratic values, it is important to refer to a survey question that in recent years has been used by a number of prominent surveys, among them the Latinbarometer. The item reads as follows:

**DEM2.** Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:


- (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático
- (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.
- (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático

The Latinbarometer has reported on this item for 17 countries in Latin America, including Ecuador. In *The Economist* of July 26, 2001, the results are presented, showing Ecuador with 40% of the respondents selecting the pro-democracy response (choice # 2 above).<sup>8</sup> This placed Ecuador above Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Panama but lower than the other countries in their sample. Costa Rica scored the highest at 71%. The results obtained by the University of Pittsburgh study are shown in Figure III. 15 below. The 60% preference for democracy, when compared to the other countries in the 2001 Latinbarometer results would rank Ecuador below Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay, and marginally above Argentina, Honduras and Venezuela, with the other countries falling much lower.

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<sup>8</sup> The percentages reported are 40% out of all persons in their sample, including those who did not respond to this question.





**Figure III. 15 Preference for regime type**

Unfortunately, it is difficult to know what to make of these results for two reasons: 1) We have doubts about the validity of the question; and 2) we have doubts about the comparability of the samples. Regarding question validity, despite its wide use, the question reported on above has significant limitations as we do not know what the respondent means by “democracy.” In the Ecuador survey, we included an item that asks respondents to define what they mean by democracy, but since those definitions vary from person-to-person and from nation-to-nation, it is difficult to make comparisons and to draw conclusions. In one recent study published by Seligson, comparing Costa Rica, Chile and Mexico, it was found that definitions of democracy were dramatically different, with nearly all respondents in the Costa Rica survey focusing on freedom, whereas those in Chile and Mexico were more likely to define it in terms of economic liberalism.<sup>9</sup> The University of Pittsburgh series of questions has normally avoided this term, preferring instead to ask about the values that underlie support for democracy or dictatorship. Democracy has become such a socially approved term, while authoritarianism carries with it such negative connotations, many respondents may be inhibited from stating their true feelings on this question. But, because of its widespread use, we have included it here.

The Ecuador survey did attempt to determine what it is that Ecuadorians mean when they refer to democracy. We asked the question (DEM13), “In a few words, what does democracy mean to you?” This was an open-ended question, so respondents were free to answer any way

<sup>9</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rican Exceptionalism: Why the 'Ticos' Are Different," in *Citizen Views of Latin America*, ed. Rodieric Ai Camp, 90-106 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).



they wished. The results are shown in Figure III. 16 below. As can be seen, most Ecuadorians define democracy in terms of freedom, equality and the right to choose their leaders. Only a minority of the respondents provided an economic definition of democracy. These are encouraging findings suggesting Ecuadorian values more in line with those of Costa Rica than those found in Chile or Mexico.




Figure III. 16 What does democracy mean?



The second major problem with the Latinbarometer results is that the samples differ markedly from country-to-country.<sup>10</sup> Some are entirely urban and others are claimed to be national in scope, but there is good reason to doubt the veracity of that claim.<sup>11</sup> Some results vary so dramatically from year-to-year, that there are other reasons to question the quality of the surveys.<sup>12</sup> The study in Ecuador was carried out by “Informe Confidencial” and it is stated that the sample of 1,200 covers 96.5% of the population. The date of the Ecuador study was April 21-22, 2001. It is difficult to know what accounts for the wide variation between the CEDATOS sample and the Informe Confidencial sample. Our sample is of course much larger, and by definition that should make it far more accurate.

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<sup>10</sup> Technical details are found at: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/ano2001/ficha-tecnica2001.doc>.

<sup>11</sup> For example it is claimed that the sample in Guatemala covers 100% of the population, yet the questionnaire used there was not translated into any of the major indigenous languages spoken there.

<sup>12</sup> For example, in 2000 62% of Panamanians preferred democracy whereas in 2001 only 34% did. In El Salvador in 2000 the result was 63% but in 2001 it had declined to 25%, the lowest of any country.



## CHAPTER IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY

Throughout Latin America governments have been attempting to decentralize in order to achieve two objectives. First, there is the widespread belief that local government is efficient government. Large, distant and impersonal central governments are increasingly seen as highly inefficient, being unable to respond to variations in local needs and demands and also more likely to be immune to citizen control and accountability. Second, local governments, by placing control in the hands of the people, may help build democracy from the ground up. The implicit model, of course, is democracy in the United States, which DeToqueville argued was strong in part because of the widespread proliferation of many local units. The downside, of course, is that local governments may prevent effective implementation of national policies. One only need think of the extreme difficulties Argentina has had in recent years in exercising national fiscal control over provincial governments to recognize that macro-economic policy-making can become complicated when local governments are strong.

Many governments in the region have recently implemented political reforms designed to transfer greater power to subnational levels of government and provide a more substantial policymaking and oversight role to citizens at the local level.<sup>1</sup> Advocates of decentralization argue that it holds a great potential to stimulate the growth of civil society organizations . . . ; prevent widespread disillusionment with new policies from turning into a rejection of the entire democratic process . . . ; [and] boost legitimacy by making government more responsive to citizen needs (Diamond 1999, 124-25). Implicit in this proposition is that local institutions, if made relevant to the daily lives of citizens, will have a positive effect on how those citizens view their larger political system.

For most of its history, Ecuador has been a highly centralized country. Ecuador's local governments have been and continue to be highly dependent upon central government transfers, with little capacity to generate their own revenue. Moreover, even though recent law has raised the allocation of national revenues to local governments 15%, given the precarious state of the national economy, it would be wrong to assume that this will, in the short run, imply a significant expansion of local government revenues. According to ARD<sup>2</sup>, which has been contracted by USAID to help strengthen local government in Ecuador:

In few countries in Latin America has there occurred such an aggressive and widespread expression of intent to employ a decentralized system of local governance for democratic purposes, as in Ecuador. However, because of the

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<sup>1</sup> This paragraph is drawn from Jon Hiskey and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support: A Study of Bolivia."

<sup>2</sup> ARD, *USAID/Ecuador: Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Project (DDLGP)* (Burlington, Vermont, 2001).

absence of a cohesive framework for progressive, step-wise decentralization and the presence of myriad interpretations of what decentralization actually means, there exists a mélange of conflicting, redundant, and confusing policy reforms and administrative orders working at cross-purpose.<sup>3</sup>

The government of Ecuador is committed to increasing decentralization. As stated by CONAM (Consejo Nacional de Modernización),

The Political Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador mandates that the public administration shall be organized and developed in a decentralized and dissipated manner and that the Central Government shall progressively transfer its functions, attributions, competitions, responsibilities, and resources to autonomous, independent organizations or to other regional organizations. The Constitution further states that the management of the Central Government will be dispersed in such a way as to delegate its attributions to officials of decentralized dependent bodies.

It is these principles which define the actions of the National Commission for Decentralization, Autonomies and Territorial Circumscriptions, and of the National Council for the Modernization of the State (CONAM), as well as those of the Technical Secretariat. Moreover, it is these principles which have laid the groundwork for a series of actions and proposals which will lead to the adoption of a new management model for Ecuador. (<http://www.conam.gov.ec>)

The focus of this decentralization effort, however, is at the provincial level rather than at the municipal.

The Ecuador democracy survey carried out in 2001 by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project contains a large battery of items allowing us to measure attitudes toward and participation in local government. The reader should consult the questionnaire, beginning with questions NP1 and ending with question MUNI15 to see the entire series. Not all of the items will be examined in this report, but are, of course, available for analysis in the full data base, and can be compared with future studies, or studies carried out in specific regions or municipalities in Ecuador. The data base presented here presents a true picture at the national level.

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, the new decentralization law does not adequately elaborate certain fundamental requisites normally required for effective decentralization. Absent are clear assignment of roles, responsibilities, and expenditure authorities among levels of government, yet policies exist that presume certain roles at a given level. Fiscal considerations (e.g., standards for budget planning, accounting, monitoring, reporting, and controls) are also absent, yet administrative procedures are pursued without reference to any legally binding and agreed-on standard.



## *Citizen Views of Municipal Problems*

We asked our respondents to tell us what is the most serious current problem faced by their municipal government. The results are shown in Table IV. 1 below. Note that in this (and other) tables, the “valid percent” column refers to those who answered the question, whereas the column labeled “percent” includes all people in the survey, including those who did not answer the particular question asked. As can be seen, there is no consensus, with Ecuadorians listing a wide variety of problems. The most frequently-mentioned problem is poor administration, almost as frequently respondents mentioned problems of road maintenance, lack of security, lack of services and lack of water. Some respondents, about 9%, blame the municipality for the economic situation, but it is interesting that this percentage is so low, suggesting that even though the country does have serious economic problems, most citizens do not see that as one that is within the realm of local government. Evidence of that is that in another question in the survey (A4), economic problems top the list, as is shown in Table IV. 2 below. Over two-thirds of the respondents note that economic problems, poverty and unemployment, are the most important national problems. This is an important finding since it shows that citizens understand quite clearly who is responsible for the national state of the economy and who is responsible for problems at the local level.

**Table IV. 1 What is biggest problem in municipality**

**MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Bad administration	372	12.7	15.0	15.0
	Road maintenance	356	12.2	14.4	29.4
	Lack of security, delinquency	333	11.4	13.4	42.8
	Lack of services	279	9.5	11.2	54.0
	Lack of water	269	9.2	10.9	64.9
	The economic situation	260	8.9	10.5	75.3
	Lack of funds, help	246	8.4	9.9	85.3
	None	126	4.3	5.1	90.3
	Clean up of public places	95	3.2	3.8	94.1
	Lack of environmental care	46	1.6	1.8	96.0
	Others	43	1.5	1.7	97.7
	Corruption	32	1.1	1.3	99.0
	High taxes	13	.5	.5	99.6
	Abuse of authority of Mayor	7	.2	.3	99.8
	Lack of machinery and equipme	4	.1	.2	100.0
Total	2482	84.9	100.0		
Missing	Don't know/No response	441	15.1		
Total		2923	100.0		



**Table IV. 2 Most serious problem faced by the country****A4 In your opinion, What is the most severe problem being faced by your country?**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Economic problems	1268	43.4	44.0	44.0
	Poverty	377	12.9	13.1	57.1
	Unemployment	350	12.0	12.1	69.2
	Corruption	332	11.4	11.5	80.7
	Delinquency, crime, violenc	139	4.7	4.8	85.5
	Bad government	122	4.2	4.2	89.8
	Inflation, high prices	107	3.6	3.7	93.5
	War against terrorism	61	2.1	2.1	95.6
	Dollarization	27	.9	.9	96.5
	Migration	16	.6	.6	97.1
	Popular protests	14	.5	.5	97.5
	Others	14	.5	.5	98.0
	Drug trafficking	12	.4	.4	98.4
	Lack of land to cultivate	9	.3	.3	98.8
	Gangs, problematic youths	8	.3	.3	99.0
	Environmental problems	7	.3	.3	99.3
	Lack of credit	5	.2	.2	99.4
	Drugs	4	.2	.2	99.6
	Lack of justice	4	.1	.1	99.7
	Lack of education	2	.1	.1	99.8
	Closure of banks	2	.1	.1	99.9
	External Debt	1	.0	.0	99.9
	Foreign Commerce	1	.0	.0	100.0
	Lack of energy sources	1	.0	.0	100.0
	Total	2883	98.6	100.0	
Missing	Don't know	40	1.4		
<b>Total</b>		<b>2923</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Since the focus of this chapter is on local government, the analysis of perceived problems will concentrate on local-level problems. In that context, it is important to examine the differences, if any, by region. Recall that the sample is divided into three main strata: the coast, the sierra and the oriente, with the first two being divided into urban and rural and the third being divided into Northern and Southern regions. The results presented in Table IV. 3 below show some variation from one region to the other. Road maintenance is a major problem in all regions of the country, but seems to be far more serious in the Rural Sierra region than anywhere else. In contrast, problems with security and crime are common in the urban areas, but far less of a problem in rural areas. It is also of note that poor administration of the municipality is most



commonly noted among those in the urban sierra. In no region of the country are issues of local corruption, the environment, or taxes seen as the major municipal problem. This does not mean that Ecuadorians are not concerned about those problems (at the national level, for example, corruption was a frequently mentioned problem) but only that respondents did not see these problems as the most serious at the level of local government.

**Table IV. 3 Most serious problem faced by the municipality: by region**

**MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality? \* ESTRATO Region Crosstabulation**

% within ESTRATO Region

		ESTRATO Region						Total
		Urban Coast	Rural Coast	Urban Sierra	Rural Sierra	North Oriente	South Oriente	
MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	None	7.1%	6.0%	4.5%	.3%	4.8%	2.1%	5.1%
	Lack of water	10.5%	14.9%	7.2%	17.8%	11.9%	10.6%	10.8%
	Road maintenance	14.0%	13.7%	13.1%	20.2%	7.1%	10.6%	14.3%
	Lack of security, delinquency	12.0%	8.1%	20.8%	5.5%	4.8%	2.1%	13.4%
	Clean up of public places	7.1%	2.0%	2.1%	.3%		2.1%	3.8%
	Lack of services	12.5%	14.1%	7.4%	14.7%	11.9%	10.6%	11.2%
	The economic situation	11.2%	8.1%	8.6%	11.7%	19.0%	23.4%	10.5%
	Lack of funds, help	8.0%	18.1%	8.9%	9.8%	16.7%	19.1%	9.9%
	Bad administration	11.3%	12.1%	21.1%	13.5%	14.3%	12.8%	15.0%
	Lack of environmental care	1.4%	1.6%	2.4%	1.8%	2.4%	4.3%	1.9%
	Corruption	1.8%		.6%	2.8%	2.4%		1.3%
	Lack of machinery and equipme	.1%	.4%		.3%	2.4%		.2%
	High taxes	.7%		.7%				.5%
	Abuse of authority of Mayor	.4%		.1%	.3%			.2%
	Others	1.7%	.8%	2.4%	.9%	2.4%	2.1%	1.8%
<b>Total</b>		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

We can also examine these differences by looking at the nation as a whole and subdividing it by the level of urbanization. That result is found in Table IV. 4 below. The table reveals that there are only two major differences between urban and rural Ecuador in terms of perceived municipal problems: in urban areas there is far more concern with crime, while in rural areas there is far greater concern with water supply.



**Table IV. 4 Most serious problem faced by the municipality: urban vs. rural**


**MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality? \* AREA Area Crosstabulation**

% within AREA Area

		AREA Area		
		Urban	Rural	Total
MUNI2 In your opinion, what is the biggest problem of your municipality?	None	5.9%	2.7%	5.1%
	Lack of water	9.1%	16.1%	10.9%
	Road maintenance	13.5%	16.7%	14.4%
	Lack of security, delinquency	15.8%	6.4%	13.4%
	Clean up of public places	4.7%	1.0%	3.8%
	Lack of services	10.3%	14.2%	11.3%
	The economic situation	10.1%	11.5%	10.4%
	Lack of funds, help	8.6%	14.0%	10.0%
	Bad administration	15.7%	12.9%	15.0%
	Lack of environmental care	1.9%	1.8%	1.9%
	Corruption	1.2%	1.4%	1.3%
	Lack of machinery and equipme	.1%	.3%	.2%
	High taxes	.7%		.5%
	Abuse of authority of Mayor	.3%	.2%	.3%
	Others	2.1%	.8%	1.7%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

The impact of urbanization on concern over crime is clearly shown in Figure IV. 1 below. In that chart, the sample is broken down into Quito, Guayaquil and then cities of various sizes. It is clear that the concern over crime is greatest in Quito.





**Figure IV. 1 Impact of urbanization: Crime as major municipal problem**

The results presented above suggest quite clearly that citizens have a relatively small group of major concerns about local government, including administration, roads, security and other services, although the emphasis shifts somewhat from region to region. For example, projects targeted at small cities and rural areas could focus less on crime and more on other issues (e.g., water) and thereby better satisfy constituent demands. Targeting of social policy helps increase their efficacy and save precious resources, human and capital. The data base available here would allow policy makers to examine closely citizen needs and target their projects accordingly. Clearly, in Ecuador “one size” does not “fit all.”


### *Perceived Responsiveness of Mayors to Problems*

Let us examine how well Ecuador’s mayors are perceived as responding to the problems noted by their constituents. We followed up the question on naming the most serious problem with the following one:

**MUN13.** ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde de este municipio por resolver ese problema? **[leer respuestas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS



The results for the nation as a whole are presented in Figure IV. 2 below. As can be seen, about half of the respondents gave a negative response (i.e., “nothing” or “a little”), and only less than a third gave a positive response, with the remainder saying that they did not know.



**Figure IV. 2** How much has the mayor done to resolve the problem?



Wide differences emerge among different regions of the country as can be seen in Figure IV. 3 below. Satisfaction with the way the mayor is handling problems is far lower in the Sierra, and is especially low in the rural Sierra compared to other regions of the country.




Figure IV. 3 How much has the mayor done to solve the most serious problem? By region



Satisfaction with the mayor’s efforts does not largely depend upon the nature of the problem that is to be solved, as is shown in Figure IV. 4 below. The exceptions are solving administrative problems and problems of abuse of authority, where satisfaction is lower. Thus, we may conclude that respondents overall do not believe that mayors have done enough to solve local problems, irrespective of the type of problem seen as being the most serious.




Figure IV. 4 How has the mayor done to resolve problems? By specific problem




### *Satisfaction with Municipal Government*

The survey asked a series of questions attempting to measure overall satisfaction with local government services. The key item is as follows:

**SGL1.** ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son ... ? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe


This same item has been asked in a number of surveys in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project so that it is possible to compare Ecuador to the other cases. The response for the sample as a whole is shown in Figure IV. 5 below, where it can be seen that only about one-third of the respondents said that the services were “good” or “very good.”



**Figure IV. 5 Evaluation of municipal services.**



How does this compare with other surveys in the series? The results are presented in Figure IV. 6 below. As can be seen, the range is rather narrow, with each of the countries in the series hovering around 50, the mid-point of the scale. Ecuador falls near the middle of this group of countries.



**Figure IV. 6 Evaluation of municipal services in comparative perspective**



What factors determine the nature of the evaluation of municipal services in Ecuador? To answer that question, a multivariate analysis was first carried out testing demographic, socio-economic, and geographic factors. The regression analysis<sup>4</sup> see Table IV. 5 below shows that gender and age have no impact on satisfaction, nor does marital status when all other factors are held constant. What does matter, however, is family size, location and education. This means that when it comes to satisfaction with municipal services, it does not matter if one is a man or a woman, young or old, married or single. Let us examine, however, the factors that do matter.<sup>5</sup>

**Table IV. 5 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	52.392	2.804		18.685	.000
	Q1 Gender	1.585	.899	.034	1.763	.078
	MARRIED Marital status	-1.941	1.013	-.039	-1.915	.056
	Q2 How many years old are you	-.018	.036		-.495	.621
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.576	.271	.055	2.127	.034
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.320	.118	.059	2.715	.007
	TAMANO city size	-.780	.247	-.062	-3.158	.002


a. Dependent Variable: SGL1R Satisfaction with municipal services

<sup>4</sup> OLS regression is used because the dependent variable is coded 1-5, and is treated here as continuous.

<sup>5</sup> Income and wealth were also used as predictors, but they do not have any consistent relationship with satisfaction so were dropped from the analysis.



Education is a significant predictor of satisfaction with municipal services, as is shown in Figure IV. 7 below. As can be seen, those with education above that of primary are more likely to view municipal services positively.



**Figure IV. 7 Satisfaction with municipal services and education**



As noted, there is a weak relationship in terms of size of family and satisfaction. On inspection, it turns out that the entire relationship is a function of a small number of very large families. For this reason, no substantive significance should be given to this finding.

The most important variable explaining the differences in satisfaction is size of city. The results are shown in Figure IV. 8 below. As can be seen, the real difference is not size at all, but living in Guayaquil vs. anywhere else in Ecuador. Satisfaction levels in Guayaquil are quite high, and contrast drastically with Quito.





Figure IV. 8 Satisfaction with municipal services and location



### *Citizen Participation in Municipal Matters*

The essence of democracy is participation, and virtually all programs that seek to strengthen local government include the expansion of citizen participation as one key mechanism for doing so. The problem in Latin America, however, has been that there is a long exclusionist tradition at all levels of government and citizens are often viewed as intruders once the elections have occurred. It is important in this study to establish baseline levels of participation and to determine if some citizens participate more while others less.

The 2001 survey contains a number of items that measure participation, and the analysis begins with the basic one (NP1) of participation in municipal meetings during the 12 months prior to the survey. The results are shown in Figure IV. 9 below, in which it is shown that about one-in-ten Ecuadorians have participated in a municipal meeting in the year prior to the survey.



**Figure IV. 9 Attendance at municipal meeting in last year**

Is this high or low, compared to other countries in the region? We have some data in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project to help answer that question, as is shown in Figure IV. 10 below. These show Ecuador at the lower end of the group of countries. It is important to note, however, that participation in local government tends to shift around somewhat from year-to-year, depending on the nature of the issues confronting the



public. Yet, these data do help us understand that among Ecuadorian adults, most do not attend such meetings.




Figure IV. 10 Attendance at municipal meetings in comparative perspective



It is important to examine participation in municipal meetings by key characteristics of the population. Once again, we turn to multivariate analysis in order to determine which factors are related to participation. The results are shown in Table IV. 6below. These results show that marital status, income and wealth are not associated with levels of municipal participation. They also show that age, size of family, and, most especially education and city size are associated with municipal participation. Gender appears as insignificant, but, as we shall see in a moment, there is a strong education/gender connection that affects these results.

**Table IV. 6 Predictors of Attendance at Municipal Meetings**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	-12.366	4.221		-2.930	.003
	Q1 Gender	-2.278	1.268	-.036	-1.797	.072
	Q2 How many years old are you	.111	.051	.054	2.157	.031
	MARRIED Marital Status	-1.152	1.435	-.017	-.803	.422
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.769	.386	.053	1.992	.047
	Q10 Into which of the following ranges does your family income fit?	.361	.352	.025	1.027	.304
	WEALTH Wealth Measured by Ownership of Capital Goods	.059	.304	.005	.194	.846
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.923	.180	.125	5.118	.000
	TAMANO city size	2.900	.350	.173	8.297	.000

a. Dependent Variable: NP1R Attended Municipal Meeting in Last Year

Let us examine the gender/education nexus as it relates to municipal participation. The results are shown in Figure IV. 11 below. As can be seen, males participate more than females at all levels of education, but the big gap emerges among those with higher education; Ecuadorian women with university education are far less active than males of the same level of education, although they do participate more than males with lower levels of education. In other countries, especially Bolivia, the gender gap in participation is marked across all education levels, whereas in Ecuador the difference emerges sharply only at the upper end of the education spectrum. It is unfortunate that females do not participate more, especially since so many municipal-level issues impinge directly upon females.






Figure IV. 11 Participation in municipal meetings by gender and education



Age typically has a curvilinear relationship to political participation of most forms. The young and old participate at relatively low levels, while those in the middle exhibit the highest levels of participation. This is thought to be because the young have little stake in their cities, towns and villages, while the old are often too infirm to continue the involvement they may have had as younger people. The pattern of municipal participation we find in Ecuador is consistent with this expectation, as is shown in Figure IV. 12 below. Fewer than 8% of the youngest age cohorts attended a municipal meeting in the last year, compared to over 14% of those in the 55-65 bracket.





Figure IV. 12 Municipal meeting participation and age



Finally, as noted, geographic location has an impact on participation in municipal meetings. The results shown in Figure IV. 13 below reveal a strong association between the two factors. Participation in small cities and rural areas is *three times as high* as it is in Quito.



**Figure IV. 13 Attendance at municipal meetings by geographical area**




## *Demand-Making on Municipal Government*

Attending meetings does not necessarily mean that citizens are interacting with or making demands upon local government. Such attendance may be little more than a “spectator sport,” in which citizens who have nothing else to do show up to hear what is going on. Demand-making is far more active, and is measured by variable NP2 in the survey:

**NP2.** ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda

The results of this question are shown in Figure IV. 14 below. As can be seen, the level of participation in this sort of activity is higher than it was for meeting attendance.



