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**LAPPOP**



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# Democracy Audit:

## Bolivia, 2002

by

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# Introduction: Overview of Bolivian Politics, 2000-2002<sup>1</sup>

This introduction briefly reviews the major political events that have occurred in Bolivia since the last political culture study on that country was produced by the University of Pittsburgh. The first study was conducted in 1998, the second in 2000 and this, the third, in 2002.

In many ways the period 2000-2002 reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the Bolivian political system. On the one hand, electoral continuity and respect for the basic requisites of democracy have contributed to a continuation of the stability of the past 17 years.<sup>2</sup> Since the early 1980s there have been five presidential elections and a total of eleven elections overall if municipal elections are included. On the other hand, repeated accusations of corruption, outbreaks of violent popular protest, and declarations of states of siege have buffeted democracy in a number of ways. Moreover, these problems have occurred in the context of continued economic problems. For example, the national census of 2001 found that 58.6% of the population earned incomes below the poverty line, a major improvement over the 70.9% recorded in the 1992 census. Nonetheless, even with this lowered poverty rate, Bolivia ranks poorly compared to a number of other countries in Latin America.<sup>3</sup>

The contrasting patterns of dialogue, democracy and ongoing conflict emerge clearly in the events of this period. Perhaps the two themes that emerge most clearly are, on the one hand, important advances in institutional strengthening, while on the other, strong demand for constitutional reforms.<sup>4</sup>

Between November, 1999 and April 2000, major popular mobilizations emerged in Cochabamba in what was to become termed the “Water War.” Citizens protested in order to have the government cancel the contract with the firm “Aguas del Tunari,” and were protesting the reform of the Potable Water Law. One result was the separation from the governing coalition the NFR party in February, 2000. The Catholic Church and the Defensoría del Pueblo mediated the conflict between the organizers of the mobilization and the government. In April 2000 peasant and indigenous marches in the highlands erupted, with the protestors demanding changes in the agrarian reform law, salary increases, and a halt to the coca eradication campaign. On April 8 the government declared a stage of siege, which was ratified by the Congress the 13<sup>th</sup> of

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter was prepared with the assistance of Agustín Grijalva

<sup>2</sup> Pilar Domingo, 2001. “Party Politics, Intermediation and Representation.” In *Toward Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience*, ed. John Crabtree y Laurence Whitehead. New York: Palgrave Publishers, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> CEPAL, “Situación y perspectivas 2002. Estudio Económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2001-2002,” <http://www.eclac.org>

<sup>4</sup> The events reported on here were documented in the following sources: *Kessing's Record of World Events* (London, 2001-2002); *Facts on File* (New York, 2001-2002); Comisión Andina de Juristas: Cronología Andina en <http://www.cajpe.org.pe/> CLACSO, Observatorio Social de América Latina en <http://www.webcom.com/clacso/>, and, of course, a review of the Bolivian and international press.

that month and was kept in force until April 20<sup>th</sup>. On April 24 the cabinet was reorganized as a result of the protests.

Political protests continued on through much of 2000. They grew to involve professors, doctors, peasants, workers, bus drivers, students and other occupations. The conflict over coca eradication grew more tense. In September and again in October new protests emerged, which were resolved by an agreement with the government, but failed to include the issue of the coca eradication. On October 20, 2000 a new ministry was formed to deal with indigenous matters.

On May 31, 2001 a new Criminal Code entered into operation, which satisfied a long-held goal of both the Banzer and Quiroga governments. One main objective of the Code was to strengthen key civil liberties that were granted in the 1994 Constitution. These changes, when added to the creation of the Tribunal Constitucional, the Consejo de la Judicatura, the Defensoría del Pueblo and the offices of the public defender of the Ministry of Justice, constitute major gains for Bolivian democracy.<sup>5</sup> An extensive analysis of public views of the code is included in this study.

In April and May 2001, new protests emerged. But those events were overshadowed by the announcement on July 27 of the resignation of President Banzer for reasons of health. He stepped down officially on August 6, and was succeeded by Vice President Jorge Quiroga. The new President restructured the cabinet based on a coalition of the AND, MIR and UCS, thus narrowing the broader coalition of the Banzer years. In November, 2001 new outbreaks of violence occurred in clashes between the army and the coca growers, resulting in a temporary suspension of eradication activities. Similarly clashes occurred in January, 2002, but were once again negotiated successfully by the Catholic Church.

The most important political event of 2002 was the election for president and legislators. In the study that follows, there is a detailed analysis of the election as seen from the perspective of the survey. What is important to note here is that the election produced a coalition of the MNR, MIR and the UCS supporting the selection by the legislature of Sánchez de Lozada. The new coalition government formulated a 12-point program which it calls the "Plan Bolivia." Among the key provisions of the plan are constitutional reforms by which the referendum would become a new mechanism of citizen control. Several other measures to increase citizen participation were also proposed. The election is also notable for the emergence of a strong indigenous candidate, but once again, we leave that discussion to the chapter on elections.<sup>6</sup> Suffice it to note here that the prefect of La Paz, the vice-minister of education and other key political figures come from indigenous backgrounds. The election itself went off without any major problems.<sup>7</sup> The coalitions formed during this period are summarized in the following table:

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<sup>5</sup> See PNUD, *Informe de Desarrollo Humano Bolivia 2002* (La Paz: PNUD, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> This process began in the municipal elections of 1995, in which a number of indigenous mayors were elected. See Donna Lee Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), p. 189.

<sup>7</sup> Organización de Estados Americanos, "Informe Preliminar del Jefe de la Misión de Observación Electoral – Elecciones Bolivia 2002."

### Governing Coalitions, 1997- 2002

<i>President</i>	<i>Governing Period</i>	<i>Party Coalition</i>
Hugo Banzer	August 6, 1997-February 2, 2000	ADN, MIR, NFR, UCS PDC, CONDEPA, FRI
	February 2, 2000-Agust 6, 2001	ADN, MIR, UCS PDC, CONDEPA, FRI
	Agust 7, 2001-Agust 6, 2002	ADN, MIR, UCS
	Agust 7,2002-	MNR, MIR, MBL, UCS

Rene Antonio Mayorga has summarized the major thrust of the reforms in a recent study.<sup>8</sup> Among the various changes that have been proposed, which are to be made via a Constituent Assembly, is a constitutional reform that would permit that not only political parties but also civil society organizations to run candidates for office. Also it has been proposed that all deputies be elected in single-member districts. Moreover, this system of districts would also apply at the level of the prefecture, the department and the municipalities. Other reforms involve the creation of a second round in the elections instead of the current system of electing the president via a coalition in the legislature. It has been proposed that a unicameral legislature would be created, and both the referendum and plebiscite would be established. Finally, the suspension of parliamentary immunity in cases of corruption has been proposed.

<sup>8</sup> Rene Antonio Mayorga, *Desmontaje de la Democracia* (La Paz: Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios, 2001), pp. 20-22.

# Chapter I. Methodology and Sample Characteristics

This is the third in a series of studies of democratic values and behaviors in Bolivia, which forms part of the larger University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. The first study was conducted in 1998 and produced a study by Mitchell A. Seligson entitled, *La cultura política de la democracia boliviana* (Así piensan los bolivianos, # 60; La Paz, Bolivia: Encuestas y Estudios, 1999). A second study was conducted in 2000, and produced a monograph by Mitchell A. Seligson entitled *La cultura política de la democracia en Bolivia: 2000* (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2001). This third study follows the design and format of the other two, although the focus of the report will be different in many respects. In this first chapter, the methodology of the three studies is detailed and a description of the basic parameters of the data sets are introduced.

## Sample Design

In the prior versions of this study, a description was provided of the sample design. That description is included here, updated to reflect the information from the 2002 sample, in order to provide that information for the readers who do not have access to the prior studies.

### *A Sample Design to Represent All Voting-Aged Bolivians*

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is underrepresented in the election.<sup>9</sup> Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

Any serious study of democratic values in Bolivia confronts two problems in sample design: 1) the wide dispersal of the population; and 2) a multi-lingual population. Comparisons with other countries help put these problems in perspective. Consider Germany, the country with

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<sup>9</sup>This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, past President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, “The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy.” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

the largest population in Western Europe, is home to 82 million people, who occupy 357,000 square kilometers of territory. Bolivia, in contrast, with a population of only 8 million, occupies a massive 1.1 million square kilometers.<sup>10</sup> Bolivia is the 29<sup>th</sup> largest country on the planet, but with a population about the same size of that of the Dominican Republic, a country that is only 4% of Bolivia's size. Indeed, all of Japan, with its 125 million people, would nearly fit into Santa Cruz Department alone. In short, Bolivia has a relatively small population living on a large land mass. From the point of view of sample design, this creates complexities, which are only compounded by the fact that Bolivia's population is very unevenly distributed. For example, La Paz has a population density of about nearly 17 persons per square kilometer, whereas the Department of Pando, with a surface area substantially larger than Costa Rica but an estimated population in July 2002 of 54,201, has a density of fewer than .5 residents per square kilometer. The population density of Bolivia as a whole is only 8 persons per square kilometer compared to 20 for Brazil and 312 for Belgium.<sup>11</sup>

In a multi-lingual country it is important to avoid excluding linguistic minorities. Unfortunately, obtaining relevant current language information has not been easy. We need to know about the proportion of Bolivians who do not speak Spanish and would therefore be unable to respond to questions put to them in that language. If we use the recently released census data from the 2001 national population census, we see that only 63.5% speak Spanish (see the INE web page), but we know this information is not correct since it does not correspond to the 2001 census question that was asked to list *all* of the languages that they know, not just their predominant language. The web-based 2001 information totals 100%, when the question actually asked must provide results over 100% since many Bolivians know more than one language. It is of note that these figures include 20.8% who are Quechua speakers and 13.6% who are Aymará speakers.

In Bolivia, while many languages are spoken, Spanish is the overwhelmingly predominant language. According to the Bolivian 1992 census bureau, only 8.1% of the population over the age of 6 were monolingual Quechua speakers, and 3.2% of the population were monolingual Aymará speakers.<sup>12</sup> These numbers of monolingual speakers of indigenous languages however, have been declining rapidly as a result of, among other things, the widespread dissemination of the mass media. For example, the Bolivian census bureau estimates for 1997 show that only 4.4% of the population are monolingual Quechua and 2.0% are monolingual Aymará. Unfortunately, we do not yet have the complete language totals for the 2001 census to compare with our results. In order not to exclude the opinions of these individuals, it was necessary to prepare versions of the questionnaire in both Quechua and

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<sup>10</sup>Data are from the World Bank, *World Development Report, 2000/2001*. Oxford University Press, 2000, Washington, D. C., pp. 274.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank. *World Development Report, 2000/2001*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 232.

<sup>12</sup>There were also small numbers of speakers of other indigenous Languages such as Guarani, as well as speakers of Portuguese, English and other languages. The costs involved in preparing questionnaires in each of these languages, and having a multi-lingual staff of interviewers available on the spot as such speakers were encountered, made the exclusion of such monolingual speakers necessary.

Aimará, and to include bi-lingual interviewers in the survey team. In the 2002 national sample, we found the following results in response to our question asking about the language the respondents spoke at home when they were growing up.




Figure I. 1 Mother tongue of respondents, 2002

This question is useful, but it does not tell us if the respondent, at the moment of the survey, understood more than one language (including Spanish as one of them) and thus could have responded in that language. In fact, we found that an overwhelming proportion of respondents who spoke a language other than Spanish, also understood Spanish. For that reason, only 31 (weighted) respondents were interviewed in either Quechua or Aimará.

### ***Representing the Departments in the National Sample: Stratification***

In the design of the sample, the factors of population size and its distribution needed to be considered. In addition, Bolivia's Departments, which range so greatly in population and geographic area, each have their own social and political profiles, and a study that attempts to represent the country ought to be certain to include each of its departments. In order to achieve this objective, it was decided that the sample would be designed to represent each of Bolivia's nine departments, while still being able to speak with confidence about the country as a whole.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are nine high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the nine schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have nine tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

In Bolivia, if we want to be sure that citizens from each of the nine departments are interviewed, we must divide the sample into nine strata. We call these strata *Astrata*. Thus, in the Bolivia census, we have nine separate strata, one for each department. If we do not divide the country into separate strata, then it is quite likely that most of those to be interviewed would come from Bolivia's most populous departments (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), and that few, if any interviews would take place in the department of Pando, the least populous department. By stratifying the sample, we guarantee a distribution of interviews across all nine departments.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup>), then a total of 27 tickets would need to be drawn (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Bolivia it is important to further subdivide the departments into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each department into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of departments we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each department by population size. It is common practice in Bolivia to divide the population into four clusters: 1) cities larger than 20,000; 2) cities and towns of between 2,000 and 20,000; 3) "compact rural" zones, of populations from 500 to 1,999; and, finally, 4) "dispersed rural" zones of fewer than 500 people. Our sample for each department has been stratified in this fashion.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the department and within each department, we have what is called a "multi-stage stratified sample design." But now the question comes as to how large a sample and how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Bolivia. That is because the smallest departments would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample was very large. For example, Pando comprises only .6 of one percent of Bolivia's population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only about 18 would likely to be drawn from Pando.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a sample of 300 respondents per department, which would mean that 95% of the time, our sample would be no more than  $\pm 5.8\%$  away from the true departmental view for a given question in the survey. This level of  $\pm 5.8\%$  is calculated using the standard formulas for sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario<sup>13</sup> at the level of the department the survey would be a reasonably accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 5.8% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could interview all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions<sup>14</sup> the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 3.5\%$  at the level of the department. Since the three departments of Bolivia that form the so-called Acentral axis@ are so important politically (i.e., La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), it was decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in those departments by interviewing an additional 100 respondents in each of them, for a total of 400 in each. In those three departments, our “confidence interval” for the sample is no more than  $\pm 5.0\%$ , or nearly 1% more accurate than for the other departments.

The samples of 300 and 400 per department were designed to provide approximately equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we attempt to generalize beyond the level of the department to the nation as a whole, it is vital to adjust the sample size so that it accurately reflects the relative population size of each department. For example, referring again to Pando, and comparing it to La Paz, it is necessary to decrease the relative weight of Pando in the national sample and increase the relative weight of La Paz in order that we can obtain an overall picture of opinion in Bolivia. To do this the sample, once drawn, was assigned post-hoc weights so that each department correctly reflected its contribution to the national population total. A detailed discussion of the weighting appears in a section below.

The sample design for the nine departments as a whole, with 300 interviews in six departments, and 400 interviews in three departments, called for a total sample of 3,000. A sample of this size is accurate at no worse than  $\pm 1.7\%$ . Technically, our sampling error is  $\pm 1.7\%$ . This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than  $\pm 1.7\%$ . Of course, other factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of  $\pm 1.7\%$  is very good.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the nine departments. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together

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<sup>13</sup>The worst case emerges when opinion is divided right down the middle, and on a given question, 50% express one view and 50% express another.

<sup>14</sup>For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.

in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost, especially in a country like Bolivia where the density of population nation-wide is so low. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. Experience suggests that the confidence for a clustered stratified sample design of 3,000 Bolivians would increase to around  $\pm 2.0\%$  from the level of  $\pm 1.7\%$  stated above. For the purposes of this study, a level of  $\pm 2.0\%$  will be assumed. It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection until the household itself was reached. The individual respondent within the household was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the commonly confronted problem of having the sample incorporate too many females and too many very young or very old people. That household bias results from a higher probability of females, the very young and the very old to be at home more often than other respondents. Quota sampling at the level of the household is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by Encuestas & Estudios, among the leading survey research firms in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. Over the past 18 years, Encuestas & Estudios has conducted over 900 surveys for more than 250 clients. It currently employs 116 people full time, and utilizes 83 part-time interviewers, of whom 40 are bilingual (Quechua or Aymar a). This firm implemented the above described sample design, and was also responsible for carrying out multiple pre-tests of the survey instrument as well as the translation of the instrument into Quechua and Aymar a. In addition, the firm was responsible for all data entry.

The actual number of interviews gathered in 2002 by the Encuestas & Estudios firm in the national sample was 3,016 or 16 more than the goal of 3,000. In 1998, a total of 2,997 respondents were interviewed and in 2000, the sample size was 3,006. This is a very high level of completion of the survey, and speaks well of the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors.

### **The Special Municipal Sample**

The interviews at the national level were not, however, the only ones collected for this study. USAID has been assisting the Bolivian government to improve municipal governance and citizen participation at the local level in a project called “Desarrollo Democr tico y Participaci n Ciudadana” (hereafter DDPC). A secondary goal of the present study was to evaluate the impact of that program. In prior studies, specialized samples of DDPC municipalities were drawn, analyzed and reported upon. In the present study, it was decided to select a sample of municipalities from among those 30 that had undergone a complete program of assistance from the DDPC staff, and to compare those municipalities to the national sample just described. That

comparison is presented later in this report. The sample sizes by Department (broken down by urban vs. rural) are shown in Table I. 1.<sup>15</sup>

Table I. 1. DDPC selected municipalities:

By department , urban vs. rural, in 2002

	DDPC Urban		DDPC Rural		Total	
	Col %	N	Col %	N	Col %	N
La Paz	25.2%	91	27.8%	150	26.7%	241
Santa Cruz	16.6%	60	5.6%	30	10.0%	90
Cochabamba	24.9%	90	38.9%	210	33.3%	300
Oruro	8.3%	30	11.1%	60	10.0%	90
Chuquisaca	24.9%	90	16.7%	90	20.0%	180
Total	100.0%	361	100.0%	540	100.0%	901

The interviews normally took place in the respondent=s home, and were “face-to-face.” In cases where a selected respondent was not at home when the interviewer arrived, call-backs were made to the dwelling at least once.<sup>16</sup> The interviews lasted for an average of 42 minutes each in 1998, 36 minutes in 2000 (the number of questions asked in 2000 was somewhat fewer than in 1998), and 40 minutes in 2002, although a small number of interviews lasted for as long as two hours and one interview lasted for three. Rural and urban interviews took about the same amount of time, but travel to the rural areas to locate the respondents took much more time. In order to carry out the survey it was necessary to utilize a fleet of buses and jeeps, as well as a small airplane in the most remote areas.

### *Sample Weights*

As noted above, in order that the sample accurately reflects the distribution of population in Bolivia it is necessary to weight the sample. To do this involves the calculation of sample weights. The calculations are shown in Table I. 2 below. In the second column of the table the best estimates of departmental populations as of July, 2002 are provided by the Bolivian census bureau, based on projections from the 2001 national population census. The percent of the population that each department comprises is given in the third column. For example, La Paz comprises 29.21% of the national population. In the fourth column, the actual sample for each

<sup>15</sup> Note that the DDPC sample was self-weighted (i.e., each case = 1).

<sup>16</sup> When call-backs did not produce the selected respondent, then a substitute was used from the same PSU. If more than one respondent matched the quota within the household, the individual who would next celebrate a birthday was selected.

department is given, excluding the DDPC additional interviews. Those interviews are excluded here because the goal is to use the weights to modify the sample totals so as to mirror the national population distribution among the nine departments. The additional DDPC interviews would skew those results since the selection was based on DDPC criteria rather than the national population distribution. In the fifth column, the percent of the total national sample that each department comprises is given. In the penultimate column the weight factor is derived, which is the result of dividing the population percentage by the sample percentage. Finally, by multiplying the sample size by the weight factor, the final column provides the weighted sample size.

The weighted sample shows the striking impact of the variation in population size among Bolivia's nine departments. In Pando, with less than 7% of the population, but with a sample of 300 respondents, or 10% of the national sample, it is necessary to weight down the sample so that these interviews now comprise only 21 out of the 3,016. If this correction were not introduced, Pando would end up being as influential in the national totals as Potosí. On the other hand, when we wish to examine Pando alone, we have 300 interviews to examine, thus allowing us to speak of those results with a reasonable level of confidence. If we had interviewed only 21 respondents from Pando, virtually nothing could have been said about the area. It should also be kept in mind that within each department, the sample was drawn proportional to the population distribution, so that large and small population concentrations are each correctly represented.

Table I. 2 Calculation for sample weight factors for 2002 sample

Department	Population Estimate, July 2002 <sup>a</sup>	% of national total	Sample N	% of sample total	Weight factor: (population % ÷ sample %)	Weighted sample
La Paz	2,399,806	28.3	402	13.3	2.12633	855
Santa Cruz	2,109,280	24.9	421	14.0	1.77547	747
Cochabamba	1,494,809	17.6	392	13.0	1.35503	531
Oruro	397,366	4.7	320	10.6	0.44177	141
Chuquisaca	539,854	6.4	292	9.7	0.65586	192
Potosí	715,577	8.4	300	9.9	0.85178	256
Pando	54,201	0.6	288	9.5	0.06723	19
Tarija	402,630	4.7	300	9.9	0.47927	144
El Beni	372,291	4.4	301	10.0	0.43872	132
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,485,814</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,016</b>	<b>100.0</b>		<b>3,017<sup>b</sup></b>

<sup>a</sup> Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).

<sup>b</sup> Varies from actual sample owing to rounding error.

### ***Special Circumstances Affecting the 2002 Sample***

In 2002 special circumstances prevented reinterviews in the same target locations that had been used in prior surveys. In the Department of Pando our survey teams found that two of the survey locations were no longer populated, and as a result a total of 36 interviews had to be carried out in neighboring locations. In Potosí the same situation arose in one location, and 17 interviews had to be carried out in a neighboring location. Finally, because of serious icing conditions that made roads impassable, one location in Potosí was not reachable and as a result 20 interviews were shifted to another sector in the same village. In each case in which a substitute was made, the interviews were conducted in the same municipality as they had been in prior waves, but only the village or neighborhood within the village was changed. As these changes affected only 53 interviews out of a total of nearly 3,000, and the shifts were minor, we do not believe that these shifts in the sample design of 2002 produced any significant impact on the overall results.

### **Sample Characteristics**

In much of the study that is reported upon below, the focus is on the 2002 sample, although in a number of instances, comparisons are made with the earlier studies. If changes are noted, it is important to be able to attribute those changes to shifts in Bolivian attitudes and behaviors rather than changes in the sample. The reader should keep in mind that the survey does not involve interviewing the same respondent for each wave, but different respondents based on identical sample designs. If the sample design is not carried out with care, considerable variation can emerge from one survey to the next based entirely upon differences in the manner in which respondents are selected. The result could be, for example, that one survey would have a larger proportion of males than females, or old as compared to young. Since both gender and age have been shown to influence some of the attitudes and behaviors that we are studying in Bolivia, variations in the sample could erroneously lead us to conclude that opinions have changed from one survey to the next, when in fact all that has changed is the sample.

How comparable are the samples that have been drawn in this study? The answer, as will be shown in detail in a moment, is that they are very comparable. First, it is important to note that it has already been shown that the samples were drawn from the same departments and in the same proportions in each sample, with only minor corrections made in the weighting formula to account for shifts in the census data.<sup>17</sup> Second, the most important parameters are demographic, namely gender and age, so we begin the comparisons with the basic demographic characteristics of the samples. Consider gender, as shown in Figure I. 2. As can be seen, the proportion of males and females is unchanged across the three waves of interviews. It is clear, therefore, that if there are shifts in the views of men or women, it is not because of a different proportion in the distribution of gender in the samples.

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<sup>17</sup> As noted above, in 2002 access conditions required a few minor modifications of the sample in some areas.





Figure I. 2 Gender distribution in samples, 1998-2002

Age is another variable that has proven to be important in prior analyses. For example, we have found that many forms of participation vary by age. Yet, as is shown in Figure I. 3, the average age does not vary significantly across the samples.



**Figure I. 3 Mean age of respondents by survey year**

Marital status remained fairly constant across the samples, although there was some minor variation, as is shown in Table I. 3. The proportion married in 2002 was somewhat below those for prior years, but at the same time, those in “common law” unions (*unión libre, concubinato*) increased, indicating that perhaps there is no real difference in the sample but only a greater willingness to admit that some “marriages” have not been formally certified.

Table I. 3. Distribution of samples by marital status

	Year						Total	
	2002		2000		1998		Col %	Count
Married	48.0%	1,446	54.5%	1,634	53.4%	1,583	52.0%	4,664
Bachelor	32.8%	988	30.9%	928	31.5%	934	31.8%	2,851
Common law	11.9%	357	7.4%	222	8.7%	258	9.3%	838
Widow	4.0%	122	4.1%	124	4.0%	119	4.1%	364
Divorced	1.8%	56	1.6%	49	1.4%	41	1.6%	146
Separated	1.4%	41	1.4%	43	.9%	28	1.3%	113
Total	100.0%	3,017	100.0%	3,006	100.0%	2,977	100.0%	9,000

A further indication that these small differences in marital status had no practical effect emerges when we examine the number of children per respondent, as is shown in Figure I. 4. As can be seen, there is no significant variation across the samples.




Figure I. 4 Mean number of children, by sample

These figures of the number of children per respondent might seem especially low, given the high birth rates in Bolivia, but the mean number of children are for the entire sample, including those not married, or not living in common-law unions. When examined by including the impact of marital status, as is shown in Figure I. 5, it is clear that the numbers conform more closely to expectations. Moreover, these are not the total completed family sizes, but only the

family sizes at the moment of the interview. Since, as already shown, the mean age of the sample is 36 years of age, substantial proportions of the female respondents have not completed their child-bearing years.




Figure I. 5 Number of children by marital status, 2002 sample

The distribution of the sample, by the degree of urbanization of the community in which the interview was conducted was extremely stable throughout the period 1998-2002. As can be seen in Figure I. 6, the largest group of interviews was in the urban areas of towns larger than 20,000 people, although about one-quarter of the sample was carried out in the smallest communities of dispersed rural settlements.





Figure I. 6 Distribution of samples by urbanization

Moving beyond demographic factors, we turn to education and income, variables that have been shown to be important in prior studies in this series. As can be seen in Figure I. 7, the educational levels of the 2000 and 2002 samples were virtually the same, but there was an increase from 1998. Part of this increase may be attributable to the rapid increase in educational levels in Bolivia that has occurred because of increased state investment in public education, and part may be due to variation in the sample.



**Figure I. 7 Mean years of education by sample**

Finally, we examine income levels across the three samples. The results are shown in Table I. 4. Normally we would expect the level of income to be increasing over time since GNP usually increases. However, Bolivian incomes per capita have stagnated and even declined, in recent years, according to World Bank data. For example, the GNI (Atlas Method) stood at \$970 in 1997, but declined to \$940 in 2001 (data for 2002 are not available as of this writing).<sup>18</sup> If we examine the mean income as reported on our scale, which ranges from 0-8, the mean incomes in the first survey (1998) was 2.6, rising to 3.0 in 2000 but *falling* to 2.9 in the 2002 survey. These are incomes reported in Bolivianos without controlling for inflation, so in deflated terms, the 2002 incomes would be lower. Inflation in 2000, for example, is reported by the world bank as being 3.7% and in 2001 it was 1.5%. In our data base, among the lowest tiers of income, those below 250 Bolivianos, the variation over the three surveys is quite small, amounting to less than one per cent. On the other hand, increases in the 2,000 to 20,000 Boliviano range are notable, especially in the period 1998-2000. This indicates a shift in the direction of some of the population toward the higher income range, although the overall average, as noted above, showed that the increase was focused on the 1998-2000 period rather than the 2000-2002 period. Our survey, then, shows some variation in the distribution of incomes in inflated Bolivianos, and for variables that are affected by income, it would be important to control for these changes in our multivariate analyses.

<sup>18</sup>See:

[devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=BOL&CCODE=BOL&CNAME=Bolivia&PTYPE=CP](http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=BOL&CCODE=BOL&CNAME=Bolivia&PTYPE=CP)

Table I. 4. Monthly household income by sample

Income category	Year		
	1998	2000	2002
None (housewife, unemployed)	1.9%	.8%	1.3%
<250 Bolivianos	15.3%	13.3%	14.1%
251- 500	31.0%	24.2%	27.4%
501 - 1,000	32.3%	31.7%	26.9%
1,001 - 2,000	13.0%	15.6%	17.6%
2,001 - 5,000	4.8%	10.2%	8.0%
5,001 - 10,000	1.4%	2.9%	3.0%
10,001 - 20,000	.3%	1.1%	1.4%
>20,000	.0%	.2%	4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

## Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the sample design and sample characteristics for the surveys to be analyzed in this study. By commonly accepted survey research standards, the samples are large, enabling us to speak of the results within a narrow band of sampling error. Moreover, the samples allow us not only to talk about Bolivia as a whole, but also to examine differences among departments. We have seen that the samples vary little across the years in terms of their basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics, but alert us to the need of control, when appropriate, for education and income since there are some small variation on those variables.

## Chapter II. Elections and Democracy

Ever since the restoration of democracy in Bolivia, Presidential elections have been filled with surprises. The election process itself differs from that of many other countries since in reality there are two elections because of frequently-debated “Article 90” of the Bolivian Constitution.<sup>19</sup> In the first, the population casts its vote. In the second, the legislature decides the winner among the top two candidates. This second stage only occurs when no one candidate receives a majority of the votes cast, but in practice, no candidate has received such a majority since democracy was restored to Bolivia. What we have seen is an election process with a large number of parties, and in which the front-runners often receive nearly the same percentage of the total vote. The election of 2002 was characterized by these features, but also saw the emergence of several new parties and a reduction of votes for parties that had run in prior elections.

The overall results of the two elections, 1997 and 2002 that show these dramatic shifts are presented in Table II. 1. Among the parties that ran in both elections, only the MNR increased its vote share, and then only by less than 5%. The ADN suffered the largest percentage loss, declining from over 22% of the votes to only 3%. A nearly equally serious loss was suffered by Condepa.

