

Political Culture of Democracy in Argentina and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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Tables	vii
Figures	vii
Preface	xiii
Prologue: Background to the Study	xv
Acknowledgements	xxv
Executive Summary	xxix
Understanding Figures in this Study	xxxv
Part I: Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas	1
Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas	3
I. Introduction	3
II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas	5
III. Equality of Economic and Social Opportunity in Argentina: A Perspective from the 2012 AmericasBarometer	12
<i>Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Discrimination</i>	28
IV. Public Opinion toward Common Proposals on Public Policy	31
<i>Direct Intervention of the State</i>	32
<i>Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Assistance Programs</i>	33
<i>Affirmative Action</i>	37
V. Conclusion	39
Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color	41
Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth	42
Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage.....	43
Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas	45
I. Introduction	45
II. Political Participation in the Americas.....	48
<i>Electoral Participation</i>	48
<i>Beyond Electoral Participation</i>	51
III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes	65
<i>Public Opinion toward Women's Leadership</i>	66
<i>Public Opinion toward the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups</i> ...	69
<i>Public Opinion toward the Participation of Homosexuals</i>	70
<i>Public Opinion toward the Participation of the Disabled</i>	71

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals	73
<i>Gender Quotas</i>	73
<i>Compulsory Voting</i>	74
<i>Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality</i>	75
V. Conclusion	75
Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender.....	77
Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation.....	78
Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation.....	79
Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement.....	81
I. Introduction	81
II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation	84
III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy.....	91
IV. Protest Participation.....	94
V. Conclusion	97
Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide	98
Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support.....	99
Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information.....	100
Part II: Governance, Political Engagement and Civil Society in the Americas.....	101
Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy	103
I. Introduction	103
II. Corruption	105
<i>Perception of Corruption</i>	108
<i>Corruption Victimization</i>	112
<i>Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?</i>	115
III. Insecurity	117
Perception of Insecurity	119
Crime Victimization	124
<i>Who are the Most Likely to be Crime Victims?</i>	127
V. The Impact of Crime and Corruption on System Support	129
VI. The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Support for the Rule of Law	134
VII. Conclusion.....	142
Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance.....	143
I. Introduction	143

II. Support for the Political System	146
III. Political Tolerance	149
IV. Democratic Stability	154
V. Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions	157
VI. Support for Democracy	160
VII. Conclusion.....	162
Chapter Six: Local Government	165
I. Introduction	165
II. Local Level Participation	168
<i>Local Meeting Attendance</i>	168
<i>Demand-Making on Local Government</i>	170
<i>Determinant of Participation in Local Government.....</i>	173
III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Governments	177
<i>Satisfaction with Local Services</i>	177
<i>Trust in Local Government.....</i>	186
IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the System	188
V. Conclusion	190
Part III: Beyond Equality of Opportunity	191
Chapter Seven. The Social and Ideological Bases of Argentine Political Parties	193
I. Introduction	193
II. Party Identification in Argentina.....	193
III. Social Bases of Political Parties in Argentina	202
IV. The Ideological Bases of Political Parties in Argentina.....	207
V. Conclusion	225
Chapter Eight. Electoral Behavior and Presidential Vote in Argentina	227
I. Introduction	227
II. The Electoral Context	227
III. Motivations of Vote Choice.....	239
III. Determinants of the Presidential Vote Choice in 2011	249
IV. Conclusion	255
Chapter Nine. Social Protest in Argentina	257
I. Introduction	257
II. Political Participation in the Streets	259
III. Determinants of Protest Participation.....	269
IV. Conclusion	276

Appendices.....	277
Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent.....	279
Appendix B. Sample Design.....	281
Appendix C. Questionnaire	285
Appendix D. Regression Tables	323

Tables

Table 1. Effects of Crime Perception and Victimization on Various Institutions in Argentina.....	140
Table 2. Effects of Crime and Corruption Perception and Victimization on Various Institutions in the Americas.....	141
Table 3. The relationship between system support and political tolerance	146
Table 4. Estimated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism by Party Identification in Argentina	224
Table 5. Electoral Results and Voter Turnout for the 2011 Elections.....	228
Table 6. 2011 Presidential Vote: Comparison between Pairs of Candidates (Reference or Base Category: Binner)	250
Table 7. 2011 Presidential Vote: Comparison between Pairs of Candidates (Reference or Base Category: CFK)	251

Figures

Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions	5
Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas	6
Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution.....	7
Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas	8
Figure 5. Change in Inequality in Argentina	9
Figure 6. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index in Six Regions of the World.....	10
Figure 7. Loss of Potential Human Development due to Inequality	11
Figure 8. Family History and Education Achievement in the Americas	12
Figure 9. Color Palate used in the AmericasBarometer	14
Figure 10. Determinants of Education Level in Argentina.....	16
Figure 11. Factors Associated with Education Level in Argentina	17
Figure 12. Education Level of Mother as Determinant for Education Level for Respondent in Argentina	18
Figure 13. Determinants of Personal Income in Argentina for Employed Respondents.....	19
Figure 14. Factors Associated with Personal Income in Argentina Among Employed Respondents.....	20
Figure 15. Level of Mother's Education as Determinant of Personal Income in Argentina among Employed Respondents	21
Figure 16. Respondent Income in Comparison with Employed Respondents' Spouse or Partner	22
Figure 17. Determinant of Food Insecurity in Argentina	23
Figure 18. Factors Associated with Food Insecurity in Argentina	24
Figure 19. Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in the Americas.....	26
Figure 20. Determinants of Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in Argentina.....	27
Figure 21. Factors Associated with Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in Argentina	27
Figure 22. Agreement that Men should have Priority in the Labor Market in the Americas	29
Figure 23. Agreement that Men should have Priority in the Labor Market in Argentina	30
Figure 24. Percentage in Agreement that Poverty comes from "Culture" in the Americas	31
Figure 25. Belief that the State should Reduce Income Inequality in the Americas	33
Figure 26. Percentage who Report Receiving Public Assistance in the Americas.....	35

Figure 27. Percentage who Report Participating in CCT Programs in the Americas.....	36
Figure 28. Belief that Participants of Public Assistance Programs are “Lazy” in the Americas	37
Figure 29. Support for Affirmative Action in the Americas	39
Figure 30. Percentage that Voted in the Last Elections in the Americas	49
Figure 31. Socio-Demographic Factors and the Vote in Argentina	50
Figure 32. Community Participation and Community Leadership in the Americas	52
Figure 33. Civic and Political Meeting Attendance in Argentina	53
Figure 34. Determinants of Socio-Demographic Factors of Community Participation in Argentina	54
Figure 35. Determinants Socio-Demographic Factors for Community Leadership in Argentina.....	55
Figure 36. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Community Participation in Argentina.....	56
Figure 37. Socio-Demographic Factors Associate with Community Leadership in Argentina	57
Figure 38. Political Interest in the Americas	58
Figure 39. Political Interest in Argentina	59
Figure 40. Political Persuasion and Participation in Political Campaigns in the Americas	60
Figure 41. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Political Persuasion in Argentina	62
Figure 42. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Participation in Political Campaigns in Argentina	63
Figure 43. Gender Roles and Participation in Argentina.....	64
Figure 44. Skin Color and Participation in Argentina	65
Figure 45. Belief that Men are Better Political Leaders than Women in the Americas	67
Figure 46. Corruption Level and Gender in the Americas versus Argentina	68
Figure 47. Managing of the National Economy and Gender in the Americas versus Argentina	68
Figure 48. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are not Good Leaders in the Americas	70
Figure 49. Support for Homosexuals Seeking Public Office in the Americas	71
Figure 50. Support for Disabled Persons Seeking Public Office in the Americas	72
Figure 51. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas	74
Figure 52. Internal Efficacy in the Americas.....	85
Figure 53. Determinants of Internal Political Efficacy in Argentina.....	86
Figure 54. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Argentina	87
Figure 55. External Efficacy and Representativeness of Political Parties in the Americas	88
Figure 56. Determinants of External Efficacy in Argentina.....	89
Figure 57. Determinants of Representativeness of Political Parties in Argentina.....	89
Figure 58. Factors Associated with External Efficacy and Representativeness of Political Parties in Argentina	90
Figure 59. Determinants of Political System Support in Argentina	91
Figure 60. Factors Associated with Political System Support in Argentina.....	92
Figure 61. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Argentina	92
Figure 62. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Argentina.....	93
Figure 63. Percentage that Participated in Protests or Public Demonstrations in the Americas	95
Figure 64. Determinants of Protest Participation in Argentina	96
Figure 65. Effect of Discrimination and Education Level on Protest Participation in Argentina	97
Figure 66. Corruption Index in the Americas	106
Figure 67. Perception of Corruption in the Americas.....	109
Figure 68. Perception of Corruption over time in Argentina.....	110
Figure 69. Determinants of Perception of Corruption in Argentina.....	111
Figure 70. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Corruption in Argentina.....	111

Figure 71. Percentage of Corruption Victimization in the Americas	113
Figure 72. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Argentina	114
Figure 73. Corruption Victimization over time in Argentina	115
Figure 74. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Argentina	116
Figure 75. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Corruption Victimization in Argentina.....	117
Figure 76. Homicide Rate in Six Countries of the Americas	118
Figure 77. Perception of Insecurity in the Capitals Cities of the Americas	120
Figure 78. Perception of Insecurity over time in Argentina	121
Figure 79. Biggest Problem that faces Argentina.....	121
Figure 80. Perception of Insecurity in the Regions of Argentina	122
Figure 81. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity in Argentina	123
Figure 82. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Perception of Insecurity in Argentina.....	123
Figure 83. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Capital Cities of the Americas.....	125
Figure 84. Location of Most Recent Act of Crime in which Respondent was Victim in Argentina...126	126
Figure 85. Personal Crime Victimization by Region in Argentina	126
Figure 86. Personal Crime Victimization over time in Argentina.....	127
Figure 87. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Argentina.....	128
Figure 88. Factors Associated with Personal Crime Victimization in Argentina.....	129
Figure 89. Determinants of Support of the Political System in Argentina.....	130
Figure 90. Impact of the Perception of Insecurity and Perception of Corruption on Support for the Political System in Argentina	131
Figure 91. Factors Associated with Support for the Political System in Argentina	133
Figure 92. Percentage that Supports the Rule of Law in the Americas	135
Figure 93. Percentage that Supports the Rule of Law over time in Argentina	136
Figure 94. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Argentina.....	136
Figure 95. Impact of Corruption Victimization and Trust in the Justice System on Rule of Law in Argentina	137
Figure 96. Factors Associated with Support for Rule of Law in Argentina.....	138
Figure 97. Support for the Political System in the Americas	147
Figure 98. Components of Support for the Political System in Argentina.....	148
Figure 99. Support for the Political System over time in Argentina	148
Figure 100. Political Tolerance in the Americas	150
Figure 101. Components of Political Tolerance in the Argentina.....	151
Figure 102. Political Tolerance over time in Argentina	151
Figure 103. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Argentina.....	152
Figure 104. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Argentina	153
Figure 105. Favorable Attitudes Toward a Stable Democracy in the Americas	154
Figure 106. Favorable Attitudes toward a Stable Democracy over time in Argentina.....	155
Figure 107. Determinants of Stable Democracy in Argentina	156
Figure 108. Factors Associated with Stable Democracy in Argentina	157
Figure 109. Trust in Institutions in Argentina	158
Figure 110. Trust in Institutions over time in Argentina	159
Figure 111. Support for Democracy in the Americas.....	161
Figure 112. Support for Democracy over time in Argentina.....	162
Figure 113. Percentage that Attended Municipal Meetings in the Americas	169
Figure 114. Percentage that Attended Municipal Meeting over time in Argentina.....	170
Figure 115. Percentage that Requested Assistance from Local Governments in the Americas.....	171

Figure 116. Percentage that Requested Assistance from Local Governments over time in Argentina	172
Figure 117. Resolution of Requests to Local Governments in Argentina.....	172
Figure 118. Determinants of Participation in Municipal Meetings in Argentina	173
Figure 119. Determinants of Requesting Assistance from Local Governments in Argentina	174
Figure 120. Factors Associated with Participation in Municipal Meetings in Argentina	175
Figure 121. Factors Associated with Requesting Assistance from Local Government in Argentina	176
Figure 122. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Americas.....	178
Figure 123. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Argentina	179
Figure 124. Evaluation of Local Government Services over time in Argentina	179
Figure 125. Satisfaction with the Roads and Highways in the Americas.....	181
Figure 126. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Americas.....	182
Figure 127. Satisfaction with Health Services in the Americas	183
Figure 128. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services in Argentina	184
Figure 129. Factors Associated with Satisfaction with Local Services in Argentina.....	185
Figure 130. Trust in Local Government in the Americas.....	187
Figure 131. Trust in Local Government over time in Argentina	188
Figure 132. Satisfaction with Local Services as Determinant for Support for the Political System in Argentina	189
Figure 133. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the System in Argentina.....	189
Figure 134. Percentage that Sympathizes with a Political Party in the Americas	195
Figure 135. Sympathy for Political Party over time in Argentina	196
Figure 136. Party Identification in Argentina.....	197
Figure 137. Party Identification over time in Argentina.....	198
Figure 138. Determinants of Party Identification in Argentina.....	199
Figure 139. Factors Associated with Party Identification in Argentina	200
Figure 140. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Party Identification in Argentina	201
Figure 141. Education by Party Identification in Argentina.....	202
Figure 142. Wealth by Party Identification in Argentina	203
Figure 143. Food Insecurity by Party Identification in Argentina.....	204
Figure 144. Discrimination by Party Identification in Argentina.....	205
Figure 145. Age by Party Identification in Argentina	205
Figure 146. Region of Residence by Party Identification in Argentina	206
Figure 147. Size of Place of Residence by Party Identification in Argentina	207
Figure 148. Ideological Self-Placement in the Americas	208
Figure 149. Ideological Self-Placement over time in Argentina	209
Figure 150. Self-Identification by Party in Argentina	210
Figure 151. Support for the Role of the State in the Americas.....	212
Figure 152. Support for the Role of the State over time in Argentina.....	213
Figure 153. Support for the Components of the Role of the State in Argentina	214
Figure 154. Support for the Components of the Role of the State over time in Argentina	215
Figure 155. Support for the Idea that the State should Own the Most Important Businesses in the Country in the Americas.....	216
Figure 156. Support for the Role of the State by Party Identification in Argentina.....	217
Figure 157. Fiscal Progressivism by Party Identification in Argentina.....	218
Figure 158. Determinants of Ideological Self-Placement in Argentina	219

Figure 159. Factors Associated with Ideological Self-Place in Argentina.....	220
Figure 160. Determinants of the Role of the State in Argentina	221
Figure 161. Factors Associated with the Role of the State in Argentina.....	222
Figure 162. Determinants of Fiscal Progressivism in Argentina.....	223
Figure 163. Accumulated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism for non-Party Identifiers by Support of the Job of the President.....	224
Figure 164. Accumulated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism for non-Party Identifiers by Support of the Job of the President.....	225
Figure 165. Approval of the Job of the President in the Americas.....	229
Figure 166. Approval of the Job of the President, National Congress, Governors, and Provincial Legislatures over time in Argentina	230
Figure 167. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Manage the Economy over time in Argentina.....	231
Figure 168. Current and Retrospective Evaluation of Personal and National Economic Situations over time in Argentina.....	233
Figure 169. Reported Changes in Household Income in Argentina.....	234
Figure 170. Reported Change in Household Income in the Americas	235
Figure 171. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Fight Poverty in Argentina	236
Figure 172. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Promote Democratic Principles in Argentina	236
Figure 173. Evaluation of the Capacity of National Government to Fight Corruption in Argentina	237
Figure 174. Evaluation of the National Government to Improve Security in Argentina	237
Figure 175. Effectiveness of the Current Government over time in Argentina.....	238
Figure 176. Life Satisfaction over time in Argentina	239
Figure 177. Evaluations of Personal and Economic Economies by 2011 Presidential Vote Choice in Argentina.....	240
Figure 178. Percentage that Received Offer to Sell Vote in Exchange for Material Good over time in Argentina	241
Figure 179. Percentage offered to Sell Vote for Material Good by 2011 Vote Choice in Argentina	242
Figure 180. Percentage that would Vote for Incumbent Candidate by Participation in CCT Programs in some Countries in the Americas.....	244
Figure 181. Determinants of Participation in AUH in Argentina.....	246
Figure 182. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Participation in AUH in Argentina	248
Figure 183. Political Factors Associated with Participation in AUH in Argentina.....	248
Figure 184. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by National Economic Perception in Argentina	252
Figure 185. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Education in Argentina.....	253
Figure 186. Estimated Probabilities of Vote Choice by Corruption Perception in Argentina	253
Figure 187. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Wealth Quintals in Argentina	254
Figure 188. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Age in Argentina	254
Figure 189. Number of Protests (Strikes and Road Closures) in Argentina, 1997-2012	258
Figure 190. Number of Strikes and Road Closures in Argentina, 1997-2012.....	258
Figure 191. Percentage of People who turned to the Government for Assistance and Participated in a Protest over time in Argentina	260

Figure 192. Frequency of Protest Participation in Argentina	261
Figure 193. Perception of the Result of Protests or Demonstrations over time in Argentina	262
Figure 194. Voluntary Participation in Protests or Public Demonstrations in Argentina	262
Figure 195. Motivations for Protest or Demonstrations over time in Argentina.....	263
Figure 196. Protest or Demonstration Against National and Provincial Governments over time in Argentina	264
Figure 197. Repertoire of Protests over time in Argentina.....	265
Figure 198. Approval of the Use of Peaceful Demonstrations as Protest Method in the Americas...	266
Figure 199. Approval of the Use of Road Closures as Protest Method in the Americas	267
Figure 200. Approval of the Occupation of Private Property as a Protest Method in the Americas.....	268
Figure 201. Approval of Contentious Political Methods over time in Argentina	269
Figure 202. Determinants of the Probability of Participation in a Demonstration or Protest in Argentina II.....	272
Figure 203. Factors Associated with the Probability of Participating in Protests or Demonstrations in Argentina	274
Figure 204. Hierarchical Model of the Effect of Households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs on the Probability to Protest in Argentina	275
Figure 205. Hierarchical Model of the Effect of Public Employment on the Probability of Protest in Argentina	276

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

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Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the AmericasBarometer *Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common “informed consent” form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.


The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions		
Mexico and Central America			
Costa Rica			
El Salvador			
Guatemala			
Honduras	 Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras		
Mexico	 Opinión Pública y Mercados	 INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO	
Nicaragua			
Panama		 Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas	

Caribbean		
Belize		
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i>	
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname		
Trinidad & Tobago		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	 UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	 CIPPEC [®]
Bolivia	 Ciudadania Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	 EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasília	 CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Chile	 Instituto de Ciencia Política	 Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	 FLACSO ECUADOR	 UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO
Paraguay	 CIRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos	
Uruguay	 CIFRA	 UM UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	 CISOR	 ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Canada and United States			
Canada	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	YORK UNIVERSITY	THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	PERLA



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Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica • Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project
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Caribbean Group	
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Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants •Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA •Dr. François Gélineau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval
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Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
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Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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United States	•Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University •Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University •Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor of Political Science, Iowa State University
Canada	•Nat Stone, Professor, Marketing and Business Intelligence Research Program, School of Business, Algonquin College •Dr. Simone Bohn, Associate Professor of Political Science, York University •Dr. François Gélineau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval •Dr. Keith Neuman, The Environics Institute

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP is being implemented in Argentina for the third time and for the first time in other countries of the region. This year, the survey covered 26 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Canada and the United States.¹ Consequently, this is a unique opportunity to examine with analytical rigor trends in perceptions, attitudes, and personal experiences among Argentines. The number of countries involved in the study allows us to contextualize these tendencies into a comparative perspective with the rest of the citizens of the Americas. The current report focuses on examining the perceptions, attitudes and experiences of Argentine public opinion on equality of opportunity and marginalization, and the impact of these phenomena on a variety of themes that affect the stability and quality of democracy in the region.

Part I of this report presents a general description of inequality of opportunities and marginalization on the continent, and discusses the impact of these phenomena on the formation of citizens' democratic attitudes.

Chapter I begins with a comparative examination of the objective measure of economic and social inequality in the Americas. The region has historically been one of the most unequal of the world in both income distribution and concentration of wealth. In recent years, while there still exists significant variation between countries, we have seen a regional trend toward the reduction of economic inequality. However, important differences still persist in opportunities to access and in resources available to citizens depending upon individual characteristics, among other factors, and the place these characteristics occupy in the social space of their respective countries.

Next, based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer, the chapter examines the effects of gender, ethnicity, age, wealth, urban-rural status, and social class on three objective measures of inequality in Argentina: education, personal income and food insecurity. In general, the data indicate that there do not exist significant differences between men and women with respect to the level of education achieved by citizens in the country. However, age, ethnicity, rural status, family history, and wealth affect the expected number of years of formal education achieved by Argentines. In terms of personal income, the results of the regression analysis suggest that women, older individuals, those of darker skin complexion, and the less educated tend to receive incomes considerably lower. Finally, levels of food insecurity in Argentina, although comparatively low in regards to the rest of the region, tend to be higher among older individual, the poorer and those who have received fewer years of formal education.

The chapter also analyzes from a comparative perspective, the experiences of Argentina with discrimination. The data show that Argentina is one of the countries where citizens report lower levels of discrimination. In fact, social class is the only variable that increases the probability that an Argentine feels discriminated against, being naturally that the poorer are more likely to suffer acts of

¹ The complete list of the countries included in the 2012 round of AmericasBarometer is as follows: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago, Belize, Suriname, Haiti, the United States, and Canada.

discrimination. At the same time, we explore how existing inequalities in Argentina can be attributed to certain discriminatory social norms and attitudes in society. In general terms, the empirical evidence indicates that this does not seem to be the case; on average, Argentines tend to be the least discriminatory citizens on the continent. Finally, we examine levels of approval of Argentines, in comparison with the rest of the continent, with respect to public policies implemented by the State to rectify inequalities. In relation to this point, the data are a bit less conclusive. While there exists high levels, comparatively, of agreement with the idea that the State should intervene to reduce economic inequalities, a considerable proportion of respondents in Argentina hold openly discriminatory attitudes toward those who participate in government social assistance programs.

Chapter 2 analyzes the link between discrimination and political participation. Even though economic inequality has decreased in a number of countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean over the last decade, the chapter shows that there still persist strong inequalities in certain important aspects of political participation. In general, such inequalities are more evident in the region than in Argentina.

In relation to the first aspect of political participation analyzed in this chapter, electoral participation, the results indicate that in Argentina, there do not exist strong inequalities among citizens by factors such as gender, social class, education level, or family history. In terms of the second aspect studied, political participation in community activities or civil society, the information shows that the level of involvement of Argentines is low. The frequency with which Argentines participate in this type of activity varies positively with skin color and wealth, and negatively with size of place of residence. Gender, for its part, does not have a statistically significant effect on community participation neither does the position a woman holds in the labor market or in the family. Regular participation of Argentines in political parties, the third aspect of participation examined, is also relatively low in comparison to regional standards. Just over 8% of Argentines report having worked for a candidate or political party during the 2011 presidential election. The results of the statistical estimations show that none of the socio-demographic factors considered affect the probability of an Argentine actively participating in a political campaign.

The chapter also comparatively analyzes the level of citizen support for equality of opportunities in political participation of minority groups. With respect to support of political leadership by women and gender quotas, Argentina finds itself among those countries most receptive to the inclusion of women in politics. Moreover, in terms of participation among racial groups, homosexuals, and physically disabled persons, Argentines find themselves among the least discriminatory on the continent.

Chapter 3 analyzes comparatively the manner in which the personal experiences of Argentines with discrimination affect the formation of their perceptions of their own capacities to understand political issues, and their belief in the representativeness of government and political parties, support for the political system, democracy in abstract terms, and their propensity to participate in protests. In general, these results indicate no statistically significant effect on the formation of such perceptions and attitudes.

Concretely, the empirical evidence suggests, first, that those Argentines who express higher levels of interest in politics, are men, more educated, and older; they also report better understanding of important political issues of Argentina. Second, only social class affects (negatively) the perceptions

on the representativeness of government and political parties. That is, people who are economically wealthier, on average, believe less that governments are interested in what people like them think and that parties represent them. Third, the ethnicity of respondents is the only socio-demographic factor that affects (positively) support for the Argentine political system; people of darker skin tones tend to have higher levels of support than those with lighter tones. Fourth, education and age have positive impacts on support for democracy. Although the effects of these variables are slight in substantive terms, we find that Argentines with university-levels of education and older adults show significantly higher levels of support for the idea that even with its deficiencies, democracy is still the best form of government. Finally, discrimination by the government is a moderately important predictor in explaining the probability of participating in protests or public demonstrations. Interest in politics, and education of the respondent also affects said probability. On average, those who report being discriminated against by the government, have more years of formal education. Those who are more interested in politics have a significantly higher probability of involving themselves in “contentious” politics.

Part II of this report tests diverse hypotheses of the impact of individual determinants on two phenomena that have large impacts in Latin American societies today: the perception and victimization of both corruption and crime. At the same, it examines citizen participation in social organization, political parties, electoral processes, and political activities that link them to where they reside. Finally, it analyzes the potential impacts of these phenomena on support for the political system, the rule of law, and stable democracy.

Chapter 4 analyzes comparatively the perceptions and personal experiences of Argentines with corruption and crime, and how these phenomena affect support for the political system and rule of law in the country. First, the chapter shows that perception on the extent of corruption in Argentina is comparatively high, only being exceeded by Colombia, and Trinidad & Tobago. The trend of Argentines to perceive corrupt practices as being widespread has remained unchanged in the past year. Of the determinants of perceived levels of corruption, only class has a slightly positive effect. Second, Argentines hold an intermediate level within the region with respect to corruption victimization. Those Argentines most likely to be victimized by corruption in different institutional instances are those who report having been discriminated by the government, are more educated, and are men.

This chapter also examines in comparative terms the problem of crime. On the one hand, we find that Argentina is 12th country within the continent where citizens in the capital city (Buenos Aires) feel the most insecure about being a victim of crime. Similar to the capitals of neighboring countries such as Chile (Santiago) and Uruguay (Montevideo), the level of perception of insecurity in Argentina is higher than capital cities of other countries with higher criminal homicide rates. The factors that predict reported perception in Argentina are gender and size of place of residence. Women and residents of large cities tend to feel higher levels of insecurity. On the other hand, the analysis of crime victimization reveals that two of every ten Argentines report having been victims of a crime in the past year. Not accounting for the confidence intervals, this average is lower than those reported in the capital cities of Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Colombia. The factors that affect the probability of an Argentine being a victim of crime are size of place of residence (positively) and age (negatively).

What is the impact of the perception/victimization of corruption and crime on support for the political system and the rule of law in Argentina? The statistical analysis in this chapter suggests that

corruption and crime victimization do not have an impact on the level of support for the Argentine political system. However, both the perception of corruption and the perception of insecurity have statistically significant negative effects. At the same time, those who have more positive evaluations of the national economy, approve of the job of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, have darker skin tones and are older, express higher levels of support for the system. In terms of impact of corruption and crime on support for the rule of law in Argentina, the results of the regression analysis indicate that only victims of corruption have a significantly lower probability in support for the rule of law. Confidence in the justice system, age, education, and the size of place of residence are all positively associated with said support.

Finally, the empirical evidence presented in the chapter suggests that corruption and crime consistently affect democratic institutions (and democracy in general) in the countries of the Americas. While in Argentina the perception of corruption, and to a lesser extent, the perception of insecurity, negatively affects citizens' opinions on some liberal democratic institutions, the countries of the Americas are equally challenged by perceptions and victimization associated with both issues.

Chapter 5 takes a deeper look at political legitimacy. This includes the examination, developed in previous LAPOP reports, of the combination between support for the political system and political tolerance as indicators for democratic stability. In relation to support for the political system, Argentina occupies an intermediary position within the region. For political tolerance, Argentina has an average level comparatively high for regional standards. The factors that positively affect the level of tolerance of Argentines are perceptions of corruption, evaluations of personal economic situations, and education. On the other hand, those who express more conservative ideologies tend to be less tolerant than others.

The chapter continues with an examination of the favorable perceptions that has been coined "stable democracy," that is, high levels of support for the political system, and high tolerance. On average, 33.6% of Argentines hold this combination of attitudes. What are the factors that explain the probability of a person supporting stable democracy in Argentina? The results of the regression indicate that there is not a significant effect of insecurity, corruption or economic evaluations. Additionally, the importance of religion, skin color, education, and fundamentally, the approval of the job of the president, affect positively the probability of holding the combination of attitudes favorable to stable democracy.

In relation to the legitimacy of other democratic institutions, the chapter shows that Argentines express a higher level of trust in modes of communication followed by the Catholic Church, the President, the Armed Forces and Electoral Justice. In comparison with other countries, the presidency, the National Congress, and the National Justice, have relatively high levels of citizen trust. Although the level of trust of Argentina increased for all the analyzed institutions, the increase is most significant for the presidency and least for the modes of communication.

Chapter 6, the last of the second part of the report, analyzes comparatively the experiences and perceptions of Argentina with respect to four factors that affect the relationship that citizens have with local government authorities: participation in municipal council meetings, the seeking of assistance from government officials, trust in local governments, and satisfaction with the quality of local public services. Furthermore, the chapter estimates the effects of said satisfaction on support for the political system.

The study of participation in municipal meetings indicates that, following a historic trend, Argentines involve themselves very little in this type of activity, only one of every twenty-five respondents, the second lowest value of the continent, reported have participated in a meeting organized by the municipal council during the past year. Citizens that have the highest probability of participating in these meeting are those who have petitioned local authorities, participated in community associations, and worked for a candidate or political party in the last presidential elections.

In terms of seeking assistance, the level of involvement of Argentines is also comparatively low, even though respondent reported high level of trust in local governments and report receiving favorable responses to their petitions. According to the estimations presented in this chapter, the probability of requesting assistance is significantly higher among women, those who attend municipal meetings, worked in political campaigns, and reside in rural areas, while it is significantly lower among those who are satisfied with the quality of the provision of public services.

The chapter finally analyzes the level of satisfaction of Argentines with local public services. In this sense, Argentina finds itself in the second position on the scale behind Canada, and are significantly more alike other decentralized countries of the continent. The results of the regression analysis indicate that having presented a petition to the authorities of the municipality, trust in others, approve of the work of the president, and reside in small cities positively affect the perception of quality of public services. It is worth noting that those who report that the public services are good or very good, on average hold higher level of support for the Argentine political system.

Having analyzed the relationship among equality of opportunities, marginalization, and democracy, and having examined questions related to corruption and crime, the legitimacy of the political system, participation in social organizations and local government, Part III of this report includes more specific analyses on three key issues of the political reality of Argentines: the social and ideological bases of political parties, electoral behavior and vote choice in the 2011 presidential elections, and the characteristics of social protest.

Chapter 7 analyzes the phenomenon of party identification in Argentina in terms of the composition of social and ideological bases of the parties of the country. Although the Argentine political parties have historically been seen as the most stable of the region, they do not appear to have higher levels of participation or citizen militancy today. In fact, just three of every ten Argentines identify with a party (mostly with *Frente para la Victoria*, the party of the national government). The positive evaluation of the national economy, political interest, and age affect positively the probability of party identification, while education and leftist ideological influence negatively.

The comparative low levels of party identification are apparent at the level of social and ideological linkages of the citizens. On the one hand, the study of the social bases of Argentine parties shows that there do not exist large differences between the traditional political forces (*Partido Justicialista* y *Unión Cívica Radical*), even though the followers of FVP tend to be poorer, less educated, and younger. On the other hand, even though there exists an important level of ideological tension within the party system, the evidence suggests that this tension is relatively low among the electorate. In effect, the structure of the ideological bases of Argentine parties does not present significant differences in the positioning of sympathizers of different parties on the left-rights scale, or their support for the role of the State. However, the sympathizers of FVP are considerably more progressive in fiscal terms than the sympathizers are from other parties.

Chapter 8 first analyzes the electoral context in which the 2011 presidential elections took place. The data indicate that the positive perception of Argentines on the effectiveness of government to manage the economy and lead on social questions such as the reduction of poverty and the defense of human rights had increased considerably. In terms of the factors that could have inclined voters to vote in favor of the president, we analyze socio-demographic profiles of the respondents, their evaluation of the economy, whether they receive government social assistance, whether they had been exposed to vote-buying requests, support for the active role of the state, and the perception/victimization of crime and corruption. The econometric estimations suggest the vote for Cristina Fernández de Kirchner came fundamentally from the poorer sectors, the less educated, those who identified with a political party, and those who held more positive evaluations of the national economy. Additionally, those who were offered to sell their vote or participate in the state's social assistance programs were not significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent. This last finding can be linked to the fact that the distribution of *la Asignación Universal por Hijo* follows well established regulations and the sympathizers of FVP do not appear to have particularly exposed to vote-buying offers.

Chapter 9 studies in detail the phenomenon of social protest in Argentina. According to 2012 AmericasBarometer, comparatively speaking, Argentina finds itself as one of the most contentious countries in the region. Furthermore, the proportion of Argentines that in the past year protested or demonstrated in the street is higher than the proportion that took part in some instance of state conflict resolution. These protests and demonstrations are, to a large extent, voluntary, and seem to be effective in obtaining their intended outcomes, and are motivated largely by issues of insecurity and economy. Finally, they are focused against both the national government and provincial government, although citizen support for these actions appears to be decreasing.

Having described the general characteristics of the phenomenon, this chapter moves to examining the individual determinants of protest participation. In this sense, the factors with the largest impact are corruption victimization, marginalization, political party militancy, vote buying offers, sharing political information on social networks, and education level of the respondent. Of special theoretical and empirical interest for this report is the positive relationship between party militancy and protests, which indicates the interrelatedness between the institutional and non-institutional politics; this makes clear evidence that these political arenas are not mutually exclusive.



Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable’s estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and
Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, access credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.¹ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.³ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).⁴

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

¹ Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

² López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³ De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁴ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,⁵ fosters political instability and violence,⁶ and decreases trust in democracy.⁷ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.⁸ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹⁰ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Haiti and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing objective

⁵ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

⁶ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁷ Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁸ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Haiti and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹¹ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions

¹¹ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹² As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹³ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. Inequality in Haiti exceeds that even in Brazil and is the highest in the Americas, at 59.5 (measured in 2001).¹⁴

¹² The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹³ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

¹⁴ World Bank Indicators. <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>> (accessed July 18, 2012).




Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁵ In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

¹⁵ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

In the case of Argentina, the last two decades have witnessed abrupt changes in income inequality. As shown in Figure 5, the GINI index increased by almost one point (from 0.44 to 0.53) between 1993 and 2002. From then on, however, it decreased consistently until arriving at 0.43 in 2011, just below the series' initial value.¹⁶ Inequality in Argentina increased abruptly throughout the 1990s and in the beginning of the last decade because of two fundamental factors: severe macroeconomic crises (including default on the national debt) and market liberalization. These phenomena produced contractions in income in sectors that heavily rely upon unskilled labor due to weak labor unions and the absence or insufficient nature of protective policies for those most affected. What factors explain the decline in inequality observed in the last 10 years? On the one hand, it is, without a doubt, that there existed a positive effect associated with the rapid economic recuperation from the boom in primary materials. However, it was not only the economic growth that reduced inequality in the country. An increase in the international price of prime materials was also a factor in expanding the economy and labor demand; the sectors directly involved (agriculture, mining, and combustible manufacturing) are heavy in land and capital use. A second factor which is more of a political nature, and perhaps more relevant, is related to the policies implemented by the governments of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-present) seeking to increase employment levels, improve real salaries (especially in sectors with high use of informal jobs) and to strengthen labor institutions.¹⁷ Additionally, the Kirchner administrations developed an extensive policy of public spending on social assistance and urban infrastructure, preceded by the fiscal surplus generated through the incorporation of new taxes (retention to the exportation of grain), the policy of external debt reduction and the re-nationalization of the social security system. These measures allowed the vigorous implementation of a social policy through the development and creation of conditional cash transfer programs to the poorest citizens (*Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*, and *Asignación*

¹⁶ This trend of decrease in income inequality in Argentina is similar if we use alternative indicators such as income ratios or representation of deciles in total income.

¹⁷ Etchemendy, Sebastián. 2011. *El Diálogo Social y las Relaciones Laborales en Argentina, 2003-2010. Estado, Sindicatos y Empresarios en Perspectiva Comparada*. Buenos Aires: Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe, Programa Regional para la Promoción del Diálogo y la Cohesión Social en América Latina, OIT.

Universal por Hijo), an increase in retirement accounts and pensions, and a continual increase in the minimum wage which was constant in nominal terms throughout the 1990s and grew more than 400% between 2003 and 2008.




Figure 5. Change in Inequality in Argentina

How will economic inequality evolve in the Americas during the next decade? This is a difficult question to answer because change in inequality depends on various factors including national economic growth, the regional economic environment, the evolution of the economies in Europe, China, and the United States,¹⁸ and public policy (especially, regarding employment and social protection) adopted by the governments. In relation to Argentina, it is likely that the pattern of decreasing inequality will continue, at least in the short term. If an economic deceleration is projected in an inflationary context, there is little chance that the government will cease its course in terms of employment protection, the creation of solid macro labor institutions and consolidation of social assistance policies.

As was mentioned above, economic inequality in the Americas is accompanied by clear social inequalities. While the Human Development Index (HDI)¹⁹ shows comparatively medium or high levels of development for the majority of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, recently, the United Nations developed a new index called the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI according to the level of existing inequality in each country. Figure 6 presents the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the

¹⁸ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

¹⁹ HDI is an index between 0 and 1 that measures the average of achievement of a country on three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education, and income. The calculation are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), el Instituto de Estadísticas de UNESCO (2011), el Banco Mundial (2011a) and el Fondo Monetario Internacional (2011).

world. As becomes apparent, both in absolute and relative terms, Latin American and Caribbean exhibit the largest difference between the two indexes.




