THE RISE OF ETHNO-POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA:

THE BOLIVIAN CASE

(A paper prepared for the 2006 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadephia, PA)

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Abstract: This paper argues that the recent electoral success of the MAS and other ethno-populist parties in Latin America is a result of these parties' ability to combine traditional populist rhetoric and platforms with an inclusive ethnic appeal. The MAS has sought to appeal to the indigenous population, but it has tried to do so without alienating white and *mestizo* voters. Thus, it has avoided exclusionary rhetoric, recruited non-indigenous as well as indigenous candidates and formed alliances with a variety of indigenous and non-indigenous organizations. At the same time, the MAS has used classical populist strategies, such as denouncing the traditional parties, market-oriented policies, and foreign intervention, to win the support of both indigenous and non-indigenous voters. This strategy have enabled the MAS to stitch together a coalition of indigenous voters, poor people, union activists, the politically disenchanted, and people with leftist, statist, and nationalist views. A multinomial logit analysis of survey data from the 2002 election provides support for these arguments.

Latin America had long been the one region in the world without major ethnic parties. In recent years, however, important parties that are based to varying degrees in the indigenous population have emerged in the region. The most successful of these movements have been ethno-populist parties—that is, parties that combine an inclusive ethnic appeal with a traditional populist platform. Ethno-populist parties and leaders have won significant legislative or presidential victories in several of the Andean countries in the last few years. In Bolivia, for example, Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) won a resounding victory in the 2005 presidential elections. In Ecuador, Pachakutik helped elect Lucio Gutiérrez president in 2002, although the party subsequently broke with his administration. Finally, in Peru, an ethno-populist leader, Ollanta Humala, won a surprising victory in the first round of the presidential elections in 2006 before losing narrowly in the second round.

What explains the rise of ethno-populist parties in Latin America? Why have these parties been more successful than traditional ethnic parties? And why has this new breed of populist parties developed a decidedly ethnic appeal?

The existing literature on ethnic parties and populism cannot account for the emergence and development of ethno-populist parties. The literature on populism has stressed that populist movements emerge in the cities and rely on the urban working class as their main base of support, although they usually incorporate other classes as well (Conniff 1999; Drake 1978; Ianni 1975; Weyland 2001). Some of the populism literature has also located populism within a particular historical epoch in Latin America, namely

the 1930 through the 1960s, when socio-economic modernization, import-substitution industrialization and political liberalization made the construction of populist coalitions feasible (Germani 1974; O'Donnell 1979; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Collier and Collier 1991; Weyland 2001). The ethno-populist movements, however, have emerged from rural areas in the last decade, and their core of support is the indigenous peasantry, although they have won numerous followers in urban areas as well.

Much of the literature on ethnic parties, meanwhile, has suggested that ethnic parties will rely on a single ethnic group for support. According to this literature, ethnic parties will use exclusionary communal appeals to mobilize members of their own ethnic group on the party's behalf, rather than reaching out to members of other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2002). The ethno-populist movements in Latin America, however, have built multi-ethnic coalitions by avoiding exclusionary rhetoric, developing an inclusive populist platform, and forming alliances with organizations dominated by members of other ethnic groups.

Another scholarly literature, the indigenous politics literature, has generated important insights into why powerful indigenous movements have arisen in some Latin American countries in recent years, but this literature has not typically sought to explain why some of these movements have transformed themselves into parties or achieved electoral success (Yashar 2005; Maybury-Lewis 2002; Warren and Jackson 2002). One notable exception is the work of Van Cott (2003 and 2005), which argues that institutional reforms and the maturation of the indigenous movement helped foster the

rise of indigenous parties in Latin America.[1] As we shall see, however, neither of these factors played an important role in the rise of the MAS in Bolivia. To the contrary, this study argues that the MAS and other ethno-populist parties have succeeded in large part because they broadened their base beyond the indigenous movement and developed an inclusive cross-ethnic appeal based in large part on populist rhetoric and platforms. This cross-ethnic appeal was feasible in Latin America because ethnic relations in the region are not polarized and ethnic identities tend to be ambiguous and fluid.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section defines ethno-populism and discusses why ethno-populist parties and leaders have achieved electoral success in recent years. The second section examines the rise of the most important ethno-populist movement to date, the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia. I argue that the MAS has achieved electoral success in recent years in large part because it has been able to build an ethno-populist coalition of indians, poor people, the politically disenchanted, sub-altern organizational activists, and left-of-center (especially, statist and nationalist) voters. The third section tests these arguments with a multinomial logit analysis of survey data from the 2002 Bolivian elections. The conclusion discusses whether ethno-populist movements, such as the MAS, are likely to meet the same fate as traditional populist movements. I suggest that the rural indigenous core of the ethno-populist movements may prove to be more durable than the volatile urban bases of traditional populist movements.

[1] Van Cott (2005) also attributes the success of certain indigenous parties to a number of other factors, especially the weakness or disintegration of the left in Latin America.

Understanding the appeal of ethno-populism

Figure 1 illustrates how ethno-populist, ethnic, populist, and class-based parties differ on a couple of key dimensions: the degree to which they make ethnic appeals; and the degree to which they are inclusive. Like ethnic parties (and unlike populist or class-based parties), ethno-populist parties develop a clear ethnic appeal. In their platforms and rhetoric, ethno-populist parties emphasize the demands of a single ethnic group and they often use cultural or political symbols associated with that group. However, unlike ethnic parties, ethno-populist parties are inclusive. Whereas ethnic parties have often used exclusionary rhetoric and platforms, ethno-populist parties have sought to appeal to a variety of different ethnic groups. Thus, they have eschewed exclusionary rhetoric, developed broad-based platforms, and recruited leaders and candidates from a range of different ethnic groups. Just as traditional populist movements reached out to the middle classes, the peasantry, and the industrial bourgeoisie to supplement their main base of support among the urban working class, ethno-populist movements have sought to recruit supporters among the white, *mestizo* and indigenous people in urban and rural areas, while still depending heavily on their rural indigenous core.

Much of the literature on ethnic parties suggests that an ethnic party cannot win the support of voters who belong to ethnic groups other than the ones that the ethnic party was established to represent. The leaders of ethnic parties therefore focus on mobilizing members of their own group rather than developing broader appeals. They do so by exaggerating the threat posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting

exclusionary rhetoric and platforms (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2002). Thus, ethnic parties take increasingly extreme positions (at least on ethnic issues) rather than moving to the center to attract the median voter. This leads elections to become polarized along ethnic lines. In some cases, elections become so polarized that they resemble ethnic censuses in which each ethnic party's vote corresponds roughly to each ethnic group's share of the population (Horowitz 1985: 526-530).