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<sup>19</sup> Rene Antonio Mayorga, *Desmontaje de la Democracia* (La Paz: Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios, 2001). But also see for a more socially based explanation, Carlos Toranzo, ¿Lógica Corporativa o Lógica Ciudadana? en *Retos y Dilemas de la Representación Política*, ed. Rafael Archondo. La Paz: PNUD, 2000.

Table II. 1 Party Votes in Bolivian Presidential Elections, 1997 and 2002

Party	Candidate	Percent of Vote 1997	Percent of Vote 2002	1997/2002 Change
ADN	Hugo Banzer (97) Ronald MacClean (02)	22.3	3.39	-18.91
MNR	Juan Carlos Duran (97), Sánchez de Lozada (02)	17.7	22.46	4.76
MIR	Jaime Paz Zamora	16.7	16.31	-0.39
UCS	Ivo Kuljis (97) Johny Fernández (02)	15.9	5.51	-10.39
Condepa	Remedios Loza (97) NicolasValdivia (02)	15.8	0.37	-15.43
MBL <sup>a</sup>	Miguel Urioste	2.5	0	
IU <sup>a</sup>	Alejandro Veliz	3.7	0	
VS or PS <sup>a</sup>	Jerjes Justiniano (1997), Rolando Morales (2002)	1.4	0	
EJE <sup>a</sup>	Ramiro Barrenechea	0.6	0	
PDB <sup>a</sup>	Antonio Galindo	0.4	0	
NFR <sup>b</sup>	Manfred Reyes Villa	0	20.91	
MCC <sup>b</sup>	René Blattmann	0	0.63	
PS <sup>b</sup>	Rolando Morales	0	0.65	
LJ <sup>b</sup>	Alberto Costa	0	2.72	
MIP <sup>b</sup>	Felipe Quispe	0	6.09	
MAS <sup>b</sup>	Evo Morales	0	20.94	

<sup>a</sup>Party did not compete in 2002. The MBL formed a coalition with the MNR, while the IU formed one with the NFR. The VS, Vanguardia Socialista, changed its name to Partido Socialista.

<sup>b</sup>Party did not compete in 1997. The NFR was a component of the ADN. René Blattman was a presidential candidate for the MNR, but then withdrew.

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral and Encuestas y Estudios.

Another way of looking at the differences between the two elections was the concentration of votes among the front-running parties. The comparisons are shown in Table II. 2. As can be seen, the top three parties in 1997 won over half the votes, but they won only 42% of the votes in 2002. Even more dramatic are the results for the top five parties, which in 1997 won 88% of the votes, whereas in 2002 those same parties won only 48% of the votes in 2002.

Table II. 2. Vote Share of Front-Runner Parties, 1997 vs. 2002

	Vote share 1997	Vote share in 2002 of top parties in 1997
Top 3 parties, 1997	56.7	42.16
Top 5 parties, 1997	88.4	48.04

In comparative terms, this level of volatility is extraordinary. An indicator of electoral volatility has been constructed by Mainwaring.<sup>20</sup> This indicator allows us to measure the transfer of votes from one party to others in subsequent elections. Based on the electoral returns for the legislature from 1979-1993, Mainwaring calculates a volatility rate of 34.5% for this period, which was the third highest in Latin America, exceeded only by Peru (1980-1995, 58.5%) and Ecuador (1979-1996, 38.6%). If the Bolivian election of 2002 is included, then for the period 1997 to 2002, the Bolivian rate reaches 55.2%.<sup>21</sup>

Prior to 2002, the three main parties, MNR, MIR and ADN had been able to form a series of coalitions since 1985 that facilitated the selection of the new president.<sup>22</sup> In 2002, however, the drastic decline of ADN altered this arrangement. An important element in the shift involved the MAS and the NFR, which together garnered nearly 42% of the votes. Thus, in 2002, the MNR and the MIR formed a coalition without the ADN.

From the point of view of institutional development, the elections of 2002 were troubling because they seem to suggest a lack of depth of popular commitment to the established parties. On the other hand, the entry of new forces, especially indigenous forces, could suggest an important broadening of political participation in Bolivia. In this chapter the survey data allow us to analyze these trends to determine what they mean for democratization in Bolivia.

One limitation in this analysis is that the Bolivia survey, like virtually all post-election surveys, suffers from a “coattail effect,” that is, the tendency of respondents in surveys to report having voted, when they did not, and report having voted for the winner when they did not. This effect was first studied in the context of the University of Michigan National Elections surveys and has been well documented.<sup>23</sup> The Bolivia survey for 2002 shows the same phenomenon. For example, even though the MNR received 22% of the national vote, the survey finds that 37% of the voters claim to have done so. However, 9% of the respondents in the survey would not

<sup>20</sup> Mainwaring, Scott. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999. The index is calculated by summing the percentage of votes earned or lost by each party from one election to the following, and then dividing this total in half.

<sup>21</sup> This rate includes both congressional chambers. Mainwaring only uses figures of the low chamber.

<sup>22</sup> Pilar Domingo, “Party Politics, Intermediation and Representation.” In, *Toward Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience*, ed. John Crabtree y Laurence Whitehead. New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001.

<sup>23</sup> Wright, G.C. "Errors in Measuring Vote Choice in the National Election Studies, 1952-1988." *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 1 (1993): 291-316.

reveal their votes, and an additional 7% stated that they had voted “null or blank.” On the other hand, voters for the losing parties suffered an apparent decline in support. For example, while the national election totals showed MAS with 21% of the vote, the survey found 14%. Similarly, while the NFR received 21% of the vote, the survey revealed 17%.<sup>24</sup> The result of this tendency of respondents to “go with the winner” means that when we examine the characteristics of voters for specific parties we know that some of them did not actually vote for that party and thus our picture of the voter is blurred somewhat. Yet, as noted, this is a world-wide problem that affects virtually all surveys, but had not prevented cogent and persuasive analyses of election surveys from presenting reasonably clear pictures of trends.

## Turnout

The calculation of voting turnout can give us a good idea of the level of political participation in Bolivia, and how that participation varies by demographic, geographic and socio-economic factors. Turnout, however, needs to be thought of as two different measures. First, one would want to know turnout in terms of the proportion of eligible voters who voted. Second, one would want to know the proportion of registered voters who voted. The first figure is often neglected in studies of turnout, but since those who are not registered cannot vote, we need to calculate it to get a clear idea of overall voting participation.

### *Turnout of Eligible Voters*

Estimates of turnout have been made by IDEA, the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Their estimates run through the 1997 election. Their results are reported in Table II. 3. As can be seen, beginning in the 1980s and up through 1997, voters as a proportion of registered voters oscillated between 71% and 82%, which by international standards is quite high. IDEA shows, however, that a substantial proportion of the voting-age population is not registered, so the turnout as a percentage of eligible voters was only 64.5% in 1997, a number which, in any event, was considerably higher than in the prior two elections.

Table II. 3. Electoral Turnout, 1956-1997

Year	Total Vote	Registered	% registered who voted	Voting- age population	Turnout of voting age population	Population
<b>1956</b>	958,016	1,126,528	85.0%	1,503,740	63.7%	3,269,000
<b>1960</b>	987,730	1,300,000	76.0%	1,553,850	63.6%	3,453,000
<b>1964</b>	1,297,319	1,411,560	91.9%	1,643,850	78.9%	3,653,000
<b>1966</b>	1,099,994	1,270,611	86.6%	2,002,500	54.9%	4,450,000
<b>1978</b>	1,971,968	1,921,556	102.2%	2,386,800	82.6%	5,304,000
<b>1979</b>	1,693,233	1,871,070	90.5%	2,452,050	69.1%	5,449,000
<b>1980</b>	1,489,484	2,004,284	74.3%	2,520,000	59.1%	5,600,000
<b>1985</b>	1,728,365	2,108,458	82.0%	2,652,750	65.2%	5,895,000
<b>1989</b>	1,563,182	2,136,587	73.2%	3,086,880	50.6%	6,431,000
<b>1993</b>	1,731,309	2,399,197	72.2%	3,461,850	50.0%	7,065,000
<b>1997</b>	2,321,117	3,252,501	71.4%	3,596,616	64.5%	7,340,032

Source: IDEA, [www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int), 2002

<sup>24</sup> These figures from the survey count the null or blank votes as valid when calculating the percentages.

The IDEA calculations, however, need to be taken with considerable caution because the voting-age population given seems unusually low. IDEA is reporting that the voting-age population amounts to only 48% of the total population. One possible confusion here is that prior to 1994, the voting age for single individuals was 21, while married individuals could vote at 18. After that date, the voting age for all citizens was set at 18. In order to verify those figures, and to determine the turnout rates for eligible voters for 2002, it is necessary to use the population data provided by the census, and project it from 2001 to 2002. Fortunately, our calculations can be more precise than those developed by IDEA since the 2001 census data are now available (at least in part). IDEA based its estimates on United Nations and World Bank figures derived from older census tabulations. This is done in Table II. 4. These figures show that the voting-age population is actually 54.9% of the total population. The only uncertainty here is the month in which the person turned 18 and would therefore have been eligible to register and vote. Since the census data are from July and the election was held in July, it is reasonable to merely subtract all of those who were 17 and younger from the national census totals.

Table II. 4. Voting age population according to 2001 census, as projected to 2002

<b>Total population, 2001</b>	8,274,325
<b>- population 0-9 years of age</b>	-2,170,998
<b>- population 10-14 years of age</b>	-1,026,718
<b>-population 15 years of age</b>	-186,989
<b>-population 16 years of age</b>	-175,422
<b>-population 17 years of age</b>	-169,764
<b>Voting age population, July, 2001</b>	4,544,434
<b>Plus estimated annual population growth rate of 2.6%</b>	118,155
<b>Estimated voting age population, July, 2002</b>	4,662,589

Source: calculated from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) web site.

As shown in the above table, according to the 2001 census, the population of Bolivia was 8,274,325 of whom 4,544,434 were 18 years of age and older. To that population we add the projected population increase (2.6%) and derive an estimated voting-age population of 4,662,589.<sup>25</sup> According to the data recently released by the Corte Nacional Electoral, the votes actually cast were 2,994,065, as shown in Table II. 5. Thus we have a turnout rate of the voting age population of 64.2%, which is about 6% lower than IDEA estimated for 1997. This difference, however, is a function of the higher eligible electorate included in the calculations carried out in this report and not necessarily indicative of a decline in the actual vote. The turnout rate of registered voters was 72.1%

<sup>25</sup> From this number should be subtracted non-citizens, but the 2001 census does not yet provide this information. In any event, international migration into Bolivia has traditionally been quite low.

Table II. 5. Votes cast in the 2002 national election

Votes	Totals	Percents
<b>Registered</b>	4,155,055	100.0
<b>Total</b>	2,994,065	72.06% (turnout)
<b>Of total votes:</b>		
<b>Valid</b>	2,778,808	92.81%
<b>Blank</b>	130,685	4.37%
<b>Null</b>	84,572	2.83%
	2,994,065	100.00%

Source: Corte Nacional Electoral

The results from the University of Pittsburgh survey (question VBPRS02) appear in Figure II. 1. As can be seen, about 85% of the respondents reported having voted, with an additional 9% stating that they were not registered to vote, and 5% stating that they had not voted. These participation rates, by international standards, are very high, and are also higher than the actual election results as calculated above. Again, this fits in with the pattern of higher reported turnout in surveys than in actual fact.




Figure II. 1 Turnout rate according to survey


### *Characteristics of Voters versus Non-Voters*

With most of the respondents claiming to have voted, it is not easy to distinguish the characteristics of the voters from the non-voters. In order to carry out this analysis, logistic regression was employed, since the dependent variable was recoded into a dichotomy between voting and non-voting. The results of the analysis are shown in Table II. 6. The column labeled “Sig.” shows which variables are statistically significant at .05 or better (i.e., only five times out of 100). The significant predictors are urbanization, gender, age, and education. Although income and ethnic self-identification were significant predictors when the other variables are excluded from the equation, when those are included they become more important and wipe out the income and ethnic effect.

**Table II. 6 Predictors of turnout (logistic regression)**

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
UR, Urbanization	-.114	.046	6.268	1	.012	.892
Q1, Gender	-.532	.114	21.983	1	.000	.587
Q2, Age	.061	.005	131.25	1	.000	1.063
			4			
Q10, Family income	.018	.048	.133	1	.715	1.018
BLANCO, Self-identify as “white”	.113	.151	.558	1	.455	1.120
INDIGENA, Self-identify as “Indian”	.280	.179	2.438	1	.118	1.323
ED, Years of education	.115	.016	54.226	1	.000	1.122
Constant	-.469	.372	1.594	1	.207	.625

In order to more clearly show the reader the impact of these significant variables, we present a series of graphs highlighting each one individually. Urbanization was the first significant predictor. This variable (UR) is coded to reflect five distinct sampling strata, covering urban centers with populations larger than 20,000 down to dispersed rural settlements of fewer than 500 residents. The results are shown in Figure II. 2. As can be seen, the major difference is between the large cities and the rest of the country.



**Figure II. 2 Urbanization and turnout**

We next look at gender, which is shown in Figure II. 3. As can be seen, there is a significant gender gap, with men more likely to vote than women. It should be kept in mind that the difference in gender was shown to be significant by the regression analysis even after other variables have been held constant.




Figure II. 3 Voting turnout by gender

We next look at the impact of age on voting turnout. The results presented in Figure II. 4 in part support those found in other studies and in part contradict them. The relationship between age and voting has long been found to be curvilinear. For example, a study of six Central American countries as part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project found that the young and the old vote at levels lower than those in their middle years.<sup>26</sup> The explanation for this phenomenon is that the young have little reason to participate in politics as they normally have not yet raised a family, while the old have often lost interest in politics and, perhaps more importantly, have difficulty getting to the polls. In Bolivia, however, while the young exhibit much lower turnout, the old (those over 66 years of age) vote at the highest levels. One reason for this may be that in Bolivia, those over 65 years of age have been receiving an annual cash payment. In order to obtain the payment, citizens must register, and this may be responsible for the higher turnout.





Figure II. 4 Voting turnout by age

An even clearer picture of the impact of age on vote among the young is shown in Figure II. 5. Whereas in the prior figure the 18-25 year old cohort were lumped together, in this new figure, we can examine the individual years of 18, 19, and 20 years of age. It is very clear that those who are 18 vote at the lowest rates. Indeed, the gap is so large between the 18 year olds and the 19 year olds one begins to suspect that part of the problem of low voting among the young is merely an artifact of registration problems. Individuals who were 18 on the date of the

<sup>26</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson et al., "Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis," in *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*, ed. John A. Booth (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

election might not have been old enough to have registered to vote in the months prior to the election. The process of registering is somewhat complex and time consuming, as it requires a personal visit by the individual to the local registration office.<sup>27</sup> If these institutional barriers to registration in fact explain the low turnout among the 18 year old cohort, perhaps policy changes could be considered to find a way to register 17 year olds who will turn 18 by the next election.



**Figure II. 5 Voting turnout by age: 18-20 year group**

<sup>27</sup> The electoral code has the following provisions:

Artículo 96°.- (OBLIGATORIEDAD DE REGISTRO). Todos los ciudadanos están obligados a registrarse en el Padrón Electoral, siendo optativa la inscripción para los mayores de setenta años.

Artículo 98°.- (NORMAS PARA LA INSCRIPCIÓN). La inscripción y reinscripción es un acto personal. El ciudadano deberá hacerlo en la notaría de su circunscripción electoral más próxima a su domicilio.

Artículo 99°.- (NORMAS PARA LA INSCRIPCIÓN). Los notarios electorales en ejercicio de la facultad otorgada por el inciso a) del Artículo 42° del presente Código, inscribirán a los ciudadanos.

Artículo 100°.- (DOCUMENTO VÁLIDO Y AUTORIDAD COMPETENTE). La inscripción de los ciudadanos se efectuará con la presentación de documento de identidad, pasaporte o libreta de servicio militar y ante el notario electoral de su domicilio, el cual con su firma y sello dará fe del acto.

It is illuminating to examine the joint effect of age and gender. The results are shown in Figure II. 6. There is it seen that for each age cohort males are more likely to vote than females.





Figure II. 6 Voting turnout by age and gender

The last remaining significant predictor of vote turnout is education. The results shown in Figure II. 7 demonstrate that only higher education affects turnout. Among those with university-level education, turnout is about 10% higher than it is in the rest of the population.



**Figure II. 7 Voting turnout by education**

These results, however, are strongly affected by gender, as is shown in Figure II. 8. Females increase their turnout in direct linear proportion to increased education. There is a large gap between males and females at the lowest levels of education, but one that narrows to virtually no difference among university educated Bolivians. What is surprising is to see that voting among Bolivian males with junior high school and high school education at such low levels. The explanation for this pattern is not obvious and requires examination.




Figure II. 8 Voting turnout by education and gender

Not only is education important in explaining vote choice, but the level of political information is as well. Of course, education and information often are closely associated since well-educated individuals have many more sources of information than those who are poorly educated. The results shown in Figure II. 9 reveal that the MNR voters are the most informed while the MAS voters, who are also the least well educated, are the least well informed.





Figure II. 9 Impact of political information on vote for president, 2002

Turnout by department in Bolivia does vary, but much of that is variation produced by different levels of urbanization, education and age, the factors that we have shown to produce significant variation in voting. In order to examine variation in turnout *net* of the impact of these factors, an analysis of covariance was performed, using turnout as the dependent variable and urbanization, education, age and gender as covariates. While all of the covariates were significant, department is not. The results are shown in Figure II. 10.<sup>28</sup> Pando has higher turnout than the other departments, and the results for that one department lie outside the confidence intervals of the departments with the lowest turnout, but since the overall impact of department is insignificant, this finding is not of substantive import.

<sup>28</sup> Since the effective sample size for some departments is very small, to conduct this analysis the unweighted sample was employed. Since the comparison is by department, this has no impact on the interpretation of the results.



**Figure II. 10 Voting turnout by department**  
**Controlled for gender, age, education and urbanization**

### Party Voting and Citizen Characteristics

We now move beyond the act of voting itself to dissect the characteristics of the voters for the various parties. To do this we need to concentrate on the five parties that received the largest number of votes since the sample size for the smaller parties is too low to be able to make reasonably sound interpretations of the results. In Table II. 7 the overall results are presented. The reader needs to keep in mind the earlier discussion of the inflated vote total, and the inflated votes for the winning party. The parties are listed from highest to lowest vote totals, according to the survey. The top four, up through MAS, have 300 or more cases and are suitable for analysis. The remaining parties will be excluded from this analysis since lumping them together is not very helpful, given the different programs each of these parties represents.

Table II. 7. Vote by party, 2002 presidential election

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
MNR	830	27.5	37.1	37.1
NFR	369	12.2	16.5	53.6
MIR	326	10.8	14.6	68.2
MAS	311	10.3	13.9	82.1
Nulo/Blanco	151	5.0	6.8	88.9
ADN	77	2.6	3.5	92.3
UCS	63	2.1	2.8	95.2
JYL	61	2.0	2.7	97.9
MIP	30	1.0	1.4	99.3
MCC	11	.4	.5	99.7
PS	6	.2	.3	100.0
Total	2,235	74.1	100.0	
INAP	456	15.1		
DK	326	10.8		
Total	782	25.9		
	3,017	100.0		

### ***Demographic, Ethnic, Geographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Party Voters***

In what ways do the voters for the top four parties differ from each other? We first look at gender. As can be seen in Figure II. 11, with the single exception of votes for the MIR, where men comprise 60% of the votes, gender has no impact on the vote. In many countries parties show a much stronger gender split, but not in Bolivia.




Figure II. 11 The impact of gender on vote, 2002

We next look at age. The results are shown in Figure II. 12. The differences are significant, with the MNR attracting the oldest constituency and the MIR the youngest. Since the NFR and MAS were new to the political scene for the 2002 election, they did not have a reservoir of loyal voters that the MNR could rely upon and which understandably produced an average older age of voter for that party. Moreover, the NFR directed an important part of its campaign toward the youth. The MIR had, however, run in the last election, and indeed had been founded in 1971. Therefore, it had ample opportunity to attract an older constituency. At the same time, with its leftist orientation, it was more likely to attract a younger voter.




Figure II. 12 The impact of age on vote, 2002

Urbanization is the next variable to be examined. The results are shown in Figure II. 13. We can see that in general, the parties draw approximately the same level of support from each stratum of the population, with the exception of the greater urban concentration of vote for the NFR and the lower concentration of urban support for the MIR. These results help debunk many myths of Bolivian politics, which have long argued that one party or the other has its routes in the city or the countryside.




Figure II. 13 The impact of urbanization on vote, 2002

We can also examine support for the parties by department. Sharp differences emerge, as is shown in Figure II. 14. The MNR, for example, was very strong in Beni and Pando, but far weaker in La Paz and Oruro. On the other hand, MAS was very strong in La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro, but very weak in Pando, Tarija and El Beni. The reader should keep in mind that this figure shows the distribution of votes *within* each department; departments vary greatly in total population size, and therefore these figures do not reflect the national vote distribution.




Figure II. 14 Impact of department on vote for president, 2002

In recent years there has been a resurgence of ethnic politics in Latin America, especially in Guatemala, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. In some cases, this has led to parties defined by their ethnic identity.<sup>29</sup> We discuss this issue of ethnicity in great detail later in this study. Here we concentrate only on the party vote issue. In Bolivia, among the four parties being studied here, the MAS is the party that is most closely identified with ethnic politics. The results of the survey show that the indigenous population was far more likely to vote for that party than the others, as shown in Figure II. 15. For the country as a whole, only 10.8% of the respondents to the survey identified as Indian, and among those who voted for the top four parties being studied here, only 10.4% were Indian. Yet, the proportion of MAS voters who self-identified as Indian was 22% as shown in Figure II. 15. The proportion of voters for the other parties does not exceed 9%. These results, which were to be expected, help give us confidence in the overall integrity of the data base.

<sup>29</sup> Deborah Yashar, "Indigenous Protest and Democracy in Latin America," in *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*, ed. Jorge Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Deborah J. Yashar, "Contesting citizenship - Indigenous movements and democracy in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 1 (1998):23-42.




Figure II. 15 Impact of ethnic self-identification on vote for president, 2002

Education also divides the voters by party. As can be seen in Figure II. 16, the NFR voter is far better educated than the voters for the other parties, whereas the MAS voter has the lowest level of education. These differences in part are explained by the urban strengths of the NFR and the rural strengths of the MAS. The MNR and the MIR voters score at about the national average.





Figure II. 16 Impact of education on vote for president, 2002

Not only is education important in explaining vote choice, but the level of political information is as well. Of course, education and information often are closely associated since well educated individuals have many more sources of information than those who are poorly educated. The results shown in Figure II. 17 reveal that the MNR voters are the most informed while the MAS voters, who are also the least well educated, are the least well informed.



**Figure II. 17 Impact of political information on vote for president, 2002**

Income also has an impact on party vote, as is shown in Figure II. 18. The NFR voter has an income significantly higher than the national average, as does the MNR voter. On the other hand, the MAS voter is far less wealthy than the national average.





Figure II. 18 Impact of income on vote for president, 2002


***Political Differences Among Voters***

Voters do not differ solely on demographic, socio-economic geographic grounds. There are important political differences among them. The survey used a left-right scale (variable L1), ranging from a low of 1, indicating the extreme left, to a high of 10 indicating the extreme right. Bolivians clustered around the middle of the scale, averaging 5.4. As can be seen in Figure II. 19, however, the MNR voter was much further to the right than the national average, whereas the MIR and MAS voters were much further to the left. Only the NFR voter was close to the center and the national average.




**Figure II. 19 Impact of ideology on vote for president, 2002**

One of the key variables that has been examined in the prior studies in this series has been *system support*, defined as the degree to which citizens view their basic system of government as being legitimate. In another chapter in this study, this variable is explored in some detail. The index is based on 5 items (variables B1-B6) and is scored on a 0-100 basis. System support varies significantly among supporters of the major parties in the 2002 elections, as shown in Figure II. 20. There it can be observed that the MIR and MNR have a level of support statistically indistinguishable from each other, but significantly higher than the NFR and MAS. These results are particularly interesting when placed along side of the ideology results shown above. The MIR, which was on the left, is nonetheless comprised of voters with relatively high levels of system support. We say “relatively” because as shown in prior reports and elsewhere in this study, system support in Bolivia overall is low. The MAS party, however, is supported by an alienated left. The NFR, in contrast, is on the alienated right, but since the upper portion of the confidence interval passes through the national mean (see figure), one should be cautious about calling this group “alienated.” The MAS, however, clearly falls into that category.



**Figure II. 20 Impact of system support on vote for president, 2002**  
**Confidence interval plot**

Political tolerance, the belief that minorities should enjoy a full range of civil liberties, has also been studied extensively in this series of surveys on Bolivia, and will be analyzed later in this report. Tolerance is measured as an index based on four variables (D1-D4) and also ranges from 0-100. Here we examine differences in levels of tolerance among the voters for the four major parties in the 2002 election. The results are shown in Figure II. 21. The differences are not as sharp as they were for system support, with the only significant difference being the MNR on the intolerant end versus the MAS on the “tolerant” end. We put “tolerant” in quotes because even though the MAS supporters are the most tolerant of the rights of political minorities (which they clearly are), they are still in the negative end of the tolerance scale (below 50). It has been noted before that Bolivians express low levels of political tolerance when compared to other countries in Latin America for which we have data in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. Elsewhere in this study we report on overall levels of tolerance.



**Figure II. 21 Impact of tolerance on vote for president, 2002:**  
**Confidence interval chart**

***Democratic and Anti-Democratic Values: Variation by Party Vote***

We now turn to a series of measures that tap into support or opposition to democracy. A key indicator of anti-democratic values is support for the overthrow of democracy by a military coup. This question has grown in importance in Latin America in recent years as a number of countries seem to be questioning the value of a democratic regime. Studies by Encuestas y Estudios over the period 1996-2001 reveal a steady decline in the proportion of the Bolivian population that prefers democracy over other forms of government. We asked a series of questions (JC1-JC12) in which various circumstances were presented as possible justifications for a coup. We then associated these responses with support for the four major parties in the 2002 election. The results are shown in Figure II. 22. The voters for the MNR are significantly less likely to support a coup, no doubt a reflection on their own history, in which military rule removed their party from power. It is disappointing to see that voters for all other parties express considerable support for coups, and when confronted with conditions of high levels of crime and corruption, majorities of the voters for the NFR and MIR would justify such an overthrow. Near majorities of MAS voters would also justify an overthrow. Even among MNR supporters, 44%

would justify the overthrow of democracy by a military coup when confronted with high levels of crime or corruption.




Figure II. 22 Justification of military coup by party vote

The 2002 survey contains a battery of items (AUT10-AUT17) in which respondents are asked to select among democratic and authoritarian options. On each of those there were significant differences among the parties. In Figure II. 23 the overall patterns are shown for three key items in this series. These items are:

**AUT10. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo?**

- [1] Lo que Bolivia más necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, o
- [2] Lo que el país necesita más es un hombre que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la población?

**AUT15. A veces hay protestas que provocan dificultades porque se cierran las calles. En esos casos, ¿qué debe hacer el gobierno?**

- [1] Negociar con los manifestantes aunque esto pueda tardar días o semanas, afectando la economía del país, o
- [2] Mandar a la policía para abrir los caminos.

**AUT16. Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría Ud. que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno:**

- [1] Mantener el orden en la sociedad
- [2] Respetar la libertad del individuo

The items have been recoded to make the democratic response equivalent of 100 and the non-democratic response equivalent to 0. In that way, the percentage democratic of each response can be obtained, and is shown in Figure II. 23. The party whose supporters are consistently the most democratic is the MAS, whereas the MNR supporters score at the bottom. The extreme case is the last question asking for the respondent to select between maintaining order versus respecting individual liberty. Over three-fifths of those who voted for the MAS favored liberty, compared to a much smaller proportion of those who voted for the other parties.




Figure II. 23 Preference for democratic rule and vote for president, 2002

### The “Uninominal” Deputy

Many countries throughout the world have been changing the manner in which the public is represented in politics. A major reason for this is that publics have increasingly lost faith in

their legislatures, as numerous surveys have revealed.<sup>30</sup> Bolivia has also suffered from this problem and has acted to remedy the problem by introducing a system similar to that employed in Germany. In that country, after World War II, the influence of the United States helped introduce a mixed system of representation in which a portion of the legislature was elected using the traditional German system of “party lists,” by which voters cast their vote for a given party, which has a list of candidates for a multi-member legislative district. The other portion of the legislature is elected in single-member districts, much as in the U.S. and Britain. In this case voters are electing an individual, not a party.

In theory, single-member districts can help bridge the gap between elected officials and their constituencies. In single-member districts voters are casting their vote for an individual rather than an amorphous list of names. They then can hold that individual accountable for actions and non-actions. In practice, single-member districts work best if accompanied by the ability of the individual legislator to “bring home the pork” to his/her district. If the legislator cannot do that either because the party controls the “pork” or because the budget itself is entirely controlled by the executive, there is little for which a single-member district deputy can be held accountable. In Bolivia, the single-member district system is not accompanied by the pork-barrel system, so it is very difficult to those deputies to win support of their constituents.

Bolivia has a mixed system of representation by which a portion of the deputies are elected in multi-member districts and another portion in single-member districts. In the 2002 study we asked a series of questions to determine how well this system was functioning. But we also want to know about split-ticket voting. It is to that issue we turn first.