Figure 6. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index in Six Regions of the World

Figure 7 shows the total loss in human development caused by inequality (that is, the percent difference between the HDI and the IHDI) in various regions throughout the world. As can be seen, Latin America and the Caribbean have lost 26% of their human development potential due to persistent inequality. For Argentina, which has an HDI of 0.797 and an IHDI of 0.641, the loss in 2011 was close to 19%. This value places Argentina slightly below the reported losses for East Asia and the Pacific, and six percentage points above those observed in Europe and Central Asia.




Figure 7. Loss of Potential Human Development due to Inequality

Figure 8 illustrates the national variation of social inequality in the region defined by the differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children from advantaged families (in light green bars) and disadvantaged families (dark green bars) for a group of countries in the Americas.²⁰ For example, the figure shows that a Jamaican student from a disadvantaged family has a probability exceeding 80% of completing sixth grade on time while the probability of a student from a more favorable family environment increases slightly to 90%. However, the data indicate that children from disadvantaged families in Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru have a probability of less than 15% of finishing their sixth year of studies on time. Note that most of the countries of Central and South America standout at highly unequal rates. The percentage of Argentina, however, indicates a level of considerable equality. In fact, Argentina is the second most equal country of all those included in the figure. An Argentine student coming from a disadvantaged family has about a 65% probability of completing the sixth grade, compared with a probability of 80% for an advantaged student.

²⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, y Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Ibid.*




Figure 8. Family History and Education Achievement in the Americas

III. Equality of Economic and Social Opportunity in Argentina: A Perspective from the 2012 AmericasBarometer

The previous section offered a brief review of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas and Argentina. It is appropriate now to ask, who are those most affected by inequality and what do citizens think about inequality of opportunities. A group of questions included in 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to evaluate, on the one hand, to what point certain objective measures of inequality such as income and education, vary by gender, ethnicity, and the type of family from which the respondents come. On the other hand, these questions allow us to analyze citizens' opinions regarding who they believe are victims of discrimination, to what degree they perceive that economic and social inequalities are natural (or desirable), and what types of public policies they approve to rectify said inequalities.

Previous works on discrimination in countries throughout the Americas note that people with similar skillsets and education levels that come from different social groups, tend to receive unequal salaries and different employment opportunities. This type of discrimination can occur because of negative attitudes toward the discriminated group or for what is called "statistical discrimination", that is, that employers conclude that members of certain marginalized groups have less skills or inferior levels of human capital. Toward this end, various studies on labor discrimination conclude that in

certain countries on the continent, women (in particular those of marginalized ethnic or racial groups) receive salaries lower than men with similar characteristics.²¹ However, a series of recent experimental and observational studies suggest that some forms of labor discrimination by gender in Latin America may be less frequent than is commonly thought.²²

The first social division that is examined in this report is that which exists between men and women. According to experts on inequality, a noticeable reduction in social discrimination by gender has occurred in the region. Although there still exist considerable gaps, empirical evidence suggests that inequality between men and women in the labor market has lessened.²³ There has been an increase in equality in terms of the composition of social class²⁴, and the distance between education level attained by men and women has decreased considerably.²⁵

The second social division exists between different racial and ethnic groups. Although very little reliable data exist that allow us to measure with precision the level of discrimination motivated by race and ethnicity of the continent,²⁶ recent studies indicate that racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities continue to experience situations of economic and social inequality, particularly in regards to salary, employment, and occupation.²⁷ According to some analysts, this type of discrimination is more prevalent than gender discrimination.²⁸

The third and final dimension to be examined here refers to the effect of family origin and origins of class on economic and social opportunities. For many years, difference in class, more than gender or race, has been the driving force of inequality in Latin America and other parts of the hemisphere. This finding has recently been confirmed by a group of studies, many of which were cited

²¹ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil". *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277–293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil". *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach". *Económica* L (1-2).

²² Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, y Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile". En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, editado por Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, y Andrea Moro. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, y Sergio Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile". En Ñopo et al. 2009. *Ibid.*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candeló, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, y Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study". En Ñopo et al. 2009. *Ibid.*; Petrie, Ragan, y Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru". En Ñopo et al. 2009. *Ibid.*

²³ Hite, Amy Bellone, y Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure". *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

²⁴ Hite, Amy Bellone, y Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure". *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

²⁵ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Nopo, y Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean". SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

²⁶ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

²⁷ De Ferranti et al. 2004. *Ibid.*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. "The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35 (2): 3-17.

²⁸ Branton, Regina P., y Bradford S. Jones. 2005. "Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment". *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2): 359-72.

in the preceding paragraph, that demonstrate that social class and family origin are factors that clearly affect equal access of opportunities in the countries of the region.²⁹

The study of data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer begins by exploring what Argentines from distinct racial groups, gender, social class, and place of residence (urban versus rural) about their own economic and social resources. The questionnaires used in 2010 and 2012 contain a series of questions that allow us to establish to which racial and ethnic group the respondents belong.³⁰ The question **ETID** simply asks if the respondents identifies as white, mulatto, mestizo, indigenous, or black. Additionally, since the 2010 AmericasBarometer, with support from Professor Edward Telles from Princeton University, an innovative color palate has been used. This palate is shown in Figure 9.³¹ At the end of each interview, the interviewer is asked to discretely code the skin color of the face of the each respondent on a scale of 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest). Data from the 2010 round corresponding to the **COLOR** variable assisted in understand the differences in educational attainment and perception on the economic crisis by citizens from different racial groups (see the Special Reports in Boxes 1 and 2 at the end of this chapter). Thanks to continued support of Professor Telles, we have been able to continue the use of the color palate in the 2012 round.³²



Figure 9. Color Palate used in the AmericasBarometer

²⁹ See, for example, Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, y Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Ibid.*; Telles, Edward Eric, y Liza Steele. 2012. “Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?” *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁰ The complete text of all questions from the 2012 questionnaire are included in Annex C of this report.

³¹ Telles, Edward Eric, y Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid.*

³² In 2012, the color palate was used in 24 countries, with the exception of the United States and Canada. In 2010 it was used in 23 countries, excluding Haiti.

Also included in the 2012 questionnaire, as was done in previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, were questions regarding social and economic resources of the respondents: level of education, family income, and household good (for example, if there is potable water, flat screened televisions, or vehicles). This group of questions, found in the **R** series of the questionnaire, was used to create a household wealth index based on five quintiles standardized to the urban and rural areas of each country.³³ In the last round, those who said they currently had a job were asked their personal income for the first time (question **Q10G**). Additionally, those people who reported being married or living with a partner, were asked about income inequalities within their household. This last concept was measured through the following question:

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all
 (2) You earn less than your spouse;
 (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
 (4) You earn more than your spouse;
 (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing
 (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

Together with the measures of household wealth, the 2012 round included a group of questions related to the familial origins of the respondent. The question **ED2** asks about the level of education attained by the respondent's mother. Self-identified social class is measured with question **MOV1** which asks the respondent to identify to what social class her or she is part of: high, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, or low class.³⁴

Finally, in all the countries of the region, two new questions about food insecurity were asked: **FS2** and **FS8**.³⁵ These questions, originally developed by the LAPOP team in Mexico in collaboration with Yale University, allow us to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

³³ This variable appears as **QUINTALL** in the database of 2012. For more information about the composition of this variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁴ See Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José y Rosario Queirolo. De próxima publicación. Class Perceptions in Latin America. The cases of Colombia and Uruguay. *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁵ In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many of the new questions, including these, were only asked to half of the sample (or respondents) with the objective of maximizing space on the questionnaire.

Analysis of the 2012 AmericasBarometer data begins by estimating a linear regression model that evaluates the effect of gender, race, age, wealth, and urban-rural status on the education level attained by Argentines.³⁶ The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 10.³⁷ First off, as can be seen, gender does not have a statistically significant effect on the level of education. Additionally, it becomes apparent that older adults have, on average, fewer years of formal education than the younger individuals in the sample. The difference between the age groups, as is illustrated in Figure 11, is close to 4 years. Next, wealth appears to be the most important predictor of education level of Argentine citizens. Indeed, the bivariate relationship presented in the same figure indicates that those people situated in the highest wealth quintal received, on average, almost 5 more years of formal education than did people situated in the lowest wealth quintal. Skin color has a negative statistically significant effect in that people of darker complexion have, on average, lower levels of education than those with lighter complexions. More concretely, the average difference in the amount of years of formal education between a person situated in category 1 of the color palate and another situated in category 8 is, as is shown in Figure 11, close to 5 years.³⁸ Finally, as is demonstrated in the same figure, those who live in urban areas report have received, on average, approximately 2 more years of formal education than those living in rural zones.




Figure 10. Determinants of Education Level in Argentina

³⁶ In order to facilitate interpretation, all of the LAPOP reports present results from multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is included on the vertical axis. The point represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence intervals. When the bars do not cross the vertical “0” line, that variable is statistically significant. That is, there exists a relationship between the independent and dependent variable. For more information on the graphs and figures used in the report, see page xlivi.

³⁷ The complete results of the statistical model discussed in this chapter are found in Annex D of this report.

³⁸ For the generation of the statistical model and the figures on Argentina, the categories 9, 10, and 11 of the COLOR variable were recoded to category 8 because of the small number of observations (1, 3, and 0 cases, respectively).




Figure 11. Factors Associated with Education Level in Argentina

Figure 12 shows that family history affects the education levels of Argentines. This is evident by examining the education level of the respondent (Y axis) with the level of education attained by his or her mother (X axis). Item **ED2** is used to measure family history that was included in the multivariate regression model presented above because it was only asked to half of the sample. Including this variable would have reduced the inferential capacity related to the effects of the other independent variables of the model. As can be seen in the figure, the higher the level of education of the mother, the higher the level of attained education of the respondent. That is, a person whose mother has not had any type of formal education has, on average, close to 6 years of education. However, another person whose mother obtained a *superior* or university-level education has, on average, 14

years of formal education. As is indicated by the non-overlapping confidence intervals, the differences reported between the averages in the figure are statistically significant.




Figure 12. Education Level of Mother as Determinant for Education Level for Respondent in Argentina

It is now worth asking if the socio-demographic factors that are related with education level of Argentines are also related with their income levels.³⁹ Figure 13 shows the results of a linear regression analysis that estimated the potential impact of race, age, sex, education, place of residence, and family history on personal income of the respondents that reported having been employed at the moment of the survey.⁴⁰ It is worth noting that 52% of the people asked in Argentina met this condition.

³⁹ See footnote 1 for more information on how to interpret the income scale.

⁴⁰ Income, whether family (question **Q10NEW**) or personal (**Q10G**), is coded on a scale of 0 to 16 where each category of responses corresponds to a higher range in income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




Figure 13. Determinants of Personal Income in Argentina for Employed Respondents

First, the data indicate that women have lower incomes than men. Specifically, as is illustrated in Figure 14 (upper-left quadrant), on average, men are situated almost one point higher than women on the income scale. Second, it is observed that age has a curvilinear effect on personal income in that people considered to be middle aged (especially those who fall within 46-55 year age bracket) have incomes higher than the young or the old included in the sample. The concrete effects of this relationship, also separated by gender, can be seen clearly in the upper-right quadrant of the same figure.⁴¹ Third, the skin color variable has a negative sign that indicates that people of darker complexion have on average lower incomes than those of a lighter complexion; however, this relationship does not reach statistical significance. Fourth, as can be expected, there exists a strong positive relationship between wealth and personal income. Figure 14 shows that people situated in the highest wealth quintal have double the income level of those situated in the lowest quintal. Finally, the level of education of the respondents has a strong positive impact on personal income. It is interesting to note that the gap between the average income of men and women tends to be lower among those with lower levels of education and more amplified among those with intermediate levels.⁴² The gap is further reduced among those with university-level education, but does not contract to the initial levels.

⁴¹ Note that the age bracket for women with the highest levels of income is 36-45 years.

⁴² For the generation of models and figures for Argentina, the respondents with “no education (7 cases) were recoded into the category “primary education”.




Figure 14. Factors Associated with Personal Income in Argentina Among Employed Respondents

As was the case above, the variable that measures family history was not included in the regression analyses because we only have this information for half of the sample. Figure 15, however, shows the bivariate relationship between the mother's education level and the income of those respondents who were employed at the time the survey was administered. It is clear that personal income tends to increase with the education level of the mother; however, the overlapping confidence intervals indicate that the average differences are not statistically significant.




Figure 15. Level of Mother's Education as Determinant of Personal Income in Argentina among Employed Respondents

After showing that Argentine women, on average, have lower salaries in comparison to men, next we analyze item **GEN10** which asks respondents who are married or living with a partner about their personal income compared with their cohabitant. Figure 16 only shows the differences in personal income of those men and women who reported being employed when the survey was administered. Of the women who met this condition, 56.7% stated have lower incomes than their spouse or partner, 37.6% reported having the same income, and only 5.6% reported having incomes higher than their spouse or partner. For men, the averages are 11.6%, 29.5%, and 58.9% respectively. In other words, the data indicate that six in ten women in Argentina have incomes lower than their spouse or partner, three have similar incomes and only one has a higher income. One possible interpretation of this is that for the same workwomen receive lower salaries than men. However, it is also possible that women have lower incomes for the types of occupations they hold and for the higher costs that are generally associated with hiring a woman (especially costs related to reproduction and childcare). Whatever the case, the 2012 AmericasBarometer data are clear with other estimations that show that Argentine women receive about half the income of that received by men.⁴³

⁴³ See, OECD Development Centre. <http://www.oecd.org/countries/argentina>.




Figure 16. Respondent Income in Comparison with Employed Respondents' Spouse or Partner

After showing the personal income in Argentina is not evenly distributed among men and women nor among different social groups, it may be of interest to know if the same occurs with respect to access of a primary resource for any citizen: food. Figure 17 presents the results of a linear regression model that estimates the effects of the same socio-demographic factors used in prior analyses on food insecurity in Argentina. To measure food insecurity, the answers to questions **FS2** and **FS8**, which were only asked to half the sample, were summed. This generated an index with a range from 0 to 2, where higher values reflect a higher level of food insecurity and lower values indicate a lower level.




Figure 17. Determinant of Food Insecurity in Argentina

The results of the regression analysis indicate that three variables achieve statistical significance: age (at least for certain age brackets), wealth, and education. Older respondents, the wealthiest, and those who have attained higher levels of formal education are less exposed to food insecurity. It is important to note that of all those who responded to these questions, 14.3% reported having an intermediate or high level of food insecurity. This figure is relatively low, at least in the regional context where 21.6% of respondents reported having problems acquiring food. To see the effects of education, age, and social class on food access more clearly in Argentina, Figure 18 shows the bivariate relationship of these variables. With respect to education, the data indicate that 18.4% of those who attained a primary education reported have suffered, some extent, from food insecurity, compared with 15.3% and 9.2% of people with secondary and university educations, respectively. In terms of age, the highest of percentage of food insecurity (20.5%) corresponds to the age bracket of 26-35 years while the lowest percentage (3.6%) corresponds to the bracket of 66 years or older. Finally, social class obviously has a negative effect on food insecurity as reported in Figure 18. As can be seen, close to a quarter of people situated in the first wealth quintal, compared with less than 5% in the highest quintal, exhibit problems with food security.




Figure 18. Factors Associated with Food Insecurity in Argentina

Another way to analyze social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of those victimized by discrimination. To understand this question, respondents were asked if they had been victims of any act of discrimination in the past year. The series of question presented below, were first used during the 2008 round, were slightly modified for this round and used for 16 countries in the Americas:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year**, have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?

	Yes	No	DK	DA	NA
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

Figure 19 shows the percentage of citizens for each one of these countries who reported having been a victim of discrimination in either their place of work or school. It can be seen that Argentina, along with Nicaragua and just above Venezuela, occupies the third from the bottom position. In effect, just 8% of Argentines (almost 4 percentage points lower than the regional average) report having been discriminated in their place of work. This value is lower than in other countries such as Uruguay (12.7%) and Costa Rica (11.4%), both recognized for the high levels of social tolerance. The countries with highest levels of self-reported discrimination in a place of work or school are, in this order, Trinidad & Tobago and Haiti with averages exceeding 20%. Below them, but with comparatively high values are Bolivia (17.1%) and Colombia (16.8%).




Figure 19. Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in the Americas

Figure 20 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis that examines the determinants of the probability of an individual being discriminated against in a place of work in Argentina. First, women do not appear to be more likely to experience this type of discrimination compared to men. This finding suggests that individual perceptions of discrimination are not necessarily related with objective indicators.⁴⁴ Neither age, education, nor urban-rural status of the respondent have a statistically significant effect on the probability that an individual feels discriminated against by others in their place of employment or school. Finally, social class (measured by wealth level) is the only variable that has a statistically significant effect in the expected direction. The higher the level of wealth of the respondent, the lower the probability that he or she reports having been discriminated against. As can be seen in Figure 21, the probability that a person situated in the lowest wealth quintal

⁴⁴ A useful reference for this discussion is Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*

reporting having been a victim of discrimination is 11% compared with a probability of 5% for a person situated in the highest wealth quintal.




Figure 20. Determinants of Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in Argentina




Figure 21. Factors Associated with Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace in Argentina

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Discrimination

The previous sections of this chapter showed that economic and social resources are not evenly distributed in Argentina. Although Argentina is one of the most equal countries of the region, there still exist certain inequalities with respect to gender, race, urban-rural status, social class, and family history. This section explores some reasons for why these inequalities persist. In particular, it examines the extent to which these socioeconomic differences can be attributed to social norms and discriminatory attitudes existing in society.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included various questions to evaluate how economic inequalities are related to general attitudes with respect to the role of men and women in the economy and the economic achievements of different racial groups. First, a question was created regarding social norms relative to the work performance of men as compared to women. Previous research suggests that in countries throughout the hemisphere there persists the attitude that the role of men and women in the labor market is different.⁴⁵ To evaluate this possibility, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the statement presented below. The answers, originally based on a 0 to 7 scale where 0 indicated the lowest level possible of agreement and 7 the highest level possible, were then recoded onto a 0-100 scale in order to facilitate comparability.

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 22 presents the average level of agreement for all the countries of the Americas included in this round. At its extremes, with high levels of agreement, are the Dominican Republic (54.9), Guyana (51.8), and Haiti (49.4). At the other extreme, with averages less than 22 points on the scale are the United States, Canada, and Uruguay. With an average of 32 points, Argentina is situated within a group of countries that expresses a comparatively low level of agreement with the statement. It is important to note that the regional average is just 4 points higher than the average for Argentina. The majority of countries of the continent tend to be situated just above or below the regional average.

⁴⁵ Morgan, Jana, y Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics". Work presented in the conference *Marginalization in the Americas*, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, y Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Figure 22. Agreement that Men should have Priority in the Labor Market in the Americas

The average level of agreement with the question GEN1 does not allow us to observe the stark differences that exist between the different answers given by respondents. Figure 23 disaggregates the responses in Argentina, returning to the original 1 to 7 scale. As can be seen below, almost 45% of Argentines report being very much in disagreement with the idea that men should have priority over women in terms of employment. However, close to 28%, a considerable proportion, selected value 5, 6, or 7 on the scale. Forty-three percent, it should be noted, were women.




Figure 23. Agreement that Men should have Priority in the Labor Market in Argentina

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked respondents about their perceptions as to why racial and ethnic inequalities exist. In this round, the following question was asked in all of the countries to half of the sample.

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? [Read alternatives, just one answer]	
(1) Because of their culture, or	(2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) [Do not read] Another response	(88) DK
	(98) DA

Figure 24 presents the percentage of respondents who, in each country, reported being in agreement with the idea that the poverty is associated with a person's skin color is due to their culture more than injustices against them or other factors. On average, 22% of the citizens of the hemisphere report being in agreement with this statement. In comparative terms, Argentina occupies a position just below the regional average: 20.6%. The group of countries least receptive to the idea is headed by Uruguay (12.4%), followed by Venezuela (15.8%) and Panama (16.1%). On the opposite extreme of the scale, with averages exceeding 30% of respondents are Guatemala, Trinidad & Tobago and the Dominican Republic.




Figure 24. Percentage in Agreement that Poverty comes from “Culture” in the Americas

IV. Public Opinion toward Common Proposals on Public Policy

What actions should be taken by governments of the region to deal with the economic and social inequalities that are faced by citizens? While answering this question might go beyond the scope of this report, in this section we examine the most commonly discussed policy options and present the opinions of the respondents on these issues.

Direct Intervention of the State

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens their opinion on the role of the state to reduce inequality. The question **ROS4** seeks to understand if people are or are not in agreement, on a 1 to 7 scale with the following statement:

ROS4. The Argentine government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

This question allows us to observe the extent to which citizens perceive that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that government should try to resolve. As is done throughout this report, the responses are recoded onto a scale of 0 (“very much in disagreement”) to 100 (“very much in agreement”) points.

Figure 25 shows the national average with respect to citizen opinions that the State should implement public policies to reduce income inequalities. As can be deciphered, there exists strong support for this idea throughout the region. Effectively, say for the case of the United States who has an average of just 47.2 on the scale, the regional average is 79 points. With a national average of 84.4 points, Argentina finds itself in the seventh position of countries in the Americas, although the overlapping confidence intervals indicate this position is indistinguishable from that of Nicaragua (above) and Guyana (below). In clear contrast, the support of participation of the State in reducing economic inequality is considerably lower in Haiti (65.4), even though it is the poorest country in the region, Honduras (68.3), and Venezuela (71.3).




Figure 25. Belief that the State should Reduce Income Inequality in the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Assistance Programs

One public policy option to reduce inequalities is social assistance programs. In the last twenty years, many governments in the region have transformed their assistance programs, providing economic assistance to those citizens who most need it in exchange for enrolling their children in school and participating in public health programs.⁴⁶ The most well-known of these programs in the

⁴⁶ Barrientos, Armando, y Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America". *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico". *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, y Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, DC: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., y AmyErica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin

region are *Opportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and *Asignación Universal por Hijo* (AUH) in Argentina. In general, conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have constituted an effective strategy to improve the living conditions of the poorest sectors.⁴⁷ Irrefutable empirical evidence exists which shows that these policies have contributed to reducing inequality and poverty in some of the historically most unequal contexts of the region. Furthermore, they have had positive effects on levels of matriculation, school attendance, and also “has increased access to preventive health services and vaccination, increased visits to assistance centers, reduced illness levels and incentivized consumption in general and the consumption of food, with positive results in terms of childhood weight, especially for the smallest children”.⁴⁸

In 2012, the AmericasBarometer measured the levels of enrollment in public assistance programs by the national government with a new question:

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 26 shows the percentage of respondents in each of the countries included in this round who reported that some in their household receive monthly public assistance from the national government. A cursory look shows that levels of participation vary significantly throughout the continent. As can be see, around 15% of Argentines report receiving this type of aid. Save for the extreme case of Bolivia, which has a notably high level of participation (54.9%), the regional average of recipients is 14%. Countries which find themselves above the regional average are the Dominican Republic (22.6%), Suriname (22.3%), and Jamaica (20.2%). At the bottom of the list of countries are Honduras (4.9%) and Peru (7.3%), paradoxically, a leading case in the 90s because of the creation of an extensive focused social program (el FONCODES) that still exists today, but on a much smaller scale. Note that Brazil is the only large country that occupies a comparatively high position on the scale. This, as will be seen below, is a result of the expansion of the program *Bolsa Familia* under the successive governments of the Workers’ Party (PT).

America”. *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin America Public Opinion Project.

⁴⁷ Some work, however, argues that the effectiveness of these and other similar programs depends in large part on the design and implementation. See, Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias, and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean”. The World Bank: Social Protection Working Paper 605.

⁴⁸ Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations”. *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499.




Figure 26. Percentage who Report Receiving Public Assistance in the Americas

As we alluded to in the above paragraph, the 2012 AmericasBarometer also included an optional question to measure participation in CCT program. Figure 27 presents the national averages for those countries where the question was included.⁴⁹ Similar to the case of social assistance programs analyzed above, there is a significant amount of national-level variation in terms of participation rate. 31.3% of respondents in the Dominican Republic reported receiving this type of assistance compared to 3.8% in Peru. In Argentina, 18.6% of those consulted stated that they receive social assistance through the AUH program.⁵⁰ This placed Argentina one percentage point above the regional average, even though as can be seen from the overlapping confidence intervals, this position is statistically insignificant from that of Ecuador.

⁴⁹ In Argentina, Peru, and the Dominican Republic, the question was asked to the entire sample. In all other countries, it was only asked to half of the respondents.

⁵⁰ In Chapter 8 of this report we analyze the individual-level determinants of participating in AUH.




Figure 27. Percentage who Report Participating in CCT Programs in the Americas

The survey also offers us the opportunity to evaluate citizens' opinions regarding CCT programs and other public assistance plans. The questionnaire does not ask directly about *support* of such programs, but explores the individual attitudes toward those who receive the assistance.⁵¹ Answers to the question **CCT3**, while originally based on a 1 ("very much in disagreement") to 7 ("very much in agreement") scale, were recoded onto a scale of 0 to 100 points.

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

The national averages of each country for this question are displayed in Figure 28. Unfortunately, the citizens of the Americas express a considerable level of agreement with the

⁵¹ A split sample answered this question.



statement; the regional average is 46.5 points. Even more unfortunate is the position of Argentina. With an average of 63.7 points, Argentina leads the ranking of societies in terms of discrimination toward recipients of social assistance programs implemented by the government. Other countries with high averages are Uruguay (57.5), Chile (54.5), and Venezuela (52.4). On the other extreme with levels of agreement below 40 points are Guyana, Haiti, Brazil, and Suriname.




Figure 28. Belief that Participants of Public Assistance Programs are “Lazy” in the Americas

Affirmative Action

Another possible public policy solution that has become of interest in some countries of Latin America and the Caribbean is affirmative action. Although in the United States affirmative action has a history spanning numerous decades, throughout the rest of the continent, it is a recent phenomenon that

has only be seriously considered as a public policy option in some of the countries that have large percentage of populations of African descent.⁵²

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, respondents were asked, on a scale of 1 to 7, to what degree do they support affirmative action. The question, **RAC2A** was asked to half of the sample for each country and was recoded onto a scale of 0 to 100 points.

RAC2A. University should reserve space for students with darker skin color, even though they would have to exclude other students. To what point do you agree or disagree?

Figure 29 examines the level of support for affirmative action in all of the countries of the Americas. The variation found at the national level is, once again, considerable. The highest levels of support for the statement above are found in Paraguay (69.8), Honduras (62.7) and Argentina (62.6). Alternatively, the lowest levels of support are found in the United States (25.7), Canada (28.8), and Trinidad & Tobago (62.6). However, we should be cautious when drawing conclusions based on descriptive analyzes, the data suggest a relationship between percentage of the population that is black in a country and citizen support for affirmative action.

⁵² For more information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Amy Erica. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 29. Support for Affirmative Action in the Americas

V. Conclusion

The large differences in opportunities for citizens constitute one of the most serious political, social, and economic problems for governments throughout the continent. This chapter began by examining the magnitude of economic inequality in the countries of the Americas. Traditionally, the region has stood out as being one of the most unequal in the world in terms of income distribution and the concentration of wealth. In more recent years, although with significant variation between countries, we have observed a regional trend toward the reduction of economic inequalities. However, there still persist important differences in terms of access to opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on, among other factors, individual characteristics and the place in which these characteristics are situated within the social space in their respective countries.

In terms of the data provided by the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, this chapter examined the potential effects of gender, ethnicity, age, wealth, urban-rural status, and the origin of social class on three objective measures of inequality in Argentina: education, personal income, and food insecurity. In general, the data indicated that there does not appear to be significant differences between men and women with respect the level of attained education by Argentines. However, age, ethnicity, rural residence, family history, and wealth affect the number of years of formal education received by Argentines in the theoretically expected direction. In terms of personal income, the results of the regression analysis suggest that women, older people, and those with less education tend to receive incomes considerably lower. Finally, the levels of food insecurity in the country, although comparatively low within the context of the country, tend to be higher among the older respondents in the sample, the poorer and those who have attained fewer years of formal education.

This chapter also comparatively analyzed the personal experiences of Argentines with discrimination. The data show that Argentina is one the countries where citizens report lower levels of discrimination. Indeed, social class is the only variable that increases the probability that an Argentine feels discriminated against, while the poor are naturally more likely to suffer acts of discrimination. Furthermore, in this chapter we explored the extent to which existing inequalities in Argentina can be attributed to certain social norms and discriminatory attitudes in society. In general terms, the empirical evidence indicates that this does not appear to be the case now, on average, Argentines tend to be the least discriminatory citizens on the continent. Finally, we comparatively examined the levels of approval for the State to rectify inequalities. In relation to this point, the data are a bit more uncertain. While there exists a comparatively high level of agreement that the State should intervene to reduce economic inequalities, a considerable proportion of those interviewed in Argentina (and throughout the continent more generally) hold attitudes that are openly discriminatory towards those who receive social assistance from programs implemented by the national government.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ Unfortunately, because the 2010 survey in Haiti was focused on the earthquake's aftermath, skin color was not coded. Nonetheless, results from other countries are instructive.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant socio-demographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



■ 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

Perceptions of Severe Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth, 2010 AmericasBarometer



¹ The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.


The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the socio-demographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Socio-demographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.³

¹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

² Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.⁸ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and

⁴ In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218..

⁷ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁸ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁹ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements to many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

¹⁰ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid*. Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

The rest of this chapter is divided in the following manner. The second section examines the actual level of electoral and community participation on the continent. The third section analyzes public opinion relative to participation of disadvantaged groups in politics and access to public positions. The fourth section explores some possible solutions toward reducing political inequalities in the region. The final section presents conclusions.

II. Political Participation in the Americas

This section explores how unequal political participation is on the continent using data from the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. Given the lack of evidence for the region until now, we do not assume that there exist considerable disparities in the levels of participation between different social groups such as men and women. To what extent political participation is unequal or homogenous, is, at its core, an empirical question.

Electoral Participation

The analysis begins by examining inequalities in electoral participation. The AmericasBarometer survey measures electoral participation with the question **VB2**. In those countries that have a parliamentary form of government, this question is modified slightly and asks respondents about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2011? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]
(1) Voted [**Continue**]
(2) Did not vote [**Go to VB10**]
(88) DK [**Go to VB10**] (98) DA [**Go to VB10**]

Figure 30 shows the proportion of electoral participation in each one of the countries disaggregated by gender. In the first place, there exist large disparities between national averages. While average electoral participation is close to 91% in Peru, in Honduras it just barely exceeds 50% and in Paraguay 60%. It is important to note that voting is compulsory in some of the countries and voluntary in others. This institutional difference surely contributes to explaining the variation among countries, but it does not explain it all. For example in Honduras, voting is obligatory. In comparative terms, Argentina exhibits a considerably high level of electoral participation, situating itself in the third position with an average of 88.7%. This value is approximately 13 percentage points higher than the regional average. Second, the figure indicates that, save for the case of the United States where men (86.8%) participate more than women (77.6%), there is not a statistically significant difference between one and the other. This finding is consistent with recent surveys done in developed countries which suggest that in terms of electoral participation, women have closed the gap that existed between them and men.¹⁷

¹⁷ The case of the United States presents two anomalies. First, in the last election, more women than men voted: 66% and 62%, respectively. Second, in the survey, there were much higher levels of vote turnout (18%) than was the case. This overreporting was also observed in the last presidential election. See the report from the United States Census, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports", 20/7/2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>. Consultado 21/7/2012. Ver también, Allyson L.




Figure 30. Percentage that Voted in the Last Elections in the Americas

Next, we look with more detail at the inequalities in electoral participation that exist between different social groups in Argentina. Figure 31 clearly shows there are no inequalities that are statistically significant between citizens of different social classes, education levels, or family

Holbrook, y Jon A. Krosnick. "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique", febrero 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>. Consultado 21/7/2012.

history.¹⁸ Furthermore, as was stated above, there does not exist a significant difference in electoral participation between men and women. This, without a doubt, is owed to the incorporation of the vote as a political right for Argentines and a civic obligation.




Figure 31. Socio-Demographic Factors and the Vote in Argentina

¹⁸ Remember that because of the low number of cases, Argentines with no levels of formal education were recoded into the “primary education” category.

Beyond Electoral Participation

Electoral participation does not tell us everything. There exist various forms in which a citizen can involve him or herself in the democratic system beyond voting. Participation of different social groups in other types of political activities may or may not follow the same trends observed in electoral participation. The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions that ask about alternative modes of political participation. Among other subjects, citizens are asked in what type of community organizations or civil society groups they participate, how and how frequently they communicate with group representatives and to what extent they involve themselves in activities organized by parties or political movements. The analysis of these questions allows us to obtain a general perspective on the influence, or lack of influence of certain social groups on the national political process.

For many years, the AmericasBarometer has included a group of question that measures the frequency with which citizens participate in different group and community organizations. In the 2012 round, questions were included that explore if the respondent holds any sort of leadership position in said groups. The wording of the questions contained in the **CP** series is the following:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, those who reported participating at least one or two times a year in an organization were asked the following questions:

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

At its most basic level, it is interesting to understand if citizens of the Americas participate in community groups. Figure 32 examines these questions. The left side of the Figure shows average levels of community participation for each one of the countries of the continent. Participation in community groups is calculated as the average of responses to the question **CP6**, **CP7**, and **CP8**, and recalculated onto a scale of 0 to 100 points where 0 signifies the respondent never participated in a group and 100 signifies that he or she participates frequently in all of the groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of those people consulted who reported being leaders of a community group.




Figure 32. Community Participation and Community Leadership in the Americas

In the first place, it is evident that Argentines show comparatively low levels of community participation. As can be seen in the figure (left side), Argentina has an average of just 14.2 points on the 0-100 scale. This value is 12 points low than the regional average and is almost 10 points lower than the average of Brazil, the southern cone country with the highest score. It is telling that the other two countries that makeup this region of the continent, Uruguay and Chile also exhibit comparatively low levels of community participation. Countries that have the highest averages are Haiti (41.6), Guatemala (40.5), and somewhat further down, Bolivia (35.9). Second, the right side of the figure show that just 6.3% of those Argentine that participate with some sort of regularity in community organization activities also occupy some sort of leadership position. This is the lowest average of the continent, significantly behind the regional average that reaches 13.2%. Other countries with low levels of community leadership are Belize (7.2%), Venezuela (7.4%) and Panama (7.7%). On the opposite extreme are Haiti, where a little more than a quarter of community activists report holding leadership positions, El Salvador (23.6%), Guatemala (17.5%) and the Dominican Republic (17.1%).

Moving on to a more detailed analysis of participation by Argentines in different social and political organizations, Figure 33 indicates that the primary organizations within which they participate



are religious organizations, followed by parent associations, sports groups, improvement committees or councils, political parties, womens' groups, and finally, professional associations. It is worth noting that, on average, attendance in religious organizations is five times that of attendance in meetings of political parties or movements.




Figure 33. Civic and Political Meeting Attendance in Argentina

How do social inequalities affect participation in community activities and the probability of occupying a community leadership position in Argentina? To answer this question, we estimate two regression models, the first linear and the second logistic, that include as independent variables: discrimination victimization in the workplace, race, sex, wealth, age, education level and size of place of residence of the respondents. Figure 34 and Figure 35 show the results of both models.¹⁹

¹⁹ The results of the complete statistical models in this chapter can be found in Annex D.




Figure 34. Determinants of Socio-Demographic Factors of Community Participation in Argentina

With respect to the determinants of community participation in Argentina, there is an observed positive effect with skin color, gender, and race, and a negative effect for place of residence. First, as is illustrated in the bivariate relationship presented in Figure 36, those with darker skin tones tend to participate at much higher proportions than those with lighter skin tones.²⁰ More concretely, people with a value of 1 on the color palate reach an average of just over 10 points on the participation scale, while people with a value of 6 obtain close to 18 points. Second, on average, women virtually double the level of community participation of men: 18.5 and 19.9 points, respectively. Third, despite the differences between the quintiles of wealth are only moderately significant, people with the highest incomes (say for those in the fifth quintile) tend to participate more than those with less resources. Fourth, residents of rural areas and less populated, smaller cities, involve themselves more frequently in community activities than inhabitants of more significant medium to large cities. Finally, workplace discrimination and older age tend to have a positive effect on levels of community participation among Argentines, but both variables fail to achieve statistical significance.

²⁰ Remember that categories 9, 10, and 11 of the variable **COLOR** were recoded into category 8 because of low number of observations.



Related to the factors that affect the probability that a respondent in Argentina occupies a community leadership position, the results are less suggestive. In fact, despite all the included variables in the model having the expected signs, only the respondent's education level achieves statistical significance. As is shown in Figure 37, people who have 18 years of formal education have an estimated probability of 14% of being community leaders compared to a probability of 1% for those with no type of education.




Figure 35. Determinants Socio-Demographic Factors for Community Leadership in Argentina




Figure 36. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Community Participation in Argentina




Figure 37. Socio-Demographic Factors Associate with Community Leadership in Argentina

In addition to exercising their right to vote and to involve themselves in community activities, many citizens actively participate in political campaigns. To study Argentines' participation in political parties, we first analyze the relationship between political interest and activism. In agreement the "neotocquevillian" concept of democracy, said interest should incentivize citizens to participate in political organizations. To capture the respondents' level of political interest, we use the following question from the survey recoded onto a scale of 0 to 100 points where higher values signify higher interest:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) Little	(4) None	(88) DK	(98) DA
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As can be seen in Figure 38, with an average of 36.7 points, Argentina finds itself among the countries where citizens express a moderate level of interest in politics. Excluding the extreme case of the United States which leads the list of countries with 72.1 points, the regional average is 36 points. That is to say, virtually the value reached in Argentina. Those countries which have the highest levels of political interest are Canada, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Belize with average exceeding 43 points. On the other extreme of the scale, with averages below 31 points are Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama.