This literature assumes that ethnic parties cannot attract votes from members of other ethnic groups because ethnic polarization is high and the boundaries dividing ethnic groups are clear and relatively stable. In Latin America, however, ethnic polarization has traditionally been low and ethnic identification tends to be ambiguous and fluid in part because of widespread *mestizaje* or miscegenation. The ethnic boundaries between indigenous people and *mestizos* (as well as between *mestizos* and whites), for example, are notably unclear and porous. Moreover, because of social discrimination against indigenous people, many Latin Americans who are mostly or fully of indigenous descent do not usually identify as indigenous, preferring to identify themselves as *mestizos* under most circumstances. Many of these people nevertheless respect certain indigenous traditions and sympathize with some of the demands of the indigenous movement.

An inclusive indigenous movement in Latin America thus has the potential to win votes not only from self-identified indigenous people, but also from the many *mestizos* who feel some identification with indigenous people and sympathize with some of their

demands (Madrid 2005a). Moreover, given the low levels of ethnic polarization prevailing in Latin America, inclusive indigenous parties may even attract some votes from whites or other non-indigenous people who sympathize with their party platforms. Exclusionary indigenous parties, by contrast, are unlikely to win support either from *mestizos* or from whites. Even many self-identified indigenous people will find these parties' exclusionary rhetoric and platforms too much to stomach, given the traditionally low levels of ethnic polarization in Latin American society. Moreover, in many Latin American countries, the indigenous population is itself divided along regional or ethno-linguistic lines, and exclusionary indigenous parties may have a difficult times uniting these disparate communities. Exclusionary indigenous parties in Latin America thus have a much lower ceiling of potential supporters than do more inclusive parties. In Latin America, then, it is not just feasible for an indigenous party or movement to be inclusive; it is the most rational electoral strategy to pursue.

In order to attract supporters from a variety of different ethnic groups, however, inclusive indigenous parties have had to develop an appeal that extends beyond indigenous issues. The most successful indigenous parties, the ethno-populist parties, have formulated a broad populist appeal that has capitalized on growing disenchantment with existing political parties and the neoliberal economic model. Ethno-populists have criticized the traditional parties as corrupt, ineffective, and clientelistic institutions that serve only the interests of the elites, and they have presented themselves as honest, grassroots, and democratic alternatives. They have denounced the market-oriented economic policies that have been widely implemented in Latin America during the last

two decades, arguing that these policies have only enriched foreign corporations and domestic elites, while worsening poverty and inequality.

Ethno-populist parties thus resemble traditional populist parties in that they tend to be anti-elitist, highly nationalist, and supportive of state intervention in the economy.[2] Their appeal lies principally with the subaltern sectors, but like the traditional populist parties they also draw support from certain middle class sectors of the population. Ethno-populist parties differ from traditional populist parties not only in that they have developed a clear ethnic appeal, but also in that their base tends to be in rural areas. As a result, their platforms tend to emphasize the demands of the rural poor, such as agrarian reform, local autonomy and water rights. The ethno-populist parties owe their success to their ability to fuse traditional populist constituencies to their rural, largely indigenous base.

The remainder of this paper examines the causes of the rise of the most successful ethno-populist party to date: the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia. In 2002, the MAS and its presidential candidate, Evo Morales, stunned observers by finishing second in the presidential elections with 21 percent of the vote. Morales and the MAS followed up this surprising performance by winning an unprecedented 54 percent of the vote in the December 2005 presidential elections, making Morales the first indigenous president in the history of Latin America. As we shall see, the success of the MAS was in large part due to the party's inclusive ethno-populist appeal. The MAS'

[2] Ethnopopulist parties also resemble classical populist parties in that they tend to be weakly institutionalized, and are often dominated by a single, charismatic leader.

criticism of the traditional parties and elites, its denunciations of market reforms and foreign intervention in Bolivia, and its inclusive pro-indigenous rhetoric attracted supporters not only among the indigenous population, but also among leftists, statists, nationalists, the politically disenchanted, subaltern organizational activists and poor people more generally.

Existing explanations

Some studies of the MAS have attributed the party's rapid growth in part to the institutional reforms that Bolivia carried out in the 1990s. Van Cott (2003a: 756), for example, maintains that Bolivia's PR system, which used large multi-member districts, "made it difficult for geographically-concentrated indigenous movements to win enough votes nationwide to gain national office." She and others have argued that Bolivia's constitutional reform of 1994 facilitated the rise of the MAS by creating smaller single-member districts for elections to one tier of the lower chamber of the legislature (Van Cott 2003a and 2005; Collins 2004; Stefanoni 2004: 22; interview with Lazarte 2004). This explanation is unconvincing, however, because the MAS or its predecessor would have won approximately the same number of seats in 1997 and 2002 if Bolivia had retained the previous proportional representation system.[3] Indeed, the German-style mixed system that Bolivia adopted was designed to achieve proportionality by using the PR tier to offset any disproportionality created by the outcomes of the races in the single-member districts.

[3] For example, the 17 percent of the vote that the MAS earned in the department of Cochabamba in the 1997 elections would have earned it three legislative seats under the old system, as opposed to the four seats that it won under the new system.

Another institutional explanation for the rise of the MAS has focused on the decentralization process Bolivia underwent in the mid-1990s. The 1994 Law of Popular Participation created 311 municipalities nationwide—previously there had been only a few dozen, mostly urban municipalities—and called for elections to be held for mayoral and council member positions throughout the country. Some scholars have argued that this law enabled the MAS to gain a foothold at the local level, which its members could use as a stepping stone for national offices (Andolina 1998: 240; Van Cott 2003a, 2003b, and forthcoming; Collins 2004; Urioste 2004: 345-46; interviews with Rivera 2004 and Torrico 2004). In the 1995 elections, the predecessor of the MAS won 11 mayoralties and 60 municipal council seats which, it is argued, provided the fledgling party with leadership experience and access to resources that would prove helpful to the party in subsequent elections. This explanation for the rise of the MAS is also problematic, however. To begin with, the municipal electoral victories of the MAS and its predecessor in 1995 and 1999 were confined largely to the department of Cochabamba (Rojas Ortuste 2000). It therefore seems unlikely that the MAS' strong electoral performance outside of Cochabamba in the 2002 elections could be explained by the resources, experience or reputations won by the party's mayors. Moreover, there is no evidence that the MAS has performed better in those municipalities where it has elected mayors or council members. To the contrary, between 1997 and 2002, the MAS increased its share of the total vote by a much smaller margin in those municipalities where it had elected mayors in 1995 than in those municipalities where it did not control the mayoralty—the MAS boosted its vote

by 13 percentage points in the former municipalities and 19 points in the latter.[4] Thus, it does not appear that either the decentralization law or the shift to a mixed electoral system can explain the rapid rise of the MAS.