**Figure IV. 14** Made a demand on the local government within the last year



The factors that explain differences in levels of demand-making seem similar to those that differentiate municipal participation. As can be seen in Table IV. 7 below, gender, age, wealth, family size, education and city size all have an impact on demand making, but gender, education and city size have the strongest impact.<sup>6</sup>

**Table IV. 7 Predictors of Demand-Making on Municipality**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-1.299	4.413		-.294	.769
	Q1 Gender	-6.122	1.442	-.079	-4.246	.000
	AGE Age	1.210	.593	.047	2.041	.041
	WEALTH Wealth measured by ownership of capital goods	.756	.316	.050	2.391	.017
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.779	.410	.044	1.900	.058
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	1.060	.203	.116	5.226	.000
	TAMANO city size	2.299	.400	.109	5.741	.000

a. Dependent Variable: NP2R Made Demand on Municipality

Let us first examine the joint impact of education and gender. Is it the case that women participate less than men because of their lower level of education? The results shown in Figure IV. 15 below demonstrate that at each level of education, women make fewer demands on their local governments than do men. It also shows that men with university education are especially active, with nearly one-third of them making demands. Even among women with the lowest levels of education, however, nearly one-in-five have made demands in the last year.

<sup>6</sup> This can be determined by examining the column labeled 't'; the larger this number the stronger the impact. The t must be above 2.0 for the variable to be statistically significant.






Figure IV. 15 Demand-making on municipality: impact of education and gender



Consider the pattern found in Guatemala, which was revealed in a national sample carried out in 2001 (see Figure IV. 16 below). The results show that while a gender gap exists in Guatemala among those with limited education, it virtually disappears among the university education, unlike Ecuador where the gap not only persists but widens. There are other patterns, with, for example, a very wide gap among males and females in Bolivia at the low end of the educational spectrum, but one that diminishes substantially at the high end. This finding is troubling.




Figure IV. 16 Demand-making on municipality in Guatemala: impact of education and gender



As noted from the regression results, factors other than age and education influence demand-making. The most important of these is the geographic location. The results shown in Figure IV. 17 below show that residents outside of Ecuador's two main cities are far more likely to be making demands on their local governments, with those in medium-sized cities the most likely to be making demands.




Figure IV. 17 Demand-making on municipality: impact of location



We can examine the impact of gender within these city sizes by looking at the results in Figure IV. 18 below . As we see, there is a gender gap in all areas except Guayaquil. This suggests a very different political culture operating in that city versus the rest of Ecuador. It is also of note that the gap is two-to-one in both Quito and in rural areas. These are striking differences, indeed.




Figure IV. 18 Demand-making on municipalities: impact of location, by gender


### *Participation in the Budget-Making Process*

One of the most important shifts in local governance in Latin America in recent years has been the involvement of citizens in the formulation of municipal budgets. In Ecuador we sought to determine how common this involvement has been, so we asked:

**MUN15.** ¿Ha participado Ud. en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí, ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR



The results of this question for the sample as a whole are shown in Figure IV. 19 below. As can be seen, less than 5% of the respondents had participated in municipal budget-making. This low figure is not, however, surprising, since many municipal governments do not welcome such participation.



**Figure IV. 19 Participated in municipal budget-making process**



When we attempt to determine what distinguishes those who participated from those who did not, the regression results<sup>7</sup> show that the standard socio-economic and demographic variables do not work. For example, males and those with higher levels of education are not significantly more likely than females and those with lower levels of education to participate in the budget-making process. Where differences do emerge is among voters vs. non-voters. As is shown in Table IV. 8 below, whereas 5% of those who voted in 2000 mayoral/deputy election participated in budget making, only 2% of those who did not vote did so.

**Table IV. 8 Participation in formulation of municipal budget**

**Report**

MUNI5 Have you participated in elaboration of the city council's expenditures plan?

VB5 Vote for mayor/deputy	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
1 Yes	.05	2308	.223
2 No	.02	548	.143
Total	.05	2856	.210

### *Local vs. National Government*

Ecuadorians recognize that they deal with different levels of government, including local and national. Do they see then all the same as “just government?” Evidently not. We asked our respondents which level of government they view as being more successful at resolving local problems. The question read:

**LGL1.** En su opinión, ¿Entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados, o el municipio quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio?


¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? O ¿El municipio?

(1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) El municipio [**NO LEER** (4) Ninguno] [**NO LEER** (5) Todos igual] (8) No sabe / no contesta

The results are presented in Figure IV. 20 below. Overwhelmingly, citizens see municipal government as the one that best solves local problems.

<sup>7</sup> Here logistic regression is used rather than OLS.





**Figure IV. 20 Who has responded better to local problems?**



When this question is examined by region of the country, the pattern shown in Figure IV. 21 emerges. As can be seen, the regional patterns follow the nation, except that confidence in municipal government, once again, is highest in Guayaquil.





Figure IV. 21 Who responds better to local problems: by location

Another way of looking at the local/national issue is to find out if Ecuadorians are willing to give more responsibility and funding to local or national government. We asked:

**LGL2.** En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma **[NO LEER]** (3) No cambiar nada **[NO LEER]** (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios] (8) No sabe / no contesta



The results are shown in Figure IV. 22 below. As can be seen, the majority is in favor of giving more funding and responsibility to local government, although there is a strong minority who would prefer that the central government become the recipient.



**Figure IV. 22 Willingness to give more responsibility and funding to local government**

One problem that faces local government in Ecuador is the inadequacy of budgets to carry out their many responsibilities. We asked our respondents if they would be willing to pay more taxes to get better services. The question read as follows:

**LGL3.** ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio?

(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe



The results are shown in Figure IV. 23 below. Not surprisingly, most Ecuadorians would not be willing to pay more taxes.




Figure IV. 23 Would you be willing to pay more municipal taxes in order to get better service?



We can put these numbers into comparative perspective by looking at the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. The results are shown in Figure IV. 24 below. There it is shown that Ecuador is relatively low in terms of willingness to pay more local taxes.




Figure IV. 24 Willingness to pay more municipal taxes

## *Conclusions*

This chapter has presented a great deal of information about the views of Ecuadorians regarding their local governments. The findings generally show strong support for local government, along with reasonable levels of participation in it. Notable differences in participation levels, however, were found across gender and education lines, as well as urban/rural lines.



## CHAPTER V. THE RULE OF LAW

In general terms, the rule of law can be defined as the preeminence of the law and its effectiveness in protecting the basic rights of citizens.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the rule of law is an essential precondition for the establishment and maintenance of democracy. Without the rule of law, on the one hand the power of the state remains unchecked, while on the other, citizens do not have legitimate protection against crime. The absence of the rule of law gives rise to generalized violence and/or a government that uses its power arbitrarily. Consequently, countries that cannot firmly establish the rule of law can suffer a profound crisis of legitimacy. Under such conditions democracy is threatened, and can die a slow death.<sup>2</sup>

**We can demonstrate the close linkage of trust in the judiciary, a vital requisite to the effective rule of law, and the legitimacy of the political system. In**

Table V. 1 below the key questions measuring support for Ecuador's main judicial institutions are examined for their linkage to our overall measure of system support. Specifically, as described in some detail below, we look at the linkage between system support and support for the public prosecutor, the public defender, the police, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. We carry out this analysis controlling for the major socio-economic and demographic variables of wealth, education, gender and age in order to be certain that the relationships we uncover are not an artifact of some other characteristic of our respondents. As can be seen in the table, each of these judicial/police institutions strongly associate with our measure of system support. The strongest association (as shown by the value of the column labeled "t") is with the Constitutional court, followed by the public prosecutor ("Fiscalía General de la Nación). The relationship is not quite as strong, but still significant at better than one in one thousand (i.e. sig. < .001) for the public defender, the police and the Supreme Court. While education and gender are significant predictors, wealth and age are not, but, more importantly, the presence of these controls does not alter the close tie between a confidence in the judiciary

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<sup>1</sup> Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985).

<sup>2</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Do Economists Know Best?" *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1995): 27.

and system support. These findings, then, suggest a very tight connection between trust in the judiciary and greater system support.


**Table V. 1 Predictors of system support**

		<b>Coefficients<sup>a</sup></b>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	22.705	2.079		10.924	.000
	B15R Public Prosecutor	.152	.017	.192	9.133	.000
	B17R Public Defender	.060	.014	.088	4.433	.000
	B18R Police	.076	.013	.109	5.672	.000
	B31R Supreme Court	.108	.016	.139	6.855	.000
	B44R Constitutional Cou	.148	.015	.203	10.146	.000
	WEALTH Wealth	-.227	.152	-.027	-1.489	.137
	ED Education	-.350	.098	-.069	-3.566	.000
	Q1 Gender	1.703	.708	.040	2.404	.016
	AGE Age	-.245	.256	-.017	-.954	.340

a. Dependent Variable: PSA5 System support



A graphical representation of the relationship between trust in judicial institutions and legitimacy of the political system is shown in Figure V. 1 below. Since the overall scale of system support is too finely graded (0-100) to be able to show it clearly in a chart along with several judicial institutions, here we focus on one key system support item, namely, pride in the political system. This is a an item that has clear face validity, asking about the degree to which the respondent is “proud to live under the Ecuadorian system of government.” As can be seen each of the core judicial items displays the same positive linkage to system pride; those low on support for the judiciary are low on pride in the system.



**Figure V. 1 Pride in the system and trust in judicial institutions**

These findings suggest that it is very important for democratic stability for citizens to trust their judicial institutions. Yet, many countries in Latin America, Ecuador among them, have many citizens who do not trust their judicial institutions. For this reason, it is not surprising that, beginning in the 1980s with the redemocratization of nearly all countries in Latin America, many of them have enacted diverse reforms to strengthen the rule of law. These reforms include judicial reforms, constitutional expansion of citizens’ basic rights, improving police practices, and the creation or strengthening of procedures and institutions to protect citizens’ rights.

In this chapter we examine citizens’ perceptions of the legal system and their views on the ways in which the law is applied. In addition, we focus on citizens’ evaluations of the institutions designated to protect their rights. These perceptions and evaluations allow us to gauge the success of the reforms and policy innovations designed to promote the rule of law. An important component of citizens’ support for the rule of law and for democracy is their support



for the judicial system. Public trust in the judiciary directly affects the legitimacy of this branch of government. In a pioneering study of the legitimacy of national high courts in eighteen countries, Gibson, Caldeira and Baird found that the level of satisfaction that the public has in court decisions (otherwise known as specific support) is strongly related to the overall legitimacy of the judiciary (or diffuse support).<sup>3</sup> Public trust in the judiciary is one of the key results of strong judicial performance. Public opinion surveys have been employed to measure the success of judicial reforms, primarily by assessing citizens' perceptions of the efficiency and accessibility of the judicial system.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter, we focus on citizens' diffuse support for the institutions designated to protect their rights. We create a dependent variable (LEGINST) to measure this diffuse support, otherwise known as the legitimacy of the legal system. Before we discuss the creation of this dependent variable, we first turn to discuss our independent variables, which can be classified into the following four categories:

1) *Specific support variables.* As we have mentioned, specific support refers to citizens' level of satisfaction with the actual, concrete performance of institutions and/or their members. Thus, specific support includes satisfaction with institutional performance, as well as with an institution's decisions and policies. For example, satisfaction with recent decisions of the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Tribunal would fall under the rubric of specific support. In this chapter, specific support is measured by citizens' trust that judges will prosecute criminal offenders (AOJ12) and their level of satisfaction with judicial services they have utilized (AOJ13). Note that in both of these cases, our measurements do not reflect general trust (or diffuse support) in the institutions protecting citizens' rights (institutional legitimacy). Rather, these two items measure public perceptions of judicial performance in specific situations.

It is important to distinguish between *specific support* and *diffuse support*. The latter refers to general trust, and is frequently utilized in studies of courts and public opinion. In this chapter, we measure diffuse support with our dependent variable, the general trust in institutions that protect rights (LEGINST). In contrast to *specific support*, *diffuse support* consists of a general sentiment towards an institution, regime, or community, which is distinct from satisfaction with its recent performance and specific policies. Diffuse support refers to a "reservoir of goodwill" that citizens have for a particular institution.<sup>5</sup> Specific support and diffuse support are of course related concepts, but they do not refer to the same phenomenon. For example, one could disagree quite strongly with one or more recent Supreme Court decisions, yet still trust this Court and defend the institution as a whole. Contrarily, one could agree with one or more recent decisions of the Court, but in general still view the overall institution as untrustworthy. Of course, an accumulation of specific support over time generally produces diffuse support, but diffuse support cannot depend exclusively with specific support. Thus, if Rule of Law institutions are to function properly, citizens must view these institutions as

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<sup>3</sup> The use of the term "specific support" has varied in other applications. Generally, specific support refers to the incumbents rather than the institutions, and that has been the use given to it in other places in this study.

<sup>4</sup> William C. Prillaman, *The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000).



legitimate even when they disagree with some of their decisions. The differences and relationships between specific and diffuse support have been thoroughly examined in various studies, particularly in the cases of the United States Supreme Court, European Constitutional Courts, and the Court of Justice of the European Union.<sup>6</sup>

2) *Socioeconomic variables.* These variables include age, city of residence, sex, income, economic level, and education. We include these variables because numerous studies have argued that access to justice in Latin America varies according to these factors.<sup>7</sup> In this chapter, we aim to determine whether trust in institutions protecting rights varies significantly according to socioeconomic status. For example, do the rich trust these institutions more than the poor? Do women trust them less than men?

3) *Variables pertaining to public perceptions of corruption.* In Chapter VI of this study we examine corruption in more detail, demonstrating that the relationship between corruption and legitimacy (or general trust in democratic institutions) is a complex one. The hypothesis that corruption delegitimizes institutions has only recently been tested empirically, and only by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. In fact, previous theories viewed corruption as a functional part of these very institutions and their maintenance. If we assume that corruption delegitimizes institutions, it is necessary to measure the extent of its impact, given that institutional legitimacy could suffer as the result of numerous other factors related to the institution, such as: efficiency, age, importance, media image, and the accessibility of its services. In this chapter, the variables PC5, PC12 and PC16 measure citizens' perceptions of corruption, not their direct experiences with it. We are interested in empirically testing the following three hypotheses: a) citizens' perceptions of corruption of the police, judges, and fiscales affect the legitimacy of institutions protecting rights; b) these perceptions affect trust in these institutions even when controlling for characteristics such as age, city size, education, sex, income and wealth; c) corruption exerts an impact even when controlling for the influence of other independent variables (related to the protection of rights), such as the prosecution of criminal delinquents and the perception of the quality of judicial services.

4) *Victimization variables.* These variables measure the actual experience of victimization by crime, as well as the fear of such victimization (AOJ11 and VIC1). In light of the rapid increase in crime, it is important to identify which citizens feel most vulnerable to crime, and which have

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<sup>5</sup> David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967); David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-57; David Easton, "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 9 (1976): 431-48; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira and Vannesa A. Baird, "On the Legitimacy of National High Courts," *American Political Science Review* 92 (1998): 343-58

<sup>6</sup> For example, see: Jeffery J. Mondak and Shannon Ishyama Smithey, "The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court," *The Journal of Politics* 59-4 (1997): 1114-114 2; James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, "The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice," *American Journal of Political Science* 39-2 (1995): 459-89. Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, "The Legitimacy of the Courts of Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support," *The American Political Science Review* 89-2 (1995): 356-76.

<sup>7</sup> Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, eds. *The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press., 1999).



suffered direct victimization, to determine if they register lower levels of confidence in the institutions protecting rights. The variable JC10R, which measures respondents' willingness to justify a military coup in order to curb crime, aims to determine if the crime wave jeopardizes democratic legitimacy.

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section, we provide a general assessment of citizens' trust in the institutions directly responsible for the protection of their basic rights. We identify the factors that promote trust in these institutions. In the second portion, we focus on two specific groups of citizens: those who have utilized judicial services and those who have been victims of crime. We determine the impact of experience with the judiciary and victimization on their trust in the institutions that protect their rights.

### *Levels of Trust in the Protection of Rights*

Several questions in our survey asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in various juridical institutions on a scale of 1 to 7. Of these institutions, six are entrusted with protecting the rights of citizens. The series of questions gauging citizens' trust in these six institutions reads as follows:

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escalera de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1-NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a UD. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho UD. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a UD. ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>Nada</b>						<b>Mucho</b>   <b>No sabe</b>	
Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.							
<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? ( <b>Sondee:</b> Si UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7.)							<b>B1</b>
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Fiscalía General de la República?							<b>B15</b>
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?							<b>B17</b>
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Policía?							<b>B18</b>
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?							<b>B31</b>
<b>B44.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?							<b>B44</b>

As Figure V. 2 shows, public trust in these institutions is quite low. In this graph, we contrast citizens' trust in the institutions that protect their rights with their trust in other domestic



institutions. The scale<sup>8</sup> in the graph ranges from zero (no trust) to 100 (high trust). It is notable that only Congress and political parties register lower levels of public trust than the Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor's Office. Even though the Public Defender is ranked higher than other institutions protecting rights, it still scores substantially lower than the media, the armed forces and the church, which receive the highest levels of trust.

In comparative terms, the low levels of public trust in the Ecuadorian Supreme Court contrast greatly with the high levels of trust Supreme Courts garner internationally, as demonstrated by the previously mentioned study of Gibson, Caldeira and Baird. In this seminal study, the Spanish Supreme Court scored the lowest in terms of public trust in Western Europe, yet still enjoyed support from 51.5% of the population (in 1993). Other courts, such as those of the Netherlands and Germany, registered levels of diffuse support as high as 89% and 75% respectively. In Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian Court ranked lowest in terms of public trust, yet 43.4% of respondents stated that they trusted the Court. In the case of Ecuador, only 16.1 % of citizens trust the Supreme Court, if we interpret trust as a number larger than 50 on a scale of 1 through 100.

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<sup>8</sup> These levels of trust were determined by converting the original seven-point scale to a zero to 100 basis. To do so, we first subtracted one from each value of the original scale. Next, we divided each value by six, so that all values ranged from zero to one. Finally, we multiplied these values by 100.






Figure V. 2 Trust in institutions for protection of rights

What factors are potential causal explanations of these low levels of trust? To answer this question, we created a summary index to measure citizens' trust in the institutions designed to protect their rights. This variable is an index of trust in six institutions: the Public Defender, the police, the Constitutional Court, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the lower courts, and the Supreme Court. We selected these institutions because they are the ones to which citizens must turn to protect their basic rights in diverse situations. We combined these institutions into the variable LEGINST.<sup>9</sup> Statistically speaking, there is ample justification for combining these six variables into a single index, as a reliability analysis demonstrates that all of these items form a reliable scale ( $\alpha = .75$ ). In addition, a factor analysis of these items reveals that they all share a single dimension, as indicated by Table V. 2. To construct our index (LEGINST), we added together our six variables, which as mentioned now range from 0 to 100, and divided by six (the number of institutions included in the index). Thus, our resulting index measures the mean level of respondents' overall trust in these six institutions.

<sup>9</sup> In a recent study of the rule of law in Latin America, Mark Ungar insists on the necessity of analyzing judges' performance in conjunction with that of other institutions. See: Mark Ungar, *Elusive Reform – Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).



**Table V. 2 Factor analysis of institutions for protection of rights**

<b>Factor Analysis of Institutions for Protection of Rights <sup>a</sup></b>	
	Component
	1
B1R Courts	.535
B15R Fiscalía	.749
B17R Public Defender	.697
B18R Police	.628
B31R Supreme Court	.742
B44R Constitutional Court	.692

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analy

<sup>a</sup>. 1 components extracted.

We use this index (LEGINST) as a dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis, the results of which are reported in Table V. 3 below, which lists the independent variables we included in our analysis. Of these independent variables, urbanization, education, sex, and income are not statistically significant predictors of trust in institutions that protect rights. That is, low trust in these institutions is generalized throughout the country, and is not dependent upon these demographic or socioeconomic factors. These institutions garner low levels of trust for both men and women, be they rich or poor, at all educational levels, in urban and rural areas. We do find that age (Q2) is significant, and we analyze this variable in greater detail later in the analysis. It is important to remember that these coefficients do not refer to the actual accessibility of justice, or citizens' ability to turn to these institutions when their rights are threatened. Rather, in this analysis we focus on the general trust that citizens have in these institutions as a whole.

We also measure the impact of two crime-related variables on this general trust, and find no significant effects. Our results indicate that respondents who have been victimized by crime in the past twelve months (VIC1), and those who fear criminal victimization (AOJ11), do not register significantly lower levels of trust. Personal victimization and fear of victimization are not related to trust in institutions protecting rights. But this may be because trust is so low in these institutions, and crime so widespread that no further impact of these variables can be detected by our measure.



Table V. 3. Predictors of trust in the protection of rights

Predictors of trust in protection of rights <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	38.704	3.401		11.381	.000
	Q2 Age	-.107	.025	-.081	-4.224	.000
	TAMANO city size	-.047	.199	-.004	-.235	.814
	EDR Education	-.373	.583	-.014	-.640	.522
	JC10R Justification for a coup in order to stop crime	.029	.008	.066	3.680	.000
	AOJ11 Probability of being victim of assault or robbery	-.557	.379	-.027	-1.471	.142
	AOJ12 If you were a victim of robbery or assault, how much do you trust that the judicial system will punish the guilty one?	-3.705	.353	-.194	-10.483	.000
	Q1 Gender	-.917	.714	-.023	-1.285	.199
	Q10 Family income	.213	.198	.023	1.075	.283
	WEALTH	-.235	.168	-.031	-1.398	.162
	PC5 Perception of corruption of Police	1.238	.173	.139	7.147	.000
	PC12 Perception of corruption Judges	1.624	.200	.183	8.136	.000
	PC16 Perception of corruption Prosecutors	2.511	.215	.262	11.662	.000
	VIC1 Have you been a victim of physical aggression or some other criminal act during the last twelve months?	-.373	.874	-.008	-.427	.669

<sup>a</sup>. Dependent Variable: LEGINST

A more positive finding is that when citizens think the judicial system will prosecute criminals, their trust *increases*. Citizens who believe that the judicial system would punish a criminal who committed a crime against them (AOJ12) report higher levels of trust in institutions protecting rights. To measure trust that the judicial system would prosecute the hypothetical criminal, we relied upon the following question:

AOJ12. *Si UD. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?*  
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS

The negative sign of this item's coefficient indicates that the less respondents trust the judiciary to prosecute criminal offenders, the less they trust the institutions that protect their rights. Keep in mind, however, that overall trust in the judicial system is very low. When responding to question AOJ12, seven out of ten citizens answered that they absolutely did not



trust the judiciary to prosecute criminals. Citizens perceive judges as ineffectual in fighting crime, implying that judges are seen as responsible for creating an atmosphere of impunity. This generalized perception of criminal impunity diminishes trust in the institutions entrusted with upholding citizens' rights.<sup>10</sup> For example, we find that these negative evaluations regarding judges have a negative influence on trust in the effectiveness of police and prosecutors. That is, even though the police detain criminals and the prosecutors initiate legal action, they are still perceived as ineffective due to judicial inaction. Figure V. 3 depicts the relationship between trust that criminals will be prosecuted and trust in the institutions protecting rights.





Figure V. 3 Trust in protection of rights and trust in criminal prosecution

<sup>10</sup> For an additional study that reports similar (although not identical) results, see: Edgardo Buscaglia, Valeria Merino and Ana Lucía Jaramillo, *Estudio sobre la Correlación entre la Existencia de Justicia y la Consolidación de la Democracia en Ecuador* (Quito: CLD, 2000). This study differs in that the dependent variable is support for democracy.




The second variable that is significant in this regression analysis is PC16, which measures corruption of the prosecutors. In this chapter we do not focus on actual corruption, but rather citizens' perceptions of corruption. We find that perceptions of corruption have a negative effect on citizens' trust that their rights are protected. As demonstrated in Figure V. 4, there is a clear relationship between citizens' perception of prosecutor's corruption and their trust in the protection of rights. While the slope decreases at the values of eight and ten (of perceived corruption), the general tendency is sufficiently clear. These two decreases could be explained by a lack of knowledge regarding the institution of the prosecutors.



**Figure V. 4 Trust in protection of rights and perception of corruption of prosecutors**




When we examine the perception of judges' corruption (PC12), we find a strong positive relationship between judges' honesty and trust, as reported in Figure V. 5. In reality, the majority of respondents placed judges at the lower end of the corruption scale (on the X axis), indicating that they thought judges were very corrupt. Of the respondents interviewed, 72.7 % gave judges a score of less than five. Overall, the mean level of judges' corruption is 3.19, slightly lower than the mean assigned to police.



**Figure V. 5 Trust in protection of rights and perception of corruption of judges**



Perceptions of police corruption also have a clear impact on trust in the protection of rights, as depicted in Figure V. 6. We found that 72.2 % of respondents gave the police a rating lower than five on the corruption scale. The mean of police corruption is 3.30, which implies that the public perceives them as predominantly corrupt.