Figure 38. Political Interest in the Americas

Figure 39 presents more detailed information on the magnitude of political interest among Argentines, differentiating the percentage of respondents for each of the options of question **POL1**. As can be seen, in general, those consulted are distributed into thirds: one third expresses some or a lot of interest, another third expresses little interest and the final third expresses no interest.




Figure 39. Political Interest in Argentina

Moving now to the analysis of political activism, it is interesting to understand the manner in which Argentines participate in politics. Even though participation in political parties was becoming less frequent in the majority of democracies around the world in recent years, it continues to be a crucial activity given that parties are the only actors that seek to obtain power through the popular vote. Question **PP1** and **PP2** are meant to measure citizen participation in political party activities through the following wording:

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2010?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 40 presents the average level of responses to both questions for each one of the countries included in the 2012 round. On the left side of the figure, the percentage of citizens who expressed having tried to persuade others “frequently” or “occasionally” is presented. On the right side, the percentage of those who reported having worked for a political campaign during the last presidential elections is presented.




Figure 40. Political Persuasion and Participation in Political Campaigns in the Americas

With respect to more indirect forms of political participation (trying to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate), it can be seen that Argentina occupies a relatively low position among the other countries. Only 12.7% (close to 4 point below the regional average) of Argentines report having attempted to at some time influence the vote of others.²¹ The United States, where almost half of those interviewed reported having done so, the Dominican Republic and Guyana lead the list of highest average percentages. On the extreme opposite, Bolivia, Mexico, and Paraguay hold the lowest average values at 10%. With respect to participation in political campaigns, the level of activism in Argentina reaches 7.6% of respondents. This value is essentially equal to the regional average of 8.8%. Suriname, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic appear as the countries with the highest levels of citizen participation in political campaigns. In South America, the Brazilians and Paraguayans report having the highest percentage. Of those countries with the lowest level of citizen participation in electoral campaigns, we find, Chile with just 1.9% of those consulted, Canada, Mexico, Panama, and Peru.

Next, we examine the variation in levels of political persuasion for different social groups in Argentina. Figure 41 presents the bivariate relationships of different groups of individuals that reported having tried frequently or occasionally to convince others on political matters. The data, confirmed by the regression analysis, indicate that there does not exist a significant statistical difference between men and women. Neither do patterns exist for social class, as can be seen by the overlapping confidence intervals. In terms of the effect of age, it appears that there is an increasing trend of persuasion until the age bracket of 36-45 years. This trend plateaus until the 56-65 age bracket and then falls in a pronounced way. Argentines with more years of formal education try in larger number to convince others to vote for a particular candidate or party: the average difference between those with university (*superior*) education and those with a primary-level education is close to 8 percentage points.

²¹ Concretely, 75.2% of Argentines said that they have never tried to convince others, 21.1% said they did it rarely, 8.6% on occasion, and only 4.1% reported having done so frequently.




Figure 41. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Political Persuasion in Argentina

Figure 42 presents the same bivariate relationships for those who reported having worked for a party or candidate during the presidential election of 2011. The descriptive information, confirmed by statistical estimations, suggests no significant differences in terms of gender, age, wealth, and education level of the respondent, even though those situated in the lowest income quintals and those with more years of formal education tend to, in general, participate somewhat more in political campaigns.




Figure 42. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Participation in Political Campaigns in Argentina

The above analysis, as has been mentioned, indicates that there are no appreciable inequalities in levels of participation by gender in Argentina. Nevertheless, it is possible that participation indices in community and political activities of women vary with their position in the labor market and in the family.²² Figure 43 seeks to examine this question by differentiating the level of participation by gender, in the case of women, according to marital status (married or single) and in the labor market (having or not having own income). The evidence suggests that the position of women in these

²² See, for example, Iverson, Torben, y Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Ibid.*

environments does not have a relationship with differences in levels of political participation. In none of the cases analyzed do the confidence intervals allow us to conclude that married women and women without an income participate more (or less) than other women.




Figure 43. Gender Roles and Participation in Argentina

The results discussed up until this point say little about the relationship between race and political participation in Argentina. Figure 44 presents the level of participation of Argentines for each type of participation analyzed in this chapter according to skin color. As can be seen, in all cases, the slope of the curves are “flat” along the range of the variable **COLOR** indicating that ethnicity does not generate significant differences in the level of participation of respondents.




Figure 44. Skin Color and Participation in Argentina

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women’s place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups’ participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call “social desirability bias,” meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.²³ This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the “socially desirable,” non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

²³ Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

Public Opinion toward Women's Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked the following three questions to measure respondents' attitudes toward women in political leadership positions.²⁴

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA

VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?

(1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?

(1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

The analysis that follows begins with the answers to the first of these questions, recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale where higher values indicate higher levels of agreement with the statement. Figure 45 shows that Argentina holds an intermediate position on the continental scale with an average of 33.5 points (just 2 points below the regional average). On the high extreme, with averages that exceed 40 points are Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Trinidad & Tobago. Of those countries with the lowest average levels of approval to the idea that men are better political leaders than women, we find Uruguay, Brazil, the United States, and Costa Rica.

²⁴ Questions **VB51** and **VB52** were only asked to half of the interviewees.




Figure 45. Belief that Men are Better Political Leaders than Women in the Americas

Figure 46 presents the average scores to the question **VB51** for all of the countries of the Americas (left side) and for Argentina (right side). Figure 47 does the same with the average level of responses to question **VB52**. In general, there do not exist important differences in the opinions of the inhabitants of the Americas versus the opinions of Argentines. In terms of the relationship between levels of political corruption and gender, the large majority of respondents (64% in the Americas and 74.8% in Argentina) understand that men and women that hold public office can be equally corrupt. Just 8.6% more of those interviewed on the continent understand that men can be more corrupt than women. With respect to the abilities of men and women to improve the economy of a country, close to 60% in the America and 66% in Argentina believe that gender makes no difference. Only 6% more of respondents on the continent believe that women would do a better job than men if they made the decisions on the national economy.




Figure 46. Corruption Level and Gender in the Americas versus Argentina




Figure 47. Managing of the National Economy and Gender in the Americas versus Argentina

Public Opinion toward the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked respondents about their attitudes toward people of dark skin complexion holding political leadership positions. This was done through the following question which was the recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale where higher values indicate a higher level of agreement with the statement:²⁵

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks “non-whites” in general]

(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree	(88)
DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A		

Figure 48 shows the results for the countries of the Americas, except for the United States, Canada, and Guyana, where the question was not asked. In spite of there being significant national-level variation, the general level of agreement with statement in the region is relatively low. With an average of 23.1 points (almost 3 points below the regional average) Argentina holds the sixth position from the bottom of the least discriminatory countries toward people of dark skin complexion holding political leadership positions. Noting the overlapping confidence intervals, those countries with the lowest national averages are Uruguay (15.4), Trinidad & Tobago (17), Brazil (19.3), Jamaica (21.3), and Costa Rica (22.8). On the other extreme, with averages exceeding 30 points on the scale are Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, and Guatemala.

²⁵ This question was asked to half of the sample.




Figure 48. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are not Good Leaders in the Americas

Public Opinion toward the Participation of Homosexuals

As was done in the 2010 round, the most recent AmericasBarometer survey included the following question to measure individual attitude toward the right of homosexuals to run for public office. The response was originally based on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 signified “firmly disapprove” and 10 “firmly approve”. Being adjusted to the LAPOP standard, the question were then recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale to facilitate comparison

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

As can be seen in Figure 49, there exist large amounts of national variation in the level of agreement with the statement with a range between 77.8 and 8.5 points. In general, Argentines are



receptive to the idea that homosexuals should be permitted to seek public office. With an average of 60.1 (almost 19 points higher than the regional average), the only countries that exceed Argentina are Canada, Uruguay, the United States, Brazil, and Chile, although for the last two countries the differences between averages are not statistically significant. On the other extreme of the ranking, with average support below 25 points are Honduras, Guyana, Jamaica, and Haiti.




Figure 49. Support for Homosexuals Seeking Public Office in the Americas

Public Opinion toward the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question seeking to measure the extent to which citizens believe that people with physical disabilities should be able to seek public office.

Originally placed on a 1 to 10 point scale, the responses to the following question were recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale.²⁶

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?
(99) N/A

Figure 50 shows the average for all countries of the Americas included in this round. The average level of support for the statement in the region is close to 67.7 points. However, as can be seen, there exists important variation throughout the continent. On one extreme, citizens of the United States, Uruguay, and Canada express the highest levels of support, with averages equal to or exceeding 87 points. The second group of countries including Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, has levels of approval that exceed 75 points. On the opposite extreme of the scale, with average values below 54 points are Haiti, Guyana, Belize, and Honduras.




Figure 50. Support for Disabled Persons Seeking Public Office in the Americas

²⁶ As with previous cases, this question was asked to half of respondents.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women and Haitians of different social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.²⁷ The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes question **GEN6** that allows us to measure citizens' support for gender quotas.²⁸ As is customary, the responses were placed on a 1 to 10 point scale and were then recoded on a 0 to 100 point scale.

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 51 shows the national averages of support for the statement for all of the countries of the Americas. On the low extreme of the scale, with comparatively low average levels of support are Trinidad & Tobago (46.4), Canada (47.3), and Brazil (53). On the high extreme with averages exceeding 76 points are El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Argentina makes up part of the group of countries that are more receptive toward gender quotas with an average of 69.8 points, that is, close to 5 points higher than the regional average.

²⁷ Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

²⁸ This question was asked to half of respondents.




Figure 51. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.²⁹ While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.³⁰ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in elections is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 4, would suggest that

²⁹ Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

³⁰ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.³¹

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.³² While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,³³ material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

In spite of the decline of economic inequality in a large number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the past decade, this chapter has shown that there still persist strong inequalities in important aspects of political participation. In general, the survey data suggest that such inequalities are more evident through the region as a whole than in Argentina.

With respect to the first aspect of political participation analyzed, electoral participation, the results indicate that in Argentina there do not exist significant inequalities among citizens based on gender, social class, education level, or family history. For the second aspect studied, political participation in community activities or within civil society, the information shows that the level of involvement among Argentines is comparatively low. The frequency with which they participate varies positively with skin color and wealth of the respondents, and negatively with the size of place where the respondent resides. Gender, for its part, does not have a statistically significant effect on community participation in Argentina; nor does the position of women in the labor market or the family. Participation of Argentines in political parties, the third aspect of political participation analyzed in this chapter, is also fairly low compared to the rest of the region. Effectively, little more than 8% of those interviewed reported having worked for a candidate or political party in the last presidential elections of 2011. The results of the statistical estimation signal that none of the socio-demographic factors affect the probability of actively participating in political campaigns.

³¹ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid.*

³² Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. “Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas.” Working paper.

³³ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

This chapter also analyzed comparatively the level of support of citizens toward equality of opportunities in political participation for minority groups. With respect to support for women holding political leadership positions and gender quotas, Argentina finds itself among the group of countries most receptive to the inclusion of women in politics. Likewise, in support for participation of marginalized racial groups, homosexuals, and the physically disabled, Argentines are among the continent's least discriminatory citizens.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender



This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.¹

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation². The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable

Predicted Probabilities for Men's and Women's Political Participation in Latin America



from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.


Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.² On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.³ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences,

¹ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

² Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65.

³ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁴ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group – may well base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁵

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁶ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.⁷ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁸

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁹ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰

⁴ For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁵ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

⁶ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁷ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁸ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹¹ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹²

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹³ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁴ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹⁶

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such attitudes more generally. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹¹ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹² Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁵ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁶ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.¹⁷

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, intra-household inequalities by gender, and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Internal efficacy varies a considerable amount: from a high of 67.6 in the United States, to a low of 38.8 in Paraguay. With a value of 40.0, Haitians register levels of internal efficacy that are the second lowest in the region. This is particularly interesting, given that Haitians are so extraordinarily participatory, since internal efficacy is typically associated with participation.

¹⁷ This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




Figure 52. Internal Efficacy in the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? Figure 53 shows the results of the linear regression analysis that seeks to answer this question.¹⁸ In addition to the standard socio-demographic variables and political interest, we include variables that measure personal experiences with discrimination in the workplace (**DIS2**) and by the government (**DIS3**). Also note that we include variables measuring both women, in general, and women who identify as housewives.




Figure 53. Determinants of Internal Political Efficacy in Argentina

The evidence suggests that, in the first place, experiences with discrimination have no effect on the opinions of the respondents in their capacity to understand politics. Second, we observe that Argentines who express higher levels of interest in politics, are more educated, and are older, believe they have a better understanding of the most important political issues of the country. Finally, women report having less understanding of issues, while the variable that identifies housewives has a positive sign but fails to reach statistical significance. Skin color, wealth, and size of place of residence also have no effect on internal political efficacy.

Figure 54 shows in more detail how the statistically significant variable in the analysis above are related to Argentines' belief in their understand of the functioning of the political system. As can be seen below, those who have more interest in politics have an average score almost 35 points higher for internal efficacy than those who report having no interest. People with university-level education, hold average levels of 8 and 11 points higher than those people with secondary and primary-level educations, respectively. The effect of age consistently increases until the 46-55 age bracket and then declines, however it does not reach the average levels obtained by the youngest respondents. Finally, men obtain a score on the internal efficacy scale that is slightly higher (close to 6 points, on average) than women.

¹⁸ The complete results of the models estimated in this chapter can be found in Annex D of the current report.




Figure 54. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Argentina

Below, we examine answers to the question **EFF1** and **EPP3** that reflect the perceptions of the respondents that the political system (governments officials and political parties) listens to them and represents them. Figure 55 shows the average levels of distribution of these variables in the Americas. As can be seen, in both cases Argentina is found toward the bottom of the list, achieving average scores of 38.5 and 34.4, respectively. The South American countries that have average levels below Argentina on the scale that measures whether governments are interested in what the people think (left hand side of the figure) are Chile, Peru, Colombia, Paraguay (even though the differences in these countries are not significantly different) and Brazil. Of those countries with the highest averages, we find Venezuela (which leads the rankings for both questions), Suriname, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. It is interesting to note that the governments of Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales, considered

to be the most radical of the “new left of Latin America,”¹⁹ are relatively well evaluated at least in their capacity to listen to what citizens think. Also, it is worth mentioning the comparatively low position that Paraguay occupies, where the survey was implemented just after the scandal of Fernando Lugo, both in terms of government representativeness and political parties. Along the same lines we find Honduras, now a couple years out of the coup de tat that ousted Manuel Zelaya. These data suggest that the removal of presidents does not necessarily generate good linkage between new governments, parties and citizens. Indeed, it appears the opposite occurs. Finally, except for a few exceptions such as Ecuador that decreased in comparison to the second graph, or Chile that shows a reverse finding, the majority of countries show similar averages on the two scales. The extreme case, undoubtedly, is Costa Rica, a country traditionally associated with a democratically stable political culture that appears to be experiencing an unusual and extended crisis of trust in governmental institutions and politics in general.




Figure 55. External Efficacy and Representativeness of Political Parties in the Americas

¹⁹ Levitzky, Steven, y Kenneth M. Roberts. 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Who in Argentina believes that governments are interested in what people like them think? Who is in agreement with the idea that political parties listen and represent them? To respond to these questions, we estimate two linear regression model, one for each question, that include the same independent variables that were included in the previous statistical analysis. The results of these models are presented in Figures 56 and 57, respectively.




Figure 56. Determinants of External Efficacy in Argentina




Figure 57. Determinants of Representativeness of Political Parties in Argentina

Both models present similar results. In neither of the two cases do we observe a statistically significant effect of self-reported discrimination, whether at work or by the government. Of the socio-demographic factors, only the social class of the respondent has a small negative effect in the first model. That is, wealthier people have, on average, a lower level of belief that governments are interested in people like them. Education appears to move in the same direction, but fails to meet the minimum standards for statistical significance. Finally, as we expected, political interest has a strong positive affect on both dependent variables. The concrete effects of the statistically significant variables are presented in Figure 58.




Figure 58. Factors Associated with External Efficacy and Representativeness of Political Parties in Argentina

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences with marginalization and discrimination by an individual, as was mentioned in the outset of this chapter, can also affect more abstract political attitudes. The 2012 AmericasBarometer analyzed a set of general attitudes of citizens, with support for the political system and support for democracy being the most relevant.²⁰ Below, we explore the ways in which personal experiences with discrimination affect the formation of such attitudes.

Figure 59 presents the results of a linear regression analysis that replicates the previous model in this chapter, but uses as the dependent variable support for the political system.²¹ The primary results indicate first that both forms of discrimination appear to negatively affect the level of system support. However, in neither case do these relationships reach statistical significance. Second, people of darker skin tones hold, on average, higher levels of support than lighter skinned individuals. As can be seen in Figure 60, people in category 8 of the color palate have, on average, close to a 15 point increase on the scale of support for the political system than citizens in the first category. In the same direction, those who express a lot of interest in politics, have approximately 10 points higher on the scale than those who express no interest.




Figure 59. Determinants of Political System Support in Argentina

²⁰ In Chapter 5 we describe in detail how these attitudes were measured and how they vary over time in Argentina.

²¹ The complete results are reported in Table 4 of the Annex of this chapter.




Figure 60. Factors Associated with Political System Support in Argentina




Figure 61. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Argentina

Having demonstrated that self-reported discrimination does not affect system support in Argentina, we now analyze its potential impact on support for democracy. To examine this question, we estimate a second linear regression model identical to the one above, explaining the belief that “democracy, even with its faults, is better than any other system of government.” Figure 62 presents the results of this analysis. Again, discrimination does not have an impact on the formation of this belief. Interest in politics, education level, and age, all have a positive effect. This impact, however, is not substantively important. As can be seen in the bivariate relationships shown in Figure 63, on average, Argentines who report high levels of interest in politics have almost a 10 point increase on the scale of support for democracy than those who have no interest. In the same sense, people with



university-level education have about 4 points more, on average than those with primary education. Finally, respondents in the age bracket of 66 or more years old tend to have a level of support of just 6 points higher than adults younger than 25 years.




Figure 62. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Argentina

IV. Protest Participation

As was mentioned above, marginalization and discrimination can motivate certain individuals and social groups (especially the most polarized) to organize and participate in demonstrations or political protests. A series of LAPOP studies have shown that in at least some countries of the region, including Argentina, the act of protest has become a “normal” method of political participation. In the words of these authors, “people who protest are more interested in politics, and it is probable that they participate in community activities, that is, combine traditional forms of participation with protest”.²² The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions on political protest participation. In this section, we only analyze the first of these questions (**PROT3**), while Chapter 9 is dedicated entirely to the question of social protest in Argentina.

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

(1) Yes [Continue]	(2) No [Go to PROT6]
(88) DK [Go to PROT6]	(98) DA [Go to PROT6]

Figure 63 presents the percentage of citizens who reported having participated in protests or public demonstration in each of the countries of the Americas. As can be seen, participation by Argentines is comparatively high, not accounting for the confidence intervals. Argentina is placed in the tenth position with a ranking of 8.1% of respondents having reported participating in this type of activity in the past year. The cases of Bolivia and Haiti emerge as the most “contentious” with average values exceeding 17% of respondents. Somewhat further behind are Peru, Paraguay, and Chile; for the last case, this can possibly be attributed to the massive student mobilizations rejecting the Chilean education system that provides ample participation in the private sector to the detriment of the States. On the opposite end of the scale with percentage of less than 4% are Jamaica, El Salvador, Panama, and surprisingly, Venezuela.

²² Moseley, Mason, y Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America”. *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 42; Lodola, Germán, y Mitchell Seligson. 2010. *Cultura política de la democracia en Argentina: Consolidación democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles*. Montevideo: LAPOP-Universidad Di Tella-University of Vanderbilt.




Figure 63. Percentage that Participated in Protests or Public Demonstrations in the Americas

Who are those who protest in Argentina? The following logistic regression model corrected for design effects estimates the possible effect of discrimination and socio-demographic characteristics on the probability that an Argentine has participated in a protest or public demonstration in the past year. Figure 64 shows the results of this analysis.²³

First, different from the results obtained in models discussed in this chapter, the variables that measure self-reported discrimination have positive signs. Discrimination in place of work, however, does not reach minimum levels of statistical significance. However, discrimination by the government does appear as a moderately important predictor of explaining protest participation. In fact, as is shown in Figure 65, 23.8% of those who reported having felt discriminated against by the government mobilized in some way in the past year compared to 6.8% who did not feel discriminated against.

²³ As was mentioned, in Chapter 9 we conduct a more detailed analysis of this question.

Second, education level has a positive effect in the propensity of a person to protest. As can be seen in the same figure, the probability of an Argentine with a university-level education taking to the street is almost 2 and 3 times higher than the probability of those with a secondary and primary-level education. These data call to attention the fact that in Argentina protests are commonly attributed to the *piquetero* movement and unemployed workers organization. However, this form of collective action extends across other actors of the political system. It is also important to remember those known as “picketers of abundance” arising from the agricultural association in response to the national government’s attempt to increase export retentions of grain in 2008. Finally, race, wealth, gender, female position in the home, age, and size of place of residence do not affect said probability.





Figure 64. Determinants of Protest Participation in Argentina



V. Conclusion

This chapter comparatively analyzes the manner in which personal experiences of Argentines with discrimination affect the perceptions of their own capacity to understand political issues, government representativeness, political parties, support for the political system, democracy in abstract terms, and the probability of participating in protests or public demonstration. In general, the results indicate that self-reported discrimination (both in the work place and by the government) do not have an effect on the formation of said perceptions and attitudes.

First, the empirical evidence suggests that Argentines who express higher levels of interest in politics are highly educated, elderly, and men; they also report to have better understandings of the most important political issues in Argentina. Second, only class (negatively) affects citizen perception on the representativeness of government and political parties. That is, people who are wealthier have, on average, lower levels of belief that governments are interested in what people like them think and that political parties represent them. Third, ethnicity of the respondent is the only socio-demographic factor that (positively) affects support for the political system, in that people of darker skin complexion tend to have higher levels of support than people with lighter complexions. Fourth, education and age have a positive impact on support for democracy. While the effects of these variables are slight in statistical terms, we observe that Argentines with university-level education and older adults hold higher levels of support for the idea that even with its deficiencies, democracy is still the best form of government. Finally, discrimination is a moderately important predictor of explaining the probability of participating in protests. Interest in politics and education of the respondent also affect said probability. That is, on average, those who report have been discriminated against by the government, have higher levels of formal education, show higher interest in politics, and have a significantly higher probability of being involved in activities of “contentious” politics.


Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



¹ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement
and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.²

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.³ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.⁴ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific governments

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

maintain public support.⁵ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.⁶ However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to use both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).⁷ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.⁸ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.⁹ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹⁰

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places

⁵ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

⁶ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁷ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

⁸ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

⁹ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* (64).

¹⁰ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).



where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter first analyzes the level of perception and victimization of corruption and crime in a comparative perspective. Second, it estimates the potential effects of socio-demographic factors and attitudes on the perceptions of both phenomena in Argentina. Third, it examine who are the most likely to be victimized in Argentina. Finally, the chapter analyzes the concrete effects of both phenomena on democratic attitudes of both Argentines and the citizens throughout the continent.

II. Corruption

Measuring corruption represents a challenge for political analysts. Of the systematic efforts taken to measure presence of corruption in the world is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) conducted annually by Transparency International. This index puts forward an indicator of the presence of corruption in a specific country based on external evaluations and surveys of businessmen. Each country receives a score within the range of 1 (the highest possible level of corruption) to 10 points (lowest level possible). Historically, Argentina has been among the group of countries with a lower score. Since 1995, the first year of the index, until 1999, the negative perception of corruption in Argentina increased uninterrupted. During these years, Argentina fell from the 24 to 71 on the world ranking. More recently, in 2000, in part because of the arrival to power of the *Alianza* government (1999-2001), with a governing strategy centered on honesty, Argentina experienced a slight improvement in its ranking to spot 52. Notwithstanding, notorious political scandals, such as the passing of labor reform laws through the payment of bribes to opposition senators, Argentina fell once again to 92. Under the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the place of Argentina has not changed significantly. Currently, Argentina finds itself as 100 out of 183 countries with a score of 3 points. This is thanks to, in good measure, the public visibility of a series of corrupt acts carried out by high level national government officials

Figure 66 shows the last CPI score for all of the countries, except for Belize which lacks data, included in the current round of the AmericasBarometer. As can be see, the countries are distributed among four large groups. The first group receives scores equal to or about 7 points on the scale; the second group between 3.2 and 4.8 points; the third, where we find Argentina, receives scores between 2.5 and 3 points; and the fourth group closes the ranking with values of less than 2.3 points.




Figure 66. Corruption Index in the Americas

While this index is superior to object indicators based on official reports or trials, that only capture a subgroup of corrupt acts that actually occur, this measure also has important limitations. First, the CPI is not designed to make comparison across time given that the methodology of measurement changes from year to year and between countries. Furthermore, because the index places more importance on a country's overall position among other countries before its actual score, this position can change due to changing perceptions in other countries and if the number of countries analyzed changes. Third, the CPI only captures incidence of administrative and political corruption in the public sector (that is to say, perceptions on officials, politicians, and bureaucrats) but not at the system level. Fourth, by asking external evaluators and businesspeople about corruption in public administration, the index tends to correlate positively with the size of the black market in a given country and the level of regulatory policies of the State. This last point, in part explains the low scores for some countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, whose governments in recent years have expanded their regulatory role in the economy. In light of these cases, our attention is called to the comparatively high score of Brazil even though a number of ministers within the government of Dilma Rousseff were forced to resign after being accused of participating in organized corruption schemes while in the ministerial role. The fifth and final problem of the CPI is that it estimates the

perception of corruption but not its actual presence. In a society it is possible that a high level of perception of corruption exists, while at the same time, the actual number of incidences is low given that individual perceptions are conditioned on the current impact of specific scandals. The methodology developed by LAPOP, as will be seen below, resolves a number of these problems.

LAPOP has designed a series of questions used in AmericasBarometer that allow us to measure both the *perception* of corruption as well as *victimization* by corrupt acts. After testing them in Nicaragua in 1996,¹¹ the questions were refined and improved. To measure citizen perception on how widespread corruption is in their country, there exists the following question rescaled to a 0 to 100 points, where 0 represents the perception that corruption “is not widespread” and 100 signifies that it “is very widespread”.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is [Read]

(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Because definitions of corruption can vary from one country to the other, at the time of asking about corruption victimization we make sure to avoid this ambiguity by forming the questions as: “In the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” Also, similar questions are asked to see if the respondent had to pay a bribe to a local official, political or military officer, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health centers or hospitals.¹² It should be underscored that the questions designed by LAPOP not only refer to corruption in the public sector (national and local), but also within other public institutions. Therefore, the first advantage of the LAPOP series is that it allows us to determine the institutional context in which corruption is most frequent. A second advantage is that we can create a corruption scale that distinguishes those who were victimized in one context and those who were victimized in multiple instances. As is the case with crime, it is understood that having been a victim of corruption in more than one instance can have larger implications on the formation of individual attitudes toward rule of law and democratic institutions.

The series of items related to corruption victimization is the following:

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98

¹¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates; Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk about Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates.

¹² The question **EXC20** refers to bribes paid to military officials; it was used for the first time in the 2012 round.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Perception of Corruption

This section discusses the question **EXC7** which captures respondents' general perceptions on corruption. Figure 67 indicates that citizens of the America tend to perceive high levels of corruption in their respective country. In effect, the large majority of countries have average values that exceed 65 points on the scale and almost half hold values in excess of 70 points. The countries that have the lowest averages of corruption perception are Suriname, Canada, Uruguay, and Nicaragua, with an average of 55.3 points. The countries with the highest averages include Colombia, Trinidad & Tobago, Argentina, and Guyana, with an average level of 80.4 points. It is important to note that as is indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals, that the 79.5 points reported for Argentina, is not statistically distinguishable from the averages for Colombia (above) and Mexico (below). Once more, the comparatively low score of Brazil is surprising given the wave of corruption scandals that have affected that new government of the PT.




Figure 67. Perception of Corruption in the Americas

Similar to other indicators discussed in the report, it is interesting to evaluate changes in corruption perceptions among Argentines over time. Figure 68 shows the trend in the country for those years in which we have data. As can be seen, corruption perception in Argentina has remained high. While in 2008, the average level reached 84.5 points on the scale in 2010 it decreased significantly to 78.6 points and in 2012 increased marginally. As is apparent from the overlapping confidence intervals, the close to one point increase between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant.




Figure 68. Perception of Corruption over time in Argentina

To understand the principal determinants of corruption perception among Argentines, below we estimate a linear regression model that includes as predictors the standard socio-demographic figures used in this report along with respondents' personal experiences with marginalization in the workplace and by the government. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 69.¹³

As can be observed, level of wealth has a slightly positive effect on said perception. Specifically, as is illustrated in that bivariate relationship shown in Figure 70, Argentines falling into the fifth wealth quintal hold perceptions, on average, close to 9 points higher than those in the first quintal.

¹³ The complete results of the models analyzed in this chapter are shown in Annex D of the present report.




Figure 69. Determinants of Perception of Corruption in Argentina




Figure 70. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Corruption in Argentina

As was mentioned above, it is important to note that higher levels of corruption perception do not necessarily correspond with elevated (or rising) levels of corruption victimization. That is to say, although perceptions may be high, victimization may be low. In the following section, we analyze comparatively the extent to which Argentines report have been victimized by corruption.

Corruption Victimization

Figure 71 shows the percentage of respondents for each country included in this round that report having been victims of a corruption attempt at least once during the past year. As can be seen below, there exist notable national-level variation that forms a range from 67% in Haiti to 3.4% in Canada. Argentina finds itself among those countries of the continent that have an intermediate level of corruption victimization. That is, 19.2% of those interviewed (compared with a regional average of 20.7%) reported having been victimized by at least one of the discrete experiences listed in the group of questions making up the EXC battery. This value is close to six times higher than the country in the hemisphere with the lowest reported percentage, however, it is about half that of the percentages reported in Bolivia (44.8%) and Ecuador (40.9%). It should be mentioned that in some countries there exist a considerable gap between corruption perception and victimization. Some countries that have comparatively high levels of perception such as Colombia, Panama, and Argentina have relatively low levels of victimization. On the other hand, the opposite pattern holds for countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Haiti. Lastly, a group of countries that has traditionally been identified as having transparent public practices including Canada, Chile, Uruguay, and the United States, exhibit comparatively low levels on both indicators.




Figure 71. Percentage of Corruption Victimization in the Americas

Figure 72 shows the distribution of the number of instances (or institutional environments) in which Argentines reported having been victimized by corruption. Among the respondents, 10.5% report having been victimized in one instance, 4.5% in two and 3.8% in three or more instances. This is to say that approximately 6 of 10 Argentine corruption victims over the course of the past year were victimized in one instance or institutional environment.




Figure 72. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Argentina

How has corruption victimization varied over time in Argentina? Figure 73 presents the evolution of the corruption victimization index in Argentina. As can be seen, corruption victimization shows a clear declining trend in the last six years. Note, however, that the almost four percentage point drop between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant but the drop of a little more than seven percentage points occurring between the first and last rounds of measurement is significantly different.




Figure 73. Corruption Victimization over time in Argentina

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

With the objective of having a clear understanding of corruption victimization in Argentina, we estimate a logistic regression model whose dependent variable is coded as 1 if a person was the victim of at least one act of corruption during the past year and 0 if not. As was done in the previous model, we include as independent variables the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and self-reported acts of discrimination against the respondent in the workplace and by the government. As is done throughout the report, the results of the regression model are presented in Figure 74.¹⁴

As we can see, discrimination by the government has a statistically large and positive impact on the probability that an Argentine will be a victim of corruption. As is shown in Figure 75 (upper left hand side), the estimated probability of being victimized for a person who has reported being discriminated against by the government compared to a person having not been discriminated against is 38% and 18%, respectively. This could be because a corrupt act occurring in a governmental office could be interpreted as a discriminatory act. In fact, corruption victimization is a positive predictor of discrimination by the government, which is to say that there exists a recursive relationship between both phenomena. Additionally, two socio-demographic factors have an impact on the probability of being victimized: gender and education level. As can be seen in the same figure (upper right hand side), the estimated probability of being victimized for men is almost 6 percentage points higher than for women. Finally, in the lower part of the figure, we can see that there is a significantly increased probably for those people with more years of formal education: while the probably of being victimized

¹⁴ The results do not change significantly if we use as a dependent variable a continual measure of victimization of corruption **EXCTOT**, that is, the number of ways in which each respondent was victimized.

for a person with a primary-level of education is 16%, for somebody with a university-level (*superior*) education, it increased to 22%. These results may be due to the fact that men and people with higher levels of education interact more frequently within those environments in which the survey measures corrupt acts. However, with respect to education, it can also be that those citizens with lower levels of education tend to “normalize” certain social practices that higher education strata conceive of as corrupt.




Figure 74. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Argentina




Figure 75. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Corruption Victimization in Argentina

III. Insecurity

As was mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report, the statistics compiled by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on the basis of official data generated by different state agencies in each of the countries indicate that the homicide rate has increased considerably in Central America in recent years. The rate has grown somewhat less in the Caribbean and has fallen slightly in South America. In the case of Argentina, the homicide rate in 2011 was 4.3 for every 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁵

¹⁵ The data for Argentina were originally generated by la Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal (DNPC), an office within the Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos. As is stated by the DNPC, the 2009 data do not report the homicides that occurred in the Buenos Aires province, even though the calculation of the rate for that year occurred within computing the population for said province. For a discussion of the confidence of said data, see Fleitas, Diego M. 2010. *La Seguridad Ciudadana en Argentina y su Relación en el Contexto Regional*. San José, CR: FLACSO. The author of this report argues that the information generated by DNPC underestimated the problem of crime in the country. The data put forward by

This figure is, aside from those values reported for Canada (1.6) and Chile (3.2), the lowest on the continent. Figure 76 shows the criminal homicide rate for every 100,000 inhabitants for a select group of Latin American countries between 2006 and 2011. The annual series for Argentina, as can be seen, remains stable over time, with a slight decrease (from 5.5 to 4.3) reported between 2010 and 2011.




Figure 76. Homicide Rate in Six Countries of the Americas

While these statistics are extremely useful, they do not always provide a complete panorama of crime. First, criminal homicide data obviously do not contain information about less extreme forms of crime. Second, official data on this type of information is generally based on official crime reports and it is known, as has been demonstrated in previous LAPOP studies, that more than half of citizens report having been victimized by crime and not reporting the act to the authorities. This is due to citizens' lack of confidence in the abilities of those political institutions charged with resolving the problem of crime. Therefore, in those countries where people have higher levels of confidence in the police and justice system, there are proportionally more reports. The official data, then, can show higher levels of crime where it is comparatively lower and lower levels where it is higher. An additional problem of the official statistics based on reports is the definition of a crime is not the same in all countries. Naturally, this makes it difficult to compare between different countries in the same region.

The public opinion data used in this report also have limitations that are worth mentioning. First, the reporting of acts of crime reported by relatives of the victims surveyed usually results in an

Fleitas in the Ministerio de Salud database are higher (on average but 3%) than those generated by DNCP, but are only up to 2008.

exaggeration of acts. Second, the definition of “family” varies between individuals. Some only refer to the nuclear family, while others may include distant relatives. For this reason, surveys are potentially subject to a problem of double counting given that member of an extended family may be in the same *cluster* of the sample and report the same crime. Third, the severity of the crime depends on the effectiveness of emergency medicine. Where these services are efficient, there will be a tendency to find lower levels of crime perception. Fourth, the perception of insecurity can increase because of a series of factors outside of crime such as sensationalist reporting of the subject by communication outlets.¹⁶ Finally, the AmericasBarometer survey does not gather information about the primary cause of the crime. Therefore, it is not possible to determine with any precision the percentage of criminal acts reported by the respondent that were because of interpersonal reason (between couples, families, acquaintances or neighbors) that were not related to other forms of crime.

Perception of Insecurity

This section analyzes, in comparative perspective, the level of perception of insecurity within the daily lives of Argentines. The AmericasBarometer measures this level of perception with the following question, recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale where higher values signify a higher perception of insecurity and lower values mean a lower perception:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?			
(1) Very safe	(2) Somewhat safe	(3) Somewhat unsafe	
(4) Very unsafe	(88) DK	(98) DA	

Given that the majority of criminal acts take place in urban zones, and especially in national capitals, we made the decision to present crime data for the capitals of the countries included in the sample, excluding the United States and Canada, because of sampling issues.

Figure 77 reveals that there exists a considerable level of variation within the region. In fact, the score reported for the capital of the country that leads the list is more than double the score received by the capital of the country at the bottom of the ranking. Strikingly, the Central American countries, where according to official data crime has grown at a sustained rate in recent years, find themselves spread throughout the scale. The countries that hold the highest averages of perception of insecurity are Mexico (64.7), Peru (63.9), Guatemala (63.2), Venezuela (61.9), and Haiti (61.7). On the other extreme are Jamaica (29), and Trinidad & Tobago (32.7). As can be seen, Argentina is the 22nd country of continent where citizens in the capital feel most insecure of becoming victims of a crime or assault. Buenos Aires receives a score of 44.4 points on the scale, just 2 points below the regional average. The score placed Argentina (as well as Uruguay) above other countries of the region such as

¹⁶ In agreement with a study examining five countries of Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico) the communication modes in Argentina tend to be more dedicated to the theme of insecurity and be more sensationalist than the other countries analyzed. See, Rincón, Omar, y Germán Rey. 2008. “Los cuentos mediáticos del delito”. *Urvio, Revista Latinoamericana de Seguridad Ciudadana* 5: 34-45. In the same sense, through content analysis and comparison of the Argentine newspapers *Clarín* y *La Nación*, Martini argue that the sensationalist coverage expands to crime, related areas with higher levels of violence and increases criminal violence. In this sense, an increase in crime contributes to an increase in insecurity. See, Martini, Stella. 2007. “Argentina: Prensa gráfica, delito y seguridad”, En *Los relatos periodísticos del crimen*, editado por Germán Rey. Bogotá: C3-FES.

