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Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic and in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

Rosario Espinal, Ph.D.
Temple University

Jana Morgan, Ph.D.
University of Tennessee

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



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By:

Jana Morgan, Ph.D.
University of Tennessee

Rosario Espinal, Ph.D.
Temple University

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development



Prologue: Background to the Study

Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Political Science
Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
Vanderbilt University

and

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science
Founder and Senior Advisor to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
Vanderbilt University

The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “informed consent” form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO[®] (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the “Adgys”[®] questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency

between the coding in the questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed “Rapid Response Report,” based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team’s or donor’s priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-

specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.

This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.


This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

| Country | Institutions | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Mexico and Central America | | |
| Costa Rica |  | |
| El Salvador |  | |
| Guatemala |  | |
| Honduras |  |  |
| Mexico |  |  |
| Nicaragua |  | |
| Panama |  | |



| Andean/Southern Cone | |
|----------------------|---|
| Argentina |  |
| Bolivia |   |
| Brazil |  |
| Chile |   |
| Colombia |   |
| Ecuador |   |
| Paraguay |  |
| Peru |  |
| Uruguay |   |
| Venezuela |   |

| Caribbean | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Bahamas |  |
| Belize |  |
| Dominican Republic | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div> |
| Guyana |  |
| Haiti |  |
| Jamaica |  |
| Suriname |  |
| Trinidad & Tobago |  |



| Canada and United States | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Canada |  |
| United States |  |

Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

The AmericasBarometer project has been made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both of these institutions. At USAID Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite have consistently contributed constructive insights to the project and facilitated its use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt John Geer has been a tireless advocate of the project, which is fortunate to be housed within and benefit from a department that is brimming with talent. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, in other research units such as the Center for Latin American Studies, in the Office of Contract and Research Administration, and in the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected data collection efforts associated with the 2014 AmericasBarometer came from USAID, Vanderbilt, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden. We thank the individuals that we have worked with at each of these institutions for their important contributions.

We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marengo, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts. Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting

the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita Corral, Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez, Brian Faughnan, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodríguez, and Vivian Schwartz-Blum. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Fred Batista, Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Mollie Cohen, Claire Evans, Adrienne Girone, Matthew Layton, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Trevor Lyons, Arturo Maldonado, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. We especially want thank those graduate students who worked alongside us as research assistants over the past two years on activities related to the development, implementation, auditing, analysis, and reporting of the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

| Country | Researchers |
|---|--|
| Mexico and Central America Group | |
| Mexico | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados, Mexico ●Dr. Vidal Romero, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico |
| Costa Rica | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Subdirector of the project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, Doctoral Candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Researcher of the Project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica |
| El Salvador | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador |
| Guatemala | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA |
| Honduras | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, USA |
| Nicaragua | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Ken Coleman, Research Faculty, University of Michigan, USA ●Mr. Eduardo Marengo, LAPOP Consultant, Managua, Nicaragua |
| Costa Rica | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, PhD candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Research Staff, Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica |
| Panama | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, PA, USA |
| Andean/Southern Cone Group | |
| Argentina | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Professor, Department of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina |
| Brazil | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Frederico Batista Pereira, PhD candidate at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA ●Matthew Layton, PhD candidate at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA |
| Bolivia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba, Bolivia ●Dr. Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Social, Cochabamba, Bolivia |
| Chile | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| Colombia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia ●Dr. Miguel García, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia |

| Country | Researchers |
|---------------------|---|
| Ecuador | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco, Quito, Ecuador [now at Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.] ●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Program Manager, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Diana Orcés, Research Affiliate, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, and Assistant Professor, Oakland University, USA |
| Paraguay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Manuel Orrego, CIRDA, Paraguay ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay |
| Peru | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, USA ●Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Principal Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, Peru |
| Uruguay | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay ●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay |
| Venezuela | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA ●Dr. Mariana Rodríguez, Program Coordinator, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA |
| Caribbean Group | |
| Bahamas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●M'Wale Rahming, President, Public Domain, Nassau, Bahamas |
| Dominican Republic | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA |
| Guyana | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana |
| Haiti | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Francois Gélinau, Professor and Research Chair in Democracy and Legislative Institutions, Laval University, Quebec, Canada. ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Roody Reserve, PhD student in Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| Jamaica | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Balford Lewis, Research Fellow, Centre for Leadership and Governance, UWI, Mona, Jamaica ●Anthony A. Harriott, Professor of Political Sociology, Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, and the Head of Department of Government at the Mona Campus, UWI, Jamaica |
| Suriname | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jennifer Goede, Executive Director, DataFruit, Suriname |
| Trinidad & Tobago | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago ●Dr. Mark Kirton, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago |
| North America Group | |
| Canada | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Nat Stone, Manager, POR Knowledge Management and Practices at Public Works and Government Services Canada and Professor (part-time) at Algonquin College, School of Business, Ottawa, Canada ●Dr. Keith Neuman, Executive Director of the Environics Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada |
| United States | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Founder and Senior Advisor to LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Research Professor, Spanish and Portuguese Department, Vanderbilt University, USA |

We thank all of these people and institutions for their wonderful support.

Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014



Executive Summary

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In the Dominican Republic, LAPOP studies have been carried out since 2006, although some graphs incorporate DEMOS survey data (1994, 1997, 2001, and 2004), in particular data from DEMOS 2004 since the study was done in collaboration with LAPOP. The Dominican survey of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was conducted by Gallup Dominican Republic in March 2014 and 1,520 people were interviewed.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago.* In Part I, we devote the first chapter to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity in the region. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters of Part I to address topics that are considered "core" to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends for the region, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses in large part on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, we highlight the position of Dominican Republic in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

Chapter 1 demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report also documents change over time with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity. The Dominican Republic is located in a relatively high position among the countries of the region with 38.5% of respondents who reported citizen security as the most important problem facing the country. The same pattern is observed with regard to specific illegal activities such as robberies, the sale of drugs, and extortion inside the neighborhood. Regarding robberies, 71.5% of respondents indicate that they have occurred in their neighborhood in the past 12 months, a high level in the comparative perspective that places the country in second place in the region. Regarding the sale of illegal drugs in the neighborhood, the Dominican Republic occupies the third place in the region with 58.1% reporting that drug sales have occurred in their neighborhoods in the previous year. In the case of extortion, the percentage of Dominicans who report this type of incidence in their neighborhood is lower at 24.4%, but the country has the highest rate in the region for this type of criminal activity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the

Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure. This finding is particularly significant for the Dominican Republic, which displays one of the worst averages (36.0) among the countries of the region on a scale from 0 to 100 regarding perceptions of the economic situation of the household, and among Dominicans, the majority (68%) report that their income is not sufficient and that they are stretched financially.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond the personal finances of citizens of the Americas and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. However, Dominicans have an average economic evaluation (45.2) that exceeds the regional average on a scale of 0 to 100. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Chapter 3 shows that corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. The Dominican Republic displays a relatively high rate (23.3%) of corruption victimization, and just as in other countries like Venezuela, Peru, and Mexico, perceptions of high corruption coincide in large part with high rates of corruption victimization. While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole. Thinking about corruption inside the justice system specifically, a high rate of victimization is observed in the Dominican Republic in interactions with both the courts and the police. Among Dominican respondents who had dealings with the courts, 22.4% report having been solicited for a bribe, while the regional rate is 13.6%. In interactions with police, 16.2% of Dominicans have been asked for a bribe, almost double the regional rate of 9.8%.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business. Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic is

located among the countries with the largest percentage of respondents (22.2%) who justify the payment of bribes in 2014.

In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on services offered. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004, and the Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the lowest average levels of trust (42.1) on a scale from 0 to 100. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with a closer look at one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. Dominicans' average levels of trust in 2014 are 55.3 for the armed forces, 42.8 for Congress, and 29.4 for political parties. Dominicans report average levels of trust in the armed forces and political parties

that are located below regional averages, and they seem to trust more in Congress than other citizens in the region.

But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. For the Dominican Republic, the average level of trust in this religious institution in 2014 is 62.7, above the regional average. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time between our 2012 study and 2014 survey. For the Dominican Republic, the average level of trust in elections in 2014 is 42.5, below the regional average.

Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, and the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. In the Dominican Republic, the police receive an average level of trust of 35.6, and the justice system an average of 38.5, both below the regional averages for 2014. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. In the Dominican Republic, the average level of support for the political system in 2014 is 51.2 on a 0 to 100 scale. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. In the Dominican Republic, the average level of political tolerance in 2014 is 49.8 on a 0 to 100 scale. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance). In the Dominican Republic, the distribution of these democratic attitudes in 2014 is similar to the regional profile. The percentage of Dominicans who report attitudes in alignment with support for stable democracy is 22.8% in 2014. At the same time, 26.9% attitudes conducive to authoritarian stability, 21.4% to unstable democracy, and 28.9% to democracy at risk.

Part II of this report includes three chapters that focus specifically on the Dominican Republic, placing the country in a regional context and exploring evolution of political attitudes and behaviors over time within the country. These chapters permit insights into themes that help deepen our understanding of contemporary democracy and political dynamics within the Dominican Republic. To

conduct this analysis, the chapters draw upon data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer as well as previous surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic, permitting greater regional perspective in the discussion. These chapters examine three major sets of issues important in the Dominican context. Chapter 6 considers issues pertaining to the justice system and the rule of law, including crime and corruption as well as their implications for Dominican democratic culture. Chapter 7 considers a series of political values and behaviors that have significant implications for democratic norms and practices, including political tolerance; support for democracy; the legitimacy of political and social institutions; as well as political and civic engagement; and evaluations of performance by the incumbent government. Finally, Chapter 8 follows on previous AmericasBarometer reports in analyzing issues of social inclusion and human rights, considering attitudes regarding gender, sexual minorities, race, and immigration in the Dominican Republic.

Chapter 6 discusses the challenges for the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law in the Dominican Republic. It begins with a discussion of crime, outlining recent trends in crime statistics and detailing Dominican survey respondents' experiences as victims of crime, as well as their perception of the security situation. Overall, the trends are not promising, as crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity have continued to worsen in recent years and the regional positioning of the Dominican Republic on these indicators is middling at best. The temporal evolution of experiences with crime victimization reflects a process of deterioration in recent years. Between 2010 and 2014, the proportion of respondents in the Dominican Republic who reported having been victims of crime increased from 16.5% to 23.4%, and the number indicated that they or someone in their household had been victims also increased from 27.2% to 36.1%. In both cases, these changes represent more than natural fluctuations in measurement, capturing a significant change since the gap between 2010 and 2014 is statistically significant. These levels of reported crime victimization place the Dominican Republic among the top seven countries in terms of victimization at the household level and among the top five countries with the highest rates of victimization reported by individual respondents, only surpassed by Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela.

Furthermore, Dominicans are more likely than the average respondents in the AmericasBarometer to report that the criminal acts against them were committed in their own home and much less likely to report being victims in another municipality different than their place of residence. In other words, crime victimization in the Dominican Republic tends to occur closer to the place of residence of respondents, suggesting that violence is a daily threat for many Dominicans. When examining the characteristics of those most likely to report being a victim, it appears that those who live in rural areas and small towns are less likely to experience crime than those living in large cities and higher education is also associated with a greater probability of being a victim of crime.

Given the importance of crime near the home, the AmericasBarometer also explores experiences with crime in the neighborhoods of respondents. The data show the percentage of respondents who have heard of four types of crime in their neighborhood: robberies, illegal sale of drugs, extortion, and murder. Among these, robberies are, by far, the most common, as reported by 71.5% of Dominican respondents, followed by the sale of drugs. In the Latin-American and Caribbean region, Dominicans in 2014 reported the second highest level of robberies in their neighborhoods, the third highest in the sale of illegal drugs, the highest rate of reported extortion, and the third highest rate of murders in the neighborhood.

Beyond the personal or local experiences with victimization, the survey asks about respondents' perceptions about crime and insecurity more generally. The Dominican Republic falls into the upper third of the countries in the region with the largest percentage of respondents (38.8%) who identify security problems as the most pressing concerns for the country. In some measures, such as perceptions of insecurity and presence of gangs in the neighborhood, the Dominican Republic is located among the worst in the Americas. In terms of perceptions of insecurity in the neighborhood, Dominicans evaluate their situation more negatively than other countries, with the exception of Venezuela and Peru; and within the Dominican Republic, the perception of insecurity has deteriorated in a statistically significant manner between 2012 and 2014. The country occupies the third highest position in the region in perceptions of prevalence of gangs in the neighborhood. This position places the country significantly below the reported level of gang activity in Panama and Venezuela, and roughly at the same level as El Salvador and Mexico. However, between 2012 and 2014, there was a decrease in the perception of gang activity in the neighborhood among Dominican respondents. This decrease is statistically significant and the regional position of the country in 2014 represents a relative improvement in comparison to 2012 when the Dominican Republic ranked first in perceptions of the prevalence of gangs. Overall, crime remains a significant concern in the Dominican Republic. Official statistics on crime, as well as perceptions of insecurity and reported victimization have increased in the last decade.

The chapter then turns to an analysis of victimization by petty corruption as well as perceptions of government corruption. Corruption, which occurs when public officials use their power and/or public resources for personal gain, has the potential to introduce several problems in the political and economic system, such as hampering growth, increasing inequality, undermining social capital, and as related to the focus of the AmericasBarometer, influencing evaluations of democratic institutions, particularly the justice system. The evidence suggests that growing numbers of Dominicans have been targeted by bribery attempts, with the percentage of bribery victims increasing steadily between 2008 and 2014. In 2014, 23.3% of Dominican respondents report at least one personal encounter with corruption. Among the countries of the Americas, the Dominican Republic has the eighth highest rate in terms of reported experiences with corruption. Considering only Dominicans who had interactions with institutions that are potentially susceptible to corruption, such as courts, the municipality, hospitals, and government offices, and therefore had the potential risk of being a victim of corruption in these contexts, bribery attempts were most common in courts and municipal governments, with more than 20% of interactions with these institutions resulting in bribes. A multivariate analysis of factors associated with corruption victimization indicates that men, younger people, those with higher levels of education, and those living in larger cities are more likely to be asked for a bribe. But it is worth noting that it is not surprising that those most likely to have interactions with institutions where they can be asked for a bribe (for example, males, respondents with more education, and urban residents) are also those most likely to report that a government official asked them for a bribe.

Perceptions of corruption have remained at a steady, but high level during the period between 2008 and 2014, after a slight dip between 2004 and 2008. In the 2014 survey, the perception that corruption is widespread is quite common, since 53% of Dominican respondents indicate that corruption is "very generalized" and 29% considers it "somewhat generalized." Within the Americas, Dominicans have an average perception of corruption that exceeds the regional average, and the country is located in the eighth position for this indicator of corruption.

The analysis in Chapter 6 concludes by considering how these threats to the rule of law might affect the legitimacy of the major institutions charged with combatting these societal ills – the judicial system and the police. Trust in the justice system and trust in the ability of judicial courts to ensure a fair trial and punish the guilty have followed a downward trend between 2008 and 2014. Among the countries of the Americas, the Dominican Republic is located near the central third in the region for these indicators of trust in the judicial system. Beyond the justice system, the police are another important institution for the effective administration of justice. As noted with evaluations of the judicial system, trust in the police has also deteriorated in recent years, going from 46.6 points in 2008 to 35.6 in 2014 on a 100-point scale. Of the 25 countries in the sample, only two have lower average trust in the police: Venezuela and Guyana.

Crime, corruption, and the perceptions of these problems are significantly associated with the lack of trust that is observed in the institutions in charge of ensuring the rule of law. As expected, the evidence suggests that experiences of victimization and perceptions of crime and corruption are serious and widespread problems that erode trust in institutions. Dominicans who have been victims of crime or corruption are significantly less likely to trust the judiciary, as are those who perceive that there is insecurity and corruption. A similar pattern is observed in the case of trust in the police. Victims of crime and corruption have significantly less trust in the police than those who have not been victims in the last 12 months. Furthermore, respondents who perceive crime and corruption as serious and widespread problems have less trust in this institution. Of these factors, the perception of insecurity has the largest significant impact on trust in the police: those who think that their neighborhood is very safe have evaluations of police that are 20 points higher than those that consider their neighborhoods very unsafe.

These results clearly show that crime and corruption undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions such as trust in the justice system and the rule of law. Overall, crime and corruption have continued to intensify, posing challenges to the Dominican system through weakening the rule of law and undermining the legitimacy of institutions charged with guaranteeing public security, government transparency, and equitable treatment under the law.

Chapter 7 analyzes democratic values and political behavior in the Dominican Republic, including democratic norms and support for democracy, political and civic engagement, partisanship, exposure to clientelism, and evaluations of the incumbent government's performance in office. The discussion begins by focusing on democratic legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of major political and social institutions in the Dominican Republic. On support for the system, the data indicate a decreasing pattern in support between 2008 and 2012 followed by stabilization in the 2014 survey. A multivariate analysis reveals that Dominicans who approve of the President's performance, who have more positive evaluations of the national economy, and who are more satisfied with local services, express greater support for the system. On the other hand, support is lower among victims of crime and corruption, as well as among those that perceive crime and corruption as more serious problems. That is, being a victim of corruption or crime, as well as perceptions of these problems, has implications beyond the erosion of trust in the judicial system, a topic discussed in the previous chapter.

Chapter 7 then addresses the norms of tolerance in the Dominican Republic. The data from the last five AmericasBarometer surveys suggest that tolerance among Dominicans dropped considerably between 2006 and 2010, but then recovered significantly in 2012 before declining again in 2014. This decline between 2012 and 2014 is statistically significant, indicating erosion in the level of respect for

the basic political rights of those who oppose the political system. A multivariate analysis shows that political tolerance is much less influenced by evaluations of government performance, economic perceptions, and even perception of crime and corruption in comparison to support for the political system.

The regional data demonstrate that the Dominican Republic is located within the regional average or just below with regards to diffuse support for the system (12th position), tolerance towards those with strong anti-system beliefs (15th position), and the legitimacy of specific political institutions such as elections (16th position) and political parties (16th position). On the other hand, Dominicans rank 9th in the Americas in their abstract support for democracy. The pattern of declining democratic legitimacy in the Dominican Republic, which has been underway since the early 2000s, appears to have slowed according to the 2014 AmericasBarometer data – support for the political system and for some (but not all specific institutions) has leveled off, and abstract support for democracy has even increased slightly. An important caveat to these modest gains, however, is that some of these democratic values, particularly system support, are highly contingent upon evaluations of the president, local government, and the economy. Thus, commitment to the institutions of democracy is likely to vacillate if performance in these areas falters.

The chapter then proceeds to analyze the ways in which Dominicans engage with society and the state. The data indicate that Dominicans are particularly right-leaning in their ideological orientation, placing as the most ideologically right population in all of the Americas with Dominican partisan identifiers especially likely to hold right-leaning ideological positions.

Among countries in the Americas, the Dominican Republic ranked third in 2014 in the share of respondents who sympathize with a political party (54.3% of respondents). This high rate of partisan identification has remained steady since the last non-presidential election year in which an AmericasBarometer survey was conducted in 2010. The PLD is the beneficiary of much of this partisan attachment, with 41.3% of Dominican respondents identifying with the party. Those mostly likely to identify with a party are those with right-leaning ideologies, those who positively evaluate the national economy, and those with darker skin tone. Rightist ideology is strongly associated with partisanship. Only 36% of those with the extreme leftist ideologies identify with a political party, while 70% of those with extreme rightist ideologies have party affiliations, almost two times more. This pattern reflects the general tendency of the Dominican party system to be located to the right of the ideological spectrum. Dominicans are also heavily involved in civic organizations, placing second in the region on the civic engagement scale analyzed in Chapter 7; and Dominican participation in civic associations has increased slightly since 2010.

In addition to high levels of political and civic engagement, the Dominican Republic experiences high levels of clientelism. Among Dominican respondents, 31.5% report knowing people that had received clientelistic offers and 24.4% report having directly received an offer. The Dominican Republic ranks first in the region in exposure to or knowledge of clientelistic offers. Some countries that usually stand out as having high levels of clientelism, such as Argentina and Venezuela, are located in a lower position than the Dominican Republic; and even Mexico, a bastion of clientelism in Latin America, exhibits a lower percentage than the Dominican Republic in this measure. A multivariate analysis indicates that party identification, skin tone, education, and household wealth are not related in a statistically significant manner to receiving or knowing of clientelistic offers. However,

men, younger people, and rural residents have a higher likelihood of exposure to and knowledge of clientelistic offers than women, the elderly, and urban residents.

Access to government social spending in general or to conditional cash transfers in particular is also widespread in the Dominican Republic, with the country ranking first in the region on these indicators. Thirty eight percent of Dominican respondents indicate that their household benefits from the conditional cash transfer program, *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. These rates of government assistance match those reported in the 2012 AmericasBarometer, indicating that social services have expanded or declined significantly in the last two years. A multivariate analysis suggests that poorer and less educated respondents are the most likely to benefit from this program, which was itself designed to target the poor. Respondents with darker skin and those living in more rural areas are also more likely to receive this type of public assistance. Moreover, those who sympathize with the PLD receive the *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* at higher rates than those who do not sympathize with any party (independents), which suggests that providing social services to citizens has the potential to generate benefits not just in terms of social progress, but also in political support; although the available data do not allow the ability establish causality.

The chapter concludes by examining assessments of government performance, which have either held steady or improved between 2012 and 2014. Evaluations of performance in the economic arena – combatting poverty and managing the economy – are especially positive. President Medina’s job performance ratings are also quite high in regional and temporal perspectives.

Finally, Chapter 8 examines the extent to which Dominicans hold views that are consistent with providing opportunities for, promoting participation among, and equal treatment of groups frequently marginalized, including women, sexual minorities, and immigrants in general, as well as Haitian immigrants and their descendants in the Dominican Republic. In analyzing attitudes regarding women, the data indicate that most Dominicans support women’s equality in the household and in the workforce. Additionally, the trend of declining opposition to women’s equality in the political realm, which began in 2010, has held steady in the 2014 survey. However, it is important to note that Dominican support for greater political participation among women has actually been experiencing a *decline* during the same period. A multivariate analysis of support for the presence of women in politics reveals that respondents who hold more egalitarian views of women in society, both at home and in the workplace, are also more likely to support gender equality in politics. Women and people with more education also exhibit more egalitarian attitudes than men and the less educated.

In terms of supporting reproductive rights for women, the Dominican Republic is near the middle of the countries in the region, with 59% that support abortion when the health of the mother is at risk. When rape is the motivation for abortion, Dominicans are much less in favor of allowing the termination of a pregnancy, with only 30.5% of Dominican respondents approving of abortion under these circumstances. Since 2010, when asking about abortion in the Dominican Republic using these same questions, the support for abortion increased slightly between 2010 and 2012, but there is no statistically significant change between 2012 and 2014. An analysis of attitudes about abortion when the health of the mother is at risk reveals that higher levels of education, lighter skin tone, and egalitarian attitudes about the role of women in the workforce are significantly related to support for the right to terminate a pregnancy. The effect of education is particularly noteworthy.

Regarding the rights of sexual minorities, the Dominican Republic ranks in the bottom half of countries in the region, scoring only 34.5 on a 100-point scale measuring support for homosexuals' rights to run for public office. The average score for this measure increased 10 points in the Dominican Republic between 2006 and 2014, which constitutes a substantive and statistically significant change. The level of support for the rights of same-sex couples to marry places the Dominican Republic near the middle of the region with an average of 22.0 in 2014. This result places the Dominican Republic well below the average support in Uruguay, the country with the highest level of support for same-sex marriage with an average of 70.6 on the same 100-point scale. On the other hand, the tolerance for gay marriage is much higher in the Dominican Republic than in other Caribbean countries like Jamaica and Haiti, where support falls below 7 points. In addition, between 2010 and 2014 there was a small but statistically significant increase of 3.45 points in Dominicans' support for the right of same-sex couples to marry.

In analyzing attitudes toward immigrants, the data indicate a pattern of decline in Dominicans' willingness to accept Haitians' rights and to recognize patterns of discrimination against Haitian immigrants. For instance, the average score on a 100-point scale measuring Dominican respondents' assessments of the level of discrimination experienced by Haitians was just 48 points, a score that represents a statistically and substantively significant decline of 10 points in willingness to acknowledge discrimination between 2010 and 2014. Thus, attitudes toward Haitians have deteriorated in recent years at the same time that changes in the legal system have undermined the status of Dominicans of Haitian descent and of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic. A multivariate analysis examines the factors associated with attitudes towards Haitian immigrants. The results indicate that support for democracy, political tolerance in general, positive perceptions of personal economic conditions, higher education, and urban residence are related to higher acceptance of the rights of Haitians and their descendants. The effect of education is particularly strong, so that higher levels of education significantly increase the acceptance of the access of Haitian descendants to citizenship rights and work permits for immigrants. Attitudes regarding immigration more generally, as opposed to specifically Haitian immigrants, have also deteriorated somewhat in recent years. In particular, there seems to be less support for the idea that immigrants do not take jobs away from Dominicans.

Negative attitudes toward immigrants do not prevent Dominicans from exploring the possibility of emigrating themselves. Nearly 24% of respondents indicate that their households benefit from remittances sent by friends or family living abroad and 29% report intentions to move to another country in the next three years. In regional perspective, these scores place the Dominican Republic in 4th and 5th place on receiving remittances and intentions to live abroad, respectively (among the countries that included these questions in their surveys). The percentage of Dominican respondents that report either having received remittances or that they have intentions of leaving the country have remained more or less the same between 2010, 2012 and 2014, after previous increases. Dominicans most likely to report the intention of going to live or work abroad include men, those with higher levels of household wealth, and in particular, the young.



Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

**Part I:
Insecurity, Governance, and Civil
Society in the Dominican Republic and
in the Americas**

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

Nicole Hinton and Daniel Montalvo
with
Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a “security trap,” where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, “The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy.”

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.¹ First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime’s ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue

¹ Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, “crime and violence carry staggering economic costs” that consume approximately 8% of the region’s GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care” (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.² Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.³
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

² The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

³ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.



This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,⁴ Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,⁵ some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.⁶ We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa⁷ (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

⁴ The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

⁵ Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

⁶ Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

⁷ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.




Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012⁸

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.⁹ Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁰




Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

⁸ Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.

⁹ The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.

¹⁰ Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/>. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.



Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).




Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording



incidents of robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.¹¹ The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).¹²

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the

¹¹ There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

¹² An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates*. According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions¹³ not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and

¹³ In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.



Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.¹⁴

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:¹⁵

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.¹⁶ Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,¹⁷ the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

¹⁴ InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Taxis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

¹⁵ Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

¹⁶ Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

¹⁷ It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.¹⁸ The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.¹⁹ However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.




Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

¹⁸ Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

¹⁹ As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.



Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.




Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Figure 1.6 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure 1.5 demonstrates, it still ranks low in

comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.²⁰




Figure 1.6. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country²¹

²⁰ It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

²¹ Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.



IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:²²

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]
 (88) DK [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**] (98) DA [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]

Figure 1.7 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.²³ We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.7 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5 adults living in an urban area reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).²⁴

²² LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because no changes were introduced within those periods.

²³ Figure 1.7 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

²⁴ See also Figure 1.16.




Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.8 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.8 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate “security” as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).




Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?
 [fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.9, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.




Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent’s household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.10 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.²⁵ We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

²⁵ This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.




Figure 1.10. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality/canton/parish
- (4) In another municipality/canton/parish
- (5) In another country
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Figure 1.11 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).




Figure 1.11. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these “VICBAR” questions:

| |
|--|
| Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood. |
| VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no] |
| VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no] |
| VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no] |
| VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no] |

Figure 1.12 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;



and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.²⁶




Figure 1.12. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.13 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When comparing the two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the

²⁶ When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.²⁷ It is important to remember that the distribution of illegal activities differs among countries, with activities such as selling drugs being more localized (concentrated) in certain neighborhoods in some countries, while it may be more diffused in other countries. This does not mean that overall drug use, or overall levels of drug sales, are necessarily higher in one country than another. Rather, it means that knowledge about the sale of drugs in the countries at the top of Figure 1.13 is more widespread than in countries at the bottom of the chart.




Figure 1.13. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁷ Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).



Next, Figure 1.14 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.²⁸




Figure 1.14. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁸ When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

Finally, Figure 1.15 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series – burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.²⁹




Figure 1.15. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

²⁹ When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.³⁰ In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.³¹ The results in Figure 1.16 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

³⁰ Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

³¹ Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 1.16. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.17 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.³² The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

³² The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.




Figure 1.17. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

**Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014
(Figure 1.16)**

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|--------------------------|----------|
| 66 years or older | -0.094* | (-5.09) |
| 56-65 years | -0.069* | (-3.82) |
| 46-55 years | -0.026 | (-1.45) |
| 26-35 years | 0.004 | -0.23 |
| 16-25 years | 0.022 | -1.18 |
| Skin Tone | -0.033 | (-1.75) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.076* | -4.35 |
| Years of Schooling | 0.199* | -10.73 |
| Woman | -0.071* | (-4.70) |
| Urban | 0.212* | -10.61 |
| Guatemala | -0.03 | (-1.32) |
| El Salvador | -0.040* | (-1.98) |
| Honduras | -0.027 | (-1.18) |
| Nicaragua | -0.050* | (-2.27) |
| Costa Rica | -0.135* | (-5.67) |
| Panama | -0.268* | (-8.69) |
| Colombia | -0.055* | (-2.74) |
| Ecuador | 0.055* | -2.05 |
| Bolivia | -0.024 | (-0.92) |
| Peru | 0.055* | (-3) |
| Paraguay | -0.125* | (-6.11) |
| Chile | -0.183* | (-6.84) |
| Uruguay | -0.014 | (-0.70) |
| Brazil | -0.082* | (-3.93) |
| Venezuela | -0.016 | (-0.87) |
| Argentina | -0.003 | (-0.19) |
| Dominican Republic | 0.004 | (-0.17) |
| Haiti | -0.065* | (-2.89) |
| Jamaica | -0.253* | (-10.09) |
| Guyana | -0.225* | (-8.28) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.207* | (-8.87) |
| Belize | -0.073* | (-3.93) |
| Constant | -1.604* | (-85.00) |
| F | 37.2 | |
| Number of cases | 38102 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).¹ Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than \$2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on \$10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious \$4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.² Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.³ So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if

¹ Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of “Latin America and the Caribbean” in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

²<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp>

³<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life>

delegated sufficient political authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we document are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|---------|---------|---------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| R3. Refrigerator | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | DK 88 | DA 98 |
| R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular) | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R4A. Cellular telephone | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."] | (0) No | (1) One | (2) Two | (3) Three or more | 88 | 98 |
| R6. Washing machine | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R7. Microwave oven | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R8. Motorcycle | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R12. Indoor plumbing | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R14. Indoor bathroom | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R15. Computer | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R18. Internet | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| R1. Television | (0) No [Skip to R26] | | | (1) Yes [Continue] | 88 | 98 |
| R16. Flat panel TV | (0) No | | | (1) Yes | 88 | 98 |
| | | | | | | 99 INAP |

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown slightly since

2006 (when it was 89%).⁴ Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.




Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014⁵

⁴ In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

⁵ This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.



Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common; roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.⁶ We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.⁷ For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

⁶ This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. *AmericasBarometer Insight Report 2008*, no. 6. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf>. The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

⁷ Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer.⁸




Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.⁹

⁸ If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable’s effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.




Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014¹⁰

Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.¹¹ Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).¹² It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:¹³ the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities, being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from

¹⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

¹¹ In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

¹² In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

¹³ The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

their parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.¹⁴ Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**
 (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
 (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
 (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
 (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
 (88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). In contrast, the majority of citizens of the Dominican Republic (68%) report that their income is not sufficient and they are stretched. These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide

¹⁴ See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173> and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf

the sample by quintiles of household wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than 6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile for the region as a whole, 3 out of every 10 individuals in the region report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the middle wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. In the Dominican Republic, the perception of household income is much more negative in 2014. Among Dominicans in the highest wealth quintile, 4 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not sufficient. At the same time, half of those in the poorest quintile feel the same way. Among those in the middle wealth quintile, 74% say that their income is not sufficient. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.




Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014




Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6).¹⁵ More importantly, the relative stability of respondents’ perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.

¹⁵ The averages calculated for the Americas as a whole in all figures for Part I also include the Dominican Republic.




Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time




Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).




Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014




Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Figure 2.10). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Figure 2.10 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.




Figure 2.10. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014¹⁶

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF’s April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF’s projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

¹⁶ For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity* (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent's views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.11).¹⁷




Figure 2.11. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.12 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like

¹⁷ Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year's growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.

whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood¹⁸ and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.¹⁹ Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.²⁰

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educate individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing.

Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

¹⁸ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

¹⁹ See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

²⁰ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure 2.12. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,²¹ 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both

²¹ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.

prevent money from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.



Appendix

Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|--------------------------|----------|
| Rural | -0.175* | (-22.82) |
| Man in a Couple | 0.035* | (5.57) |
| Woman in a Couple | -0.014* | (-2.25) |
| Woman Living Alone | -0.042* | (-7.43) |
| Level of Education | 0.346* | (59.08) |
| Skin Tone | -0.134* | (-19.55) |
| 16-25 Years | -0.003 | (-0.49) |
| 26-35 Years | -0.018* | (-3.18) |
| 46-55 Years | 0.008 | (1.55) |
| 56-65 Years | 0.020* | (3.79) |
| 66 Years or Older | 0.004 | (0.74) |
| Guatemala | -0.060* | (-6.21) |
| El Salvador | -0.083* | (-9.45) |
| Honduras | -0.034* | (-3.04) |
| Nicaragua | -0.142* | (-15.57) |
| Costa Rica | 0.119* | (13.25) |
| Panama | 0.033* | (3.29) |
| Colombia | -0.012 | (-1.18) |
| Ecuador | -0.039* | (-3.12) |
| Bolivia | -0.130* | (-8.53) |
| Peru | -0.077* | (-9.08) |
| Paraguay | 0.022* | (2.83) |
| Chile | 0.076* | (8.88) |
| Brazil | 0.093* | (10.67) |
| Venezuela | 0.052* | (5.38) |
| Argentina | 0.058* | (8.11) |
| Dominican Republic | -0.010 | (-0.86) |
| Haiti | -0.162* | (-11.86) |
| Jamaica | 0.024* | (2.39) |
| Guyana | 0.017 | (1.38) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 0.143* | (18.17) |
| Belize | 0.010 | (1.23) |
| Constant | -0.102* | (-11.69) |
| Number of observations | 33769 | |
| Population size | 29411.22 | |
| Design df | 1912 | |
| F(32, 1881) | 413.07* | |
| R ² | 0.3952 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Appendix 2.22. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

| | Standardized Coefficient | (Z Statistic) |
|---|--------------------------|---------------|
| GDP Growth Rate (Estimated) | 0.178* | (2.19) |
| Rural | 0.018* | (2.82) |
| Woman | -0.060* | (-10.48) |
| Wealth Quintile | 0.041* | (6.65) |
| Level of Education | 0.037* | (5.16) |
| Skin Tone | -0.015* | (-2.18) |
| Received Assistance From the Government | 0.035* | (6.13) |
| Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood | -0.031* | (-5.32) |
| Asked to Pay a Bribe | -0.023* | (-3.92) |
| 16-25 Years | 0.038* | (5.23) |
| 26-35 Years | 0.020* | (2.79) |
| 46-55 Years | 0.000 | (-0.03) |
| 56-65 Years | 0.003 | (0.43) |
| 66 Years or Older | -0.008 | (-1.30) |
| Constant | -0.094 | (-0.50) |
| var(Country-Level) | 0.104 | |
| var(Individual-Level) | 0.901 | |
| Number of groups | 23 | |
| Wald $\chi^2(14)$ | 385.25* | |
| Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses. * p<0.05 | | |

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank¹ finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).² Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silverson and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007;

¹ The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.

² Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.

- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.
- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes |
|---|--|----|-----|
| Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... | | | |
| EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? | | 0 | 1 |
| EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 |
| [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 |
| EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes |
|---|--|----|-----|
| EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.³ Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population of the region the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. In the Dominican Republic, the rate of corruption victimization is slightly higher in comparison with the region in 2014, with 16.2% reporting that they had been asked to pay a bribe by a police officer. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.4% of the overall regional sample and 2.2% in the Dominican Republic reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents in the region had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 13.6% in the region as a whole and 22.4% in the Dominican Republic were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 3% of respondents in the region and 1.8 % in the Dominican Republic reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.4% in the region and 21.1% in the Dominican Republic were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals in the region and 3% in the Dominican Republic with children in school were asked for a

³ As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada



bribe related to education while nearly 7.9% of respondents in the region and 5.1% in the Dominican Republic who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.




Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or

not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.⁴ In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure 3.2).⁵ This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).⁶




Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

⁴ The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

⁵ The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

⁶ While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences than any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.




Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.⁷ Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.⁸ Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

⁷ For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

⁸ Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.




Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.⁹ Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to

⁹ Measured from the question WF1: “Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No”



occur in places where the rule of law is objectively weaker.¹⁰ As we model these differences, we include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.¹¹

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.¹² In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.¹³ This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

¹⁰ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.

¹¹ The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

¹² As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

¹³ We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.




Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.¹⁴ Specifically, respondents are asked:

¹⁴ This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]

(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is “very uncommon” and 100 represents the perception that corruption is “very common.”

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.




Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014




Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to “the government” even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. In countries like the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Peru, Paraguay, and Mexico high perceptions largely coincide with high corruption victimization rates. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national



scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.




Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014




Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so

again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.¹⁵




Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

¹⁵ The coefficients are standardized—the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.¹⁶

| | No | Yes | DK | DA |
|---|----|-----|----|----|
| EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified? | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.¹⁷

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.¹⁸ All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

¹⁶ This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

¹⁷ Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).

¹⁸ In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect—the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p < 0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.




Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014




Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014




Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this



concern, Chapter 4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014
(Figure 3.5)

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|---|--------------------------|----------|
| Rural | -0.097* | (-4.51) |
| Woman | -0.262* | (-16.57) |
| Level of Education | 0.081* | (3.88) |
| Wealth Quintile | 0.132* | (6.68) |
| Received Assistance From the Government | 0.081* | (4.77) |
| Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood | 0.326* | (17.12) |
| Skin Tone | -0.040 | (-1.80) |
| 16-25 Years | -0.090* | (-4.47) |
| 26-35 Years | 0.006 | (0.28) |
| 46-55 Years | -0.037 | (-2.02) |
| 56-65 Years | -0.089* | (-4.54) |
| 66 Years or Older | -0.189* | (-8.57) |
| Guatemala | -0.056* | (-2.46) |
| El Salvador | -0.254* | (-9.39) |
| Honduras | -0.041 | (-1.59) |
| Nicaragua | -0.177* | (-7.73) |
| Costa Rica | -0.166* | (-5.94) |
| Panama | -0.102* | (-3.11) |
| Colombia | -0.223* | (-8.68) |
| Ecuador | -0.065* | (-2.04) |
| Bolivia | 0.029 | 0.89) |
| Peru | -0.032 | (-1.49) |
| Paraguay | 0.005 | (0.29) |
| Chile | -0.364* | (-9.26) |
| Uruguay | -0.307* | (-12.16) |
| Brazil | -0.203* | (-7.15) |
| Venezuela | -0.049* | (-2.03) |
| Argentina | -0.120* | (-5.27) |
| Dominican Republic | -0.082* | (-3.22) |
| Haiti | 0.393* | (15.17) |
| Jamaica | -0.237* | (-10.32) |
| Guyana | -0.124* | (-4.80) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.225* | (-9.03) |
| Belize | -0.059* | (-3.46) |
| Constant | -1.448* | (-63.98) |
| Number of observations | 29123 | |
| Population size | 25866.08 | |
| Design df | 1969 | |
| F(34, 1936) | 55.79* | |
| Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05 | | |

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.

Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014
(Figure 3.10)

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|---|--------------------------|----------|
| Asked to Pay a Bribe | 0.076* | (5.00) |
| Rural | -0.083* | (-4.72) |
| Woman | -0.044* | (-3.51) |
| Level of Education | 0.128* | (7.68) |
| Wealth Quintile | 0.083* | (5.60) |
| Received Assistance From the Government | -0.034* | (-2.40) |
| Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood | 0.123* | (8.58) |
| Skin Tone | -0.005 | (-0.27) |
| 16-25 Years | -0.103* | (-6.55) |
| 26-35 Years | -0.003 | (-0.17) |
| 46-55 Years | 0.007 | (0.45) |
| 56-65 Years | 0.024 | (1.51) |
| 66 Years or Older | 0.054* | (3.69) |
| Guatemala | -0.043* | (-1.99) |
| El Salvador | -0.070* | (-3.45) |
| Honduras | -0.082* | (-3.69) |
| Nicaragua | -0.094* | (-4.52) |
| Panama | -0.095* | (-4.67) |
| Colombia | 0.082* | (3.35) |
| Ecuador | -0.175* | (-6.03) |
| Bolivia | -0.136* | (-4.38) |
| Peru | 0.035 | (1.79) |
| Paraguay | 0.062* | (3.07) |
| Uruguay | -0.151* | (-7.92) |
| Venezuela | 0.040 | (1.93) |
| Argentina | 0.028 | (1.58) |
| Dominican Republic | 0.052* | (2.10) |
| Haiti | -0.156* | (-6.50) |
| Jamaica | 0.047* | (2.27) |
| Guyana | 0.055* | (2.32) |
| Belize | 0.005 | (0.27) |
| Cut1 | -3.212 | (-74.48) |
| Cut2 | -1.429 | (-50.13) |
| Cut3 | 0.404 | (15.59) |
| Number of Interviews | 22124 | |
| Population size | 20675.9 | |
| Design df | 1354 | |
| F(31, 1324) | 32.32* | |
| Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses. * p<0.05 | | |

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.



Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as “neither good, nor bad.”
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens’ evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the “third wave” of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization’s influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet’s study of Bolivia’s 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata’s findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti’s cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in



government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falletti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

| |
|---|
| Now let's talk about your local municipality... |
| NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer |
| NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1] |

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.¹ The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.² In the Dominican Republic, rates of local participation previous to 2014 were much higher in comparison to the rest of the region. In 2010, there year in which the highest rate of local participation is observed for Dominicans, almost 1 out of every 4 citizens attended a municipal meeting. Nevertheless, as in other countries of the region, the level of attendance to local meetings in 2014 has declined significantly.




Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country, the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with

¹ Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.

² Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America’s strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the 2014 AmericasBarometer – there is no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.




Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level since 2006 in the Americas and the Dominican Republic. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.




Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated

with political federalism.³ Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.




Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has

³ We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.



attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).

Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with age until people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.




Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014⁴

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruptions are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

⁴ For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.




Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month
 (3) Once or twice a year (4) Never
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning “never” and 100 meaning “once a week.”



Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static in the region since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. In the Dominican Republic, the level of participation in the community as has also remained static but since a significant increase in 2010. Nevertheless, Dominicans participate to a greater extent to resolve problems in their communities in comparison to the average level in the rest of the region. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.




Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

| | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|
| SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? | | | | |
| (1) Very satisfied | (2) Satisfied | (3) Dissatisfied | (88) DK | (98) DA |
| (4) Very dissatisfied | (99) N/A (Does not use) | | | |
| SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] | | | | |
| (1) Very satisfied | (2) Satisfied | (3) Dissatisfied | (88) DK | (98) DA |
| (4) Very dissatisfied | (99) N/A (Does not use) | | | |
| SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] | | | | |
| (1) Very satisfied | (2) Satisfied | (3) Dissatisfied | (88) DK | (98) DA |
| (4) Very dissatisfied | (99) N/A (Does not use) | | | |

Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 4.8 we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti’s rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.




Figure 4.8. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.9, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' of the Americas satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region. In contrast, the average level of satisfaction with the services of local government in the Dominican Republic is below the regional average in 2014, and it has remained stable since 2010.




Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.10 we further explore citizens’ evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding “Good” or “Very Good” views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.




Figure 4.10. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.⁵ Figure 4.11 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

⁵ We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas. In fact, in the case of the Dominican Republic, these services are provided in large part by the national government.




Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.12 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela’s decline. Compared to 2012, Venezuelans rated schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political



and social instability in the country. In the Dominican case, we observe a statistically significant increase from 2012 when the average on the same scale was 54 points. That is, Dominicans' evaluations of public schools in the country have improved about 8 points in the last two years, although international evaluations of the quality of education in the Dominican Republic does not place the country in a good position in comparative perspective. Perhaps, the recent efforts by the government to focus on a number of changes in educational policies have resulted in an improvement in perceptions about the public service, although the full and substantive impact of the changes will be felt only after a few years.




Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.13 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and

Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has declined dramatically in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services ($r = .44$) than the quality of roads ($r = .33$) and health services is also more weakly correlated ($r = .29$) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.




Figure 4.13. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.14). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas and the Dominican Republic in 2014 rated them higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Dominicans report being much more satisfied with public schools in comparison to the rest of the citizens of the Americas. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads for the region as a whole were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level ($r = .26$).




Figure 4.14. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.⁶ Figure 4.15 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts. Chileans appear to be quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their

⁶ A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.

services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is $r=.30$. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.




Figure 4.15. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.16 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest.

Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government's services are failing them.

We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.




Figure 4.16. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.17, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point in the region, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. In the Dominican Republic, trust in local government has been declining steadily since 2008, as with other institutions. In 2014, citizens residing in the metropolitan region of the Dominican Republic exhibit significantly more trust in their municipality than those who live in the north or east of the country. The public in the Americas and the Dominican Republic now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.




Figure 4.17. Trust in Local Government over Time




Figure 4.18. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Figure 4.18 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale. Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Figure 4.18 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally

high levels of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated ($r = .39$).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.19 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.




Figure 4.19. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.⁷ People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin tone) these findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have

⁷ Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.



similar levels of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.16 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.19 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

| | Standardized Coefficients | (t) |
|--|---------------------------|--------|
| Corruption Victimization | 0.196* | -11.05 |
| Perception of Insecurity | 0.027 | -1.5 |
| Satisfaction with Services of Local Government | -0.117* | -6.16 |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.551* | -39.67 |
| Perception of the National Economy | 0.033 | -1.75 |
| 66 years or older | 0.02 | -1.08 |
| 56-65 years | 0.059* | -3.14 |
| 46-55 years | 0.050* | -2.52 |
| 26-35 years | -0.043 | -1.96 |
| 16-25 years | -0.179* | -7.42 |
| Skin Tone | 0.033 | -1.52 |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.064* | -3.2 |
| Years of Schooling | 0.078* | -3.53 |
| Women | 0.068* | -3.99 |
| Urban/Rural | 0.127* | -5.89 |
| Guatemala | -0.105* | -4.56 |
| El Salvador | -0.073* | -3.32 |
| Honduras | -0.073* | -3.24 |
| Nicaragua | 0.067* | -3.12 |
| Costa Rica | -0.112* | -4.26 |
| Panama | -0.123* | -4.56 |
| Colombia | -0.059* | -2.71 |
| Ecuador | -0.073* | -3.08 |
| Bolivia | -0.174* | -4.79 |
| Peru | 0.002 | -0.1 |
| Paraguay | -0.053* | -2.46 |
| Chile | 0.03 | -1.17 |
| Uruguay | 0.100* | -4.48 |
| Brazil | -0.031 | -1.35 |
| Venezuela | -0.105* | -5.14 |
| Argentina | -0.003 | -0.15 |
| Dominican Republic | -0.027 | -1.21 |
| Haiti | -0.215* | -9.69 |
| Jamaica | -0.091* | -3.77 |
| Guyana | -0.186* | -7.74 |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.073 | -1.91 |
| Belize | -0.063* | -2.4 |
| Constant | -1.966* | -87.78 |
| F | 60.11 | |
| Number of cases | 35412 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL

| | Standardi zed Coefficients | (t) |
|--|-------------------------------|--------|
| Corruption Victimization | -0.034* | -5.36 |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.113* | -16.73 |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.056* | -8.68 |
| Requested Help from Municipal Office | -0.041* | -6.24 |
| Perception of the National Economy | 0.141* | -20.49 |
| 66 years or older | 0 | -0.02 |
| 56-65 years | -0.004 | -0.64 |
| 46-55 years | 0.001 | -0.13 |
| 26-35 years | 0.016* | -2.21 |
| 16-25 years | 0.055* | -8.1 |
| Skin Tone | -0.018* | -2.31 |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.039* | -5.5 |
| Years of Schooling | -0.016* | -2.09 |
| Women | 0.039* | -7.37 |
| Urban/Rural | -0.034* | -3.8 |
| Guatemala | 0.01 | -1.2 |
| El Salvador | 0.026* | -2.34 |
| Honduras | 0.025* | -2.73 |
| Nicaragua | 0.044* | -5.28 |
| Costa Rica | 0.009 | -0.82 |
| Panama | 0.047* | -4.9 |
| Colombia | 0.009 | -1.03 |
| Ecuador | -0.005 | -0.44 |
| Bolivia | -0.008 | -0.57 |
| Peru | -0.026* | -3.05 |
| Paraguay | 0.009 | -0.85 |
| Chile | 0.019 | -1.91 |
| Uruguay | -0.012 | -1.17 |
| Brazil | -0.073* | -6.78 |
| Venezuela | -0.013 | -1.36 |
| Argentina | 0.039* | -3.62 |
| Dominican Republic | -0.049* | -3.75 |
| Haiti | -0.026 | -1.92 |
| Jamaica | -0.093* | -8.95 |
| Guyana | -0.046* | -4.45 |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.016 | -0.96 |
| Belize | -0.005 | -0.48 |
| Constant | -0.002; -0.26 | |
| F | 47.69 | |
| Number of cases | 35412 | |
| R-Squared | 0.08 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)

| | Standardized Coefficients | (t) |
|--|---------------------------|--------|
| Corruption Victimization | -0.049* | -8.45 |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.086* | -14.6 |
| Satisfaction with Services of Local Government | 0.361* | -57.08 |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.043* | -7.96 |
| Requested Help from Municipal Office | 0.014* | -2.5 |
| Perception of the National Economy | 0.068* | -11.08 |
| 66 years or older | 0.021* | -3.36 |
| 56-65 years | 0.009 | -1.41 |
| 46-55 years | 0.000 | -0.05 |
| 26-35 years | -0.014* | -2.16 |
| 16-25 years | 0.004 | -0.57 |
| Skin Tone | 0.004 | -0.57 |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.009 | -1.53 |
| Years of Schooling | -0.040* | -5.93 |
| Women | 0.010* | -2 |
| Urban/Rural | 0.027* | -3.76 |
| Guatemala | -0.060* | -6.87 |
| El Salvador | -0.002 | -0.18 |
| Honduras | -0.009 | -1.01 |
| Nicaragua | -0.020* | -2.12 |
| Costa Rica | -0.020* | -2.33 |
| Panama | -0.088* | -8.98 |
| Colombia | -0.068* | -7.24 |
| Ecuador | -0.040* | -4.47 |
| Bolivia | -0.062* | -5.29 |
| Peru | -0.089* | -10.56 |
| Paraguay | -0.003 | -0.31 |
| Chile | 0.006 | -0.57 |
| Uruguay | -0.026* | -2.9 |
| Brazil | -0.080* | -8.03 |
| Venezuela | 0.017 | -1.62 |
| Argentina | -0.048* | -4.54 |
| Dominican Republic | -0.052* | -5.78 |
| Haiti | -0.071* | -7.57 |
| Jamaica | -0.092* | -11.32 |
| Guyana | -0.040* | -4.13 |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.133* | -9.93 |
| Belize | -0.070* | -7.48 |
| Constant | 0.004; -0.51 | |
| F | 177.14 | |
| Number of cases | 35011 | |
| R-Squared | 0.2 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004–2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in

hard times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.

Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for “democracy” as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V’s goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill¹ and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The “Churchillian” question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average² is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has included since 2006³ and by sub-region.⁴ Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the

¹ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

² As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.

³ Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.

Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.




Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” citizens responded to the following questions:

| |
|---|
| B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system? |
| B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? |
| B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? |
| B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police? |
| B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church? |
| B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church? |
| B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties? |
| B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? |
| B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country? |

⁴ Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.



As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.⁵ The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.⁶ A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

⁵ This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

⁶ Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).




Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country's average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust

in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the “pacification” of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).




Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.⁷ Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this

⁷ Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

concept. Responses were recoded 1 (“yes” the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 (“no” it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.⁸

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.⁹ These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

⁸ These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach’s α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.

⁹ Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.




Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trustful of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.




Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.¹⁰ Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but

¹⁰ Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces ($r = .34$), the national police ($r = .67$), and the justice system ($r = .50$). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, $r = .44$, $r = .69$, and $r = .45$.

low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

| | High Tolerance | Low Tolerance |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| High System Support | Stable Democracy | Authoritarian Stability |
| Low System Support | Unstable Democracy | Democracy at Risk |

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

| |
|---|
| I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. |
| B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) |
| B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? |
| B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? |
| B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? |
| B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? |

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an

increase of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.¹¹ Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.




Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Figure 5.10 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system. The fact that levels of system support in the Dominican Republic are essentially equivalent to those in the United States reflects in part the substantial decline in the support for the system in the United States in recent years, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. In the national survey of the United States in 2006, the average system support was around 66 points; it decreased to about 54 points in 2008 and remained stable at that level in 2010 and 2012, falling again to 49.9 in 2014.

¹¹ However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously the AmericasBarometer surveyed 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.




Figure 5.10. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables,

presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.¹² As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the America's newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.11, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.¹³




Figure 5.11. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

¹² Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

¹³ When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

| |
|--|
| D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: <i>[Probe: To what degree?]</i> |
| D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number. |
| D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ? |
| D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ? |

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.¹⁴

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.¹⁵ Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant

¹⁴ The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

¹⁵ These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).

countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years. In the Dominican case, political tolerance has declined three points since 2012, a change that is not very large but is statistically significant.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.12 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.




Figure 5.12. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Figure 5.13, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).




Figure 5.13. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.14. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.¹⁶ The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.14. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.¹⁷ And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. That is, while the level of satisfaction with government performance contributes to greater support for the political system, these perceptions appear to at the same time drive those that approve of the performance of the national executive to, for example, express less acceptance towards fellow citizens that have differing political views. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and

¹⁶ Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

¹⁷ When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to “their” executive and to be less tolerant towards those who criticize “their” government.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught and that education is an essential element for a stable democracy. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy’s champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy’s cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.




Figure 5.15. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.15. Alarming, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.15, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.16. In the Dominican Republic, the percentage that reports attitudes in favor of stable democracy in 2014 is 22.8%. At the same time 26.9% of respondents express attitudes conducive to authoritarian stability, 21.4% to unstable democracy, and 28.9% to democracy at risk.




Figure 5.16. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Figure 5.17 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. The Dominican Republic is located in the middle range among countries of the region with 22.7% who report democratic attitudes conducive to a stable system. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.




Figure 5.17. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public



concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix

Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|--------------------------|----------|
| Urban/Rural | 0.047* | (-6.24) |
| Sex | 0.014* | (-2.54) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.031* | (-4.42) |
| Years of Schooling | -0.005 | (-0.69) |
| Skin Tone | 0.002 | (-0.34) |
| 16-25 years | -0.009 | (-1.26) |
| 26-35 years | -0.011 | (-1.62) |
| 46-55 years | 0.021* | (-3.24) |
| 56-65 years | 0.022* | (-3.46) |
| 66 years or older | 0.042* | (-6.84) |
| Presidential Job Approval | 0.199* | (-28.64) |
| Satisfaction w/Local Government Services | 0.120* | (-19.79) |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.007 | (-1.28) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.082* | (-13.34) |
| Perception of National Economic Situation | 0.043* | (-6.57) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity Index | -0.107* | (-15.58) |
| Guatemala | -0.038* | (-3.96) |
| El Salvador | 0.017 | (-1.80) |
| Honduras | -0.003 | (-0.27) |
| Nicaragua | 0.058* | (-5.96) |
| Costa Rica | 0.047* | (-4.80) |
| Panama | 0.046* | (-4.73) |
| Colombia | 0.042* | (-4.36) |
| Ecuador | 0.064* | (-6.70) |
| Bolivia | -0.082* | (-6.54) |
| Peru | -0.014 | (-1.40) |
| Paraguay | -0.019* | (-2.07) |
| Chile | 0.095* | (-9.26) |
| Uruguay | 0.051* | (-5.17) |
| Brazil | 0.041* | (-4.24) |
| Venezuela | 0.019 | (-1.90) |
| Argentina | 0.033* | (-3.37) |
| Dominican Republic | -0.067* | (-6.58) |
| Haiti | 0.082* | (-8.09) |
| Jamaica | -0.017 | (-1.92) |
| Guyana | -0.047* | (-4.87) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 0.003 | (-0.20) |
| Belize | -0.041* | (-3.95) |
| Constant | -0.007; (-1.04) | |
| F | 135.06 | |
| Number of cases | 32152 | |
| R-Squared | 0.17 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|--------------------------|----------|
| Urban/Rural | 0.059* | (-8.49) |
| Sex | 0.013* | (-2.31) |
| Years of Schooling | -0.022* | (-3.07) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.030* | (-4.73) |
| Skin Tone | -0.005 | (-0.70) |
| 16-25 years | 0.026* | (-3.74) |
| 26-35 years | -0.001 | (-0.09) |
| 46-55 years | 0.01 | (-1.46) |
| 56-65 years | -0.001 | (-0.17) |
| 66 years or older | 0.011 | (-1.72) |
| Presidential Job Approval | 0.235* | (-31.81) |
| Satisfaction w/Local Government Services | 0.111* | (-18.21) |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.017* | (-2.86) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.050* | (-7.85) |
| Perception of National Economic Situation | 0.046* | (-6.86) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity Index | -0.075* | (-11.27) |
| Guatemala | -0.022* | (-2.44) |
| El Salvador | -0.029* | (-3.48) |
| Honduras | -0.026* | (-3.02) |
| Nicaragua | 0.018* | (-2.04) |
| Costa Rica | 0.074* | (-9.18) |
| Panama | -0.004 | (-0.43) |
| Colombia | -0.013 | (-1.55) |
| Ecuador | -0.025* | (-2.61) |
| Bolivia | -0.105* | (-8.89) |
| Peru | -0.068* | (-8.48) |
| Paraguay | -0.078* | (-8.91) |
| Chile | -0.071* | (-8.02) |
| Uruguay | 0.008 | (-0.85) |
| Brazil | -0.041* | (-4.71) |
| Venezuela | -0.004 | (-0.43) |
| Argentina | 0.006 | (-0.76) |
| Dominican Republic | -0.079* | (-8.79) |
| Haiti | -0.041* | (-4.30) |
| Jamaica | -0.018* | (-2.20) |
| Guyana | -0.040* | (-5.09) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 0.006 | (-0.48) |
| Belize | -0.038* | (-4.31) |
| Constant | 0.000; (-0.02) | |
| F | 103.2 | |
| Number of cases | 31909 | |
| R-Squared | 0.13 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 5.3. Coefficients for Figure 5.11, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|--------------------------|----------|
| Urban/Rural | 0.054* | (7.26) |
| Sex | 0.017* | (3.29) |
| Years of Schooling | -0.015* | (-2.14) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.014* | (-2.18) |
| Skin Tone | -0.002 | (-0.31) |
| 16-25 years | 0.042* | (6.25) |
| 26-35 years | 0.003 | (0.49) |
| 46-55 years | 0.012 | (1.87) |
| 56-65 years | 0.020* | (3.11) |
| 66 years or older | 0.038* | (5.95) |
| Presidential Job Approval | 0.315* | (43.58) |
| Satisfaction w/Local Government Services | 0.110* | (17.62) |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | 0.013* | (2.43) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.064* | (-10.56) |
| Perception of National Economic Situation | 0.076* | (11.90) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity Index | -0.066* | (-9.72) |
| Guatemala | -0.064* | (-6.93) |
| El Salvador | -0.055* | (-6.69) |
| Honduras | -0.063* | (-6.81) |
| Nicaragua | 0.005 | (0.55) |
| Costa Rica | 0.099* | (11.16) |
| Panama | -0.052* | (-5.61) |
| Colombia | -0.048* | (-5.36) |
| Ecuador | -0.025* | (-2.61) |
| Bolivia | -0.107* | (-8.93) |
| Peru | -0.082* | (-8.59) |
| Paraguay | -0.122* | (-13.23) |
| Chile | -0.070* | (-7.04) |
| Uruguay | -0.006 | (-0.60) |
| Brazil | -0.149* | (-13.80) |
| Venezuela | -0.039* | (-3.61) |
| Argentina | 0.021* | (2.41) |
| Dominican Republic | -0.098* | (-10.67) |
| Haiti | -0.134* | (-12.55) |
| Jamaica | -0.091* | (-11.60) |
| Guyana | -0.069* | (-7.71) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | -0.019 | (-1.29) |
| Belize | -0.054* | (-6.00) |
| Constant | 0.011; (1.45) | |
| F | 155.91 | |
| Number of cases | 31976 | |
| R-Squared | 0.23 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

**Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.14, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance
in the Americas, 2014**

| | Standardized Coefficient | (t) |
|--|-----------------------------|----------|
| Urban/Rural | -0.006 | (-0.61) |
| Sex | -0.047* | (-8.75) |
| Years of Schooling | 0.114* | (-15.05) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.037* | (-5.21) |
| Skin Tone | 0.022* | (-2.63) |
| 16-25 years | 0.009 | (-1.28) |
| 26-35 years | -0.012 | (-1.63) |
| 46-55 years | -0.013* | (-1.98) |
| 56-65 years | -0.014* | (-2.06) |
| 66 years or older | -0.016* | (-2.39) |
| Presidential Job Approval | -0.086* | (-10.97) |
| Satisfaction w/Local Government Services | -0.022* | (-3.31) |
| Attended Municipal Meeting | -0.007 | (-1.08) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.008 | (-1.27) |
| Perception of National Economic Situation | -0.005 | (-0.80) |
| Neighborhood Insecurity Index | 0.046* | (-6.10) |
| Guatemala | -0.113* | (-11.22) |
| El Salvador | -0.019 | (-1.91) |
| Honduras | -0.009 | (-0.84) |
| Nicaragua | 0.026* | (-2.25) |
| Costa Rica | 0.002 | (-0.14) |
| Panama | -0.095* | (-9.21) |
| Colombia | -0.001 | (-0.14) |
| Ecuador | -0.037* | (-2.99) |
| Bolivia | -0.053* | (-3.60) |
| Peru | -0.042* | (-3.69) |
| Paraguay | 0.021 | (-1.80) |
| Chile | 0.050* | (-3.93) |
| Uruguay | 0.090* | (-7.10) |
| Brazil | 0.035* | (-2.99) |
| Venezuela | 0.068* | (-5.10) |
| Argentina | 0.040* | (-3.29) |
| Dominican Republic | 0.041* | (-4.07) |
| Haiti | 0.041* | (-4.03) |
| Jamaica | 0.050* | (-3.80) |
| Guyana | 0.040* | (-3.42) |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 0.131* | (-6.71) |
| Belize | 0.032* | (-2.65) |
| Constant | 0.000; (-0.02) | |
| F | 55.94 | |
| Number of cases | 31853 | |
| R-Squared | 0.12 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Part II:
**Rule of Law, Democratic Attitudes, Political
Behavior, Social Inclusion, and Human
Rights in the Dominican Republic**

Chapter 6. The Rule of Law in the Dominican Republic: Crime, Corruption and the Justice System

Jana Morgan and Rosario Espinal

I. Introduction

This and the following two chapters explore themes that help deepen understanding of contemporary democracy with a particular emphasis on important patterns within the Dominican Republic. These chapters draw upon the most recent AmericasBarometer data collected in 2014 as well as previous surveys conducted by LAPOP in the Dominican Republic in order to consider cross-time dynamics in political attitudes and behaviors. This chapter addresses issues pertaining to the justice system and the rule of law, including crime and corruption and their implications for Dominican democratic culture. The subsequent chapter examines a series of important political values and behaviors among survey respondents, including tolerance, support for democracy and democratic institutions, political and civic engagement, and evaluations of government. The final chapter follows on previous AmericasBarometer reports in exploring issues of social inclusion and human rights, with an emphasis on gender, race, and immigration.

In this chapter, we explore challenges to the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law in the Dominican Republic. We begin by considering crime. We outline recent trends in crime statistics, detail Dominican survey respondents' experiences with and perceptions of crime, and explore different types and targets of criminal activity. Overall, crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity have continued to worsen in recent years and the positioning of the Dominican Republic in regional perspective on these indicators is middling at best. We then turn to a discussion of corruption as a second major challenge for the rule of law in the Dominican Republic, considering both encounters with and perceptions of corruption. We find that growing numbers of Dominicans have been targeted by bribery attempts, with the percentage of bribery victims increasing steadily between 2008 and 2014. However, perceptions that corruption is a widespread problem have remained at a high but steady level over the same period. We conclude the analysis in this chapter by considering how these threats to the rule of law might affect the legitimacy of the major institutions charged with combatting these societal problems – the judicial system and the police. The evidence suggests that victimization experiences as well as perceiving crime and corruption as serious, widespread problems undermine trust in these institutions.

II. Crime

As discussed in the previous chapters, crime and insecurity are serious problems confronting many countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In fact, the region has the highest share of its population dying as the result of intentional homicide in the world, and the homicide rates in Central America and the Caribbean have experienced significant increases since the beginning of the 21st century. Moreover, about one-third of respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey consider security issues to be the most important problem facing their country, and Dominican Republic falls into the top third of countries in region on this indicator, with 38.8% identifying security problems as the country's most pressing concern. Indeed, like many of its neighbors, the Dominican

Republic has experienced increasing challenges posed by crime. While robbery rates are comparatively low in the Dominican Republic, the homicide rate of 22.1 per 100,000 people ranks the country near the Caribbean average in 2012 of 21.8. Perhaps more importantly, the over-time trends are not promising, as like other countries in the region, homicide rates in the Dominican Republic have increased significantly from their 21st century nadir of 12.4 in 2001 (UNODC 2012).

Here we consider an alternative information source concerning the threat posed by crime in the Dominican Republic – the AmericasBarometer surveys’ crime victimization data. Crime victimization surveys are particularly effective for understanding cross-time trends in crime even while having potential shortcomings with regard to specifying overall crime rates (Bergman 2006). Thus, in using the AmericasBarometer crime victimization data, our focus here is on assessing how crime victimization has varied over time in the Dominican Republic between 2010 and 2014.¹ We also explore the characteristics of those respondents most likely to report being crime victims. We augment this discussion of victimization by also considering citizens’ perceptions of security problems, which have previously been found to be an important predictor of democratic values, even more than victimization itself (Espinal and Morgan 2012; Morgan and Espinal 2006). In addition, we specifically examine respondents’ perceptions and observations of gangs and drugs in their neighborhoods. This section of the chapter concludes by considering how crime and insecurity affect support for the rule of law.

Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic

To assess crime victimization among survey respondents, the AmericasBarometer included a series of questions designed to assess whether respondents or anyone in their household has been the victim of any type of crime in the past year. The specific wording reads:

| | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| <p>VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No</p> | | | | |
| <p>VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)</p> | | | | |

Figure 6.1 displays the results from these questions regarding crime victimization for the Dominican Republic between 2010 and 2014, all years for which comparable data are available. The left panel of the figure depicts the percentage of respondents who indicate that they were personally the victim of a crime within the past 12 months, while the right panel presents the percentage of respondents who indicate that either they or a member of their household had been a crime victim in the past 12 months, which is based on combining VIC1EXT and VIC1HOGAR. As we can readily observe, the pattern of increased crime victimization, which we observed in the aggregate homicide statistics for the Dominican Republic, is repeated here in the AmericasBarometer crime victimization

¹ The AmericasBarometer surveys in the Dominican Republic for 2004, 2006 and 2008 also included questions about crime victimization, but the question wording changed in 2010, undermining the overtime comparability of these earlier results. Because the primary goal here is to assess temporal shifts, we do not present the 2004-2008 data for crime victimization.



data. Reported experiences of crime victimization among respondents increased steadily between 2010 and 2014. A steady increase in victimization is evident when we consider the respondents' personal experience alone as well as that of other members of the respondent's household. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of respondents reporting that they were the victims of a crime increased from 16.5% to 23.4%, and the number indicating that they or someone in their household had been victims also increased from 27.2% to 36.1%. In both cases, these changes represent more than natural fluctuations in measurement, as the gap between 2010 and 2014 is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).²




Figure 6.1. Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic, 2010-2014

These levels of reported crime victimization place the Dominican Republic among the top five countries in terms of individual respondents' reported victimization rates (see Figure 1.7) and among the top seven countries in terms of overall household victimization (see Figure 6.2 below). In fact, Dominicans are more likely than respondents from any other Caribbean country to report being the victim of a crime in the past 12 months.

² The increases between 2012 and 2014 are also statistically significant, but at $p < 0.05$. The change between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant at conventional levels.




Figure 6.2. Reported Crime Victimization in Respondent's Household, 2014

The survey also asked those who reported being crime victims in the past 12 months about where they were most recently victimized:

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima?
[Leer alternativas]
 (1) En su hogar
 (2) En este barrio o comunidad
 (3) En este municipio
 (4) En otro municipio
 (5) En otro país
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

The results from this question, asked only of those who reported being victimized, are presented in Figure 6.3. Most victims report encountering crime quite close to their homes with 35.5% being victimized in their home and another 26.2% reporting that they were victimized in their own neighborhood. In fact, Dominicans are more likely than the average AmericasBarometer respondent to report that criminal acts against them were committed in their own home and much less likely to report being victimized in a municipality other than their place of residence.




Figure 6.3. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization, Dominican Republic 2014

Aside from understanding rates and locations of criminal acts, we are interested in exploring which Dominicans are most likely to report being crime victims. To assess this question, we conducted multivariate logistic regression analysis of crime victims. We are particularly interested in understanding how respondents' socioeconomic characteristics like race, gender, age, well-being, education, and geography are correlated with their likelihood of reporting that they had been a crime victim. Figure 6.4, which illustrates the results of this analysis, reveals that crime affects Dominicans evenly regardless of skin tone, gender, age or household wealth.³ Only education level and place of residence are significantly associated with respondents reporting that they were crime victims. Those living in rural areas and smaller towns are less likely to experience crime than those in larger cities and towns,⁴ while more education is associated with a greater likelihood of reporting crime victimization.

³ The full results for this regression analysis as well as all others in this chapter may be found appended to the end of the chapter.

⁴ The variable measuring the size of respondents' place of residence is coded such that higher scores indicate smaller areas (e.g. rural areas or small towns) and lower scores indicate larger ones (metropolitan areas). Household wealth or well-being is measured using an index created from a series of survey items that record the presence of particular consumer goods or services within the household, including a television, refrigerator, conventional telephone, cell phone, vehicle, clothes washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor potable water, indoor bathroom, computer, flat screen television, and internet. In constructing the scale, responses are weighted according to their frequency in the urban or rural population in the country, with more rare items having more weight in building the index. Separate weightings are employed for urban

These significant relationships are depicted in Figure 6.5, where we can clearly observe how reports of crime victimization are more likely among respondents who reside in larger cities and have more education. While wealth and gender were significantly associated with crime victimization across the region as a whole (see Figure 1.16), these factors were not significant among Dominicans.




Figure 6.4. Correlates of Crime Victimization, Dominican Republic 2014

and rural respondents because access to these goods and services is likely to be significantly different for rural versus urban households.




Figure 6.5. Relationship of Crime Victimization with Place of Residence and Education Level, Dominican Republic 2014

Neighborhood Exposure to Crime, Gangs and Drugs

Given the significance of crime that occurs close to home in shaping respondents' perceptions of security problems, it is useful that the AmericasBarometer survey allows us to assess the level of criminal activity that they observe in their neighborhood. A series of questions, listed below, asked respondents about four different sorts of criminal acts that may have occurred in their neighborhood – robbery, illegal drug sales, extortion, and murder.

| Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿cuáles de los siguientes actos de delincuencia han ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio. | Sí | No |
|--|----|----|
| VICBAR1. Han ocurrido robos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 |
| VICBAR3. Han ocurrido ventas de drogas ilegales en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 |
| VICBAR4. Han ocurrido extorsiones en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 |
| VICBAR7. Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 |




Figure 6.6. Presence of Crime in Respondent's Neighborhood in past 12 months, Dominican Republic 2014

Figure 6.6 presents the percentage of Dominicans who indicate that they had heard about each type of crime occurring in their neighborhood within the past 12 months. Robberies were by far the most common, reported by 71.5% of respondents', followed by drug sales, reported by 56.1% of respondents. In fact, within the entire Latin American and Caribbean region, Dominicans report the second-highest level of robberies in their neighborhoods and the third-highest level of drug sales in 2014. Extortion and murders were reported by much smaller shares of Dominican respondents at 24.4% and 33.9%, respectively. But at these levels, the Dominican Republic is located as the country with the highest rate of reported extortion and the third highest rate of reported murders in respondents' neighborhoods.

Another survey question, which has been a core part of the AmericasBarometer since 2006 asked respondents about gang activity in their neighborhood:

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio (vecindad) está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?

Figure 6.7 depicts cross-time variation in responses to this question in the Dominican Republic. Here higher values indicate that respondents saw their neighborhood as more affected by gangs, and the variable has been coded to range from 0 to 100. As we can see, there was a steady increase in perceived gang activity in Dominican neighborhoods between 2006 and 2012, a pattern that parallels the other crime data discussed above. However, between 2012 and 2014, there was decline in Dominican respondents' perceptions of the extent to which gang activity affects their neighborhoods, and this decline was statistically significant with a $p\text{-value} < 0.05$. This small but significant change represents the one positive sign amid generally relative deteriorating conditions concerning experiences with and assessments of criminal activity in the Dominican Republic. Despite this decline, however, within the region the Dominican Republic is third, in viewing their neighborhoods as highly



affected by gangs (Figure 6.8). The Dominican Republic occupies a significantly better position than Venezuela and Panama and there are no significant differences between the Dominican position and that of El Salvador and Mexico. This regional position represents a relative improvement compared to 2012 when the Dominican Republic ranked first in this measure of perception of the gang presence in the neighborhood. It is worth noting that this question measures the *perceptions* of the presence of gangs and results do not offer an objective measure of the incidence of gang activity or participation in them, but rather perceptions for each country that is affected by several factors and not necessarily gang activity itself.




Figure 6.7. Extent to which the Neighborhood is affected by Gangs, Dominican Republic 2006-2014




Figure 6.8. Extent to which the Neighborhood is affected by Gangs, 2014

Perceptions of Insecurity in the Dominican Republic

In addition to direct experiences with crime at the personal, household, or neighborhood level, citizens maintain perceptions about the security situation in their neighborhood and their country. While these perceptions are certainly connected to respondents’ exposure to crime as victims, perceptions go beyond personal experiences to encompass broader assessments of the security situation. Here we consider three survey items that assess respondents’ perceptions of crime in their neighborhood:

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?
 (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a)

DOMAOJ11B. Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años?
 (1) Más seguro (2) Igual (3) Menos seguro

PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio** es **mayor, igual, o menor** que el de hace 12 meses?
 (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor

First, we place Dominicans' crime perceptions in regional perspective by considering how safe they feel in their neighborhood (AOJ11) and how much violence they perceive in their neighborhood as compared to a year ago (PESE2). We recode these variables so that they range from 0 to 100 and higher scores indicate greater perceived insecurity. As Figure 6.9 suggests, Dominicans do not feel particularly secure as compared to other citizens in the Americas. Dominicans evaluate the security situation in their neighborhoods more negatively than all but two countries – Venezuela and Peru. Perceptions of how violence in their neighborhood has evolved in the past 12 months are more equivocal, with Dominican respondents averaging closer to the middle among countries in the region, with seven countries where more citizens view their neighborhoods as more violent than Dominicans.⁵

⁵ It is important to note that insecurity can be influenced by actual experiences with crime (which, should be noted, varies in type between countries) and also by news coverage of crime. Some research suggests that news may be more effective in cultivating fear of crime in places where crime is less frequent than in places where crime is more common (see discussion in Castorena and Zechmeister 2015). In addition, sensitivity to crime and insecurity may be more acute where crime has not become a persistent feature of everyday life. In short, while perceptions of insecurity are influenced by actual experiences, these are also conditions by other factors beyond simply the overall level of violent crime in a country.