### ***Split-Ticket Voting***

In Bolivia, votes for the president are also votes for the multi-member (i.e., “plurinominal”) list of candidates for the legislature. The uninominal candidates, however, are elected with a separate ballot, one for each jurisdiction. To what degree do Bolivians split their ballots, voting for one candidate for President/member candidates and another party’s candidate for the single-member (i.e., “uninominal”) candidate? We can answer this question by examining the cross-tabulation shown in Table II. 8. If 100% of the voters for President/multi-member deputy had voted the same way for the single-member candidate, all of the respondents would be on the diagonal group of cells (shaded in grey) in the table. In fact, as is clearly shown, between one-half and one third of the voters split their tickets. Voters for the MNR and MIR were least likely to split their tickets, but voters for the NFR and the MAS were just as likely to split their tickets as not to have done so. In part this may be a function of the lack of candidates for these parties in all districts. It is of note that whereas the MNR voters who split their tickets were most likely to cast a single-member district vote for the NFR, NFR voters were more likely to vote for the MIR. Voters for the MIR and MAS, however, tended to split their votes widely. For example, the MIR and MAS split-ticket voter went most heavily for other minor parties, but the MAS split-ticket were also likely to vote for the MIR.

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<sup>30</sup> Pipa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Table II. 8. Straight-ticket vs. Split-ticket voting in Bolivia, 2002 election

Deputy vote	Presidential vote				Total
	MNR	NFR	MIR	MAS	
MNR	68.7%	9.9%	10.4%	9.3%	36.7%
NFR	8.9%	47.3%	4.0%	6.0%	15.3%
MIR	6.8%	20.5%	67.8%	13.8%	21.7%
MAS	1.9%	1.2%	2.7%	51.5%	9.9%
Other vote	13.8%	21.1%	15.1%	19.4%	16.4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

These findings are very interesting since they suggest an independence of thought on the part of the voter, but perhaps more importantly suggest that the “coattails” of the Presidential candidate are relatively short. That is, large numbers of voters would cast their votes for a legislator *other* than that of the presidential candidate if they had had the opportunity. This means that if Bolivia were to shift entirely to a single-member district system, it could be very difficult for an elected president to develop a majority in the legislature. It is important to keep this finding in mind since there are a number of proposals to make this shift.

### ***Preferences for the Single-Member District***

We asked our respondents (question VB7), “In your opinion, who represents you better: 1) the multi-member party list or 2) the single-member deputy of your district?” We allowed respondents to also state that they did not know which one was which or to state “none.”<sup>31</sup> The results are shown in Figure II. 24. The opinions provide overwhelming support for the single-member representative, and almost no support for the multi-member representative. Moreover, there has been a large increase between 2000 and 2002 and a decline in the “none” response. It seems obvious that from the point of view of the voters, the uninominal system has been a major success.

<sup>31</sup> The “none” option was not given in 1998, the first time the question was asked, so the the data from that year are not comparable.




Figure II. 24 Who represents you better?

It is also clear from the data that Bolivians, on the whole, understand the nature of the single-member system. In the 2002 survey we asked (UNI1), “Who elects the single-member deputy?” The results are shown in Figure II. 25. Most respondent know that the single-member deputy is elected by the voters of his/her electoral district.






Figure II. 25 Who elects the single-member deputy?

We also asked in the 2002 survey (UNI2), “In your opinion, who should the single-member district obey more? His party? The municipal council members? Those who elected him/her? Him/herself?” The results of this question are also very encouraging, as is shown in Figure II. 26. There we see that nearly three-quarters of the respondents stated that the elected representative should obey the electorate more than anyone else.



**Figure II. 26** Who should single-member district representative obey more?

These findings suggest that the Bolivian population is demanding direct accountability to voters. There are different ways in which this could be accomplished. In the survey for 2002 we included three items (UNI3-UNI5) to determine if voters had *heard of* different mechanisms for achieving this accountability. These were: 1) holding public audience with the deputy; 2) holding meetings with the “departmental brigades,” and 3) EDCs, or “encuentros de decisiones concurrentes.” The results are shown in Figure II. 27, where it can be observed that most Bolivians had not heard of these ways of contacting their single-member deputy. This findings suggests that a public information campaign is perhaps needed in order to expand awareness of demand-making mechanisms so as to increase accountability of elected representatives.



**Figure II. 27 Knowledge of ways to contact deputy**

We can look at these same three variables at the level of each department. The results are shown in Figure II. 28. There is some departmental variation (e.g., the high score of Pando for the EDC's), but for the most part, these results show that at the level of the department, most Bolivians have not heard of these participatory mechanisms that help hold elected officials accountable to popular demands.




Figure II. 28 Heard of ways to contact deputy: by department

## Conclusions


This chapter has looked at voting turnout and partisan vote choice in the 2002 Bolivian national election. We noted that Bolivia suffers from volatility in voter preferences, reflected by strong shifts of vote choice from one election to another. The analysis of the 2002 survey data has found a number of demographic, geographic, socio-economic, and ideological factors that influence either one or both of these dimensions of political participation. Sharp differences separate voters from non-voters and those who prefer one party over another. It was also found that ethnic differences also explain partisan vote choice especially with respect to the MAS party. Important differences emerged among supporters of the various parties in support for democratic and anti-democratic values. The chapter also examined the single-member district system in Bolivia, and found that it is overwhelmingly popular. It is also a system that is well understood by the public, at least in terms of its basic functioning, although most Bolivians have not heard of various accountability mechanisms that exist for citizen input to the single-member representative.

## **Chapter III. Local Government and Democracy**

Prior editions of this study have focused on local government, which has been among the most dynamic elements of the Bolivian political system since the passage of the Popular Participation Law in 1994 and the Law of Administrative Decentralization in 1995. The report from 2000 showed a troubling decline in popular participation in local government activities, suggesting that perhaps the novelty of the new system was wearing off and Bolivian local participation would fall back to the low levels of the pre-reform period. The survey carried out in 2002 is a good place to determine the longer-run trends of popular participation as we repeated the same questions asked in 1998 and 2000. What we find is that participation has returned to high levels, in some cases to the highest levels yet measured in this study, which is certainly very encouraging. The 2002 study also contains within it a special sample of respondents who live in municipalities that have received the full package of inputs from the USAID-supported Democratic Development and Popular Participation (DDPC) program, and we can compare the response of those individuals to the sample as a whole. We do that in the second section of this chapter. In the first part of the chapter we examine the national sample results.


### **Municipal Participation: National Results**

Attendance at municipal meetings (measured by NP1) is one very important way that citizens can influence local government. For many years in Latin America municipal meetings were closed to the public, but it has become common throughout the region to allow, indeed invite, citizens to attend. We measured the proportion of citizens who attended such meetings in the year prior to the surveys, and the results are shown in Figure III. 1. As can be seen, the decline experienced in 2000 was ephemeral, and by 2002 the loss had been entirely restored.




**Figure III. 1 Participation in municipal meetings, 1998-2002**

We can compare these results to some of other surveys in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project series. Unfortunately, the comparisons are not exact since in some countries there is the widespread use of the “cabildo abierto,” the open town meeting, at which larger numbers of citizens attend, many of them to enjoy the entertainment that is often provided by local singing and dancing groups. This attendance counts in our surveys, however, as municipal participation, but makes the comparison exercise a bit risky. As can be seen in Figure III. 2, Bolivia stands in about the middle of the range of countries included in the series.




**Figure III. 2 Attendance at municipal meetings:  
Bolivia in comparative perspective**

The survey goes beyond mere attendance at meetings and looks at demand-making (question NP2). We want to know if the respondents asked for help or presented a petition to some office of the local government during the year prior to the survey. Here we note an active citizenry, one that in 2002 scored at the highest level ever in our series; one out of five Bolivians made a demand on their local governments in the year prior to the survey.




**Figure III. 3 Demand-making on local government: Bolivia, 1998-2002**

We can gain some perspective on these results by examining them in comparative perspective. The results are shown in Figure III. 4. It can be seen that Bolivian demand-making is on the high end, but far below the extreme cases of Guatemala and Peru.




**Figure III. 4 Demand-making on local government:  
Bolivia in comparative perspective**

Demands can be met or denied. In poor countries it is very difficult and sometimes impossible for public officials to meet citizen demands. We asked our respondents who told us that they had made demands to tell us if they were satisfied or not with the reply given to them (question NP2A). The results are shown in Figure III. 5. There is it shown that only two-fifths of those making a demand have been satisfied, a proportion that has not changed significantly over the years that the survey has been conducted. The reader should keep in mind that these figures refer only to those making demands on local government, which, as has already been shown, amount to about one-fifth of the respondents.



**Figure III. 5 Satisfaction with local government response,  
Among those who made a demand**

In Bolivia, one very important mode of participation is that of attending meetings to discuss or plan the municipal budget or to help develop the Annual Operative Plan (POA). We asked respondents about this form of participation (variable NP4). The results are shown in Figure III. 6. As can be seen, the pattern follows that of overall municipal participation, albeit at a lower level. In 2000 participation declined, but it returned to its prior level by 2002.



**Figure III. 6 Participation in budget or POA meetings**

Another very important form of local participation in Bolivia is bringing complaints to the municipal vigilance committee (Comité de Vigilancia). The results shown in Figure III. 7 follow the now-familiar pattern, with the dip in 2000 being fully restored in 2002.




Figure III. 7 Presented a complaint to the vigilance committee

## Municipal Participation: The Impact of the DDPC

As noted in the first chapter of this study, one objective of the analysis is to examine the impact of an effort to enhance municipal government in Bolivia. That program, called the DDPC, or Democratic Development, and Citizen Participation. In the 2002 study it was decided to select a special sample of those municipalities and/or commonwealth associations of municipalities, called *mancomunidades* in Bolivia, and to compare those results with the national results. The sample of DDPC municipalities was drawn at random from the list of municipalities that, by the time of the study, had undergone the full package of inputs. In this way, comparisons can be made between those municipalities and *mancomunidades* and the rest of the country. The DDPC program also applied part of its package to other areas of the country from which the national sample was drawn.<sup>32</sup> In order not to confuse the results with those areas of the country which had received partial DDPC inputs, we eliminated those areas from the national sample, so that the comparison could be made directly between the “full-package” DDPC sample and the rest of the country. As will be noted below, however, we still needed to introduce controls to compensate for demographic and socio-economic differences between the national sample and the DDPC sample.

<sup>32</sup> Specifically, it worked in 17 out of the 132 municipalities from which the sample was drawn, affecting 404 of the 3,017 respondents in the 2002 study.

The DDPC program began by selecting a small number of municipalities and doing pilot project work there. This effort was then scaled up under what was called the “replicability strategy.” Under this strategy, DDCP provided small institutional strengthening grants to selected *mancomunidades* and departmental municipal associations to hire from three to five technical staff with expertise or training in municipal budgeting, participatory planning, municipal legislation, meeting facilitation, etc. DDCP, in turn, trained these technical staff in its “Modelo de Gestión Municipal Participativa,” which, as a starting point, sought to increase citizen participation in the definition of the annual operating plan and budget. The efforts also focused on strengthening the capacity of the municipal executive and council to properly prepare accounts, organize itself and, in general, respond to the increasing demands of the citizenry in a public manner.

One goal of the project has been to make citizens become more active municipal actors. The expectation was that they would participate more frequently in municipal meetings, feel that the municipal government is more transparent and responsive than the national norm, and believe that they exercise effective social control over the municipal government. Eventually, but not immediately, if successful, these two elements were designed to increase citizen satisfaction with the performance of municipal government and, by extension, with the democratic system of governance.

The specific activities carried out to achieve the above-stated goals were:

1. EDA 1: (Encuentro de Avance-1), is a one-day public hearing in which the Municipal Executive (Mayor) reports on his/her progress on implementing/executing the annual operating plan and budget (POA/P). Representatives from the Municipal Council, Vigilance Committee, OTBs, Civil Society and citizens at large are invited to attend and to actively question the Executive. The EDA is meant to engender accountability in the Municipal Executive and to provide a mechanism for citizens to exercise social control over municipal spending decisions. The EDAs are generally held quarterly. The second trimester EDA is known as EDA 2.

2. EDA 2: see previous paragraph. Although DDCP encourages each municipality to hold EDAs on a quarterly basis, (although the DDPC contractual commitment with USAID only requires 2 EDAs annually).

The heart of the DDCP participatory municipal planning process is the conduct of “cumbres” (municipal planning public hearings) to which all municipal actors (Executive, Council, Comité, OTBs, Civil Society, Sectoral Interests) play a role in defining the content of annual operating plans and budgets. Each “cumbre” occurs sequentially over a three month period; “Cumbre 1” in September, “Cumbre II” in October and “Cumbre III” in November of each year. The hope is that through the three summits, citizens will perceive themselves as exercising greater control over the definition of municipal spending priorities and greater social control and oversight of the Executive. Hopefully, over time, there would be an increase in citizen satisfaction with the performance of their representatives and municipality.

3. Cumbre I: DDCP invites the Presidents of each OTB to participate in the conduct of a training to diagnose the needs of their communities and to prioritize development projects. The training, which lasts a full day, usually is attended by 60 - 100 OTB Presidents in a rural municipality. Once the training is finalized, the Presidents return to their community to conduct a participatory diagnostic.

4. Cumbre II: In the one-day Cumbre II, the information gathered by the OTB representatives is then, in a participatory manner involving OTB leaders, collated and prioritized by the Comité de Vigilancia and presented to the Municipal Executive to serve as the basis for drafting a Municipal Annual Operating Plan and Budget (POA/P). Cumbre II is usually attended by 80-120 OTB representatives, the Vigilance Committee and municipal representatives from the Executive and Council.

5. Cumbre III: In the one-day Cumbre III, the Mayor presents, in a public hearing attended by OTB leaders, a draft POA/P to the Municipal Council and Vigilance Committee, requesting their approval for its content and/or suggestions for modifications. Once negotiations are finalized, the Municipal Council and Vigilance Committee are required to “aprobar” (in the case of the Municipal Council) and “pronunciar” (in the case of the Vigilance Committee). Some municipalities carried out one or two of the scheduled three Cumbres. In some cases the municipalities are as yet, as of December 31, 2002 (the date of the most recent information), to carry-out the remaining Cumbres.

6. EDC 1: In the one-day EDC 1, DDCP invites Mayors, Municipal Council Members, Presidents of Vigilance Committees, Civil Society Representatives, Sectoral Representatives (Health, Education, etc), Prefectos, Sub-Prefectos, and others to meet with their single-member district congressional representative (*diputado uninominal*) to define the interests and demands of constituents as the basis for drafting an annual work plan for the single-member district representative. Generally, 75-125 individuals participate in the event. It is hoped to see increased levels of citizen satisfaction with their representative, although perhaps not for the Congress as a whole.

7. EDC 2: The one-day EDC 2 allows the single-district representative to inform his/her constituents on progress in implementing the annual work plan. During these sessions, the representative may also request assistance from participants in implementing the work plan.

8. *Capacitación, Reglamentos Específicos para Comité, Concejo, Ejecutivo*: These are multi-day training sessions of Vigilance Committees or Municipal Councils or Executives, in which the internal rules of organization and order are defined for each institution. That is to say, DDCP convokes all the Vigilance Committees of a certain Mancomunidad and will train them in documenting internal processes and organization, based upon a DDCP model of how small, rural municipalities might organize themselves.

9. *Aprobación de Reglamentos Específicos para Comité, Concejo, Ejecutivo*: In those cases where the “Reglamentos Específicos” are officially adopted by a Vigilance Committee, or Municipal Council or Executive, it is hoped that citizens will perceive greater transparency and efficiency of operations.

## **Control Variables**

Before are made between the special DDPC sample and the rest of Bolivia,<sup>33</sup> however, it is important to determine if the DDPC sample differs demographically or socio-economically from the rest of the country. Since the DDPC program focused heavily on rural areas and smaller cities and towns, it is likely that the sample drawn to represent the areas that received the full DDPC package of inputs would be more rural, and as a consequence poorer and less well educated than the national population. Demographically, however, we would not expect

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<sup>33</sup> Again, the reader needs to recall that we remove from the “rest of Bolivia” municipalities in which the DDPC provided some inputs. The data base variable to do this is called MUNISEL.

differences. As shown in Table III. 1 (observe the last column, the one labeled “Sig.”), there are no significant differences between the national and DDPC samples in terms of gender or age. This is as expected. There are, however, wide and significant differences in urbanization, education and income. The DDPC sample is, again as expected, more rural, less well educated and of lower income than the national population. We therefore need to control for these factors before we make comparisons on the issues of municipal participation.


Table III. 1. Comparisons of national sample with DDPC sample, 2002: Demographic and socio-economic factors

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q1 Gender * DDPC02 National vs. DDPC sample for 2002	Between Groups	(Combined)	.035	1	.035	.140	.708
	Within Groups		979.465	3916	.250		
	Total		979.500	3917			
Q2 Age * DDPC02 National vs. DDPC sample for 2002	Between Groups	(Combined)	.874	1	.874	.004	.949
	Within Groups		851278.282	3916	217.385		
	Total		851279.156	3917			
UR Urban/Rural * DDPC02 National vs. DDPC sample for 2002	Between Groups	(Combined)	1226.223	1	1226.223	885.207	.000
	Within Groups		5424.594	3916	1.385		
	Total		6650.817	3917			
ED Education * DDPC02 National vs. DDPC sample for 2002	Between Groups	(Combined)	6002.116	1	6002.116	256.930	.000
	Within Groups		91387.979	3912	23.361		
	Total		97390.095	3913			
Q10 Monthly income * DDPC02 National vs. DDPC sample for 2002	Between Groups	(Combined)	564.705	1	564.705	301.565	.000
	Within Groups		6848.037	3657	1.873		
	Total		7412.742	3658			

### ***Municipal Meeting Participation: DDPC vs. the Nation***

The differences in municipal meeting participation (NP2) encountered between the national sample and the DDPC sample are relatively large and statistically significant, as shown in Figure III. 8. As can be seen, Bolivians living in the regions where the DDPC carried out its full program participated at significantly higher levels than those in the rest of the country. This, of course, is a major finding. It shows a 27% increase in the DDPC areas vs. the nation even


when key control variables (urbanization, income and education) are introduced. When these results are placed in an international perspective, the DDPC areas increase their participation to match the top-level countries shown in Figure III. 2 above. No country in our data base, for example, has participation levels above 29%, so the DDPC-induced increase is important in this comparative sense.



**Figure III. 8 Nations vs. DDPC: Participation in municipal meeting:  
Controlled for urbanization, income and education**

### ***Demand-Making: DDPC vs. the Nation***


We also can compare demand-making at the municipal level. The results in Figure III. 9 show once again that participation in the DDPC areas, even when controlled for the demographic and socio-economic differences between them and the rest of Bolivia, is significantly higher. In percentage term, over the national base, the increase is 27%. In addition, once again, the DDPC areas come close to matching those countries in our sample that are at the top of the list (see Figure III. 4). These findings suggest significant and large increases in participation as a result of the DDPC efforts, since we have controlled for the relevant variables that could otherwise explain the higher levels in the DDPC areas.



**Figure III. 9 Nation vs. DDPC: Demand-making on local government  
Controlled for urbanization, income and education**


### ***Satisfaction: DDPC vs. the Nation***

We asked respondents about their satisfaction with the response they received from their municipality for the demands that were made. Here we see (Figure III. 10) a sharp and significant difference in levels of satisfaction among those who made demands. Apparently, those municipios in the DDPC program have learned how to respond to citizen demands far better than other municipios in Bolivia. This is a clear indication of the efficacy of the DDPC program. Later it will be shown, however, that satisfaction with municipal government for the DDPC sample as a whole is not significantly higher than it is for the rest of the country. In combination with the results shown in Figure III. 10, this means that satisfaction increases for those Bolivians who make demands on their system, but not for Bolivians who merely live in regions in which the DDPC has been operating.




**Figure III. 10 Nation vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with municipal response  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

Participation in POA meetings shows a difference, but only when controls are not introduced. We find that the DDPC sample has a level of participation of 22%, but the national sample is only 13%. However, when controls are introduced, this difference declines to insignificance, even though the DDPC remains higher. The results are shown in Figure III. 11.



**Figure III. 11 National vs. DDPC: Participation in POA meetings  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

Complaints to the vigilance committee were also higher in the DDPC areas, but when controls were introduced, the difference was not significant, as shown in Figure III. 12.



**Figure III. 12 National vs. DDPC: Complaints to vigilance committee  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

## **Satisfaction with Municipal Services: National and DDPC Results**

### ***National-Level Results***

The survey has contained a series of questions attempting to measure satisfaction with municipal services. We first asked a very general question asking respondents to classify the services in terms of: excellent, good, fair, bad or very bad. We then asked about satisfaction with treatment by local government. As can be seen in Figure III. 13, satisfaction has been declining.





Figure III. 13 Satisfaction with local government: 1998-2002


***DDPC vs. National Results***

Initial examination of the DDPC sample does not reveal any significant difference between it and the nation as a whole, as is shown in Figure III. 14.




**Figure III. 14 National vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with municipal services  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

When we look at the subset of Bolivians, both national and DDPC, who have attended a municipal meeting within the past year, that is where the impact of the DDPC can be clearly seen. As shown in Figure III. 15, when we examine only those Bolivians who have attended a municipal meeting within the last year (variable NP1), we see that those who live in the areas which received the “full package” of DDPC inputs are significantly more satisfied with municipal services than those who do not. Thus, just living in a municipality that has undergone major reforms is insufficient to “get the word out,” to the citizens as a whole. But when those citizens have contact with their municipal governments, they apparently detect the change and are more satisfied by the services that they get. This finding reconfirms the one reported on earlier in Figure III. 10, where it was shown that citizens who made a demand and were living in DDPC areas were more satisfied with the response to that demand than those citizens who made demands but were not living in a DDPC area.




**Figure III. 15 National vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with municipal services**  
**Controlled for urbanization, education and income**  
**(among those who attended a municipal meeting in last year)**

We find even stronger results when we control not just for participation but for demand-making. The results are shown in Figure III. 16. Bolivians who made a demand on their municipality and who live in DDPC areas are significantly more satisfied with municipal services than those who made a demand but did not live in a DDPC area.




**Figure III. 16 National vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with services**  
**Controlled for urbanization, education and income**  
**(among those who made a demand within the last 12 months)**

We now turn to satisfaction with treatment by municipal officials (SGL2). Here the difference between the national and DDPC areas is even clearer. As can be seen in Figure III. 17, for the national sample as a whole, satisfaction with treatment is significantly lower than respondents who live in areas in which the DDPC program has been fully carried out.



**Figure III. 17 National vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with treatment by municipality  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

We also see the same pattern among those who made a demand within the 12 months prior to the survey, as is shown in Figure III. 18. It is quite clear, therefore, that the DDPC program is changing the way that municipalities are doing business, making them more responsive to their “customers.” Resources to satisfy demands remain, of course, very constrained in Bolivia, given the overall level of national income, but the DDPC project has found a way to increase citizen participation and satisfaction.



**Figure III. 18 National vs. DDPC: Satisfaction with treatment by municipality controlled for urbanization education and income (among those who made a demand in the last 12 months)**

## National vs. Local Government

### *National Sample Comparisons*

The survey includes several questions that attempt to focus on the trade-offs between local and national government. These questions can help us determine if Bolivians would prefer greater decentralization, or would rather see the central government absorb more responsibility for governance.

The first question in this series (LGL1) asks which level of government has responded best to solving community problems. The results are shown in Figure III. 19. It is clear that the community and the municipality are strongly preferred by the population in each of the years of the survey, whereas the central government and the legislature are preferred by only a very small segment of the population. The small decline in 2000 for the municipality was almost entirely restored in the 2002 survey.





Figure III. 19 Who has responded better to community problems?

Since the original question did not contain any information on the “Prefecture” level of government, in 2000 and 2002 we included another question (LGL1A) to measure this. The results are contained in Figure III. 20. The prefecture has grown more popular in 2002 than it was in 2000, while the municipality far exceeds all other levels of government.



**Figure III. 20 Who has responded better to local problems?  
(including the “prefecture”)**

We next asked (LGL2) if more responsibility and funding should be given to the municipality, the government, or if nothing should be changed. We also allowed the answer: “more to the local government if it would provide better service.” The results are shown in Figure III. 21. As can be seen, there has been a steady and strong increase in support for increased funding for the municipality.




Figure III. 21 Should more responsibility and funding be given to...

### Willingness to Pay More Taxes

We have also asked each year, beginning in 1998, if the respondents would be willing to pay more local taxes in order to get better service (LGL3). As can be seen in Figure III. 22, about one-fifth of respondents would be willing to do so, a proportion that has not changed significantly since 1998.




Figure III. 22 Willingness to pay more municipal taxes

## Responsiveness of Local Government

### *National Level Results*

The final item in the series on local government measures citizen perception of its responsiveness. The question (LGL4) asks if the municipality responds to what do people want all the time, the majority of the time, once in a while, almost never or never. When converted to a 0-100 scale, as we have for other items in this study, we see that the overall level has not changed significantly over the years. The results are shown in Figure III. 23





Figure III. 23 Responsiveness of municipality, 1998-2002


### *DDPC vs. the Nation*

Comparison of the DDPC sample to the nation as a whole shows that the DDPC sample expresses a perception of significantly higher levels of responsiveness on the part of the municipality, as is shown in Figure III. 24. This is the same pattern we have seen throughout this chapter.



**Figure III. 24 National vs. DDPC: Perceived responsiveness of municipality  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

If we examine this same relationship among respondents who participated in a municipal meeting within the last year, the relationship is even stronger, as is shown in Figure III. 25. Both the national and the DDPC levels increased among this subset of participant Bolivians, while the increase in satisfaction among the participant DDPC respondents is considerably greater.



**Figure III. 25 National vs. DDPC: Perceived responsiveness of municipality**  
**Controlled for urbanization, education and income**  
**(among those who participated in a municipal meeting in the last year)**

### The Gender Gap

Prior versions of this study have highlighted the gender gap in participation in Bolivia. Has this gap narrowed in the general public and has it narrowed within the DDPC sample? In terms of attending municipal meetings (NP1), as can be seen in Figure III. 26, the gap remains quite wide in both samples. But it is also of note to see just how high the DDPC participation is for both men and women. Of course, these results are not controlled for the factors such as urbanization, education and income that we explored in detail above. But they do show that while female participation is only 60% of that of males in the national sample, it is only 51% of males in the DDPC. This suggests that far more needs to be done in the DDPC program to narrow the gender gap. At the same time, it is very important to stress that the participation rates for both males and females are far higher in the DDPC than in the rest of the nation.





Figure III. 26 National vs. DDPC: Participation in municipal meeting by gender

The same pattern is also found for demand-making, as is shown in Figure III. 27. Once again the gap between males and females is large, but it is larger in the DDPC sample. Females make 68% of the demands that males make in the national sample, but only 45% of the demands that males make in the DDPC sample.



**Figure III. 27 National vs. DDPC: Demand-making on municipal government by gender**

## Conclusions

This chapter has examined participation in municipal government. It has found that such participation is relatively common in Bolivia, higher than a number of other countries in Latin America. Bolivians attend municipal meetings, make demands on their elected officials and attend budget planning meetings. We also saw that the DDPC program has had an important, significant impact on raising participation in areas where it has implemented its full program package. There is reason for those who work in this program to feel proud of their efforts. We also saw, however, that a wide gender gap still exists in Bolivia, one that has not been narrowed in the DDPC municipalities.

## Chapter IV: System Support and Decentralization

In the previous chapter it was shown that the DDPC program has accomplished many of its key goals by increasing participation and demand-making among those municipal governments that have received the full package of inputs.<sup>34</sup> It was also shown that not all goals have been accomplished. For example, female participation still lags woefully behind that of male. In this chapter we take a look at one of the unintended consequences of Bolivia's decentralization and popular participation efforts. This consequence is not in any way a function of the DDPC program, but is linked directly to aspects of the legislation that govern the decentralization program itself. The chapter shows a potential downside of decentralization that could result in it producing *more negative* views of the political system when the performance of local institutions falters. These findings suggest that important modifications in the Bolivian decentralization law may be warranted.

### The Theory of Decentralization: Impact on Democracy

Driven in part by the increasingly negative public views toward the political systems of their countries, and the widespread belief that institutional engineering can yield important benefits, many governments in the region have recently implemented political reforms designed to transfer greater power to subnational levels of government and provide a more substantial policymaking and oversight role to citizens at the local level. Advocates of decentralization argue that it holds “great potential to stimulate the growth of civil society organizations . . . ; prevent widespread disillusionment with new policies from turning into a rejection of the entire democratic process . . . ; [and] boost legitimacy by making government more responsive to citizen needs”<sup>35</sup>. Implicit in this proposition is that local institutions, if made relevant to the daily lives of citizens, will have a positive effect on how those citizens view their larger political system.<sup>36</sup>

Advocates of decentralization are not likely to mention that the process can be a double-edged sword. If, as proponents hope, the performance of enhanced local institutions matches the

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<sup>34</sup> This chapter draws on Jon T. Hiskey and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia,” forthcoming, *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

<sup>35</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). Merilee S. Grindle, *Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

<sup>36</sup> Angelika Vetter, “Local Political Competence in Europe: A Resource of Legitimacy for Higher Levels of Government?” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 14, No.1, 2002, pp.3-18.

expectations of citizens in terms of providing greater opportunity for meaningful political participation and elite accountability, then the benefits of decentralization may emerge. If, on the other hand, newly empowered local political institutions revert to elite control, or if the goals of citizen involvement and greater accountability are not met, the result may be to undermine citizen support for the political system, perhaps leading to a new level of cynicism.