Colombia or Brazil where, according to what was presented in the previous section, the criminal homicide rates are markedly higher.




Figure 77. Perception of Insecurity in the Capitals Cities of the Americas

It is interesting to note, as can be seen in Figure 78, that the perception of insecurity among Argentines has decreased considerably over the last six years and especially in the last two. While in 2008 the average score rose to 57.3 points on our scale, in 2010 it descended to 52 points and currently it is situated almost 13 points lower than that. In all cases, as can be seen by the non-overlapping confidence intervals, these differences are statistically significant. In the aggregate of the six years for which we have data, the decrease in perception of insecurity is close to 32%. While this is difficult to understand exactly what caused this decrease, it is possible that it is due in part to a combination of factors: an increase in favorable positions for tougher sentencing for criminals, the increase in the proportion of the national budget (and that of various provinces) toward security, the expanded use of

“video-vigilance” as a crime prevention method, the normalization of crime in some districts, and, as we will see in this chapter, the decline in the rate of actual crime victimization in the country.




Figure 78. Perception of Insecurity over time in Argentina

In spite of this marked decrease in perception of insecurity, we should note that security constitutes the largest level of worry for public opinion in Argentina, as is illustrated in Figure 79. Effectively, 39.8% of Argentines (compared with 29.6% of citizens of other countries) report the lack of security and crime as the biggest problem of the country. Following that is the economy with 35.5%, and much further behind, politics (6.1%) and basic services (5.3%).




Figure 79. Biggest Problem that faces Argentina

In what regions of Argentina do people report having the highest levels of perceptions of insecurity? As can be seen in Figure 80, there exists a relatively significant level of regional variation, consistent with what has been reported by academic studies in previous years.¹⁷ Aside from the confidence intervals, the inhabitants of AMBA (Buenos Aires and Conurbano Bonaerense), where most crimes occur, according to official data, residents report average levels of perception of insecurity that are only surpassed by those that reside in Patagonia. Next, still above the national average are Cuyo and the Central region. Finally, the inhabitants of the North (both northwest and northeast) and the province of Buenos Aires have the lowest levels of perception of insecurity, somewhat lower than the national average.




Figure 80. Perception of Insecurity in the Regions of Argentina

To find more about who has higher levels of perceptions of insecurity in Argentina, below we estimate a linear regression model that includes as predictors the same socio-demographic variables used throughout this report. The results are presented in Figure 81.¹⁸ As can be seen, two variables reach statistical significance: gender and the size of residence of the respondent. As is illustrated in

¹⁷ See, Fleitas, Diego M., y Alejandra Otamendi. 2007. "Homicidios, Suicidios y Uso de Armas de Fuego en las Provincias Argentinas", En *Las Armas y las Víctimas*, editado por Khatchik DerGhougassian. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés.

¹⁸ We also estimated alternative models including variable **G10** which measures the frequency with which the respondent follows the news on radio, television, or through newspaper. This variable did not reach statistical significance while the rest of the variables remained unchanged. We also estimated models using dichotomous variables for each of the regions of Argentina (and using AMBA as the reference category). The results indicated no statistical difference between the regions.

Figure 82, on average, Argentine women fall 4.2 points higher on the perception of insecurity scale than men while those who reside in important medium and large cities receive 8 points more than residents of small cities and 26 points more than those living in rural areas.




Figure 81. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity in Argentina




Figure 82. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Perception of Insecurity in Argentina

As was the case for corruption, it is important to keep in mind that high levels of perception of insecurity do not necessarily correspond with elevated levels of crime. Perceptions can be high while at the same time, actual victimization relatively low. To better understand this, the next section analyzes crime victimization.

IV. Crime Victimization

In 2010, the AmericasBarometer updated the following series of question to measure crime victimization.

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [\[Read options\]](#)

(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this municipality
(4) In another municipality
(5) In another country
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Before beginning with the analysis of this question, it is worth mentioning that the survey is only administered to of age adults. Therefore, it is possible that the victimization of minors is not always reported because family members are not always aware of these acts. Furthermore, the reader should remember that the respondents self-identify as crime victims. What can happen, then, is that in area where certain criminal acts (especially those perpetrated against marginalized groups) have become “normalized”, victims no longer report with the some level of frequency.

Figure 84 presents the averages of the national capitals for the question **VIC1EXT** which reports personal levels of crime victimization (left hand side) and the combination of **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR** which presents victimization in the home (right side). The data indicate that, on average, 23.8% of those interviewed that reside in national capitals reported having been victims of a criminal act in the past year, while 25.6% said that they themselves or a family member were victims during the same time period. Compared with the capitals of the other countries of the area, the incidences of criminal acts suffered directly by those interviewed in Buenos Aires is relatively high. 26.7% report having been a victim of crime. This average places Buenos Aires below the rates reported in eight other national capitals; however, these differences are not statistically significant. The lowest levels of personal crime victimization are found in the capitals of Guyana, Jamaica, Belize, and Panama where less than 13% of those interviewed reported having been victimized. With respect to crime victimization in the home, the majority of countries (Argentina included) tend to maintain their position on the scale. In Argentina, the average percentage of individuals that report either themselves having been victimized or someone with whom they live increased to 31.8%, that is to say, almost 5 points higher than the regional average.




Figure 83. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Capital Cities of the Americas

Figure 84 shows the places where, according to the answers given by respondent, criminal acts in Argentina occurred in the past year. According to this information, we observe that 40.5% of these events took place in the home of the respondents, 30.5% in their neighborhood, 17.4% in their municipality, and only 11.6% in other municipalities. It is interesting to note that crime victimization in the home and the neighborhood (the two most intimate geographic circles of respondents) account for close to 70% of crimes. That is to say, approximately 3 of every 4 criminal acts suffered by Argentines take place within an intimate distance of the victim. These data may indicate, as was mentioned above, that at least some part of those crimes reported by victims in the LAPOP survey are related to interpersonal conflicts and not necessarily conflicts derived directly from criminality.




Figure 84. Location of Most Recent Act of Crime in which Respondent was Victim in Argentina

In which regions of Argentina do criminal acts occur the most? Figure 85 show the regional percentages of personal, self-reported crime victimization from the data collected in the survey. Notwithstanding the confidence intervals, Patagonia and AMBA appear to be the most insecure regions for the country with averages of 39.4% and 26.7%, respectively. After these two regions, those that follow are, in this order, Cuyo, Central, Northeast, Northwest, and finally, the province of Buenos Aires.




Figure 85. Personal Crime Victimization by Region in Argentina

In what way have personal experiences with crime changed throughout time in Argentina? Figure 86 shows the observed trend in self-reported personal crime victimization in Argentina between 2008 and 2012. It is important to note that in 2010 LAPOP changed the formulation of the questions with the intention of increasing the validity of the responses. Between 2004 and 2008, we used the question **VIC1** which asked, “Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? For the last two rounds, this question was substituted for **VIC1EXT** which offers more concrete details about criminal acts. However, the change in question wording cannot explain the decrease of close to 6 percentage points in the victimization rate between 2008 and 2012. This decrease, as is shown with the non-overlapping confidence intervals, is statistically significant.




Figure 86. Personal Crime Victimization over time in Argentina

Who are the Most Likely to be Crime Victims?

To analyze who is most likely to be a victim of crime in Argentina, we construct a logistic regression model that estimates the effects of socio-demographic factors along with corruption victimization on a dichotomous dependent variable coded as 1 if the respondent was a victim of some type of crime during the last year, and 0 if not. Figure 87 shows the standardized coefficients for the model, corrected for the design-effects.¹⁹ As can be seen, four variables affect the probability of an Argentine being a victim of crime: corruption victimization, age, education level, and size of place of residence. Those who were victims of corrupt acts, younger citizens, the more educated and those who live in large urban areas have a significantly higher probability of being a victim of crime.

¹⁹ These do not change substantially if we use as the dependent variable a continual measure of victimization by corruption **EXCTOT**, that is the number of ways in which the respondent was victimized.




Figure 87. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Argentina

Figure 88 shows the concrete effects of these three variables. As can be seen, first, corruption victims have an estimated probability of 29% of being a victim of crime, while those who were not victimized by corruption have a 20% probability. Second, as age of the respondent increases, their probability of being crime victim decreases. The average difference in expected probabilities between younger Argentines and older citizens is 16%. Third, the probability of a person with a university-level (*superior*) education reporting having been a victim of crime in the past year is almost double that of a person with primary-level of education. Finally, as has been shown in previous studies, the results reveal the increased probability of being a crime victim for urban dwellers compared with citizens living in other areas. The lower part of Figure 88 shows that the estimated probability of being a crime victim in rural areas is 15% while in large cities and the capital, the probability rises to 27% and 33%, respectively.




Figure 88. Factors Associated with Personal Crime Victimization in Argentina

V. The Impact of Crime and Corruption on System Support

What are the effects of both the crime and corruption victimization and perceptions on system support in Argentina? To respond to this question, we estimate another linear regression model whose results are reported in Figure 89. The dependent variables, “system support” is calculated as an average of the responses to five questions from the survey: **B1** or the perception that the justice system guarantees a fair trial; **B2** or respect for the country’s institutions; **B3** or the belief that the fundamental

rights of citizens are well protected; **B4** or pride of living under the political system of the country; and **B6** or the belief that one should support the political system of the country. The responses to each one of the questions were originally based on a 1 to 7 point scale where 1 indicated “no” support and 7 “a lot” of support, but were recoded on to a 0 to 100 point scale.²⁰

The independent variables of greatest interest are perceptions of insecurity, the percentage of the population being crime victims, the perception of corruption and the percentage of the population being victims of corruption. As was discussed in the introduction of this chapter, we expect to find a negative relationship between crime perception and victimization and corruption and individual attitudes in favor of system support. The regression equation also included as series of variables that measures of one current personal economic situation (**IDIO1**), the national economic situation (**SOCT1**), satisfaction with the performance of the president (**M1**), and political interest.²¹ For obvious reasons, the expectation is to find that these variables are positively associated with system support. Finally, we include the usual socio-demographic variables: race, gender, age, education level, wealth quintals, and size of place of residence of the respondent.




Figure 89. Determinants of Support of the Political System in Argentina

Moving on to the analysis of the results of the regression model presented above, first, although both crime and corruption victimization have the expected negative sign, both fail to reach statistical

²⁰ For more information, see Chapter 5.

²¹ The variables that measure perception of economy are based on the following questions: **SOCT1** and **IDIO1**. To measure the performance of the president, we use **M1**. To see the actual question wording of these items, see the complete questionnaire in the Annex of this report.

significance.²² However, perception of corruption and perception of insecurity do have a negative impact on system support that is statistically significant. As can be seen in Figure 90 which illustrated the bivariate relationship of these variables, the more insecure an Argentine feels and the more widespread he or she believes corruption is in the country, the less support he or she has toward the political system. On the one hand, those people who report feeling very insecure have, on average, almost 20 points less on the scale of system support than those who report feeling very secure. On the other hand, those who believe that corruption is very widespread have about 10 points less than those who believe that it is not widespread.

The rest of the independent variables that reach statistical significance positively affect levels of system support. As can be seen in Figure 91, those who have more positive evaluations of the current national economic situation (although not for those who positively evaluate their current personal economic situation), those who exhibit higher levels of political interest, and those who approve of the job of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, also hold higher levels of system support. The average difference between respondents who evaluate the national economy as very good and very bad is close to 30 points on the scale. While the difference between those who believe that the performance of the President is very good and very bad is about 40 points. With regard to the socio-demographic variables, it can be seen in the same figure that citizens with darker skin complexion and those who are older express more elevated levels of system support. Finally, there exists evidence that women tend to hold more support than men; however, this variable does not achieve statistical significance.





Figure 90. Impact of the Perception of Insecurity and Perception of Corruption on Support for the Political System in Argentina

²² We also estimated models replacing the corruption victimization index with the continual measure EXCTOT. The results obtained are virtually unchanged.






Figure 91. Factors Associated with Support for the Political System in Argentina

VI. The Impact of Crime and Corruption on Support for the Rule of Law

This section undertakes a detailed analysis of the rule of law in the region. Normally, the rule of law is conceptualized as the universal application of laws or the idea that no group is above the law.²³ Previous LAPOP studies have found that important variation exists in the opinions related with the disposition of citizens to accept that authorities can violate the law to capture criminals. In agreement with the threat hypothesis discussed above, those who perceive higher levels of crime and corruption and who have been victims of the two should also be, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to accept violations of the rule of law.²⁴

To measure support for the rule of law, the AmericasBarometer uses the following items which captures the extent to which citizens believe that authorities should respect the law to combat crime.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

(1) Should always abide by the law

(2) Occasionally can cross the line

(88) DK

(98) DA

Figure 92 presents the percentage of citizens that support the rule of law for each of the countries included in this round of the survey. The results suggest that there exists a relatively high level of support for the rule of law in the region. On average, 64.8% of respondents say that authorities should always respect the law when fighting crime. In comparative terms, Argentina is situated relatively low in the 18th position on the scale, an average of 60.8% (statistically indistinguishable from the percentage in Haiti which is above and Ecuador which is below). Put differently, 4 of every 10 Argentines interviewed say that on occasion, authorities can violate the law to capture criminals. Behind Argentina is a group of countries led by Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad & Tobago, and Peru, where the average of people that support the rule of law is lower than 58%. Notably, Uruguay is also part of this group even though it is widely recognized for its tolerant and democratic political culture. On the other extreme, with average values of support equal or above 74% are Jamaica, Venezuela, and Panama.

²³ See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. "Why the Rule of Law Matters". *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

²⁴ See, Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. "Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?" *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 19.




Figure 92. Percentage that Supports the Rule of Law in the Americas

Figure 93 presents the change of support for the rule of law in Argentina over time. As can be seen, the level of support remains constant at about 60% of those interviewed. Note small increases and decreases observed in this period are, as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals, not statistically significant.




Figure 93. Percentage that Supports the Rule of Law over time in Argentina

What is the impact, if there is one, of crime and corruption on support for the rule of law in Argentina? To give a concrete answer to this question, we construct a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent believes that authorities should always respect the law and 0 if not. This model is similar to the one presented in the previous section with inclusion of one additional explanatory variable, the level of confidence in the justice system, that we would logically expect to have a positive effect.²⁵ Figure 94 presents the results of the regression analysis.




Figure 94. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Argentina

²⁵ This variable is based on question AOJ12 of the questionnaire.



First, although the variables dealing with crime and corruption are in the expected negative direction, only corruption victimization reaches statistical significance. As is illustrated in Figure 95, the probability of a victim of corruption supporting the rule of law is 50% compared with the probability of 63% for non-victims. Second, as is shown in the same figure, as support for the justice system increases, so does probability in supporting the rule of law: the difference in estimated probabilities for those who have a lot of confidence and for those who have no confidence is, in absolute terms, 18%. Finally, with the exception of ethnicity and wealth, the socio-demographic variables have a positive effect on support for the rule of law. As is shown in Figure 96, older Argentines, more educated citizens, those who reside in large urban areas, and women tend to have significantly higher estimated probabilities of support for the rule of law in Argentina.




Figure 95. Impact of Corruption Victimization and Trust in the Justice System on Rule of Law in Argentina




Figure 96. Factors Associated with Support for Rule of Law in Argentina

To have a more complete understanding of the impact of corruption and crime on political institutions and the functioning of democracy in Argentina and throughout the continent, we estimate the same linear regression model as in the previous exercise to explain a grouping of dependent variables listed in Tables 1 and 2.²⁶ Given the volume of information contained in the models, the figures only indicate if perception/victimization of corruption and crime have a statistically significant negative (-) or positive (+) effect on each of the dependent variables. As an example for the reader, we take the variable “Support for coups (**COUP**)” in Argentina. As can be seen, only corruption perception has a positive impact, that is to say, as perceptions of corruption increases, so too does the support for military intervention in politics.

In general, the comparative lesson from both figures suggests that the phenomena of crime and corruption have a much more consistent effect on the liberal democratic institutions throughout the continent than in Argentina. Within Argentina, we find that the perception of corruption affects, in the expected direction, 10 of the 12 variables analyzed, while perception of insecurity affects (also in the predicted direction) 5 of them. In no case does corruption victimization or crime victimization have statistically significant effects on those variables selected. That is, the largest challenges for Argentine democracy appears to be related with the perceptions citizens have regarding the extent to which corrupt practices are widespread and, to a lesser extent, the perception of growing rates of crime. The differences with the rest of the countries included are notable. As can be seen clearly in Figure 99, the democratic institutions and political actors in countries throughout the Americas seem to be equally challenged by both citizens’ perception of corruption and crime and by the victimization of these two phenomena.

²⁶ The questions used for this analysis can be seen in Appendix C of this report. The results of the model are available by contacting the author.

Table 1. Effects of Crime Perception and Victimization on Various Institutions in Argentina

	Percepción de corrupción	Victimización por corrupción	Percepción de inseguridad	Victimización por delincuencia
Satisfacción con la democracia (PN4)			(-)	
Apoyo a golpe de estado (COUP)	(+)			
Confianza en el Congreso (B13)	(-)		(-)	
Aprobación del trabajo de diputados nacionales (M2)	(-)			
Confianza en los partidos políticos (B21)	(-)			
Representatividad de los partidos políticos (EPP3)	(-)			
Confianza en el Presidente (B21A)	(-)			
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente (M1)	(-)			
Aprobación del trabajo del Gobernador (M10)	(-)			
Aprobación del trabajo de diputados provinciales (M11)				
Confianza en la intendencia (B32)	(-)		(-)	
Eficacia externa (EFF1)	(-)			
Confianza en la Corte Suprema (B31)	(-)		(-)	
Confianza en la policía (B18)	(-)		(-)	

Table 2. Effects of Crime and Corruption Perception and Victimization on Various Institutions in the Americas

	Percepción de corrupción	Victimización por corrupción	Percepción de inseguridad	Victimización por delincuencia
Satisfacción con la democracia (PN4)	(-)	(-)		(-)
Apoyo a golpe de estado (COUP)	(+)		(+)	(+)
Confianza en el Congreso (B13)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Aprobación del trabajo de diputados nacionales (M2)	(-)	(-)		(-)
Confianza en los partidos políticos (B21)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Representatividad de los partidos políticos (EPP3)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Confianza en el Presidente (B21A)	(-)		(-)	(-)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente (M1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Confianza en la intendencia (B32)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Eficacia externa (EFF1)	(-)			(-)
Confianza en la Corte Suprema (B31)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Confianza en la policía (B18)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)

VII. Conclusion

This chapter examined, comparatively, the perceptions and personal experiences of Argentines with corruption and crimes, and the impact of these phenomena on system support and rule of law within the country. First, the chapter showed that the perception of Argentines regarding the degree to which corruption is widespread is comparatively high, being just above that expressed by Colombia and Trinidad & Tobago. The trend for Argentines to perceive that corrupt practices are widespread remains consistent, without significant changes for the past eight years. Of those determinants of the level of corruption perception in Argentina, we find that only social class has a small positive effect. That is, wealthier people tend to perceive corruption as being more widespread. With respect to corruption victimization, Argentina has an intermediary score on the regional scale. Over time, corruption victimization has decreased significantly between 2008 and 2012. Those who are more likely to be victims of corrupt acts are those who report have been discriminated by the government, the more educated, and men.

Second, the data from the AmericasBarometer report that Argentina is the 11th country on the continent where citizens feel the most insecure of being crime victims. Equal to Chile and Uruguay, Argentina finds itself above other countries of the continent with criminal homicide rate much higher. However, the perception of insecurity among Argentina has decreased considerably during the past six years, especially in the last two. The factors that predict higher levels of perception of insecurity in Argentina are gender and size of place of residence. That is, women and those living in larger cities tend to have a higher perception of insecurity. With respect to crime victimization, the information indicates that little more than two of every ten Argentines report having been a victim of crime in the past year. The overtime trend in personal crime victimization in Argentina has decreased about 6 percentage points between 2008 and 2012. Of those factors that predict the probability that an Argentine is a victim of crime are size of place (positive) and age (negative). That is, younger people and those who live in large urban areas have a higher probability of being a crime victim.

Third, this chapter estimated the potential impact of perception/victimization by corruption and crime on support for the system and rule of law in Argentina. The analysis suggests that victimization by both crime and corruption do not have an impact on the level of support for the political system in Argentina. However, perception of corruption and perception of insecurity both have a negative effect. Also, those who have positively evaluated the current national economic situation, those who approve of the job of the president, people with darker skin complexion, and older citizens tend to hold more elevated levels of support for the political system. In terms of the impact of corruption and crime on support for the rule of law, we find that only victims of corruption have a significantly lower probability of support for the idea that authorities always respect the law when fighting crime. On the other hand, confidence in the justice system, age, education and size of place of residence are all positive predictors of support for rule of law in Argentina.

Finally, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that corruption and crime have a much more consistent effect on democratic institutions (and democracy more generally) in other countries throughout the continent than in Argentina alone. While in Argentina the perception of corruption, and, to a lesser extent, the perception of insecurity has a negative effect on citizens' opinions regarding political institutions and actors within the liberal democracy, countries throughout the Americas seem to be equally challenged by both perceptions and victimization associated with these two phenomena.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.³

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Institutional variables have also been shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that

¹ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (Harper Perennial, 1942); Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in *The Democracy Sourcebook*, ed. Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub (The MIT Press, 1999); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

² Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Mitchell A. Seligson, “Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America,” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000): 5-29; John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

³ See also Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Sage Publications, Inc, 1963).

⁴ David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4 (October 1975): 435-457; Seligson, “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.”

⁵ Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1, 1988): 1203-1230. Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Daron Acemoglu et al., “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May 2008): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4 (1995): 485-514.

systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.⁸ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹¹ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

⁷⁷ Christopher Anderson, *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory, "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 66-81.

⁸ Margarita Corral, *Participation in Meetings of Political Parties*, Insights Series (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2009); Margarita Corral, *Mis (trust) in political parties in Latin America*, Insights Series (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008); Margarita Corral, *Political Parties and Representation in Latin America*, 2010.

⁹ Daniel Montalvo, *Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings*, AmericasBarometer Insights: (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008). José Miguel Cruz, *Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?*, AmericasBarometer Insights (Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2009). Arturo Maldonado, *Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote*, 2011.

¹⁰ Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5.

¹¹ James L. Gibson, "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (June 1, 1988): 511-529; James L. Gibson, "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (January 18, 2008): 96-108; James L. Gibson, "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1998): 819-850; James L. Gibson, "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 (1995): 571-599.

¹² George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2000); Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2009); Leonie Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 593-608; Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 959-978.

¹³ Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarians* (Bob Altemeyer, 2007).

¹⁴ Robert K. Postic, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1955).

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁷

Research by Golebiowska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁸ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 3. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model. It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

¹⁵ Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Mark Peffley and Robert Rohrschneider, "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (2003): 243 -257.

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral.2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44.

¹⁸ Golebiowska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiowska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

¹⁹ Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48.

Table 3. The relationship between system support and political tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High Support for the Political System	Stable Democracy	Stable Authoritarianism
Low Support for the Political System	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's index of support for the political system indicates the degree to which individuals have confidence in the political institutions of the country, respect, and feel protected by them. This measure is calculated as an average to responses to the questions listed below. Following the standard procedure, the original scale is from 1 to 7 but is recalculated onto a new 0 to 100 point scale where 0 signifies "very little support" for the political system and 100 "a lot of support".

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Figure 97 shows the average scores of support for the political system for each of the countries of the Americas included in this round of surveys. As can be seen, there exists considerable national-level variation. On the high extreme of the scale are Belize, Suriname, Nicaragua, and Canada with values that exceed 60 points. On the other extreme are a group of countries led by Honduras, Panama, Haiti, and Brazil with values less than 46 points. Argentina, for its part, occupies an intermediate position on the scale with an average score of 55.4 points, almost 3 points higher than the regional average. This last figure is significant given that for the 2010 AmericasBarometer, Argentina was the second to last country on the continent in terms of system support. That is to say, in comparative terms, and not accounting for confidence intervals, Argentina rose 12 points in the ranking. If we take into account the intervals, the position of Argentina is not distinguishable from that of Guyana (above) or Guatemala (below).




Figure 97. Support for the Political System in the Americas

Political system support usually varies along individual dimensions that make up the aggregate index. Figure 98 presents the levels of agreement in Argentina for each one of the five components. In effect, we observe important variations. The highest levels of approval correspond to support for the political system of the country and respect for political institutions with 63.5 and 61.8 points, respectively. Next is the feeling of pride of living under the Argentina political system with 56.6 points. Finally, with lower levels of support are the belief that individual rights are protected and that fair trials are guaranteed with 48.3 and 46 points, respectively.




Figure 98. Components of Support for the Political System in Argentina

As mentioned before, support for the political system among Argentines has grown significantly in the past two years. As can be seen in Figure 99, during the period between 2008 and 2010, the level of support remained relatively stable. However, in the last round of surveys, this figure increased significantly by almost 10 points, on average, with respect to 2010.




Figure 99. Support for the Political System over time in Argentina

III. Political Tolerance

The second component used to measure system legitimacy is political tolerance. In AmericasBarometer studies, this variable is calculated as an average of the responses to the following four questions; originally formed on a 1 to 10 point scale, they are recoded onto the 0 to 100 point scale where 0 represents “very little tolerance” and 100 “very high tolerance”.

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Haitian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

Figure 100 presents the average scores of political tolerance for each of the countries of the Americas. Different to the results obtained in the index of system support, for this measure, Argentina achieves a comparatively high score for the region with an average of 58.9 points on the scale (close to 4 points higher than the regional average). The countries with the highest values of political tolerance are the United States (72.6), Trinidad & Tobago (69.1), Guyana (67.9), and Canada (67.6). The lowest average scores belong to Honduras (36.6), Ecuador (43.4), El Salvador (43.7), and Peru (43.8).




Figure 100. Political Tolerance in the Americas

As can be seen in Figure 101, Argentina holds relatively homogenous levels of support across the different components of the political tolerance index. The highest average values belong to support for the ability to participate in peaceful protests, and the right to vote with 63.4 and 62 points, respectively. Lower levels, but still higher than the regional averages, are found in approval to seek public office (55.7) and the freedom of expression (55.2).




Figure 101. Components of Political Tolerance in the Argentina

How has political tolerance changed over time in Argentina? Figure 102 presents the average levels of tolerance in Argentina for each round of the AmericasBarometer from 2008 until 2012. Unfortunately, the latest round shows a considerable decline in the level of political tolerance in comparison to previous years. The fall in 2012 (which is quite homogenous throughout all the components of the index) is close to 8 points on average, and, as is clear from the confidence intervals, statistically significant.




Figure 102. Political Tolerance over time in Argentina

What factors affect the level of political tolerance in Argentina? Figure 103 presents the results of the linear regression model that seeks to answer this question.²⁰ Following the discussion put forward in the introduction of this chapter, we included as explanatory variables indicators of perceptions and victimization of crime and corruption expecting to find a negative effect on the level of tolerance. We also include two variables that measure the importance of religion and self-reported ideology of the respondents.²¹ The theoretical expectation is that people who view religion as somewhat important in their lives and those who self-identify as more rightist on the ideological spectrum will be, on average, less tolerant. The model also includes variables that capture the individual perception on the current national economic situation as well as a person's evaluation of their own economic situation. We expect to find that as individuals evaluate more positively both national and personal economies, this will affect positively their level of political tolerance. Approval of the president is also included; those who have more negative evaluations will, with time, have more negative levels of political tolerance. However, the direction of this variable is not obvious and neither should it be particularly strong. Finally, we include the standard socio-demographic variables used in this report.




Figure 103. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Argentina

The results indicate, first, that the perception and victimization of crime has no impact on the level of political tolerance expressed by Argentines. Second, the perception of corruption (but not victimization) positively affects tolerance in Argentina. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, as is illustrated in Figure 104, the belief that corruption is more widespread, their level of political tolerance increases. That is, a person who says that corruption is very widespread has almost a 10 point increase on the tolerance index than someone who says that corruption is not widespread. Third, the effect of

²⁰ The complete results of the models estimated in this chapter are shown in Annex D of this report.

²¹ The variable that measures religion comes from question **Q5B** and is recoded onto a 0-100 scale. For the question wording, see the appendix of this report. The variable measuring ideology, **L1**, is based on self-placement onto a 1-10 scale, where "1" signifies "left", or liberal and 10 "right", or conservative. For more information, see Chapter 7.

ideology behaves in the predicted negative direction, indicating that those respondents who self-place more toward the right of the spectrum tend to be less tolerant. In fact, as can be seen in the same figure, a person who self-identifies as 10 on the ideological scale has, on average, almost 20 points less on the tolerance index than a person who self-identifies as 3. Note, that on the other hand, the importance of religion and level of approval of the job of the president do not affect the levels of tolerance of people in Argentina. Fourth, on average, Argentines who hold more positive evaluations of their personal economic situations (but not of the national economy) show higher levels of tolerance (almost 12 points, on average) than those who rate their economic situation as being very bad. Finally, of the socio-demographic variables, only education is a significant predictor, in the positive direction. That is, on average, people who have university-level (*superior*) education fall almost 12 points higher on the tolerance scale than those who hold a primary-level education.




Figure 104. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Argentina

IV. Democratic Stability

As was discussed in the introduction of the chapter, both support for the system and political tolerance are vital elements for democratic stability. Figure 105 shows the attitudes of citizens throughout the Americas for this combination of attitudes. The information indicates that, with an average of 33.6%, Argentina finds itself in a moderately elevated position (6 percentage points higher than the regional average) compared to the other countries on the continent. The group of countries with the highest averages includes Canada (51.5%), Guyana (45.5%), the United States (44.9%), and Uruguay (42.6%). On the other extreme, with values of less than 16% are Honduras, Haiti, Bolivia, and Peru.




Figure 105. Favorable Attitudes Toward a Stable Democracy in the Americas

How has the percentage of Argentines with attitudes favorable to democratic stability changed over time? Figure 107 shows the percentage of citizens in Argentina that express high levels of system support and high political tolerance between the periods of 2008 and 2012. Although we see minor increases over time, in none of these scenarios are the increases statistically significant.




Figure 106. Favorable Attitudes toward a Stable Democracy over time in Argentina

Having analyzed in a comparative perspective the attitudes favorable to democratic stability, below we examine the determinants of these attitudes in Argentina. Figure 107 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the attitudes of the respondent favor democratic stability and 0 if they don't. The findings indicate that, first, the variables regarding corruption and crime behave in the expected negative direction but fail to reach statistical significance. Second, the impact of one's evaluation on the current national and personal economies is also indistinguishable from zero. Third, opposite of our expectation, there is a small positive impact in regards to the importance of religion. As can be seen in Figure 108, the difference in estimated probabilities of having compatible attitudes with democracy for those who report religion as being very important in their lives and those who do not, is about 10%. Fourth, approval of the job of the president appears as the most important predictor in explaining the combination of favorable attitudes for democratic stability. In this case, the difference between those who strongly approve and disapprove of the job of the president is 33%. Finally, two socio-demographic variables positively affect attitudes of democratic stability: skin color and education. In the same figure, we show, on one side, Argentines situated in the categories 1 and 8 of the color palate have estimated probabilities of holding pro-stable democracy attitudes at 33% and 45%, respectively. On the other side, Argentines with the highest level of education are, on average, 10% more likely to hold this combination of attitudes than their compatriots with primary-level education.





Figure 107. Determinants of Stable Democracy in Argentina



V. Legitimacy of other Democratic Institutions

As is customary in LAPOP surveys, the questionnaire includes the following battery of questions that measure the level of citizen confidence toward the primary social and political institutions of each country. The questions, asked on a 1 to 7 point scale where 1 signifies “none” and 7 “a lot”, were recoded onto a scale that varies between 0 and 100 points.

- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B11.** To what extent do you trust the Electoral Commission?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the Parliament?
- B18.** To what extent do you trust the Police?
- B20.** To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
- B20A.** To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
- B21.** To what extent do you trust the political parties?
- B21A.** To what extent do you trust the President?
- B31.** To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
- B37.** To what extent do you trust the mass media?

Figure 109 presents the levels of confidence expressed by Argentines for each of the institutions mentioned. Following each score, in parentheses, is Argentina's position on the regional scale, as well as the number of countries in which the question was asked. As can be seen, citizens in Argentina hold higher levels of confidence in the modes of communication followed by the Catholic Church, the President, the Armed Forces, and Electoral Justice. Next are, in this order, the Supreme Court, the justice system, the National Congress, the Police, the Evangelical Church, and finally, political parties. In comparative terms, the institutions with the best rankings are the presidency (11 out of 26 countries), the National Congress (12 of 26) and the Electoral Justice (12 of 24), while those with the lowest positions are the Armed Forces (21 of 23) and the Catholic Church (20 of 24).




Figure 109. Trust in Institutions in Argentina



How can we compare these results to those of previous years? Figure 110 presents the changes over time of the levels of confidence of Argentines for the institutions analyzed in those years for which we have data. It can be seen that all of the institutions show higher levels of confidence in 2012 than those expressed in previous years. In all cases, these increases are statistically significant, as is depicted by the non-overlapping confidence intervals. The institutions in which citizen confidence has increased the most between 2010 and 2012 are the presidency (which went from 33 to 57.1 points), the Catholic Church (from 43.3 to 57.7), the Armed Forces (38.3 to 51.6), the Supreme Court of Justice (36.2 to 43), and the Electoral Justice (38 to 50.6). Those that increased the least are the modes of communication (53.6 to 60.1), the political parties (27.3 to 34.7), and the National Congress (38.2 to 46.4).




Figure 110. Trust in Institutions over time in Argentina

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy, in an abstract sense, is also considered a requisite democratic consolidation. The AmericasBarometer evaluates support for democracy by asking respondents their opinion on a modified quote from Winston Churchill²², inspired from the classic study of Rose and Mishler on the topic.²³ The answers to question **ING4** were asked using a 1 to 7 point scale where 1 signifies “very much in disagreement” and 7 “very much in agreement” but were recoded onto the 0 to 100 point scale.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 111 shows the average levels of support for democracy for all of the countries of the Americas. In general, there exists a considerably high level of support among the inhabitants of the continent given that the regional average reaches 71.3 points on the scale. Of those countries that exhibit the higher levels are Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina with average values exceeding 80 points. On the bottom of the scale are Honduras, with an average of 52.6 points, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru.

²² The words of Churchill made reference to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others”.

²³ Rose, Richard y William Mishler. 1996. “Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives”. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




Figure 111. Support for Democracy in the Americas

How has support for democracy in Argentina changed in recent years? Figure 112 presents the levels of change that have occurred within the country. As can be seen, support for democracy decreased significantly in 2010 with respect to 2008 and increased slightly in 2012. However, the rise of almost 3 points was not statistically significant.




Figure 112. Support for Democracy over time in Argentina

VII. Conclusion

This chapter examined in-depth issues of political legitimacy from a comparative perspective. It included an examination of citizen support for the political system, the level of political tolerance expressed by respondents and a combination of both factors as an indication of what has been labeled democratic stability in studies undertaken by LAPOP.

In relation to support for the political system, analysis of the data indicated that Argentina occupies an intermediate position on the continental scale with an average of 3 points higher than that of the region. On average, Argentines' support for the political system increased almost 10 points in the past two years. With respect to political tolerance, the information collected showed that Argentina holds a comparatively high score for the region falling just behind seven countries. Argentines expressed relatively homogenous levels of support for each of the components of the tolerance index, with higher average values for support for peaceful protests and expanding the right to vote. However, the overtime change of the level of political tolerance in Argentina shows a decrease of almost 8 points in the past two years. Of those factors that positively affect the level of tolerance in Argentina are: the perception of corruption, personal economic evaluations and education. On the other hand, as was expected, those with more conservative ideology tend to be less tolerant.

This chapter established that 33.6% of Argentines hold attitudes favorable to democratic stability (that is, high levels of system support and high tolerance), while at the same time, support for democracy, in abstract terms, remained comparatively high. What are the factors that explain the probability that a person supports democracy in Argentina? The results of the regression analysis indicate that there is not a significant effect of insecurity, corruption or economic evaluations on the

dependent variable. Additionally, the importance of religion, skin color, education, and, most fundamentally, approval of the job of the president, positively affect the probability of holding the combination of attitudes considered favorable to democratic stability.

In relation to legitimacy of other institutions, this chapter showed that Argentines express a high level of confidence in the modes of communication followed by the Catholic Church, the President, the Armed Forces, and the Electoral Justice. In comparative terms, the institutions with the lowest regional rankings are the presidency, the National Congress, and Electoral Justice. Although the level of confidence among Argentines has increased for all of the institutions analyzed, the most significant increase corresponds to the presidency and the least significant to the modes of communication.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ This process happened simultaneously as the “third wave” of democratization took place in the hemisphere.² Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

However, others argue that local politics do not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan

¹ Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir (1983). *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³ Faguet, Jean-Paul (2004). Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴ Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo (2002). “Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States.” *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵ Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta (2002). “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries.” *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹¹ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶ Bardhan, Pranab (2002). "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷ Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen (1999). "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

⁸ Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto (2005). "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

⁹ Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell (2003). "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

¹⁰ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca (2008). "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

¹¹ West, Karleen (2011). The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer. Vanderbilt University.

¹² Hirschmann, Albert (1970). *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

¹⁴ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2006, 2008, and 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. (2008). ““This is Not a Meeting for Women”: The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women’s Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes”. *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. (2009). “Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands”. *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy (2002). “The Impact of Senegal’s Decentralization on Women in Local Governance”. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷ West, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Montalvo, Daniel (2009a). “Demand-Making on Local Governments.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10.

¹⁹ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰ Montalvo, Daniel (2009b). “Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14.

²¹ Montalvo, Daniel (2010). “Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35.