**Figure V. 6 Trust in protection of rights and perception of corruption of police**



As mentioned previously, we found age (Q2) to be significantly correlated with trust in Table V. 3 above. The negative coefficient indicates that older respondents have less trust in the protection of their rights. As demonstrated by Figure V. 7, the most notable difference in trust is in the youngest age group (18-25). This finding can partially be explained by the fact that older respondents generally have had (or have) more direct contact with the system protecting their rights. That is, older respondents are more likely to have had concrete experiences, which are frequently negative, with these institutions. Further on in this chapter, we demonstrate that perceptions regarding the quality of judicial service affect trust in the institutions that protect rights.




Figure V. 7 Trust in protection of rights and age



The variable JC10R in Table V. 3 above corresponds to respondents' justification of a military coup in light of crime increases. The coefficient of .066 in the column entitled "beta" indicates that respondents who would not justify a military coup due to high crime also register more trust. It is important to remember that in Chapter III, (see Figure III. 1, p. 64) we observed that 72% of respondents indicated that they would justify a military coup due to high crime rates. In fact, this was the primary reason for justifying a rupture in the constitutional order.

### *Satisfaction with the performance of judges*

Another factor that affects trust in the protection of rights is the perception of the quality of judges' service. To measure these perceptions, we relied upon the following survey question:

**AOJ3.** Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general,  
¿cómo lo atienden?  
(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites  
(8) NS/NR

Variable AOJ3 was not included in the first regression analysis (see Table V. 3, p. 126) since the majority of respondents had never had direct contact with the courts. Thus, the inclusion of this question would have greatly diminished the number of respondents in our sample. We prefer to analyze this variable in a new regression analysis, in which we also include the previously significant independent variables. We present our results in Table V. 4 below.



**Table V. 4 Predictors of trust in protection of rights including satisfaction with judges**

Predictors of trust in protection of rights including satisfaction with judges <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	30.587	2.903		10.535	.000
	JC10R High crime	.034	.012	.078	2.761	.006
	AOJ12 If you were a victim of robbery or assault, how much do you trust that the judicial system will punish the guilty one?	-1.670	.581	-.085	-2.876	.004
	PC5 Police	1.360	.273	.155	4.986	.000
	PC12 Judges	1.828	.305	.211	5.990	.000
	PC16 Prosecutors	2.324	.328	.247	7.088	.000
	AOJ3 When you have to bring a matter before the court, in general, how are you treated?	-3.575	.765	-.142	-4.674	.000

<sup>a</sup>. Dependent Variable: LEGINST

These regression results demonstrate that the impact of AOJ3 (one's personal treatment by courts) is significant and negative. Thus, citizens who have been treated poorly by the courts are less confident that their rights will be protected in general, not only by judges but by the other institutions entrusted with this responsibility as well. The results presented in Figure V. 8 shows that even though trust in the institutions protecting rights is low in general, there is some difference between those who have been treated well by judges and those who have not.





**Figure V. 8 Trust in protection of rights and satisfaction with judges**

Given the importance of respondents' personal experience with courts, we turn now to examine what types of respondents receive poor treatment by the courts. To do so, we now treat variable AOJ3 as a dependent variable, and assess the impact of the independent variables on urbanization, sex, and income. The results of this regression reveal that the only significant independent variable is urbanization, or the size of respondents' city. In other words, in general there is a negative perception, but a key difference exists between urban and rural respondents. Figure V. 9 shows that in rural areas, a larger percentage of respondents affirmed that they had been well treated by judges when compared to their urban counterparts. In contrast, a larger percentage of respondents in urban areas stated that they had been poorly treated. We find that there is greater discontent with judges in the largest cities, especially in Quito and Guayaquil, as illustrated by Figure V. 10. A smaller percentage of respondents declared that they had been treated well or very well in larger cities when compared to other cities and rural areas. Also, it is notable that a larger percentage reported poor treatment in Quito.






Figure V. 9 Treatment before a court and area







Figure V. 10 Treatment before a court and city size



## Victimization


Even though we found that victimization (VIC1) was not significant in explaining trust in institutions protecting rights (Table V. 3, p. 126), it is still important to examine how citizens react when they have been victimized. First, in Figure V. 11 we determine the percentage of citizens who have been victimized during the past year. We find that one in five respondents reported that they had suffered from a crime.



**Figure V. 11** Have you been a victim of a crime?



These data on victimization are only valid for the past twelve months; it could be the case that many respondents were victimized before this time frame. Recent data from other surveys confirm this. According to a poll conducted by CEDATOS/Gallup, from 1996 through 2000, crime in Ecuador rose six times more than the total population. In contrast, crime reporting only rose a total of 43% and detainees increased by 37%, while 44% of the population had been victimized by robbery and 73% stated that violence and insecurity had increased.<sup>11</sup> Figure V. 12 reports the types of crimes respondents in our survey experienced. The large majority of these crimes are crime against property (robbery without aggression).




**Figure V. 12 Victimization and kind of crime**

<sup>11</sup> More details from this survey are available at the CEDATOS website: [www.cedatos.com/focus](http://www.cedatos.com/focus)




We posed specific questions to respondents who had been victimized by crime to examine how they handled the incident. In particular, we aimed to determine what types of interactions they had with the police and courts following their victimization. One of our questions asked respondents if they reported the crime. Figure V. 13 shows that a high percentage of victims preferred not to report the crime to the police, the courts, the press, or any other institution.



**Figure V. 13 Did you report the crime?**



The principal reason respondents did not report the crime is that they perceived such action to be fruitless, or because they feared reprisals. This indicates that official crime statistics, frequently used to gauge crime increases, are unreliable since they are based upon statistics compiled by judges and police from crime reports rather than from the victims themselves. Figure V. 14 lists the reasons for which citizens did not report crimes.



**Figure V. 14 Why did you not report the crime?**

When asked if the police and other authorities should operate on the margins of the law to ensure public security, 39% of respondents (victims and non-victims) stated that such action was justified. Thus, the combination of high crime and a sense of helplessness makes citizens more willing to justify authorities' violation of procedures and basic rights. While such violations might arguably increase public security, they destroy the rule of law. Essentially, 61% of respondents stated that living in a safe society is more important than respecting rights and liberties.

Trust that the state will protect and respect basic rights is also low. The majority of respondents indicated that they had very little trust that the state protects and respects their rights; 61.1% assigned a grade of 3 or less on the protection of their rights, as depicted in Figure V. 15. Thus, there is a paradoxical situation. Citizens demand order, even at the margins of the rule of law, yet they also decry the lack of respect for their rights. Citizens demand respect for



their rights, even as they express a willingness to deny these rights to others. Such a paradox is distressing since under the rule of law no differences exist in treatment of citizens.





Figure V. 15 Perception of protection of basic rights by the state



Finally, it is interesting to examine public knowledge of important reforms of the legal system. One of the most significant reforms of the penal system in Ecuador is the new Criminal Code of Procedure. Our survey asked citizens if they had heard something about this legal instrument. As the below graph demonstrates, approximately 7 out of every 10 Ecuadorians had not heard of this legal reform.



### *Conclusions*

The lack of legitimacy of the institutions entrusted with protecting basic rights is the results of two principal factors: low trust in the ability of the judicial system to control crime; and the perception that judges, police, and prosecutors are corrupt. Even though trust in these institutions is low throughout Ecuador, those who have had direct experiences with the judicial system register even lower levels of trust. Also, there is more public discontent with judges in Quito and Guayaquil than in other cities or in the rural sector. Paradoxically, as many citizens feel powerless in the face of high crime rates, more citizens favor the use of force at the margin of the rule of law.



## CHAPTER VI. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY

One of the most serious problems that Ecuador has faced in recent years has been that of corruption. Well publicized scandals in government and in the banking sector have made national and even international news headlines. Corruption issues in Ecuador have not been limited to those sectors alone, but have spread widely in many areas. A recent study by the Controller General's office found that of the 1,496 audits carried out in 2001, 34% of the cases could involve criminal liability and 50% of the cases could involve civil liability. The Comisión de Control Cívico de la Corrupción opened its doors in 1999 in an attempt to deal with this serious problem.

Surveys of public opinion are not good instruments for measuring the magnitude and nature of corruption in high places since those acts are relatively few in number and most of what the public knows about them comes from media reports. Surveys are, however, excellent mechanisms to measure the kind of corruption that affects citizens in their daily lives. Indeed, it will be argued below that in comparison to the well-known but often criticized Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, surveys are the best way to measure such corruption. The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has carried out several studies of corruption, focusing the magnitude of corruption experienced by citizens, citizen perception of the honesty or dishonesty of various institutions and the impact of corruption on democracy. In this chapter the focus will be on Ecuador, with comparisons made to other countries as appropriate.

### *Perception of the Magnitude of Corruption*

There is a perception of widespread public corruption in Ecuador. We asked our respondents (EXC7), "Taking into account your experience, or what you have heard, the payment of bribes to public officials is: very common, somewhat common, little common, or not at all common?" The results are shown in Figure VI. 1 below. For the country as a whole, three-fourths of the population believes that corruption is very or somewhat common.




Figure VI. 1 How common is payment of bribes to public officials?



There is significant variation on this question by region of the country as is shown in Figure VI. 2 below. The item is converted into the familiar 0-100 scale, and shows that the perception in Quito is significantly higher than it is in the other areas of the country.




Figure VI. 2 How common is corruption? By region



We can place these findings in comparative perspective by looking at the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion data base. As shown in Figure VI. 3 below, Ecuador scores higher than any of the other countries except Paraguay, meaning that the national perception of the magnitude of corruption is higher in Ecuador than in the other countries except Paraguay. However, it must be stressed that this is the *perception* of corruption, not the direct experience with corruption, which will be the central focus of much of the remainder of this chapter. Perception and experience do not always coincide for a variety of reasons. For example, if a country is actually low on corruption practices but the population has been highly sensitized to the problem of corruption through national publicity on the subject, respondents may say that corruption is more widespread than the actual experience data reveal.




Figure VI. 3 Perception of corruption: Ecuador in comparative perspective



## *Magnitude of Individual Acts of Corruption*

In this section, we shift the focus from perception to actual experience with corruption. We asked an extensive series of items to measure both individual experience with corruption as well as vicarious experience. The series of questions is follows:

<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	<b>No</b>	<b>Sí</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>INAP</b>
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que UD. no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC4.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando coimas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC5.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	
<b>EXC11.</b> Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? ¿O no ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año [marcar 9]?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC13.</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año? ¿O es que UD. no trabaja [marcar 9]?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Le han exigido pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguna gente le pidió una coima para evitar el pago de la luz eléctrica?	(0)	(1)	(8)	

It is very important to note, before examining the results that items Exc11-Exc16 differ from the others in that they filter for those who actually use the service being asked about. For example, in question EXC14, we filter out all of those who have not had dealings with the courts in the



year prior to the survey, so that the percentage who say that they have been victimized are of those who have had such dealings.

The results of the series of questions measuring experience with bribery are shown in Figure VI. 4 below. The impression one has from this chart is that experience with corruption in Ecuador is, indeed, widespread.




Figure VI. 4 Corruption experiences in Ecuador



The highest level of corruption experience occurs on the question that asks about seeing a police officer solicit a bribe. This experience occurred to over two-fifths of Ecuadorians in the 12 months prior to the survey. The second-highest level was, sadly, in the school system. In this item, 47.4% of all respondents had a child in school in the year prior to the survey, and of those 41.1% had experienced a bribe. However, care must be taken in interpreting this figure. The question, as reported above, asks about “payments in excess of those required by law.” It may well be that schools require payments from parents for books, materials or other educational materials that are in fact used for that very purpose. Thus, while these payments may not be required by law, they are not necessarily an instance of corruption.

The third most frequent form of corruption occurs in hospitals or health clinics. Here we find that a bit more than one-third of the respondents had this experience. Once again, not everyone used the health service. In fact, only 45.8% of the respondents made use of those facilities in the year prior to the survey.

About one-third of all respondents saw a public employee solicit a bribe in the year prior to the survey, although only a far smaller percentage (18.9%) were personal victims of bribery demands from public employees. Yet, this means that nearly one-in-five Ecuadorians were victimized by public employees over the 12-month period in question. The remaining forms of corruption are all indicated in the figure above.

How do these levels of corruption experience compare with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base? It should be noted that in this comparison, we include only those questions that have the same format and wording in each country. For this reason, the variables reported on in Figure VI. 5 below do not include all of the items in the 2001 Ecuador survey. It should also be noted that Paraguay is missing data on several of the items that remain in the series. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn. First, false accusations by police in Ecuador are less common than in the other countries in the series, but police demands for bribes in Ecuador are quite common, falling a good distance below Bolivia but higher than the other countries. When it comes to observing someone paying a bribe to the police, Ecuador is very high, only slightly below Bolivia. A similar pattern is found among those who report having seen someone paying a bribe to a public official. Finally, in perhaps the most general overall measure of corruption (EXC6), asking about a public employee soliciting a bribe, Ecuador ranks behind Paraguay and Bolivia, but is far higher than the cases in Central America. Overall, then, these comparisons show that Ecuador’s level of corruption as experienced by citizens is not among the highest on which we have data, but consistently scores close to the top of the series except for false accusations by the police.






Figure VI. 5 Corruption Experience: Ecuador in comparative perspective (University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base)

### Who Are the Victims of Corruption in Ecuador?

Now that we know something about the perception and reality of day-to-day corruption experience in Ecuador, it is important to determine who are its victims. To do this we utilize an overall scale of corruption victimization. This is desirable because to proceed on a variable-by-variable basis would produce an extremely long series of analyses, given that we are working with 11 different measures of corruption. At the same time, it is desirable to focus on direct personal experience with corruption rather than observed corruption, which means eliminating items EXC4, EXC5. Furthermore, since EXC1 does not deal directly with bribes, this item is also dropped. Thus, the index comprises items EXC2 (police bribe), EXC6 (public employee bribe), EXC11 (municipal bribe), EXC13 (bribe at work), EXC14 (bribe in court), EXC15 (bribe in public health services), EXC16 (bribe in schools), EXC17 (bribe for electric service). In most of the other index creation exercises in this study, the items have been averaged, but in this one, since several include only those respondents who used the service (e.g., respondents with children in school), it was decided that we would count the instances of corruption to which a respondent had been confronted during the year prior to the study. In this way, we can distinguish between those who had never had the experience to those who had had repeated experiences. The results are shown in Figure VI. 6 below. They tell an important message.



They show that only 50% of Ecuadorians have not been victims of at least one corruption experience in the 12 months prior to the survey. In addition it shows that one-in-four Ecuadorians have been victims of one act, and the remaining 25% have been victims of more than one act. To put it another way, on average, Ecuadorians in our sample experienced .9 corrupt acts in the year prior to the survey.




Figure VI. 6 Number of times respondents have been victims of corruption in the past year



We can now turn to the question of “who are the victims of corruption?” To do this, we carry out our by now familiar regression analysis, with the results shown in Table VI. 1 below. We see that gender, education, marital status, size of family, and city size are all relevant predictors. It is especially important to note that family income does not matter (nor does wealth, although it is not shown here) in explaining corruption victimization; rich and poor are equally likely to be victims of corruption in Ecuador. It is also important to note that age does not matter, with young and old equally likely to be victims of corruption.

**Table VI. 1 Predictors of corruption victimization**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.964	.141		6.821	.000
	Q1 Gender	-.302	.047	-.124	-6.484	.000
	AGE Age	-.029	.019	-.035	-1.491	.136
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.026	.006	.091	4.036	.000
	Q10 Monthly family incom	.018	.012	.033	1.538	.124
	MARRIED Marital status	.321	.053	.123	6.094	.000
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.039	.014	.068	2.748	.006
	TAMANO city size	-.042	.013	-.064	-3.245	.001

a. Dependent Variable: EXCTOT Total index of corruption victimization

It is not surprising to find that women are less likely to be corruption victims, as is shown in Figure VI. 7 below. Women in Ecuador have fewer dealings in public life, as the data in this study on civil society participation reveal. Whereas, on average, men were likely to suffer 1.1 experiences with corruption in the year prior to the survey, women were only likely to experience .8 acts on average.







Figure VI. 7 Corruption victimization and gender




As noted, education is a factor that is associated with corruption victimization. The relationship is shown in Figure VI. 8 below. Here we see that those with higher levels of education are more likely to be victims of corruption than those with lower levels. We see this holds for men and women alike. The question we have here is a causal one. We already know that rich and poor are equally likely to be victims of corruption, so why are the more highly educated more likely to be victimized. Two possibilities suggest themselves, but these are not mutually exclusive. More highly educated citizens may be more involved in public life and therefore be in a situation in which they can become victims of corruption. Second, it may be that more highly educated citizens are more likely to report acts of corruption. Fortunately, it is possible to determine which of these two explanations is the one most likely to explain the pattern found here. We can do this by examining the link between education and forms of corruption that should not depend upon emersion in public life. If the relationship disappears there, then we can know that it is the exposure to public life that exposes the more highly educated to corruption. In fact, when we examine variable EXC17, which is corruption involving the non-payment of electric bills, the relationship disappears. We find the same pattern when we examine bribery at work or bribery in the courts (where we only measured those who had dealings with the courts). So, these findings suggest that it is not so much the greater reporting of corruption by the more highly educated that gives them greater exposure to corruption but that they are in fact more exposed.



**Figure VI. 8 Education and corruption victimization: by gender**




As noted, marital status and family size have an impact on corruption victimization. Here, again, we are focusing on exposure, as those who live in family units with children are more likely to be exposed to corruption in a variety of ways, including in the school system, in the public health system and even in local government (where citizens request various documents and certificates related to their family life). The relationship to marital status is shown in Figure VI. 9 below.



**Figure VI. 9** Corruption victimization and marital status



The impact of number of children on corruption victimization is shown in Figure VI. 10 below. There it is seen that the big difference is between those with no children and those with some. Since the size of family is strongly associated with education, and since education has been shown to be associated with corruption victimization, in this chart we control for education.



**Figure VI. 10** Corruption victimization and number of children controlled by education



Finally, we look at the impact of the place of residence on corruption victimization. The results are shown in Figure VI. 11 below. As can be seen, the differences are not stark, but do show higher corruption in Quito and much lower corruption in rural areas. We assume that this is a function of the greater or lesser degree of government institutions in the former than the later.




Figure VI. 11 Corruption victimization and city size

### *Impact of Corruption on System Support*

In many ways, the most important long-term reason to study corruption is the possible impact that it may have on democratic stability. There has been much speculation as to the effect of corruption on democratic countries. The thesis is that countries with high levels of corruption cannot expect to hold onto the loyalty of their citizens over the long run. Such countries are likely to be faced with political instability that could ultimately lead to their overthrow. Until recently, however, that speculation was not supported by empirical findings. As part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, however, studies have been carried out in a number of Latin American countries in which it has been shown empirically that citizens who have been victims of corruption are less supportive of their political systems than those who have not. That research began with a study of Nicaragua, the results of which have been published in two reports and a recent article in an academic journal that focuses on issues of



public integrity and transparency.<sup>1</sup> Since then, these findings have been replicated with data from Bolivia, Paraguay and El Salvador, suggesting that the Nicaragua findings are not idiosyncratic but form part of a larger pattern. This has resulted in another academic publication.<sup>2</sup> This chapter begins with a review of the literature on corruption and its potential impact. This material has been drawn from the discussion contained in a recent study of democracy in Bolivia by the author of this study, along with the academic publications just cited.<sup>3</sup> It is then followed by a look at the results from the Ecuador survey being analyzed here.

### ***Corruption and Its Impacts***

Economists have long warned us about the pernicious impacts of corruption, arguing that it increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives and, ultimately, results in reduced economic growth. Political scientists, even the realists, have had a much more ambivalent view of the problem. The early tradition in political science was dominated by the functionalist school. As Huntington<sup>4</sup> argued in his famous writings on the subject: "...corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is." This view represents a considerable body of writing by political scientists and sociologists, which views corruption in functionalist terms, especially in the developing world. More recently, however, now that democracies have emerged widely in the Third World, corruption has begun to be viewed quite differently, and is seen as a threat to consolidation of those regimes.

The evidence economists have gathered on the negative impact of corruption on investment and growth in developing nations is very strong. Political scientists, however, thus far have been far more anecdotal in their claims for the costs or benefits of corruption in those nations. The apparently Janus-faced nature of corruption, it is shown in this chapter, at least in Ecuador, is illusory. Corruption is not only bad for the economy, it is also bad for the polity as well. This part of this chapter first briefly reviews the literature, and then tests the competing claims of the political effects of corruption using the survey data from Ecuador.

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<sup>1</sup> Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. A Report to USAID, Nicaragua. Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study* (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates).

<sup>2</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002).

<sup>3</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Bolivia: 2000* (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2001).

<sup>4</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



### ***Corruption as Economic Evil***

Most economists who have studied corruption argue that it reduces investment and slows growth.<sup>5</sup> It does so for a variety of reasons. First, bribes are normally not reported by either party to the transaction, thus denying the treasury needed tax revenues. This tax loss is compounded because the bribe often serves to circumvent the reporting of normal business transactions that otherwise would have produced tax consequences (e.g., construction permits, ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, import and export taxes, etc.). Second, public services become focused toward assisting those who pay bribes, denying those services to those who do not, thereby resulting in uneven and often inferior services to many. Third, bribes enable service providers (e.g., contractors for public infrastructure projects) to ignore established standards, offering substandard goods or services, from which the economy suffers (e.g., roads that deteriorate rapidly, hospitals that provide inferior treatment). Fourth, corruption weakens the rule of law and as a result makes transactions irrational from an economic point of view (e.g., contracts are not awarded to the highest quality, lowest cost bidder, but to the firm that pays the highest bribe).

In a large-scale cross-national study of the period 1982-1995 for over 100 countries carried out by the International Monetary Fund, Mauro<sup>6</sup> found that when corruption increases by two points on a ten-point scale, GDP decreases by half a percent and investment decreases by 4 percent. Furthermore, public investment suffers; expenditures on education decline by .5% for each two-point increase in corruption.<sup>7</sup> The World Bank<sup>8</sup>, also found, using a cross-national design, that among countries in which bribery was both high and unpredictable, the rate of investment was nearly half of what it was in low corruption countries. Corruption was also found to increase income inequality. According to Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme<sup>9</sup>, for example, corruption severely decreases income growth for the poor. Other studies come to virtually identical conclusions (Ades and DiTella<sup>10</sup>; Mauro<sup>11</sup>). Yet another cross-national study,



based on 69 countries, found that high levels of corruption encourage businesses to go underground, which denies the government of tax revenue, producing smaller, less effective government.<sup>12</sup> In short, while not all agree that corruption is bad for the economy, there is a consensus that it is.<sup>13</sup>

### *Corruption as Political Good*

If economists largely view corruption as “sand” in the gears of the economy, political scientists, drawing on the classic work of Robert Merton,<sup>14</sup> for many years largely viewed it as the “grease” that gets the bureaucracy moving in many developing countries. V.O. Key, one of the leaders in the early systematic study of politics, viewed corruption as necessary for politics itself. As he argued in his classic work on Southern politics,

Quite apart from the levity with which corrupt-practices acts are regarded, literal adherence to some of the state laws would make a state-wide campaign almost impossible....The chances are about 99 to 1 that not a single serious race for state-wide

<sup>5</sup>One exception is Nathaniel Leff. Nathaniel Leff, 1964. "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption." *American Behavioral Scientist* 8 (November), pp.8-14.

<sup>6</sup>Paolo Mauro, 1997. *Why Worry About Corruption?* Economic Issues, vol. 6. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>7</sup>The IMF argument is further elaborated by Tanzi and Davoodi. Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, 1998. *Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth*. Economic Issues, vol. 12. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>8</sup>World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-104.

<sup>9</sup>Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?" IMF Working Papers 98/76. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>10</sup>Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella. 1996. "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption." *IDS Bulletin* 2 (1997), pp.6-10.

<sup>11</sup>Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3); Paolo Mauro, 1997. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, ed. Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics.

<sup>12</sup>Eric Friedman, et al. 2000. "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 77(3, June), pp.459-493.

<sup>13</sup>For a different view see Beck and Maher and Lien. J.P. Beck and M.W. Mahr, 1986. "A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets." *Economic Letters* 20: 1-20 and D.D. Lien, 1986. "A Note on Competitive Bribery Games." *Economic Letters* 22: 337-431.