Another explanation for the rise of the MAS focuses on the indigenous movement that gave birth to it. Van Cott (2003a: 753), for example, maintains that "the most important sociopolitical change [leading to the success of the MAS in 2002] was the maturity and institutional consolidation of indigenous and peasant social movement organizations following 20 years of mobilization that intensified in 2000." Certainly, the MAS has depended heavily on the largely indigenous coca growers' unions from whence it sprang in the mid-1990s. The coca grower unions, and other indigenous organizations, have provided the MAS with leaders, activists, and a modicum of material resources that they have used in their campaigns. The coca unions' dense network of supporters helped the new party rack up impressive victories in rural areas of Cochabamba during the 1995 and 1999 municipal elections as well as the 1997 general elections, but these unions had little influence outside this region. The coca grower unions did gain control of the Bolivian confederation of peasant unions, the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), in the early 1990s, but these unions were not able to deliver many votes outside of Cochabamba either. Indeed, in the 1999 municipal elections, the MAS won 7.8 percent of the vote in Cochabamba, but less than 2.4 percent in the rest of the country (Rojas Ortuste 2000: 103-112). Thus, at the

[4] During the same period, the MAS increased its share of the vote by a slightly smaller margin (18 as opposed to 19 percentage points) in those municipalities where it had elected council members in 1995 than in those where it had not elected any.

beginning of the new millennium, the MAS was still a minor regional party that relied heavily on its base within the coca growers' unions in Cochabamba.

There is no evidence that the indigenous movement changed significantly between 1999 and 2002 in a way that could explain the dramatic increase in the votes for the MAS. By 1999, the indigenous movement was already quite strong, but it was divided and it remained so in 2002.[5] Indeed, important indigenous leaders, such as Felipe Quispe and Alejo Véliz, did not support Morales and the MAS in the 2002 elections, but rather ran on the tickets of other parties and used the indigenous organizations they controlled to support their campaigns. What changed between the 1999 and 2002 elections was not the indigenous movement, but rather the appeal of the MAS outside of the indigenous movement. The MAS succeeded where other indigenous parties failed precisely because it became much more than just an indigenous party. Whereas previous indigenous parties had drawn their leadership and support almost exclusively from the Aymara population, the MAS built a much broader base, recruiting *mestizo* and white as well as indigenous candidates and forging alliances with a variety of different kinds of organizations.

An inclusive indigenous appeal

The main base of support for the MAS, even in recent years, has been the indigenous population. The MAS attracted indigenous voters for a number of reasons.

[5] Felipe Quispe, for example, has been the official president of the CSUTCB since 1998, although a dissident faction of the CSUTCB has remained in the hands of allies of Morales.

First, in contrast to the traditional parties, much of the MAS' leadership, including Evo Morales, was indigenous as were many of the party's candidates for the legislature. Second, the MAS had close ties to numerous indigenous organizations. Indeed, the MAS received the support of the lowlands' indigenous federations, the CIDOB and the CPESC, as well as the majority of the highlands indigenous organizations, including the sectors of the main peasant federation, the Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), that were not controlled by Felipe Quispe. Third, the MAS made numerous rhetorical and symbolic appeals to the indigenous population. The leaders of the MAS frequently spoke in indigenous languages, used indigenous clothing and banners, and trumpeted the achievements of indigenous civilizations. Fourth and finally, the platform of the MAS embraced many traditional indigenous demands from agrarian reform and indigenous autonomy to bilingual education and the end to coca eradication programs.

The MAS also took important steps to win the support of non-indigenous people, however. The leaders of the MAS avoided exclusionary rhetoric that might have alienated *mestizos* and whites and emphasized that the party was open to all peoples. In a 2004 interview with the author, Dionisio Nuñez, a legislator from the MAS, explained that initially the party was dominated by indigenous people but:

> "in the end we came to understand that we didn't want to go from being excluded to excluding others, that we had to include more people, business people, the middle classes…Originally, there were three peasant

organizations that founded the MAS. Two years ago, the reformulation of the MAS began…The MAS ceased to be solely indigenous and peasant. ”

In order to attract non-indigenous voters, the MAS recruited many white and *mestizo* candidates, including the party's vice presidential candidates in 2002 (Antonio Peredo) and 2005 (Alvaro García Linera). By some estimates, approximately one-half of the MAS legislators elected in 2002 were white or *mestizo* (Van Cott 2005: 88). The MAS also established ties with numerous organizations dominated by *mestizos,* including labor unions, professional associations, industrial federations, and organizations of teachers, small businessmen, adjudicators, truck drivers, and the self-employed. These allied organizations provided the MAS with human and material resources from activists to transportation and food and gave the MAS an organizational base outside of the indigenous movement, outside of rural areas and outside of the Department of Cochabamba.

The MAS' inclusive strategy made sense because the low levels of ethnic polarization and the fluidity of ethnic boundaries in Bolivia made it feasible for an indigenous party to win non-indigenous votes. Moreover, the party needed to win non-indigenous votes if it were to become a majority party since, according to various surveys, the vast majority of Bolivians do not self-identify as indigenous, or at least do not do so consistently (Madrid 2005b; PNUD 2004; Seligson 2002; Rojas and Verdesoto 1997).[6] Although indigenous leaders suggest that two-thirds or more of the Bolivian

[6] The 2001 census in Bolivia reported that approximately 62 percent of the Bolivian population self-identified as indigenous, but the census did not allow respondents to identify themselves as *mestizo.*

population are indigenous, most Bolivians prefer to identify themselves as *mestizo*, in part because of discrimination against the indigenous population. Indeed, in the 2002 LAPOP survey, 65 percent of respondents self-identified as *mestizo*, and only 11 percent of the respondents self-identified as indigenous. Many of these self-identified *mestizos*, however, have indigenous features, maintain indigenous traditions, and speak indigenous languages, which have led some scholars to refer to them as "indigenous *mestizos*" (de la Cadena 2000; PNUD 2004). These indigenous *mestizos* represented a natural constituency for the MAS since many of them would have presumably experienced the discrimination and social exclusion that the MAS has sought to address, but they would not be receptive to exclusionary ethnic appeals owing to their ambiguous ethnic identification.