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes the following questions to evaluate the degree of engagement of citizens with the local political system.

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]**
(98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**

MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Local Meeting Attendance

Figure 113 presents the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a municipal meeting during the past year. As can be seen, Argentina occupies the second to last position on the regional scale, followed only by Chile. In effect, only one of every 20 Argentines has participated in a municipal council meeting. This proportion is very small compared with countries such as Haiti, the United States, and the Dominican Republic where approximately 2 of every 10 citizens attended this type of meeting. Note also that of the four federal countries of Latin America, Venezuela is the only one that has a relatively important participation level; perhaps a product of the strategy of Hugo Chavez geared toward creating territorial power and targeting resources to the organization and community participation in local service management. Brazil and Mexico, for their part, have percentages just above that of Argentina. Colombia and Bolivia, unitary countries with high levels of decentralization at the municipal level show rates of participation comparatively lower. The descriptive data presented here puts into question the thesis that decentralization naturally causes higher rates of political participation at the local level.




Figure 113. Percentage that Attended Municipal Meetings in the Americas

How has participation in municipal meeting among Argentines changed in recent years? Figure 114 shows a statistically indistinguishable decline in the percentage of citizens that reported having attending these meetings. Notwithstanding the confidence intervals, the decrease in the last two years is more pronounced although always within a considerably low range.




Figure 114. Percentage that Attended Municipal Meeting over time in Argentina

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also allows us to examine a second form of local participation and involvement with the exercise of municipal government: demand-making on local government. Figure 115 presents the percentage of citizens that responded affirmatively to question **NP2**. Haiti leads this ranking with a participation of 21.3% of respondents. This figure should be read in the context of the Haitian case, more so than as an indicator of a developed and active civil society. As can be seen, almost 13% of Argentines reported having made a petition to an official of a local government agency during the past year. This percentage is statistically indistinguishable from Uruguay (above), and Venezuela (below), it is close to the regional average. Of those countries with averages of less than 10% are Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras, and Costa Rica.




Figure 115. Percentage that Requested Assistance from Local Governments in the Americas

How has the practice of demand-making to local governments changed over time in Argentina? As can be seen in Figure 116, the percentage of citizens in Argentina making demands to the local government remained essentially unchanged between 2008 and 2010 but decreased by close to 2 percentage points in the last round of this survey. However, as is indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals, this decrease is not statistically significant.




Figure 116. Percentage that Requested Assistance from Local Governments over time in Argentina

To those who answered in the affirmative to the previous question (194 people in Argentina), they were then asked if the petitions they made to the local authorities had been resolved. Figure 117 shows the average responses to question **MUNI10**. As can be seen, a little more than 3 of every 10 Argentines (very close to the regional average) who put forward a petition received a favorable result. Although it is not possible to make any conclusions with respect to the contents of the demand (some of which may be personal issues and not have anything to do with community problems) this figure suggests that Argentine municipalities have a reasonable capacity of attention and service.




Figure 117. Resolution of Requests to Local Governments in Argentina

Determinant of Participation in Local Government

Which citizens in Argentina are more likely to participate in meetings organized by municipal legislatures and to make demands to local authorities? To respond to these questions, we construct two logistic regression models, one for each of the dependent variables that were coded as 1 if the respondent participated in meetings or made a demand, respectively and 0 if they did not. Of the independent variables included, as have been used in previous models of this report, are participation in community groups, participation in political campaigns, and the evaluation of the job of the president along with socio-demographic characteristics. We also include the level of satisfaction with the provision of local public services (see the next section), expecting to find a negative effect for this variable in both models. Naturally, it is logical to predict that as an individual becomes more satisfied with the quality of public services, they will be less likely to make demands to the authorities. In the same sense, although association is less clear, this same person will have to involve him or herself with less frequency in local meetings where decisions about issue of the well-being of the residents not being met are made. Finally, the two dependent variables are also included as predictors in the corresponding models with the purpose of testing to see if those who attend municipal meetings are also more likely to make demands on local authorizes, and vice-a-versa.²² The results of these analyses are shown in Figures 118 and 119.²³




Figure 118. Determinants of Participation in Municipal Meetings in Argentina

²² The correlation between these two variables is just .195. This justifies its inclusion.

²³ The complete results of the models analyzed in this chapter are found in Annex D of this report.




Figure 119. Determinants of Requesting Assistance from Local Governments in Argentina

The results of the first regression analysis indicate that although the variable that measures satisfaction with local services goes in the expected negative direction, it does not achieve statistical significance; neither do evaluation of the job of the president or the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondent. Second, those who make demands or petitions have a significantly higher probability of attending municipal council meetings. As can be seen in the bivariate relationships presented in Figure 120, on average, 14.6% of those who made a demand last year attended meetings compared with 2.6% of those who did not. Third, those who worked for a candidate or party in the 2011 presidential campaign are more likely (by a margin of five to one) to participate in municipal meetings than those who do not involve themselves in this campaign. Fourth, those who participate frequently in community associations also have a significantly higher probability (by a margin of four to one) of attending meetings than those who do not participate in these activities.




Figure 120. Factors Associated with Participation in Municipal Meetings in Argentina

In relation to the factors that influence the probability of an Argentine presenting a petition to the local authorities, the results suggest that this type of behavior is significantly related to attending municipal council meetings and active participation in political campaigns. As shown in Figure 121, this relationship occurs in proportions of four to one and two to one with respect to those who do not attend or participate, respectively. Second, as was expected, those who are more satisfied with local services have a significantly lower probability of demand-making: the difference between the averages for those who consider services to be very bad and those who view them as very good is close to 10%. Third, women tend to make demands with more frequency than men; indeed, the difference between the two is almost 6 points. Finally, those living in rural areas are much more likely to petition their local authorities than are residents of large urban centers.




Figure 121. Factors Associated with Requesting Assistance from Local Government in Argentina

III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Governments

The AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to measure citizen satisfaction with the quality of the provision of local public service by municipalities and trust in local governments. The first question of the series, shown below, has appeared in previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer. In accordance with the LAPOP standard, the responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale where 0 represents the lowest level of satisfaction and 100 the highest.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [\[Read options\]](#)
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
 (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

The 2012 round incorporated three new questions to understand with better precision the degree of satisfaction of the respondents with some of the services that have been traditionally the responsibility of local governments.²⁴

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK (98) DA

Finally, trust in local government is evaluated with the following question where respondents were asked to answer on a scale of 1 to 7 points, with 1 being “none” and 7 “a lot”. As usual, the answers were recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale.

B32. To what extent do you trust the municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In a comparative perspective, this section analyzes the degree of satisfaction of Argentines with the provision of local public services in general that without mentioning any type of service in particular. Shown in Figure 122, the answers to question **SGL1** indicate that although there exists considerable variation at the national-level, citizens of the continent, on average, express a reasonable level (50.5 points) of satisfaction. With an average value of 59.1 points, Argentina finds itself second

²⁴ It should be remembered that the responsibility of providing the types of services analyzed below can fall to different levels of government in different countries throughout the region. In Argentina, local governments are responsible for the provision of water, sewage, transportation, public lighting, and a variety of small services that without a doubt affect the quality of life of citizens. None of the three services analyzed here are, however, the direct responsibility of Argentine municipalities.

on the scale behind Canada and ahead of Nicaragua and Ecuador, although the differences with the three countries are not statistically significant. Reasonably so, Haiti is the country with the lowest level of satisfaction in local services followed by Jamaica, Suriname, and Belize. It is interesting to note that on the one hand, Caribbean countries consistently occupy the lowest levels of the scale, while on the other, the results of the federal countries in Latin America on the scale cast doubt on the “optimistic” literature on fiscal federalism between decentralization of functions and the quality of the provision of public services.




Figure 122. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Americas

Figure 123 presents the disaggregated data to evaluate, with better precision, the extent to which Argentines feel satisfied with the delivery of public services by their municipal governments. The information indicates that citizen perception in the country is divided into three groups: little more than 50% report that the quality of service provision is good or very good, around 35% feel that is fine (neither good nor bad), while close to 15% report it as being bad or very bad.




Figure 123. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Argentina

Shown in Figure 124, average levels of satisfaction with the provision of services by local governments in Argentina have shown a significant increase between 2008 and 2012. The most important change, and statistically significant, is that which occurred in the last two years, when the average increased almost 10 points on the scale.




Figure 124. Evaluation of Local Government Services over time in Argentina

It is possible that citizens evaluate the quality of some public services more positively or negatively than others. The following three figures show the levels of satisfaction with the state of highways and roads, schools, and public health services for each of the countries included in the 2012 AmericasBarometer. In comparative terms at the regional level, the average values of satisfaction remain close to 50 points on the scale, with a slightly higher average for the case of public schools (53.7) and lower for medical services and health (47.7).

Figure 125 shows the degree of satisfaction with roads and highways according to the answers from **SD2NEW2**, recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale where 0 indicates little satisfaction and 100 represents a lot of satisfaction. With 55.7 points, almost 6 points higher than the regional average, Argentina is situated fourth from the top behind Ecuador (60.8), Panama (59) and Mexico (56.7). On the other end of the scale, with satisfaction levels lower than 45 points are Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Colombia, and Haiti.




Figure 125. Satisfaction with the Roads and Highways in the Americas

Figure 126 presents the responses to the question **SD3NEW2**, the average levels of satisfaction with the quality of public schools for each of the countries included in the 2012 round, recoded onto the 0 to 100 point scale. As shown, even though Argentina finds itself in a lower position than it did in regards to that of satisfaction with the quality of highways, it has basically the same average: 55.5 points. Those countries where citizens express higher levels of satisfaction are Costa Rica (64.1), Ecuador (62.2), Nicaragua (61.6), and Panama (60.4). Of those that expressed lower average levels are Chile, with just 42.8 points, Haiti, Brazil, and Peru. In the case of Brazil, it is a bit disconcerting given

the positive evaluations that the education decentralization program FUNDEF has received in academic circles in recent years.²⁵




Figure 126. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Americas

Finally, Figure 127 evaluates satisfaction with public health services throughout the continent, according to responses to the question **SD6NEW2**. Again, Argentines achieve an average level of satisfaction similar to those observed with the analysis of other services: 53.1 points. Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, and Nicaragua hold the highest averages, while Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil (despite the recognition of its health decentralization program, SUS), Haiti, and Chile hold the lowest levels of satisfaction. In sum, as was said above, at cursory glance there do not exist huge differences in citizen perceptions with respect to the quality in the provision of different types of local public services.

²⁵ See, for example, Oliveira, Frabrécio Augusto de. 2003. "Fundef e Saúde: duas experiências (virtuosas?) de descentralização". En *Descentralização e Federalismo Fiscal no Brasil. Desafios da Reforma Tributária*, editado por Fernando Rezende, y Frabrécio Augusto de Oliveira. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad Adenauer-FGV.




Figure 127. Satisfaction with Health Services in the Americas

In ending this section, we seek to explain the determinants of satisfaction with local services in Argentina through a linear regression model whose results are shown in Figure 128. In addition to the socio-demographic variables included, we also insert as explanatory variables interpersonal trust,²⁶ approval of the job of the president, participation in political campaigns, participation in community organizations, and variables that measure the involvement of citizens in local government, that is, participation in municipal meetings, and demand-making.

²⁶ This variable is based on the question **IT1** recoded onto the 0-100 scale. For the complete question wording, see the questionnaire in Annex C of this document.




Figure 128. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services in Argentina

The results of this analysis show that four significant variables affect the level of satisfaction of Argentines with respect to the provision of local services: having presented a request to a municipal authority, interpersonal trust, approval of the work of the president, and the size of place of residence of the respondent. As is expected, the first of these variables has a negative impact on citizen satisfaction with local services. Figure 129 shows that those who presented a petition hold, on average, around 5 points less of satisfaction than those who did not. The same figure shows that citizens who express higher levels of trust in others consistently hold higher levels of satisfaction with local services: the difference between those who do not trust in their compatriots and those who do is about 10 points on the scale; on the other hand, the higher the level of satisfaction with the job performance of the president, the higher the level of satisfaction with the provision of local services. In this case, the average difference between those who positively evaluate the work of the president and those who negatively do so is close to 20 points. Finally, people who reside in large urban centers tend to express lower levels of satisfaction than those who live in small cities, and, more strikingly, in rural areas.




Figure 129. Factors Associated with Satisfaction with Local Services in Argentina

Trust in Local Government

Beyond just evaluating the quality of local public service provision, citizens can also show different levels of trust toward their respective municipal governments. To understand respondents' trust in local authorities, we analyze the responses to the question **B32** which was described above. It is worth mentioning that by measuring trust in abstract terms, it is possible to capture individual perceptions that do not exclusively deal with local government, but with evaluations or beliefs that are formed over time.

Figure 130 presents the average levels of trust in local government for the countries of the Americas. As can be seen, first, Argentines show a comparatively elevated level of trust in the local authorities. In effect, the country average is 54.3 points on the scale, approximately 4 points higher than the regional average.²⁷ Taking into account the confidence intervals, the average reported for Argentina is indistinguishable from those for Venezuela and Uruguay toward the top and bottom, respectively. Other countries with high values of trust in their local governments are El Salvador (60.9), Venezuela (59.4), and Mexico (58.4). On the lower end of the scale are Haiti, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, and Brazil with averages below 43 points. It is interesting to note that the countries with federal systems of government in Latin America, such as Mexico and Venezuela are known to have "weak federalism" and are considered to have relatively low levels of fiscal and administrative autonomy at the municipal level. Brazil, on the other hand, is known to have more "robust federalism" characteristics and has notable levels of municipal fiscal and administrative decentralization; however, its average on the scale is 44.6 points. Therefore, contrary to the theories that associate higher levels of decentralization with strengthened ties between citizens and local government (and, as a result, higher levels of trust) the descriptive evidence again suggests that this relationship is more complex and might depend on the occurrence of other factors.

²⁷ This figure places the local government in the fourth place among Argentine institutions that have the highest levels of citizen trust. For details, see Figure 105 of this report.




Figure 130. Trust in Local Government in the Americas

As can be seen in Figure 132, levels of trust in local governments by Argentines increased significantly between 2010 and 2012 (by almost 14 points, on average), this after having experienced a small decrease (of about 5 points) between 2008 and 2010. This increase could be caused by, among other factors, the notable increase in direct public investment by the national government in municipalities.²⁸




Figure 131. Trust in Local Government over time in Argentina

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the System

As was argued at the beginning of the chapter, many citizens only have contact with authorities that hold positions in the local level of government. Therefore, their attitudes toward the political system, in general, can be modeled by these relationships. Figure 132 presents the results of a linear regression model that seeks to determine the effect of satisfaction with the provision of local services on support for the political system. The model replicates exactly the analysis done in Chapter 4 (see Figure 89) with the addition of variable **SGL1**. As can be seen, there exists a significant positive association between satisfaction with local services and system support, while the rest of the variables behave in the same manner as in the previous model. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 133, those people who report that the services are good or very good hold values, on average, 20 points higher on the scale of political system support than those who evaluate the provision of public services as being bad or very bad.

²⁸ See, Lodola, Germán. 2011. “Gobierno nacional, gobernadores e intendentes en el kirchnerismo”. En *La Política en Tiempos de los Kirchner*, editado por Miguel de Luca, y Andrés Malamud. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.




Figure 132. Satisfaction with Local Services as Determinant for Support for the Political System in Argentina




Figure 133. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the System in Argentina

V. Conclusion

In comparative perspective, this chapter analyzed the experiences and perceptions of Argentines with respect to four factors that affect the functioning of municipal government and the relationship between citizens and local authorities: participation in municipal council meeting, demand-making on government officials, trust in local government, and satisfaction with the quality of local public services. Additionally, the chapter estimated the effect of such satisfaction on support for the Argentine political system.

The study of participation in municipal meetings indicates that, following the historical trend, Argentines involve themselves very little in these types of activities. Just 1 of every 25 respondents, the second lowest value of the region, reported having participated in organized meetings by the municipal council in the past year. Those Argentines who have a significantly higher probability of participating in these meeting are those who make demands on their local authorities, frequently participate in community associations, and worked in the last presidential campaign for either a candidate or political party.

In terms of making demands to local authorities, the level of involvement of Argentines is also comparatively low, even though of those respondents who have a high level of trust in their local governments and receive favorable results from their petitions by the authorities. According to the estimations presented in this chapter, the probability of presenting a petition is significantly higher among women, people who attend municipal meetings, those who participate actively in political campaigns, and reside in rural areas; while it is significantly lower among those who are satisfied with the quality of the provision of local services.

Lastly, the chapter analyzes the level of satisfaction of Argentines with local public services. In this sense, Argentina finds itself second among the other countries included in the survey, behind only Canada and ahead of other decentralized countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The results of the regression analysis indicate that those who make demands on local municipal authorities, trust others, approve the work of the president, and reside in small cities, hold higher perceptions of the quality of local public services. It is worth noting that those who report services as being good or very good, on average, hold higher levels of support for the Argentina political system.

Part III:

Beyond Equality of Opportunity

Chapter Seven: The Social and Ideological Bases of Argentine Political Parties

I. Introduction

The Argentine society has traditionally been a community defined by politicization and party membership. Despite high democratic instability, Argentina has one of the largest traditions of strong political parties (although decentralized on the provincial level, and more recently, municipal), in a context of party systems that are relatively highly institutionalized for the regional standards.¹ In what way do parties continue to be central actors in the political life and culture of Argentina? Obviously, at the institutional level, as political parties are the only instruments through which democratic disputes regarding access to power are brokered. However, less clear is the role of political parties as “interest aggregators”, that is to say, as political structures whose label, in some form, is to summarize the grouping of opinions and values, an overarching view (or ideology) of the world. To tap into this question, the current chapter examines the ways in which Argentines interact with political parties, the composition of their social bases, and the ideological and attitudinal differences that exist between the identifiers of different party groupings.

This chapter is organized in the following way. The second section analyzes the phenomenon of party identification from a comparative perspective focusing special attention on the evolution of the “partyization” of the electorate in recent years and the principal determinants of party sympathizing. The third section examines the composition of the social bases of Argentine political parties. More concretely, it studies the links between citizens’ party preferences and personal experience with discrimination. The fourth section analyzes the ideological bases of political parties on three fronts: the ideological self-placement of respondents on the left-right scale, support for the active role of the State in the economy, and the level of agreement with a more equal distribution of taxes and public spending. The fifth section estimates econometrically those factors that affect the ideological position of Argentina, their views on state intervention, and their attitudes toward progressive fiscal policies. The final section presents conclusions.

II. Party Identification in Argentina

Party identification is commonly understood as a psychological orientation that implies a positive sentimental affect or cognitive belonging to a specific political party as a reference group, not being required to hold formal membership, an active relationship, or consistent voting behavior with this party.² In an institutionalized party system, the programmatic responses of parties are clear and the voters are then capable of distinguishing the positions of public policies by only paying attention to

¹ An institutionalized party system implies stability in the competition between parties and the existence of relatively stable party organizations and with roots in society. For a discussion on this topic, see Mainwaring, Scott, y Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

² See, Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller, y Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley. Various recent works find that party identification has lost importance in determining vote choice and has turned to being more sensitive to the positions of public policy sustained by parties and candidates. For a discussion on the stability of party identification and its linkages with public policy preferences in the United States, see Johnston, Richard. 2006. “Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 329-351.

party labels.³ These labels act as a filter to how citizens comprehend core issues of the political agenda and how they evaluate candidates, political leaders, and governmental administrations.⁴

Although party identification is a complex concept, it is typically measured rather simply in public opinion surveys: the self-identification of party affinity.⁵ Similar to versions used in previous rounds, the 2012 AmericasBarometer includes the following question to discover whether respondents identify with a political party:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1]
(98) DA [Skip to POL1]

As can be seen in Figure 134, there exists important national-level variation in the levels of party identification throughout the countries of the region. In Argentina, just 27% of those interviewed responded affirmatively to the question. This number, statistically indistinguishable from that reported in Canada (above) and Ecuador (below), is 7 points lower than the regional average. The countries with the highest level of party-identification of the electorate are the Dominican Republic, where 63.4% of those interviewed reported being sympathizers with a political party, the United States (61.1%), Nicaragua (54.8%), and Uruguay (53.4%). On the other end of the scale are Guatemala (12.9%), Chile (14.1%), Bolivia (15.9%, and Peru (16.4%). With respect to the comparative data, it is interesting to note that Argentina, along with other countries with strong party traditions such as Chile, Costa Rica, and to a lesser degree, Colombia, are below Brazil, which has historically had a much less institutionalized political party system.

³ Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper; Mainwaring, Scott, y Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Ibid.*

⁴ Dalton, Russell, y Martin Wattenberg. 1993. "The Not So Simple Act of Voting". In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, edited by Ada Finifter. Washington, DC: The American Political Science Association.

⁵ Blais, Andre, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, y Neil Nevitte. 2001. "Measuring Strategic Voting in Multiparty Plurality Elections". *Electoral Studies* 20 (3): 343–352; Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, y Eric Schickler. 2002 *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.




Figure 134. Percentage that Sympathizes with a Political Party in the Americas

Although the discussion on the evolution of party loyalty in Argentina exceeds the objective in this chapter, it is worth mentioning that various researchers have noted the gradual decline of party-identification of the electorate (especially, the non-Peronists) in the country.⁶ With respect to public opinion studies, some findings with a historical series larger than ours have indicated that since the return of democracy until present-day, there has been a clear decline of political identification among Argentines. The pollster Ipsos-Mora and Araujo, for example, reports that between 1984 and 2010, the proportion of citizens that reported being affiliated with a party declined (with some fluctuations in

⁶ See, for example, Torre, Juan Carlos. 2003. "Los huérfanos de la política de partidos. Sobre los alcances y la naturaleza de la crisis de representación partidaria". *Desarrollo Económico* 42 (168): 647-665.

electoral years) from 26% to 7%, while the number of sympathizers declined from 47% to 15%. Information from AmericasBarometer data finds the same pattern, although in 2012 we find an important increase in the proportion of party sympathizers in relation to previous rounds. As is shown in Figure 135, the percentage of party sympathizers in Argentina increased by 7.5 points in the last two years after having experienced a small decline between 2008 and 2010. This increase can be explained, at least in part, to the mobilization induced by the national elections of 2011 and, as shown below, by the increase in party identification with the party of the national government.




Figure 135. Sympathy for Political Party over time in Argentina

To those who reported sympathizing with a political party, they were then asked the following semi-open question (that is, they were not given a list of appropriate responses) with the objective of understanding their concrete party-identification. It is worth stating that given the deep internal divisions found within the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ), we asked respondents to expand if he or she respondent “*Justicialismo*” or “*Peronismo*”. With this, we were looking to distinguish between those who sympathized with “Kirchner Peronism” and “non-Kirchner Peronism”.

VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST, probe only if response is “Peronist” or “Peronism”]

(1701) FPV (Peronist Kirchnerista)
 (1702) Justice Party (Duhalde, other not Kirchneristas)
 (1703) Radical Social Union
 (1704) Socialist Party
 (1705) PRO
 (1706) South Project
 (1707) Provincial party in the government (example MPN)
 (77) Other
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA

The distribution of answers to question **VB11** is shown in Figure 136. As can be seen, party preferences are distributed overwhelmingly to *Frente para la Victoria* (FPV), the party currently controlling the national government. A little more than 6 of 10 Argentines identify with this party. The rest of the party options achieve percentages considerably lower. Just 12.7% of those to whom the question was asked reported sympathizing with PJ, 10.1% with the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), 4.8% for the party of the provincial government, 2.4% for the *Partido Socialista* (PS), 2.1% for the PRO, and 5.8% for other political parties.




Figure 136. Party Identification in Argentina

In comparing the party preferences of Argentines over the past two years, as is done in Figure 137, we can see a notable increase in those who feel affinity toward FPV and decline in other political forces, with the exception of provincial parties which increased slightly. The FPV almost tripled its percentage of followers between 2008 and 2010, PJ and UCR lost close to 15% and 10% of their followers, respectively, PS and PRO (led by the ex-governor of Santa Fe, Hermes Binner, and by the current head of government of the city of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri), disappeared from the map of party preferences of those interviewed. It is important to underscore that although the increase in levels of electoral and legislative support toward the FPV are well documented⁷; it is possible that that number of Kirchner sympathizers in the 2010 and 2012 rounds of the AmericasBarometer is somewhat

⁷ Zelaznik, Javier. 2011a. "Las coaliciones kirchneristas". En Malamud, Andrés, y Miguel de Luca. 2011. *Ibid.*; Zelaznik, Javier. 2011b. "Materiales para el estudio del sistema político argentino (1999-2011)." En Malamud, Andrés, y Miguel de Luca. 2011. *Ibid.*

over-reported because of a “social desirability” effect which would incline some people to express sympathy for the party of government even though it is not their true preference.⁸




Figure 137. Party Identification over time in Argentina

To investigate the individual attributes that determine who sympathized with a political party in Argentina, we construct a logistic regression model whose results are presented in Figure 138.⁹ The dependent variable is a dichotomized version of question **VB11** which assumes a value of 1 if the respondent sympathizes with a party and 0 if not. For the explanatory variables, we included the standard socio-demographic variables included throughout this report, political interest, the ideological position of the respondent on the left-right continuum (see ahead), crime and corruption victimization, and the evaluation of national and personal economic situations.

⁸ On the theme of social desirability in public opinion polls, see, Tourangeau, Roger, Lance J. Rips, y Kenneth A. Rasinski. 2000. *The Psychology of Survey Response*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Obviously the over representation of FPV can be related to a higher predisposition of those who sympathize with this partido to express their preferences.

⁹ The complete results of the models analyzed in this chapter are found in Annex D of this report.




Figure 138. Determinants of Party Identification in Argentina

The results indicate that victims of corruption and crime are not more likely to identify with a political party than non-victims.¹⁰ Evaluation of one's personal economic situation also does not influence partisan identification among the Argentine electorate. However, evaluations of the national economy, political interest, and ideology all have a positive effect on the probability of party identification. As shown in Figure 139, Argentines who view the functioning of the economy as very good have a probability of 45% of sympathizing with a political party versus a probability of 19% for those who think it is very bad. In the same sense, those who show greater interest in politics have partisan preference much more intense than those who show no interest: the difference in probabilities between the two groups is 47%. For ideology, the same figure shows that the probability of identifying with a party is significantly higher for those who place themselves more toward the right of the ideological spectrum. As was expected, citizens who place themselves at the center are less likely to identify with a party. As we move towards both ends of the spectrum, the probability of party ID increases. This increases, however, consistently toward the right, but not the left. In fact, the average difference in estimated probabilities of identifying with a party between those who place themselves in category 10 and category 1 on the ideological scale is 15%. In other words, Argentines who are more ideologically conservative tend to be more partisan than voters with liberal ideologies.

¹⁰ In none of the alternative specifications of this model do the variables on corruption or crime achieve statistical significance. For this reason, and because the other predictors do not change substantially, we decided to exclude these variables from the analysis.




Figure 139. Factors Associated with Party Identification in Argentina

The regression analysis also indicates that age (positively), social class and education (negatively) affect the probability of party identification in Argentina. As can be seen in Figure 141, the probability of identifying with a party for older adults within the sample is approximately 2.5 times that of the younger respondents. The effects of wealth and education are less significant with a difference in probabilities between the poor and less educated, on the one hand, and the rich and more educated on the other being 9% and 15%, respectively.




Figure 140. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Party Identification in Argentina

III. Social Bases of Political Parties in Argentina

There exists a vast amount of literature on the classist nature of political parties in Argentina, especially since the ascent of Peronism in the 1940s.¹¹ This section will not attempt to discuss all the empirical findings of such contributions, but will simply present the socio-demographic profile of contemporary Argentine parties. It is important to note that for some parties, especially the PRO and the PS, we rely on few observations, that is, few people reported as adhering to these political groups. Therefore, as is indicated by the extending error bars of these cases, the results pertaining to the socialists and the *macristas* are illustrative and should be interpreted with caution.

The analysis begins by examining the relationship between party identification and education of the respondent. As can be seen in Figure 141, sympathizers of FPV tend to be people with less formal years of education (on average, 9.4 years) than adherents to other political parties except in the case of the provincial groups (8.5 years). However, if we take into account the confidence intervals, there exists significant homogeneity in the composition of education by the followers of FPV and the traditional national parties (PJ and UCR). On the other hand, the partisan expressions of more urban origins and district level (PS and PRO) appear to receive members with more education: 12.3 and 13.9 years of formal education, on average, respectively.




Figure 141. Education by Party Identification in Argentina

¹¹ For an extensive review of this literature, see Lupu, Noam, y Susan C. Stokes. 2009. "Las bases sociales de los partidos políticos en Argentina, 1912-2003." *Desarrollo Económico* 48 (192): 515-542.



In terms of class composition, as is shown in Figure 142, the distribution of partisan identification is very similar between the traditional political forces, although there do exist some evident differences between identifiers of FPV and those of the other parties. Effectively, with the exception of UCR and provincial groups, the FPV has a significantly higher proportion of adherents who fall within the lower income population sector. Those with higher levels of income, on the other hand, tend to identify in larger proportion with PS and PRO. On average, the sympathizers of FPV and UCR are situated between the second and third wealth quintals, while those identifying with the PJ and PS are, on average, above the third and for the PRO, close to the fourth quintal.




Figure 142. Wealth by Party Identification in Argentina

If we examine party identification according to level of food insecurity of respondents, as it was defined in Chapter 3 of this report, Figure 143 indicates that only among those identifying with the FPV and PJ does there exist a proportion (13.4% and 4.3%, respectively) that confronts high levels of insecurity in regard to access to food.¹² At the same time, within the rest of the party organization, with the exception of PS and PRO, there exist proportions of sympathizers that suffer from intermediate levels of food insecurity. These percentages are considerably higher among those Argentines who identify with provincial parties and other political forces (25% and 16.7%, respectively), and lower among those who identify with the PJ (8.7%), UCR (7.7%), and FPV (5.4%).




Figure 143. Food Insecurity by Party Identification in Argentina

Figure 144 presents the distribution of party identifiers in Argentina according to if the respondent had been a victim of discrimination in any of the instances that we discussed in Chapter 3, that is, in the workplace, by the government, or in any other place. As can be seen, close to a quarter of sympathizers of the PJ, the PS and provincial parties reported having been discriminated against (principally by the government in the case of the *justicialistas*) during the past year. There also exist a lower, but still significant, percentage for the followers of FPV (14.5%), PRO (12.9%), UCR (7.9%), and other political parties (9.1%).

¹² The correlation between the variables wealth quintal and food insecurity is -.181, which justifies its treatment.




Figure 144. Discrimination by Party Identification in Argentina

The age profile of Argentine political parties, as is illustrated in Figure 145, suggests that the presence of young adults is stronger among the identifiers of PRO, who, on average, are 34.3 years old, and somewhat weaker among those of the provincial parties (41.2). Among the other political groups, there are not significant observable differences with respect to age, save for the important generational profile of the PJ which is, on average, significantly older (by almost 5 years) than those who identify with the FPV.




Figure 145. Age by Party Identification in Argentina

Figure 146 presents the geographic distribution of party sympathizers according to the region of residence of the respondents. In line with the traditional territorial distribution of the Peronist vote, the FPV receives a larger proportion of followers in the northern region and the *Conurbano Bonaerense*. The PJ followers are more concentrated in the central region, the Buenos Aires province and, to a lesser extent, in Cuyo. The sympathizers of UCR tend to be located with greater homogeneity in the Northeast. Finally, and disregarding the confidence intervals, the *macristas* and *socialistas* have larger proportions of followers in the urban districts they govern while the followers of provincial parties are concentrated in the northeast and in Patagonia.

Alternatively, this same relationship is observed within the interior of those regions by examining party identification according to size of place of residence of the respondents. Figure 147 shows that the traditional parties (FPV, PJ, and UCR) hold their bastions of political support in medium-sized cities with some participation in smaller cities and rural areas (especially in the case of UCR and FPV) and in large cities (in the case of PJ). The political bases of more contemporary parties (PS and PRO), on the other hand, are principally in urban areas, although the socialists have some territorial presence in small districts and rural areas.




Figure 146. Region of Residence by Party Identification in Argentina




Figure 147. Size of Place of Residence by Party Identification in Argentina

IV. The Ideological Bases of Political Parties in Argentina

Although, as it has been mentioned, the study of the social bases of Argentine political parties has received considerable academic attention, there exists much less information with respect to the opinions and political ideologies of those citizens who identify with the different party groupings.

A recurring theme in Argentine politics in recent years has been polarization. In countries such as this one where politics is played out with such intensity, it is reasonable that administrations generate strong sentiments with respect to the public policies they design and implement. One dimension of polarization that the political science literature has considered to be relevant in political ideology, typically understood in left (liberal) and right (conservative) terms. What significance do these terms have for Argentines in reality? The question used to measure ideology is the following:¹³

¹³ It is worth mentioning that the modal category of the left-right category is “5”. Given that values “5” and “6” may reflect situations of non-valid responses, the analysis of this chapter that use the ideological scale were done with the complete scale and with the scale omitting values “5” and “6”. The results obtained were the same, allowing us to report the results only for the models including the complete scale.

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98
										Left	Right

Shown in Figure 148, the vast majority of citizens of the Americas place themselves close to the ideological center, with a small inclination toward the right. In fact, the region's ideological mean is 5.5 on the scale. The countries whose citizens express the most politically conservative ideologies are Belize, Jamaica, Colombia, and Paraguay with average values exceeding 6 points. Only in three countries, Haiti, Guatemala, and Uruguay is the mean position to left on the ideological spectrum. In the case of Argentina, the average mean is 5.7 on the scale; a value indistinguishable from that reported for El Salvador (above) and Ecuador (below). Through analysis of this information, it does not appear evident, aside from the case of Uruguay, an association between average citizen ideological position and the fact that a country's current government led by an administration defined as a part of the "new left" in Latin America. The case of Argentina is unique because, as can be seen in Figure 149, the mean ideology level has shifted slightly but significantly toward the right of the spectrum in the past two years, however, remaining firmly within the centrist position.




Figure 148. Ideological Self-Placement in the Americas




Figure 149. Ideological Self-Placement over time in Argentina

If, as is argued in the literature on voting behavior and party competence, parties serve as “lenses” through which citizens evaluate the political world that surrounds them, then we should find relevant differences in ideological positions for those who identify with different political parties. This should be the case to the extent that parties are, in reality, different, and present different political ideas when competing in the electoral arena. Figure 150 shows the average of the ideological identifications of the sympathizers for each of the Argentine political parties, according to data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer. As can be see, the followers of the provincial parties situate themselves toward the right with an average of 7.4. The socialists and the *macristas* remain in the center, although more toward the left than those who sympathize with any other party. These results are rather significant, especially in the case of the PRO, however, given the few cases we have for this party, the error bar extends throughout most of ideological continuum. Finally, the radicals, *kirchneristas* and *justicialistas* are situated to the center right politically, although the differences between their respective averages (6.5 for the case of UCR, 5.8 for the FPV, and 5.6 for the PJ) are not statistically significant. In conclusion, when taking into account the confidence intervals, there do not appear to be large ideological differences in ideologies among those who adhere to different political parties.




Figure 150. Self-Identification by Party in Argentina

To examine more in-depth Argentine ideological position beyond just that of the left-right scale, below, we analyze a battery of questions that captures a complimentary dimension of political ideology related to the role of the State should have in social and economic issues that are relevant to the population. The current survey includes the following question to measure citizen perceptions on the role of the State.¹⁴ The responses, originally on a 1 to 7 scale, were recoded to a scale of 0 to 100 points where the highest values indicate a higher level of support for state intervention and the lower values signify lower levels of support.

- ROS1.** The Argentine government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
- ROS2.** The Argentine government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
- ROS3.** The Argentine government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
- ROS4.** The Argentine government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
- ROS5.** The Argentine government, more than the private sector, should be the principal provider of retirement pensions. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
- ROS6.** The Argentine government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

¹⁴ The 2008 round only included **ROS1** to **ROS4**. The 2012 round included the question **ROS5** only in Argentina. This obviously limits the possibility of conducting comparisons through time on these questions.



Figure 151 shows the national average of citizen opinion on the role of the State. This variable is calculated as the average of responses to the questions **ROS1**, **ROS2**, **ROS3**, **ROS4**, and **ROS6**. As can be seen, Argentines express strong levels of support for state intervention in economic and social areas.¹⁵ With an average of 84.1 points (almost 6 points higher than the regional average), Argentina finds itself, along with Uruguay, in the second grouping of countries that exhibit the highest “statist” opinions on the continent. Levels of support just above that of Argentina are found in Nicaragua (87.9), the Dominican Republic (87.5), and Paraguay (87.3), perhaps because of the magnitude and significant social penetration of the state apparatus in these countries. On the other hand, participation of the state is dramatically less significant in the United States, where average support reaches just 43.5 points on the scale, and somewhat less in Haiti (66.7), and Honduras (69.8). In South America, the lowest averages belong to Bolivia and Venezuela with values of 76 points. It is important to note that these two countries possibly constitute the most emblematic cases of economic policies designed on the return of the state as a significant actor. These data points therefore can be read as an indicator of comparatively high levels of political polarization within these societies.

¹⁵ Naturally, as was shown in various works in political science, statistical preferences in public opinion increased after the implementation of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s. As we know, in Argentina, policies focused on open markets received high levels of citizen support. According to data from the consultants Ipsos-Mora y Araujo, between 1992 and 1999 close to 70% of Argentines supported economic privatization.




Figure 151. Support for the Role of the State in the Americas

In relation to the Argentine case and the in the AmericasBarometer data set, as is illustrated in Figure 152, support for the active role of the State has remained constant, without any statistically significant changes, over the past six year, exhibiting a slight decrease in 2010 with respect to 2008 and an average increase of almost 3 points in 2012.