<sup>14</sup>Robert K. Merton, 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structures*. New York: Free Press.



office in any southern state (or any other state) during the past 20 years has been unaccompanied by perjury, morally if not legally, by the candidate or his managers in reports of campaign receipts or expenditures.<sup>15</sup>

This work was followed by early studies in the developing world that saw positive political benefits to corruption (Abueva<sup>16</sup>; Bayley<sup>17</sup>; and Nye<sup>18</sup>). But the classic statement is that of Huntington, who stood the economists' perspective on its head; if the goal is to stimulate growth, corruption is a necessary evil. As he argued: "In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over centralized honest bureaucracy."<sup>19</sup> Huntington was not alone in his view about the positive benefits of corruption. Other major studies followed.<sup>20</sup> In a classic collection of essays, Heidenheimer and his colleagues included many pieces that sung the praises of corruption.<sup>21</sup> For example, in a study that looks at Africa, one author asks, "What is the problem about corruption?" and answers by saying, "It is natural but wrong to assume that the results of corruption are always both bad and important."<sup>22</sup> From this point of view, corruption serves the function of binding society together, something that is sorely needed in most developing nations. As Leys puts it: "the greater the corruption, the greater the harmony between corruptor and corruptee."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>V.O. Key Jr., 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Vintage Books, p. 481.

<sup>16</sup>José Abueva, 1966. "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils, and Graft to Political Development." *East-West Center Review* 1966, pp.45-54.

<sup>17</sup>David Bayley, 1967. "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation." *Western Political Quarterly* 19 (December), pp.719-32.

<sup>18</sup>Joseph Nye, 1967. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 61 (June), pp. 417-27.

<sup>19</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.69.

<sup>20</sup>John Waterbury, 1973. "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime." *World Politics* 25 (July), pp.533-55. John Waterbury, 1976. "Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco." *Government and Opposition* 11 (Autumn), pp. 426-45.

<sup>21</sup>Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, Eds. 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick: Transaction.

<sup>22</sup>Colin Leys, 1989. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, p.57.

<sup>23</sup>Colin Leys, 1989. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, p.54.



This argument was made even more forcefully by a study on corruption in France. Bequart-Leclercq<sup>24</sup> states it clearly:

Corruption functions like grease in the gears; it has an important redistributive effect, it is a functional substitute for direct participation in power, it constitutes the cement between elites and parties, and it affects the effectiveness with which power is exercised.

Moreover, corruption is especially beneficial in nations with authoritarian traditions since “Corruption guarantees certain zones of freedom and of free movement in the face of the totalitarian tendencies inherent in states and political parties.... Political corruption has another important function, to redistribute public resources by parallel means accessible to groups that would otherwise be excluded.”<sup>25</sup>

In a similar vein, a study of corruption in Israel argues that corruption has positive economic as well as political effects. It encourages foreign investment by “bypassing cumbersome, genuinely hampering, governmental economic regulations.”<sup>26</sup> In the Israeli case, Werner argues that corruption has helped integrate immigrant groups into the larger culture, and also improves the quality of the bureaucracy by providing “supplemental income” that helps counteract the attractiveness of higher-paid private sector employment.<sup>27</sup>

Corruption is also central to the phenomenon of clientelism, which is also seen as a mechanism to bind citizens to elites. The classical work is that of Banfield in southern Italy (Banfield<sup>28</sup>). From this perspective, clientelism involves a clear-cut exchange relationship, in which personal favors are exchanged for political support, in the form of votes or contributions. Not all clientelism involves corrupt practices<sup>29</sup>, but much of it does (Etzioni-Halevy<sup>29</sup>; Johnston<sup>30</sup>).

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<sup>24</sup>Becquart-Leclercq. 1989. "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p. 192.

<sup>25</sup>Becquart-Leclercq. 1989. "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.193.

<sup>26</sup>Simcha B. Werner, 1989. "The Development of Political Corruption in Israel." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.251.

<sup>27</sup>Simcha B. Werner 1989. "The Development of Political Corruption in Israel." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.251.

<sup>28</sup>Edward Banfield, 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Chicago: The Free Press.

<sup>29</sup>Eva Etzioni-Halevy, 1985. *Bureaucracy and Democracy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

<sup>30</sup>Michael Johnston, 1979. "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines." *American Political Science Review* 73 (June), pp.385-98.



Clientelism, it has been noted however, can be a two-edged sword, increasing trust between patron and client, while decreasing trust for all others.

### *Corruption as Political Evil*

Recently, several prominent works have appeared that take strong issue with the benign view of corruption articulated by many political scientists in the past.<sup>31</sup> The rapid spread of democracy throughout the developing world is perhaps most directly responsible for this shift in perspective. While corruption may have had its positive functions under dictatorships, it is seen as being dysfunctional under democracy, especially as regards confidence in the political system.

Summarizing the findings of papers gathered in a recent edited volume, the editors argue that, "Countries in which petty corruption is pervasive must ... endure disablingly low levels of trust in public institutions, with all the extremely negative consequences for commitment to collective projects, civic behavior, levels of crime and public order" (Doig and Theobald<sup>32</sup>). Readers of the Doig and Theobald volume who are seeking empirical confirmation of their findings will be disappointed, however. The collection of studies, which covers Uganda, Hong Kong, Botswana and Australia, is almost entirely descriptive, with little data and no statistical tests offered. The editors are not to be faulted, however, since an extensive review of the literature world-wide uncovers virtually no empirical support for the claims (Doig and McIvor<sup>33</sup>). One very recent, partial exception is a new study by Lipset and one of his students (Lipset and Salman Lenz<sup>34</sup>). The study is not focused directly on Huntington's emphasis on legitimacy, however, but rather on a related one, namely the impact of corruption on democracy, utilizing a large cross-national data set that incorporates a measure of democracy and a measure of corruption. Their data on corruption come from the Corruption Perception Index for 1998 compiled by Transparency International and their measure of democracy is the Freedom House Index, averaged over the period 1972-1998. The findings are that although a strong bivariate relationship emerges, when controls for GNP per capita and other (unspecified) variables are introduced, the relationship becomes insignificant. These findings, while not speaking to the corruption/legitimacy nexus, do weaken support for the impact of corruption on the political system, since at least since the time of Huntington's observations on the functionality of corruption, it has been repeatedly found that developing countries have higher levels of corruption than advanced industrial countries. Therefore the failure of the relationship between trust and democracy to survive the introduction of a control for GNP greatly weakens our

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<sup>31</sup>Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>32</sup>Alan Doig and Robin Theobald, eds., 2000. *Corruption and Democratisation*. London: Frank Cass, p.6.

<sup>33</sup>Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, 1999. "Corruption and Its Control in The Developmental Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature." *Third World Quarterly* 20(3, June).

<sup>34</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, and Gabriel Salman Lenz, 2000. "Corruption, Culture and Markets." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.



confidence in their conclusion that democracy is inversely associated with corruption. That study, therefore, not only does not test the relationship between corruption and legitimacy, its own assertions that the study “broadly confirms” the linkage is refuted by their multivariate analysis.<sup>35</sup>

The most recent evidence supporting the view that corruption leads to lowered legitimacy emerges in the collection edited by Pharr and Putnam<sup>36</sup>. In a chapter by Donatella della Porta<sup>37</sup> looking at data from Europe, the author hypothesizes that corruption is both a cause and an effect of poor government performance, “thus reducing trust in the government’s capacity to address citizens’ demands...Lack of confidence in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers.” The evidence once again uses the Transparency International Perception Corruption Index and the Eurobarometer to obtain evidence on confidence in government. The results, focused on France, Germany and Italy for the period 1976-1995, support the hypothesis. Indeed, looking at all of the Eurobarometer cases as a group, the author finds an association between high levels of corruption and low satisfaction with democracy. In a related paper in that same volume focused on Japan, Pharr<sup>38</sup> states: “This chapter demonstrates that in Japan, at least, officials’ misconduct has been by far the single best predictor at any given point in time of citizen confidence in government over the past two decades.” Pharr notes that this finding corresponds to that of Paige and Shapiro<sup>39</sup>, who found that in the U.S. public corruption (especially Watergate) brought about an abrupt and lasting change in public opinion. Several sources of data are used, but the main conclusions are based on a time-series regression that demonstrates that the number of articles on corruption in the main newspaper in Tokyo is the best predictor, over time, of dissatisfaction with politics.

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<sup>35</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, 2000. "Corruption, Culture and Markets." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books, p.122.

<sup>36</sup>Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, Eds, 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>37</sup>Donatella della Porta, 2000. "Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* eds. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.205.

<sup>38</sup>Susan J. Pharr, 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.173.

<sup>39</sup>Benjamin I Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans; Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.337-38.



In the Latin American region, Morris<sup>40</sup> carried out an extensive study of the causes and consequences of corruption in Mexico, a country which ranked 58<sup>th</sup> on the TI survey for 1999. Morris concludes that the positive role of corruption is limited to elites, who both pay and receive bribes as a regular way of conducting their affairs. When it comes to the mass public, however, he uses survey data to test the corruption/legitimacy linkage. The survey (a non-random sample of about 700 respondents) in three Mexican cities, did not ask about experience with corruption, but only about the perception of the extent to which corruption is necessary to deal with the bureaucracy. The findings show a strong relationship between this perception and low trust in government, which is another (limited) way of defining legitimacy, but since the perception that bribes are needed may in fact be a function of the low evaluation of government in the first place, we really cannot be sure if corruption itself is responsible for the decline in trust in government. A more recent study on corruption and system support, conducted in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, also examines perception of corruption rather than experience with it (Camp, Coleman and Davis<sup>41</sup>). In Asia Shin<sup>42</sup> has also studied corruption for the South Korean case, but has focused on citizen perception of the corruption/honesty of public officials, rather than personal experience with corrupt practices.

### ***Correcting for Limitations of Prior Work***

Does corruption matter in politics? As has been shown by the review of the literature, views on this subject differ widely. Those who have made the strongest case that corruption performs a beneficial function have done so based on studies that have been almost entirely anecdotal and/or theoretical. On the other hand, those who have made the case that corruption has a pernicious effect on belief in the legitimacy of political institutions, have either provided no evidence supporting the claim, or have given evidence that is flawed and indirect. Let us review these problems in the prior research.

### ***Prior Efforts at Measuring Corruption***

It is not surprising that until recently corruption research has been largely descriptive rather than empirical. The problem researchers have confronted when studying corruption is that given its *sub rosa* nature, it is an inherently extremely difficult phenomenon to measure. Over the years, different approaches have been taken to solve this problem, each with their own limitations.

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<sup>40</sup>Stephen D. Morris, 1991. *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

<sup>41</sup>Roderic Ai Camp, Kenneth M. Coleman, and Charles L. Davis, 2000. "Public Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico." Annual Meeting of the World Association of Public Opinion Research. Portland, Oregon, May 17-18.

<sup>42</sup>Doh C. Shin, 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.208-214.



The early efforts were based on the criminology approach of using official police and court records. One could simply count the number of arrests and convictions for corruption in a given country. The main difficulty with such an approach, of course, is the problem of the spuriousness of the measure; the more vigilant the authorities, the more arrests and convictions, completely independent of the corruption rate itself. Thus, in highly corrupt countries there may be virtually no enforcement, while in “squeaky clean” countries there may be frequent arrests and convictions for even minor infractions. For the most part, this approach has been abandoned.

In order to overcome the measurement problem inherent in using official records, two newer approaches have been taken, each with their own serious limitations, however. The first (already cited) is that carried out by Transparency International (TI) with its annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). TI is an international coalition that promotes integrity in government world-wide. The TI effort has expanded over the years, including more countries and a wider range of data sources, including perceptions of nationals and expatriates. But the primary difficulty of this index is that it is grounded, as its title states, in *perception* of corruption rather than the fact of it. This is a problem of which TI is well aware, and has resulted in their extensive efforts to improve the quality of the measure. In recent years, multiple measures and multi-year averages have been used, thus hopefully increasing the reliability of the measure.<sup>43</sup> In spite of all of its limitations, the CPI remains the most widely used measure of corruption in use today, akin to the Freedom House measure of democracy. Most economists rely upon it when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment.

The second recent approach, designed to go beyond perception and to get more directly at experience with corrupt practices, is the World Bank’s “Private Sector Survey.”<sup>44</sup> This survey was carried out in 1996 and 1997 in sixty-nine countries by sending questionnaires to 3,685 firms in selected countries. The study, while helpful in many ways, still confronts a number of serious problems. First, the response rate was about 30 per cent, leaving open the possibility that selection bias may have resulted in a tendency for more honest firms to have responded in the more corrupt countries whereas in less corrupt countries a wider cross section may have responded. A further problem with the World Bank approach is that among the firms that did respond, the more corrupt ones certainly had more to hide than the less corrupt, resulting in a potentially serious under reporting of corruption among the more corrupt firms. But perhaps the biggest problem with the World Bank approach is that the data base is made up entirely of private sector firms, and therefore there is no direct evidence on public sector corruption. It is the integrity of the public sector that has been of most direct concern to policy makers and anti-corruption reformers alike. Indeed, the World Bank’s own analysis of the pernicious effects of corruption focuses on the public sector, even though its data come from the private sector.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>These efforts are explained in detail in the TI web cite. The specific document that presents the methodological issues is: [www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi\\_framework.html](http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi_framework.html).

<sup>44</sup>For details see World Bank, *World Development Report*. World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D.C. : Oxford University Press, pp. 174-175.

<sup>45</sup>See the analysis of the impact of corruption on growth and investment, *World Development Report* . World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report*, Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-103.



Another even more recent approach to the measurement of corruption moves in an entirely different direction and runs into a new set of problems. The study of Japan by Pharr noted above uses newspaper reports of corruption as the independent variable. She recognizes that changes in corruption levels revealed by this measure may reflect changes in the actual level of corruption, or may be entirely a reflection of variation in the reporting of corruption. She argues, however, that this important distinction is not relevant for her analysis, but indeed it is, so much so that the conclusions of the research are largely undermined. Her argument is flawed for two reasons. First, she states “A given report of misconduct is a fact, a data point, in that it records a specific occurrence in which a public official is accused of wrongdoing” (Pharr<sup>46</sup>). In reality, however, the accusation may be entirely the invention of the newspaper itself, whose motivations for making the accusation may vary from a desire to increase circulation to an effort to weaken one party or candidate and strengthen another. By no means can we take the report as a “fact” in Japan, and we should have even less confidence in newspaper reports in much of the developing world where newspapers often range from irresponsible to largely government controlled. Journalists are often poorly trained, standards of ethics are largely non-existent and fact verification uncommon. Second, whatever the quality of the reporting of corruption in the press, all we can say if we find that trust in government declines when reports of corruption increase is that the media influence public opinion. We cannot say that corruption itself causes any changes whatsoever in public attitudes toward the state. Thus, in countries in which the press makes a habit of inventing stories of government scandals, and in which we find low confidence in the political system, our concern as social scientists should be with the quality of journalism and the corruption of journalistic standards rather than with public corruption.

An entirely different approach has been taken in the survey research field. This effort has been inspired by crime victimization surveys that have become the mainstay of sociological investigation into crime. Criminologists have long recognized that official reports of crime are highly unreliable because of the heavy degree of political manipulation of the data. Police chiefs who want new police cruisers from their local governments have major incentives to justify the request by the claim that a new crime wave has hit the town. It may be that the police chief has told his/her officers to become especially aggressive when enforcing the law, or it may be that the figures themselves have been “cooked.” Alternatively, politicians who are seeking credit for success in crime fighting have incentives to see reports of fewer crimes, and salary raises for the police force might be contingent upon less aggressive policing. In order to overcome these intractable problems, criminologists have increasingly come to rely upon victimization surveys, which are widely regarded as providing a more accurate tally of crime rates.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Susan J. Pharr, 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.194.

<sup>47</sup>Homicide rates, however, are used as reliable indicators of one form of extreme crime.



Internationally, this approach has been spearheaded by the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention (Newman<sup>48</sup>). Implemented in 1987, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) now includes 55 countries, with samples of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents per country. In 1996, for the first time, a single question was included in the surveys on bribe victimization. While a broader series of questions is most certainly to be preferred, at least this source of data does not suffer from the biases and limitations inherent in the TI and World Bank approach. The United Nations effort does not ask about perception of corruption, but actual citizen experience with public corruption. While it cannot tap into high-level corruption (bribes of ministers and legislators), it does very effectively measure citizen exposure to (rather than perception of) day-to-day corruption. Recently, the World Bank has begun following this approach, and has begun conducting studies of corruption at the level of the citizen. A review of the approach used by the Bank has been presented as a conference paper (Kaufmann<sup>49</sup>). One such study, for example, has been carried out in Nicaragua.<sup>50</sup>

### ***The Missing Evidence for the Corruption/Legitimacy Linkage***

Typical of those who decry the negative effects of corruption is the World Bank,<sup>51</sup> which recently stated the thesis that “Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital... Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy...” Unfortunately, although the bank presented substantial evidence that corruption negatively affects the economy, it provided no support whatsoever for the claims that minor corruption (or even major corruption) erodes political legitimacy, for while the Bank presented evidence on the level of the independent variable (i.e., corruption) it presented no corresponding evidence on the dependent variable (i.e., political legitimacy). A more recent World Bank study uses a multi-index measure of governance, including perceptions of corruption world-wide and finds that per capita incomes, and adult illiteracy are lower while infant mortality is higher when governance is poor (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoid-Lobaton<sup>52</sup>). Yet, once again, there is no linkage between corruption on the one hand and political legitimacy on the other.

Much of the empirical research decrying the negative impact of corruption on political legitimacy has used measures of corruption that are seriously flawed (such as the ones

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<sup>48</sup>Graeme Newman, ed., 1999. United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.27-28.

<sup>49</sup>Daniel Kaufmann, 1998. "Corruption Diagnostics: A New Technocratic Framework for the Analysis of Corruption and Its Implications for the Design of Action Programs." Miami Anti-Corruption Summit. Miami, Florida, April 2-4.

<sup>50</sup>See Comité Nacional de Integridad and World Bank-CIET International. 1998. *Encuesta nacional sobre integridad y corrupción en la administración pública: Encuesta de hogares*. Managua.

<sup>51</sup>World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-104.

<sup>52</sup>Daniel Kaufmann, Arat Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. *Governance Matters*. Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2196. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.



enumerated above). Virtually none of the prior work, moreover, has been able to make a direct link between corruption and its impact on legitimacy. The studies that use nation-wide aggregates for corruption and political attitudes run into the immediate problem of the ecological fallacy. In the absence of individual-level information researchers have no way of knowing if high levels of national corruption (even assuming for the moment that the measurement is not seriously flawed) are responsible for national levels of citizen attitudes toward their political systems. For this reason, the studies reviewed above, that use the TI measure of corruption as a predictor and national aggregates of satisfaction with the performance of democracy as the dependent variable, are subject to questions of spuriousness. Indeed, the Lipset study reviewed above found, as already noted, that once controls were introduced for GNP, the purported relationship disappeared.

In order to test the hypothesis that corruption undermines political legitimacy, we need data at the level of the individual. Corruption surveys, though embryonic, appear to be the most promising of the efforts undertaken to date. Such surveys give us evidence at the level of the individual of their experience with day-to-day corruption. Unfortunately, most of those surveys thus far, while providing information on experience with corruption at the level of the individual, give us no information on the dependent variable (i.e., belief in legitimacy of the political system).

A way to overcome these limitation is to obtain corruption experience data at the level of the individual via survey research, as was done in the Ecuador survey of 2001, while simultaneously obtaining information from those same individuals on their belief in the legitimacy of their government. The analytical task, then, becomes searching for the connections between corruption experience on the one hand and legitimacy beliefs on the other. Appropriate control variables, and direction of causality questions need to be addressed, but can be with this approach. In this paper, this is the approach taken.

### *Testing the Impact of Corruption on Legitimacy*

Latin America in general, and Ecuador in particular, where currently there is extensive attention focused on corruption (Tulchin and Espach<sup>53</sup>), is a good place to test the hypothesized linkage between corruption and legitimacy for two reasons. First, this is a region of the world long widely believed to suffer from high levels of corruption. It is suggestive that only one Latin American country, Chile, scores in the top twenty of the least corrupt countries, ranking 19 out of 91 in the 2001 data set. Uruguay is 35 and Costa Rica is 40. The remaining countries in the region score below 40.<sup>54</sup> Ecuador ranked 79 out of 91 countries in the 2001 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Only Bolivia scored lower, at 84. Second, Latin America has long had problems of political instability, suffering an endless succession of coups

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<sup>53</sup>Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach., eds., 2000. *Combating Corruption in Latin America*. Washington, D. C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

<sup>54</sup>This information is taken from the TI web cite at [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org).



through much of its history. If, as Easton<sup>55</sup> and Lipset<sup>56</sup> have argued, legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for democratic stability, then it is plausible that legitimacy is questionable in many Latin American countries. From an empirical point of view, considerable evidence exists to show that legitimacy levels remain low in many countries in the region, despite ten or more years of democratic rule (Seligson<sup>57</sup>).

When we use the system support measure developed earlier in this report and examine the impact of corruption, the findings are very clear, as is shown in Figure VI. 12 below. Respondents in our national survey who have not been victims of corruption in the year prior to the survey scored above the national mean on system support, but the more corrupt acts suffered by a respondent, the lower support tends to fall.<sup>58</sup> The results hold even when controls are introduced for gender, age, education, income, marital status and city size. In addition, the analysis was run to examine political party effects, in order to check if voters for the incumbent party were less likely to report corruption victimization. No such effect one was found.

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<sup>55</sup>David Easton, 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October), pp.435-57.

<sup>56</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59 (February), pp.1-22.

<sup>57</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson, 2000, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11(2).

<sup>58</sup> The slight increase at the highest levels is statistically insignificant.






Figure VI. 12<sup>59</sup> The impact of corruption victimization on system support

## Conclusions

Corruption matters. This paper has shown that corruption substantially erodes system support in Ecuador, a finding that coincides with other research in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. Moreover, the direction of causality is clear; those about to demand a bribe do not first ask the victim about their level of system support. We can know with confidence that being victimized by bribes lowers support. In Ecuador, the survey shows that every-day corruption is quite common, affecting half the adult population in a given year, and it affects rich and poor alike. These results strongly suggest that corruption, left unchecked, can erode the legitimacy of the political system, ultimately threatening its stability.

<sup>59</sup> Note that a very small number of respondents suffered more than five acts, but the N was too small for the means to be stable, so those cases were grouped with those who experience 5 acts.



## CHAPTER VII. CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

We now turn to the very important issue of civil society participation. Recent events in Ecuador have highlighted the powerful impact that such participation can have on the political system. Citizens in Ecuador can and have organized to press for their demands. But Ecuador is not alone in this pattern. World-wide, the rapid and dramatic transitions to democracy that have occurred throughout the world since the 1980s have led many researchers to focus on civil society as a potentially vital element in the democracy puzzle.<sup>1</sup> In Eastern Europe, the role that Solidarity played in bringing down the old authoritarian communist order has been studied in detail, and many argue that it was vital to the overthrow of that system. In Latin America, many have pointed to role of civil society in organizing the “No vote” in Chile, which resulted in the replacement of Pinochet’s dictatorship with a competitive and economically dynamic democracy. In Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and elsewhere human rights NGOs have played a key role in the democratization process.

Dictatorships have long been infamous for suppressing and/or co-opting civil society organization. Citizens in such systems are deprived of their ability to provide collective expression of their demands. Democracy, on the other hand, cultivates civil society organizations as a key element in the articulation of citizen demands.

In recent years political scientists, stimulated by Robert Putnam’s classic work, *Making Democracy Work*, have begun to take a more systematic look at the role of civil society in democracy.<sup>2</sup> Putnam and others have argued that the key to building democracies is through the development of “social capital.” Countries with high levels of social capital are countries in which citizens trust each other and trust their governments. This trust largely emerges from their active participation in civil society organizations.<sup>3</sup> Putnam believes that the process of building social capital is a long one, but cannot prosper without an active civil society. It is for this reason that building stable democracies in former dictatorships does not occur overnight.

How active is civil society participation in Ecuador? The data in the present study allow us to answer that question with some precision. Numerous other studies of civil society merely count the number of organizations that exist in a given country or region, and presume that those counts reflect the level of activity of citizens. The democratic values survey conducted for this study allows a far more direct measure; the respondents were asked about their participation in nine distinct forms of civil society organizations. The survey makes it possible not only to

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<sup>1</sup> See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). This introductory section draws on prior reports in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

<sup>2</sup> Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*.

<sup>3</sup> Jeffery J. Mondak, "Psychological Approaches to Social Capital, Special Issue," *Political Psychology* 19 (1998).; Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, "Social Capital, Civil Society, and Contemporary Democracy," *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (March/April) (1997).; Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2000).

examine the levels of participation, but to determine which Ecuadorians participate more and which less. In addition, the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project data base allows comparisons with other Latin American countries.