Evo Morales was in some ways an ideal candidate for a party that sought to appeal to various Bolivian indigenous groups as well as to *mestizos*. Morales was of Aymara descent, but he had lived for a long time in a predominantly Quechua area, he spoke Quechua as well as Aymara and he headed unions that consisted mostly of Quechua speakers. Thus, he could appeal to the Quechua as well as the Aymara, which are the two main indigenous groups in Bolivia. In addition, Evo Morales had many characteristics typical of a Bolivian *mestizo*, including a preference for speaking in Spanish rather than indigenous languages.

Instead, respondents were asked if they were Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Chiquitano, Mojeno, some other native group, or none of the above.

Not surprisingly, Morales and the MAS have been successful in attracting votes from members of different ethnic groups. As **Table 2** indicates, the MAS fared well with Quechua-speaking voters as well as with the Aymara-speaking population in the 2002 elections. People who self-identified as indigenous or spoke indigenous languages at home in their childhood were much more likely to vote for the MAS, but the MAS also won numerous votes from other sectors of the population. According to the 2002 LAPOP survey, 67 percent of the people who reported voting for the MAS self-identified as *mestizo,* whereas only 22 percent self-identified as indigenous, and less than 9 percent self-identified as white. Many of the self-identified *mestizos,* however, had strong indigenous roots. Indeed, according to the same LAPOP survey, 69 percent of the people who reported voting for the MAS, including two-thirds of the MAS voters who self-identified as *mestizo,* had grown up in a household where an indigenous language was spoken**.** Approximately one-quarter of the MAS' supporters, however, neither self-identified as indigenous, nor grew up in a home where indigenous languages were spoken. As we shall see, many of these people were drawn to the MAS by its populist rhetoric and platform.

Previous indigenous parties in Bolivia, by contrast, had never managed to attract voters outside of the Aymara areas. Some of the leaders of these indigenous parties, such as Luciano Tapia of the Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA) and, more recently, Felipe Quispe of the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP), adopted highly exclusionary rhetoric. Quispe frequently denounced the qa'aras [whites], saying, for example, that "they wanted to bathe themselves in indigenous blood" (author interview 2004). Such

rhetoric alienated non-indigenous as well as many indigenous voters. Indeed, Quispe's brand of Aymara nationalism alienated not only the non-indigenous population, but the Quechua population as well, and, as a result, his party never managed to obtain a significant number of votes outside Aymara-speaking areas. Moreover, other parties and leaders declined to respond to Quispe's rhetoric with similar communal appeals, thus preventing the emergence of an outbidding process similar to that which has gone on in some other regions with ethnic parties.

The leaders of some other indigenous parties, such as Victor Hugo Cárdenas of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL), Macabeo Chila of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari (MRTK), or Genaro Flores of the Frente Único de Liberación Katarista (FULKA), typically eschewed such exclusionary rhetoric, but even these leaders and parties largely failed to reach out to non-indigenous voters by recruiting large numbers of non-indigenous candidates or establishing an organizational presence in non-indigenous areas. Some of the more inclusive indigenous parties did form alliances with traditional parties—the MRTKL, for example, allied with the MNR in the 1993 elections, which led Cárdenas to be elected vice president--but the traditional parties clearly dominated these alliances and the pacts tended to result in the cooptation and subordination of the indigenous parties (Ticona, Rojas, Albó 1995: pp. 121-156). None of these parties, commonly referred to as Katarista parties, managed to win more than 3 percent of the vote, and they typically disappeared after one or two elections.

Prior to the MAS, the only Bolivian party that had successfully developed an ethno-populist appeal was Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA). CONDEPA was not precisely an indigenous party—its founder, Carlos Palenque, and many of its top leaders were *mestizos*—but it adopted many indigenous demands and cultural symbols and it recruited some indigenous candidates. CONDEPA, like MAS, criticized the traditional parties and the market-oriented policies they implemented. The party's ethno-populist profile attracted many indigenous and *mestizo* supporters and it fared relatively well in elections from 1989 to 1997, winning between 12 and 17 percent of the vote. CONDEPA, like the Katarista parties, never managed to develop a following or an organizational base outside of Aymara-speaking areas, however. Moreover, the death of Palenque in 1995 caused serious leadership problems for CONDEPA. Riven by disputes and criticized by many of its former supporters for briefly joining the right-wing Banzer government, the party's fortunes declined precipitously after 1997. Thus, by the 2002 elections, the MAS was the only significant party making an inclusive ethnic appeal.

A populist appeal

Crucial to the success of the MAS was its embrace of traditional populist policies, rhetoric, and organizational ties. Like traditional populist parties, the MAS denounced existing political elites and institutions, attracting the support of many politically disenchanted voters. The MAS's highly statist and nationalist platform also attracted many voters who had traditionally supported populist or leftist parties. The MAS, as we have seen, also gradually developed ties with many of the same sub-altern organizations--

such as labor unions and peasant associations--that had traditionally provided support to populist and leftist parties in Bolivia. These organizations provided financing, leadership and votes for the ethno-populist party. Indeed, in the 2002 LAPOP survey, more than 27 percent of the MAS' supporters reported attending union meetings sometimes or frequently, and almost 39 percent of the party's supporters participated sometimes or frequently in the meetings of trade associations. The party's populist platform, candidates, and grassroots organizational ties have particularly appealed to the poor. According to the 2002 LAPOP survey, 52.1 percent of MAS' supporters reported a monthly income of less than 500 Bolivianos, as opposed to only 38.9 percent of the supporters of other parties.[7]

The success of Morales and the MAS was made possible in large part by growing disenchantment with the traditional parties, specifically, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) and the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) (Bohrt Irahola 2002; Romero Ballivián 2002; Van Cott 2003a; Mayorga 2006). Between 1985 and 2003, Bolivia maintained what has become known as a system of pacted democracy in which the three traditional parties took turns in governing the country, usually in alliance with each other and younger parties, such as CONDEPA and the Unión Cívica Solidaridad (UCS). The failure of these parties to bring significant socio-economic progress or social peace to Bolivia gradually undermined their support, however. By late 2001, almost half of the

[7] Like many populist parties, the MAS has also relied to a large degree on the charismatic and tireless leadership of the party's *caudillo*, in this case Evo Morales, to win over the electorate. Not surprisingly, Morales has consistently fared better than the party as a whole in general elections. In 2005, for example, Morales won a larger share of the votes than did the MAS' candidates in the prefectural elections in every department.

population said that parties were not necessary for democracy as opposed to only 17 percent in 1993 (Calderón and Gamarra 2004: 17). A survey carried out shortly after the elections in mid-2002 found that less than 28.7 percent of the population trusted parties and by 2004 this figure had fallen to 23.4 percent, making parties the least trusted institution in Bolivia in that year (Seligson 2004: 102). The declining confidence in the parties was also noticeable in the electoral arena. After 1989, the three main parties, the MNR, the ADN and the MIR, steadily lost ground. Whereas in 1989 these three parties accounted for 65.3 percent of all votes cast, by 2002 they accounted for just 39.0 percent. By the 2005 elections the traditional parties were in such disrepute that only the MNR presented a candidate in the presidential elections and it won a mere 6 percent of the votes cast. However, Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS), an electoral grouping led by former ADN president Jorge Quiroga and other current or former members of the traditional parties, won 26.5 percent of the vote.

