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THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2006

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Executive Summary

The 1978 democratic transition in the Dominican Republic was the first in the wave of political openings that swept through Latin America from the end of the 1970s. Compared to other Latin American transitions, the Dominican has not drawn as much attention because it shifted from an authoritarian civil government rather than a military dictatorship.

In its almost 30 years of existence, Dominican democracy has remained relatively stable despite the country's institutional deficiencies and socioeconomic problems. This is what the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey data presented in this report reveals. It shows that the Dominican people are attached to democracy as a political system, on the one hand, and points to the problems ailing the system, on the other. These opinions are contrasted with those of other Latin American countries.

The data presented in this report should be understood in the socioeconomic and political context of mid 2006. The survey in the Dominican Republic was conducted in June, when the administration of President Leonel Fernández had a high level of popularity. Amidst the crisis that prevailed during the last part of the administration of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD; Dominican Revolutionary Party), the PLD and its allies won the presidential elections of May 16, 2004 with 57% of the vote. They also triumphed in the congressional and municipal elections of May 16, 2006.

Therefore, it is quite likely that some of the positive evaluations of democratic institutions and the PLD government reflect the allure that this administration held when the survey was conducted. It should also be pointed out, though, that some opinions regarding democracy have been consistently positive over the last decade, as shown by the DEMOS survey data (1994, 1997, 2001, and 2004) and that of LAPOP 2006. Many questions of these surveys allow such comparisons through time.

Chapter I presents a brief summary of the democratic process in the Dominican Republic and the socioeconomic and political situation when the 2006 LAPOP survey was conducted. Chapter II presents technical details of the survey and summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample. It is a multi-staged, probabilistic survey, designed to elicit opinions representative of the Dominican population. The sample includes urban and rural residents, rich and poor, men and women, and people from different regions of the country. The demographic profile of the sample reflects the social composition of the Dominican population.

Chapter III analyzes the meanings people give the term “democracy.” The predominate notion of democracy in the liberal tradition emphasizes the procedures to elect a government, the balance of powers within the state, and a system of individual rights and freedoms. Counterposed to this vision is that which emphasizes social rights, whether as a crucial component of political procedures or just by themselves.

Most Dominicans define democracy in normative terms, referring to people's civil rights such as the freedom of expression and the right to vote. Still, around a third of the population surveyed could not define democracy in any specific way. It was found that the greater the education or wealth of respondents, the greater their tendency to have a normative conception of democracy. Additionally, the series of surveys measuring support for the democratic system in the Dominican Republic (DEMOS and LAPOP) show that two-thirds of the population consistently states that democracy is preferable to any other form of government: 76% in DEMOS 1997, 79% in DEMOS 2001, 74% in DEMOS 2004, and 74% in LAPOP 2006. This data suggests that the public favors democratic stability.

Chapter IV addresses the topic of tolerance as an ingredient essential to democracy, to support for the political system, and to democratic stability. On a scale of political tolerance, constructed with four indicators (the right to vote, demonstrate, run for office, and give speeches), the Dominican Republic has one of the highest levels of tolerance among the Latin American countries included in the LAPOP project.

This comparative study pays special attention to the topic of democratic stability and how it is affected by the level of support for the political system. The idea is that if political institutions are not respected, this can create discontentment that can lead to the collapse of governments and even the democratic system. Compared to the data from the 2004 DEMOS survey, conducted in the middle of an economic and institutional crisis in the Dominican Republic, the levels of support for the political system in 2006 increased in all the indicators used in the LAPOP study: respect for institutions, for civil rights, pride in being Dominican, and accepting the political system. The Dominican Republic has one of the highest levels of support for its political system within Latin America.

This support, along with political and social tolerance, is necessary to maintain democratic stability. The survey data shows that the Dominican political system tends to be stable because a large percentage of the population supports the system's institutions. Additionally, compared to the other Latin American countries surveyed, the Dominican Republic shows a relatively high percentage in attitudes favoring democratic stability.

Although mistrust in political institutions is well recognized in the literature on democracy in Latin America, and has been documented in various surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic, the 2006 LAPOP data shows an improvement in the evaluations of almost all the country's political institutions. People who evaluate the economy better and who feel safer give more positive evaluations. Compared to the other surveys over the last 12 years (1994-2006), in 2006, we find a significant improvement in support for democracy, especially the view that democracy benefits the people and functions satisfactorily.

Current and recent Latin American presidents have shown populist tendencies. The 2006 LAPOP survey included five questions to measure how much respondents supported populism in their country. The Dominican Republic scored a relatively low average on

the populism scale, indicating that Dominicans do not show much support for this kind of president.

Chapter V addresses corruption, a topic that has been widely debated in the Dominican Republic. It was essential in the processes of capital accumulation during the authoritarian regimes, and since the 1978 transition to democracy different social and political groups have demanded it be reduced. Corruption is a particularly troubling problem because it generates great inefficiencies in the use of public resources and creates an institutional and cultural climate that mocks the basic rules of living in a democratic community.

The 1994-to-2006 data shows that most Dominicans think corruption is a serious or very serious problem. Many also believe corruption is widespread in the country. In 2006, the percentage of people who consider corruption to be a serious problem declined some, but the percentage who think that corruption is widespread rose slightly.

While a majority of people believe corruption among public officials to be a serious and widespread problem, other data indicates that people have rather limited firsthand experience with acts of corruption. For example, when respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of corruption in accessing government services, only a minority said they had been. Additionally, the reported level of victimization by corruption was significantly lower in 2006 than in 2004. This suggests that although the vast majority of people believe that there is a lot of corruption in the country, not many have experienced it firsthand.

In fact, compared to the other Latin American countries in the LAPOP survey, the Dominican Republic was, in 2006, among the five countries with the lowest percentage of people victimized by corruption in the previous year. Within the Dominican Republic, corruption is more widespread in urban areas (especially the Santo Domingo metropolitan area) than rural ones; and it affects men more than women.

Crime is another serious problem in many Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic. The data in Chapter VI shows that the sense of public insecurity has grown considerably. For example, when people were asked whether they felt safer, just as safe, or less safe (in and outside their home) than they did five years ago, the percentage feeling unsafe rose from 42% in 1994 to 79% in 2006.

The number of people who reported having been the victim of a crime doubled from 2004 to 2006. The most common type of crime is robbery without physical aggression, and 70% of respondents in 2006 believe that the police are involved in crime. Additionally, the percentage of people who support acting outside the law to capture criminals increased significantly between 2004 and 2006. People who feel unsafe show a greater propensity to condone acting outside the law to capture criminals. Within the Latin American region, five countries report lower crime rates than the Dominican Republic and nine report higher rates.

Drugs is one of the main causes for the rise in crime. The 2006 LAPOP survey asked respondents in all participating countries whether they had seen someone selling drugs in their neighborhood in the last year. The level of drug dealing reported in the Dominican Republic is high compared to the other countries in the region. Only Costa Rica has a higher percentage.

On a different topic, decentralization (a return to the local level as the ideal place to bring government closer to the people) has been the central aim of the political reform processes promoted in Latin America in recent decades. The data in Chapter VII shows that, among the countries surveyed, the Dominican Republic has the highest number of people who have had contact with their local government through municipal meeting attendance; fewer Dominicans petitioned their municipal government, however. Additionally, the Dominican Republic has the highest level of satisfaction with local government services. This suggests that Dominicans are more satisfied than other Latin Americans with the services offered by their local government. Chapter VIII also shows that, among the countries surveyed, the Dominican Republic has the highest level of satisfaction with the efficacy of the current administration.

Dominican society is party-centric. Political parties have played a central role since the end of the Trujillo dictatorship, frequently to the detriment of the development of other social organizations. The strong leadership of political bosses (*caudillos*), imbued with ideological polarity, was crucial in the formation of the party system and the consolidation of party loyalties in the 1960s. Dominican society continues to demonstrate a high level of party identification despite the transformations and current difficulties that the parties face. As can be seen in the comparative 2006 LAPOP data in Chapter VIII, the Dominican Republic has the highest levels of party support (60.4%). Nicaragua is second (49.8%) and Guatemala has the lowest level of party support (14.7%). The Dominican data also shows that, in recent years, there has been a realignment of party preferences in favor of the *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (Dominican Liberation Party, or PLD).

Chapter IX addresses the topic of social capital. In terms of interpersonal trust within one's community, the Dominican Republic is located in the middle of the group of Latin American countries in the LAPOP project. Additionally, on the scales of civic, political, and religious participation that were constructed, Dominicans participated least in the civic realm and most in the religious. This indicates that Dominican associative life has an important religious component. Women participate more in religious activities, parent-teacher organizations, and women's associations. Men participate more in community improvement committees, professional associations, unions, and political organizations.

Chapter X analyzes the topics of gender and migration. The data shows that one of the most important changes in Dominican public opinion over the last decade has been the increasing acceptance of women's equality in the political and domestic spheres. Between 1994 and 2006, the view that women should participate to the same degree as men in politics grew continually, except for a temporary decline in 2004. There is wide disagreement with the notion that politics is only something for men, and the trust that

people have in female candidates has grown, with the exception of a slight decline in 2004.

To ascertain people's views on reproductive rights and access to public health services, we included a question about abortion in the questionnaire. There were two possible responses: approve of abortion in the case of health risks, rape, and incest; or disapprove of abortion in all circumstances. While 59% voiced total opposition to abortion, 41% supported it in the above-mentioned circumstances. Among people with a university education, the level of support grows significantly.

Dominican society is a receiver and sender of migrants. It receives many Haitians while it pushes many Dominicans to migrate abroad, especially to the United States and Europe. The LAPOP survey formulated two questions regarding Haitian migration. One asked whether people agree or disagree with the proposal that the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic be given Dominican citizenship. And the other asked whether people agree or disagree with the proposal that the Dominican government give work permits to undocumented Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. In both cases, the majority of people disagreed.

Regarding Dominican migration overseas, we found that 20% of respondents said they receive remittances from abroad, and that the majority people who receive them are not among the most poor. Additionally, a significant percentage of people (35.9%) stated that they wanted to go work or live outside the Dominican Republic. The highest percentages were among people with a secondary education and young people between the ages of 18 and 25.

Chapter I Background

The 1978 democratic transition in the Dominican Republic was the first in the wave of political openings that swept through Latin America from the end of the 1970s. Compared to other Latin American transitions, the Dominican has not drawn as much attention because it shifted from an authoritarian civil government rather than a military dictatorship.

It is worth emphasizing that Dominican democracy, in its almost 30 years of existence, has remained relatively stable despite the institutional deficiencies and socioeconomic problems that have confronted and still confront the country. For example, in 2003 and 2004, a severe economic and institutional crisis, which included the bankruptcy of three major banks and a failed reelection project, wore out the country politically. Nonetheless, the democratic order was not interrupted. A change in government came instead during regular presidential elections in 2004, with Leonel Fernández of the *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (PLD; Dominican Liberation Party) rising to power.

It is important to point out, regarding the results of the public opinion study of the Dominican Republic we present here, that survey data should always be understood in terms of the socioeconomic and political context in which it was obtained. The 2006 LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) survey in the Dominican Republic was carried out in June of that year, a period in which President Leonel Fernández had a high level of popularity. Amidst the crisis that prevailed during the last part of the administration of Hipólito Mejía of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD; Dominican Revolutionary Party), the PLD and its allies won the presidential elections of May 16, 2004 with 57% of the vote. The PLD won a further victory in the congressional and municipal elections of May 16, 2006, in which it obtained 51% of the votes and acquired 69% of the seats in the Senate, 54% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 44% of the municipalities.

It is very likely that some of the positive evaluations of the PLD government that appear in this study reflect the allure that this government held for important segments of the Dominican population when the survey was conducted. Some of the comparisons are favorable, both in terms of their historic trajectory, which the DEMOS surveys in the Dominican Republic allow us to establish, and in relation to other Latin American countries included in the 2006 LAPOP project.

Achievements and Obstacles in the Democratic Process: A Brief Historical Survey

The 12 yearlong Balaguer government (1966-1978) represented the long transition between the failed democracy of the early 1960s and the 1978 transition. Along with authoritarian elements, it also contained civil ones, which facilitated the future transition. The authoritarian elements included: repression as a mechanism of political control against dissent; prolonged wage austerity; the personalization of power; the excessive share of political and economic power held by the military; the lack of power of the

legislative branch of government; the subordination of judicial branch to the executive; and electoral irregularities that ensured Balaguer's re-election in 1970 and 1974.

Among the elements that facilitated the democratic transition we find: the permanence of the formal structure of the state (Balaguer did not close any branch of government); tolerance toward the less radical opposition; economic policies that gave incentives to the private sector; the subordination of military power to the president; and favorable international conditions, particularly the spread of social democracy in Latin America and the Carter administration's policy of supporting human rights.

From 1966 to 1975, in the context of the Cold War, authoritarian elements dominated the Balaguer government. But starting in 1976, Balaguer's principal opposition, the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD; Dominican Revolutionary Party), strengthened its ties to European social democracy and underwent a process of de-radicalization to become a viable option to take power in 1978 (Espinal 1987).

The two PRD governments (1978-1982 and 1982-1986) helped to create an atmosphere of tolerance and respect for basic political rights, to improve electoral processes, and to further the demilitarization of politics. But the economic crisis of the early 1980s, and the internal conflicts within the PRD, foreclosed its promised redistribution of wealth so hoped for by wide sectors of the population. In the context of a deteriorating economy, the perception of government corruption and intra-partisan struggles produced public discontent. The PRD lost a good deal of political support and saw its share of the vote fall from 53% in 1978 to 39% in 1986.

This contributed to Balaguer's triumph in the 1986 elections with 40.5% of the vote, when only a relative majority was required to win. The *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (PLD; Dominican Liberation Party) also benefited from the unpopularity of the PRD, increasing its share of the vote from 9.8% in 1982 to 18.4% in 1986. The tri-partisan character of Dominican politics was thus established in 1986. The three large parties relied on a charismatic leader who supplied them with ideology, leadership, and a social base of support: Balaguer for the *Partido Reformista* (Reformist Party, later called the *Partido Reformista Social Cristiano* or PRSC – Social Christian Reformist Party), José Francisco Peña Gómez for the PRD, and Juan Bosch for the PLD.

Despite the weight of personalist leadership, these parties have become strong and stable entities that have helped maintain a stable political system. Thus, until very recently, Dominican democracy has rested on a system of parties with strong social support, forged around their historic leaders.

Balaguer's electoral triumph in 1986 generated political uncertainties due to his 12 year precedent of authoritarian government. The question was whether Balaguer would guarantee the civil liberties achieved during the PRD governments and would maintain the principle of competitive elections established in 1978. Regarding the first, the Balaguer government upheld the achievements; regarding the second, there was an

important step backwards between 1986 and 1994: the general elections of 1990 and 1994 were highly disputed.

The electoral experience of 1990 generated a process of social organization and struggle for democratic reforms. New civic organizations arose with strong support from the middle class (the best known case is that of the civic movement *Participación Ciudadana* or Citizen Participation). And international assistance, especially from the United States, was important in the efforts to democratize the electoral process.

In the May 1994 elections, the three principal leaders of the major parties ran for office: Balaguer, Peña Gómez, and Bosch. But this time, the principal competitors were Balaguer and Peña Gómez, not Balaguer and Bosch as in 1990. The elections were very close, with only a small number of votes separating Balaguer (42.3%) and Peña Gómez (41.6%), while the PLD came in a distant third place. After several weeks of uncertainty regarding the final vote count, Balaguer was proclaimed the victor. But pressure from the PRD for a new count, civil society demands for electoral transparency, and international pressure, especially from the United States which had invested a good deal of resources to improve electoral procedures, led to negotiations, mediated by the Organization of American States (OAS), between the principal political leaders. The electoral crisis concluded with the signing of the *Pacto por la Democracia* (Pact for Democracy), which proposed a set of constitutional reforms, especially electoral ones, and reduced Balaguer's new presidential mandate to two years without the possibility of immediate re-election.

Subsequently, the political life of the three big political bosses each successively came to an end. Juan Bosch was the first to go, announcing his retirement from public life at the end of 1994. In 1998, Peña Gómez died just before the congressional and municipal elections of that year; and in July 2002, Balaguer died.

With the establishment of run-off elections in the 1994 pact, the presidential election of 1996 obliged the parties to form alliances. Balaguer, prohibited from running for re-election, did not offer enthusiastic support in the first round to his party's candidate, Jacinto Peynado. In the second round, Balaguer made a deal with Leonel Fernández of the PLD to prevent a victory by Peña Gómez, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the first round

The formation of the "*Frente Patriótico*" (Patriotic Front), as the alliance between Balaguer and the PLD was called, took the public by surprise. The PLD had been a party with left-leaning inclinations, and Bosch and Balaguer had been political rivals besides. But the hitherto untainted candidacy of Fernández, and the pragmatic position adopted by the PLD since 1990, facilitated this unlikely alliance. In this way, the cycle in which each of the three major parties had governed during the democratic period came to an end. But the "*Frente Patriótico*" left a bitter feeling among PRD supporters and wide sectors of the public since it prevented the triumph of Peña Gómez.

After its 1996 electoral defeat, the PRD consolidated its position as the opposition party, facilitating its triumph in the 1998 congressional and municipal elections and in the 2000 presidential election. The death of Peña Gómez just before the congressional-municipal elections solidified the PRD vote, and the party obtained a majority in both chambers of Congress and of the municipalities. In the 2000 presidential election, the PRD chose Hipólito Mejía, who did not have long-standing ties to the PRD but had been a protégé of Peña Gómez and his running-mate in the 1994 elections, as its candidate. Mejía managed to articulate the diverse interests of the PRD, which flourished after the death of Peña Gómez.

The PRD Government, 2000-2004

A majority government offers advantages and disadvantages for a democracy. On the positive side, the most important advantage is that the executive branch can formulate public policies with congressional support. The most negative aspect is the ease with which a government can impose policies potentially detrimental to many sectors, especially those without direct ties to the government. Mejía was known for his polemic and confrontational rhetoric. He promoted clientelism in the government bureaucracy, and later he initiated a reelection project antagonistic to the historic character of the PRD and counterproductive given the economic crisis that reigned during 2003 and 2004.

The debates to undertake constitutional reforms began in 2001 and 2002. Civil society organizations mobilized to push for the formation of a constituent assembly in order to make profound changes. At the start of 2002, President Mejía received the report of a commission named, with the participation of representatives from civil society, to make specific reform proposals. But after winning a majority of seats in Congress in the May 2002 elections, PRD legislators, ignoring the popular mobilizations, restricted the constitutional reform to the institution of re-elections.

Meanwhile, between 2001 and 2002, the rate of economic growth fell an average of 3.5% per year due to the slowing global economy, the high price of fuel, and the weaknesses of domestic economic policies. The government responded with an expansionary spending policy which produced a deficit covered by external financing. In 2003, the collapse of three banks deepened the economic crisis by accelerating inflation and devaluing the peso. At the start of 2004, political discontent reigned throughout the country.

Dominican democracy confronted a difficult situation: inflation, the devaluation of its currency, and a re-election project by Mejía that weakened his administration's capacity to govern and sharpened the leadership struggles within the PRD.

The growing dissatisfaction did not lead to a political outburst for various reasons: 1) the public could make out, on the horizon, the May 2004 presidential election as an opportunity to change the government; 2) the favorite candidate, Leonel Fernández, had governed during the "golden years" of economic growth at the end of the 1990s; 3) despite the succession crisis in party leadership, the party system remained relatively

stable; and 4) the custom of negotiation and ritualistic pacts during difficult moments was kept alive by political leaders.

In the context of the economic crisis, with high inflation and rapid currency devaluation, the opposition candidate, Leonel Fernández, obtained 57% of the vote with his promise to return economic stability to the country and foment modernity.

The PLD Government and Antecedents to the Survey, 2004-2006

The Economy

Taking power on August 16, 2004, the Fernández administration set out to achieve macroeconomic stability. It signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the agreed terms of which it largely fulfilled. These terms implied two fiscal reforms which included higher taxes: the first at the end of 2004 and the second in mid 2005. As a result, the country was able to restructure its foreign debt, the economy began to grow again, and the rate of inflation was brought under control, as can be seen in Figure I-1. The currency substantially rebounded, dropping from 50 pesos-to-the-dollar at the most critical moments at the end of 2003 to 30 pesos-to-the-dollar in 2005. The country's gross and net reserves also grew considerably (Table I-1).




Figure I-1. Annual Variation in the Consumer Price Index

Table I-1. Economic Indicators

Indicador/Año	2003	2004	2005
Producto Interno Bruto (millones de dólares corrientes, PPP)	62038	63426	67410
Crecimiento del PIB (%)	-1.9	2.0	9.3
Inflación (%)	42.6	28.7	7.4
Tipo de cambio promedio (RD\$:US\$1)	30.7	41.9	30.4
Reservas brutas (millones de dólares)	279	825	1,916
Reservas netas (millones de dólares)	-95	191.5	858.6

Fuente: World Development Indicators y Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia

The economic stabilization was undoubtedly the principal success of the PLD government's first two years, although there remains the large challenge of converting the economic growth associated with PLD administrations into greater social equality. As suggested in the World Bank document, *Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles*, although economic growth is key to reducing poverty, it needs to be accompanied by public policies that promote opportunities for the poor to be able to benefit from it. In the Dominican case, the high per capita growth rate of GDP during the first PLD government, at an average of six%, as seen in Figure I.2, was highly unequal and only reduced poverty by one%. Furthermore, as a result of the 2003-2004 financial crisis during the Mejía administration, around one-and-a-half million Dominicans fell into poverty. At the end of 2004, it was estimated that out of every 100 Dominicans, 42 were poor and 16 found themselves in extreme poverty.




Figure I-2. Gross Domestic Product per capita (current dollars, PPP)¹

Although GDP per capita has grown substantially over the last 15 years (Figure I-2), the unemployment rate, which fell considerably from 1990 to 1999, increased between 2000 and 2004; though in 2005 it dropped slightly (Figure I-3). This has been the source of pressure on the PLD government to improve employment opportunities and income distribution at the same time it foments growth.

¹ World Development Indicators




Figure I-3. Total Unemployment Rate²

Outside of macroeconomic stabilization, the principal economic challenges faced by PLD government have revolved around two topics. One is the free trade agreement with the United States and Central America (DR-CAFTA) signed by the Hipólito Mejía administration but implemented in the Fernández administration. It has implied legislative and tax changes. The starting date was to be January 1, 2006, but the target was not met. The country’s entrance is still pending, subject to legislative and practical changes. The other topic is the electric energy problem, the giant stone in the government’s shoe. Despite the large public subsidies to the energy sector, the government has still not been able to achieve an adequate energy supply for the country. In 2005, the subsidies for electric energy and propane gas amounted to 2.5% of GDP, almost equal to the combined spending on education and health care. If these subsidies were eliminated, the economy would be negatively affected since the majority of electricity consumers are people of limited means. But if they are maintained, few resources remain to invest in the social programs so necessary to reduce poverty.

Despite these problems, the 2006 LAPOP survey shows that Dominicans have a somewhat positive perception of the country’s economic situation. In Table I-2, we can see that 41.6% of Dominicans feel that the national economic situation has improved over the previous year, while 58.4% believe that the economy has remained the same or worsened. On the other hand, personal economic perceptions are less positive, since only

² Dominican Republic Central Bank, <http://www.bancentral.gov.do>

35.5% believe that their own economic situation has improved, while 64.5% stated that their economic situation remains the same or is worse than a year ago.

Table I-2. Perceptions Regarding the Economic Situation Compared to the Situation 12 Months Ago, 2006³

	La situación económica del país comparada a la situación hace 12 meses	Su situación económica personal comparada a la situación hace 12 meses
Mejor	41.6%	35.5%
Igual	18.8%	24.0%
Peor	39.6%	40.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

The Political Context

Besides the topics already listed, the problems that dominated the first two years of the PLD administration were: the anti-corruption campaign, an increase in crime, and the start of construction on the Santo Domingo metro.

The private sector corruption scandals stemming from the bankruptcy of three banks in 2003, and the increasing public sector corruption associated with Hipólito Mejía’s reelection project, created a political atmosphere favoring transparency in the use of public and private sector resources. Leonel Fernández addressed the subject in his inaugural speech on August 16, 2004, and subsequently created an ethics commission. Some efforts to prosecute PRD government officials were also initiated, though a few months later it was obvious that the judicial proceedings would not progress in a satisfactory manner. To date, few cases are still being prosecuted and there have been few convictions.

Regarding how to control the alarming rise in the crime rate, after vacillating for various months, the government instituted the “*Barrio Seguro*” (Safe Neighborhood) program, which consists of combining policing measures with some social programs in high risk neighborhoods. Nonetheless, the crime rate continued to rage and the public did not see progress in efforts to combat it. The death of a young middle class student in Santiago, murdered to steal a cell phone, catalyzed the government to implement stronger control measures at the end of July 2006. Combined police and military units were formed to control the main cities, and the hours in which alcohol could be sold were restricted. The

³ Source: LAPOP, 2006.

measures received widespread support and the homicide rate fell after their implementation.

In his inaugural speech on August 16, 2004, President Fernández announced his plan to build a metro in the city of Santo Domingo. The proposal divided the population and public opinion makers. In the face of such controversy, the government waited for an opportune moment to begin this costly project. In his second year in office, Fernández took advantage of rising oil prices to begin construction, using the argument that it would save fuel. The metro is the government's principal public investment project, through which it hopes to satisfy the capital accumulation needs of the construction industry, an historically strong sector in the country and a key source of support for those in power.

Since the end of 2005, the preparations for the congressional and municipal elections of May 2006 have dominated the politico-electoral field. The PRSC discussed the possibility of an electoral alliance with the PRD and the PLD. But the crass pragmatism shown by PRSC leaders in their negotiations with both parties gave a bad flavor to the alliance efforts. Such agreements were perceived as an effort to obtain personal benefits from specific candidates. In the end, the PRSC established an electoral alliance with the PRD, known as the *Alianza Rosada* (Pink Alliance).