### *Levels of Participation*

The survey contains a block of items to measure participation in civil society. In the survey we measured this participation in eight distinct types of organizations. We asked respondents if they participated weekly, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never. This format differs from those used in prior series from the University of Pittsburgh, where we used terms such as, “frequently,” “once in a while,” “almost never” and “never.” so the results are not directly comparable. What is comparable is to compare those who never participate with those who have some level of participation. The block of questions in the 2001 Ecuador survey are as follows:

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si UD. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca


	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de algún comité o sociedad de la Iglesia o templo?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP11.</b> ¿Reuniones de una cooperativa?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP12.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna asociación cívica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

The results are presented in Table VII. 1 below and Figure VII. 1 below. The information in both the table and figure are the same, but are perhaps clearer to some readers in one format or the other. As can be seen, participation church-related committees and parent-teacher organizations is highest, followed by community development associations. After that, fewer than one-in-five Ecuadorians participate in professional associations, unions, cooperatives, civic associations or political parties.



**Table VII. 1 Civil Society Participation**

	Church committee	Parent-teacher organization	Community development association	Professional association	Union	Cooperative	Civic association	Political party
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1 Once a week	32.3%	8.5%	6.8%	4.3%	2.3%	2.9%	2.8%	2.5%
2 Once a month	18.5%	32.6%	16.3%	8.0%	5.3%	6.8%	4.2%	3.2%
3 Once a year	10.7%	16.5%	15.6%	8.2%	5.1%	8.4%	4.5%	6.9%
4 Never	38.5%	42.4%	61.4%	79.4%	87.3%	81.8%	88.5%	87.4%



**Figure VII. 1 Civil Society Participation**



We can compare these results with those from other surveys in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. To do this, we must convert the data sets to a single standard, which is comparing participation to non-participation. This is done in Figure VII. 2 below. A lot of data are shown, but the reader should compare Ecuador, the first bar on the left of each cluster of bars with the other countries. Ecuador is never the most participant country, frequently lagging behind Bolivia and sometimes lagging behind Paraguay. When it comes to school related participation (e.g., parent-teacher associations), Ecuador is far behind Bolivia and Paraguay, but about the same as the Central American countries in the data base. This is approximately the same pattern for union participation, except only Bolivia is far ahead of Ecuador. In general, then, we can conclude that in comparative terms, Ecuador is a mid-range country in terms of levels of civil society participation.




Figure VII. 2 Civil society participation in comparative perspective

### *Who Participates?*

Now that we know the levels of civil society participation, we want to know who participates and who does not. To answer this question we once again use multivariate analysis, and to simplify the presentation, we attempted to form an overall index of civil society participation, comprised of the eight separate questions in the survey reviewed above. Upon examination, however, these eight items did not form a single scale but two distinct ones. The factor analysis is reported in Table VII. 2 below. Factor analysis is a method to determine if variables form a single underlying dimension or in fact relate to different dimensions. The



reader will note that the results show two distinct factors.<sup>4</sup> What seems to clearly distinguish these two factors, or modes, of civil society participation is their frequency of occurrence. The first three are the ones that we found had relatively high levels of participation, the third, community development participation, had a lower level, and the remaining forms of participation were far lower. We label the first three variables “Community participation” and the second “Formal participation,” as it involves such organizations as professional associations, unions and cooperatives.

Table VII. 2 Rotated Component Matrix

	Factor	
	Formal participation	Community participation
CP6R Church	.006	.744
CP7R School	.076	.721
CP8R Community development	.341	.555
CP9R Prof. Association	.632	.112
CP10R Union	.732	-.015
CP11R Cooperative	.662	.149
CP12R Civic association	.699	.154
CP13R Political party	-.669	-.111

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

### *Predictors of Communal Participation*

We first examine the predictors of communal participation. The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table VII. 3 below. The results show a number of important patterns. They reveal that females participate *more* than males, a finding, no doubt directly linked to female roles in child rearing and school-related participation. The results also reveal that age is related to communal participation (although we will see below that the pattern is curvilinear). Interestingly the better off participate *less* in communal activities than do the poorer citizens (even when controlling for size of family). We also find that those with higher levels of education participate more. Married Ecuadorians, along with those with more children are more participant, again, because of the education connection. Finally we find two sets of variables directly linked to the environment in which respondents live. Smaller cities and towns have higher levels of participation, and the level of crime, measured by respondent victimization and respondent fear of crime are lower. We need to look at these carefully, as we will below.

<sup>4</sup> This is shown by the high “loadings” of the first three variables on the second “factor” (i.e., dimension) and low loadings on the other variables. The remaining five variables, however, load on the first factor.



**Table VII. 3 Predictors of Communal Participation**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	24.036	3.347		7.181	.000
	Q1 Gender	2.223	.966	.044	2.300	.022
	Q2 How many years old are you?	-.081	.039	-.049	-2.072	.038
	Q10 Monthly family income?	-1.077	.244	-.094	-4.414	.000
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.323	.134	.054	2.404	.016
	MARRIED Marital status	6.104	1.088	.114	5.609	.000
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	.663	.294	.057	2.253	.024
	TAMANO city size	1.479	.271	.108	5.450	.000
	VIC1R Victim of a crime in last year	.038	.012	.062	3.193	.001
	AOJ11 Speaking about the place, neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-1.092	.509	-.041	-2.144	.032

a. Dependent Variable: COMPPT Communal participation

Since we know that both demographic variables, gender and age, have an impact on communal participation, we show the joint effects of both in Figure VII. 3 below. The pattern shown has emerged in many other studies of participation in which the young and old participate less, whereas those in the middle years participate the most. This pattern relates to life style in which younger people, before they establish families, occupy themselves with social activities and spend relatively little time in community activities. Once a person settles down to building a family and child rearing, community activity increases as they now have a stake in their communities. As older age sets in, as children leave home, interest in community activity once again declines, and at the oldest ages, infirmities restrict people's travel outside the home.







Figure VII.3 Communal participation: impact of gender and age



The finding that females participate more than males, as is shown in Figure VII. 3 above needs to be examined a bit more carefully, as the suspicion is that this result is being heavily influenced by school related participation, and also by the fact that females in Latin America are often more heavily involved in church-related activities than males. The question, then, is participation of females also higher in community development associations? Since the overall index does not allow for that distinction to be made, we need to break down the results into their original, individual variable format. As can be seen in Figure VII. 4 below, these expectations are substantiated by the data. Women participate more than men in activities related to the church and to a far higher degree in activities related to the school, but at a lower level in community development association activities. This finding is important because it suggests that in Ecuador civil society participation is very gender specific; it is not the case that women do not participate, but that their participation is very role-specific. We shall see later in this chapter that in many other forms of participation women are restricted in their levels of participation.




**Figure VII. 4 Communal participation: activity by gender**

As noted in the regression analysis, education plays a role in determining participation, but the relationship was not a strong one. When education alone is examined as a predictor of communal participation, those with higher education participate *less* than those with lower levels of education. However, this relationship is influenced by a number of factors, including significant effects of marital status, city size, victimization and other variables shown in the regression analysis in Table VII. 3 above. When the effect of these other variables are removed



from the analysis, the results are shown in Figure VII. 5 below.<sup>5</sup> The effect of education on participation is positive, but quite modest.




**Figure VII. 5 Communal participation and education controlled for covariates**

<sup>5</sup> These effects are removed via analysis of covariance.




Married Ecuadorians participate in communal activities more than do unmarried, as is shown in Figure VII. 6 below. Again, this relationship is in part an effect of having children and of age (as those in their middle years are more likely to be married than the young or old).



**Figure VII. 6** The impact of marital status on communal participation




The impact of family size is shown in Figure VII. 7 below. Once again we see a curvilinear pattern, with those with no children having the lowest participation, those with three children the highest, and then as the number of children goes beyond that level, there is a decline. Perhaps this drop-off is an effect of the old rhyme “Old Mother Hubbard,... she had so many children she did not know what to do.” That is, beyond a certain number of children, it may be that parents are so occupied with child-rearing that their community participation is attenuated.



**Figure VII. 7 Communal participation and number of children**




Finally, we look at neighborhood impacts on communal participation. What we see in Figure VII. 8 below is that the major distinction is between Quito and Guayaquil on the one hand and the rest of the country on the other, with communal participation being lower in these two big cities than elsewhere.



**Figure VII. 8 City size and communal participation**




We already know that crime is more prevalent in urban areas of Ecuador than in more rural areas. In the regression results reported in Table VII. 3 above we saw that crime victimization was a significant predictor of communal participation. However, if the reader looks closely, s/he will find that the sign is *positive*, meaning that those who have been victimized participate more. When this finding is broken down by the different kinds of communal participation these findings become easier to grasp. The results shown in Figure VII. 9 below. As we can see, crime does not have an impact on church committee attendance or on school committee attendance, but it does have an impact on community development association participation. The increase in such participation we assume is a function of the individual's concern with crime, and perhaps with efforts to make neighborhoods safer. We do not know for certain, however, if that is the case, since the survey did not enquire as to the specific nature of community development organization participation.



**Figure VII. 9 Communal participation and crime victimization**



The feeling of fear or security in one's neighborhood is a factor in determining the extent to which Ecuadorians participate in communal activities. When fear is greater, participation is lower, as is shown in Figure VII. 10 below. The impact, however, is primarily on church-related activities.



**Figure VII. 10 Communal participation and perception of neighborhood safety**

### *Predictors of Professional Participation*

We now turn to professional participation, that is, participation in professional associations, union, cooperatives, civic associations and political parties. We run the same regression model that we applied to the communal participation index, and the results are shown in Table VII. 4 below. The results are similar in some ways to those we found for the communal participation, but differ in others. We see, for example, that once again gender is significant, with males participating more than females, even when education, income and other variables are held constant. But, for professional participation, the impact of gender is far stronger than it was for communal participation.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, education plays a stronger role in predicting professional participation than in communal participation. Age income, marital status and

<sup>6</sup> The reader can compare the t coefficients for an idea of the relative strength of gender in these two equations.



number of children, factors significant for communal participation, are not significant for predicting professional participation. Finally, while victimization and fear of crime have a significant impact for both forms of participation, only for professional participation do they both lower participation.

**Table VII. 4 Predictors of Professional Participation**

		Coefficients <sup>a</sup>				
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	6.868	1.666		4.124	.000
	Q1 Gender	-2.614	.480	-.106	-5.445	.000
	Q2 How many years old are you?	.036	.019	.045	1.874	.061
	Q10 Monthly family income?	.209	.121	.037	1.732	.083
	ED Which was the last year of school you completed?	.229	.067	.078	3.432	.001
	MARRIED Marital status	.372	.540	.014	.689	.491
	Q12 How many sons or daughters do you have?	-.271	.147	-.047	-1.845	.065
	TAMANO city size	.424	.135	.063	3.152	.002
	VIC1R Victim of a crime in last year	.021	.006	.068	3.484	.001
	AOJ11 Speaking about the place neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the probability of being victim or assault or robbery	-.856	.253	-.065	-3.384	.001

a. Dependent Variable: PROPPT Professional participation

Since it was found in the regression results reported in Table VII. 4 above that age, income, marital status and number of children were not significant predictors of professional participation, no further analysis of these variables is undertaken here. As noted, however, gender does make a difference. Let us examine the impact of gender on each form of professional association. This is shown in Figure VII. 11 below. As can be seen, the impact of gender is very strong in all areas except political parties, where there is parity between the genders.






Figure VII. 11 Professional participation and the impact of gender



In Ecuador, males are more likely to be in the work force than females, and this factor partly explains the higher levels of participation of males than females. For example, we find that whereas only 7.1% of males list their occupations as “home maker,” 51.5 of females do. This means that women have many fewer opportunities to be members of professional associations, unions and cooperatives than to men. Civic association membership (e.g. Lions clubs), however, should be open to all, yet men are far more participant than women. Again, we assume that gender roles are determinant here. The good news is that political party participation, while fairly rare among all citizens, is equally common for males and females alike.

Education has a differential impact on different forms of professional association, as is shown in Figure VII. 12 below. As can be seen, the strongest impact of education is on participation in professional associations, which is an obvious artifact of educational criteria used in membership of many such associations (e.g. law associations require law degrees). But, cooperative and civic association participation is also higher among the better educated. On the other hand, education has little impact on participation in unions and none on participation in political parties. Once again, this is a positive finding, suggesting that political parties accept participation from a broad spectrum of the public, not just well-educated males.




Figure VII. 12 Professional participation and education

Finally, we look at the impact of city size and crime on professional participation. The results of city size are shown in Figure VII. 13 below. The results are complex, but clearly show



that city size has no impact on political party participation, again indicating that there is a substantial degree of equality of participation in this area. Civic association participation and (surprisingly) union participation is lower in Quito and, to a lesser extent, Guayaquil, is lower than in the rest of the country. Presumably this suggests that rural unions are more common than urban, which is an uncommon situation. Finally, professional associations are far lower in Guayaquil than they are in other areas, which is also a surprise.





Figure VII. 13 Professional participation and city size




Crime victimization lowers participation. The results are shown in Figure VII. 14 below.



**Figure VII. 14 Professional participation and crime victimization**



Fear of crime also lowers professional participation, as is shown in Figure VII. 15 below.



**Figure VII. 15 Professional participation and fear of crime**



We can conclude this section by noting that we now have a great deal about the levels of civil society participation in Ecuador, and the way the levels of that participation varies by demographic, socio-economic and other factors.

### ***Does Civil Society Participation Lead to Action?***

Thus far this chapter has explored the levels of participation of Ecuadorian in various civil society organizations. It has been found that Ecuadorian citizens are active in a broad range of civil society organizations. It could be argued, however, that participation in committees could be purely social events, and that citizens meet to have a good time, not to stimulate change in their communities.

It is possible to test this suspicion by examining the linkages between “talk” and “action.” The survey not only asked about attendance in civil society organizations, but it also asked about individual work in resolving community problems. Is talk associated with action? Most definitely. But first, we need to examine the overall levels of community problem-solving efforts.<sup>7</sup>

The survey asked the respondents if they had been active in trying to contribute to solving a neighborhood problem. The text of the item read as follows:

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...

**CP5.** ¿En los últimos dos años usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?

(1) Sí [**sigá**]


(2) No [**Pase a CP6**]

(8) NS

The results are shown in Figure below. As can be seen, over two-fifths of the respondents have taken such action.

<sup>7</sup>The theoretical research on which this series is based comes from Mitchell A. Seligson, "A Problem-Solving Approach to Measuring Political Efficacy," *Social Science Quarterly* 60 March (1980): 630-42.






**Figure VII. 16 Worked to help resolve community problem**




Now we return to the question about “talk vs. action” to see if those who involve themselves in civil society organizations are more likely to work to resolve community problems. The results shown in Figure VII. 17 below. As can be seen, the impact is very strong. Fewer than one-third of respondents who never participate in community development association organizations actually attempt to solve problems, whereas over 80% of those who participate on a weekly basis do so. The pattern is similar for the other forms of communal participation.



**Figure VII. 17 Impact of community development association participation on voluntary participation**




A similar pattern is found for participation in professional associations, but the relationship is not as strong. The results are shown in Figure VII. 18 below.



**Figure VII. 18 Impact of professional association participation on voluntary participation**



Finally, we find linkages between civil society participation and participation at the level of the municipality. Citizens active in their local communities are far more likely to be active in their local governments, as is shown in Figure VII. 19 below.




**Figure VII. 19 Community development association participation and attending municipal meetings**



### *Does Civil Society Participation Lead to Increased System Support?*

The many strong arguments made by and since DeToqueville for the importance of civil society participation have frequently suggested that participant citizens are loyal citizens. In terms of the analysis of the survey data in this study, we want to know if civil society participation translates into higher system support. We do have some indication that that is the case. Consider participation in the parent-teacher organization, which has the highest level of participation other than church-related participation. The results are shown in Figure VII. 20 below. As can be seen, greater participation translates into greater system support. The overall scale of communal participation and system support are significantly associated, but professional participation is not, indicating that the key organizations for democracy are the communal organizations.



**Figure VII. 20 Participation in parent-teacher organization and system support**

### *Conclusions*

This chapter has found that civil society participation in Ecuador is common, although not as high as it is in some other countries. It has also found that this participation is widespread,



found among rich and poor, young and old, although there are differences in demographic, socio-economic and residential patterns. Civil society participation, moreover, is directly linked to local action and to participation in local government. The more such participation, the more active citizens are in working to resolve problems in their local communities and to attend municipal meetings.



## APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE IN SPANISH



Latin American  
Public Opinion  
Project

Versión # 19, Lunes, 22 de Octubre de 2001; 16:51

**UNIVERSIDAD DE PITTSBURGH**  
**AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Ecuador, 2001**

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Provincia: _____	<b>PROV</b>	
Cantón: _____	<b>CANTON</b>	
Parroquia: _____	<b>PAROQ</b>	
Zona _____	<b>ZONA</b>	
Sector _____	<b>SEC</b>	
Manzana (o Segmento) _____	<b>MANZANA</b>	
Estrato: 1. Costa Urbana 2. Costa Rural 3. Sierra Urbana 4. Sierra Rural 5. Oriente Norte 6. Oriente Sur 8. Frontera norte 9. Frontera sur	<b>ESTRATO</b>	
Idioma del cuestionario (1) Español (2) Quichua	<b>IDIOMAQ</b>	
Número de visitas a la casa: 1 2 3	<b>CALLBACK</b>	

Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Q1. ANOTE:</b> Sexo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	<b>Q1</b>	
<b>A4.</b> Para empezar, en su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema <b>más grave</b> que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	<b>A4</b>	
<p>(01) Problemas económicos (03) Desempleo (05) Delincuencia, crimen, violencia (07) Falta de tierra para cultivar</p> <p>(09) Problemas del medio ambiente (11) Narcotráfico (13) Pandillas (15) Migración</p> <p>(88) No sabe</p> <p>Anotar si no existe código:</p>		
<p>(02) Inflación, altos precios (04) Pobreza (06) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) (08) Falta de crédito</p> <p>(10) Drogadicción (12) Corrupción (14) Mal gobierno (16) La guerra contra terrorismo</p>		

<i>Con qué frecuencia ...</i>	<b>Todos los días</b>	<b>Una o dos veces por semana</b>	<b>Rara vez</b>	<b>Nunca</b>		
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A1</b>	
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A2</b>	
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<b>A3</b>	

<b>SOCT1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica del país? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT2</b>	
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que en los próximos doce meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>SOCT3</b>	
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría UD. que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO1</b>	
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO2</b>	
<b>IDIO3.</b> Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree Ud. que su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) No sabe	<b>IDIO3</b>	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido UD. ayuda o cooperación ... ?

	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>		
<b>CP1.</b> Al presidente de la República	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP1</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP2</b>	
<b>CP3.</b> Al alcalde	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP3</b>	
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio u oficina del gobierno nacional	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4</b>	
<b>CP4A.</b> A la CONAIE ó a otro movimiento indígena	(1)	(2)	(8)	<b>CP4A</b>	

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	<b>CP5</b>	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En los últimos dos años usted ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio?		
(1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a CP6]</b> (8) NS		

<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado UD. dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5A</b>	
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido UD. con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5B</b>	
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo UD. a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5C</b>	
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar UD. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS	<b>CP5D</b>	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si UD. asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de algún comité o sociedad de la Iglesia o templo?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes o productores?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP11.</b> ¿Reuniones de una cooperativa?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP11</b>
<b>CP12.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna asociación cívica?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP12</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido político?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	<b>CP13</b>

<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría UD. que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS	<b>LS1</b>	
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<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de la comunidad o de su barrio en general es ..? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS	<b>IT1</b>	
<b>IT2.</b> ¿Cree UD. que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? (1) Se preocupa de sí misma (2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo (8) NS	<b>IT2</b>	
<b>IT3.</b> ¿Cree UD. que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, tratarían de aprovecharse de UD., o cree que no se aprovecharían de Usted? (1) Sí, se aprovecharían (2) No se aprovecharían (8) NS	<b>IT3</b>	

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría UD. en esta escala? Ponga una X en la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b> (NS=88)
<b>Izquierda</b> <span style="float: right;"><b>Derecha</b></span>										

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto [reuniones convocadas por el alcalde] durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario,	<b>NP2</b>	

concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? No (1) Sí (2) (8) No sabe/ no recuerda		
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son ... ? (1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos, ni malos (4) Malos (5) Muy Malos (8) No sabe	<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>SGL2.</b> ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al municipio para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mala, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe	<b>SGL2</b>	
<b>LGL1.</b> En su opinión, ¿Entre el gobierno nacional, los diputados, o el municipio quién ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de su comunidad o barrio? ¿El gobierno nacional? ¿Los diputados? O ¿El municipio? (1) El gobierno nacional (2) Los diputados (3) El municipio [ <b>NO LEER</b> (4) Ninguno] [ <b>NO LEER</b> (5) Todos igual] (8) No sabe / no contesta	<b>LGL1</b>	
<b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al municipio, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma [ <b>NO LEER</b> (3) No cambiar nada] [ <b>NO LEER</b> (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios] (8) No sabe / no contesta	<b>LGL2</b>	
<b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al municipio? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe	<b>LGL3</b>	
<b>LGL4.</b> ¿Cree usted que el alcalde y el concejo municipal responden a lo que el pueblo quiere siempre, la mayoría de veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca? (1) Siempre (2) La mayoría de veces (3) De vez en cuando (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (8) No sabe	<b>LGL4</b>	
<b>MUNI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual Alcalde de este municipio? Anotar Nombre: _____ [ <b>revisar lista de alcaldes</b> ] (1) Correcto (0) Incorrecto (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI1</b>	
<b>MUNI2.</b> En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? [ <b>No leer respuestas</b> ] [ <b>aceptar una sola respuesta</b> ] (00) Ninguno [ <b>pase a MUNI5</b> ] (01) alta de agua (02) Falta de arreglo de calles (03) Falta de seguridad, delincuencia (04) Falta de Aseo público (05) Falta de servicios (06) La situación económica (07) Falta de fondos y ayuda (10) Mala administración (11) Descuido del medio ambiente (88) NS/NR [ <b>pase a MUNI5</b> ] Otros [anotar]: _____	<b>MUNI2</b>	

<p><b>MUNI3.</b> ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde de este municipio por resolver ese problema? [<b>leer respuestas</b>]  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS</p>	<p><b>MUNI3</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5.</b> ¿Ha participado Ud. en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?  (1) Sí, ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI5A.</b> ¿En qué cosas gasta la municipalidad la mayor parte de su presupuesto? [<b>No Leer</b>]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Aseo público</li> <li>2. Caminos, carreteras, puentes, canchas de fútbol, u otros obras públicas</li> <li>3. Salud, educación</li> <li>4. Corrupción</li> <li>5. Sueldos</li> <li>6. Nada</li> <li>Otro</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;">88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI5A</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene Usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio?  (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI6</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI7.</b> En su opinión, ¿los proyectos que ejecuta el municipio benefician o no benefician a personas como Ud. y a su familia?  (1) Sí benefician (0) No benefician (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MUNI7</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI8.</b> ¿Ha realizado UD. algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante el último año?  (1) Sí [<i>sig</i>] (0) No [<i>pase a MUNI11</i>] (8) NS/NR [<i>Pase a MUNI11</i>]</p>	<p><b>MUNI8</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI9.</b> ¿Cómo fue atendido? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (4) Mal  (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.</p>	<p><b>MUNI9</b></p>
<p><b>MUNI10.</b> ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR  (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>MUNI10</b></p>

<b>MUNI11.</b> ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS/NR	<b>MUNI11</b>	
<b>MUNI11A.</b> ¿Quién cree que influye más en las decisiones que se toman en el municipio? <i>[lea las alternativas] [aceptar solo una respuesta]</i> (01) El alcalde [presidente del concejo municipal] (02) El partido del alcalde (03) El Concejo Municipal (04) El Gobierno Nacional (05) Las Organizaciones comunitarias (06) Las Organizaciones No-gubernamentales (ONG's) (07) Los empresarios privados (77) Otros: [solo si mencionan] _____ (88) No sabe	<b>MUNI11A</b>	
<b>MUNI15.</b> ¿Qué tan interesado cree Ud. que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI15</b>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al Desempleo muy alto	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC1</b>	
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC4</b>	
<b>JC7.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema izquierda en las elecciones	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC7</b>	
<b>JC8.</b> Frente al triunfo de partidos de la extrema derecha en las elecciones	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC8</b>	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC10</b>	
<b>JC11.</b> Frente a mucho desorden social	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC11</b>	
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC12</b>	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción	(1) justificaría	Se	(2) No justificaría	se	(8) NS	<b>JC13</b>	

<b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido UD. víctima de una agresión física o de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí <i>[siga]</i> (2) No <i>[Pasar a AOJIC]</i>	<b>VIC1</b>	
<b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de agresión o acto delincuenciales sufrió UD.? <i>[Lea las alternativas][Si es más de un crimen, marque aquí el más reciente y llene VIC3B y VIC3C]</i> (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (77) Otro (especifique) _____ (99) Inap (no vic.)	<b>VIC2</b>	

VIC3B. Crimen # 2 _____ (usar código de VIC2)	VIC3B
VIC3C. Crimen # 3 _____ (usar código de VIC2)	VIC3C
AOJ1. <i>[Si ha sido víctima]</i> ¿Denunció UD. el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí <i>[siga]</i> (2) No lo denunció <i>[Pasar a AOJ1B]</i> (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)	AOJ1
AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció UD. el hecho? <i>[marcar una sola alternativa y pase a AOJ1C]</i> (1) Fiscalía (2) Policía (3) Juzgados (6) Prensa Otro: _____ (8)NS (9) Inap (no víctima)	AOJ1A
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS (9) No víctima	AOJ1B
AOJ1C. <b>[se hace a TODOS]</b> ¿Si Ud. observa a alguien cometiendo un delito en su barrio, que haría? 1. Llamaría a la policía 2. Llamaría a los vecinos 3. No haría nada 4. Detenerlos 5. Justicia mano propia 6. Llamaría familiares 8. NS/NR	AOJ1C
AOJ2. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	AOJ2
AOJ3. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, ¿cómo lo atienden? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	AOJ3
AOJ4. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas de la Fiscalía, ¿cómo lo atienden? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Mal (4) Muy mal (9) Nunca hizo trámites (8) NS/NR	AOJ4
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿Cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen(8) NS	AOJ8
AOJ9. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿Cree usted que: Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva para poder entrar a su domicilio o la policía puede entrar a la casa sin necesidad de una orden	AOJ9

judicial? sin una orden judicial	(1) Se debería esperar a la orden judicial (8) NS	(2) La policía puede entrar			
<b>AOJ10.</b> ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunos derechos y libertades o respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden.	(1) Vivir en sociedad ordenada	(2) Respetar derechos y libertades	(8) NS	<b>AOJ10</b>	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde UD. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente UD. muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?	(1) Muy seguro	(2) Más o menos seguro	(3) Algo inseguro	(4) Muy Inseguro	<b>AOJ11</b>
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si UD. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?	(1) Mucho	(2) Algo	(3) Poco	(4) Nada	<b>AOJ12</b>
	(8) NS/NR				
<b>AOJ13.</b> ¿Ha oído hablar sobre el nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal?	(1) Sí	(2) No		<b>AOJ13</b>	
	(8) NS/NR				

**[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1- que significa NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a UD. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho UD. elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a UD. ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<b>Nada</b>						<b>Mucho</b>	No sabe

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas.