The MAS was in a good position to take advantage of disenchantment with the traditional parties because of its outsider status. Unlike most of the other parties, the MAS never participated in the various coalition governments. To the contrary, the MAS consistently criticized the ruling parties and their policies, and it participated in numerous social protests against them, ranging from marches and demonstrations to roadblocks. The MAS also differed from the traditional parties in that it had no party bureaucracy to speak of, and its candidates were typically social movement leaders rather than politicians. Indeed, the MAS was hardly a political party at all, but rather a collection of numerous social organizations. The MAS thus had strong outsider credentials, which

helped it to capture the support of those voters who were fed up with the traditional parties and political elites. Not surprisingly, the MAS fared particularly well in those areas of the country where electoral volatility had been highest—electoral volatility is one sign of disenchantment with the existing parties—as well as in regions that traditionally had low rates of voter turnout, and high levels of blank and null ballots. In 2002, the MAS won 37.4 percent of the vote in those municipalities with above average volatility between 1985 and 1997 and only 14.8 percent in municipalities with below average volatility. It won 34.5 percent of the vote in municipalities with above average levels of blank and null ballots, but only 16.1 percent of the vote in other municipalities. Survey data also show that the MAS drew heavily from the ranks of the politically disaffected. As Table 1 indicates, MAS supporters tended to have less confidence in political parties, and more negative assessments about the performance of the government. In the 2002 LAPOP survey, 38.8 percent of the respondents who reported voting for the MAS said that they had no trust in parties at all as opposed to 27.2 of the respondents who reported voting for other parties. The same survey found that 22.5 percent of MAS supporters evaluated the outgoing Quiroga administration, as bad or very bad, as opposed to only 10.3 percent of the people who voted for other parties.

The MAS was also aided by growing disenchantment with neoliberal reforms. Beginning in 1985, successive Bolivian governments had implemented sweeping market-oriented reforms, ranging from the elimination of subsidies, credits, and price controls to trade liberalization and the privatization of state-owned companies. These measures initially generated some significant benefits, bringing an end to the hyper-inflationary

crisis that ravaged Bolivia in the early 1980s. By the late 1990s, however, Bolivia was experiencing serious economic problems again. Between 1998 and 2002, gross domestic product per capita in Bolivia declined significantly, and poverty and unemployment grew (PNUD 2004: 68). As a result, disenchantment with the government's economic policies had risen considerably by the 2002 elections. The MAS capitalized on this disenchantment by denouncing the neoliberal policies, and proposing state interventionist policies, including the recuperation of privatized companies, in order to redistribute income and generate an economic recovery. It drew its support heavily from the ranks of the economically disaffected. Indeed, in the 2002 LAPOP survey, 67.4 percent of the respondents who reported voting for the MAS rated the performance of the economy as bad or very bad.

In opposing neoliberal policies, the MAS often appealed to nationalist sentiments. For example, in its 2002 governing program, the MAS (2002: 9) declared:

> "The neoliberal parties such as the MNR, ADN, MIR, MBL, UCS, NFR, CONDEPA and other small groupings of their corrupt circle, are characterized by the submission and betrayal of the country, by the handing over of the national patrimony almost without charge to the voraciousness of international capital and its directors, who impose conditions of poverty on the legitimate owners of natural resources."

The MAS made control over Bolivia's considerable natural gas deposits a centerpiece of its campaign, particularly in the 2005 elections. It helped block President Sánchez de Lozada's plan to export gas through Chile, and then pressed the ensuing government of Carlos Mesa to renegotiate its contracts with the foreign firms that exported the gas. After being elected president, Morales went so far as to seize control of the natural gas fields and demand that the foreign firms pay a higher share of their profits to the state. These moves proved quite popular. President Morales' public approval ratings soared by 13 points to 81 percent in the wake of his takeover of the gas fields (*Latin American Weekly Report* May 23, 2006: 16).

The MAS also appealed to nationalist sentiments in opposing the coca eradication program that the Bolivian government expanded in the late 1990s with the support of the U.S. government. The MAS' 2002 governing program, for example, vowed that "we will defend our national territory against all forms of North American penetration, and our producers of coca leaves against the criminal repression by mercenary forces paid by U.S. organisms" (MAS 2002: 16). This nationalist appeal also proved relatively successful. Moreover, the MAS was given an important boost in the final days of the 2002 campaign when the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, warned Bolivians against voting for Morales, stating that: "The Bolivian electorate must take into account the consequences for the future of Bolivia if they elect leaders linked, by one form or another, with narco-trafficking and terrorism." In the wake of this declaration, which many Bolivians viewed as inappropriate interference in their internal affairs, Morales'

support went up by five points in surveys taken in the principal cities of the country (Ballivián Romero 2003: 251).

The party's statist and nationalist appeals thus won over many voters, particularly left-of-center voters who felt abandoned by the traditional parties' embrace of the United States and neoliberal reforms (Romero Ballivián 2002: 191; Seligson 2004; Van Cott 2005). The MAS, moreover, aggressively courted this left-of-center constituency, recruiting well-known leftists to serve as candidates for the vice presidency and the legislature and developing a traditional left-wing platform in many areas (Zegada Claure 2002: 51; Patzi Paco 2004; Van Cott 2005). Not surprisingly, the MAS fared much better in 2002 in those municipalities that had traditionally supported left-wing parties and candidates, winning 35.1 percent of the vote in municipalities that had above average levels of support for the left between 1985 and 1997, as opposed to only 15.0 percent in municipalities that had traditionally below average levels of support for left wing parties. According to the 2002 LAPOP survey, 48.0 percent of MAS voters identified themselves as being on the left or center-left (1-4 on a ten point left-right scale), 38.8 percent identified with the center (5-6 on the scale), and only 13.2 percent with the right or center-right (7-10 on the scale).[8] The same survey showed that the MAS took votes principally away from the MIR, a traditionally left-wing party that had shifted to the center after 1989 and was part of the center-right governing coalition from 1997 to 2002. Indeed, 39.5 percent of MAS' 2002 supporters reported voting for the MIR in the 1997

