
Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 2008

The Impact of Governance

Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga
Universidad de los Andes

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Scientific Coordinator and editor of the series
Vanderbilt University



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PRESENTATION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pre-test phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. The 2008 country reports contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez

PROLOGUE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007, was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us

to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common Figure format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in Figural form

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector, and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.


² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendices for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

COUNTRY	INSTITUTIONS	
MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA GROUP		
Mexico		
Guatemala		
El Salvador		
Honduras		
Nicaragua		
Costa Rica		
Panama		

ANDEAN/SOUTHERN CONE GROUP			
Colombia			
Ecuador			
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>		
Bolivia			
Paraguay			
Chile			
Uruguay			
Brazil			
Venezuela			

CARIBBEAN GROUP	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallop, República Dominicana, S.A.</i> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
CANADÁ Y ESTADOS UNIDOS	
Canada	
USA	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY

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The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Elizabeth Ramirez, Eric Kite and Sharon Carter assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor, generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had it entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Vera Kutzinski, Director of the Center for the Americas supported us with funding for various aspects of the study. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt has been a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala ● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador ● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc. ● Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University ● Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. ● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública ● Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University ● Dr. Damaris Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois ● Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Country	Researchers
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee ● Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies ● Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study has been carried out in Colombia over five consecutive years. For the third time, also, the study has been done simultaneously in all countries in the region. This year, the AmericasBarometer LAPOP study embraces 23 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Canada and the United States¹. It therefore constitutes a unique opportunity not only for carefully examining the tendencies of attitudes, perceptions, beliefs and experiences of the Colombians over the past five years, but also of placing these results in a wider comparative perspective which gives context to the conclusions one can derive from them.

With the experience acquired in studies over previous years, this year's report adopts a slightly different modality. In the past, reports have analyzed each subject separately (that is to say, for example, one chapter on civil society, another on local authorities, and so forth). This year, in coordination with the teams from the rest of the countries, we decided to use a rather more integral focus.

Part I of the report formulates the fundamental theories on the relation between citizen perceptions and experiences of governance, on the one hand, and support for stable democracy, on the other. The aspects of governance analyzed here include administrative corruption, crime and delinquency, local governments and civil society, and the economy's performance. Also, the theory proposes five dimensions as pointers towards stable democracy.

A first dimension consists of citizen adhesion to a "Churchillian" view, which believes democracy to be the best form of government. On this point, the average Colombian merely demonstrates a medium degree of adhesion to the said principle (or belief) compared with other countries. However, the Colombians do better in this regard than the Ecuadoreans or Peruvians. And even the citizens of Chile and Mexico, as regards their level of support for democracy as such, are behind Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, among others.

The second dimension consists of support for the active participation of citizens in community organizations, pacific protests and political campaigns. In this dimension, Colombia's position is half-hearted by comparison with most of the rest of the countries, significantly below Paraguay, Nicaragua, Argentina and Uruguay.

A third point of support for stable democracy is related to citizen tolerance in the exercise of political rights by minorities, even when these minorities are fervently opposed to the country's form of government. The analysis shows that Colombians are relatively intolerant; not only does the average not go above 50 points (in a scale of 100), but the country is one of those with the lowest levels of political tolerance.

¹ The complete list of countries included in the 2008 round of the AmericasBarometer is as follows: Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panamá, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brasil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, United States and Canada. Data from Belize were not available at the time of preparing this report.

The fourth dimension is related to the legitimacy of key institutions within the political system, conceived as the combined confidence citizens place in the national government, in Congress, in the political parties, the justice system and the Supreme Court of Justice. To the degree to which one wants to measure long-term legitimacy, we attempt to control the effect of the popularity enjoyed by the present government. Even with these controls, the position of Colombia in the regional context is quite high, bettered only by Jamaica, Uruguay and Mexico.

The last, but not least, dimension of support for stable democracy is interpersonal trust as a foundation for a productive and useful life in community. In this aspect, Colombia is clearly bettered by the Canadians, although practically on the same level as the Costa Ricans, Americans and Paraguayans, and higher than virtually all the other countries that have been studied.

Part II contains an empirical analysis of the above-mentioned aspects of governance and their impact on these dimensions of support for stable democracy. Chapter 2 (the first chapter in this part) examines the experiences, perceptions and attitudes of the citizens vis-à-vis corruption.

A first result shows that one in every ten Colombians states that he (or she) has been a victim of some act of corruption when interacting with administrative entities, the police, judicial or educational authorities, in labor matters and in hospitals. In comparative terms, this percentage is rather low. Only three countries (Panama, the United States and Uruguay) show lower rates of victimization, and in fact the differences between these countries do not register a significant statistic. This proportion has remained practically constant over the past five years. By contrast, almost eight of every ten Colombians believe that corruption amongst public officials is quite common, or even *very* common. This proportion, undoubtedly high, places Colombia in an intermediary point among the rest of the hemisphere's countries.

What impact does victimization due to corruption have on the pillars of support for stable democracy? Analysis of the data indicates that those who have been victims of some corrupt act show higher levels of political tolerance. By way of contrast, both the legitimacy of the political institutions and interpersonal trust are negatively affected by experiences of corruption. On the other hand, the perception of corruption influences in different ways support for stable democracy. Those who believe that administrative corruption is more common tend to show higher levels of support for democracy as the best possible system and support citizen rights to participate in political life. The chapter ends by showing some preliminary evidence to the effect that Colombians are comparatively more permissive when it comes to corrupt activities – such as trafficking in influences and bribery – than the citizens of most of the countries included in this study.

Chapter 3 analyzes the incidence of criminality on the daily life of the citizens and the way the experiences and perceptions of crime and security affect support for stable democracy. A little over 15% of Colombians report having been victims of some crime during the past year. This proportion, which has not varied significantly over the past five years, is not comparatively high, since only Panama and Jamaica present rates of victimization that are clearly lower. Better educated males living in the larger cities are the ones most exposed to being victims of delinquents. Also, the relation between victimization by crime and the dimensions of support for stable democracy is similar to that in the case of corruption: the victims show greater levels of tolerance, and lower levels of institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Aside from direct experience, citizens also have a subjective perception of insecurity. In Colombia, approximately 35% of citizens say they feel rather (or *very*) insecure as regards the possibility of being victim of a theft or personal attack (e.g. mugging). This percentage is relatively low in comparison with other countries, above all if one bears in mind that in countries like Argentina, Peru and Chile, half, or more, of those surveyed also feel equally insecure. Despite the government's emphasis on citizen security, the Colombians have constantly maintained this feeling of insecurity over the past few years, although there has been a slight, but significant, descent in the perception of insecurity between 2007 and 2008. As expected, the perception of insecurity has a negative impact on the trust that Colombians have in others.

The experiences and perceptions of the citizens as regards the authorities at a municipal level, as well as their participation in organizations of civil society, constitute the focus of Chapter 4. Colombia appears in this analysis as one of the countries where citizens have most faith in the local governments and are most satisfied with the way these governments provide public services. In accordance with these results, it is also seen that Colombia is among the countries where there is greatest support for decentralization both of responsibilities and of resources. In fact, our statistical analysis shows that, to the degree in which Colombians are most satisfied with municipal services, the more they support a larger allocation of resources to local administrations. Likewise, both institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust receive a positive influence when people are satisfied with public services.

On the other hand, when one compares them with the citizens of other countries, the Colombians demonstrate a medium level of participation in meetings of religious organizations, professional associations and parent-teacher associations. As for participation in community development committees, unions and women's groups, their participation is noticeably low in comparative terms. Contrary to expectations, citizen participation in organizations of civil society at a local level (religious organizations, parent-teacher associations and community development boards) makes practically no impact on their support for stable democracy; only those who attend meetings of a religious nature show a slight improvement in the matter of interpersonal trust.

Chapter 5, the last one in this second part of the report, analyzes citizen perception of the country's economic performance and its impact on support for stable democracy. In the opinion of only one out of every four Colombians, the country's most serious problem is the economy, and this constitutes one of the lowest proportions in the region, bettered only by Brazil and Venezuela. The average assessment which citizens make of the government's economic performance is no higher than a medium point (50 points in a scale of 100), although comparatively speaking, Colombia appears in the upper half of the table of countries. This position naturally coincides with the perception of the country's economic situation. The Colombians, on average, are in second place regarding the qualification they give to their own personal economic situation, bettered only by the Argentinians.

Naturally, those who give a better qualification for the national economic situation and their personal economic situation have a better opinion of the performance and economic policies of the government. Nonetheless, when these two factors, amongst others, are controlled, we observe that the better-off and those with higher levels of education are more critical of such policies. On analyzing the relation between perception of the economy and support for stable

democracy, we find that the higher the qualification of the government's economic performance, the greater is the support for democracy as the best form of government, on the one hand, and the legitimacy recognized in the key institutions of the political system.

Now, in relation to the State's role in the economy, Colombia appears as one of the countries where citizens expect most active State intervention in managing key industries, generating employment, reducing inequality and ensuring the general welfare of society. The intensity of this belief in the country is only less, on average, than that of Paraguayans, Argentines and Dominicans.

Regarding the impact of these factors on support for stable democracy, Part III goes beyond governance and includes more specific analyses of four key aspects of the Colombians' political culture.

Chapter 6 looks takes a closer look at political legitimacy. This includes an examination, already developed in former reports, of the combination of support for the political system and political tolerance as indicators of democratic stability. The most noteworthy result places Colombia as the country with the greatest proportion of citizens in a category known as "authoritarian stability"; in fact, 38% of Colombians express high levels of support for the system but low levels of political tolerance.

Among the political institutions studied, the president is the one who receives the highest levels of trust, above the Catholic Church, the communications media and the Armed Forces. At the other extreme, unions, political parties and Congress are the institutions that enjoy least confidence on the part of the Colombians, although, comparatively speaking, the said institutions have greater legitimacy than in the majority of other countries.

A longitudinal look at confidence in the representatives of the three branches of power (the government, Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice) shows that, while the government conserves a preponderant place vis-à-vis the other two institutions, these have regained terrain. It is worthwhile pointing out the confidence Colombians place in the Supreme Court. It not only occupies second place, bettered only by the Canadian court, but also the level of citizen trust has increased since the preceding year. This is particularly important in a context of exacerbated public and verbal confrontation between the President of the Republic and the Supreme Court due to judicial investigations of the numerous political links (mostly by members of the governing coalition) with paramilitary groups. Data on institutional confidence seem to show that the citizens have not incorporated this confrontation, and without diminishing their support for the president, they have compensated with higher levels of confidence in the activities of the Court.

The chapter continues with an interesting examination of citizen attitudes contrary to the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. In this matter, news from Colombia is not very encouraging. In fact, the Colombians' political culture shows worrying symptoms of intolerance. Colombia is the country where citizens believe, with the greatest intensity, that the president should limit the exercise of opposition parties. Also, it occupies first place among those who believe that a minority should be prohibited from opposing the "people's" decisions, and is one of the first to believe that those who are not part of the majority represent a threat to the country. Colombia also occupies second place among those who believe that the president ought to govern

without Congress and should take no notice of the decisions of the High Courts, and it is one of the countries with the greatest proportion of citizens who believe that the president, in certain circumstances, ought to close Congress and dissolve the Constitutional Court. These results, although they do not necessarily mean that the breakdown of institutional democracy is imminent, do suggest that a hypothetical self-coup by the president would not meet with much opposition from the Colombians, and an important proportion of the citizens would even applaud such a measure.

The chapter closes with an analysis of the factors which influence attitudes that run counter to liberal democracy. Firstly, these attitudes are more intense among those with the lowest levels of education. Those who express the greatest satisfaction with the performance of President Uribe's government, also exhibit, with greatest conviction, those attitudes which run counter to democratic institutionalism, a result which, although it is not totally surprising, does suggest a problematic relation between the major aspects of democracy and respect for the rights of minorities and for the principle of the separation of powers. Finally, those who sympathize with the Conservative Party and the *Partido de la U* are those least respectful of these democratic principles, whereas those who are close to the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (Alternative Democratic Pole) show a significantly greater regard for the said principles.

Chapter 7 deals with the relation of citizens to parties and elections. Initially it shows that lack of respect for political parties is not a phenomenon peculiar to Colombia. In fact, confidence in political parties in Colombia is bettered only by that of Canada, Mexico, Jamaica, Uruguay and Chile, and is greater than that of the other countries. However, only one in every three Colombians expresses sympathy for some party, a lower percentage when compared with other countries. Going even further, in a comparative perspective the intensity of this affinity among sympathizers is rather half-baked. In Colombia, sympathy for political parties is more common amongst men, and among older people and the better educated, as well as those who live in small towns or in rural areas. However, fear of participating in politics naturally inhibits people from expressing their affinity to a particular political party.

Among those who do feel affinity for a particular party, the most predominant are those who favor the Liberal Party, some 40%. Surprisingly, the second place is occupied by the *Partido de la U* with 19% of favor. This party was created recently and is fundamentally a coalition of dissident Liberal Party members who, for ideological and instrumental reasons, have joined forces with the government. Despite its newness and apparent fragility, this party has managed to capture the attention and the sympathy of a significant portion of citizens who probably see it as the party which best represents President Uribe. Another noteworthy aspect of the present distribution of party affiliation in Colombia is that a greater proportion of citizens are closer to the left-wing party *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (15%) than to the traditional Conservative Party (14%)

As for the ideological position of the Colombians, it can be described, on average, as belong to a spectrum of the right. Except for those who feel close to the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, those who sympathize with the other parties are on the right of the national average. Furthermore, although in the past two years this position has moved slightly towards the left, in comparative terms, only the Dominicans and the Costa Ricans are further right, while the rest of the countries show an average ideological position inclined towards the left by comparison with Colombia.

Likewise we find that one in every five Colombians say they have had an offer, either in cash or in material goods, in exchange for their vote in elections. This finding, although far from perfect, is one of the few existing indicators on the phenomenon of buying votes, and shows the enormous magnitude of its incidence in Colombia. Worse still, of those who received offers in exchange for their vote, one in every five Colombians decided in fact to sell their vote. This statistic, which may even be a conservative estimate if we keep in mind that those interviewed were reticent about confessing to this kind of behavior, could suggest that around 4% of the votes (some 400,000) had been vitiated by this problem.

The chapter ends with an examination of those surveyed during the most recent elections, namely the local elections held in October 2007. Concretely, what was examined was citizen perception of the degree of threat exerted by paramilitary and guerrilla groups, as well as by drug traffickers and clientelism, on the said elections. Given that, for the 2007 study, these questions were formulated before the elections took place and, for the present study, the questionnaire was applied shortly after the elections, it is interesting to see how the perception of threat on elections was significantly reduced between those two moments in time.

In its turn, Chapter 8 examines the evaluation made by citizens of the performance of the three branches of public power. In the first place, as was already mentioned, the Colombian president enjoys a high level of popularity on the part of the citizens when compared with governors of the other countries. The same is true of the general assessment of the government's performance. When different areas of politics are examined, however, one sees that the Colombian government maintains this privileged position on matters related to citizen security and even to the protection of human rights, whereas in social areas, such as the fight to combat poverty and unemployment, the country's relative qualification places it only in an intermediate position among the other countries of the hemisphere. Presidential approval is greatest among those who have a more positive perception of the national economy. The same is true of those who are on the right in the ideological spectrum. Controlling these factors, among others, those whose sympathies lie with the *Partido de la U* and *Cambio Radical* also show the greatest satisfaction with the president's performance, while the opposite is true of those who feel close to the *Polo Democrático*.

In a second section of the chapter, we analyze, for the first time in the AmericasBarometer studies, the evaluation made by citizens of Congress and its performance. Two kinds of negative attitudes are explored vis-à-vis the legislative body related with the perception that Congress could be a nuisance for the government, on the one hand, and that the deliberations of congressmen are a waste of time. Despite an apparently generalized lack of credibility, the performance of Colombia's Congress is not anything like the worst in comparative terms, receiving better qualifications than the legislative bodies of Ecuador, Mexico and even of Chile and the United States. On the contrary, Colombia seems to be among the countries in which citizens believe more firmly that the tasks carried out in Congress fulfil people's expectations and that laws passed by Congress are important. Furthermore, in a general evaluation of the legislative body, Colombia's Congress occupies third place, bettered only by the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. Among the Colombians, older people with a higher level of education and greater economic affluence are more skeptical about Congress's performance. On the other hand, those who have a better socio-tropical and ego-tropical perception on the economy assess the legislative body's performance

more positively. Finally, those who sympathize with the *Polo Democrático* are the most critical of Congress (where this party constitutes one the most important forces of opposition).

To end this chapter, we take a look at the perception citizens have of the justice system and its principal agents. In the first place, we find that the average level of confidence in the justice system among Colombians places the country as number two among the nations studied, just behind the Canadian justice system (and above that of the United States). Likewise, Colombia occupies a privileged place among the concert of the hemisphere's nations, and the first in South America, as regards perception of the impartiality of judgments passed by law enforcers and tribunals, only behind Canada, Jamaica and the United States. The same situation prevails in relation to citizens' confidence in organisms such as the Constitutional Court, the Attorney General's Office and the Ombudsman. Three of every five Colombians who had some dealing with judges or with the Attorney General's Office indicated that they were quite satisfied, or *very* satisfied, with their interaction with the law. And even though less than half those who were victims of some crime denounced the fact to the authorities (a middling percentage in a comparative perspective), the perception of impunity in the Colombian justice system is the lowest in the South American continent.

Chapter 9, the last one in this report, deals with painful experiences of the Colombians as a result of the armed conflict, and with the perceptions that Colombians have regarding a possible solution. As in earlier reports, we find that one in every three Colombians reports some form of victimization due to the conflict, whether it be loss (24%), displacement (19%) or flight from the country (5%) of some relative. The major perpetrators of this kind of activity are the guerrillas (56%), followed by paramilitary groups (35%). It should be stressed that 4% of the victims point to demobilized ex members of the so-called "self defense" groups as authors of activities of which they have been victims.

The level of citizen confidence in illegal armed groups is almost nil (by comparison with legal institutions), while the great majority considers that the solution to the conflict with both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries ought to be by negotiation (and not a military solution). Nonetheless, approximately three out of every five Colombians believe that a negotiated solution with the guerrillas is unlikely or impossible in the short term. Despite demobilizations in recent years, half the citizens are equally skeptical about negotiations with the paramilitaries. Finally there is a high level of citizen support for demobilization and the reinsertion of members of illegal armed groups.

PART I: THEORY AND TRANSNATIONAL COMPARISONS

Preface: Context of Democratic Development in Colombia and Description of the Data

Context of the country

The country's present political situation is been marked by profound contrasts. On the one hand, in the midst of an institutional situation which is a novelty for Colombia – product of a presidential reelection directly provided for by an amendment to the constitution passed in 2004 by Congress and ratified by the Constitutional Court – the enormous popularity of President Uribe does not appear to be waning after six years in power. On the other hand, more and more revelations have come out – exposed and investigated by the media, independent research centers and, finally, by the justice apparatus – regarding the links between partially demobilized paramilitary groups and high-level political figures, including a considerable number of congressmen and women the great majority of whom belong to the government coalition, accused of having been elected by means of armed intimidation by these paramilitary self-styled “self-defense” groups.

These two sides of the coin have generated pugnacious confrontations, via public statements, not only between the government and political sectors of the opposition, but also between the former and the Supreme Court of Justice, an organ constitutionally designed to investigate members of Congress involved in what has come to be called “para-politics”. While certain magistrates of the Court have accused members of this administration of applying undue pressure and of obstructing ongoing investigations, the government has denounced the manipulation of witnesses to deliberately undermine the prestige of President Uribe and his closest collaborators. Some of the results contained in the present report show early evidence of the manner in which this head-on clash between institutions has been assimilated by the common citizens, not always consistently.

In October 2007, elections were held to vote into office local authorities, governors and departmental assemblies, mayors and municipal councils. This electoral process aroused great interest in the media and among organizations of civil society, since once again it became evident that there existed a serious risk of interferences with the normal development of the electoral debate from illegal armed groups. This led to the formation of an inter-institutional group to supervise the elections, and this group produced, ahead of time, a “Map of Electoral Risks”, coordinated by the Electoral Observation Mission. Some of the findings included in this report illustrate citizen perception of the anomalies that appeared during the process.

The Colombian economy has shown very promising indicators over the past years, with notable increases in GDP growth. Table 0.1 indicates that the Colombian economy not only shows relative stability, but also rates of growth have been on the rise over the past three years.

Nonetheless, the most recent trends reveal a slowing down, and growth projections for 2008 have had to be adjusted.

Table 0.1 – Growth of GDP 2000-2007

GDP Growth (% per annum)	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Ecuador	3	5	4	4	8	6	4	2
Mexico	7	0	1	1	4	3	5	3
Bolivia	3	2	2	3	4	4	5	5
Brazil	4	1	3	1	6	3	4	5
Chile	4	3	2	4	6	6	4	5
Uruguay	-1	-3	-11	2	12	7	7	7
Colombia	3	1	2	4	5	5	7	8
Venezuela	4	3	-9	-8	18	10	10	8
Argentina	-1	-4	-11	9	9	9	8	9
Peru	3	0	5	4	5	7	8	9

Finally, it is worth taking a comparative look at the state of democracy in Colombia. Figure 0.1 shows the evolution of the joint indicator from Freedom House (an organization dedicated to studying the evolution of freedom around the world) during the first eight years of the 21st century for a number of South American countries¹. In the case of Colombia there have been improvements, although other countries in the region have shown comparative results which are clearly much better.




Figure 0.1 - Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties 2000-2007

¹ The Freedom House index, which combines political rights and civil liberties, goes from 2 (the most free) to 14 (the least free). In the Figure presented here, these points have been converted into a more intuitive scale from 0 (the least free) to 100 (the most free).

The study and the data

In 2008, the AmericasBarometer LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) carried out its fifth annual study of public opinion in Colombia. The first of these studies, samples of which were gathered during the first semester of 2004, was made simultaneously with seven other countries: Mexico and six Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama).

In 2005, when the LAPOP study was done only in Colombia, a virtually identical questionnaire was used as the one used the year before, although certain aspects were brought up to date and new questions were added that were more appropriate for the contemporary situation in the country and in the region. Concretely, as a result of a critical look at the conditions of democracy in Colombia and in the region, early calculations were made (to be fleshed out in later studies) in an attempt to measure the attitudes of citizens regarding certain principles of liberal democracy, in particular the principle of the separation of powers. Likewise, certain indicators were included that attempted to make a fuller analysis of the experiences and the impact of the armed conflict in the country.

In 2006, it was possible to contrast the findings of the study in Colombia with those of Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Guyana, as well as the countries included in the 2004 report. This study made it possible to establish unprecedented comparisons between neighboring countries, and that undoubtedly enabled us to place in perspective our findings on the state of democracy in Colombia.

In 2007, the study was again carried out in Colombia. As in previous studies, the questionnaire remained mostly unchanged with a view to completing a series, within a relatively short period of time, and thus achieve a total joint indicator for the country. Also several questions were included to evaluate the experiences of the citizens in electoral processes, in particular those related to the buying and selling of votes, and the impact of illegal armed groups on the free exercise of electoral rights.

This year the study had two characteristics which made it unique in Colombia. On the one hand, a sequence was completed which embraced the past five years in the measurement, analysis and interpretation of a series of indicators related to the political behavior of the Colombians, with their perceptions and attitudes on democracy and its principles, and with the experiences in the exercise of citizenship. On the other hand, this year a study was carried out on a number of countries without precedents. Besides those analyzed in 2006, we added Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Jamaica, the United States and Canada. Naturally, comparisons embracing so many cases meant that it was possible, as never before, to analyze the situation of democracy in Colombia from the point of view of its citizens in a comparative perspective.

As normally occurs with LAPOP studies, the results presented here are representative of all non institutionalized citizens (that is, not residing in prisons, hospitals, military installations, schools, etc.) of a voting age (that is, over 18 years). Consequently, as distinct from many public opinion studies which are commonly carried out in Colombia and Latin America, our sample is not restricted to urban areas or to the country's five largest cities. Also, the survey is taken from

house to house, by means of personal interviews and without the bias imposed by surveys done by telephone or other means.

As in previous studies, the sample was designed with the participation of Colombia's National Consultancy Center (CNC, for its initials in Spanish), one of the country's most prestigious and experienced survey firms. The field work, the capture and the initial verifying of data were also carried out by the CNC.

A haphazard method was employed, stratified by conglomerates and multi-phased, which embraced 1,503 persons interviewed. The margin of error established is $\pm 2.53\%$ with a level of reliability of 95%. This means that if we took multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of those samples would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision no less than $\pm 2.53\%$.

Basic distributions of the sample

The sample is also representative of each of the country's five regions. As will be explained in greater detail in the appendix, which presents a technical description of our sample, 21% of the population lives in the Atlantic region, 17% in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 3% in the former National Territories and 16% in Bogotá, according to projections up to 2008 as indicated in the 2005 census. For studies carried out between 2004 and 2008, this distribution has been reflected in the sample, as can be seen in Figure 0.2.




Figure 0.2 - Distribution of the sample by regions 2004-2008

In the course of the five years of study, stratification has taken into account the size of each municipality and the division between rural and urban areas, respecting the real distribution of the country's population, as can be seen in Figure 0.3.




Figure 0.3 – Distribution of the sample according to size of place 2004-2008

Once the households to be included in the sample were identified, quotas were applied by gender. As a faithful reflection of the population's distribution, the sample was divided into practically equal parts between men and women, as is shown in Figure 0.4.