Figure 6.9. Perceptions of Insecurity and Violence, 2014

In Figure 6.10, we assess how crime perceptions have evolved in the Dominican Republic from 2006 to 2014. The chart on the left shows respondents' perceptions of the likelihood that they might become victims (AOJ11), and the right side shows the level of insecurity that respondents feel in relation to the previous five years (DOMAOJ11B). Both graphs in the figure use a 0 to 100 scale in which higher values indicate more *negative* perceptions of security. Responses to both questions show statistically significant lower perceived insecurity in 2008, 2010, and 2012 as compared to 2006, although some of the initial gains in 2008 were lost in 2010 and then somewhat recovered in 2012. However, the patterns for the two questions diverge when it comes to data from 2014. The general perceptions of personal insecurity deteriorate in a statistically significant manner in 2014, while the change in evaluations of insecurity as compared to the previous five years shows a continuation in the improvement trend between 2010 and 2014.




Figure 6.10. Perceptions of insecurity (left) and Trend in Feelings of Insecurity Compared to Previous Five Years (right), Dominican Republic 2006-2014

Figure 6.11 presents a similar cross-time assessment, here depicting the percentage of Dominican respondents who indicate that they feel less secure than they did five years ago (DOMAOJ11B). It is worth noting that this figure does not use the same insecurity scale used in the right bar graph of the previous figure, but rather the percentage of respondents that feel less safe. The time series for this measure begins in 1994, offering us insight into security assessments over two decades. Here we see that after a steady increase in perceived insecurity between 1994 and 2006, perceptions of personal safety improved in 2008 before worsening again in 2010 and then rebounding somewhat in 2012. Between 2012 and the most recent 2014 survey, the number of respondents who see themselves as less safe than five years earlier has remained virtually the same, declining only two points from 65 to 63 percent. Overall, while this measure suggests that Dominicans' perceptions of the security situation have deteriorated significantly over the past 20 years, much of this decline happened in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Since that time, the changes have been less dramatic and since 2010, perceptions have become slightly less critical. This indicator, thus, diverges from the pattern of worsening security perceptions, which we observed in Figure 6.10.




Figure 6.11. Perceptions of Personal Safety, Dominican Republic 1994-2014

Overall, crime remains a serious concern in the Dominican Republic. Official crime statistics as well as victimization reported in our survey have increased over the past decade. Among their neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean, Dominicans are particularly worried about gangs in their neighborhoods, and overall levels of concern about insecurity are comparatively high in the Dominican Republic. While perceptions of the gang problem as well as assessments concerning changes in insecurity are slightly less negative in 2014, progress in combatting crime is small and uneven. Those with more education and living in larger cities and are more likely to report being the victim of crime than those with less education and from smaller towns. Additionally, in comparison to the rest of the region, crime victimization in the Dominican Republic is especially likely to occur close to home, suggesting that violence is an ongoing, everyday threat for many Dominicans.

III. Corruption

Corruption, which occurs when officials use their power and/or public resources for personal gain, poses a second major challenge to the rule of law. As detailed in Chapter 3, corruption has the potential to stymie growth, heighten inequality, render social programs ineffective, undermine social capital, and of course, create inequities in the application and administration of justice. Here we are particularly interested in how experiences with and perceptions of corruption have evolved over time in the Dominican Republic and how they connect to Dominicans' evaluations of democratic institutions, particularly the justice system. In order to make these assessments, we use AmericasBarometer data to explore the extent to which Dominicans report being the victims of corruption as well as their evaluations of the overall levels of corruption in Dominican society. These aspects of the survey offer insight into both individual experiences with (mostly) petty day-to-day corruption as well as observations of broader patterns of (mostly) high-level corruption.



Personal Experiences with Corruption

To assess individual Dominicans' personal experiences with corruption, we employ a set of AmericasBarometer survey items, which ask respondents whether they have been asked to pay a bribe in a series of different circumstances:

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes |
|--|---|----|-----|
| Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... | | | |
| EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? | | 0 | 1 |
| EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 |
| EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? | | 0 | 1 |
| EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? | 99 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? | 99 | 0 | 1 |

We begin our assessments of these questions by exploring the extent to which petty bribery permeates different facets of the state apparatus. Figure 6.12 displays the percentage of respondents who report being bribed in each of the separate contexts specified in the eight survey items above. The left side of the figure displays the percentage of the entire population who report a bribery experience in each context, while the right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents who were asked for a bribe when they had interactions in each context and thus had an opportunity to be solicited for a bribe.⁶




Figure 6.12. Corruption Experiences by Location of Solicitation, Dominican Republic 2014

Among all Dominican respondents, bribery by the police and the military were the most common encounters with corruption, at 16.2% and 7.6% of respondents, respectively. But when considering only those who had interactions with the relevant government entity and therefore had an opportunity to be target for a bribe, bribery attempts were most common in the courts and the municipal government, with more than 20% of interactions resulting in bribes in these contexts. School officials were least likely to solicit bribes among both the entire population and among respondents with children in school.

⁶ Questions EXC2, EXC6 and EXC20 about the police, government official and the military respectively do not include a filter that asks respondents to specify whether they had any dealings with these entities. Therefore, the percentages for these three groups is the same across the left and right sides of the figure.

Using these questions about respondents' experiences with specific forms of bribery, we are also able to construct a measure of overall corruption victimization, not only for 2014 but for five waves of the AmericasBarometer beginning in 2006. Figure 6.13 depicts changes in corruption victimization over this time period based on this overall measure, which reflects the percentage of Dominicans in each survey who reported at least one personal encounter with corruption.⁷ The results suggest that encounters with bribery have been on the rise since 2008, and the increases since 2010 are statistically significant. Thus, as with crime, corruption victimization has intensified and in 2014 affected 23.3% of Dominican respondents personally. Among countries across the Americas, the Dominican Republic has the 8th highest rate of reported bribery encounters, with Haiti, Bolivia, Paraguay, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador all surpassing Dominican levels of corruption victimization (See Figure 3.4).




Figure 6.13. Corruption Victimization over time, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

Given the increasingly widespread nature of encounters with bribery, Dominicans from many walks of life have likely been personally targeted by corruption, but it is likely that some groups are more susceptible to corruption victimization than others. To assess how corruption victimization differentially affects different facets of the Dominican population, we conducted a logistic regression analysis of the aggregate bribery exposure measure. The results from this analysis are depicted in Figure 6.14.⁸

⁷ EXC20, which asks about corruption in the military, was only asked in 2012 and 2014 and is therefore not included in this overtime measure.

⁸ The full logistic regression results including coefficients and test statistics may be found appended to the end of this chapter.




Figure 6.14. Correlates of Corruption Victimization, Dominican Republic 2014

The evidence suggests that skin tone and wealth do not have statistically significant relationships with corruption victimization. But there are clear patterns in the data. Men and younger people as well as those with more education and from larger cities are more likely to encounter bribery than female, older, less educated, and more rural respondents. We depict these patterns in Figure 6.15. The strongest relationships appear for respondents' gender and education level. Men and highly educated respondents are significantly more likely to report encounters with corruption – 31.2% of men and 31.8% of those with some education past secondary school. On the other hand, 15.5% of women and 7% of those without any formal education report experiences with bribery. In general, it is not surprising that people who are more likely to have experiences in domains where bribery solicitations might occur (e.g., men, more educated, urban respondents), are also more likely to report encountering petty corruption.




Figure 6.15. Relationships between Corruption Victimization and Respondent's Sex, Age, Education and Place of Residence, Dominican Republic 2014

Perceptions of Corruption

In addition to personal experiences with mostly low-level bribery, citizens maintain perceptions of overall corruption levels. These perceptions likely go beyond their own direct encounters with corruption, also encompassing overall assessments of society-wide patterns and high-level corruption scandals. The AmericasBarometer data offer insights into these broader patterns of corruption perceptions based on the following question:

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[LEER]**

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Muy generalizada | (2) Algo generalizada |
| (3) Poco generalizada | (4) Nada generalizada |

We recode this variable to range from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater perceived corruption. Figure 6.16 presents the cross-time changes in perceived corruption based upon this survey item for the period from 2004 to 2014. These data indicate that while direct personal experiences with corruption have increased significantly in the Dominican Republic over the past 6 years, Dominican perceptions of widespread corruption among public officials have not changed much. In fact, perceived corruption actually declined slightly between 2004 and 2008, with statistically significant reductions in perceptions of corruption. Since 2008, there have been no statistically significant variations in the overall level of perceived corruption in the Dominican public sector. Of course, the perception that corruption is widespread is quite common, as the majority (53%) of Dominican respondents indicate

that corruption is “very generalized” in the 2014 survey and another 29% view corruption as “somewhat generalized.” Within the Americas, Dominicans have perceptions of government corruption that exceed the regional average, and the country places 8th in the region on this indicator of corruption (See Figure 3.7 and 3.8).




Figure 6.16. Perceptions of Corruption over Time, Dominican Republic 2004-2014

IV. Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law

Crime and corruption as well as perceptions of these violations of the rule of law may undermine public support for the democratic system that allows these societal ills to persist and even intensify. In particular, support for a legal system that does not seem to be effectively combatting crime or corruption may be weaker among those who have experienced victimization or who see these problems as widespread, serious concerns. To consider this possibility here, we explore public confidence in the judiciary and the police, assessing how these attitudes are shaped by experiences with and perceptions of crime and corruption.

Trust in the Justice System

The AmericasBarometer survey assesses respondents’ trust in the judicial system using a series of questions. The first two items measure confidence that the courts guarantee a fair trial and general confidence in the judicial system, while the third item asks respondents to assess whether they would trust the justice system to punish someone who had perpetrated a crime against them.

| |
|--|
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (1) Nada – (7) Mucho |
| B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? (1) Nada – (7) Mucho |
| AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada |

Here we consider how attitudes on each of these measures of trust in the justice system have evolved over time, and we place Dominican attitudes in a comparative perspective. Then we use multivariate regression analysis to explore how experiences and perceptions of crime and corruption, as well as demographic factors, are associated with these attitudes. Figure 6.17 presents the cross-time variation in these three measures of confidence in the judicial system. As with other survey items above, we have recoded each measure so that it ranges from 0 to 100, higher values indicate more trust. The general pattern that we observe across all three indicators is steady or increasing until 2008 when trust peaks and then follows a declining trajectory through 2014. Confidence that the courts provide a fair trial has declined from a high-point of 50.6 in 2008 to a low of 40.1 in 2014. Confidence in the judicial system overall has dropped from 50.1 in 2008 to 38.5 in 2014, and trust that the judicial system would punish someone guilty of a crime has decayed from 50.6 in 2008 to 43.9 in 2014.




Figure 6.17. Evaluations of Justice System over Time, Dominican Republic 2004-2014

Moving to a cross-national perspective, Figures 6.18 and 6.19 depict national averages on these three indicators for all countries in the Americas in 2014. Here Dominicans' attitudes about the judiciary place the country near the middle third of countries in the region. Among 25 countries, the

Dominican Republic places 7th from the bottom in confidence that the courts guarantee a free trial (left panel of Figure 6.18), while the positioning on trust in the justice system places the country 6th from the bottom (right panel of Figure 6.18). Assessments of the likelihood that the justice system will punish someone guilty of a crime are more favorable, placing the Dominican Republic in 9th highest position (Figure 6.19).




Figure 6.18. Evaluations of the Justice System, 2014




Figure 6.19. Confidence that the Justice System will Punish the Guilty, 2014

To assess the degree to which crime and corruption undermine the legitimacy of the judicial system, we conducted two multivariate regression analyses. The first regression model, depicted in Figure 6.20, analyzes an index based upon averaging responses to B1 and B10a about trust in the courts to guarantee a fair trial and in the judicial system.⁹ Higher values indicate more legitimacy for these institutions. Here we readily see that crime and corruption pose serious challenges for maintaining trust in the capacity of democratic institutions, particularly those charged with defending the rule of law. Dominicans who have experienced victimization from crime or corruption are significantly less likely to trust the judiciary, and even after controlling for these victimization experiences, perceptions that crime and corruption are serious and widespread problems independently

⁹ The Cronbach's alpha for these two items is .69, indicating that it is appropriate to combine them into a single additive scale.

undermine the judiciary’s legitimacy. Trust in the judiciary is also significantly lower among men, older respondents, and those with more education.




Figure 6.20. Correlates of Confidence in the Justice System, Dominican Republic 2014

Figure 6.21 displays the relationships that crime and corruption experiences and perceptions have on trust in the judiciary.¹⁰ Here the effects that these societal ills have in undermining the legitimacy of democratic institutions appear clear. Among respondents who have experienced crime victimization themselves or who have family members who have been victims in the past year have an average score of just 34.1 on the trust in the justice system index, while those who have not been touched by crime directly have average eight more points on the scale, with a score of 42.4. A similar pattern emerges for corruption victims who average 32.6 on the scale as compared to a mean value of 41.5 for those who do not report being targeted for bribes. Evaluations of crime and corruption yield similar effects, as those who perceive these issues to be widespread are much less likely to evaluate the judicial system as trustworthy.

¹⁰ The full results of the analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, are appended to the end of this chapter.




Figure 6.21. Relationships between Victimization and Perception of Corruption and Crime and Confidence in the Justice System, Dominican Republic 2014

In the second regression, we use the same set of independent variables but for the dependent variable we analyze respondents' assessments of the judicial system's ability to punish someone guilty of a crime (AOJ12).¹¹ The results of this analysis, which are depicted in Figure 6.22, reveal much the same pattern as in the analysis above. The main distinction here is that corruption victimization no longer has a statistically significant effect. Of course, it is not surprising the experiences and perceptions of crime would exert more influence over attitudes regarding punishing criminals than would experiences with corruption. It is interesting to note, however, that while corruption victimization does not have a significant effect here, perceptions of corruption do matter in evaluating the judicial system's ability to properly punish criminal behavior. Figure 6.23 provides a visual image of the relationships that perceptions of crime, crime victimization, and perceptions of corruption have with assessments of the judicial system's ability to bring guilty parties to justice.

¹¹ The full results of the analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, are appended to the end of this chapter.




Figure 6.22. Correlates of Confidence that the Justice System will Punish the Guilty, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 6.23. Relationships between Victimization and Perception of Corruption and Crime and Confidence in the Justice System to Punish Guilty, Dominican Republic 2014

Trust in the Police

Beyond the judicial system, the police are another major institution involved in the effective administration of justice. If crime and corruption are affecting many people and are generally perceived as widespread and perhaps even untouchable problems, the police are likely to incur some of the blame for these maladies. Here we analyze an AmericasBarometer question that asks respondents about their level of trust in the police. Responses are coded to range from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more trust.

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

Figure 6.24 presents the average level of trust in the police in the Dominican Republic for each AmericasBarometer survey from 2004 to 2014. As we observed with the indicators of trust in the judiciary above, trust in the police increased between 2004 and 2008 and then follows a general pattern of decline through 2012. The level of trust in the police has remained stable between 2012 and the most recent survey in 2014.¹² Today, Dominicans rate the police at an average score of just 35.6 points on the 100-point scale, well-below the midpoint.




Figure 6.24. Trust in the Police, Dominican Republic 2004-2014

Putting the Dominican Republic in regional perspective on this indicator, as we do in Figure 6.25, does not contradict the view that the Dominican police are viewed as untrustworthy. Among the 25 countries in the sample, only two have lower average levels of trust in the police – Venezuela and Guyana. Therefore, despite the stabilization in the level of trust in the police between 2012 and 2014, the Dominican Republic remains far behind most of its neighbors in the region.

¹² The increase of an average of 34.9 in 2012 to 35.6 in 2014 is less than a point and is not statistically significant.




Figure 6.25. Trust in the Police, 2014

A regression analysis of trust in the police in Figure 6.26 suggests that challenges to the rule of law play an important role in undermining the legitimacy of this institution.¹³ Victims of crime and corruption have significantly lower trust in the police than do those who have not been victimized in the past 12 months. Respondents who perceive crime and corruption as serious and widespread problems are also significantly less trusting. We present these bivariate relationships in Figure 6.27. There we readily see that average trust in the police among crime and corruption victims is more than 10 points lower than it is among those who have not experienced victimization. Perceptions of insecurity reveal the largest substantive pattern – those who think that their neighborhood is very safe have average evaluations of the police that are nearly 20 points higher than the evaluations of those who see their neighborhood as very unsafe.

¹³ The full results of the analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, are appended to the end of this chapter.




Figure 6.26. Correlates of Trust in the police, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 6.27. How Experiences with and Perceptions of Crime and Corruption are Associated with Trust in the Police, Dominican Republic 2014

V. Conclusion

This chapter has explored crime and corruption as core challenges to the rule of law in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, the picture painted by the data is not particularly bright. Crime victimization and perceptions of corruption have worsened in recent years, and encounters with corruption have also become more common. When comparing the Dominican Republic to its neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean, the situation also does not appear particularly optimistic, as the country tends to be positioned among the poorest-performers in the region. The country ranked 7th in terms of victimization by crime and 8th on corruption as well as perceptions of neighborhood insecurity and government corruption, second in terms of the prevalence of gangs and robberies, third in the prevalence of drugs, and first in extortion. In analyzing victimization patterns, we found that respondents from larger cities and more education were significantly more likely to report being victims of crime and corruption in the past 12 months. Men and young to middle-aged people were also more likely to be corruption targets than were women and the elderly, who likely have fewer interactions with public officials and thus fewer opportunities to be solicited for bribes.

The implications of these threats to the rule of law are significant. Evidence in this chapter demonstrates that widespread crime and corruption weaken the legitimacy of the major institutions charged with confronting these problems – the judiciary and the police. Victims of crime and corruption are significantly less trusting of the police and significantly more skeptical of the judicial system than those who have not experienced victimization. Likewise, those who perceive crime and corruption to be serious, widespread problems are much less likely to view these institutions as effective and legitimate. Overall, crime and corruption have continued to intensify the challenges that they pose to the Dominican system, as they contribute to weakening the rule of law and undermining the legitimacy of institutions charged with promoting public safety, government transparency, and equitable treatment under the law.



Appendix

Appendix 6.1 Logistic Regression Analysis of Crime Victimization (Coefficients and significance levels for Figure 6.4 Correlates of Crime Victimization)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|----------|
| Size of Place | -0.189* | (-2.41) |
| Level of Education | 0.359* | (4.57) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.046 | (-0.67) |
| Age | -0.011 | (-0.19) |
| Female | -0.112 | (-1.65) |
| Skin Tone | -0.045 | (-0.66) |
| Constant | -1.233* | (-15.55) |
| F | 9.21 | |
| Number of cases | 1504 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 6.2 Logistic Regression Analysis of Corruption Victimization (Coefficients and significance levels for Figure 6.14 Correlates of Corruption Victimization)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|----------|
| Size of Place | -0.186* | (-2.74) |
| Level of Education | 0.191* | (3.06) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.108 | (1.45) |
| Age | -0.325* | (-5.48) |
| Female | -0.495* | (-8.10) |
| Skin Tone | -0.107 | (-1.44) |
| Constant | -1.325* | (-17.87) |
| F | 20.73 | |
| Number of cases | 1505 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 6.3 Regression Analysis of Confidence in the Justice System
(Coefficients and significance levels for Figure 6.20 Correlates of confidence in the justice system)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Place | 0.032 | (1.26) |
| Level of Education | -0.117* | (-4.01) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.055 | (-1.88) |
| Age | -0.108* | (-3.96) |
| Female | 0.127* | (5.07) |
| Skin Tone | -0.000 | (-0.00) |
| Perception of Corruption | -0.126* | (-4.98) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.073* | (-3.27) |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.126* | (-4.79) |
| Someone in Home was a Victim of Crime | -0.081* | (-3.09) |
| Constant | -0.000 | (-0.00) |
| F | 17.66 | |
| Number of cases | 1457 | |
| R-Squared | 0.12 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix Table 6.4 Regression Analysis of confidence that the justice system will punish the guilty
(Coefficients and significance levels for Figure 6.22 Correlates of confidence that the justice system will punish the guilty)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Place | 0.037 | (1.56) |
| Level of Education | -0.128* | (-4.06) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.054 | (-1.67) |
| Age | -0.049 | (-1.57) |
| Female | 0.048 | (1.83) |
| Skin Tone | 0.076* | (3.36) |
| Perception of Corruption | -0.060* | (-2.45) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.050 | (-1.98) |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.083* | (-2.82) |
| Someone in Home was a Victim of Crime | -0.090* | (-3.25) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 11.16 | |
| Number of cases | 1447 | |
| R-Squared | 0.08 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |



Appendix Table 6.5 Regression Analysis of Trust in the Police (Coefficients and significance levels for Figure 6.2 Correlates of confidence in the police)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Place | 0.023 | (0.83) |
| Level of Education | -0.022 | (-0.71) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.099* | (-3.19) |
| Age | 0.031 | (1.17) |
| Female | 0.050* | (2.18) |
| Skin Tone | 0.027 | (0.99) |
| Perception of Corruption | -0.111* | (-4.30) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.076* | (-2.96) |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.181* | (-6.41) |
| Someone in Home was a Victim of Crime | -0.085* | (-3.73) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 14.87 | |
| Number of cases | 1456 | |
| R-Squared | 0.10 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Chapter 7. Democratic Attitudes and Political Behavior in the Dominican Republic

Jana Morgan and Rosario Espinal

I. Introduction

This chapter explores Dominicans' democratic values and political behaviors, examining the factors associated with these norms and behaviors and placing the evidence from the 2014 AmericasBarometer in both a temporal and cross-national perspective.

We begin by analyzing democratic norms, including support for the political system, political tolerance, the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and attitudes regarding democracy itself. Here we find that the Dominican Republic places at or below the regional average in diffuse support for the political system, tolerance for those with strong anti-system beliefs, and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, such as elections, political parties, and the legislature. And while the country has experienced a general trajectory of declining support for the system and its institutions since the early 2000s, this decay seems to have leveled off somewhat in 2014.

We then turn our attention to the ways in which Dominicans engage with the political system. In particular, we focus on patterns of partisan identification, civic engagement, clientelism, and evaluations of the incumbent government. We also explore the features of households that receive a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. The region-wide data indicate that Dominicans have comparatively high levels of partisan attachment and civic participation, particularly in religious, parent, and neighborhood associations, and these high levels of political and civic engagement have remained steady or even increased since 2010. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic exhibits high levels of clientelism as a mechanism employed by parties and candidates to attract support. Access to government social spending in general or conditional cash transfers in particular is also widespread in the Dominican Republic, with the country ranking first in the region on these indicators. Evaluations of government economic performance and job approval for President Medina were also quite high at the time of the survey.

II. Democratic Attitudes

The attitudes and values of the citizenry have an important role in promoting the consolidation of democracy, particularly with regard to the legitimacy of democratic institutions and procedures (Booth and Seligson 2009; Diamond 1999). In essence, the concept of democratic legitimacy reflects the extent to which major political actors and ordinary citizens respect the norms and rules of democracy and whether they consider democratic procedures as the only viable rules of the game. As detailed in Chapter 5 on democratic legitimacy in the Americas, LAPOP has traditionally defined legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system, using AmericasBarometer data to measure this concept. In studies of democratic legitimacy, the emphasis is not concrete on support for the current political leadership, but rather on broader and presumably more deeply held values concerning the political system and the institutions that comprise it. To assess democratic legitimacy in

the Dominican Republic, we consider these diffuse facets of support, for the political system generally and for specific institutions.

Another attitude important for the stability and quality of democracy is tolerance for those with different viewpoints. Democracy requires that citizens and influential political actors respect the outcomes of elections and the policy process, even if they disagree with them. Respecting these outcomes requires people to accept that others hold different viewpoints and to be comfortable allowing everyone to exercise their political rights, regardless of who they are or what they believe in. Given the importance of political tolerance as a crucial democratic value necessary for maintaining widespread support for democratic ideals and institutions, we analyze the degree of tolerance among Dominican citizens and identify how tolerant attitudes have varied over time and across groups within the Dominican Republic.

Support for the Political System

To measure system support, we employ respondents' answers to a series of five questions asking about the extent to which they have confidence in the general contours and working of the Dominican system of government. These questions include citizens' confidence that the judicial system has the capacity to guarantee a fair trial (B1), general respect for Dominican political institutions (B2), confidence that citizens' basic rights are protected (B3), pride in the Dominican political system (B4), and sense of obligation to support the political system (B6). We transform each of these questions from seven-point scales to measures that range from 0 to 100, with higher values corresponding to scores that indicate greater support for the system. We then average respondents' answers across these five items to construct an index of system support.

| |
|---|
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (1) Nada (7) Mucho |
| B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana? |
| B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano? |
| B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político dominicano? |
| B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político dominicano? |

Figure 7.1 displays the average score on the scale measuring system support in the Dominican Republic from 2006 to 2014. The figure clearly depicts a pattern of decaying support between 2008 and 2012. However, in the most recent AmericasBarometer survey this decline has been arrested. The change in the index between 2012 and 2014 is not statistically significant, suggesting a leveling-off of diffuse support for the political system in the Dominican Republic, which is a positive development after several years of decline, particularly in light of a region-wide pattern of deteriorating system support over this period. The Dominican average of 49.8 points on the system support scale places it around the median of countries in the Americas in 2014 with the 12th highest level of system support.