[8] In this survey, 29 percent of the overall population placed themselves on the left or center-left of the political spectrum (1-4 on a ten point left-right scale).

elections, whereas only 20.1 percent recalled voting for the ADN and 16.3 percent reported voting for the MNR.[9]

The MAS was not the only party to make populist appeals in the 2002 or the 2005 elections. The Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), headed by Manfred Reyes Villa, also managed to win a great deal of support with its criticisms of the traditional parties and their program of neoliberal reforms. Reyes Villa and the NFR soared to an early lead in the opinion polls in 2002, but lost ground steadily during the last weeks of the campaign and ended up finishing third in the election, a bare tenth of a percentage point behind Morales and the MAS and less than two percentage points behind the winner Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR (Gálvez Vera 2002). The NFR subsequently joined the MNR-led government, which undermined the party's populist credentials and hurt it badly once the Sánchez de Lozada government foundered. In the 2005 presidential elections, the party won less than one percent of the total vote, although Reyes Villa was elected prefect of the department of Cochabamba. Other populist candidates and parties fared considerably worse. None of these parties or candidates had the MAS' grassroots and anti-establishment credentials or Morales' personal appeal, with the possible exception of Felipe Quispe and the MIP. Quispe's exclusionary rhetoric, however, ultimately turned off many more voters than it attracted.

[9] Many of the respondents could not remember which party they voted for or were ineligible to vote in the 1997 elections. Others remembered inaccurately. Indeed, many more respondents recalled voting for the three traditional parties, the MIR, the ADN, and especially, the MNR, than presumably did vote for these parties, given the national-level results. Nevertheless, municipal-level electoral data also support the notion that the MAS drew votes principally away from the MIR. Indeed, the change in the vote for the MAS at the municipal level is highly negatively correlated with the change in the vote for the MIR—more than with any other party.

A quantitative analysis of the MAS vote

In the preceding sections, I have argued that the MAS' success in the 2002 elections was based on its ethno-populist appeal. More specifically, I have sought to show how the MAS built an electoral coalition of indigenous and poor people, sub-altern organizational activists, politically disenchanted voters, and people with left-of-center nationalist and state interventionist views. In this section, I test these arguments by carrying out a multinomial logistic regression analysis of the determinants of the vote for the MAS in 2002, using the survey carried out by LAPOP shortly after the election. As with most post-election surveys, this survey overestimated the percentage of the population that reported voting for the winner of the election, the MNR in this case, and underestimated the percentage of the population that reported voting for the other parties.[10]

Table 3 describes the variables that were included in the analysis and their predicted effects on voting for the MAS. None of these variables were correlated with each other at above the .3 level. Indigenous status was measured using four dummy variables that record whether the respondent: 1) self-identified as indigenous; 2) spoke Quechua at home as a child; 3) spoke Aymara at home as a child; or 4) spoke another indigenous language at home. I expected all four of these variables to be correlated with self-reported voting for the MAS. Socio-economic status was measured by monthly

[10] The survey underestimated the MAS' vote by a somewhat larger amount than the third and fourth place parties: the NFR and the MIR. Approximately 13.9 percent of voters responding in the national sample reported voting for the MAS, but the MAS actually received 19.4 percent of the vote.

income, which I expected to be negatively correlated with support for the MAS.[11] Participation in subaltern organizations was measured through two variables attendance at meetings of labor union and meetings of trade associations—the latter included organizations of peasants, professionals, businesspersons, and producers. I expected these variables, which were measured on a four point scale with 4 representing frequent participation, to be positively correlated with support for the MAS. Political disenchantment was measured through three questions: 1) self-reported trust in political parties measured on a 1-7 scale with 1 representing no trust; 2) an assessment of governmental performance on a 1-5 scale with 1 representing a very bad assessment; and 3) an evaluation of the economy on a similar five point scale. I expected each of these variables to be negatively correlated with self-reported voting for the MAS. Unfortunately, the survey did not include questions about support for state intervention in the economy or opposition to market-oriented policies; nor did it contain questions about nationalist views or opposition to foreign intervention in Bolivia. The survey did, however, include a question that asked respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right), which I expected to be negatively correlated with support for the MAS. Given that the left in Bolivia has traditionally been very supportive of state intervention in the economy and hostile to the United States, I would expect this variable to be highly (negatively) correlated with nationalist and state interventionist views and it should therefore serve as an acceptable proxy variable.

[11] I did not include a variable measuring education level because this variable was correlated with monthly income at a relatively high level (r=.48).

I also added a number of control variables to the analysis. These included a dichotomous variable that measured whether a respondent came from one of the highlands departments (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, or Potosí), and a variable measuring the level of urbanization on a four point scale with 4 representing the most urbanized areas (locales with over 20,000 residents). I expected the highlands variable to be positively correlated with support for the MAS and the urbanization variable to be negatively correlated with it. Finally, I included control variables for gender and age. Further information on the survey and the specific wording of the questions can be found in Seligson (2003).

Because the 2002 Bolivian elections included 11 parties, I modeled the determinants of voter choice using a multinomial logit model with the MAS as the base category. **Table 4** presents the results for comparisons between the MAS and the three other main parties. Each parameter estimate in Model 1 represents the predicted marginal effect of the variable in question on the log-odds ratio of voting for the MNR versus the MAS; Model 2 compares the MIR to the MAS; and Model 3 compares the NFR to the MAS.

As the table indicates, self-identification as indigenous had the expected sign in all three models, but it was only a statistically significant determinant of the probability of voting for the MAS in Models 1 and 2 (MNR/MAS and MIR/MAS). To examine what effect indigenous self-identification had on the probability of voting for the MAS, I carried out a simulation using Clarify. The simulation found that people who self-identify

as indigenous had a 17 percent probability of voting for the MAS when all other variables are held at their means, whereas people who did not self-identify had less than an 11 percent likelihood of voting for the MAS. The variable measuring whether the respondent grew up in a household where a lowlands indigenous language was spoken also had the expected sign, but was only statistically significant in model 2 (MIR/MAS). However, the variables measuring whether the respondent grew up in a household where Aymara or Quechua was spoken were negative and statistically significant in all three models. This indicates that people who reported growing up in a household where Aymara or Quechua was spoken were significantly more likely to have supported the MAS than any of the other major parties in 2002. The substantive effects of growing up in an Aymara or Quechua speaking household are relatively strong, as a simulation using Clarify indicates. Holding all other variables at their means, Aymara speakers had a 23 percent probability of voting for the MAS, Quechua speakers had a more than 18 percent probability of voting for the MAS, and people who spoke neither Aymara nor Quechua had only an 8 percent probability of doing so. These findings suggest that the MAS succeeded in attracting many voters with indigenous backgrounds, including many who do not self-identify as indigenous. I have suggested that this success was due in large part to the MAS' inclusive ethno-populist appeal. If the MAS had adopted more exclusionary rhetoric, it might (or might not) have fared better among people who self-identified as indigenous, but it probably would have fared worse among the much larger category of people with indigenous backgrounds who self-identify as *mestizo*.