The PRD objective in this alliance was to retain an important share of congressional seats given the possibility that the PLD might obtain a majority. The PRSC, in turn, sought to increase its small share of congressional and municipal representation. Despite the optimism of the leadership of each of these parties, it was evident that the alliance would generate discontent among aspiring candidates because the number of seats available for both parties would be reduced by half. Rapidly, various candidates from these parties broke ranks to join the PLD.

The 2006 congressional and municipal elections constituted an important political test for the PLD. At play was its capacity to demonstrate local political vitality. PLD candidates triumphed, greatly helped by a president with high approval ratings and an environment of economic stability (which does not mean prosperity for most people). The PLD obtained a majority in both chambers of Congress and significantly increased their presence in municipal governments. Between the 2002-2006 and the 2006-2010 periods, it went from only 3% (one senator) to 69% of senate seats; from 28% to 54% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies; and from 6% to 44% of mayorships.

Public Opinion Surveys

In the last 15 years, the Dominican Republic went from being a country in which very few public opinion surveys were conducted, to one in which such surveys are constantly being conducted. The principal newspapers have arrangements with companies that sporadically conduct them for dissemination in the news. But the only systematically conducted public opinion surveys carried out for more than a decade, and available for researchers to analyze, are the DEMOS surveys of political culture. These provide a great

deal of information about how the population perceives public institutions and other topics. Four DEMOS surveys have been conducted: in 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2004. In this report we use some data from these surveys to demonstrate tendencies over the last 12 years for questions comparable to those of the 2006 LAPOP survey.

The DEMOS surveys show that, since 1994, support for democracy as the best kind of government has been strong and stable in the Dominican Republic; this is true even in the 2004 DEMOS survey, conducted in the middle of an economic and institutional crisis. But along with support for democracy, the Dominican population has evaluated their government, institutions, political parties, and the way democracy works with clear disapproval.⁴ This shows that, even if the public has maintained its preference for democracy, there exist important doubts about how their institutions operate.

In any case, despite the discontent, the levels of electoral participation in the Dominican Republic have been high. Additionally, a large percentage of the population (60% in 2006) said it supported one of the political parties. Such party ties and the high level of voter turnout have injected a good deal of dynamism into Dominican politics and have given people the hope that they can improve their living situation by changing the government. While such political loyalties and the relative stability of the party system exist, the Dominican political system should be able to withstand sporadic crises, including severe ones like that of 2003-2004. The situation would be otherwise if these conditions were to disappear.

The DEMOS surveys have provided data for various academic studies. One of them analyzed the trust that the Dominican population has in the country's public institutions (Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006). In this article, the authors demonstrate that the most important explanatory factors for trust in public institutions are the effectiveness or the performance of the acting administration, both in terms of the public services offered and the prevailing economic climate. Therefore, favorable opinions regarding how well the economy is doing and the provision of services are very important for the maintenance of institutional stability. This work also shows that the middle class has less institutional trust than the poor and the rich, and that older people have more institutional trust than young ones.

Espinal, and Kelly (2006) do not find any relation between civic participation and trust in political institutions. This part of their analysis of the DEMOS surveys contradicts an earlier study by Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis (2000) in which civic participation and institutional trust in the Dominican Republic was analyzed based on a survey of participants in civic programs financed by the United States Agency for International

⁴ For accumulated data from the surveys conducted in 1994, 1997, and 2001, see Isis Duarte and Ramonina Brea, *¿Hacia dónde va la democracia dominicana? 1994-2001*. PUCMM, Santo Domingo, 2002. For the 2004 survey, see Ramonina Brea, Isis Duarte, and Mitchell Seligson, *La Democracia Vulnerable: Insatisfacción y Desconfianza (1994-2004)*. PUCMM, Santo Domingo, 2005.

Development (USAID). The Finkel, Sabatini, and Bevis analysis supports the hypothesis that participation in civic organizations reduces trust in political institutions. Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly, however, do not find this negative relation between civic participation and institutional trust in the data from the DEMOS surveys.

Another important topic, addressed with data from the DEMOS surveys, is the role of women in politics, society, and the family. Espinal, Hartlyn, and Morgan Kelly (2005, 2006) found that the ideology favoring gender equality has strengthened since the first DEMOS survey in 1994, achieving its highest level in 2001, falling some in 2004, especially among men, and finally rising again in the 2006 LAPOP survey. Regarding women's participation in politics, statistical analyses show that women and people with more education have more egalitarian attitudes than men and people with less schooling. It was also found that political party militants (especially men) are more susceptible to be influenced by the rhetoric of party elites regarding the role of women in politics. This is a possible the reason why, in 2004, when important political leaders employed male-chauvinist language, support for women's participation in politics declined significantly, according to the DEMOS survey data for that year.

Besides the four DEMOS surveys, a simple survey financed by USAID on participants in its civic programs was also conducted. Additionally, the *Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales* (CIES; Center for Social Studies and Investigations) of the Universidad Iberoamericana (UNIBE) has carried out various socio-political surveys. Starting in 2004, *Latinobarómetro* included the Dominican Republic in its project of regional surveys, and further empirical data comes from the "Democracy in Latin America" project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Of all these surveys, DEMOS and LAPOP are the most similar and together they cover a period of 12 years, thus helping to better understand the characteristics and changes of Dominican public opinion about important political topics like democracy, political and social institutions, corruption, tolerance, migration, and the participation of women in politics.

Chapter II The Data and Methodology

In systematic public opinion studies, it is important to use rigorous and carefully designed methodology. In this chapter we explain the methodology of the 2006 LAPOP survey and present a basic analysis of the sample's characteristics.

The Methodology of the 2006 LAPOP Survey in the Dominican Republic

The principal goal of this study is to understand the democratic values and political attitudes of the Dominican people. With these aim in mind, the design included a representative sample of the population at the national level, including people from all regions of the country, from urban and rural areas, women and men, the employed and unemployed, people of different educational levels, of different degrees of wealth, and people who are and are not politically and civically active. The design of the sample and the manner in which the data is collected are important in order to incorporate people representative of the entire population.

To include people of limited economic means, the interviews were done face-to-face and not by telephone. This method ensures that people without telephone service in their homes would have the same opportunity to participate as people who do have telephones.

To include people who were busy during working hours, interviewers visited the selected homes at various hours of the day and night. They also made weekend visits to catch participants at home.

To ensure that the rights of all participants would be protected, and to create a comfortable and safe atmosphere, everyone who participated in the survey received a series of guarantees regarding their rights. They all had the opportunity to refuse to participate in the survey, but most accepted. In general, respondents were receptive to being interviewed. Additionally, all the participants received guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity. The informed consent document appears in Annex B.

Another important methodological aspect has to do with the quality of the data-collection and data-processing. The survey was organized at a meeting in May 2006 in Heredia, Costa Rica in which the teams from participating countries in the *Barómetro de las Américas, 2006* were present. Dr. Jana Morgan represented the team from the Dominican Republic at this meeting. Also present were two representatives from Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. The survey was revised and improved on the basis of several test runs directed by Dominique Zephyr, LAPOP's Caribbean region Director, who also took charge of training the interviewers.

The sample of the 2006 LAPOP survey for the Dominican Republic was designed by Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. in consultation with Dr. Polibio Córdoba of CEDATOS Gallup Internacional in Ecuador, a recognized expert on survey samples, and

under the general direction of LAPOP's Director, Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, of Vanderbilt University. Both of them were in Santo Domingo to finalize the sample.

The field work was carried out by Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. To conduct the interviews, five teams of four interviewers and one supervisor, for a total of 25 persons, were employed. The supervisors had extensive experience and technical capacity, and were carefully selected and trained by Gallup. The field work was carried out over a period of 22 days, from June 1 to June 22, 2006. All interviews were supervised and 30% of the respondents were interviewed again by the supervisors. The interviews were conducted using personal digital assistants (PDAs) to ensure accurate and precise data collection, processing and codification. Because oversight of the data collection and processing is ensured, we find the process to be reliable.

It is common in public opinion surveys for there to be rejections and empty homes. In the case of the 2006 LAPOP survey, the percentage of people who declined to participate was 0.9% (23 people). Additionally, 7.8% of possible informants were absent or unavailable to participate, and 16.2% did not qualify because they did not satisfy interviewers' quotas, either because they were outside the age range or were incapacitated. In addition, 14.6% of the houses chosen for the survey were closed, unoccupied, destroyed, not located, or being used for a business.

The Sample⁵

The 2006 LAPOP survey in the Dominican Republic used a multi-stage probability sample. The object population of the sample are all Dominicans that are not members of the military or institutionalized, are at least 18 years old, reside in rural and urban areas, and are of sound body and mind and are not in trouble with the law. The sample population neither includes Dominican citizens residing in other countries nor those that are institutionalized.⁶ People were interviewed in 225 municipalities, 31 provinces, and the National District. Therefore, it is a national sample representative of all Dominicans with the right to vote – not only those registered to vote but all people allowed to vote.

The sample was based on census maps and urban and rural household listings obtained from the 2002 *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda* (National Population and Housing Census). It is a multi-stage, stratified area, cluster, probability sample up to the selection of the household. Since the sample has a probabilistic design, all citizens had the same chance of being selected. To cover all the geographic areas of the country, the sample was stratified into four regions: the Santo Domingo metropolitan area, North, East, and South. Without stratification, the random selection would mean that any one of these areas might have ended up with only a few interviews.

⁵ See Annex A.

⁶ It does not include people interned in hospitals, mental institutions, or jails.

It is important to take into account that cities, towns, and communities have different sizes. This factor was also taken into account to ensure the selection of people representative of all these urban and rural types of settlement. Therefore, after setting up the four-region stratification, these regions were divided between urban and rural areas, using the criteria established by the *Oficina Nacional de Estadística* (ONE; National Statistics Office) in the 2002 *Censo Nacional de Población y Familia* (National Population and Family Census). The metropolitan region is considered entirely urban while the other three regions have both rural and urban components.

At the first level of the stratification process, we decided on the number of municipalities (the PSUs or Primary Sample Units) that needed to be selected in each region. After choosing the municipalities by region in proportion to their population, the municipalities were divided into urban and rural areas to give them the chance of being selected as Census Supervision Areas (the SSUs – Secondary Sampling Units).

To give an analogy, this stratification process is like a raffle in which seven different ticket-holding receptacles are used: one receptacle for the metropolitan region and two receptacles for each one of the three other regions, one for the rural area and the other for the urban area within each region. This way of stratifying the sample prevents the respondents from mostly residing in the largest cities or in only one region, like the metropolitan one. Because we stratified by region and by area (urban and rural), the sample is better able to ensure a representative selection of people in each region and from the two areas.

After the stratification process, we chose specific households within each selected municipality. These households are the final units of observation. To select households, we formed residential clusters from which 6 to 8 homes in urban areas, and 10 to 12 homes in rural ones, were selected. Once the household was selected, the interviewer chose the specific respondent in each home to participate in the survey according the gender and age quotas that each had been assigned. For more details regarding the sample, see Annex A: Sample Design.

The final size of the national sample is 1,519 people, divided among the 4 regions or strata: Metropolitan, North, East, and South. Five hundred eleven people were interviewed in the metropolitan district (33.6% of the total sample), 500 in the north (32.9%), 221 in the east (14.5%), and 287 in the south (18.9%).

A national sample of some 1,500 people has a probable sampling error of $\pm 2.5\%$ with a 95% level of confidence. This means that 95% of the times the true value of a response will be within $\pm 2.5\%$ of the estimate produced by this sample. This is the error for the worst case in which responses to a question are equally divided, 50:50, and it is difficult to judge which response is preferred. With a sample of this size, the survey represents citizens' views, with an error no larger than $\pm 2.5\%$ (95% of the time) in the worst case scenario, as accurately as if 100% of citizens residing in the Dominican Republic had been interviewed. The situation improves when the responses are not so equally divided.

For example, when the responses are divided 10:90, the error is only $\pm 1.5\%$ with a confidence level of 95%.

If it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” in each strata of the study, the above-noted estimates of the sample’s accuracy could be maintained. However, such a process would significantly raise the costs of conducting interviews. The alternative is to use the method of “cluster sampling” indicated above, which considerably lowers the transportation costs for nearly all interviews. The clusters are groups of interviews in relatively small areas like blocks or rows of houses where a series of people are interviewed in different households. This system significantly reduces expenses, although it normally raises the error of the sample and consequently lowers the degree of reliability. Since this sample has a multi-stage cluster design, we need to take into account its effects when we calculate the real error.

According to the calculations carried out by Gallup República Dominicana, S.A., the sampling error at the national level, considering the average design effect (1.8) is 3.40%. That is, in the worst case scenario when responses are equally divided (50:50), the true responses of the national population will be (95% of the time) within $\pm 3.4\%$ of the responses given by the people interviewed in the sample. We can see that the decision to save money by using a stratified cluster sample, instead of a random sample, only costs the study a bit of precision and does not imply much loss. To understand the effects of this cluster design in greater detail, see Annex C: Design Effect.

Within each region of the country, the size of the sample is obviously smaller and proportional to the region’s size with respect to the total population. Therefore, the sampling errors for individual regions are larger than that for the entire country. The metropolitan region produces a sampling error of $\pm 5.8\%$, and the northern region one of $\pm 5.41\%$. In the eastern and southern regions, the sampling errors are ± 8.47 and ± 7.43 respectively.

For reasons that have to do with the evaluation of USAID programs, we also interviewed 1,000 additional people in the metropolitan district to obtain an error for this sub-sample identical to the error of the national sample. However, in this study, with the exception of the specific places that are noted, we only use the national sample of 1,519 to be able to compare the analysis with earlier surveys and with those carried out by LAPOP in 2006 in other countries.

Characteristics of the Sample

We begin the presentation of the data with a general overview of the characteristics of the sample and a comparison between the 2004 and 2006 samples. The results of the 2004 DEMOS survey are based on a weighted sample to correctly reflect the distribution of the population. There was no need to weight the 2006 sample since it was designed to automatically reflect the distribution of the Dominican population.

Figure II-1 shows that the distribution of the 2004 and 2006 samples are more or less the same. In both years there is a small difference, with more women participating than men. This difference is slightly larger than the difference in the Dominican population. According to the 2002 *Censo de Población y Vivienda*, 50.2% of people in the Dominican Republic are women.

Figure II-1. Distribution of the Samples by Sex




Figure II-2. Distribution of the Samples by Age

In the distribution of the age ranges in 2004 and 2006 that appear in Figure II-2, it can be seen that most of respondents are young. This should not be a surprising since the Dominican population is also young: the majority of people are under the age of 35. In 2004 and 2006, the age distributions are almost the same.




Figure II-3. Distribution of the Samples by Region

In terms of the distribution by region, we can see in Figure II-3 that the 2004 and 2006 samples are very similar. The only difference is that there is less representation from the northern region and more from the eastern region in the 2006 sample. But the differences between the samples are not statistically significant. Because we use a stratified design, it is not surprising that the sample distribution reflects the actual regional distribution of Dominicans. For example, the 2002 *Censo de Población y Viviendas* indicates that 32% of the population lives in the National District; this is the same percentage of the 2004 sample and a little less than that of the 2006 sample, with 33.5%.

Figure II-4 presents a summary of the sample distributions by level of education. It can be seen that, in 2006, half of the sample had attended secondary school or university, a small increase over 2004.⁷ According to the 2002 *Censo de Población y Vivienda*, only

⁷ The measure of education changed between the 2004 and 2006 surveys. It could be that part of this growth is due to this change.

37% of the Dominican population has attended secondary school or university. It can be seen, therefore, that the survey produces a sample with an educational level above the national norm. Part of the discrepancy is that the national census includes children while the surveys only take into account people at least 18 years old. Since the population of the Dominican Republic is mostly young, the proportion of the population under the age of 18 is high. The survey includes people 18 years old or greater, of which a large proportion have had the opportunity to complete their secondary or university education. For this reason, the average educational level of the census is less than that of the survey.




Figure II-4. Distribution of the Samples by Educational Level




Figure II-5. Distribution of the Samples by Monthly Income

Figure II-5 shows the distribution of the samples by family monthly income. In line with the Dominican Republic’s economic growth between 2004 and 2006, respondents’ family monthly income improved over the last two years, although still five% of sample participants stated that they had no source of income in 2006.

The Complete Sample of All the Countries Included in LAPOP 2006.

This report makes use of the surveys carried out by LAPOP in other Latin American countries in 2004 and 2006. In some chapters there are figures that show survey results from the other countries. It should be made clear that, in all cases where we use comparative data, the sample is weighted according to the size of the sample in each country. This weighting is used because the samples in some countries are larger than in others, and because the Ecuadorian and Bolivian national samples are also weighted (see the Ecuador and Bolivia reports for a full discussion of weighted national samples). Therefore, in Bolivia and Ecuador the samples were around 3,000 cases, while in the other countries the national samples were more or less half that number (approximately 1,500 cases). The complete weighted sample produces a database for each country of

1,500 cases. The weighting does not affect the results of the comparative averages presented in the reports. But it should be emphasized that the weighting does affect the size of the error bars. In almost every country, the weighted sample is at least a little smaller than the actual sample. For this reason, the error bars (or confidence intervals) are greater in the weighted sample than in the national sample. In most countries, with the exception of Ecuador and Bolivia, the difference in the confidence intervals between the weighted sample and the actual sample is minimum. As a result, the confidence intervals of the regional figures, in the complete regional sample, are conservatively estimated.

Chapter III Conceptions of Democracy

The definition of the term “democracy” constitutes an important topic in political debates. What is and is not a democracy divides analysts, politicians, and the public in general. The predominate notion of democracy in the liberal tradition emphasizes the procedures to elect a government, the balance of powers within the state, and a system of individual rights and freedoms. Counterposed to this vision is that which emphasizes social rights, whether as a crucial component of political procedures or just by themselves.

Latin America is not exempt from this debate, especially because democracy, in both senses of the term, has been sorely lacking in the region. Establishing democratic procedures of governance and guaranteeing civil liberties has been a big challenge, giving rise to large political struggles with limited gains. But even more difficult has been the establishment of democratic systems with the capacity to attend the economic needs of the population and address the serious problems associated with profound social inequality.

There are two theoretical perspectives that have guided political studies of democratization in Latin America. One emphasizes the political aspects and the role of strategic actors in the rise and maintenance of democracy. This focus goes back to Linz’s (1978) analysis of the collapse of democratic regimes, where he argues that even if structural factors provide opportunities or constraints, political actors are key and ultimately responsible for deciding to either strengthen or undermine democracy. Linz suggests that although the people do not always unconditionally support democracy – that is, despite its effects on well-being – it neither solidifies nor collapses simply because of the existing economic system. One conclusion that emerges from these suggestions is that democratic regimes are capable of surviving even in adverse structural conditions, so long as the principal political actors take adequate decisions to sustain them. For this to occur, efficient and effective leadership is required.

These ideas, initially applied to study the collapse of democratic regimes, were incorporated by authors like O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) in their analysis of the transition from authoritarian regimes in Latin America during the 1980s. For them, the Latin American transitions, in adverse economic conditions, depended on the decision of key political actors to oppose the authoritarian regimes. During the transition, the political options widened in an optimistic atmosphere. Thus, while Linz emphasized the role of strategic decisions by important political actors to prevent the collapse of democratic systems, O’Donnell and Schmitter suggested that these actors were important in creating the possibilities for the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America.

The structural focus, by contrast, centers its analysis on the organization and characteristics of the economy and class relations. Supporters of this perspective believe that the context constrains political decisions and democratic consolidation. From this perspective, it is possible to identify at least two axes of analysis of Latin American

politics. One calls attention to the need to establish democratic systems that, in the context of a capitalist economy, better attend the needs of most Latin Americans (Karl 1990). The other assumes that it is impossible to establish and maintain democracies in the context of the structural dependence and inequalities of Latin American economies (Petras 1986). This latter perspective lost force, following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, until the end of the 1990s when the rise of leaders like Hugo Chávez, with populist projects resoundingly critical of capitalism, revitalized it.

Between academic debates and concrete problems, Latin America has made some important advances in the process of democratization over the last three decades. Wide segments of the population have opted to support democracies and the political rights they entail even though they still lack adequate social protection. But the ideas about and commitment to democracy vary between countries; and in some, successive economic crises and poor government management have provoked social tensions and the collapse of political party systems, with the consequent rise of personalist and populist leaders who advocate for social and plebiscite democracy outside the procedures and freedoms of liberal democracy (Morgan 2007). Thus, the old dilemma of what is democracy and who does it serve prevails in the region.

In public opinion surveys, it has been difficult to adequately capture what the concept of “democracy” means to the public. The term can have different meanings for respondents, making it hard to measure (Bratton 2002: 6; Schedler and Sarsfield 2004). Furthermore, studies of democracy and public opinion show that the public’s understanding can differ greatly from the conventional meanings in political theory. Nonetheless, it is worth trying to understand what the public understands by democracy in order to be able to infer how willing people are to support democratization processes, especially during difficult times.

To achieve this objective, the LAPOP survey included an open-ended question to capture the principal meanings that first come to mind when respondents hear the term. Question DEM13 of the questionnaire states: In a few words, what does democracy mean for you? Up to three possible meanings were accepted. If more than one was given, the respondent was asked to identify the most important. In order to create a simple variable, the statistical analysis focused on the meaning indicated as most important.

The different responses were grouped into four categories, each corresponding to a different conception of democracy: **instrumental-utilitarian**, **normative-axiomatic**, **negative**, and **empty**.

The **instrumental-utilitarian** conception emphasizes the evaluation of the performance and benefits of democracy; for example, associating democracy with well-being, growth, economic progress, or greater opportunities. The **normative-axiomatic** conception includes aspects that are not tied to an immediate and personal benefit, such as free elections or freedom. The **negative** conception focuses on the problems identified with democracy; for example, disorder, crime, and corruption. Finally, the **empty** category is used to lump together all those responses that lacked any specific meaning of democracy.

The theoretical importance of this classification lies in the possibility that topics related to political legitimacy and tolerance could be strongly related to the conception of democracy that one has. It can be assumed that if political legitimacy and tolerance do not have a normative basis, then attitudes might be very fragile and ephemeral, especially in the face of the economic and political difficulties of democratic systems.

Conceptions of Democracy in the Dominican Republic




Figure III-1. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in the Dominican Republic

Figure III-1 shows the distribution of conceptions about democracy in the Dominican case. The normative meaning was indicated by 52.9% of respondents; 37.1% did not give any concrete meaning, 6.1% gave it a utilitarian meaning, and 4.0% a negative one.

Table III-1. The Five Most Common Responses to the Question: “What does democracy mean to you? Which meaning is the most important?”

Respuesta	Frecuencia	Porcentaje de la Muestra Total	Categoría de la Respuesta
No tiene ningún significado	508	33.5%	Vacío
Libertad de expresión	352	23.2%	Normativo
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	176	11.6%	Normativo
Libertad de movimiento	51	3.4%	Normativo
Bienestar, progreso económico	46	3.0%	Utilitario
Total de las cinco más comunes	1133	74.7%	

Table III-1 shows the three specific responses most mentioned: does not have a meaning (33.5%), freedom of expression (23.2%), and freedom in general (11.6%). Three of the most frequently given responses belong to the normative category, while one comes from empty category and the other the utilitarian one. No negative response was among the five most common.

Table III-2. The Most Common Response to Each Conception of Democracy

Concepción de la Democracia	Respuesta	Frecuencia	Porcentaje de las Respuestas en la Misma Categoría	Porcentaje de la Muestra Total
Normativo	Libertad de expresión	352	43.9%	23.2%
Vacío	No tiene ningún significado	508	90.4%	33.5%
Negativo	Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	17	28.3%	1.1%
Utilitario	Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	46	50.0%	3.0%

The most frequent responses in each of the four categories of democracy appear in Table III-2. Freedom of expression is the most common response within the normative category, while the most mentioned utilitarian response refers to the country's economic situation.

Factors that Explain the Conceptions of Democracy

The data in Figure III-2 shows that, in the normative category, there is a positive relation with wealth: the greater the wealth, the greater the tendency to assign a normative value. In fact, almost 100% of the people in the highest wealth category have a normative conception of democracy. By contrast, there is a negative relation between wealth and the lack of meaning: the lesser the wealth, the greater the tendency to assign democracy an “empty” meaning. There is a slight relation between negative conceptions and greater poverty – it is more common to come across a poor person with a negative conception of democracy than someone from the middle or upper classes.




Figure III-2. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Personal Wealth

Figure III-3 more or less reflects the same tendencies with respect to education. People with higher levels of education tend to hold normative conceptions, while people without formal education tend toward empty conceptions. In the group of people with secondary education, more view democracy in a normative manner. In fact, the majority of people who attended secondary school hold normative conceptions. This indicates that increasing the educational level of Dominican youth, so they attend secondary school, could serve to improve the conceptions that the public has about democracy.




Figure III-3. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Educational Level

Figure III-4 shows that, in the middle-range age groups, normative conceptions prevail and conceptions empty of meaning are less represented. The negative and utilitarian conceptions increase some with age: older people are more likely to hold these conceptions than young ones.




Figure III-4. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Age Group

Figure III-5 shows differences by sex. More men than women express normative conceptions of democracy, and more women than men have conceptions empty of meaning. The negative and utilitarian conceptions are more or less equal in both.




Figure III-5. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Sex

Logistic Regression of the Conceptions of Democracy

To distinguish between the different effects of the various sociodemographic variables, we ran a logistic regression that included all the above mentioned factors as independent variables, as well as some others. The predictors of the model are: sex, age, education, wealth, urban versus rural residence, and size of the city in which the respondent lives.

We present the results of this regression in Table III-3. We used the category of normative conceptions as the reference category throughout the analysis. In other words, all the coefficients are interpreted with reference to people who hold normative conceptions of democracy.