Figure 0.4 - Distribution of the sample by gender 2004-2008

Also we attempted to maintain the population’s proportionality as regards educational level. The corresponding indicator is a continuous measurement of the number of years of education approved, which goes from 0 to 18. The average during the five years of study is around 9 years². This measurement can be taken jointly to obtain an indicator with three categories: primary education (0 to 5 years), secondary education (6 to 11 years) and higher education (over 12 years). For the five studies, the sample is distributed in these education levels, as can be seen in Figure 0.5.




Figure 0.5 – Distribution of the sample according to education level 2004-2008

² In 2008, the interviewers reported an average of 8.6 years of education.

Likewise, the range of ages (which is gauged by grouping together the continuous measurement of years accomplished) also represents a way of describing the sample. The average age of those surveyed oscillates around 37 years of age³ and is distributed by age groups as shown in Figure 0.6.




Figure 0.6 – Distribution of the sample according to age groups 2004-2008

³ In 2008, the average age was 36.9 years.

One of the survey's socio-demoFigure questions asked citizens to identify to which ethnic group they belonged. We should make clear, therefore, that this is not an objective measurement nor does it correspond to the interviewers viewpoint, as occurs in some opinion surveys, but rather represents the ethnic self-identification of the person interviewed. Although this characteristic is not included among the criteria of the sample's design, the distribution has remained surprisingly stable, with only slight variations, as seen in Figure 0.7.




Figure 0.7 - Distribution of the sample according to ethnic self-identification 2004-2008

Finally, a question was included in the 2007 study which asked the person interviewed to which social class he or she belonged: lower class, middle class and medium-high or high class. There were no major variations in the percentages for each category, despite the fact that this criterion is not included in the sample's design, as one can observe in Figure 0.8.




Figure 0.8 – Distribution of the sample according to social class 2007-2008

Chapter 1. Building Support for Stable Democracy¹

Theoretical framework

Theory

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how, in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).² Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place overnight. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset, 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we

¹ This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

² This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad*, or more accurately, *governanza*³).⁴ Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House website), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.⁵ Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between

³ Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality or performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

⁴ According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

⁵ We emphasize *support for stable democracy*, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).⁶ Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measurements do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.⁷ The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly

⁶ Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

⁷ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;

2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.

3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.

4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn⁸:

Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4)

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillian concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

⁸ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

(ING4): Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure 1.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.⁹ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

⁹ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure 1.1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl’s classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. A recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.)

that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.¹⁰

The scale is based on the following LAPOP ITEMS:

E5. That people may participate in demonstrations allowed by law. How strongly do you approve or disapprove?

E8. That people may participate in an organization or group to attempt to solve community problems. How strongly do you approve or disapprove?

E11. That people may work in electioneering campaigns for a political party or candidate. How strongly do you approve or disapprove?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in Figure 1.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majority support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

¹⁰ Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7




Figure 1.2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

- B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski, 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to

know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

- D1.** Some people always speak against the country's form of government, not only of the present government, but the form of government itself, How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people having a **right to vote**?
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of allowing these people to hold **peaceful demonstrations** to express their viewpoints? Please read me the number.
- D3.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people having the right to postulate for **public service positions**?
- D4.** ¿How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people coming on television to **make a speech**?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure 1.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (D5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.




Figure 1.3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than possible alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe in the legitimacy of political institutions that make democracy effective. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in many authors (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹¹ based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:


- B14.** How much do you trust the Nacional Government?
- B10A.** How much do you trust the justice system?
- B31.** How much do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?
- B13.** How much do you trust the Nacional Congreso?
- B21.** How much do you trust political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure 1.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondents' perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure 1.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, just barely has a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about "crisis of legitimacy" in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay's high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.

¹¹ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.



(Results controlled by effect of presidential approval)

Source: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Figure i.4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure 1.5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings when the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure 1.5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Now, talking of people here, would you say that the people in your community are very trustworthy? Slightly trustworthy? Not very trustworthy? Or not trustworthy at all?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure 1.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure 1.6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but by four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

PART II: GOVERNANCE

Chapter 2. Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework¹

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

¹ This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”² Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.³ And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

Corruption Victimization

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government

² USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaid/indexpg.html) February.

³ The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

official?" We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

	INAP Did not treat or have contact	No	Yes	NS/NR
Now we want to talk about your personal experience of things that happen in your life...				
EXC2. In the past year, did any police officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	8
EXC6. In the past year, did any public official ask you for a bribe?		0	1	8
EXC11. In the past year, have you had to do paperwork in the municipality or delegation? No → Mark 9 Sí → Question: In the past year, to do any kina of paperwork (permits, for example) have you had to pay any sumo f money over and above what the law requires?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. Do you work? No → Mark 9 Sí → Question: In the past year, in your work, have you been asked for a bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. In the past year, did you have any dealings with a judicial proceedings? No → Mark 9 Sí → Question: In the past year, have you had to pay a bribe for judicial services?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. Have you used public (State) medical services in the past year? No → Mark 9 Sí → Question: To be attended in a hospital or health center in the past year, have you had to pay any kina of bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. In the past year, did you have a child at school or in high school? No → Mark 9 Sí → Question: In the school or high school during the past year, did you have to pay any kind of bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having your electric Light cut off?		0	1	8
EXC18. Do you think, the way things are, that paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	8

When we take jointly all instances of victimization by corruption described above, it is possible to determine what percentage of the citizens of the country have been victims of at least one of these forms. Figure 2.1, which shows these percentages for the countries included in round

2008 of the LAPOP study, indicates that the incidence of acts of corruption witnessed and suffered in reality by Colombians is relatively low. Less than one in every ten citizens have had to undergo one of the experiences described in the previous section, a percentage similar to that of Uruguay, the United States and Panama. It represents a fifth of what occurs in Haiti, and a third of what happens in Mexico and Bolivia.




Figure 2.1 - Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective 2008

This result is consistent with that found in previous comparative rounds of this study. Furthermore, the levels of victimization by corruption have remained relatively stable, fluctuating around 10%, with a slight decrease compared with the previous year, as one can see in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2 - Corruption Victimization 2004-2008

In 2008, less than one out of every one hundred was victim of three or more forms of corruption, as one can see in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3 – Number of Forms of Corruption Victimization 2008

Figure 2.4 shows that, in 2008, the incidence of victimization by corruption was greater in the Pacific Region and in Bogotá, above the national average, and less in the Eastern and Central Regions.




Figure 2.4 - Corruption Victimization by Regions 2008

In fact, Bogotá appears as one of the regions with the greatest incidence of corruption over time, although with a notable reduction in the past year, as is shown in Table 2.1

Table 2.1 - Corruption Victimization by regions 2004-2008

Region	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Bogotá	15.6%	19.0%	13.9%	16.5%	12.1%
Atlantic	14.5%	10.3%	5.3%	11.5%	9.9%
Pacific	12.8%	16.7%	9.2%	8.8%	14.1%
Central	11.7%	8.1%	10.6%	7.8%	7.5%
Eastern	9.12%	13.0%	12.0%	13.3%	5.5%
Former National Territories	16.7%	16.7%	3.7%	7.4%	8.3%

What are the characteristics of those people who have been victims of corruption? To answer this question, we created a statistical model of logistic regression to estimate that the factors of the individual increase or diminish the likelihood of being a victim. Among those factors we include level of education, gender, age, wealth, perception of family economy⁴, the number of children, the region and ethnic self-identification.

For this model, as for the rest of the statistical models included in this report, we used a novel system of converting the results into Figures showing the standardized coefficients (with a view to avoiding the different metrics used) corresponding to each of the factors, along with its reliability interval of 95%. When the reliability interval overlaps the vertical line, indicated by 0, we consider the factor to have a significant impact, that could be negative (when the reliability interval's two extremes are on the left of the vertical line) or positive (when both extremes are on the right)⁵.

Following this convention, therefore, one can appreciate in Figure 2.5 that five factors influence the likelihood of being a victim of corruption: level of education, gender, age, wealth and the number of children.




Figure 2.5 - Factors which influence the likelihood of being a victim of corruption

⁴ This perception is based on the question “Is the salary or wage you receive, and the total income of your family, enough to live on and also to save? Or is it enough, but with difficulties? Or is it not enough and you have great difficulties?”

⁵ Detailed results of the model appear in Table 2.2 in the Appendix to this chapter.

In effect, men have a higher propensity to being victims of corrupt acts than women, perhaps because they are the ones who more frequently interact with one of the instances where, as we have determined, such acts are likely to occur.

Likewise, the better educated are more often victimized than those with less education. The impact of gender and education level on victimization by corruption is illustrated in Figure 2.6.




Figure 2.6 – Corruption Victimization according to gender and education level

As can be seen in Figure 2.7, younger people are more often victimized than older people; in fact, victims of corruption have an average age of 33 years, while the national mean is 37.




Figure 2.7 – Corruption Victimization by Age

On the other hand, people who are better off are more often victims of corruption than the poorer citizens. Figure 2.8 shows the relation between the degree of wealth (considered as possession of material goods) that we have used in all LAPOP studies and the percentage of victims of corruption⁶. Finally, when other factors are controlled, the number of children is a significantly positive predictor of victimization by corruption.




Figure 2.8 – Corruption Victimization by Wealth

Perception of corruption

As we have already discussed, very few studies have analyzed victimization by corruption. Most diagnostics are based on indicators of the perception of corruption, either by international experts in a particular country, or based on public opinion surveys. This last focus is what concerns us in this section.

⁶ The indicator of wealth is constructed based on the series of questions R1 to R15, and goes from 0 to 9. This is a better indicator of the economic situation of a household than the income, since many of those interviewed prefer not to answer questions about their income.

The survey includes the following question on the **perception** of corruption among citizens, converted into a scale from 0 to 100 to obtain more intuitive results:

EXC7. Bearing in mind your own experience or what you have heard, is corruption by public officials (1) very common (2) quite common (3) not very common or (4) not common at all?

Figure 2.9 shows that, as distinct from victimization by corruption, Colombia's position, although it is not among the worst, certainly does not occupy a privileged position. This shows that the relation between perception and victimization is not at all obvious, and in some cases seems not to exist, if we consider the indices for Bolivia, for example, where traditionally there have been low levels of perception accompanied by high indices of victimization⁷.




Figure 2.9 - Perception of corruption in a comparative perspective 2008

The perception of corruption has remained around the same levels over the five years of the LAPOP study up to this point, as is shown in Figure 1.10. These tendencies are corroborated when we observe in Figure 2.11, the behavior of the Index for Perception of Corruption and International Transparency over the past eleven years.

⁷ In fact, there are no significant differences in the perception of corruption between victims and non victims in Costa Rica, Panama, Brazil, Haiti and Jamaica.




Figure 2.10 - Perception of corruption 2004-2008




Figure 2.11 - International Transparency - Index of Perception of Corruption 1998-2008

All the country's regions show levels of perception of corruption close to the national average, with the exception of the former National Territories, where the level is lower, and

Bogotá, which shows greater perception of corruption, as is shown in Figure 2.12. These two deviations probably correspond to the State in those two regions.




Figure 2.12 - Perception of corruption by region 2008

It is possibly for this same reason that, as seen in Figure 2.13, for the inhabitants of rural areas corruption is less common among government officials than for those who live in urban centers.




Figure 2.13 - Perception of corruption by place of residence (urban/rural) 2008

Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy

For the LAPOP project, the ultimate reason for examining the phenomenon of corruption, beyond describing the levels of perception and victimization, is to examine in what way the phenomenon affects citizen attitudes regarding the democratic system. In this section, we ask if both the victimization and the perception of corruption have any incidence on the five pillars of stable democracy, as they were defined in the theoretical chapter at the start of this report.

Impact of victimization by corruption

Does victimization by corruption have an impact on support for democracy, support for the right to participate⁸, political tolerance, the legitimacy of political institutions⁹ and inter-personal trust?

To reply to these questions, we constructed five models of lineal regression, one for each of the components of support for stable democracy. In these models we included, as a central factor, the continuous measurement of victimization by corruption (that is, the number of ways in which each person interviewed had been victimized).

Additionally, we included socio-demographic variables such as gender, level of education, age¹⁰, level of wealth and the size of the place (that is, if the person lives in a rural area, a small or medium-sized town, a large city or in the capital).

Also, we included other factors such as the perception of the family economy and the degree of interest in politics. Finally, we also included the level of approval of the president's performance as a necessary control for measuring the real support for stable democracy, over and above the specific support for the government in power at the present time.

As can be seen in Table 2.3, in the Appendix to this chapter, victimization by corruption has a positive impact on political tolerance, whereas it has a negative influence on legitimacy of institutions and on inter-personal trust. However, it does not seem to make an impact on support for democracy as such, nor on the right to participate.

⁸ This index, based, as we explained in the previous chapter, on questions E5, E8, E11, has sufficient reliability ($\alpha = .72$).

⁹ For this index, constructed on the basis of questions B10A, B13, B14, B21, B31, we obtain $\alpha = .81$, that is, a reliable index.

¹⁰ We believe that some of the attitudes regarding stable democracy may have a non lineal relation with respect to age (for example, if the attitudes increase up to a certain age and then begin to decline). To model this relationship, we included in the equations a quadratic term for age (that is, the variable age elevated by four).

In effect, as is shown in Figure 2.14, the more forms of victimization a citizen has been subjected to, the more tolerant he (or she) becomes as regards the political and civil rights of minorities, perhaps because corrupt acts generate a specific reflex of solidarity with vulnerable groups. In fact, those who have been victims of at least one form of corruption express a level of tolerance above the national average.




Figure 2.14 - Impact of victimization by corruption on political tolerance

In the opposite direction, for victims of corruption the key institutions of Colombia's political system are less legitimate than for those who have not been subjected to corrupt acts. Furthermore, the intensity of victimization reduces still further institutional legitimacy, as shown in Figure 2.15.




Figure 2.15 - Impact of Corruption Victimization on the legitimacy of institutions

In the same way, victimization by corruption considerably reduces the confidence Colombians have in their fellow citizens, as shown in Figure 2.16. In fact, those who have been subjected to three or more forms of corruption, even if they are not very numerous, do express a level of interpersonal trust that is less than half of those who have not been victims.




Figure 2.16 - Impact of Corruption Victimization on interpersonal trust

Impact of the perception of corruption

Does the perception of corruption have a different impact on support for stable democracy than corruption victimization itself? To explore this hypothesis, we constructed models similar to those described in the previous section, with the difference that, instead of victimization, we included as a factor our measure of the perception of corruption, while the other factors remained unchanged.

Table 2.4 shows the complete results of these models of lineal regression. As can be seen in the said table, there is no correspondence between perception and victimization as regards their impact on the pillars of support for stable democracy. In effect, the perception of corruption significantly influences only support for democracy per se and the right to participate, precisely the dimensions about which victimization does *not* seem to care.

On the one hand, perception of corruption increases support for democracy as the best form of government (Figure 2.17). Although it may seem strange, this could be interpreted as a citizen belief in democracy as the best corrective against corruption by the State. In accordance with this interpretation, those who perceive high levels of administrative corruption adopt what we might call a “Churchillian” spirit which leads them to think that, for this evil of the political system, the best cure would be a deepening of democracy.




Figure 2.17 – Impact of perception of corruption on support for democracy

Likewise, those who believe that corruption of State officials is quite common, or very common, show a level of support for the right to participate higher than the national average, whereas, naturally, those who do not perceive high levels of corruption in public administration support the said right less than the average Colombian, as is illustrated in Figure 2.18.




Figure 2.18 – Impact of the perception of corruption on support for the right to participation

Attitudes towards corruption

To better understand the phenomenon of corruption, it is not enough to study the perception of the citizens nor their experience of corrupt acts. In effect, both victimization and, especially, perception are measured by the concept itself of corruption which people have. Not all behavior that could be defined as an act of corruption according to the norms, are perceived as such by the citizens. To go even further, what in some countries, or in certain contexts, constitute habitual and acceptable practices, in others would be inadmissible.

To explore this third dimension of corruption – namely attitudes on corruption – the questionnaire applied in Colombia included the following questions:

<p>DC10. A mother with several children has to procure a birth certificate for one of them. To avoid wasting time, she pays \$10.000 pesos more than necessary to a municipal employee. Do you think that what the woman did was ... [Read alternatives]:</p> <p>Corrupt and she should be punished.....1 Corrupt but justifiable2 Not corrupt3 NS/NR [don't read].....8</p>
<p>DC13. An unemployed person is brother-in-law of an important politician and uses his influence to get public employment. Do you think that what the politician does in this case is ... [Read alternatives]:</p> <p>Corrupt and should be punished.....1 Corrupt but justifiable.....2 Not corrupt.....3 NS/NR [don't read].....8</p>
<p>COLDC14. A traffic policeman stops a driver who is making a wrong turn and the driver offers the policeman \$50.000 pesos to avoid a fine and being allowed to go. Do you think that what the driver did was ... [Read alternatives]:</p> <p>Corrupt and should be punished.....1 Corrupt but justifiable.....2 Not corrupt.....3 NS/NR [don't read].....8</p>
<p>COLDC15. The policeman receives the \$50.000 pesos and lets the driver go without a fine. Do you think what the traffic policeman has done is ... [Read alternatives]:</p> <p>Corrupt and should be punished.....1 Corrupt but justifiable.....2 Not corrupt.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>

Unfortunately only questions dc10 and dc13r were asked in the other countries. Comparative tables show that Colombians are comparatively permissive of corrupt behavior.




Figure 2.19 – The woman is corrupt and should be punished 2008 (comparative perspective)




Figure 2.20 – The politician is corrupt and should be punished (comparative perspective)

In the hypothetical case of the woman who pays the bribe in order to be attended more speedily, only two of every five Colombians condemn her behavior as corrupt, over 20 percentage points less than in the case of Panama or Costa Rica (Figure 2.19). Even more serious, only less than half of those interviewed in Colombia consider trafficking in influences on the part of politicians to get jobs for their friends and relatives as a corrupt practice that should be punished, by contrast with 80% in Peru and 77% in Mexico (Figure 2.20).

In the case of Colombia, these questions were also included in the 2007 study, enabling us to look at the evolution of these attitudes. As seen in Figure 2.21, there were no major variations from one year to the next. However, a more careful look enables us to state that the condemnation of corruption increased slightly, but significantly, in the case of a congressman who receives a bribe, or of the firm that pays it, as also in the case of a driver who pays a bribe and the traffic policeman who receives it¹¹.




Figure 2.21 – Attitudes on corruption 2007-2008

¹¹ The proofs t to compare the data of indicators from 2007 to 2008 show that the differences in the above-mentioned dimensions are statistically significant ($p < .05$).

With a view to obtaining an aggregate measure of permissiveness regarding corruption, we built an index based on the five questions described¹². The evolution of this scale, shown in Figure 2.22, indicates a slight but significant descent in the level of Colombians' permissiveness vis-à-vis corruption¹³. These two previous results, although premature, could show a positive trend in citizens' attitudes regarding corruption.




Figure 2.22 – Permissiveness on corruption 2007-2008

¹² This scale has a moderately acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .60$)

¹³ A proof t between two years indicates a significant difference statistically ($p < .05$)

Conclusion

Although we still have a long way to go in the study of the complex phenomenon that is corruption, the LAPOP survey constitutes the most integral effort that we know so far for researching the matter from the viewpoint of the ordinary citizen. To explore the three dimensions of this phenomenon – namely, victimization, perception and attitudes – ours would seem to be an adequate way of capturing the complexity of one of the problems that most acutely endanger democracies at the present time.

In Colombia, corruption does not seem to have an important impact on the citizens' daily lives. Colombians' experiences of corruption are few in comparison with what occurs in other countries. Nonetheless, mediated perhaps by the communications media, the perception of corruption in Colombia is still relatively high. This undoubtedly means that corruption, which is certainly a serious problem in the country, occurs in spheres unknown to the world in which ordinary people live their daily lives, probably in high political circles and in public administration. In any case, as was seen at the end of the chapter, there is still a lot to be done in terms of political culture in order to attain standards of zero tolerance on corruption, not only on the part of State agencies, but also in the attitudes of all Colombians.

Appendix

Table 2.2 - Factors that influence the probability of being a victim of corruption

	Coefficients	Err. Est.
Education level	0,104**	(0.04)
Woman	-1,210***	(0.20)
Age	-0,039***	(0.01)
Wealth	0,156*	(0.07)
Size of the place	0,012	(0.18)
Perception of family economy	-0,208	(0.12)
Number of children	0,213***	(0.06)
Atlantic	0,058	(0.42)
Pacific	0,792	(0.54)
Central	-0,252	(0.45)
Eastern	-0,578	(0.71)
Former National Territories	0,402	(0.69)
Mestizo/a	-0,131	(0.23)
Indigenous	-0,442	(0.56)
Afro Colombian	-0,415	(0.36)
Other ethnias	-0,528	(0.81)
Constant	-2,062**	(0.67)
F	6.750	
N	1422	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2.3 - Impact of Corruption Victimization on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right of participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Corruption victimization	1,126	(1.43)	0,558	(1.34)	5,815**	(1.68)	-3,056*	(1.30)	-6,695***	(1.76)
Presidential approval	0,160***	(0.03)	0,011	(0.03)	-0,140**	(0.05)	0,329***	(0.03)	0,073	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,099***	(0.02)	0,076***	(0.02)	0,036	(0.02)	0,108***	(0.02)	0,066**	(0.02)
Years of education	0,806***	(0.20)	0,624***	(0.17)	0,251	(0.21)	-0,615***	(0.14)	0,301	(0.28)
Woman	-1,921	(1.35)	-1,528	(1.14)	-3,307*	(1.59)	0,384	(1.27)	0,093	(1.43)
Age	0,965***	(0.22)	0,229	(0.17)	-0,265	(0.21)	0,091	(0.19)	0,563*	(0.26)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	-0,000	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,228	(0.49)	0,126	(0.42)	0,721	(0.45)	-0,251	(0.29)	1,112*	(0.44)
Perception of family economy	0,787	(0.98)	0,878	(0.77)	0,892	(0.73)	1,848*	(0.79)	3,226**	(1.04)
Size of place	-0,942	(0.70)	-1,436**	(0.47)	-0,657	(0.73)	-1,264**	(0.46)	-4,395***	(0.68)
Constant	27,027***	(5.56)	54,099***	(4.64)	56,544***	(6.22)	28,842***	(5.04)	33,892***	(6.54)
R-squared	0.081		0.035		0.045		0.173		0.063	
N	1392		1437		1429		1424		1439	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 2.4 – Impact of perception of corruption on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for right to participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Perception of corruption	0,096***	(0.03)	0,050*	(0.02)	0,025	(0.03)	-0,038	(0.02)	-0,009	(0.03)
Presidential approval	0,170***	(0.04)	0,013	(0.04)	-0,144**	(0.05)	0,325***	(0.03)	0,073	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,101***	(0.02)	0,081***	(0.02)	0,045	(0.03)	0,106***	(0.02)	0,060*	(0.03)
Years of education	0,767***	(0.21)	0,592**	(0.17)	0,281	(0.20)	-0,678***	(0.14)	0,298	(0.29)
Woman	-1,852	(1.40)	-2,255	(1.17)	-4,218**	(1.44)	0,830	(1.29)	1,230	(1.49)
Age	0,941***	(0.23)	0,242	(0.17)	-0,269	(0.22)	0,147	(0.19)	0,529*	(0.26)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	-0,001	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,182	(0.49)	-0,123	(0.39)	0,787	(0.46)	-0,150	(0.30)	0,882	(0.45)
Perception of family economy	0,387	(0.97)	0,734	(0.78)	0,814	(0.74)	2,144**	(0.78)	3,499**	(1.00)
Size of place	-1,104	(0.69)	-1,575**	(0.46)	-0,700	(0.75)	-1,303**	(0.48)	-4,275***	(0.70)
Constant	22,093***	(5.71)	51,553***	(5.17)	56,122***	(6.98)	29,778***	(5.23)	34,138***	(6.50)
R-squared	0.093		0.044		0.039		0.174		0.054	
N	1339		1376		1369		1364		1370	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 3. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand, it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, makes it difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S., since

vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents would be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was largely an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on

the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.¹ According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,² says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”³ In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.⁴ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.⁵

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru, 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and

¹In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

²According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

³Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm).

⁴Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

⁵The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar, 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered, or even being the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

Crime Victimization

In order to explore how crime affects people's lives we include the following question:

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been victim of any criminal act in the past 12 months?

This question has not only been formulated in the five studies carried out in Colombia, enabling us to explore trends over a period of time, but it has also been included in the questionnaires for other countries studied in LAPOP's 2008 round. This enables us to establish comparisons regarding the rates of victimization of crime.

As seen in Figure 3.1, 15.5% of Colombians said they had been victims of some criminal act over the past year. This percentage puts Colombia among the countries with the lowest rate of victimization, a little less than half that reported in countries like Argentina and Peru, and significantly less than in Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela.




Figure 3.1 - Victimization by crime in comparative perspective 2008

Rates of victimization by crime have remained practically constant in Colombia. Figure 3.2 shows that, although there appears to have been a slight increase in the past two years by comparison with previous studies, the differences are not statistically significant.




Figure 3.2 – Victimization by crime 2004-2008

However, there are noticeable differences between one region and another within the country. As was predicted in the initial section of this chapter, the capital of the Republic shows indices of victimization almost ten percentage points above the national average. In Bogotá, therefore, and in the Pacific region, the proportion of citizens who say they have been victims of criminal acts is significantly greater than in the Central and Atlantic regions.




Figure 3.3 – Victimization by crime by regions 2008

With a view to examining the characteristics of those who have been victims of criminal acts, we created a simple model of logistic regression, including factors such as level of education, gender, age, wealth and the size of the place of residence.

Using the technique described in the previous chapter, in Figure 3.4 we present the standardized coefficients of the statistic model. Table 3.1 in the Appendix to this chapter shows the complete results of the exercise.