Figure 7.1. Support for the Political System, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

To assess the individual features associated with greater support for the Dominican political system, we conducted multivariate regression analysis of this scale. Figure 7.2 depicts the results of this analysis, which finds that those who approve of the president's job performance, value the national economy positively, are more satisfied with local services are more supportive of the system. Women, younger people and those from more rural areas¹ are also more supportive of the political system. On the other hand, system support is lower among victims of crime and corruption as well as those who perceive crime and corruption as more serious problems. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 graphically display some of the bivariate relationships for some of the variables found to be significant in the multivariate model.²

¹ The variable measuring the size of respondents' place of residence is coded such that higher scores indicate smaller areas (e.g. rural areas or small towns) and lower scores indicate larger ones (metropolitan areas).

² Coefficients as well as test statistic for this regression analysis and all others presented below can be found in tables appended to the end of the chapter.




Figure 7.2. Correlates of System Support, Dominican Republic 2014

The analysis reveals that while we often think of system support as a deeply held commitment to democratic procedures, the reality is the Dominicans' assessments of the political system are also shaped by transient considerations.³ For instance, we find that assessments of the president's job performance, evaluations of the national economy, and satisfaction with the services provided by local government all have significant relationships with system support, where more positive performance evaluations on all three indicators are associated with greater diffuse support for the system. As shown in Figure 7.3, the effect is greatest for presidential performance evaluations. Among those who evaluated President Medina's performance as very poor, the average level of system support was only 24.8, while the average score among those who viewed his performance as very good was more than twice as high at 57.7.

³ This finding is not terribly surprising given the prevalence of previous research showing that contemporary assessments of economic and political performance influence the legitimacy of democratic institutions (e.g. Espinal, Hartlyn and Morgan 2006).




Figure 7.3. Relationships between Performance Evaluations and System Support, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 7.4. Crime, Corruption, and System Support, Dominican Republic 2014

Additionally, the analysis demonstrates that being victimized by corruption and crime, as well as perceptions of these problems, have implications beyond undermining trust in the judicial system, which we observed in the previous chapter. These factors are also associated with lower levels of diffuse support for the political system overall. All four variables measuring victimization experiences and perceptions of crime and corruption have significant negative relationships with system support in the Dominican Republic (Figure 7.2). As depicted in the upper right quadrant of Figure 7.4, corruption victims are significantly less supportive of the system than those who do not report being targeted for bribes, averaging 43.0 and 51.8 respectively on the system support scale. We see the same pattern for crime victims with a gap that is ever-so-slightly smaller between victims and non-victims. Perceptions of crime and corruption manifest similar negative relationships with system support. Those who perceive insecurity to be quite high and who view corruption as having spread extensively throughout government are the least likely to support the system, averaging 43.6 and 44.3 on the system support scale. Finally, the regression analysis also indicates that women are more supportive of the political system as are those with less education and those from rural areas.

Political Tolerance

Next, we consider the extent to which norms of tolerance and respect for different viewpoints are valued across the Dominican population. To assess levels of political tolerance, the AmericasBarometer survey asked four questions pertaining to the willingness to support the politics rights of those who always speak against the Dominican system of government. That is, the questions are designed to tap respondents' respect for different political views, even to the point of tolerating opposition to the regime itself. The first question asks about respect for their right to vote (D1), the second about the right to protest (D2), the third about the right to run for office (D3), and the fourth about their rights to free public speech (D4). To assess overall levels of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic, we rescale responses to these questions so that they range from zero to 100, and then we average respondent's scores across all four questions to create a scale measuring political tolerance, with higher values indicating greater tolerance.

| |
|--|
| <p>D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala. (1) Desaprueba firmemente (10) Aprueba firmemente</p> |
| <p>D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. (1) Desaprueba firmemente (10) Aprueba firmemente</p> |
| <p>D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos? (1) Desaprueba firmemente (10) Aprueba firmemente</p> |
| <p>D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso? (1) Desaprueba firmemente (10) Aprueba firmemente</p> |

Using this scale, the left side of Figure 7.5 displays the average level of political tolerance among Dominican respondents from 2006 and 2014. The data suggest that tolerance dropped considerably between 2006 and 2010, but then recovered significantly in 2012 before declining once again in 2014. This decline between 2012 and 2014 is statistically significant, indicating a deteriorating level of respect for the basic political rights of those who oppose the political system. The right side of the figure shows the Dominican Republic in comparative perspective. Here, we observe that the

average score of 51.1 points on the political tolerance scale positions the country in the middle among countries across the Americas on this indicator of democratic political culture in 2014, with the 10 other countries placing above the Dominican Republic on this indicator. This regional position is roughly comparable to the country's position in the 2012 survey when the level of political tolerance located the Dominican Republic near the middle of the region with 13 countries in higher positions at that time.




Figure 7.5. Political Tolerance: the Dominican Republic in Cross-Time and Regional Perspective

To assess the factors associated with political tolerance, Figure 7.6 depicts the results of multivariate regression analyzing the political tolerance scale in the Dominican Republic.⁴ The analysis demonstrates that tolerance is much less influenced by evaluations of government performance, assessments of the economy, and even perceptions of crime and corruption. In fact, of the factors examined in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 above in our analysis of support for the political system, only corruption victimization has a significant relationship with tolerance, and here we find that being targeted for a bribe is actually associated with *greater* tolerance for the political rights of those who oppose the political system. This relationship, which is also depicted in the upper left quadrant of Figure 7, suggests that corruption victims are especially willing to accept viewpoints that challenge the legitimacy of the political system. This suggests that victims may themselves be especially disenchanted with the political system that has victimized them and may therefore share some of the viewpoints articulated by those opposed to the Dominican political system.

⁴ The full results for this regression analysis as well as all others in this chapter may be found appended to the end of the chapter.




Figure 7.6. Correlates of Political Tolerance, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 7.7. Factors that have Significant Relationships with Political Tolerance, Dominican Republic 2014



Other factors that have statistically significant relationships with political tolerance include respondent's skin tone, gender, and age. The bivariate relationships between tolerance and these variables are also depicted in Figure 7.7 above. Women, respondents with darker skin, and individuals with less household wealth are significantly less tolerant than those with lighter skin, men, and the wealthy.⁵ The pattern of relationships between tolerance and demographic variables are similar throughout the region. In the analysis of respondents from all countries in the Americas, evidence shows that women and people from poorer households are less tolerant than men and the wealthy. In addition, the region displays a positive relationship between education and tolerance. In contrast with the results for the Dominican Republic, the relationship between skin tone and political tolerance is not statistically significant in the regional data.

Legitimacy of Institutions

Beyond diffuse support for the political system and respect for political rights of those who oppose the regime, we also consider other attitudes pertinent to understanding the legitimacy of democracy within Dominican society. The AmericasBarometer survey asked an extensive series of questions regarding citizens' trust in a wide array of institutions, which are listed below.

| |
|--|
| B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? |
| B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas? |
| B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional? |
| B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía? |
| B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica? |
| B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas? |
| B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos? |
| B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente? |
| B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su ayuntamiento? |
| B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país? |
| DOMB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las organizaciones empresariales? |
| DOMB50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las juntas de vecinos? |

After converting responses to these questions to scales that range from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater trust, we assess changing levels of trust in these institutions over time in the Dominican Republic. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 display temporal variations in trust in the various political institutions listed, while Figure 7.10 depicts levels of trust in the social institutions in the 2014 survey. Trust in these social institutions serve as a sort of benchmark level of trust within the Dominican Republic to compare against levels of political trust.

Among all the institutions listed in the survey, the highest average level of trust observed in the Dominican Republic is trust in the President with an average of 71.1 on a 0 to 100 scale (B21A). This high level of trust in the President largely reflects trust in the incumbent occupying the presidency at the time of the survey. Thus, the high level of trust in the Dominican presidency coincides with

⁵ Household wealth or well-being is measured using an index created from a series of survey items that record the presence or absence of particular consumer goods or services within the household, including a television, refrigerator, conventional telephone, cell phone, vehicle, clothes washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor potable water, indoor bathroom, computer, flat screen television, and internet service. In constructing the scale, responses are weighted according to their frequency in the urban or rural population in the country, with more rare items having more weight in building the index. Separate weightings are employed for urban and rural respondents because access to these goods and services is likely to be significantly different for rural versus urban households.

President Medina’s considerable popularity even two years into his term of office. The president’s high approval rating at the time of the AmericasBarometer survey in 2014 is also evident in a question that specifically asks respondents to evaluate the president’s job performance (M1), which is presented in detail below in Figure 7.8 – over 78% of respondents evaluated President Medina’s performance positively, a result that would be the envy of many of his colleagues throughout the Americas.⁶




Figure 7.8. Trust in Political Institutions, Dominican Republic 2004-2014, Part I

⁶ This section discusses two questions regarding the presidency. The first, presented in Figure 7.8, measures the level of trust in the president as an institution (B21A), while the second measure support for the performance of the incumbent president Danilo Medina (M1).




Figure 7.9. Trust in Political Institutions, Dominican Republic 2004-2014, Part II

Beyond this high rating for the presidency, the institutions with the greatest levels of legitimacy are social, not political. The Catholic Church, neighborhood organizations, and evangelical churches have the highest levels of legitimacy, with average scores of 62.7, 59.7, and 58.9 respectively (trust in the Catholic Church and in evangelical churches has declined slightly since 2012). The only political institution aside from the president to perform near this range is the Armed Forces, which averaged a score of 55.3, slightly surpassing the level of trust in the business organizations.

The remaining political institutions fare more poorly in terms of engendering societal trust. Their rank order from highest to lowest levels of trust in 2014, after the presidency and armed forces, is: elections (46.7, see Figure 7.11), Congress (42.8), municipality (42.1), justice system (38.5), police (35.6), and political parties (29.4). Most of these institutions, including the armed forces, the municipality, Congress, the justice system and political parties, have experienced declining levels of public confidence since 2008. This is an important point to consider, as the confidence in the President does not seem to have had a positive effect on the citizenry's trust in other public institutions, at least at the moment the latest survey was carried out.




Figure 7.10. Trust in Social Institutions, Dominican Republic 2014

Figures 7.11 and 7.12 place Dominican trust in political institutions in some broader comparative perspective, by presenting levels of trust in elections, the legislature and political parties across the Americas. On all of these items, the Dominican Republic places in the middle to bottom half of countries in the region. Dominican trust in elections places the country 16 out of 25 countries in the region (Figure 7.11). Trust in parties is also mediocre, putting the Dominican Republic in 16th position among 24 countries in the region (right side of Figure 7.12). Evaluations of the legislature are slightly more favorable, with the Dominican Republic ranking 12th (left side of Figure 7.12).




Figure 7.11. Trust in Elections, 2014




Figure 7.12. Trust in the legislature and political parties, 2014

Support for Democracy

We conclude our discussion of democratic legitimacy by examining overall levels of support for the abstract idea of democracy. The AmericasBarometer survey offers us two survey items designed to tap general support for democracy. The first employs the “Churchillian” view of democracy, namely that democracy, despite its shortcomings, is better than any other form of government. The second question asks citizens whether they would be willing to accept an iron fist government in order to resolve the country’s problems or if they prefer to allow everyone to continue participating in the political process. We recoded both items to range from 0 to 100. The first question is a scale with higher values indicating greater support for democracy. The second question reports the percentage of people who would accept a *mano dura*, or iron fist, government to resolve problems.

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?
 (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos




Figure 7.13. Support for Democracy, Dominican Republic 2006-2014




Figure 7.14. Support for Government with an Iron Fist, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

Figures 7.13 and 7.14 report cross-time variation in responses to the questions from 2006 to 2014 within the Dominican Republic. In Figure 7.13, we can see that while support for democracy declined somewhat from 2006 to 2010, there has been a recovery in democratic legitimacy over the last four years. This progress is statistically and substantively significant as the average score on the support for democracy scale increased from 68.6 in 2010 to 72.6 in 2014. There has also been a recent

decline in support for iron fist governments in the Dominican Republic. In 2010, 40.5% of respondents supported an iron fist government to resolve the country's problems, but in the most recent survey only 34.9% agreed with this position, a statistically significant shift.




Figure 7.15. Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2014

The comparative positioning of the Dominican Republic on the support for democracy question is displayed in Figure 7.15. The Dominican Republic ranks in the top half of countries in the Americas, occupying the 9th position in support for democracy as the best form of government. This support for democracy seems to be swayed by performance evaluations (as observed above in our analysis of the influence of political and economic evaluations on system support) and by the pressures of contemporary issues (as observed in the analysis of the role of crime and corruption in influencing system support).

III. Political Attitudes and Behavior

In addition to values and attitudes that pertain directly to democratic norms and institutions, other political attitudes and behaviors play an important role in shaping the nature of political culture and competition. Here we use AmericasBarometer data to explore a series of these attitudes and behaviors, analyzing ideology (left-right self-identification), partisanship, civic engagement, as well as offers of clientelist exchanges, government transfers, and assessments of government performance. These factors offer considerable insight into important facets of the Dominican political system.

Political Ideology

To evaluate left-right self-identification we employ a question that asked respondents to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale. The 10-point scale was recoded so that it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more right-leaning ideology and lower values left-leaning ideology.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---------|---|---|---|----|
| <p>L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Izquierda | | | | | Derecha | | | | |




Figure 7.16. Right Ideology in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2014

Figure 7.16 presents the average score on the right ideology scale in the Dominican Republic from 2006 to 2014. The data show a high tendency toward right-leaning ideology in 2006 with a score of 69.2 in that year, but between 2006 and 2012 there is a significant shift back toward the center, with

ideology averaging 55.5 in 2012. In the most recent survey, however, average ideology has moved significantly back toward the right with a score of 60.4. As depicted in Figure 7.17, this score places Dominicans as the most right-leaning citizens in the Americas.




Figure 7.17. Right Ideology in the Americas, 2014

To understand how ideology is correlated with various sociodemographic characteristics, we employ a multivariate regression analysis. We find that education, skin tone, and age are significantly correlated of ideology, while gender, wealth, and place of residence are not. The educated and the young are more left-leaning, as are those with lighter skin. We display these significant relationships in Figure 7.18 below.⁷

⁷ The full results for this regression analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, may be found appended to the end of the chapter.




Figure 7.18. Correlates of Right Ideology, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 7.19. Sociodemographic Factors Associated with Right Ideology, Dominican Republic 2014

Additionally, we consider how ideology is associated with partisanship. Figure 7.19 presents the average ideology of people who sympathize with the PLD, PRD, and PRSC and of independents. The data clearly indicate that independents are significantly less right leaning in their ideological orientation than are those who affiliate with any of the three parties. There are no statistically significant differences in the average ideology of PRD, PLD, or PRSC. That is, the average ideological positioning on the left-right scale is not distinguishable among party sympathizers.




Figure 7.20. Right Ideology and Partisanship, Dominican Republic 2014

Partisanship

Since the transition to democracy in 1978, the Dominican Republic has been characterized by relatively high levels of stability in the party system, particularly with reference to the considerable turmoil that has embroiled other party systems throughout Latin America (Morgan 2011; Morgan, Hartlyn and Espinal 2011; Seawright 2012). There have been some important changes in electoral preferences within the Dominican system, but there have not been major new entrants into the system. Rather, support has largely shifted across the same three political parties present at the time of the transition.

When the 1978 transition occurred, two parties dominated: the *Partido Reformista Social Cristiano* (PRSC) (then called the Reformist Party), and the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (Dominican Revolutionary Party –PRD). Over the decade of the 1980s in the face of accumulated failings of the PRD while in government, *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (Party of Dominican Liberation –PLD) increased its vote share, in large part attracting those disenchanted with the PRD. As a result, a three-party system existed from 1986 to 2000. Following the deaths of these parties’ *caudillos* (Juan Bosch, José Francisco Peña Gómez, and Joaquín Balaguer), the party system experienced some repositioning. In particular, the PRSC was incapable of reorganizing itself following the death of Balaguer in 2002 and experienced a rapid decline in electoral support. Before each



election, the *reformistas* fragmented over disputes about the inter-party alliances. Because the PLD has governed most since 1996, many PRSC supporters moved toward the PLD government, which eventually facilitated a formal alliance between PRSC and PLD in the 2012 presidential elections. At that time, many key PRSC leaders were high-ranking officials in the government of Leonel Fernández, and for the first time in its history, the PRSC did not nominate its own candidate.⁸

Here we use AmericasBarometer data to assess how current levels of partisanship in the Dominican Republic compare to historical and cross-national partisan identification. Then we explore the factors associated with partisan identification. We use a basic question asking respondents whether they sympathize with a political party.

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
(1) Sí (2) No




Figure 7.21. Partisan Sympathizers, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

Figure 7.21 presents the percentage of Dominicans respondents who sympathized with a political party from 2006 through 2014. Partisan allegiances are higher in presidential election years when more people typically think about politics and emphasize ties to their preferred candidate's party. Thus, we see particularly high levels of partisan affiliation in 2008 and 2012. But even in non-presidential election years, more than half of Dominican respondents identify with a political party, and the percentage remains constant between 2010 and 2014 at 54%. That is, there has not been deterioration in the levels of party identification in the Dominican Republic in 2014.

As seen in Figure 7.22, this rate of partisan identification places the Dominican Republic as the country with the third highest level of partisanship in all of the Americas, surpassed only by Costa Rica and Uruguay, which both held presidential elections in 2014 while the Dominican Republic did not.

⁸ For more details on the evolution and relative stability of the Dominican party system see Morgan, Hartlyn and Espinal (2011).




Figure 7.22. Partisan Sympathizers in the Americas, 2014

In order to highlight the Dominicans most likely to identify with a political party, we analyzed responses to this question using multivariate logit analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 7.23.⁹ Here we see that those with more right-leaning ideologies, more positive evaluations of the national economy, and darker skin are more likely to affiliate with a political party. The associations underlying these significant relationships with partisanship are depicted in Figure 7.24, which indicates that just 46.1% of those who evaluate the economy poorly affiliate with a party while 64.5% of those with positive economic evaluations do so. Right ideology is also strongly correlated with partisanship, a result that confirms our analysis of the ideological orientations of those who sympathize with each party and those who are independents (Figure 7.20). Only 36% of those with far left ideologies affiliate with a political party, while 70% of those on the far right hold partisan

⁹ The full results for this regression analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, may be found appended to the end of the chapter.



sympathies, nearly twice as many. This pattern reflects the party system’s general tendency toward the right side of the political spectrum, which is not surprising given the right-leaning orientation of the Dominican public observed above in Figure 7.17.




Figure 7.23. Correlates of Partisan Identification, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 7.24. Skin tone, ideology, economic evaluations and partisanship, Dominican Republic 2014

In the Dominican Republic wave of the AmericasBarometer survey, respondents were also asked whether or not they belonged to the political party with which they sympathized. The question is presented below.

DOMVB13. ¿Pertenece usted a este partido o sólo simpatiza?
 (1) Pertenece (2) Simpatiza (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

The left side of Figure 7.25 displays the share of Dominican respondents who are party members, sympathizers, and independents in 2014. Party members make up 26.3% of respondents, 28.0% are sympathizers, and 45.7% are independents. To create this measure, we combine response to VB10, VB11, and DOMVB13. Those who say that they do not identify with a party in VB10 are coded as independents and not asked to answer DOMVB13. Those who do identify with a party in VB11, are asked in DOMVB13 whether they are members or just sympathizers with the party, creating the second and third categories in Figure 7.24.

The right side of the same Figure indicates that men and women in the Dominican sample are divided equally between members of parties, sympathizers, and independents. We observe that gender differences are not statistically or substantively significant.




Figure 7.25. Sympathizers and Members of Political Parties, Dominican Republic 2014

The data also allow us to identify the distribution of partisan identifiers across the three Dominican parties. As shown in Figure 7.26 which presents the distribution of Dominican partisan identification in 2014, only 1.4% identify with the PRSC, 10.3% with the PRD, and 41.3% with the PLD, currently the largest party and the party of the incumbent president.

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]
 (2101) PRD (2102) PLD (2103) PRSC (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP




Figure 7.26. Party Identification, Dominican Republic 2014

Civic Participation

In addition to political engagement through partisan identification, we also consider the extent to which Dominicans are engaged in civic participation. Here we draw upon three AmericasBarometer questions asking respondents about their participation in religious organizations, parents associations, and neighborhood improvement groups. The variables are recoded to range from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater participation. We also construct a scale of civic engagement by averaging responses to all three questions.

| Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. | | | | |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------|
| | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca |
| CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Figure 7.27 displays average scores for the Dominican Republic on each of these questions as well as the scale for the period beginning in 2006 and continuing through 2014. The data indicate that religious organization participation is considerably higher than participation in parents associations and neighborhood improvement groups. The temporal patterns suggest some systematic variation, with increasing engagement from 2006 through 2010, then a decline in 2012 and a recovery in 2014, back to or even exceeding the levels of participation in 2006.




Figure 7.27. Civic Participation, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

The overall level of civic participation in the Dominican Republic is quite high. Using a civic engagement scale that incorporates all three facets of participation, Figure 7.28 presents the degree of engagement across the Americas. Here, Guatemala ranks first, and the Dominican Republic ties for second place with Paraguay, followed closely by Haiti, Honduras, El Salvador, and Ecuador.




Figure 7.28. Civic Participation Scale in the Americas, 2014

Clientelism and Government Transfers

In the era since the 1978 transition, Dominican democracy has been characterized by high levels of clientelism, which penetrates all social sectors. In fact, clientelism is a staple of the Dominican political system, helping to facilitate the relative stability of the party system and the maintenance of traditional political elites in power (Morgan, Espinal, and Hartlyn 2011). On special holidays and during the electoral campaign, it is custom that the parties and the candidates distribute objects and money to marginalized sectors (Espinal and Morgan 2012, 207). Hence, it is not surprising that the country still records high levels of party support, despite a process in which the all the major party organizations have lost their ideological moorings, with all parties drawing more support from those on the right side of the ideological spectrum and with independents being more left-leaning.

Here we draw upon AmericasBarometer survey questions to assess current levels of reported clientelist offers in the Dominican Republic, placing these data in temporal and cross-national perspectives. In particular, the survey asked respondents two questions about clientelist encounters that they may have had. The first, CLIEN1n, asks respondents whether they know anyone who had been offered a favor, gift, or other benefit from a political party or candidate in exchange for their vote in the most recent national elections. This question allows respondents to distance themselves from clientelism by asking not about their own personal experiences with clientelism, which they may be more reluctant to admit due to social desirability bias, but rather about their knowledge of clientelist offers that may have been made to their friends or family members. The second question is more specific to the respondent’s experience and asks whether they had been personally offered a favor, gift, or other benefit in exchange for their vote during the 2012 presidential campaign (CLIEN1na). In our analysis here, we combine these two measures to create an indicator of overall clientelism in society. The measure tells us the percentage of respondents who reported either knowledge of or personal encounters with clientelist offers in the most recent elections. Thus, anyone who answers yes to either or both clientelist questions is coded as having knowledge of clientelist offers.

| | | | |
|---|--------|---------|---------|
| CLIEN1n. Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio a alguna persona que usted conoce para que lo apoye o vote por él? | | | |
| (1) Sí | (2) No | (88) NS | (98) NR |
| CLIEN1na Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2012, ¿alguien le ofreció a usted un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto? | | | |
| (1) Sí | (2) No | (88) NS | (98) NR |

For the Dominican Republic, 31.5% of respondents indicated that they knew someone who had been offered a clientelistic benefit, and 24.4% said that they had personally received a clientelistic offer. Since some answer positively to both questions, the total number of Dominicans who reported knowledge of or experience with clientelistic interactions is 37.1%, as Graph 7.29 indicates. Some countries that are often noted as having high levels of clientelism like Argentina and Venezuela place quite a bit lower than the Dominican Republic. Even Mexico, a bastion of Latin American clientelism, scores more than 11 percentage points lower than the Dominican Republic on this measure.




Figure 7.29. Prevalence of Clientelism Experienced or Observed by Respondents, 2014

To assess who the targets of clientelism are in the Dominican Republic, we conducted a multivariate logit analysis of this scale for Dominican respondents. The results of this analysis are depicted graphically in Figure 7.30 and the full set of coefficients and significance tests can be found in the data appendix to this chapter. The evidence in Figure 7.30 indicates that partisan identification, skin tone, education, and even household wealth have no significant relationship with receiving or knowing of clientelist offers. On the other hand, the respondent's gender, age, and place of residence are significantly associated with clientelism, with men, younger respondents, and those from more rural areas are more likely to report knowledge or receipt of clientelist offers. Figure 7.31 depicts these significant relationships. There we see that 42.6% of men, but only 31.7% of women report exposure to clientelism. The age effect seems driven by particularly low rates of targeting among senior citizens (21.6%), while those under 35 are especially likely to receive or have knowledge of clientelist offers (over 40% for both age groups under 35). Finally while 44.6% of residents of rural areas report

knowledge of clientelist offers, only 31.4% of those living in Santo Domingo reported such encounters with clientelism.