Figure 152. Support for the Role of the State over time in Argentina

A clearer idea on the level of “statism” of Argentines, as is shown in Figure 153, can be gleaned by analyzing the averages for each of the six dimensions of the phenomenon presented at the beginning of this section. Aside from state ownership of the country’s key businesses and industries, a question to which we will return below, the respondents in Argentina express relatively homogeneous values of support for each of the components of the index. Not accounting for the confidence intervals, the highest average values correspond to state involvement in health services, pensions and retirement with 87.9 and 86.2 points, respectively. The lowest values, although still elevated in the regional context, are found in the areas of reduction of inequality (84.4 points), the generation of well-being (82.7 points), and creation of jobs (81.6 points).




Figure 153. Support for the Components of the Role of the State in Argentina

The evolution of Argentine support for each one of the six components has, as is shown in Figure 154, remained relatively stable throughout the recent years. In comparing the averages from the 2012 round with those reported for the prior two years, only the level of support for the ideal of state ownership of businesses decreased, while at the same time support for the other dimensions increased slightly. From a statistical point of view, however, the only significant change in recent years is the average increase of 5.2 points to the idea that the State should be the provider of retirement pensions. This point is relevant given that the first government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner nationalized the pension system until the end of 2008. The other important finding is the apparently low and decreased level of support for state involvement in the owning of key businesses, especially given the recent nationalization of 51% of the shares of the national hydrocarbon business (YPF). In relation to this, it is worth noting that, in the first place, the decrease (almost 3.5 points between 2010 and 2012) is not statistically significant. On the other hand, as is shown in Figure 154, the average level of agreement to question **ROS1** in Argentina is one of the highest in the hemisphere. Indeed, with an average value of 64.5 points, Argentina occupies the eighth highest position in the continental ranking of support for state participation in business, above neighboring countries such as Uruguay (57.6), Peru (56.9), Brazil (56.3), and Bolivia (56.3). It is possible, therefore, to conclude that Argentines not only support state action as a regulator of the markets, but also as a lender of services or owner of the businesses that produce them.




Figure 154. Support for the Components of the Role of the State over time in Argentina




Figure 155. Support for the Idea that the State should Own the Most Important Businesses in the Country in the Americas

The comparatively high level of support for state intervention in Argentina, as is illustrated in Figure 156, transcends party identification. The differences in averages between those who identify with different parties are minimal and do not reach levels of statistical significance. Sympathizers of the PRO and provincial parties appear to be the least statist, and the *justicialistas* the most, but note that the overlapping confidence intervals do not allow us to come to any firm conclusion. In any case, similar to that of left-right positions, there do not exist large differences between adherents of different parties—especially of those followers of the tradition parties—in terms of the role of state intervention.




Figure 156. Support for the Role of the State by Party Identification in Argentina

The situation is a bit different with regards to the implications for social stances. The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions that measure the openness of the respondents to a more equitable form of distribution of resources and to eventually pay higher taxes to increase public spending on education, health, and social policies for the population sectors with the fewest resources. The questions are listed below and were asked to a split sample, that is, only half of the total number of respondents.¹⁶

SOC1. For every 100 that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? [READ OPTIONS]				
(1) The rich person should pay 50, and the poor person 20.				
(2) The rich person should pay 40, and the poor person 30.				
(3) The rich person should pay 30, and the poor person 30.				
(4) [DO NOT READ] Another combination				
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A		
SOC5. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?				
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A
SOC9. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services?				
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A
SOC11. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more “Asignación Universal por Hijo”?				
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A

¹⁶ For the analysis that follows, the options of answers 1 and 2 from question **SOC1** were combined, while that of option 4 (made up of only 5 individuals) was eliminated from the analysis.

Unfortunately, given that these questions were asked only in a few countries, it is not possible to analyze the results from a comparative perspective at the regional level. Additionally, given that they were only asked to half of the sample in Argentina, some parties were excluded given the insufficient number of observations with which to conduct relevant analyses. Figure 157 presents the average responses for each of the questions of the SOC according to respondent party ID. It can be seen that there exists a reasonable level of variation between the followers of the three traditional parties. On the one hand, the sympathizers of the FPV express more progressive views in terms of distribution: 24% responded affirmatively to the four questions and 21% to three. The *justicialistas*, on the other hand, are much less progressive with an average of 5% of positive responses to the four questions and 35% of three. Finally, the radicals manifested the highest degree of fiscal conservatism with 11.1% responding negatively to the four questions and a little more than 44% saying they were in agreement with only three.




Figure 157. Fiscal Progressivism by Party Identification in Argentina

To determine the individual-level factors that potentially affect the position of Argentines in each one of the political ideology dimensions discussed in this section, we specify three statistical models that are discussed below. The first linear regression model examines the determinant of self-ideological placement on the left-right scale. Of the variables included, along with the standard socio-demographic characteristics, are victimization by corruption, crime, and discrimination, perception of both national and personal economic situation, whether the respondent identifies with a political party, evaluation of the work of the president and support for the active role of the state.



The results presented in Figure 158 show that five variables reach levels of statistical significance. First, those who have been victimized by discrimination tend to, on average, place themselves more to the left (or to the center to be more precise) than non-victims. As is illustrated in Figure 159, the concrete effect of this variable is slight. On average, those who reported having been discriminated against place themselves on the scale at 5.3, while those who report having not been discriminated against are found at 5.7. Second, although the gender impact is minimal (0.2 points on the ideological scale), female Argentines tend to be more to the right than men. Third, people of darker skin complexion position themselves to the right of people with lighter skin tones. The specific effect of this variable is substantively more important than that of discrimination. As can be seen in the same figure, on average, those respondents in category 1 of the color palate are placed exactly at the center of the ideological continuum. On the other hand, those who correspond to category 8 are at the 7 position. Fourth, the level of formal education of the respondent has a negative impact, that is, the less formal education the respondent has, the more toward the right the respondent tends to place him or herself. More concretely, those with primary-levels of formal education, secondary and university levels place themselves at 6.1, 5.7, and 5.2, respectively. However, the most important predictor of ideological position of Argentine is the size of place of residence. As shown in previous studies on political culture, residents of large urban centers tend to hold political ideologies more liberal than residents of rural areas. In Argentina, the former place themselves at the 4.9 position while the latter at 7.4.




Figure 158. Determinants of Ideological Self-Placement in Argentina




Figure 159. Factors Associated with Ideological Self-Place in Argentina

The second linear regression model examines the determinants of the variation in support for the role of the state. The analysis includes the same independent variables as in the previous analyses, aside from the ideological self-placement which here appears as a predictor variable. In relation to the expected theory, in the first place we expect to find a negative effect in terms of corruption, crime, and discrimination victimization given that the victims will have associated their situation with the poor performance of the state in the protection of citizen rights. Second, it is not clear in which direction the perceptions of the two economic evaluation variables will go. On the one hand, negative perception of the economy could create preferences for statist public policies if it is understood that poor economic performance is the fault of the market. However, the opposite could also be the case if people believe that such performance is the result of governmental action. The effect of political ideology, however, is more obvious: we expect that those who identify more to the left will support more intensely state intervention. Finally, the expectation of approval of the job of the president is that it will be positively associated with perceptions on the role of the state. Having established our theoretical expectations, the results of the model are shown in Figure 160.




Figure 160. Determinants of the Role of the State in Argentina

Although the majority of variables have the expected signs, only two of them reach statistical significance, crime victimization and gender. On the one hand, the victims of crime tend to, on average, support more (and not less) intervention by the state in economic and social issues compared to non-victims. However, as is seen in Figure 161, the substantive effect of this variable is marginal, just 3.2 points, on average. The same occurs for the next variable, women are slightly (1.2 points, on average) more supportive of increased role of the state than are men.




Figure 161. Factors Associated with the Role of the State in Argentina

Finally, with the purpose of evaluating the factors that have influence on the fiscal progressivism of Argentines, we construct an ordered logistic regression model where the dependent variable is computed as the sum of positive responses to the questions **SOC1**, **SOC5**, **SOC9** and **SOC11**. This generates an ordinal variable with five categories, without assuming the distance between the categories are equal, it covers a range that goes from “not progressive” (category 0) to “completely progressive” (category 4).¹⁷ The specification of this model is partially different than prior analyses given that as independent variables we include both ideological self-placement of the interviewer and the level of support for the role of the state.

The results of the regression analysis which are shown in Figure 162 indicate that those who sympathize with a political party and firmly approve of the job of the president tend to hold a more progressive position on fiscal matters.¹⁸ To assist in the interpretation of the effects, we estimate the probability of being more or less progressive beginning with the coefficients of the ordered logit model. Given that this type of econometric technique estimates the probability that a respondent with certain characteristics will fall into one of the categories of the dependent variable, we first present the probabilities for those who identify with a political party compared with those who do not (Table 4) and then the accumulated probabilities for all groups of individuals throughout the range of approval values for work of the president (Figure 163 and 164).¹⁹

¹⁷ The Cronbach alpha of this variable is relatively high, $\alpha = .642$.

¹⁸ Table 4 of the Appendix of this chapter presents the complete results of the model.

¹⁹ To compute these probabilities, the other continuous independent variables were left at the means, while the dichotomous independent variables were switched between 0 and 1.



In general, both figures show that Argentines are moderately progressive: note that the first category of the index always receives the highest probabilities. However, there exist important differences between the respondents that should not be overlooked. First, as seen in Table 4, the estimated probabilities of those who identify with a party are found in the highest categories of the index (that is, 2, 3, and 4) are significantly higher than those who do not sympathize with a political party. The measured differences in these probabilities between sympathizers and non-sympathizers are 1.6%, 7.6%, and 6.1%, respectively. Second, as is illustrated in Figure 163 and 164, the accumulated probabilities of a respondent situated in categories 2, 3, and 4 of the index are also significantly higher compared to those with the level of job approval of the president. This effect, as is observed in comparing the accumulated probabilities presented in both figures, is considerably higher for party identifiers compared to non-identifiers. Although the change in accumulated probabilities is gradual for both groups of individuals in regards to the rise in satisfaction with the job of the president, the probability of a sympathizer approving strongly of the work of the president is placed in category 3 and 4 of the fiscal progressive index and is almost double the probability of a non-sympathizer with the same characteristics.




Figure 162. Determinants of Fiscal Progressivism in Argentina

Table 4. Estimated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism by Party Identification in Argentina

Categorías del índice	Simpatizante	No simpatizante	Diferencia
Categoría 0	4.1 %	7.3%	-3,2%
Categoría 1	36.9 %	48.9%	-12%
Categoría 2	17.9%	16.3%	1,6%
Categoría 3	26.5%	18.9%	7,6%
Categoría 4	14.6%	8.5%	6,1%




Figure 163. Accumulated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism for non-Party Identifiers by Support of the Job of the President




Figure 164. Accumulated Probabilities of Fiscal Progressivism for non-Party Identifiers by Support of the Job of the President

V. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the phenomenon of party identification in Argentina in regards to the composition of social and ideological bases of the political parties. Although Argentine parties have historically been among the most stable in the region, in the current environment they do not appear to have high levels of citizen participation or citizen activism. In fact, just 3 of every 10 Argentines reported identifying with a party (mostly with the FPV). The positive evaluation of the national economy, political interest, and age all positively affect the probability of party identification while ideology and education had a negative impact.

The comparatively low levels of party identification are seen in the social and ideological bonds of citizens. On the one hand, the study of the social bases of Argentine parties demonstrated that there do not exist large differences between traditional political forces, even though the followers of the FPV tend to be poorer, less educated, and younger. On the other hand, although there exists an important level of ideological tension in the party system that is reflected in the positioning of the principal political coalitions and in the design of government policies, the evidence suggests that this tension transfers to the Argentine electorate in relatively small segments. Effectively, the structure of the ideological bases of the political parties in Argentina does not present significant differences in terms of the positioning of the followers of different political parties among the left-right spectrum and with respect to the role of the state. However, the followers of the FPV are considerably more progressive in fiscal terms than the followers of other political parties.

Chapter Eight: Electoral Behavior and Presidential Vote in Argentina

I. Introduction

The resounding triumph of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK) and her powerful electoral tool, the FPV, in the national elections of 2011 set various records in Argentina's contemporary electoral history. For the first time, the same political project triumphed in three consecutive presidential terms.¹ Furthermore, the percentage of votes received by the candidate at reelection was more than those obtained by any candidate since the return to democracy, and only exceeded in history by Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1928 and Juan Domingo Perón in the three elections in which he was candidate. Additionally, the distance between the electoral support received by CFK and that of her immediate competitor resulted in the largest gap in a presidential election, with the exception of the victory of Perón over Ricardo Balbín (UCR) in 1973. Finally, the president's victory represents the largest electoral recovery ever observed by an administration in Argentina following a fall in the off year legislative election. It is worth remembering, this political recovery occurred in a less than favorable context: conflict in the agricultural sector, international economic crisis, and the death of former President Néstor Kirchner, leader of the political project.

This chapter examines issues of Argentine electoral behavior and investigates the primary socio-demographic and attitudinal determinants of the vote in the 2011 presidential election. First, with the objective of characterizing the electoral context, we analyze the public opinion and the perception of Argentines on the capacity of the national government to adequately improve the economy, reduce poverty, promote democratic principles, fight corruption, and improve public security. Second, we discuss, theoretically, a series of factors that might have inclined citizens to vote for CFK in the presidential election. More concretely, we explore the potential effects of the perceptions about the state of the economy, the receiving of government assistance, the exposure of the “buying/selling” of votes by political activists, the support for the role of an active state, the perception and victimization of corruption and crime, and the socio-demographic profile of voters. Finally, we estimate econometrically, the impact of these factors on Argentine vote choice in the above mentioned election. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that the vote for CFK came primarily from poorer and less educated sectors, from those who identify with a political party, and those who had a better evaluation of the performance of the national economy (although not of the personal economy). At the same time, there is not an observed effect of political clientelism. It is worth mentioning that people who receive social assistance from the government and are open to the offering of personalized material goods do not show a higher inclination of having voted for the President.

II. The Electoral Context

Fieldwork for this study took place during the months of March and April 2012, that is to say, five months after the presidential election. Any analysis of election results with post-election surveys presents distortions. Frequently, in these surveys, rate of electoral participation are higher than reported

¹ While the UCR had been victorious with Hipólito Yrigoyen–Marcelo T. de Alvear–Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916- 1930), there existed profound differences between the sectors identifying with the leader of the radical party and the “antipersonalistas” that supported Alvear.

rates and levels of support of the winning candidate slightly exceed the percentage of votes obtained. As will be seen below, however, the biases found in the AmericasBarometer data for Argentina are minor. This allows us to analyze, at least tentatively, the context in which the election appears to have been disputed as well as the determinant of presidential vote choice. The question included in the survey to understand the electoral preferences of respondents during the 2011 presidential contest is the following:

VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2011?
 (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)
 (1701) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner - Frente para la Victoria
 (1702) Hermes Binner – Frente Amplio Progresista
 (1703) Ricardo Alfonsín – Unión para el Desarrollo Social
 (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)

Table 5 presents the results of the election along with the proportion of responses by those interviewed indicating they had voted for the respective candidate.² As shown below, this study overestimates by a little over 10% of the vote received by CFK and underestimates by approximately 8% and 5% of the votes for Hermes Binner and Ricardo Alfonsín, respectively. Despite these distortions, the available estimations for the three primary candidates are fairly precise and considerably less distorted than what is usually observed in these types of studies.

Table 5. Electoral Results and Voter Turnout for the 2011 Elections

Candidatos	Porcentaje de votos elección 2011	Porcentaje de respuesta encuesta LAPOP
Cristina F. de Kirchner (FPV)	54,11	64,35
Hermes Binner (FAP)	16,81	8,78
Ricardo Alfonsín (UDS)	11,14	5,82
Otro	17,94	18,09
En blanco	4,48	2,96

Nota: Los porcentajes de votos presentados en la columna 2 se calculan sobre el total de votos positivos.

To analyze the characteristics of the electoral context, we first examine the level of citizen approval for the performance of President CFK in comparative perspective with the other countries of the region and in relation to the levels of approval for the National Congress, Governors, and Provincial Legislatures in Argentina.

² As was mentioned in Chapter 2 (see Figure 30), 88.7% of Argentines reported having voted in this election, compared with a true participation rate of 79.4% of citizens legally able to. Of these, 86.2% responded to question **VB3**.

The first general approximation of the evaluation of the performance of the national government consisted of directly asking respondents about the quality of work of the president for their respective countries. The question included in the survey, recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale, is the following:

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [name of the President of the country] is...?: [Read options]
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA

As we can see in Figure 165, the government of CFK is the fifth most positively evaluated on the continent. With an average of 62.3 points on the scale, a value that is statistically indistinguishable from the administrations of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and José Mujica in Uruguay; citizen approval with the job of the president in Argentina is almost 8 points higher than the regional mean. Ecuadorians (68.3) and Nicaraguans (67.3) are those with more positive evaluations of the work of their president, while Americans (44.7) followed by Hondurans (45.1) and Chileans (46.2) hold the lowest evaluations.




Figure 165. Approval of the Job of the President in the Americas

As is seen in Figure 166, approval of the government led by CFK increased significantly during the last two years, after experiencing a strong decline in 2010 after a conflict with rural sectors because of an increase in the export quotas dealing with grain and a loss in the off year legislative elections of 2009. Opposite to what we see in the majority of countries in the region, CFK improved her level of support, including when the domestic economic context showed signs of deceleration. Certainly, although the growing tendencies in the levels of approval during the last two years observed for the group of political actors analyzed in the figure, in both relative and absolute terms, the average support for presidential management is what grew the most between 2010 and 2012.³ Another interesting finding that comes from the figure is that the national executive power and the provincial executive powers (governors) are significantly better evaluated than their respective legislative bodies. This result is a paradox in a time where a returning debate among academics and opinion leaders is focusing on personalistic politics and the concentration of public power to Latin American presidents.




Figure 166. Approval of the Job of the President, National Congress, Governors, and Provincial Legislatures over time in Argentina

³ The closed question used to measure approval of these powers of the State are the following: **M2**, **M10**, and **M11**. To see the complete question wording, see Appendix C at the end of this report.

One of the areas where the level of approval of the national government has seen the strongest improvement is in that of the managing of the economy, and, as will be analyzed later, constitutes one of the principal determinates of the vote for CFK in during the 2011 elections. As shown in Figure 167, although with values below 50 points on the scale, average citizen approval toward the managing of the economy by the current *Kirchnerista* government increased significantly by 14 points in the last two years.⁴




Figure 167. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Manage the Economy over time in Argentina

⁴ The question used to measure this concept is the following: **N15**. All questions from the **N** series discussed in this section were originally asked on a 1 to 7 scale, but were recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale. For the wording for these questions, see Appendix C of this report.

To examine with better precision the potential factors that influence the formation of this perception, we use below four variables that refer to the opinions of Argentines with respect to the state of the national economy (sociotropic evaluation), and personal economy (isotropic evaluation) in both the present day and in the past (retrospective evaluation), based on the following questions:

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

As illustrated in Figure 168, the positive perception of Argentines of both their personal and national economic situations exhibit a significant increase in the latest round of the survey. Specifically, the proportion of those who report their current economic situation and that of the country as good or very good doubled between 2010 and 2012, while those with negative opinions decreased by approximately half. In terms of retrospective perceptions of the respondent on the personal and national economic situations, those who perceived an improvement increased from 15% to 26% and from 8% to 24%, respectively; while at the same time the average of those who perceived personal and national economic situations to have worsened declined from 33% to 22% and from 48% to 34%. Putting these figures into a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that the only inhabitants of the continent that systematically declared being more satisfied than Argentines in terms of the economic situation are the Brazilians and Uruguayans.




Figure 168. Current and Retrospective Evaluation of Personal and National Economic Situations over time in Argentina

The tendency to positively evaluate the handling of the economy by the government of CFK can be associated, at least in part, with some concrete experiences of the respondents. The 2012 AmericasBarometer included the following question that examines the changes in the household income of the respondents:

The results for Argentina, illustrated in Figure 169, indicate that close to 40% of those consulted reported that their household incomes increased in the past two years, approximately 43% stated that it stayed the same, and only 18% admitted that it declined.




Figure 169. Reported Changes in Household Income in Argentina

To have a better idea of what the percentages might imply, Figure 170 presents the distribution of three answer to the question **Q10E** for each of the countries (aside from Canada where the question was not asked) included in this round of the survey. As shown, the average of Argentines who reported an increase in household income is the second highest in the region behind that of Uruguayans (51.6%).




Figure 170. Reported Change in Household Income in the Americas

The importance of perception on economic performance in Argentina should not hide the magnitude of other public policy factors that are equally relevant to characterizing the electoral context of the 2011 elections. In Chapter 7 we discussed comparatively the high level of approval among Argentines (without majority distinctions of party identification) with respect to the implementation of statist policies, including the re-nationalization of the social security system and participation of the State in the strategic businesses for the economic development of the country. Below, we show that although there were significant increases in level of support for social policies such as fighting poverty, and the protection of the democratic rights of citizens.

Figure 171 presents the average levels of agreement with the idea that the government of CFK combats poverty. As illustrated below, after a period without change, this average increased significantly by about 14 points in the last survey. Such an increase can be attributed to the implementation of inclusive social policies by the government: AUH, expansion of collective conventions, increase in retirements and family assistance, formalization for domestic labor, and revitalization of the *Consejo del Salario Mínimo* that had been frozen during the 1990s.




Figure 171. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Fight Poverty in Argentina

Figure 172, for its part, shows a significant increase of more than 17 points in citizen perception that the government promotes democratic principles. Among other factors, this positive value is possibly associated with the active policies for human rights and the expansion of rights to minorities supported by the Kirchner administration.




Figure 172. Evaluation of the Capacity of the National Government to Promote Democratic Principles in Argentina

Finally, it is important to note, as is shown in Figure 173 and Figure 174, that the survey reports a statistically significant increase (although still with average values of less than 40 points), with the levels of approval in the two areas most critical for the administration of the current government: corruption and public security.




Figure 173. Evaluation of the Capacity of National Government to Fight Corruption in Argentina




Figure 174. Evaluation of the National Government to Improve Security in Argentina

After analyzing each of the indicators of governmental capacity, it is now interesting to understand the general effectiveness perceived by Argentines of the CFK administration. To respond to this question, we construct an indicator of “effectiveness” for the current government, which is calculated as the average of the responses to the questions **N1**, **N3**, **N9**, **N11**, and **N15**, adjusted onto a 0 to 100 point scale where the highest values indicate a higher perception of effectiveness. As shown Figure 176, said averages in Argentina increased significantly by almost 13 points in 2012 compared to the previous round.




Figure 175. Effectiveness of the Current Government over time in Argentina

To end the section on electoral context in which the presidential election of 2011 took place, we examine the perception of government performance with the more general measurement of subjective well-being that is typically captured in the survey with: “life satisfaction” or “happiness”. We decided to proceed in this manner because numerous studies have suggested that economic condition is linked to sentiments that a person has toward the life in general.⁵ Naturally, those who experience difficult economic situations express low levels of subject well-being while those who benefit from good economic conditions hold higher levels of happiness. The question used to measure life satisfaction is the following, also recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale:

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... [Read options]?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Somewhat satisfied	(3) Somewhat dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer	

In the first place, Figure 176 indicates that Argentines, on average, show a considerably high level of life satisfaction: 75.6 points in 2012. Furthermore, one can observe that the average grew by

⁵ See, for example, Bruno, Frey S., y Alois Stutzer. 2002. *Happiness and Economics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

about 10 points with respect to previous studies. This increase, as indicated in the confidence intervals, is statistically significant.




Figure 176. Life Satisfaction over time in Argentina

In sum, the information discussed in this section suggests that the electoral context constituted a favorable one, at least from the point of view of public opinion, for the victory of President CFK. However, from these data, we do not have any better idea of the concrete factors that influence the electoral decisions of the voters. The next section examined a series of variables that the literature on electoral behavior typically associate with vote choice and presents descriptive evidence that links these factors with support for the primary presidential candidates during the 2011 election.

III. Motivations of Vote Choice

In agreement with an extensive literature in the field of political science, one of the factors that has the largest impact on electoral decisions of voters are their judgments on the economic situation, both personal and that of the country.⁶ Figure 177 shows, on a 0 to 100 point scale where 0 indicates the worst evaluation possible and 100 the best, the distribution of perceptions of Argentines on the progress of one's personal economy and the national economy according to presidential vote during the 2011 election. In general, we observe that *kirchneristas* voters are those who have better evaluations of their own personal economic situation, both in the present and the past. However, the difference between the averages of these people and those who supported Hermes Binner and Ricardo Alfonsín are insignificant. The most pronounced and statistically significant differences between the *Kirchneristas* and other voters are perceptions on the progress of the national economy. Indeed, the

⁶ For an excellent review of the literature, especially in the United States, see Bartels, Larry M. 2010. "The Study of Electoral Behavior". In *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*, edited by Jan E. Leighley. New York: Oxford University Press.

first of those are more optimistic regarding both actual and retrospective performance of the country's economy, with an average difference close to 10 and 12 points, respectively. These differences constitute an initial indicator of the association between the vote for CFK and the positive evaluations of the national economy. However, this relationship should be tested in multivariate models (as will be done in the next section) given that it could be hiding the effects of other socio-demographic and attitudinal factors that operate at the individual level.




Figure 177. Evaluations of Personal and Economic Economies by 2011 Presidential Vote Choice in Argentina

A second factor that political scientists have identified as a determinant of vote choice, at least in certain contexts, is clientelism and its political derivatives such as patronage and nepotism. By “clientelism” we usually mean the personalized offering of material goods to voters, by activists of the political party of the government or opposition, in exchange for their electoral support. The question used to measure vote-buying is the following:

CLien1. In the last few years and thinking about the election campaigns, has any candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or some other good or benefit in exchange for your vote or support for that candidate or party? Has this happened frequently, rarely, or never?

(1) Frequently (2) Rarely (3) Never (88) DK (98) DA

Unfortunately, in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, this question was only asked to a reduced number of countries, which impedes us from analyzing the phenomenon in a comparative perspective. Figure 178 shows, however, the change in recent years of the percentage of Argentines who reported having received “sometimes” (that is, frequent or on occasion) an offer of a material good in exchange for their vote. As illustrated, from the last round, 13.4% of respondents reported having received an offer of this type. The value is close to 5 percentage points lower than that reported in 2010, although, as the error bars suggest, the differences are not statistically significant. It is worth noting that this figure is sure to be underestimated given the low disposition of respondents to confess their participation in the clientelistic exchange of goods for votes.⁷




Figure 178. Percentage that Received Offer to Sell Vote in Exchange for Material Good over time in Argentina

⁷ Given that we do not have an indirect question, for example, related to vote-buying with relatives or friends of the respondent, we can not measure if there exists underreporting

Figure 179 distinguishes the averages of those who reported having received a clientelistic offer according to presidential vote choice in last elections. There do not exist consistent statistically significant differences between the *Kirchneristas* voters and those who voted for an opposition candidate, this is in part due to the fact that we have a low number of observations for the former. However, it is interesting to note that those who responded as saying they supported Ricardo Alfonsín (22.7%) appear to be, on average, more exposed to political clientelism than those who voted for CFK (15.3%) or Hermes Binner (11.1%). These results do not necessarily mean that the voters of a given candidate received a material offer from political activists for the party for whom they ultimately voted. However, it is an indicator that the clientelistic vote does not appear to be linked disproportionately to the electoral performance of the incumbent candidate.




Figure 179. Percentage offered to Sell Vote for Material Good by 2011 Vote Choice in Argentina

A third factor that can affect vote choice is related to government assistance policies. As was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this report, during the last decade, various Latin American governments transformed the assistance policies in line with universal distributive criteria. Of those innovations most well known is the implementation of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), which basically consist of the distribution of money to poor families on the condition that they enroll their children in school and use public health services, especially for vaccinations. According to analysts, the design of CCTs reduces or prevents the manipulation of resources for electoral benefit given that the money is assigned directly (that is, without political intermediaries) to the recipients.⁸ Others say that such

⁸ See, among others, Ariel Fiszbein, y Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers. Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, DC: The World Bank; Cohen, Ernesto, y Rolando Franco. 2006. “Los Programas de Transferencias con Correspondencia en América Latina: Similitudes y Diferencias”. In *Transferencias con Correspondencia: Una Mirada Latinoamericana*, edited by Ernesto Cohen, y Rolando Franco. México DC: SEDESOL; de la Brière, Bénédicte, y

programs can induce citizens to vote in favor of a candidate or party of governments for the following reasons. First given that CCTs are implemented by the national government (most of the time without the interference of subnational or local authorities), this good can be claimed as a merit of their execution or politicize the citizens to which it is allocated. Second, the recipients can feel more inclined to vote for the candidate or party of the government because they have an interest in maintaining the social assistance benefits and evaluate with uncertainty the continued financing if the opposition wins the elections.⁹ Third, the beneficiaries can also electorally compensate the current government because they understand that assistance policies have a socially positive impact on the rest of the community and on those like them.

The empirical evidence on the link between receiving public assistance and voting is not conclusive. Some works have shown that there exists an effect of participation in CCT programs on presidential election results.¹⁰ Similarly, using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Layton and Smith suggest that the beneficiaries of these programs have a higher probability of voting (hypothetically) for the candidate of the party in power, even though this association is attenuated by the social status of the respondent and their evaluations on the performance of government.¹¹ However, other analysts find no positive association between receiving governmental assistance through CCT programs and voting for the incumbent or incumbent-supported candidate.¹²

Figure 180 presents preliminary evidence that there exist statistically significant differences in some countries of the region between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of CCTs and their hypothetical vote for the incumbent candidate.¹³ Considering all the countries included in the figure, there exists a statistically significant 14.6% difference in the probability of beneficiaries to vote for the incumbent candidate compared to non-beneficiaries. However, there still exists considerable national-level variation. For example, in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru, the differences are not significant in the aggregated average and appear to have an opposite relationship. In Brazil, there exists an important difference, although not significant, between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. On the

Laura B. Rawlings. 2006. "Examining Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A Role for Increased Social Inclusion?" Social Protection Discussion Paper 603. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

⁹ Stokes, Susan. 2001. *Mandates for Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Hunter, Wendy, y Timothy Power. 2007. "Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy, and the Brazilian Elections of 2006". *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (1): 1-30; Licio, Elaine Cristina, Lucio R. Rennó, y Henrique Carlos de O. de Castro. 2009. "Bolsa Família e Voto na Eleição Presidencial de 2006: em busca do elo perdido". *Opinião Pública* 15 (1): 31-54; Nicolau, Jairo, y Vitor Peixoto. 2007. "As bases municipais da votação de Lula em 2006". Documento de Trabajo, Instituto Nacional de Altos Estudios; Souza, Celina. 2009. "Electoral Politics in Brazil with Evidence from the State of Bahia: State-Led Social Funds versus Federal-Led Social Policies". Trabajo presentado en el Congreso LASA, Rio de Janeiro, Junio 11-14; Zucco, César. 2008. "The President's 'New' Constituency. Lula and the Pragmatic Vote in Brazil's 2006 Elections. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40 (1): 29-49.

¹¹ Matthew L. Layton, y Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Políticas públicas de asistencia social y voto presidencial en América Latina." *Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP).

¹² Bohn, Simone R. 2011. "Social Policy and Vote in Brazil. Bolsa Família and the Shifts in Lula's Electoral Base". *Latin America Research Review* 46 (1): 64-79; Montero, Alfred P. 2010. "No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2: 113-153.

¹³ The dependent variable used in this figure is **VB20**. For the complete question wording, see Appendix C at the end of this chapter. The percentage of votes for the incumbent candidate is computed by dividing by the number of people who indicated having voted or voting blank.

contrary, Argentina, and Colombia present the largest significant differences between the two groups: 19.4 and 17.1 percentage points, respectively. While the results for the case of Argentina suggest the presence of a positive relationship between receiving government social assistance and a hypothetical vote for the official candidate, this relationship is far from definitive. The problem is that social assistance is never distributed randomly. The differences in the aggregate might mask the true factors of the decision to vote for the official candidate such as, presumably, factors related socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the recipients.




Figure 180. Percentage that would Vote for Incumbent Candidate by Participation in CCT Programs in some Countries in the Americas

To analyze the ways in which CCT assistance programs in Argentina follow non-random patterns of participation, we estimate a logistic regression model corrected for the design effects of the sample to determine those factors that affect the probability of receiving AUH. The dichotomous dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the respondent reports being a recipient of the program and a 0 if not. There are factors that we should consider evaluating to understand if there exists biases of any type in the assignment of AUH among the population. First, it is necessary to keep in mind the eligibility requirements. These criteria depend fundamentally on income, employment status, and size

of household.¹⁴ Therefore, holding everything else constant, we expect that people with lower income, that live in households with more members, and that suffer from unemployment will have higher levels of probability of participating in the program. Furthermore, given that education is highly correlated with income, we expect to find that people with higher levels of formal education exhibit lower probabilities of being recipients of AUH. It is possible, finally, that age and gender predict the probability of receiving such assistance. Given that the target population of this program is citizens with children, it is expected that younger adults will have higher probabilities of participation. Also, given that many single mothers raise their children without the help of the fathers, we also expect that women will report higher levels of participation than men. Finally, although it is not completely clear what the effect will be, it is possible that rural/urban status of the respondent could influence the estimated probability. It is possible to theorize that the increase in job opportunities reduces the relative attraction of these programs given that the benefits they provide are less attractive than work opportunities provided in the formal sector of the economy. This could result in a lower level of participation in urban areas compared with rural zones. However, given that the rural population tends to, on average, be poorer, it is also possible to find the opposite effect. Additionally, to test the possible impact of political factors on the probability of reporting participation in AUH, the model includes three dichotomous variables that indicate if the respondent asked for assistance from his or her municipal authorities or council (**CPA4**), participated in a public protest or demonstration (**PROT3**), and whether the respondent worked for a candidate or political party during the 2011 elections (**PP2**). Logically, if there exists a political bias in participating in AUH, these variables would have a positive sign.

The results of the regression model are presented in Figure 181. In general, the analysis indicates that participation in AUH follows patterns of efficiency in accordance with the distribution criteria explained above, more so than having political biases. As can be seen, all of the socio-demographic factors (with the exception of urban-rural status) are statistically significant in the predicted directions, while only one political variable (participating in electoral campaigns) is statistically significant. In this sense, as was anticipated, the probability of receiving assistance from AUH is significantly higher among people who live in large households (measured by the number of children), are women, and have darker skin complexions; and significantly lower among respondents who are economically more affluent,¹⁵ more educated, and older.

The concrete effects of these variables are presented in Figure 181. As can be seen, the estimated probability of reporting being a recipient of AUH increases consistently with number of children (15% for those who have no children versus, for example, 32% for those who have 5 children), ethnicity (9% for those who are placed in category 1 of the color palate, versus 38% for those who are in category 8) and among women (22%) more so than men (15%); although it decreases with level of wealth (26% probability of receiving AUH for those in the first quintal versus 10% in the fifth),¹⁶ and education

¹⁴ AUH benefits unemployed workers, employees in the informal sector and domestic workers (that have a salary equal to or less than the minimum) that have children under the age of 18, and are pregnant.

¹⁵ The model was also estimated using variables on household income (**Q10NEW**), and personal income in place of the wealth index (**QUINTALL**). In both cases, the income effect is significantly higher than that of wealth. However, we decided to report the model with **QUINTALL** considering that the income variables have high levels of non-response.

¹⁶ The estimated probability of receiving AUH is 38% for those who have no income and a personal income of less than 770 pesos.

level (probabilities of 24% and 10% for those with primary-level educations and university-level, respectively).

In terms of the specific effect of active participation in political campaigns, as can be seen in Figure 182, we observe that those who declare having worked for a candidate or party in the 2011 presidential elections hold a higher probability of being recipients of AUH than those who were not involved in this type of activity: the average difference in estimated probabilities between these two groups is 20 percentage points. One possible interpretation of these results is not political bias in deciding who participates, but rather a certain informational advantage that party activists possess over those who are not. People who regularly work in a political party might have more information about the necessary requirement to be a recipient of the program and the formal processes to ask for economic assistance.







Figure 181. Determinants of Participation in AUH in Argentina




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


Figure 182. Socio-Demographic Factors Associated with Participation in AUH in Argentina




Figure 183. Political Factors Associated with Participation in AUH in Argentina

IV. Determinants of the Presidential Vote Choice in 2011

This section presents, and discusses the obtained results from the estimating Argentines' electoral decisions during the previous presidential election in 2011. In this competition, there were seven candidates. For three of them, CFK, Hermes Binner, and Ricardo Alfonsín, the survey obtained a sufficient number of observations to analyze using multivariate models. However, the rest of the candidates, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, are included in the catch all category "other" for question **VB3**. For this reason, we exclude them from the analysis.

With the purpose of estimating the effects of socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics on the electoral preferences declared by the respondents in Argentina, we construct two multinomial logistic models with identical specifications. These models were estimated using as the dependent variable the electoral option divided into three categories: CFK, Binner, and Alfonsín. Given that for this econometric technique, the comparisons between voter profiles were done with one of the dependent variable categories serving as a reference, the models were estimated with different bases or references: Binner and CFK. By doing this, all possible comparisons between the candidates are exposed.

The models include the standard socio-demographic variables (skin color, wealth, age, gender, education, and size of place of residence), the perception of corruption and perception of insecurity,¹⁷ whether the respondent had been offered to sell his or her vote, if the respondent is a beneficiary of AUH, dichotomized party identification, the level of support for the role of the state, and perception of the performance of personal and national economies.