Figure 3.4 - Factors that influence the likelihood of being victim of crime

As can be seen in the previous Figure, and is shown in detail in Figure 3.5, the incidence of victimization by crime is greater among the better educated. Also, there is a significant difference between men and women. Except among those of the lowest education levels, men are more likely to be victims of some kind of criminal act than women are.




Figure 3.5 – Victimization by crime according to education and gender

Criminal activity, as was said earlier, is fundamentally an urban phenomenon. Consequently, as would be expected, levels of victimization are higher when the place of residence is larger. As shown in Figure 3.6, medium-sized and large cities, and the capital of the Republic, have percentages of victims above the national average, and practically double those of small cities or towns and rural areas.




Figure 3.6 – Victimization by crime according to size of the place

Perception of insecurity

The second dimension related to crime has to do with how secure citizens feel in this regard. In an attempt to explore this matter, the questionnaire includes the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the place or barrio/colony where you live and thinking about the possibility of being attacked or robbed, do you feel very safe? fairly safe? pretty unsafe? or very unsafe?

Once converted to a scale of 0 to 100, Colombians feel fairly safe if one compares them with citizens of other countries in the region. Only in Jamaica, the United States and Canada is there significantly less perception of insecurity than in Colombia, as seen in Figure 3.7, which is surprising if one considers not only the rates of criminality reported in other studies such as those mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, but also, and fundamentally, the situation of armed conflict and violence which has been typical of this country over the past decades.




Figure 3.7 – Perception of insecurity in comparative perspective 2008

The levels of insecurity perceived are even slightly less over the past year compared with results from previous years, as can be seen in Figure 3.8, although this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 3.8 – Perception of insecurity 2004-2008

As regards criminality, victimization would seem to be related to perception, at least in the regional variation. The inhabitants of Bogotá are those who suffer most intensely from feelings of insecurity as regards crime, while the inhabitants of the Central and Atlantic regions express less fear of criminal attacks, as can be seen in Figure 3.9.




Figure 3.9 – Perception of insecurity by regions 2008

Impact of crime on support for stable democracy

As was set out in the theoretical chapter of this report, and in the theoretical framework of this chapter, there is a risk that the crime situation erodes activities favorable to a stable democratic system. To begin to explore this hypothesis empirically, we want to examine the impact of victimization by crime and the perception of insecurity on the five dimensions of stable democracy: namely, support for democracy as the best form of government, support for the right to participate in politics, political tolerance, legitimacy of the institutions and interpersonal trust.

Impact of crime victimization

With a view to studying the impact of being a victim of criminal acts on support for stable democracy, we build five models of lineal regression, one for each of the above-mentioned dimensions, including as central factor a dichotomy variable codified as 1 if the respondent was victim of any criminal act in the past year, and 0 if, luckily, he or she was not.

As additional factors, we included the usual sociodemographic variables, besides the measurements of perception of the family economy, interest in politics and approval of the president's performance.

The results of the econometric models appear in Table 3.2 of the Appendix to this chapter. As seen in the said table, crime victimization has a significant effect on political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

In the first place, just as in the case of corruption, victims of criminal acts also show higher levels of political tolerance, as is shown in Figure 3.10. The difference between victims and non victims, which is almost 7 points on the scale of 0 to 100 of tolerance, is small but significant.




Figure 3.10 – Impact of crime victimization on political tolerance

The opposite is true in the case of the legitimacy of political institutions. Those who have been victims of a criminal act in the past year not only are below the national average in the measurement of legitimacy, but also exhibit a significant reduction by contrast with those who did not report victimization, as can be seen in Figure 3.11.




Figure 3.11 – Impact of crime victimization on legitimacy of institutions

Finally, the same negative impact, even more pronounced, exists regarding interpersonal trust, as one can see in Figure 3.12.




Figure 3.12 – Impact of crime victimization on interpersonal trust

The relation found here between crime and attitudes towards the political system is not a peculiarity of the sample taken in the present study. On the contrary, the impact of crime victimization on these dimensions of support for stable democracy has been consistent over the five years during which this study has been carried out. For the greater part of those years, there has been a significant difference between victims and non victims.

Impact of the perception of insecurity

As well as citizen experiences with crime, it is important to analyze the perception citizens have of their own personal security. As in the case of corruption, the dimensions of victimization and perception in some way complement one another to obtain a more complete panorama of the crime phenomenon and its relation to the Colombians' attitudes as regards the political system.

For this reason we also wanted to gauge the effect that perception of insecurity might have on the five dimensions of support for stable democracy. To this effect, we built models of lineal regression for each of these dimensions, including the factors already mentioned, but substituting victimization for the measurement of perception of insecurity described in previous sections. The results of these statistic models appear in detail in Table 3.3 of the Appendix to this chapter.

As distinct from victimization, perception of insecurity is a weaker predictor of attitudes on stable democracy. In fact, perception only has a significant impact on interpersonal trust. Those people who are most insecure regarding crime also express more distrust in their relationship with their fellow citizens, as can be seen in Figure 3.13.




Figure 3.13 – Impact of perception of insecurity on interpersonal trust

Conclusion

High indices of crime constitute one of Latin America's most serious problems. Nonetheless, the Colombians report moderate or comparatively low levels of victimization by criminal acts when compared with other countries in the region. Something similar occurs with the perception of Colombia's citizens regarding the likelihood of being victims of crime.

This does not mean, however, that this perspective of governance – namely, the experiences and perceptions of individuals regarding crime – is less innocuous as regards citizen support for democratic stability. As we saw in the final part of the chapter, both crime victimization and the perception of insecurity have a significant impact on important dimensions of the said support. The control of this problem is therefore definitive for the stability and legitimacy of the democratic system.

Appendix

Table 3.1 – Factors that influence the likelihood of being a victim of a criminal act

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Level of education	0,080**	(0.03)
Woman	-0,399**	(0.14)
Age	-0,007	(0.01)
Wealth	0,001	(0.05)
Size of the place	0,234***	(0.05)
Constant	-2,457***	(0.32)
F	10.47	
N	1499	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3.2 – Impact of crime victimization on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right of participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of the institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Victimization by crime	-0,969	(1.87)	1,952	(1.52)	4,879**	(1.71)	-3,316*	(1.47)	-6,017**	(2.18)
Presidential approval	0,159***	(0.03)	0,013	(0.03)	-0,134**	(0.05)	0,325***	(0.03)	0,066	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,102***	(0.02)	0,075***	(0.02)	0,040	(0.03)	0,107***	(0.02)	0,062*	(0.02)
Education	0,816***	(0.21)	0,586**	(0.17)	0,269	(0.20)	-0,618***	(0.15)	0,226	(0.28)
Woman	-2,109	(1.36)	-1,484	(1.15)	-3,656*	(1.54)	0,537	(1.28)	0,474	(1.40)
Age	0,962***	(0.22)	0,241	(0.17)	-0,228	(0.22)	0,068	(0.19)	0,517*	(0.25)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	0,000	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,243	(0.48)	0,120	(0.42)	0,751	(0.45)	-0,255	(0.29)	1,078*	(0.43)
Perception of family economy	0,718	(0.97)	0,920	(0.77)	0,875	(0.71)	1,828*	(0.79)	3,210**	(1.03)
Size of place	-0,907	(0.71)	-1,496**	(0.47)	-0,800	(0.74)	-1,176*	(0.48)	-4,210***	(0.68)
Constant	27,276***	(5.50)	53,625***	(4.67)	55,450***	(6.46)	29,617***	(4.95)	35,302***	(6.74)
R-squared	0.080		0.036		0.040		0.173		0.059	
N	1392		1437		1429		1424		1439	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3.3 – Impact of perception of insecurity on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for the right of participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Perception of insecurity	-0,053	(0.03)	-0,001	(0.02)	-0,023	(0.02)	-0,029	(0.02)	-0,192***	(0.03)
Presidential approval	0,158***	(0.03)	0,009	(0.04)	-0,144**	(0.05)	0,326***	(0.03)	0,050	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,102***	(0.02)	0,078***	(0.02)	0,048	(0.03)	0,104***	(0.02)	0,063*	(0.02)
Education	0,820***	(0.21)	0,618**	(0.17)	0,306	(0.20)	-0,642***	(0.15)	0,232	(0.27)
Woman	-1,932	(1.32)	-1,726	(1.11)	-4,077**	(1.49)	0,840	(1.27)	1,445	(1.40)
Age	0,996***	(0.23)	0,224	(0.17)	-0,246	(0.22)	0,077	(0.19)	0,521*	(0.24)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	0,000	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,245	(0.48)	0,163	(0.42)	0,758	(0.45)	-0,308	(0.29)	1,114*	(0.42)
Perception of family economy	0,538	(1.03)	0,832	(0.80)	0,598	(0.67)	1,781*	(0.81)	2,355*	(1.04)
Size of place	-0,719	(0.72)	-1,419*	(0.48)	-0,517	(0.73)	-1,146*	(0.49)	-3,656***	(0.64)
Constant	28,623***	(6.11)	54,417***	(5.05)	57,829***	(6.57)	30,446***	(5.14)	44,029***	(6.84)
R-squared	0.087		0.035		0.038		0.171		0.093	
N	1382		1427		1420		1413		1431	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 4. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework¹

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators or cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, in most of Spanish/Portuguese-speaking Latin America, Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

¹ Parts of this section were written by Daniel Montalvo.

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Alburquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).²

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystalized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963)*. That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that ruled in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society

² There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross-nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple associations express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of “outsiders.” There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

Measuring Local Government Participation

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government’s responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (civpart). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

The following questions were used to test our theory on these two aspects:

B32. To what extent do you have confidence in your mayor?

COLB32A. To what extent do you have confidence in you municipal council?

LGL2A. Bearing in mind public services that exist in the country, to whom should **most responsibility** be given?

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) A little more to central government
- (3) Equal amounts to central and municipal governments
- (4) Rather more to the municipality
- (5) Much more to the municipality
- (88) NS/NR

LGL2B. And bearing in mind the economic resources that exist in the country, who ought to **administer more funds**?

- (1) Much more by the central government
- (2) A little more by central government
- (3) Equal amounts by the central and municipal governments
- (4) Rather more by the municipality
- (5) Much more by the municipality
- (88) NS/NR

SGL1. Would you say that the services which the municipality is providing are:

- (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (mediocre) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (worst possible)?
- (8) NS/NR

Measurement of civil society participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured the participation of civil society with a battery of standard questions. This series, known as CP (“community participation”) is shown in what follows:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me how often you attend meetings of these organizations: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.					
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	NS/NR
CP6. Meetings as a religious organization? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Meetings of parent-teacher association of school or high school? Attendance	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. ¿Meetings of a Committee or board for improvements in the community? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. Meetings of association of professionals, trades people, producers and/or farmers organizations? Attendance...	1	2	3	4	8
CP10. Union meetings? Attendance...	1	2	3	4	8
CP20. ¿Meetings of women’s associations or groups? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8

Confidence in local authorities

As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the Colombians exhibit comparatively high levels of confidence in their mayors, only significantly below those of Dominican Republic. This result is not only very positive, it is also consistent with comparisons made in previous rounds of LAPOP studies.




Figure 4.1 – Confidence in municipal government in comparative perspective 2008

Confidence in municipal authorities, that is in the mayor and the municipal council, suffered a decline between 2006 and 2007, but has sprung back to levels even higher than those at the start of the past year, as can be seen in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2 – Confidence in Mayor and Municipal Council 2004-2008

Mayors and councilors of the Eastern and Central regions are those who enjoy most citizen confidence, as can be seen in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3 – Confidence in Mayor and Council by regions 2008

Despite the return to higher levels of confidence in local government, such confidence is still less than citizen trust in governors and in the national government (Figure 4.4), which would seem to contradict the hypothesis that citizens put more trust in instances of government that are closer to their daily lives.




Figure 4.4 – Confidence in municipal, departmental and local governments 2004-2008

Decentralization of responsibilities and resources

For the first time the LAPOP questionnaires included two questions related to the level of citizen support for decentralization, both of responsibilities and of resources. Figure 4.5 shows that Colombians would like greater responsibilities to be given to municipal governments, especially by comparison with other countries included in the study.




Figure 4.5 – Support for decentralization of responsibilities in comparative perspective 2008

Figure 4.6 shows that the inhabitants of the Atlantic region are reticent about this kind of decentralization, significantly beneath the national average, whereas the inhabitants of the Central region are the most favorable. This corresponds, in part, to regional levels of confidence in municipal government.




Figure 4.6 – Support for decentralization of responsibilities by regions 2008

Colombians also appear to be among those most favorable to the decentralization of economic resources, by comparison with the citizens of other countries, as one gleans from a study of Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7 – Support for decentralization of resources in comparative perspective 2008

The regional variation for support of decentralization of resources follows the same pattern: the Atlantic region shows the same clearly lower level than the national average, whereas the Eastern region appears to be the region most disposed to this kind of decentralization.




Figure 4.8 – Support for decentralization of resources by regions 2008

Satisfaction with public municipal services

As is traditional, the study measures the degree of citizen satisfaction with the way municipal governments provide public services. Figure 4.9 shows Colombia to be among the countries whose citizens are most satisfied with the provision of services.




Figure 4.9 – Satisfaction with local services in comparative perspective 2008

This comparatively high level of satisfaction with services provided by the municipality is not just something from the past year. In fact, Colombians have shown satisfaction with the said services during the past five years, without notable variations, as can be seen in Figure 4.10.




Figure 4.10 – Satisfaction with municipal services 2004-2008

Figure 4.11 show that the inhabitants of Bogotá and of the Central region are those who show most satisfaction with services provided by their respective municipalities. In the former National Territories, where generally the State's presence is poor, local services receive a considerably lower qualification, well below the national average.




Figure 4.11 – Satisfaction with municipal services by regions 2008

When respondents are asked to evaluate each of the basic services, the provision of health services obtains the lowest qualification, while services such as electricity and public education are those that generate higher levels of satisfaction, as one can see in Figure 4.12.




Figure 4.12 – Satisfaction with different public services 2008

Participation in municipal affairs and demands on local authorities

Aside from the way citizens evaluate their public services, they may be involved directly in the exercise of local government. To gauge to what extent this happens, we included the following two questions in the questionnaire:

NP1. Have you attended an open community meeting or municipal session during the past 12 months?

NP2. Have you requested help or presented a petition to any official or municipal councilor over the past 12 months?

As can be seen in Figure 4.13, only one in every ten Colombians attend meetings called by the municipality, a relatively small proportion when compared with countries like Dominican Republic and Venezuela.




Figure 4.13 – Attendance at municipal meetings in comparative perspective 2008

There did exist, however, a significant increase in the percentage of citizens who attended a municipal meeting over the past year, as can be seen in Figure 4.14.




Figure 4.14 – Attendance at municipal meetings 2005-2008

On the other hand, the inhabitants of Bogotá are less involved in this kind of activity, whereas in the former National Territories there is greater participation (Figure 4.15).




Figure 4.15 – Attendance at municipal meeting by regions 2008

Figure 4.16 shows that merely one out of every ten Colombians presents petitions to local governments, a percentage half that of Uruguay. Comparatively, therefore, in Colombia citizens are not accustomed to getting involved very often in the exercise of municipal government, perhaps because the institutional instances required for this kind of activity are less developed than in other countries.




Figure 4.16 – Presentation of petitions to municipal government in comparative perspective

Also, this percentage has been diminishing over recent years, as can be seen in Figure 4.17.




Figure 4.17 – Presentation of petitions to municipal government 2004-2008

Regional distribution follows a similar pattern as that of attendance at municipal meetings (Figure 4.18).




Figure 4.18 – Presentation of petitions to municipal government by regions 2008

This trend is confirmed when we observe how the percentage of those people who say they have requested help from the mayor or a municipal councilor has been in decline in recent years (Figure 4.19).




Figure 4.19 – Petition for help from mayor or councilor 2004-2008

Impact of satisfaction with services and participation in municipal meetings on support for decentralization

Is there any relationship between satisfaction with municipal services, participation in municipal meetings and support for decentralization? It could be expected that those most satisfied with the provision of services, and those who more frequently attended open meetings, would also be those most in favor of granting municipalities more responsibilities and resources. To test this hypothesis empirically, we built a lineal regression model taking as dependent variable the index of support for decentralization of both responsibilities and resources. Besides the level of satisfaction with municipal services and a dichotomy variable which indicates if the individual

attended a municipal meeting during the past year, we included sociodemoFigure variables such as education level, gender, age, wealth and size of the place of residence. Table 4.1 in the Appendix to this chapter shows the results of these two models (decentralization of responsibilities and decentralization of resources).

Figure 4.20 shows that neither satisfaction with services nor attendance at municipal meetings make a significant impact on support for decentralization of responsibilities. In fact, the model indicates that the only determining factor is gender. Women tend to support this modality of decentralization less than men do, controlling other factors.




Figure 4.20 – Factors that influence support for decentralization of responsibilities

By way of contrast, those most satisfied with the provision of services by the municipality are in favor of municipalities receiving more resources, as can be seen in Figure 4.21.




Figure 4.21 – Factors that influence support for decentralization of resources

This relationship between satisfaction with municipal services and support for decentralization of resources is illustrated in Figure 4.22.




Figure 4.22 – Support for decentralization of resources according to satisfaction with municipal services

Impact of satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy

The theoretical framework of this chapter poses the hypothesis that support for the democratic system in general springs from the interaction of citizens with local instances of government. To test this hypothesis empirically, we built five lineal regression models, one for each of the dimensions of support for stable democracy. The results of the models appear in Table 4.2 of the Appendix to this chapter.

As can be seen in this table, satisfaction with municipal services has a significant effect on institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. Figure 4.23 shows that those most satisfied grant greater legitimacy to key institutions of the political system.




Figure 4.23 – Legitimacy of political institutions according to satisfaction with municipal services

Results of the model also show that satisfaction with the way municipal services are provided has a positive effect on interpersonal trust, as can be seen in Figure 4.24.




Figure 4.24 – Interpersonal trust according to satisfaction with municipal services

The frequency of attendance at meetings of a religious nature has remained fairly constant in Colombia over the past five years, as can be seen in Figure 4.26.




Figure 4.26 – Attendance at meetings of religious organizations 2004-2008

Although less frequently than in the case of religious organizations, attendance of Colombians at parent-teacher association meetings occupies a relatively high place in the comparative table of the rest of the countries included in this study, only ten percentage points less than Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, countries which occupy the first places in the South American subcontinent, as can be seen in Figure 4.27.




Figure 4.27 – Attendance at meetings of parent-teacher associations in comparative perspective 2008

Figure 0.28 shows that attendance at these kinds of meetings has slightly declined, but has nevertheless been sustained over the past few years.




Figure 4.28 – Attendance at meetings of parent-teacher associations 2004-2008

The level of participation in community development committees has remained stable, with certain minor fluctuations, as one can appreciate in Figure 4.30.




Figure 4.30 - Attendance at community development committees 2005-2008

A little over one out of every ten Colombians participates in meetings of professional or trade associations, half the level of Bolivia, as is shown in Figure 4.31.




Figure 4.31 - Attendance at meetings of professional association in comparative perspective 2008

Figure 4.32 shows how, in recent years, there has been a slight decline in the frequency of participation in this kind of association, with respect to the first years of this study.




Figure 4.32 – Attendance at meetings of professional associations 2004-2008

The low rate of union membership of Colombian workers is evidenced in Figure 4.33. Only in El Salvador is the percentage of attendance at union meetings lower than in Colombia, which constitutes a seventh of the rate in Bolivia and a quarter of the rate of attendance in Brazil.




Figure 4.33 – Attendance at union meetings in comparative perspective 2008

In the past four years, this trend has remained practically constant, as is illustrated in Figure 4.34.




Figure 4.34 – Attendance at union meetings 2005-2008

Finally, Colombia occupies the last place in attendance at meetings of women’s groups, as can be seen in Figure 4.35.




Figure 4.35 – Attendance at meetings of women’s groups in comparative perspective 2008

Also, there is a significant decline over the past year in the percentage of Colombian citizens who attend this kind of meeting, as is evidenced in Figure 4.36.




Figure 4.36 – Attendance at meetings of women’s groups 2006-2008

Impact of participation in local civil society groups on support for stable democracy

To examine whether or not citizen participation in local civil society groups – that is, in religious organizations, parent-teacher associations and community development committees – have some incidence on support for stable democracy, we created statistic models, taking as dependent variables the indicators for each one the five pillars of this support that we have mentioned throughout this study.

The models therefore include three central variables that indicate whether or not the individual has participated in each one of these groups. Besides, the models include sociodemographic variables, as well as indicators of interest in politics and approval of the president’s performance. The detailed results of these models appear in Table 4.3.

None of the forms of participation we have studied seems to have had a significant impact on support for democracy per se, the so-called “Churchillian adherence”, as seen in Figure 4.37³.




Figure 4.37 – Impact of participation in local groups on support for democracy

³ For the sake of brevity and simplicity, the Figures that summarize the models in this section only show the effects of those forms of participation which concern us here, and omit Figure representation of all other factors.

These forms of participation in local groups also exhibit no impact on support for the right of participation (Figure 4.38).




Figure 4.38 – Impact of participation in local groups on support for the right of participation

The same absence of significant effects is produced in relation to political tolerance, as is seen in Figure 4.39.




Figure 4.39 – Impact of participation in local groups on political tolerance

In the same way, there seems to be no relation between participation in religious organizations, parent-teacher associations or community development boards, and the level of citizen legitimacy as regards the key institutions of the political system, as is evidenced in Figure 4.40.




Figure 4.40 – Impact of participation in local groups on institutional legitimacy

Finally, attendance at meetings of a religious nature is related to personal trust, as shown in Figure 4.41.




Figure 4.41 – Impact of participation in local groups on interpersonal trust

In effect, as can be seen in Figure 4.42, those who attend religious organizations show little more than five points more on the scale of interpersonal trust than those who do not attend this kind of meeting.




Figure 4.42 – Impact of attendance at meetings of religious organizations on interpersonal trust

Appendix

Table 4.1 – Factors that influence support for decentralization of ...

	Responsibilities		Resources	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Satisfaction with municipal services	0,061	(0.05)	0,145***	(0.04)
Attendance at municipal meetings	3,126	(3.11)	2,761	(3.06)
Education level	0,066	(0.29)	-0,357	(0.26)
Woman	-5,343*	(2.42)	-1,368	(2.08)
Age	0,082	(0.08)	-0,009	(0.07)
Wealth	0,278	(0.61)	0,203	(0.61)
Size of place	-1,578	(0.97)	-0,738	(0.73)
Constant	50,250***	(5.32)	51,780***	(5.67)
R-cuadrately	0.011		0.010	
N	1359		1357	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.2 – Impact of satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support of democracy		Support of right of participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Satisfaction with municipal services	0,002	(0.04)	-0,030	(0.03)	-0,037	(0.04)	0,103***	(0.03)	0,080*	(0.04)
Presidential approval	0,159***	(0.04)	0,014	(0.04)	-0,132**	(0.05)	0,320***	(0.03)	0,071	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,100***	(0.02)	0,074***	(0.02)	0,042	(0.03)	0,102***	(0.02)	0,057*	(0.03)
Education	0,786***	(0.20)	0,597**	(0.18)	0,293	(0.20)	-0,607***	(0.16)	0,286	(0.29)
Woman	-1,912	(1.41)	-1,559	(1.18)	-3,622*	(1.47)	0,617	(1.28)	0,245	(1.41)
Age	1,003***	(0.22)	0,216	(0.17)	-0,264	(0.22)	0,150	(0.19)	0,564*	(0.25)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	-0,001	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,298	(0.50)	0,250	(0.43)	0,825	(0.45)	-0,377	(0.30)	0,986*	(0.44)
Perception of family economy	0,699	(0.96)	0,787	(0.84)	0,831	(0.75)	1,859*	(0.78)	3,249**	(1.00)
Size of place	-0,868	(0.70)	-1,429**	(0.48)	-0,510	(0.71)	-1,499**	(0.47)	-4,609***	(0.70)
Constant	26,312***	(5.81)	55,860***	(4.82)	58,053***	(6.34)	23,006***	(5.47)	29,819***	(7.09)
R-squared	0.079		0.035		0.035		0.181		0.058	
N	1369		1413		1407		1399		1416	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.3 – Impact of citizen participation on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right of participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Religious organization	-0,004	(0.02)	-0,010	(0.02)	0,005	(0.02)	0,025	(0.02)	0,055*	(0.02)
Parent-teacher association	-0,000	(0.03)	0,048	(0.02)	0,011	(0.03)	0,005	(0.02)	-0,024	(0.03)
Community development committee	-0,042	(0.03)	0,022	(0.03)	-0,028	(0.04)	0,023	(0.03)	0,010	(0.03)
Presidential approval	0,151***	(0.03)	0,007	(0.03)	-0,143**	(0.05)	0,328***	(0.03)	0,074	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,102***	(0.02)	0,068***	(0.02)	0,045	(0.02)	0,096***	(0.02)	0,053	(0.03)
Education	0,826***	(0.22)	0,578**	(0.17)	0,281	(0.20)	-0,675***	(0.15)	0,257	(0.30)
Woman	-2,173	(1.41)	-2,031	(1.18)	-4,371**	(1.46)	0,533	(1.32)	-0,002	(1.39)
Age	1,030***	(0.24)	0,206	(0.20)	-0,118	(0.23)	-0,014	(0.18)	0,578*	(0.29)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,001	(0.00)	0,001	(0.00)	-0,005	(0.00)
Wealth	0,197	(0.50)	0,250	(0.41)	0,859	(0.44)	-0,253	(0.30)	0,965*	(0.45)
Perception of family economy	0,992	(0.95)	1,004	(0.78)	0,735	(0.72)	2,051**	(0.73)	3,271**	(1.01)
Size of place	-0,988	(0.69)	-1,342**	(0.47)	-0,637	(0.71)	-1,224*	(0.47)	-4,314***	(0.70)
Constant	26,701***	(5.97)	54,192***	(5.27)	54,561***	(6.65)	29,614***	(4.95)	32,443***	(7.09)
R-squared	0.081		0.038		0.037		0.172		0.060	
N	1375		1418		1412		1406		1420	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 5. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical framework¹

It has become commonplace in the field of democratic governance, and talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens do directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in most of the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did one’s opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton’s three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, bad economic outlooks and perceptions affected “peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (5).