Figure 7.30. Correlates of Receiving or Observing Clientelism, Dominican Republic 2014




Figure 7.31. Demographics of Clientelism, Dominican Republic 2014

Beyond explicitly clientelist exchanges, many governments across Latin America have transformed their social assistance program to provide targeted, means-tested benefits to poor citizens in exchange not for political allegiance but for participation in public health and/or education programs. These conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs were first launched in Mexico and later diffused throughout the region to include programs like Brazil's *Bolsa Familia* and the Dominican Republic's *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. CCTs are often seen as effective strategies for directing social assistance toward the most disadvantaged citizens and for improving performance on social indicators including school enrollment, access to preventative healthcare, children's health and nutrition, and poverty (Valencia Lomelí 2008). Of course, the design and implementation of the programs themselves have a significant influence on their ability to achieve these sorts of goals (Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer in the Dominican Republic included two questions measuring whether or not the respondent's household received public assistance general (WF1) and of a CCT benefit (*Tarjeta de Solidaridad* in the Dominican Republic) (CCT1B). Responses to these items are coded to indicate the percentage of respondents in households that receive such benefits.

| |
|---|
| WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda regular en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR |
| CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre la Tarjeta de Solidaridad [u otro programa de transferencia condicional], ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR |




Figure 7.32. Recipients of Government Assistance and Conditional Cash Transfers in the Americas, 2014

Figure 7.32 displays the percentage of respondents across the Americas who report that they or someone in their household has received some assistance for the government (left panel) or a conditional cash transfer (right panel). While the general question about public assistance was asked in all 25 countries included in this report, the question about CCTs was asked in 18 countries. On both measures, the Dominican Republic ranks first. 28.5% report receiving public assistance of any sort, while 38.1% report receiving a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. These rates of public assistance roughly parallel those reported in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, indicating that social services have not expanded or declined significantly in the past two years. The percentage with a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* is oddly higher than the percentage reporting public assistance, likely because many beneficiaries of public assistance do not readily recognize that the programs they benefit from are in fact the results of government efforts to provide social services. This a frequent occurrence in other contexts, including the United States, where social program beneficiaries do not see themselves as receiving public assistance or fail to credit government with the aid that they receive.




Figure 7.33. Correlates of Receiving a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, Dominican Republic 2014

To identify the features of those receiving public assistance, specifically a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, we conduct multivariate logit analysis of CCT1B, which is presented graphically in Figure 7.33.¹⁰ We find that, as expected, poor and less educated respondents are more likely to benefit from this program, which is designed to target the poor. Additionally, darker skinned respondents and those living in less urbanized areas are more likely to receive this form of public assistance (Figure 7.34). As shown in Figure 7.35, we also find that supporters of the incumbent PLD receive the *Tarjeta* at a greater rate than those that do not identify with a party (independents). This suggests that providing social services to citizens has the potential to yield benefits not only in terms of social progress but also in terms of political support; although the available data does not allow us to establish causality. The difference between PLD, PRD, and PRSC recipients is not distinguishable,

¹⁰ The full results for this regression analysis, including coefficients and test statistics, may be found appended to the end of the chapter.



particular with regards to PRSC given the small number of respondents that identify with this party — only 21 PRSC sympathizers answered this question, and 8 indicated they received the *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*.¹¹




Figure 7.34. Demographics of Households Receiving a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, Dominican Republic 2014

¹¹ Given the small number of PRSC sympathizers, the confidence interval for this group in Figure 7.35 is very large.




Figure 7.35. Partisanship of Respondents in Households Receiving a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, Dominican Republic 2014

Evaluations of Current Government

As observed in our analysis of system support above, assessments of the current government’s performance have significant implications not only for specific support for the leaders and parties in power but also for citizens’ assessments of the broader political system. In other words, government performance has the potential to shore up or undermine democratic legitimacy among the mass public. Therefore, highlighting these evaluations and how they have changed over time within the Dominican Republic offers some insight into one basis upon which democratic attitudes are formed.

The AmericasBarometer survey offers a series of questions tapping evaluations of the incumbent government. The first set asks respondents about their assessment of the government’s performance within four different policy domains: alleviating poverty (N1), combatting corruption (N9), improving security (N11), and managing the economy (N15). The second asks specifically for evaluations of the president’s job performance (M1). As with other measures throughout the report, we have recoded responses to these questions to scales ranges from 0 to 100; higher values indicate more positive performance evaluations. We consider each question here in turn.

- | |
|--|
| N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza? |
| N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno? |
| N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana? |
| N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía? |
-
- | |
|--|
| M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Danilo Medina Sánchez es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) |
|--|




Figure 7.36. Government Effectiveness by Policy Arena, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

Figure 7.36 depicts cross-time variation of government effectiveness across each of four different policy arenas, while Figure 7.37 builds a scale based on averaging responses to these four items and presents the average scale value over time.¹² The data suggest that after several years of declining performance evaluations, Dominicans are feeling much more positively about government's effectiveness in 2014. As shown in Figure 7.37, overall government effectiveness declined significantly between 2010 and 2012 by nearly 10 points on the 100-point scale. In 2014, however, evaluations of government policy performance rebounded, increasing from 38.8 in 2012 to 52.6 in 2014. In fact, the recovery was so dramatic that average performance evaluations in 2014 are significantly higher than they were in 2010. We observe a similar pattern in Figure 7.36, which examines the individual policy arenas that comprise the overall scale. After a slow but steady decline in the first decade of the 21st century, performance evaluations across all four policy arenas dropped dramatically in 2012, but then recovered in 2014, and in the cases of poverty alleviation and economic management, surpassed the levels of the previous decade. Among the four policy areas, evaluations of government efforts to combat poverty are highest, with an average score of 60.7 in 2014. Economic

¹² The Cronbach's alpha score for the scale in 2014 is 0.87 and is over 0.8 in the preceding years as well.

management places second with a score of 57.0, followed by improving security at 54.2 points, and combatting corruption at 46.5.




Figure 7.37. Government Effectiveness Scale, Dominican Republic 2010-2014

The comparative positioning of the Dominican Republic in terms of government efficiency is presented in Figure 7.38. The scale excludes question N1 about government efforts to combat poverty because it was not asked in all countries of the region. On a scale of three items, the Dominican Republic occupies the third highest position in the region in terms of government effectiveness, surpassed only by Ecuador and Nicaragua.




Figure 7.38. Government effectiveness scale (without N1) in the Americas, 2014

Finally, Figure 7.39 presents citizens' evaluations of incumbent President Danilo Medina. As we briefly mentioned above, Medina's job approval ratings are quite high, placing him 1st among chief executives in the Americas in 2014. 23% of Dominican respondents to the AmericasBarometer survey rated Medina's performance as very good, and another 55.4% evaluated his performance as good. On the other hand, only 1.2% considered his job performance to be very bad, and just 3.3% rated his work as bad. Thus while, 78.4% of Dominicans evaluated Medina positively, only 4.5% viewed his performance negatively.




Figure 7.39. Presidential approval, Dominican Republic 2014

IV. Conclusion

This chapter has broadly explored the democratic norms as well as political attitudes and behaviors of Dominicans, placing these facets of political culture in temporal and cross-national perspective, and assessing how these attitudes and behaviors are distributed across the Dominican population. The data here suggest that the Dominican Republic places at or below the regional average in terms of diffuse support for the political system and when considering the legitimacy of specific democratic institutions. On our measure of diffuse support, Dominicans rank near the middle for the region in 12th place, and the country's positioning is similar or worse when considering the legitimacy of individual institutions like elections (16th in the region), political parties (16th) and the legislature (19th). Levels of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic are also near the regional mid-point, with the Dominican Republic ranking 15th on this scale. Abstract support for democracy as the best form of government places the Dominican Republic in a slightly better comparative position, 9th overall, but still not leading the region.

On the other hand, while democratic legitimacy has been on a general trajectory of decline since the early 2000s, the most recent AmericasBarometer data from 2014 suggest that this decline has been arrested and support for the political system and for some (but not all) specific institutions has leveled off and abstract support for democracy has inched upward. However, some of these democratic values, namely system support, seem highly contingent on performance evaluations of the president, local government and even the economy. Thus, commitment to the institutions of democracy is not something Dominicans give to their government expecting nothing in return; they expect government to deliver, and when it cannot, commitment to democratic procedures is susceptible to decline.



Along with these democratic values, which provide crucial insight into the nature of Dominican political culture and the depth of democratic legitimacy, we also explored more concrete political attitudes and behaviors, which highlight important dynamics of the Dominican political system. Here we found that Dominicans are particularly right-leaning in their ideological orientation. In fact, when compared to other countries in the Americas, the Dominican Republic ranks as the most ideologically right with a score of 60.4 on the 100-point scale. Dominican partisans are especially likely to hold right-leaning ideological positions, while independents are more centrist. Among countries in the Americas, the Dominican Republic ranked third in 2014 in the share of respondents who sympathize with a political party, and this high rate of partisan identification has remained steady since the last non-presidential election year AmericasBarometer survey in 2010. The PLD is the beneficiary of much of this partisan attachment, with 41.3% of Dominican respondents identifying with the PLD, which is about four times more than the second major party the PRD with 10.3%. In 2014, the PRSC no longer commands much of a public following at all with 1.4% of respondents identifying with the party. Dominicans are also heavily involved in civic organizations, placing second in the region on the civic engagement scale analyzed here, and Dominican participation in civic associations has increased slightly since 2010.

In addition to high rates of political engagement through parties and civic participation through religious, parent, and neighborhood associations, Dominican political culture experiences high levels of clientelism. In fact, among citizens in the region Dominicans had the highest level of direct experiences with or knowledge of clientelist offers being extended by parties or candidates in exchange for votes, at 37% of respondents. Younger people, men, and rural residents were especially likely to report such encounters.

Access to government social spending in general or conditional cash transfers in particular is also widespread in the Dominican Republic, with the country ranking first in the region on these indicators. The Dominican conditional cash transfer program, *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, was received by 38% of respondents' households, with poorer, less educated, more rural and darker skinned Dominicans more likely to benefit. Dominican partisans are also more likely to report having a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* in their household than independents.

Finally, assessments of government policy efforts have either held steady or improved between 2012 and 2014, and performance evaluations are especially positive in assessing economic policies – combatting poverty and managing the economy. President Medina's job performance ratings are quite high. In fact, his approval level at the time of the survey is the highest in all of the Americas, with over 78% of respondents evaluating his performance as good or very good.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1 Regression analysis of system support in the Dominican Republic, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.2)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | 0.058* | (2.18) |
| Level of Education | -0.095* | (-2.94) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.044 | (-1.40) |
| Age | -0.066* | (-2.48) |
| Female | 0.132* | (5.94) |
| Skin Tone | -0.009 | (-0.38) |
| Perception of Corruption | -0.102* | (-4.05) |
| Corruption Victimization | -0.060* | (-2.70) |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.108* | (-3.90) |
| Someone in Home was a Victim of Crime | -0.055* | (-2.16) |
| Satisfaction with Services of Local Government | 0.130* | (4.58) |
| Evaluations of National Economy | 0.063* | (2.38) |
| Presidential Job Approval | 0.195* | (8.33) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 21.18 | |
| Number of cases | 1429 | |
| R-Squared | 0.19 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 7.2 Regression analysis of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.6)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | 0.013 | (0.42) |
| Level of Education | 0.061 | (1.70) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.070* | (2.54) |
| Age | -0.043 | (-1.51) |
| Female | -0.072* | (-3.24) |
| Skin Tone | -0.067* | (-2.58) |
| Perception of Corruption | 0.042 | (1.41) |
| Corruption Victimization | 0.077* | (2.59) |
| Perception of Insecurity | -0.028 | (-0.99) |
| Someone in Home was a Victim of Crime | -0.015 | (-0.55) |
| Satisfaction with Services of Local Government | -0.042 | (-1.27) |
| Evaluations of National Economy | -0.036 | (-1.08) |
| Presidential Job Approval | 0.020 | (0.70) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 3.97 | |
| Number of cases | 1425 | |
| R-Squared | 0.04 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

**Appendix 7.3 Regression analysis of right ideology in the Dominican Republic, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.18)**

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|---------------------|------------|
| Size of Location | 0.040 | (1.07) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.031 | (1.09) |
| Age | 0.104* | (4.29) |
| Female | 0.015 | (0.64) |
| Skin Tone | 0.105* | (4.34) |
| Level of Education | -0.094* | (-3.05) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 11.06 | |
| Number of cases | 1367 | |
| R-Squared | 0.04 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

**Appendix 7.4 Logit analysis of partisan sympathizers in the Dominican Republic, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.23)**

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|---------------------|------------|
| Size of Location | 0.043 | (0.67) |
| Level of Education | -0.093 | (-1.34) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.074 | (1.17) |
| Age | 0.117 | (1.78) |
| Female | 0.074 | (1.36) |
| Skin Tone | 0.176* | (2.73) |
| Public employee | 0.077 | (1.48) |
| Evaluations of National Economy | 0.262* | (5.30) |
| Right Ideology | 0.421* | (8.71) |
| Constant | 0.269* | (4.35) |
| F | 13.09 | |
| Number of cases | 1348 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 7.5 Logit analysis of receiving or observing a clientelist offer in the Dominican Republic, 2014 (Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.30)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | 0.238* | (4.12) |
| Level of Education | 0.110 | (1.74) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.040 | (0.62) |
| Age | -0.192* | (-3.42) |
| Female | -0.242* | (-4.98) |
| Skin Tone | 0.025 | (0.40) |
| Sympathizes with a Party | 0.008 | (0.14) |
| Constant | -0.560* | (-9.44) |
| F | 7.83 | |
| Number of cases | 1469 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 7.6 Logit analysis of receiving a Tarjeta de Solidaridad in the Dominican Republic, 2014 (Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 7.33)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | 0.330* | (4.01) |
| Level of Education | -0.365* | (-5.78) |
| Wealth Quintiles | -0.368* | (-5.30) |
| Age | -0.070 | (-1.17) |
| Female | -0.003 | (-0.06) |
| Skin Tone | 0.156* | (2.67) |
| PRSC Sympathizer | 0.039 | (0.70) |
| PRD Sympathizer | 0.043 | (0.70) |
| PLD Sympathizer | 0.237* | (3.38) |
| Constant | -0.553* | (-7.02) |
| F | 9.97 | |
| Number of cases | 1482 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Chapter 8. Social Inclusion and Human Rights in the Dominican Republic

Jana Morgan and Rosario Espinal

I. Introduction

In this final chapter, we use AmericasBarometer data to consider the extent to which Dominicans hold views consistent with opportunities for, participation by, and equal treatment of frequently marginalized groups, including women, sexual minorities, immigrants in general, as well as Haitians and their descendants who reside in the Dominican Republic. Understanding the treatment of people who have historically lacked power and who are subjects of discriminatory practices offers important insights into an important facet of liberal democracy, which prioritizes respecting the rights and viewpoints of all, particularly minorities. The chapter also examines data related to Dominicans' migration abroad.

Concerning women's, the data indicate that most Dominicans support women's equality in the household and in the workforce. Additionally the trend of declining opposition to women's political equality, which began in 2010, has continued through the 2014 survey on most of the available indicators. Analysis of these attitudes reveals that respondents who hold more egalitarian views of women in society, both in the home and the workplace, are also more likely to support gender equality in politics. Gender and education affect these views: women and more educated Dominicans hold more egalitarian attitudes than men and the less educated. In terms of reproductive rights, opposition to abortion is fairly strong in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic places near the middle of countries in the Americas in terms of seeing abortion as justified when the mother's health is at risk, with 59% support, although fewer support abortion in the case of rape or incest.

Regarding attitudes toward sexual minorities, the Dominican Republic ranks in the bottom half of countries in the Americas with a score of only 34.5 on the 100-point scale measuring support for homosexual rights to run for public office. That is, the Dominicans on average are less tolerant of the political rights of homosexual than citizens in 14 countries in the Americas, and more tolerant than the citizens of 10 other countries. Despite this low level of tolerance for sexual diversity, the score on this measure has increased by 10 points in the Dominican Republic since 2006. The level of support for the rights of same-sex couples to marry places the Dominican Republic near the middle of the region with an average of 22.0 in 2014. This result places the Dominican Republic well below the average support in Uruguay, the country with the highest level of support for same-sex marriage with an average of 70.6 on the same 100-point scale. On the other hand, the tolerance for gay marriage is much higher in the Dominican Republic than in other Caribbean countries like Jamaica and Haiti, where support falls below 7 points. In addition, between 2010 and 2014 there was a small but statistically significant increase of 3.45 points in Dominicans' support for the right of same-sex couples to marry.

In analyzing attitudes toward immigrants, the data indicate a pattern of decline in Dominicans' willingness to accept Haitians' rights and to recognize patterns of discrimination against Haitian immigrants. This decline has occurred in conjunction with changes in the legal system that have impacted the status of Dominicans of Haitian descent. Attitudes regarding immigration more generally, as opposed to specifically Haitian immigrants, have also deteriorated somewhat in the last two years.

The analysis concludes with an examination of Dominican emigration abroad. We observe that nearly 24% of Dominican households benefit from remittances, ranking the country 4th among the countries where respondents were asked to report this form of income. Additionally, the Dominican Republic places 5th in the region in the percentage of respondents who indicated an intention to go live or work in another country in the next three years. Younger, wealthier respondents, as well as men are particularly likely to have plans to emigrate in the near future.

II. Gender and Sexuality

In recent decades, there has been a process of economic and political transformation in the Dominican Republic, which has included greater democratization, industrialization, urbanization, and integration into the global economy through migration, tourism, commerce, and communications. With these changes, social pressure to broaden citizen rights and improve the quality of democracy has increased. Efforts to enhance opportunities for women in particular have been undertaken through advocacy work, education and international assistance, and the topic of gender and the incorporation of women into the economic and political spheres has been an important element of the social programs of diverse public and private institutions.

Here we explore how public attitudes regarding gender equality in society and politics have evolved in the Dominican Republic alongside these general processes of structural and political change. The accumulated data from the surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic show that there have been important changes in public opinion with respect to gender rights and acceptance of women’s equality in the public and domestic realms. However in regional perspective, the Dominican Republic places in the middle of the pack concerning the rights of women and sexual minorities.

Women in Society

The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey in the Dominican Republic included several questions pertaining to women’s rights. Some were asked in many countries throughout the region, while others are specific to the Dominican Republic because they have been included in multiple waves of AmericasBarometer surveys and they stem from the DEMOS surveys. We begin here with two Dominican-specific questions, listed below, which offer insights into respondents’ attitudes concerning women’s role in the workplace and in the home. For our analysis here, each item has been recoded to range from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater support for women’s’ rights.

| |
|---|
| <p>DOMW11. ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?</p> <p>(1) Sí, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza</p> <p>(2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza</p> |
| <p>DOMW12. ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar?</p> <p>(1) El hombre (2) La mujer (3) La mujer y el hombre</p> |

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 depict responses to these questions. The first presents temporal variation in support for women in the workforce (DOMW11). The data suggest that the vast majority of Dominicans, 81.8%, support women’s right to work, regardless of their family’s economic need for the income. This level of agreement with women’s economic rights has been largely steady for over a decade.




Figure 8.1. Support for Women in the Workplace, Dominican Republic 2004-2014




Figure 8.2. Decision-Making in the Home, Dominican Republic 2014

Figure 8.2, which depicts attitudes about decision-making authority within households, indicates that 77% of Dominicans think the woman and the man should make important decisions jointly and another 2.2% favored women as having primary decision-making power. On the other hand, 20.7% said that men should make important household decisions independently.

Women in Politics

In addition to women’s role in society, the AmericasBarometer also affords us insight into attitudes regarding women’s role in politics. The question below assesses support for women as political leaders. As we do throughout the report, we recode responses to the question to range from 0 to 100; here higher values indicate greater disagreement with the view that men make better political leaders than women.

VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?
 (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo
 (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo

Figure 8.3 presents average scores on this scale in the Dominican Republic from 2008 to 2014. The data indicate that despite a significant increase in gender egalitarianism between 2010 and 2012, support for women’s political equality did not increase significantly between 2012 and 2014. In addition, although the AmericasBarometer in all other countries in the region did not include this item on the political capacity of women, the question was included in the entire region in 2012. At that time, the Republic Dominican ranked last in terms of support for women in politics (Espinal and Morgan 2012) and the average response among Dominicans in 2014 places the country in the same position if we use data from 2012 for other countries as a point of comparison.




Figure 8.3. Support for Women in Politics (VB50), Dominican Republic 2008-2014

To examine in the factors associated with support women’s political equality, we conducted multivariate regression analysis of the scale created for VB50 FOR 2014. Figure 8.4 presents the results of this analysis. Figure 8.4 shows the results of this analysis.¹ The evidence indicates that respondents who hold more egalitarian views of women in society, both in the home and the

¹ A table displaying all the coefficients and test statistics for this analysis can be found appended to the end of this chapter.

workplace, are also more likely to support gender equality in politics.² At the same time, women and educated respondents also hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than men and the less educated. We display the bivariate relationships between these significant factors and gender egalitarianism in Figure 8.5. The patterns mirror those identified in the multivariate analysis. Interestingly, the gap in responses between women and men, which is about 8.5 points, is not as wide as that observed for those in the highest versus lowest education categories nor as that observed for respondents falling into the most versus least favorable views regarding women's right to access to paid work, which are both more than 20 points.




Figure 8.4. Correlates of Support for Women in Politics (VB50), Dominican Republic 2014

² To measure support for the equality of women in the home and workplace, the DOMW12 questions about decision-making at home and GEN1 on the right to work of women are employed. DOMW12 is coded as two indicator variables with male dominance in decision-making as the reference category excluded in the analysis. GEN1 is recoded so that higher values indicate greater support for equal access of women to employment.




Figure 8.5. Factors Associated with Support for Women in Politics (VB50), Dominican Republic 2014

To further explore the evolution of Dominican attitudes regarding women in the political realm, we utilize a series of questions that have been asked in the Dominican Republic over the past two decades, first in the DEMOS surveys and later in the AmericasBarometer:

DOMW6. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?

DOMW7. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política?

W8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer?

(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) **[NO LEER]** LE DA IGUAL, AMBOS
(88) NS (98) NR

DOMW9. ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar?

(1) Mayor (2) Menor (3) **[NO LEER]** IGUAL
(88) NS (98) NR

W10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: **[Leer]**

(1) No es conveniente que participe
(2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan
(3) Debe participar igual que el hombre
(88) NS
(98) NR

Figure 8.6 displays the responses to these questions over time, beginning in 1994 and extending through the most recent survey in 2014 (the data for 1994 to 2004 comes from the DEMOS surveys).

Since 2008, there has been a pattern of generally increasing support for women in the political sphere, although the changes between 2012 and 2014 are small and generally do not achieve statistical significance. Nevertheless, the overall trend is toward more egalitarian attitudes with regard to women as candidates (W8), as leaders in office (DOMW9), and as political actors in the mass public (DOMW6 and W10). There is one exception to this pattern – responses to DOMW7 move in the opposite direction. On this item, which asks the extent to which respondents agree that women should participate *more* in politics, there has been a decline in attitudes supporting female participation. Thus, while Dominicans have shown modest increases in abstract support for women’s equality, they are now *less* likely to favor tangible advances toward greater political participation among women than they were 14 years ago. Moreover, the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys, which provided data on region-wide attitudes regarding women in politics, indicated that the Dominican Republic ranks at or near the bottom among countries in the Americas in terms of various gender-egalitarian attitudes (Espinal and Morgan 2012). Unfortunately, these questions about support for women in politics were not included in the other countries of the Americas in the 2014 survey, so we are unable to show updated regional comparisons for these items or scales.




Figure 8.6. Attitudes about Women in Politics, Dominican Republic 1994-2014

Reproductive Rights

In addition to gender (in)equality in the home, workplace, and political sphere, reproductive rights are an important issue that affect many women. The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey includes two questions to assess respondents’ attitudes regarding abortion. The first, which is asked across most countries in the region, asks whether abortion is justified when the mother’s health is at risk. The second, asked only in the Dominican Republic, considers whether abortion should be permissible when the woman has been the victim of incest or rape.

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?
 (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría

DOMW14B. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo en caso de incesto o violación sexual?
 (1) Sí, de acuerdo en caso de incesto o violación
 (2) No está de acuerdo




Figure 8.7. Attitudes about Abortion When the Mother's Health is at Risk in the Americas, 2014

Figure 8.7 displays the percentage of respondents in each country in the Americas who believe abortion is justified when the mother's health is as risk. Among the 23 countries where this question was asked, the Dominican Republic has the 11th highest (or 13th lowest) level of support for abortion rights in this situation at 59% of respondents in favor. This represents a decline in regional position from the 2012 survey when the Dominican Republic ranked 8th in support for the right to an abortion when the mother's health is at risk. The question about support for abortion in cases of rape was not included in all countries of the region, hence we cannot make regional comparison on this issue.

In Figure 8.8, we present the evolution of attitudes about abortion over time in the Dominican Republic. The left side of the figure is based on responses to the first question about situations in which the mother's health is at risk, while the right side shows the percentage of respondents who find abortion acceptable in cases of rape or incest. Immediately we can see that there is much greater acceptance for abortion if the mother's health is at risk than in contexts where the pregnancy is the result of sexual assault of some kind. In 2014, 59.3% agree that an abortion would be justified based on considerations of the mother's health, but just over half as many, only 30.5% of Dominican respondents, find abortion permissible in cases of rape or incest. Additionally, on both items we can see that acceptance of abortion increased slightly between 2010 and 2012, but we observe no statistically significant change between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 8.8. Attitudes about Abortion, Dominican Republic 2010-2014




Figure 8.9. Correlates of Abortion Attitudes, Dominican Republic 2014

To explore the factors associated with abortion attitudes we conduct a multivariate analysis of the question asking respondents whether abortion is justified if the mother’s health is at risk. The results, which are depicted in Figure 8.9, suggest that there is no significant gender gap on abortion attitudes in the Dominican Republic.³ We do find that gender egalitarian attitudes regarding women in the workforce are positively associated with acceptance of abortion when the mother’s health is in question. More educated and lighter skinned respondents are also more likely to see abortion as justified under these circumstances. Figure 8.10 displays the bivariate relationships for these statistically significant effects. The effect of education is particularly notable. 42% of those with no formal education are accepting of abortion if the mother’s health is at risk, while 70.7% of those with post-secondary education hold those attitudes regarding abortion – a gap of nearly 30 points.