The first column of Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis. The second column shows the differences between CFK and Binner voters while the third does the same between the Alfonsín and Binner voters. On the one hand, we see that six factors are statistically significant in explaining the differences between those who reported having voted for CFK versus Binner. First, holding all other factors constant, those who believe that corruption is widespread are less likely to have voted for the president. Second, those who report sympathizing with a political party have a higher propensity of having voted for CFK. Third, on average, citizens who positively evaluate the national economy have higher probabilities of having voted for the incumbent. Finally, with respect to the socio-demographic profile of CFK and Binner, we see that the wealthier, the older, and the more educated are all less likely to have voted for the former. On the other hand, the results from the Alfonsín-Binner comparison suggest that only two factors are statistically significant in explaining the differences in vote choice: the perception of corruption and wealth. Voters who more strongly perceive that corrupt practices are widespread and the wealthier are less likely to have voted for Alfonsín. It is interesting to note that none of the variables that measure political benefits (that is, having received an offer to sell one's vote, or participating in AUH) are significant factors in explaining the probability for having voted for the president during the 2011 elections.

¹⁷ In no case do the variables that capture corruption victimization and crime victimization reach levels of statistical significant, for this reason, we exclude them from the regression.

**Table 6. 2011 Presidential Vote: Comparison between Pairs of Candidates
(Reference or Base Category: Binner)**

Variables	Modelo 1 CFK vs. Binner	Modelo 2 Alfonsín vs. Binner
Percepción de corrupción	-.016* (.008)	-.019* (.008)
Percepción de delincuencia	-.005 (.004)	-.009 (.006)
Recibió oferta por su voto	-.000 (.004)	.006 (.005)
Recibe AUH	.002 (.004)	.000 (.005)
Identificación partidaria	.007* (.003)	.004 (.004)
Rol del estado	.005 (.007)	.006 (.009)
Economía personal presente	-.002 (.007)	-.016 (.009)
Economía nacional presente	.024** (.006)	-.000 (.008)
Color de piel	.089 (.075)	.042 (.104)
Quintiles de riqueza	-.270* (.099)	-.268* (.135)
Edad	-.189* (.082)	-.108 (.116)
Mujer	.119 (.244)	-.303 (.347)
Nivel educativo	-.967** (.199)	-.255 (.277)
Tamaño lugar de residencia	-.030 (.11)	-.091 (.158)
Constante	4.95** (1.11)	3.62* (1.51)

N = 811. LR chi2 (28) = 138.30, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Pseudo R2 = 0.137.

Errores estándar entre paréntesis. ** p>0.01, * p>0.05

Table 7 presents the results of a multinomial logistical regression estimated to compare the differences between the voters of Alfonsín and CFK. In this case, using CFK as the base or reference category, we observe that evaluations of the performance of the national economy and the level of education of respondents are the only significant variables. Holding other factors constant, those who hold more positive perceptions of the national economy tend to have a lower probability of voting for Alfonsín, while those with more education are more likely. It is worth pointing out, once more, that clientelism does not have any effect in explaining the difference observed between the voters of the two candidates. If anything, it appears that what is occurring is the opposite of what is typically predicted in

the literature that links clientelism with a vote in favor of the incumbent candidate: if in place of a significance level of 95% we accept one of 96%, those who received an offer to sell their votes are more likely to have voted for Alfonsín, not CFK. This result is consistent with the descriptive information presented in Figure 180 of this chapter.

**Table 7. 2011 Presidential Vote: Comparison between Pairs of Candidates
(Reference or Base Category: CFK)**

Variables	Modelo 1 Alfonsín vs. CFK	Modelo 2 Binner vs. CFK
Percepción de corrupción	-.003 (.005)	.016* (.008)
Percepción de delincuencia	-.003 (.005)	.005 (.004)
Recibió oferta por su voto	.006 (.003)	.000 (.004)
Recibe AUH	-.001 (.004)	-.002 (.004)
Identificación partidaria	-.003 (.003)	-.007* (.003)
Rol del estado	.000 (.008)	-.005 (.007)
Economía personal presente	-.014 (.008)	.002 (.007)
Economía nacional presente	-.025** (.007)	-.024** (.006)
Color de piel	-.047 (.084)	-.089 (.075)
Quintiles de riqueza	.002 (.110)	.270* (.099)
Edad	.081 (.095)	.189* (.082)
Mujer	-.422 (.284)	-.119 (.244)
Nivel educativo	.712** (.223)	.967** (.199)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-.060 (.134)	.030 (.11)
Constante	-1.33 (1.19)	-4.95** (1.11)

N = 811. LR chi2 (28) = 138.30, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. Pseudo R2 = 0.137.

Errores estándar entre paréntesis. ** p>0.01, * p>0.05

Figures 184 and 187 show the estimated probabilities of voting for the three primary candidates according to perception of corruption, perceptions of the performance of the national economy, wealth, age, and education of the respondent. As can clearly be seen, the most important predictors of voting for CFK (compared to Hermes Binner and Ricardo Alfonsín) are the perceptions of the national economy and education. While those who believe that the national economy is very bad have a probability of close to 40% of having voted for the president, such probability rises to approximately 90% for those who perceive the economy as very good. In terms of education, the estimated probability of voting for CFK decreases from about 90% for those who have no formal education to close to 50% for those who have at least 18 years of education. In terms of the specific effects of other statistically significant factors (perceptions of corruption, wealth, and age), the probability of having voted for CFK decreases about 10 percentage points between the lowest values of these variables and the highest.




Figure 184. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by National Economic Perception in Argentina




Figure 185. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Education in Argentina




Figure 186. Estimated Probabilities of Vote Choice by Corruption Perception in Argentina




Figure 187. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Wealth Quintals in Argentina




Figure 188. Estimated Probabilities of 2011 Vote Choice by Age in Argentina

IV. Conclusion

First, this chapter examined some of those factors linked with electoral behavior in Argentina. The information discussed indicates that the electoral context constituted a favorable environment for the victory of President CFK. The positive perception of Argentina on the effectiveness of the government to manage the economy and lead in social areas such as the reduction of poverty had increased considerably in the two years prior to the election.

Second, we analyzed a series of factors that could have inclined citizens to vote for CFK during the 2011 presidential election. More concretely, along with the socio-demographic profiles of the respondents, we explored the effects of perception of the state of personal and national economies, participation in government assistance programs, vote-buying offers, the perception and victimization of corruption and crime, and the support for the active role of the state. Finally, we estimate the impact of these factors on vote choice during the above mentioned elections. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that the vote for CFK came fundamentally from the poorest and least educated sectors, from those who identified with a political party, and from those who had better evaluation of the national economy. Additionally, an important note is that the reception of benefits (whether through the reception of government social assistance as well as the offer to sell one's vote) did not have a significant influence on presidential vote choice. This, as is demonstrated, can be linked to the fact that participation in AUH follows distributive regulations rather efficiently and that at the same time FPV sympathizers were not particularly more exposed to vote-buying offers.

Chapter Nine: Social Protest in Argentina

I. Introduction

Market reforms and economic adjustment policies implemented during the 1990s in Argentina were introduced during an environment of relative social calm. On the one hand, consent of the workers movement produced a drastic decrease in labor conflicts and confined union militarization to only some syndicates of the public sector. On the other hand, the popular protests were initially sporadic and remained restricted to some key economic sectors within the interior of the country negatively affected by the privatization of state owned businesses and sharp processes of industrial reorganization, and to some localities of Conurbano Bonaerense where there existed territorial movement that organized previously. However, as shown in Figures 189 and 190, the increase of unemployment eroded the link between the unemployed and unions, social conflict grew rapidly, and ended up playing a key role in the episodes that precipitated the situations of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001). The government of Eduardo Duhalde (2001-2003) expanded considerably the social assistance programs, which contributed to the decline in the level of protests. However, the level of social conflict continued to be elevated.

The new government of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) decided to negotiate with the largest *piquetero* groups (some of which had *peronismo* links) and ignored the most radical groups (mostly those groups considered to be political independents or loyal to leftist minority parties). The first was done through the inclusion of related groups in the implementation of assistance programs, establishment of small business financial assistance, and offering of state agency positions such as Minister of Social Development and Infrastructure. The government also sought the political support of organized workers' movement, who regained strength during the economic recovery that opened the discussion on improved salaries for workers. Such resurgence resulted in resumption of collective negotiations of salaries in industrial sectors and the largest services, and the expansion of the number of strikes that reached their highest point in 2005. In general, the strikes were of an economic nature more so than political, and sectorial or at the business level before multi-sectorial. Both officials from the *Confederación General del Trabajo* and its opposition *Central de Trabajadores Argentinos* halted strikes against the Kirchner administration. The labor conflict became more institutionalized and decreased during the first part of 2007 when most of the sectorial salary agreements were made. It is worth mentioning that the peak of observed conflict came during the first year of the administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is for the protests led by agricultural entities in opposition to Resolution 125 that increased the withholding of grain harvest originally meant for export. From the point of view of contentious collective action, these protests show that a model of action originally started by the "weakest" sector (*piqueteros*) can be expanded to other actors of more political and economic influence.




Figure 189. Number of Protests (Strikes and Road Closures) in Argentina, 1997-2012




Figure 190. Number of Strikes and Road Closures in Argentina, 1997-2012

This chapter studies the phenomenon of social protest in Argentina. First, we analyze citizens' political participation through those forms considered conventional versus non-conventional such as protest. Next, we examine the properties of protest in recent years in Argentina, and we evaluate from a comparative perspective citizen opinion on the legitimacy of different protest instruments such as peaceful protest, shutting down roads, and the occupation of public property. Finally, we use the 2012 AmericasBarometer data to estimate both individual and contextual-level determinants of participation of Argentines in protests or public demonstrations.

II. Political Participation in the Streets

When introducing the issue of social protest in Chapter 3 of this report, we indicated that Argentina is one of the countries of the continent with the highest levels of participation in protests or public demonstrations over the past year (see Figure 64). In what way do Argentines place this form of non-conventional participation in comparison to those methods that are a regular part of the institutionalized political process? To respond to this question, Figure 191 shows the percentage of people between the rounds 2008 to 2012 of the AmericasBarometer who reported having requested assistance from a government representative or official, attended a municipal council meeting, put forward an official petition to local authorities and participated in a protest or demonstration.¹ The most relevant information that can be gleaned from this figure, as was discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the average participation by Argentines in protest events declined significantly by almost half (about 7 percentage points) in the last two years. While the survey carried out in 2010 showed the proportion of Argentines that had participated in street protests to express their displeasures was higher than those that had participated in the formal institutions of the democratic system; for the 2012 round, social protests seem to have lost its centrality in comparison with conventional mechanisms of political participation such as seeking assistance from officials or councils, putting forward a request to municipal authorities and asking for help from a minister or state official.

¹ Unfortunately, in the 2008 round, the question that measured the level of protest participation was not included. The rest of the questions used to generate this figure are: **CP2**, **CP4**, **CP4A**, **NP1** and **NP2**.




Figure 191. Percentage of People who turned to the Government for Assistance and Participated in a Protest over time in Argentina

Figure 192, however, suggests that there persists in Argentina a certain level of “gymnastics” in the decision to protest that can be, at least in part, attributed to the comparatively high rates of union membership, the extensive activity of social organizations with strong territorial presences in some districts, and the expansion of different modes of contentious collective action to other actors of the political system. Indeed, as can be gathered from the figure, practically 57% of Argentines who reported having protested, did so two or more times.




Figure 192. Frequency of Protest Participation in Argentina

Alternatively, regular participation in these types of events can be linked to the positive perception toward the results of protests. Illustrated in Figure 193, 73.4% of respondents in 2012 (compared to 77% in 2010) believe that it is worth protesting. This is an important finding given that there does not exist conclusive empirical evidence with respect to the “success” of social protests. While some authors recognize the effectiveness of contentious political action including violent behaviors, others indicate that protest by itself is only an effective method in certain institutional conditions.²

² Among the first, see, Jennings, Edward. 1979. “Civil Turmoil and the Growth of Welfare Rolls: A Comparative State Policy Analysis”. *Policy Studies Journal* 7: 739-45; Gamson, William. 1990. *The Strategy of Social Conflict*. Belmont: Wadsworth; McAdam, Doug. 1999. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, Chicago: Chicago University Press; Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Entre los segundos, ver Koopmans, Ruud. 1993. “The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989”. *American Sociological Review* 58: 637-58; Schumaker, Paul. 1978. “The Scope of Political Conflict and the Effectiveness of Constraints in Urban Politics”. *Sociological Quarterly* 19: 168-84.




Figure 193. Perception of the Result of Protests or Demonstrations over time in Argentina

It is also interesting to note that 95% of Argentines who participated in a protest, as shown in Figure 194, did it voluntarily and just 5% who participated reported having been pressured to do so by a neighbor or member of a participating organization, union, business, or institution where they work.³




Figure 194. Voluntary Participation in Protests or Public Demonstrations in Argentina

³ The questions used to measure voluntary participation in protests are the following: **ARGPROT6** and **ARGPROT7**. For the complete question wording, see Appendix C of this report.

The main catalyst of protests over the course of the last year, as shown in Figure 195, are questions related to citizen insecurity (25.8%) followed by problems concerning the performance of the economy (17.5%), the quality of education (14.2%), political issues such as corruption, exclusion and approval of certain laws (10.8%), human rights (10.8%), the provision of basic public services (5%) and the environment (4.2%).⁴ Comparison in the timing of the motives of protests in Argentina indicates that, on the one hand, a considerable increase (close to 60%) in those linked with problems of insecurity and to a lesser extent, with education and politics. On the other hand, the protests and public demonstrations in response to questions of the economy and defense of human rights experienced a sharp fall, almost 40% and 50%, respectively, between 2010 and 2012.




Figure 195. Motivations for Protest or Demonstrations over time in Argentina

Figure 196 reveals more information of interest. Close to 50% of protests and demonstrations declared by respondents of the 2012 round took place in direct reference to the national government and to different provincial governments. In the first case, close to seven of every ten episodes were done to protest against the government headed by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and a little more than two out of ten in response to some type of political support. We observe, however, that the proportion of protests against the current national administration decreased from 42.9% in 2010 to 34.5% in 2012. At the same time, demonstrations increased slightly from 10.3% to 12.6% of the total in that period. In the second case, there is a more pronounced drop in the percentage of protest events

⁴ For more details on the operationalization of these items, see the question Y4 of the questionnaire in Appendix C of this report.

with the purpose of negatively acting against provincial administrations. This went from a total of 53.1% in 2012 to 37.2% in 2012.




Figure 196. Protest or Demonstration Against National and Provincial Governments over time in Argentina

As in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer, this new version of the survey included a battery of questions on the repertoire or modes of action used by protestors in the past *three* years.⁵ As shown in Figure 197, 13.6% of Argentines reported having participated in peaceful demonstrations, 4% in strikes, and 3.9% in road closures. In all these types of actions, we observe a decreasing trend over time; in relative terms the largest fall (close to 61%) in the participation of Argentines in road closures.

⁵ Concretely, the questions used are: **ARGPROT8A**, **ARGPROT8B**, **ARGPROT8C**. See Appendix C for complete question wording.




Figure 197. Repertoire of Protests over time in Argentina

How do Argentines evaluate the different modes of contentious political action that can eventually affect the rights of others? To respond to this question, which has contemporary relevance given that some sectors have attempted to criminalize social protest, the questionnaire includes a series of questions that capture citizen perception of the legitimacy of peaceful demonstrations, road closures, and the occupation of private property.⁶

⁶ The questions are **E15**, **E14** and **D2**. As is customary, they were recoded onto a 0 to 100 point scale; for more information on question wording, see Appendix C.

When we look at this issue from a comparative perspective, we find that Argentines are found to be relatively high on the scale of legitimacy of the participation of citizens in peaceful demonstrations. As shown in Figure 198, Argentina is tenth among all other countries in the hemisphere where people approve most strongly of this type of action as an instrument of protest. The average value of 63.5 points obtained by Argentina (almost 3 points higher than the regional average) is statistically indistinguishable from those reported by Jamaica (above) and Costa Rica (below). Of those countries with higher levels of acceptance of peaceful protests are the United States (83.2), Trinidad & Tobago (76.4), Guyana (74.3), Canada (73.5), and Uruguay (72.7). On the opposite end of the scale, with an average level of approval equal to or below 51 points are Honduras, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.




Figure 198. Approval of the Use of Peaceful Demonstrations as Protest Method in the Americas



On the other hand, in Figure 199 and Figure 200, we can see that the inhabitants of the continent tend to reject the use of road closure and the occupation of private property as modes of protest. The regional average of approval for these types of actions of contentious politics are just 31.6 and 17.1 points, respectively. In the case of Argentina, it is particularly noteworthy that the average levels of approval of road closures (24.7 points) and the occupation of private property (11.9 points) are only exceeded by the averages of El Salvador for the former and Nicaragua and Jamaica, for the latter.




Figure 199. Approval of the Use of Road Closures as Protest Method in the Americas




Figure 200. Approval of the Occupation of Private Property as a Protest Method in the Americas

These levels of citizen rejection increased significantly in recent years, as shown in Figure 201. Although the average level of citizen approval to engage in peaceful demonstrations decreased 10% between 2010 and 2012, the levels of public consent toward road closures and the occupation of private property fell much more significantly: 29% and 42%, respectively.




Figure 201. Approval of Contentious Political Methods over time in Argentina

III. Determinants of Protest Participation

After analyzing the general characteristics of the phenomenon of social protest in Argentina, this section examines the individual-level determinants of participation in contentious political events. With this purpose, we construct a logistic regression model where the dependent variable assumes a value of 1 if the respondent participated in a protest or public demonstration in the last year, and 0 if not.

With respect to the explanatory factors, first, the model includes indicators that measure crime and corruption perception and victimization. Naturally, we expect to find a positive effect with the variables meaning that those who perceive more strongly the presence of insecurity and corruption, that is, those who were victimized have higher probability of participating in protest. Second, we

include, with the same theoretical expectation, a dichotomous variable that captures if respondents reported having been marginalized in a form discussed in the first chapter of this report. Third, the model empirically tests the potential impact on evaluations of the performance of personal and economic situations. The interpretations of the economic voting theory⁷ and radicalism denominated by marginalism⁸ argues that protest is an answer to unfavorable economic situations. Therefore, we expect that as evaluations of personal and/or economic situations worsen, the probability of participating in a demonstration or protest will increase. Fourth, with the purpose of examining whether social protest has normalized and now constitutes an alternative form of conventional political participation,⁹ we include the index of community participation discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, various authors have argued that the border between political party action and social protest has become diluted because political parties are increasingly involved in social movements.¹⁰ To analyze this possibility, the model also includes a variable that indicates whether the respondent actively worked for a candidate or political party in the last presidential election. Fifth, analysts for the case of Argentina have argued that there exists a positive association between social protest, participation in social assistance programs and political clientelism.¹¹ To test the opposite relationship, that is, the reaction of social assistance, and the offer of selling one's vote to generate incentives to protest with the purpose of obtaining new resources, we include variables that measure whether a person is a participant in AUH and if they were a victim of a vote-buying offer. Sixth, we include a dichotomous variable that captures whether a respondent shared political information through social networks with the purpose of using the networks as a mechanism of mobilization.¹² The logistic regression model also controls for political interest and evaluation of the work of the president, expecting to find a positive effect in the first case, and a negative one for the second.

Finally, we include the usual socio-demographic variables. A traditional line of analysis indicates that those individuals with more education and economic resources tend to be more politically active. The reason is that these resources facilitate the development of social links that incentivize participation and promote the use of cognitive abilities necessary to create collective action.¹³ However, an alternative line of study suggests that the means of protest are usually utilized by

⁷ Lewis-Beck, Michael S., y Brad Lockerbie. 1989. "Economics, votes, protest: Western European cases". *Comparative Political Studies* 22 (2): 155-177.

⁸ Jenkins, Craig. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9: 527-53.

⁹ Norris, Pippa, Stefan Walgrave, y Peter Van Aels. 2005. "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" *Comparative Politics* 37 (2): 189-205.

¹⁰ Goldstone, Jack. 2003. "Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Politics." En *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, ed. Jack Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press; Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Respecto del caso argentino, ver Auyero, Javier. 2007. *La zona gris: violencia colectiva y política partidaria en la Argentina contemporánea*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XX editores.

¹¹ Lodola, Germán. 2005. "Protesta popular y redes clientelares en la Argentina: El reparto federal del Plan Trabajar (1996-2001)". *Desarrollo Económico* 44 (176): 515-35; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2006. "Partisanship and Protest: The Politics of Workfare Distribution in Argentina". *Latin American Research Review* 41 (3): 122-147.

¹² Concretely, question **PROT 8** says: "In the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network on the web such as Twitter, Facebook, or Orkut?".

¹³ Flanagan, Scott, y Russell Dalton. 1984. "Parties Under Stress: Realignment and Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies." *West European Politics* 7: 7-23; McAdam, Doug, y Ronelle Poulsen. 1993. "Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism". *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (3): 640-667.

those who come from lower socioeconomic strata and lower levels of education.¹⁴ On the other hand, we expect that older people will be less likely to participate than the young given the aging process, and the fact that the former usually adhere more firmly to political conventions of society.¹⁵ Academic investigations on the individual motives of participation in protest are less clear with respect to the impact of gender. Some work finds that women participate more than men,¹⁶ but others indicate that no statistically significant difference exists between people of different sexes.¹⁷ Finally, following classic studies that associate social conflict with the process of economic modernization, we expect that urbanism (measured here by the size of place of residence of the respondent) is positively related with the probability of participating in protests.

The results of the regression analysis are presented in figure 202.¹⁸ We find that seven variables positively affect the probability of an Argentine having taken to the streets in a demonstration during the past year. First, victims of corruption and victims of discrimination have a significantly higher probability of participating in protests or demonstrations than non-victims. Specifically, as was shown in Figure 204, the estimated probabilities for victims are 14% and 17%, respectively, while for non-victims it is 7% in both cases. Second, contrary to theories that associate social protest with unfavorable economic conditions, respondents' evaluations of their own economic situation and that of the country do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of participating in protests.¹⁹ Third, there exists partial evidence about the normalization of social protest in Argentina. On the one hand, the variable that measures individual participation levels in community organizations does not have an effect statistically distinguishable from zero. But, on the other hand, those who participate in political campaigns have a significantly higher probability of partaking in protests versus those who do not. In this case, as is indicated in Figure 203, the average difference in the estimated probability between both groups of people is 19%. Fourth, the empirical evidence suggests that recipients of AUH do not show a higher propensity for protesting than non-recipients. However, as can be seen in the same figure, those who report having been offered a material good in exchange for their vote have a probability almost three times higher of protesting (18%) than those who did not receive such an offer (7%). Fifth, sharing political information over social networks also increases the probability of taking to the streets. In this sense, the estimated probability for those who reported having done so is 19% versus 6% for those who have not. Sixth, the approval of the work of the president does not have an effect on the dependent variable while higher levels of political interest result in higher probability of protesting. Finally, for socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, only education level matters in a positive sense. That is, Argentines with university-level education have an estimated probability of participating in a protest of 14% compared to 8% and 4% for those with a secondary and primary-level education, respectively.

¹⁴ Piven, Frances, y Richard Cloward. 1977. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage, 1977; Piven, Frances. 1993. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. New York: Vintage.

¹⁵ Lewis-Beck y Lockerbie.1989. *Ibid.*; Norris *et al.* 2005. *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Barnes, Samuel, y Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

¹⁷ Lewis-Beck y Lockerbie.1989. *Ibid.*; Sussman, Glenn, y Brent S. Steel. 1991. "Support for Protest Methods and Political Strategies among Peace Movement Activists: Comparing the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany". *The Western Political Quarterly* 44 (3): 519-40; Norris *et al.* 2005. *Ibid.*

¹⁸ The complete results of the models analyzed in this chapter are included in Annex D of this report.

¹⁹ We estimated alternative models including (separately and jointly with the question **IDIO1** and **SOCT1**, the perception of family economy, the reduction of household income, if the respondent was unemployed, and if he or she was employed by the government. None of the variables reached statistical significance, while the rest of the variables remained unchanged.






Figure 202. Determinants of the Probability of Participation in a Demonstration or Protest in Argentina II





a positive effect indicating that the probability of protesting is higher for those who live in poorer districts, and as Murillo and Ronconi suggest in previous work, are public employees.²⁰

As is shown in Figures 204 and 205, the contextual variables do not appear to affect the probability that an Argentine has participated in a protest or public demonstration in the last year. While the socio-demographic and attitudinal variables do not change from the previous analyses, the percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs has the expected sign but does not result in statistical significance. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the poorer districts have, as was indicated above, higher levels of participation in government social assistance programs which is not positively related with the propensity of protesting. The variable that measures the relative weight of the public sector in a given district on the other hand has the predicted positive sign but, again, fails to reach statistical significance. This result appears to challenge the hypothesis linking the stability of public employment with a higher inclination of protesting.




Figure 204. Hierarchical Model of the Effect of Households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs on the Probability to Protest in Argentina

²⁰ Murillo, María Victoria, y Lucas Ronconi. 2004. "Teacher's Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-Sector Labor Relations." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (1): 77-98.




Figure 205. Hierarchical Model of the Effect of Public Employment on the Probability of Protest in Argentina

IV. Conclusion

This chapter studies in detail the phenomenon of social protest in Argentina. According to the 2012 AmericasBarometer data, speaking comparatively, Argentina is one of the more contentious countries of the region. At the same time, while the proportion of Argentines who have protested in the last year or participated in a public demonstration declined with respect to previous rounds, it is still higher than the proportion of processes of conflict resolution such as seeking assistance from a national deputy, or participating in a meeting organized by the municipal council. These protests and demonstration are, in a large part, of a voluntary nature, they appear to be efficient in obtaining the expected result, and are fundamentally motivated by question related to citizen insecurity and the functioning of the economy, and involve both the national government and provincial governments.

The individual-level determinants of protest and demonstration participation are victimization by corruption and marginalization, political party activism, offers of vote-buying, having shared political information on social networking sites, and the level of education of the respondent. Of special theoretical and empirical interest for this report is the positive relationship between party activism and protest, which indicated a relationship that exists between institutional politics and non-institutional politics, making it clear that they are not mutually exclusive political arenas. Finally, the chapter analyzed the potential impacts of contextual factors such as the percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs and the size of the public sector in the Municipalities (departments) where the respondents live. Unfortunately for the expected theories, in neither case do these contextual variables appear to influence the propensity of Argentines to take to the streets.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Marzo de 2012

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo de la Universidad de Vanderbilt y la Universidad Torcuato di Tella. El proyecto está financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. La entrevista durará unos 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Argentina.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse con MBC Mori al teléfono (011) 5272-1900 y preguntar por Germán Oliveto, responsable de este proyecto. El número IRB del estudio es 110627.

¿Desea Participar?

Country	Year	Sample Size	Weighted/Unweighted	Fieldwork dates
Argentina	2012	1,512	Unweighted	March 3 rd to April 4 th

LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys

In its effort to collect the highest quality data possible, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) decided to adopt a new sample design for the AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys. The two main reasons for this decision were: (1) updating the sample designs to reflect the population changes as revealed by recent census information, and (2) standardizing the sample sizes at the level of the municipality in order to both reduce the variance and provide an initial basis for using multi-level analysis drawing on municipal data. This change in the sample design makes the sample representative by municipality size¹ for all countries, to enable the use of the municipality as a unit of analysis for multilevel statistical analysis.

- 1) Prior LAPOP surveys were based on the 2000 round of national census data. Since new censuses have been carried out in many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last few years, the samples were updated in order to take into account population shifts, so that sample designs are based on the most current population distributions available (by sex and age and also across geographical units within each country). Unfortunately, not all nations in our sample had updated census data available at the time LAPOP designed the 2012 AmericasBarometer. We plan to integrate new census information for future rounds as they become available.
- 2) With the objective of making it possible to perform subnational multi-level analyses and therefore assess the impact of both contextual and individual level characteristics at the subnational level, LAPOP adopted a new strategy for designing survey samples that allocate a somewhat larger number of cases to smaller municipalities within each country. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of considering both the effects of municipal as well as regional characteristics on citizens' attitudes and behaviors; however, multilevel analyses are only feasible if a reasonable number of interviews are carried out in each municipality, and if those interviews are reasonably well distributed throughout each municipality. Prior LAPOP samples were PPS² adjusted to the municipal level, but this meant that some municipalities had a very small number of interviews, while others were quite large. A single large municipality, e.g., the capital of the country, could have drawn a very larger number of interviews. For the 2012 round, we continued to use PPS in the selection of the municipalities themselves, but established

¹ The new sample design included three different strata of municipalities classified according to their size. Municipalities were grouped in sizes appropriate for the country. One common grouping was (1) Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, (2) Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, (3) Municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.

² Probability Proportional to Size

a target minimum sample size for each municipality of 12 respondents for larger countries and 24 respondents in smaller countries, in both cases divided into clusters of six respondents each. The clusters were distributed in direct proportion to the urban/rural breakdown of a given municipality³. Thus, by increasing the number of interviews per municipality in the smallest municipalities, LAPOP seeks to facilitate investigating subnational patterns using multilevel modeling techniques. For the larger municipalities, we also retained the PPS approach, but would often subdivide the large cities into districts (or equivalent units) whenever possible so that a large city might have 4 or even 6 PSUs. Our rationale there was to treat the district as a unit for the purposes of calculating the intra-class correlations (rho statistic). The largest gains from this new sample design will come in subsequent rounds of surveys, as aggregated data across time will provide users with larger municipal sample sizes. The 2012 round established the basis for collecting useful data at the municipal level that can be merged with future round of surveys using the same sample design.

Simulations were carried out using the 2010 data set in order to determine the impact of revising the sample designs. Those simulations demonstrated the efficacy of the new design proposal, but required some modification for the largest countries in the sample. At the same time, the 2012 round sample design continue to utilize the very same strata as in prior years in order to maintain the reporting continuity of prior studies.

The remaining pages of this technical note describe the sample design of the Argentinean AmericasBarometer 2012 survey.

Argentina 2012 AmericasBarometer Round

The 2012 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella with the field work being carried out by MBC Mori Consultores. The 2012 AmericasBarometer received generous support from many sources beyond Di Tella, including USAID, UNDP, IADB, Vanderbilt University, Princeton University, Université Laval, among others.

This survey was carried out between March 3rd and April 4th, 2012 as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys. The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,512 people. It involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish.

The sample was developed using a multi-stage probability design (with quotas at the household level) and was stratified by the six major regions of the country: Metropolitan area and province of Buenos

³ It should be noted that in some countries particular circumstances forced some deviation from this norm of 12 and 24 respondents per municipality. Users of the database should examine the variable PSU included in the UNWEIGHTED dataset to find sample sizes per municipality (or subunits of municipalities when the population size of the municipality was very large).

Aires, Central, Northeastern, Northwestern, Cuyo, and Patagonia; size of municipality⁴ and by urban and rural areas within municipalities. The municipalities with over 500,000 inhabitants are self-selected, which is the same thing as saying that they are selected with probability equal to 1. Small and medium-sized municipalities are selected within each stratum, with probability proportional to the population size (PPS) of the municipality, on a systematic basis, with a random starting point.

Quotas for gender and age were adopted since multiple recalls in a national sample such as this are impractical from a cost standpoint. Our experience shows that even three recalls leave the sample with a notable gender imbalance (more women than men). Rather than have to include post-hoc weights to adjust for this sample error, we resolve the problem in the field via quotas.

Table 1 shows the unweighted sample size in each of the six regions (strata) and by municipality size.

Table 1: Sample sizes by Strata and Municipality Size in the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey in Argentina

Strata	Unweighted Sample Size
Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires	450
Pampeana	234
Northeast (NEA)	144
Northwest (NOA)	198
Cuyo	108
Patagonia	72
Province of Buenos Aires	306
Total	1,512
Size of Municipality	
More than 100,000 inhabitants	558
Between 25,000 and 99,999 inhabitants	378
Between 2,000 and 24,999 inhabitants	162
Less than 2,000	414
Total	1,512

A total of 252 sampling points were selected: 222 in the urban areas and 30 rural ones, distributed across the 74 selected municipalities. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6 interviews in both, urban and rural areas. A total of 1,332 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and 180 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is $\pm 2.5\%$.

⁴ The new sample design included three different strata of municipalities classified according to their size. Municipalities were grouped in sizes as follow: (1) Small municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, (2) Medium-sized municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, (3) Large municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Weighting of the Argentina datasets

The dataset contains a variable called WT which is the “country weight” variable. Since in the case of Argentina the sample is self-weighted, the value of each case = 1. The variable “WEIGHT1500” should be activated to produce representative national results. When using this dataset for cross-country comparisons, in order to give each country in the study an identical weight in the pooled sample, LAPOP reweights each country data set in the merged files so that each country has an N of 1,500. In SPSS this is done via the “weight” command.

The questionnaire used in this round and the country report (written by German Lódola) can be found on the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org. Further details of the sample design are contained in the country report.

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Argentina 2012, Versión # 10.0.3.3 IRB Approval: 110627



El Barómetro de las Américas: Argentina, 2012

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PAÍS. País:

01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam				

17

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]** _____

ESTRATOPRI.

- (1701) AMBA
- (1707) Provincia de Buenos Aires
- (1702) Centro
- (1703) Noreste Argentino (NEA)
- (1704) Noroeste Argentino (NOA)
- (1705) Cuyo
- (1706) Patagonia

ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de municipalidad

- (0) Más de 1.000.000
- (1) Entre 100.000 y 999.999
- (2) Entre 25.000 y 99.999
- (3) Entre 2.000 y 24.999
- (4) Menos de 2.000

UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____

PROV. Provincia: _____

17 _____

MUNICIPIO. Cantón: _____

17 _____

ARGDISTRITO. Distrito: _____

ARGESEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____

ARGSEC. Sector: _____

CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral): _____

[El cluster debe de tener 6 entrevistas]

UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]

TAMANO.

Tamaño

del

lugar:

- (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)
- (2) Ciudad grande
- (3) Ciudad mediana
- (4) Ciudad pequeña
- (5) Área rural

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español

Hora de inicio: _____	_____
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ Mes: _____ año: 2012	_____
<p>¿Vive usted en esta casa? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista ¿Es usted ciudadano argentino o residente permanente de Argentina? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista ¿Tiene por lo menos 18 años? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista</p>	
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA	

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género : (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	_____
--	-------

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas]	_____
(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	_____
(88) NS (98) NR	_____

CUESTIONARIOS PARES			
[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]			
A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
INAP	99		

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país ? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.	
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí No NS NR
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1 2 88 98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el intendente o concejal?	1 2 88 98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del Estado?	1 2 88 98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una sesión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) NR [Pase a SGL1]	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, digame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP7]			88	98	
CP6L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP8]			88	98	
CP7L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP9]			88	98	
CP8L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS
(98) NR

MIL6. Ahora, cambiando de tema, ¿qué tan orgulloso(a) está de las Fuerzas Armadas de Argentina? [Leer las opciones]

(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR

MIL5. ¿Qué tan orgulloso(a) se siente de ser argentino(a) cuando escucha el himno nacional? [Leer las opciones]

(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la

(2) En contra del Gobierno provincial /Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires

(3) **[No leer]** Ni a favor ni en contra del Gobierno provincial

(4) **[No leer]** Alguna vez a favor y alguna vez en contra

(88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR

(99) Inap

ARGPROT5. ¿Usted cree que valió la pena hacer estas protestas o que no consiguió nada?

(1) Valió la pena (2) No consiguió nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap

¿Durante alguna de las protestas o manifestaciones en las que participó en los últimos 12 meses, podría decirme si usted pudo ver alguno de los siguientes hechos?

ARGPTRO5B. Choques o enfrentamientos con la Policía?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap

ARGPROT5D. Toma de viviendas, edificios o instituciones públicas o privadas?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap

PROT7. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta?

(1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS

(98) NR (99) INAP

ARGPROT6. Pensando en las protestas o manifestaciones en las que participó el año pasado, ¿alguna vez recibió presiones o lo obligaron de alguna manera a participar?

(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[pase a PROT6]** (88) NS **[pase a PROT6]**

(98) NR **[pase a PROT6]** (99) Inap

ARGPROT7. **[Sólo si respondió SI a ARGPROT6]** ¿Quién lo presionó u obligó a participar en protestas o manifestaciones? **[Aceptar más de una respuesta, hasta 3 máximo] [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

	ARGPROT7A	ARGPROT7B	ARGPROT7C
Los vecinos o miembros de su organización	1	1	1
El Sindicato	2	2	2
La comunidad	3	3	3
La empresa, institución o representantes del lugar donde trabaja	4	4	4
El comité cívico o alguna otra agrupación cívica	5	5	5
El municipio, la prefectura o alguna institución estatal	6	6	6
El partido	8	8	8
Otros	7	7	7
Nadie	10	10	10
NS	88	88	88
NR	98	98	98
Inap	99	99	99

PROT6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha firmado alguna petición?

(1) Sí ha firmado (2) No ha firmado (88) NS (98) NR

PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u Orkut?

(1) Sí, ha hecho (2) No ha hecho (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin el Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión [o alguien le pidió "dinero"] (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
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VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) En su hogar
- (2) En este barrio
- (3) En este municipio
- (4) En otro municipio
- (5) En otro país
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)

ARM2. Si usted pudiera, ¿tendría un arma de fuego para su protección?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los **últimos doce meses** usted...

	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “comunidad”]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si no trabaja marque 99]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP

Voy a leerle una serie de frases que se oyen en la calle o en los medios de comunicación cuando se habla de formas para combatir la delincuencia. Me gustaría que usted me dijera si está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia...

	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Algo en desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR
VIC101. es crear programas de prevención. Está usted: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC102. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es hacer leyes más duras.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC103. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es contratar seguridad privada.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR
VOL207. Suponga que para corregirlo y educarlo un padre le pega a su hijo cada vez que este le desobedece. ¿Usted aprobaría que el padre le pegue a su hijo, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL206. Suponga que un hombre le pega a su esposa porque ésta le ha sido infiel con otro hombre. ¿Usted aprobaría que el hombre le pegue a su esposa, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un/a hija/o. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, ó no aprobaría que lo mate pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a esa persona que mantiene asustada a la comunidad, ó no aprobaría que lo maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a gente considerada indeseable, ó no aprobaría que la maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, ó no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?