<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? ( <b>Sondee:</b> Si UD. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio )		<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene UD. respeto por las instituciones políticas del Ecuador?		<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree UD. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente UD. orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa UD. que se debe apoyar el sistema político ecuatoriano?		<b>B6</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?		<b>B11</b>	

<b>B12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en las Fuerza Armadas?		<b>B12</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Congreso Nacional?		<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en el Gobierno Nacional?		<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		<b>B15</b>	
<b>B16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Procuraduría General del Estado?		<b>B16</b>	
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		<b>B17</b>	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Policía?		<b>B18</b>	
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Contraloría?		<b>B19</b>	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en la Iglesia Católica?		<b>B20</b>	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en los partidos políticos?		<b>B21</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su Municipio?		<b>B32</b>	
<b>B33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?		<b>B33</b>	
<b>B35.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las últimas elecciones Presidenciales (1998) fueron libres, o sea que la gente pudo votar por el candidato que prefería?		<b>B35</b>	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		<b>B37</b>	
<b>B38.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los sindicatos?		<b>B38</b>	
<b>B39.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las cámaras de los empresarios privados?		<b>B39</b>	
<b>B40.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?		<b>B40</b>	
<b>B41.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la junta parroquial?		<b>B41</b>	
<b>B42.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?		<b>B42</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser ecuatoriano?		<b>B43</b>	
<b>B44.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?		<b>B44</b>	
<b>B45.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión Anticorrupción?		<b>B45</b>	
<b>B46.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus parientes?		<b>B46</b>	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus amigos?		<b>B47</b>	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en sus vecinos?		<b>B48</b>	
<b>B49.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la gente de su barrio?		<b>B49</b>	

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría Ud. Que el Gobierno actual (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)			
N1. Combate la pobreza.			N1
N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.			N3
N9. Combate la corrupción en el Gobierno.			N9

**[Recoja tarjeta "A"]**

**[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "B"]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que UD. desapueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que UD. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza UD. aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>							<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>			<b>No sabe</b>

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.			E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.			E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.			E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.			E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas.			E14
E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.			E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.			E3

*[No recoja tarjeta "B"]*

**Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de ver la tarjeta B. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.**

<b>D32.</b> ¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal ley?		<b>D32</b>	
<b>D33.</b> ¿Qué opina de una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político ecuatoriano? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba esta prohibición?		<b>D33</b>	
<b>D34.</b> ¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure programas de televisión? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?		<b>D34</b>	
<b>D35.</b> ¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure películas en los cines? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?		<b>D35</b>	
<b>D36.</b> ¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?		<b>D36</b>	
<b>D37.</b> ¿Qué opina de que el gobierno censure la propaganda de personas que critican nuestro país? ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba tal censura?		<b>D37</b>	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Ecuador. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos **[tarjeta B]**.

<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Ecuador, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</i>		<b>D1</b>	
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>	
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>	
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>	

*[Recoja tarjeta "B"]*

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está UD. más de acuerdo? <b>NEWTOL4.</b> (1) El Estado debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea que pueda dañar a nuestra nación <b>o...</b> (2) El Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello. (1) Prohibir la expresión (2) No prohibir la expresión (8) NS		<b>NEWTOL4</b>	
<b>NEWTOL5.</b> (1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran <b>o...</b> (2) Los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestra sociedad y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno. (1) Tienen derecho (2) Deberían ser controlados (8) NS		<b>NEWTOL5</b>	

<b>ACRI.</b> Ahora le voy a leer tres frases. Por favor dígame cual de las tres describe mejor su opinión: (1) La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios, o... (2) Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas, o.... (3) Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.		<b>ACRI</b>	
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<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		<b>DEM2</b>	
<b>DEM6.</b> Ahora le voy a leer un par de frases sobre la democracia. Por favor, dígame con cual está más de acuerdo: (1) En general, y a pesar de algunos problemas, la democracia es la mejor		<b>DEM6</b>	

<p>forma de gobierno (2) Hay otras formas de gobierno que pueden ser tan buenas o mejores que la democracia (8) No sabe</p>		
<p><b>DEM8.</b> ¿Cree UD. que los militares deben estar subordinados al poder civil? ¿o el poder civil debe estar subordinado a los militares? (1) Militares subordinados (2) Civiles subordinados (8) NS</p>	<b>DEM8</b>	
<p><b>DEM9.</b> ¿Considera UD. que en nuestro país los militares son los que mandan o son los civiles los que mandan? (1) Militares mandan (2) Civiles mandan (8) NS</p>	<b>DEM9</b>	
<p><b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura <i>[siga]</i> (2) Participación de todos <i>[pase a DEM13]</i> (8) No responde <i>[pase a DEM13]</i></p>	<b>DEM11</b>	
<p><b>DEM12.</b> Dígame por favor, ¿qué significa para UD. un gobierno de mano dura? <b>[No leer respuestas] [anotar una sola respuesta]</b> 1 Gobierno militar 2 Que haga respetar la ley 3 Que haga leyes más duras 4 Que imponga su decisión 5 Que respete la ley 6 Que ponga orden 7 Ser fuerte con los delincuentes 8 Que vele por la ciudadanía Otras respuestas _____ 88 NS</p>	<b>DEM12</b>	
<p><b>DEM13.</b> En pocas palabras, que significa para UD. la democracia? <b>[No leer alternativas] [anotar solo una respuesta]</b> (1) Libertad (2) Igualdad (3) Bienestar, progreso económico (4) Capitalismo (5) Gobierno no militar (6) Libre comercio, libre negocio (7) Elecciones, voto (10) Derecho de escoger los líderes (11) Corrupción (12) Participación (13) Gobierno de la gente (14) Obedecer la ley Otro (anotar) _____ (88) NS/NR</p>	<b>DEM13</b>	
<p><b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa UD.? (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ver con elecciones (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>AUT1</b>	
<p><b>AUT2.</b> El sistema actual de gobierno no ha sido el único que ha tenido nuestro país. Alguna gente piensa que estaríamos mejor si los militares volvieran a gobernar. Otros dicen que debemos mantener el sistema que tenemos ahora. ¿Qué piensa UD.? (1) Retorno de los militares (2) El mismo que tenemos ahora <i>[(0)</i> <i>Ninguna]</i></p>	<b>AUT2</b>	

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted de acuerdo?

<b>AUT3</b>	(1) Lo que el Ecuador necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura	..	(2) Lo que el país necesita es un hombre que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la población (8) NS	<b>AUT3</b>
<b>AUT4</b>	(1) La única forma de sacar al país adelante es eliminar con mano dura a los que causan problemas	..	(2) Para que el país salga adelante es necesario tomar en cuenta a todas las personas inclusive aquellas que causan problemas (8) NS	<b>AUT4</b>
<b>AUT5</b>	(1) Los derechos humanos son más importantes que el orden y la seguridad	..	(2) En lugar de derechos humanos lo que nuestro país necesita es mucho orden y seguridad (8) NS	<b>AUT5</b>

<b>AUT6.</b> ¿Qué tipo de gobierno necesita este país...? (1) Uno que sepa tomar decisiones rápidas o eficientes aunque no tome en cuenta a todos los sectores (2) Uno que tome en cuenta a todos los sectores aunque tarde más en sus decisiones (8) NS		<b>AUT6</b>
Voy a leerle algunos de los problemas que tenemos en el país, para que me diga quién cree usted que puede solucionarlos mejor; <b>sí un gobierno civil electo, o un gobierno militar:</b>		<b>MIL1</b>
<b>MIL1.</b> Reducir el desempleo 1. Un gobierno civil electo 2. Un gobierno militar 8. NS/NR		<b>MIL2</b>
<b>MIL2.</b> Combatir la delincuencia 1. Un gobierno civil electo 2. Un gobierno militar 8. NS/NR		<b>MIL3</b>
<b>MIL3.</b> Combatir la corrupción 1. Un gobierno civil electo 2. Un gobierno militar 8. NS/NR		<b>MIL4</b>
<b>MIL4.</b> Mejorar la economía 1. Un gobierno civil electo 2. Un gobierno militar 8. NS/NR		<b>MIL5</b>
<b>MIL5.</b> Tomar decisiones más rápidas 1. Un gobierno civil electo 2. Un gobierno militar 8. NS/NR		

<p><b>D26.</b> De los dos gobiernos que voy a describir, para UD. cuál es más democrático...          ¿Un sistema en que todos tengamos garantizado un nivel básico de vida? O ¿Un sistema en que las cosas se decidan por mayoría?          1. Nivel básico 2. Mayoría 8. NS</p>	<b>D26</b>	
<p><b>D43.</b> ¿Qué tipo de Presidente de la República prefiere usted más? Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o... Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evitando el Congreso si fuera necesario.          1. Leyes 2. Rápidamente, evitando el Congreso 8.NS/NR</p>	<b>D43</b>	
<p><b>D46.</b> Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno: Mantener el orden en la sociedad, o respetar la libertad del individuo          1. Mantener orden 2. Respetar la libertad 8. NS</p>	<b>D46</b>	
<p><b>D47.</b> En las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por cuál de estos dos tipos de gobiernos votaría usted:          1. ¿Un gobierno que garantice la seguridad económica y la posibilidad de un buen ingreso?          2. ¿Un gobierno que garantice las elecciones libres, la libertad de expresión y de prensa?          8. No sabe/ No responde</p>	<b>D47</b>	

<p><b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otra para que vote por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que vote por un partido o candidato? <i>[lea las alternativas]</i>          (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>PP1</b>	
<p><b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó UD. para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 1998?          (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>PP2</b>	
<p><b>ABS5.</b> ¿Cree UD. que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?          (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) No importa como vote (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>ABS5</b>	

<p><b>M1.</b> Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría UD. que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Gustavo Noboa es:          (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>M1</b>	
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<i>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</i>	No	Sí	NS	INAP		
<b>EXC1.</b> ¿Ha sido acusado durante el último año por un agente de policía por una infracción que UD. no cometió?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC1</b>
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC4.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando coimas (soborno) a un policía en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC4</b>
<b>EXC5.</b> ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC5</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? ¿O no ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en el último año [marcar 9]?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)		<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último año? ¿O es que UD. no trabaja [marcar 9]?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)		<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9] ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)		<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? [Si dice “no,” marcar 9] Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)		<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? [Si dice “no” marcar 9] En la escuela o colegio durante el último año. ¿Le han exigido pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)		<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguna gente le pidió una coima para evitar el pago de la luz eléctrica?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?	(0)	(1)	(8)			<b>EXC18</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta...? (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada(4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR	<b>EX C7</b>	
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**[Usar tarjeta “C”]**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree UD. que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado.

<b>INSTITUCIONES</b>	<b>Grado de corrupción</b>										<b>NS</b>		
	<b>Muy corruptos</b>					<b>Muy honrados</b>							
<b>PC1.</b> Los diputados	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC1</b>	
<b>PC2.</b> Los ministros	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC2</b>	
<b>PC3.</b> Los alcaldes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC3</b>	
<b>PC4.</b> Los concejales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC4</b>	
<b>PC5.</b> Los policías	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC5</b>	
<b>PC8.</b> Los profesores universitarios	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC8</b>	
<b>PC9.</b> Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC9</b>	
<b>PC12.</b> Los jueces	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC12</b>	
<b>PC13.</b> Los militares	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>	
<b>PC14.</b> Los líderes de los partidos políticos	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC14</b>	
<b>PC15.</b> Los líderes de las ONG's	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC15</b>	
<b>PC16.</b> Los fiscales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC16</b>	
<b>PC17.</b> Los Prefectos Provinciales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC17</b>	
<b>PC18.</b> Los Consejeros provinciales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC18</b>	
<b>PC19.</b> La prensa	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC19</b>	
<b>PC20.</b> Los líderes de las organizaciones indígenas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC20</b>	
<b>PC21.</b> Los Presidentes de la República	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	<b>PC21</b>	

Recoja Tarjeta C

<b>Ahora me puede decir...</b> <b>GI1.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [No leer, George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (no sabe)	<b>GI1</b>	
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Ecuador? [No leer, José Cordero]	<b>GI2</b>	

(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)		
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cuantas provincias tiene el Ecuador? [ <i>No leer, 22</i> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI3</b>	
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Ecuador? [ <i>No leer, cuatro años</i> ] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI4</b>	
<b>GI5.</b> ¿Recuerda usted cómo se llama el presidente de Chile? [ <i>No leer, Ricardo Lagos</i> ] (1) Correcto(2) Incorrecto (o no sabe)	<b>GI5</b>	
<b>POV1.</b> Debido a la crisis económica ¿Ha tenido que sacar algún hijo de la escuela o colegio?  1. Sí 2. No. 8 NS/NR 9 No tiene hijos en la escuela/colegio	<b>POV1</b>	
<b>POV2.</b> ¿Recibe algún miembro de su familia el Bono Solidario 1. Sí 2. No. 8NS/NR	<b>POV2</b>	
<b>POV3.</b> ¿Recibe algún miembro de su familia la Beca Escolar? 1. Sí [ <b>Seguir con POV4</b> ] 2. No [ <b>PASAR A POV5</b> ] 8. NS/NR	<b>POV3</b>	
<b>POV4. [SOLO PARA LOS QUE RECIBEN LA BECA ESCOLAR]</b> ¿La beca escolar le ha ayudado a mantener a su hijo (sus hijos) en la escuela o no le ha ayudado? 1. Sí ayuda 2. No ayuda 8 NS/NR 9. Inap (no recibe Beca Escolar)	<b>POV4</b>	
<b>POV5.</b> La beca escolar paga \$6 por cada hijo por cada mes que asiste a la escuela. ¿En su opinión esta cifra es suficiente para ayudar a una familia pobre a mantener algún hijo en la escuela, o es insuficiente?  1. Sí es suficiente. 2. No es suficiente 8. NS/NR	<b>POV5</b>	
<b>POV6.</b> ¿Cree Ud. que es importante seguir con la política del libre comercio internacional con otros países, o cree que el libre comercio ha dañado a nuestro país?  1. Seguir con libre comercio 2. Ha dañado a nuestro país 8. NS/NR	<b>POV6</b>	
<b>POV7.</b> Si tuviera problemas económicos serios, ¿a dónde acudiría UD.? [ <b>No leer lista</b> ] (1) A la iglesia (2) A la escuela (3) A la Municipalidad (4) A las ONGs (5) A Un Chulquero (6) A una asociación comunitaria (7) Al Ministerio de Bienestar Social (8) A un amigo (9) A La familia Otro _____ 88 NS/NR	<b>POV7</b>	
<b>POV8.</b> Si busca Ud. un préstamo, ¿a dónde acudiría Ud.? [ <b>No leer alternativas</b> ] 1. Un banco 2. Un Chulquero 3. Un amigo 4. Una cooperativa 5. Una ONG 6. La familia Otro _____ 88. NS/NR	<b>POV8</b>	
<b>POV9.</b> ¿Debido a la situación económica del país, ha tenido su familia que dejar de comer algunas cosas que comía antes?  1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR	<b>POV9</b>	

<p><b>ENVIO1.</b> ¿Cree UD. que la gente que viola las leyes que protegen nuestro medio ambiente debería ser castigada como criminal o cree que debe de recibir un castigo menor? (1) castigado como criminal (2) castigo menor (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO1</b></p>
<p><b>ENVIO2.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la contaminación del ambiente, especialmente del aire y el agua es un problema muy serio, mientras otros dicen que esto es más que nada propaganda de grupos ambientalistas fanáticos. ¿Cuál opinión refleja más su punto de vista? 1. problema muy serio 2. propaganda 8 NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO2</b></p>
<p><b>ENVIO3.</b> ¿Estaría dispuesto a contribuir con algo de su tiempo para ayudar a proteger y limpiar el medio ambiente, o es que está demasiado ocupado con otras cosas? 1. dispuesta a contribuir tiempo 2. demasiado ocupado 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO3</b></p>
<p><b>ENVIO4.</b> En su opinión, ¿las ONGs han ayudado mucho, poco o nada a proteger el medio ambiente? 1. mucho 2. poco 3. nada 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO4</b></p>
<p><b>ENVIO5.</b> En su opinión, ¿el municipio ayuda mucho, poco o nada a proteger el medio ambiente? 1. mucho 2. poco 3. nada 8NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO5</b></p>
<p><b>ENVIO6.</b> En su opinión, ¿el gobierno nacional ayuda mucho, poco o nada a proteger el medio ambiente? 1. mucho 2. poco 3. nada 8.NS/NR</p>	<p><b>ENVIO6</b></p>

<p><b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene UD. cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS</p>	<p><b>VB1</b></p>
<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Voto UD. en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 1998? (1) Si votó <i>[siga]</i> (2) No votó <i>[pasar a VB4]</i></p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>

<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las elecciones pasadas de mayo de 1998? <b>[Si no votó, seguir con VB4. Si votó, pasar a VB5]</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Democracia Popular [lista 5: Jamil Mahuad]</li> <li>2. Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano [lista 10: Alvaro Noboa]</li> <li>3. Alianza PRE---APRE---UPL [lista 10-13-16: Alvaro Noboa]</li> <li>4. Izquierda Democrática [lista 12: Rodrigo Borja]</li> <li>5. Movimiento Popular Democrático [lista 15: Maria Eugenia Lima]</li> <li>6. Pachakutic-- [lista 18: Freddy Ehlers]</li> <li>7. Alianza Nacional--MIRA [lista 11: Rosalía Artiaga]</li> <li>8. Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País [lista 21: Freddy Ehlers]</li> <li>9. Alianza Pachukutic-Nuevo País [lista 18-21: Freddy Ehlers]</li> <li>10. Otro _____</li> <li>11. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco</li> </ol> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. Inap (No votó)</p>	<b>VB3</b>
<p><b>VB4.</b> Si no votó, ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? <b>[anotar una sola respuesta]</b></p> <p>(01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato  (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de cédula de identidad (07)No se encontró en el padrón electoral</p> <p>Otro _____ (88) NS/NR</p>	<b>VB4</b>
<p><b>VB5.</b> Ahora dígame ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones para el Alcalde y diputados en el 2000?</p> <p>(1) Sí <i>[siga]</i> (2) No <i>[PASE a ED]</i> (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>VB5</b>

<p><b>VB6.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para Alcalde en las elecciones pasadas del 2000?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Partido Conservador</li> <li>2. Democracia Popular</li> <li>3. Partido Social Cristiano</li> <li>4. Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano</li> <li>5. Izquierda Democrática</li> <li>6. Frente Radical Alfarista</li> <li>7. Movimiento Popular Democrático</li> <li>8. Partido Socialista Frente Amplio</li> <li>9. Pachakutic</li> <li>10. Otro _____</li> <li>11. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco</li> </ol> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. Inap (No votó)</p>	<b>VB6</b>
<p><b>VB7.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado provincial (para el Congreso Nacional) en las elecciones pasadas del 2000?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Partido Conservador</li> <li>2. Democracia Popular</li> <li>3. Partido Social Cristiano</li> <li>4. Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano</li> <li>5. Izquierda Democrática</li> <li>6. Frente Radical Alfarista</li> <li>7. Movimiento Popular Democrático</li> <li>8. Partido Socialista Frente Amplio</li> <li>9. Pachakutic</li> <li>10. Otro _____</li> <li>11. Varios _____</li> <li>12. Voto Nulo/ Voto en Blanco</li> </ol> <p>(88) NS/NR    (99) Inap (no votó)</p>	<b>VB7</b>

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que UD. aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

Ninguno	(00)						<b>ED</b>	
Primaria	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		
Secundaria	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Universitaria	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)		
No sabe/no responde	(88)							

<b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	<b>Q2</b>	
<b>Q3.</b> ¿Cuál es su religión? (1) Católica (practicante) (2) Católica (no practicante) (3) Evangélica (4) Ninguna (5) Otra: _____ (8) No qu	<b>Q3</b>	
<b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran sus ingresos familiares mensuales? <b>[Incluir remesas del exterior]</b> <b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta D]</b> (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$25 (02) Entre \$26- \$50 (03) \$51-\$100 (04) \$101-\$150 (05) \$151-\$200 (06) \$201-\$300 (07) \$301-\$400 (08) \$401-500 (09) \$501-\$750 (10) \$751-\$1,000 (11) \$1,001- \$1,500 (12) \$1,501-\$2,000 (13) \$2,000 y más (88) NS/NR	<b>Q10</b>	
<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b> (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (0 = ninguno)	<b>Q12</b>	

<b>ETID.</b> ¿Ud. se considera blanco, mestizo, indígena o negro? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Otra _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>
<b>LENG1.</b> ¿Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (accepte más de una alternativa) (1) Castellano (2) Quichua (3) Otro (nativo) _____ (4) Otro (extranjero) _____ (8) NS/NR	<b>LENG1</b>

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: *[leer todos]*

<b>R1.</b> Televisor a color	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R1</b>
<b>R2.</b> Televisor en blanco y negro	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R2</b>
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora [nevera]	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono (convencional)	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>
<b>R10.</b> Número de focos y lámparas en la casa	_____			(00) No hay focos	<b>R10</b>
<b>R11.</b> Radio	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R11</b>
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>
<b>R13.</b> Electricidad	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R13</b>
<b>R14.</b> Baño interno	(0) No			(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>

**OCUPI. ¿En qué trabaja UD? (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)**

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración		OCUPI
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	7	Amas de Casa	13	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	8	Estudiantes	14	
Agricultores dueños, partidarios o arrendatarios de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de planta	9	Jubilados y Rentistas	15	
Ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros y trabajadores	10	Trabajadores ocasionales	16	
Profesionales independientes	5	Campeños empleados en faenas agrícolas	11			
Artesanos independientes	6	Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	12			

<b>OCUPIA.</b> ¿Es dueño o alquila tierras de labranza? (1) Dueño [siga a OCUP2] (2) Alquila [siga a OCUP4] (3) No [siga a TI]	<b>OCUPIA</b>
<b>OCUP2.</b> ¿Cuántas hectáreas mide en total la tierra que UD. es dueño(a)? _____ . _____ (enteros . decimales) [si la respuesta no es en hectáreas, anotar textualmente _____] (anote fracciones: 1/4 = .25; 1/3 = .33; 1/2 = .50 2/3 = .66; 3/4 = .75) 00.00 = Inap (no tiene tierra)	<b>OCUP2</b>
<b>OCUP3.</b> ¿Tiene título de propiedad o escritura de toda, alguna parte o nada de esta tierra? 1. Toda 2. Alguna parte 3. Nada 8. NS 9. Inap (no tiene tierra)	<b>OCUP3</b>
<b>OCUP4.</b> ¿Cuántas hectáreas mide en total la tierra que UD. alquila? _____ . _____ (enteros . decimales) (anote fracciones: 1/4 = .25; 1/3 = .33; 1/2 = .50 2/3 = .66; 3/4 = .75) 00.00 = Inap (no alquila tierra)	<b>OCUP4</b>
<b>Hora terminada la entrevista</b> _____ : _____ <b>TI.</b> Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	<b>TI</b>

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios: \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

## Tarjeta "A"

<b>Mucho</b>	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
<b>Nada</b>	1

## Tarjeta "B"

<b>Aprueba</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>9</b>
	<b>8</b>
	<b>7</b>
	<b>6</b>
	<b>5</b>
	<b>4</b>
	<b>3</b>
	<b>2</b>
<b>Desaprueba</b>	<b>1</b>

## Tarjeta "C"

<b>Muy honrados</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>9</b>
	<b>8</b>
	<b>7</b>
	<b>6</b>
	<b>5</b>
	<b>4</b>
	<b>3</b>
	<b>2</b>
<b>Muy corruptos</b>	<b>1</b>

## Tarjeta D

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$25
- (02) Entre \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10) \$751-\$1,000
- (11) \$1,001- \$1,500
- (12) \$1,501-\$2,000
- (13) \$ 2,000 y más

**APPENDIX B: TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE**

- **SAMPLE DESIGN, FIELD WORK, AND ARCHIVE PROCEDURES.**
- **COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES.**

**BY: A. Polibio Córdova C.  
Executive President of  
CEDATOS / GALLUP International**

**February, 2002.**

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## DEMOCRACY AUDIT

- **SAMPLE DESIGN, FIELD WORK, AND ARCHIVE PROCEDURES**
- **COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES**

By: A. Polibio Córdova C.  
Executive President of CEDATOS / GALLUP International

The University of Pittsburgh, under the auspices of USAID /Ecuador, conducted an exhaustive evaluation of the Ecuadorian institutions dedicated to the investigation of markets and public opinion. The objective of this evaluation was to contract one of these institutions to design a sample, conduct field work, and process the resulting data for the “Democracy Audit.” Following this evaluation, CEDATOS / GALLUP International was selected as the most capable firm in terms of professionalism, experience, and infrastructure in the country.