³ A table displaying all the coefficients and test statistics for this analysis can be found appended to the end of this chapter.




Figure 8.10. Factors Associated with Abortion Attitudes, Dominican Republic 2014

Sexual Minorities

The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey includes a question asking respondents the extent to which they approve of homosexuals having the right to run for public office. We recode responses to this question into a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater support for the political rights of homosexuals.

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

Figure 8.11 displays the average score on this scale measuring opposition to discrimination against homosexuals for each country in the Americas. The observed range on this scale across the region is particularly high when compared to other survey items, a gap of nearly 70 points separating Canada at the top and Haiti at the bottom. At the top are countries like Canada, Uruguay, the United States, and Chile, which tend to possess comparatively high levels of economic and human development, more established democracies, and certainly in the case of Uruguay, less religious populations. At the bottom are some of the region's poorer and more culturally conservative countries. The Dominican Republic averages 34.5 on this indicator measuring support for political equality, ranking 15th which places it in the bottom half of countries in the Americas.




Figure 8.11. Support for Homosexuals Running for Public Office in the Americas, 2014

Despite this middling positioning for the Dominican Republic in comparative perspective, this placement obscures recent movement toward greater acceptance of equal political rights for homosexuals among Dominicans. Between 2006 and 2014, the average score on this measure has increased by 10 points in the Dominican Republic, which constitutes a statistically and substantively significant shift. Figure 8.12 depicts this temporal evolution in the measure of attitudes toward homosexuals.




Figure 8.12. Support for Homosexuals Running for Public Office, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer also included a question about the extent to which respondents approve of same-sex couples having the right to marry. The answers to this question were recorded on a scale of 0 to 100, where higher values indicate greater support for the right to marry for homosexuals.

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?

Figure 8.13 shows the responses to this item in the Americas by country. As can be observed, the Dominican Republic is located in the middle of the region with an average of 22.0 in 2014. This result places the Dominican Republic well below the average in Uruguay, the country with the highest level of support same-sex marriage with an average of 70.6 points. On the other hand, tolerance for the social rights of homosexuals is much higher in the Dominican Republic than in other Caribbean countries like Jamaica and Haiti, where support falls below 7 points on the 100-point scale.




Figure 8.13. Support for Same-Sex Couples' Right to Marry in the Americas, 2014

Since 2010, the AmericasBarometer has included this item on the right to marriage for same-sex couples in the Dominican Republic. Figure 8.14 shows the average support for the 2010, 2012 and 2014 surveys. During these years, a small increase in the level of support for this right for homosexuals in the country from 18.58 in 2010 to 22.03 in 2014, a statistically significant change.




Figure 8.14. Support for Same-Sex Couples' Right to Marry, Dominican Republic 2010-2014

III. Race and Migration

Next we examine race, national origin, and attitudes pertaining to immigrants in the Dominican Republic. Race, and especially national origin, has been the basis of patterns of marginalization and exclusion in the Dominican Republic. Thus, understanding the current contours of these issues within Dominican political culture offers important insight into the strength of democratic norms and values.

Race

We begin by simply reporting the racial composition of Dominican society according to survey respondents' self-identification, using the question below. As displayed in Figure 8.15, 13.5% identify as white, 58.0% of respondents identify as mestizo/indio, 12.4% as mulatto, and another 15.8% as black.

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza (india), negra, mulata u otra?
 (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza/India (4) Negra/dominicano negro (5) Mulata (7) Otra
 (88) NS (98) NR




Figure 8.15. Racial Self-Identification, Dominican Republic 2014

Immigrants in the Dominican Republic

Migration is a topic of crucial importance for Dominican society due to the significant migratory flows into and out of the country. This migratory circuit has socioeconomic, cultural and political causes and consequences. Migration into the Dominican Republic is fundamentally composed of Haitians who enter into various areas of the economy, above all in agriculture and construction. It is a migration composed primarily of poor workers with low levels of education or occupational training. Due to the history of conflict between the two countries, this migration generates considerable public controversy in Dominican society, making it interesting to use survey data to learn about the attitudes of the Dominican population first toward immigrants in general and then toward Haitians in particular.

Two survey questions offer insights into general attitudes toward immigrants. The first item asks whether respondents believe that immigrants are taking jobs away from Dominicans or simply doing work that Dominicans did not want to do. The second question explores the extent to which respondents approve of the government providing social services to immigrants; this second item is converted into a scale ranging from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more support for immigrants being eligible for social services.

| |
|--|
| <p>IMMIG2. En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los dominicanos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos? [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</p> <p>(1) Hacen los trabajos que los dominicanos ya no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos</p> |
| <p>IMMIG1. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los inmigrantes indocumentados que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo</p> |

Figure 8.16 displays responses to these question in the Dominican Republic from 2008 to 2014, with answers to the first question on the left side of the figure and the scale derived from the second on the right (the second question was not asked in 2010, leaving this data point empty in the right panel). We observe that Dominican attitudes toward immigrants are not particularly favorable. In 2014, 53.8% agreed that immigrants fill jobs that are undesirable for Dominicans, which represents a statistically significant decline in this viewpoint as compared to relatively steady scores around 60% in the previous three waves. On the scale measuring approval of government social services being provided to immigrants, the average score of 61 in 2014 is barely past the scale midpoint and is consistent with previous the two previous surveys in which the question was asked.




Figure 8.16. Attitudes toward Immigrants in the Dominican Republic, 2008-2014

In addition to these general attitudes regarding migrants, the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey included several questions that specifically explore Dominican attitudes toward Haitian immigrants residing in the country, which are listed below.

| |
|---|
| DOMHAI1. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con que los hijos de inmigrantes haitianos nacidos en la República Dominicana sean ciudadanos dominicanos? |
| DOMHAI2. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o desacuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano otorgue permisos de trabajo a los haitianos indocumentados que viven en República Dominicana? |
| DOMHAI4. Hay personas que dicen que los haitianos son discriminados en la República Dominicana, otros dicen que no. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los haitianos son discriminados? |

Figure 8.17 displays temporal variation in responses to the first two items, which ask about attitudes regarding the citizenship rights of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic (left panel) and about preferences concerning whether government should provide work permits to undocumented Haitians (right panel). Each item has been converted to a scale that ranges from 0 to

100 with higher values representing more support for Haitian rights. Overall there is more support for granting citizenship to the children of Haitian immigrants than for providing work permits to undocumented Haitians, but in both cases there was a decline in support in 2014, moving back toward the levels observed in 2010. For the work permits question, this movement is statistically significant.




Figure 8.17. Attitudes toward the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2014

With these two questions, we constructed a scale measuring support for the rights of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic.⁴ We then conducted linear regression analysis of this scale, the results of which are presented in Figure 8.18.⁵ The evidence indicates that while skin tone, household wealth, gender, and age do not have significant relationships with attitudes toward Haitians, several other factors considered here are important predictors. Support for democracy and general political tolerance are positively associated with accepting rights for Haitians and their offspring. We also find that people who see their own economic situation positively are more likely to support access to citizenship and work permits, perhaps because they do not see themselves as economically threatened by Haitian immigration. Additionally, those with more education and from more urban areas are more accepting of Haitian rights.⁶ We present the bivariate relationships for some of these significant effects in Figure 8.19. There we can see that the effect of education is particularly strong, with more education significantly increasing acceptance of access to citizenship and work permits.

⁴ The Cronbach's alpha score for this scale is 0.54.

⁵ A table displaying all the coefficients and test statistics for this analysis can be found appended to the end of this chapter.

⁶ The variable measuring the size of respondents' place of residence is coded such that higher scores indicate smaller areas (e.g. rural areas or small towns) and lower scores indicate larger ones (metropolitan areas).




Figure 8.18. Correlates of Support for the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, 2014




Figure 8.19. Factors Associated with Support for the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, 2014

Figure 8.20 displays responses to the third question about Haitian immigration listed above, which specifically explores perceptions of discrimination against Haitians within the Dominican Republic (DOMHAI4). Higher values on the 0-100 scale generated from this variable indicate that respondents think that Haitian immigrants experience discrimination. This question was also asked in the 2012 AmericasBarometer so we are able to make comparisons between that year and the current survey. The data reveal a statistically significant 10-point decline in Dominican respondents' indicating, which means that in 2014 there is less belief that Haitians are victims of discrimination. It is worth noting that in the two years since the 2012 survey, Haitian immigrants have faced dramatic changes in the Dominican legal system that have weakened the citizenship rights of their descendants. These changes most notably include the Constitutional Court judgment (TC-168-13), which stripped many Dominicans of Haitian decent of citizenship already acquired, or the possibility of acquiring it. This has sparked an intense national debate with differing positions within the public about the rights of Haitians and their descendants and a new Law 169-14 to mitigate the effects of the judgment TC168-13.




Figure 8.20. Assessments of Haitian Ciscrimination in the Dominican Republic, 2012-2014

Dominican Migrants

We conclude our discussion of immigration by considering migration by Dominicans to other countries and how these patterns affect the family or friends of migrants who remain on the island. Many Dominicans have emigrated to the United States, Europe, and other countries in Latin American and the Caribbean for the same reasons that the Haitians go to the Dominican Republic: in search of jobs and better opportunities. In the past three decades, various studies have been conducted about Dominican migration, its transnational character and the support that it provides to Dominican society. The AmericasBarometer does not cover this entire range of themes, but it does offer a baseline for understanding the importance of migration in Dominican households and the migratory plans of the



Dominican population. Specifically, two survey items allow us to learn the percentage of respondents who live in households that receive remittances as well as the percentage who have intentions to go live or work abroad within the next three years.

| | | | |
|---|--------|---------|---------|
| Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? | | | |
| (1) Sí | (2) No | (88) NS | (98) NR |
| Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? | | | |
| (1) Sí | (2) No | (88) NS | (98) NR |

Figure 8.21 presents the percentage of respondents across the Americas who indicate that their household benefits from receiving remittance from abroad. Among the 20 countries where this question was asked, the Dominican Republic ranks as the country with the fourth highest share of respondents from households that receive remittances with 23.5%, which suggests that close to a fourth of Dominican homes receives some type of subsidy from migrants. Haiti and Jamaica stand apart from the rest of the region with the largest percentages of households reporting remittance receipt.




Figure 8.21. Receipt of Remittances in the Americas, 2014

The share of households reporting remittance receipt increased significantly between 2006 and 2010. But since 2010, the rate has leveled off and there have been no significant changes in the past four years (see Figure 8.22).




Figure 8.22. Receipt of Remittances, Dominican Republic 2006-2014




Figure 8.23. Intentions to Live or Work abroad, Dominican Republic 2006-2014

The survey also asks respondents whether they intend to go live or work abroad within the next three years. Figure 8.23 displays changes in the percentage of Dominican respondents who indicated that they planned to emigrate over the period from 2006 to 2014. In 2014, this percentage stands at 28.9%, which represents a small but statistically insignificant decline from the rates in 2010 and 2012, but the change is not statistically significant. The only statistically significant changes in this indicator were the decline between 2006 and 2008 and the increase between 2008 and 2010.

Figure 8.24 places Dominican intentions to emigrate in regional perspective. Here we see that the Dominican Republic has a comparatively high rate of respondents with plans to leave the country to go work or live abroad, placing 5th in the region, around the same level as Honduras, Guyana, and El Salvador. Only Jamaica and Haiti significantly outpace the Dominican Republic on this indicator of exit migration.




Figure 8.24. Intentions to Live or Work Abroad in the Americas, 2014

The results of a regression analysis to analyze the factors associated with making plans to emigrate in the not-too-distant future are depicted in Figure 8.25.⁷ Here we see that younger respondents, men, and those with greater household wealth are more likely to indicate intentions to live or work abroad than are older, female, and poorer respondents. Figure 8.26 displays the bivariate relationships for these statistically significant features. The age pattern is the most dramatic with 41.7% of the youngest respondents indicating an intention to emigrate but only 9.4% of the oldest age group. The effects for respondent’s sex and household well-being are not as strong but are nevertheless significant. Nearly 33% of men but only 25% of women indicate an intention to live or work abroad. Among those at the bottom of the household wealth distribution, only 21% have plans to emigrate but over 36% of those at the top have such plans.⁸




Figure 8.25. Correlates of Intending to Live or Work Abroad, Dominican Republic 2014

⁷ A table displaying all the coefficients and test statistics for this analysis can be found appended to the end of this chapter.

⁸ Household wealth is measured using an index created from a series of survey items that record the presence or absence of particular consumer goods or services within the household, including a television, refrigerator, conventional telephone, cell phone, vehicle, clothes washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor potable water, indoor bathroom, computer, flat screen television, and internet service. In constructing the scale, responses are weighted according to their frequency in the urban or rural population in the country, with more rare items having more weight in building the index. Separate weightings are employed for urban and rural respondents because access to these goods and services is likely to be significantly different for rural versus urban households.




Figure 8.26. Factors Associated with Intending to Live or Work Abroad, Dominican Republic 2014

IV. Conclusion

This chapter has explored Dominican attitudes with respect to the rights of women, sexual minorities, and immigrants. On the topic of gender, we made use of a broad set of survey questions designed to measure support for women's equality in the home, workforce, and politics as well as attitudes regarding abortion. The data indicate that most Dominicans support women's equality in the household and in the workforce. About 82% of Dominicans agree that women should have the right to work regardless of their family's financial situation, and 77% think that household decisions should be made jointly by the woman and the man while another 2% thought important decisions should be made solely by the woman. Of course, these figures indicate that about 20% of Dominican respondents are not supportive of this sort of gender equality. Concerning women in politics, a decrease in Dominican opposition to female political leadership observed in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey (Espinal and Morgan 2012) has persisted through the 2014 data. Analysis of these attitudes revealed that respondents who hold more egalitarian views of women in society, both in the home and the workplace, are also more likely to support gender equality in politics. Women and more educated Dominicans also hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than men and the less educated.

In terms of reproductive rights, among countries including these survey questions, Dominicans fall in the middle of the range in terms of seeing abortion as justified when the mother's health is at risk, with a 59% support. While acceptance of abortion increased slightly between 2010 and 2012, the 2014 results represent no change from 2012. On the other hand, fewer respondents indicate a willingness to accept abortion in cases in which pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, just over 30%

see abortion as permissible in these instances. Multivariate analysis of Dominican abortion attitudes found no evidence that women are more supportive of reproductive rights, but more gender egalitarian attitudes are correlated with less opposition to abortion as is education.

Regarding attitudes toward sexual minorities, the country placed in the bottom half of countries in the region with a score of only 34.5 on the 100-point scale measuring opposition to discrimination against homosexuals being able to run for public office. Despite this fairly low score, there has been some important progress since 2006 as the average score on this measure has increased by 10 points in the Dominican Republic during this time period, a statistically and substantively significant shift.

Concerning the rights of immigrants, the case of Haitians is the most prominent in the Dominican Republic. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we observe some declines in Dominicans' willingness to accept Haitians' rights and to acknowledge patterns of discrimination against Haitian immigrants. In particular, support for Haitians' access to work permits experienced statistically significant decline between 2012 and 2014, with an average score of 41.3 on the 100-point scale. Recognition of discrimination against Haitians also declined significantly in 2014. The average score on the scale measuring respondents' assessments of the level of discrimination was just 48 points in 2014, which represents a statistically and substantively significant decline of 10 points since 2010. Thus, attitudes toward Haitians have deteriorated in the past two years at the same time that the legal system has taken several steps that have weakened the status of Dominicans of Haitian descent with the Sentencia TC 168-13. Attitudes regarding immigration more generally, as opposed to specifically Haitian immigrants, have also deteriorated somewhat in recent years. In 2014, just over 50% of respondents agreed that immigrants fill jobs that are undesirable for Dominicans, which represents a statistically significant decline in this viewpoint as compared to relatively steady scores around 60% in the previous three surveys. This suggests that immigrants are not perceived as much as a necessity demanded by the economy.

The final analysis of the chapter explored Dominican emigration abroad. We observed that nearly 24% of Dominican households benefit from remittances, ranking the country 4th among the countries where respondents were asked about receiving financial support from friends or family living abroad. On the other hand, a slightly higher percentage, 29%, of respondents indicate an intention to go live or work in another country in the next three years, which places the country in 5th place in the region on this indicator of plans to emigrate. Younger, wealthier respondents as well as men were particularly likely to be thinking about leaving to live abroad in the near future.

Appendix

**Appendix 8.1 Regression analysis of support for women in politics, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 8.4)**

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | -0.032 | (-1.12) |
| Level of Education | 0.097* | (3.44) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.014 | (0.48) |
| Age | -0.012 | (-0.51) |
| Skin Tone | 0.003 | (0.14) |
| Married | -0.005 | (-0.22) |
| Female | 0.084* | (3.99) |
| Women Should Make Decisions in the Household | 0.054 | (1.87) |
| Both Should Make Decisions in the Household | 0.168* | (6.95) |
| Support Women in the Workplace | 0.276* | (10.41) |
| Constant | 0.000 | (0.00) |
| F | 32.46 | |
| Number of cases | 1475 | |
| R-Squared | 0.18 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

Appendix 8.2 Logit analysis of support for reproductive rights in case of risk of mother's health, 2014 (Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 8.9)

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | -0.051 | (-0.86) |
| Level of Education | 0.227* | (3.65) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.058 | (0.94) |
| Age | 0.022 | (0.40) |
| Skin Tone | 0.144* | (2.48) |
| Married | 0.084 | (1.68) |
| Importance of Religion | -0.013 | (-0.23) |
| Tolerance | 0.104* | (2.01) |
| Support Women in the Workplace | 0.232* | (3.73) |
| Female | 0.028 | (0.47) |
| Constant | 0.399* | (6.58) |
| F | 5.53 | |
| Number of cases | 1468 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

**Appendix 8.3 Regression analysis of attitudes toward Haitian rights, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 8.18)**

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|---------|
| Size of Location | -0.079* | (-2.60) |
| Age | 0.031 | (1.15) |
| Female | 0.023 | (0.90) |
| Level of Education | 0.106* | (3.41) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.043 | (1.66) |
| Perception of National Economic Situation | -0.030 | (-1.24) |
| Perception of Personal Economic Situation | 0.066* | (2.27) |
| Tolerance | 0.106* | (3.82) |
| Support for Democracy | 0.061* | (2.45) |
| Skin Tone | 0.030 | (1.04) |
| Constant | -0.000 | (-0.00) |
| F | 7.21 | |
| Number of cases | 1433 | |
| R-Squared | 0.05 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

**Appendix 8.4 Logit analysis of intention to go live or work abroad, 2014
(Coefficients and standard errors for Figure 8.25)**

| | Coefficients | (t) |
|--|--------------|----------|
| Size of Location | 0.090 | (1.40) |
| Age | -0.543* | (-8.31) |
| Skin Tone | 0.031 | (0.43) |
| Female | -0.214* | (-4.26) |
| Level of Education | 0.149 | (1.89) |
| Wealth Quintiles | 0.219* | (3.26) |
| Evaluation of National Economy | -0.012 | (-0.18) |
| Evaluation of Personal Economic Situation | 0.036 | (0.55) |
| Constant | -1.007* | (-13.98) |
| F | 15.15 | |
| Number of cases | 1483 | |
| Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05 | | |

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Appendices



Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

March, 2014

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion, which is being financed by Vanderbilt University and I am here on behalf of Gallup Dominican. The interview will last for 45 minutes.

The principle goal of the study is to learn about the opinion of people regarding different aspects of the situation in the country. The study is being conducted so that we can better understand what people think about their country, although we cannot offer any specific benefit. We plan to hold a series of conferences based on the results of what people say. We will never disclose your individual opinion.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not be paid for your participation, but it will not cause you to incur any expenses.

If you have any questions with respect to the study, you may contact Gallup at (809) 567-5123 and ask for Ramón Montero, the director of the study. We will leave you this letter in case you want to review it. The IRB number for the study is 110627.

¿Do you wish to participate?



Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design AmericasBarometer 2014 Survey in Dominican Republic

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Sample Size</i> | <i>Weighted/Unweighted</i> | <i>Fieldwork dates</i> |
|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Dominican Republic | 2014 | 1,520 | Unweighted | March 11 th to March 25 th |

LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2014 round of surveys

In its effort to collect the best quality data possible and therefore produce the highest quality studies, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) adopted a new sample design for the AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys, which was also employed in 2014. The two main reasons for this decision to change the sample design from that which was used in the 2004-2010 period were: (1) updating the sample designs to reflect the population changes as revealed by recent census information, and (2) standardizing the sample sizes at the level of the municipality in order to both reduce the variance and provide a basis for using multi-level analysis drawing on municipal data. This change in the sample design makes the sample representative by municipality type¹, to enable the use of the municipality as a unit of analysis for multilevel statistical analysis. Details of the revisions are found in the description of the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan for assistance in and advice on the AmericasBarometer. One of the world's leading experts in sample design methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski, and his graduate students, advised us throughout the process. Over the course of a year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs. Our colleagues at the University of Michigan, confirmed that LAPOP had already been following the best practices, within the limits of resources at our disposal, in its sample design. Our own review of the major update we carried out in 2012 sample design left us pleased in almost every respect. The effort to obtain a standard sample size per municipality/canton/parish did not have any adverse impact on intra-class correlation levels, yet has given us a basis for calculating context effects at the local level. In some particular cases, however, in the 2014 round we requested country teams to conduct specific alterations, like updating their sampling frame to take into consideration (if available) the new 2010-2011 national census information. We also asked teams to verify that the 2012 sample design continues to reflect and represent each country population structure and distribution.

Finally, after several rounds of consultations and technical discussions with experts at the ISR at the University of Michigan on how to update the 2012 samples for the 2014 round of surveys, LAPOP requested that countries to update their samples at the block level while retaining the same primary and sub-stratification units (i.e., *Estratopri*, *Municipalities* and *Census Segments*) that were

¹ The new sample design included three different strata of municipalities classified according to their size. Municipalities were grouped in sizes appropriate for the country. One common grouping was (1) Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, (2) Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, (3) Municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.

included in the 2012 sample. This means that users of prior AmericasBarometer surveys can do so knowing that the designs across time remain very similar, if not identical. Countries that had new population census available and did not experience significant population shifts or changes in their population distribution were asked to replicate the 2012 sample using the latest census information available and to replace the sampling points at the block level.

With respect to *data collection*, in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer we expanded the use of handheld electronic devices. For the first time, we employed for data collection the “Adgys”[©] questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track on a daily basis the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time, or nearly real time, but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents’ privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 20 countries in which we used this technology. In the remaining 6 countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

The remaining pages of this technical note describe the sample design of the Dominican Republic AmericasBarometer 2012 survey.

Dominican Republic 2014 AmericasBarometer Round

This survey was carried out between March 11th and March 25th of 2014, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2014 wave of surveys. It is a follow-up of the national surveys of 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 carried out by the LAPOP. The 2014 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with the field work being carried out by Gallup República Dominicana. The 2014 AmericasBarometer received generous support from many sources, including USAID, UNDP, IADB, Vanderbilt U., Princeton U., Université Laval, U. of Notre Dame, among others.

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,520 people. It involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish. The survey used a complex sample design, taking into account stratification and clustering.

The sample consists of four strata representing the four main geographical regions: Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area, North, East, and South. Each stratum was further sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas.

Table 1 shows the unweighted sample size in each of the four regions (strata) and by municipality size.



Table 1: Sample sizes by Strata and Municipality Size in the 2014 AmericasBarometer Survey in the Dominican Republic

| Strata | Unweighted Sample Size |
|---|-------------------------------|
| Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area | 556 |
| North Region | 531 |
| East Region | 193 |
| South Region | 240 |
| Total | 1,520 |
| Size of Municipality | |
| Large (More than 100,000 inhabitants) | 871 |
| Medium (Between 25,000-100,000 inhabitants) | 336 |
| Small (Less than 25,000 inhabitants) | 313 |
| Total | 1,520 |

The sample consists of 63 primary sampling units and 252 final sampling units. A total of 1,138 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and 382 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5 .

Quotas for gender and age were adopted since multiple recalls in a national sample such as this are impractical from a cost standpoint. Our experience shows that even three recalls leave the sample with a notable gender imbalance (more women than men). Rather than have to include post-hoc weights to adjust for this sample error, we resolve the problem in the field via quotas.


Weighting of the Dominican Republic datasets

The AmericasBarometer samples of Dominican Republic are self-weighted. The dataset contains a variable called WT which is the “country weight” variable. Since in the case of Dominican Republic the sample is self-weighted, the value of each case = 1. The variable “WEIGHT1500” should be activated to produce representative national results. When using this dataset for cross-country comparisons, in order to give each country in the study an identical weight in the pooled sample, LAPOP reweights each country data set in the merged files so that each country has an N of 1,500. In SPSS this is done via the “weight” command.