Table III-3. Factors that Explain the Alternative Conceptions of Democracy: Results of a Logistic Regression

		B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Negativo	Intersección	.029	.840	.001	.972	
	Mujer	.033	.274	.014	.904	1.033
	Edad	.003	.009	.087	.768	1.003
	Educación	-.072	.039	3.463	.063	.930
	Riqueza	-.406	.087	21.640	.000	.666
	Urbano	-.824	.481	2.929	.087	.439
	Tamaño	.078	.131	.352	.553	1.081
Vacio	Intersección	2.038	.385	28.056	.000	
	Mujer	.792	.123	41.628	.000	2.208
	Edad	-.037	.004	68.564	.000	.964
	Educación	-.186	.018	108.647	.000	.830
	Riqueza	-.169	.039	19.126	.000	.844
	Urbano	-.247	.224	1.224	.269	.781
	Tamaño	.034	.062	.307	.579	1.035
Utilitario	Intersección	-1.672	.699	5.723	.017	
	Mujer	.396	.223	3.158	.076	1.486
	Edad	.003	.007	.145	.704	1.003
	Educación	-.069	.029	5.590	.018	.933
	Riqueza	-.144	.071	4.149	.042	.866
	Urbano	-.187	.402	.216	.642	.829
	Tamaño	.052	.113	.210	.647	1.053
Nagelkerke (Pseudo R cuadrado) = .22						
a La categoría de referencia es Normativo.						

The logistic regression tells us that the only significant difference between people with negative conceptions of democracy and people with normative conceptions is their level of wealth: people with negative conceptions are significantly less wealthy than people with normative conceptions. In the case of utilitarian conceptions, people with such views have educational levels significantly lower than people with normative conceptions.

The bivariable analysis shows that the most important differences appear between the normative and empty conceptions. All the independent variables, with the exception of urban versus rural residence and city size, show significant differences between the empty and normative conceptions. Women have significantly greater negative conceptions than men. Additionally, age, education, and personal wealth each have a negative relation with empty conceptions. That is, people with normative conceptions are significantly older, have had more schooling, and are richer than people who hold empty conceptions.




Figure III-6. Percentage of Dominicans Who Think that Democracy Is Preferable to Any Other Form of Government

In general, the Dominican data suggests that the vast majority of the population either has a normative conception of democracy or has no specific notion. Few have a negative or utilitarian conception. This could be the reason why, despite the socioeconomic and institutional problems in Dominican society, democracy has been maintained for almost three decades without interruption. Additionally, the series of Dominican surveys that measure support for the democratic system (DEMOS 1997-2004 and LAPOP 2006) show that a high percentage of the population consistently believes that democracy is preferable to any other form of government: 76% in 1997, 79% in 2001, 74% in 2004, and 74% in 2006 (Figure III-6). This indicator suggests that, politically, the public prefers democratic stability.

Conceptions of Democracy: the Dominican Republic in Comparative Perspective

In Figure III-7, we can see the Dominican Republic's position in relation to the other Latin American countries that are part of the 2006 LAPOP survey project. In the regional context, the level of normative conceptions of democracy in the Dominican Republic is low (52.9%). Only Panama and El Salvador have lower normative conception levels, while Chile shows normative conceptions of 76.2%. Additionally, many Dominicans

have an empty conception of democracy; in this category, the country is located in second place, after El Salvador. The levels of utilitarian conceptions, those that have to do with the performance of the government or regime, are located in the middle of the group of countries: four have higher percentages of the population with utilitarian conceptions and seven have lower percentages. Only 4.0% of Dominicans have negative conceptions.




Figure III-7. Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in Latin America

Although the Dominican Republic’s ranking, with respect to normative conceptions of democracy, is low, there is no rejection or strong negative conception of democracy. On the contrary, the problem is that so many people do not know what democracy means. This suggests that greater civic education is needed for the public to develop a concrete idea of what democracy is, to identify when it exists or when it does not, and to be able to support it with knowledge and conscience.

As shown in the analysis of Dominican conceptions of democracy, education has a positive relation with normative conceptions and a negative relation with empty

conceptions. The same relations appear in the analysis in terms of personal wealth. This indicates that promoting education and more equitable economic growth can increase the proportion of the population supporting normative ideas of democracy, which, in turn, can improve and consolidate the country's democratic regime.

Chapter IV Tolerance and Support for the Political System

The level of political and social tolerance is a good indicator of the level of the public's normative commitment to democracy. In turn, support for the institutional system is a sign of the public's identification with the political system and can provide insight into the system's stability. Without institutional support and tolerance, democratic regimes are more vulnerable.

This chapter address the topic of political tolerance, social tolerance, and support for the political system, all factors that critically influence the consolidation of a stable democracy. In the first section, we analyze political tolerance as a dependent variable that we explain through sociodemographic factors such as age, degree of education, and sex. We use a political tolerance index to measure Dominicans' acceptance of the rights of people who constantly criticize and disagree with the country's form of government. Then we present data on the factors that influence political tolerance, both through descriptive statistics as well as a linear regression model. Next we address the topic of social tolerance, which we measure through a single question: the level of acceptance of homosexuals' rights. Finally, we show the empirical relation between tolerance and support for the political system. From this, we devise a typology to indicate the type of democracy that exists.

Political Tolerance in the Dominican Republic

One of the challenges of the social sciences is to adequately measure political and social tolerance. Some scholars have formulated very general questions like, "Do you believe in free speech?" But the widely favorable responses to such questions contradict peoples' actual attitudes and practices. Others have concentrated on the degree of support for specific groups, but generally respondents refuse to identify these groups. A third method consists of asking questions about people who are victims of intolerance in the society, but this depends on the risk that the public believes these people face.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) uses a more general modality to measure political tolerance, with particular emphasis on the possibility of making comparisons through time and between countries. The series includes four questions regarding democracy. The questions asked in the survey, based on a general formulation, are the following:

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en la República Dominicana. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos donde uno significa desaprueba firmemente y diez aprueba firmemente.

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no solo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]*

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba UD. que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?




Figure IV-1. Political Tolerance: Support for the Rights of Those Who Criticize the System

With these four components (the right to vote, protest, run for office, and give speeches), we constructed a political tolerance scale with a range of 0-to-100 points. These questions have the advantage of allowing cross-country comparisons as well as making comparisons among respondents within the country.

In Figure IV-1, we present the average tolerance level in the four components of the scale, each one of them also on a scale from 0-to-100. Higher values signify greater tolerance. In the Dominican Republic, we find that the average in the four variables surpasses 50 points, and in two of them, 60 points. The levels of tolerance toward the right to vote and protest are significantly higher than the tolerance to run for office or give speeches. In the rest of this section of the chapter, we analyze the scale constructed with these four questions.




Figure IV-2. Political Tolerance: Support for the Rights of Those who Criticize the System, by Country

In Figure IV-2, we can see that the level of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic is one of the highest among the participating countries in the 2006 LAPOP surveys. Only Jamaica, Haiti, and Costa Rica showed greater support for the rights of those who

criticize the political system. In the Dominican Republic, the value on a scale of 0-to-100 is 58.9; in Jamaica and Costa Rica, it is 62.2 and 72.7 respectively.

In terms of the differences in political tolerance between various groups of the Dominican population, men tend to show more political tolerance than women, as has been demonstrated in other studies (Golebiowska 1999). In Figure IV-3, we can see this sex-effect in the Dominican Republic: men appear to have significantly greater political tolerance than women.




Figure IV-3. Political Tolerance by Sex

Tolerance increases significantly with education, especially among those people with a university education (Figure IV-4). Many studies of political tolerance have found a positive relation between years of education and tolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). It is argued that educational systems normally teach respect for others, so that more education produces greater tolerance. The Dominican education system appears to have the same effect that has been observed in many other countries, including those of the LAPOP survey. The average level on the political tolerance scale for respondents with a university education is 15 points higher than the average of people without any formal education. In fact, there does not appear to be an important difference between the first three education levels; only attending the university has the effect of significantly increasing political tolerance. In general, however, more educated people are more tolerant than people with less education.




Figure IV-4. Political Tolerance by Education

To end the analysis of political tolerance, we designed a linear regression model that includes all the sociodemographic variables mentioned above, such as geographic location, civil state, ethnic identification, and the measure of support for the political system developed later in this chapter. The measure of support for the system is a scale, from 0-to-100, comprised of five questions regarding general trust in the Dominican political system. In the regression analysis, the measures of education and age use the number of years instead of the group ranges presented in the figures. Personal wealth is measured on a scale of 0-to-9 based on the number of durable consumer goods found in the respondent's home.

Table IV-1. Factors that Explain Political Tolerance: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Constante	38.046	4.125		9.223	.000
Educación	1.233	.202	.184	6.103	.000
Apoyo al sistema	.082	.038	.057	2.184	.029
Edad	2.088	.577	.100	3.619	.000
Mujer	-5.528	1.645	-.087	-3.360	.001
Riqueza	.480	.523	.027	.918	.359
Urbano	2.323	1.859	.033	1.249	.212
Casado/Unido	.395	1.700	.006	.232	.816
Blanco^a	-2.778	2.531	-.030	-1.097	.273
Negro^a	3.831	2.224	.046	1.722	.085
Mulato^a	-.296	2.440	-.003	-.121	.904
R Cuadrado Adj. = .04					
^a Categoría de Referencia: Indio					

Table IV-1 shows the linear regression identifying the explanatory factors of political tolerance in the country. As can be seen, education is a statistically significant factor: a greater degree of education makes people more tolerant. Another significant factor is the index of support for the system: greater support for the country's political and democratic system promotes tolerant attitudes. Older people also show more political tolerance than the young, a relation that is statistically significant. Finally, sex has a meaningful effect on political tolerance: men appear more tolerant than women. The negative value of the coefficient in the regression of this variable means that men are more tolerant than women. Factors such as wealth, civil state, and ethnic identification have no significant effect on political tolerance.

Social Tolerance

The adoption of egalitarian values in attitudes and public policies has been a central theme in the construction of democracies. Social tolerance has to do with respect for other peoples' decisions and lifestyles.

From different theoretical perspectives it has been suggested that greater levels of industrialization and urbanization produce important cultural transformations like secularization, the expansion of citizens' rights, and tolerance for social diversity. There is no clear understanding, however, of the causality of these changes or the speed at which they occur. But political democracy, whether seen as a cause or effect of these socioeconomic transformations, is considered to be important in the construction of a citizenry with more egalitarian and tolerant attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

We included a question in the LAPOP questionnaire that measures people's attitudes toward the right of homosexuals to run for public office. In the Dominican Republic, we also asked about the right of homosexuals to organize themselves to defend their rights. The questions are the following:

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos?

DOMD5A ¿Con que firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que los homosexuales puedan organizarse para defender sus derechos?




Figure IV-5. Social Tolerance Measured by Support for the Rights of Homosexuals

Figure IV-5 shows the average level of support for homosexuals to run for public office is 24.6 on a scale of 0-to-100. There is greater acceptance regarding the question of whether or not homosexuals can organize themselves to defend their rights, with an average level of support for this right of 48.8 on the same scale.⁸

⁸ In the DEMOS surveys from 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2004, an advance was shown in the level of tolerance toward the idea that homosexuals can run for public office. But this advance disappears in the 2006 LAPOP survey. It is possible that by using a scale to register responses in the LAPOP survey, the level of support fell, though more for methodological reasons than an actual drop.




Figure IV-6. Social Tolerance Measured by Support for the Right of Homosexuals to Run for Public Office, by Sex

Regarding the right to run for office, which is the key question used to measure social tolerance in all the participating countries in the LAPOP study, there are no statistically significant differences between women and men, although women tend to be slightly more tolerant than men (Figure IV-6).




Figure IV-7. Social Tolerance by Education

Even more than with political tolerance, social tolerance significantly increases with education: more education means more social tolerance. In Figure IV-7, it can be seen that the difference between the average on the social tolerance scale of people without formal education and those who have a university education is 10.2 and 36.6 respectively.

To determine the contributing factors to social tolerance, we ran a linear regression analysis. The results are presented in Table IV-2. In the linear regression model, we find that only education, being a woman, or ethnically identifying oneself as black has a significant and positive effect on social tolerance. We do not find important effects for the variables of support for the system, age, wealth, geographic area, and civil state.

Table IV-2. Factors that Explain Social Tolerance: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Constante	1.96	.44		4.47	.00
Educación	.10	.02	.14	4.72	.00
Apoyo al sistema	.00	.00	.01	.48	.63
Edad	-.10	.06	-.05	-1.69	.09
Mujer	.39	.18	.06	2.24	.02
Riqueza	.09	.06	.05	1.55	.12
Urbano	.09	.20	.01	.44	.66
Casado/Unido	-.16	.18	-.02	-.90	.37
Blanco ^a	.19	.27	.02	.71	.48
Negro ^a	.54	.24	.06	2.28	.02
Mulato ^a	.30	.26	.03	1.17	.24
R Cuadrado Adj. = .04					
^a Categoría de Referencia: Indio					

Support for the Political System

The LAPOP studies pay particular attention to the theme of democratic stability in the construction of political legitimacy, or what is known as “support for the system.” The idea is that when political institutions are not respected, this creates dissatisfaction that can lead to the collapse of governments and even the democratic system.

There are advantages and disadvantages in supporting the political system. Extreme levels of support for the system, whether high or low, can be negative for a democracy. For example, it is unhealthy for citizens to unreservedly support the political system because they can lose their critical and oversight capacity. Alternatively, if they do not support the political system, this means that they have lost respect for public institutions, which could lead to political instability as has occurred in various Latin American countries in recent years. When citizens do not care much for the system, they do not worry about its possible collapse. Therefore, democracies need a balance between critique and support for the system.

The following questions were used to construct a scale with which to measure the level of support for the system that exists among Dominicans:

- B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*)
- B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?
- B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político dominicano?
- B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político de la República Dominicana?
- B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político dominicano?




Figure IV-8. Components of the Scale of Support for the System

In Figure IV-8, we find that compared to 2004, the year of a profound economic and institutional crisis in the Dominican Republic, the levels of support for the system in 2006 rose in all components used to construct the LAPOP scale. The growth was particularly important in the case of support for political institutions, the only one that surpasses 70 points on the scale. We also see that between 2004 and 2006 there was a rise of more than 20 points in the average of people who support the political system. The question with the lowest average has to do with protection of Dominican citizens' basic rights. Most people do not agree that the system adequately protects their basic rights.

Figure IV-9. Support for the System by Country

In Figure IV-9, we present the support-for-the-political-system average for all the countries included in the 2004 and 2006 LAPOP surveys. Dominicans show greater support for their political system compared to most other countries. In 2006, Mexico and Costa Rica are the only countries with greater support for their political system than the Dominican Republic.




Figure IV-10. Support for the Dominican System

In Figure IV-10, we see that, in line with the tendencies of the variables that comprise the scale, the average level of support for the Dominican political system significantly increased from 44.4 in 2004 to 57.0 in 2006 (on a scale of 0-to-100).




Figure IV-11. Support for the Dominican System by Personal Wealth

There is less support for the system among people with more economic resources, as can be seen in Figure IV-11.⁹ In the linear regression of support for the Dominican system, this negative relation between wealth and support for the system is statistically significant.

⁹ The number of respondents in category 9 on the individual wealth scale is very low, for which reason we joined categories 8 and 9 into a single group.




Figure IV-12. Support for the Dominican System by Educational Level

The impact of education on support for the system was insignificant in 2004; but in 2006, higher levels of education result in less support for the system. Figure IV-12 shows that, in 2006, respondents with a university education have an average of 52.4 on the scale of system support, while persons without any formal education have an average of 66.4, or 14 points more. It is possible that the reason people with more education show less support for the system in 2006 is that, in the wake of the economic and institutional crisis that affected the country in 2003-2004, they are more critical and distrustful. In any case, the level of support for the political system increased among all educational segments between 2004 and 2006. The rise in support among people without any formal education was from 47.5 to 65.4, and among people with a university education, from 43.5 to 52.4.




Figure IV-13. Support for the Dominican System by Party Identification

In Figure IV-13, we see differences in support for the Dominican political system among the supporters of various parties. People who support the PLD show a significantly higher level of support than supporters of the PRD or people who do not support any particular party.

To understand the relative importance of the various factors that contribute to support for the system, we present the results of a linear regression of this variable in Table IV-3. People with less education and fewer economic resources, as well as supporters of the governing PLD, support the system more.

Table IV-3. Factors that Explain Support for the Dominican System: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	t	Sig.
Constante	60.403	3.405		17.739	.000
Mujer	1.369	1.205	.030	1.135	.256
Edad	.051	.043	.035	1.195	.232
Educación	-1.907	.853	-.070	-2.236	.026
Riqueza individual	-1.342	.377	-.108	-3.558	.000
Urbano	.511	1.345	.010	.380	.704
PRD^a	-2.758	1.887	-.042	-1.462	.144
PLD^a	7.395	1.333	.162	5.548	.000
PRSC^a	1.652	3.035	.015	.544	.586
Simpatiza con otro partido^a	-.729	7.788	-.003	-.094	.925
R-cuadrado	.06				

^a Categoría de Referencia es No simpatiza con ningún partido político

Support for a Stable Democracy

This study departs from the belief that support for the system and tolerance are necessary to sustain democratic stability. In a democracy, it is vital that the people trust their political institutions and are willing to tolerate everyone’s civil rights, including those of minorities.

Table IV-4 indicates different possible combinations of support for the system in democratic societies. To create the typology, we took into account the level of institutional system support and the level of tolerance, dividing these variables between high and low levels.

Table IV-4. Theoretical Relation Between System Support and Tolerance in Institutionally Democratic Societies

Tolerancia		
Apoyo al sistema institucional	Alta	Baja
Alto	Democracia Estable	Estabilidad Autoritaria
Bajo	Democracia Inestable	Democracia en Riesgo

Stable democracies are those in which the majority of citizens show a high level of support for the institutional system and a high level of tolerance. The unstable ones are those in which there is a low level of support for the system and high tolerance. The stable systems are not necessarily democratic unless they guarantee the rights of all citizens; therefore, if support for the system is very high and tolerance low, the society can become authoritarian. A democracy-at-risk is that which shows a low level of support for the system and low tolerance.

Although it is not possible to predict the failure of a democratic system with only public opinion data – other factors also contribute, such as the role of elites, the position of the military and international actors – systems where the population neither supports the basic institutions nor the rights of minorities are the most vulnerable to a breakdown of democracy.

Table IV-5. Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System in the Dominican Republic

		Tolerancia	
		Alta	Baja
Apoyo al sistema institucional	Alto	Democracia Estable 38%	Estabilidad Autoritaria 23%
	Bajo	Democracia Inestable 23%	Democracia En Riesgo 16%

In the Dominican case, we see in Table IV-5 that the highest percentage, with 38%, is located in the stable democracy box. This reflects a high level of support for the system and a high level of tolerance. The box of authoritarian stability and unstable democracy are tied at 23% each, while the lowest percentage is found in the at-risk democracy box.

This data reflects the stability that the Dominican political system tends to have, since 61% express a high degree of support for the institutional system. Perhaps here lies one of the reasons why Dominican democracy, the first to be established in Latin American in the third wave of democratization that began in 1978, has not suffered serious crises of governability since then.




Figure IV-14. Attitudes that Favor a Stable Democracy by Country

Figure IV-14 shows the percentage of the population in all the participating countries in the 2006 LAPOP survey that have favorable attitudes for a stable democracy. That is, we see the percentage of the population in each country with high levels of tolerance and support for the system. Compared to the other countries, the Dominican Republic has a high level support for the system and a high level of political tolerance. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Dominican Republic is a country with a relatively high percentage in the attitudes that favor democracy, with 38% of Dominicans favoring a stable democracy. Costa Rica has the highest level, with almost 50%, and Mexico is in second place with 45%. Ecuador is the country with the lowest levels of attitudes that favor a stable democracy, with only 12% of the population.

In terms of age, in Figure IV-15 we see that older respondents show more support for a stable democracy than young ones: 45.6% of people over the age of 65 support a stable democracy, while only 34.1% of people between the ages of 26 and 35 do.




Figure IV-15. Support for a Stable Democracy by Age




Figure IV-16. Support for a Stable Democracy by Economic Evaluation of the Country

There is also a positive relation between support for a stable democracy and economic perceptions, as shown in Figure IV-16. Positive perceptions of the economy are related to greater support for a stable democracy. But the differences are not statistically significant, except among those people who believe that the country’s economy is very bad or mediocre. It is interesting to note that perceptions regarding the national economic situation have a statistically stronger relation to support for democracy than perceptions regarding one’s personal economic situation.

Logistic Regression of Support for a Stable Democracy

Table IV-6. Factors that Explain Support for a Stable Democracy: Results of a Logistic Regression

	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intersección	-.494	.390	1.600	.206	
Mujer	.036	.117	.094	.759	.965
Edad	.009	.004	4.793	.029	.991
Educación	.065	.083	.620	.431	.937
Urbano	.246	.131	3.501	.061	.782
Riqueza	-.007	.037	.037	.848	1.007
PRD	.336	.182	3.402	.065	.715
PLD	.175	.133	1.752	.186	.839
PRSC	.428	.290	2.184	.139	.652
OtroPID	.125	.742	.028	.866	.882
Situación económica personal	-.020	.072	.074	.785	1.020
Situación económica nacional	-.198	.068	8.441	.004	1.219
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-cuadrado	.03				

Table IV-6 shows that, in the Dominican Republic, no significant differences appear between respondents expressing high levels of support for the system and high levels of tolerance in terms of education, sex, wealth, urban or rural residence, or party sympathy. The only significant effects are for age and the evaluation of the national economic situation. Older people and those who evaluate the economy more favorably show more support for a stable democracy. It is interesting to note that respondents' party identification had no statistical effect on support for a stable democracy. That is, although identifying oneself with the governing party increased support for the Dominican political system, party identification per se has no impact on support for democracy.


Trust in Dominican Institutions

Mistrust in political institutions is widely recognized in the literature on democracy in Latin America and has been documented in diverse surveys carried out in the Dominican Republic. A study of trust in public institutions conducted with data from the 1994 to 2001 DEMOS surveys finds that trust in institutions is not homogenous or generalized, but instead is tied to citizens' perceptions of how well the government works (Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly). The evaluation of public services is the most influential explanatory factor of the degree of trust in institutions.

In general, the data from LAPOP 2006 shows an improvement in the evaluations of all the country's political institutions except the system of justice. But evaluations improve among people who evaluate the economy more positively and feel safer. We also find

that in 2006 that there was an improvement in the evaluation of public services compared to 2004 (Figure IV-17).

It is difficult to determine from the survey data whether there really was an improvement in available public services between 2004 and 2006. The 2004 DEMOS survey, conducted at the beginning of that year, was carried out in the context of an economic crisis and great discontent with the Hipólito Mejía government. The 2006 survey, by contrast, was carried out in June of that year in a political atmosphere of greater economic stability and approval of the Leonel Fernández administration. This differing political context could explain the difference in the evaluations rather than a real



improvement in services.

Figure IV-18. Evaluation of Dominican Democracy

Comparing the 12 years of surveys, in 2006 there is an important upturn in support for democracy, especially in the perception that democracy is beneficial and works (Figure IV-18). As in the case of the evaluation of services, the responses to these questions could be greatly influenced by the political context. When the 2004 DEMOS survey was conducted, the country found itself in a deep economic and institutional crisis, which explains the lower levels of approval regarding the operation and benefits of democracy. It should still be noted, however, that there had been a declining tendency since 1997. The 2006 upturn is particularly noteworthy because, in the evaluation of the operation and benefits of democracy, the rise surpassed the levels of all previous years.

On the other hand, the opinion that democracy is preferable to other forms of government remained stable in the last decade, above 70%, even despite the 2004 crisis. Nonetheless, a preference for order has also retained a consistent and important degree of support,

even if it means there might be less democracy. This data reflects the fact that, although Dominicans widely consider democracy to be the best system of government, there is also a desire for there be more order in the system.




Figure IV-19. Trust in Dominican Political Institutions

In Figure IV-19, we see the average trust in a series of political institutions. We use a scale of 1-to-7, with the higher values meaning more trust in the institution. There was an important increase in the trust in Dominican public institutions between 2004 and 2006. We see this increase particularly in terms of trust in the president, which was the lowest scoring institution in 2004 and the highest in the 2006 survey. There are also increases in the trust of the armed forces, Congress, and municipalities. The president, the national government, and the armed forces received the highest averages in the evaluations of trust.




Figure IV-20. Average Trust in the Judicial System (Scale Transformed to 0-to-100) by Country

We place the Dominican Republic in regional perspective in Figure IV-20, which ranks the countries of the study according to the level of trust in their judicial systems. In the Dominican case, the average value is 46.7 on a scale of 0-to-100 measuring trust in the system of justice (question D10A). This is a middle range value compared to the other countries in the study.




Figure IV-21. Trust in Other Dominican Institutions

In Figure IV-21, we present the level of trust in other Dominican institutions, using the same scale of 1-to-7 used in Figure IV-19. The figure shows that trust in political parties, which is generally low, rose. Trust in the Catholic Church and the mass media maintained relatively high levels, similar to those from 2004, though with a rise in trust in evangelical churches. All these changes are statistically significant.




Figure IV-22. Trust in Dominican Political Institutions

Figure IV-22 shows that, among public institutions in 2006, the president, the national government, the armed forces, and municipalities obtained the best evaluations.

With sex as independent variable, the average level of trust in the armed forces is higher among men than among women (Figure IV-23). In terms of the Catholic Church, the level of trust is slightly higher among women than men, while for evangelical churches, it is greater among men than women. In all these cases, the differences are statistically significant. There are no significant differences between men and women, however, in the average level of trust in other institutions.




Figure IV-23. Trust in the Armed Forces by Sex

In terms of educational level, there is a statistically significant relation between greater amounts of education and less trust in the following institutions: the system of justice, the armed forces, Congress, the national government, and the police. Figure IV-24 shows the relation between education and trust in the police. We see that people without formal education have an average level of trust in the police of 4.3, while those who have attended the university only have an average level of trust of 2.9. We find the same relation between educational levels and trust in the other mentioned institutions: the system of justice, the armed forces, Congress, and the national government.




Figure IV-24. Trust in the Police by Education

Populism

To end this chapter, we examine the survey data on the topic of populism. In Latin America, current and recent presidents have manifested populist tendencies. This is the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and even Lula in Brazil. It is a widely studied and debated topic in the region (Roberts 2006; Weyland 2001).