The findings also provide some support for the hypothesis that the MAS has fared particularly well among the poor. Monthly income has the expected sign and is statistically significant in two out of the three models. The exception is model 2 (MIR/MAS), where it falls below conventional levels of statistical significance, no doubt, because the MIR has also traditionally drawn a lot of support from the poorer sectors of the population. **Figure 1** shows a simulation of the effect of income on the likelihood of voting for the MAS—the downward sloping vertical line represents the predicted probability of voting for the MAS at different levels of income and the vertical lines in the figure represent the 95% confidence interval of each estimate.[12] People in the lowest income category have an 18 percent probability of voting for the MAS holding all other variables at their means, while people in the highest income category have less than a 5 percent probability of doing so.

The ideology variable also has the expected sign and is statistically significant in two out of the three models, indicating that left-wing voters tended to support the MAS. The exception once again is model 2 (MIR/MAS), where the coefficient has the opposite sign than what was predicted, although it is not statistically significant. This is not terribly surprising, however, considering that the MIR was traditionally a left-wing party, and retained the support of many people on the left, even after it shifted to the center in the late 1980s. The effect of ideology on the probability of voting for the MAS is even stronger than income. As **Figure 2** indicates, holding all other variables at their means, there is a 20 percent probability that people who identify with the farthest left-wing

[12] Figures 1-4 were made using Clarify software. See Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003.

category would vote for the MAS, while there is only a four percent likelihood that some one in the farthest right-wing category would do so.

The variables measuring participation in labor unions or trade associations both have the expected sign in all three models, indicating that organizational activists were more likely to vote for the MAS. However, participation in labor unions is only a statistically significant determinant of voting for the MAS in Models 1 (MNR/MAS) and 3 (NFR/MAS), perhaps because the MIR has also traditionally had ties to labor unions. Participation in trade associations, meanwhile, is only statistically significant in Model 1 (MNR/MAS). The general lack of significance for the trade association variable may partly be a product of the fact that this category included not only peasant organizations, but also organizations of professionals, merchants, and producers. It may be that participants in the latter groups, which are not subaltern organizations, were less likely to support the MAS.

The variables measuring political disenchantment also register mostly the predicted results. The evaluation of government performance has the expected sign and is statistically significant in all three models, indicating that the lower an individual's evaluation of the government, the more likely he or she was to vote for the MAS instead one of the other three main parties. Trust in parties also has the expected sign and is statistically significant in two out of the three models, suggesting that the MAS also won support from people with little confidence in political parties. The exception here is model 3 (NFR/MAS), which has the opposite sign, although it does not approach

statistical significance. This, too, is not terribly surprising, however, considering that the NFR, like the MAS, was an outsider party, which denounced the traditional parties and aggressively pursued the anti-system vote. Finally, the variable measuring an individual's evaluation of the economy had the expected sign in all three models, but was only statistically significant in model 3 (NFR/MAS).

As **Figures 3** shows, evaluations of government performance have a relatively strong impact on the likelihood of voting for the MAS. If all other variables are held at their means, an individual who evaluated the outgoing government of President Quiroga as very bad would have a 22 percent probability of voting for the MAS, whereas an individual who rated it as very good would only have a 5 percent probability of voting for the MAS. The effect of trust in parties on the MAS vote is much weaker, however. A simulation estimates that an individual who expressed no trust in parties would have a 13 percent probability of voting for the MAS other things being equal, whereas an individual who expressed a lot of trust in political parties would have a 7 percent probability of voting for the MAS. But, as **Figure 4** reveals, the confidence intervals of these two estimates overlap, so we can not even be sure that individuals who express no trust in parties are more likely to support the MAS than individuals who express a lot of trust in parties.

The control variables have mixed results. The variable measuring whether an individual comes from the highlands has the expected sign and is statistically significant in two out of the three models, indicating that individuals from the highlands are more

likely to support the MAS. The urbanization rate, however, has the expected sign in only two of the models, and is only statistically significant in one (MIR/MAS), indicating that the level of urbanization has a weak or inconsistent relationship with the probability of voting for the MAS. The variables measuring gender and age are consistent, however, suggesting that men and younger people may be more likely to vote for the MAS. Age is statistically significant in two of the models (MNR/MAS and NFR/MAS), but gender is only weakly significant in one of them (MNR/MAS).

Conclusion:

This study has shown that institutional reforms and changes within the indigenous movement cannot explain the rise of the MAS in Bolivia. Rather, the MAS' impressive electoral performance in the 2002 elections stemmed in large part from the party's ethno-populist appeal. Unlike most previous indigenous parties in Bolivia, the MAS sought to win the support of white and *mestizo* voters as well as indigenous people. It did so by using inclusive rhetoric, recruiting numerous white and *mestizo* candidates, and forming alliances with many non-indigenous organizations. Equally importantly, the MAS used a number of traditional populist strategies to attract voters of different ethnic backgrounds. It denounced existing political and economic elites, formed alliances with subaltern organizations and presented itself as the representative of the poor. It also developed a highly nationalist and state interventionist platform, criticizing U.S. intervention in Bolivia and Washington-sponsored coca eradication programs and market-oriented policies. As a result, the MAS won votes not only among the indigenous population, but

also from many poorer, left-leaning, and politically disenchanted *mestizo* and white voters.

Some leaders and parties in other Andean countries have pursued similar ethno-populist strategies. Ollanta Humala in Peru, for example, embraced many traditional indigenous demands and symbols, but without adopting exclusionary rhetoric.[13] Humala sought to appeal not just to the indigenous population, but to the subaltern sectors more generally with his anti-elitist, and highly nationalist and state interventionist platform. In the 2006 presidential elections, he swept the indigenous highlands, but also ran well in many poorer *mestizo* areas in the rest of the country, winning the first round of the presidential elections before losing in a runoff to Alan García. In Ecuador, Pachakutik has also combined an inclusive indigenous appeal with criticisms of neoliberal policies, foreign powers and existing elites. In the 2002 presidential elections, Pachakutik formed an alliance with a populist military colonel and *mestizo* leader, Lucio Gutiérrez, which helped elect Gutiérrez president. Once in office, however, Gutiérrez embraced neoliberal reforms and rejected many indigenous demands, causing Pachakutik to leave the government. Gutiérrez, whose base was weakened because of the departure of Pachakutik, was forced to leave office in the face of social protests a couple of years later. Pachakutik, meanwhile, is currently considering a new populist electoral alliance for Ecuador's upcoming presidential elections.