Decentralization by itself, is no guarantee of increased citizen support. Rather, the performance of local institutions becomes a crucial determinant of the reaction that citizens have to decentralization and, therefore, a potentially important element in levels of support for the political system. The findings in this chapter suggest that system support, rather than being solely a product of individual attributes or the performance of national-level political institutions, is in part a function of how well or poorly *local* political institutions perform. The findings, then, support the contention that decentralization has the potential to bolster citizen levels of system support at the national level, suggesting a possibly important mechanism to overcome some of the key problems that Bolivia has been facing. Ironically, however, the findings of this study also demonstrate that the renewed emphasis on local government can have the opposite effect of producing more negative views of the political system when the performance of local institutions falters. More generally, these results point to the importance of including the local institutional context in research on the determinants of citizens' views of their political system.

## System Support in Developing Countries

In each of the prior studies in this series, a careful examination of system support has been carried out. In Bolivia, it has been found that system support is comparatively low, when placed in the context of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data set. Early research on system support and citizen attitudes toward democracy, however, treated these values as forming over very long periods of time, and therefore largely resistant to change over the short term. Beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal study on civic culture<sup>37</sup> scholars focused on the linkages between a society's presumably deeply embedded cultural values and support for a particular political regime. The basic thesis of that research was that a country's political system over the long term will be largely congruent with the deeply embedded cultural values of its society. Proponents of this thesis argue, for example, that Latin American society is "authoritarian, hierarchical, patrimonial, and semifeudal to its core" and thus should generally produce authoritarian political regimes.<sup>38</sup> Inglehart, however, has suggested that such values can change over relatively short spans of time, reacting, in part, to changing systemic

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<sup>37</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>38</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, ed., 1974. *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

conditions.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, research by Booth and Seligson has shown striking incongruence of political culture and regime type in Mexico.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, if it were true that systems and values are congruent over the long term, what could explain the protracted period of authoritarian rule in most of Latin America, followed by the current period of widespread democratization?

In opposition to the static view of cultural attitudes and system support, a far more dynamic perspective of the determinants of democratic system support has emerged, focusing its lens on the link between government performance and citizens' views of their political system. Beginning with economic performance, there is abundant evidence that citizens at least in part base their support of the government in power on the prevailing economic conditions<sup>41</sup> Others carried this research one step further and linked the economic performance of an incumbent government to support for the larger political system. When the macroeconomic performance of a government declines, levels of system support have been found to decline as well.<sup>42</sup> A study of South Koreans' attitudes toward their political system found that system support is also a function of the "political performance" of the system's institutions. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova find a significant relationship between levels of corruption and system support across 15 European democracies<sup>43</sup>. Similarly, in the report on the Bolivia survey for the year 2000, it

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<sup>39</sup> Ronald Inglehart, 1999. "Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. ed. Pipa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 236-256

<sup>40</sup> John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A Reevaluation," *Latin American Research Review* 19, no. 1 (1984).

<sup>41</sup> Donald R. Kinder and Roderick D. Kiewiet. "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.23, No.3, 1979, pp. 495-527. Michael Lewis-Beck, "Pocketbook Voting in U.S. National Election Studies: Fact or Artifact." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.29, No.2, 1985, pp. 348-356

<sup>42</sup> Harold D. Clark, Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg, "The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Polity and Society in Western European Democracies." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 4, 1993, pp. 998-1021. Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, 1995. "Confidence in Political and Private Institutions." In *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 298-322. Susan J. Pharr, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stephen M. Weatherford, "How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?" *Political Behavior*, Vol 9 , 1987, pp.5-28.

<sup>43</sup> Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, "Corruption and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies." Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. 2000.

was shown very clearly that system support is closely linked to corruption. This finding has been published recently in an academic journal.<sup>44</sup>

More recently, scholars have begun to explore the thesis that the design of a system's institutions can affect citizen levels of system support. Anderson and Guillory find that the way in which a system's institutional framework treats the winners and losers in electoral politics, namely whether the system is majoritarian or consensual, has a significant effect on how citizens evaluate their political system. They conclude that "the study of what citizens think about the political system requires the combination of information about political institutions and about individuals and their attitudes."<sup>45</sup> According to this perspective, levels of system support are not solely a function of individual characteristics, cultural values, and/or economic conditions, but rather are also contingent on the institutional framework of a democratic regime.

### ***Decentralization and System Support***

Indeed, it is the assumption that good design can improve institutional performance that in turn can affect citizen attitudes toward their political system that seems to be driving much of the international development community's emphasis on decentralization. With this community's backing, an increasing number of developing country governments have in recent years initiated extensive institutional reforms that are intended to strengthen the role of local government. Bolivia has been at the forefront of those efforts. In what the U.S. Agency for International Development calls "second generation reforms," political decentralization "allows people to participate more effectively in local affairs . . . [and] [l]ocal leaders can be held increasingly accountable for decisions that affect citizens' lives . . . Taken together, as local government improves, these changes can enhance the legitimacy of the democratic system."<sup>46</sup>

To date, though, few researchers other than the studies reported in this series on Bolivia and other similar studies in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, have undertaken a direct empirical test of the implicit proposition driving the decentralization trend—that the performance of local government institutions will affect the legitimacy of a

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<sup>44</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics*, Vol.64, No 2, 2002, pp.408-33.

<sup>45</sup> Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No.1, 1997, pp. 66-81.

<sup>46</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2000. "USAID/Bolivia: Results Review." Washington, D.C.: Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau of Global Programs, Field Support and Research, July, p. 5.

country's political system. This chapter identifies the potential consequences of decentralization through analysis of the impact local institutions have on system support.

A central problem limiting prior research on the impact of decentralization on system support has been its inattention to intra-national variations in institutional performance. Arguably, in fact, the strongest test of the proposition that institutional performance affects citizen attitudes is one in which other potentially important factors are held constant and variations in system support are directly related to variations in the performance of the same institution across different areas of a given country. The multitude of cross-national variables that may affect variations in levels of system support make the identification of any direct linkage between features of an institution and levels of system support difficult. Analysis of that linkage within one country, Bolivia, that has meaningful variation in institutional performance allows for the control of an assortment of other possible determinants of system support and thus the ability to establish a stronger relationship between institutions and attitudes.

This chapter follows the logic outlined above. It takes a single country, Bolivia, and analyzes the impact of variation in the performance of local government on citizen views toward its political system. The chapter begins with a review of Bolivia's widely publicized decentralization program and the specific institutional features of that program that will serve as the focus of the analysis.

## Decentralization in Bolivia

In the past fifteen years, Bolivia has experienced "a silent revolution" in its economic and political structures that have fundamentally transformed the country from one characterized by centralized control, personalism, and extreme instability into one where democracy, the market, and, more recently, decentralization are the defining characteristics.<sup>47</sup> On all three counts, Bolivia stands at the forefront of trends taking place across the developing world.

For both the political and economic reforms, the watershed year for Bolivia was 1985. First, on August 5, Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected president by a congressional vote following popular elections in which no candidate gained an absolute majority.<sup>48</sup> The following day Paz Estenssoro entered office, representing the first peaceful transfer of power in 25 years.<sup>49</sup> He then proceeded to implement a sweeping set of austerity measures and other market-based economic reforms. Sparked in large part by the widespread protests that followed these painful

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<sup>47</sup> Rene A. Mayorga, "Bolivia's Silent Revolution." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 142-156.

<sup>48</sup> The Bolivian Constitution provides for legislative selection of the president when no candidate receives a majority, a frequent occurrence in recent elections. For a comprehensive discussion of this period see Gamarra (1994).

<sup>49</sup> Rene A. Mayorga, "Bolivia's Silent Revolution." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 142-156.

economic reforms, Estenssoro's National Revolutionary Movement party (MNR) and Hugo Banzer's Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN), the other major political contender at the time, formed a governing coalition, known as the "Pact for Democracy," that allowed Paz Estenssoro the political space and capital needed to continue his reform agenda.<sup>50</sup>

With the initial successes of Paz Estenssoro's economic reforms, such as a dramatic reduction in inflation rates, and the subsequent peaceful transitions of power from Paz Estenssoro to Paz Zamora in 1989 and from Paz Zamora to Sánchez de Lozada in 1993, the path was cleared for a second wave of reforms designed to address the endemic corruption and practice of patronage that had plagued the Bolivian democratization process.<sup>51</sup> The first attempt at addressing these problems came in the form of a law for the "Administration and Control of the Government" that was designed to strengthen the sanctions for corrupt behavior or other types of misconduct among political elites<sup>52</sup>. As Gamarra notes, though, the anti-corruption goals of this law were undermined by "continuous charges of political corruption within the ranks of the two ruling parties."<sup>53</sup> That is, the law was, in the end, derailed by the very issue it was explicitly designed to address.

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<sup>50</sup> Eduardo Gamarra, 1994. "Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 105-128. Jorge Lazarte, Bolivia, creencias e incertidumbres de la democracia. (Cochabamba, Bolivia: ILDIS, 1993). Juan A. Morales, 1994. "Democracy, Economic Liberalism, and Structural Reform in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 129-150

<sup>51</sup> Eduardo Gamarra, 1994. "Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 105-128. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead., eds., 2001. *Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience*. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave.

<sup>52</sup> Eduardo Gamarra, 1994. "Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 105-128. Juan A. Morales, 1994. "Democracy, Economic Liberalism, and Structural Reform in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 129-150

<sup>53</sup> Eduardo Gamarra, 1994. "Crafting Political Support for Stabilization: Political Pacts and the New Economic Policy in Bolivia." In *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico*. eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 105-128.

In 1994, Sánchez de Lozada ushered in another set of reforms that was designed to attack corruption and strengthen accountability through the decentralization of many governmental responsibilities. The “Popular Participation Law” (PPL) began what many observers see as “Latin America’s most significant and innovative effort ever to extend and complement the institutions of representative democracy through decentralization.”<sup>54</sup> With the help of international development agencies, the PPL was designed to create a newly empowered local level of government that included several provisions explicitly designed to heighten the accountability of local government officials to citizens.

Among the more notable features of the PPL and later constitutional reforms associated with it were 1) the redistricting of municipal borders to incorporate rural communities previously excluded from local government; 2) the institutionalization of citizen oversight committees and grassroots organizations designed to have an ongoing role in local government; 3) a dramatic increase in the development responsibilities of municipal governments; 4) a significant transfer of fiscal resources to municipal governments; and 5) efforts to enhance the accountability of municipal government by allowing the municipal town council to remove the mayor with a three-fifths majority vote in cases of misconduct.<sup>55</sup> This latter provision, included in constitutional reforms of 1995, came to be known as the “*voto constructivo de censura*” or the constructive vote of censure. (*It is this key feature of Bolivia’s decentralization reforms and its impact on levels of system support that serves as the focus of the analysis in this chapter.*

The “*voto constructivo*” was established as another “power to the people” mechanism in the municipal decentralization process in Bolivia. Throughout Latin America, mayors are often charged with unethical and illegal practices, yet once a mayor is elected he/she remains in office at least until the next election. In Bolivia, the “*voto constructivo*” was designed to help rid municipalities of corrupt or poorly performing mayors. Yet, as we shall see in this chapter, it was also used for purely political purposes and thus served to weaken rather than strengthen democracy.

The first round of municipal elections for the 311 newly created municipalities was held in December of 1995, marking the point of departure for Sánchez de Lozada’s decentralization reforms. The selection of mayors and town councils followed a proportional representation format in which officially recognized political parties presented lists of candidates to the

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<sup>54</sup> Rene A. Mayorga, “Bolivia’s Silent Revolution.” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1997, pp. 142-156.

<sup>55</sup> The Constitutional amendment that provided for this *voto constructivo* reads as follows:

Upon completion of at least one year of office by the mayor elected according to paragraph 6 of Article 200, the Council will be able to censure and remove him/her with a three-fifths vote of all its members through the constructive vote of censure, always simultaneously electing the successor from among the council members. . . . This proceeding cannot be repeated for at least one year following the change in mayor, nor during the last year of the mayoral term. (author translation)

electorate, with the mayoral candidate listed first.<sup>56</sup> If no party received an absolute majority, the selection of the mayor was decided by a municipal council vote. In the case of a tie, the vote was repeated up to three times when, if the tie persisted, the candidate from the party receiving the most votes became mayor.

Given the small size of town councils in the majority of Bolivian municipalities and given the fact that there were very few municipal elections in which a party won an absolute majority of the votes, the selection of mayors in Bolivia often hinged on the vote of one or two council members.<sup>57</sup> As a result, this electoral system produced considerable “back-room bargaining” among local elites and national party officials as a means to gain control over local government. This system parallels quite closely the election of presidents in Bolivia, since no party has won a majority of votes since the restoration of democracy and therefore all presidents have been selected by the legislature. The result in both presidential and mayoral elections is that most of the winners take office with very tenuous support among both the electorate and the legislature and council. The mayors, however, were vulnerable to post-election partisan manipulation since only at that level does the *voto constructivo* procedure exist.

It is clear from patterns of mayoral selection and subsequent use of the *voto constructivo* that presidential politics played a large role in the formation of local governments during the first electoral cycle of the newly formed municipalities. First, with respect to those mayors entering office in 1996, candidates from president Sánchez de Lozada’s MNR party gained control of 38 percent (118) of Bolivia’s mayoral posts, despite only receiving 21 percent of the votes cast in municipal elections. This disparity was not merely an artifact of an unequal distribution of votes, as evidenced by the fact that in over 60 of those MNR municipalities, the MNR lost the popular vote, but entered office by winning the municipal council vote.

A more telling indication of the political “horse-trading” that surrounded the selection of mayors, and the subsequent use of the *voto constructivo* to replace mayors, comes from the pattern of mayoral removals and replacements following the election of ADN candidate Hugo Banzer as president in 1997. If the *voto constructivo* were truly used only as a tool to remove corrupt or inefficient mayors (as it was designed to do according to the constitutional norm), we should see no systematic removal of one party’s mayors across Bolivia, and their replacement with individuals from another party. On the other hand, if we see that mayors of the president’s party are systematically replacing mayors from opposition parties following a presidential election, then politics, rather than corruption, presents itself as the likely driving force behind

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<sup>56</sup>With an absolute majority of votes a party’s candidate became mayor and, according to Article 200 of the Bolivian Constitution, would not be subject to the *voto constructivo*.

<sup>57</sup>The size of municipal councils varies by municipal population. For municipalities with a population less than 25,000 (a category that includes 88 percent of Bolivian municipalities) the number of council members is five. From 25,001 to 50,000, there are seven members (there are 22 municipalities in this category). For municipalities with a population between 50,001 and 75,000 the number of members is 9 (there are 6 municipalities in this category), while for the remaining municipalities (pop. > 75,000) as well as capital cities the size of the city council is eleven (9 municipalities in this category).

this process. This latter scenario is precisely what took place following the 1997 national elections.

The party of outgoing president Sánchez de Lozada, the MNR, lost 26 municipalities in 1998 through use of the *voto constructivo* by municipal councils, with the mayorships in *all* 26 going to council members from one of the parties in the ADN coalition. The ADN, the party of incoming president Banzer, gained control of 24 municipal governments in 1998, and its principal coalition partner in the 1997 elections, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), increased its share of municipalities by 10. These changes in local government, keep in mind, are not “coattail effects,” since the removal and replacement of mayors was divorced from the popular election. Rather, this systematic shift in party control of local government across Bolivia occurred as a result of town councils invoking the *voto constructivo*.

The *voto* provision on the surface appears very similar to the “vote of no confidence” powers granted many legislatures in parliamentary systems around the world, and indeed the intentions behind this provision were to strengthen the accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms underlying the broader decentralization reforms. The provision, however, has revealed itself as a glaring weakness in Bolivia’s decentralization program. A World Bank report found that the *voto constructivo* was used to replace 30 percent of the country’s mayors in 1997 and 25 percent in 1998.<sup>58</sup> The effect of this widespread replacement of mayors, the Bank argues, was to make “political instability more acute as it stimulates the formation and destruction of political coalitions for purely personal-political interests. It also distances local government from the electorate [by allowing] for the substitution of elected mayors voted in the polls by a council member selected by the municipal council”. While much of the program produced seemingly positive changes in the ways of Bolivian politics, from increased political participation to more citizen oversight of local development projects, the *voto constructivo* has brought ceaseless and clearly politically motivated turnover in the mayor’s office.

Additional evidence of the negative impact of the *voto constructivo* continues to emerge. For example, one study of Bolivia’s decentralization process found the *voto constructivo* to be one of the principal

obstacles to achieving greater public accountability and better municipal performance. In practice, the censure procedure for removing ‘incompetent’ or ‘corrupt’ mayors [was] little more than a political tool used by local officials to win power for themselves and their parties. The procedure breeds corruption and disillusionment with the democratic process.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> World Bank. 1999. “A Strategic View of Decentralization in Bolivia: Advances, Issues, Opportunities, and Recommendations.” Project Evaluation Report, February, p.28.

<sup>59</sup> Gary Bland, *Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law and the Emergence of Local Accountability* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999).

Another indication of the widespread recognition of the misuse of the *voto constructivo* provision in many municipalities comes from efforts by the Bolivian Senate in 2000 to draft a new Municipalities Law that sought “to correct some of the deficiencies in municipal governance, such as the excessive use of the constructive vote of censure.”<sup>60</sup> This attempt to modify the *voto* provision through legislation was ruled unconstitutional because it involved an article of the Constitution and thus required a Constitutional amendment. As of this writing, there is considerable discussion on carrying out Constitutional reforms.

After this ruling in 2001, calls for constitutional reform came from across Bolivian society. In response, the Bolivian Congress created the Citizen’s Council for Constitutional Reform in the spring of 2001 and charged it with the creation of a document outlining the most important and pressing constitutional reforms as they emerged through a nationwide “dialogue.” The Council spent five months collecting input from Bolivians through public forums, conferences, and electronically via the internet. The Council recommended elimination of the *voto constructivo de censura*, calling its use “preponderantly political-partisan, undermining the purpose of its original conception, a fact that generated institutional instability and damaged local democracy.”<sup>61</sup>

A recent editorial by the Federation of Municipal Associations of Bolivia, a national organization representing Bolivia’s municipal governments, supported the proposed elimination of the *voto constructivo*, referring to the provision as the “*voto destructivo*” (destructive vote), and claiming that “the spirit that motivated the inclusion of the provision soon was totally spoiled by the excessive weight of partisanship in our still incipient democratic system that

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<sup>60</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2000. “USAID/Bolivia: Results Review.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau of Global Programs, Field Support and Research, July.

<sup>61</sup> The full text of the Council’s recommendations for changes in municipal institutions is as follows:

Voto Constructivo de Censura

The present design of this article allowed for its use as an instrument of censure with motives preponderantly political-partisan, undermining the purpose of its original conception, a fact that generated institutional instability and damaged local democracy. Furthermore, this feature is an element of parliamentary systems of government, [not] in an environment and context where the municipal government political representatives lack maturity.

Alternatives [proposed]:

- Elimination of the *voto constructivo de censura*.  
Maintain the original intentions [of the *voto*], but with modifications in its design: allowing its use only after two and a half years (the midpoint of the mayor’s term in office), under specific and transparent regulations that avoid the abuse and political maneuvers [of the past]. (author translation)

This text is from the Citizen Council for Constitutional Reform’s “Anteproyecto de Ley de Necesidad de Reforma Constitucional,” accessed on April 5, 2002 at:

<http://www.reformas-constitucionales.gov.bo/3programrefomas/htmlversion/index.html>.

generated alliances to change mayors based on the interests of one or various parties.”<sup>62</sup> The move for the elimination of the *voto constructivo* was bolstered when in early 2002 it became clear that use of the *voto constructivo* had not substantially diminished in the second municipal electoral cycle. In 2001, the first year municipal councils were allowed to use the provision following the 1999 elections, 16 percent of Bolivia’s mayors were removed from office.

In short, we have a specific institutional feature of a decentralization program that was available for use in all 311 municipalities of Bolivia,<sup>63</sup> but one that likely had very different effects on the governance capacity of local political institutions depending on whether it was deployed or not. In some towns, the *voto constructivo* was not used, and the mayor was allowed to serve out his/her time in office. In others, however, the provision was employed, often times more than once. It is the task of this chapter to examine the impact of that removal on the perceptions of the electorate concerning their larger political system.

The research question, then, involves determining whether use of the *voto constructivo* had a substantive effect on citizens’ views of not only their local government but of the larger Bolivian political system. According to World Bank reports, in cases where the town council deployed the *voto* to remove the mayor, the result was to “distance local government from the electorate.”<sup>64</sup> If this is indeed the case then we should find a systematic difference in system support levels across *voto* and non-*voto* towns. Citizens in municipalities where the mayor was allowed to serve out his term in office would likely have a more favorable view of their political system than citizens living in municipalities where the local government fell victim to the partisan use of the *voto constructivo*.

If, on the other hand, the local institutional performance has little effect on citizens’ views of their larger political system, we should find no significant differences in system support levels among citizens in municipalities where the *voto constructivo* was employed and those where it was not. Finally, if the use of the *voto constructivo* was not merely a political move but it was in fact used primarily to remove corrupt or poorly performing mayors, then we should see a more positive view of the Bolivian system among citizens living in towns where an ineffectual and/or corrupt mayor was removed from office and replaced by one of the town council members. By having a prominent local institutional design feature that was used in some but not all of Bolivia’s municipalities, we have an opportunity to examine within a single country the impact of local institutions on citizen views of their political system.

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<sup>62</sup>This document is available on the organization’s website, accessed March 29, 2002 at: [www.enlared.org.bo/shnoti.asp?noticia=1586](http://www.enlared.org.bo/shnoti.asp?noticia=1586)

<sup>63</sup>This number increased to 314 in 1999.

<sup>64</sup>World Bank, “A Strategic View of Decentralization in Bolivia: Advances, Issues, Opportunities and Recommendations.” Project Evaluation Report (February, 1999).

## System Support in Bolivia

In postulating a link between institutional performance at the municipal level of government and citizen views toward their larger political system, the first step is to demonstrate that variations in municipal government performance affect citizen attitudes toward their municipal government. As our notion (and measure) of system support purports to tap “how well the political system and political institutions conform to a person’s general sense of what is right and proper and how well the system and institutions uphold basic political values of importance to citizens”<sup>65</sup> we must first show that people are aware of local government and their attitudes toward local government are affected by the performance of its institutions. It is unlikely that variations in local government performance would affect levels of system support if they did not first affect citizen attitudes toward municipal government.

As discussed above, we view use of the *voto constructivo* during the first three years of Bolivia’s decentralization program as an indicator of poor municipal institutional performance. In our analysis of citizen attitudes, we posit more negative views of local government and lower levels of system support among citizens living in towns in which mayors have been removed from office by the council. As a stylistic device, we refer to those municipalities where the *voto constructivo* was employed as “change in mayor” towns and those municipalities that did not use the provision as “same mayor” towns.

Finally, in our analysis we are aware that there may have been cases where removal of the mayor improved the performance of the government by ridding it of a corrupt mayor. This possibility, however, only *decreases the likelihood* that citizens in “change in mayor” towns will exhibit lower levels of support for their government, making confirmation of our hypothesis more, not less, difficult.

The survey data provide several elements that allow for testing of the impact of the *voto constructivo* on citizen attitudes toward the political system. First, the data are drawn from two nationally representative surveys carried out in 1998 and 2000. This allows for an assessment of whether the effects of the use of the *voto constructivo* between 1997 and 1998 (if any) persist over time or are relatively short-lived. We can test this because under the law that governs the *voto constructivo*, its use is prohibited in both the first and last years of a given electoral cycle. This means that with the second round of municipal elections held in December 1999, use of the *voto constructivo* was prohibited in both 1999 (the last year of the first electoral cycle) and 2000 (the first year of the second cycle). Thus we can see if the use of the provision in 1997 or 1998 still had an impact as late as 2000 when the second survey was carried out. We could not use the 2002 survey for this purpose since the full cycle of municipal elections had not been completed by the time that survey was conducted.

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<sup>65</sup> Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson.. “Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No.2, 1982, pp.240-264.

The municipalities included in the samples for both years provide a fairly even split between those where the *voto constructivo* was used (46 municipalities in 1998 and 45 in 2000) and those where the elected mayor was able to remain in office between 1996 and 1998 (41 in 1998 and 43 in 2000). There is also a roughly equal split of respondents living in “change in mayor” and “same mayor” towns. In the 1998 survey, 1,911 respondents lived in “change in mayor” towns and 1,563 lived in “same mayor” towns. For the 2000 sample, 2,037 respondents lived in municipalities where at least one mayor had been removed from office between 1996 and 1998, while 1,868 respondents lived in municipalities where the elected mayor was allowed to serve those three years.

We also need to be certain that differences in the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” municipalities in terms of their socio-economic and demographic composition are not responsible for any differences in system support that we might attribute to use of the *voto constructivo*. A comparison of the economic and social characteristics of respondents living in “change in mayor” and “same mayor” municipalities reveals few significant differences. For the 1998 survey, the mean level of years of education for respondents in “change in mayor” towns was 9.1 while it was 9.0 for respondents in “same mayor” towns. Likewise for family income, the differences in the means for the two groups of respondents were insignificant.<sup>66</sup>

Three potentially meaningful differences do exist between the two groups in the 1998 sample. First, the average ideology self-rating of the “change in mayor” respondents was significantly more to the right than their “same mayor” counterparts (5.49 v. 5.17 on a 1-10 left-right scale). A second significant difference was the ethnic composition of the two groups. In the “change in mayor” group, 18 percent of the respondents classified themselves as white, 65 percent as mestizo, and 14 percent as indigenous. In contrast, the composition of the “same mayor” group in the 1998 survey was 26 percent white, 56 percent mestizo, and 15 percent indigenous. By identifying these differences, we can take steps to control for these factors in the subsequent multivariate models. Finally, there is a significant difference between our two categories of respondents with respect to the number of basic services they reported receiving. In the 1998 survey, the mean number of basic services received by respondents in “change in mayor” towns was 2.3 (of the three basic municipal services of potable water, sewerage, and electricity), while the mean basic service level for respondents in “same mayor” towns was 2.1. This difference in service provision levels between the two groups of respondents is significant at  $p < .01$  and emerges in the 2000 survey as well, thus providing us with another potentially significant determinant of system support levels that we will control for in our subsequent models.

While it is important to be aware of the potential for these difference to have some systematic effect on the attitudes of respondents toward their political system, and we control for these variables in subsequent analyses, the groups for both years are so similar as to justify as a

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<sup>66</sup> Income data were coded 0-7 with each category representing a range of monthly income (e.g., 1=<250 Bolivianos/month; 7=10,001 and >). The mean income level for the *voto* respondents in 1998 was 2.45 (between 251-500 Bs and 501-1000 Bs) and 2.51 for the non-*voto* group, suggesting that on average residents living in municipalities where the *voto constructivo* was employed earned slightly less than the non-*voto* respondents.

first step a straightforward “difference in means” analysis of their attitudes toward the political system in order to determine if living in a “change in mayor” town had any effect on those attitudes.

## **Citizen Views in “Change in Mayor” and “Same Mayor” Municipalities**

We begin with a look at the differences in mean levels of support for municipal government among citizens living in municipalities where the mayor was removed and those living in towns where the elected mayor was allowed to serve out his/her term. Four items in the survey tap respondent attitudes toward the municipal government and the “citizen institutions” created by the country’s decentralization law, and read as follows:

B22. To what extent do you have confidence in the municipal government?

B22B. To what extent do you have confidence in the indigenous authority?

B22C. To what extent do you have confidence in the municipal oversight committee?

B22D. To what extent do you have confidence in the Territorial Base Organizations (OTBs)?<sup>67</sup>

The scale for each of these items was 0-100, with 100 representing the most positive view of municipal government institutions.<sup>68</sup> The impact of the *voto constructivo* on citizen attitudes towards these institutions should provide some indication of how widespread any possible effects of the provision were on citizen views toward the larger decentralization program. The null hypothesis is that the removal of mayors had no effect on the perception of the municipal government itself, or any other institutions related to the municipality. If those effects were present, but relatively constrained, then there should be a difference in how people view their municipal government in “change in mayor” and “same mayor” towns, but not in how they view the grassroots community groups (OTBs), the oversight committees, or the indigenous authority. If, however, use of the *voto* affected how people viewed the entire decentralization package, then we should find significant differences in the means of all four items.

We also include an item that asked respondents to assess the quality of services they received from their municipal government. The item is worded as follows:

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<sup>67</sup> These are the basic municipal civil society institutions established by the decentralization law.

<sup>68</sup> Each item was scored on a 1-7 basis, but are converted here to a 0-100 metric by subtracting one point from each score, dividing by six and multiplying by 100.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipal government is providing to the people are excellent, good, average, poor, or very poor?

This scale for this item was also 0 (very bad) to 100 (excellent) to match the other items discussed above. If respondents in “change in mayor” towns had a much more negative view of the actual services they received from their municipal government than those individuals living in “same mayor” towns, this may be the source of lower levels of support for local government in “change in mayor” towns, and may also have played a role in the use of the *voto* provision, thus bringing into question the underlying assumption of our analysis—that the use of the *voto* was a *cause, not a consequence*, of poor local government performance. However, if no substantively significant difference exists between respondent views of local government services in *voto* and non-*voto* towns, we have further evidence for our position that there exists no underlying difference between the two groups of respondents that may explain both the use of the *voto* and lower levels of system support.

The data in Table IV. 1 provides a comparison of the mean response levels for those citizens living in municipalities where the *voto* was used at least once and those living in municipalities where the elected mayor was allowed to serve the entire term.