The 2006 LAPOP survey included five questions to measure respondents' support for populism in their country. They are:

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo

POP1. [Leer alternativas]

1. Para el desarrollo del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario],
2. Aunque atrase el desarrollo del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.

POP2. [Leer alternativas]

1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o, al contrario]
2. Aún cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso.

POP3. [Leer alternativas]

1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o, al contrario]
2. Aún cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas.

POP4. [Leer alternativas]

1. Nuestros Presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],
2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros Presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.

POP5. [Leer alternativas]

1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario],
2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.

With these five questions, we constructed an index of support for populism that consists of an average of favorable responses to populism in the executive branch. The scale has a range of 0-to-100; higher values indicate more support for presidential populism, while lower values indicate less support for populism.¹⁰

In Figure IV-25, we present the averages on this scale for the countries that included this series of questions in their surveys. The Dominican Republic has a relatively low average on this scale, 23.0, indicating that Dominicans do not support presidential populism very much. Only Jamaica has a lower average than the Dominican. Peru, with its populist history, shows a higher average. Guatemala and Colombia also register high averages compared to the other countries of the study.

¹⁰ In some countries there has been a high rate of lost cases on this scale; but in the Dominican Republic only 5.6% of the respondents do not have a mark on the scale. The lost cases do not show age differences with the rest of the sample, but there are small differences in education, sex, and personal wealth. Women, people with less education, and the poor have a greater probability of being lost cases on this scale. But because they are only 5.6% of the total survey, it is not a worrisome problem in the Dominican case.




Figure IV-25. Average Support for Presidential Populism by Country

In general, the data presented in this chapter shows that, in the Latin American context, the Dominican Republic ranks favorably in terms of political tolerance and the stability of the political system. The Dominican political tolerance average is among the highest of the Latin American countries included in the LAPOP project. Additionally, the average is higher in 2006 than in 2004 in all the indicators used to measure political support, and sometimes it is considerably higher, as in the opinion that one should support the political system and have pride in it.

In the Dominican case, both political and social tolerance increase significantly with higher levels of education. Such tolerance constitutes a pillar in the construction of a stable democracy.

The data shows that, in the Dominican Republic, there was a notable increase in the trust in public institutions in 2006 with respect to 2004. Thus, we can see that there was a process of both economic and political stabilization after the crisis that affected the country in 2003 and 2004. It should be made clear, however, that some of these indicators can easily change if there is another deterioration in the economic or political situation. Surveys can only capture the state of public opinion at a particular moment in time, but the political conditions in precarious democracies like the Dominican can change with relative ease, generating new changes in public opinion.

Chapter V Corruption

Corruption has been a topic of wide debate in the Dominican Republic. It was essential in the processes of capital accumulation during the authoritarian regimes, and since the democratic transition in 1978, different social and political groups have demanded that it be reduced. Corruption is worrisome for various reasons: among them, it generates great inefficiency in the use of public resources so scarce and necessary for the development of the country; and it creates an institutional and cultural climate that mocks the basic rules of coexistence in a social and democratic community.

Corruption occurs in various ways in the Dominican state: through kickbacks and the famous method known as “*grado a grado*” in public works contracts. It also occurs through bribes that citizens pay, voluntarily or involuntarily, to lesser ranking public officials to expedite services, as well as through political clientelism involving different social sectors. Government corruption scandals frequently appear in the press, but many are not investigated and almost all go without being punished.

Public corruption devalues governmental work because it breaches the public trust that those in power look after the common good and represent the interests of all citizens. Despite this, Dominican governments have been reluctant to put on a straight jacket to control corruption, preferring to leave this resource available to politicians although they know it causes discontent in wide segments of the population excluded from the illegal dealings.

To make matters worse, the bankruptcy of three banks in 2003 added new elements to the panorama of Dominican corruption. These events motivated a new wave of denouncements and efforts to control corruption, both public and private. Nonetheless, attempts at reform and control still remain limited given the magnitude of the problem and the public’s perceptions.

Several surveys investigate public perceptions. For example, comparisons with Latin American countries from one round of surveys in 2004 show that the levels of corruption in the Dominican Republic are among the highest in the region. The World Bank Institute’s Governance Indicators, and their “Control of Corruption” index, indicate that the Dominican Republic is the seventh most corrupt country of the 18 covered by the World Bank. While Chile and Costa Rica attain the fifth percentile, the Dominican Republic remains in the second (Figure V-1).




Figure V-1. World Bank Institute's Control of Corruption Index for 2004: the Dominican Republic in Comparative Perspective

Survey after survey reveal that the Dominicans see corruption as a serious or very serious problem. With data from the combined 1994-2004 DEMOS surveys and the 2006 LAPOP survey, Figure V-2 shows the high percentage of people that have consistently thought this way over the last 12 years. Besides, a large percentage consider corruption to be widespread in the country. Although the percentage considering corruption to be a serious problem diminished in 2006, those who think corruption is widespread increased slightly. In the 2004 DEMOS survey, 84% of respondents said that corruption was a serious or very serious problem. Two years later, the 2006 LAPOP survey revealed that 87% think that corruption is somewhat or very widespread, and 91% believe it to be a serious or very serious problem. In other words, the vast majority of Dominicans continue to see corruption as a very serious problem.




Figure V-2. Perceptions of Corruption in the Dominican Republic

Figure V-3 shows that the belief that corruption is very widespread among public officials has a statistically negative relation with the level of trust in the armed forces, the police, and the Catholic Church. In other words, the greater the trust in these institutions, the less corruption is perceived to be widespread among public officials. Perceptions of corruption have no significant relation with trust in any other political or social institution. It is striking that perceptions of corruption do not have any significant effect on trust in institutions central to democracy, like Congress or the system of justice.




Figure V-3. Relation Between Trust in the Armed Forces, Police, Catholic Church and Perceptions of Corruption

Victims of Corruption

Although the perception is high that corruption is widespread among public officials and constitutes a serious problem, other data shows that the public's direct experience with corruption is more limited. Figure V-4 shows the percentage of people that, using a series of public services in the last year, were victimized by the solicitude of a bribe. In 2006, nine% said that, within the last year, a police officer had asked them for a bribe, six% that a public official had asked them for one, four% were asked for a bribe in a school, and five% in a hospital. The percentages are a little higher in the case of the courts, although they fell from 20% in 2004 to 12% in 2006, and in municipal governments, where they rose between 2004 and 2006 (Figure V-4). The level of victimization by corruption is significantly lower in 2006 than in 2004. We see less corruption in the bribes requested by public officials, in the courts, hospitals, and schools. If we were to use these questions

to describe the state of corruption in the Dominican Republic, we would have to conclude that it is not as widespread as people think.




Figure V-4. Paying Bribes in Services

When most of the population says corruption is widespread and a serious problem, it is possible that they are thinking of the scandals involving high-ranking public officials, with whom common people do not have any direct ties but know about from the media.

For the LAPOP survey, we created an index of seven different acts of corruption. Six appear in Figure V-4: bribes to the police, to a government official, in municipal governments, in the courts, in public hospitals, and in the schools. The seventh involves the request of bribes at work, but is not included in Figure V-4 because it was not used in the 2004 DEMOS survey. The scale was initially created to go from 0-to-7 points, but since few respondents scored above 5 points, those of 6 and 7 were collapsed into the fifth. The scale was thus reduced to 0-to-5.




Figure V-5. Total index of victimization by Corruption by Region

The victimization by corruption average is 0.26. Figure V-5 shows that the highest scores in the index are from the metropolitan region of Santo Domingo, followed by the North, East, and South. That is, residents of Santo Domingo are more likely to be victims of corruption than people in the rest of the country. This difference is statistically significant only between the metropolitan region and the South.

Instead of analyzing how many times each person was victimized by corruption, we focused the analysis on the percentage of people who had at least one experience with corruption during the previous year. Using this scale of victimization, we created a variable that treats all victims in the same manner: it does not distinguish between people victimized just once or multiple times. This same variable was employed in all the participating countries in the 2006 LAPOP surveys. We can, therefore, make comparisons not only with the World Bank's Control of Corruption measure, but also with the experience that people living in each country included in this study have with corruption. In the Dominican case, it is 17.7%. In 2006, nine countries have a higher percentage of their population victimized by acts of corruption than the Dominican Republic, and five have lower levels of victimization. Haiti, Bolivia, Mexico, Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have higher levels of

victimization, while Chile, Colombia, Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras have lower levels than the Dominican Republic. This means that, in the Latin American context, corruption in the Dominican Republic is neither very high nor very low.

Figure V-7 shows that more people in urban zones (20%) than rural ones (11.9%) have been victims of corruption. Figure V-8 indicates that more men (24.8%) than women (11.2%) have been victims of corruption. This difference is substantial and statistically significant.




Figure V-7. Percentage of People who Have Been Victims of Corruption, Urban vs. Rural




Figure V-8. Percentage of People who Have Been Victims of Corruption, by Sex

Finally, victimization levels diminish with age. It can be seen in Figure V-9 that around 22% of young people under age of 35 have been victims, while only 10.7% of the people between the ages of 55 and 65, and 2.7% of people older than 65 have been. These differences are statistically significant.




Figure V-9. Percentage of People who Have Been Victims of Corruption, by Age

Table V-1 shows the linear regression indicating the factors that influence victimization by corruption. In this analysis we used the victimization scale constructed at the outset of this section. The scale has a range of 0-to-7 experiences of victimization by corruption in the previous year. Higher values indicate more experiences of corruption. The significant values in the analysis are: being a women, age, and the size of the city in which respondents live. The three factors have a negative relation with victimization by corruption. That is, women, older people, and persons who reside in smaller cities or rural areas experience corruption less than men, young people, and urban residents.

Table V-1. Factors that Predict Victimization by Corruption

	B	S.E.	Beta	t	Sig.
Constante	.775	.091		8.566	.000
Mujer	-.237	.034	-.183	-6.883	.000
Edad	-.055	.015	-.129	-3.731	.000
Educación	.006	.004	.041	1.326	.185
Ingresos familiares	.015	.008	.058	1.957	.051
Casado/Unido	-.035	.036	-.026	-.967	.334
Números de hijas(os)	.012	.009	.048	1.312	.190
Tamaño de la ciudad	-.045	.010	-.114	-4.276	.000
R cuadrado = .07					

Justifying Bribes

To understand not only the level of victimization by corruption but also the attitudes of the population toward corruption, in the 2006 LAPOP survey we asked Dominicans how willing they were to accept corruption. We used the two following questions to measure the justification of bribes or to accept of corruption:

EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno? Sí o No?

EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar sobornos es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable? Sí o No_

While the experience of paying a bribe seems to be limited to 17.7% of the Dominican population, an important segment considers that, given the way things are, one can justify paying a bribe, or that paying bribes is justifiable given the poor public services.




Figure V-10. Justifying the Payment of Bribes

Figure V-10 indicates that 22.3% of the people believe that, given the way things are, one can justify paying a bribe, and 24.9% think that paying a bribe is justifiable due to the poor public services.

Figure V-11 shows that justifying the payment of bribes is greater in the more populated areas of the country: Santo Domingo and the North. Residents of Santo Domingo justify bribes due to poor services, while those of the North because of the way things are.




Figure V-11. Justifying the Payment of Bribes by Region

It can be seen in Figure V-12 that men justify paying of bribes more frequently than women: 26.4% of men justify bribes while only 19.4% of women do.




Figure V-12. Justifying the Payment of Bribes by Sex

To determine which factors explain the justification of paying bribes, we ran a logistic regression that, in Table V-2, shows the following: women and older people (except those over the age of 65) are less likely to justify a bribe, while people with less schooling have a greater propensity to justify it. People in the metropolitan area of Santo Domingo and in the East are more likely to justify it than southerners. We do not see any significant effect due to either personal wealth or city size.

Table V-2. Factors that Explain Justifying Bribes Because of the Way Things Are (EXC18): Results of a Logistical Regression

	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intersección	.677	.431	2.469	.116	
Mujer	-.365	.128	8.108	.004	.694
Urbano	.364	.297	1.503	.220	1.439
Tamaño de la ciudad	-.191	.120	2.556	.110	.826
Riqueza	.047	.041	1.324	.250	1.048
Edad	-.024	.005	28.215	.000	.976
Educación	-.042	.016	6.829	.009	.958
Región Metropolitana^a	-.691	.309	4.983	.026	.501
Región Norte^a	.206	.181	1.292	.256	1.228
Región Este^a	-.681	.246	7.641	.006	.506
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-cuadrado = .06					
La categoría de referencia es “No se justifica el pago de sobornos”					
^a La categoría de referencia es Región Sur					

Victimization by Corruption and Its Impact on Justifications

It is likely that the two aspects of corruption – victimization and justification – are connected. The idea is that victims of corruption can change their perspective regarding the justification of bribes as a result of their experience. It might be that victims have a tendency to justify the payment of bribes to eliminate whatever guilty feeling they might have for having been a victim. It might also be that victims of corruption tend to accept it less precisely because of their negative experiences.

In Figure V-13, the data of the LAPOP survey shows that when a person is a victim of corruption he or she tends to justify the payment of a bribe more. Nonetheless, as people increasingly experience acts of corruption, they become more adverse to the payment of bribes. The results indicate that both possible effects exist: the initial experience with corruption causes the justification of bribes to grow, but subsequent experiences of being a victim has the opposite effect.




Figure V-13. Relation between Victimization by Corruption and Justifying Bribes

Residents of urban areas resist justifying the payment of bribes even if they are repeatedly victims of corruption, while rural residents are more likely to justify paying bribes if they are repeatedly victims of corruption.

In Figure V-14, we see that people from urban areas continue to reject justifying bribes at rather high levels, even when they have been victims of corruption. Rural people, however, are more influenced by their experiences of corruption. One possible explanation of this difference is that urban residents are exposed to being victims of corruption with greater frequency; as a result, their strategy is to reject this practice instead of justifying it. There could also be an indirect relation with educational levels, since we know from the previous regression analysis that the lower the educational level, the greater the justification of paying bribes. In other words, a greater concentration of people with lower levels of schooling in rural areas could be part of the explanation.




Figure V-14. Relation between Victimization by Corruption and Justifying Bribes, Urban vs. Rural

Finally, there is a slight negative relation between being a victim of corruption and support for the political system: the greater the experiences of corruption, the lower the support for the political system (Figure V-15).




Figure V-15. Relation between Victimization by Corruption and Support for the Dominican System

Although the perception of corruption is extensive in the Dominican Republic, the data shows that, compared to the rest of Latin America, Dominicans are not the greatest victims of corruption. In the Dominican case, corruption is more widespread in urban areas, especially in the Santo Domingo metropolitan area, and affects men more than women.

While the experience of paying a bribe seems to be limited to 17.7% of the population, an important segment considers that sometimes paying a bribe is justified. Men, people with less schooling, and younger people are more likely to justify a bribe.

Chapter VI Criminality

Personal Safety

The crime rate has increased in many Latin American countries and the Dominican Republic is no exception. For example, the number of homicides in the country has grown from 1,086 in 2001 to 2,382 in 2005. The public has felt the pernicious effects of criminality and, as a consequence, the level of discontent regarding this problem has risen considerably, to the point that throughout 2006 various social protests tried to get the government to control the delinquency. The feeling of fear in the population is unquestionable and the sense of public insecurity has been consistently rising, as data from the 1994-2004 DEMOS surveys and the 2006 LAPOP survey reveal. For example, when people are asked whether they currently feel safer, just as safe, or less secure inside and outside their homes than they did five years ago, the percentage who responds less secure rose from 42% in 1994 to 79% in 2006 (Figure VI-1).

Crime constitutes a clear threat to personal safety and has also become a new threat to political stability, which is why the Dominican government has undertaken a series of actions to combat it, among them the “*Barrio Seguro*” (Safe Neighborhood) program, which it has implemented in poor neighborhoods of Santo Domingo and Santiago with high crime rates.

As we see in Figure VI-2, the number of people who report having been victims of delinquent acts doubled from 2004 to 2006. This figure reveals that the crime problem in the country has gotten worse. There have been many attempts to explain this phenomena, but it is probably a consequence of several factors: the economic crisis of 2003-2004, which, according to government figures, created a million-and-a-half new poor, a boom in drug-trafficking in recent years, and police weakness confronting (or its complicity in) the problem.

Figure VI-1. Percentage of People Who Feel Less Secure Now than Five Years Ago




Figure VI-2. Have Been a Victim of Some Crime in the Last Year

Of those affected by crime in 2006, most (50.8%) were the victim of a robbery without physical violence or threat (Figure VI-3). The second most common type of crime is robbery with physical violence or threat. In other words, more than 75% of crime victims were the victim of robbery; and of all crimes, property theft is by far the largest with 66.8% (robbery without physical violence or threat, damage to property, and home burglary). The remaining 33.1% of crimes are acts of physical violence, which are the most dangerous from the view point of personal safety, although they do not yet represent the majority of crimes. In any case, crime generates a great deal of public fear, even in people who have not personally been victimized. Additionally, in 2006, 70% of respondents believed that the police were involved in crime, making them feel even more unprotected.




Figure VI-4. Average of Respondents Who Have Been a Victim of Crime by Country

Figure VI-4 shows the crime problem from a regional perspective.¹¹ It can be seen that the Dominican Republic is close to the middle of the group of countries included in the 2006 LAPOP surveys. Five countries – Jamaica, Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador – report lower crime rates than the Dominican Republic. The other nine, including Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico, report higher rates than the Dominican Republic. Although the crime problem is important and has been growing, the Dominican situation is not as bad as in Peru and Chile where, on average in 2006, 26.2 and 23.1% of respondents said they had been the victim of a crime. This in no way means, however, that the Dominican numbers are favorable, especially since the number of people who reported having been the victim of a crime doubled between 2004 and 2006.

Characteristics of Crime Victims

In the following series of figures, we present the characteristics of respondents who were victims of crime in 2004 and 2006. Figure VI-5 shows the distribution of victims by sex.




Figure VI-5. Crime Victims in the Last Year by Sex

¹¹ It is important to emphasize the fact that, in the figure, the countries are ranked by their crime levels in 2004, but the discussion in the text refers to the 2006 order.

While in 2004, slightly more women than men were crime victims, in 2006 the distribution by sex equalized. In both years, the differences by sex are not statistically significant.

Figure VI-6 shows the most common crimes in the Santo Domingo metropolitan area. In 2006, 23.2% of residents in the metropolitan region were victims of a crime, while only 11.8% were victims in the southern region. But in all regions, crime increased compared to 2004. The changes between 2004 and 2006 are statistically significant.




Figure VI-6. Crime Victims in the Last Year by Region

We find an important difference between urban and rural areas in 2004 and 2006, with more crime victims found in urban areas (Figure VI-7). This difference is statistically significant.




Figure VI-7. Crime Victims in the Last Year by Area (Urban vs. Rural)

The annual increase and the number of crimes reported by people with higher levels of education are striking (Figure VI-8). While the percentage for the entire population of Dominicans surveyed is 16.2%, in 2006 the figure reached 25% for those with a university education. In 2004, people with university and secondary educations were victims at a higher and statistically significant rate than people without formal education or with only a primary education. In 2006, the only statistically significant difference is between people with a university education and those with only a primary education. The reason could be that, with more resources, people with higher levels of education are more attractive targets for criminals. It could also be that people with university educations are more willing to denounce being a victim of a crime, while less educated and poorer people could be more fearful of reporting a crime because they have less trust in the impartiality of the interviewer.




Figure VI-8. Crime Victims in the Last Year by Education

The Safety Problem in Neighborhoods and for the Country

Regarding the degree of safety in the area or neighborhood where respondents live, 49.7% said they felt very safe or somewhat safe, and 50.3% said they felt unsafe or very unsafe (Figure VI-9). In other words, roughly half of the Dominican population feels at least somewhat safe in their own neighborhood, while the other half feels unsafe.




Figure VI-9. Feeling of Personal Safety in One’s Neighborhood

Furthermore, the great majority of Dominicans consider crime to represent a threat to the country’s future: 90.2% of respondents believe that the crime threat to the country’s future well-being is high. Only 3.5% consider that it is small or non-existent.

Figure VI-10 shows the results by region of two questions discussed above regarding the crime problem. We converted the scales of the variables in this figure to a range of 0-to-100. Higher values indicate more negative attitudes regarding personal safety and the crime threat in the country. The figure shows that people from the southern region of the country feel significantly more secure in their neighborhoods than residents of other regions. But there is no regional difference regarding the crime threat. Although southerners personally feel more secure, this security does not translate into a more favorable view of the crime problem at the national level.




Figure VI-10. Personal Insecurity and Crime as a National Threat by Region




Gráfico VI-11. Inseguridad personal por edad

In Figure VI-11 we find that the feeling of personal insecurity increases with age, with the exception of the oldest age group. People between 46 and 65 years old feel significantly more insecure than people under the age of 25 or people over 65. We did not find any significant age-based difference to the question regarding the threat of crime to the country's future.

Perceptions of and Respect for the System of Justice

In a country where the vast majority of people consider crime to constitute a threat to the nation's future, it is important to have a functioning system of justice to combat this problem and improve perceptions of the national situation. For this reason, it is worrisome that the survey captured a decline, between 2004 and 2006, in the public's perception of the judicial system's capacity to address the crime problem. As can be seen in Figure VI-12, the number of people who, if they were the victim of a crime, would not trust the judicial system to punish the guilty increased significantly between 2004 and 2006. Therefore, while the number of crime victims is growing, the perception of the judicial system's capacity to confront the crime problem is falling.




Figure VI-12. Trust in the Capacity of the Judicial System

Probably as a result of the falling trust in judicial system’s capacity to punish criminals, the percentage of the public who favors acting outside the law to capture criminals rose significantly between 2004 and 2006. In 2004, 23% of respondents said that acting outside the rule of law to capture criminals would be permissible, while 41% said so in 2006. That is, the percentage of people who support the idea of acting outside the law to capture criminals doubled. Besides the real increase in criminality as measured by the number of crime victims, it is possible that this view is also influenced by the perception, held by many including some judicial system authorities, that the new Penal Procedural Code offers many rights to suspects or people indicted of crimes.




Figure VI-13. Percentage of People Who Think It Is Acceptable to Act Outside the Law to Capture Criminals by Victims or Not of Crimes in the Last Year

Figure VI-13 shows that people who have been victims of a crime are more likely to condone acting outside the law to capture criminals, both in 2004 and 2006. This difference is statistically significant in 2004 but not in 2006, which means that the tolerance for crime has fallen even among people who have not been the victim of a crime. In other words, more people, whether victims or not, support the idea of acting outside the law to resolve the country's crime problem.




Figure VI-14. Percentage of People Who Think It Is Acceptable to Act Outside the Law to Capture Criminals, by Feeling of Personal Insecurity

Figure VI-14 shows that, in 2006, the more unsafe people felt, the greater propensity to condone acting outside the law to capture criminals: 43.5% of people who feel very unsafe support the idea of acting outside of the law, while 34.4% of people who feel very safe support this position.

Figure VI-15 shows the percentages of respondents who think it is acceptable to act outside of law to capture criminals by the conception they have of democracy. The idea of the conception of democracy was developed in Chapter III, and as explained there, people can have different notions of what “democracy” means.




Figure VI-15. Percentage of People Who Think It Is Acceptable to Act Outside the Law to Capture Criminals, by Conception of Democracy

Using the different responses to this question, we constructed four categories by type of conception. We find that people without any clear conception of what democracy means (those that have empty conceptions) are equally disposed to permit acting outside the law to capture criminals as people with normative visions of democracy (that is, people who define democracy with ideals such as liberty or equality). Both groups show high levels of tolerance for acting outside the law to capture criminals (43.6% and 40.2% respectively). The level of tolerance for acting outside the law is lower among people with a negative or utilitarian conception (31.1% and 30.4% respectively). But, as shown in Chapter III, 90% of the interviewed population demonstrated normative or empty definitions of democracy.

Table VI-1 shows the factors that explain the tendency to accept acting outside the law to capture criminals. The only statistically significant factors are personal wealth and

personal safety. The richest people and those who feel most insecure are more willing to accept acting outside the law than the poor and people who feel more secure.

Table VI-1. Factors that Explain the Acceptance of Actions Outside the Law to Capture Criminals: Results of a Logistic Regression

	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intersección	-.716	.442	2.628	.105	
Mujer	.046	.114	.162	.687	1.047
Edad	-.004	.004	.764	.382	.996
Educación	.103	.081	1.631	.202	1.108
Urbano	-.058	.128	.207	.649	.943
Riqueza Individual	.082	.036	5.146	.023	1.085
Inseguridad Personal	.121	.060	4.056	.044	1.129
Víctima de delincuencia	-.180	.155	1.360	.243	.835
Confianza en el sistema judicial	.001	.002	.791	.374	1.001
Nagelkerke Pseudo R-cuadrado = .02					

Other Crime Problems: Drugs and Gangs

Drugs are one of the most important causes behind the increase in crime. The 2006 LAPOP surveys asked respondents in all the participating countries in the study about the relevance and magnitude of this problem in their neighborhoods. Figure VI-16 shows the percentages in each country who have seen someone selling drugs in their neighborhood within the last year. The level of drug activity that people report in the Dominican Republic is rather high compared to the other countries of the region. Of the Dominicans interviewed, 22.1% said that they had seen people dealing drugs. Only Costa Rica had a higher percentage.




Figure VI-16. Percentage of Respondents Who Have Seen Someone Dealing Drugs in the Last Year

The data on drug dealing and gangs show that, in the Dominican case, these are greater problems in urban areas than in rural ones. This result is in line with the analysis earlier in this chapter indicating that urban residents have been victims of crime in greater proportion and feel more unsafe than rural residents. Figure VI-17 shows that 26.6% of respondents in urban areas have seen someone dealing drugs in the last year, while only 11.2% of people in rural areas have had this experience.




Figure VI-17. People Who Have Seen Someone Dealing Drugs in the Last Year, Urban vs. Rural




Figure VI-18. The Gang Problem in Your Neighborhood, Urban vs. Rural

Figure VI-18 shows the same relation between urban residence and crime, where a greater proportion of urban respondents (37%) say that their neighborhood is very affected or somewhat affected by gangs, while only 22.4% of rural residents have the same perception.