### I. Sample Design

#### II. 1. UNIVERSE

The survey provided national coverage, focusing on the three principal regions: sierra, costa and amazonía (with the exception of the insular region of Galápagos) and on urban and rural areas. In addition, we conducted an independent survey in the border provinces. While this survey was independent from the national survey, similar instruments were used in both cases.

#### 2. POPULATION

This study includes members of the civil population that are not institutionalized. We excluded residents of hospitals, orphanages schools, military barracks etc. Nevertheless, the particular households located in these places are included in the population of the sample.

#### 3. UNIT OF OBSERVATION – FINAL UNIT OF SELECTION

This study contains topics referring not only to the individual (adults of at least 18 years of age, eligible to vote, who speak Spanish or Quechua but no other monolingual language), but also to the head of the household and its other members. Thus, **the statistical unit of observation is the household**, due to the fact that all these people belong to only one household.

At the same time, all households live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. The dwelling is a unit that is easily identified in geographical terms. In addition, dwellings display more permanence over time. These two elements make the dwelling particularly well-suited as the **final unit of selection**, identified on a block in urban areas or a “parceled out” segment in rural areas).

#### 4. SAMPLING METHODOLOGY

The sampling method is the means by which one determines the size of the sample, the construction of the domains of the study, the definition of selection stages of sample units, the

population estimations from the sample data and the calculation of errors implicit in these estimations.<sup>1</sup>

To select the appropriate sample methodology, we considered the following factors:

a) Obtaining a representative sample for the following levels, strata and domains of study

- The entire country
- Strata of the first stage:
  - 1. Sierra
  - 2. Costa
  - 3. Oriente
- Strata of the second stage:
  - 1. Urban areas
  - 2. Rural areas
- Domains of study:
  - 1. Quito
  - 2. Guayaquil
  - 3. Cities with 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion
  - 4. Cities with 25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants
  - 5. Cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants
  - 6. Rural parishes<sup>2</sup>

b) The calculation of the sampling errors that correspond to these estimations.

c) Facilitating the execution of the survey.

d) Optimal assignment to permit a reasonable equilibrium between the budget, sample size and the precision of the results.

e) Utilizing the best and most accurate sampling frame available for each city (census, maps, and recent lists of dwellings).

Based upon these considerations, the method utilized in this study is a probabilistic sampling at all stages. It is stratified, multistaged, and clustered, with a random selection of units in each stage, including the final selection of adults to be interviewed within each household.

This sample is stratified by region (Costa, Sierra and Oriente) and by area (urban and rural), and is multistaged. First, Primary Sampling Units (PSU, cantons) were selected. Following the identification of these Primary Sampling Units, Secondary Units were selected from each PSU, conforming to census sectors. Then, Units of the Third Stage (blocks or segments) were selected, followed by the selection of Final Sampling Units (FSU). The Final Sampling Units were clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas, and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each dwelling unit of these clusters, we selected one single household as a Unit of Observation.

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<sup>1</sup>CORDOVA, P.: "Introducción a la Investigación por Muestreo". Edit. DGEA/México, 1972. Presentation by Leslie Kish, Edition 2000. Ecuador.

<sup>2</sup> In our treatment of rural areas, we relied upon parish centers (populated centers) with "parceled out" dwellings or upon "segments" similar to blocks, when the dwelling of the population center was not structured according to standard physical units.

Finally, we selected and interviewed one adult of voting age, according to a random process (Kish / Córdova System).<sup>3</sup> Following a norm of probabilistic selection, we did not allow for a substitution or a replacement of the selected units. (See pertinent procedures discussed further in the text).

To ensure the consistency, sufficiency, and efficiency of the sample, we assigned particular sample sizes to each strata and total aggregation level. The interior of the sampling stratum is auto-weighted, but requires weighting for the aggregation of strata (Sierra, Costa and Oriente) due to the smaller size of the Oriental region. In each stratum, the selection of the sample is determined by proportional probability for the size of each domain.

This design allows for the ready calculation of results by strata, domain, and total population. Using versatile and simple procedures, one can readily engage in calculations of the principle variables and socio-demographic characteristics considered in this study.<sup>4 5</sup>

## 5. SAMPLING FRAME

The sampling frame was constructed through maps and lists of city and parish dwellings, obtained through the information provided by the Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda of 1990. To update this information, we relied upon the cartographic updates and new counts of constructions and dwellings conducted by CEDATOS in the year 2001.

To ensure that the sampling frame was appropriate for each city, we used the following sources of information:

1. Updated maps with information obtained by public and private institutions involved in housing programs. This information provided the means by which to verify the cartographic limits of cities, and to create maps in areas with new developments, with the aim of registering the creation or elimination of blocks and rural segments.
2. Counts of constructions, dwellings, and residential populations by age, processing these lists with the directions and identification of the dwellings by blocks, for all the cartographic sections of the sample in each selected city and parish. This is a job in which CEDATOS has engaged for 27 years in its direct study of cities and rural areas.

## 6. SAMPLE SIZE

To determine the size of the sample we rely upon the following criteria: we utilize a sampling procedure of final clusters, ranging in size from 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. This last factor is the explanatory variable of the design and the function of its variance.<sup>6</sup> The

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<sup>3</sup> CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

<sup>4</sup> KISH, L.: "Survey Sampling": John Wiley & Sons. 1965.

<sup>5</sup> RAJ, D.: "Sampling Theory". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Chapters 4-5 provide an extensive example of these methods of selection.

resulting design effect of the sample of clusters (DEF) is estimated on average at 1.022, in the case of three strata, with cluster sizes of 6 to 12.

The adjustment of the sample size from a simple random sample to a clustered sample, is derived from the following formula:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ(DEF)}{n}}$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ (DEF)}{E^2}$$

Where:

E = Band of probable error (+/- 0.05)

P = Percentage of population with a given attribute of 50%.

Q = (1-P) Percentage of population without the attribute considered in P. Q= 50%.

DEF = Design effect. Relation of variances between the clustered sample we utilize to that of a simple random sample. This value fluctuates between 1.0 and 2.0. The clustered sample and the simple random sample tend to conform less when the size of the cluster is smaller and there is real variance from the stratified sample.<sup>7</sup> There is a direct trade-off between the rise of real variance due to clustered sample effects and the diminishing of the real variance by stratification with the assignment of proportional sizes to the size of the stratum. With this base and according to the tables of DEF, we estimate that in the present design DEF= 1.022.<sup>8</sup> for the regions of Costa and Sierra and DEF= 1.011 for the region Oriente.

Z = Value of the normal distribution. For a confidence level of 95%, this value is 1.965.

n = Sample size

## 7. CALCULATION OF SIZE BY STRATA, DOMAINN, PSU, AND SAMPLING UNITS

The sample design considered assigning selection units for the 22 provinces of the country, while the sample is not sufficient to represent the respective provinces, it is sufficient for the regions of Costa, Sierra and Oriente. In the first stage, in which we select Primary Sampling Units (PSU),

<sup>6</sup> Ver: KISH, L.: "Statistical Design For Research".- John Wiley. 1987. For a discussion of design effects, see Chapters 2 and 7 and "Survey Sampling" Chapters 2 y 11.

<sup>7</sup> FRANKEL, M. "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". ISR; The University of Michigan. 1971.

<sup>8</sup> FRANKEL, M: Op. Cit. Tablas de DEF y discusión.

the PSUs are characterized by the urban and rural populations, to assign sample sizes with proportional probability to their actual size. In the region of Oriente we used the divisions of Oriente Norte and Oriente Sur.

In its totality, the sample consists of 434 sampling units: 296 urban and 138 rural, distributed in 60 cantons of the 21 continental provinces.

The aggregations of the sizes (nh), produce sizes (nd) by domain (1. Quito, 2. Guayaquil, 3. cities of 100,000+ inhabitants, automatic inclusion, probability 1; 4. cities of 25,000 to 100,000 inhabitants; 5. cities of less than 25,000 inhabitants, and 6. rural parishes). This is sufficient for estimations of total results and for results disaggregated by age groups and other socio-demographic variables.<sup>9</sup>

$$nd = \sum_h n_{hd}$$

## 8. SAMPLE SIZE, CONFIDENCE LEVELS, AND MARGINS OF ERROR

The anticipated confidence level for this national sample was 95% ( $Z_{.95} = 1.965$ ) with a margin of error of  $\pm 2\%$ , assuming a proportion of 50/50 ( $P = 0.50$ ;  $Q = 1 - P$ ); for dichotomous variables, in the worst case scenario. We assume a DEF of 1.022 through the system of cluster sampling for the regions Sierra and Costa and of 1.011 for the region Oriente, which was stratified into northern and southern zones.

With this backdrop, the probable margins of error by stratum for a simple random sample and the clustered sample we utilized are as follows:

### SAMPLE SIZE AND MARGINS OF ERROR 95% Confidence Level

Strata	Sample Size	Margin of Error (%)	
		S.R.S.	C.S.
<b>REGIONS</b>			
Sierra	1.145	2.90	2.97
Costa	1.293	2.70	2.79
Oriente	478	4.49	4.54

### BY AREA

<sup>9</sup> GUENTHER, W.: "Introducción a la Inferencia Estadística". McGraw-Hill. 1968.  
See Chapters 3-5, for exercises on these applications.

<b>Urbana</b>	<b>1.785</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>2.38</b>
<b>Rural</b>	<b>1.131</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>2.99</b>
<b>COUNTRY TOTAL</b>	<b>2.916</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>1.86</b>

## 9. ADJUSTMENTS FOR NONCOVERAGE

To ensure efficiency, sufficiency and precision of the sample, we adopted a sampling system with “Adjustment for noncoverage.” This guarantees the execution of the sample with the estimated size as minimums within the confidence level and maximum permissible error. Additionally, the system assured the elimination of bias resulting from the substitution or replacement of units that could not be objects of an interview. This system estimates an important cost for CEDATOS, but also guarantees the quality of the information. The method is based upon CEDATOS’s knowledge of “noncoverage” it observed in similar studies of the nation as a whole, urban and rural.

The system consists of applying the sample size (n) estimated for each stratum, domain, and PSU a factor of coverage (t), with which we calculate the operative size of final selection (n\*), expressed as:

$$n^* = (1 + t) n$$

t = Rate of no interview. This rate considers situations of noncoverage (no interview, refusal, unoccupied dwellings, absence of adults, or impossibility of interviewing after 3rd visit, among other possible events). According to the experience of CEDATOS and the information available from its studies, the rate (t) varies by province, region, size of city, socio-economic level of the household, urbanization, etc.

n\* = Final sample size to be selected:  $n^* = (1 + t) n$

The average rate of t for the national sample was 0.18, in which:

$$n^* = (1 + 0.18) 2.916 = 3.441 \text{ adults to be interviewed.}$$

***The actual size obtained at the end of the survey was 2,925 adults; 6 more than the estimations for the national sample. By strata and by rural and urban areas, the sample was optimal.***

## 10. SURVEY PERSONNEL

CEDATOS invested all of its energy to ensure that this study would be successful. CEDATOS fulfilled the requirements set by the anticipated size of the sample, without having to resort to posterior weighting due to incomplete sample sizes. This posterior weighting introduces considerable non-sampling errors. The confidence levels and margins of error are more or less as anticipated, and have the additional guarantee of sample sufficiency in terms of size and quality of the survey

CEDATOS assigned 422 people to work on this study. These workers can be classified as follows:

### PERSONNEL ASSIGNED BY CEDATOS FOR THE STUDY "DEMOCRACY AUDIT"

<b>FUNCTIONS</b>	<b>Total People</b>
1. Field Coordinators	35
2. Field Supervisors	65
3. Spanish-speaking Interviewers	195
4. Bilingual Interviewers (Quechua/Spanish)	5
5. Bilingual Supervisors (Quechua/Spanish)	2
6. Quality control in the field	28
7. Critics / codifiers	40
8. Data Entry	28
9. Quality control of data entry	8
<b>TOTAL IN FIELD AND DATA ENTRY</b>	<b>406</b>
<b>10. DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL</b>	<b>12</b>
11. Administrative Personnel	4
<b>TOTAL PERSONNEL</b>	<b>422</b>

**11. UNIVERSE, POPULATION TOTALS, REGIONS (COSTA, SIERRA AND ORIENTE), URBANIZATION, AND DOMAINS OF THE STUDY.**

**ECUADOR: TOTAL POPULATION, PROJECTED FOR 2001**  
Thousands of Inhabitants

	<b>Country Total</b>	<b>Sierra</b>	<b>Costa</b>	<b>Oriente</b>
Total	12,778	5,701	6,442	635
Urban	8,261	3,447	4,586	228
Rural	4,517	2,254	1,856	407

**Percentage Distribution (%)**

	<b>Country Total</b>	<b>Sierra</b>	<b>Costa</b>	<b>Oriente</b>
Total	100.0%	44.6%	50.4%	5.0%
Urban	100.0%	41.7%	55.5%	2.8%
	64.7%	60.5%	71.2%	35.9%
Rural	100.0%	49.9%	41.1%	9.0%
	35.3%	39.5%	28.8%	64.1%

**SIERRA AND COSTA DIVISIONS**  
Thousands of inhabitants

	<b>Sierra and Costa Total</b>	<b>SIERRA</b>	<b>COSTA</b>
Total	12,143	5,701	6,442
Urban	8,033	3,447	4,586
Rural	4,110	2,254	1,856

**Percentage Distribution (%)**

	<b>Sierra and Costa Total</b>	<b>SIERRA</b>	<b>COSTA</b>
Total	100.0%	46.9%	53.1%
Urban	100.0%	43.0%	57.0%
	66.2%	60.5%	71.2%
Rural	100.0%	54.8%	45.2%
	33.8%	39.5%	28.8%

**Source:** INEC. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Projections  
**Processed by:** CEDATOS. Departamento de Investigaciones  
September 24, 2001

**SIERRA****Urban****Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

<b>Province</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Population</b>		<b>Sample</b>	<b>PSU</b>	<b>Points of Sample</b>
1. Pichincha	Quito	1,648,448	60.5%	336	12	50
2. Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	216,390	7.9%	42	2	7
3. Imbabura	Ibarra	139,316	5.1%	27	1	5
4. Tungurahua	Ambato	177,781	6.5%	34	1	5
5. Chimborazo	Riobamba	128,648	4.7%	26	1	4
6. Azuay	Cuenca	283,652	10.4%	56	2	9
7. Loja	Loja	129,770	4.8%	27	1	4
			100.0%			
TOTAL	100,000+	2,724,005	79.0%	548	20	84
INHABITANTS		390,476	11.3%	48	5	11
REMAINDER	OF URBAN					
SIERRA						
(25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		332,385	9.6%	96	12	24
REMAINDER	OF URBAN					
SIERRA		<b>3,446,866</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>119</b>
(Less than 25,000 inhabitants)						
<b>TOTAL URBAN SIERRA</b>						
<b>RURAL</b>						
CANTONS WITH	100,000+	724,398	32.1%	146	20	16
INHABITANTS						
REMAINDER	OF RURAL	725,775	32.2%	104	5	11
SIERRA						
(25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)		803,739	35.7%	203	12	26
REMAINDER	OF RURAL					
SIERRA		<b>2,253,912</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>53</b>
(Less than 25,000 inhabitants)						
<b>TOTAL RURAL SIERRA</b>						
<b>TOTAL SIERRA SAMPLE</b>				<b>1,145</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>172</b>

**COSTA**  
**Urban**  
**Cities of 100,000+ inhabitants**

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample	
1. Guayas	Guayaquil	2,163,060	65.5%	432	15	64	
2. Guayas	Milagro	129,150	3.9%	24	1	4	
3. Guayas	Durán	164,997	5.0%	32	1	5	
4. Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	128,646	3.9%	24	1	4	
5. Manabí	Portoviejo	172,302	5.2%	32	1	5	
6. Manabí	Manta	184,561	5.6%	40	1	6	
7. Los Ríos	Quevedo	136,679	4.1%	32	1	5	
8. El Oro	Machala	221,608	6.7%	48	2	8	
		100.0%					
TOTAL		100,000+	3,301,003	72.0%	664	23	101
INHABITANTS			937,694	20.4%	161	10	30
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)			347,301	7.6%	96	8	20
REMAINDER OF URBAN COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)			<b>4,585,998</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>921</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>TOTAL URBAN COSTA</b>							
<b>RURAL</b>							
CANTONS WITH 100,000+ INHABITANTS			353,783	19.1%	80	23	9
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)			1,006,487	54.2%	196	10	27
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)			495,732	26.7%	96	8	15
REMAINDER OF RURAL COSTA (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)			<b>1,856,002</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>TOTAL RURAL COSTA</b>							
<b>TOTAL COSTA SAMPLE</b>				<b>1,293</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>202</b>	

**TOTAL SIERRA AND COSTA**

Urban		1,613	78	270
Rural		825	78	104
<b>TOTAL ORIENTE</b>		<b>2,438</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>374</b>

Province	City	Population		Sample	PSU	Points of Sample
<b>NORTH ZONE</b>						
	URBAN	106,484	33.7%	80	5	10
	RURAL	209,784	66.3%	158	5	17
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>316,268</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>SOUTH ZONE</b>						
	URBAN	121,631	38.2%	92	5	16
	RURAL	196,784	61.8%	148	5	17
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>318,415</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>ORIENTE</b>						
	URBAN	228,115	35.9%	172	10	26
	RURAL	406,568	64.1%	306	10	34
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>634,683</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>478</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>60</b>

**12. SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA.  
GENERAL SUMMARY**

**CEDATOS / GALLUP INTERNATIONAL**

**SAMPLE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION BY STRATA**

	<b>URBAN Total</b>	<b>RURAL Total</b>	<b>TOTAL Total</b>
<b>SIERRA</b>			
100,000+	548	146	694
25,000 – 100,000	48	104	152
Less than 25,000	96	203	299
Total Sierra	692	453	1,145
<b>COSTA</b>			
100,000+	664	80	744
25,000 – 100,000	161	196	357
Less than 25,000	96	96	192
Total Costa	921	372	1,293
Total Sierra and Costa	1,613	825	2,438
<b>ORIENTE</b>			
North Zone	80	158	238
South Zone	92	148	240
Total Oriente	172	306	478
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,785</b>	<b>1,131</b>	<b>2,916</b>

**GENERAL SUMMARY**

<b>COUNTRY TOTAL</b>	<b>SAMPLE</b>	<b>PSU</b>	<b>Points of Sample</b>
<b><u>BY REGION</u></b>			
SIERRA	1,145	37	172
COSTA	1,293	41	202
ORIENTE	478	10	60

TOTAL	2,916	88	434
<b><u>BY AREA</u></b>			
URBAN	1,785	88	296
RURAL	1,131	88	138
TOTAL	2,916	88	434

### 13. SAMPLE SELECTION BY STRATA AND AREA. CITIES AND PARISHES

#### NATIONAL SURVEY: SAMPLE SELECTION

1. BY STRATA (REGIONS COSTA, SIERRA, AND ORIENTE)
2. BY AREA (URBAN AND RURAL)
3. BY PSU'S
4. BY CANTON, PROBABILITY OF SELECTION PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)
5. POINTS OF SAMPLE AND FINAL SIZE, PROBABILITY PROPORTIONATE TO SIZE (pps)

SIERRA												
SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)												
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size S	
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Ru
1	Imbabura	Ibarra	La Esperanza	1	1	5	2	27	20	47	32	
2	Pichincha	Quito	Puembo	12	1	50	4	336	41	377	396	
3	Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	Alluriquin	2	1	7	2	42	20	62	50	
4	Tungurahua	Ambato	Quizapincha	1	1	5	2	34	20	54	40	
5	Chimborazo	Riobamba	Cubijiles	1	1	4	2	26	13	39	31	
6	Azuay	Cuenca	San Joaquín	2	1	9	2	56	20	76	66	
7	Loja	Loja	Taquil	1	1	4	2	27	12	39	32	
TOTAL						84	16	548	146	694	647	
REMAINDER OF SIERRA												
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)												
8	Imbabura	Otavaló	San Pablo	1	73.4/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
9	Pichincha	Rumiñahui	Cotogchoa	1	74.4/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
10	Cotopaxi	Latacunga	Belisario Quevedo	1	116.7/125.4	3	2	16	20	36	19	
11	Bolívar	Cuaranda	Guanujo	1	73.1/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
12	Cañar	Azogues	Cojitambo	1	67.8/125.4	2	3	8	24	32	9	
TOTAL						11	11	48	104	152	57	
REMAINDER OF SIERRA												
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)												
13	Carchi	Montúfar	La Paz	1	32.6/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
14	Imbabura	Cotacachi	Imantag	1	36.2/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	
15	Pichincha	Mejía	Tandapi	1	60.6/125.4	2	3	8	26	34	9	
16	Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	Canchagua	1	15.8/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	
17	Tungurahua	Baños	Llígua	1	17.2/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
18	Chimborazo	Guano	San Gerardo	1	40.5/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
19	Chimborazo	Guamote	Palmira	1	33.9/125.4	2	2	8	20	28	9	
20	Cañar	Biblián	Turupamba	1	23.8/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	
21	Azuay	Santa Isabel	Abdón Calderón	1	21.3/125.4	2	3	9	24	33	10	
22	Azuay	Chordeleg	San Martín de Puzhi	1	9.9/125.4	2	2	7	13	20	9	
23	Loja	Calvas	El Lucero	1	31.0/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	
24	Loja	Catamayo	San Pedro de la Ben	1	24.5/125.4	2	2	8	12	20	9	
TOTAL						24	26	96	203	299	113	