**Table IV. 1. Characteristics of “Same Mayor” and “Change in Mayor” Municipalities**

	1998 sample				2000 sample			
	Same mayor, 1996-98	N	Change in mayor, 1996-98	N	Same mayor, 1996-98	N	Change in mayor, 1996-98	N
Municipal Institutions (scale 0-100)								
Mean Confidence in Municipal Government	48.1	1,594	42.5	1,741	45.5	1,917	43.8	1,898
Mean Confidence in Indigenous Councils	51.9	1,420	46.5	1,567	50.0	1,752	48.4	1,743
Mean Confidence in Oversight Committees	46.8	1,465	42.7	1,563	43.9	1,741	43.6	1,757
Mean Confidence in Community Organizations	47.5	1,371	43.3	1,403	46.9	1,592	44.8	1,624
Mean Perceptions of Quality of Local Government Services	47.8	1,597	45.6	1,755	47.9	1,863	47.5	1,838

All differences in means for 1998 significant at  $p < .01$ . For 2000, differences for “Government” and “Community Organizations” significant at  $p < .05$ .

What the comparison of means in Table IV. 1 suggests is that the turmoil that the use of the *voto constructivo* seems to have brought to the operations of municipal government did indeed have an impact on citizen attitudes toward municipal-level institutions. First among those institutions was the municipal government itself where there was a five point difference in the level of support between citizens living in “change in mayor” towns and “same mayor” towns. Moreover, the negative consequences of use of the *voto* on citizen attitudes appear to have touched all institutions affiliated with the Bolivian decentralization program. It seems that the utilization of a highly visible provision in a highly visible set of reforms can have widespread effects on citizen views of the institutions that emerge from those reforms. Before we affirm this conclusion, however, we will need to subject it to a number of tests, as shown below.

With respect to respondents’ views of the quality of municipal government services, there is a statistically significant difference between the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” respondents in 1998, with respondents in towns in which the mayors were removed having a slightly more negative view of local services than in the towns in which mayors served out their terms. The substantive difference between the two groups on this item, however, is small with only two points on a 100 point scale separating them while for the other items in Table IV. 1, the differences are 4 and 5 points.

An examination of the frequencies of responses for the two groups reveals that the different mean values for the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” groups on the quality of government services item comes in large part from differences in the frequency of respondents choosing the categories of “good” and “regular.” Sixty percent of “change in mayor” respondents characterized local government services as “fair” while 57 percent of “same mayor” respondents viewed their government services as “fair.” Conversely, close to 14 percent of “change in mayor” respondents viewed government service provision as “good” compared to 18 percent of “same mayor” respondents. The frequency of responses for the other options— “excellent,” “bad,” and “very bad”—on the other hand were nearly identical across the two groups of respondents.

In contrast, the differences in means for the other items in Table IV. 1 are meaningful not only in a statistical sense, but in substantive terms as well. For example, with the “confidence in municipal government” item, 48 percent of respondents in both the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” groups chose one of the two midpoints on the 7-point response scale. The 5 point difference in the mean levels of confidence in municipal government between the two groups stems from the much greater percentage of “change in mayor” respondents expressing little or no confidence in local government when compared with the “same mayor” respondents. What these differences in frequencies suggest is that a significant portion of citizens in “change in mayor” towns had very negative views of local government, despite being relatively satisfied with the services provided by their local government. In fact, for “change in mayor” respondents, the correlation between satisfaction with local services and confidence in local government is .27, while for “same mayor” respondents the Pearson correlation coefficient is .39, indicating that the latter group was more inclined to link their confidence in government with actual government performance. Thus the principal source of the dissatisfaction with local government expressed by “change in mayor” respondents appears to be the political deadlock and instability caused by use

of the *voto constructivo* rather than dissatisfaction with the services provided by local government. Nonetheless, we still will include in our multivariate analysis citizen views of local service provision to account for this possibility.

The results from the 2000 survey in Table IV. 1 indicate that the effects of use of the *voto* provision may have been somewhat short-lived. Given the fact that 1998 was the last year of the electoral cycle in which the *voto constructivo* could be employed before the next wave of elections, we can surmise that the decline in significant differences between citizen views of local government institutions in towns in which the mayors were removed versus those in which they were not was in part a function of the absence of the *voto* provision from local politics in 1999. For every item displayed in Table IV. 1, the support levels among citizens in “change in mayor” towns increased, suggesting that the inability of local politicians to use the *voto* provision in the year prior to the 2000 survey made those 2000 respondents living in “change in mayor” towns more similar to their “same mayor” counterparts.

The next step is to look at whether the negative views of municipal institutions held by citizens living in towns in which mayors were removed extended to Bolivia’s political system as a whole. While debates regarding the measurement and use of system support remain,<sup>69</sup> our approach to assessing levels of system support in Bolivia relies on a well-established and researched set of survey items that taps respondents’ views toward their larger political system.<sup>70</sup> The support variable, as shown below, is based on the five-item index, with each item using a 1-7 scale. This scale has been used in many of the prior studies produced in this series of studies on Bolivian political culture. For interpretive purposes these were rescaled to create a 0-100 scale. The five items included in the index are as follows:

- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?
- B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Bolivia?
- B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Bolivian political system?
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Bolivia?
- B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Bolivia?

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<sup>69</sup> Pippa Norris, ed, 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>70</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, and Edward N. Muller. “Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No 3, 1987, pp. 310-326. Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson.. “Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No.2, 1982, pp.240-264.

These five items, when combined as an index, in our view provide a good picture of the degree of system support Bolivians have for their political system.<sup>71</sup>

If the *voto constructivo* were used more as a political weapon than as a means to evict extremely corrupt and/or inefficient mayors, and citizens viewed this institutional deficiency as representative of their larger political system, we should see significant differences in the levels of system support among individuals living in municipalities where the *voto* was used to remove mayors and those in which it was not. Such differences would then suggest the impact that specific institutional design features of the decentralization agenda can have on citizen levels of system support *at the national level*.

**Table IV. 2.** System Support and Use of the “Voto Constructivo”

System Support Items (scale 0-100)	1998				2000			
	Same mayor, 1996-98	N	Change in mayor, 1996-98	N	Same mayor, 1996-98	N	Change in mayor, 1996-98	N
Mean Confidence in Courts	41.7	1,538	36.8	1,697	39.2	1,825	36.2	1,812
Mean Confidence in Political Institutions	54.4	1,573	48.4	1,712	55.3	1,888	51.2	1,841
Mean View on Protection of Basic Rights	45.1	1,552	40.5	1,700	42.0	1,841	40.2	1,817
Mean Level of System Pride	51.9	1,571	44.4	1,700	47.2	1,867	44.2	1,831
Mean Level of System Support	54.1	1,541	45.7	1,666	50.9	1,844	48.0	1,806
Mean Score on System Support Index	49.6	1,575	43.3	1,720	47.0	1,893	44.0	1,842

All differences in means significant at  $p < .01$  except “Basic rights, 2000” where  $p < .02$ .

<sup>71</sup> Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis.” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 26, No.2, 1982, pp.240-264. Mitchell A. Seligson, and Edward N. Muller. “Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica, 1978-1983.” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No 3, 1987, pp. 310-326. Mitchell A. Seligson, Edward N. Muller, and Steve Finkel. “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica.” *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol.19, No 3, 1989, pp. 329-351.

The data in Table IV. 2 show the mean scores of the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” respondents for the system support items. As is clear from the significant differences in means, those respondents living in municipalities where the mayor served the entire term had consistently more positive views of their political system than those living in towns in which the mayors had been removed.

As with Table IV. 1, we again see a lessening of the differences between the mean scores of the two groups in the 2000 survey, supporting the contention that when use of the *voto* provision was no longer allowed (in 1999 and 2000) its negative effect on citizens’ views of their system faded. The similarity of this pattern with the one that emerges in Table IV. 1 serves to reinforce the notion that the use of the *voto* to remove mayors had a significant impact on citizen attitudes toward their political system. Our next step is to determine whether these apparent negative consequences of Bolivia’s decentralization program will hold up to a more rigorous multivariate analysis of system support levels among Bolivians.

### ***Modeling Citizen Levels of System Support***

In this section we construct a multivariate model that incorporates a wide range of factors that can potentially affect levels of citizen support for the political system. The focus of the model, however, will be on whether the bivariate relationship between use of the *voto constructivo* and levels of system support remains significant when controlling for other possible determinants of system support.

Beginning with standard socio-economic controls, we include the respondent’s years of education, income level, age, and a gender dummy variable. Recalling the significant differences in the ethnic make-up of the “change in mayor” and “same mayor” groups in the 1998 sample we also include a series of dummy variables that incorporate a respondent’s ethnicity into the model, dividing the respondents into three ethnic groups, white, mestizo, and Indian (with mestizo as the base group).

Next we include two political variables that may affect respondent views toward the political system. A respondent’s self-rating on a ten-point ideology scale is used to determine whether the particular ideological leanings of respondents affect their views of the system. Second, a dummy variable is used to determine whether the respondent was a “winner” or “loser” in the 1997 presidential elections, defined in terms of whether the individual voted for one of the parties of the winning coalition or not in the 1997 presidential elections. Both of these variables should help control for any possible overlap between citizen views of the government in power at the time of the survey and views of the larger political system, as well as accounting for the significant differences in ideology among the two groups of respondents that emerged in the 1998 sample.

We also include in the model a respondent’s views of Bolivia’s current economic situation and the performance of the Banzer (i.e., the then incumbent) government. As with the

political variables, these items allow us to control for the theoretically important effect of citizen attitudes toward the government in power and its management of the economy on views towards the larger political system. By including these controls, any effect that we find from the “*voto*” variable (described below) on system support will be all the more substantively significant given that it emerged after controlling for such variables as respondents’ assessments of the economy and current government. Unfortunately, the item that tapped respondents’ views of the economic situation was only included in the 2000 sample, so we were not able to include such a measure for the 1998 model.

We use two variables designed to tap respondent views of local government performance—one survey item that directly asks respondents their assessment of the quality of local government services (as discussed in the previous section) and a dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 to those respondents receiving all three basic services, and a value of 0 to all others. The intent here is to provide as strict a test as possible for our position that use of the *voto* affected how citizens viewed the Bolivian political system by including other potentially critical local-level determinants of system support such as the quantity and quality of basic service provision.

In order to assess the impact that use of the *voto constructivo* may have had on system support levels, we use a dummy variable, assigning a value of one to those respondents living in “same mayor” towns—those municipalities where the mayor that entered office in 1996 was allowed to remain in office through the end of his/her term—and a value of zero to respondents living in “change in mayor” towns. The difference in means analysis presented above suggests that the simple fact that an elected mayor was allowed to serve out his/her term had a considerable impact on system support. The multivariate analysis will allow us to determine whether the strength of this institutional effect holds up when controlling for other factors.

Table IV. 3 displays the results of three models—column one provides the results from the 1998 sample, column two the 2000 sample, and column three displays the regression results from the two samples combined. Most notable in all three models is the consistently strong contribution of the *voto* dummy variable in explaining variance in levels of system support, even after taking into account the considerable strength of the control variables. As suggested by the difference in means analysis, the effect of the *voto* was particularly strong for the 1998 sample. What the partial coefficients for this variable in the three models indicate is that respondents living in municipalities where the *voto constructivo* was not used had system support levels close to three points higher than those respondents living in “change in mayor” towns. Given the fact that the model takes into account the powerful effects on system support of respondent views of the economy, the current government, local government performance, as well as individuals’ socio-economic characteristics, this effect of a single institutional feature of the country’s decentralization program is all the more striking.

Table IV. 3 Multivariate Model of the Impact of the “Voto Constructivo”

Variables	1998		2000		1998-2000	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Constant	49.03 (std.error)		54.91 (std.error)		48.83 (std.error)	
Age	(2.82) -.02	-.02	(3.10) -.01	-.01	(2.0) -.04	-.03
Education	(.03) -.10	-.03	(.03) -.08	-.02	(.02) -.23**	-.06
Income	(.10) .39	.03	(.10) .46	.03	(.07) 1.15**	.08
Gender (Male=1; Female=0)	(.33) 1.65*	.04	(.33) 1.65*	.05	(.24) 1.13*	.03
Ethnic dummy (White=1; Mestizo and Indian=0)	(.75) -1.20	.03	(.75) -1.05	-.03	(.54) -.36	-.01
Ethnic dummy (Indian=1; White and Mestizo =0)	(.86) -3.59*	-.05	(.86) -3.73*	-.05	(.63) -1.23	-.02
Ideology (Far left=1; Far right=10)	(1.46) 1.14**	.13	(1.46) 1.12**	.13	(.99) .82**	.10
Evaluation of Banzer government (1=very good; 5=very bad)	(.18) -4.60**	-.20	(.18) -3.85**	-.17	(.13) -3.96**	-.17
Assessment of current economic situation (1=excellent; 5=very bad)	(.48) -	-	(.51) -2.26**	-.10	(.35) -	-
Support for ADN coalition in 1997 presidential elections (vote for ADN coalition=1; all else=0)	(.83) 3.73**	.09	(.83) 3.75**	.09	(.57) 3.21**	.08
Basic service provision (1=receives water, sewerage, electricity; 0=all else)	(.83) -3.70**	-.10	(.83) -3.79**	-.10	(.57) -5.09**	-.14
Evaluation of local government services (0=very poor; 100=excellent)	(.83) .13**	.15	(.83) .12**	.14	(.58) .11**	.12
voto dummy (No change in mayor=1)	(.02) 2.97**	.08	(.02) 3.0**	.08	(.01) 2.68**	.07
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	(.76) .13		(.76) .14		(.54) .11	
(F-stat.)	(27.55)		(27.01)		(44.36)	
N	2162		2153		4253	

\* = p &lt; .05; \*\* = p &lt; .01

Among the control variable coefficients, the most notable are the highly significant effects on system support of respondent views of the Banzer government, local government services, and Bolivia's economic situation. In very intuitive fashion, the model reveals that with all of these factors, the more negative the views held by a respondent, the lower the level of system support. The models also indicate that the political leanings of respondents affect system support levels as well, with those voting for the ruling ADN coalition and those identifying themselves as right-of-center being more likely to express higher levels of system support. What the strength and direction of these coefficients suggest is that we have adequately captured important determinants of system support among Bolivians that involve their partisan views, and assessments of both their local and national government performance.

Also of note is the combination of a significant negative coefficient for the education variable (for the combined 1998- 2000 model) and a positive coefficient for the income variable. These two variables have a fairly strong and significant positive correlation with one another but have opposite effects on an individual's level of system support. The significant and negative coefficient for those respondents receiving the three basic municipal services indicates a fairly strong discontent with the political system among individuals who are relatively well off, at least in terms of basic services. Finally, it appears that those respondents that identified themselves as indigenous generally held more negative views of their political system than their mestizo and white counterparts. To reiterate though, the strength of these coefficients only makes our test of the effect of the *voto* on system support more stringent, as it is clear that we have included substantively important controls in the model.

Returning to the variable of most interest for this analysis, an indicator of the local institutional performance as measured by whether a mayor was able to remain in office for his/her entire term, we find the impact of local-level institutional performance has both a statistically and substantively significant impact on levels of system support across all three models. Respondents living in municipalities that did not suffer through the political turmoil of *voto*-inspired turnover in mayors expressed far stronger support for the Bolivian political system than did their counterparts living in "change in mayor" municipalities. In the context of a fragile political system like Bolivia's, this unintended consequence of one aspect of a decentralization program designed to strengthen support for the system should serve notice that such policies carry both risks and rewards for those seeking to bolster support for the many emerging democracies around the developing world.

Are there alternative explanations to our findings that could challenge them? One such explanation is that towns where the *voto* was employed might have been those with *prior* levels of system support significantly lower than in those towns where the *voto* was not used.

There are several features of our analysis that allow us to largely reject this countervailing explanation of the results. First, our models of system support include a comprehensive set of individual-level variables that are highly significant determinants of an individual's level of system support. These include the standard socio-economic variables (age, income, education, and ethnicity) and, more importantly, a respondent's ideology, whether they voted for the winning coalition in the 1997 presidential election, their evaluation of the

incumbent government, their evaluation of local government services, and, for the 2000 model, their evaluation of the current economic situation. When taken together, all of these variables should capture any systematic pre-existing differences in system support levels between “change in mayor” and “same mayor” towns.

For example, one might argue that municipalities with a large percentage of poorly educated, low-income citizens that were particularly hurt by Bolivia’s economic situation would be likely to have significantly lower levels of system support and thus be more inclined to employ the *voto*. Our models, however, take into account these determinants of system support and should, if use of the *voto* is simply a product of pre-existing low levels of system support, reveal *no significant independent* contribution of the *voto* dummy variable to variations in system support levels.

Similarly, we include citizen perceptions of the quality of local government services, a factor that is a strong determinant of system support levels. Those citizens with more positive views of local government services had higher levels of system support than those who viewed the quality of local government services as poor. Yet, even when controlling for citizens’ perceptions of local government services, the coefficients for the *voto* dummy are very clearly significant and in the expected direction across all three models. These findings alone provide sufficient basis to reject the thesis that the *voto* was a product of pre-existing low levels of system support.

A second element of support for the finding that system support levels are essentially a product, rather than a determinant, of use of the *voto* emerges from the knowledge that the *voto* was not used in 1999 or 2000 (because of the legal provisions restricting its use). Knowing this, we should expect, if our argument is correct, a general decline in the differences between “change in mayor” and “same mayor” towns in the 2000 survey with respect to their levels of system support. If use of the *voto* were a result of pre-existing low levels of system support, then the fact that the provision was not used in 1999 or 2000 should have had no impact on the differences in system support levels between the two groups of municipalities.

What these findings suggest, along with the smaller impact of the *voto* dummy coefficient in the 2000 model, is that when the *voto* was not used, the system support levels of the two groups of municipalities became more similar. For each measure of “confidence” in local government institutions in Table IV. 1 the level of support for these institutions in the “change in mayor” group of municipalities increased between 1998 and 2000. For Table IV. 2, the most notable change in mean levels of support among the “change in mayor” municipalities occurred for the “support for institutions” item and the “support for the system” item. Of the five items in our system support index, these two are the ones theoretically most directly related to use of the *voto*, and again, when use of the *voto* was prohibited in 1999 and 2000, we see an increase in the mean levels of support among respondents living in “change in mayor” towns. If the *voto constructivo* were not having an independent effect on system support, we should see no such change.

When taken together then, we have several pieces of support for our findings that use of the *voto* did in fact contribute to a decline in levels of system support among citizens living in those municipalities. This evidence suggests there is no reason to believe the alternative hypothesis for which we could uncover no empirical support.

## **The Importance of these Results for Decentralization Reform**

Our findings clearly carry with them mixed blessings for both proponents of decentralization and those interested in the strengthening of democracy around the developing world. The first implication of this analysis of system support in Bolivia is that local institutions matter, perhaps more than at any point in the highly centralized history of Latin America.<sup>72</sup> From this finding, we see the basic proposition driving the decentralization trend as correct. By bringing the political system closer to the people, and allowing them to become more involved in that system, the role of local political institutions in a person's evaluation of the political system seems to have become greater. The significant impact that local institutions can have on citizen attitudes toward their political system is a positive finding in the sense that an explicit focus of many developing countries and international development agencies in the past ten years has been to make local institutions more democratic and responsible for more government functions. In a society expressing high levels of discontent with its political system, then, our findings support the theory that strengthening local governments is one particularly useful way to effect change in those attitudes, just as proponents of the recent wave of decentralization would argue.

The dark side of the finding that local institutions matter is that they can matter for both good and ill, so if their design or performance does not match the highly publicized democratic ideals that often surround decentralization reforms, their effect on citizen views of the system can just as easily be negative. When local governments are unable or unwilling to match the rhetoric of decentralization, or when a specific institutional feature designed to promote clean government or accountability becomes merely another weapon, a particularly powerful one at that, in partisan warfare, citizen feelings of disenchantment and disillusionment with their political system are likely to increase.

These findings need to be taken into consideration as Bolivia looks toward the possibility of making changes in political institutions. They suggest that mechanisms need to be found that can both provide for accountability while restricting the impact of purely political factors have on local government.

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<sup>72</sup> Andrew Nickson, *Local Government in Latin America* (Boulder, C.O. : Lynn Rienner, 1995). Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition in Latin America*.(Princeton, N.J. :Princeton University Press. 1980).

## Chapter V. The New Criminal Code

In the study reporting on the survey for the year 2000, a section was included on the new criminal procedures code, which, at that point, had not yet come into existence. In this chapter we examine in more detail the public reaction to the new code.

### The New Code of Criminal Procedure (NCCP)<sup>73</sup>

We begin this chapter by reproducing the basic elements of the new code that were reported upon in the 2000 study (see pp. 143-144 of the Spanish version). The New Code of Criminal Procedures was enacted by Law 1970 which was ratified on March 25, 1999. This law became mandatory on 31 May 1999, the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. After a two-year period of legal vacation (*vacatio legis*), the time for preparation for the CCP full implementation, it entered into full force on June 1, 2001.

The model for the NCCP is a United Nations sponsored Rule-of Law Code designed to include Latin American legal concepts in an adversarial, accusatory, oral public criminal process. This Code is, therefore, not primarily a North-American, Common Law model, but a Civil Code model more amenable to the requirements of Latin American legal systems. The countries that have passed similar codes are: Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, The Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia and the State of Cordoba, Argentina. Chile, Honduras, Ecuador, and other Argentine states are considering adoption of similar codes.

In 1992, ILANUD, carried out a USAID-funded study of problems with the Bolivian criminal justice system. Out of that study, a number of reforms have taken place. These reforms include:

- 1) In 1993, the re-ratification of the 1979 Inter-American Pact of Human Rights, commonly known as the "San José Pact", incorporating its guarantees about due-process, rights against self-incrimination, right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and a presumption of innocence, into Bolivian law;
- 2) Inclusion of those fundamental human rights and guarantees in a constitutional amendment ratified in 1994, effective in 1995;
- 3) In that same constitutional reform, the creation of an independent Public Ministry and Attorney General's Office for prosecution of criminal cases, an Ombudsman's (Defensoría del Pueblo) office to denounce rights violations, a Judicial Council to provide the administrative and disciplinary structure of the judicial branch, and the creation of a Constitutional Tribunal, whose purpose is to interpret the Constitution and provide constitutional jurisprudence for the future;
- 3) In 1994, the creation of the Ministry of Justice in the Executive branch, and in 1995, the Public Defender's office within that Ministry;

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<sup>73</sup> Drawn in part from <http://www.reformapenal.gov.bo/>

4) Since 1994 through 1998, the passage of the enabling laws of these new entities, the Criminal Code has been amended to provide for laws against money laundering and criminal association, and these institutions have begun to operate;

### ***What the new Code of Criminal Procedure (NCP) Does***

The following are the major elements of the new code:

**Oral, Public Trials.** It establishes an accusatory, adversarial, oral, public criminal proceeding, designed to be more rapid and more just than its predecessor code. The transparency of the oral trial process, and the participation of citizens in it are designed to diminish the possibilities of corruption and increase citizen awareness about the reasons for decision in a criminal case, and citizen participation in that decision-making process.

**Fundamental Rights.** Within this procedure, the rights of suspects are required to be honored, and due process afforded as the constitution of a democratic society mandates. These include the presumption of innocence, which carries with it a right to release during trial, unless the accused found to be a danger to society or a risk of flight; the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a fair and speedy trial, and the right to confront one's accusers.

**Public Prosecutors.** The Prosecutor in “public” cases now directs an investigation, and files and carries forward a case as the present constitution contemplates. In “private” cases (in which there is no declared public interest, such as insufficient checking account funds cases), the complainant (querellante) may still appear before the Court and may file criminal actions there, without intervention of the fiscal or the police, although a defendant may not be detained. There is an intermediate proceeding, in which some private cases, such as rape of an adult, may be converted at the option of the alleged victim to a public case, to be prosecuted by the state's prosecutor.

**More effective investigation.** It provides for prosecutor intervention in police investigation to insure effective preparation of cases for trial. It also establishes specialized investigative units and courts, including those specializing in narcotics cases, raising possibilities of effective, specialized drug interventions both before and after sentencing. These interventions also involve undercover agents and controlled drops designed to exist within the Bolivian Constitution.

**Alternative Dispute Resolution.** It provides for alternative methods of resolving disputes. In private cases, the court may order **mediation** efforts. In recognition of the Bolivian Constitution's requirement, **traditional native community justice** is recognized, so long as it does not provide for either a process or a punishment that violates that constitution. (Note that trafficking in narcotics was never an act prohibited in native community law, so this alternative will not apply to narcotics cases).

**Substantial justice delay reduction.** It establishes a two stage proceeding in all common criminal cases. In the first stage, limited to six months, the instructional judge conducts hearings to decide whether State and the Police actions comply with constitutional guarantees and determine the legality of evidence to be presented at trial. This judge is not permitted to conduct any investigation, and will not be the judge at the oral trial. In the second stage, the preparation for and presentation of an oral public trial take place. It is the stage where witnesses are called, subject to examination and cross-examination. These cases must be set within a period of a year.

**Citizen participation in trials.** Cases carrying a sentence of more than four years will be tried by a mixed panel of two professional judges and three citizen judges. The panel is required to immediately pronounce sentence, although it may hear evidence directed toward the sentencing phase first, if it deems it necessary. Cases carrying less than a four-year sentence will be tried to a single judge, whose requirements of oral trials and immediacy of decision are the same.

**Plea Agreements and suspended sentences.** A prosecutor and defendant enter into plea agreements by either the abbreviated proceeding mentioned above, or by a suspension of proceedings and an imposition of a sentence providing for conditions of release. Victim participation in this proceeding is required. A prosecutor may offer such an agreement to a co-conspirator in exchange for his testimony against others.

**Rules of Evidence for Oral Trials.** It provides for rudimentary rules of evidence, controlling expert witnesses, laboratory tests, documents and the like, eliminating the archaic “tachas” (credibility pre-determined by statute) of the present code.

**Supervision of Sentences.** It creates Sentence Supervising Judges (Jueces de Ejecución). These judges oversee the actual imposition of the sentence, with supervision by offices to be created in a new “Law of Execution of Sentences.” These judges will also have the power to reduce the actual prison time after two thirds of a sentence has been served and impose conditions of release in cases where permitted in the Criminal Code, as a Bolivian form of parole and parole supervision.

**Streamlined Appeals Processes.** The number of appeals available is substantially reduced. Except for extra-ordinary writs, there is a right of direct appeal only at the end of the trial phase and after sentencing. Review to the Supreme Court by *casación* (similar to certiorari) is granted only when the Superior Courts of different Departments interpret an applicable law differently. Constitutional Issues are reviewed by the Constitutional Tribunal. The appeal process that in the past sometimes took years is to be substantially reduced.

### ***Implementation of the new Criminal Procedure Code***

The Code resolves severe problems that have been endemic to the Bolivian criminal process. Taken in the context of the justice reforms as a whole, its design should provide

substantially reduced possibilities for corruption, delay, violations of rights and negligent conduct of actors within the system.

Obviously, there are and should be concerns about what it produces in the future, for, like any system, it resolves some problems, but will certainly create others. What is important is to insure that the problems are foreseen, and are dealt with.

The National Implementation Commission, created by the law approving the Code, has adopted a plan for implementation which provides for five areas of significant preparation, all of which are related. These are: 1. Changes required in other laws; 2. Institutional strengthening; 3. Training; 4. Dissemination to the civil society of information about the Code; and 5. Preparation for the application of emergency measures.<sup>74</sup>

## Knowledge of the New Criminal Code

Knowledge of the new criminal code peaked on the eve of its implementation and has since fallen. This, no doubt, is a function of declining attention being paid by the media to the code. As reported in the 2000 study just about half of the population had heard of the new code. By 2001, when a specialized study was done for USAID and the UNDP, this proportion had increased to 60%. By mid-2002, however, knowledge had *declined* as is shown in Figure V. 1.

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<sup>74</sup> This plan is the most detailed effort to prepare for the eventual implementation of a code ever undertaken by a USAID justice project.






Figure V. 1 Heard or read of new criminal code

We can examine variation in knowledge of the code from many perspectives. We first check to see if knowledge varies by degree of urbanization. The results are shown in Figure V. 2. It is very clear from these results that urban Bolivians have much more knowledge about the code than do rural. This is a result of many factors including higher levels of education in urban areas and greater media accessibility. It also suggests that the results are sensitive to media effects, so that if the media have been reporting less on the code by mid-2002, it is understandable if public opinion on this subject has waned.




**Figure V. 2 Heard or read of new criminal code:  
by level of urbanization**

We control for education and income and reanalyze the data. The result is shown in Figure V. 3. Here we see that when the education and income of the respondent is partialled out of the analysis the difference in knowledge of the new code diminishes, but still remains significant. We can conclude that greater awareness of the code in urban areas is not merely a reflection of the greater education or wealth of urban Bolivians, but in fact represents a real impact of urbanization, most likely a difference of media effects.



**Figure V. 3 Heard or read of new criminal code by urbanization, controlled for education and income**

We can also examine differences among the nine Departments of Bolivia. The reader will recall that the sample was designed so that each Department could be studied separately as the sample for each one is representative. We need to control, however, for the already-noted impact of education, income and, of course, urbanization. For example, we know that the departments of Beni and Pando are quite remote and rural. In order to make these comparisons, however, we need to turn off the weighting of the sample so that each Department will have its full compliment of 300 or more cases. The results are shown in Figure V. 4, where it can be seen that knowledge of the code was highest in Chiquisaca and lowest in Pando and Tarija.




**Figure V. 4 Heard or read of new criminal code, by department:  
Controlled for urbanization, education and income**

### How Knowledge of Code Was Acquired

One of the challenges in implementing public policies in democracies is informing the public of them. In this study, we sought to find out how the public learned of the new code. To do that we asked a series of questions (AOJ8a1a-c) to determine if those who had heard of the new code had done so via TV, radio or the newspapers. We also wanted to find out if some Bolivians had multiple sources of information.