In summary, the data presented in this chapter clearly indicates that the crime problem has increased in the Dominican Republic. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of people who reported having been the victim of a crime doubled, and there was an increase in all the variables studied. Additionally, the percentage of people who feel more insecure now than five years ago, inside or outside their home, continued to rise. The crime problem affects urban areas more than rural ones, and especially the Santo Domingo metropolitan area. We also see people with higher levels of education, which means higher standards of living, proportionally more affected. Around 95% of the population sees the crime problem as a national threat, and less people than in 2004 trust the capacity of the judicial system to confront the crime problem. It does not help either that people perceive that the police are part of the criminal world.

We also find that, in 2006, there was a greater inclination than in 2004 to accept acting outside the law to capture criminals, both among people who had personally been the victim of a crime as well those who had not. But support for acting outside the law is greater among people who feel unsafe. Dominicans also report having seen drug dealing in a higher proportion than in most Latin American countries included in the LAPOP surveys. The same is true with the identification of gangs as a problem in respondents' neighborhoods. This individual and comparative data synthesize the violent turn that has occurred in Dominican society and the anti-democratic attitudes and the lack of trust that this situation has started to generate.

Chapter VII Local Government

A central goal of the political reform processes fomented in Latin America in recent decades has been decentralization, that is returning to the local level as the ideal place to bring the government closer to the people. The Dominican Republic has not been exempt from this debate, and with the aim of facilitating decentralization, Law 166-03 established the transfer of significant funds from the national budget to the municipalities.

The goal has been to generate new forms of political participation that promise better government action and, therefore, an improvement in the public's living conditions. The idea is that the decentralization of government functions can resolve many of the problems that electoral democracy has not been able to address.

As democratization processes advanced in dissonance with peoples' standards of living, the argument took hold that one of the principal causes of governmental incapacity was the excessive centralization of power in the presidency. In the context of this argument, the policy of decentralization became a key response to the growing dissatisfaction with national politics, characterized by an inefficient centralization inherited from the authoritarian period.

Decentralization acquired a modernizing and democratic discourse. A modern state should transfer (decentralize) responsibilities and facilitate decision making in order to respond to the demands of a society that wants to modernize and democratize.

From the perspective of decentralization, it is assumed that these processes increase citizen participation, and in turn, greater citizen participation leads to greater efficiency in public administration. In this sense, decentralization processes are seen as increasing the possibility of developing an authentic democracy through greater participation.

Participation in Local Government

The LAPOP survey included various questions that address the topic of local government in order to understand the ties between the public and municipal government offices, the receptivity of local officials to people's needs and demands, the evaluation of services, and the financing of these government offices.

Below are the questions we asked respondents regarding these topics.

Figure VII-1 shows the comparative data for Latin America. The percentage of people who had contact with the local government by attending a municipal government (*ayuntamiento*) meeting is 22.9 in the Dominican case, which is the highest level of participation among the countries included in the study.

<p>NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión municipal o una reunión convocada por el síndico durante los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>
<p>NP1B. ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (8) NS</p>
<p>NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, regidor o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) No sabe/ no recuerda</p>
<p>SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el ayuntamiento está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy Buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) No sabe</p>
<p>SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al ayuntamiento para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) No sabe</p>
<p>LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al ayuntamiento, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?</p> <p>(1) Más al ayuntamiento (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al ayuntamiento si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) No sabe / no contesta</p>
<p>LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento?</p> <p>(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) No sabe</p>



Figure VII-1. Percentage of People Who Attended a Municipal Meeting in the Previous Year




Figure VII-2 shows the percentage of respondents in each country who petitioned the local government. We find that fewer Dominicans petitioned municipal governments than attended local government meetings. Only 15.8% presented a petition, showing that this is not a widespread custom in the Dominican Republic as it is in other Latin American countries like Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and El Salvador where there is more participation in local government through petitioning. In summary, Dominicans participate more in municipal meetings than the citizens of any of the other countries, but they are close the average in terms of petitioning.




Figure VII-2. Percentage of People Who Petitioned Local Government in the Previous Year

We see in Figure VII-3 that rural residents are more likely to petition municipal authorities, but there is no difference between rural and urban residents in meeting attendance. Perhaps in line with the ideals of decentralization, the smaller populations of municipalities facilitates participation in local government.




Figure VII-3. Percentage of People Who Had Contact with Local Government in the Previous Year by Urban vs. Rural

Figure VII-4 shows that, in general, the percentage of men who have had contact with the local government by attending municipal meetings is greater than that of women. Of men, 25% had attended local meetings, compared to 20.9% of women. The tendency is almost the same in terms of petitioning. But in neither case is the difference between the sexes statistically significant.




Figure VII-4. Percentage of People Who Had Contact with Local Government in the Previous Year by Sex

What do Dominicans think about the usefulness of attending local meetings? When asked about the impact of their participation in the municipality, 49% believe that public officials pay much or some attention to people’s requests. Disaggregating the answers by those who attended meetings, Figure VII-5 shows that 15% believe that municipal officials pay much attention to what people ask for, while 34% think they pay some attention. The remaining respondents (51%) indicated that officials pay little or no attention. This data shows that the Dominican population is divided on the importance of attending municipal meetings: half think that attending has an impact and the other half thinks that it does not.

Relating attendance at municipal meetings to the feeling that people have of the attention they receive, Figure VII-5 shows that people who attend municipal meetings have a more favorable opinion of government activity than people who do not. This relation could just be the result of attending meetings itself. In other words, people who participate have an opportunity to observe how local officials try to resolve problems, or perhaps by attending meetings they start to empathize with officials, leading to more favorable evaluations of them. Although, the opposite might also occur: people who already view their local government positively tend to attend meetings because they think this is a way they can help resolve problems. In any case, it is obvious that attending local government meetings has a positive relation with the perception that it is worth attending them for the results it brings. Of the respondents who attended a meeting, 27.2% indicated that officials pay much attention to what they request in meetings, while only 11.2% of those who did not attend had the same opinion.




Figure VII-5. Percentage of People Who Believe that Municipal Officials Pay Attention to What People Request in Municipal Meetings, by Attendance at Meetings

Evaluations of Public Services

The evaluation of municipal services turns out to be more positive than that of public services in general. To measure satisfaction with local government services, we asked whether the services that municipal governments provide are very good, good, satisfactory, poor, or very poor. We transposed this question onto a scale of 0-to-100; higher values indicate greater satisfaction. To measure the evaluation of specific public services at the national level, we used various questions regarding the quality of a range of public services like transportation, education, hospital, Social Security (IDSS), energy, potable water, and the construction of low-income housing. With these seven services, we constructed an evaluative scale with a range of 0-to-100. In Figure VII-6, the bar on the left shows the average satisfaction with local government services is 57.6, while the average satisfaction with the group of national public services is 47.4, or 10 points less.




Figure VII-6. Evaluation of Municipal Services and Specific Public Services




Figure VII-7. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Country

Figure VII-7 shows, alternatively, the degree of satisfaction with local government services in all the countries included in the 2006 LAPOP surveys. The Dominican Republic has the highest figure, suggesting that Dominicans are more satisfied with their public services, particularly those offered by the local government, than other Latin Americans. Other countries with a high level of satisfaction with local services are Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras, while those with the lowest levels of satisfaction are Haiti, Jamaica, and Panama.

A possible explanation of the Dominican Republic’s relatively high ranking within Latin America is that more resources have been channeled to local governments in recent years, in accord with Law 166 of 2003. It has also been suggested that another positive aspect for municipal management is the separation of presidential from congressional and municipal elections, making municipal candidates rely more on their own work to be elected rather than their party’s endorsement. Nonetheless, other Latin American countries separate elections in this way but do not receive such positive evaluations.

For the time being, since there is scarce empirical evidence about the evaluation of municipal governments to support possible explanations, the LAPOP data offers an initial base, a first approximation, on the state of public satisfaction with municipal

governments. The magnitude and persistence of this positive evaluation should be confirmed with new empirical data obtained from future surveys.

The topic is interesting not only in regards to the Dominican Republic, which shows the highest level of satisfaction among the countries in the LAPOP project, but also in the regional comparative analysis, since figuring out what produces greater satisfaction with how the public sector operates is fundamental to foment projects that contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Latin America.

It is worth mentioning that in the Dominican case, despite the relatively good evaluation of municipal governments shown in the June 2006 survey, in the congressional and municipal elections of May 2006, the party controlling the majority of municipalities and municipal councils (*sindicaturas* and *regidurías*), the PRD, lost the elections and many of its municipal positions. In other words, the favorable evaluation does not seem to have translated into many electoral victories.

In the case of party identification, Figure VII-8 shows that supporters of the PRD expressed greater satisfaction with local government services than people who do not identify with a party or who supported a minority party. The average level of satisfaction with local services among PRD supporters is 61.6, while it is only 55.7 among people who do not support any party, and 50.0 among supporters of minority parties.

The reason for this could stem from the period in which the survey was conducted, in June 2006, when the vast majority of municipalities had PRD governments. It has to be noted, however, that PRSC and PLD supporters do not evaluate local government services much lower than PRD supporters. It is clear that supporters of the major parties have more positive evaluations than other respondents. There are no statistically significant differences in terms of city size, urban versus rural residence, income, education, and sex.



Figure VII-8. Evaluations of Local Services by Party Identification




Table VII-1 shows that the factors explaining satisfaction with local government services in a multivariable linear regression are personal wealth and identification with the PRD. In other words, people with more economic resources and people who support the PRD are more satisfied with local government services.

Table VII-1. Factors that Explain Satisfaction with Local Government Services: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	t	Sig.
Constante	49.293	3.373		14.616	.000
Mujer	1.036	1.454	.020	.712	.476
Edad	.010	.051	.006	.203	.839
Educación	.179	1.031	.006	.174	.862
Riqueza individual	.976	.455	.067	2.142	.032
PRD^a	6.592	2.278	.086	2.893	.004
PLD^a	1.682	1.605	.031	1.048	.295
PRSC^a	6.552	3.706	.050	1.768	.077
Otro partido^a	-5.272	9.380	-.016	-.562	.574
Urbano	1.584	1.626	.028	.974	.330
R-cuadrado = .01					
^a Categoría de Referencia es Ningun partido					

Local Government Responsibilities and Financing

Finally, we included two questions in the survey asking about the responsibilities and financing of municipal governments. Of survey respondents, 47.7% consider that municipal governments should be given more responsibilities and resources, while 34.9 are even willing to pay municipal governments more taxes to so they can provide better services.




Figure VII-9. Percentage Who Want to Support Municipal Governments More, by Satisfaction with Municipal Services

Those who are more satisfied with municipal services are more willing to support the transfer of more resources to municipal governments. This relation is seen in Figure VII-9. Satisfaction with municipal government services has a positive relation with the idea of the national government transferring more responsibilities and resources to municipal governments and with the willingness to pay more taxes. By contrast, the greater the dissatisfaction with municipal services the lower the desire that more functions be transferred to municipal governments and to pay more taxes, with the exception of those who consider municipal services to be very poor. This latter group is more willing to pay higher taxes to improve services. It is possible that people who evaluate municipal services as very poor believe that if they paid more taxes the services would improve, while those people who consider services to be poor or just satisfactory are not willing to pay more taxes, perhaps because they doubt that paying more would significantly improve services.




Figure VII-10. Percentage Willing to Pay Higher Taxes to Improve Local Services, by Personal Wealth

Both the richest and poorest people are less willing to pay more taxes, as shown by Figure VI-10. Only around 20% of the richest and the poorest are willing to pay more taxes to improve municipal services, while people in intermediate categories on the wealth scale are willing to pay local government more taxes. Alternatively, we see in Figure VII-11 that men are a little more inclined than women to pay more taxes in order to improve the services offered by the municipality. Thirty-nine% of men support the idea of paying more taxes, while only 31% of women do so. This difference between the sexes is statistically significant.




Figure VII-11. Percentage Willing to Pay Higher Taxes to Improve Local Services, by Sex

This data reveals that an important segment of the population is aware that municipal governments should, and wants them to, play a more active and improved role in supplying public services. In a low-income country with many direct taxes on the population, it is striking that 34.9% say they are willing to pay more taxes in order to improve services.

It should also be noted that from 2004 to 2006 there was an increase in the trust average in municipal governments: it grew from 3.1 to 4.6. Although there was an increase in institutional trust from 2004 to 2006 in all government offices, as shown in the chapter on institutional trust, municipalities did not fall behind; they too experienced a rise.

The data presented in this chapter reveals that Dominicans evaluate the performance of local government favorably and also participate rather actively in their municipalities. The Dominican Republic heads the list of Latin American countries included in the LAPOP survey in municipal meeting attendance and in positively evaluating municipal services. There is also a positive relation between favorable evaluations of municipal services and the willingness to have more functions be assigned to municipal

governments, as well as to pay more taxes in order for municipal governments to be better able to fulfill their duties. Middle groups are more inclined to favor such action, since both the richest and poorest people are less inclined to pay more municipal taxes.

Chapter VIII Elections and Political Parties

The aborted democracy at the beginning of the 1960s and the electoral fraud that occurred between 1966 and 1978, in the suffocating political context of Balaguerian authoritarianism, made elections a banner in the construction of civil rights and democracy in the Dominican Republic. The struggle for transparent elections led by the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD; Dominican Revolutionary Party), along with other organizations opposed to the Balaguer regime, marked a generation for whom this achievement was primordial. Later, with the return of fraud in 1990 and 1994, elections renewed the centrality of Dominican political processes. In the end, when this key mechanism of public political participation is violated, nothing is guaranteed.

These political struggles, centered on electoral processes, solidified an ideology of electoral participation in Dominican society which has translated into high voter turnout, except in the case of congressional and municipal elections, which are conducted separately and always show a high level of abstentionism. While the average abstention rate in presidential elections is 26%, this rises to 46% in the congressional and municipal elections that are conducted on a different date than presidential ones.

Most of the population, around 75% according to the four DEMOS surveys (1994-2004), believes that elections are a public right and duty. This reveals how important Dominicans consider voting to be and explains the high voter turnout in presidential elections up to now. We also find, in the four DEMOS surveys, that the greater the tie to party organizations, the greater the degree of electoral participation.

A commitment to voting serves an obvious function in a democracy. Voting is the mechanism that not only permits participation in the elections of leaders, but it also validates the elections themselves. A democracy, therefore, needs to have clear rules to ensure electoral competitiveness. Transparency is fundamental to eliminate the possibility of fraud or altering the results, as well as economic or military coercion.

Dominican electoral processes have been conflictive, and perhaps because of this very conflictiveness, the public has been inclined to vote. Not even the country's socioeconomic difficulties have adversely effected electoral participation.

Part of the reason for Dominicans' loyalty to voting has to do with the historic dynamism and polarization of Dominican political parties. During the sixties and seventies, the opposition parties became the channels for movements against the government. Then, in the democratic period, they retained their historic antagonism, more rooted in people's ideology than in the concrete practices of political leaders. Additionally, organized civil society made electoral rights an important goal, to the point that the struggle for electoral transparency largely defined the activism of an important segment of civil society during the first half of the 1990s.

The history of fraudulent electoral processes, tied to the general disorganization of Dominican state institutions, created an ideal space for the construction of political

citizenship around voting. The positive aspect of this has been a constant vitality in Dominican politics, even in the middle of serious crises affecting two out of the three main parties. The negative aspect has been an excessive electoralism, manifested in long, tiresome campaigns, and also in electoral reforms that do not necessarily lead to more or better democracy.

The level of interest in politics remains relatively high; so too does identification with political parties, whether by being a member or just supporting them. This combination has helped to produce political vitality, and it works well with the operational requisites of electoral democracy.




Figure VIII-1. Electoral Participation Reported in the 2006 LAPOP survey

Electoral conduct

A high percentage of the population is registered to vote: 89.4% said they were. The main reason is that voter registration is part of national personal identification card. Additionally, a high percentage of the interviewed population said they voted in the 2004

presidential elections (80.3%), while 77.2% said they voted in the 2006 congressional and municipal elections (Figure VIII-1).




Figure VIII-2. Reasons for Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election

The voter turnout in past elections reported in the survey is considerably higher than the actual levels of electoral participation, particularly in the case of congressional and municipal elections. Although 77.2% of respondents said they participated in the elections, the real level of participation in this election was 58%. The probable reason for this discrepancy lies in a common problem in surveys conducted around the world. There is almost always a percentage of people who report having voted although in reality they did not. This occurs for different reasons.

Sometimes they forget whether or not they voted, especially if it occurred awhile ago. Another reason is existing social and cultural pressure, leading people to say they voted even if untrue. This pressure exists in almost all democratic societies, which is why we see the voting figures reported in surveys are often higher than the true figures of electoral participation. The point of this explanation is to demonstrate that, although the figures we see reported in the survey are not identical to the true figures of participation, this does not mean that there are problems with the survey or that its results are generally incorrect. This discrepancy between the electoral results reported in surveys and those

emerging from voting booths is common and does not imply an error in the survey itself, but instead an over-estimation of electoral participation on the part of respondents.

Figure VIII-2 shows the principal reasons people give for having voted in the 2004 presidential elections: a candidate's platform (36.2%), a candidate's qualities (33.1%), and a candidate's political party (30.7%).

Figure VIII-3. Reasons for Not Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election

There are various reasons why a segment of the population, estimated at 27%, did not vote in these elections, as Figure VIII-3 shows, but they can be grouped into five categories: discontent with the options of the system (34%), did not have the required documentation (26%), logistical problems (21%), were not old enough (14%), and other (5%).




Figure VIII-4. Electoral Participation by Region

Electoral participation in the country differs from one region to the next. In the 2004 presidential election, voter turnout was slightly higher in the North and South; in the 2006 congressional and municipal elections, it was higher in the East and South (Figure VIII-4). The only significant difference is between the southern and metropolitan regions in the presidential elections. The difference is not significant in the presidential elections but it is in the congressional elections, in which we see a higher turnout in the South than among metropolitan area residents. The explanation probably lies in that there are greater expectations of change and well-being in the Santo Domingo metropolitan area, where the problems tend to be greater because of the high population density.

Additionally, Figure VIII-5 shows that voting percentages are slightly higher in rural areas than urban ones. The difference between voter turnout in the 2004 presidential election is five points, and in the congressional and municipal elections it is three points. Clearly, the difference in 2006 elections does not reach a statistically significant level; in the presidential elections of 2004, the difference is more notable but it too fails to reach a significant level.




Figure VIII-5. Electoral Participation by Urban and Rural Area

Figure VIII-6 shows the relation between educational levels and reported electoral participation. People with a medium amount of education tend to vote a little less than the rest, but not always. In the 2004 presidential election, people with secondary education voted significantly less than all other educational-level groups. In the 2006 elections, we see the same tendency, but it does not achieve a significant level in these elections.




Figure VIII-6. Electoral Participation by Education

The relation of age and electoral participation is the inverse of what we see with education: the oldest and youngest people tend to vote less (Figure VIII-7). Taking the example of the 2006 congressional and municipal elections, more than 80% of people between the ages of 36 and 65 said they voted, while only about 70% of young people between 18 and 35, and people over 65, said they voted in these elections. It is important to note that the figures for the group of young people between 16 and 25 years old are low in the 2004 presidential election because an important part of this age group had not yet arrived at the legal voting age in 2004. That is, a young person 18 years old at the time of the survey was only 16 when the 2004 election was held and therefore did not have the legal right to vote. When young people 18 and 19 years old who could not vote in the 2004 election are excluded from the analysis, the percentage of youth from 20 to 25 years old who participated rises to 71.3%.




Figure VIII-7. Electoral Participation by Age

Electoral participation tends to fall in relation with greater wealth, except in the case of the richest groups, where there is a rebound in voter turnout after the decline (Figure VIII-8). A little more than 70% of people in the middle of the wealth scale report having voted. By contrast, more than 80% of the richest and the poorest people said the same thing. This suggests that the greatest abstentionism lies in the middle income sectors.




Figure VIII-8. Electoral Participation by Personal Wealth

When self-defined ideology is taken into account (in which respondents were asked to note their ideological position on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 is left and 10 is right), we do not find a consistent pattern of electoral participation, neither comparing the 2004 and 2006 elections, nor in the specific case of one of them (Figure VIII-9). In other words, people who consider themselves to be on the left or on the right might have the same inclination whether or not to vote. If there is a tendency, it seems to be that people who define themselves on the extreme ends of the scale participate in elections more than people in the middle of the scale. This relation is very clear in the case of the 2004

presidential election. In the 2006 congressional and municipal elections, the relation is less obvious because people exactly in the middle of the scale also participated at rather high levels.




Figure VIII-9. Electoral Participation by Ideology

Evaluations and Efficacy of the Current Administration

To examine evaluations of the current government and examine the relation between these evaluations and the level of civic and political participation, we constructed a scale to measure the perceptions that Dominicans have about the efficacy of the current government. Figure VIII-10 shows the average of the six components that we use to develop this scale of government efficacy: combating poverty, promoting and protecting democracy, combating government corruption, protecting human rights, improving public safety, and combating unemployment. The last bar condenses the information of the scale constructed in this manner. All these scales go from 1-to-7 points, as indicated in the column on the left-hand side of the figure. Point 1 on the scale means that the

current government has done nothing in a specific area and point 7 means that it has done a lot.




Figure VIII-10. Government Efficacy: the Components of and the Efficacy Scale Combining Six Questions

In Figure VIII-10, we see that the highest evaluations occur in those areas that have to do with the promotion of democracy as a system of political liberties: promoting and protecting democracy and protecting human rights. These evaluations of the Fernández administration’s success in protecting and promoting democratic ideals are significantly higher than the evaluations of its efficacy in more practical areas of governance. The lowest evaluations are those regarding fighting unemployment and government corruption. We combine the evaluations of these six government responsibilities to produce an efficacy scale of the current administration. The average on this scale, which include these six aspects, is 4.3.

Figure VIII-11 shows the Dominican Republic’s average on the efficacy scale of the current administration, with a range from 1-to-7, along with those of the other countries of the 2006 LAPOP project. The Dominican Republic’s average on the efficacy scale of 4.3 is the highest value among all the countries in the study. The country closest to the Dominican Republic is Chile, with an average of 4.1. But even in the comparison with this country, which has been an example of efficiency and efficacy in the region, Dominicans give significantly better evaluations. Chile and the Dominican Republic are the only countries with an average above 4.0. Most countries have averages on the scale between 3.0 and 4.0. Four countries have averages lower than 3.0: Ecuador (2.3), Haiti (2.9), Honduras (2.9), and Nicaragua (2.9), while Peru has an average of 3.0.




Figure VIII-11. Efficacy of the Current Government by Country

Preferential Vote

The preferential vote was used for the first time in the Dominican Republic in the 2002 congressional elections. It consists of open lists of candidates, but only for the Chamber of Deputies. Voters can, therefore, individually select candidates running to be deputies from a list that a party offers. To explore the use of this electoral mechanism, we included a question in the LAPOP survey simply consisting of indicating whether or not the preferential vote was used. According to the survey results, 80% of Dominicans said they used the preferential vote for deputies in the 2006 elections.




Figure VIII-12. Use of the Preferential Vote for Deputies by Region

Figure VIII-12 shows that it was used more in the southern region and less in the northern: 85.5% of southerners indicated they used the preferential vote, while only 72.4% in the North said they did. This difference is statistically significant. However, we

did not find any significant difference by sex, age, education, socioeconomic status, or party identification.

The extensive use of the preferential vote can mean that this electoral modality is widely accepted and that many people use it. But another possibility is that many people do not understand what the term “preferential vote” means, but responded positively nonetheless. Since no other questions on this topic were asked, it is difficult to decipher this point and it needs to await future study. It is surprising, and somewhat suspicious, that the preferential vote was used more in the South, where the educational level is lower than in the Santo Domingo metropolitan area or in the North. This suggests that the question was possibly misunderstood, or maybe that the preferential vote is very susceptible to clientelism in impoverished areas. In any case, these are topics that remain pending future studies.

Party Preferences

Dominican society is party-centric. Since the end of the Trujillo dictatorship at the beginning of the 1960s, political parties have played a central role in Dominican politics, and frequently they have been detrimental to the development of other social organizations. The strong leadership of political-bosses (*caudillos*), imbued with ideological polarity, was crucial in the formation of the party system and the consolidation of party loyalties. Between 1966 and 1986, bipartisanship prevailed, with the hegemony of the *Partido Reformista* (PRSC; Reformist Party) and the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (PRD; Dominican Revolutionary Party). Since 1986, the *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (PLD; Dominican Liberation Party) has gained electoral strength. From their origins, these three parties depended on a charismatic and personalist leader who provided ideology and facilitated political affiliations: Balaguer for the PRSC, Peña Gómez for the PRD, and Juan Bosch for the PLD.

It was precisely with such ideological, personalist leadership that these parties became strong and stable political entities that have helped sustain the democratic regime which began in 1978. Thus, until very recently, Dominican democracy rested on a structured party system with strong social support forged around their historic party bosses. This kind of party, although it has given stability and dynamism to Dominican politics, has also constituted an obstacle in the process of political modernization, since these very party organizations have not managed to democratize themselves after the disappearance of their political bosses.

The transition to post-*caudillo* party organizations has been most effectively achieved by the PLD, which has been able to combine the guidance of old party leaders with national leadership from its principal electoral figure: President Leonel Fernández. To its advantage, the internal reorganization problems of the PRD and the PRSC have increased the PLD’s popularity: between 2004 and 2006, it became the most widely supported party. One problem is that this growing support has been combined with widening

clientelism previously foreign to this party, since Juan Bosch had structured the PLD in small circles with an emphasis on political education and service mystique.




Figure VIII-13. Party Support by Country

Figure VIII-13 shows the importance of political parties in Dominican society. The Dominican Republic registered 60.4% in party support, the highest level among the Latin American countries included in the 2006 LAPOP study. In fact, the Dominican Republic scored 10 points higher than Nicaragua, the country in second place. It is interesting to observe that Dominicans demonstrate a level of party identification twice that of Chile, where political parties have historically been very important.