¹ This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat in doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, those citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government, however according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, that “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed.

Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions.

Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

Perception of government's economic performance

To begin the analysis of the government's economic performance as seen by the citizens, we should first calibrate the importance the economy has for them. The questionnaire, by means of a semi-open question, requests the respondents to identify what, to their mind, is the country's principal problem. The replies can be grouped into different categories, as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 5.1 - Principal problems of Colombia according to citizens (A4) recoded in categories

Economy	Security	Basic services	Politics	Others
Credit, lack of (09)	Delinquency, crime (05)	Water, lack of(19)	Armed conflict (30)	Inequality (58)
Unemployment/lack of employment(03)	Gangs (14)	Roads/ in bad repair (18)	Corruption (13)	Torced displacement (32)
Economy, problems with, crisis of (01)	Kidnapping (31)	Education, lack of, bad quality of (21)	Human Rights, violations of (56)	Discrimination (25)
Inflation, high prices (02)	Security (lack of) (27)	Electricity, lack of (24)	Politicians (59)	Drug addiction (11)
Poverty (04)	War against terrorism (17)	Health, lack of health services (22)	Bad government (15)	Demographic explosion (20)
Land to farm/ lack of (07)	Terrorism (33)	Transport, problems with (60)		Environment (10)
Foreign Debt (26)	Violence (57)	Housing (55)		Migration (16)
		Malnutrition (23)		Drug traffic2)
				Popular protests (strikes, road blocas, etc.)(06)
				Narcoterrorism (65)
				Other (0)

As one can see in Figure 5.1, little more than one in every five Colombians considers the economy to be the country's most important problem at the present time, a low percentage compared with the number of people who believe the most serious problem is security.




Figure 5.1 – The country's principal problem 2008

In fact, the percentage of those who think that in Colombia the main problem is the economy is one of the lowest percentages among all the countries included in this study, only above Venezuela, and to a lesser degree above Brazil, as can be seen in Figure 5.2.




Figure 5.2 – The main problem is the economy, in comparative perspective 2008

Furthermore, this percentage has been declining over recent years, as is shown in Figure 5.3.




Figure 5.3 – The main problem is the economy 2004-2008

With a view to examining how Colombians perceive the government’s economic performance, we created a new index (ECONPERF) based on the following questions²:

Using a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 signifies NOTHING and 7 signifies A LOT,,,	Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. To what extent would you say the present government is combating poverty?	
N12. To what extent would you say the present government is combating unemployment?	

Colombia occupies a moderately high place among countries in the region as regards perception of the government’s economic performance, as seen in Figure 5.4.




Figure 5.4 – Perception of government’s economic performance in comparative perspective 2008

² This index is reliable ($\alpha = .76$).

However, Colombians give a negative qualification to the government's performance in economic matters, if we consider that, on a scale of 0 to 100, the average of the last three years is below fifty percentage points, although it has been improving in the past two years (Figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5 – Perception of government's economic performance 2004-2008

In order to attempt an analysis of factors that influence this perception, we used two key variables that have to do with perception of the national economy (sociotropic) and perception of personal economy (egotropic), based on the following questions:

SOCT1. Now, talking of the economy, how would you qualify the country’s economic situation? Would you say it is good, very good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

IDIO1. How would you qualify in general your economic situation? Would you say it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

As can be seen in Figure 5.6, Colombians, although on average they give the country’s economy a negative qualification (the indicator is lower than 50 points), comparatively they are only less satisfied than the Uruguayans, Chileans, Brazilians and Argentinians.




Figure 5.6 – Situation of national economy in comparative perspective 2008

Is the Colombians' perception of the economic and personal economy related in some way to their assessment of the government's economic performance? To answer this question, we created a lineal regression model using these two indicators as predictors of the said assessment, besides the other usual sociodemographic factors. The results of the model appear in Table 5.2 in the Appendix to this chapter, and they are represented in Figure 5.8. As can be seen in this Figure, besides the education level and the level of wealth, which have a negative impact on perception of the government's economic performance, both the situation of the national economy and that of the personal economy have a positive effect on the said perception.




Figure 5.8 – Factors that influence perception of the government's economic performance

These relationships can be appreciated in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.




Figure 5.9 – Perception of government’s economic performance according to perception of national economy




Figure 5.10 – Perception of government’s economic performance according to perception of personal economy

Impact of the perception of the government's economic performance on support for stable democracy

To examine whether or not citizen perception of the government's performance in economic matters affects support for stable democracy, we created five regression models, one for each of the dimensions of the said support, as has already been explained in this report. The results of the model appear in Table 5.3 in the Appendix to this chapter. As can be seen in that table, the Colombians' assessment of the government's economic performance positively influences support for the "Churchillian concept" of democracy and the legitimacy of institutions.

In effect, those who give a positive qualification to the government in matters of the economy, also show a level of support for democracy as the best system of government over and above the national average, as is seen in Figure 5.11.




Figure 5.11 – Effect of perception of government's economic performance on support for democracy

The same occurs in relation to the legitimacy of key institutions of the political system (system of justice, national government, Congress, political parties and Supreme Court of Justice) as is shown in Figure 5.12.




Figure 5.12 – Impact of perception of government’s economic performance on institutional legitimacy

The role of the State in the economy

One of the classic political debates has to do with the degree of intervention of the State in the economy. To examine the Colombians' beliefs as regards this discussion, several questions were included for the first time in the questionnaire of the LAPOP project:

<p>Now I am going to read some phrases on the role of the State. Please tell me to what extent you are in agreement or in disagreement with what I read. We continue to use the same scale of 1 to 7.</p> <p>NS/NR = 8</p>	<p>Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</p>
<p>ROS1. The Colombian State, instead of the private sector, should own the country's most important firms and industries. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?</p>	
<p>ROS2. The Colombian State, rather than individuals, should be mainly responsible for ensuring people's welfare. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?</p>	
<p>ROS3. The Colombian State, rather than private enterprise, should be mainly responsible for creating employment. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?</p>	
<p>ROS4. The Colombian State ought to implement strong policies to reduce inequality of incomes between rich and poor, To what extent do you agree or disagree with this idea?</p>	

In general, Colombians believe that the State should own the main firms and industries. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 5.13, Colombia is one of the countries with the highest level of support for this kind of State intervention, almost ten points above Uruguay, a country where the privatization of several public service firms was rejected in a referendum. One can also observe, in general, a strong contrast between Latin American countries and the U.S., where there seems to exist a consensus in favor of private enterprise.




Figure 5.13 – Support for the role of the State as owner of the main enterprises in comparative perspective 2008

There is strong support for the idea that the State, rather than the private sphere, should be mainly responsible for citizen welfare, as one sees in Figure 5.14.




Figure 5.14 – Support for the role of the State as responsible for general welfare in comparative perspective

Similarly, Colombia exhibits a majority support for the notion that the State, rather than private business, is responsible for generating employment. Once again, this contrasts noticeably with the U.S., and even with Canada, as can be seen in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.15 – Support for the role of the State as generator of employment in comparative perspective 2008

Finally, a similar situation exists regarding citizen support for a central role by the State in reducing social inequalities, as is evidenced in Figure 5.16.




Figure 5.16 – Support for the role of the State as responsible for reducing inequality in comparative perspective 2008

With these four items we can build an index of support for a more active role of the State in the economy³. In accordance with this index, Colombia occupies fourth place among the countries included in this study which most favor State intervention in the economic aspects of national life, as can be seen in Figure 5.17.




Figure 5.17 – Support for a more active role of the State in the economy in comparative perspective 2008

³ The reliability of this index is fairly acceptable ($\alpha = .69$)

What are the particular traits of those who are in favor of the State’s playing a main part in the economy over and above private enterprise? An econometric model might give us the answer to this question. This model includes, besides the sociodemographic characteristics, factors such as perception of the situation of the national and personal economies, ideological stance, approval rate for presidential performance, and party affiliation. The results of the model appear in Table 5.4 in the Appendix to this chapter, and are represented in Figure 5.18.




Figure 5.18 – Factors that influence support for a more active role by the State in the economy

As can be inferred from the previous Figure (which shows that coefficients by age and age raised to the fourth degree are statistically significant), the middle-aged tend to be more interventionist, while young people and the elderly are more favorable to private enterprise, as is seen in Figure 5.19.




Figure 5.19 – Support for a more active role by the State in the economy by age

Although the subject of party affiliation will be dealt with in a later chapter, we believe that the State’s role in the economy is a central aspect of the differences between political party platforms in Colombia. That is why we include in this model dichotomy variables for those who consider themselves to be sympathizers with each of Colombia’s main political parties. As can be observed in the results of the model and in Figure 5.20, those who sympathize with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* are significantly more favorable to greater State intervention in the economy (by comparison with those who do not sympathize with any party, which is our basic category). In fact, *Polo Democrático* is the only party whose affiliates seem to record this effect.




Figure 5.20 – Support for a more active role by the State in the economy by party affiliation

Appendix

Table 5.2 – Factors that influence the perception of government’s economic performance

	Coefficient	Err. est.
Education level	-0,543**	(0.18)
Woman	1,220	(1.36)
Age	0,055	(0.05)
Wealth	-1,066*	(0.46)
Size of place	0,217	(0.64)
National economic situation	0,330***	(0.04)
Personal economic situation	0,094*	(0.05)
Constant	35,636***	(4.17)
R-squared	0.083	
N	1469	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.3 – Impact of perception of government’s economic performance on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for right to participation		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Government economic performance	0,136***	(0.04)	0,050	(0.03)	-0,002	(0.03)	0,313***	(0.03)	0,055	(0.03)
Presidential approval	0,089*	(0.03)	-0,018	(0.04)	-0,138**	(0.04)	0,158***	(0.03)	0,047	(0.04)
Interest in politics	0,091***	(0.02)	0,071***	(0.02)	0,040	(0.03)	0,080***	(0.02)	0,048*	(0.02)
Education	0,887***	(0.21)	0,691***	(0.17)	0,355	(0.20)	-0,416**	(0.15)	0,237	(0.29)
Woman	-2,489	(1.38)	-1,812	(1.16)	-3,889**	(1.45)	0,160	(1.14)	0,776	(1.42)
Age	0,978***	(0.22)	0,220	(0.17)	-0,259	(0.22)	0,098	(0.18)	0,521*	(0.25)
Age-squared	-0,008**	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.00)	0,003	(0.00)	-0,000	(0.00)	-0,004	(0.00)
Wealth	0,435	(0.48)	0,247	(0.41)	0,794	(0.46)	0,050	(0.30)	1,159**	(0.43)
Perception of family economy	0,344	(0.95)	0,619	(0.79)	0,682	(0.72)	0,988	(0.80)	3,143**	(1.05)
Size of place	-0,995	(0.70)	-1,489**	(0.44)	-0,663	(0.74)	-1,369**	(0.45)	-4,464***	(0.69)
Constant	25,426***	(5.58)	53,611***	(4.79)	56,341***	(6.70)	24,972***	(4.49)	33,975***	(6.34)
R-squared	0.095		0.039		0.036		0.287		0.056	
N	1382		1425		1415		1414		1425	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.4 – Factors that influence support for a more active role by the State in the economy

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	0,094	(0.20)
Woman	-1,840	(1.24)
Age	0,497**	(0.18)
Age -squared	-0,005*	(0.00)
Wealth	-0,269	(0.37)
Size of place	-0,725	(0.53)
National economic situation	-0,036	(0.03)
Personal economic situation	0,004	(0.03)
Ideological position	-0,126	(0.24)
Presidential approval	0,004	(0.02)
Liberal Party	-0,019	(1.97)
Conservative Party	-2,088	(3.04)
Polo Democrático	7,496***	(2.11)
Party of the U	2,949	(2.29)
Cambio Radical	0,594	(3.71)
Other	-0,240	(3.15)
Constant	71,291***	(5.45)
R-squared	0.027	
N	1213	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

PART III. BEYOND GOVERNANCE

Chapter 6. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

Theoretical background

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.¹ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

The legitimacy/tolerance equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

¹ Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following²:

- B1.** To what extent do you believe that justice tribunals in Colombia guarantee a fair trial?
- B2.** To what extent do you respect Colombia’s political institutions?
- B3.** To what extent do you think basic citizen rights are well protected by Colombia’s political system?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud to live under Colombia’s political system?
- B6.** To what extent do you think you should support Colombia’s political system?

Support for the system in Colombia has remained relatively high, even with a slight increase in the past year, as can be seen in Figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1 – Support for the system 2004-2008

² In the case of Colombia, this index of support for the system is highly reliable ($\alpha = .79$).

The items used to create the index *political tolerance* are the same as those used previously to measure support for the right of citizen integration³. This index, in the case of Colombia, is relatively low. Worse still, in 2008 it reached the lowest level of the past five years, as one can see in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2 – Political tolerance 2004-2008

³The index of political tolerance is also fairly reliable ($\alpha = .83$)

From a theoretical viewpoint, we propose to analyze the relationship between support for the system and tolerance, to do which we need to dichotomize both scales into “high” and “low”⁴. **Error! Reference source not found.** presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance. Let us revise them cell by cell.

Table 6.1 - Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support

System support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	Democracy at risk

Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites,

⁴ Each of these scales goes from 0 to 100, so the mean point selected is 50.

the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass of the public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, which incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Democratic stability in Colombia

The distribution of the Colombians in the combination of these two dimensions appears in Table 6.2. As you can see, the category with the largest number of respondents is that called *authoritarian stability*. This means that, although almost 70% of Colombians show high levels of support for the political system, which speaks well for legitimacy, the majority are intolerant when it comes to the rights of minorities.

Table 6.2 – Support for the system and tolerance 2008

Support for the system (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy 30.8%	Authoritarian stability 38.5%
Low	Unstable democracy 12.8%	Democracy at risk 17.9%

In effect, the two categories related to the low level of support for the system are minorities in Colombia. On the one hand, only 18% appear in the critical zone of democracy at risk, a comparatively low percentage, about half that of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, as can be seen in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3 – Democracy at risk in comparative perspective 2008

Likewise, Colombia and Costa Rica appear as the countries where a smaller proportion of citizens are located in the category of unstable democracy, that is, who show high levels of political tolerance combined with low levels of legitimacy, almost one third of the percentages in Brazil and Argentina (Figure 6.4).




Figure 6.4 - Unstable democracy in comparative perspective 2008

As was already mentioned, among the group of citizens who give high levels of legitimacy to the political system, over half express little tolerance. In fact, as one can see in Figure 6.5, the percentage of citizens located in the category of authoritarian stability in Colombia is the highest of all countries included in this study. This finding, the first signs of which had been detected in studies during previous years, is extremely worrying, above all when one analyzes certain attitudes which run counter to some of the principles of liberal democracy, which will be the subject of the final section of this chapter.




Figure 6.5 – Authoritarian stability in comparative perspective

Finally, Colombia occupies a moderately high place in the category of *stable democracy*, as is seen in Figure 6.6.




Figure 6.6 – Stable democracy in comparative perspective 2008

Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of Colombians into the four categories during the past five years. As one can observe, the group that has most grown is that which corresponds to high support/low tolerance, that is, what we call *authoritarian stability*. In other words, although the political system has enjoyed consistently high levels of legitimacy (between 60% and 70%), Colombians show themselves to be increasingly intolerant of the rights of minorities.




Figure 6.7 – Democratic stability 2004-2008

Trust in institutions

As usual, there is a wide battery of questions on citizen confidence in a series of political institutions, with the novelty this year of including, for the first time, confidence in the president (different from confidence in the national government, which is what we have been using in this study). Figure 6.8, which shows the levels of confidence for each one of the institutions being studied, indicates that the greatest level of confidence is for the president, followed by the Catholic Church, the communications media, the Armed Forces and the People's Defense Office. As usual in Colombia, and in the majority of countries studied, the parties and the unions have lower levels of citizen trust..




Figure 6.8 – Confidence in institutions 2008

When we analyze each of the three branches of public power, Colombia occupies first place in confidence in the president of the Republic, as can be seen in Figure 6.9. This is not surprising, given the high levels of popularity that President Uribe's government has obtained in public opinion surveys.




Figure 6.9 – Confidence in the president in comparative perspective 2008

What is more surprising is that, despite the apparent discredit of Congress due to repeated scandals related to corruption and the links of congressmen to paramilitary groups, the level of confidence in the legislative branch in Colombia is not only above the mean of 50 points (which indicates a positive qualification), but also occupies a relatively high place in comparative perspective, bettered in South America only by the Uruguayan Congress, as can be seen in Figure 6.10.




Figure 6.10 – Confidence in Congress in comparative perspective 2008

Even more encouraging is the position of confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice, the highest level in Latin America, as is shown in Figure 6.11.




Figure 6.11 – Confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice in comparative perspective 2008

When we assess the level of confidence in the three branches (national government⁵, Congress and the Supreme Court) over a period of time, we observe that, even though confidence in the government has been consistently higher than that of other branches of power, the gap between the three averages has been closing, especially as regards the government and the Court (Figure 6.12).

This is particularly important given the present juncture of confrontation between the branches of power, especially between the government and the Supreme Court. As is well known, the Court has been investigating and judging the links of congressmen with illegal groups (especially with the so-called “self defense” paramilitary groups). These investigations have mostly affected politicians who belong to the parties of the government coalition, leading to public

⁵ Se examina acá la confianza en el *gobierno*, ya que apenas en 2008 se midió la confianza en el *presidente*.

reactions on the part of the government attempting to question the legitimacy of the Court and its right to carry out these investigations.

What this Figure shows is that, despite public confrontations between the representatives of these two branches of power, which have reached considerable levels of aggressiveness and virulence, citizens do not seem to be “buying” the confrontation and, despite the fact that confidence in the government has remained constant, and even slightly increased, this has not been accompanied by a loss of confidence in the Supreme Court. On the contrary, Colombians seem to support the judicial investigations carried out by the Court, and repay these investigations with higher levels of confidence and legitimacy.




Figure 6.12 – Confidence in the Government, the Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice 2004-2008

Attitudes counter to liberal democracy

One of the central themes for democracy in Latin America is that related to the breakdown of the fundamental institutions of liberal democracy. After the era of military dictatorships, we believe that the present threat to democracy in the region has to do with the concentration of power in one of the branches and the institutional instability of the system (closing down of Congress, dissolving of the high courts, and so forth). No less related to the above are popular attitudes which tend to lose respect for the rights of minorities, as is perceived in the high percentage of Colombians who are located in the cell of *authoritarian stability* mentioned in the previous section.

The LAPOP study is not unaware of this concern. That is why we have included in the questionnaire a series of questions that attempt to examine citizen perceptions and attitudes vis-à-vis the principles of liberal democracy, on the understanding that, although breakdowns of institutionality do not necessarily depend on the said attitudes (they are generally the result of activities on the part of political elites), public opinion can become either the safeguard of stability or a sounding board for those who wish to produce instability.

In the first place, the study has been including the following questions in the questionnaire:

D32. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a law that prohibits public protests?

D33. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a law that prohibits meetings of any group that criticizes the country's political system?

D34. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a government's censure of television programs?

D36. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a government's censoring books that are in the libraries of public schools?

D37. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a government's censoring a communications media that criticizes it?

Based on these five questions, we built an index of approval for censure⁶ with a view to examining how far people are prepared to go in allowing measures which clearly run counter to civil liberties and citizens' political rights..

⁶ This index is highly reliable ($\alpha = .78$).

As can be seen in Figure 6.12, levels of permissiveness for serious restrictions on the basic principles of democracy are still considerably high. In fact, there has been a slight but significant increase in this phenomenon between 2007 and 2008.




Figure 6.13 – Index of approval of censorship 2005-2008

Attitudes on the protection of civil and political rights of citizens have an undeniable ideological component that interacts with the growing polarization which exists between the parties of Colombia's government coalition and those of the opposition..

Figure 6.14 shows that those who are located to the left of the ideological spectrum exhibit a level of approval of censure clearly below that of those who are located on the right⁷.




Figure 6.14 – Index of approval of censure according to ideological position 2008

As was mentioned earlier, one of the present risks for democratic systems in the region has to do with the possibility of so-called “self-coups”, that is, the closing down of other branches of power, particularly by presidents. Although it is not a case of behavior that arises originally from ordinary citizens, it is often levered by high levels of popularity, as occurred in Peru with Fujimori, and as could happen in Venezuela with Chávez. To examine closely citizen attitudes regarding this phenomenon, LAPOP includes the following two questions:

⁷ The measurement of an ideological position is based on the self-location of the respondents in a scale that goes from 1 (left) to 10 (right). In Figure 6.14 these positions have been grouped into three categories : left (values 1, 2 and 3), center (4,5,6, and 7) and right (8,9 and 10).

JC15. Do you believe that there may sometimes be sufficient reason for the president to close down Congress, or do you believe there can never exist a sufficient reason for doing that?

JC16. Do you believe that there may be sometimes sufficient reason for the president to dissolve the Constitutional Court, or do you believe that there can never exist a sufficient reason for doing that?

Figure 2.15 shows that almost one out of every three Colombians would justify that the president close down Congress, a percentage that places Colombia as one of the countries with the highest proportion of citizens who would support this type of antidemocratic measure, on the same level as Bolivia.




Figure 6.15 – Support for closing Congress in comparative perspective 2008

In the same way, almost one out of every four Colombians would tolerate that the government dissolve the Constitutional Court in certain circumstances, as shown in Figure 2.16.




Figure 6.16 – Support for closing the Constitutional/Supreme Court in comparative perspective 2008

With these two questions we created a variable that measures the percentage of people who would support the closing of Congress or the Court (that is, people who replied affirmatively to one of the two previous questions, or to both), as an indicator of citizen aversion to the separation of powers.

Figure 6.17 shows that more than one out of every three respondents in Colombia considered the closing down of Congress or the Court (or both) as justifiable, a comparatively high percentage, on a level with Bolivia..




Figure 6.17 – Aversion to the separation of powers in comparative perspective 2008

This percentage has been declining, although slowly, as observed in Figure 6.18.




Figure 6.18 – Aversion to the separation of powers 2005-2008

The greatest incidence of this type of citizen is to be found in Bogotá and in the former National Territories, as shown in Figure 6.19.




Figure 6.19 – Aversion to the separation of powers by regions 2008

What are the typical traits of people who show they are averse to the separation of powers? In an attempt to explore the answer to this question, we built a logistic regression model on this variable, including as predictors the sociodemographic characteristics, the ideological position, approval of the president's performance, satisfaction with municipal services, sociotropic and isotropic perceptions of the economy, and indicators of victimization by crime, corruption and the armed conflict. Detailed results of the model appear in Table 6.3 in the Appendix to the present chapter. The representation in Figure 6.20 shows that older people from the large cities, as well as corruption victims, are the people most likely to justify the closing down of the legislative or the Court.




Figure 6.20 – Factors that influence the likelihood of being averse to the separation of powers

In the 2008 study (after tests carried out in 2007), we included a battery of questions related to attitudes on principles of liberal democracy such as the separation of powers, political representation, respect for the opposition and minorities, with a view to assessing opinions that might favor the rise of messianic populist leaders. Our questions were the following:

Bearing in mind the present situation of the country, I want you to say, using the card, to what extent are you in agreement or in disagreement with the following statements.	Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
POP101. For the country's progress it is necessary that our presidents limit the voice and the vote of the opposition parties. To what extent are you in agreement or in disagreement?	
POP102. When Congress gets in the way of the government's work, our presidents ought to govern without Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	
POP103. When the Constitutional Court gets in the way of the government's work, it should be ignored by our presidents. To what extent are you in agreement or in disagreement?	
POP106. Presidents have to follow the will of the people, because what the people want is always right. Do you agree or disagree?	
POP107. The people should govern directly, and not through elected representatives. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	
POP109. In today's World, there is a struggle between good and evil and people have to choose one or the other. To what extent do you agree or disagree that there is a struggle between good and evil?	
POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we ought not allow a minority to oppose that decision. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	
POP112. The major obstacle to our country's progress is the dominant class, which takes advantage of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	
POP113. Those that do not agree with the majority represent a threat to the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?	

We will review the replies to these questions one by one (converted into a scale of 0 to 100).

Colombians, on average, believe that the president ought to ignore Congress in the exercise of government, which runs counter to the principle of separation of powers that ought to characterize democratic institutionalism. As seen in Figure 6.21, the level of the Colombians is only bettered by Ecuador where, as we know, institutional instability is almost a routine matter.




Figure 6.21 – Support for governing without Congress in comparative perspective 2008

Likewise, only the Ecuadorians seem to be above the Colombians in the degree of agreement with the idea that the president ought to ignore the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, as we see in Figure 6.22.




Figure 6.22 – Support for ignoring the Supreme Court/Constitutional Court in comparative perspective 2008

With the intention of measuring citizen perception of the relationship between the governor and “the people”, on the supposition that populist leaders establish direct connection with “the people”, we included some questions such as that represented in Figure 6.23, which shows with what degree of intensity Colombians agree that the president ought to follow what is supposedly the infallible will of “the people”. The country’s position is merely moderate in comparative terms.




Figure 6.23 – Support for always following the will of the people in comparative perspective 2008

To examine just how polarized each country is, and how Manichaeic its citizens' attitudes might be, we included two questions in this series, the first of which appears represented in Figure 6.25. In this we explored to what extent people believe that reality can be boiled down to a struggle between good and evil. In general, the great majority tend to believe that reality is as simple as that, since almost all countries gave over an average of 50 points on a scale of 100.