The results of this question are shown in Figure V. 5. As expected, TV is the most popular medium, while newspapers were the least likely to have been the source. It is more important to note, however, that even though the newspaper is a less common source of information about the code, no doubt because of the lower level of newspaper readership than TV and radio watching/listening, it is still a very common source of information as Figure V. 5 shows. It is also of note to examine the gender breakdown in this figure. The difference is non-existent for TV, small for radio, but quite large for newspapers; apparently, in Bolivia, newspapers are more heavily read by males than females.



**Figure V. 5 How did respondents hear of new code?  
By gender (of those who heard)**

We can also compare the mechanism by which respondents heard about the new code by looking at the impact of urbanization. Figure V. 6 shows that TV and radio interact with each other; TV is highest in the cities, while radio is highest in the rural areas. Newspaper readership is also highest in the cities and declines in rural areas.





Figure V. 6 How did respondent hear of new code?  
by urbanization


### Attending Meetings on New Code

We sought to determine if Bolivians had attended meetings of some civil society organization at which the new code was discussed (AOJ8a1). Efforts were made to promote such meetings. The results are shown in Figure V. 7. Here we wish to look at the entire Bolivian population, not just those who say that they had heard of the code. This helps show that only a very small percentage of the population had attended such meetings.



**Figure V. 7 Attended meetings on new code:  
entire national sample**

Looking only at those who had heard of the code, and who had responded to the question about attending a civil society meeting, we can see sharp differences by levels of urbanization. As shown in Figure V. 8, respondents in rural areas were more likely to have attended such meetings. This is a pattern we have seen before, with rural populations more active in some civil society organizations.




**Figure V. 8 Attended a meeting to discuss the code  
Among those who had heard of it**

## Evaluation of the New Code

We asked several questions evaluating the new code. We asked respondents about oral trials, jury trials, and bail. For each of these key provisions, we asked respondents if they thought that the provision was very good, somewhat good, somewhat poor or poor (AOJ17a-c). The results are presented below.

### *Opinion of Oral Trials*

Oral trials, long a part of Anglo-Saxon justice, are relatively new in Latin America. The new criminal code provided for this type of trials. Defendants will orally testify and be subjected to cross examination. Bolivians strongly favor it, as shown by their responses to a question comparing oral vs. written trials (AOJ17a). The results are shown in Figure V. 9. Only 7% of the respondents had a negative view of this type of trial.



**Figure V. 9 Opinion of oral trials**

### ***Trial by Citizen Judges***

For criminal cases with penalties over four years, three “citizen judges,” selected from voter registration roles, try cases and dictate sentences together with two professional judges. Prosecutors, rather than judges or police, will direct investigations. As can be seen in Figure V. 10, Bolivians are overwhelmingly favorable to this arrangement.





Figure V. 10 Opinion of trial by “citizen judges”

***Respecting the Presumption of Innocence and Bail***

The survey also asked (AOJ17c) about support for the presumption of innocence and the availability of conditional liberty (secured via bail) for accused criminals in cases where the offenses are minor, such as minor robberies. The results in Figure V. 11 show that this is the only item in the series in which there is significant opposition. On this item, a majority of the respondents believe that conditional liberty is not a good idea.



**Figure V. 11 Opinion of conditional liberty for those accused of minor crimes**

***Comparison of the Various Provision of the New Criminal Code***

We can compare the reaction of Bolivians to the new criminal code by converting each of the above three questions into a 0-100 scale and then preparing a bar chart of the results. As can be seen in Figure V. 12, the support for conditional liberty is far lower than support for oral trials and citizen judges. Informal discussions with the respondents revealed that they were concerned that conditional liberty means placing at risk their own safety and security since the “bad guys” might be out roaming the streets. Of course, conditional liberty is a very important constitutional guarantee to prevent abuses by the state, an all-too-often occurrence in Latin America. These findings suggest that this aspect of the new criminal code needs increased attention from those in charge of promoting its national acceptance.




Figure V. 12 Opinion on various provisions of the new criminal code

We also included an item (AOJ18) that asked respondents to state which of the four options they considered to be the most important. These were: 1) the role of “citizen judges” 2) the rights of the presumed delinquents, 3) the rights of the victim, or 4) regulations limiting detention. The results are shown in Figure V. 13. As can be seen, the majority of respondents believe that the rights of the victim are the most important, followed by the provision for citizen judges.




Figure V. 13 Which is the most important provision of the new code?

We can examine the impact of education on these preferences, the results of which are shown in Figure V. 14. There it is seen that support for the rights of victims is high, in the majority, at *all* levels of education. The only shift in opinion by education is on the citizen judge feature of the new code, in which those with higher levels of education are more supportive of this aspect of the code than those with lower levels of education.




Figure V. 14 Most important code provision, by education

Gender also matters in citizen preferences among the provisions of the new code. As shown in Figure V. 15. Women are much more likely to be concerned with victim rights than men.




Figure V. 15 Most important provision of code, by gender

Finally, we examine the impact of urbanization on opinions regarding various provisions of the code. As can be seen in Figure V. 16, victims' rights are paramount in all areas of Bolivia. What changes is declining support for citizen judges in rural areas.




Figure V. 16 Most important provisions of code, by urbanization

## Conclusions

This chapter has explored opinions about the new criminal code in Bolivia. We now know that citizens widely support it. At the same time we learned that citizen attention is focused on the rights of victims, with less concern for the accused. This patterns persists among all levels of society, including those with more and less education, males and females, urban and rural dwellers.

## Chapter VI. System Support and Tolerance

### A Leading Indicator of Stable Democracy

Political scientists have marveled at the rapid world-wide expansion of the number of democratic polities since the 1980s. Like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the expansion took nearly all of us by surprise. In the field of Latin American politics, we had been used to a cyclical pattern of democratic expansion followed by a rise in authoritarian regimes, but the current wave has been so widespread and had already lasted long enough to be an exception to prior cycles.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, world-wide the current wave of democracy is clearly more widespread and shows signs of being longer-lasting than any of the prior ones.<sup>76</sup>

Unfortunately, the reality is that after over a decade of intensive research on the factors that cause democracies to emerge and, perhaps more importantly, cause them not only to survive but to develop and deepen, we are a long distance from finding the answers. This is not a reason to be discouraged since the development of scientific understanding of phenomena is a long-term proposition. We think of all of the breakthroughs in new vaccines in medicine and new advances in microchip design, but we forget that the armies of scientists and the mountains of cash that are invested in those fields, compared to the small investment we make in studying democracy. We also forget that there are many more blind alleys, failed experiments and bankrupt high technology companies than there are cases of spectacular success.

The Bolivia series of surveys, along with the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project being conducted in some other countries in the region, is designed to advance our understanding of the factors that are important for democratic survival and strengthening. In this chapter we examine what we consider to be an embryonic “leading indicator” of democratic strengthening or weakening. In effect, we have been attempting to develop the social science equivalent of the “canary in the coal mine,” something that would on the one hand alert us to shifts in public opinion that might prove ominous for democratic development, indeed even survival. On the other hand, the same indicator, if it were moving in a positive direction, might point the way toward a more stable future.

The social sciences have been struggling to develop indicators of social phenomenon for decades. Indeed, entire journals, such as *Social Indicators Research* have long been dedicated to this effort, and the World Bank has been publishing its *Social Indicators of Development* in both

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<sup>75</sup> Mikael Boström, "Political Waves in Latin America, 1940-1988," *Ibero-Americana, Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies* 19, no. 1 (1989):3-19; Mitchell A. Seligson, "Democratization in Latin America: The Current Cycle," in *Authoritarians and Democrats: The Politics of Regime Transition in Latin America*, ed. James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

<sup>76</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

paper and electronic formats. In political science, the compilation of handbooks of indicators has seen some progress.<sup>77</sup> In the field of democratization, however, we must admit that little progress has been made. One reason for this is that the problem is very complex. We know that many factors influence the direction of democracy, and several of those are very difficult to measure. For example, international factors, involving foreign support for or opposition to democracy no doubt play an important role in democratic development. In recent coup attempts in Latin America, for example in Guatemala, Ecuador and Venezuela, external factors played a major role. Elites, of course, play a key role in determining the direction in which democracy develops or decays.<sup>78</sup> But in democracies, the mass public counts for a great deal. At one level, the public votes, and can vote in favor of leaders who promise a democratic future or can vote in favor of those who do not.<sup>79</sup> The public can also unsettle and even unseat democracies through relentless protest demonstrations as they recently did in Venezuela. Bolivia in the past few years has experienced a number of such protest demonstrations. So, it is important to include in any leading index of democracy, the views of the mass public.

Unfortunately, in our view, the efforts to develop good measures that would help us predict the future direction of democracy based on survey research have been hampered by the widespread tendency to include the word “democracy” in the survey questions themselves. The term is a loaded one, that carries with it a great deal of what social scientists refer to as “social desirability response bias.” In a recent article the author of this monograph co-authored with two collaborators, it was demonstrated that the use of the word “democracy” in survey questions can lead to serious problems of interpretation.<sup>80</sup>

The approach perused in this series of studies is to largely avoid the term “democracy” and attempt instead to probe the underlying values that presumably are needed to support stable democracy. This has been done by probing the values of system support and political tolerance as is described below. Is there any evidence that the Pittsburgh approach does provide a glimpse into the future? In fact, there is. Costa Rica is Latin America’s oldest and most stable democracy, and nobody is predicting its demise. Yet, in recent years it is clear that the system is undergoing a major change. Evidence of that emerged first in 1998 when abstention from the presidential vote went up by 50% over its historically low levels, and voting for minor parties in the legislature increased by over 25%. Then, in March and April of 2002 the greatest civil unrest in over 50 years broke out, with protests against the preliminary legislative approval of the “Energy Combo” legislation, a package of three bills designed to modernize the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) in the areas of energy and telecommunications. ICE is a highly regarded state

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<sup>77</sup> Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political Social Indicators*. 3d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press., 1983).

<sup>78</sup> Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *The politics of democratic consolidation : southern Europe in comparative perspective, The new Southern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Gunther, Josê R. Montero, and Juan J. Linz, *Political parties : old concepts and new challenges* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>79</sup> Amber L. Seligson, "When Democracies Elect Dictators: Motivations for and Impact of the Election of Former Authoritarians in Argentina and Bolivia" (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 2002).

<sup>80</sup> Damarys Canache, Jeffrey Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Measurement and Meaning in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2001).

monopoly that has extended electric and telephone service to nearly all areas of the country, but has been criticized of late for inefficiency at a time when such enterprises are being privatized around the world. The bill was strongly supported by the country's two main parties, but opposed by a coalition of ten legislators from minor parties. Initial protests came from environmental groups, but later involved an extremely broad group of civil society organizations spreading throughout the country, leading to the biggest protests in thirty years. Eventually, the government agreed to table the legislation, setting up a bi-partisan study committee to review its provisions. Then, in the 2002 elections, new parties emerged including a right-wing anarchist/libertarian party. The result was not only a further increase in abstention, but for the first time in Costa Rica's history the vote count required a second round to decide among the two leading candidates.

Was any of this predictable by the leading indicators developed by the University of Pittsburgh? Consider the information presented in Figure VI. 1, which is based on the longest series of surveys in the University of Pittsburgh data base. There we see that support in the 1970s was high, and remained high even though in the period 1980-82 the country suffered its worst economic crisis of the century. Yet, by the late 1980s it became apparent that system support was declining and the increase in abstentionism in the elections of 1998, the protests of 2000 and the party-system breakdown in the elections of 2002 could all be anticipated by the trend in sharply declining system support. This is not the place to discuss these results further, but the interested reader can peruse the articles on the subject.<sup>81</sup> The important point is that the system support measure showed systematic declines *before* the shifts in the electoral system. The level of support in Costa Rica, even after these declines, is still higher than in any other Latin American country for which we have data at the University of Pittsburgh, so it is not the case that the indicator is predicting a breakdown of democracy there. But it did appear to predict a major electoral realignment and unprecedented civil disobedience.

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<sup>81</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999," *Latin America Research Review* 37, no. 1 (2002):160-85; Mitchell A. Seligson, "¿Problemas en el Paraíso? La erosión el apoyo al sistema político en Costa Rica, 1978-1999," in *La Democracia de Costa Rica ante el siglo XXI*, ed. Jorge Rovira Más (San Pedro de Montes de Oca, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2001).




Figure VI. 1 System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999

There is additional evidence that the leading indicators are meaningful, and we can use the Bolivian case to see why. In 1998 when the first measure was taken, most political scientists were arguing that Bolivia was advancing very rapidly in democratic development. While true in many ways, it was also the case that the Bolivian public had serious reservations about their system, evidence of which emerged in the large-scale protests that followed beginning in 2000.

In this chapter, we review the pattern of evidence of system support and political tolerance for the national samples from 1998-2002. We first examine the system support data and then look at tolerance. Finally, we conclude by combining the two measures into an overall leading index of democratic stability.

## System Support

### Measurement of System Support

The University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of items that measures what we call “system support” that measure a generalized sense of legitimacy of the political system. In addition, another, longer battery of questions has been developed measuring confidence in the specific institutions of the state. The questions were all based on a 1-7 response metric that has been used by Pittsburgh in many other countries. To

make it easier, however, for the reader to compare these responses the items are converted into a familiar 0-100 metric (commonly used in test grades or in Centigrade thermometers). The items in the series are as follows:

*B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?*

*B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Bolivia?*

*B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Bolivian political system?*

*B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Bolivian?*

*B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Bolivia?<sup>82</sup>*


### ***Comparisons 1998-2002***

We first examine the Bolivia results for 2002 compared to prior years. As in the past, we convert the results to a 0-100 metric.<sup>83</sup> The results are shown in Figure VI. 2. There it is shown that system support has increased in 2002 for four of the five variables. This certainly is an encouraging and positive finding, suggesting a great level of legitimacy for the Bolivian system than in any prior year in which the survey has been conducted. The lack of improvement on the “basic rights protected” item suggests that Bolivians are still skeptical of the manner in which the political system protects them from abuse. Perhaps the implementation of the new criminal code will help improve this aspect of system support, but we already note a significant improvement on the “fair trial” item.

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<sup>82</sup>There is no question ‘B5’ in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring the basic concept. In order to retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

<sup>83</sup>A score of 1 point was subtracted from each variable to give them all a 0-6 range, and then the resulting number was divided by 6, to give the scale a 0-1 range, and then multiplied by 100, to give it a 0-100 range.



**Figure VI. 2 System support, 1998-2002**

We can summarize this finding with the overall index of system support that we have used in prior version of this study. This index sums up all five items, and once again uses a 0-100 metric. The results are shown in Figure VI. 3. Once again, we see clear evidence of increased support.




Figure VI. 3 System support, overall index, 1998-2002

### *System Support by Department*

We can further examine these shifts in system support by looking at the data at the level of the department. The results are shown in Figure VI. 4, where we see that in most departments, the pattern follows the national results. In Cochabamba, however, the location of the greatest protest activity in recent years, system support has not increased.





Figure VI. 4 System support, overall index, 1998-2002: by department

### System Support and Ethnicity


Ethnicity plays an important role in Bolivia in many ways, including politics. Indeed, throughout Latin America, ethnic identification has begun to play a more important role in the democratization process.<sup>84</sup> In Bolivia we have found that the population most clearly self-identifies into the following categories: White, Mestizo, Cholo, Black and Indian. We are not arguing that these are the only ethnic categories in use in Bolivia, but our research has found that they do seem to cover virtually the entire population. Indeed, in our sample for 2002, only 2.8% of the sample did not respond. When we examine system support by ethnicity, the results are shown in Figure VI. 5. It is quite clear that ethnicity matters, with those who identify as “Indian” expressing the lowest system support. However, it is important to keep in mind that only this group is significantly different from the others since the confidence intervals (not shown) clearly distinguish only the Indian population on the one hand, from the Whites and Mestizos on the other.

<sup>84</sup>Deborah Yashar, "Indigenous Protest and Democracy in Latin America," in *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*, ed. Jorge Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Deborah J. Yashar, "Contesting citizenship - Indigenous movements and democracy in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 1 (1998):23-42.



**Figure VI. 5 System support and ethnic self-identification**


We know, however, that other factors matter in determining system support. The main socio-economic and demographic ones are urbanization, education, income and gender. We control for these factors and once again examine the impact of ethnicity to see if the ethnic differences are really making underlying socio-economic differences. In fact, as shown in Figure VI. 6, ethnicity remains a significant predictor of system support even when these variables are controlled for. The only important shift is that once these controls are introduced, the system support for Blacks declines, and is lower than that of the Indian population.



**Figure VI. 6 System support and ethnic self-identification:  
Controlled for education, income, urbanization and gender**

### *System Support in Comparative Perspective*

We can place these data in international perspective by comparing them with some of the other nations in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. The results are shown in Figure VI. 7. Bolivia’s progress is evident.




**Figure VI. 7 System support in comparative perspective**

These findings suggest that the increase in system support is not idiosyncratic, confined to one region of Bolivia, but is indeed widespread, although not ubiquitous. The results, coupled with the overall increase in system support, are encouraging.

### ***Perceptions of the Economy and System Support***

One factor that helps determine system support is national performance. When the economy is perceived as doing well, citizens are more likely to support their government. On the other hand, when the economy is causing them pain, citizens tend to blame their government. This pattern is evident in Bolivia, as is shown in Figure VI. 8.



**Figure VI. 8 Impact of perception of national economic situation and system support**

## Political Tolerance

Political tolerance, defined in these studies as the willingness to respect civil liberties of all citizens, even those with whom you disagree, has been problematical in Bolivia. We have not only encountered a low level of tolerance in absolute terms, but in relative terms, compared to other countries in Latin America, tolerance has been low. Moreover, education does not seem to increase tolerance in Bolivia, where it does in other countries. These findings have been reported upon in prior studies in this series.

### *Measurement of Political Tolerance*

Our argument is that political systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, under girded by high levels of system support, as discussed above in the section on system

support.<sup>85</sup> But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim, indeed. Concretely, it is difficult if not impossible for those who hold minority points of view to aspire to persuade others to accept those views, if the majority will not allow them to express themselves publicly. Majorities, as Przeworski has argued, citizens must agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process.”<sup>86</sup>

The measurement of tolerance has a long history, much of which was reviewed in the report on the 1998 data set and will not be repeated here. The other main method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance towards communism.<sup>87</sup> This approach worked well, so long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lowered levels of intolerance toward communists were an indication of a general decline of intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. That is the approach taken by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.<sup>88</sup> The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:

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
<sup>85</sup> The section of the theory of political tolerance and its link to stable democracy is drawn from earlier discussion of this topic in prior reports on other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

<sup>86</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

<sup>87</sup> Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

<sup>88</sup> Even though different measures have been utilized in the study of tolerance, it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least-Liked?'," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.

This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot. The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Bolivia.



*D1. There are people who only say bad things about the governments of Bolivia, not only the current government, but the system of Bolivian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.*

*D2. Thinking still of those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?*

*D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government be allowed to run for public office?*

*D4. Thinking still about those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of them appearing on television to make a speech?*

### **Levels of Tolerance: 1998-2002**

We first examine the data to see if any changes in tolerance have emerged over the years since the survey was first conducted. The results are shown in Figure VI. 9. While the

differences among the years are statistically significant, no obvious overall trend emerges. We note first that with the single exception of the “right to demonstrate” in the 2000 sample, tolerance was below the mid-point of 50 on the 0-100 scale. We also note that although tolerance for the right to vote increased from 1998 to 2000, in 2002, an election year, it did not increase further. Moreover, the right to run for office and the right of free speech declines from the 2000 levels, although not by much. In short, we do not observe any tendency here of increased tolerance over the years.




Figure VI. 9 Political tolerance, 1998-2002

The overall index of tolerance for the period 1998-2002 is shown in Figure VI. 10. As noted, no overall trend is found, with tolerance levels in 2002 being the same as they were in 1998. Perhaps this should not come as any surprise since, as noted above, tolerance is closely connected to formal education. In Bolivia, however, education has not stimulated increased tolerance, suggesting that significant attention needs to be paid to civic education in the school system. Change, however, is bound to be slow since it would take considerable time for such changes, when and if made, would produce sufficient young people to begin to shift national attitudes.




Figure VI. 10 Political tolerance, overall index, 1998-2002

### *Tolerance and Education*

We have found in prior studies that education does not increase tolerance in Bolivia. We find the same result in the 2002 survey, as is clear from Figure VI. 11. There we see that although those with the lowest levels of education are slightly less tolerant than those with higher levels of education, the difference is very, very small and statistically insignificant.




Figure VI. 11 Tolerance and education, 2002

### *Tolerance and Geography*

Tolerance does vary by geography. Consider the wide range of tolerance between Beni and Potosí, which is shown in Figure VI. 12.




Figure VI. 12 Tolerance by department

Tolerance is not higher in Beni because it is a largely rural area. When we examine urbanization as a predictor of tolerance, we find the results shown in Figure VI. 13. There we see that the only significant difference is the contrast between the respondents who live in the largest cities (> 20,000 population) and those who live in the rest of Bolivia. Only those who live in the large cities are less tolerant, whereas there is no significant difference (as shown by the confidence intervals on the chart) among those who live in areas of varying densities.




Figure VI. 13 Tolerance and urbanization

### ***Tolerance and Ethnic Self-Identification***

We can also see if ethnic self-identification, which had an important impact on system support, also varies by ethnic self-identification. The results are shown in Figure VI. 14. As can be seen, there is no significant difference among the groups. The varying sizes of the confidence intervals, the reader is reminded, is a function of the variation in sample size of the various groups.




Figure VI. 14 Tolerance and ethnic self-identification

## Leading Indicator Results: Support for Stable Democracy

We have now examined the two variables, system support and tolerance, that together form our overall measure of support for stable democracy. It is now time to combine these two to be able to determine the proportion of the population that expresses attitudes conducive to stable democracy and those who do not. The theory with which we are working is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy.

In prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh project, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.<sup>89</sup> The framework shown in Table VI. 1 represents all of the

<sup>89</sup> This framework was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29. The theoretical material presented here appears in the prior versions of the Bolivia report as well as in some of the other studies in the series.

theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.<sup>90</sup>

**Table VI. 1.** Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support  
in Institutionally Democratic Polities

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup>This framework was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29. The theoretical material presented here appears in the prior versions of the Bolivia report as well as in some of the other studies in the series.

<sup>91</sup> Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.<sup>92</sup>

### ***Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia***

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. First, it should be noted that system

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<sup>92</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO y Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. Also appears as "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua," Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.

support and tolerance are positively associated with each other in Bolivia ( $r = .14$ ,  $\text{sig.} < .001$ ). This means that those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into “high” and “low.”<sup>93</sup> The overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way, and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low.

The results for the Bolivia 1998-2002 surveys are shown in Table VI. 2. As can be seen, for the series as a whole only a little more than one-in-ten Bolivians are both supportive of their political system and express political tolerance. On the other hand, the largest cell by far is the democratic breakdown cell, in which close to one half of all Bolivians fall. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Finally, between about a fifth and a quarter of Bolivians fall into the “unstable democracy” or “authoritarian stability” cells. But there are changes over the years that should be noted. The “stable democracy” cell has gone up consistently, while the “democratic breakdown” cell has declined.

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<sup>93</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, “Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as “Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica.” In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO y Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. Also appears as “Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua,” Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.

Table VI. 2. Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia: 1998- 2002

System support	Tolerance					
	High			Low		
High	Stable Democracy			Authoritarian Stability		
	1998: 11%	2000: 13%	2002: 14%	1998: 24%	2000: 21%	2002: 28%
Low	Unstable Democracy			Democratic Breakdown		
	1998: 17%	2000: 21%	2002: 15%	1998: 47%	2000: 45%	2002: 44%

Percentages do not total 100% because of rounding.

How do the Bolivian results compare with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base?<sup>94</sup> Not well, as is shown in Figure VI. 15. As can be seen, Bolivia is among the countries that cluster at the low end of the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but only a little more than one fourth the level of support found in Costa Rica.

<sup>94</sup>In order to create this chart, a new variable, called “bar2x2” was created in the data base. It eliminates cases in which missing data are found on either the tolerance or the system support measure. The coding was:  
 if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1)democ = 100.  
 if (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.  
 if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.  
 if (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 1)democ = 0.




Figure VI. 15 Respondents in “stable democracy” cell:  
Bolivia in comparative perspective

### Confidence in Institutions in Bolivia

The system support series, as noted at the outset of this chapter, includes a core set of five general questions and then an extension to a large number of specific institutions. In this section we examine the results for those institutions. The results are summarized in Figure VI. 16.




Figure VI. 16 Trust in institutions, 1998-2002

We can easily see that the Catholic Church in Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, is among the most trusted institutions. In 2002 we asked for the first time about “military government” and we see that it scored quite low. But, so did parties, the Congress and the police. The municipality did better. Unfortunately, because we have measured so many institutions, it is difficult to detect the patterns shown in the above figure. For this reason, we are including a tabular presentation of the same material. The results are shown in Table VI. 3.

Table VI. 3. Trust in Institutions

Institution	Year		
	1998	2000	2002
B18R Police	30.7	28.4	26.0
B30R Parties	28.2	23.1	28.7
B32R Military governments			28.9
B13R Congress	37.4	33.7	38.0
B23AR Public Prosecutors	40.3	38.6	41.5
B22CR Vigilance Committee	42.9	41.9	41.9
B23R Unions	42.2	41.7	43.3
B22R Municipal government	43.9	42.6	44.4
B23ER Constitutional Tribunal		42.5	45.0
B22DR OTB	43.5	44.1	45.4
B11R Election Court	40.7	39.8	46.5
B23BR Public defenders	43.0	46.0	46.9
B22BR Indigenous authority	46.6	45.8	47.5
B21AR Central Government	41.7	32.2	50.2
B31R NGOs		48.6	
B21R Journalists	55.7	58.9	56.3
B20R Catholic Church	67.0	69.9	68.6

## Conclusions

In this chapter we have seen that political support has risen significantly since 2000. On the other hand, political tolerance remains low and shows no sign of improving. We have also seen that Bolivia has made some progress in the combined support/tolerance measure, largely because of the increase in support, when compared to other nations in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. System support is influenced by perceptions of the economy. Tolerance, on the other hand, while not being influenced by education in Bolivia, is not related to ethnicity and is lower in urban areas.

## VII. Corruption and Democracy

Corruption is a serious problem for emerging democracies in that it has been shown to slow economic growth and investment. World-wide, however, increasing concern is being focused on the linkage between corruption and democracy. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that corruption erodes confidence in democracy. In the 2000 version of this series of studies, an analysis of the Bolivia data was included, a version of which was subsequently published in a leading academic journal.<sup>95</sup> In that analysis, it was clearly shown that corruption does erode support for the system in Bolivia, as well as other countries in the region. The discussion in the 2000 report compared the data for 1998 with that of 2000.

### International Ranking of Bolivia's Level of Corruption

We begin this discussion by placing Bolivia in a world-wide context. Transparency International regularly releases its "Corruption Perception Index." If we can rely on the validity of those data, even in very general terms, Bolivians ought to be concerned. The results of their 2002 survey appears in Table VII. 1. The key piece of information in this table is where Bolivia stands compared to other countries. Of the 102 in the survey, Bolivia ranks at 89, along with Cameroon, Ecuador and Haiti. There are only 10 countries in the world with a score lower than that of Bolivia. This finding, alone, gives us grounds for concern.

Table VII. 1. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2002<sup>96</sup>

Rank	Country	CPI 2002 score	Surveys used	Standard deviation	High-low Range
1	Finland	9.7	8	0.4	8.9 - 10.0
2	Denmark	9.5	8	0.3	8.9 - 9.9
	New Zealand	9.5	8	0.2	8.9 - 9.6
4	Iceland	9.4	6	0.4	8.8 - 10.0
5	Singapore	9.3	13	0.2	8.9 - 9.6
	Sweden	9.3	10	0.2	8.9 - 9.6
7	Canada	9.0	10	0.2	8.7 - 9.3
	Luxembourg	9.0	5	0.5	8.5 - 9.9
	Netherlands	9.0	9	0.3	8.5 - 9.3
10	United Kingdom	8.7	11	0.5	7.8 - 9.4
11	Australia	8.6	11	1.0	6.1 - 9.3
12	Norway	8.5	8	0.9	6.9 - 9.3
	Switzerland	8.5	9	0.9	6.8 - 9.4

<sup>95</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries," *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002):408-33.

<sup>96</sup> Table taken from the TI web cite.