Table VIII-1. The 2004 Presidential Vote Compared to the 2006 Congressional Vote, Only Including People Who Participated in Both Elections

¿Por quién votó para Presidente en 2004?	Por cuál partido votó en la boleta congressional en las elecciones del pasado 16 de mayo del 2006?					
	Ninguno (dejó boleta en blanco, o la anuló)		PLD	PRSC	Otro	Total
Ninguno (dejó boleta en blanco o la anuló)	.0%	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%	.0%	100.0%
Leonel Fernández (PLD)	.9%	7.4%	88.3%	2.1%	1.2%	100.0%
Hipólito Mejía (PRD)	.4%	75.6%	14.9%	8.3%	.8%	100.0%
Eduardo Estrella (PRSC)	1.7%	27.6%	13.8%	51.7%	5.2%	100.0%
Otro	.0%	6.7%	20.0%	6.7%	66.7%	100.0%
Total	.8%	27.5%	62.0%	7.2%	2.5%	100.0%

Table VIII-1 compares voters' choice of party in the 2004 presidential election with the 2006 congressional elections. We include only those respondents who indicated they went to the polls in both elections. Of the people who annulled their vote or cast blank ballots in 2004, 50% of them voted for the PLD in 2006, 25% for the PRD, and 25% for the PRSC. Of those who voted for Leonel Fernández in 2004, 88% voted for the PLD in 2006. This means that, between 2004 and 2006, the PLD did not lose many voters. Among those who voted for Hipólito Mejía in 2004, 75.6% voted again for the PRD, indicating that this party retained three quarters of its 2004 votes. Of the people who did vote again for the PRD in 2006, the majority (14%) voted for the PLD. Of those who voted for Eduardo Estrella in 2004, 51.7% voted for the PRSC in 2006, 27.6% for the PRD, and 13.8% for the PLD. This means that of the three main parties, the PRSC lost the most voters between 2004 and 2006, and that most of those it lost voted for the PRD. This shift in electoral choice from the PRSC and the PRD was probably influenced by the electoral alliance established between the PRD and the PRSC for the 2006 congressional elections. Additionally, many PRSC voters probably had already changed to the PLD in 2004.

Table VIII-2. The 2006 Municipal Vote Compared to the 2006 Congressional Vote

¿Por cuál partido votó en la boleta congressional en las elecciones del pasado 16 de mayo, 2006?	¿Por cuál partido votó en la boleta municipal el pasado 16 de mayo, 2006?				
	PRD	PLD	PRSC	Otro	Total
Ninguno (dejó boleta en blanco o la anuló)	44.4%	22.2%	22.2%	11.1%	100.0%
PRD	86.2%	5.1%	7.2%	1.4%	100.0%
PLD	5.1%	92.2%	1.7%	1.0%	100.0%
PRSC	15.7%	7.1%	77.1%	.0%	100.0%
Otro	21.4%	14.3%	3.6%	60.7%	100.0%
Total	29.4%	59.0%	8.8%	2.8%	100.0%

Table VIII-2 compares the municipal and congressional votes in the 2006 elections. The data indicates that there was a high correlation between both votes in the case of the PLD and PRD, but less so in the case of the PRSC. Some 92.2% of those who voted for the PLD at the congressional level also voted for this party at the municipal level, and 86.2% of those who voted for the PRD at the congressional level also did so at the municipal level. However, only 77.1% of those who voted for the PRSC in the congressional elections chose this party in the municipal elections. That is, the desertion of the PRSC vote is greater than that of the other two principal parties of the political system.

Figure VIII-14 shows that electoral participation is greater among people who say they support a party than those who do not. In the 2004 presidential election, 85% of those who say they support a party voted, compared to 72.7% of those who do not support a party. In 2006, the difference in voter turnout is even greater among those who say they support a party and those that do not: 84.5% compared to 65.2% , with these difference being statistically significant.




Figure VIII-14. Voter Turnout by Party Support

Figure VIII-15 shows the voter turnout reported in the surveys in relation to party support. Turnout is greater in the case of those who say they support the PRD than for the other two principal parties of the Dominican political system. The differences are more striking in the 2006 elections than in the 2004. Of people who identify with a party, PRSC members voted less. Additionally, according to the preceding figure, being a party member generally increases the chances of participating in elections.




Figure VIII-16 shows a reduction in party support between 1994 and 2006, although this data also shows that, over the last 12 years, Dominicans generally have rather strong party affinities. The level of support for a political party dropped from 70% in 1994 to 60% in 2006.




Figure VIII-16. Party Support

Relating party support with sociodemographic variables in Figure VIII-17, we find a statistically significant difference by region, with less support in the more populated areas of Santo Domingo and the North, and greater levels in the eastern and southern regions. The percentage difference between the Santo Domingo metropolitan area and the North with respect to the South is 15%. This difference is statistically significant.




Figure VIII-17. Party Support by Region

The difference by sex, however, is small. Women's affinity for a party (59%) is a little less than that of men (61%), but the difference between the sexes is not statistically significant. This result is somewhat surprising since women do not usually participate in political life to the same degree as men in less developed societies. However, in the Dominican case, no marked difference between women and men in terms of political support was found. In other words, party preferences prevail among both men and women.

The support of specific parties is shown in various figures in relation to sociodemographic variables. Figure VIII-18 shows party identification by region. What jumps out is the regional difference in the North and the Santo Domingo metropolitan area for those without any party identification. The PLD consistently shows the greatest support in all regions, particularly in the East (47.4%), though with less support in the North (36.3%). The PRD appears reduced to second place, with the South as its region of strongest support (21.3%). Meanwhile the PRSC shows very low percentages in all regions, especially in the Santo Domingo area where it only obtained a level of support of 2.5%. Its greatest support comes from the South and East with 5.6% each.




Figure VIII-18. Party Identification by Region

Figure VIII-19 shows specific party identification by sex. The figures are similar in all categories, with the greatest difference being in support for the PLD, in which women surpass men by 5.2%.




Figure VIII-19. Party Identification by Sex, 2006

Party identification by education, which appears in Figure VIII-20, shows that the greater the education, the greater the tendency to not identify with a party. Also, despite the common association of the PLD with the middle class, the percentages of support for this party are slightly higher among people with less schooling. We also see that the PRD has slightly less support among people with less education: only 11.5% of people without an education support the PRD, while 14% of people with a university education support this party. The PRSC seems to get its greatest support from people with less schooling: 7.7% of people without formal education support it.




Figure VIII-20. Party Identification by Education

Changes in Party Identification

In recent years there has been a realignment in Dominicans' party preferences. This is reflected in the data of Figure VIII-21. In the 2004 DEMOS survey, 28.5% of respondents said they changed party identification, and 15% in 2006. It is interesting to note that this fluidity declined substantially between 2004 and 2006. Additionally, we do not find any important sociodemographic differences between people who changed parties and those who did not.




Figure VIII-21. Changes in Party Identification

Figure VIII-22 shows the changes in party identification by current party support. This data reflects the fact that, of current PLD supporters, 17.9% probably shifted to the PLD within the last five years. The percentage is around half that for the PRD and the PRSC. In other words, 17.9% of current PLD supporters were tied to another party within the past five years. The PRD and the PRSC have more stable party bases, with only 8.8% and 7.9% of their supporters being new to the party within last five years. The electoral results from 2004 and 2006 also show evidence of this change in the PLD.




Figure VIII-22. Change in Party Identification by Party Support in 2006

Figure VIII-23 shows that old supporters of the PRD and the PRSC changed party identification more than old supporters of the PLD or of minority parties. That is, of the people who changed parties within the last five years, 51.5% of them were supporters of the PRD, 32.8% of the PRSC, and 14.9% of the PLD. Therefore, while the PLD has many new supporters it has still not lost many old ones. Alternatively, the data shows that the PRD and the PRSC have lost many members and it is likely that many of the people who left these parties have shifted their support to the PLD.




Figure VIII-23. Changes in Party Identification by Previous Party Support, 2006

Attitudes Regarding the Role of Political Parties

Figure VIII-24, on people's opinion regarding the role of Dominican political parties, shows that for most, the parties only serve to participate in the elections held every two years. In 2006, however, there was an increase in the opinion that parties allow people to participate at all levels of politics, while the opinion that parties made it difficult for people to participate in politics fell. This more favorable opinion of the political parties is noteworthy because, for many years, the public evaluated them poorly; furthermore, the parties are going through an important transformative stage after the disappearance of their great leaders.

The data presented in this chapter shows that the system of party preferences and its impact on the electoral process in the Dominican Republic is changing. From the tri-party system established 1986, with the PLD as the minority of the three large parties, the situation has evolved into one in which, since 2004, the PLD dominates party preferences. This transformation could be simply seen as a temporary electoral phenomena, with a pendulum moving toward different parties in different elections. This is a possibility. But the difficulties of the PRD and the PRSC to relegitimze their leadership, both within the parties and in the society-at-large, make it hard for them to rebound electorally and, therefore, recapture support. One sign of the problems facing these parties is the fact that their principal contingents of supporters seem to be older people.

In this general sense, the Dominican political system continues to show a high level of electoral strength: abstention levels are moderate and, despite the little trust in political parties evidenced for various years, in 2006 there was a rebound in the percentage of people who consider that the parties allow people to participate in politics at all levels. What's more, as seen in Chapter IV, in 2006 there was a rise in trust in the parties in conjunction with a rise in trust in all Dominican social and public institutions. Undoubtedly, the party system and party loyalties are in the process of transformation,

Figure VIII-24. Attitudes Regarding the Role of Dominican Political Parties

but none of the the system's three principal parties have yet collapsed. Given the crisis of the PRD and the PRSC, the PLD, which had less experience in power, served to channel the public's discontent with the Hipólito Mejía administration in 2004. In other words, the PLD has filled the political vacuum left by the other two major parties. A challenge of the current PLD government is to avoid succumbing, in the exercise of power, to the corrupt and clientelistic practices that so damaged the PRSC and the PRD.

Chapter IX Social Capital

For various decades, the social sciences have shown great interest in studying the quality of democracy, both in stable democratic societies as well as those with emerging democracies. In the consolidated democracies of countries with higher levels of economic development, the primordial interest has revolved around studying the decline of civic and political participation, and the loss of trust in public institutions and the negative implications this has for the vitality of democratic systems and how well they work. In emerging democracies, the emphasis has been on analyzing the survival and stability of democratic regimes facing economic and institutional adversities. For Latin America, the central challenge has been how to harmonize political democracy with the search for greater social equality.

In the context of reflections on the state of contemporary democracies, the concept of “social capital” has been an important reference point in political analyses. The idea behind this concept is that citizen organization and participation are vital for a democracy to be able to effectively achieve individual and collective goals. It is suggested that greater social organization leads to the formation of more social capital, increased community political effectiveness, improved public policies, and, therefore, to greater trust in political institutions and to greater legitimacy of the democratic system. By contrast, less social capital produces political incapacity, making it hard for communities to achieve their objectives, leading, in turn, to less effective and trustworthy governments. In the classic argument, social organization is tied to levels of interpersonal trust (Putnam 1993, 1995).

The idea that civic participation is positive comes, paradoxically, from both conservative and liberal left thought. The right conceives of participation in social organizations as a way to devolve power to communities, to the local level, and counterposed to the power and programs of the central government. From this perspective, decentralization is preferable to the accumulation of power in the high spheres of government. The liberal left, for its part, values political participation as a way to increase the involvement of the public in political processes and raise the voice of common people. From this perspective, it is assumed that activism in voluntary associations not only improves the levels of social tolerance, something crucial to democracy, but also political action, since there is evidence that people who participate in voluntary associations are more likely to participate in politics. In this sense, social capital becomes political capital.

The survey data from the Dominican Republic shows, in the Latin American context, a relatively high level of interpersonal trust when respondents were asked about the trust they have in people from their neighborhood. Figure IX-1 shows the level of interpersonal trust in the countries included in the LAPOP surveys; the Dominican Republic finds itself located more or less in the middle of this group in 2006. Four countries showed more interpersonal trust than the Dominican Republic: El Salvador, Colombia, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The countries with the lowest levels of trust in 2006 are Haiti, Panama, and the Andean countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

The levels of interpersonal trust in the Dominican Republic decline, however, when we inquire about other aspects of trust, such as the perception that people will take advantage of others if given the chance.

In the Dominican case, there is a relative low level of organizational membership, but there is, in turn, significant participation in community activities and a high level in religious association activities. It is not by chance, then, that in the Dominican Republic churches play a particularly important role in the construction of citizenship, something contradictory to the tendencies of modernizing societies where associative life tends to pass from the religious plane to the civic and secular.




Figure IX-1. Interpersonal Trust Measured by Trust in Neighbors by Country

Political Interest

Political interest is fundamental to motivate people to participate in social organizations. To measure interest in politics, we constructed a scale with three questions regarding general political interest, reading, watching, or listening to political news, and discussing politics. The questions are:

<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR</p>
<p>DOMPOL3. ¿Con que frecuencia lee, oye o ve noticias de política: con frecuencia, a veces, o nunca?</p>
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer alternativas) 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) NS/NR</p>

Dominicans' political interest average on this scale of 0-to-100 is 41.9. In Figure IX-2, we find that men's average political interest is 46.5, compared to an average of 37.8 for women. This means that, in the surveys, men showed greater political interest than women according to the three questions used in the scale indicated above.




Figure IX-2. Scale of Political Interest by Sex




Figure IX-3. Scale of Political Interest by Urban vs. Rural

However, we did not find any substantial difference between the political interest average in urban and rural areas (Figure IX-3). But, as expected, in Figure IX-4 the level of political interest increases with the level of education. The difference is more than 10 points on the political interest scale among those with no schooling (35.3) and those who studied at the university (45.5).




Figure IX-4. Scale of Political Interest by Education

To more completely understand the factors that influence political interest, we ran a linear regression on the political interest scale. The results of the regression appear in Table IX-1. It can be seen that the significant factors influencing political interest among Dominicans are sex, educational level, and age. As Figure IX-2 shows, men express much more interest in politics than women. When we take into account the effect of the other variables, women score 8.5 points less than men on the political interest scale. We also see that interest in politics increases with more years of education and the older a person is. For each additional year of education, respondents increased their position on the political interest scale by .56, and for each additional year of age, they increased it .11.

Table IX-1. Factors that Explain Political Interest: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	t.	Sig.
Constante	37.324	3.865		9.656	.000
Mujer	-8.503	1.441	-.150	-5.899	.000
Casado/Unido	.597	1.485	.010	.402	.688
Educación	.564	.176	.096	3.204	.001
Edad	.110	.049	.062	2.249	.025
Riqueza individual	-.263	.450	-.017	-.584	.560
Urbano	.924	1.632	.015	.566	.571
R-cuadro (Adj.) = .03					

Participation in Civic and Political Organizations

In terms of the level of associative life, the survey asked various questions regarding attendance at different kinds of association meetings, such as religious, parent-teacher, women's, and community improvement. The series of questions regarding participation in these organizations can be seen below.

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.

CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....
CP8. ¿De un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?
CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...
DOMCP14 ¿De asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa?

Figure IX-5 shows the percentage of respondents who indicated they participated in each of the organizations at least once-a-week. Religious organizations showed the highest level of social participation. This group has a much higher level of participation than all other ones included in the survey. Of the Dominicans interviewed, 39% said that they attended a religious organization meeting at least once-a-week. The group with the second highest level is that which attended local improvement committee meetings, with 6.9% weekly participation.




Figure IX-5. Weekly Participation in Civic Organizations

Since participation in religious organizations is much greater than participation in any other type of organization, we excluded religious participation from the scale of civic participation. Furthermore, as shown later on, there are important differences between people who attend religious meetings and those who participate in other organizations.¹²

We constructed a scale of civic participation that included participation in the following organizations: parent-teacher associations, community improvement committees, unions, women’s or housewives’ associations, and associations of professionals, merchants or peasants. Participation in party and political movement meetings are not included in this scale since attendance at political meetings is a measure of political participation rather

¹² It might be that the respondents who go to mass or another religious services every week include this type of participation in their responses to this question. It is not clear whether attendance at this type of meeting, whether a mass or other service, should be included as a measure of civic participation.

than civic participation. Political parties or other organizations that pursue political or state power are normally not considered as civil society organizations. Therefore, we use attending religious meetings as a measure of religious participation, attending political party meetings as a measure of political participation, and the scale of attendance of meetings of other groups as a measure of civic participation.¹³




Figure IX-6. Participation in Various Types of Organizations

Figure IX-6 shows the average in each of these 0-to-100 point scales measuring the intensity of civic, political, and religious participation. The civic participation average is

¹³ For the three types of participation, we have scales ranging from 0-to-100. Non-attendance gets no points on the scale, attendance once- or twice-a-year gets 33 points, monthly attendance gets 67 points, and weekly attendance gets 100 points. In the case of the participation scale, for each respondent we took the average level of participation in the five organizations included in the construction of the scale.

less than the party or religious averages. The civic participation average is only 12.4 while the party participation is 17.8 and the religious is 56.0.




Figure IX-7. Participation in Various Types of Organization by Sex

Figure IX-7 shows the differences by sex on the civic, religious, and political participation scales. Women show a slightly higher average than men in civic participation and significantly higher in religious participation, but less in political party participation. These figures are not unusual. Traditionally, public space, of which the parties are an expression, was reserved for men, while the religious and social fields were for women. Still, men’s participation in religious activities is high, and women’s participation in political parties should not be scorned. This data reveals that Dominican women are not far behind the men in party activity. However, although they support political parties to the same degree as men, they do not participate as actively in them.




Figure IX-8. Participation in the Components of the Civic Participation Scale by Sex

In the components of the civic participation scale in Figure IX-8, and as expected due to traditional sex roles, women show greater levels of participation in parent-teacher and women’s associations, but men participate more in community improvement committees, unions, and professional and peasant associations. That is, women participate more in organizations related to their traditional roles as women, mothers, and housewives, while men attend more meetings that have to do with the working world and the community. These sex-based differences are statistically significant for each type of organization on the scale.




Figure IX-9. Participation in Various Kinds of Organizations by Civil State

In terms of marital status, married people (including couples living together) have slightly higher civic participation averages, less religious participation, and the same degree of political party participation as single people. It can be seen in Figure IX-9 that the difference between married (and coupled) and single people is only significant on the civic participation scale. It is to be expected that people in marital unions have higher levels of civic participation, since some of the organizations that comprise this scale are related to children, such as parent-teacher associations. The robust level of religious participation by single people, however, is surprising. This result might be influenced by the presence of many single mothers who do not appear in the category of married or coupled, but in reality conform households with their children. In other words, although they are single in terms of marital status, their lives generally correspond to the dynamic of married people or couples living together.

The data by regions in Figure IX-10 shows that the North has the highest civic, political party, and religious organization participation averages. The region with the lowest civic participation average is the metropolitan area, precisely the area with the densest population. Religious participation is lowest in the South, and the lowest level of political participation is found in the East. The difference between the North and the lowest region in each type of participation is statistically significant.

It is hard to offer explanations of this phenomena without more empirical data to serve as support. But the greater civic, political, and religious participation in the North might be due to the fact that this region, although it is the second most densely populated after Santo Domingo, is organized into small provinces, cities and municipalities where civic and political participation is more feasible. Additionally, compared to the East and South, the North is economically more prosperous and is home to cities that are more dynamic commercially and socially. In other words, the combination of greater economic prosperity and medium-sized cities might explain the higher levels social and political activism of the northern region.




Figure IX-10. Participation in Various Kinds of Organizations by Region

We see in Figure IX-11 that the rural population has slightly higher levels of civic, religious, and political participation. The difference between urban and rural areas is statistically significant in the case of civic and political party participation, but not so in the case of religious organizations, although it is believed that rural people are more inclined to participate in religious organizations than urban ones.




Figure IX-11. Participation in Various Kinds of Organizations by Urban vs. Rural




Figure IX-12. Participation in Various Kinds of Organizations by Education

We also see in Figure IX-12 that more education is associated with more civic participation. Specifically, people with a university education participate at significantly higher levels than people who did not attend the university. Additionally, respondents without formal education participate in civic organizations at significantly lower levels than people with some schooling. However, we do not see any differences between people of different educational levels in terms of participation in religious organizations and political parties.




Figure IX-13. Participation in Various Kinds of Organizations by Political Interest

Finally, Figure IX-13 shows the differences in civic, religious, and political participation by levels of political interest. We see a positive and significant relation between political interest and participation in the different types of organizations. The effect is most striking in political party participation. Here, people with much political interest have an average four times greater than people without political interest (36.8 compared to 8.7). The only exception to this general tendency (of greater political interest tied to greater participation in organizations) occurs in the case of participation in religious organizations, where people with much political interest participate less. It could be that a high level of political interest is an expression of greater secularism and, therefore, leads to a drop in religious activity participation.

To end the analysis of participation by attending civic organization meetings, we present a linear regression of the civic participation scale. Table IX-2 shows the results of this analysis. The model includes, as factors that could explain civic participation, sex, civil state, age, education, urban versus rural residence, personal wealth, political interest (measured on the scale developed earlier in this chapter), and support for the political system (a variable explained in Chapter IV).

Table IX-2. Factors that Explain Civic Participation: Results of the Linear Regression

	B	S.E.	Beta	T	Sig.
Constante	-4.484	2.058		-2.179	.029
Mujer	2.053	.668	.077	3.075	.002
Casado/Unido	2.900	.682	.106	4.252	.000
Edad	.032	.023	.038	1.424	.155
Educación	.351	.081	.125	4.329	.000
Urbano	4.653	.746	.158	6.236	.000
Riqueza individual	-.054	.203	-.007	-.265	.791
Interés Político	.120	.012	.253	10.137	.000
Apoyo al Sistema	-.011	.015	-.019	-.742	.458
R cuadrado (Adj.) = .11					

The factors with significant effects on civic participation are sex, civil state, education, urban residence, and political interest. Women participate more than men, and married people or couples living together more than single people. More years of education results in a higher level of civic participation. Contrary to what we saw in the analysis of Figure IX-12, when we introduce the other control variables in the linear regression, we find that more urban people participate in civic organizations than people who live in rural areas. Finally, as we saw in the bivariable analysis, political interest produces greater participation in civic organizations.

Active Participation in the Solution of Local Problems

Besides attending organization meetings, active participation in the community constitutes an important form of civic participation. In fact, it might be that working together with one’s neighbors to resolve local problems increases participants’ civic and democratic attitudes even more than attending organization meetings. Therefore, in this section we examine some questions in the survey that have to do with more active participation than in association meetings.

One question, in which respondents say whether they had contributed in some way to the solution of a community problem, shows that 44% of the total sample contributed. Figure IX-14 shows the relation between participating in the solution of local problems and the region where the respondent lives. Active participation in the resolution of local problems appears highest in the North and almost 20 points less in the South, the region that shows

the lowest levels. We also find, in data not presented in the figures, that participating in the solution of local problems is greater in rural areas than urban ones, but this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure IX-14. Active Participation in the Resolution of Local Problems by Region




Figure IX-15. Active Participation in the Resolution of Local Problems by Sex

Figure IX-15 shows that participation in the resolution of local problems is much greater among men than women: 51.9% of men contributed to their resolution within the previous year, while only 35.9% of women did so. This result also reflects what we found in Figure IX-8, where we saw that men are more likely to participate in local improvement committee meetings.

Figure IX-16 shows the relation between contributing to the community and educational levels. Here, participation consistently increases with higher educational levels: 52.8% of people with a university education had contributed to resolve a local problem, but only 27.6% of people without any formal education contributed to their community to help solve a problem – almost half the level of participation among university graduates.




Figure IX-16. Active Participation in the Resolution of Local Problems by Education

Of those who said they helped resolve a problem in their community or neighborhood, Figure IX-17 shows how they contributed. Of contributors, 66.8% provided their own labor, 64.4% donated money or materials, 64.3% attended local meetings, and 35.8% promoted the organization of a new group to resolve a problem.




Figure IX-17. Ways of Participating to Resolve Local Problems

Relations Between the Community and the State

The relationship between communities and elected authorities or government officials was analyzed with survey questions that inquired about the assistance that respondents requested of a congressional deputy, municipal authority, or public institution. We used the following series of questions.

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismos, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.		
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso	1	2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (síndico, regidor)	1	2
CP4. A alguna secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2




Figure IX-18. Requests Made to Government Officials to Resolve Local Problems

Figure IX-18 shows that, to resolve a personal or community problem, 10.2% of respondents stated they had requested assistance from a deputy, 7.1% from a public institution or state official, and 13.6% from a local authority. Local authorities received more petitions than representatives of other levels of government, and non-elected government offices did not receive as many petitions as elected deputies. Still, the majority of Dominicans did not ask authorities for assistance, and when they did, they seem to direct their requests to municipal officials or deputies rather than government offices.

We see in Figure IX-19 that the percentage who requested assistance from an official, especially at the local level where we find a significant difference, is greater in rural areas. Of rural residents, 18.3% say that they had requested assistance from a local authority while only 11.7% of urban residents had done so.




Figure IX-19. Requests to Government Officials to Resolve Local Problems, by Urban vs. Rural

Figure IX-20 shows the relation between an interest in politics and requests to the government for assistance resolving local problems. People who show a greater interest in politics tend to request more assistance than those who have less political interest, especially in the case of a deputy or local authority. In terms of asking a deputy for assistance, the difference between those who have an interest in politics and those who do not is 14 points: 6% of people without an interest in politics say they had asked a deputy, while 20% of people with much interest in politics requested some kind of help from a deputy to resolve a community problem. This difference could be the result of the fact that people with an interest in politics are more willing to think of politics as a way to resolve problems; or it could be that those with an interest in politics have more political connections through whom they make petitions.




Figure IX-20. Requests to Government Officials to Resolve Local Problems, by Political Interest

Protest as a Form of Participation

Public political action is not limited to organizations or petitions, but also includes the possibility of demonstrations or public protests. In the LAPOP survey, we included two questions about protests. A very general one asked about participating in a protest at some time in a respondent's life, and another more specific one inquired about participating in a protest or demonstration within the preceding year. These are the questions:

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]

PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?