<b>COSTA</b>												
<b>SELECTION (100,000 or more inhabitants)</b>												
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Sel	
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Ru
25	Guayas	Guayaquil	Chongón	15	1	64	1	432	10	442	510	
26	Guayas	Milagro	Chobo	1	1	4	1	24	10	34	28	
27	Guayas	Durán	Tarifa	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	
28	Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas	Tabiazo	1	1	4	1	24	9	33	28	
29	Manabí	Portoviejo	Río Chico	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	
30	Manabí	Manta	Santa Marianita	1	1	6	1	40	9	49	47	
31	Los Ríos	Quevedo	San Carlos	1	1	5	1	32	9	41	38	
32	El Oro	Machala	El Cambio	2	1	8	2	48	15	63	57	
TOTAL						101	9	664	80	744	784	
<b>REMAINDER OF COSTA</b>												
<b>SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)</b>												
33	Esmeraldas	Quinindé	La Unión	1	93.4/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	
34	Manabí	Jipijapa	América	1	98.1/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	
35	Manabí	Sucre	San vicente	1	100.5/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	
36	Manabí	Chone	Canuto	1	126.2/152.6	3	3	17	22	39	20	
37	Guayas	Daute	Limonal	1	88.4/152.6	3	3	16	24	40	19	
38	Guayas	Santa Elena	Atahualpa	1	104.8/152.6	3	3	16	22	38	19	
39	Guayas	El Empalme	El Rosario	1	65.9/152.6	3	3	16	23	39	19	
40	Los Ríos	Ventancas	Zapotal	1	72.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	
41	El Oro	Huaquillas	Hualtaco	1	41.8/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	
42	El Oro	Santa Rosa	La Avanzada	1	65.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	
TOTAL						30	27	161	196	357	190	
<b>REMAINDER OF COSTA</b>												
<b>Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)</b>												
43	Esmeraldas	Atacames	Tonchigue	1	22.8/152.6	3	2	16	14	30	19	
44	Manabí	Bolívar	Quiroga	1	43.1/152.6	3	2	16	12	28	19	
45	Manabí	Rocafuerte	Resbalón	1	29.2/152.6	3	1	16	10	26	19	
46	Guayas	Colimes	General Vernaza	1	21.6/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	
47	Guayas	Yaguachi	Virgen de Fátima	1	56.0/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	
48	Los Ríos	Urdaneta	Ricaurte	1	28.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	
49	Los Ríos	Buena Fe	Patricia Pilar	1	34.1/152.6	2	2	8	12	20	9	
50	El Oro	El Guabo	Borbones	1	41.4/328.3	3	2	16	12	28	19	
TOTAL						20	15	96	96	192	113	

ORIENTE (ZONA NORTE)												
SELECTION (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)												
	Province	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Probability of Selection	Points of Sample		Sample Size			Size Selected	
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural
51	Sucumbíos	Lago Agrio	El Eno	1	65.5/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	19
52	Scumbíos	Cascales	Sevilla	1	16.3/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	19
53	Napo	Tena	Puerto Misahuallí	1	56.9/60.9	3	4	16	40	56	19	19
54	Napo	Quijos	Cosanga	1	6.7/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	19
55	Orellana	Orellana	San Luis	1	32.7/60.9	3	3	16	30	46	19	19
TOTAL						15	17	80	158	238	94	94
ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)												
SELECTION (25,000 – 100,000 inhabitants)												
56	Pastaza	Pastaza	10 de Agosto	1	49.6/60.9	4	5	24	48	72	28	28
57	Morona	Morona	Río Blanco	1	67.6/60.9	3	4	20	32	52	24	24
TOTAL						7	9	44	80	124	52	52
REMAINDER OF ORIENTE (ZONA SUR)												
Selection (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)												
58	Morona	Sucúa	Huambí	1	19.6/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	19
59	Zamora	Zamora	Timbara	1	41.9/60.9	3	3	16	24	40	19	19
60	Zamora	Zumbí	Paquisha	1	6.6/60.9	3	2	16	20	36	19	19
TOTAL						9	8	48	68	116	57	57

GENERAL SUMMARY										
By Region	Number of Cantons	Points of Sample				Sample Size			Size Selected	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
SIERRA	24	119	53	692	453	1145	817	535	817	535
COSTA	26	151	51	921	372	1293	1087	439	1087	439
ORIENTE	10	26	34	172	306	478	203	361	203	361
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>1131</b>	<b>2916</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>
<b>BY REGION</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>1785</b>	<b>1131</b>	<b>2916</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>	<b>2106</b>	<b>1334</b>

#### 14. REGIONAL SAMPLE (BORDERS). ANTICIPATED SIZE

##### REGIONAL SAMPLE (INCLUDING ADJUSTMENT FOR NONCOVERAGE)

##### NORTHERN PROVINCES

BORDER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
SAN LORENZO	29,433		500			
URBAN	16,200	55.0%	275	34	1	San Lorenzo
RURAL	13,233	45.0%	225	20	3	Alto Tambo, Sta. Rita, Tululbí
<b>CARACHI</b>						
TULCAN	87,896		500			
URBAN	52,169	59.4%	297	37	1	Tulcán
RURAL	35,727	40.6%	203	18	3	Julio Andrade, El Carmelo, Maldonado
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NUEVA LOJA	64,549		500			
URBAN	23,874	37.0%	185	23	1	Nueva Loja
RURAL	40,675	63.0%	315	26	4	Gral. Farfán, Pacayacu, Dureno, Sta. Cecilia
<b>TOTAL</b>	181,878		757			
<b>URBAN</b>	92,243	50.7%	743	94	3	
<b>RURAL</b>	89,635	49.3%	1500	94	10	

OTHER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	386,839					
URBAN	185,374	47.9%	170	21	3	Quinindé, Río Verde, Muisne
RURAL	201,465	52.1%	184	16	3	Viche, Rocafuerte, Galera
<b>CARACHI</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	79,279					
URBAN	24,704	31.2%	23	3	1	Espejo - El Angel
RURAL	54,575	68.8%	50	4	1	San Isidro
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	80,225					
URBAN	20,403	25.4%	19	3	1	Lumbaquí
RURAL	59,822	74.6%	55	5	1	Gonzalo Pizarro
<b>TOTAL</b>	546,343		500			
<b>URBAN</b>	230,481	42.2%	210	27	5	
<b>RURAL</b>	315,862	57.8%	290	25	5	

##### TOTAL Border and Non-Border

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes
URBAN	322,724	44.3%	967	121	8
RURAL	405,497	55.7%	1,033	89	15
<b>TOTAL</b>	728,221		2,000		

##### SOUTHERN BORDER

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
LOJA (TOTAL PROVINCE)	436,928					
URBAN	217,649	49.8%				
RURAL	219,279	50.2%				

**15. REGIONAL SAMPLE (INCLUDING ADJUSTMENT FOR NON-COVERAGE)**

**REGIONAL SAMPLE (ANTICIPATED SIZE)**

**NORTHERN PROVINCES**

BORDER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
SAN LORENZO	29,433		590			
URBAN	16,200	55.0%	325	41	1	San Lorenzo
RURAL	13,233	45.0%	265	26	3	Alto Tambo, Sta. Rita, Tululbí
<b>CARACHI</b>						
TULCAN	87,896		590			
URBAN	52,169	59.4%	350	45	1	Tulcán
RURAL	35,727	40.6%	240	24	3	Julio Andrade, El Carmelo, Maldonado
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NUEVA LOJA	64,549		590			
URBAN	23,874	37.0%	218	28	1	Nueva Loja
RURAL	40,675	63.0%	372	37	4	Gral. Farfán, Pacayacu, Dureno, Sta. Cecilia
<b>TOTAL</b>	181,878		893			
<b>URBAN</b>	92,243	50.7%	877	114	3	
<b>RURAL</b>	89,635	49.3%	1770	87	10	

OTHER CANTONS	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
<b>ESMERALDAS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	386,839					
URBAN	185,374	47.9%	200	26	3	Quinindé, Río Verde, Muisne
RURAL	201,465	52.1%	218	21	3	Viche, Rocafuerte, Galera
<b>CARACHI</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	79,279					
URBAN	24,704	31.2%	27	4	1	Espejo - El Angel
RURAL	54,575	68.8%	59	6	1	San Isidro
<b>SUCUMBIOS</b>						
NON-BORDER CANTONS	80,225					
URBAN	20,403	25.4%	22	4	1	Lumbaquí
RURAL	59,822	74.6%	65	6	1	Gonzalo Pizarro
<b>TOTAL</b>	546,343		590			
<b>URBAN</b>	230,481	42.2%	249	34	5	
<b>RURAL</b>	315,862	57.8%	341	33	5	

**TOTAL Border and Non-Border**

	Population	%	Sample	Points of	Cantons/
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				Sample	Parishes
URBAN	322,724	44.3%	1,142	148	8
RURAL	405,497	55.7%	1,218	120	15
TOTAL	728,221		2,360		

**SOUTHERN BORDER**

	Population	%	Sample	Points of Sample	Cantons/Parishes	Selected Places (pps)
LOJA (TOTAL PROVINCE)	436,928					
URBAN	217,649	49.8%				
RURAL	219,279	50.2%				

**16. MAP OF ECUADOR. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF THE SAMPLE.**

**ECUADOR  
DEMOCRACY AUDIT  
Geographical Distribution of the Sample**



Produced by: CEDATOS - Gallup International Ecuador

## 17. DETAILS OF THE DESIGN: SAMPLE FRACTIONS

To determine the fractions for the sample (f) one should consider the distinct stages of selection:<sup>10</sup>

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

$f_i$  = Fraction of the sample in stage i.

$n_i$  = Sample size of stage i

$N_i$  = Total dwellings in stage i

For each stage of selection the fraction is:

$$f_i = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (stages 1, 2, 3 y 4)}$$

Where:

$f_1$  = Probability of selection in stage 1: PSU

$f_2$  = Probability of selection in stage 2: sectors

$f_3$  = Probability of selection in stage 3: (blocks or segments)

$f_4$  = Probability of selection of the cluster within each block or segment

Given that we take clusters of dwellings by blocks of the sample, the fraction converts into:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVM}$$

Where:

TVM = is the total number of dwellings in the block or segment

<sup>10</sup> CORDOVA, P.: Op. Cit. Also "Metodología de la Encuesta Nacional de hogares". Edit. DANE, Colombia, 1972-1984.

The global fraction of the sample (probability of selection within each PSU) should satisfy the following condition:

$$PU = \frac{TVS}{TVU} \times \frac{TVM}{TVS} \times \frac{h \text{ NH}}{TVM}$$

TVU = total dwellings in the PSU

TVS = number of dwellings in each sector

TVM = number of dwellings in each block

NH = number of households in each dwelling of the selected cluster

h = h households to be selected in each cluster and 1 person in each one of these households

### Probability of final selection

The final probability of selection of the cluster (g) is expressed as:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_s}{T_T} \times \frac{T_m}{T_s} \times \frac{T_g}{T_m} = \frac{T_g}{T_T} = \frac{1}{T_T}$$

Where:

$T_T$  = Total number of dwellings in the city (PSU)

$T_s$  = Total number of dwellings in the sector

$T_m$  = Total number of dwellings in the selected block

$T_g$  = Total number of clusters of h dwellings by block

In general, the probability of selection of a cluster in a given city is expressed as:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{n_c}{N_c} = f_c$$

Where:

$P_c$  = Probability of selection of a cluster of h dwellings in city c.

$T_{Mc}$  = Number of blocks to be selected in the city and in these h final dwellings

$T_{Tc}$  = Total number of dwellings in the city

$n_c$  = Size of the sample in city c

$N_c$  = Size of the population in area c

$f_c$  = Global fraction of the sample for city c (PSU)

## 18. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES FROM THE SAMPLE

The results of the sample should be treated at the level of each PSU to produce the total population estimates.<sup>11</sup> The restitution factor to be applied to each selected PSU is defined as the product of:

- a) Basic weight (F). The basic weight is equal to the “interval of selection” of the PSU.
- b) Adjustment of coverage for nonresponse: ( $R_{hj}$ ). The adjustment for nonresponse is calculated for each block (cluster) and is applied to each interviewed household (with completed interviews) within each cluster.
- c) This results in dividing the number of selected and interviewed households (with complete interviews) on the block. The final restitution factor ( $W_{hj}$ ) to be applied to each block is the product of the two previous factors.<sup>12</sup> The estimation of the total for characteristic X of the

population is expressed as:

$$X' = \sum_{h=1}^d \sum_{j=1}^{n_h} X_{hj} W_{hj}$$

$$W_{hj} = (F) \cdot (R_{hj})$$

Where:

- h = 1,2, ..... domain units h  
 j = 1, 2,..... selected blocks for the sample in city h.  
 $n_h$  = Total number of blocks in the sample of city h.  
 $W_{hj}$  = Restitution factor of block j in city hj  
 X = Statistic X for block j of city h.

$$X = \sum_{k=j}^{T_{hj}} X_{hjk}$$

- $X_{hjk}$  = Statistic X for the household, block j, of city h.  
 k = 1,2,..... households with completed interviews on block j of city h  
 $T_{hj}$  = Total households with interviews completed on block j of city h  
 F = Basic weight  
 $R_{hj}$  = Factor adjustment for nonresponse of block j in city h.

The above formula compares the sample information with that of its appropriate sampling frame. As this frame can have deficiencies or imperfections, it is convenient to take the sample results with an estimator independent of the population, as a projection of the population. The corresponding factor is:

<sup>11</sup> KAJ, D.: Op. Cit. See Chapter 9 for methods of calculating errors for various types of samples.

<sup>12</sup> DANE: op. cit.  
 CORDOVA P.: Op. cit.

$$L = \frac{\text{Projected population at the date of the survey}}{\text{Población restituida al marco}}$$

Finally, the estimation of the population is expressed as:

$$X = X' \cdot L$$

## 19. PRECISION OF RESULTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

The population characteristics are estimations that are calculated from the elements included through the sample. This estimation depends upon the design of the sample and the particular combination of elements that are selected.

While these estimations are based upon a probabilistic sample, the statistics can still contain two types of errors.

- a) Errors outside of the sample that result due to procedures of observation, interview, field work, processing, data entry. Thus, the data cannot be perfect. These errors are common in all types of statistical analysis.
- b) Errors due to sampling, that can occur when the procedure is probabilistic and results because one studies only a fraction of the total population. In this way, the selected sample is one of the combinations of N elements, taken in groups of n, that could have been selected through the random process. The variation in the results due to chance that could have been obtained through these NCn samples,<sup>13</sup> forms the sampling error.

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<sup>13</sup> Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.

Our primary interest is in the calculation of sampling errors due to its theoretical and practical importance. This importance resides in the fact that by acknowledging the sample error, one can estimate the real value of a statistic between the limits of a confidence interval.

The standard deviation of the sample distribution of a given estimation is known as the standard error, and is the root of the variance of this distribution.

To calculate the variance of a rate, ratio, or proportion (r) in sampling clusters, we utilize the following formula:<sup>14 15</sup>

$$\text{Var} (r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[ \text{var} (y) + r \text{vr}(x) - 2 \text{cov} (x,y) \right]$$

Where:

$$r_x = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^a y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^a x_i} = \frac{y}{x}, i = 1,2,\dots,a$$

- a = Total of segments or clusters in the sample
- y<sub>i</sub> = Sum of the values of variable x in the i<sup>th</sup> cluster
- x<sub>i</sub> = Sum of the values of variable x in the i<sup>th</sup> cluster
- y = Total sum of the values of variable y, in the sample
- x = Total sum of the values of variable x, in the sample

To facilitate the calculation, one can abbreviate the formula as follows:

$$\text{Var} (r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[ \frac{a}{a-1} \sum Z_i^2 \right]$$

Where:

$$Z_i = (y_i - rx_i)$$

The Standard Error (SE) of r is:

$$\text{SE} (r) = \sqrt{\text{var}(r)}$$

And the coefficient of variation in percentage terms is:

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<sup>14</sup> Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.  
 The variance of an estimator can be obtained with the product of X var (r).  
<sup>15</sup> KISH, L.: Op. cit. 1965. Chapter. 6. Op. cit. 1987. Chapter. 4

$$C.V. (r) = \frac{SE (r)}{r} \times 100$$

According to the design of the sample, as we noted in a previous section, it is useful to calculate DEF as a means of determining the efficiency of the sample design utilized.<sup>16</sup> DEF is the reason for the variance of a sample of clusters, with respect to the variance of an unrestricted random sample of the same number of elements. That is:

$$DEF = \frac{S^2 \text{ cluster.}}{S^2 \text{ msa}}$$

A design effect equal to one indicates that the sample is as efficient as a simple random sample, and a value greater than one indicates that there are losses in efficiency due to clustering. In this case, we found that DEF= 1.022 for the regions of Costa and Sierra, and DEF = 1.011 for the region Oriente.

The confidence intervals calculated after completion of the survey, according to the sizes of the sample effectively observed, indicated an error of + / - 1.86% for a 95% confidence level for the national sample, and a confidence interval of + / - 2.97% for the Sierra, + / - 2.79 % for the Costa, and + / - 4.54% for Oriente. For these areas, the margins of error are: + / - 2.38% for urban areas and + / - 2.99% for rural areas.

## 20. WEIGHTS FOR AGGREGATION OF DOMAINS AND STRATA

The sampling method utilized in this study considered a distribution of sample sizes self-weighted at the internal level for the strata of sierra y costa; however not in the oriental region, due to the notable difference in population when compared to the other two regions. In addition, as a consequence of the random selection at the level of each household, the sample in its totality does not project the population by sex, which necessitates the introduction of weights to ensure that the sample corresponds to the census distribution by sex. Finally, while the PSU selection resulted from a probabilistic proportion of set size for urban and rural areas, this introduces variance that needs adjustment. This adjustment relies upon weights, which are derived from the urban/rural distribution as well as the sample proportion by PSU in light of the real proportion of the population, also by PSU.

With these above considerations in mind, we calculated weight values by sample point, including urban and rural areas, which results in a chain of components, as follows:

$W_{pi}$  = Weight for each sample point i according to its population in light of the population of its region.

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<sup>16</sup> FRANKEL, M.: "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". Edit. ISR, U. Of Michigan. 1971. In particular, see Appendix E.

$W_{mi}$  = Weight of each sample point of sample  $i$  according to the sample size assigned to it, according to the size of the sample of the whole region.

$W_{gi}$  = Ratio of men/women observed in the sample at sample point  $i$

$W_{Gi}$  = Ratio of men/women observed in sample unit  $i$  according to the last population census and INEC projections for 2001.

$W_{ai}$  = Urban/rural distribution observed by the survey in sample point  $i$ .

$W_{Ai}$  = Urban/rural distribution observed in sample point  $i$ , according to the population census of 1990 and INEC projections for 2001.

With the previous values from these calculations, we proceed to calculate the following values:

$$F_{1i} = W_{pi} / W_{mi};$$

$$F_{2i} = W_{gi} / W_{Gi};$$

$$F_{3i} = W_{ai} / W_{Ai}$$

With these partial factors ( $F_{ji}$ ;  $j = 1, 2, 3$ ;  $i = 1, \dots, 436$ ), we estimated a final factor to weight by locality:

$$F_{fi} = F_{1i} \cdot F_{2i} \cdot F_{3i}$$

This  $F_{fi}$  is incorporated into the dataset for each point of sample  $i$ .

### **III. COMMENTS ON THE WORK ASSIGNED TO CEDATOS / GALLUP International.**

**(Includes suggestions regarding “unusual” aspects observed during the study; point 4 of the "deliverables" indicated by the contract).**

#### **1. INICIAL PLANNING OF THE STUDY**

The meeting with Prof. Mitchell Seligson in Ecuador was very positive. Prof. Seligson traveled to Ecuador to evaluate the institutions capable of conducting this study. Nevertheless, CEDATOS would have been capable of constructing a plan that would have been more conclusive and that would have satisfied to a greater degree the objectives of the University and USAID, had CEDATOS been provided with more detailed information in terms of the final objectives of the study. It is understandable that the experts advisors could not provide more

information than that given, the information was very valuable and came from individuals well-versed in the material. Nevertheless, for the following studies, it would be worthwhile to structure a reference document that indicates particular aspects, such as the scope of the study, topics, interview environment, modalities, etc. that would render the project more efficient in terms of cost, time, and precision. This is now possible after this first experience.

## 2. QUESTIONNAIRE

While the questionnaire is fairly large, it did not present; it is dynamic, clear, fluid, and awakens an interest in the respondent. With this adjustment, the average time of the interview would drop to 40 minutes, in contrast to the present average of 50 minutes. This could be an objective of future endeavors. The use of auxiliary cards was appropriate; however we observed some difficulties that were overcome with the necessary instruction of the interviewer in rural areas that are less developed than the national average.

The version in Quechua was util. Still, some selected native speakers of Quechua expressed a reluctance to continue the interview in that language; they preferred Spanish, even though there were delays in understanding and answering the question. This occurred not only in rural areas, but also in urban areas, among residents who had arrived to these urban areas recently. The indigenous that live in cities and know and speak Spanish only on a rudimentary level still do not prefer to speak in Quechua. In the future, it would be useful to include questions that, avoiding this difficulty, allows the indigenous respondent to be registered as such.

The questionnaire passed through various revisions before being finalized. We found various questions that should be restructured and adapted to the language and common expressions of Ecuador.

## 3. THE SAMPLE

Neither the design nor the sampling presented significant problems for CEDATOS, given that CEDATOS possesses the information, cartography, knowledge and experience necessary for this type of work. The sizes appeared to be appropriate for the survey; perhaps in the future it would be best to classify urban areas in terms of sizes of 100,000 or more; 40,000 – 100,000, and less than 40,000, with a pertinent distribution in the sample. In rural areas, for an insignificant additional cost one could include the scattered area that goes farther than the parish. The last census of the population will include important information on this human and geographical segment.

The census cartography utilized in this survey was recent, and was updated for various new urban and rural sectors. We took into account the possibility of conducting new studies in the future with similar segments.

## 4. QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

The training received by interviewers and supervisors contributed heavily to the success of the work. The new system of training seminars for interviewers had positive results. The

participation of Prof. Orlando Pérez was very valuable; he was forthcoming with suggestions and instructions, and could authenticate and observe the training and the beginning of field work in various cities of the country, with the personnel assigned to urban and rural areas.

The interviewers and supervisors had sufficient practice in identifying sampling units, the final selection of households, and the adults in the households of the sample. They handled with skill the random tables at the level of the household (Kish / Córdova method).

## 5. FIELD WORK, INTERVIEWS; REACTIONS

The interviews were conducted according to the previously established schedule, with only a few minor changes. The first change was caused by a national holiday in the first week of November, which lasted four days. Another inconvenience resulted in the Northern frontier, in the sector of San Lorenzo, Esmeraldas, when a guerilla incursion in the zone resulted in the death of various residents. Due to this incursion, we had to organize new work groups with more experienced interviewers and people from the area.

The majority of the population received the survey very well and collaborated with the project. In urban areas, as has occurred on other occasions, we observed a certain resistance and lack of interest on the part of individuals of high socio-economic status, especially due to the extent of the questionnaire. In the northern frontier, above all Carchi and Sucumbíos, some people were afraid to answer certain questions, as “they could come to the knowledge of the Colombian guerrillas and narcotraffic agents.”

A good number of respondents were interested in learning of the results of the survey; “always you ask us, but you do not tell us the opinions of the others,” said some. Others demonstrated a lack of interest in political matters, even if they commented on the distrust in various institutions and the fight against corruption. It would be worthwhile to communicate the results to the diverse levels that were consulted, both urban and rural.

## 6. VALIDATION OF INFORMATION

The supervision of 100% of the places of the survey (confirming that the interview was conducted in the proper household with the person that was randomly selected) contributed substantially to the quality of the information. The selection of the survey with previous setting of the rate of noncoverage is a procedure that makes it possible to complete the anticipated sample; 18% of noncoverage was fulfilled. The majority of non-responses occurred in large cities, and in middle and upper middle socio-economic levels.

The validation of information, with second interviews and corroboration, was conducted for up to 40% of the sample. The requirement of 1 supervisor for every 3 interviewers was fulfilled.

## 7. CRITIQUES, CODIFICATION, AND DATA ENTRY

In the second week of field work, critiques of the questionnaire arose (in terms of evaluations and revision), prior to the data entry. The work parties were satisfied to take three daily turns (8

am to 1 pm; 1 pm to 6pm and from 6pm to 11pm). All of the questionnaires were processed and the quality control functioned completely.

#### 8. PROCESSING OF ARCHIVES, QUALITY CONTROL, AND THE AUDIT FROM PITTSBURGH

As the survey progressed, the technical team of the Centro de Cómputo of CEDATOS worked in parallel to input the data and file preparation in SPSS format. This work complied with the requirements of the University of Pittsburgh and all information was sent as soon as it was available

As indicated by the contract, the questionnaires were sent to the University of Pittsburgh to be audited. Profesor Seligson's answer was completely satisfactory. The key to this satisfactory result was the quality control applied to each and every stage of the study.

#### 9. COMUNICATIONS

Regular communication was maintained between the University of Pittsburgh and CEDATOS to coordinate the ongoing study. Profesor Seligson's responses were very positive, and he was always collaborating with CEDATOS. At the same time, he fulfilled all of his requirements and observations from the United States. Email was the system of communication that was utilized extensively and intensively.