Figure 6.25 – Belief in the struggle between good and evil in comparative perspective 2008

More concretely, we wanted to see to what extent citizens believe that there is a gap between the “ruling class” and “the people”, and that the principal obstacle to progress in the country is that the former take advantage of the latter. Colombia appears as one of the countries where people believe this with the greatest intensity, as is evidenced in Figure 6.26.




Figure 6.26 – Belief that the ruling class is the major obstacle to progress in comparative perspective
2008

Finally, three questions analyze citizen respect for the exercise of the opposition and the rights of minorities. Figure 6.27 shows that Colombia occupies a dishonorable first place in support for the idea that the president can and should limit the exercise of opposition, a level that could be explained as much by the president’s enormous popularity, as by the polarization Colombia has witnessed in recent years in the political arena.




Figure 6.27 – Support for limiting the opposition in comparative perspective 2008

For the same reason, we could explain the first place occupied by Colombia in the attitude against the expression of ideas by minorities, as seen in Figure 6.28.




Figure 6.28 – Support for impeding opposition from minorities in comparative perspective 2008

Likewise, Colombia occupies one of the first places in the belief that those who are not with the majority represent a threat to the country (Figure 2.29). This in some way echoes the growing level of polarization, fostered by the government itself, which disqualifies anyone who thinks or expresses ideas different from those of the governing coalition, even going so far as to identify such a person as a terrorist.




Figure 6.29 – Belief that minorities are a threat in comparative perspective 2008

Questions POP101, POP102, POP103, POP107, POP110 and POP113 are useful for building an index of attitudes that run counter to liberal democracy, which is comparable for the countries being studied. Figure 6.30 shows that Colombia occupies second place in this classification, only behind Ecuador. This result is worrying, not only for the domestic reasons we have already mentioned (growing polarization, stigmatizing of the opposition, disqualifying by the government itself of the other branches of power, especially the Supreme Court), but also because, unfortunately, it is by no means a good sign to have levels similar to those of Ecuador, where institutionality has been fragile in the recent past..




Figure 6.30 – Attitudes counter to liberal democracy in comparative perspective 2008

We wished to explore whether or not certain characteristics or traits exist that might predict these kinds of attitudes contrary to principles of liberal democracy. For this we built a statistical model using, besides the usual sociodemographic variables, indicators for perceptions of national and personal economies, ideological position, approval of the president’s performance, and party affiliation.

Table 6.4 in the Appendix to this chapter contains the complete results of this statistical exercise. Also, Figure 6.31 shows that the level of education, the degree of presidential approval and party affiliation are factors which make a significant impact on anti-liberal attitudes.




Figure 6.31 – Factors which influence attitudes counter to liberal democracy

In the first place, as one can see in Figure 6.32, the better educated tend to exhibit attitudes more respectful of the minimal principles of liberal democracy. The opposite is true in the case of presidential approval (Graphic 6.33). Those who are in favor of the president tend to respect these principles less.




Figure 6.32 – Attitudes counter to liberal democracy according to education level




Figure 6.33 – Attitudes counter to liberal democracy according to presidential approval

Finally, the relation to party affiliation will be illustrated in the chapter that follows, which deals with political parties and ideology. It is worth noting, as from now, that those who sympathize with the *Partido de la U*, the party closest to President Uribe, show higher levels of disrespect for the principles of liberal democracy, whereas those who sympathize with the *Polo Democrático* express great respect for those principles⁸.

In the first place, it is noteworthy that attitudes that run counter to the principles of liberal democracy are independent of the citizens' ideological position when other factors such as presidential approval are controlled.

More important still, results confirm that the president's immense popularity, which is usually good news given the importance of citizen confidence in the governor for the quality of governance, comes in this case with a shadow cast upon it. The fact that, independently of party affiliation or ideological position, those who most approve the president's performance also express with the greatest intensity attitudes contrary to the separation of powers and respect for the rights of the opposition and of minorities is, as we said, a worrying symptom that indicates the polarization which exists in Colombia and the stigmatization, fostered from the seat of government itself, of anyone who expresses in public his or her opposition to the government.

The descriptive Figures presented in the final section of this chapter, as also the results of the statistic model, ought not to be interpreted as an imminent danger of institutional breakdown and the end of the separation of powers. We cannot infer the likelihood of a self coup, an action which usually comes from a country's political elite, just because of the results of a survey that examines the attitudes of ordinary citizens. However, what one can affirm is that, in the case of some sector of the political system, especially the executive power, attempting an action of this nature that would lead to the closing down of Congress, for example, and of the Courts, or the limitation of the exercise of political rights of the citizens, there would be no reaction from the population in defense of these principles. An important proportion of Colombians would even applaud such measures. And that is certainly not good news for the health of democracy in Colombia.

⁸ Given that party affiliation in the model is done by using dichotomy variables for each important party, leaving aside, as a basic category, the variable that identifies those who do not sympathize with any party, the coefficients and statistical significances ought to be interpreted in accordance in that way. This means that what the results indicate in relation to party affiliation is that sympathizers of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* show less anti-liberal attitudes by comparison with those who do not sympathize with any party at all. Similarly, those who sympathize with the *Partido de la U* are less respectful of liberal principles than those who do not sympathize with any party.

Appendix

Table 6.3 – Factors that influence the likelihood of being adverse to the separation of powers

	Coefficient	Err. est.
Woman	-0,144	(0.12)
Age	0,010*	(0.00)
Education level	0,041	(0.02)
Wealth	-0,015	(0.04)
Size of place	0,169***	(0.05)
Ideological position	0,027	(0.02)
Presidential approval	0,002	(0.00)
Satisfaction with services	0,001	(0.00)
National economic situation	-0,004	(0.00)
Personal economic situation	0,000	(0.00)
Victim o a crime	0,138	(0.19)
Victim of corruption	0,452**	(0.16)
Victim of conflict	0,012	(0.17)
Constant	-1,722***	(0.42)
F	2.684	
N	1082	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6.4 – Factors that influence attitudes counter to liberal democracy

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	-1,011***	(0.22)
Woman	0,022	(1.02)
Age	-0,081	(0.05)
Wealth	-0,371	(0.35)
Size of place	0,416	(0.66)
National economic situation	-0,050	(0.03)
Personal economic situation	-0,030	(0.04)
Ideological position	-0,043	(0.25)
Presidential approval	0,176***	(0.03)
Liberal Party	3,395	(2.23)
Conservative Party	6,528**	(2.44)
Polo	-8,327*	(3.35)
Party of la U	6,732*	(2.65)
Cambio Radical	-2,281	(5.95)
Other	-2,094	(3.79)
Constant	54,739***	(4.41)
R--squared	0.111	
N	1219	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 7. Elections and Political Parties

This chapter analyzes the perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of citizens vis-à-vis electoral institutions and political parties. Also, as something added to the study this past year, we continue to analyze the experiences of voters with the threats hanging over electoral democracy, threats which include the buying and selling of votes and coercion by illegal armed groups. This is particularly important for two reasons.

In the first place, the ascent to power of President Uribe led to a restructuring of the political party system in Colombia. Swept along on the crest of the wave of the president's immense popularity, many sectors of the traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party, left their collectivities and formed a series of new parties (e.g. the *Partido de la U*) or consolidated the secession of parties which, although they had appeared during the previous elections, had done so under the aegis of the two traditional political collectivities. A case in point is the party known as *Cambio Radical* (Radical Change). Thus two great blocks were formed: on the one hand, the block that belongs to the government coalition, mainly the Conservative Party, the *Partido de la U* and *Cambio Radical*, among others; on the other hand, the opposition block, which is a minority and has little ideological cohesion (in reality, what mainly unites these groups is opposition to the government) made up of the Liberal Party (that is, those sectors of the Liberal Party which did not go over to the president's side for ideological or pragmatic reasons) and the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, a party constituted by several traditional movements, and some new ones, from the Colombian left. One of this chapter's aims, therefore, is to examine the present composition and evolution of party affiliation in the light of this restructuring which has meant the end of the two-party system which held sway in Colombia for over a century.

In the second place, revelations emanating both from the communications media and from the justice system, fundamentally based on testimonies of demobilized members of paramilitary groups, regarding the relationship between these groups and politicians at different levels, including congressmen and women, has debilitated the legitimacy of the results of the last two general elections and has seriously questioned the present composition of political representation and the electoral regime itself. The great majority of politicians under investigation for links with the so-called "self defense" groups, many of whom are at present in prison, belong to parties close to the government, a fact which has unleashed permanent strife between the executive and the judicial instances charged with the investigations, particularly the Supreme Court of Justice, as was mentioned in the previous chapter¹. According to these investigations, illegal armed groups, especially the paramilitary groups, influenced electoral results by means of intimidation. Another central aim of this chapter is to give continuity to the analysis, begun in the 2007 report, of citizen experiences with forms of violent coercion on the exercise of the right to vote.

¹ The previous chapter contains an analysis of citizen confidence in the three branches of public power over the course of the past five years.

Party affiliation

The initial question, which serves as a filter in the questionnaire and introduces the subject of party affiliation, is the following:

VB10. At this moment do you sympathize with any political party? (Yes/No)

Figure 7.1 shows that less than one out of every three Colombians replied in the affirmative to this question, a low level compared with other countries in the region.




Figure 7.1 – Sympathy for a political party in comparative perspective 2008

The percentage of citizens who say they sympathize with a political party has remained more or less constant since 2006, when this question was asked for the first time (Figure 7.2).





Figure 7.2 – Sympathy for a political party 2006-2008

The inhabitants of the Atlantic coast are the ones closest to political parties, clearly ahead of the national average, whereas those who live in the Central region and in Bogotá are more skeptical about party politics (Figure 7.3).



Graphic 7.3 – Sympathy for a political party by regions 2008

Those who answered this last question in the affirmative were asked which of the parties deserved their sympathies. The replies are summarized in Figure 7.4. As will be seen, among those who sympathized with some party, the majority feel close to the Liberal Party.

On the other hand, those who sympathize with the Conservative Party and the *Polo Democrático* are divided into roughly equal parts. This result is worthy noting since the former is one the two traditional parties that had a monopoly on the Colombians' political identity for many decades, while the latter is a relatively new left-wing party, with comparatively little presence in government circles, except for periods in which it has obtained the mayoral office in Bogotá.

More remarkable is the percentage of people who say they identify with the *Partido de la U*, a recently formed party based on the popularity of President Uribe and which many analysts consider to be a rather opportunistic gathering of politicians from other parties (particularly the Liberal Party), with little ideological or pragmatic cohesion, and greatly dependent on the figure of the president. It may be that this viewpoint contains much truth. However, it is important to underline the fact that this party has managed to capture the sympathies of an important percentage of ordinary Colombians, in greater proportions than the Conservative Party itself and the *Polo Democrático*.




Figure 7.4 – Party affiliation 2008

Figure 7.5 shows the evolution of party sympathies over the past four years. The Figure clearly demonstrates the growth of the *Partido de la U* and, to a lesser degree, that of the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, mainly at the expense of the two traditional parties.




Figure 7.5 - Party Affiliation 2005-2008

Figure 7.6, in its turn, illustrates the great regional variations that exist in 2008 as regards affiliation to the main parties. As we know, Bogotá is the stronghold of the *Polo Democrático*, while the Liberals maintain majorities on the Atlantic coast. The *Partido de la U* has its followers mainly in the Central and Eastern regions, while the former National Territories and, to a lesser degree, the Pacific coast region remain mostly faithful to the traditional two-party system.




Figure 7.6 – Party affiliation by regions 2008

As can be seen in Figure 7.7, the traditional parties, especially the Liberal Party, obtain their sympathies in rural areas and in small municipalities. The opposite is the case with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, whose sympathizers are concentrated in the capital and in intermediary cities. As for the *Partido de la U*, it is strong in the medium-sized and large cities.




Figure 7.7 – Party affiliation according to size of place 2008

To end this brief description of party affiliation, Figure 7.8 shows that traditional parties concentrate their sympathizers among those of lower educational levels, as distinct from the *Polo Democrático* which counts on a majority of adherents among people with university education. The *Partido de la U*, for its part, has a great many of its sympathizers among those who have some degree of secondary and primary education. Those who feel close to the Conservative party have, on average, 7.2 years of education, whereas *Polo Democrático* sympathizers have an average level of 12.3 years of formal education.




Figure 7.8 – Party affiliation according to education level 2008

Those who expressed sympathy for some political party were also asked the following question:

VB12. And would you say that your sympathy for this particular party is very weak, weak, neither weak nor strong, strong, or very strong?

Converting this indicator into a scale from 0 to 100, Figure 7.9 places Colombia in an intermediate point compared with other countries. Venezuela is the country where people most emphatically express their sympathy for a particular party. On the other hand, despite its history of political militancy, the Figure shows to some extent the impoverishment of party life in Chile, a phenomenon associated by several analysts with the dismantling of politics that occurred during the long years of dictatorship.




Figure 7.9 – Intensity of party affiliation in comparative perspective 2008

When levels of intensity are analyzed for each one of the groups of individuals corresponding to the different parties, we observe that those who feel most sympathy for their party are the ones who say they are close to the *Partido de la U*, while those who identify with *Cambio Radical* or *Polo Democrático* do so with less intensity, as is shown in Figure 7.10.




Figure 7.10 – Intensity of party affiliation by parties 2008

To better understand what characterizes those who say they feel sympathy for a particular political party, we built a logistic regression model the results of which are shown on Table 7.1 in the Appendix to this chapter. Among other factors, we include sociodemographic variables, ideological position, indicators of victimization by crime, corruption or the armed conflict, and the indicator of fear of participating. Figure 7.11 summarizes the results of this statistical exercise.




Figure 7.11 – Factors that influence the likelihood of being a sympathizer with a political party

As can be seen in the previous Figure, and is illustrated in Figure 7.12, the better educated more often express their sympathy for a particular political party.




Figure 7.12 – Sympathy for a political party according to education level

Likewise, as can be deduced from the results of this model and is illustrated in Figure 7.13, the inhabitants of the larger cities are less identified with a political party.




Figure 7.13 – Sympathy for a political party according to size of place

Finally, those who feel greatest fear of participating in politics naturally are less inclined to express sympathy for a particular political party, as is shown in Figure 7.14.




Figure 7.14 – Sympathy for a political party according to fear of participating

This index on fear of participating was created on the basis of the following questions²:

If you were to decide to participate in some of the activities I am about to mention, would you do so with fear, with little fear, or with a lot of fear?	Without fear	With a little fear	With a lot of fear
DER1. Participate to solve community problems, would you do so ...?	1	2	3
DER2. Vote in a political election, would you do so ...?	1	2	3
DER3. Participate in a pacific demonstration, would you do so ...?	1	2	3
DER4. Postulate as candidate for popular election to a post, would you ...?	1	2	3

Unfortunately these questions do not figure in the questionnaire of the great majority of countries in LAPOP's 2008 round, and therefore comparisons are not possible.

² This index is fairly reliable ($\alpha = .73$).

It is possible, however, to observe that, in Colombia, fear of participation has not varied much in the last few years (Figure 7.15).




Figure 7.15 – Index of fear of participation 2004-2008

On the other hand, apart from those who are not identified with any party at all, the sympathizers of the *Partido de la U* are the ones who express most fear of participation, although they are beneath the national average, as can be seen in Figure 7.16.




Figure 7.16 – Index of fear of participation according to party affiliation

Ideology and party affiliation

As was mentioned earlier, one of the questionnaire’s central questions has to do with the respondent’s ideology. As is the custom in our studies, those interviewed are asked to locate themselves within a scale that goes from 1 (left) to 10 (right). Figure 7.17 shows that Colombians, on average, are among those who most consider themselves to be on the right of the ideological spectrum, bettered significantly only by the Dominicans. On the other hand, Uruguayans, Bolivians and Venezuelans are located on the left side of the scale. To some extent these results show an affinity with the ideological color of the present government in those countries, and that of their electors.




Figure 7.17 – Ideological position in comparative perspective 2008

In any case, the ideological position of the Colombians has moved slightly to the left in recent years, especially since 2005, as can be seen in Figure 7.18.




Figure 7.18 – Ideological position 2004-2008

There clearly exists a relationship between education level and ideological position. In general, as one can see in Figure 7.19, the better educated are, on average, to the left of the national average, whereas those of little or no education (perhaps a year or two of primary school) are on the right in the ideological spectrum.




Figure 7.19 – Ideological position according to education level 2008

Likewise, those who feel sympathy for a particular political are located slightly, but significantly,³ to the right of those who show themselves to be more skeptical as regards the political parties, as one can observe in Figure 7.20.




Figure 7.20 – Ideological position of sympathizers and non sympathizers with a political party 2008

³ Test τ shows a statistically significant difference ($p < .05$) between the mean of ideology of sympathizers and non sympathizers. However, as we saw earlier, when these factors are controlled, ideology is not a significant factor in the likelihood or otherwise of being a sympathizer with some party.

Sympathizers with each one of the parties are also distinguished by their ideological position. Figure 7.21 shows that those who identify with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* clearly occupy the left on the ideological scale. In fact, it is the only party whose sympathizers are located, on average, to the left of the national average. Sympathizers with the rest of the parties are all on the right, especially those who are identified with *Cambio Radical*.




Figure 7.21 – Ideological position according to party 2008

Finally, to end for the moment this analysis of party affiliation, we take up again the debate on factors that are influential in generating attitudes that run counter to liberal democracy. As you will recall, one of the factors that turned out to be statistically negative was party affiliation. In effect, as one can see on Table 6.4 in the Appendix to the previous chapter,, and is illustrated in Figure 7.22 below, sympathizers of *Polo Democrático Alternativo* are significantly more respectful of the principles of liberal democracy – such as the separation of powers and the protection of minorities’ rights – than those who do not sympathize with any party. Also, those who feel close to the *Partido de la U* and the Conservative Party express attitudes that violate the said principles with a significantly greater intensity.




Figure 7.22 – Attitudes contrary to liberal democracy by party affiliation 2008

Likewise, there are differences between sympathizers with the different parties as regards to what extent they are prepared to tolerate limitation of civil liberties and the imposition of censorship, as we can see in Figure 7.23.




Figure 7.23 – Approval of censorship according to party affiliation 2008

Perceptions of political parties

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, and can be seen in Figure 3.24, among the institutions which enjoy low levels of confidence (along with the unions) are political parties. Slightly higher in percentage of approval one finds confidence in elections and in the National Electoral Council, the other two electoral institutions analyzed in this study.




Figure 7.24 - Confidence in electoral institutions 2008

Despite the poor position of political parties with respect to other political and social institutions, Colombia's parties are not as discredited as those of some other countries. Only in Canada do parties seem to enjoy significantly higher levels of approval than the Colombian ones, as can be observed in Figure 7.25. Further down the list there appear, amongst others, the parties in Costa Rica, Argentina and Brazil, and even the Democrats and the Republicans in the United States.




Figure 7.25 – Confidence in political parties in comparative perspective 2008

The situation is similar with regard to confidence in elections (Figure 7.26) and in electoral tribunals (Figure 7.27).




Figure 7.26 – Confidence in elections in comparative perspective 2008




Figure 7.27 – Confidence in electoral tribunal in comparative perspective 2008

Furthermore, confidence in parties, and above all in the National Electoral Council, has grown in the past year, as can be seen in Figure 7.28.




Figure 7.28 – Confidence in electoral institutions 2004-2008

To discover what Colombians think about political parties, the questionnaire included the following two questions for the first time:

EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do political parties in Colombia represent voters well?

EPP2. To what extent are Colombian political parties corrupt?

EPP3. How much notice do political parties take of people like you?

Despite the discredit which seems to be a characteristic of Colombia’s political parties, citizens give a positive qualification to the political representation that these parties provide, as one sees in Figure 7.29. Only the parties in Uruguay and Dominican Republic are seen to represent voters better, according to respondents. The parties in Argentina and Bolivia are well behind, as are the North American parties also⁴.




Figure 7.29 – Parties represent voters well in comparative perspective 2008

⁴This question is not included in the Canadian survey.

Likewise, in the opinion of those interviewed only parties in Dominican Republic, Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador take more notice of people than the Colombian ones, as can be seen in Figure 7.30.




Figure 7.30 – Parties taking notice of people, in comparative perspective 2008

Contrary to what some think, parties in Colombia are not much less, nor much more, corrupt than others in the continent, in the opinion of Colombians themselves. Perception of corruption in political parties is high in all countries. However, Colombia's place on the scale is only about in the middle (Figure 7.31).




Figure 7.31 – Corruption in political parties in comparative perspective 2008

The above results do not mean that Colombian parties have no problems. However, this comparative perspective can help us to nuance a little our concept of the quality of representation those parties offer, their level of accountability and their pulchritude.

On the other hand, Colombians do not get involved to any great extent in the life of the parties, as can be seen in Figure 7.32. Attendance at party meetings has remained relatively low in the past few years, especially in 2005 (Figure 7.33).




Figure 7.32 – Attendance at meetings of political parties in comparative perspective 2008




Figure 7.33 – Attendance at meetings of political parties 2004-2008

Electoral processes

Aware as we are that electoral processes in Colombia are subject to threats both from corrupt politicians and from members of illegal armed groups, as has been in evidence recently, we wished to take advantage of the occasion of this survey to inquire about citizen experiences at the moment of voting. For this reason we included, as from the previous year, the following questions in the questionnaire:

COLVB25A. Have you ever been pressurized under threat to vote for a particular candidate or party? (Yes/No)

COLVB25B. Has any relative or yours or close friend ever been pressurized under threat to vote for a particular candidate or party? (Yes/No)

COLVB25C. Have you ever been pressurized under threat NOT to vote? (Yes/No)

COLVB25D. Has any relative of yours or close friend ever been pressurized under threat NOT to vote? (Yes/No)

Both in relation to threats to vote for somebody, identified by some analysts as typical of paramilitary groups, and threats to *not* vote (commonly associated with the guerrillas), we formulated a direct question and an indirect one, due to the supposition that it could be difficult for respondents to talk about this matter in the first person.

As can be seen in Figure 7.34, there is a difference in the percentage of affirmative replies between the direct question and the indirect one, although this difference is not significant.




Figure 7.34 – Threats to respondents and relatives to vote and not to vote 2008

As one can see now in Figure 7.35, there was a slight increase in the past year in the number of threats aimed at electing certain candidates or parties, while abstention under coercion was slightly reduced. In any case, nearly 2% of those interviewed reported threats to vote for a particular candidate, while only one in one hundred said they had been violently pressurized not to vote. These percentages, though very small, are nonetheless worrying. If we consider that, in the last legislative elections in 2006, some 10 million voters participated, and if we were to suppose that these threats were effective in all cases, the results indicate that something like 200,000 votes were deposited under coercion. Any significant fraction of this size undoubtedly represents an important figure⁵.




Figure 7.35 – Threats to vote for somebody 2007-2008

⁵ For obvious reasons, it is much more difficult to calculate the effects of threats aimed at abstention.

We also wanted to continue our pioneer study, begun last year, on the buying and selling of votes. To do so we included the following questions:

COLVB26A. Have you ever been offered cash or material goods in exchange for your vote for a particular candidate or party?

COLVB26B. Have you ever acceded to voting for a particular candidate or party in exchange for cash or material goods?

COLVB26C. Has any relative or yours or close friend ever been offered cash or material goods in exchange for a vote for a particular candidate or party?

COLVB26D. Has any relative of yours or close friend ever acceded to vote for a particular candidate or party in exchange for cash or material goods?

Figure 7.36 shows that one out of every five Colombians says he or she has received an offer for a vote, undoubtedly an enormous proportion. As we can see, there is no subreport on the incidence of buying votes, in that the indirect question (related to relatives or friends) did not produce replies with significant percentages different from the direct question.




Figure 7.36 – Buying of votes 2008

Of those who received an offer in exchange for a vote, one out of every five decided effectively to sell that vote, as we can see in Figure 7.37. This figure could even be below the real number if we bear in mind that indirect replies reported a much greater percentage; that is, six out of every ten “relatives or friends” decided in fact to receive material goods or cash in exchange for their vote for a particular candidate or party. Even taking the conservative estimate based on replies the respondents gave directly (that is concerning their own experience, not that of relatives or friends), this means that 20% (who sold their vote) out of 20% (who received an offer for their vote) would amount to 400,000 votes bought in the last national elections. This is no doubt only a rough estimate, but it gives us a preliminary idea of the magnitude of this problem.




Figure 7.37 – Sale of votes 2008

Figure 7.38 shows that the level of vote buying has remained practically constant over the past year.




Figure 7.38 – Buying of votes 2007-2008

As for the proportion of those who sold their vote, this percentage was considerably less, as one can see in Figure 7.39.




Figure 7.39 – Sale of votes 2007-2008

In 2007, before the local elections in October, we inquired about perception of threats menacing the said electoral process. A few months later, in the 2008 survey, we decided to inquire about the experiences of our respondents in the course of those elections. The questions were the following⁶:

<p>[Card B]</p> <p>Now we're going to talk about last October's local elections. On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 means "very much in disagreement" and 7 means "very much in agreement". To what extent are you in agreement with the following statements?</p>	<p>Note 1 a 7 NS/NR=8</p>
<p>COLVBLOC2. Last October's election in your municipality were free and just.</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC3. Last October's elections in your municipality were threatened by actions on the part of paramilitary groups</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC4. Last October's elections in your municipality were threatened by actions on the part of guerrilla groups.</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC5. Last October's elections in your municipality were threatened by actions on the part of drug traffickers.</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC6. Last October's elections in your municipality were threatened by clientelist practices.</p>	

⁶ In 2007, the formulation of the questions was prospective, that is, they referred to « next October's elections ».