Figure IX-21. Participating in Protests

Figure IX-21 shows that 15.2% of respondents said they had participated in a protest at some time, while 5.3% said they had participated in the last year. The current level of protest in the Dominican Republic is not very high, although 15% of the population has protested at some time in their life.

Participation in both cases is greater among men than women. This relation is shown in Figure IX-22. The difference between the sexes is much higher when we include all protests during one's life, perhaps because women were less active in protests. This difference, however, is currently smaller.




Figure IX-22. Participating in Protests by Sex

Finally, we see in Figure IX-23 that participation in protests and demonstrations is greater among people with higher levels of education. The number of people with a university education who participated in a protest at some time during their life is close to 30%, while it is only 10% for people without a formal education.

It is also interesting to note that there is a significant relation between age and participation in protests. The percentage of those who said they had participated at some time increases with age, except among the oldest, but there is not much variation by age in public protest participation during the last year.




Figure IX-23. Participating in Protests by Education

The data presented in this chapter shows that, in terms of community interpersonal trust, the Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position in relation to the Latin American countries included in the LAPOP project. The level of political interest turns out to be higher among men and people with higher educational levels, and participation in associative activities with a religious character is shown to be high. On the civic, political-party, and religious participation scales that we constructed, civic participation has the lowest levels and religious the highest. This indicates that Dominican associative life has a strong religious component. Women participate more in religious activities, in parent-teacher organizations, and in women's associations. Men, by contrast, participate more in community improvement committees, professional associations, unions, and political organizations. In this study we find that the northern region shows the highest levels of associative participation for all three kinds: civic, political, and religious.

Chapter X Gender and Migration

Gender

Greater acceptance of women's equality in public and domestic spheres is one of the most important changes in Dominican public opinion during the last decade. Various factors explain this phenomena, including the insertion of women in the educational system and the labor market, as well as the gender education work carried out by various women's organizations and the mass media.

This change of opinion, favorable to greater women's participation in politics, was accompanied by reforms in the Dominican legislation that favored such participation. The passage of a female electoral quota in 1997 established a minimum of 25% congressional deputy and municipal council seats should go to female candidates. In 2000, this quota was raised to 33%. While this minimum of 33% has still not been attained at the congressional or municipal levels, the quota has served to keep the topic of women's political representation on the public agenda.




Figure X-1. Attitudes about Women in Politics

Figure X-1 shows the tendency for greater acceptance of women's participation in politics over the last 12 years, the period for which we have systematic public opinion survey information: DEMOS 1994-2004 and LAPOP 2006. A consistent and rising

tendency was registered in the opinion that women should participate as much as men in politics, with a temporary decline in 2004 in the opinion that women should participate more in politics. There is wide disagreement with the idea that politics is a man's affair. There has been an advance in the level of trust in women as candidates, with the exception of a slight decline in 2004. However, the decline in the opinion that women have the same capacity to govern as men starting in 2004 was maintained in 2006.

To arrive at a solid explanation for this 2004 decline in favorable attitudes towards women's participation requires reflection as well as more information. In the meantime, we can assume that the male-chauvinist rhetoric demonstrated by the Hipólito Mejía administration might have contributed to this step backwards. Paradoxically, the Mejía administration had a woman vice-president; and it is possible that its own political exhaustion might have operated against women in their struggle to be accepted and valued in the political world.

Greater public support for the occupation of political posts by women is important to induce change. For this reason, the decline in the favorable opinion regarding the political participation of women in 2004 is worrying. On the positive side, however, this negative tendency reversed itself to become favorable for women in almost all the questions asked in the 2006 LAPOP survey.




Figure X-2. Support for Women in Politics

Figures X-2 and X-3 show the percentage differences between 2004 and 2006 with respect to: disagreement with the notion that politics is a man’s affair, the belief that women should participate more in politics, and the view that, as candidates, women inspire the same trust as men. In all these opinions there was a change favorable to women between these two years, although there was a small decline in the view that women have at least the same capacity as men to govern. There was also a slight increase over the last two years, from 73.3% to 77%, regarding the idea that women should participate as much as men in politics.




Figure X-3. Trust in Women as Candidates and Rulers

Figure X-4 shows the scale, from 0-to-5 points, measuring the level of support for the participation of women in politics. The scale was created with the five questions shown in Figure X-1: whether or not one approves of women participating more in politics, whether or not women inspire more trust than men as candidates, whether or not women have the same capacity as men to govern, whether women should participate in politics as much as men, and whether or not one believes that politics is a man’s affair.

With this information summarized on a scale, we see the rising tendency of support for the participation of women in politics, with a decline in 2004 and a rebound in 2006. We also find that the difference between men and women grows substantially from 1994 (when there was no significant difference) to 2006 (when there was). Both in 2004 and 2006, women on average favor female political participation more than men. In 2004, men’s average on the scale is 3.1 and women’s average is 3.5. In 2006, the difference between the sexes grows: men have an average of 3.3 and women of 3.8.

Education has a clear positive impact on the acceptance of women’s participation in politics, as Figure X-5 shows: the greater the level of education the greater the acceptance. A university education produces an average of 4.4 in 2006 and 4.1 in 2004. But people without any formal education have an average of 3.1 in both years. This is a difference over more than one point on the scale of support for women in politics with a range of 0-to-5.




Figure X-5. Scale of Support for Women in Politics by Education

Besides the impact of demographic factors on support for women’s participation in politics, we consider the effect of attitudes about women in other parts of life, like the home and work. For example, Figure X-6 shows that those who believe a woman should only work when a man’s income is insufficient tend to support the political participation of women less. This relation is present in both 2004 and 2006.




Figure X-6. Scale of Support for Women in Politics by Support for Women at Work

Greater acceptance of the participation of women in decision making also appears in the domestic sphere. Figure X-7 shows an increase from 54.6% to 63.3% between 2004 and 2006 in the opinion that men and women should make the important decisions about their home collectively. This increase comes as a result of the decline in the percentage of respondents who think that men should make the important decisions. Alternatively, women are more supportive of the idea that women make important decisions, while men are more supportive of the idea that men make them. The difference is statistically significant. Greater education is related to the idea that decision-making in the home should be shared by the couple. But the oldest people and the poorest tend to favor decision making by men.

To compare the impact of all these factors together and control for their effects, we ran a linear regression on the scale of support for women in politics. The independent variables in the model are: support for women at work, attitudes regarding decision making in the home, sex, age, education, personal wealth, and civil status. The results of the regression are presented in Table X-1. The regression has an adjusted R-squared of .21, which indicates that the model explains an important part of the variation on the scale of support for women in politics.

Table X-1. Linear Regression of the Support for Women in Politics Scale

	B	S.E.	Beta	t	Sig.
Constante	1.44	.15		9.68	.00
Apoyo a la mujer en el trabajo	.72	.10	.19	7.57	.00
La mujer debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar	.37	.22	.04	1.68	.09
La mujer y el hombre deben tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar	.79	.08	.26	9.84	.00
Mujer	.40	.07	.13	5.50	.00
Edad	.06	.02	.06	2.37	.02
Educación	.04	.01	.14	4.71	.00
Riqueza individual	.09	.02	.11	4.06	.00
Casado/Unido	-.05	.07	-.02	-.73	.47
R cuadrado (Adj.) = .21					

The factors that have a significant impact are: support for women at work, support for the role of women in decision making in the home, being a woman, age, education, and personal wealth. The only factor with no significant relation is civil state. The relation between sex and support for women was the most expected; here we find women are more willing to support female participation than men. The rights of women at work and in the home promote more positive attitudes regarding the political participation of women. Age, education, and personal wealth have positive impacts on support for women in politics. In other words, older, more educated, and wealthier respondents express greater levels of support for the political participation of women.




Figure X-7. Making Important Decision in the Home

Opinions Regarding Abortion

To learn about opinions regarding the construction of reproductive rights and access to public health services, we included a question about abortion in the questionnaire. The question included two possible answers: approval of abortion in the case of health risk, rape, and incest, or disapproval in all circumstances. Fifty-nine% expressed total opposition, while 41% showed support for abortions in the circumstances noted above. There was 43.7% support among men, and 39% among women (Figure X-8). Although the difference does not reach a statistically significant level, men are more supportive of women’s right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. It is possible that the sex-based difference is the result of Dominican women being more religious than men, or of the levels of education and income that also affect attitudes toward abortion.




Figure X-8. Percentage Who Agree with Interrupting a Pregnancy When the Mother’s Health Is at Risk and in the Case of Incest or Rape, by Sex

Approval of abortion under certain circumstances rises considerably among people with a university education. Figure X-9 shows that the greater the education the greater the acceptance of abortion in the signaled circumstances. Of people with a university education, 64.4% support abortions in the indicated situations, while only 23.1% of people without schooling do so.




Figure X-9. Percentage Who Agree with Interrupting a Pregnancy When the Mother’s Health Is at Risk and in the Case of Incest or Rape, by Educational Level

The same occurs with the level of personal wealth. There was over 75% support in the two groups of greatest wealth: 100% of the richest people support the right to abort under certain circumstances, while only 21 and 24% of the two poorest groups accept it. This relation appears in Figure X-10.




Figure X-10. Percentage Who Agree with Interrupting a Pregnancy When the Mother’s Health Is at Risk and in the Case of Incest or Rape, by Personal Wealth

Migration: Haitian and Dominican

Dominican society is a receiver and sender of migrants. It receives an important flow of Haitians and, at the same time, many Dominicans emigrate abroad, especially to the United States and Europe.

The LAPOP survey formulated two questions about Haitian immigration. One asks whether respondents agree or disagree that the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be Dominican citizens. On a scale of 0-to-100 points, higher values indicate more approval of bestowing citizenship. The average response to this question is 43.4.

The other question asks whether respondents agree or disagree with the Dominican government handing out work permits to undocumented Haitians who live in the Dominican Republic. The response average to this question is 40.9.

The attitudes regarding Haitians vary little by region of the country, with the exception of the South where there is greater rejection of handing out work permits to undocumented Haitians. This greater rejection might be because of the larger Haitian presence in this region, as the South is the transit and work zone of Haitians.




Figure X-11. Attitudes Regarding Haitians in the Dominican Republic by Region




Figure X-12. Attitudes Regarding Haitians in the Dominican Republic by Ethnic Identification

Approval of Haitians’ rights is greater among people who identify themselves as black compared to other racial groups (Figure X-12). The relation between racial self-identification and support for Haitians could result from the fact that many black people are descendents of Haitians, or that people who self-identify as black are more tolerant because of their shared race.

Approval for both questions consistently increases with higher levels of education. Additionally, and this is particularly interesting, the greatest level of support in both questions comes from Dominicans who said they had lived outside of the Dominican Republic. It is possible that their own experience of marginality, which Dominicans feel when they emigrate, helps them to better identify with the situation of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic.




Figure X-13. Percentage Who Receive Remittances from Abroad by Region

Regarding Dominican migration abroad, we find that 19.6% of respondents said they received remittances from abroad. The Santo Domingo and Santiago areas, the richest in the country, capture more remittances than the East and South (Figure X-13). The same occurs in terms of urban and rural areas: urban areas have a significantly higher level of remittances than rural ones.

In turn, a larger segment in wealthier groups receives remittances. We see in Figure X-14 that 40% of the richest respondents receive remittances, while only 2.9% of the poorest receive them.




Figure X-14. Percentage Who Receive Remittances from Abroad by Personal Wealth

As Figure X-15 shows, an important proportion of those people with family members residing abroad receive remittances, while only 6.8% of people without family abroad receive them. Of respondents with family members in the United States and other countries, 47.3% receive remittances; and 41.7% of those who have family members only in the United States, and 44.9% of those with family members in other countries besides the United States, receive them.

The average amount of money that beneficiaries say they receive is between 3,501 y 5,250 pesos per month; people who depend somewhat or little on the remittances receive 3,500 pesos monthly; and those who do not depend on them receive around 1,750 pesos per month.




Figure X-15. Percentage Who Receive Remittances from Abroad from Close Family Members in Other Countries

Of the population interviewed in 2006, 35.9% expressed the intention of living or working abroad. People in the Santo Domingo area and the North headed the list, with 39.4% and 40.2% respectively; the South showed a lower percentage of people who planned on living or working abroad, with only 21.5%.

The intention of leaving the country increases with educational level, but falls among those with a university education. Of people with secondary education, 48.3% intend to go live in another country within three years, this being the highest level among all educational groups (Figure X-16).




Figure X-16. Percentage Intending to Go Live or Work Abroad by Education

By contrast, the intention of moving abroad declines with age. The youngest want to leave the country in a high proportion (Figure X-17): 54% of the young want to leave the country, while less than 20% of people older than 45 years of age want to live in another country.




Figure X-17. Percentage Intending to Go Live or Work Abroad by Age

In summary, this chapter presents information to evaluate the progress in public opinion toward greater approval of women's participation in politics and their rights to make personal and household decisions. Despite the decline in approval in 2004, there was a rebound in 2006 in line with the tendencies registered between 1994 and 2001. Although there is still much to achieve in this field, in terms of advances in public policies favoring women, significant changes in public opinion have been achieved.

Regarding migratory processes, attitudes toward Haitian migration are divided in the country, with a tendency to reject giving them rights. The opinion average leans toward disapproval of handing out work permits to undocumented Haitians and of bestowing citizenship on the children of Haitians born in Dominican territory. There is greater acceptance among people with more education, those who identify themselves as black, and those who have lived outside of the Dominican Republic.

In terms of Dominican migration, the data reveal that around 20% of respondents receive remittances. It is striking that a high percentage of remittances are destined to wealthier Dominicans. This supports the idea that the migration is not simply a phenomena of poor people abandoning their countries, but is also a social option for people from the middle class who cannot acheive their desired level of consumption in their native country. It cannot pass unnoticed that 35.9% of the population plans on going to live outside the country, and that this percentage rises to 54% among young people.

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ANNEX A: Technical Description of the Sample

AUDITORIA DE LA DEMOCRACIA LA REPÚBLICA
DOMINICANA 2006
DESCRIPCIÓN TÉCNICA DE LA MUESTRA



Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.

INFORME DISEÑO MUESTRAL

LAPOP 2006

Junio de 2006

1. POBLACIÓN

La Población objeto para este estudio está constituida por la población civil no institucional residentes en el país de 18 años o más en pleno ejercicio de sus facultades físicas y legales.

2. UNIVERSO

El Universo de la encuesta contemplará una cobertura nacional, 32 Provincias representadas en 225 Municipios que conforman las cuatro regiones en que se divide geográficamente el país: I Metropolitana, II Norte, III Este y IV Sur, y por demarcación urbana y rural.

3. MARCO MUESTRAL

El marco de muestreo está constituido por el inventario cartográfico y el listado de viviendas por zona urbana y rural, obtenidos de la información del Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda de 2002.

El país está organizado de la siguiente manera:

DIVISIÓN POLÍTICO ADMINISTRATIVA

- **Región:** Es una división geográfica operativa, que divide al país en cuatro áreas con el criterio de proximidad.
- **Provincia:** Es la delimitación más grande de la división Política-administrativa de la República Dominicana, la misma está constituida por municipios o distrito municipales.
- **Municipio o Distrito Municipal:** Es la delimitación constituida por Secciones.
- **Sección:** Es la delimitación que está formada por barrios si es en zona urbana, y por parajes en la zona rural. Esta división clasifica la zona de residencia en urbano-rural.

- **Barrio/Paraje:** Es la delimitación más pequeña de la división Política-administrativa, cuando es urbano ésta delimitación recibe el nombre de barrio, cuando es rural recibe el nombre de paraje.

División Política-administrativa		
REGIÓN	PROVINCIA	MUNICIPIO DISTRITO MUNICIPAL
Metro	2	9
Norte	14	105
Este	6	32
Sur	10	79
TOTAL	32	225

DIVISIÓN CENSAL

- **Polígonos:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de diez (10) áreas de supervisión.
- **Áreas de Supervisión Censal (ASC):** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo, la misma está formada por un promedio de cinco (5) segmentos censales.
- **Segmentos Censales:** Es una división logística-operacional de trabajo de campo. Es la delimitación más pequeña de la División Censal, contiene de 12 a 24 hogares en la zona rural y de 25 a 35 hogares en la zona urbana.

4. UNIDADES DE OBSERVACIÓN-UNIDAD FINAL DE SELECCIÓN

La **unidad final de observación** es el hogar y la persona debe pertenecer a un solo hogar.

A su vez, todo hogar habita una vivienda que puede ser compartida con otros hogares. La vivienda es una unidad fácil de identificar en el terreno, con cierta permanencia en el tiempo, por lo que será considerada como la **unidad final de selección**, identificada en un segmento censal.

5. TAMAÑO DE LA MUESTRA

El tamaño de la muestra es de 1500 entrevistas efectivas a nivel nacional, distribuidas por regiones y áreas.

Para la Región Metropolitana se realizará una muestra adicional de 1000 entrevistas efectivas, distribuidas en los 9 municipios que conforman la región.

6. ESTRATIFICACIÓN

La primera estratificación consiste en la división del país en cuatro (4) Regiones, a saber; I Región Metropolitana, II Región Norte, III Región Este, IV Región Sur.

La segunda estratificación consistió en dividir la población entre demarcación urbana y rural, utilizando para ello el criterio establecido por la Oficina Nacional de Estadística (ONE) en el Censo Nacional de Población y Familia del año 2002.

La región Metropolitana será considerada con demarcación Urbana en su totalidad.

7. MÉTODO DE MUESTREO

El diseño de muestreo es probabilística hasta la selección de la vivienda, estratificado, y polietápico por Conglomerados, con selección aleatoria de unidades en cada etapa.

Probabilístico: cada elemento de la población bajo estudio tiene una probabilidad conocida, y diferente de cero, de ser seleccionado en la muestra.

Estratificado: las unidades de observación se agrupan con base a características similares, por Regiones (I-IV) y por áreas (urbano y rural).

Polietápico por Conglomerados: las unidades de observación se seleccionan a través de las siguientes etapas.

Definiciones:

Unidades Primarias de Muestreo (UPM): Municipios

Unidades Secundarias de Muestreo (USM): Áreas de Supervisión Censal que comprenden alrededor de 160 viviendas en promedio.

Unidades Terciarias de Muestreo (UTM): Segmentos Censales que en general comprenden entre 25 a 35 viviendas en las áreas urbanas y de 12 a 24 en las áreas rurales, en los casos en que la cantidad de viviendas sea menor a 8 se formarán grupos de Segmentos Censales conformados por un conjunto de viviendas no menor a 8 en el área urbana y no menor a 12 en las áreas rurales.

Unidades Finales de Selección (UFS): Conglomerados de tamaño 6 a 8 en el área urbana y de 10 a 12 en el área rural.

Unidad Final de Observación: Son las viviendas y dentro de estas, el hogar.

Vivienda: Se define como vivienda, todo local o recinto estructuralmente separado e independiente que ha sido construido, hecho o convertido para fines de alojamiento permanente o temporal de personas, así como cualquier clase de albergue fijo o móvil, ocupado como lugar de alojamiento a la fecha de un censo o una encuesta.

Comentario: La vivienda puede estar construida por un conjunto de cuartos o un cuarto, apartamento o casa destinada a alojar a un grupo de personas o a una sola persona.

Hogar censal: Es la unidad formada por personas o grupos de persona, con o sin vínculos familiares; que comparten la misma vivienda y los mismos servicios y mantienen un presupuesto común para comer. Pueden ocupar toda la vivienda o parte de la misma.

Familia: Grupo de personas emparentadas entre sí o que viven juntas.

Unidad Final de Estudio: En cada unidad de vivienda de estos conglomerados se seleccionará solamente un hogar como Unidad de Observación; finalmente en cada hogar visitado se seleccionará para entrevistar **a uno y sólo un adulto** en edad de votar. La selección del informante específico a entrevistar corresponde al entrevistador, quien tiene como única limitación el cumplimiento de la cuota asignada.

Este diseño permite proveer estimaciones confiables para las principales variables y características socio-demográficas consideradas en el estudio, para los siguientes grupos:

- nivel nacional para la población de referencia
- por región geográfica (I-IV)
- por área urbano y rural.

8. NIVELES DE CONFIANZA Y MARGENES DE ERROR.

Para una muestra de 1500 el nivel de confianza previsto para toda la muestra nacional fue del 95% ($Z_{.95} = 1.965$), con un margen de error de ± 2.5 , asumiendo una proporción 50/50 ($P = 50$, $Q = 1 - P$) para variables dicotómicas, en el peor de los casos.

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n}}$$

Donde

E = Intervalo de error probable

P = Porcentaje de población con un atributo dado del 50%.

Q = $(1 - P)$ Porcentaje de población sin el atributo considerado en $P, Q = 50\%$

Z = Valor de la distribución normal. Para un nivel de confianza del 95%, este valor es 1.965.

n = Tamaño de muestra.

El error cometido a nivel nacional es 2.54%, esto es considerando un muestreo aleatorio simple; como este es un diseño polietápico por conglomerado, debemos considerar el efecto del diseño (DEF)⁽¹⁾.

DEF = Efecto de diseño. Relación de varianzas del diseño de muestras utilizado por conglomerados, respecto a un muestreo simple aleatorio.

$$DEF = \frac{Var(M.Comglomerados)}{Var(MAS)}$$

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ * (DEF)}{n}}$$

El DEF ha sido estimado por estudios similares realizados el año 2005, el cual varía entre 1.5 y 2.1, dependiendo de la región y la demarcación.

El error cometido a nivel nacional considerando el efecto del diseño promedio (1.8), es de 3.40%.

(1) Mitchell A. Seligson, Polibio Córdova; "Auditoria de la Democracia Ecuador 2004" pag184

Estimaciones de DEF según demarcación y regiones:

Demarcación	DEF ESTIMADO
Urbano	1.55
Rural	2.06
Total Nacional	1.8

Regiones	DEF ESTIMADO
I. Metro	1.6
II. Norte	1.75
III. Este	1.5
IV. Sur	1.5

El error cometido por región y por demarcación se muestra en la siguiente tabla

Distribución de la Muestra por Región , por Demarcación y Margen de Error			
Regiones	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
I. Metro	458	4.59	5.81
II. Norte	578	4.09	5.41
III. Este	202	6.91	8.47
IV. Sur	262	6.07	7.43

Demarcación	Tamaño de la Muestra	Margen de Error M.A.S (%)	Margen de Error M.P.C (%)
Urbana	1050	3.03	3.77
Rural	450	4.63	6.65
Total Nacional	1500	2.53	3.40

9. AJUSTE POR NO COBERTURA

Para asegurar la eficiencia, suficiencia y precisión de la muestra se adoptó un sistema de muestreo con ajuste por no cobertura, el cual garantiza la ejecución de la muestra con los tamaños estimados como mínimos dentro de los niveles de confianza y de error máximo permisible. El método es posible por el conocimiento que se tiene de la “No cobertura” observada en estudios similares. Este ajuste consiste en aplicar a los tamaños de la muestra estimados para cada estrato, dominio un factor de no cobertura (t), con el cual se calcula el tamaño operativo final de selección (n^*)⁽²⁾ dado por:

$$n^* = (1 + t)n$$

t = tasa de no entrevista. Esta tasa considera situaciones de no cobertura (no entrevista, rechazos, viviendas desocupadas, ausencia de adulto, o imposibilidad de entrevistarlo, entre otros eventos). Según la experiencia de Gallup República Dominicana en estudios similares, la tasa promedio de no entrevista es de 0.22.

$$n^* = (1 + 0.22)1500$$

$$n^* = 1830$$

De esta manera entonces, el tamaño final de la muestra será se 1830 unidades.

(2) Mitchell A. Seligson, Polibio Córdova; “Auditoria de la Democracia Ecuador 2004” pag186

10. CALCULOS DE TAMAÑOS POR REGIÓN, POR ESTRATOS Y # DE UPMs

El Diseño de la muestra consideró asignación de unidades de selección para las 32 provincias del país, si bien la muestra no es suficiente para representar a la provincia respectiva, pero sí a las 4 regiones.

La cantidad de UPM a seleccionar será de 67. En la primera etapa de selección el número de Municipios (UPM) a seleccionar será de 1 Municipio por cada 25.000 viviendas por Región; la Región Metropolitana está formada por 9 municipios, todos serán considerados en la muestra. Las 58 Municipios faltantes se seleccionaron mediante muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

Una vez seleccionados los Municipios se determinó la población urbana y rural para la asignación de tamaños con probabilidad proporcional al tamaño, para la selección de las Áreas de Supervisión Censal (USM). La Región Metropolitana se consideró urbana en su totalidad. Para la selección de las USM, se utilizó un muestreo aleatorio sistemático.

De cada Área de Supervisión Censal (USM), se seleccionaron 2 Segmentos Censales (UTM), y de cada Segmento se seleccionará 1 conglomerado de tamaño 6 a 8 en la zona urbana y de 10 a 12 en la zona rural.

La distribución de las UPM, USM y UTM fue la siguiente:

REGIÓN	# UPM	# USM AREAS URBANAS	# USM AREAS RURAL	# USM AREAS TOTAL	# UTM SEGMENTOS URBANOS	# UTM SEGMENTOS RURALES	# UTM SEGMENTOS TOTAL
Metro	9	44	0	44	88	0	88
Norte	31	27	15	42	53	27	80
Este	11	12	4	16	24	8	32
Sur	16	12	7	19	24	14	38
TOTAL	67	91	26	117	189	49	238

En total la muestra esta constituida por 238 puntos de muestra: 189 urbanas y 49 rurales distribuidas en 225 Municipios de las 32 Provincias.

11. AMPLIACIÓN DE LA REGIÓN METROPOLITANA

La Región Metropolitana está compuesta por 9 Municipios, todos los cuales serán incluidos en la muestra, las áreas de supervisión censal se seleccionaron con probabilidad proporcional a la cantidad de viviendas contenidas en las mismas (PPT). Estas Áreas tienen en promedio 120 viviendas y 4 segmentos censales, dichos segmentos censales tienen generalmente entre 25 y 35 viviendas.