[13] Ollanta Humala's father and brother developed an ethno-nationalist ideology, dubbed *etno-cacerismo*, which celebrated the supremacy of the "copper-colored races," but Ollanta distanced himself from this kind of rhetoric.

How are ethno-populist parties and leaders likely to fare in the future? Traditional populist leaders and parties have had a hard time holding together their unwieldy urban-based coalitions. In many instances, the propensity of populist leaders to boost government spending and expand state involvement in the economy has created economic problems for populist governments, which, in turn, have led their volatile urban constituencies to abandon them. The ethno-populist leaders, however, have a potentially more stable base. Rural areas in Latin America have traditionally been less electorally volatile than urban areas. Patron-client relations prevail in many rural areas of Latin America and these have sometimes fostered stable, and less performance-driven, ties between voters and parties. Ethnic links, moreover, may prove to be stronger and more enduring than the programmatic, personalistic or clientelistic ties that have bound Latin American voters to some populist leaders and parties in the past.

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FIGURE 1
A TYPOLOGY OF PARTIES

		Degree of Inclusiveness	
		Inclusive	**Exclusive**
Nature of appeal	**Ethnic**	Ethno-populist	Ethnic
	Non-ethnic	Populist	Class

TABLE 2
Characteristics of the Voters for the Largest Bolivian Parties in 2002 Elections
(LAPOP 2002 Bolivia Survey – National Sample)

	% of MAS voters	% of MNR voters	% of MIR voters	% of NFR voters	% of all voters
Ethnic identification					
Indigenous	21.8	7.7	8.6	8.3	11.0
Mestizo	66.5	62.5	66.0	69.5	65.3
White	8.8	27.2	22.4	21.0	21.2
Language					
Quechua	40.9%	24.2%	20.9%	23.9%	26.1%
Aymara	31.0	9.2	10.6	9.8	14.4
Other native	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.5	1.8
Monthly income					
Up to 500 Bolivianos	52.1	35.8	42.4	34.5	40.8
Above 500 Bolivianos	47.9	64.2	57.6	65.5	59.2
Ideology					
Left (1-4)	48.0	15.8	48.8	26.6	28.7
Center (5-6)	38.8	40.0	34.9	46.2	43.0
Right (7-10)	13.2	44.2	16.3	27.3	28.3
Participation in trade associations					
Sometimes or often	38.9	21.6	23.3	28.0	26.0
Almost never or never	61.1	78.4	76.7	72.0	74.0
Participation in unions					
Sometimes or often	27.1	11.4	12.4	8.9	14.4
Almost never or never	72.9	88.6	87.6	91.1	85.6
Trust in parties					
None (1)	38.8	21.9	21.7	31.4	29.2
A little (2-3)	39.6	34.9	38.8	41.4	37.2
Some (4-5)	19.1	35.8	30.5	24.4	27.8
A lot (6-7)	2.6	7.5	9.1	2.8	5.8
Gov't evaluation					
Bad or very bad	22.6	13.7	7.9	5.1	12.0
Regular	53.6	52.0	52.4	47.3	52.4
Good or very good	23.8	34.3	39.8	47.6	35.6
Economic situation					
Bad or very bad	67.2	62.2	57.1	62.5	62.3
Regular	31.7	36.3	41.1	34.3	35.9
Good or very good	1.1	1.5	1.8	3.1	1.8
Urban	66.4	71.3	67.4	76.2	70.9
Highlands dept.	86.6	59.4	45.2	72.6	65.4
Male	60.4	51.7	54.2	51.1	52.2
Under 50	82.3	71.1	88.6	81.3	78.7

TABLE 3
MEASURES OF ETHNO-POPULIST APPEAL

Variable	**Predicted relationship with support for the MAS**	**Proxy variable**
Indigenous status	Positive	1) Indigenous self-identification 2) Aymara speaker 3) Quechua speaker 4) Lowlands language speaker
Social class	Negative	Monthly income (8 point scale)
Leftist/statist/nationalist views	Positive	Ideology (10 point left-right scale)
Subaltern organization participation	Positive	1) Participation in labor unions (4 point scale) 2) Participation in trade associations (4 point scale)
Political disenchantment	Positive	1) Trust in parties (8 point scale) 2) Evaluation of government (5 point scale) 3) Evaluation of the economy (5 point scale)

TABLE 4
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTE FOR THE MAS IN 2002
(multinomial logit regression analysis)

	Model 1 (MNR/MAS)	**Model 2 (MIR/MAS)**	**Model 3 (NFR/MAS)**
Constant	-2.298***	-.747	-3.379***
	(.634)	(.720)	(.712)
Indigenous self-Identification	-.493*	-.707*	-.532
	(.245)	(.297)	(.287)
Aymara speakers	-1.26***	-.578*	-1.286***
	(.241)	(.284)	(.287)
Quechua speakers	-.841***	-.585*	-.694**
	(.200)	(.235)	(.223)
Lowlands indigenous language speakers	-1.143	-1.670	-.913
	(.614)	(.775)	(.761)
Monthly income	.268***	.071	.200**
	(.066)	(.076)	(.072)
Ideology	.326***	-.044	.155***
	(.037)	(.042)	(.041)
Participation in trade Associations	-.177*	-.071	-.020
	(.079)	(.091)	(.087)
Participation in labor Unions	-.215*	-.110	-.316**
	(.091)	(.106)	(.109)
Trust in political Parties	.165**	.183**	-.019
	(.056)	(.064)	(.064)
Evaluation of gov't Performance	.235*	.686***	.668***
	(.106)	(.127)	(.121)
Evaluation of economic situation	.122	.210	.284*
	(.109)	(.126)	(.122)
Urbanization level	-.103	-.213	.017
	(.072)	(.081)	(.082)
Highland department	-.682**	-1.70***	-.295
	(.229)	(.249)	(.252)
Male	-.340*	-.204	-.304
	(.172)	(.197)	(.189)
Age	.036***	.005	.016*
	(.006)	(.008)	(.007)
Pseudo R^2	.1474		
N	1882		

$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ two-tailed t-tests

Standard errors in parentheses

FIGURE 1
THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE MAS



FIGURE 2
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE MAS



FIGURE 3
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT APPROVAL ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE MAS



FIGURE 4
THE EFFECT OF LEVEL OF TRUST IN PARTIES ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR THE MAS