Rank	Country	CPI 2002 score	Surveys used	Standard deviation	High-low Range
14	Hong Kong	8.2	11	0.8	6.6 - 9.4
15	Austria	7.8	8	0.5	7.2 - 8.7
16	USA	7.7	12	0.8	5.5 - 8.7
17	Chile	7.5	10	0.9	5.6 - 8.8
18	Germany	7.3	10	1.0	5.0 - 8.1
	Israel	7.3	9	0.9	5.2 - 8.0
20	Belgium	7.1	8	0.9	5.5 - 8.7
	Japan	7.1	12	0.9	5.5 - 7.9
	Spain	7.1	10	1.0	5.2 - 8.9
23	Ireland	6.9	8	0.9	5.5 - 8.1
24	Botswana	6.4	5	1.5	5.3 - 8.9
25	France	6.3	10	0.9	4.8 - 7.8
	Portugal	6.3	9	1.0	5.5 - 8.0
27	Slovenia	6.0	9	1.4	4.7 - 8.9
28	Namibia	5.7	5	2.2	3.6 - 8.9
29	Estonia	5.6	8	0.6	5.2 - 6.6
	Taiwan	5.6	12	0.8	3.9 - 6.6
31	Italy	5.2	11	1.1	3.4 - 7.2
32	Uruguay	5.1	5	0.7	4.2 - 6.1
33	Hungary	4.9	11	0.5	4.0 - 5.6
	Malaysia	4.9	11	0.6	3.6 - 5.7
	Trinidad & Tobago	4.9	4	1.5	3.6 - 6.9
36	Belarus	4.8	3	1.3	3.3 - 5.8
	Lithuania	4.8	7	1.9	3.4 - 7.6
	South Africa	4.8	11	0.5	3.9 - 5.5
	Tunisia	4.8	5	0.8	3.6 - 5.6
40	Costa Rica	4.5	6	0.9	3.6 - 5.9
	Jordan	4.5	5	0.7	3.6 - 5.2
	Mauritius	4.5	6	0.8	3.5 - 5.5
	South Korea	4.5	12	1.3	2.1 - 7.1
44	Greece	4.2	8	0.7	3.7 - 5.5
45	Brazil	4.0	10	0.4	3.4 - 4.8
	Bulgaria	4.0	7	0.9	3.3 - 5.7
	Jamaica	4.0	3	0.4	3.6 - 4.3
	Peru	4.0	7	0.6	3.2 - 5.0
	Poland	4.0	11	1.1	2.6 - 5.5
50	Ghana	3.9	4	1.4	2.7 - 5.9
51	Croatia	3.8	4	0.2	3.6 - 4.0
52	Czech Republic	3.7	10	0.8	2.6 - 5.5
	Latvia	3.7	4	0.2	3.5 - 3.9
	Morocco	3.7	4	1.8	1.7 - 5.5
	Slovak Republic	3.7	8	0.6	3.0 - 4.6
	Sri Lanka	3.7	4	0.4	3.3 - 4.3
57	Colombia	3.6	10	0.7	2.6 - 4.6
	Mexico	3.6	10	0.6	2.5 - 4.9
59	China	3.5	11	1.0	2.0 - 5.6
	Dominican Rep.	3.5	4	0.4	3.0 - 3.9
	Ethiopia	3.5	3	0.5	3.0 - 4.0
62	Egypt	3.4	7	1.3	1.7 - 5.3

Rank	Country	CPI 2002 score	Surveys used	Standard deviation	High-low Range
	El Salvador	3.4	6	0.8	2.0 - 4.2
64	Thailand	3.2	11	0.7	1.5 - 4.1
	Turkey	3.2	10	0.9	1.9 - 4.6
66	Senegal	3.1	4	1.7	1.7 - 5.5
67	Panama	3.0	5	0.8	1.7 - 3.6
68	Malawi	2.9	4	0.9	2.0 - 4.0
	Uzbekistan	2.9	4	1.0	2.0 - 4.1
70	Argentina	2.8	10	0.6	1.7 - 3.8
71	Cote d'Ivoire	2.7	4	0.8	2.0 - 3.4
	Honduras	2.7	5	0.6	2.0 - 3.4
	India	2.7	12	0.4	2.4 - 3.6
	Russia	2.7	12	1.0	1.5 - 5.0
	Tanzania	2.7	4	0.7	2.0 - 3.4
	Zimbabwe	2.7	6	0.5	2.0 - 3.3
77	Pakistan	2.6	3	1.2	1.7 - 4.0
	Philippines	2.6	11	0.6	1.7 - 3.6
	Romania	2.6	7	0.8	1.7 - 3.6
	Zambia	2.6	4	0.5	2.0 - 3.2
81	Albania	2.5	3	0.8	1.7 - 3.3
	Guatemala	2.5	6	0.6	1.7 - 3.5
	Nicaragua	2.5	5	0.7	1.7 - 3.4
	Venezuela	2.5	10	0.5	1.5 - 3.2
85	Georgia	2.4	3	0.7	1.7 - 2.9
	Ukraine	2.4	6	0.7	1.7 - 3.8
	Vietnam	2.4	7	0.8	1.5 - 3.6
88	Kazakhstan	2.3	4	1.1	1.7 - 3.9
89	Bolivia	2.2	6	0.4	1.7 - 2.9
	Cameroon	2.2	4	0.7	1.7 - 3.2
	Ecuador	2.2	7	0.3	1.7 - 2.6
	Haiti	2.2	3	1.7	0.8 - 4.0
93	Moldova	2.1	4	0.6	1.7 - 3.0
	Uganda	2.1	4	0.3	1.9 - 2.6
95	Azerbaijan	2.0	4	0.3	1.7 - 2.4
96	Indonesia	1.9	12	0.6	0.8 - 3.0
	Kenya	1.9	5	0.3	1.7 - 2.5
98	Angola	1.7	3	0.2	1.6 - 2.0
	Madagascar	1.7	3	0.7	1.3 - 2.5
	Paraguay	1.7	3	0.2	1.5 - 2.0
101	Nigeria	1.6	6	0.6	0.9 - 2.5
102	Bangladesh	1.2	5	0.7	0.3 - 2.0

### **Explanatory notes**

A more detailed description of the CPI methodology is available at <http://www.transparency.org/cpi/index.html#cpi> or at [www.gwdg.de/~uwwv/2002.html](http://www.gwdg.de/~uwwv/2002.html)

#### **A CPI 2002 Score**

relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

#### **A Surveys Used**

refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country's performance.


A total of 15 surveys were used from nine independent institutions, and at least three surveys were required for a country to be included in the CPI.

**Standard Deviation**

indicates differences in the values of the sources: the greater the standard deviation, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.


**Bolivian Views of Corruption During Democracy and Dictatorship**

Not only are international sources concerned about corruption in Bolivia, but Bolivians themselves are concerned. We can demonstrate this with two items from the 2002 survey. First, we asked respondents (M4) if they believe that corruption was higher during the Banzer dictatorship, 1971-1978 or has been higher during democracy since 1982. The results are shown in Figure VII. 1. Three-fifths of Bolivians perceive that corruption is worse under democracy than it was under dictatorship.




**Figure VII. 1 When has corruption been higher?**

How widespread is this belief? As we will see, it is extremely widespread, covering all geographic and demographic portions of the population. We first look at potential urban/rural differences. These are shown in Figure VII. 2. As can be seen, urbanization makes no significant impact on this perception.




**Figure VII. 2 Perception that corruption is worse under democracy than dictatorship by urbanization**

We do find some small variation by department, as shown in Figure VII. 3. Only remote Pando and Beni show a reduction in the perception that corruption has gotten worse since the restoration of democracy in Bolivia.



**Figure VII. 3 Perception that corruption is worse under democracy than under dictatorship by department**

We can see this pattern a bit more clearly if we look at the confidence interval plot shown in Figure VII. 4. There it becomes clear that the only significant difference is the one between the high score in La Paz and the low one in Beni. In this analysis, the sample weights have been turned off; otherwise the confidence intervals by department for the smaller departments would appear unusually and incorrectly large.



**Figure VII. 4 Perception that corruption is worse under democracy than dictatorship: Confidence intervals by department**

### Corruption Victimization: 1998-2002

Perception of corruption is one thing; victimization by corruption is quite another. Although we expect the two to coincide, we are most directly interested in the frequency with which Bolivians have been victimized by corruption, and if the level of victimization has changed over the years in which this survey has been conducted. The survey asked a series of questions (EXC1-EXC14) measuring personal experience and knowledge of corruption through a third party. The original items are as follows:

Hablemos de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	Si	No	NS
EXC1. Ha sido acusado durante los dos últimos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?	1	0	8
EXC2. Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno)?	1	0	8
EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un policía en el último año?	1	0	8
EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?	1	0	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último años?	1	0	8
EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	1	0	8

EXC13. En su trabajo, le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último años?	1	0	8
EXC14. ¿Conoce a alguien que ha tenido que pagar una coima en los estrados judiciales en el último año?	1	0	8

As can be seen in Figure VII. 5, the level of corruption has remained very stable in Bolivia in the 1998-2002 period. The only important increase was for the item on knowing someone who had to pay a bribe in the courts, but on that one item, the wording changed from 1998 to the 2000/2002 surveys. In the 1998 survey, the item referred to “La corte” whereas in the subsequent administration, the broader term, “los estrados judiciales” was used.





Figure VII. 5 Corruption victimization, 1998-2002

What we see from these results is that corruption appears to be very common in Bolivia. The above figure does not show us, however, what proportion of the respondents had been victimized more than once. To examine that phenomenon, we focus exclusively on direct personal experiences with corruption, which are EXC1 (unfair accusations by the police), EXC2 (police asking for a bribe), EXC6 (public employee asking for a bribe), EXC11 (bribery in the municipality), and EXC13 (bribery at work). The reason for this is that the indirect experiences, the ones in which respondents may have heard about a corrupt act, do not give us a clear picture of the actual frequency of corruption since many individuals may have heard about the same, single corrupt act. The result would lead to over counting. Even so, when we confine the results to a direct count of victimization, the results are disturbing. As shown in Figure VII. 6, only

slightly less than half of the population of Bolivia (based on our survey) had not personally experienced a corrupt act in the year prior to being interviewed. Most of those who had been victimized, had suffered more than once; 18.7% of the sample had experienced three or more corrupt acts in the course of the year.



**Figure VII. 6 Total personal experiences with corruption: 2002 sample**

We can use this overall index of direct personal corruption victimization to examine a number of issues related to corruption. We do so in the paragraphs that follow.

### ***Corruption Victimization by Department and Urbanization***

In the 2000 study we examined corruption by department, but did so largely based on individual acts of corruption. Here we examine the overall index to look for patterns across the departments. We need to keep in mind that the average Bolivian was victimized 1.1 times. The results are shown in Figure VII. 7. There we see that three departments, Oruro, La Paz and Cochabamaba have levels of corruption victimization above the national average.





Figure VII. 7 Total index of corruption victimization by department

But these results do not control for urbanization, nor do they factor in differences in the sample in terms of education or gender. Controlling for them could be important since urbanization has been shown to be linked to corruption levels, and since we also know that some departments, such as La Paz, are far more urban than others.


We first examine the urbanization/corruption linkage. As we can see from Figure VII. 1, corruption victimization is far higher in urban areas than in rural.



**Figure VII. 8 The impact of urbanization on corruption victimization**

The analysis depicted in Figure VII. 9 controls for urbanization, as well as education and gender to examine the variation in corruption by department.<sup>97</sup> We see that corruption drops somewhat in La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba and increases a bit in the other departments. This is largely because of the removal of the urbanization effect. But, there are two overall points. First, corruption does indeed vary by department, with some areas, such as Oruro with corruption levels twice that of Pando (uncontrolled). Second, even where corruption is relatively low, the level is still high by international standards. In Western Europe, for example, surveys have shown corruption victimization at .07% of the population compared to 47% in Bolivia.

<sup>97</sup> These controls were carried out using analysis of covariance.



**Figure VII. 9 Total index of personal corruption victimization by department**  
**Controlled for urbanization, education and gender**


### Corruption and the DDPC Program

Elsewhere in this study, we have examined closely the impact of the DDPC program on municipal development. The focus of that program was not on corruption, but since about one-fifth of the respondents in the national sample say that they were victims of corruption at the level of the municipality, one wonders what impact, if any, the DDPC program has been having on stemming corruption.

To answer this question we return to the special DDPC sample drawn in 2002, the one that is focused on those municipalities that have experienced the full range of DDPC inputs. We again adjust the national sample to exclude those portions of it that had partial DDPC inputs so as not to confuse the experimental group (i.e., the DDPC municipalities) with the control (i.e., the rest of the nation not affected by DDPC).


We asked each respondent about their overall perception of the level of corruption among public functionaries (EXC7). The responses are recoded into our familiar 0-100 format, and the results appear in Figure VII. 10. In order to compare the nation to the DDPC sample, we had to control for differences between the two samples in terms of urbanization, gender, education and

income. The results show, nonetheless, that in the DDPC municipalities, the perception is that corruption is not as pervasive as it is in the rest of Bolivia, and the difference is statistically significant.




**Figure VII. 10 Perception of corruption: National vs. DDPC**  
**Controlled for urbanization, gender, education and income**

The reduction of actual corruption is, of course, very important. In this regard, the DDPC program fares less well. When we first examine the national vs. DDPC on corruption victimization at the level of the municipality (EXC11), we find that the DDPC is much lower, as can be seen in Figure VII. 11.



**Figure VII. 11 Corruption victimization by municipality:  
National sample vs. DDPC**

The results shown in Figure VII. 11 above would appear to be very encouraging, yet, we cannot accept them without controlling for the factors that we already know differ between the national sample and the special DDPC sample. These are urbanization, education, income and gender. Once these are controlled for, a different picture emerges. The results of introducing these controls appear in Figure VII. 12. We see that the national sample still exhibits a higher level of corruption victimization at the municipality, but that the difference is no longer significant.



**Figure VII. 12 Corruption victimization by municipality:**  
**controlled for urbanization, education, income and gender**  
**National sample vs. DDPC**


These findings are suggestive. It appears that the DDPC program is having some effect on lowering corruption in municipal government. Yet, about 18% of respondents in the municipalities that have been targets of an extensive municipal strengthening program are still being victimized by corruption in those municipalities. This suggests that more effort needs to be made to combat corruption as a component of the DDPC program.

## Political Partisanship and Corruption Victimization

In another chapter in this study, we carried out an extensive analysis of the vote in the 2002 election. We examined the characteristics of voters and non-voters, as well as the characteristics of the voters for the four parties that won the most votes. In this chapter we examine the impact of corruption on both turnout and partisan preference.

We look first at turnout. Was turnout affected by corruption victimization? Although differences appeared initially in the analysis, when we controlled for the factors already shown to be the primary causes of non-voting (age, education, income, gender, urbanization and ethnicity) the differences became insignificant.

Party preference, as expressed by the vote in the 2002 presidential election, is another matter. Here we see clear differences. In Figure VII. 13 we display bars indicating the vote for the four main parties. The height of each bar shows how frequently the respondent had been victimized in the year prior to the study. This is our indicator of direct, personal victimization by corruption. As we see, the voters for the MNR and the MIR were far less likely to have been victimized by corruption than voters for the MAS, and somewhat less likely to have been victimized than voters for the NFR. Corruption, then, may well have played a part in the vote. If we consider the MAS and, to a lesser extent, the NFR to be parties of disaffected voters, while the MNR and MIR supporters were voting for the parties that eventually formed the winning coalition that claimed the presidency, then corruption victimization seems to have played a role in influencing the vote. MAS and, to a lesser extent NFR voters had been victimized by corruption more frequently than MNR and MIR voters and that perhaps explains why they chose those parties to support in the election.



**Figure VII. 13 Corruption victimization and vote for president, 2002**  
 controlled for urbanization, education, gender, income, ethnicity

These findings are very important for an understanding of the views of the Bolivian voter. We will not repeat here our discussion of the differences among voters for the various parties, but we have already shown that corruption causes a decline in system support, a vital factor in democratic political stability. Now we also know that corruption can influence the vote. This suggests that Bolivian political parties need to pay attention to the problem of corruption if they expect to win votes in future elections.

## **Conclusions**

Corruption is a significant problem for democracy in Bolivia. Not only does the country rank high in international comparisons of corruption, our data show that about half of Bolivians are victimized by corrupt practices each year. This chapter has shown who are the main victims, the impact of the DDPC program on corruption and the impact of corruption on presidential vote.

## VIII. Ethnicity and Democracy

Throughout this study, reference has been made to the impact of ethnicity in defining attitudes in Bolivia. In the 2000 study an extensive analysis was carried out on the socio-economic characteristics of ethnic groups in Bolivia, and there is no need to repeat that analysis here. Given the importance that ethnic issues played in the 2002 elections, it is appropriate for us to extend the analysis to the fundamental question of the differences, if any, in support for democracy among ethnic groups in Bolivia.


### Comparisons of Dictatorship and Democracy

#### *Crime*

A new series of items introduced in the 2002 survey (M2-M4) asked respondents to compare Bolivian democracy to the last long period of dictatorship (Banzer, from 1971-1978). We wanted to know if they believed that was more crime, more unemployment or more corruption during the dictatorship or during the democratic period. The analysis shows the responses, broken down by ethnic self-identification. The results are shown in Figure VIII. 1. Two important findings emerge from this figure. First, irrespective of ethnic identification with the exception of the small sample of Blacks, most Bolivians believe that there has been more crime under democracy than under dictatorship. Empirically, of course, it is not possible to verify that perception since it is difficult to trust crime rate data for the period of dictatorship. But the perception that things are worse under democracy is troubling, although one that is widespread in many democratizing countries.<sup>98</sup> Second, it is clearly not the case that the Bolivian Indian population has a more negative view of democracy than do other Bolivians. Indeed, these results show that significantly more Whites, Cholos and Mestizos believe that crime is worse under democracy than under dictatorship.

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
<sup>98</sup> Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).



**Figure VIII. 1 When was there more crime?  
Responses by ethnic self-identification**

Before we take these results as definitive, however, we need to control for demographic and socio-economic differences between the ethnic groups. For example, we already know that Whites are more urban, better educated and wealthier than the Indian population. We control for these by first creating a scale based on the question by coding those who say that crime is worse under democracy as 100, those who say it is the same as 50 and those who say that crime was worse under dictatorship a 0. We then apply controls and re-run the analysis.<sup>99</sup> The results appear in Figure VIII. 2, where we see that even though the controls have a significant effect on the results, the patterns observed above in Figure VIII. 1 are retained in this more complex multivariate analysis.

<sup>99</sup> The controls were co-variables in an analysis of variance design.




**Figure VIII. 2 Perception that crime is worse under democracy: by ethnic self-identification controlled for urbanization, education, income and gender**

## *Unemployment*

The next item in the series asks respondents to compare the levels of unemployment under dictatorship and democracy. Here we can see no difference based on ethnicity. When controls are introduced for demographic and socio-economic factors, ethnicity remains insignificant (results not shown). But what is very important to note in these results is that only approximately 15% of the population of Bolivia believes that unemployment was worse under dictatorship than democracy. Given that one of the appeals of many dictatorships is that they “get the trains to run on time,” which is another way of saying that they can provide better employment than can democracy, it is troubling to see that most Bolivians believe that this is indeed the case in their country. In fact, we know that dictatorship is no better at running the economy than is democracy, as a major cross-national study has shown.<sup>100</sup>


<sup>100</sup> Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael E. Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).



**Figure VIII. 3 Perception of unemployment during dictatorship and democracy:  
by ethnic self-identification**

### ***Corruption***

We now look at the last item in the series, the one on the perception of corruption during dictatorship and democracy. When has corruption been worse? As can be see in Figure VIII. 4, a familiar pattern emerges. We see that irrespective of ethnic self-identification, most Bolivians believe that there has been more corruption under democracy than there was under dictatorship.



**Figure VIII. 4 Perception of corruption under dictatorship and democracy:  
By ethnic self-identification**


We conclude this exploration of ethnicity and democracy with two findings. First, ethnicity does not seem to matter as much as some would suggest, at least in this limited set of question, with no statistically significant differences in the area of perception of unemployment and corruption. Second, Bolivians look back at the last dictatorship through rose-colored glasses.

### Aggressive Political Participation

The protests and disturbances that have affected Bolivia in recent years have been linked in the media to ethnicity. Our survey can shed light on this phenomenon by examining the results of the series of items that measure approval of aggressive political participation. These items do not directly measure such participation, but since civil disobedience is illegal in Bolivia, direct questions about participation in such illegal activity might not produce adequately reliable responses.


The series is our “E” series of questions, focusing on approval of aggressive forms of participation, which are E15, closing or blocking streets, E14, invading private property, E2, taking over factories and other buildings, and E3, participating in a group that attempts to overthrow an elected government by violent means. Each of these items was asked on a 0-10 scale, but are converted here to the familiar 0-100 metric.

The results of the analysis are presented in Figure VIII. 5. The reader needs to keep in mind that the scale is 0-100, so that these results show that irrespective of ethnic self-identification, support for these forms of civil disobedience is very low. Nonetheless the differences by ethnicity are striking. We see that whites are less likely to support blocking streets, but as a form of protest, this is the most highly acceptable form in Bolivia. It is also of note that the black population, once again, quite small in our sample, is by far the most supportive of invading property, taking over factories and buildings, and overthrowing elected governments by violent means.



**Figure VIII. 5 Approval of aggressive political participation:  
by ethnic self-identification**

We can summarize this information by creating a single scale of approval of aggressive political participation. As shown in Figure VIII. 6, it is clear that the Indian and Black populations are significantly more supportive of such participation than are the other self-identified ethnicities in Bolivia.



**Figure VIII. 6 Approval of aggressive political participation index:  
by ethnic self-identification**

Perhaps the most salient result for the purposes of this chapter is the responses of the Indian population. We see that they are more likely to approve each of the four forms of civil disobedience than Whites or Mestizos. And their approval of such actions is second only to Blacks on three of the four questions. Their support is especially high on the item asking about approval for a violent overthrow of an elected government.

These results tell us that while most Bolivians seem to agree that democracy was a happier time (as shown in the preceding section of this chapter) they also show that there is a sharp division along ethnic lines, with self-identified Whites being the least likely to approve civil disobedience, and Indians and Blacks the most likely. Ethnic differences, then, do seem to matter in Bolivia on issues with an important linkage to democratic political stability.

### **Ethnicity and Support for a Coup**

Directly linked to the attitudes explored immediately above is the series of questions (JC1-12) in which we ask about the conditions under which the respondent would justify a military coup. Although such coups seem like a thing of the past in Latin America, we should not forget that as recently as 2000 there was a coup in Ecuador and in 2002 a coup in Venezuela. Both were ephemeral, but the potential for such episodes exists in many countries in the region.

### High Unemployment

The first question we asked (JC1) was about justifying a coup under conditions of high unemployment. The results are shown in Figure VIII. 1. Here we see that the main difference is between Whites on the one hand, and the other groups on the other, with the exception of Blacks, who are most likely to support a coup under these circumstances. It is also of note to see that nation-wide, over one-third of the population would justify a coup under conditions of high unemployment.





Figure VIII. 7 Would justify a coup when unemployment is high by ethnic self-identification

### Many University Student Strikes


We next asked about justifying a coup when there are many university student strikes. As can be seen in Figure VIII. 8, support for a coup under these conditions is somewhat lower than under conditions of high unemployment, but it is still over one-third of the population. On the low side are the Whites and Cholos while the Blacks once again are highest.



**Figure VIII. 8 Would justify a coup when there are many student strikes by self-identification**

***Labor Strikes***


We also asked about coup justification under conditions of many strikes by unionized laborers. Here, most Bolivians feel about the same way, with the exception of the Black population, which has much higher levels of support, as is shown in Figure VIII. 9.



**Figure VIII. 9 Would justify a coup when there are many unionized labor strikes  
by ethnic self-identification**

### *Cutting Employee Salaries*


Justification for a coup when employers lower salaries follows a similar pattern, as shown in Figure VIII. 10.



**Figure VIII. 10 Would justify a coup when employers lower worker salaries by ethnic self-identification**

***High Crime Rates***


Crime has been a far more serious problem on other countries of the region than it has been in Bolivia. Yet, as will be see when looking at the responses to the coup justification item in Figure VIII. 11, nearly half of the Bolivian population would justify a coup under conditions of high crime. It is interesting to note that on this item, the pattern is sharply different from the prior ones. Here Blacks are less supportive of a coup than are Indians. Indeed Blacks and Whites are almost identical on this item.



**Figure VIII. 11 Would justify a coup when crime is high  
By ethnic self-identification**

### ***High Levels of Corruption***

The final item in the series deals with support for a coup under conditions of high levels of corruption. Once again we see (Figure VIII. 16) that the national level of justification for a coup is high, totally nearly one-half the population. Only whites are somewhat lower, but even for that group, 40% would justify a coup.



**Figure VIII. 12 Would justify a coup when corruption is high by ethnic self-identification**

This examination of support for a coup shows that between one-third and one-half of the Bolivian population would support such an event under varying conditions. There is variation by ethnicity, but the pattern changes from situation-to-situation. The only group that consistently is less supportive of coups than the national average are self-identified Whites.

### Preference for Dictatorship or Democracy

Although we saw disappointingly high proportions of the population justifying military coups, it is also the case that *ceteris paribus* Bolivians prefer democracy to dictatorship in overwhelming proportions. We need to be cautious about these results, since, as noted earlier in this study, the term “democracy” is heavily loaded. We asked (JC15) if the respondent preferred democracy or dictatorship. The full wording of the item is important to include because of the context in which each option is placed:


JC15. Algunas personas prefieren vivir bajo una democracia porque protege los derechos humanos e individuales, a pesar de que a veces pueda ser ineficiente y desordenada. Otros prefieren vivir bajo una dictadura por su orden y eficiencia. Qué prefiere más Ud. una democracia o una dictadura?

Una democracia [1]

Una dictadura [2]


NS [8]

The results are shown in Figure VIII. 13. It is clear that Bolivians of all ethnicities prefer democracy over dictatorship, even though Blacks are somewhat lower than other ethnic groups.



**Figure VIII. 13 Prefer democracy over dictatorship**  
**By ethnic self-identification**  
**Controlled for urbanization, gender education and income**

We can also examine the response to this question for each of the national samples in this study. The results are shown in Figure VIII. 14. We see that there is a decline over the years, one that is statistically significant, but in absolute terms support for democracy is still very high.



**Figure VIII. 14 Preference for democracy or dictatorship**  
by year, 1998-2002

Nonetheless, one needs to consider these positive results alongside of the coup justification items just presented. The two sets of responses establish a paradox, since on the one hand Bolivians strongly prefer democracy to dictatorship while on the other as many as half would support a military coup.


One possible explanation to this paradox is that many Bolivians may not equate military rule with dictatorship. Alternatively, their definitions of democracy may not exclude military rule. One way to examine further this question is to utilize another item on preference for democracy. The item used is one that is widely employed in surveys in the region. The respondent is read the following item:

AOJ14. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?

- [1] La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno
- [2] En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario es preferible a uno democrático
- [3] Me da lo mismo un régimen democrático que un régimen no democrático


The results help explain why the paradox exists. When asked to choose between dictatorship and democracy, as shown in Figure VIII. 14, Bolivians overwhelmingly chose democracy. But, when asked if at times dictatorship is an option or if it really does not make a difference which regime

is preferable, the results in Figure VIII. 15 show that fewer than two-thirds of the respondents unequivocally prefer democracy. Variation by ethnicity from this overall pattern is notable for the Chola and Black group. In those two groups support for democracy is weaker than for other ethnicities.



**Figure VIII. 15 Preference for regime type by ethnic self-identification**

One wonders if some of these differences are a function of socio-economic and demographic differences among the ethnic groups. In fact it is, as is shown in Figure VIII. 16. Once those influence are removed (and the three-choice format is recoded into a single 0-100 scale), Black preference for democracy remains below the others, but not significantly so.



**Figure VIII. 16 Preference for democracy over authoritarianism**  
**by ethnic self-identification**  
**controlled for urbanization, gender, education and income**

We can also review these results for 2000 and 2002 (the question was not asked in 1998). The results are shown in Figure VIII. 17. As we can see, there has been a disappointing shift away from democracy toward authoritarianism in the 2000-2002 period.




Figure VIII. 17 Preference for regime type by survey year

## Authoritarian vs. Democratic Attitudes

We are left wondering, after reviewing the above findings, as to how committed Bolivians are to democracy. We have seen that when we ask direct questions about democracy vs. dictatorship, majorities support democracy, although the numbers seem to be declining. But, “democracy” is a heavily value-laden term. As a result, many of those who say they support democracy may in fact be providing a socially desirable response rather than what they truly believe. We can examine in more detail the preference for democracy by looking at the responses to a number of other questions in the survey. We can also examine these by ethnic differences.

One key question in this series is where we allow support for law and order to compete with support for civil liberties. This question is item AUT16 in the survey, and reads:


AUT16. Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría Ud. que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno:

[1] Mantener el orden en la sociedad

[2] Respetar la libertad del individuo

[8] NS/NR

For the 2002 sample as a whole, the results are shown in Figure VIII. 18. As can be seen, the population is nearly evenly divided, with a small majority preferring order over liberty. This, of course, is a difficult choice. Citizens have the right to demand both order and liberty. But it does suggest that the support for democracy expressed above in the analysis of other questions is a contingent support, dependent upon the trade-offs that are being required. Not surprisingly, this item is significantly ( $< .001$ ) correlated with our scale of tolerance, with more tolerant individuals more likely to prefer liberty and less tolerant more likely to prefer order.



**Figure VIII. 18 In difficult times, the responsibility of the government is to maintain order or to respect individual liberties?**

Another question that poses a different sort of trade-off, one between economic well-being and civil liberties, was asked in the next question in the survey:

AUT17. ¿Qué tipo de presidente prefiere Ud. Más?


[1] Un presidente que garantice la seguridad económica y la posibilidad de un salario bueno?

[2] Un presidente que garantice las elecciones libres, la libertad de expresión y de prensa ?

[8] NS/NR

The results for the 2002 national sample are shown in Figure VIII. 19. Here we see even less support for democracy and greater concern with every-day matters such as economic security and a good salary. This item is also significantly associated with our measure of tolerance, with those who prefer a president who guarantees civil liberties more tolerant than those who prefer a president who provides economic guarantees. On the other hand, when controls for socio-

economic and demographic factors are introduced, there is no ethnic variation on the response to this item.



**Figure VIII. 19 What type of president do you prefer?**  
**One who guarantees...**

While these results suggest that the Bolivian population, when confronted with trade-offs between democracy and well-being, will chose the later, other data show that the population resists authoritarian rule. For example, consider the results of the following question:

AUT10. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo?

- [1] Lo que Bolivia más necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, o
- [2] Lo que el país necesita más es un hombre que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la población?
- [8] NS/NR

The results shown in Figure VIII. 20 reveal that most Bolivians prefer a leader who rules via dialogue rather than a strong-man who rules with an iron fist.