As can be seen in Figure 7.40, those interviewed had relatively high expectations about the purity of local elections in October 2007, by comparison with their experience once the electoral process was over. In other words, *before* the elections citizens supposed that they would be more free and just than, in their opinion, they really were.




Figure 7.40 – Perception of free and just elections 2007-2008

However, the perception of concrete threats before the elections turned out to be greater than the experience after last October, as can be seen in Figure 7.41. For each of the sources of danger enunciated (paramilitaries, guerrillas, drug traffickers and clientelists), the Figure represents on the left (the paler color) the perception that existed in mid-2007, and on the right (dark brown color) the perception after the October elections, in January 2008. As one can see, the fear of danger was greater than what actually happened, according to those interviewed.




Figure 7.41 – Threats against elections 2007-2008

With the four kinds of threats, we constructed a perception index on menaces to the electoral process. Figure 7.42 shows the previously-mentioned reduction in this perception between July 2007 and January 2008.




Figure 7.42 - Perception of electoral threat 2007-2008

For the post-electoral moment, this perception is greater in Bogotá and in the Pacific and Atlantic regions, and considerably less in the Eastern region, as can be seen in Figure 7.43.




Figure 7.43 – Perception of electoral threats by regions 2008

Finally, although there are no substantial differences, one can observe in Figure 7.44 that sympathizers with the parties closest to the government (*Cambio Radical* and the *Partido de la U*) feel more satisfied with the performance of the electoral process, whereas those who identify with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, the main opposition party, and those who sympathize with no party at all, are more critical about threats to the local electoral process held in October 2007.




Figure 7.44 – Perception of electoral threats according to party affiliation 2008

Appendix

Table 7.1 – Factors that influence affiliation to a political party

	Coefficient	Err. est.
Woman	-0,464**	(0.16)
Education level	0,064**	(0.02)
Age	0,037***	(0.01)
Wealth	0,051	(0.05)
Size of place	-0,163*	(0.06)
Ideological position	0,054	(0.03)
Victim of a crime	0,275	(0.17)
Victim of corruption	0,279	(0.27)
Victim of the conflict	0,149	(0.13)
Fear of participation	-0,009**	(0.00)
Constant	-2,764***	(0.39)
F	10.217	
N	1138	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 8. Performance of the Three Branches of Government

This short chapter will take a look at the perception Colombians have of the performance of the three branches of political power; that is, how they evaluate the behavior of the president and of the government, the legislative and the judicial system.

In a first section we will examine the general assessment made by those interviewed of the performance of the president, as well as specific assessments in different areas. Likewise, we will examine the characteristics of those who are most satisfied with the performance of the government of President Uribe.

The second section analyzes a new series of questions included in the questionnaire at this stage of the LAPOP study. These questions are related to citizen perception of Congress. Comparison between Colombia and other countries will be very useful to give us a context for the impressions that exist locally in this regard. We will also analyze the characteristics that predict the level of citizen satisfaction with this legislative body.

Finally, by means of certain questions, we will look at the perception of the performance of the organisms that belong to the judicial power, such as courts and judges.

Evaluation of the government

We have already observed, in the previous chapter, that the Colombian president is the most popular of all presidents in the countries analyzed (See Figure 7.9). A first approximation, a very general one, to the evaluation of the government's performance consisted in asking directly about the quality of the government's work. The question is as follows:

M1. And speaking in general of the present government, do you think the task President Álvaro Uribe is carrying out is ...? **[Read alternatives]**

Very good.....1
 Good.....2
 Neither good nor bad.....3
 Bad.....4
 Very bad.....5
 NS/NR.....8

As can be seen in Figure 8.1, Colombians, in general, are the citizens who give the best qualification to their president. The difference between them and the ones who are in second place, the Dominicans, is noticeably wide in the scale of 0 to 100. In South America, the second best – the government of President Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay – appears with seven points less.




Figure 8.1 – Approval of president’s work in comparative perspective 2008

Figure 8.2 shows that, after a slight fall between 2006 and 2007, the government of President Uribe has again attained the high levels of popularity enjoyed during the first years of this study. This is not to be sneezed at, considering that Uribe has been in power for six years, after a 2004 constitutional amendment approved his reelection followed by his landslide electoral victory in 2006. In other words, contrary to what has happened in other countries and on the continent as a whole, the present government does not show signs of wear and tear after such a long time.




Figure 8.2 – Approval of the president’s work 2004-2008

By means of the following series of questions we examined more concretely the government's performance in different areas:

N1. To what extent would you say the present government is combating poverty?

N3. To what extent would you say the present government promotes and protects democratic principles?

N9. To what extent would you say the present government combats corruption within the government?

N10. To what extent would you say the present government protects human rights?

N11. To what extent would you say the present government has improved citizen security?

N12. To what extent would you say the present government combats unemployment?

COLN11. ¿To what extent is the present government solving the armed conflict?

COLN12. ¿To what extent is the present government solving the problem of State finances?

COLN13. To what extent would you say the present government is combating the reorganization of paramilitary groups?

The first six questions were formulated in all, or at least in the majority, of the countries included in this study. The remaining three were included only in the Colombian questionnaire. Of those, the last question was included for the first time.

Figure 8.3 shows that, as in previous years, Colombians are more critical of their government’s performance in matters of social policies (the fight to combat poverty and unemployment) than on matters of security and the conflict. It is also worth noting that the qualification given by those interviewed on armed bands that have emerged after the reinsertion of paramilitary groups (the bar marked “paras” in the Figure) is considerably below that of other areas related to the subject of security. In any case, in all areas that were also explored in 2007, there was a significant improvement in 2008.




Figure 8.2 – Evaluations of government’s performance 2008

In those areas in which the government has the best qualifications, Colombia occupies a privileged place when compared with other countries. This is the case in matters of citizen security (Figure 8.4) and the protection of human rights (Figure 8.5).




Figure 8.3 – Government’s performance in citizen security in comparative perspective 2008




Figure 8.4 – Protection of human rights in comparative perspective 2008

On the contrary, in social areas such as the fight to combat unemployment (Figure 8.6) and the fight to combat poverty (Figure 8.7)¹, Colombia occupies a more modest place in comparative terms.




Figure 8.5 – Fight to combat unemployment in comparative perspective 2008

¹ It is worth noting that the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia (one of the poorest countries in the region) occupies first place in the fight to combat poverty.




Figure 8.6 – Fight to combat poverty in comparative perspective 2008

To find out what determines the level of approval of a president's labors in the opinion of a respondent, we constructed a linear regression model on the initial question (m1), recodified on the scale of 0 to 100. The results appear in Table 8.1 in the Appendix to this chapter, and are summarized in Figure 8.8.




Figure 8.7 – Factors that influence presidential approval

It is obvious, of course, as can be seen in the previous table and Figure, and is illustrated in Figure 8.9, that those who think the economy is going well also tend to give the best qualification to the president's labors.




Figure 8.8 – Presidential approval according to evaluation of situation of national economy

Presidential approval, even after controls have been applied (especially party affiliation), has an evident ideological component, as is shown in Figure 8.10.




Figure 8.9 – Presidential approval according to ideological position

The results of the model show that those who sympathize with the *Partido de la U* and with *Cambio Radical* have a better opinion of the president’s performance than those who do not sympathize with any party at all. In like manner, those close to the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* are more critical of the government’s performance, even when control by other factors has been applied. This is illustrated in Figure 8.11.




Figure 8.10 – Presidential approval according to party affiliation

We also included more specific questions on citizen perception of the work of the country's legislators. The questions are as follows:

EC1. And now, thinking about Congress, to what extent does Congress get in the way of the president's work?

EC2. And how much time do congressmen and women waste in discussions and debates?

EC3. And how important for the country are the laws passed in Congress?

EC4. To what extent does Congress fulfill your expectations?

Beginning with the first two questions, which in some way suggest a negative image of Congress, we see in Figure 8.13 that Colombia occupies an intermediate place, with a more positive concept² of the legislative body than that perceived by citizens of Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and Bolivia.

² One must remember, however, that in countries where the president does not enjoy such high levels of popularity, the fact that Congress is seen to stand in the way of the president's labors can be seen as something positive. Also, in general there may be citizens who, in their particular version of brakes and counterleverage which the separation of powers is designed to ensure, may consider that placing obstacles to the tasks of the executive is one of the central functions of the legislative body. The case of Venezuela, as represented in that country's position in Figure 8.13, could be interpreted in this way.




Figure 8.11 – Congress places obstacles in the way of the president’s task, in comparative perspective 2008

Colombia’s legislative body occupies a similar position as regards citizen perception that its members waste a lot of time in debates, as is seen in Figure 8.14. It is worth noting that, in this respect, the U.S., on average, obtains a more negative image.




Figure 8.12 – Members of Congress waste time in debates, in comparative perspective 2008

Colombians' perception of the importance of legislative production in Congress is compared with that of other countries. Only the citizens of Uruguay and Dominican Republic think that the labors of its legislators are significantly more important than do the citizens of Colombia, as can be seen in Figure 8.15.




Figure 8.13 – Importance of laws passed in Congress, in comparative perspective 2008

In general terms, as has been seen in previous results and is corroborated in Figure 8.16, the performance of Congress, despite its apparent discredit at present, and which seems to have become more acute in recent years, is not the one which has earned the worst qualification among the continent's countries. Not only have its levels of confidence increased in the past few years (Figure 8.12), in all indicators it occupies a place in the upper half of the table of countries included in this study..




Figure 8.14 – Congress fulfils expectations, in comparative perspective 2008

As in the case of assessing the president, we wanted to examine the factors that determine citizen perception of the performance of Congress. Based on the initial question in this section, we built a regression model whose results appear in Table 8.4 in the Appendix to this chapter and are summarized in Figure 8.17. There we see that the level of education, age and wealth appear as significant sociodemographic factors. Perception of the situation of the personal economy and that of the country as a whole, as well as party affiliation, turn out to be variables that have a statistically significant impact on perception of the labors of the legislative body.




Figure 8.15 – Factors that influence the evaluation of the performance of Congress

A better perception, both sociotropic (Figure 8.18) and isotropic (Figure 8.19) are associated with a better perception of the performance of Congress.




Figure 8.16 – Evaluation of Congress according to national economic situation




Figure 8.17 – Evaluation of Congress according to personal economic situation

Finally, and even more interesting from a political point of view, the results of the model indicate that those who sympathize with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (a party in the minority block of opposition to the government), or with a party different from those already mentioned (“others”), are significantly more critical of Congress that those who sympathize with no party at all, when controls are applied to all other factors. This finding is illustrated in Figure 8.20.




Figure 8.18 – Evaluation of Congress according to party affiliation

Evaluation of the judicial system

To end this chapter, we wish to analyze citizen perception of the judicial system, in particular of the High Courts and of the judges. We have no direct question which measures perception of performance of the judicial branch, but we do include a series of specific questions on its different aspects.

We have already seen, in the previous chapter, how people's confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice (Figure 7.11) occupies a privileged place in the context of the region. This position is corroborated as regards general confidence in the judicial system, as is seen in Figure 8.21.




Figure 8.19 – Confidence in the judicial system, in comparative perspective 2008

More concretely, the following questions inquired about citizen experiences with two key instances of the judicial system: judges and the Attorney General's office.

Another indicator of citizen perception of the judicial system is related to the impartiality of judges and judicial offices. That is why we ask to what extent the respondents think judicial offices and tribunals guarantee a just trial. Figure 8.22 shows that, in this regard, Colombia occupies first place in Latin America.




Figure 8.20 – Tribunals guarantee a just trial, in comparative perspective 2008

By the same token, Colombia occupies second place in citizen confidence in the Constitutional Court among countries that have this kind of specialized tribunal (Figure 8.23).




Figure 8.21 – Confidence in constitutional tribunal, in comparative perspective 2008

Likewise, the country occupies first place in two key institutions of the judicial system: the Attorney General's office (Figure 8.24) and the Ombudsman (Figure 8.25), among countries which have these organisms and where these questions were asked.




Figure 8.22 – Confidence in Attorney General, in comparative perspective 2008




Figure 8.23 – Confidence in Ombudsman, in comparative perspective 2008

Also, levels of confidence in the judicial system, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Attorney’s office and the Ombudsman, as well as the guarantee of just trials, witnessed a significant statistical increase between 2007 and 2008. This look at citizen confidence in the judicial system and its central institutions reveals a panorama which is undoubtedly encouraging for Colombia. This is especially important when these institutions have played an exceptionally preponderant role in recent years, revealing, investigating and judging important cases of corruption and criminality in high circles of national life.

However, as we have said in several parts of this report and in those of previous years, perception is only one side of the story. To go deeper into this subject, we wanted to inquire about Colombians’ experiences with the judicial instances. For this, the study included the following questions:

In doing paper work with the entities listed below, have you or members of your family felt very satisfied? Satisfied? Fairly satisfied? Fairly dissatisfied? Or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Fairly dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	[Not to read] Did no paperwork
ST2. Judges office or tribunals	1	2	3	4	9
ST3. Attorney’s office	1	2	3	4	9

Figure 8.26 shows that slightly more than 60% of those interviewed who had dealings with a judge's office³ were fairly satisfied (or very satisfied) with the process and the result of their dealings, the highest percentage of the four countries in which the question was asked.




Figure 8.24 – Satisfaction with judge's offices, in comparative perspective 2008

³ This corresponds to slightly less than 30% of the sample.

Likewise, as is seen in Figure 8.27, a similar proportion of Colombians manifested their satisfaction with dealings with the Attorney’s office⁴. This proportion is the highest of the four countries included.




Figure 8.25 – Satisfaction with Attorney’s office, in comparative perspective 2008

⁴ Approximately 25% of those interviewed had some dealings with the Attorney’s office in the past year.

Less encouraging is the fact that less than half of the victims of some crime denounced the crime to the authorities. As is seen in Figure 8.28, this percentage puts Colombia in a place significantly below Paraguay and Uruguay, the countries with the highest rates of reporting crime. Naturally, this makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates on the rate of criminality in countries, if we are basing our estimates on reporting, as was discussed in the previous chapter.




Figure 8.26 – Rate of reporting crime, in comparative perspective 2008

Finally, one of the most widely disseminated perceptions, documented in numerous studies, has to do with the impunity that reigns in Colombia. With a view to complementing these findings rather than attempting to refute them, we formulated the following question:

	Very	Fairly	Little	None	NS/ NR
AOJ12. If you were victim of a theft or an assault, how confident are you that the judicial sysem would punish the culprit ? [read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	8

Putting the question the other way round, and converting the scale to a metric one of from 0 to 100, it is possible to build a perception index for impunity. Figure 8.29 shows that, at least from the citizens' viewpoint and in a comparative perspective, the level of impunity perceived is one of the lowest in the region.




Figure 8.27 – Perception of impunity, in comparative perspective 2008

Conclusion

We Colombians are used to complaining, not always gratuitously, about our political institutions, their inefficaciousness, their inefficiency, their lack of transparency and their high levels of corruption. The panorama presented in this chapter may help to put those “common sense” concepts in perspective.

On the one hand, it is not surprising that President Uribe should have such high levels of acceptance, popularity and of people satisfied with what he is doing. Not only have his approval ratings remained high despite his government’s many setbacks, especially scandals due to obscure and sinister alliances with criminal groups on the part of close collaborators in his team (for example, Jorge Noguera, ex director of the Security Department, DAS) and members of the government coalition in Congress, but also, in comparative perspective, the said indicators are among the highest in the region. This not only confirms the president’s enormous charisma, but also his ability to come out unscathed by these events, when meanwhile far less scandalous behavior has severely affected citizen evaluation of presidents in other countries⁵.

Perhaps it is not too surprising, either, to see that judicial institutions conserve high levels of legitimacy among Colombia’s citizens, especially in comparison with other countries in the region. This might well be evidence of the so-called “legalist tradition” which, according to some analysts, is characteristic of Colombia’s political culture. Be that as it may, this respect represents a healthy symptom in the country’s present circumstances when bitter confrontations have been produced, especially between the executive branch and the judicial branch of power. From the viewpoint of the ordinary citizen, the labors of the justice system, in cases widely commented upon in the media, receive high levels of acceptance which do not seem to be affected by disqualifications by other actors in the political system.

Finally, the results shown here allow us to reach a qualification in context of the negative concepts expounded by the great majority of those who form public opinion with respect to Congress. In comparison with other countries, Colombian legislators receive relatively high levels of approval, confidence and legitimacy. This does not cease to surprise one, since multiple corruption scandals have erupted within the legislative body, especially as regards links discovered between congressmen and women (the majority belonging to the government coalition) and illegal groups, particularly paramilitary groups.

⁵ Results shown here constitute an additional form of empirical support of the so-called « teflon effect » which the government of President Uribe seems to enjoy.

Appendix

Table 8.1 – Factors that influence presidential approval

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	0,234	(0.19)
Woman	-1,111	(1.09)
Age	0,022	(0.04)
Wealth	-0,278	(0.36)
Size of place	-0,008	(0.44)
National economic situation	0,265***	(0.03)
Personal economic situation	0,052	(0.04)
Ideological position	1,254***	(0.29)
Liberal	-0,955	(1.94)
Conservative	0,756	(2.52)
Polo	-17,057***	(3.59)
La U	7,958***	(1.84)
Cambio Radical	7,546**	(2.38)
Other	-3,126	(3.40)
Constant	46,209***	(4.04)
R--squared	0.167	
N	1230	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 8.2 – Factors that influence evaluation of performance of Congress

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	-0,366*	(0.17)
Woman	-0,703	(1.13)
Age	-0,105*	(0.04)
Wealth	-0,899*	(0.35)
Size of place	-0,608	(0.50)
National economic situation	0,114***	(0.03)
Personal economic situation	0,084*	(0.04)
Ideological position	0,449	(0.24)
Liberal	1,967	(2.32)
Conservative	2,397	(2.52)
Polo	-6,844**	(2.55)
La U	-1,382	(1.95)
Cambio Radical	7,180	(4.28)
Other	-7,560**	(2.82)
Constant	52,212***	(3.98)
R-squared	0.078	
N	1159	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 9. The Armed Conflict

As was explained earlier, an open question was formulated requesting those interviewed to indicate what, for them, was the country’s most serious problem. If we place together under the same category those who replied “the war on terrorism”, “lack of security”, “forced displacement”, “terrorism” and “violence”, we can infer that, in the course of the past four years, almost half of the Colombian population point to these phenomena as the country’s most serious problems, as is seen in Figure 9.1. If to this we add “kidnapping”, the 2008 percentage increases considerable, as can be seen in Figure 9.2.




Figure 9.1 – The conflict as the country’s most serious problem 2005-2008




Figure 9.2 – The conflict as the country’s most serious problem 2005-2008 (including kidnapping)

Victimization by the conflict

As we have seen in previous years, one of the dimensions, perhaps the most painful, of the conflict has to do with different forms of victimization. The questionnaire included the following questions¹:

	Yes	No	NS/ NR
WC1. Have you lost a member of the family or a near relative because of the country's armed conflict? Or has any family member disappeared because of the conflict?	1	2	8
WC2. And has any member of your family had to flee or abandon his or her dwelling place because of the country's conflict?	1	2	8
WC3. Has any member of your family been forced to leave the country because of the conflict?	1	2	8

When we group together under one heading those that have been victims of at least one of these forms of violence, we can see that one out of every three Colombians has been seriously affected by the conflict, and that this proportion has not decreased at all in the five years of this study², as is shown in Figure 9.3.




Figure 9.3 – Victimization by the conflict 2004-2008

¹ It is worth noting, although it may seem surprising, that the proportion of those who decided to answer this question is not higher than the percentage of those who replied in any of the years in which this study has been carried out. Furthermore, in 2008 all those interviewed made a valid reply.

² Since the question is not limited to a specific time, this stability in the course of a prolonged period is not altogether surprising.

The incidence of victimization by the conflict is more or less similar in all regions, except for the former National Territories, where the rate is considerably higher, as can be seen in Figure 9.4.




Figure 9.4 – Victimization by the conflict by regions 2008

If we look at each one of these forms of victimization separately, the loss of a family member is what most afflicts the Colombians, followed by displacement from their homes. A considerably smaller proportion report family members having to leave the country because of the conflict and the violence, as is seen in Graphic 9.5. In none of these cases have there been significant variations over time.




Figure 9.5 – Victimization by the conflict in different forms 2004-2008

We wanted to find out what are the characteristics of those who are subjected to one of these forms of victimization by the conflict. For this we built three logistic regression models, one for each of the three. The results appear in Table 9.1 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. All models included the same sociodemographic variables, as well as the ideological position and party affiliation.

Loss of a family member or relative

Figure 9.6 summarizes the model related to the loss of a relative or family member in the conflict. As always, when the confidence interval NO overlaps with the vertical line, which indicates zero, we consider that the corresponding factor has a significant impact³.




Figure 9.6 – Factors that influence the likelihood of a family member having suffered in the conflict

³ As in all regression models used in this report, the threshold of significance is $p < .05$.

The model indicates that the only determining factor for the loss of a family member in the conflict is party affiliation. In fact, the only significant difference with respect to those who do not sympathize with any political party (our basic category) corresponds to parties different from the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the *Polo Democrático Alternativo*, the *Partido de la U* and *Cambio Radical*, as is illustrated in Figure 9.7.




Figure 9.7 – Loss of a family member according to party affiliation

Displacement of a family member or relative

Figure 9.8 shows the results of the model that sought to determine which factors influenced the fact of a Colombian having a family member being forced to leave his or her home because of the conflict.




Figure 9.8 – Factors that influenced the likelihood of a family member been forced to leave home because of the conflict

According to the results of this model, the two factors which influence the probability of a family member being forced to abandon his or her place of residence as a consequence of the armed conflict are wealth and education level. When all other factors are controlled, both sociodemographic factors and political preferences, we observe that there is less incidence of this form of victimization among those who count on less resources. Bearing this factor in mind, those who have higher levels of education are more affected by the displacement of a family member, as is seen in Figure 5.9⁴.




Figure 9.9 – Displacement of a family member according to wealth and education level

⁴ To gain clarity in the Figure, we separated the respondents into two groups : « Lack » demotes those who have a value of 4 or less in the scale of wealth (that goes from 0 to 9), while the category « affluence » includes the rest (from 5 to 9). The wealth scale is also based on Rx questions in the questionnaire.

Exile from the country of a family member or relative

Finally, Figure 9.10 shows the results of the model to determine factors that affect the likelihood of a family member of the person interviewed having to leave the country on account of the armed conflict.




Figure 9.10 – Factors that influence the likelihood of a family member having been forced to leave the country on account of the conflict

As can be seen in the results presented in the table and in the Figure, people who are married or live in free union are less likely to have a family member forced into exile because of the conflict. The same applies to better educated people. This double relationship is illustrated in Figure 9.11.




Figure 9.11 – Exile of a family member according to civil status and education level

As for party affiliation, only those who feel close to *Cambio Radical* are significantly more likely (by contrast with those who sympathize with no party at all) of having a family member who has been forced to leave the country on account of the conflict, as is shown in Figure 9.12.




Figure 9.12 – Exile of a family member according to party affiliation

We attempted to find more about the authors of acts of victimization described above. To this end we formulated the following questions⁵:

ASK ONLY IF THE REPLY TO 1, WC2 o WC3 WAS “YES”. IF NOT, JUMP TO COLPAZ1A. Which group or groups were responsible for these acts? [DO NOT READ THE ALTERNATIVES. THE RESPONDENT MAY CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE OPTION. NOTE THE OPTIONS MENTIONED OR (8) NS/NR]	Yes	No	NS/NR	Inapp. (was not victim)
COLWC4A. The guerrillas	1	2	8	9
COLWC4B. The paramilitaries	1	2	8	9
COLWC4C. Ex paramilitaries that have regrouped	1	2	8	9
COLWC4D. The army	1	2	8	9
COLWC4E. The police	1	2	8	9
COLWC4F. Other	1	2	8	9

⁵ As one can see, the respondent may point to more than one perpetrator.

As can be seen in Figure 9.13, the guerrillas (56.3%) are the group most often indicated by victims of the conflict, followed by the paramilitaries (35.1%). In this year's questionnaire we included groups of ex paramilitaries as possible perpetrators. As one can see, slightly less than one in every twenty victims (4.3%) points to these emerging groups as authors of the acts.




Figure 9.13 – Perpetrators of acts of victimization 2008

Except for a falling off, between 2005 and 2006, of mentions of the guerrillas as authors of these acts, the levels of victimization have remained constant over time, as seen in Figure 9.15.




Figure 9.14 – Guerrillas and paramilitaries as perpetrators 2005-2008

In 2008, it was in Bogotá that we found the greatest number of people who pointed to the guerrillas as authors of acts of victimization (Figure 9.15).




Figure 9.15 – Guerrillas as perpetrators by regions 2008

In 2008, the activities of paramilitary groups were centered mainly on the Atlantic region (Figure 9.16).




Figure 9.16 – Paramilitaries as perpetrators 2008

Bands that emerged after the demobilization of paramilitary groups appear to operate mainly in the Central region (Figure 9.17).




Figure 9.17 - Ex-paramilitaries as perpetrators 2008

Perceptions of the conflict

As already mentioned while posing questions on citizen confidence in a series of political and social institutions, we also wanted to explore the level of confidence of Colombians in the illegal armed groups. If we compare the qualification obtained for legal institutions (see Figure 8.8), the levels of trust in illegal groups is really very low⁶. However it is worth noting, as we have done in earlier reports, that in 2005 the so-called “self defense” (i.e. paramilitary) groups enjoyed a considerable level of trust. But perhaps as a result of events revealed in the confessions of their demobilized members, this level of trust has diminished in later years. Surprisingly, for three illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN and the paramilitaries) the level of confidence has risen slightly but significantly since 2007⁷ (Figure 9.18).