(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley
 (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **inseguro(a)** o muy **inseguro(a)**?

(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a)
 (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría...

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o
 (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia
 (3) **[No leer]** Ninguna, o ambas
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace **cinco** años?

(1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR

AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]**

(1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad
 (2) Pandillas
 (3) Policía o militares
 (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes
 (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia
 (6) Delincuentes comunes
 (7) **[NO LEER]** Otros
 (8) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes?

(1) Implementar medidas de prevención
 (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes
 (3) **[No leer]** Ambas
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Nada							Mucho	No sabe	No responde

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Argentina garantizan un juicio justo? (*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Argentina?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político argentino?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político argentino?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político argentino?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en la justicia electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su intendencia?

B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser argentino(a)?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?

Ahora, usando la misma escalera **[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]**

4 5 6 7 MUCHO

NADA 1 2 3 Anotar 1-7,
88 = NS,
98 = NR

N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?

N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?

N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS EPP1 Y EPP3 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta,

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO

Anotar 1-7,
88 = NS,
98 = NR
99 = INAP

EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿hasta qué punto los partidos políticos argentinos representan bien a sus votantes? (99) INAP

EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? (99) INAP

Ahora, usando la misma escalera **[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]** NADA 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 MUCHO

**Anotar 1-7,
88 = NS,
98 = NR**

MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas están bien entrenadas y organizadas?

MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de Argentina han hecho un buen trabajo cuando han ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?

B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas respetan los derechos humanos de los argentinos hoy en día?

MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?

MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con las Fuerzas Armadas de Argentina para mejorar la seguridad nacional?

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando la presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy bueno	(2) Bueno	(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)
(4) Malo	(5) Muy malo (péssimo)	(88) NS (98) NR

M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso Nacional argentino están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?

(1) Muy bien	(2) Bien	(3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)
(4) Mal	(5) Muy Mal	(88) NS (98) NR

M10. Hablando en general del actual **gobernador (Jefe de Gobierno)** de su provincia, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy bueno	(2) Bueno	(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)
(4) Malo	(5) Muy malo	(88) NS (98) NR

M11. Hablando de los **diputados** de la legislatura de su provincia (de la Capital Federal), sin importar los partidos a los que pertenecen, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que están realizando es...?: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy bueno	(2) Bueno	(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)
(4) Malo	(5) Muy malo	(88) NS (98) NR

SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR

SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? **[Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]**

(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR

SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? **[Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]**

(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			NS	NR

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones

POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
 (88) NS (98) NR

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar **directamente** y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
 (88) NS (98) NR

POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
 (88) NS (98) NR

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado argentino, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS2. El Estado argentino, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS3. El Estado argentino, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS4. El Estado argentino debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ROS5. El Estado argentino, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

ROS6. El Estado argentino, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Argentina. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

CCT3. Cambiando de tema.... Algunas personas dicen que la gente que recibe ayuda de los programas sociales del gobierno es vaga. ¿Hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

CONTINUAMOS USANDO TARJETA "C"

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS CCT3- RAC2A SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

Ahora quisiera saber hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con algunas medidas que le voy a mencionar. Quisiera que usted responda pensando en lo que cree que se debería hacer sin importar si se están aplicando o no actualmente. [Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR]

GEN6. El Estado debe exigir que los partidos políticos reserven algunos espacios para mujeres en sus listas de candidatos, aunque tengan que excluir a algunos hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

RAC2A. Las universidades deberían reservar vacantes para los alumnos de raza negra u originarios, aunque tengan que excluir a otros alumnos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

[Encuestador: piel más oscura refiere a negros, indígenas, no blancos en general]

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (W14A-PN5) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?

(1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Argentina?


(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Argentina es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.



1-10,
88=NS,
98=NR

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Argentina. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Argentina, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</i>	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Argentina. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D8.¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el Estado tenga el derecho de prohibir que los periódicos publiquen noticias que le puedan producir daño político?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (D6-D8) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (99) INAP

D7. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que se permita que las personas con discapacidad física se postulen para cargos públicos? (99) INAP

[Recoger tarjeta “D”]

Voy a leerle una lista de varios grupos de personas. ¿Podría decirme si hay algunos de ellos que no le gustaría tener como vecinos?	Menciona [No los quiere de vecinos]	No menciona [No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos]	NS	NR
--	--	--	----	----

DIS35A. Homosexuales. ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98
DIS35B. Pobres	1	0	88	98
DIS35C. Gente de otros países	1	0	88	98
DIS35D. Afro-argentinos	1	0	88	98
DIS35E. Indígenas	1	0	88	98

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:

(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o
 (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o
 (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
 (88) NS (98) NR

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?

(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o
 (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor
 (88) NS (98) NR

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses?					
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99	99	0	1	88	98
Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?					
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja?					
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99	99	0	1	88	98
Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?					
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?					
Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99	99	0	1	88	98
Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima (o soborno) en los					

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
juzgados en este último año?						
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima (o soborno)?		0	1	88	98	
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está... [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR						
EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en las Fuerzas Armadas está... [Leer opciones] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada o (4) Nada generalizada? (88) NS (98) NR						
Y ahora, cambiando de tema y pensando en sus experiencias en el último año, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a, o sea, tratado peor que a otras personas, en los siguientes lugares?						
	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. En el trabajo o la escuela o cuando ha buscado trabajo	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS5. En lugares públicos, como en la calle, la plaza, tiendas o el mercado?	1	2	88	98		
VB1. ¿Está empadronado (habilitado) para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite			(88) NS	(98) NR		
INF1. ¿Tiene usted documento nacional de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR						

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011?

(1) Sí votó [Siga]
 (2) No votó [Pasar a VB60]
 (88) NS [Pasar a VB60] (98) NR [Pasar a VB60]

VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011?

(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto)
 (1701) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner - Frente para la Victoria
 (1702) Hermes Binner – Frente Amplio Progresista
 (1703) Ricardo Alfonsín – Unión para el Desarrollo Social
 (77) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP (No votó)

VB60. Y en las últimas elecciones para Gobernador (Jefe de Gobierno) de su provincia... ¿Por cuál candidato votó usted? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Por el Gobernador (Jefe de Gobierno) actual
 (2) Por otro candidato
 (3) No votó
 (4) Voto en blanco o anuló
 (88) NS (98) NR

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1]
 (98) NR [Pase a POL1]

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA, sondear solo si responde "Justicialismo o Peronismo"]

(1701) Frente para la Victoria (Justicialismo Kirchnerista)
 (1702) Partido Justicialista (Duhaldismo, otros no Kirchneristas)
 (1703) Unión Cívica Radical
 (1704) Partido Socialista
 (1705) PRO
 (1706) Proyecto Sur
 (1707) Partido provincial en el gobierno (ejemplo MPN)
 (77) Otro
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones]

(1) No votaría
 (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido de la actual presidenta
 (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
 (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía
 (88) NS (98) NR

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales.

¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2011?

(1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR

VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres.

¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo

(88) NS (98) NR

VB61. ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones para GOBERNADOR (Jefe de Gobierno) de su provincia, por quién votaría usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Votaría por el candidato del actual Gobernador (Jefe de Gobierno)

(2) Votaría por algún candidato opositor al actual Gobernador (Jefe de Gobierno)

(3) No votaría

(4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía

(88) NS (98) NR

CLien1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?

(1) Frecuentemente **[SIGA con CLien2]**

(2) Rara vez **[SIGA con CLien2]**

(3) Nunca **[Pase a VB51 o VB22, según número de cuestionario]**

(88) NS **[Pase a VB51 o VB22, según número de cuestionario]**

(98) NR **[Pase a VB51 o VB22, según número de cuestionario]**

CLien2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?

(1) Más inclinado

(2) Menos inclinado

(3) Ni más ni menos inclinado

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS VB51-RAC1CA SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual?

(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer

(3) Ambos por igual (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa?

(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer

(3) No importa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Ahora vamos a hablar sobre la raza o color de piel de los políticos.

VB53. Algunos dicen que, en general, las personas de piel oscura **no son buenos líderes políticos**. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

[Encuestador: “piel oscura” refiere a negros, indígenas, “no blancos” en general]

(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo

(3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

RAC1CA. Según varios estudios, las personas de piel oscura son más pobres que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS, SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

(1) Por su cultura, o

(2) Porque han sido tratadas de manera injusta

(3) **[No leer]** Otra respuesta

(88) NS (98) NR

(99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (AB1-AB5) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS]

CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

Cambiando de tema y hablando de las cualidades que los niños deben tener, le voy a mencionar varias características y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un niño o niña:

AB1. (1) Independencia; o	(2) Respeto a los mayores
(3) [No leer] Ambos	(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP
AB2. (1) Obediencia, o	(2) Autosuficiencia (valerse por sí mismo)
(3) [No leer] Ambos	(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP
AB5. (1) Creatividad; o	(2) Disciplina
(3) [No leer] Ambos	(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (SOC1 – SOC12B) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

SOC1. Por cada 100 pesos que gana una persona rica y 100 que gana una persona pobre, en su opinión, cuánto debería pagar cada una en impuestos? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) La persona rica debería pagar 50 pesos y la persona pobre 20, o
- (2) La persona rica 40 y la persona pobre 30, o
- (3) La persona rica 30 y la persona pobre 30 también
- (4) **[NO LEER]** Otra combinación

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2A. Dígame, por favor, ¿en cuál de las siguientes áreas debe invertir más dinero el gobierno? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) Educación
- (2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe/alcantarillado/saneamiento)
- (3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
- (5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
- (7) Salud (8) Seguridad

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2B. ¿Y en segundo lugar? **[LEER OPCIONES SOLO SI LA PERSONA ENTREVISTADA NO RECUERDA LAS OPCIONES DE LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]**

- (1) Educación
- (2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe/alcantarillado/saneamiento)
- (3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
- (5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
- (7) Salud (8) Seguridad

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC3. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre algunas de las formas en que el gobierno gasta el dinero de los impuestos. Vamos a comenzar con educación. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la calidad de la educación pública primaria y secundaria en Argentina? Es: **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC4. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de la educación primaria y secundaria en Argentina, ¿qué debe hacer el gobierno? **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en educación, o
- (2) Destinar más dinero a la educación, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, o
- (3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC5. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en educación primaria y secundaria?

- (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC6. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de las escuelas, ¿quién debe decidir cómo gastar el dinero que va para las escuelas? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) Las escuelas (2) Los gobiernos municipales
- (3) Los gobiernos provinciales (4) El gobierno nacional
- (5) **[No leer]** Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC7. Ahora vamos a hablar de los servicios de salud. ¿Qué piensa usted de la calidad del servicio público de salud en Argentina? Es:[Leer opciones]

(1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC8. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de los servicios de salud públicos en Argentina, ¿qué debería hacer el gobierno? [Leer opciones]

(1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en salud, o
 (2) Invertir más dinero en salud, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, o
 (3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC9. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en el servicio público de salud?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC10. En su opinión, ¿qué tienen que hacer los gobiernos para reducir la pobreza y desigualdad en Argentina? [No leer]

(1) Crear empleos/mejorar la economía
 (2) Promover la reforma agraria
 (3) Mejorar los servicios de educación pública
 (4) Ofrecer ayuda pública a los pobres
 (5) Incrementar los impuestos a los ricos
 (6) Mejorar la infraestructura (carreteras, agua, desagüe/alcantarillado/saneamiento)
 (9) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC11. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda invertir más en el Programa "Asignación Universal por Hijo"?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "E"]

SOC12A. En esta escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **se ubican** los políticos argentinos? [Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden] (99) INAP

SOC12B. Y usando la misma escala, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **le gustaría** a usted que se ubicaran los políticos argentinos? [Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden] (99) INAP

[RECOGER TARJETA "E"]

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS VB22 – SNW1B SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

VB22. ¿Qué tan probable es que usted sea sancionado por parte del Estado si no vota en las próximas elecciones nacionales?

(1) Muy probable (2) Algo probable (3) Poco probable (4) Nada probable
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SNW1A. ¿Usted conoce personalmente a algún funcionario electo o a alguna persona que fue candidato en las últimas elecciones nacionales, provinciales o municipales?

(1) Sí (2) No [Pasar a FOR1] (88) NS [Pasar a FOR1]
 (98) NR [Pasar a FOR1] (99) INAP

SNW1B. ¿Y ese cargo es a nivel municipal, a nivel provincial, o a nivel nacional?

(1) Municipal (2) Provincial (3) Nacional
 (4) Candidatos en más de un nivel (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR1 - FOR8) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

FOR1. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. Cuando hablamos de "China" en esta entrevista, estamos hablando de China continental, la República Popular de China, y no de la isla Taiwán.

¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene **más influencia** en **América Latina?** **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China	(2) Japón
(3) India	(4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil	(6) Venezuela
(7) México	(10) España
(11) [No leer] Otro país	(12) [No leer] Ninguno [Pasa a FOR4]
(88) [No leer] NS [Pasa a FOR4]	(98) [No leer] NR [Pasa a FOR4]
(99) INAP	

FOR2. Y pensando en **[país mencionado en FOR1]**, ¿Cree usted que su influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

(1) Muy positiva	(2) Positiva
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa	(4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa	(6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) [No leer] NS	(98) [No leer] NR
	(99) INAP

FOR3. **[Preguntar SOLO si país mencionado en FOR1 NO fue China]** Y pensando en China y la influencia que tiene en **América Latina**. ¿Cree usted que esa influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

(1) Muy positiva	(2) Positiva
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa	(4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa	(6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS	(98) NR
	(99) INAP

FOR4. **Y dentro de 10 años**, en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en **América Latina?** **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China	(2) Japón
(3) India	(4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil	(6) Venezuela
(7) México	(10) España
(11) [No leer] Otro país	(12) [No leer] Ninguno
(88) [No leer] NS	(98) [No leer] NR
	(99) INAP

FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de **nuestro país?** **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China	(2) Japón
(3) India	(4) Estados Unidos
(5) Singapur	(6) Rusia
(7) Corea del Sur	(10) Brasil
(11) Venezuela, o	(12) México
(13) [No leer] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo	
(14) [No leer] Otro	(88) NS
	(98) NR
	(99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
FOR6. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país , ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas]					
(1) Mucha	(2) Algo				
(3) Poca	(4) Nada [Pasar a FOR8]				
(88) NS [Pasar a FOR8]	(98) NR [Pasar a FOR8]				
(99) INAP					
FOR7. En general, la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es [leer alternativas]					
(1) Muy positiva	(2) Positiva				
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa	(4) Negativa				
(5) Muy negativa	(6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia				
(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP			
FOR8. Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: "Los negocios chinos contribuyen al desarrollo económico de Argentina"? ¿Está usted [leer alternativas] ...					
(1) Muy de acuerdo	(2) De acuerdo				
(3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	(4) En desacuerdo				
(5) Muy en desacuerdo	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP		

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR9A – FOR9D) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]					
¿Según lo que usted sabe o ha oído, los negocios chinos que están instalados en Argentina sufren algunos de los siguientes problemas? [Leer alternativas]					
	Sí sufren/Es problema	No sufren/ No es problema	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
FOR9A. Relaciones laborales, tales como disputas con los empleados o con los sindicatos ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9B. Problemas que surgen de la falta de entendimiento de la cultura o de las costumbres de Argentina.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9C. Falta de conocimiento de las normas políticas, legales o reglas y valores sociales de Argentina.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9D. Falta de comunicación con los medios de comunicación locales y con los residentes.	1	2	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL10A – MIL10E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]					
Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en los gobiernos de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.					
	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/no tiene opinión
	NR	INAP			

MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10B. El de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES							
	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10D. Israel. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL11A – MIL11E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las relaciones en general de nuestro país con otras naciones del mundo. Cuando usted piensa en las relaciones de nuestro país con **China**, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?

	Más cercana	Más o menos igual	Más lejana	No sabe/no tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. Y la relación de nuestro país con Rusia, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11C. Y con Irán, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. Con Israel, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11E. Finalmente, con Estados Unidos, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa “Asignación Universal por Hijo”, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) =
_____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^º	2 ^º	3 ^º	4 ^º	5 ^º	6 ^º	7 ^º	8 ^º	9 ^º
Ninguno	0								
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
Primaria EGB	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Secundaria	8	9	10	11	12	13	14		
Polimodal	10	11	12						
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+			
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16					
NS	88								
NR	98								

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

**[LAS PREGUNTAS ED2 Y MOV1 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS
CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó
“9”)]**

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]**

(00) Ninguno
 (01) Primaria incompleta
 (02) Primaria completa
 (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
 (04) Secundaria o
 bachillerato
 completo
 (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
 (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
 (07) Universitaria incompleta
 (08) Universitaria completa
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

MOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

(1) Alta (2) Media alta (3) Media (4) Media baja
 (5) Baja (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? **[Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.]**

Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____

(Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR)

(Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)

Q2D
Día
Q2M
Mes
Q2Y
año

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS

(98) NR

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes

(4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante

(88) NS (98) NR

MIL8. ¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo actualmente está en servicio en las Fuerzas Armadas o ha servido alguna vez en las Fuerzas Armadas?

(1) Sí, actualmente sirviendo (2) Servía en el pasado (3) Nunca ha servido

(88) NS (98) NR

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**

(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**

(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

(4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

(88) NS **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10NEW]**

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?

(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?

(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?

(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?

(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

(00) Ningún ingreso

(01) Menos de 770
(02) Entre 770 - 1150
(03) Entre 1151 - 1530
(04) Entre 1531 - 2300
(05) Entre 2301 - 3060
(06) Entre 3061 - 3450
(07) Entre 3451 - 3840
(08) Entre 3841 - 4600
(09) Entre 4601 - 5750
(10) Entre 5751 - 6900
(11) Entre 6901 - 8050
(12) Entre 8051 - 9200
(13) Entre 9201 - 10350
(14) Entre 10351 - 11500
(15) Entre 11501 - 13800
(16) Más de 13800

(88) NS (98) NR

[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]

Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted **personalmente** gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? **[Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]**

(00) Ningún ingreso

(01) Menos de 770
(02) Entre 770 - 1150
(03) Entre 1151 - 1530
(04) Entre 1531 - 2300
(05) Entre 2301 - 3060
(06) Entre 3061 - 3450
(07) Entre 3451 - 3840
(08) Entre 3841 - 4600
(09) Entre 4601 - 5750
(10) Entre 5751 - 6900
(11) Entre 6901 - 8050
(12) Entre 8051 - 9200
(13) Entre 9201 - 10350
(14) Entre 10351 - 11500
(15) Entre 11501 - 13800
(16) Más de 13800

(88) NS

(98) NR
(99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar
- (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades
- (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades
- (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades

(88) **[No leer]** NS
(98) **[No leer]** NR

Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) ¿Aumentó?
- (2) ¿Permaneció igual?
- (3) ¿Disminuyó?

(88) NS
(98) NR

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[FS2 Y FS8 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" Ú "8")]

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.

	No	Sí	NS	NR	INAP
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Soltero [Pasar a Q12C]	(2) Casado [Siga]
(3) Unión libre (juntado) [Siga]	(4) Divorciado [Pasa a Q12C]
(5) Separado [Pasar a Q12C]	(6) Viudo [Pasar a Q12C]
(88) NS [Pasar a Q12C]	(98) NR [Pasar a Q12C]

GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo;
- (2) Usted gana menos que su pareja;
- (3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja;
- (4) Usted gana más que su pareja;
- (5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada.
- (6) **[NO LEER]** Ningún ingreso salarial

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88)

NS (98) NR

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos?

(00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR

Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____

00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-argentina, codificar como (4) Negra]**

(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra

(88) NS (98) NR

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]**

(1701) Castellano/español (1702) Aimará (1703) Guaraní (1706) Quechua

(1707) Wichi (1704) Otro (nativo) (1705) Otro extranjero

(88) NS (98) NR

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente

(2) Algunas veces a la semana

(3) Algunas veces al mes

(4) Rara vez

(5) Nunca

(88) **[No leer]** NS

(98) **[No leer]** NR

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3)

Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca

(88) NS (98) NR

	Correcto	Incorrecto	No Sabe	No Responde
--	----------	------------	---------	-------------

GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? **[NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]**

1

2

88

98

GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Argentina? **[NO LEER: 4 años]**

1

2

88

98

GI7. ¿Cuántos representantes tiene **[la Cámara de Diputados]?**

[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]

Número: _____

8888

9888

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (heladera)	(0) No			(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más
R6. Lavarropas	(0) No			(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí
R8. Moto	(0) No			(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No [Ir a R16]			(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí	(99) INAP	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana/ LCD - LED	(0) No			(1) Sí
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/cloaca?	(0) No			(1) Sí

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. **[Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado]** _____

_____ | _____ | _____

(97) **No se pudo clasificar** **[Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**

_____ | _____ | _____ | _____

Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____

TI. Duración de la entrevista **[minutos, ver página # 1** _____

_____ | _____ | _____

INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____

_____ | _____ | _____

SEXII. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____

_____ | _____ | _____

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha _____ / _____ / _____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta A



Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C






Tarjeta D



Tarjeta E



Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 770
(02) Entre 770 - 1150
(03) Entre 1151 - 1530
(04) Entre 1531 - 2300
(05) Entre 2301 - 3060
(06) Entre 3061 - 3450
(07) Entre 3451 - 3840
(08) Entre 3841 - 4600
(09) Entre 4601 - 5750
(10) Entre 5751 - 6900
(11) Entre 6901 - 8050
(12) Entre 8051 - 9200
(13) Entre 9201 - 10350
(14) Entre 10351 - 11500
(15) Entre 11501 - 13800
(16) Más de 13800

Paleta de Colores



Appendix D. Regression Tables

Chapter 1

Table 1. Determinants of Education Level in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
66 años o más	-0.315**	(-14.46)
56-65 años	-0.174**	(-6.50)
46-55 años	-0.114**	(-4.24)
36-45 años	-0.072*	(-2.81)
26-35 años	-0.015	(-0.72)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.342**	(13.82)
Color de piel	-0.138**	(-4.47)
Mujer	0.029	(1.08)
Urbano	-0.141**	(-4.69)
Constante	0.001	(0.03)
F	76.072	
N. de casos	1491	
R cuadrado	0.294	

** p<0.01, *p<0.05

**Table 2. Determinants of Personal Income
in Argentina for Employed Respondents**

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
66 años o más	0.163**	(5.11)
56-65 años	0.142**	(4.16)
46-55 años	0.181**	(4.43)
36-45 años	0.136**	(4.01)
26-35 años	0.104*	(3.11)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.354**	(7.48)
Color de piel	-0.049	(-1.53)
Mujer	-0.235**	(-7.71)
Nivel educativo	0.221**	(6.52)
Urbano	-0.018	(-0.39)
Constante	-0.044	(-1.06)
F	37.050	
N. de casos	782	
R cuadrado	0.296	

** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 3. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
66 años o más	-0.160**	(-4.02)
56-65 años	-0.058	(-1.56)
46-55 años	-0.012	(-0.25)
36-45 años	-0.012	(-0.29)
26-35 años	0.071	(1.30)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.145**	(-3.37)
Color de piel	0.009	(0.26)
Mujer	0.034	(0.99)
Nivel educativo	-0.123*	(-2.31)
Urbano	-0.045	(-0.99)
Constante	0.016	(0.34)
F	4.240	
N. de casos	736	
R cuadrado	0.067	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

**Table 4. Determinants of Self-Reported Discrimination
in the Workplace in Argentina**

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
66 años o más	-0.406*	(-2.21)
56-65 años	-0.136	(-1.18)
46-55 años	0.021	(0.19)
36-45 años	0.010	(0.08)
26-35 años	0.033	(0.32)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.350*	(-2.69)
Color de piel	0.134	(1.36)
Mujer	0.082	(0.88)
Nivel educativo	0.045	(0.36)
Urbano	-0.136	(-0.86)
Constante	-2.548**	(-17.01)
F	1.86	
N. de casos	1459	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 2

Table 1. Determinants of Socio-Demographic Factors of Community Participation in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminación en el trabajo	0.053	(1.79)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.066*	(2.48)
Color de piel	0.114**	(3.54)
Mujer	0.243**	(9.03)
Edad	0.050	(1.89)
Educación	-0.011	(-0.39)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.089*	(-2.54)
Constante	-0.009	(-0.24)
F	15.19	
N. de casos	1458	
R cuadrado	0.082	

** p<0.01; * p<0.05,

Table 2. Determinants Socio-Demographic Factors for Community Leadership in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminación en el trabajo	0.137	(0.96)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.344	(1.57)
Color de piel	-0.040	(-0.25)
Mujer	-0.036	(-0.23)
Edad	-0.103	(-0.52)
Educación	0.426*	(2.03)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.006	(-0.03)
Constante	-2.825**	(-13.39)
F	2.75	
N. de casos	656	

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Chapter 3

Table 1. Determinants of Internal Political Efficacy in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	0.033	(1.08)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.042	(1.62)
Interés político	0.262**	(8.87)
Color de piel	0.024	(0.64)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.057	(1.96)
Nivel de educación	0.116*	(3.27)
Edad	0.100*	(2.99)
Mujer ama de casa	0.049	(1.57)
Mujer	-0.102**	(-4.12)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.040	(0.91)
Constante	0.007	(0.18)
F	19.21	
N. de casos	1387	
R cuadrado	0.121	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 2. Determinants of External Efficacy in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	-0.041	(-1.27)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.025	(-0.81)
Interés político	0.111**	(3.27)
Color de piel	0.061	(1.37)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.076*	(-2.21)
Nivel de educación	-0.056	(-1.35)
Edad	-0.008	(-0.27)
Mujer ama de casa	0.014	(0.42)
Mujer	-0.011	(-0.44)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.013	(-0.25)
Constante	0.001	(0.02)
F	2.14	
N. de casos	1382	
R cuadrado	0.030	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

**Table 3. Determinants of Representativeness
of Political Parties in Argentina**

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	0.006	(0.13)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.001	(-0.04)
Interés político	0.147*	(3.11)
Color de piel	0.091	(1.98)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.076	(-1.92)
Nivel de educación	-0.027	(-0.54)
Edad	-0.039	(-0.89)
Mujer ama de casa	0.041	(1.11)
Mujer	-0.014	(-0.39)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.023	(-0.37)
Constante	0.002	(0.04)
F	2.73	
N. de casos	667	
R cuadrado	0.040	

* p<0.05

Table 4. Determinants of Political System Support in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	-0.064	(-1.88)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.023	(-0.81)
Interés político	0.147**	(4.35)
Color de piel	0.149**	(3.90)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.046	(-1.31)
Nivel de educación	0.009	(0.23)
Edad	0.028	(1.03)
Mujer ama de casa	0.005	(0.18)
Mujer	0.014	(0.64)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.057	(-0.95)
Constante	-0.001	(-0.03)
F	6.04	
N. de casos	1400	
R cuadrado	0.055	

** p<0.01

Table 5. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	-0.019	(-0.69)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.019	(-0.70)
Interés político	0.070*	(2.63)
Color de piel	-0.025	(-0.91)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.035	(1.07)
Nivel de educación	0.073*	(2.57)
Edad	0.127**	(4.99)
Mujer ama de casa	0.015	(0.52)
Mujer	0.017	(0.66)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.023	(0.58)
Constante	0.008	(0.22)
F	4.45	
N. de casos	1388	
R cuadrado	0.032	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 6. Determinants of Protest Participation in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	0.130	(1.55)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.317**	(3.56)
Interés político	0.492**	(3.96)
Color de piel	-0.098	(-0.89)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.063	(0.58)
Educación	0.306*	(2.80)
Edad	-0.186	(-1.67)
Mujer ama de casa	-0.317	(-1.86)
Mujer	0.066	(0.63)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.084	(0.78)
Constante	-2.772**	(-20.59)
F	6.96	
N. de casos	1402	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 4

Table 1. Determinants of Perception of Corruption in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	-0.153	(-0.44)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.025	(0.95)
Color de piel	-0.009	(-0.27)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.082*	(2.33)
Nivel de educación	0.057	(1.62)
Edad	0.043	(1.58)
Mujer	-0.011	(-0.48)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.032	(1.10)
Constante	-0.001	(-0.44)
F	2.01	
N. de casos	1366	
R cuadrado	0.017	

* p<0.05

Table 2. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Discriminado en el trabajo	0.001	(0.01)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.281**	(4.64)
Color de piel	0.114	(1.59)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.038	(0.40)
Nivel de educación	0.177*	(2.21)
Edad	-0.013	(-0.16)
Mujer	-0.205*	(-2.91)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.037	(-0.30)
Constante	-1.476**	(-12.58)
F	4.63	
N. de casos	1432	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Color de piel	-0.051	(-1.34)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.010	(-0.31)
Nivel de educación	0.019	(0.55)
Edad	-0.017	(-0.62)
Mujer	0.067*	(2.97)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.211**	(4.33)
Constante	-0.002	(-0.05)
F	6.65	
N. de casos	1484	
R cuadrado	0.057	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4. Socio-Demographic Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	0.200**	(3.31)
Color de piel	0.070	(1.00)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.043	(0.53)
Nivel de educación	0.202*	(2.62)
Edad	-0.265*	(-3.22)
Mujer	0.01	(0.02)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.258**	(4.80)
Constante	-1.38**	(-20.71)
F	8.79	
N. de casos	1483	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 5

Table 1. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.042	(-1.32)
Percepción de corrupción	0.102*	(2.77)
Victimización por crimen	0.028	(0.96)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.034	(-0.79)
Importancia de la religión	-0.006	(-0.13)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	-0.032	(-0.80)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.007	(0.19)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.077*	(2.35)
Ideología	-0.119*	(-2.77)
Color de piel	-0.040	(-0.96)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.015	(0.34)
Nivel de educación	0.129**	(3.57)
Edad	0.010	(0.32)
Mujer	0.014	(0.57)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.039	(-0.74)
Constante	0.075	(1.46)
F	3.97	
N. de casos	1088	
R cuadrado	0.069	

** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Table 2. Determinants of Stable Democracy in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.107	(-1.43)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.132	(-1.43)
Victimización por crimen	-0.069	(-0.93)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.150	(-1.76)
Importancia de la religión	0.210*	(2.39)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.274*	(3.18)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.068	(0.77)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.159	(1.80)
Ideología	-0.138	(-1.76)
Color de piel	0.199*	(2.27)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.073	(1.09)
Nivel de educación	0.212*	(2.35)
Edad	0.040	(0.52)
Mujer	0.013	(0.22)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.044	(0.34)
Constante	-0.572**	(-5.11)
F	2.98	
N. de casos	1081	

** p<0.01, *p<0.05

Chapter 6

Table 1. Determinants of Participation in Municipal Meetings in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Presentó un pedido o solicitud	0.539**	(4.43)
Participación comunitaria	0.501**	(4.69)
Trabajó para un candidato o partido	0.422**	(3.85)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	-0.116	(-0.90)
Evaluación de los servicios locales	-0.013	(-0.09)
Color de piel	-0.098	(-0.58)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.123	(0.64)
Nivel de educación	-0.179	(-0.93)
Edad	0.165	(1.18)
Mujer	-0.310	(-1.93)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.190	(1.00)
Constante	-3.609**	(-19.07)
F	6.88	
N. de casos	1386	

** p<0.01

**Table 2. Determinantes of Requesting Assistance
from Local Governments in Argentina**

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.320**	(4.39)
Participación comunitaria	0.164	(1.81)
Trabajó para un candidato o partido	0.149*	(2.40)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.137	(1.48)
Evaluación de los servicios locales	-0.238*	(-2.72)
Color de piel	0.002	(0.02)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.045	(-0.47)
Nivel de educación	0.042	(0.41)
Edad	-0.128	(-1.16)
Mujer	0.264*	(2.94)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.417*	(-3.20)
Constante	-2.118**	(-19.03)
F	5.35	
N. de casos	1386	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.001	(0.03)
Presentó un pedido o solicitud	-0.080*	(-2.55)
Participación comunitaria	-0.020	(-0.63)
Trabajó para un candidato o partido	-0.001	(-0.06)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.191**	(5.56)
Confianza interpersonal	0.098**	(3.47)
Color de piel	-0.003	(-0.09)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.051	(1.33)
Nivel de educación	-0.017	(-0.49)
Edad	-0.044	(-1.79)
Mujer	-0.036	(-1.41)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.106*	(-2.47)
Constante	0.002	(0.05)
F	6.93	
N. de casos	1364	
R cuadrado	0.075	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4. Satisfaction with Local Services as Determinant for Support for the Political System in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Evaluación de los servicios locales	0.127**	(3.50)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.007	(-0.22)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.119**	(-3.41)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.023	(-0.88)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.111**	(-3.91)
Percepción de la economía nacional	0.109**	(3.35)
Percepción de la economía personal	0.057	(1.48)
Interés político	0.075*	(2.46)
Confianza en el sistema de justicia	0.204**	(3.15)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.216**	(7.17)
Color de piel	0.130**	(4.08)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.010	(-0.33)
Nivel de educación	0.040	(1.10)
Edad	0.067*	(2.82)
Mujer	0.044*	(2.22)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.013	(0.25)
Constante	0.006	(0.13)
F	24.52	
N. de casos	1323	
R cuadrado	0.241	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 7

Table 1. Determinants of Party Identification in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.025	(-0.36)
Victimización por crimen	-0.113	(-1.36)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.261*	(3.01)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.019	(-0.18)
Interés en la política	0.796**	(8.61)
Ideología	0.177*	(2.17)
Color de piel	0.091	(0.98)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.201*	(-2.23)
Educación	-0.217*	(-2.56)
Edad	0.296**	(3.72)
Mujer	-0.144	(-1.77)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.064	(0.63)
Constante	-1.177**	(-11.8)
F	14.12	
N. de casos	1115	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 2. Determinants of Ideological Self-Placement in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.016	(-0.54)
Victimización por crimen	-0.029	(-1.01)
Victimización por discriminación	-0.066*	(-2.06)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.044	(-1.19)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.005	(-0.15)
Identificación con un partido	0.060	(1.70)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	-0.055	(-1.33)
Rol del Estado	-0.067	(-1.80)
Color de piel	0.121*	(2.64)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.028	(-0.81)
Educación	-0.075*	(-2.11)
Edad	0.015	(0.51)
Mujer	0.066*	(2.27)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.119*	(-3.24)
Constante	0.014	(0.37)
F	2.97	
N. de casos	1116	
R cuadrado	0.071	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3. Determinants of the Role of State in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.009	(-0.29)
Victimización por crimen	0.107*	(3.30)
Victimización por discriminación	-0.039	(-1.37)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.015	(0.36)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.017	(0.36)
Identificación partidaria	0.021	(0.57)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	-0.068	(-1.26)
Ideología	-0.066	(-1.69)
Color de piel	0.041	(0.97)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.012	(0.25)
Educación	-0.057	(-1.28)
Edad	0.013	(0.45)
Mujer	0.072*	(3.27)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.056	(-1.44)
Constante	0.053	(0.93)
F	2.24	
N. de casos	1116	
R cuadrado	0.03	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4. Determinants of Fiscal Progressivism in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Victimización por corrupción	-0.128	(-1.03)
Victimización por crimen	0.062	(0.69)
Victimización por discriminación	-0.039	(-0.44)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.169	(-1.81)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.151	(1.34)
Identificación partidaria	0.273*	(2.75)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.296*	(2.87)
Rol del Estado	0.099	(0.59)
Ideología	-0.044	(-0.40)
Color de piel	0.065	(0.67)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.227	(1.88)
Educación	0.012	(0.11)
Edad	0.018	(0.16)
Mujer	0.008	(0.09)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.107	(-0.96)
Cutpoint 1	2.710**	(-11.47)
Cutpoint 2	0.082	(0.55)
Cutpoint 3	0.805**	(5.25)
Cutpoint 4	2.209**	(11.05)
F	1.92	
N. de casos	452	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 8

Table 1. Determinants of Participation in AUH in Argentina

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Pidió ayuda a una autoridad local	0.075	(0.92)
Participó de una protesta	-0.054	(-0.056)
Trabajó para un candidato o partido	0.281*	(2.86)
Número de hijos	0.497**	(6.18)
Color de piel	0.330**	(3.46)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.214*	(-2.24)
Educación	-0.437**	(-3.79)
Edad	-1.004**	(-10.56)
Mujer	0.280**	(3.47)
Urbano	0.058	(0.52)
Constante	-1.90**	(-18.77)
F	20.59	
N. de casos	1419	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 9

**Table 1. Determinants of the Probability of Participation
in a Demonstration or Protest in Argentina II**

Variables independientes	Coeficientes	Valor t
Percepción de corrupción	-0.041	(-0.32)
Victimización por corrupción	0.201*	(2.16)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.088	(-0.72)
Victimización por delincuencia	0.084	(1.00)
Victimización por discriminación	0.243*	(2.63)
Percepción de la economía personal	0.168	(1.19)
Percepción de la economía personal	-0.168	(-1.28)
Participación comunitaria	0.057	(0.46)
Interés político	0.344*	(2.51)
Trabajó para un candidato o partido	0.264*	(3.03)
Recibió una oferta por su voto	0.246*	(2.50)
Recibe AUH	-0.045	(-0.34)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	-0.112	(-0.89)
Compartió información política por red social	0.213*	(2.05)
Color de piel	-0.165	(-1.30)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.117	(0.95)
Nivel educativo	0.288*	(2.17)
Edad	-0.095	(-0.82)
Mujer	0.008	(0.07)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.167	(1.53)
Constante	-2.831**	(-18.66)
F	6.27	
N. de casos	1299	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our “data repositories” and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.