Figure VIII. 20 What Bolivia needs is a leader who uses dialogue rather than a strong man

## Conclusions

This chapter has explored further issues related to support for democracy. It concentrated on the role of ethnicity, in which some significant differences in the way in which different groups, self-defined by ethnicity, think about democracy. We also saw that while Bolivians believe in democracy in principle, and resist strong-man rule, many are willing to sacrifice civil liberties in hopes of enjoying a stronger economy.

## Appendix: Questionnaire in Spanish

### CUESTIONARIO # versión 9

Gobernabilidad

Julio 2002

Ciudad \_\_\_\_\_ Localidad \_\_\_\_\_ Bar./UV \_\_\_\_\_ Mnz. \_\_\_\_\_ Viv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dirección \_\_\_\_\_

**Estrato:** Público [1] DDPC Urbano [2] DDPC Rural [3] **UR.:** Urbano [1] Urbano [2] Rural compacto [3] Rural disperso [4]

>20.000      2 a 20 mil      500 a 2 mil

menos 500

Provincia \_\_\_\_\_ Municipio \_\_\_\_\_ Cantón \_\_\_\_\_ Distrito electoral \_\_\_\_\_

UPM \_\_\_\_\_ Departamento La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7]

Tarija [8] Beni [9]

Nombre del entrevistado: \_\_\_\_\_ Q1. Sexo (no pregunte)  
Hombre [1] Mujer [2] Edad \_\_\_\_\_

Día del intento: Lu [1] Ma [2] Mi [3] Ju [4] Vi [5] Sa [6] Do [7] Hora de inicio: \_\_\_\_\_: \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/2000

día mes

Buenos días/tardes. Mi nombre es: \_\_\_\_\_ Soy encuestador (a) de la empresa Encuestas y

Estudios y de la Universidad de Pittsburgh de los Estados Unidos. Estamos realizando un estudio para

conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre diferentes aspectos de la situación nacional. Ud. ha sido seleccionado

(a) por sorteo para hacerle una entrevista y quisiéramos pedirle que colabore con nosotros, dedicándonos

unos minutos de su tiempo. Le reitero que todas sus respuestas serán confidenciales.

Para empezar, acostumbra escuchar algún programa de noticias.. (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

A1. Por radio Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

A2. Por la televisión Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

A3. Lee noticias en el periódico Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

**A4. En su opinión, cuál es el problema más grave que enfrenta el país?** *(Una sola respuesta, si menciona más de uno pregunte por el más importante)(respuesta espontánea)*

Desempleo [1] Inflación, precios altos, costo de vida [2] Pobreza [3] Delincuencia [4] Peligro de golpe de estado [5]

Falta de tierras para cultivar [6] Falta de crédito [7] Corrupción [8] Problemas ecológicos [9] drogadicción [10]

Violencia doméstica [11] narcotráfico [12] Otros *(especifique)* \_\_\_\_\_ No hay problemas [50] NS [88]

**A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverlos solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiendo ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda o cooperación...***(lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)*

**CP1. Al Presidente de la República** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**CP2. A Algún diputado o senador** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**CP3. Al Alcalde o concejal** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**CP3A. A la autoridad originaria o autoridad de la comunidad indígena** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**CP3B. Al comité de vigilancia del municipio** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**CP4. A alguna oficina del gobierno nacional, ministerio, prefectura o, policía** Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica del país? Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, regular, mala o muy mala?**  
Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Regular [3] Mala [4] Muy mala [5] No sabe [8]

**SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses**  
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8]

**SOCT3. Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree ud. que la situación económica actual del país será mejor, igual o peor que ahora?**

Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8]

Ahora le voy a leer algunas preguntas sobre esta comunidad y los problemas que tiene.

**CP15A. ¿Cuánta influencia cree que Ud. tiene sobre las decisiones que toman los grupos de esta comunidad? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha, poca o ninguna influencia?**

Mucha [1] Poca [2] Ninguna [3]

**CP5. ¿Alguna vez ha trabajado o tratado de resolver algún problema de la comunidad o de los vecinos de aquí?**

Si [1] No [2] => CP6

**CP5A. Si responde si CP5 => Ha contribuido con materiales o dinero para ayudar en algún problema o alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

**CP5B. Si responde si CP5 => Ha dado su propio trabajo o mano de obra?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

**CP5C. Si responde si CP5 => Ha asistido a reuniones sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

**CP5D. Si responde si CP5 => Ha tratado de organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema local o para lograr alguna mejora?**

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones frecuentemente, asiste de vez en cuando, asiste casi nunca o nunca asiste.

Asiste Ud a.....	Frecuente mente	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR
<b>CP6. Algún comité o sociedad de la iglesia o templo?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP7. Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP8. Comité o junta de mejoras para la</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>

comunidad?					
<b>CP9. Una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, campesinos o productores?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP10. Sindicato Obrero?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP11. Cooperativa?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP12. Alguna asociación o comité cívico (grupos de mujeres, etc)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP13. Juntas vecinales?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)?</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>

**L1. En esta tabla (entregue tabla # 1) hay una escala que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 es de extrema izquierda y 10 de extrema derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, se dice que una persona es de izquierda o que es de derecha. Mejor todavía, Ud. mismo cuando califica a una persona dice ese es de izquierda y ese es de derecha ¿En esta escala, políticamente Ud. dónde se ubicaría.?**

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha  
NS [88]

**LS3. Ahora, algunas opiniones: Hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? Diría Ud. que se encuentra 1) muy satisfecho, 2) algo satisfecho, 3) algo insatisfecho o 4) muy insatisfecho?**

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Algo insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4] NS [8]

**IT1. Hablando en general de la gente de este lugar, diría Ud. que la gente en general es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?**

Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] NS/NR [8]

**IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo por sí misma o cree que la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?**

Preocupada por sí misma [1] Ayuda al prójimo [2] NS/NR [8]

**IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente trataría de aprovecharse de Ud. si se les presentara la oportunidad, o cree que no se aprovecharían?**

Si se aprovecharían [1] No se aprovecharían [2]

NS/NR [8]

**VBPRS02. Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2002?**

Si [1] Estaba inscrito pero no voto[2] No estaba inscrito[3] Menor de edad[4]  
NS/NR [8]

**VBPTY02.** *Si votó en las elecciones de 2002=> Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente? (No lea las alternativas)*

ADN (Ronald MaClean)[1] MNR (Sanchez de Lozada)[2] MIR (Paz Zamora)[3] Condepa (Valdivia)[4]  
UCS (Jhonny Fernández)[5] Libertad y Justicia (Costa Obregón) [6] MAS (Evo Morales [7]  
MCC (Blattmann)[10]  
MIP (F.Quispe Mallku) [11] NFR (Reyes Villa)[12] PS (Rolando Morales)[13] Nulo, blanco[88] NS / No recuerda, NR[92]

**VBMOT02.** *Si votó en las elecciones de 2002=> ¿Por qué motivo votó Ud. por ese candidato o partido (Leer alternativas):*

reducir la corrupción [1] reducir la delincuencia [2] reducir el desempleo [3] reducir la pobreza [4] trabaja duro[5] privatizar las empresas del estado [6] significa cambio[7] tiene experiencia[8] mejor propuesta[9] entiende a los pobres[10] NS [8] NDR [9].

**VBDIP02.** *Si votó en las elecciones de 2002=> Por qué partido votó para diputado uninominal en las elecciones del 2002 ? (No lea las alternativas)*

ADN [1] MNR [2] MIR [3] NFR [4] UCS [5] Libertad y Justicia [6] MCC [7] MIP [8] MAS [9] PS [10] CONDEPA [11]  
Voto nulo, blanco [90] NS / no recuerda [8] No responde/secreto [92] NDR[9]

**VBRS99. Votó Ud. en las elecciones municipales de 1999?**

Si [1] Estaba inscrito pero no voto[2] No estaba inscrito[3] Menor de edad[4] NS/NR [8]

**VBPRS97. Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 1997?**

Si [1] Estaba inscrito pero no voto[2] No estaba inscrito[3] Menor de edad[4] NS/NR [8]

**VBPTY97.** *Si votó en las elecciones de 1997=> En 1997 por cual candidato o partido voto para presidente? (No lea las alternativas)*

ADN (Banzer) [1] MNR (Durán) [2] MIR (Paz Z) [3] Condepa (Loza) [4] UCS (Kuljis) [5]  
Voto nulo, blanco [6]Otro\_\_\_\_\_ NS / No recuerda, No responde [7] NDR [9]

**VBMOT97.** *Si votó en las elecciones de 1997=> ¿Por qué motivo votó Ud. por ese candidato o partido (Leer alternativas):*

reducir la corrupción [1] reducir la delincuencia [2] reducir el desempleo [3] reducir la pobreza [4] trabaja duro [5] privatizar las empresas del estado [6] significa cambio [7] tiene experiencia [8] mejor propuesta [9] entiende a los pobres [10] otros \_\_\_\_\_ NS [8] NDR [9].

**VB7. En su opinión, quién le representa mejor 1) el diputado plurinominal de la lista de partidos, o 2) el diputado uninominal de su circunscripción?**

Partido [1] Uninominal [2] No sabe cual es cual [3] Ninguno [4]  
NS [8]

**UNIN1. ¿ Puede decirme quién elige a su diputado uninominal? (leer alternativas)**

Todo el país [1] los votantes de su departamento [2] los votantes de su circunscripción [3]  
NS [8]

**UNIN2. ¿ En su opinión, a quién debería el diputado uninominal obedecer más ? (leer alternativas)**

A su partido [1] a los municipios [2] a los votantes que lo eligieron [3] sólo a sí mismo [4]  
NS [8]

**UNIN3. Para que los diputados uninominales conozcan las demandas de la población hay diversos medios. Yo le voy a leer uno a uno y ud me va a decir si ha escucha o no hablar de ese medio..... (leer uno a uno)**

	Ha escuchado	No ha escuchado	NR
<b>UNIN3. Audiencias públicas con el diputado</b>	1	2	8
<b>UNIN4. Reuniones de la brigada departamental</b>	1	2	8
<b>UNIN5. EDCs (Encuentros de decisiones concurrentes)</b>	1	2	8

CA1. Se habla mucho de una asamblea constituyente y reformas constitucionales. ¿ Cree Ud. que es importante cambiar la constitución en varios aspectos, o cree que a pesar de las fallas, debemos dejar la constitución tal como esta?

[1] cambiar la constitución [2] dejarla tal como esta [8] NS

**M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría que el trabajo que realizó el Presidente Quiroga fue: muy bueno, bueno, regular, malo o muy malo?**

Muy bueno [1] Bueno [2] Regular [3] Malo [4] Muy malo [5]  
NS/NR [8]

<b>Diría Ud. que durante la dictadura de Banzer (1971-1978) o durante la democracia que vivimos desde 1982 hay..... (en cada ocasión repetir la pregunta)(no leer alternativa 3)</b>					
<b>M2. Más delincuencia?</b>	[1] Durante la dictadura, o	[2] Durante la democracia	[3] Los dos igual	[8] NS/NR	
<b>M3. Más desempleo?</b>	[1] Durante la dictadura, o	[2] Durante la democracia	[3] Los dos igual	[8] NS/NR	
<b>M4. Más corrupción?</b>	[1] Durante la dictadura, o	[2] Durante la democracia	[3] Los dos igual	[8] NS/NR	

**NP1. Ahora vamos a hablar de la alcaldía de este municipio. Ha tenido Ud. la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?**

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una solicitud a alguna oficina pública, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?**

Si [1] No [2] => *Pase a NP4*  
NS/NR [8]

**NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ¿Quedó contento con la respuesta que le dieron?**

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] NDR [9]

**NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o planificar el POA (Plan Operativo Anual) de la municipalidad?**

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**NP5. ¿Ha llevado alguna queja al Comité de Vigilancia del Municipio?**

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

**SGL1. Diría Ud. que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?**

Excelentes [1] Buenos [2] Regulares [3] Malos [4] Pésimos [5] NS [8]

**SGL2. ¿Cómo le han tratado a Ud. o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? Le trataron muy bien, bien, regular, mal o pésimo?**

Muy bien [1] Bien [2] Regular [3] Mal [4] Pésimo [5] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS [8]

**LGL1. En su opinión, ¿Quién ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad?. ¿El Gobierno Central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la comunidad?**

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La comunidad [4]  
Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6] NS/NR [8]

**LGL1A. Y de las instituciones que le mencionaré a continuación, ¿Cuál ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad? ¿El Gobierno central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la prefectura?**

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La prefectura [4]  
Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6] NS/NR [8]

**LGL2. En su opinión, se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la Alcaldía o debemos dejar que el Gobierno Central asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (como el agua, recojo de basura, etc.)**

Más a la alcaldía [1] Más al gobierno [2] No cambiar nada [3] Más a la alcaldía si da mejores servicios [4] NS/NR [8]

**LGL3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que ésta pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?**

Más impuestos/tasas [1] No vale la pena pagar más [2] NS [8]

**LGL4. ¿Cree Ud. que la municipalidad responde a lo que quiere el pueblo casi siempre, la mayoría de las veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca?**

casi siempre [1] la mayoría de las veces [2] de vez en cuando [3] casi nunca [4]  
nunca [5] NS [8]

**Algunas personas dicen que se justificaría, bajo ciertas circunstancias, un Golpe de Estado por los militares, es decir cuando los militares toman el poder. En su opinión, un golpe de Estado por los militares se justifica o no se justifica... (lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).**

**JC1. Si el desempleo es muy alto?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC4. Si hay muchas huelgas estudiantiles en las universidades?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC9. Si hay un gran número de huelgas por trabajadores sindicalizados?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC10. Si los empleadores acortan mucho los sueldos de sus empleados?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC11. Si el nivel de delincuencia es muy alto?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC12. Si el nivel de corrupción es muy alto?** Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2] NS/NR [8]

**JC15. Algunas personas prefieren vivir bajo una democracia porque protege los derechos humanos e individuales, a pesar de que a veces pueda ser ineficiente y desordenada. Otros**

**prefieren vivir bajo una dictadura por su orden y eficiencia. Qué prefiere más Ud. una democracia o una dictadura?**

Una democracia [1] Una dictadura [2]

NS/NR [8]

**BC15. ¿Podrían ocurrir motivos por los cuales justificaría Ud. un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso democrático Boliviano?**

Si [1] No [2]

NS[8]

**AUT10. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo? [8] NS/NR**

[1] Lo que Bolivia más necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, o

[2] Lo que el país necesita más es un hombre que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la población?

**AUT11. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo? [8]**

NS/NR

[1] La única forma de sacar al país adelante es eliminar con mano dura a los que causan problemas, o

[2] Para que el país salga adelante es necesario tomar en cuenta a todas las personas inclusive aquellas que causan problemas

**AUT12. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo? [8]**

NS/NR

[1] Los derechos humanos son más importantes que el orden y la seguridad, o

[2] En lugar de derechos humanos, lo que nuestro país necesita es más orden y seguridad.

**AUT13. ¿Qué tipo de gobierno necesita este país...? [8]**

NS/NR

[1] Uno que sepa tomar las decisiones necesarias, con eficiencia y rapidez aunque no tome en cuenta a todos los sectores, o...

[2] Uno que tome en cuenta a todos los sectores aunque a veces tarde mucho más en sus decisiones

**AUT14. Qué tipo de presidente de la República prefiere usted más?**

[8] NS/NR

[1] Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o...

[2] Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evitando el Congreso si fuera necesario

**AUT15. A veces hay protestas que provocan dificultades porque se cierran las calles. En esos casos, ¿qué debe hacer el gobierno?**

[8] NS/NR

[1]Negociar con los manifestantes aunque esto pueda tardar días o semanas, afectando la economía del país, o

[2]Mandar a la policía para abrir los caminos.

**AUT16. Cuando la situación se pone difícil, cuál diría Ud. que es la responsabilidad más importante del gobierno:** [8] NS/NR

[1]Mantener el orden en la sociedad

[2]Respetar la libertad del individuo

**AUT17. ¿Qué tipo de presidente prefiere Ud. Más?**

[8] NS/NR

[1] Un presidente que garantice la seguridad económica y la posibilidad de un salario bueno?

[2] Un presidente que garantice las elecciones libres, la libertad de expresión y de prensa ?

**Ahora (entregue tabla # 2) vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto:”hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?”, si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. “hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?” léame el número por favor. (ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA) Usando esta tarjeta .....**

	Escala Nada Mucho	NS
<b>B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B3. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B30. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

<b>B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B22. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B22B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B22C. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el comité de vigilancia municipal?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B22D. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base OTBs</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23B. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Defensores Públicos?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23C. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en la Defensora del Pueblo?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23D. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo de la Judicatura?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B23E. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B31. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en la comunidad?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
<b>B32. ¿Hasta que punto le inspiraban confianza los gobiernos militares que tuvimos en Bolivia?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Ahora vamos a cambiar de tabla. (*entregue tabla # 3*). Esta nueva tabla tiene una escalera de 1 a 10 gradas, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desaprueba mucho y el 10 indicando que aprueba mucho. Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Bolivia. (*Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala*).

	Escalera								NS/NR
	Desaprueba				Aprueba				
<b>D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de los gobiernos bolivianos, no sólo del Gobierno actual,</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
				9	10				

sino del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas?. Por favor respóndame con un número <i>SONDEE</i> : Hasta qué punto?		
<b>D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
<b>D3. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las personas que sólo hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano les permitan postularse para cargos públicos</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
<b>D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para hacer un discurso?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

Dejemos de lado a las personas que hablan mal del sistema de gobierno boliviano. Hablemos ahora de todas las personas en general. Hasta qué punto Ud. aprueba o desaprueba ... (*encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #3*).

	Escala								NS/NR
	Desaprueba				Aprueba				
<b>E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver problemas de las comunidades?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de las calles?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas u otros edificios?</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							
<b>E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido</b>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88							

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría ... (encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #3).

	Escala Desaprueba Aprueba								NS/NR
<b>C3. ¿Una ley que prohibiera las manifestaciones públicas?</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
				9	10				
<b>C5. ¿ Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que se prohibiera reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político boliviano?</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
				9	10				
<b>C6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el Gobierno censure la propaganda de sus enemigos políticos?</b>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	88
				9	10				

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Ud. más de acuerdo?

**NEWTOL4. El Estado debería 1) tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de opiniones contrarias que puedan dañar a nuestra nación o 2) el Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello.**

Prohibir la expresión [1]      No prohibir la expresión [2]      NS [8]

**NEWTOL5. 1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran o 2) los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestros niños y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno.**

Tienen derecho [1]      Deben ser controlados [2]      NS [8]

**NEWTOL6. Los ciudadanos que apoyan el retorno de los militares al gobierno en Bolivia deberían 1) tener el mismo derecho a organizarse que cualquier otro o 2) los grupos que apoyan un gobierno militar deberían ser prohibidos de organizarse.**

Mismo derecho [1]      Prohibidos de organizarse [2]      NS [8]

**AOJ1. ¿Cree Ud. que avisar o denunciar un delito a la policía o autoridad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?**

Fácil [1]      difícil [2]      muy difícil [3]      NS/NR [8]

**AOJ2. Cuando uno tiene que resolver algún caso en los juzgados o tribunales, Ud. cree que se lo trata siempre con justicia, a veces se lo trata con justicia o no se lo trata con justicia?**

Se lo trata con justicia [1]      A veces se lo trata con justicia [2]      No se lo trata con justicia [3] NS/NR [8]

**AOJ3. Durante los últimos 12 meses ha sido Ud. víctima de robos o agresiones?**

Si [1]                      No [2]    NS/NR [8]

**AOJ3B. Durante los últimos 12 meses algún miembro de su familia ha sido víctima de robos o agresiones?**

Si [1]                      No [2]    NS/NR [8]

**AOJ3A. Si ha sido víctima el o su familia => Ha denunciado o dio aviso a la policía o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad este robo o agresión**

Policía [1]      Autoridad de la comunidad [2]      No lo denunció [3]      NS/NR      [8]  
NDR [9]

**AOJ4. De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia ha hecho en la Policía o PTJ, se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho o insatisfecho de los resultados obtenidos?**

Muy satisfecho [1]      Algo satisfecho [2]      Insatisfecho [3]    Nunca      hizo  
trámites [90]      NS/NR [8]

**AOJ5. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía o PTJ cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?**

Muy bien [1]      Bien [1]    Mal [3]    Muy mal [4]    Nunca  
hizo trámites [90]      NS/NR [8]

**AOJ6. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?**

Muy bien [1]      Bien [1]    Mal [3]    Muy mal [4]    Nunca  
hizo trámites [90]      NS/NR [8]

**AOJ7. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas del Ministerio Público o fiscales, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal?**

Muy bien [1]      Bien [1]    Mal [3]    Muy mal [4]    Nunca  
hizo trámites [90]      NS/NR [8]

**AOJ8a. Un nuevo código de procedimiento penal ha entrado en vigencia el 31 de mayo de 2001. Ud. ha escuchado o leído sobre este nuevo código?**

Sí [1]. No [2] => *Pase a Preg AOJ17. 8. NS [91]*

**AOJ8a1: Si responde si => Cómo se enteró sobre el nuevo código?**

- a) Lo vio en la televisión?    Sí [1]. No [2]  
b) Lo escuchó en la radio?      Sí [1]. No [2]  
c) Lo leyó en los periódicos?      Sí [1]. No [2]  
d) Asistió a reuniones de algún grupo u organización en su comunidad que discutía el nuevo código?      Sí [1]. No [2]

**AOJ17. El nuevo código tiene varias disposiciones importantes. En su opinión, considera Ud. que las siguientes disposiciones son muy buenas, algo buenas, algo malas, o muy malas:**

**a) Que los juicios sean orales en lugar de escritos. Diría que esto es:**

muy bueno [1] algo bueno [2] algo malo [3] muy malo [4]

**b) Que ciudadanos como Ud. puedan servir como “jueces ciudadanos” para que junto al juez ayuden a decidir la culpabilidad y pena en los juicios. Diría que esto es**

muy bueno [1] algo bueno [2] algo malo [3] muy malo [4]

**c) Que se respete la presunción de inocencia, dejando en libertad condicional a presuntos delincuentes mientras se determina su culpabilidad o inocencia en casos de menor gravedad tales como estafa o robos menores. Diría que esto es:**

muy bueno [1] algo bueno [2] algo malo [3] muy malo [4]

**AOJ18. De las siguientes cuatro opciones, en su opinión cuál es la más importante para Ud.: [elija una]**

- 1 El rol de los Jueces ciudadanos
- 2 Los derechos de los presuntos delincuentes
- 3 Los derechos de la víctima
- 4 Las disposiciones que permiten el control de la retardación
- 8 NS

**AOJ10. ¿Con cuáles de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo? Para poder luchar contra la delincuencia, las autoridades: 1) Nunca deberían romper las reglas, o 2) Algunas veces tienen que romper las reglas**

nunca romper reglas [1] algunas veces romper las reglas [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

**AOJ11. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: 1. Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva, o 2. La policía puede entrar a la casa de esta persona sin necesidad de una orden judicial**

se debería esperar [1] la policía puede entrar [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

**AOJ12. ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? 1. Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunas libertades, o 2. Respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden**

vivir en sociedad ordenada [1] respetar derechos y libertades [2] No  
sabe/no responde [8]

**AOJ13. ¿Qué tan seguro se siente usted de caminar solo por la noche en su vecindario? Usted se siente, muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro**

muy seguro [1] más o menos seguro [2] algo inseguro [3] muy inseguro [4]  
no sabe/no responde [8]

**AOJ14. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?**

- [1] La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno  
[2] En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario es preferible a uno democrático  
[3] Me da lo mismo un régimen democrático que un régimen no democrático

**AOJ15. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?**

Mano dura [1] Participación de todos [2] No responde [8]

**AOJ16. En general, ¿diría Ud. que está muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con el funcionamiento de la democracia en Bolivia?**

Muy satisfecho [1] algo satisfecho [2] algo insatisfecho [3] muy insatisfecho [4] No responde [8]

Hablemos de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...	Si	No	NS
<b>EXC1. Ha sido acusado durante los dos últimos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC2. Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno)?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un policía en el último año?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en el último año?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en el último años?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC13. En su trabajo, le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en el último años?</b>	1	0	8
<b>EXC14. ¿Conoce a alguien que ha tenido que pagar una coima en los estrados judiciales en el último año?</b>	1	0	8

**EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta muy generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?**

Muy generalizada [1]      Generalizada [2]      Poco generalizada [3] Nada  
 generalizada [4]      NS/NR [8]

**ACR1. Voy a leerle tres frases. Por favor dígame cuál de estas tres describe mejor su opinión:**

[1] La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios.

[2] Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas.

[3] Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios.

	<b>Respuesta</b>	
<b>GI1. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos? [Bush]</b>	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1] Correcto
<b>GI2. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [Cardoso]</b>	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1] Correcto
<b>GI3. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de Argentina? [Duhalde]</b>	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1] Correcto
<b>GI4. ¿Recuerda cuántos diputados hay en el Congreso? [130]</b>	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1] Correcto
<b>GI5. Recuerda cómo se llama el diputado uninominal de esta circunscripción</b>	[0] NS	

**Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?**

Católico (participante) [1]      Católico (no participante) [2]      Evangélica [3]      Ninguna [6] Otro \_\_\_\_\_ NS/NR [8]

**Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido a la iglesia (culto o templo) durante el mes pasado?**  
 \_\_\_\_\_ veces (88= NS/NR)

**Ahora para terminar, algunas preguntas que nos sirven sólo para fines estadísticos. En su casa Ud. tiene...**

	No	Uno	Dos o +	NS/NR
<b>R1. Televisor a color</b>	0	1	2	8
<b>R2. Televisor en Bco/negro</b>	0	1	2	8
<b>R3. Heladera/refrigerador</b>	1	0	8	
<b>R4. Teléfono</b>	1	0	8	

<b>R5. Automóvil o camión</b>	1	0	8
<b>R6. Lavaropa</b>	1	0	8
<b>R7. Microondas</b>	1	0	8
<b>R8. Motocicleta</b>	1	0	8
<b>R9. Tractor</b>	1	0	8
<b>R10. Energía eléctrica</b>	1	0	8
<b>R11. Agua potable</b>	1	0	8
<b>R13. Bicicleta</b>	1	0	8
<b>R14. Alcantarillado</b>	1	0	8

**R12.** *Anote si es posible, sin preguntar. Piso de las habitaciones de la casa*

Tierra [1]    Madera [2]    Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, baldosa [4] cerámica o mosaico [5]  
no se pudo ver [90]

**OCUP1.** *¿En qué trabaja Ud?. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)*

<b>1.- Auto Empleados</b>		<b>2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:</b>		<b>3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración</b>	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	6	Amas de Casa	12
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	7	Estudiantes	13
Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de Planta	8	Jubilados y Rentistas	14
ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros	9	Trabajadores ocasionales	15
profesionales independientes	5	Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	10		
		Comerciantes y artesanos empleado	11		

**OCUP2.** *Sólo para agricultores dueños de tierra o inquilinos => Cuántas hectáreas de tierra es dueño o se alquila?*

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_ (Use decimales si es necesario).    NDR[99]

**DESOC1.** *Para todos => ¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?*

Si [1]    No [2] => Pase a ED    Estudiante, Ama de casa, Jubilado [9]

**DESOC2.** Si responde Si => **¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?** \_\_\_\_\_ semanas NDR [9]

**ED.** **Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó (encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a))**

- Ninguna : 0
- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria
- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 => Primaria
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria
- Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

**Q2.** **Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?** \_\_\_\_\_ años

**Q10.** **En cuál de los siguientes rangos (muestre la tarjeta de ingresos) ubicaría el INGRESO TOTAL MENSUAL de todas las personas de su hogar?**

Nada [0] Menos de 250 Bs. [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4] De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] más de 20.001 [8] NS/NR [88]

**Q11.** **Cuál es su estado civil** (*No lea las alternativas*)

Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre, concubinato [3] Divorciado [4] Separado [5] Viudo [6] NS/NR [8]

**Q12.** **Cuántos hijos tiene Ud.** \_\_\_\_\_ hijos No tiene hijos [0]

**ETID.** **Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, mestiza, indígena o negra?**

Blanca [1] Chola [2] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5]  
Otra \_\_\_\_\_ NS/NR [8]

**LENG1.** **Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa?** (*acepte más de una alternativa*)

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymarà [3] Otro (nativo) [4] \_\_\_\_\_ Otro extranjero [5] \_\_\_\_\_ NS/NR [8]

**GRACIAS, HEMOS TERMINADO**

**LCUEST.** **Idioma de la entrevista:** Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymarà [3]

**VEST.** **El entrevistado vestía:** Traje indígena/nativo [1] Traje moderno/occidental [2]

**Hora terminada** \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_ **tiempo de duración de la entrevista** \_\_\_\_\_ **minutos**

Nombre del Entrevistado \_\_\_\_\_

**YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA**

\_\_\_\_\_ (firma del encuestador)

Firma y código Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Cod. \_\_\_\_\_

Firma y código Validador \_\_\_\_\_ Cod. \_\_\_\_\_

TABLA # 1

*Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha*

TABLA # 2

Mucho	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Nada	1

Tabla #3

<b>Aprueba</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>9</b>
	<b>8</b>
	<b>7</b>
	<b>6</b>
	<b>5</b>
	<b>4</b>
	<b>3</b>
	<b>2</b>
<b>Desaprueba</b>	<b>1</b>

## TABLA DE INGRESOS

- 0. *Nada***
- 1. *Menos de 250 Bs.***
- 2. *De 251 a 500 Bs.***
- 3. *De 501 a 1000 Bs.***
- 4. *De 1001 a 2000 Bs.***
- 5. *De 2001 a 5000 Bs.***
- 6. *De 5000 a 10.000 Bs.***
- 7. *De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs.***
- 8. *más de 20.001***