Figure 9.18 – Confidence in illegal armed actors 2005-2008

⁶ In 2008, the legal institution will less trust were the political parties, with 37.9 on a scale of 0 to 100.

⁷ He tests t carried out on the three groups provided statistically significant differences between 2007 and 2008 ($p < .05$).

Trust in the FARC is considerably above the national average in the Pacific region and in Bogotá, and less in the Central and Eastern regions. Practically identical patterns are observed as regards trust in the ELN and the paramilitaries, although in the case of the latter groups greater confidence exists in Bogotá, as can be seen in Figure 9.19.




Figure 9.19 – Confidence in illegal armed actors by regions 2008

The vast majority of the population believes that the best solution to the conflict, whether it be with the guerrillas or with the paramilitaries, is a negotiated settlement. This has not varied in recent years (Figure 9.20). In 2008 there were no differences in these attitudes among victims and non victims of the conflict (Figure 9.21).




Figure 9.20 – Support for a negotiated settlement with guerrillas and paramilitaries 2004-2008




Figure 9.21 – Support for a negotiated settlement according to victimization 2008

However, a wide majority of the population is pessimistic about the possibility of a negotiated solution. This pessimism is less as regards the paramilitaries, although it has increased since 2005, when there was a wave of hope about the possibilities of negotiation (Figure 9.22). Again, there are no differences in this regard between victims and non victims (Figure 9.23).




Figure 9.22 – Pessimism about a negotiated solution 2004-2008




Figure 9.23 – Pessimism about a negotiated solution according to victimization 2008

To examine the perceptions and attitudes of the Colombians about a possible demobilization and reinsertion of members of illegal armed groups, the questionnaire has been including the following questions:

Do you agree with the demobilization and reinsertion of:

	Yes	No	NS/NR
COLPAZ3A. The guerrillas	1	2	8
COLPAZ3B. The Paramilitaries	1	2	8

<p>COLPAZ4. Do you think demobilization of guerrilla groups would better security in your region? Or worsen it?</p> <p>Would better it.....1</p> <p>Would worsen it.....2</p> <p>Would make no difference.....3 [Don't read]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>
<p>COLPAZ5. ¿Do you think demobilization of paramilitary groups World better security in your region? Or worsen it?</p> <p>Would better it.....1</p> <p>Would worsen it.....2</p> <p>Would make no difference.....3 [Don't read]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>

Do you think citizens could forgive and be reconciled with demobilized members of:

	Yes	No	NS/NR
COLPAZ6A. The guerrillas	1	2	8
COLPAZ6B. The paramilitaries	1	2	8

With these questions we built two indices to measure support for demobilization and rehabilitation of members of the guerrilla, on the one hand, and of the “self-defense” groups on the other⁸.

These scales are acceptably reliable ($\alpha = .65$ in both cases)

Figure 9.24 shows the levels of support for processes of demobilization and reinsertion. One sees that there are no major differences between the guerrillas and the paramilitaries in this regard. One observes, also, certain fluctuations with time. In fact, there is a statistically significant increase in both indices between 2007 and 2008. Comparisons between victims and non victims of the conflict show that the former are more receptive to demobilization of the paramilitaries than the latter (Graphic 9.25).




Figure 9.24 – Support for demobilization and reinsertion 2004-2008




Figure 9.25 – Support for demobilization and reinsertion according to victimization 2008

Appendix

Table 9.1 – Factors that influence the likelihood of being victimized by the armed conflict

	Loss of a family member		Displacement of a family member		Exile of a family member	
	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.	Coeff.	Err. est.
Education level	0,013	(0.02)	0,076**	(0.02)	0,127**	(0.04)
Woman	-0,129	(0.13)	-0,129	(0.16)	-0,330	(0.25)
Age	0,005	(0.00)	-0,002	(0.01)	0,011	(0.01)
Wealth	-0,070	(0.04)	-0,186***	(0.05)	-0,001	(0.07)
Married or in free union	-0,051	(0.12)	0,156	(0.15)	-0,466*	(0.22)
Size of place	-0,094	(0.08)	0,027	(0.05)	0,076	(0.10)
Ideological position	-0,009	(0.03)	-0,022	(0.04)	0,027	(0.07)
Liberal	-0,063	(0.20)	0,182	(0.22)	0,524	(0.35)
Conservative	0,407	(0.39)	0,443	(0.40)	0,745	(0.61)
Polo	0,166	(0.33)	0,076	(0.35)	0,573	(0.47)
La U	0,302	(0.23)	0,292	(0.21)	0,461	(0.42)
Cambio Radical	0,285	(0.69)	-0,169	(0.60)	1,137*	(0.46)
Other	0,836*	(0.36)	-0,276	(0.66)	0,469	(0.69)
Constant	-0,846*	(0.38)	-1,166*	(0.44)	-4,759***	(0.66)
F	1.498		1.997		2.892	
N	1248		1248		1244	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Technical Description of the Survey

Sample Design¹

The sample in Colombia was designed to include all non-institutionalized adults (i.e., it excludes people living in the country's jails, schools, hospitals and military bases). It is a random stratified sample. The stratification ensures the inclusion of the most important geographic regions in the country: Pacific, Atlantic, Central, Eastern, the former National Territories (*Antiguos Territorios Nacionales*), and Bogotá. The sample was sub-stratified to include cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was further sub-stratified into urban and rural areas.

We used 2008 population projections for the 2005 Census, the most recent in Colombia. According to the census, 21 percent of the population inhabits the Atlantic region, 17 percent the Pacific, 25 percent the Central, 18 percent the Eastern, three percent in the former National Territories, and 16 percent in Bogotá.

Sample selection was also multistage. The first step was the municipality, then the census sector, followed by the section, and finally the block, housing unit, and household. We used a quota system by gender and age to select the respondent inside each household.

We interviewed 1,503 informants. Technically, our sampling error was (+/-) 2.53 percent. This means that if we drew repeated samples in Colombia, 95 percent of them would reflect the views of the population with an accuracy of not less than (+/-) 2.53 percent. Our sample, however, was stratified and clustered. This means that although we increased the precision of the sample through stratification, the clusters we used to control fieldwork costs somewhat reduce it. Of course, factors beyond our sampling can also reduce the accuracy of the results, including the non-response rate, errors selecting the respondent, misunderstanding the questions, among others. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of (+/-) 2.53 percent is very good.

Table A.1 summarizes the standard errors and design effects for some variables and indexes in the survey. The design effect (DEF) indicates the efficiency of a cluster design compared to a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the variances obtained in both designs are the same, meaning that the cluster design was as efficient as a simple random design. If the DEF is greater than 1, it means that the clustered design had a greater variance than that produced by a simple random design. And if the DEF is less than 1, it means that the variance of the cluster design is even smaller than that produced by the random design.

¹ In this section, and the following, were adapted from the Costa Rica 2004 report, "*Democratic Culture, Citizen Security and Social Capital in Costa Rica*," by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table A.1. Standard Errors and Design Effects for Selected Variables

Average	Estimate	Standard error	Confidence interval 95%		DEF
q2 (age)	36.8695	0.261771	36.35642	37.382571	0.47042
ed (education)	8.76698	0.193461	8.387796	9.146163	3.0367

According to the above table, the cluster design for this survey was very efficient. In fact, with the exception of education, wealth, and tolerance, all the DEF were close to 1. The standard errors for most variables were also very moderate. Table A.2 shows the standard errors and DEF for the variable q2 (age) by cluster (region).

The DEF, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the cluster design by for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table A.2. Standard Errors and Design Effects for Age by Region

Average Subpop.	Estimate	Standard Error	Confidence interval 95%		DEF
q2 (age)					
Atlantic	36.1362	0.484099	35.18736	37.08503	0.41893
Bogotá	36.5844	0.671168	35.26891	37.89988	0.51574
Central	37.7307	0.649179	36.45830	39.00309	0.59648
Oriental	36.3577	0.545566	35.28839	37.42700	0.41042
Pacific	37.4449	0.605208	36.25869	38.63110	0.40649
Former Terr. Nacionales.	36.0000	1.17501	33.69698	38.30301	0.22493

Sample Results and Description of the Respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are fair conditions to expect that the interviewed group is representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of the sample design, the sample could deviate from the characteristics of the population it represents. It could include biases that should be reported. Table A.3 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample with the 2005 census.

Table A.3. Sample vs. 2005 Population Census (18 years or older)

Characteristics	2005 Census	Survey in Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,503
% of men	48	50
% > 30 yearss	68	58
% unmarried	30	36
% married or in civil union	56	55
% with primary education	38	32
% with secondary education	37	48
% with post-secondary education	25	20
% in Atlantic Region	21	21
% in Bogotá	16	15
% in Central Region	25	25
% in Eastern Region	18	18
% in Pacific Region	17	17
% in Former National Territories	3	2

We observe that there is congruity between the sample of this survey and the 1993 Census. Some characteristics such as age, gender, and regional residence are virtually identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and single people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables, where the widest is for people with secondary education, rising from 37 percent in the 2005 census to 48 percent in the 2008 survey.

Because in general, the sample is representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. Therefore, the sample is self-weighted.

Table A.4 compares characteristics of the sample between men and women.

Table A.4. Sample Characteristics by Gender

Characteristics	Total	Men	Women
N	1,503 (100%)	50%	50%
Average age	36.84	37.20	36.49
% married or in civil union	54.99	53.40	56.57

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very similar to each other. Their ages are also very similar, differing by only one year. There is a slight difference with respect to the percentage of married or legal partners (“*union libre*”), where women have a slightly higher percentage (56.7%) than men.

Technical Description of the Sample Design

Universe

The survey universe has national coverage of adults living in all the country’s six regions: Bogota, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the Old National Territories. The universe is also comprised of adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe was divided in two sectors: one of cities with greater than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; in other words, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final Selection Unit

Because the questionnaire included questions not limited to the respondent but also to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. The respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared by more than one household (often relatively stable over time), each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sampling Method

We chose the probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample is stratified by city [municipal] size (cities with more and less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region and area (rural and urban).

It is multistage sampling because within each municipal area, it starts with Primary sampling units (sectors), followed by Secondary units (sections), then Third units (blocks) and Final sampling units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the surveyor selected only one household as an Observation Unit.

The respondent was selected according to the age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

- 18 to 27 years old
- 28 to 40 years old
- Over 40 years old

Each surveyor was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, interviewers listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas.

The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed Representative samples at the following levels:

- Nationally

First Stage Strata:

- Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants
- Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

Second Stage Strata:

- Bogotá
- Atlantic Region
- Pacific Region
- Eastern Region
- Central Region
- Former National Territories

Third Stage Strata:

- Urban Area
- Rural Area

Study Domains:

- Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)
- Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

- For each stage, we calculated margins of error that corresponded to minimum quality standards
- We sought to facilitate the operability of the interviews
- We worked with the best and most up to date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others)

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 1993 census. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría obtained the 2003 versions from the Departamento Nacional de Estadística (DANE; National Statistics Department).

Calculations by Strata

The sample is composed of 138 sampling points: 103 urban and 35 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities in 26 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Sample Sizes, Confidence Level, and Margins of Error

The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a 95% confidence level are:

Table A.5. Sample Size and Margins of Error - 95% Confidence Level

Strata Regions	Simple size	Margin of error M.A.S.	% M.P.C.
Atlantic	323	5.45	5.58
Bogotá	231	6.45	6.59
Central	376	5.18	5.29
Eastern	274	5.92	6.05
Pacific	263	6.19	6.32
National Territories	36	16.34	16.63
Areas			
Urban	1106	2.95	3.01
Rural	397	4.92	5.02
Total for country	1503	2.53	2.6

Survey Team

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country's current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexity of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of which have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 109 staff members, distributed as follows:

Table A.6. Personnel involved in the project

Activity	Total personnel
Field Coordinators	15
Supervisors	8
Interviewers	45
Supervisors of quality of fieldwork	12
Codifiers	7
Digitators	7
Data verifiers	7
Subtotal field and digitation	101
Directive and professional staff	5
Administrative personnel	3
Total team personnel	109

Table A.7. Universe, Total Population by Region and Area (rural/urban)

Colombia: total population, projection year 2008			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	6,894,729	2,584,373	9,479,102
Bogotá	7,139,232	15,820	7,155,052
Central	8,204,403	3,009,474	11,213,877
Eastern	5,307,202	2,454,441	7,761,643
Pacific	5,208,571	2,448,998	7,657,569
Nacional Territories	648,009	535,008	1,183,017
Total	33,402,146	11,048,114	44,450,260
Percentage distribution (%)			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	72,7	27,3	100
Bogotá	99,8	0,2	100
Central	73,2	26,8	100
Eastern	68,4	31,6	100
Pacific	68,0	32,0	100
Nacional Territories	54,8	45,2	100
Total	75,1	24,9	100

Table A.8. Size and Distribution of the Sample by Strata

	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic			
+ of 300,000 inhabitants	127		127
- of 300,000 inhabitants	112	84	196
Total Atlantic	239	84	323
Bogotá			
+ of 300,000 inhabitants	231		231
Total Bogotá	231		231
Central			
+ of 300,000 inhabitants	152		152
- of 300,000 inhabitants	115	109	224
Total Central	267	109	376
Eastern			
+ of 300,000 inhabitants	66		66
- of 300,000 inhabitants	112	96	208
Total Eastern	178	96	274
Pacific			
+ of 300,000 inhabitants	91		91
- of 300,000 inhabitants	88	84	172
Total Pacific	179	84	263
Nacional Territories			
- of 300,000 inhabitants	12	24	36
Total Nacional Territories	12	24	36
Total	1,106	397	1,503




Figure A.1 - Country Distribution by Strata (Regions)

Final Comments on Survey Fieldwork

About the questionnaire

The questionnaire was long, 50 minutes on average, but in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

Due to Colombia's internal conflict, some questions were especially delicate. Some interviewers mentioned that the series on page 8 of the questionnaire generated certain discomfort among some respondents. But to our surprise, we encountered very few refusals to answer questions.

About the fieldwork

For security reasons, in two municipalities it was not possible to do 50 surveys, while in another only 12 interviews were carried out instead of the 50 which had been programmed. For the same reasons we had to exchange one rural area in Cauca for a different one in the same department.

In the rest of the country, some of our interviewers were stopped and interrogated by the illegal armed groups, who finally permitted them to continue their work.

Despite the fact that some respondents were located in areas with a strong presence of illegal armed groups, there were no reports of any kind of pressure to induce answers from respondents. On the contrary, the interviewers emphasized the free will of those who agreed to be part of the study.

As in previous years, the CNC would like to extend its gratitude to all staff members involved in this study, especially the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.

Appendix B. Letter of informed consent

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been chosen at random to participate in a public opinion survey financed by the Vanderbilt University. I am here on behalf of the National consultancy Center to request an interview with you which will take 30 or 40 minutes of your time.

.The principal aim of this study is to learn about people's opinion regarding different aspects of the country's situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may refrain from answering some of the questions or you may terminate the interview at any time. Your replies to our questions will be totally confidential and anonymous.

If you have any queries regrading this study, please contact the National Consultancy Center at Telephone And ask to speak to, who is the person responsible for this project.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire in Spanish

Colombia Versión # 18Q IRB Approval: #071086

La cultura política de la democracia: Colombia, 2008

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	PAIS	8
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
YEAR. Año de la entrevista 2008	YEAR	2008
DOMINIO. Muestra nacional1 Muestra especial.....2		
ESTRATOPRI [COESTRA]: Estrato primario de la muestra [Si DOMINIO = 1 (Muestra nacional), elija una de las siguientes regiones] Región Atlántica.....811 Bogotá.....812 Central.....813 Oriental.....814 Pacífica.....815 Territorios Nal.....816 [Si DOMINIO = 2 (Muestra especial), elija una de las siguientes regiones] Southwest.....821 Urabá...822 Macizo/Putumayo.....823 Magdalena Medio.....824	ESTRATOPRI	8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
PROV [COLDEPA]. Departamento: _____	PROV	8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM [ESTRASEC] [MUNICIPIO] _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR [ESTRATER]. [Usar definición censal del país] Urbano.....1 Rural.....2	UR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

COLCENTRO. Lugar: Corregimiento/Inspección.....1 _____ Vereda.....2 _____ Cabecera municipal.....3	COLCENTRO	
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Centro poblado _____	COLCENPOB.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLESTSOC. Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rural sin estratificación.....7	COLESTSOC	
COLSECT. Sector: _____ Inap (rural, no hay sectores).... 9999	COLSECC	
COLSECC. Sección: _____ Inap (rural, no hay secciones).... 9999	COLSECC	
CLUSTER [COLMANZ]. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] Manzana: _____ Inap (rural, no hay manzanas).....9999	CLUSTER	
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: Capital nacional (área metropolitana)....1 Ciudad grande.....2 Ciudad mediana.....3 Ciudad pequeña.....4 Área rural..... 5	TAMANO	<input type="checkbox"/>
IDIOMA. Idioma del cuestionario: Español.....1	IDIOMAQ	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2008	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR		

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): Hombre.....1 Mujer.....2	Q1
--	-----------

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Mal gobierno	15
Conflicto armado	30	Medio ambiente	10
Corrupción	13	Migración	16
Crédito, falta de	09	Narcotráfico	12
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Pandillas	14
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pobreza	04
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Políticos, los	59
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema...[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	SOCT1
Muy buena.....1	
Buena.....2	
Ni buena, ni mala.....3	
Mala.....4	
Muy mala.....5	
NS/NR.....8	

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 NS/NR.....8	SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? Muy buena.....1 Buena.....2 Ni buena, ni mala.....3 Mala.....4 Muy mala.....5 NS/NR.....8	IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 NS/NR.....8	IDIO2

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. ¿A algún Congresista?	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. ¿Al Alcalde de su municipio?	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	CP4
COLCP1. ¿A algún concejal de su municipio?	1	2	8	COLCP1
COLCP2. ¿A algún Conciliador o Juez de paz?	1	2	8	COLCP2
COLCP3. ¿A la Policía?	1	2	8	COLCP3

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8	NP1
NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o el plan anual de su municipio? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8	NP4
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8	NP2

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS/ NR	Inap., no hay servicio	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8		SGL1

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS/ NR	Inap., no hay servicio	
SGL1A y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	SGL1A
COLSGL1B. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1B
COLSGL1C. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1C
SGL1D. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	SGL1D
COLSGL1E. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1E

LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? Más al municipio.....1 Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios.....2 No cambiar nada [NO LEER]3 Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER]4 NS/NR.....8	LGL2
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? [Leer alternativas] Mucho más al gobierno nacional.....1 Algo más al gobierno nacional.....2 La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y al municipio.....3 Algo más al municipio.....4 Mucho más al municipio.....5 NS/NR.....8	LGL2A

<p>LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería <i>administrar más dinero</i>? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Mucho más el gobierno nacional.....1</p> <p>Algo más el gobierno nacional.....2</p> <p>La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y el municipio.....3</p> <p>Algo más el municipio.....4</p> <p>Mucho más el municipio.....5</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>LGL2B</p>	
<p>LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al municipio para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos? [no leer alternativas]</p> <p>Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos.....1</p> <p>No vale la pena pagar más impuestos.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>LGL3</p>	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<p>CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.</p>	1	2	3	4	8	CP5
<p>COLEMP. ¿Usted diría que hoy las oportunidades de trabajo en su comunidad son mejores, iguales o peores que el año pasado?</p> <p>Mejores.....1</p> <p>Iguales.....2</p> <p>Peores.....3</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>						COLEMP

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
COLCP8A. ¿Reuniones de la Junta de Acción Comunal? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	COLCP8A
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
CP20. ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP20
COLSISBEN. ¿Está usted afiliado al SISBEN? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8					COLSISBEN	
COLFAMACC. ¿Está usted inscrito en el programa "Familias en Acción"? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8					COLFAMACC	
COLCONCOM. ¿Alguna vez ha participado en un Consejo Comunitario organizado por el presidente Uribe en su municipio? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8					COLCONCOM	

Ahora vamos a hablar de eficiencia y rendición de cuentas					
	Sí	No	NS/NR		
COLCP15A ¿Ha participado usted, alguna vez, en algún comité de control ciudadano o de veeduría ciudadana?	1 [Siga]	2 [Pase a COLCP16A]	8 [Pase a COLCP16A]	COLCP15A	

COLCP15A1 ¿Considera que la información sobre la administración municipal fue?	Accesible	Poco accesible	Reservada	NS/NR	Inap.	COLCP15A1	
	1	2	3	8	9		

	Sí	No	NS/NR	Inap.		
COLCP15B ¿Considera que la entidad pública a la que usted hizo control ciudadano cooperó con la veeduría?	1	2	8	9	COLCP15B	
COLCP16A ¿Usted considera que su Municipio rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8		COLCP16A	
COLCP16B [No aplica para Bogotá] ¿Usted considera que su Departamento rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8	9	COLCP16B	
COLCP16C ¿Usted Considera que el Gobierno Nacional rinde cuentas sobre el manejo de los recursos que administra?	1	2	8		COLCP16C	

Ahora vamos a hablar de la forma en que las autoridades se comunican con los ciudadanos y consultan con ellos... [repetir cada vez "Siempre", "Casi siempre", "De vez en cuando", "Casi nunca", o "Nunca"]

	Siempre	Casi siempre	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR	Inap	
COLAC1A ¿En su opinión, su municipio consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC1A
COLAC1B ¿En su opinión, su municipio hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC1B
COLAC1C ¿En su opinión, su municipio comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC1C
COLAC2A [No aplica para Bogotá] ¿En su opinión, su departamento consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLAC2A
COLAC2B [No aplica para Bogotá] ¿En su opinión, su departamento hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLAC2B

	Siempre	Casi siempre	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR	Inap	
COLAC2C [No aplica para Bogotá] ¿En su opinión, su departamento comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLAC2C
COLAC3A ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional consulta a los ciudadanos antes de tomar una decisión...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC3A
COLAC3B ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional hace públicos sus planes y decisiones...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC3B
COLAC3C ¿En su opinión, el gobierno nacional comparte la información abiertamente y a tiempo...	1	2	3	4	5	8		COLAC3C

<p>LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general, ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Muy satisfecho.....1 Algo satisfecho.....2 Algo insatisfecho.....3 Muy insatisfecho.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>LS3</p>
<p>IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Muy confiable.....1 Algo confiable.....2 Poco confiable.....3 Nada confiable.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>IT1</p>

<p>IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Confía plenamente.....1 Confía algo.....2 Confía poco.....3 No confía nada.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>IT1A</p>
<p>IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás?</p> <p>Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas.....1 Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>IT1B</p>

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]

L1. En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda									Derecha	(NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER TARJETA E]

	Algunas veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR	Inap.	
PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si	1	2	3	8		PROT1

contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a JC15]						
PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	1	2	3	8	9	PROT2

	Sí podría haber	Nunca habría razón	NS/NR	
JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Constitucional o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	JC16
JC13A. ¿Cree Ud. que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para un golpe de estado o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?	1	2	8	JC13A

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 [siga] No.....2 [Pasar a VIC20] NS/NR..... 8 [Pasar a VIC20]	VIC1
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? Sí.....1 [Seguir] No lo denunció2 [pasar a VIC20] NS/NR.....8 [pasar a VIC20] Inap. (no víctima).....9 [pasar a VIC20]	AOJ1
AOJ1A. ¿A quién o a qué institución denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas. Marcar una sola; si más de una, averiguar cuál fue la primera institución a la que acudió] Fiscalía.....1 Policía.....2 Juzgados.....3 Comisaría de familia.....4 Prensa.....6 Otro.....7 NS/NR.....8 Inap [no víctima o no denunció].....9	

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No” anotar “0” cero]	¿Cuántas veces? NO = 0, NS/NR=88
VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?	VIC20
VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?	VIC21

VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?						VIC27	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? Deben respetar las leyes siempre.....1 En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley.....2 NS/NR.....8						AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? Muy seguro.....1 Algo seguro.....2 Algo inseguro.....3 Muy inseguro.....4 NS/NR.....8						AOJ11	
	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	NS/ NR		
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ12	
AOJ12A. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ12A	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] La policía protege, o.....1 La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia.....2 [no leer] La policía no protege, no está involucrada en la delincuencia o protege e involucrada.....3 NS/NR.....8						AOJ18	

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

	Sí	No	NS/NR	
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2	8	WC1
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	8	WC2
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	8	WC3

PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS.**

EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION.

ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (8) NS/NR]

	Sí	No	NS/NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	9	COLWC4A
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	9	COLWC4B
COLWC4C. Exparamilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	8	9	COLWC4C
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	8	9	COLWC4D
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	8	9	COLWC4E
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	8	9	COLWC4F

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	NS/NR	
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1A
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1B

¿Qué tanto cree que es posible una solución negociada en un plazo razonable, diga usted de 4 años...:

[repetir cada vez “muy posible”, “posible”, “poco posible”, o “imposible”]

	Muy posible	Posible	Poco posible	Imposible	NS/NR	
COLPAZ2A. Con las FARC	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2A
COLPAZ2B. Con el ELN	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2B
COLPAZ2C. Con los paramilitares	1	2	3	4	8	COLPAZ2C

¿Estaría de acuerdo con la desmovilización y reinserción de:

	Sí	No	NS/NR	
COLPAZ3A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	COLPAZ3A
COLPAZ3B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	COLPAZ3B

<p>COLPAZ4. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos guerrilleros mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región?</p> <p>Mejoraría.....1</p> <p>Empeoraría.....2</p> <p>Se mantendría igual.....3 [No leer]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	COLPAZ4
<p>COLPAZ5. ¿Cree usted que la desmovilización de grupos paramilitares mejoraría o empeoraría la seguridad de su región?</p> <p>Mejoraría.....1</p> <p>Empeoraría.....2</p> <p>Se mantendría igual.....3 [No leer]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	COLPAZ5

¿Usted ve posible el perdón y la reconciliación de los ciudadanos con miembros desmovilizados de:

	Sí	No	NS/NR	
COLPAZ6A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	COLPAZ6A
COLPAZ6B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	COLPAZ6B

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			NS/NR	

	Anotar1-7, 8 = NS/NR, 9=Inap
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)	B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?	B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?	B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?	B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?	B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A

	Anotar1-7, 8 = NS/NR, 9=Inap	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?	B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	B14	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?	B15	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la Nación?	B16	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	B17	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	B18	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?	B19	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	B21A	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	B32	
COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?	COLB32A	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano?	B43	
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento?	B33	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	B47	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?	B50	
COLB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Alto Comisionado para la Paz?	COLB51	
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?	B23	
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?	COLB60	
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?	COLB61	
COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas o paramilitares?	COLB62	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?	B48	

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

Ahora, en una escala diferente

<p>COLB50. ¿Usted diría que las decisiones de las autoridades Judiciales son:</p> <p>Muy lentas.....1</p> <p>Lentas.....2</p> <p>Razonables en tiempo.....3</p> <p>Rápidas.....4</p> <p>Muy rápidas.....5</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	COLB50	
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Cómo considera usted el **acceso** a los siguientes servicios de justicia: Muy Bueno, Bueno, Regular, Malo, Muy Malo

¿Cómo considera el acceso a los servicios...	Muy bueno	Bueno	Regular	Malo	Muy malo	NS/NR	
COLB51A En las Comisarías de familia	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51A
COLB51B En la Fiscalía	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51B
COLB51C En las Inspecciones de Policía	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51C
COLB51D En los Consultorios Jurídicos	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51D
COLB51E En la Defensoría del Pueblo	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51E
COLB51F En los Juzgados	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51F
COLB51G En las casas de justicia	1	2	3	4	5	8	COLB51G

<p>COLB52. Cuando usted enfrenta un conflicto legal, civil, interpersonal, etc., Usted: [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una opción; si más de una, indicar lo que haría <u>principalmente.</u>]</p> <p>No hace nada.....1</p> <p>Concilia con la contraparte.....2</p> <p>Lo resuelve a su manera.....3</p> <p>Acude a una autoridad judicial (Juez, Policía, Fiscal).....4</p> <p>Consigue un abogado.....5</p> <p>Acude a una Casa de Justicia.....6</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	COLB52
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[Entregar TARJETA A] Usando esta escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 significa NADA y 7 significa MUCHO,,,	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		N1	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		N3	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?		N9	
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?		N10	
COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?		COLN11	
COLN12. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual sanea las finanzas estatales?		COLN12	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		N11	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		N12	
COLN13. ¿Hasta qué punto diría usted que el Gobierno actual combate la reorganización de los grupos paramilitares?		COLN13	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Colombia y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos colombianos representan bien a sus votantes?		EPP1	
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos colombianos?		EPP2	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?		EPP3	
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso estorba la labor del presidente?		EC1	
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los congresistas discutiendo y debatiendo?		EC2	
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso?		EC3	
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso cumple con lo que usted espera de ella?		EC4	

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Álvaro Uribe es...? [Leer alternativas] Muy bueno.....1 Bueno.....2 Ni bueno, ni malo.....3 Malo.....4	M1	
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Muy malo.....5 NS/NR.....8		
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los congresistas colombianos están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? Muy bien.....1 Bien.....2 Ni bien ni mal.....3 Mal.....4 Muy mal.....5 NS/NR.....8	M2	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			NS/NR

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me dijera hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

[Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR]

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR	
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me dijera, siempre usando la tarjeta, hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.. POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP101
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP102
POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP103

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP106	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP107	
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?		POP109	
POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP110	
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP112	
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP113	

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		EFF1	
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		EFF2	

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los colombianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		PN2	
COLCONST1. La Constitución expresa los valores y las aspiraciones de los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		COLCONST1	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		DEM23	
COLADAM1. Los cultivos de coca y amapola son perjudiciales para su región. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		COLADAM1	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. NS/NR = 8	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS1	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS2	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS3	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firμες para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS4	

[RECOGER TARJETA B]

COLADAM2. ¿Usted considera que la gente cultiva coca o amapola principalmente por motivos económicos, por presión de algún grupo armado ilegal o por falta de oportunidades? [SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] Motivos económicos.....1 Presión de algún grupo armado.....2 Falta de oportunidades.....3 NS.....8		COLADAM2	
COLADAM3. ¿Usted cree que la razón principal para la reducción de cultivos de coca en el país es la fumigación, los programas de desarrollo alternativo o la erradicación manual voluntaria? [SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] Fumigación.....1 Desarrollo alternativo.....2 Erradicación manual voluntaria.....3 Ninguna.....4 NS.....8		COLADAM3	

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia? Muy satisfecho.....1 Satisfecho.....2 Insatisfecho.....3 Muy insatisfecho.....4 NS/NR.....8		PN4	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Colombia es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? Muy democrático.....1 Algo democrático.....2 Poco democrático.....3 Nada democrático.....4 NS/NR.....8		PN5	

<p>W8. ¿A la hora de votar por alguien, quién le inspira más confianza: un hombre o una mujer?</p> <p>Un hombre.....1</p> <p>Una mujer.....2</p> <p>Le da igual [NO LEER].....3</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>		
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS/NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E5
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E8
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E11
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E15
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E14
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E2
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E3
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E16

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando esta escala de uno a diez. Por favor use otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba			NS/NR

	Anotar 1- 10,88= NS/NR
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político del país?	D33
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	D34
D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?	D36
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	D37

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	Anotar 1- 10,88= NS/NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</i>	D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D5

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.....1</p> <p>La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.....2</p> <p>En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.....3</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>DEM2</p>
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>Mano dura.....1</p> <p>Participación de todos.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>DEM11</p>
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido.....1</p> <p>La democracia electoral (voto popular) es lo mejor.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>AUT1</p>
<p>AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes.....1</p> <p>Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>AUT2</p>

<p>COLDH1. ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (Masacres y Desplazamiento Forzado)? [leer alternativas]</p> <p>Muy eficiente.....1</p> <p>Eficiente.....2</p> <p>Ineficiente.....3</p> <p>Muy ineficiente.....4</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>COLDH1</p>
<p>COLDH2. ¿En caso de tener conocimiento o ser objeto de una violación a los derechos humanos, a cuál de las siguientes instituciones acudiría usted para denunciar el hecho? Por favor, elija la más importante [leer opciones]</p> <p>Defensoría del Pueblo.....1</p> <p>Policía.....2</p> <p>Procuraduría General de la Nación.....3</p> <p>Fiscalía General.....4</p> <p>Personería municipal.....5</p> <p>Ministerio del Interior y la Justicia.....6</p> <p>Ninguna de las anteriores.....7 [no leer]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p> <p>[Si eligió “(7) ninguna de las anteriores” continúe, de lo contrario pase a COLDH3]</p>	<p>COLDH2</p>

<p>COLDH2A. ¿Por qué no acudiría a ninguna de estas instituciones? [Leer alternativas; marcar solo una opción]</p> <p>Por temor.....1 Por falta de confianza.....2 Porque no es su función.....3 Por ineficiente.....4 Porque no sirve de nada.....5 NS/NR.....8 INAP..... 9</p>	<p>COLDH2A</p>	
<p>COLDH3. Hay gente que dice que la política de seguridad democrática del presidente Álvaro Uribe ha incrementado —y otros dicen que ha disminuido— las violaciones a los derechos humanos como el desplazamiento forzoso, las masacres, los secuestros, y otras. ¿Usted cree que la política de Seguridad Democrática del presidente Álvaro Uribe, ha incrementado o disminuido las violaciones a los Derechos Humanos?</p> <p>Incrementado.....1 Disminuido.....2 Algunos tipos de violaciones a los derechos humanos han disminuido y otros aumentado.....3 [No leer] NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>COLDH3</p>	
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Frecuentemente.....1 De vez en cuando.....2 Rara vez.....3 Nunca.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>PP1</p>	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? Sí trabajó.....1 No trabajó.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>PP2</p>	
<p>ABS5. ¿Cree que el voto puede mejorar las cosas en el futuro o cree que como quiera que vote, las cosas no van a mejorar?</p> <p>El voto puede mejorar las cosas.....1 Las cosas no van a mejorar.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>ABS5</p>	

<p>Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.</p>		
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC1</p>	
<p>COLDC1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>COLDC1A</p>	
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....1 Corrupto pero se justifica2 No es corrupto3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC10</p>	
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC13</p>	
<p>COLDC14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>COLDC14</p>	
<p>COLDC15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>COLDC15</p>	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?	9	0	1	8	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	9 [no hay servicio]	0	1	8	EXC17
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	8	EXC18

[leer todas las alternativas cada vez]					
Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar,	Muy generalizada	Algo generalizada	Poco generalizada	Nada generalizada	NS/NR
EXC7. ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...?	1	2	3	4	8 EXC7

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...

	Correcto	Incorrecto (NS/NR)	
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <i>[No leer, George W. Bush]</i>	1	2	GI1
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Colombia? <i>[No leer: Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez]</i>	1	2	GI2
GI3 [GI2]. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Colombia? <i>[No leer, 32]</i>	1	2	GI3
GI4 [GI3]. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? <i>[No leer, cuatro años]</i>	1	2	GI4
GI5 [GI4]. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <i>[No leer, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva; aceptar también Lula]</i>	1	2	GI5

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
DER1. Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. Votar en una elección política, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. Participar en una manifestación pacífica, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. Postularse para un cargo de elección popular ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. ¿Tiene su cédula inscrita para votar? Sí.....1 No.....2 En trámite [No leer]3 No tiene cédula.....3 [No leer] NS/NR.....8	VB1
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? Sí votó.....1 [Siga] No votó.....2 [Pasar a VB10] NS/NR.....8 [Pasar a VB10]	VB2

<p>VB3. ¿Por quién votó para presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>Votó en blanco o anuló el voto.....00</p> <p>Carlos Arturo Rincón Barreto.....01</p> <p>Enrique Parejo González.....02</p> <p>Álvaro Uribe Vélez.....03</p> <p>Carlos Gaviria Díaz.....04</p> <p>Horacio Serpa Uribe.....05</p> <p>Álvaro Leyva Durán.....06</p> <p>Antanas Mockus.....07</p> <p>Otro..... 77</p> <p>NS/NR.....88</p> <p>Inap. (no votó).....99</p>	VB3	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>Sí.....1 [Siga]</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a COLVB25A]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8 [Pase a COLVB25A]</p>	VB10	
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>Partido Liberal.....801</p> <p>Partido Conservador.....802</p> <p>Polo Democrático Alternativo.....803</p> <p>Partido de la U.....804</p> <p>Cambio Radical.....805</p> <p>Convergencia Ciudadana.....806</p> <p>Alas-Equipo Colombia.....807</p> <p>Colombia Democrática.....808</p> <p>Colombia Viva.....809</p> <p>Movimiento MIRA.....810</p> <p>Por el País que soñamos (Peñalosa).....811</p> <p>Dejen Jugar al Moreno.....812</p> <p>C4.....813</p> <p>Visionarios con Antanas Mockus.....814</p> <p>Otro.....815</p> <p>NS/NR.....88 [pase a COLVB25A]</p> <p>Inap.....99 [pase a COLVB25A]</p>	VB11	

<p>VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?</p> <p>Muy débil.....1 Débil.....2 Ni débil ni fuerte.....3 Fuerte.....4 Muy fuerte.....5 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	VB12
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<p>COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLVB25A
<p>COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLVB25B
<p>COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLVB25C
<p>COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLVB25D
<p>COLVB26A. ¿Alguna vez le han ofrecido dinero o bienes materiales para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 [pase a COLVB26C] NS/NR.....8 [pase a COLVB26C]</p>	COLVB26A
<p>COLVB26B. ¿Alguna vez ha accedido a votar por algún candidato o partido a cambio de dinero o bienes materiales?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	COLVB26B
<p>COLVB26C. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez le han ofrecido dinero o bienes materiales para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 [pase a COLVBLOC1] NS/NR.....8 [pase a COLVBLOC1]</p>	COLVB26C
<p>COLVB26D. ¿Alguna vez algún familiar o amigo cercano ha accedido a votar por algún candidato o partido a cambio de dinero o bienes materiales?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	COLVB26D
<p>COLVBLOC1. ¿Votó en las elecciones para alcaldes de octubre pasado?</p> <p>Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLVBLOC1

<p>[Entregue la Tarjeta B]</p> <p>Ahora vamos a hablar de las pasadas elecciones locales de octubre. En esta escala del 1 al 7, donde 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 significa “muy de acuerdo”, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?</p>	<p>Anotar 1 a 7 NS/NR=8</p>		
<p>COLVBLOC2. Las elecciones de octubre pasado <u>en su municipio</u> fueron libres y justas.</p>		<p>COLVBLOC2</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC3. Las elecciones de octubre pasado <u>en su municipio</u> se vieron amenazadas por la acción de grupos paramilitares.</p>		<p>COLVBLOC3</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC4. Las elecciones de octubre pasado <u>en su municipio</u> se vieron amenazadas por la acción de grupos guerrilleros.</p>		<p>COLVBLOC4</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC5. Las elecciones de octubre pasado <u>en su municipio</u> se vieron amenazadas por la acción de narcotraficantes.</p>		<p>COLVBLOC5</p>	
<p>COLVBLOC6. Las elecciones de octubre pasado <u>en su municipio</u> se vieron amenazadas por el clientelismo.</p>		<p>COLVBLOC6</p>	

[Recoja la Tarjeta B]

<p>VB50. En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?</p> <p>Muy de acuerdo.....1 De acuerdo.....2 En desacuerdo.....3 Muy en desacuerdo.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>VB50</p>
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<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>Mucho.....1 Algo.....2 Poco.....3 Nada.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>POL1</p>
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>A diario.....1 Algunas veces por semana.....2 Algunas veces por mes.....3 Rara vez.....4 Nunca.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>POL2</p>

<p>[Entregue la Tarjeta F]</p> <p>En esta tarjeta hay una escala de 0 a 10, en la que 0 significa ‘muy distante’ y 10 significa ‘muy cercano’. Usted puede elegir cualquier valor intermedio.</p>	<p>Anotar 0 a 10 NS/NR=88</p>		
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FT1. Pensando en los políticos de otros países, usando esta escala, ¿qué tan cercano se siente del presidente de Venezuela Hugo Chávez?		FT1	
FT2. ¿Y del presidente de Estados Unidos George Bush?		FT2	
FT3. ¿Qué tan cercano se siente del presidente de Bolivia Evo Morales?		FT3	
FT4. ¿Y del presidente de Brasil Lula da Silva?		FT4	
FT5. ¿Y de Fidel Castro?		FT5	

[Recoja la Tarjeta F]

COLMOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES] Alta.....1 Media alta.....2 Media.....3 Media baja.....4 Baja.....5 NS/NR.....8		COLMOV1	
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Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:	Sí	No	NS/NR	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)	1	2	8	DIS2
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio	1	2	8	DIS3
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	8	DIS4
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)	1	2	8	DIS5

VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [leer alternativas] No votaría.....1 Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente.....2 Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno.....3 NS/NR.....8		VB20	
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición.....1 Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente.....2 Influir de otras maneras.....3 No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga.....4 NS/NR.....8		VB21	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encuestador: llenar:] _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código y poner un círculo alrededor del número que corresponde]

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de...	Segundo año de...	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	Séptimo año de	ED	__ __
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	--	--		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	--		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18		
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15					
NS/NR	88								

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR) **Q2**

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas] **Q3**

Católica.....1
 Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).....2
 Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas).....3
 Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).....5
 Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día.....6
 Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).....7
 Ninguna.....4
 NS/NR.....8

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] **Q5**

Más de una vez por semana.....1
 Una vez por semana.....2
 Una vez al mes.....3
 Una o dos veces al año.....4
 Nunca o casi nunca.....5
 NS/NR.....8

<p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]</p> <p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]_</p> <p>Ningún ingreso.....0 Menos de \$90.000.....1 Entre \$91.000-\$180.000.....2 \$181.000 - \$360.000.....3 \$361.000 - \$720.000.....4 \$721.000 - \$1.000.000.....5 \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000.....6 \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000.....7 \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000.....8 \$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000.....9 \$4.000.001 – o más.....10 NS/NR88</p> <p>[RECOGER TARJETA D]</p>	<p>Q10</p>
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<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior?</p> <p>Sí.....1 No.....2 [pase a Q10C] NS/NR.....8 [pase a Q10C]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>
<p>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer las alternativas. Aceptar una sola respuesta]</p> <p>Consumo (alimento, vestido).....1 Vivienda (construcción, reparación, arriendo).....2 Gastos en educación.....3 Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias).....4 Gastos médicos.....5 Ahorro/inversión.....6 Otro.....7 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	<p>Q10A1</p>
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Mucho.....1 Algo.....2 Poco.....3 Nada.....4 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	<p>Q10B</p>

<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar ¿dónde?] [No leer opciones]</p> <p>Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente.....1 Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países.....2 Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos).....3 No.....4 [pase a Q14] NS/NR.....8 [pase a Q14]</p>	<p>Q10C</p>
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [leer opciones]</p> <p>Todos los días.....1 Una o dos veces por semana.....2 Una o dos veces por mes.....3 Rara vez.....4 Nunca.....5 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	<p>Q16</p>
<p>Q14. Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>Q14</p>
<p>Q10D. Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar.....1 Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades.....2 No les alcanza, tienen dificultades.....3 No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades.....4 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>Q10D</p>
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>Soltero.....1 Casado.....2 Unión libre (acompañado).....3 Divorciado.....4 Separado.....5 Viudo.....6 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>Q11</p>
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88)</p>	<p>Q12 __ __ </p>
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	<p>Q12A __ __ </p>
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-colombiana, mulata, u otra?</p> <p>Blanca.....1 Mestiza.....2 Indígena.....3 Negra/afrodescendiente.....4 Mulata.....5 Otra.....7 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>ETID</p>

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas]	WWW1
Todos los días o casi todos los días.....1	
Por lo menos una vez por semana.....2	
Por lo menos una vez al mes.....3	
Rara vez.....4	
Nunca.....5	
NS/NR [no leer].....8	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	No...0	Sí...1	R1		
R3. Nevera	No...0	Sí...1	R3		
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo (no celular)	No...0	Sí...1	R4		
R4A. Teléfono celular	No...0	Sí...1	R4A		
R5. Vehículo (no moto). Cuántos?	No...1	Uno...1	Dos...2	Tres o más...3	R5
R6. Lavadora de ropa	No...0	Sí...1	R6		
R7. Microondas	No...0	Sí...1	R7		
R8. Motocicleta	No...0	Sí...1	R8		
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	No...0	Sí...1	R12		
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	No...0	Sí...1	R14		
R15. Computador	No...0	Sí...1	R15		

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]	OCUP4
Trabajando?.....1 [Siga]	
No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo?.....2 [Siga]	
Está buscando trabajo activamente?.....3 [Pase a MIG1]	
Es estudiante?.....4 [Pase a MIG1]	
Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar?.....5 [Pase a MIG1]	
Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar?.....6 [Pase a MIG1]	
No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo?.....7 [Pase a MIG1]	
NS/NR.....8 [Pase a MIG1]	

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.).....1</p> <p>Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor).....2</p> <p>Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.).....3</p> <p>Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.).....4</p> <p>Funcionarios del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública).....5</p> <p>Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.).....6</p> <p>Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.).....7</p> <p>Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados.....8</p> <p>Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.).....9</p> <p>Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra).....10</p> <p>Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros).....11</p> <p>Artesano.....12</p> <p>Servicio doméstico.....13</p> <p>Obrero.....14</p> <p>Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bomberos, vigilantes, etc.).....15</p> <p>Otro.....77</p> <p>NS/NR.....88</p> <p>Inap.....99</p>	<p>OCUP1</p>	<p> _ _ </p>
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<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Asalariado del gobierno?.....1</p> <p>Asalariado en el sector privado?.....2</p> <p>Patrono o socio de empresa?.....3</p> <p>Trabajador por cuenta propia?.....4 [Pase a MIG1]</p> <p>Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?.....5</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>	
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<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>OCUP1C</p>	
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Inap.....9		
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<p>MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:</p> <p>En el campo.....1 En un pueblo.....2 En una ciudad.....3 NS/NR.....8</p>	MIG1
<p>MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>En este mismo municipio.....1 [Pase a Serie COLADAM] En otro municipio en el país.....2 [Siga] En otro país.....3 [Pase a Serie COLADAM] NS/NR.....8 [Pase a Serie COLADAM]</p>	MIG2
<p>MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que éste.....1 Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que éste.....2 Un pueblo o ciudad igual que éste.....3 NS/NR.....8 INAP.....9</p>	MIG3

<p>Serie COLADAM [SI OCUP1 es campesino, agricultor o productor agropecuario, propietario de la tierra (código 10) o peón agrícola (código 11) SIGA. DE LO CONTRARIO, VAYA A TI (“Hora terminada la entrevista”)]</p>		
<p>COLADAM4. ¿Usted es el propietario de alguna finca?</p> <p>Sí.....1 No.....2 [pase a COLADAM10A] NS.....8 [pase a COLADAM10A] Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	COLADAM4	
<p>COLADAM5. ¿Tiene producción animal en su finca?</p> <p>Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	COLADAM5	
<p>COLADAM6. ¿Tiene cultivos de pancoger (para su propio sustento)?</p> <p>Sí.....1 No.....2 NS.....8 Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	COLADAM6	

<p>COLADAM7. ¿Usted comercializa la mayoría de sus productos en...</p> <p>Su finca.....1</p> <p>En el mercado local o de su municipio.....2</p> <p>En mercados fuera de su región.....3</p> <p>No comercializa productos.....4</p> <p>[No leer] Otro.....5</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	<p>COLADAM7</p>	
<p>COLADAM8. ¿Ha recibido algún apoyo del gobierno para el desarrollo de su producción agrícola?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	<p>COLADAM8</p>	
<p>COLADAM9. De los siguientes aspectos, ¿cuál cree usted que es el mayor obstáculo para la comercialización de sus productos? [Leer todas; marcar una sola opción]</p> <p>La falta de vías, carreteras y comunicaciones.....1</p> <p>Los costos del transporte de sus productos2</p> <p>El empaque o el embalaje de los productos.....3</p> <p>Las formas de pago de los compradores.....4</p> <p>La falta de centros de acopio.....5</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola; o no es propietario]</p>	<p>COLADAM9</p>	
<p>COLADAM10. ¿Cuál es el tamaño de sus tierras?</p> <p>[ANOTAR AQUÍ LA CIFRA MENCIONADA.</p> <p>SALTAR A COLADAM10B Y MARCAR LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA POR EL ENCUESTADO]</p> <p>_____ [8888=NS; 9999=Inap]</p>	<p>COLADAM10</p>	<p> _ _ _ _ </p>
<p>COLADAM10A. ¿Cuál es el tamaño de la finca donde trabaja?</p> <p>[ANOTAR LA CIFRA MENCIONADA Y MARCAR EN COLADAM10B LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA POR EL ENCUESTADO]</p> <p>_____ [8888=NS; 9999=Inap]</p>	<p>COLADAM10A</p>	<p> _ _ _ _ </p>

<p>COLADAM10B. [SELECCIONAR LA UNIDAD DE MEDIDA UTILIZADA EN COLADAM10 o COLADAM10A]</p> <p>Hectáreas.....1</p> <p>Fanegadas.....2</p> <p>Kilómetros cuadrados.....3</p> <p>Otra unidad _____</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM10B</p>	
<p>COLADAM11. ¿Alguna vez alguien lo ha presionado para cultivar coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM11</p>	
<p>COLADAM12. ¿Alguna vez ha cultivado coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a TI]</p> <p>NS.....8 [Pase a TI]</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM12</p>	
<p>COLADAM13. ¿Ha participado en algún proyecto de desarrollo alternativo o de promoción de cultivos lícitos?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a COLADAM14]</p> <p>NS.....8 [Pase a COLADAM14]</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM13</p>	
<p>COLADAM13A. ¿Qué tan satisfecho está con el proyecto de desarrollo alternativo? (Leer todas)</p> <p>Totalmente satisfecho.....1</p> <p>Satisfecho.....2</p> <p>Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho.....3</p> <p>Insatisfecho.....4</p> <p>Totalmente insatisfecho.....5</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM13 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM13A</p>	

<p>COLADAM14. ¿Alguna vez ha sustituido cultivos de coca o amapola por cultivos lícitos?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a TI]</p> <p>NS.....8 [Pase a TI]</p> <p>Inap.....9 [no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM14</p>	
<p>COLADAM15. ¿Ha vuelto a cultivar coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1 [Pase a TI]</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....3</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM14 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM15</p>	
<p>COLADAM16. ¿Ha pensado en volver a cultivar coca o amapola?</p> <p>Sí.....1</p> <p>No.....2</p> <p>NS.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p> <p>[respuesta 2 o 8 en COLADAM14 o COLADAM12, o no es campesino, ni jornalero/peón agrícola, ni empresario agrícola]</p>	<p>COLADAM16</p>	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____

TI

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta A



Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D

- 1) Ningún ingreso
- 2) Menos de \$90.000
- 3) Entre \$91.000-\$180000
- 4) \$181.000 - \$360.000
- 5) \$361.000 - \$720.000
- 6) \$721.000 - \$1.000.000
- 7) \$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000
- 8) \$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000
- 9) \$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000
- 10) \$3.000.001 - \$4'000.000
- 11) \$4.000.001 – o más

Card E



Card F

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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Very Distant

Very Near

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