Las áreas previamente seleccionadas, se escogieron 2 segmentos censales con probabilidad proporcional a la cantidad de viviendas en las mismas (PPT), luego en los segmentos escogidos se formarán los cluster que tendrán de 6 a 8 viviendas.

Se escogerá 1 cluster por segmento de manera aleatoria y en cada cluster seleccionado se completará la cuota asignada la cual será elaborada tomando en cuenta la distribución de la población por sexo y grupo de edad.

PROCEDIMIENTO.

La cantidad de entrevistas efectivas para la Región Metropolitana es de $n=1500$ y la tasa de no respuesta estimada es de 22.0%, entonces aplicando esta tasa de no respuesta tenemos el total de viviendas a seleccionar que para $n= 500$ entrevistas efectivas se escogerán $n= (500)*(1.22)= 610$ en, 88 cluster contenidos en 44 áreas de supervisión censal.

Para $n= 1000$ entrevistas efectivas se escogerán $n= (1000)*(1.22)= 1220$ en 176 cluster contenidos en 88 áreas de supervisión censal.

Para determinar la cantidad de área de supervisión censal a seleccionar, tomamos en cuenta el número de viviendas a seleccionar por área.

Para $n=500$, la cantidad de áreas a seleccionar será de $610/14=44$

Para $n=1000$ la cantidad de áreas a seleccionar será de $1220/14=88$

12. UNIVERSO, POBLACION TOTAL DE VIVIENDA, POR REGIONES (METRO, NORTE, ESTE Y SUR) Y POR DEMARCACION (RURAL/URBANA)

POBLACIÓN DE VIVIENDA , REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA SEGÚN CENSO 2002					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	1.519.247	669.381	453.016	196.601	200.249
Rural	666.059		388.465	96.951	180.643
Total	2.185.306	669.381	841.481	293.552	380.892

Distribución Porcentual					
	Total País	Región Metro	Región Norte	Región Este	Región Sur
Urbano	69,5%	100,0%	53,8%	67,0%	52,6%
Rural	30,5%	0,0%	46,2%	33,0%	47,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

13. EXIGENCIAS DEL ESTUDIO

- Cumplimiento de Cuota según Censo por Región de Género y Edad.

RANGO EDAD	POBLACIÓN		HOMBRES		MUJERES	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
18-29	1808883	35,1%	886160	34,9%	922723	35,3%
30-54	2424250	47,0%	1200802	47,3%	1223448	46,8%
>55	921602	17,9%	453789	17,9%	467813	17,9%
TOTAL	5154735	100,0%	2540751	49,3%	2613984	50,7%

- Mínimo 3 visitas, en caso de no encontrar al informante.
- 100% de Supervisión en Campo.
- 30% de Reentrevista.
- El error máximo permitido en la digitación es de 1/1000.

14. DETALLES DEL DISEÑO

Para la determinación de las fracciones de muestreo (f) se deberán considerar las distintas etapas de selección.

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

f_i = Fracción de muestreo de la etapa i

n_i = Tamaño de muestra para etapa i

N_i = Total de viviendas en etapa i

Para cada etapa de etapa de selección la fracción resultante será:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \text{ (etapas 1,2,3 y 4)}$$

Donde:

f_1 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 1: UPM Municipios.

f_2 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 2: UCM Áreas

f_3 = Probabilidad de selección en la etapa 3: UTM Segmentos Censales

f_4 = Probabilidad de selección del conglomerado dentro del segmento.

Dado que se toman conglomerados de h viviendas por segmento de muestra, la fracción se convierte en:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVS}$$

Donde:

TVS = es el número total de viviendas en el segmento

La fracción global de muestreo (probabilidad de selección dentro de cada UPM (Municipio) debe cumplir la condición:

$$PU = \frac{TVA}{TVM} \times \frac{TVS}{TVA} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVS}$$

Donde:

TVM = Total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

TVA = N° de viviendas en el Área (USM)

TVS = N° de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

NH = N° de hogares en las h viviendas del conglomerado seleccionado

h = h hogares a seleccionar en cada conglomerado y 1 persona en cada uno de estos hogares.

Probabilidad final de selección

La probabilidad final de selección del conglomerado (g) está dada por:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_a}{TT} \times \frac{T_s}{T_a} \times \frac{T_g}{T_s} = \frac{T_g}{TT}$$

Donde:

TT = N° total de viviendas en el Municipio (UPM)

T_a = N° de viviendas en el Área (USM)

T_s = N° de viviendas en el Segmento (UTM)

T_g = N° de conglomerados de h viviendas por área

En general la probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado cualquiera en el municipio c está dado por:

$$P_m = \frac{T_{Sm}}{T_{Tm}} = \frac{n_m}{N_M} = f_m$$

Donde:

P_m = Probabilidad de selección de un conglomerado de h viviendas en el municipio

T_{Sm} = N° de segmentos a seleccionar en el municipio y en estas h viviendas finales

T_{Tm} = Total de viviendas en el municipio

n_m = Tamaño de la muestra municipio m

N_m = Tamaño de la población en el municipio m

f_m = Fracción global de muestreo por municipio m (UPM)

ANNEX B: Spanish-Language Questionnaire

Carta de consentimiento informado



Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. para solicitarle una entrevista que durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación del país.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a Gallup al teléfono 567-5123 y preguntar por Carlos Acevedo, persona responsable de este proyecto.

¿Desea Participar?

Versión # V23R; IRB Approval: 060187



LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: La República Dominicana, 2006

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAIS	21
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Estratopri: 1. Región Metropolitana 2. Región Norte 3. Región Este 4. Región Sur 5. Ampliación de la Región Metropolitana	ESTRATOPRI	21 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Provincia : _____	DOMPROV	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Municipio (o Distrito Municipal) UPM: _____	DOMMUNICIPIO	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
UPM (Municipio). _____	UPM	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Sección: _____	DOMSECCION	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Barrio/Paraje _____	DOMBARRIO	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Polígono Censal _____	DOMPOLIGONO	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Area Censal _____	DOMAREACEN	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Santo Domingo (región metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande (> 100,000) 3. Ciudad mediana (25,000-99,000) 4. Ciudad pequeña (< 25,000) 5. Área rural	TAMANO	
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	DOMIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista dia: ____ mes: ____ año: 2006	FECHA	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	<input type="text"/>
---	-----------	----------------------

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? [**NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN**]

A4

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No Leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta pregunte, ¿significa algo más?]. Aceptar hasta tres alternativas

		Sondee: ¿significa algo más?	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?
	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a las leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en Paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80
NS/NR	88	88	88
Código: Si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0)	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
[Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1].			
DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.]			DEM13D
88 NS/NR. 99. INAP (ninguna o una respuesta)= 99			<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Ahora, cambiando el tema.....[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS/NR	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	SOCT1
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (síndico, regidor)	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. A alguna secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	CP4

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR		PROT1
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap	PROT2

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP	
CP5. ¿En el último año, usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio?	1	2	8	9	CP5A
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿De un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
DOMCP14 ¿De asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa?	1	2	3	4	8	DOMCP14

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general, ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (Leer alternativas) (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1
IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo de si misma o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? 1) Se preocupa sólo de si misma 2) Trata de ayudar al prójimo 8) NS/NR	IT2
IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente, si se les presentara la oportunidad, tratarían de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharían de usted? 1) Sí, se aprovecharían 2) No se aprovecharían 8) NS/NR	IT3

ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda					Derecha					(NS/NR=88)

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a o una sesión municipal o una reunión convocada por el síndico durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	NP1B
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, regidor o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el ayuntamiento está dando a la gente son ...?[Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	SGL1
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al ayuntamiento para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR	SGL2
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero al ayuntamiento, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al ayuntamiento (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al ayuntamiento si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR	LGL2
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos al ayuntamiento? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR	LGL3

Vamos a pedirle ahora su opinión sobre algunos servicios

DOMSER1 ¿Cómo usted evalúa en la actualidad los siguientes servicios públicos? ¿El transporte público, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo? 1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR	DOMSER1
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<p>DOMSER2 ¿La educación pública, considera usted que es muy buena, buena, mala, o muy mala?</p> <p>1) Muy buena 2) Buena 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Mala 5) Muy mala 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER2</p>
<p>DOMSER3 ¿Los hospitales públicos, considera usted que son muy buenos, buenos, malos, o muy malos?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER3</p>
<p>DOMSER4 ¿El Seguro Social (IDSS), considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER4</p>
<p>DOMSER5 ¿El servicio de electricidad, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo o muy malo?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER5</p>
<p>DOMSER6 ¿El servicio de la recogida de basura, considera usted que es muy bueno, bueno, malo, o muy malo?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER6</p>
<p>DOMSER7 ¿El servicio de agua potable, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER7</p>
<p>DOMSER8 ¿El servicio de la construcción de viviendas populares, considera usted muy bueno, bueno malo o muy malo?</p> <p>1) Muy bueno 2) Bueno 3) REGULAR (NO LEER) 4) Malo 5) Muy malo 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMSER8</p>

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias: **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC1	
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC4	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC10	
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC12	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC13	

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC16	

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo

POP1. [Leer alternativas]

1. Para el desarrollo del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario],
 2. Aunque atrase el desarrollo del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.
8. NS/NR

POP1

POP2. [Leer alternativas]

1. El Congreso impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorado, [o, al contrario]
 2. Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima del Congreso.
8. NS/NR

POP2

POP3. [Leer alternativas]

1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o, al contrario]
 2. Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas.
8. NS/NR

POP3

POP4. [Leer alternativas]

1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],
 2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.
8. NS/NR

POP4

<p>POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>POP5</p>	
<p>VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar AOJ8] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>	
<p>VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer las alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p>VIC2</p>	
<p>AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a AOJ8] (2) No lo denunció [seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a AOJ8]</p>	<p>AOJ1</p>	
<p>AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [no Leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe adónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>AOJ1B</p>	
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11</p>	
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>	
<p>DOMAOJ11B Cuando usted está en la casa o sale ¿se siente más seguro, igual o menos seguro que hace cinco (5) años? 1) Más seguro 2) Igual 3) Menos seguro 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMAOJ11B</p>	

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en el último año? [Leer alternativas] 1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR	AOJ16A	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas/bandas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/ NR	AOJ17	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? (1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS/NR	AOJ18	

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			NS/NR	

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de la República Dominicana garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)		B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de la República Dominicana?		B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político Dominicano?		B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político de la República Dominicana?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político dominicano ?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerza Armadas?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?		B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
DOMB20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las iglesias evangélicas?		DOMB20A
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia?		B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?		B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser dominicano?		B43
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
DOMB55. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?		DOMB55

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, hasta que punto diría que el Gobierno actual (<i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i>)	Anotar NS/NR	1-7, 8 =
N1. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.		N1
N3. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		N3
N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.		N9
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.		N10
N11. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.		N11
N12. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.		N12

[Recoja tarjeta A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Leonel Fernández es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
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[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	NS/NR

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los dominicanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		PN2
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		DEM23

RECOGER TARJETA B

DOMING5. ¿En general, usted qué prefiere? [Leer alternativas] (1) Democracia aunque haya a veces desorden o (2) Más orden aunque haya menos democracia? (8) NS/NR	DOMING5
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en la República Dominicana? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
DOMPN4A ¿Usted diría que la manera como está funcionando la democracia en el país le beneficia a usted mucho, algo, le perjudica o lo es indiferente? 1) Le beneficia mucho 2) Le beneficia algo 3) Lo perjudica 4) Le es indiferente 8) NS/NR	DOMPN4A
PN5. En su opinión, ¿La República Dominicana es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]
 Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.		E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.		E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.		E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras para protestas.		E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.		E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.		E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.		E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales		E16

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

										1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?											D32
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político dominicano?											D33
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?											D34
D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?											D36
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?											D37

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en la República Dominicana. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				NS/NR

										1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de la República Dominicana, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]											D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.											D2
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?											D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?											D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?											D5
DOMD5A ¿Con que firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que los homosexuales puedan organizarse para defender sus derechos?											DOMD5A

[Entregue al entrevistado Tarjeta D]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta tiene una escala de 1 a 10, pero el 1 indica que está en desacuerdo totalmente y el 10 significa que está de acuerdo totalmente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desacuerdo Totalmente						Acuerdo Totalme				NS/NR



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DOMW6 ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la política es cosa de hombres?		DOMW6
DOMW7 ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la mujer participe más en la política? RECOGER TARJETA D		DOMW7
DOMW8 Vamos a seguir conversando sobre la mujer. ¿A la hora de usted votar, quien le inspira más confianza un hombre o una mujer? 1) Un hombre 2) Una mujer 3) LE DA IGUAL (NO LEER) 8) NS/NR		DOMW8

<p>DOMW9 ¿Cree usted que la mujer tiene mayor o menor capacidad que el hombre para gobernar?</p> <p>1) Mayor 2) Menor 3) IGUAL (NO LEER) 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMW9</p>	
<p>DOMW10 Sobre la participación política de la mujer, ¿Con cuál de estas opiniones usted está más de acuerdo: [Leer]</p> <p>1) No es conveniente que participe 2) Sólo debe participar cuando las obligaciones familiares se lo permitan 3) Debe participar igual que el hombre 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMW10</p>	
<p>DOMW11 ¿Cree usted que la mujer sólo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza?</p> <p>1) Si, solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza 2) No, no solo debe trabajar cuando el ingreso del hombre no alcanza 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMW11</p>	
<p>DOMW12 ¿Quién cree usted que debe tomar las decisiones importantes en el hogar?</p> <p>1) El hombre 2) La mujer 3) La mujer y el hombre 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMW12</p>	
<p>DOMW13 Algunos opinan que en ninguna circunstancia el hombre debe pegar a su mujer y otros opinan que a veces se justifica que el hombre pegue a su mujer, ¿Con cuál opinión está más de acuerdo?</p> <p>1) En ninguna circunstancia el hombre le debe pegar a su mujer 2) A veces se justifica que el hombre le pegue a su mujer 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMW13</p>	
<p>DOMW14. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la interrupción del embarazo cuando peligra la salud de la madre y en caso de incesto o violación, o no está de acuerdo bajo ninguna circunstancia?</p> <p>1) De acuerdo cuando peligra la salud de la madre y en caso de incesto o violación 2) No está de acuerdo bajo ninguna circunstancia 8) NS/SR</p>	<p>DOMW14</p>	

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DEM2</p>	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde</p>	<p>DEM11</p>	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted?[Leer]</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>	

<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP1</p>
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<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>PP2</p>

<p>Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.</p>					
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es: [Leer alternativas] 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8</p>	<p>DC1</p>				
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar un acta de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 175 pesos de más al empleado del juzgado de paz. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es: [Leer alternativas] 1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) Corrupto pero se justifica 3) No corrupto 8)NS/NR</p>	<p>DC10</p>				
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su influencia o cuña para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es: [Leer alternativas] 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8</p>	<p>DC13</p>				
	<p>No</p>	<p>Sí</p>	<p>NS/NR</p>	<p>INAP</p>	
<p>Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...</p>					
<p>EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>		<p>EXC2</p>
<p>EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>		<p>EXC6</p>
<p>EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el ayuntamiento/ delegación en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el ayuntamiento/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>9</p>	<p>EXC11</p>
<p>EXC13. ¿usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en el último año?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>9</p>	<p>EXC13</p>
<p>EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en el último año?</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>9</p>	<p>EXC14</p>
<p>EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante</p>	<p>0</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>8</p>	<p>9</p>	<p>EXC15</p>

el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno?					
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?	0	1	8	9	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?	0	1	8		EXC18
EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar sobornos es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	0	1	8		EXC19

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR		EXC7
DOMEXC8. Según su opinión, ¿La corrupción en los gobiernos y la política dominicana es un problema muy grave, grave, poco grave, o no existe? 1) Muy grave 2) Grave 3) Poco Grave 4) No existe 8) NS/NR		DOMEXC8

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...		
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI1	
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama la persona que ha sido el Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados hasta las elecciones de mayo? [NO LEER: Alfredo Pacheco] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI2	
GI3. ¿Cuántas provincias tiene la República Dominicana? [NO LEER: aceptar 30, 31, 32] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI3	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en la República Dominicana? [NO LEER: 4 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI4	
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde	GI5	

VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Está empadronado para votar? (1) Sí (2) No [Pasar VB10] (3) En trámite [Pasar a VB10] (8) NS/NR [Pasar VB10]	VB1
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de mayo del 2004? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB6]	VB2

<p>DOMVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. Leonel Fernández (PLD) 2. Hipólito Mejía (PRD) 3. Eduardo Estrella (PRSC) 77. Otro 88. NS/NR [Pasar a VB8] 99. Inap (No votó)</p> <p>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)</p>	<p>DOMVB3</p>
<p>[SI VOTO, PASAR A VB8] VB4. [Si no votó] [no Leer alternativas]</p> <p>¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>1 Falta de transporte 2 Enfermedad 3 Falta de interés 4 No le gustó ningún candidato 5 No cree en el sistema 6 Falta de cédula de identidad 7 No se encontró en padrón electoral 10 No tener edad necesaria 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar /Falta de tiempo 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad 14. Otra razón (88) NS/NR 99. INAP (votó)</p> <p>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</p>	<p>VB4</p>
<p>VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos]</p> <p>[aceptar solo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Las cualidades del candidato (2) El partido político del candidato (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p>VB8</p>
<p>VB6. ¿ Votó usted en las elecciones congresionales y municipales de mayo del 2006?</p> <p>1. Sí [siga] 2. No [pasa a VB10]. 8. NS/NR [pasa a VB10]</p>	<p>VB6</p>
<p>DOMVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó en la boleta congresional en las elecciones del pasado 16 de mayo?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. PRD 2. PLD 3. PRSC 77. Otro 88. NS/NR 99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>DOMVB7</p>
<p>DOMVB8 ¿En la boleta congresional, utilizó o no el voto preferencial para diputados?</p> <p>1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR 9) INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>DOMVB8</p>



<p>DOMVB9 ¿ Por qué partido votó en la boleta municipal el pasado 16 de mayo?</p> <p>1) PRD 2) PLD 3) PRSC 77) Otro 88) NS/NR 99) INAP (No votó)</p>	<p>DOMVB9</p>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a DOMVB14] (8) NS/NR [Pase a DOMVB14]</p>	<p>VB10</p>
<p>DOMVB11A. ¿A cuál partido político pertenece usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>0. Ninguno 1. PRD 2. PLD 3. PRSC 77. Otro 88. NS/NR 99. INAP</p>	<p>DOMVB11A</p>
<p>DOMVB11B. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>0. Ninguno 1. PRD 2. PLD 3. PRSC 77. Otro 88. NS/NR 99. INAP</p>	<p>DOMVB11B</p>
<p>DOMVB12. ¿En los últimos cinco años, ¿ha simpatizado o pertenecido a un partido diferente al que ahora pertenece o simpatiza? 1) Sí [Siga] 2) No [Pase a DOMVB14] 8) NS/NR 9) INAP (ni simpatiza ni pertenece a ninguno)</p>	<p>DOMVB12</p>
<p>DOMVB13. ¿A cuál partido?</p> <p>0. Ninguno 1. PRD 2. PLD 3. PRSC 77. Otro 88. NS/NR 99. INAP</p>	<p>DOMVB13</p>
<p>DOMVB14 Y hablando de los partidos políticos, cree usted que en República Dominicana los partidos políticos: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1) Permiten a la gente participar en la política a todos niveles 2) Sirven solamente para participar en las elecciones cada 2 años 3) Dificultan la participación de la gente en la política 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DOMVB14</p>

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR		POL1	
DOMPOL3. ¿ Con qué frecuencia lee, oye o ve noticias de política: con frecuencia, a veces, o nunca? 1) Con frecuencia 2) A veces o 3) Nunca 8) NS/NR		DOMPOL3	
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (Leer alternativas) 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) NS/NR		POL2	

USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo , ¿hasta que punto esta de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala Muy en Muy de desacuerdo acuerdo	NS/ NR		
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		AA1	
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		AA2	
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		AA3	
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		AA4	

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:

DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS2	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP (No buscó trabajo)		DIS3	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR		DIS5	

USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ

Usando nuevamente la escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 representa muy en desacuerdo, y 7 muy de acuerdo:

	Escala Muy en Desacuerdo acuerdo	Muy de	N S/ N R	
DOMHAI1 ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo con que los hijos de inmigrantes haitianos nacidos en la República Dominicana sean ciudadanos dominicanos?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8			DOMH AI1
DOMHAI2 ¿Hasta que punto está de acuerdo o desacuerdo con que el gobierno dominicano otorgue permisos de trabajo a los haitianos indocumentados que viven en República Dominicana?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8			DOMH AI2

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°	
Ninguno	0						ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18	
NS/NR	88						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)

Q2

Q3.	¿Cuál es su religión?	[No Leer alternativas]	Q3
(1)	Cristiana	no católica (incluye Testigos no)	Católica (Jehová) cristiana Evangélica
(2)			
(3)	Otra		
(4)	Ninguna		
(5)			
(8)	NS/NR		

[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

Q10

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 875 pesos
- (02) Entre 876 y 1750 pesos
- (03) 1751-3500 pesos
- (04) 3501-5250 pesos
- (05) 5251-7000 pesos
- (06) 7001-10500 pesos
- (07) 10501 –14000 pesos
- (08) 14001-17500 pesos
- (09) 17501-26250 pesos
- (10) 26251-50000 pesos
- (11) Más de 50000 pesos
- (88) NS/NR

RECOGER TARJETA E

Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?

No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap

Sí → preguntar:

¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda] _____

Q10A

Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (99) INAP

Q10B

Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde?]

- (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente
- (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países
- (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)
- (4) No
- (8) NS/NR

Q10C

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR	Q14	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted percibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. [No leer] NS/NR	Q10D	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [no Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS/NR.....88.	Q12	
DOMETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona: Blanca, negra, mulata (Jabao), mestiza u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Negra (3) Mulata(Jabao) (4) Mestiza(Indio) (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	DOMETID	
DOMETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona Blanca, negra, mulata (Jabao), mestiza u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Negra (3) Mulata(Jabao) (4) Mestiza(Indio) (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	DOMETIDA	
DOMLENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Español (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	DOMLENG1	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **(leer todos)**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera]	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15	

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No Leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar "No" en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <p>1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista 4. Comerciante 5. Campesino o agricultor 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano 8. Servicio doméstico 9. Otros servicios 10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa[Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista[Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR</p>	<p>OCUP1</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <p>1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 9. INAP</p>	<p>OCUP4</p>	
<p>OCUP1A En esta ocupación, usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1. Asalariado del gobierno? 2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago 8. NS/NR 9. INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>	
<p>OCUP1B1. ¿En total, cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1B1</p>	
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <p>1. Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR 9. INAP</p>	<p>OCUP1C</p>	
<p>DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS/NR (99) Inap</p>	<p>DESOC2</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:</p> <p>1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR</p>	<p>MIG1</p>	
<p>MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas]</p>	<p>MIG2</p>	



1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]		
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este 2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	
Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	□□□
TI. Duración de la entrevista [<i>minutos, ver página # 1</i>] _____		


Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.	
Firma del entrevistador _____	Fecha ____ / ____ / ____
□□□	
Firma del supervisor de campo _____	□□□
Comentarios: _____	

Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____	
Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____	



Tarjeta # 1





Tarjeta "A"

Mucho

7

6

5

4

3


2

Nada

1



Tarjeta "B"





Tarjeta "C"

**Aprueba
firmemente**

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3


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**Desaprueba
firmemente**

1



Tarjeta "D"



Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso**
- (01) Menos de 875 pesos**
- (02) Entre 876 y 1750 pesos**
- (03) 1751-3500 pesos**
- (04) 3501-5250 pesos**
- (05) 5251-7000 pesos**
- (06) 7001-10500 pesos**
- (07) 10501 –14000 pesos**
- (08) 14001-17500 pesos**
- (09) 17501-26250 pesos**
- (10) 26251-50000 pesos**
- (11) Más de 50000 pesos**



ANNEX C: Design Effects

Appendix C: Precision of the results

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling errors and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the gathering and processing of the information. These errors can be controlled by constructing a good measurement instrument, good interviewer training, good field supervision, and with good programs to input data such errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the comparison of the result of the sample with the population gives an idea if those errors have generated biases that might make the sample unrepresentative of the population. The use of hand-held computers that have been employed in the AmericasBarometer 2006 in some of the countries studied likely reduces these errors by allowing for consistency checks during the actual process of interviewing. In addition, eliminating the process of data entry eliminates errors at this stage as well. With the traditional process of paper questionnaires, it is necessary to code the questionnaires in the office and to clean the data, which is also a process that can generate error. With paper questionnaires, this process goes on only weeks after the data have been collected. Correcting the errors detected in the office during the cleaning process, or by programs that detect errors, still leaves many of those errors uncorrected or uncorrectable.

On the other hand, sampling errors are a produce of chance and result from the basic fact of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, it must be realized that this is only one of the many possible samples that could be drawn. The variability that exists between all of these possible sampling errors could be known only if all possible samples were drawn, which is obviously impossible for practical and cost reasons. In practice, what one does is to estimate the error based on the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sampling error of a statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar circumstances. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design of the sample. The Design Effect, DEFT, indicates the efficient of the design employed in relation to a design of simple random sampling (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by the both designs (complex and SRS) is the same; that is to say, the complex sample is as efficient as the SRS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample produces an error larger than that obtained by SRS.

$$DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$$

In the table below are presented the confidence intervals (95%, that is 1.96 of the EE), and the design effects (DEFT). The table shows also the statistical value of the question (mean or percentage). The EE are estimated by STATA 9. The extreme values originate in a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socio-economic situation, and this reduces the efficiency of the cluster sampling.

It is worth noting that the sampling error is usually 10% to 40% larger than what would have been observed by SRS. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important system support index, (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. That means that confidence interval at 95% (given by the 1.96 of the EE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT from the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained by SRS.

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Error	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			itlr			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican Rep.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican Rep.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53