Appendix C. Questionnaire

República Dominicana 2014, Versión # 15.2.2.0 IRB Approval: 110627



LAPOP: República Dominicana, 2014

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| | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------|
| PAIS. País: | | | | | 21 |
| 01. México | 02. Guatemala | 03. El Salvador | 04. Honduras | 05. Nicaragua | |
| 06. Costa Rica | 07. Panamá | 08. Colombia | 09. Ecuador | 10. Bolivia | |
| 11. Perú | 12. Paraguay | 13. Chile | 14. Uruguay | 15. Brasil | |
| 16. Venezuela | 17. Argentina | 21. Rep. Dom. | 22. Haití | 23. Jamaica | |
| 24. Guyana | 25. Trinidad & Tobago | 26. Belice | 40. Estados Unidos | 41. Canadá | |
| 27. Surinam | 28. Bahamas | 29. Barbados | | | |
| IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| ESTRATOPRI: | | | | | |
| (2101) Región Metropolitana | | (2102) Región Norte | | | |
| (2103) Región Este | | (2104) Región Sur | | | _ _ |
| ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad [población en edad de votar, según censo; modificar por cada país, usando número de estratos y rangos de poblaciones apropiados]: | | | | | |
| (1) Grande(más de 100,000) | | (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000) | | | |
| (3) Pequeña (menos 25,000) | | | | | _ |
| UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"] _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| PROV. Provincia: _____ | | | | | 21 _ _ |
| MUNICIPIO. Municipio (o Distrito Municipal) _____ | | | | | 21 _ _ |
| DOMDISTRITO. Distrito: _____ | | | | | _ _ |
| DOMSECCION. Sección: _____ | | | | | _ _ |
| DOMBARRIO. Barrio/Paraje: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| DOMPOLIGONO. Polígono censal: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| DOMAREACEN. Área censal: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| DOMSEGMENTO. Segmento censal [código oficial del censo]: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| DOMSEC. Sector: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]: _____ | | | | | _ _ _ |
| [Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; clave-código asignada(o) por el supervisor de campo] | | | | | _ _ _ |
| UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] | | | | | _ |
| TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: | | | | | |
| (1) Santo Domingo (región metropolitana) | | (2) Ciudad grande (> 100,000) | | | |
| (3) Ciudad mediana (25,000-99,000) | | (4) Ciudad pequeña (< 25,000) | | (5) Área rural | |
| IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español | | | | | _ |

| | |
|--|---------|
| Hora de inicio: ____:____ | _ _ _ _ |
| FECHA. Fecha Día: ____ Mes: _____ Año: 2014 | _ _ _ _ |
| ¿Vive usted en esta casa? Sí → continúe No → Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista | |
| ¿Es usted ciudadano dominicano o residente permanente de la República Dominicana? Sí → continúe No → Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista | |
| ¿Cuántos años tiene? [Seguir solo si tiene por lo menos 18 años] Sí → continúe No → Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista | |
| ATENCION: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO Y OBTENER EL ASSENTIMIENTO DEL ENTREVISTADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA. | |

| | |
|--|---------|
| Q1. Género [ANOTAR, NO PREGUNTE]: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer | _ _ |
| Q2Y. ¿En qué año nació? _____ año (8888) NS (9888) NR | _ _ _ _ |
| LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho(a) está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |

| | | | |
|---|---------|--|---------|
| A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] | | | _ _ _ |
| Agua, falta de | 1 (19) | Impunidad | 20 (61) |
| Caminos/vías en mal estado | 2 (18) | Inflación, altos precios | 21 (02) |
| Conflicto armado | 3 (30) | Los políticos | 22 (59) |
| Corrupción | 4 (13) | Mal gobierno | 23 (15) |
| Crédito, falta de | 5 (09) | Medio ambiente | 24 (10) |
| Delincuencia, crimen | 6 (05) | Migración | 25 (16) |
| Derechos humanos, violaciones de | 7 (56) | Narcotráfico | 26 (12) |
| Desempleo/falta de empleo | 8 (03) | Pandillas | 27 (14) |
| Desigualdad | 9 (58) | Pobreza | 28 (04) |
| Desnutrición | 10 (23) | Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) | 29 (06) |
| Desplazamiento forzado | 11 (32) | Salud, falta de servicio | 30 (22) |
| Deuda externa | 12 (26) | Secuestro | 31 (31) |
| Discriminación | 13 (25) | Seguridad (falta de) | 32 (27) |
| Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción | 14 (11) | Terrorismo | 33 (33) |
| Economía, problemas con, crisis de | 15 (01) | Tierra para cultivar, falta de | 34 (07) |
| Educación, falta de, mala calidad | 16 (21) | Transporte, problemas con el | 35 (60) |
| Electricidad, falta de | 17 (24) | Violencia | 36 (57) |
| Explosión demográfica | 18 (20) | Vivienda | 37 (55) |
| Guerra contra el terrorismo | 19 (17) | Otro | 38 (70) |
| NS | 88 | NR | 98 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |
| IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) No sabe (98) No responde | _ _ |



| | |
|--|-----|
| Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio... | |
| NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal o una reunión convocada por el síndico durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde | _ _ |
| NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, regidor o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) No responde | _ _ |
| SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el ayuntamiento está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |
| Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. | |
| CP4A. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación a alguna autoridad local como el síndico o regidor? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |

| | |
|--|-----|
| CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Una vez a la semana (2) Una o dos veces al mes (3) Una o dos veces al año (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |
|--|-----|

| | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado] | | | | | | | |
| | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca | NS | NR | INAP |
| CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |
| CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |
| CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |
| CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |
| CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |
| CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | 99 _ _ |
| CPSS1. Durante los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha participado como jugador junto a otras personas en la práctica de algún deporte? [Leer alternativas] | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | _ _ |

| | |
|--|-----|
| IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR | _ _ |
|--|-----|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----------|----------|--|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | NS 88 | NR 98 | |
| Izquierda | | | | | | | | | | Derecha | | |

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

IMMIG2. En general, ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los dominicanos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos? **[Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]**

| | |
|---|--|
| (1) Hacen los trabajos que los dominicanos ya no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los dominicanos (88) NS (98) NR | |
|---|--|

IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno dominicano ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... **[Leer alternativas]**

| | |
|---|--|
| (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR | |
|---|--|

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|------------|------------|--|
| JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia. | (1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | (2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | NS (88) | NR (98) | |
| JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción. | (1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | (2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | NS (88) | NR (98) | |

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?

| | | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|--|
| (1) Sí se justifica | (2) No se justifica | (88) NS | (98) NR | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------|---------|--|

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses?

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| (1) Sí [Siga] | (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] | (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] | (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|

VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? **[Marcar el número]** _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

| | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|



| | |
|---|--|
| <p>VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincriminal del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincriminal sufrió? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión (11) [No leer] Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincriminal del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincriminal en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>POLE2N. En general, usted está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con el desempeño de la policía en su barrio?</p> <p>[Si responde que no hay policía en el barrio marcar “(4) Muy insatisfecho”]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>DOMAOJ11B. Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años?</p> <p>(1) Más seguro (2) Igual (3) Menos seguro (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de otros barrios en este municipio?</p> <p>(1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de hace 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio (vecindad) está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> |

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| <p>AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes?</p> <p>(1) Implementar medidas de prevención</p> <p>(2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes</p> <p>(3) [No leer] Ambas</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> | <input type="text"/> |
|---|----------------------|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 88 | 98 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Nada | | | | | | Mucho | No sabe | No responde |
| Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR | | | | | | | | |
| Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. | | | | | | | | |
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondée: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio) | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político dominicano? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político dominicano? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su ayuntamiento? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| DOMB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las organizaciones empresariales? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |
| DOMB50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las juntas de vecinos? | | | | | | | | <input type="text"/> |

| | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7 NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO] | Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR |
| N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza? | <input type="text"/> |
| N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno? | <input type="text"/> |
| N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana? | <input type="text"/> |
| N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía? | <input type="text"/> |

| | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO | Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR |
| EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿hasta qué punto los partidos políticos dominicanos representan bien a sus votantes? | <input type="text"/> |



| | |
|---|---|
| EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? | |
| NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO | Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR |
| B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas dominicanas respetan los derechos humanos de los dominicanos hoy en día? | |
| MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América? | |
| MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Dominicana para mejorar la seguridad nacional? | |
| Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es “nada” y 7 es “mucho”, cuál es la probabilidad que tendría de ser castigado por las autoridades alguien que en su barrio haga las siguientes acciones.: | (88) NS (98) NR |
| PR3A. Compre DVDs/CDs pirateados. ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades? | |
| PR3B. ¿Y si se conecta a la electricidad sin pagar? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades? | |
| PR3C. Y si alguien en su barrio invade un terreno desocupado, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades? | |
| PR3D. ¿Y, por construir o remodelar una vivienda sin licencia o permiso? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades? | |
| PR3E. Y usando la misma escala, ¿si alguien en su barrio fuera a construir o remodelar una casa, qué tan probable sería que a esa persona le pidieran pagar un macuteo/soborno? | |
| PR4. ¿Hasta qué punto siente usted que el Estado dominicano respeta la propiedad privada de sus ciudadanos? Seguimos con la misma escala de 1-nada a 7-mucho. | |
| [RECOGER TARJETA “B”] | |
| M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Danilo Medina Sánchez es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR | |
| SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR | |
| SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted... [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR | |
| SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted... [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR | |
| INFRAx. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (88) NS (98) NR | |
| [ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”] | |

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|----|-----------|-----------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 88 | 98 | |
| Muy en desacuerdo | | | | | | Muy de acuerdo | | NS | NR |

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

| | |
|--|-----|
| ROS1. El Estado dominicano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | □□□ |
| ROS4. El Estado dominicano debe implementar políticas firμες para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | □□□ |
| Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR | |
| ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | □□□ |
| EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | □□□ |
| EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? | □□□ |
| MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en la República Dominicana. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? | □□□ |
| TD5. Estaría dispuesto/a a pagar más impuestos si éstos se usaran para darle más a quien tiene menos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? | □□□ |
| INQ2. Las diferencias en los ingresos en la República Dominicana son grandes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? | □□□ |
| GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? | □□□ |

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

| | |
|--|-----|
| ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: proteger el medio ambiente o promover el crecimiento económico? (1) Proteger el medio ambiente (2) Promover el crecimiento económico (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR | □□□ |
| DST1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: tener viviendas de construcción más segura o evitar el aumento de costos? (1) Viviendas de construcción más segura (2) Evitar aumento de costos (3) [NO LEER] Ambos (88) NS (98) NR | □□□ |
| PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en la República Dominicana? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR | □□□ |
| W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR | □□□ |



| | |
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| <p>DOMW14B. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo en caso de incesto o violación sexual? [Si el entrevistado pregunta: Incesto es “relaciones sexuales entre familiares”] (1) Sí, de acuerdo en caso de incesto o violación (2) No está de acuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
|---|--|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 NS | 98 NR |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---------------------------|---|---|---|----|----------|----------|
| Desaprueba firmemente | | | | | Aprueba firmemente | | | | | | |

| | |
|--|--|
| | 1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR |
| E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |

| | |
|---|--|
| Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en la República Dominicana. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos | 1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR |
| D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?] | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |
| D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? | <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> |

[Recoger tarjeta “D”]

[Entréguele al entrevistado Tarjeta “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta tiene una escala de 1 a 10, pero el 1 indica que está en desacuerdo totalmente y el 10 significa que está de acuerdo totalmente.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|-----------|-----------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 88 | 98 |
| Desacuerdo Totalmente | | | | | | | | | | NS | NR |
| Acuerdo Totalmente | | | | | | | | | | | |

DOMW6. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?

DOMW7. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política?

[RECOGER TARJETA “E”]

W8. Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer?

(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) **[NO LEER] LE DA IGUAL, AMBOS**
(88) NS (98) NR

DOMW9. ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar?

(1) Mayor (2) Menor (3) **[NO LEER] IGUAL**
(88) NS (98) NR

W10. Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo:

[Leer]

(1) No es conveniente que participe
(2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan
(3) Debe participar igual que el hombre
(88) NS
(98) NR

DOMW11. ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?

(1) Sí, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza
(2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza
(88) NS
(98) NR

DOMW12. ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) El hombre (2) La mujer (3) La mujer y el hombre (88) NS (98) NR

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:

(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
(88) NS (98) NR

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?

(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR

| | INAP No trató o tuvo contacto | No | Sí | NS | NR |
|--|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria... | | | | | |
| EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un macuteo/soborno en los últimos 12 meses? | -- | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un macuteo/soborno? | -- | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |



| | INAP No trató o tuvo contacto | No | Sí | NS | NR |
|--|--|----|----|----|----|
| EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un macuteo/soborno? | -- | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el ayuntamiento en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el ayuntamiento, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún macuteo/soborno en los últimos 12 meses? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un macuteo/soborno en los juzgados en este último año? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún macuteo/soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún macuteo/soborno en la escuela o colegio? | 99 | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |
| EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un macuteo/soborno? | | 0 | 1 | 88 | 98 |

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| EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR |
|---|

| | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Ahora voy a leerle una lista de situaciones que pueden o no ser problema en algunos barrios. Por favor dígame si las siguientes situaciones son un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no son un problema en su barrio . [Repita después de cada pregunta “es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema” para ayudar al entrevistado] | | | | | | | |
| | Muy serio | Algo serio | Poco serio | Nada serio | No es un problema | NS | NR |
| DIS07. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando en su barrio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 88 | 98 |
| DIS017. Balaceras aquí en su barrio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 88 | 98 |

| Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿cuáles de los siguientes actos de delincuencia han ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio. | Sí | No | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | NS | NR | INAP |
|--|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|----|------|
| VICBAR1. Han ocurrido robos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 [Continúe] | 2 [Pasar a VICBAR3] | | | | 88 | 98 | |
| | | | | | | [Pasar a VICBAR3] | | |
| VICBAR1F. ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año? | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 | 99 |
| VICBAR3. Han ocurrido ventas de drogas ilegales en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 | | | | 88 | 98 | |
| VICBAR4. Han ocurrido extorsiones en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 | | | | 88 | 98 | |
| VICBAR7. Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio? | 1 | 2 | | | | 88 | 98 | |

| | Sí | No | NS | NR |
|---|----|----|----|----|
| FEAR10. Para protegerse de la delincuencia, en los últimos 12 meses ha tomado alguna medida como evitar caminar por algunas zonas de su barrio porque puedan ser peligrosas? | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 |
| VIC44. En los últimos 12 meses, por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad? | 1 | 0 | 88 | 98 |

| | |
|--|--|
| VB1. ¿Está inscrito para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR | |
| INF1. ¿Tiene usted cédula/documento de identidad nacional? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR | |
| VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2012? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4NEW] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10] | |

| | |
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| <p>VB3n. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2012? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, [Pasar VB101]) (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) [Pasar VB101] (2101) Danilo Medina (PLD) [Pasar a VB10] (2102) Hipólito Mejía (PRD) [Pasar a VB10] (2103) Guillermo Moreno (AP) [Pasar a VB10] (2104) Eduardo Estrella (Dominicanos por el Cambio) [Pasar a VB10] (2105) Max Puig (Alianza por la Democracia) [Pasar a VB10] (2106) Julián Serulle (Frente Amplio) [Pasar a VB10] (2177) Otro [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10] (99) INAP (No votó) [Pasar a VB4NEW]</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>VB4NEW. [SOLO PARA LOS QUE NO VOTARON. NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] [Si dice “no voté porque no quería”, preguntar por qué no quiso votar] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [Una sola respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Estaba confundido (2) No me gustaron los candidatos o la campaña (3) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (4) No creo en la democracia (5) Cuestiones burocráticas (registro, padrón) (6) Cuestiones de edad (muy joven, muy viejo) (7) No estaba en el distrito/estaba de viaje (8) No me interesa la política (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Sí votó)</p> <p>[DESPUÉS DE ESTA PREGUNTA IR A VB10]</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>VB101. [SOLO A LOS QUE RESPONDIERON “NINGUNO (BLANCO O NULO)” EN VB3n] ¿Por qué voto usted nulo o blanco en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Estaba confundido (2) Quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos, no le gustó ninguno (3) No creo en la democracia, quería protestar contra el sistema político (4) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (5) No me interesa la política (6) Mi voto no marca la diferencia (7) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(2101) PRD (2102) PLD (2103) PRSC (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>DOMVB13. ¿Pertenece usted a este partido o sólo simpatiza?</p> <p>(1) Pertenece (2) Simpatiza (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <p> </p> |
| <p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR</p> | <p> </p> |

| | | |
|---|--|-----|
| [RECOGER TARJETA “G”. ENTREGAR TARJETA “H”] FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de nuestro país? [Leer opciones] (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela, o (12) México (13) [No leer] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) [No leer] Otro (88) NS (98) NR [RECOGER TARJETA “H”] | | _ _ |
| FOR6. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país, ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucha [Sigue] (2) Algo [Sigue] (3) Poca [Sigue] (4) Nada [Pasar a FOR6b] (88) NS [Pasar a FOR6b] (98) NR [Pasar a FOR6b] | | _ _ |
| FOR7. En general, ¿la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP | | _ _ |
| FOR6b. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país, ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene EEUU en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucha [Sigue] (2) Algo [Sigue] (3) Poca [Sigue] (4) Nada [Pasar a MIL10A] (88) NS [Pasar a MIL10A] (98) NR [Pasar a MIL10A] | | _ _ |
| FOR7b. ¿La influencia que Estados Unidos tiene en nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? 1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP | | _ _ |

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

| | Muy confiable | Algo confiable | Poco confiable | Nada confiable | No sabe/ no tiene opinión | NR | |
|--|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------------|----|--|
| MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | |
| MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | |
| MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 88 | 98 | |

Ahora vamos a hacer unas preguntas sobre otro tema

| | |
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| <p>VOL207n. ¿Usted cree que para corregir a un hijo que desobedece es necesario golpearlo o castigarlo físicamente? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Muy frecuentemente (3) Algunas veces (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p> | _ _ |
|--|-----|

Ahora vamos a hablar de su experiencia. Recuerde que si usted se siente incómodo o por otra razón prefiere no responder esta pregunta, solo dígamelo y seguiremos con la siguiente pregunta.

| | |
|--|-----|
| <p>VOL208n. ¿Cuándo usted era niño, sus padres o sus tutores le pegaban o lo castigaban físicamente de alguna manera para corregir su mal comportamiento? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) Siempre (2) Muy frecuentemente (3) Algunas veces (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p> | _ _ |
|--|-----|

| Ahora le voy a leer algunas situaciones en las que algunas personas creen que está justificado que el esposo golpee a su esposa/pareja y le voy a pedir su opinión.... | Aprobaría | No aprobaría, pero lo entendería | No lo aprobaría, ni lo entendería | NS | NR |
|---|-----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----|----|
| DVW1. La esposa descuida las labores del hogar. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 |
| DVW2. La esposa es infiel. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 88 | 98 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| <p>WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda regular en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p> | _ _ |
| <p>CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre la Tarjeta de Solidaridad, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p> | _ _ |

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 ____ Año de ____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = ____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

| | 1 ^o | 2 ^o | 3 ^o | 4 ^o | 5 ^o | 6 ^o | 7 ^o | 8 ^o |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Ninguno | 0 | | | | | | | |
| Primaria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Secundaria | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | | | | |
| Universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | | | |
| NS | 88 | | | | | | | |
| NR | 98 | | | | | | | |



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| <p>ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [NO LEER OPCIONES]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |
| <p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]</p> <p>(01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discipulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |
| <p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |
| <p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a PR1] (4) Es estudiante? [Pase a PR1] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a PR1] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a PR1] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a PR1] (88) NS [Pase a PR1] (98) NR [Pase a PR1]</p> | |
| <p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | |

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| <p>PR1. La vivienda que ocupa su hogar es... [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]: (1) Alquilada [PASE A Q10NEW] (2) Propia, [Si el entrevistado duda, decir "totalmente pagada o siendo pagada a plazos/cuota/hipoteca"] [PASE A PR2] (3) Prestada o compartida[PASE A Q10NEW] (4) [NO LEER] Otra situación [PASE A Q10NEW] (88) NS [PASE A Q10NEW] (98) NR [PASE A Q10NEW]</p> | |
| <p>PR2. ¿Esta vivienda tiene título de propiedad, ya sea que lo tenga usted en su poder o lo tenga el banco u otra institución? (1) Sí (lo tiene en su poder o lo tiene el banco u otra institución) (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p> | |
| <p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]</p> | |
| <p>Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 2,800 pesos (02) Entre 2,800 y 4,000 pesos (03) Entre 4,001 y 5,200 pesos (04) Entre 5,201 y 5,950 pesos (05) Entre 5,951 y 6,950 pesos (06) Entre 6,951 y 8,250 pesos (07) Entre 8,251 y 9,350 pesos (08) Entre 9,351 y 10,800 pesos (09) Entre 10,801 y 11,700 pesos (10) Entre 11,701 y 12,600 pesos (11) Entre 12,601 y 15,450 pesos (12) Entre 15,451 y 18,300 pesos (13) Entre 18,301 y 22,100 pesos (14) Entre 22,101 y 29,600 pesos (15) Entre 29,601 y 46,150 pesos (16) Más de 46,150 pesos (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |



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| <p>PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]</p> <p>Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 2,800 pesos (02) Entre 2,800 y 4,000 pesos (03) Entre 4,001 y 5,200 pesos (04) Entre 5,201 y 5,950 pesos (05) Entre 5,951 y 6,950 pesos (06) Entre 6,951 y 8,250 pesos (07) Entre 8,251 y 9,350 pesos (08) Entre 9,351 y 10,800 pesos (09) Entre 10,801 y 11,700 pesos (10) Entre 11,701 y 12,600 pesos (11) Entre 12,601 y 15,450 pesos (12) Entre 15,451 y 18,300 pesos (13) Entre 18,301 y 22,100 pesos (14) Entre 22,101 y 29,600 pesos (15) Entre 29,601 y 46,150 pesos (16) Más de 46,150 pesos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)</p> <p>[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]</p> | | |
| <p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q11n. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q12Bn. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? [Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar]</p> <p>(00 = ninguno) _____ (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |
| <p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza (india), negra, mulata u otra?</p> <p>(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza/India (4) Negra/dominicano negro (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p> | | |

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| <p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (2101) Castellano/español (2106) Criollo haitiano (2104) Otro (nativo) (2105) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |
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| <p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p> | |
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| <p>G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer opciones] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p> | |
|---|--|

| Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente... | Correcto | Incorrecto | No sabe | No responde |
|--|---------------|------------|---------|-------------|
| G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama] | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |
| G14. ¿En qué continente queda Nigeria? [NO LEER: África] | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |
| G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en la República Dominicana? [NO LEER: 4 años] | 1 | 2 | 88 | 98 |
| G17. ¿Cuántos diputados tiene la Cámara de Diputados? [ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.] | Número: _____ | | 8888 | 9888 |

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

| | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|
| R3. Refrigeradora (nevera) | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular) | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R4A. Teléfono celular | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".] | (0) No | (1) Uno | (2) Dos | (3) Tres o más | (88) NS | (98) NR |
| R6. Lavadora de ropa | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R7. Microondas | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R8. Motocicleta | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R15. Computadora | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R18. Servicio de Internet | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R1. Televisor | (0) No [Pasa a R26] | (1) Sí [Sigue] | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |
| R16. Televisor de pantalla plana | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | (99) INAP | |
| R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje? | (0) No | (1) Sí | (88) NS | (98) NR | | |



Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

| | |
|---|--------------------------|
| FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico 1. Papel 2. Android 3. Windows PDA | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada] | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo. | <input type="checkbox"/> |


| |
|---|
| <p>Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____</p> <p>Firma del supervisor de campo _____</p> <p>Comentarios: _____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____</p> |
|---|

Tarjeta A (L1)


| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Izquierda | | | | | Derecha | | | | |



Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C






Tarjeta D



Tarjeta E





Tarjeta G

Brasil

China continental

España

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Venezuela

Tarjeta H

Brasil

China continental

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 2,800 pesos
- (02) Entre 2,800 y 4,000 pesos
- (03) Entre 4,001 y 5,200 pesos
- (04) Entre 5,201 y 5,950 pesos
- (05) Entre 5,951 y 6,950 pesos
- (06) Entre 6,951 y 8,250 pesos
- (07) Entre 8,251 y 9,350 pesos
- (08) Entre 9,351 y 10,800 pesos
- (09) Entre 10,801 y 11,700 pesos
- (10) Entre 11,701 y 12,600 pesos
- (11) Entre 12,601 y 15,450 pesos
- (12) Entre 15,451 y 18,300 pesos
- (13) Entre 18,301 y 22,100 pesos
- (14) Entre 22,101 y 29,600 pesos
- (15) Entre 29,601 y 46,150 pesos
- (16) Más de 46,150 pesos

Paleta de Colores



[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____
 años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

| | 1 ^o | 2 ^o | 3 ^o | 4 ^o | 5 ^o | 6 ^o | 7 ^o | 8 ^o |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Ninguno | 0 | | | | | | | |
| Primaria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Secundaria | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | | | | |
| Universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | | | |
| NS | 88 | | | | | | | |
| NR | 98 | | | | | | | |

[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión?
[No leer opciones]

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS (98) NR

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP's efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer's duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our "data repositories" and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas.

USAID/Santo Domingo
Avenida República de Colombia #57
Altos de Arroyo Hondo
Santo Domingo, D.N.
Dominican Republic, 10605
Tel: (809) 567-7775

